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

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FROM

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

VOL. VII.

EAST INDIES:—CARNATIC WAR, &c.

1781 & 1782.

1806.

REPORTS

ON THE

CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE CARNATIC,

AND OF C4-6-10

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS

IN THOSE PARTS.

1781. *27th June & 5th July.*—FIRST REPORT from the COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War in the Carnatic, and of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts - - - - - - - - pp. 3 to 40.

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1781. 27th *June*.—SECOND REPORT from the ſame Committee.

The SUBJECTS of this Report are,

An Enquiry into the Conduct of Sir Thomas Rumbold, Baronet, and John Whitehill, Eſquire, whilſt they were reſpectively Governors and Preſidents of Fort Saint George and its Dependencies, likewiſe of their reſpective Councils; with Recital of Covenants entered into by them with the Company—Retroſpect of the Formation and Appointment of the Committee of Circuit—Tranſactions with Sitteram Rauze, during Mr. Whitehill's firſt Government; and with Sitteram Rauze and his Brother Vizeram Rauze, in Sir Thomas Rumbold's Government—Abolition of the Committee of Circuit, and calling down the Zemindars to Madras—The Manner of the Preſident's Negociation with them in Perſon, and the implicit Credit given by the Council to his Reports—The inadequate Rents reſerved, Non-payment of Balances, and the want of Stipulations on Behalf of the Undertenants—The Acceptance of Sitteram Rauze (the Father) as Surety for his Son, when adopted by his Uncle the Rajah—Reſtoration of the Fort of Vizianagrum—The Tranſaction with Bazalet Jung, the Ten Years Leaſe to the Nabob which followed upon it, and the Negociation with the Nizam of the Decan---Severe Cenſure and Diſapproval by the Court of Directors of the above Tranſactions, and Diſmiſſion from their Service of Sir Thomas Rumbold, John Whitehill, and Peter Perring, Eſquires, in conſequence (pp. 271 to 294.):—Together with the following

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1782. *4th February.*—THIRD REPORT from the same Committee, being a Supplement to the First and Second Reports.

The SUBJECTS of this Report are,

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The SUBJECTS of the SUPPLEMENT to the First Report are,

A Recapitulation of the Narrative therein contained, respecting the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, to the last Dispatches of Sir Eyre Coote---The subsequent Intelligence from him, relative to the Effective Strength of his Army, with Substance of Information received from different Quarters respecting the Proceedings of the same---An Enquiry by the Committee into the Grounds which the Government of Madras had to expect an Invasion of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally, and Means taken to avert it---Evidence of Mr. Petrie upon the Subject; and the Opinion expressed by the Court of Directors, relative to the Cession of the Tinnivelly Territory to the Dutch - - - - pp. 593 to 597.

The SUBJECTS of the SUPPLEMENT to the Second Report are,

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ſideration of Sir Eyre Coote's Minute, relative to the Treaty concluded with Bazalet Jung by Sir Thomas Rumbold, and additional Remarks upon Mr. Hollond's Suſpenſion (pp. 597 to 604.):---Together with the following

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Supplemental Appendix to the Firſt Report.

Supplemental Appendix

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N° 4. Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort Saint George, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated 9th January 1781, relative to the Conſequences of the War with the Maratta State, and Information upon different Circumſtances - pp. 609 to 612.

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Supplemental Appendix.

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N° 2. Evidence of Captain Johnſton, and others, relative to the carrying Treaſure belonging to Sir Thomas Rumbold and other Individuals from Madras to China - - - pp. 622 to 624.

N° 3 to 5. Mr. Sadlier's atteſted Account of Monies ſaid to have been received by Mr. Whitehill and others, in the Station of Chief of Maſulipatam, with Letters between him and Sir Thomas Rumbold, his Affidavit annexed upon the Subject, and relative to the Zemindars - - pp. 624 to 629.

N° 6. Mr. Sadlier's laſt Letter to the Council, dated 8th January 1781, relative to the State of the Company's Affairs from the Miſmanagement of their Servants - - - - pp. 627 & 628.

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N° 9. Minute of Sir Eyre Coote, 12th January 1781, relative to the Incurſion of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, and the Maratta War - - - - - - pp. 631 & 632.

N° 10. Letter from the Governor General and Council in Bengal, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated 29th November 1780, containing Narrative of their Proceedings ſince the Date of their Advices by the Swallow - - pp. 632 to 637.

1782. 6th *February*.—FOURTH REPORT from the ſame Committee.

The SUBJECTS of this Report are,

A Reference to the Second Report for further Information on the Subjects treated of in this—State of the Treaſury of Fort Saint George at the Time of Hyder Ally's Irruption into the Carnatic, and Enquiry into the Nature of their Revenues, and Territorial Poſſeſſions, the Produce of the ſame, with general and particular Accounts reſpecting—Increaſe of the Balances due from the Circars, under the Governments of Mr. Stratton, Mr. Whitehill, and Sir Thomas Rumbold—Different Reaſons aſſigned for the ſame, and Evidence of Mr. Cotsford on the Subject—General Statement of Receipts and Diſburſements with Civil and Military Charges at the Preſidency, and Amount of Debts due from the Eaſt India Company—Information reſpecting the Revenues of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore—Account of the Nabob's Debts, and Irregularity in fulfilling his Engagements with the Company (pp. 641 to 688.):—Together with the following

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N° 3 to 6. Extracts of Letters from Fort Saint George, and from the Governor and Council to the Court of Directors, with Select Conſultations, &c. relative to the Irruption of Hyder Ally into the Carnatic, and their pecuniary Embarraſſments - - - - pp. 689 to 691.

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N° 9. Grant of the Jaghire to the Company, and Firmaun from the Mogul in confirmation of the ſame pp. 692 & 693.

N° 10. A Copy of Requeſts made by Colonel Ford to Nabob Salabut Jung, and a compliance thereto in his own hand, relative to the ceding certain Territories to the Company, and Copy of Treaties upon the Occaſion - - - - - - - - pp. 693 to 698.

N° 11 & 12. Extracts of Letters and Proceedings of the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, &c. relative to the diſtinction between Zemindaries and Government Lands, and replies of the principal Zemindars and Rajahs to certain Queſtions reſpecting the ſame - - pp. 698 & 699.

N° 13 & 14. Extracts of Letters, &c. from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, relative to the Diſtribution of 60,000 Pagodas yearly amongſt the Company's Civil and Military Servants, in addition to their preſent Emoluments - - pp. 699 & 700.

N° 15 & 16. Extracts of General Letters to Fort Saint George, dated 11th June 1781, relative to the reſtricting the Company's Servants from Trade, with certain Exceptions - pp. 700 & 701.

N° 17 & 18. Extracts of General Letters from Fort Saint George to the Court of Directors, reſpecting the Syſtem that had been purſued in the Management of the Circars, and on the Subject of the Inaum Lands - - - - - - - - pp. 701 & 702.

N° 19. Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Sir Eyre Coote, to the Committee of Correſpondence, dated Fort Saint George 30th November 1780, relative to the bad Policy in Renting the Company's Lands in this Preſidency to the Nabob - - - - - p. 702.

N° 20. Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committe at Fort Saint George, and Letters &c. relative to diſcharging a Bond of the Nabob's to Colonel Capper - - p. 703.

N° 21 & 22. Extract of Governor Rumbold's Minute on the Statement of a particular Account of the Tanjore Country and its Revenues, with Mr. Petrie's Evidence thereon - pp. 703 to 705.

N° 23. Evidence of Edward Cotsford, Esq. respecting the State of the Company's Possessions under the Presidency of Fort Saint George, &c. - - - - - pp. 705 to 710.

1782. 1st *March.*—FIFTH REPORT from the same Committee.

The SUBJECTS of this Report are,

Recital of Statements laid before the House in some former Reports---Retrospect of their Investigation to that Period, in the year 1774, when the first open Act of Hostility took place against the Marrattas by the President of Bombay's Seizure of Salsette and the adjacent Islands---Review of the Act of 13th George the Third, relative to the Powers exercised by the Governor General and Council at Fort William, also of the Instructions from the Court of Directors for their Conduct---Exhibit of the Annual Deductions which the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay were by Treaty, or otherwise, obliged to make out of their Revenues to the several Country Powers, also Detail of the Expences which were incurred in each Year for the Administration of the Civil Government---The Condition of the Public Treasuries, and the Amount of the Bonded and other Debts---The Number, Quality, and Distribution of the Troops, both European and Natives, in the Company's Service, under those Governments, with annexed Accounts of the Charges which attended them---An Enquiry into the Alliance or other Connection between the English Settlements and the Country Powers, with some Remarks on the Orders sent by the Court of Directors to their principal Servants who conducted the Administration of their Affairs in India---Review of Military and Political Transactions in the Countries bordering on Bengal, previous to the Arrival of the New Administration---Examination into so much of the History of the Marratta State as may serve to elucidate several Incidents of their Narrative, and throw a Light upon their Proceedings—Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Marratta War, and Considerations upon the Political Situation of Affairs in other Quarters at that Period, so far as they appear to have had any Connection with, or may be supposed to have been influenced by, the Transactions therein related (pp. 713 to 800.):—Together with the following

APPENDIX.

Appendix

N° 1. Extracts of an Act, made in the 13th Year of the Reign of King George the Third, intituled, "An Act "for establishing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the East India "Company, as well in India as in Europe" - - - - - pp. 802 to 806.

N° 2. Instructions from the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies to Warren Hastings, Esq. Governor Gen[l], Lieu[t] Gen[l] Jn° Clavering, the Honorable Geo. Monson, Rich[d] Barwell, Esq. and Philip Francis, Esq. Counsellors constituted and appointed the Gov[r] General and Council of the said United Company's Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, by an Act of Parliament, passed in the last Session, intituled, "An Act for establishing "certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the East India Company, as well "in India as in Europe" - - - - - - pp. 806 to 810.

N° 3. Extracts of the Company's General Letters to Bengal, dated 28th August 1771, and 7th April 1773, likewise Letter from the Court of Directors to Gov[r] Hastings, 18th Dec[r] 1771, containing Instructions for the Conduct of their Servants, &c. concerning the Monopoly carried on by them in the several Articles of Salt, Beetlenut, and Tobacco, and relative to the Causes of the Failure of their Investments in Goodness, Price, and Quality. - - - - pp. 810 & 811.

N° 4. Letters from the Court of Directors to Gov. Haſtings, dated 16th April 1773, and Extracts of Letters, &c. relative to the Arreſt of Mahmud Reza Khan and Shitah Roy—The Appointment of the Begum as Guardian to the Nabob—Management of the Calcutta Lands, &c. - - pp. 811 to 815.

N° 5. Copy of a Letter from Warren Haſtings, Eſq. to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Comp^y, dated 11th Novr 1773, containing his Opinion of the Defects in their preſent Syſtem of Law and Polity, and deſcribing the Points of Diſtinction which appeared to him neceſſary for aſcertaining the reſpective Provinces of the Council, the Select Committee, and the Preſident - pp. 815 to 817.

N° 6 to 10. Extracts of Company's Select and General Letters to Bengal, from 16th March 1768 to 7th April 1773, reſpecting the Sujah Dowlah—Treaty with the Soubah of the Decan—Hoſtile Preparations of the Marattas, and Conduct to be adopted with Regard to the Vizier - pp. 817 to 821.

N° 11 to 15. Extracts of General and Select Letters from Bengal, dated 10th November 1772, 15th January, and 1ſt March 1773, and ſeveral Paragraphs relative to the King Shaw Allum, and Behaviour of the Marattas towards him, with Extracts of Bengal Secret Conſultations, and Extracts of Letters, &c. relative to the Treaty reſpecting the Ceſſion of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier—The withholding the Tribute from Shaw Allum, and Inſtructions for their Conduct in his Affairs pp. 821 to 829.

N° 16 & 17. Extracts of Letters from the Governor and Select Committee at Bengal to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 31ſt Dec. and 1ſt March 1773, relative to the Application made by the Vizier for the Aſſiſtance of their Troops againſt the Marattas, and Precautions taken in the Event of a War with them - - - - - pp. 830 & 831.

N° 18 to 20. Extracts of Letters from the Governor and Select Committee at Bengal, Bengal Secret Conſultations, various Letters, Minutes, and Statements, &c. 31ſt March to 11th Oct. 1773, relative to the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad—Succeſs of the Marattas—Correſpondence of the Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah with the Preſident, relative to ſteps to be taken againſt them—Meaſures for the Defence of the Province of Kora and Kurra—Poſſeſſion taken of the Province of Cora on behalf of the Company, and Deputation of Mr. Lawrell there—Interview of Mr. Haſtings with the Vizier—Ceſſion to him of the Diſtricts of Corah and Allahabad, and Treaty in conſequence—Correſpondence between the Governor and Shaw Allum, relative to the ſame, &c. - pp. 831 to 894.

N° 21. Extract of Bengal Select Conſultations, 3d February 1772, with various Letters, Papers, and Correſpondence, &c. relative to the Vizier, the Rohillas, and the Marattas, and the Treaty concluded between the Vizier and the Rohilla Sardars - - - - pp. 894 to 902.

N° 22 to 28. Extracts of Bengal Select and Secret Conſultations, Copies of Letters from the Governor and Council to the Court of Directors, 19th Nov. 1773 to 6th Oct. 1774, containing Communications between the Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah and Mr. Haſtings, with Letters and Papers, &c. reſpecting the Aſſiſtance granted the Vizier of a Brigade of the Company's Forces—Succeſs of the ſame, and Reduction of the Rohillas—Correſpondence relative to Prize Money, and intemperate Conduct of the Vizier in his Treatment of the Family of Haſez Rhamet, &c. - - pp. 902 to 943.

N° 29. Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee of Bengal to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated 17th March 1774, relative to the Capture of Agra by Nujuff Cawn—Invaſion of the Dominions of Nizam Ally by the Marattas, and ſituation of Ragonaut Row pp. 943 & 944.

N° 30. Articles of Agreement between the King Shah Allum and the Company, dated 19th Auguſt 1765—Extract Fort William, and of Secret Letter from Bengal dated 7th Octr and 10th Novr 1773, relative to Nudjiff Khan's joining the Marattas, and opinions reſpecting the Suſpenſion of his Penſion in conſequence - - - - - - pp. 944 and 945.

N° 31. Copy of the Fifth Article of the Treaty between the Nabob Shujah ul Dowla, the Nabob Nudjum ul Dowla, and the Engliſh Company, executed at Illiabad the 16th Auguſt 1765, reſpecting the Continuation of Bulwant Sing in the Zemindaries of Benares, Gauzepoor, &c. on certain Conditions p. 945.

N° 32. Articles of a Treaty and Agreement between the Governor and Council of Fort William, on the part of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, and the Nabob Mebarek ul Dowla, reſpecting the Soubahdary of the Provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, dated 21ſt March, 1770—Extract of Company's General Letter to Bengal, dated 10th April 1771, containing Remarks upon the Allowance to the Succeſſor of Syef ul Dowlah, &c. with Extract Secret Letter from Bengal to the Court of Directors, dated 10th Novr 1772, relative to the Vizier's Treaty with the Rohillas, and Conduct of the Marattas, &c. - - - - - pp. 945 to 947.

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N° 35. Letter from Gopaul Row Gunnaſe, received 27th December 1775, relative to Ragonaut Row — Particulars relative to the Decan—Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th February 1776, an Account of the Riſe and Progreſs of the late Diſſentions and Rebellion in the Maratta Government, as given by the Miniſterial Party at the Requeſt of Colonel Upton, 3d Jany 1766—Letter from Siccaram Baboo, dated 29th Jummadee ul Aurel, or July—Articles of Agreement made with Seuram Punt Tatiah, in behalf of Madrao Balagee, ſon of Balagee Badjeerow, Pandit Punt Pradan, dated 14th September, 1761—Tranſlate of Letters from Hyder Ally Cawn of 6th and 19th November, 1771, with Extract of the General Letter to Fort St. George, dated 24th November, 1772, containing the Company's Directions for the Conduct of the Governor and Council relative to Hyder Ally, and the Marattas - - - - pp. 952 to 957.

N° 36. Extract of the Poonah Diary, 9th September, and 28th December 1773, relative to the Revolution at Poona, and Accommodation of the Maratta and Mogul Armies, &c. - pp. 957 & 958.

N° 37 to 40. Extracts of Bengal Select and Secret Conſultations, with Extracts of Letters, &c. 9th March 1774 to 9th October 1775, relative to the Diſſatisfaction of the Poona Miniſters to Ragoba's Government and their Proceedings in conſequence—Situation of Things there, and Troubles in the Decan—Advantages taken of the Diſturbances by Hyder Ally—and View of the State of Affairs in the Marratta Empire - - - - - - - pp. 958 to 962.

N° 41. Extracts of Letters from the Governor and Council of Bengal to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated 10th November and 17th October 1774, relative to their Conduct with regard to the French and other Foreign European Powers—The Rohilla Expedition, &c. - - pp. 962 to 965.

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N° 43. Extracts of Letters from the Governor and Council of Bengal to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 22d Auguſt and 17th October 1774, relative to Steps taken towards diſcharging their Temporary Loan and Reduction of their Notes—Tranſactions of the Seaſon ſince the laſt Diſpatches, viz.—Illicit Trade of Europe, or from one part of India to another—Inveſtment—Trade of India, Country, Government, and Tranſactions with the European Powers—Fortifications and Buildings—Covenanted Servants and Accounts—and Board of Inſpection pp. 966 to 974

N° 44. Extracts of Proceedings of the Council, Fort William 20th October 1774, Letters from the Governor General and Council of Bengal to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company, Secret Conſultations, Minutes of Political Tranſactions, &c. with various Letters and Papers relative to the King Shaw Allum, and the Treaty concluded between the Vizier and Feizullah Khan, &c. - - pp. 974 to 981.

N° 45. Extracts of Fort William Conſultations 25th October 1774, to 26th April 1775, relative to Minute and Explanation of the Governor General on the Mode of conducting the Buſineſs of Revenue, and general View of the Politics of the Country—Conſideration of the ſame by the Board, and Demand made by the Majority for the whole of the Governor's Correſpondence with the Reſident at the Vizier's Court, and with Colonel Champion—His Refuſal of the ſame, and Offer of Extracts—Reſolution of the Board in conſequence, and the Diſſent of the Governor thereto—Proteſt of General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, againſt the Governor's Refuſal—Reſolution by the Majority for Mr. Middleton's Recal from the Vizier's Court—Diſſent of the Governor General thereto—Order for his Recal and the whole of his Correſpondence—Reſolution for appointing the Commanding Officer in the Field to treat with the Vizier in the Room of Mr. Middleton—Diſſent of the Governor General thereto—Propoſitions reſpecting the Demand of Forty Lacks from the Vizier, Governor General's Minute thereon, and Proceedings in conſequence—Letter to Colonel Champion, directing him, on the Refuſal of the Vizier, to comply with Terms to be propoſed him, to retreat with his Army to the Country of Oude—Propoſitions of the Governor General concerning the ſame, and Opinions of Mr. Francis, Mr. Barwell, and General Clavering thereon—Extract of Letter from Colonel Champion to Select Committee, dated 24th July 1774, reſpecting the Reſolution of the Vizier for taking the Field at that Seaſon—Extract of Letter from the Select Committee, Fort William, to the Court of Directors, 24th Auguſt 1774, containing the above Information and Opinions thereon—Extract of Letter from the Governor General and Council in their Secret Department to the Court of Directors, dated 21ſt November 1774, from Paragraph 1 to 19 incluſive, and Poſtcript of the 6th December 1774, reſpecting the Differences of Opinion in the Supreme Council on Political Affairs—Addreſs to the Court of Directors in the Shape of a Letter, dated Fort William, 30th November 1774, from General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, in Juſtification of their Conduct, and ſtrong Cenſure of the preceding Adminiſtration; likewiſe ſeparate Letter of the ſame Date, mentioning ſome Points having a more immediate Relation to their perſonal Conduct—Extract of a Letter from the Governor General to the Court of Directors, and Appeal to them, dated 3d December 1774, giving an Account of his Conduct and Proceedings, and juſtifying the ſame, in reply to General Clavering and Mr. Francis, and anſwering Objections urged by them to ſome Undertakings—Minute of Mr. Barwell on the Appeals of the Members of the Council—Sentiments of the Court of Directors on the Defeat of the Rohillas, 3d March 1775—Orders of the Court of Directors for the Recal of the Troops, 7th March 1775—Extract of Letter from the Governor General and Council of Fort William, in their Secret Department, 4th January 1775, narrating the Reſolutions and Orders of the Board—Minutes, N°s 1, 2, & 3, of General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, 11th Jan. 1775, containing Obſervations and Remarks on the Governor General's Appeal to the Court of Directors of the 3d of December 1774—Minute of the Governor

Governor General, dated 10th Jan. 1775, containing Remarks on the Letters and Minutes of General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, to the Court of Directors of 30th November 1774, and 11th January 1775—Minute of General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, dated Fort William, the 25th February 1775, with Remarks on Mr. Haſtings's Minute of 10th Jan. 1775—Letter from Colonel Champion, with the Papers to which it refers, which accompanied his Addreſs of the 3d February, recorded in Conſultations of that Day, reſpecting the Rohillas—Extract of Letter from Mr. Briſtow to the Governor General and Council, dated 11th April 1775, reſpecting the Conduct of the Vizier to the Rohillas, and Account of the Names and Situation of the ſurviving Parts of the Families of Hafiz Rhamut, and the other Rohilla Chiefs - - pp. 982 to 1066.

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FIRST

REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Reported by the LORD ADVOCATE *of* SCOTLAND (HENRY DUNDAS, Esq.)
27th June and 5th July 1781.

FIRST REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

The 27th June and 5th July 1781.

The COMMITTEE of SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, and to report the ſame to the Houſe, with their Obſervations thereupon;—having, ſince the Day of their Appointment, employed themſelves with the utmoſt Diligence in peruſing the Records of the *Eaſt India* Company, and ſeveral other Papers which they had ordered to be laid before them, and in examining ſuch Witneſſes as were likely to afford them Information, and to throw Light on the ſeveral Objects of their Enquiry; they will now report to the Houſe the Reſult of their Proceedings in the following Manner:

THEY will firſt give the Houſe an Account of the Irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*; of the Military Tranſactions that happened in conſequence thereof; and of the Meaſures that were taken by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and by Sir *Edward Hughes*, Commander of His Majeſty's Ships in thoſe Seas, upon their receiving Information of *Hyder Ally*'s Irruption; and of the Defeat of the Troops under the Command of Colonels *Fletcher* and *Baillie*.

And as it is impoſſible fully to judge of the Conduct of the Company's Servants, as far as it may be ſuppoſed to have had any Influence on theſe Tranſactions, without being firſt informed of the Intelligence they received of *Hyder Ally*'s Intentions to invade the *Carnatic*, Your Committee will, in the next place, ſtate to the Houſe the Intelligence which the Company's Servants appear to have received of the hoſtile Intentions of that Prince, and of his Preparations to make War on the Britiſh Poſſeſſions: And Your Committee will then proceed to report the Conduct of the Company's Servants, as far as it appears to have had any Influence on theſe Tranſactions, or to have been the Cauſe of the Misfortunes that have lately happened, under the following Heads:

MILITARY,
POLITICAL,
REVENUE.

* Although Your Committee are not as yet prepared to give full Information to the Houſe upon all theſe different Branches of Enquiry, they have thought fit not to let the Seſſion come to a Concluſion without bringing down a Report of what they have already prepared.

And Your Committee find, as well by the Diſpatches received by the Court of Directors from their Servants in *India*, as by Letters received by the Lords of the Admiralty, by His Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, and by the Secretary at War, from His Majeſty's Officers in thoſe parts, That the various Reports which had for ſome time prevailed of the hoſtile Movements and Preparations made by *Hyder Ally Khan*, for the declared purpoſe of invading the *Carnatic*, were verified by certain Intelligence, received at *Fort St. George* on and after the 23d of July 1780, that part of his Cavalry had actually entered the Province in different places, and that one Body, after deſtroying the Village of *Conjeveram*, had penetrated quite acroſs the Peninſula as far as *Porto Novo* (a Sea Port a little to the Southward of *Cuddalore*) and had plundered it, and that *Hyder* himſelf ſoon followed with his whole Army through the Paſs of *Changama*.

See Letter from Select Committee of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, 15 October 1780.

It appears that the Alarm was now poured in from all ſides, and almoſt every Frontier of the *Carnatic* was at once attacked or threatened by the Enemy's Horſe; nor were the Northern Circars without reaſonable Apprehenſions of being over-run by detached Parties of them.

And Your Committee find, That theſe Accounts were generally accompanied by Repreſentations from the different Garriſons, of the Danger to which they were expoſed,

Select Committee, July 24, 25, 26.

expoſed, of falling a ſacrifice to the Invader, unleſs they had a material and ſpeedy ſupply of Men and Stores.

And it appears, That *Hyder's* Power was repreſented as the more formidable, not only from the number of his own Troops, which, by reports, amounted to near one hundred thouſand Men, but from his being joined by a conſiderable Body of Europeans under Monſieur *Lally*, with whom he was ſaid to confer on all Occaſions, and by whom he was ſtimulated to ſuch determined enmity againſt the Engliſh, as to give up his firſt Intention of writing to the Governor of *Madras*.—And it appears, that News being alſo then ſaid to be brought from *Mauritius*, of the French ſuperiority of Force and Succeſs in *Europe*, and of their intention of ſending to the Coaſt a conſiderable reinforcement of Troops, and ſupply of military Stores, *Hyder* was ſaid to have expreſſed his pleaſure at theſe Tidings, and to have repeated his Determination "to ruin the *Carnatic*, and to chaſtiſe the "Engliſh. He had tried them already, and knew them "well; they had no Conduct; and even now, although "he had aſſembled ſo great a Force to enter into their "Country, they had not manifeſted the leaſt glimmering "of Ability, and therefore now was the time to go "againſt them."

It was ſaid, he had given particular Orders that no Attack ſhould be made on the *Tanjore* Country; but his Deſign was either to ſurprize *Madras*, with the Situation of which he was well acquainted, or to aſſault *Arcot*, or to go firſt to *Pondicherry*, and after fortifying it, to proceed to the Siege of the Capital of the *Carnatic*—That he had received Letters from *Poonah*, which encouraged him to invade the *Carnatic*, and aſſured him, that the Peſhwa would on his part alſo proſecute the War after the Rains ſhould be over.

And Your Committee find, That Mr. *Whitehill* was now Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*, and that Mr. *Smith*, Mr. *Johnſon*, and Sir *Hector Munro*, compoſed the Select Committee; which being aſſembled on the 24th of July, and the following Days, in Conſultation, on the Intelligence lately brought to them, reſolved, "That, as beyond all doubt, *Hyder* had actually com-"mitted Hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*, the moſt expe-"ditious means ſhould be taken for aſſembling an Army "in the Field, and for this Purpoſe the following Troops "were, by the Commander in Chief, recommended to "be immediately ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs "to march at a moment's warning: His Majeſty's 73d Regiment at *Poonamakee*, 1ſt Battalion, one Regiment at *Vellore*—the Troops cantoned at *Pondicherry*, conſiſting of one Battalion of Europeans, and 4 Battalions of Sepoys—15th Battalion of Sepoys at *Trichinopoly*—21ſt D° of D° at *Madras*—Grenadiers of the European Battalion at D°—The Artillery at the Mount.—At the ſame time abſent Officers were directed to join their Corps, Draft and Carriage Bullocks were ordered to be got in readineſs, and all neceſſary Stores to be prepared:

Letters were wrote to *Bengal*, to *Bombay*, to *Tellicherry*, to the Nabob of *Arcot*, to the Rajah of *Tanjore*, to Sir *Edward Hughes*, and to the Officers Commandants on different Stations.

It appears that the Select Committee, in their Diſpatch, dated 26th July, to *Bengal*, after reminding the Governor General and Council of having in their laſt Letter informed them of *Hyder's* Approach to the Frontiers, now give an account of his being actually in the *Carnatic* with a large Army, and that great numbers of the Inhabitants were fled from their habitations, and that thereby an entire ſtop would be put to the Tillage of the Ground—That in theſe Circumſtances they muſt hope for a ſpeedy ſupply of Money from them, or their Reſources would be found inadequate to the Exigency;—that if they could be aſſured of means to ſupport the expence, and knew the preſent ſituation of the Government of *Bengal*, in regard to the *Marattas*, they would direct an Attack on *Hyder's* Poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* Coaſt, by Aſſiſtance ſent to the Detachment they had at *Tellicherry*, and by the Co-operation which they ſhould hope for, of the Squadron of His Majeſty's Ships. In concluſion, they earneſtly enforced the neceſſity of all the Preſidencies uniting to puniſh *Hyder*.

It appears in their Letter to *Bombay*, dated 28th July, the Select Committee give a ſimilar Account of *Hyder's* Invaſion, (the probable Cauſes of which they think it were ſuperfluous now to ſtate) and declare themſelves capable of acting only on the defenſive: They expreſs a hope that *Bombay* might be in a ſituation to diſtreſs *Hyder* by attacking his Poſſeſſions on their Coaſt, or at leaſt that they would do ſo when the Maratta War ſhould be at an end: They ſuggeſt it to them to uſe Endeavours for ſtirring up the Nairs againſt *Hyder*, which they ſuppoſe might be eaſily accompliſhed.

It appears that they addreſs themſelves, on the 28th July, in like manner to the Chief and Council of *Tellicherry*, recommending to them to be on their guard againſt *Hyder's* Partizans in thoſe parts; but hoping at the ſame time that they may be eaſily able to draw off the Nairs to act offenſively againſt him.

It appears to Your Committee, That the Nabob had been the firſt to give Intelligence of the Irruption of *Hyder's* Horſe, and of the Ravages which they had committed; he had very ſtrongly expreſſed his alarms for the ſafety of his Country, and had himſelf been a Solicitor to the Preſidency for the protection of his Territories.—And it appears that the Letter of the Governor to him, dated the 26th of July, contained not only an application for his aſſiſtance in Money and other Supplies, but alſo an anſwer to parts of his Letters. The Governor obſerves, "That *Hyder's* Motions for ſome "days had unveiled the deſign he ſeems to have enter-"tained for ſome time paſt againſt the *Carnatic*; that "whilſt there was any probability of his Intentions being "fruſtrated or directed to another object, he, the Go-"vernor, choſe not to put the Company or the Nabob "to the expence of great military preparations, becauſe "he was very certain after the exertions they had "lately made againſt the French, that ſuch expence "could not be provided for, without neglecting other "Objects of great Importance; but that now, when "Hoſtilities were actually commenced on the part of "*Hyder*, it became expedient at all events to attend to "the Safety of the Country; and he hoped that the "Nabob would exert himſelf for that purpoſe, and in-"form him what Money he could furniſh, and endeavour "to collect as great a ſupply as poſſible of Bullocks, "Proviſions, and other Neceſſaries."

Country Correſpondence, N° 59, N° 60, N° 61; 23 and 25 July.

N° 62, Country Corr.

It appears to have been ſuggeſted, That the Country of *Tanjore* was not over-run or plundered by thoſe who were ſpreading Deva[illegible]ation all around it; and of this circumſtance the Governor made uſe in his Letter to the Raja, dated the 29th of July, to enforce his application for Aſſiſtance, particularly for a ſupply of Grain, and an ample contribution of Money, to expedite the military Operations, and to ſhew his zeal in a Cauſe in which the welfare of his own Government, as well as that of the Company, and of the Nabob, were ſo much intereſted.

N° 65. Country Corr.

It appears that the Letter dated the 28th of July, to Sir *Edward Hughes*, contained a Requeſt that he would ſend the *Sartine* Frigate to *Pondicherry*, to convey thither Artillery, Officers, and Men, and ſome Laſcars, with Tents and Baggage, and ſome Field-pieces, and to aſſiſt in bringing off ſome French Officers, Cannon, and military Stores, which Colonel *Braithwaite*, the Commander of the Troops ſtationed there, would wiſh to put on board.—And it appears that Sir *Edward Hughes* very readily complied with this Requeſt, and informed the Board by Letter of 30th July, that as he apprehended the French would attempt to land a Body of Troops from *Mauritius* on the Coaſt, he ſhould proceed with the Squadron to a Station off *Najore* and *Negapatam*, that he might be in the way of intercepting them.

It appears to Your Committee, That Orders were ſent to Colonel *Braithwaite*, on the 24th and 27th of July, that, after he ſhould have embarked on board the *Sartine*, and ſuch other Veſſels as he could procure, all the Gunpowder, Cannon, and Stores, remaining in *Pondicherry*, he ſhould march to *Wandewaſh* with the Troops under his Command, provided he had reaſon to believe there would be no danger of his meeting a Force much ſuperior to his own; but if he apprehended any danger of that ſort, he was to march directly to *Madras*, by the moſt ſecure Route he could take.

And it appears that Colonel *Nixon*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*, was ordered, by Letter of 26th July, to detach immediately Captain *Davis*'s Battalion and two Field-pieces, to join Colonel *Braithwaite* at *Pondicherry*.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel *Baillie*, who commanded at this time a ſtrong Detachment of Troops in the *Guntoor* Circar, was ordered, by Letters the 25th and 29th of July, to direct an Attack, as he might find opportunity, on *Cuddapah*, or ſome other of *Hyder*'s Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, with a view "of diſtreſſing the "Enemy as much as poſſible, conſiſtently with the ne-"ceſſary protection of the Company's Territories;—"and that, if for the purpoſe of reducing the Fort of "*Sedheut*, he ſhould want heavy Cannon, he was in-"ſtructed to wait till it could be ſent to him from *Ma-"dras*—that he ſhould detach aſſiſtance to Lieutenant "*Douglas*, for the Defence of the *Guntoor*, if neceſſary or "expedient, and ſhould ſend Captain *Smith*'s Battalion "to *Madras*, if he could ſpare it."

And Your Committee find, That Lord *Macleod*, who commanded His Majeſty's 73d Regiment, was ſummoned to the Board on the 26th of July; and having, on his attendance there, promiſed to exert himſelf to the utmoſt for the Service to which he was appointed, received Orders the next day to march from *Poonſmalie* to *Eyecollam*, near *Conjeveram*, as ſoon as he ſhould be joined by the Detachment from the Garriſon, and the Artillery from the Mount; for which purpoſe, Orders had been made out on the 26th to Colonel *James*, who commanded there.

And Your Committee find, That all theſe Reſolutions of the Board were not unanimous.

It appears, That two Members of the Select Committee adviſed, in their Minutes of the 26th of July, that Sir *Edward Hughes* ſhould be deſired to ſail to *Pondicherry*, with the whole Squadron, for the removal of the Troops by Sea, "if Colonel *Braithwaite* ſhould "think it would be attended with the ſmalleſt riſk to "march ſo important a Detachment by Land."

And Your Committee find, That theſe Gentlemen, on the 29th and 30th of July, proteſted in very ſtrong terms againſt the Orders ſent to Colonel *Baillie*; ſtating, "That the *Cuddepah* Country was on the other ſide of "the Paſſes, far diſtant from *Innaconda*, and that if he "ſhould proceed thither with his Detachment, it would "be no eaſy matter to recall him, ſhould his Services "be required in the *Carnatic*; that he ought to be di-"rected to come with all expedition to join the Army, "by which it might be made ſufficient, in all proba-"bility, to drive *Hyder* out of the Province, or at leaſt "to prevent his taking poſſeſſion of any of the ſtrong "Forts. And that it would not be poſſible to oppoſe "him, if the Troops remained in diſperſed Bodies, and "ſcattered in diſtant Garriſons."

29th, Select Conſultation. And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and General perſiſted in recommending the Orders to be ſent as before reſolved on, alledging as reaſons, "That "Colonel *Baillie* might not only diſtreſs the Enemy in "that quarter, but oblige *Hyder* to withdraw part of his "Force from the *Carnatic*, and becauſe it was doubtful "if Proviſions could be immediately procured for a "greater number than were now under marching "Orders."

Select Conſ. 30th July. It appears, That Meſſieurs *Smith* and *Johnſon* would not admit the idea of their being unable to procure Proviſions for Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment; and declared, that they held the Majority of the Committee reſponſible for the conſequences of their Reſolution on this head.

And it appears to Your Committee, That the Colonel having, by Letter dated the 27th of July, tranſmitted an account of the Difficulties he was under to ſubſiſt his Troops, on account of *Hyder*'s Horſe to the Southward, and the fullneſs of the *Kiſtna* to the Northward, and mentioned alſo his apprehenſions of not being able much longer to detain the Bullocks neceſſary for a March (without which he could not move) the Select Committee altered their firſt Inſtructions, and iſſued a new Order on 31ſt of July, for him to march towards the Preſidency "if he ſhould be unable to ſubſiſt his Detachment in the "Enemy's Country, or from any other Quarter."

And Your Committee find, That Meſſieurs *Smith* and *Johnſon*, on the 29th of July, moved, that Sir *Hector Munro* ſhould himſelf take the Command of the Forces in the Field: and that the Governor, on the 30th July, entered his Minute of Diſſent to the Motion, "thinking "it highly expedient to have the continuance of the "General's Advice, to enable the Committee to form "their plans of Operations."—And it appears, that the General at the ſame time declared, "That whenever "the Army ſhould be aſſembled, and the Committee be "enabled to judge more clearly of *Hyder*'s Intention, he "would take the Command: In the mean time, he "thought he could render more ſervice by ſtaying at "*Madras*, and that excluſive of this Conſideration, his "health was very indifferent;" it was therefore reſolved, "That Lord *Macleod* ſhould be deſired to "take the Command, and that Inſtructions ſhould ac-"cordingly be prepared for him."

And it appears, That the Commander in Chief then recommended, that the Troops which were to take the Field from thence and from *Vellore*, ſhould aſſemble at *Eyecollam*, near *Conjeveram*; and that it was reſolved accordingly by the Select Committee.

But it appears, That a Letter received from his Lordſhip on the firſt of Auguſt by the Select Committee, occaſioned a Change in this Meaſure.—He therein offers his ſentiments on the Plan of Operations, and particularly for the junction of the ſeveral Corps of which the Army was to be compoſed.—He obſerves, "that the Rendezvous now intended, might have been the propereſt before the Invaſion, but the march of thoſe Detachments by the Routes propoſed, would, at this critical juncture, render them liable to be attacked ſeparately, and either the object of their Junction rendered abortive, or ſome part of the Army receive ſuch a Check, as, in his opinion, it would be imprudent to riſk in the firſt outſet of the War. And, deeming the Corps aſſembled at *Poonamakee* to be the baſis of the Strength of the *Carnatic*, he thinks it ought not to move from the Neighbourhood of the Magazines and Stores, till joined by all the Troops which could be drawn together, and enabled to march in ſufficient Force to act effectually in the Field againſt the numerous Cavalry of the Enemy."

He would not venture to ſuggeſt the manner of aſſembling theſe Corps, but would recommend thoſe Routes for their March, which a knowledge of the Country would point out as leaſt expoſed to be haraſſed by the Enemy; and that the Junction ſhould be formed near the Preſidency.—He declares his opinion, that Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment ſhould be ordered to march to the *Carnatic*, without delay, upon the principle, that all the Force of the Country ſhould in ſuch a Criſis as the preſent, be collected in the centre of it.—He wiſhes alſo to be joined by all the Cavalry which could be procured; and concludes with declaring, that "he cannot "adopt a reſponſibility in the execution of Plans which "do not coincide with his own Judgment." It appears, That Sir *Hector Munro*, in conſequence of this Letter, delivered in a Minute on the 1ſt of Auguſt, in which he declared,

declared, "That the defence of *Madras* and the Jaghire, not being the great object of his Plan, but as he "also wished to prevent *Hyder*, if possible, from getting "possession of the principal Forts, he could not approve of "Lord *Macleod*'s reasoning; that he still thought the "Troops should be assembled near the proposed scene "of Action, and could not himself see the difficulties "of bringing the Force together; that if the Committee "should do him the honour to desire him to effect a "Junction, he thinks he might venture to promise "them to perform it, and especially as *Hyder* with his "Infantry was yet at *Calisspauk*, near his own Territories; and while he remained there, his Cavalry "could not prevent the Junction of their Troops."

Select Conf. 1st August. And Your Committee find, That the President hereupon moved, that Sir *Hector Munro* be desired to take the Command of the Army assembled in the Field; which was resolved on; and Lord *Macleod* was directed to proceed next day from *Poonamalee* (if the Stores, &c. should all arrive that night) towards *Eyecollam*, and that the General would join him on his march, in a day or two.

And Your Committee find, That the Instructions proposed to be given to the General (by which the Plan of Operations were left to his discretion) contained a desire, that "if the dispositions made by the Enemy at "any time enabled him to leave the Command for a "few days, he would on such occasion return to *Madras*, "that the Committee might have the benefit of his "Advice for future Operations."

31st August 1780. And it appears, That Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson* dissented to this part of the Instructions, which authorized the General to leave the Army at pleasure; and they declared their concurrence of Opinion with Lord *Macleod*, on the proper mode and place for effecting a Junction of the Troops; and expressed much Alarm at the idea of a distant Rendezvous of the Army, because of the weakness and wealth of the *Black Town*, for the special defence of which they wished to have two Battalions of Sepoys raised, which the Town had promised to pay; they recapitulated many points on which the President and Sir *Hector Munro* had differed with them; and they asserted, that every material opinion of theirs had, however, been necessarily adopted by the Majority in the Orders requisite for Colonel *Baillie*.

31st August 1780. And it appears, That the Select Committee now on further Consideration, resolved to direct Colonel *Baillie* to march towards the Presidency at all events, and to take such Route as might possibly give him an opportunity of cutting off some of the Enemy's Convoys.

And it appears to Your Committee, That new Instructions were now sent to Colonel *Braithwaite* (who had, by Letter received the 31st of July, represented his Force to be so respectable as in his opinion, not to fear the impediment of any Enemy they were likely to meet with) that he should march to *Coingleput* instead of *Wandewash*, and from thence join the Army at *Eyecollam*.

The European Battalion from *Vellore* was ordered on the 31st July not to advance to join the Army at the place of general Rendezvous, if any strong Party of the Enemy was known to be in the way; but it was in such case to be detained at *Vellore*, till measures could be taken to facilitate a Junction.

And Your Committee find, That the Enemy was in the mean time making an almost uninterrupted progress in ravaging the Country, and plundering and burning the Villages, and taking several Forts on the Frontiers: Accounts of Alarm were consequently very frequent, and the Nabob sent daily intelligence of the distressed state of his Dominions, and of the few Troops there were to defend some of the principal Garrison Towns, expressing particularly his fears for his Capital, which he knew would be soon attacked, and which must quickly fall, if it was not strengthened with additional Troops and Fortifications. He represented the fatal consequences of its loss, as he had lodged great Magazines of all kinds of Stores in it, and in the principal Forts of *Vellore*, *Gingee*, *Wandewash*, and *Trichinopoly*, and hoped that measures would be taken to preserve them; that his distresses also were great for want of Money, and that he could borrow none to pay his Cavalry, which could not take the Field for want of their Arrears.

Country Corr. N° 63, 64, 66. Country Corr. N° 68, 69. 1 August. N° 74. Country Corr.

And Your Committee find, That the Raja of *Tanjore* had early declared himself disposed to assist, as far as he should have the power, in repelling the common Enemy; but, that having no Troops of his own, he must depend on the Company for the protection of his Country, which had as yet indeed escaped the Ravages of *Hyder*'s Horse, because the Rivers were impassible, but that as soon as the waters should fall, he must expect their Incursions:—He complained particularly in his Letter of the 7th of August, that the Nabob had, while in Possession of his Country, so oppressed the People and desolated the Lands, that he was now himself so far from having Money to send to the assistance of the Company, that he could not fulfil his Engagement for the Deposit, and had with difficulty paid his Subsidy of four Lacks; —that he had great Satisfaction in knowing that the Company were clear gainers of two Lacks annually in time of Peace, as the whole expences of the Troops stationed for the defence of his Country, amounted only to two Lacks; — that he would however exert himself to procure Grain for the Presidency, and had taken off all duties on Exportation, as the Presidency had informed him they had done on Importation, for the Encouragement of the Country People to carry down their Grain to the Vessels, which he desired might be sent for it.

Country Corr. N° 67. Country Corr. N° 72, 1 August. N° 75, Country Corr.

N° 67, received 30th July. And Your Committee find, That the Raja, in a Letter dated 27th of July, and Major *Maclellan* (who commanded the Company's Troops at *Tanjore*) in a Letter dated the 26th, represented the necessity of Repairs to the Fortifications, and of Reinforcements to the Troops for defence of the Country, and of Artillerymen to work the Guns in the Fort, there being none at present there but a few Invalids.

Your Committee, in forming the Recital hitherto given, have been under the necessity of examining a variety of Letters, and other Documents, which they did not think it incumbent upon them to state to the House more minutely than they have done; but those which appeared most material are collected together, and, for the Information of the House, subjoined in the Appendix, N° 1. from the Perusal of which a more minute knowledge can be acquired of the particulars of Alarm and Inability to resist the Enemy, as expressed in Letters from various Forts or Stations in the *Carnatic*, and in the Circars. From such an examination it will likewise appear, that scarce any Place from one end of the Coast to the other was without Alarm, and very few acknowledged to be in a sufficient condition of Defence. And Your Committee desire in this place to observe, that the vouchers of the Narrative of the Report subsequent to this Reference, will be found in the Appendix, N° 2. and so on in the course of the Report.

Appendix, N° 1.

App. N° 2. &c.

But it appears to Your Committee, That the Irruption of the Enemy did not appear formidable only to the Nabob, and to those most immediately exposed to Attack; and that complaints of the neglect of Preparations, and of the deficient means for Resistance, were not expressed from those quarters only.

Your Committee find, That one of the Members of Council, Mr. *Sadlier*, delivered in a Minute on the 29th July, relative to the present state of Affairs; in which he declares, That they had been long approaching to that unhappy state at which they were now arrived; and that private mismanagement, and not public calamity, had brought them to the brink of Destruction; that *Hyder Ally* had long treated them with neglect and insult; that he had for some months past been assembling a large Army on the Frontiers, while his Vakeel was allowed to remain at *Madras*, to give him daily Intelligence of the effect his motions had upon this Government, which

remained

remained inactive, and had neither Reſolution to queſtion him about the cauſe of his Intentions, or to provide againſt the Danger. That they had ſuffered their Troops to remain ſcattered in different parts of the Country, without Stores or Guns; their Garriſons were not put in a ſtate of Defence; no pains were taken to repleniſh an empty Treaſury, and that their want of Exertion now was equal to their neglect of timely Precaution.

That *Hyder*, now in the heart of the *Carnatic* with ſo great a Force, might cut off their ſmall Detachments before they could form a Junction; that the principal Garriſons, neglected and wanting all Neceſſaries, would eaſily fall.—A number of ſmall Forts, *Wandewaſh*, *Carangelly*, *Arnee*, were left defenceleſs, or garriſoned by a few Companies of Nabob's Sepoys, who had not been paid for 18 months, and might be glad to change their maſter;—that *Arcot*, and all the Stores hoarded there, perhaps had fallen;—*Vellore* could not ſpare a man from its own Defence to ſtrengthen it—The three Battalions of *Pondicherry*, without Guns, might be eaſily cut off by a part of *Hyder*'s Army—In ſhort, that the whole Country, from the *Coleroon* in the Southward to the Country of *Nellore* to the Northward, excepting *Trichinopoly*, *Vellore*, and perhaps *Amboor*, might be in *Hyder*'s Poſſeſſion in a month, and even thoſe Garriſons would then be ſtarved into Capitulation; that by the means of *Porto Novo* he had gained a communication with the Iſlands.

That, "Till *Conjeveram* was plundered, the news of "which arrived on the 23d, not one of thoſe who aſ- "ſumed to themſelves the entire management of the "Company's Affairs, would believe that there either "was an Enemy in the Country, or that it was likely to "be invaded;" yet, in eight days the Country was over-run—That moreover the Capital itſelf was in danger, and no effectual means had been yet taken for its ſafety.

That the Treaſury was empty—The Nabob had declared he had no Money; the Raja of *Tanjore* had made the ſame Declaration—The *Maſulipatam* Diſtricts were ſo far from being able to furniſh Supplies, that the arrears of Tribute now amounted to 17 Lacks of Pagodas—That *Sitteram Rauſe*, the moſt wealthy Zemindar under the Company, had not paid his Kiſts, and inſtead of being preſſed to pay them, a remiſſion of Tribute had been voted to him. *Ball Kiſtna* was in Arrear, nor was it believed that he would ever be induced to make good his Engagements.

That the Nabob's Revenue had been diminiſhing annually, though his Expences had not been adequate to his Revenue;—the other Revenues of the Preſidency had been alſo diminiſhing, their Specie had been tranſported to *China* and to *Europe* at the rate of 10 and 15 Lacks annually;—that he ſtill however thought there remained Reſources, if there was exertion to draw them forth.—He then ſtates the Confuſion which followed the news of the Irruption, and the Danger in which the *Black Town* had been, of being pillaged, and that to which the Nabob and his Treaſures were expoſed, while no immediate ſteps, proper for aſſembling the Army were taken—Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Corps ought to have been brought by ſea; Colonel *Baillie* ſhould have been ordered to march to the Preſidency; the Commander in Chief ſhould immediately have been at the head of the Army on its firſt forming.

He then reprobates the diſorder ſuffered to prevail in the *Black Town* and the Fort;—dreads the conſequence of ſuffering the Army ſtill to remain in ſeparate Bodies, each thereby eaſily to be cut off;—inveighs againſt the idea of forming it in a Country already plundered by the Enemy.—And laſtly, after recapitulating his obſervations, he concludes with an advice, that the Nabob and his effects ſhould be received into the Fort, and his Cavalry ſhould be paid, that they might be brought to act as ſoon as poſſible.

It appears, that Mr. *Johnſon*, remarking a paſſage in the Minute of Mr. *Sadlier*, where he ſays, "That till "*Conjeveram* was plundered, the news of which arrived "on the 23d, not one of thoſe who aſſumed to them- "ſelves the entire management of the Company's Af- "fairs, would believe that there either was an Enemy "in the Country, or that it was likely to be invaded;" deſired to remind the Committee, that he had delivered in a Minute on the 19th of June, and Mr. *Smith* the 19th of July, wherein they had given their ſentiments on the approaching danger.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and the General did not delay an Anſwer to Mr. *Sadlier*'s Obſervations; which they term "illiberal Reflections on the "conduct and meaſures of Government;" and the whole "an inflammatory Declamation," which they attribute to his grief at not being of the Committee, or to a panic with which he had been ſtricken, or to the extravagance of a warm imagination. Conſ. Auguſt 1ſt.

They inſiſt, that the real ſituation of Affairs was happily not ſo alarming as Mr. *Sadlier* had repreſented it to be; and that it was particularly wrong in any Member of Adminiſtration, to picture the Exertions made on a ſudden Incurſion of an Enemy, as proofs of the Country being ruined: "that if, as Mr. *Sadlier* aſſerted, the Com- "mittee were inattentive to the ſteps which *Hyder* had "for ſome time paſt been taking with reſpect to the "*Carnatic*, they moſt unqueſtionably would feel them- "ſelves worthy of the moſt ſevere diſpleaſure of their "Employers. But if Mr. *Sadlier* had been in a ſitu- "ation to have known what the Committee had done, "he would have known that they have been by no "means inattentive;—that they had repreſented, both "to the Company and to *Bengal*, the extent of *Hyder*'s "views, and had circumſtantially informed the latter of "every ſtep he had taken, previous to his Attack upon "the *Carnatic*."—That the Committee, who were alone the proper Judges, did not think it expedient, in the then ſituation of Affairs, either to demand a categorical Anſwer from him, or to ſend away his Vakeel. That *Hyder*, from the moment their Troops marched againſt *Mahé*, threatened in return an Invaſion of the *Carnatic*; that his Inclination was little to be doubted, but the Seaſon of the Year was allowed to paſs away when he could moſt effectually have injured the Nabob; the Grain was got in, the Monſoon approaching, which would neceſſarily retard every operation in the Field. "Under thoſe cir- "cumſtances, therefore, and under the certainty that his main Army and Artillery had not yet got through the *Gauts*, and that he himſelf, ſo far from being in the heart of the *Carnatic*, was ſtill in the neighbourhood of the Paſſes: Under all theſe circumſtances, the Committee deemed themſelves vigilant in the truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedily as poſſible; when they took meaſures for obtaining the co-operation of the Preſidency of *Bengal*; when they got the Nabob to collect additional Proviſions in his different Garriſons; and in ſhort, when in the laſt reſort, they came to the determination of exerting every ſinew towards the puniſhment of a wanton, unprovoked Infringement of the Peace of 1769."

They then accuſed Mr. *Sadlier* of ſowing diſaffection, by threatening not to confine his ſentiments to the Board at which he ſits, but to communicate them to the Community at large, that they may know their danger.

They defend the Plan and Place recommended by the Commander in Chief, for aſſembling the different Detachments to compoſe the Army, as the Nabob had aſſerted, that a ſufficient quantity of Proviſions could not be collected for the Troops nearer than *Wandewaſh*; and that the centrical ſituation of that Place would be found convenient for receiving Supply, and for giving Protection to the Company's and his own Poſſeſſions; that however the event would ſhew, whether they or Mr. *Sadlier* was right. They expreſs particular reſentment at Mr. *Sadlier*, for having preſumed to ſay, that the "Committee "acted by an uſurped Authority;" they conſider this as an attempt at the ſubverſion of a Power, fixed by the

moſt explicit Orders of the Company, and an unpardonable tranſgreſſion: That therefore, "as the Commands "of the Company were clear and deciſive with reſpect to "the line which in caſe of neceſſity the Preſident and "Council, as well as the Committee, were authorized to "take, and as that neceſſity now exiſted in its moſt "alarming form, the Preſident moves, and the General "ſeconds, that Mr. *Sadlier* be ſuſpended, &c."

Conſ. Auguſt 1, 1780. It appears that this Motion was carried; but that Mr. *Johnſon* and Mr. *Smith* ſtrongly expreſſed their Diſſent; and that the former deſired to make a public avowal of the ſame ſentiments which were contained in the Minute of Mr. *Sadlier*.

And Your Committee find, That they afterwards, on the 8th of September, entered their Minutes; in which they declare, That the repreſentation made by Mr. *Sadlier* agreed in many particulars with their own ſentiments; that they had before ſo expreſſed them, and had reaſon to complain of the inattention of the Committee to them; that they had, particularly on the 19th of June and 19th of July, deſired that Preparations for War might be made without delay, on receiving various Informations of *Hyder Aly*'s hoſtile Intentions.

They proteſt againſt the violence of the Meaſure of the Suſpenſion, and fear that the terror of that example was calculated to over-awe the Members of Adminiſtration from a free declaration of their Sentiments; they proteſt againſt it as unjuſt, becauſe no ſpecific Charge was brought, nor was Mr. *Sadlier* heard in his Defence; and as irregular, becauſe contrary to the ſixth Paragraph of the Company's Letter, dated the 10th of April 1778, which veſts the power of Suſpenſion in the Committee; and that the Preſident and General had before expreſsly declared it to be entirely in them (the Committee.)——They intimate a ſuſpicion, that private Reſentment againſt Mr. *Sadlier*, more than public Utility, might have cauſed the ſeverity exerciſed againſt him.

That Mr. *Sadlier*'s ideas of the danger of the Nabob was not without foundation: The Attack made by a party of Horſe, which had penetrated as far as *Triplicane*, the place of his Reſidence, without meeting with any Reſiſtance, had evinced the propriety of Mr. *Sadlier*'s Reflections.—They conclude with obſerving, that Mr. *Sadlier* was ſuſpended for a Minute containing Advice, which was afterwards, in ſeveral inſtances, obliged to be followed.

See Part of Letter from Madras to Court of Directors, 13 Sept. and 9 Oct. 1780. And it appears, That Mr. *Sadlier* afterwards, in two Letters dated 13th September and 9th October, appealed to the Select Committee, and preſſed them to reſcind the Reſolution which they had made for his Suſpenſion; and that he alſo addreſſed a Letter on the 16th of October, to the Preſident and Council, on the ſame ſubject.

And it further appears, That in a Letter dated 16th November 1780, to the Preſident and Select Committee, he complains of the inattention ſhewn to his Petitions, and particularly to his Letters to the Governor General and Council, and to the Court of Directors; which, he obſerves, had remained before the Board from the 17th until the 26th of October, and that "then, and not till "then, he had received a Letter from Sir *Hector Munro*;" which Your Committee find to contain a Challenge from Sir *Hector* to Mr. *Sadlier*, "for what he had ſaid malici-"ouſly and falſly of him in his Letters."

Appendix, N° 2. Your Committee have thought proper to put theſe Papers, together with Mr. *Sadlier*'s Anſwer to Sir *Hector Munro*, into the Appendix, and to ſubmit the whole to the obſervation of the Houſe.

And Your Committee find, That by a Reſolution of the Select Committee, on the 2d of Auguſt 1780, a Plan was then formed for a Secret Expedition, with a view of intercepting the Convoys of Proviſions or Stores which might be coming through the Paſſes for the uſe of *Hyder*'s Army; and that Captain *Coſby* was appointed to command a ſtrong Detachment, drawn for that purpoſe from the Troops ſtationed at *Trichinopoly* and at *Tanjore*, to be joined by two Regiments of the Nabob's Cavalry, if they ſhould arrive in time from the *Tinevilly* Country; and it appears that they joined him at *Trichinopoly* on the 27th of Auguſt.

But Your Committee find, That this Deſign, the only offenſive one undertaken at this time, was not attended with ſucceſs; that many Circumſtances occaſioned great Delay in the outſet; that good Intelligence could not afterwards be procured by Captain *Coſby*; but that on the contrary, continual Information was ſent to *Hyder* of all his Motions, by the Inhabitants of the Country, whom he had contrived to attach to his Intereſts — That the ways were ſo much infeſted with Parties of the Enemy's Horſe, and Captain *Coſby* found himſelf ſo continually betrayed by the Killedars, and other Servants of the Nabob, eſpecially on an Enterprize he attempted for retaking *Chittaput*, that he at laſt, after various and fatiguing Marches, was obliged to relinquiſh all other purſuits than that of ſeeking to join the Army; in which alſo, for want of Information, he was diſappointed, until he accidentally met with it on its Retreat at *Chingleput*, on the 12th of September. Select Conſ. September 9th. Vide Journal of S. H. Munro. Appendix, N° 3.

And Your Committee find, That after the Irruption of *Hyder* into the *Carnatic*, various Orders were ſent by the Select Board, to different parts of that Province and the northern Circars, to ſtrengthen the ſeveral Poſts, and to ſend aſſiſtance mutually from one place to another, as it might be neceſſary and poſſible. Select Conſ. 2d and 31 Auguſt, &c.

And it appears, by a Letter from *Chingleput*, dated 5th of Auguſt 1780, that Lieutenant *Mackay*, the Commandant, obſerving that no ſteps had been taken to ſecure the Grain of the different Villages from being carried away or burnt, and that the Nabob's managers would do nothing of themſelves, propoſed, for the good of the Service, to ſend out for as much as he could get, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Enemy.—And it appears that the Select Committee, in their Anſwer of the 8th Auguſt, expreſſed their approbation of his Conduct, and directed him to ſecure as much Grain, and collect as great a number of Cattle, as he could. Select Conſ. 7 Auguſt.

And it appears, That Advance of Pay was agreed to be made to three Regiments of the Nabob's Cavalry, and that they were ordered into immediate Service. Select Conſ. Auguſt 2.

And Your Committee find, That on the 3d of Auguſt, Advice was ſent from the Select Committee to *Maſulipatam*, *Vizagapatam*, and *Ganjam*, of *Hyder*'s Invaſion; and that Inſtructions were given to them to be on their guard, and to draw their Troops together as much as poſſible, that they might be able to act in a body, in caſe of Attack; which was, however, not much to be apprehended. And it appears, that particular application was then made to the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, that they would remit as much Money as they could collect, it being greatly wanted to anſwer the expences of the War.

And Your Committee find, That an Attack made by *Hyder*'s Horſe on 10th Auguſt, upon *Triplicane* and the Gardens about *St. Thomas's Mount*, occaſioned a Motion to be made in the Committee on the 11th, That Redoubts ſhould be thrown up around *Choultry Plain*, for the purpoſe of keeping off the Enemy's Horſe, and preventing a ſudden Incurſion upon the *Black Town*. But it appears, that General *Munro* diſapproving of this meaſure, as expenſive, laborious, and inadequate, recommended it rather to embody a Militia of Horſe and Foot, and to complete two Battalions of Sepoys, for the ſpecial purpoſe of that Defence: And when it was afterwards, on 16th Auguſt, repreſented, that many of the Inhabitants of the *Black Town* deſerted the place from apprehenſion of danger, the Preſident aſſured the Committee on the 17th, That a number of Guns had been mounted on the Wall; that the Ditch was in ſome parts cleared, and the Works were going on; that about 600 Sepoys, who had been enliſted, were perfecting themſelves in their diſcipline; and that nothing had been omitted for the defence of the Place, and the ſafety of the Inhabitants. See Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon's Minute. See Minute of Smith and Johnſon. Select Conſ. 16 Auguſt.

And

And Your Committee find, That a Letter of Thanks was addreſſed to Sir *Edward Hughes*, by the Select Committee, on * 6th Auguſt, for the Services which it appears he had rendered to Colonel *Braithwaite* by means of the Squadron; and they at the ſame time requeſted him to prolong his cruize to the Southward as much as poſſible, in order to prevent any diſembarkation of the French Troops on the Coaſt.

* Sic Orig.

Select Conſ. 8 Auguſt, 584. Appendix, No 4.

And your Committee find, That daily tidings were ſent to the Preſidency, of the progreſs which *Hyder* was making in devaſtation and conqueſt; and it appears that fear, as well as good information, ſuggeſted various accounts of his deſigns; and it was from ſome of his movements conceived, that after taking *Trinomalee*, *Pollour*, *Chittaput*, and other places, he deſigned an attempt upon *Gingee*, where the Nabob's Killedar would not at firſt allow the European Officer, who arrived there on the 8th of Auguſt with a reinforcement, to take any ſteps for the defence of the place, as he had received no orders for that purpoſe from his Maſter.

Select Conſ. 8, 9, 12, 13, 17 Auguſt. Select Conſ. 16 Auguſt. Letter dated 10 Auguſt.

It was, however, ſoon made manifeſt, that *Arcot* was *Hyder*'s firſt great object; and it appears that he ſat down before it on the 21ſt of Auguſt, it having previouſly received a reinforcement to its garriſon from Vellore on the 8th.

Vide Appendix, No 5.

And Your Committee obſerve, That it had been reſolved, that General *Munro* ſhould take the Field, at the head of the Army to be aſſembled near *Conjeveram*, and that orders had been accordingly ſent to the Officers commanding ſeveral Detachments, to repair thither, in order to unite their Corps.

But it appears, That the General informed the Select Committee on the 14th Auguſt, That this plan was prevented from being put in execution, by the want of bullocks to carry ſufficient proviſion for the Troops; and that the reaſon aſſigned at the Durbar for that deficiency was, that the Country People had driven them to the Pollams, for fear of the Enemy's Horſe; and he therefore adviſed, that the rendezvous ſhould be now made at the Mount, where the Troops ſhould remain till eight days Proviſion could be collected, and bullocks to carry it, when they ſhould immediately proceed on their march.—And it appears that this was agreed to by the Committee; and a Letter was ſent the ſame day to the Nabob, to repreſent theſe difficulties to him, to requeſt the exertions of his interference, that a ſufficient number of bullocks might be procured, and proviſions of grain and cattle furniſhed, and that he would ſend a Perſon of Conſequence to accompany the Army, in order to ſecure a conſtant and regular ſupply.

Country Corr. No 76, 14 Auguſt. No 80, 23 Auguſt.

No 82. Country Corr.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob in his Anſwer of the 29th Auguſt, reminded the Committee of the Stores of all kinds which he had laid up in ſeveral of his Forts; and, entreating them to order the Army to march immediately for the relief of *Arcot*, aſſured them, that the Troops would be there plentifully ſupplied with every neceſſary.—And it appears, That in conſequence of the new reſolution to rendezvous the Army at the Mount, orders were ſent to *Conjeveram*, that in caſe the European Detachment from *Vellore* ſhould have already reached that place, it ſhould immediately leave it, and march to the Mount.—It appears, however, that a Letter was wrote on the ſame day to Colonel *Lang* at *Vellore*, inſtructing him, that, as he had ſent ſo large a Detachment to *Arcot*, he ſhould keep the European Battalion at *Vellore* till further Orders.

Select Conſ. 14 Auguſt.

Select Conſ. 17 Auguſt.

And it appears, That Colonel *Lang* had wrote on the 12th to the Select Committee, to acquaint them, that he had not ſent theſe Troops to *Conjeveram*, and hoped they would approve of his detaining them, as he ſhould otherwiſe have had not above two hundred Sepoys for the defence of that fort; and that moreover a ſtrong body of the Enemy's Horſe was encamped in the way, ſo that it would have been dangerous to attempt the march.

Select Conſ. 19 Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel *Braithwaite* had reached *Chingleput* on the 18th Auguſt with his Corps, when he received inſtructions to join the reſt of the Army at the Mount.—It appears, That he had tranſmitted accounts on the 10th, to the Preſidency, of his having evacuated *Pondicherry*; and that he had previouſly ſent off all the French Officers capable of ſervice, and had taken an Atteſtation of Fidelity from other French Gentlemen who were to be left there.

Select Conſ. 20 Auguſt.

It appears, That Colonel *Braithwaite* had paſſed through *Carangolly* on the 12th of Auguſt, and obſerved, with great concern, the defenceleſs ſtate in which a place of that importance was left, garriſoned only by twenty Nabob's Sepoys, under an Havildar, who objected to receive ammunition from him without orders from his Maſter; and having completed his whole march without ſeeing an Enemy, when there was ſo favourable an opportunity of attacking him to advantage, he was led to conſider this circumſtance as a ſtrong proof that *Hyder* was not to be ſeriouſly apprehended; "and, that if at all faced and puſhed, he "would retire out of the *Carnatic* as faſt as he came into "it."

And your Committee find, by Letters dated the 20th, 21ſt, and 22d Auguſt, from *Chingleput*, That Proviſions were extremely ſcarce there, and that Colonel *Braithwaite* found himſelf in the moſt preſſing neceſſity for a ſupply; which ſituation was rendered the more diſtreſſing, becauſe the Nabob's Renters would not aſſiſt him, and indeed had received no Orders to do it.

Select Conſ. 21 Auguſt, &c.

And your Committee find, That Colonel *Baillie*, by Letters dated the 5th, 10th, 13th, and 16th Auguſt, and 1ſt September, informed the Select Committee, That in obedience to their Inſtructions, which had been ſent to him, he was on his March towards *Conjeveram*—That he had met with many impediments from the Rivers he was obliged to paſs, but profeſſed his eagerneſs to bring up his Corps to the place of junction as ſoon as poſſible.

Vide Appendix, No 6.

And Your Committee find, That the General, now about to quit the Committee for the Camps, delivered in a Minute on 21ſt Auguſt, before his departure; in which he declared the neceſſity he found himſelf under, of deſiring that Mr. *Davidſon* might be appointed an acting Member of the Select Committee in his abſence, in order that "his Reputation as an Officer, and as a "Man, might have a fair chance given to them when-"ever any reſponſibility ſhould fall to his ſhare, for "that he had little expectation of having any of his plans "adopted, or a fair conſtruction put upon his Actions "by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, who were determined to "oppoſe every meaſure originating from, or approved of "by, the Preſident and him: That, therefore, being "reſolved not to be anſwerable for the actions of others, "which might affect him in points as an Officer, and in "hopes of carrying the plan approved by the Preſi-"dent and him into execution, without diſpute or "diſſenſion to retard it, he moved accordingly, That "Mr. *Davidſon* ſhould be appointed of the Select Com-"mittee."

And it appears, That the Preſident ſeconded the Motion upon the ſame grounds; and added, "That though "no Man had a greater repugnance to acting contrary "to the commands of his Superiors than he had, yet he "thought there was, in the Reaſons aſſigned by the "General, an expediency for a temporary Infringement "of the Company's orders," and therefore he further recommended, "That Mr. *Davidſon* ſhould be ſworn in "before Sir *Hector Munro*'s departure;" and at the ſame time he deſired to "thank the General for the liberal "and conſtitutional ſupport he had given him ſince he "had been Preſident."

Select Conſ. 21 Auguſt.

And it appears, That Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* immediately diſſented; inſiſting, that ſuch appointment was expreſsly contrary to the Orders contained in the Letter from the Court of Directors, of the 10th April 1778. And it appears, that they afterwards, on the 3d of September,

tember, delivered in a Minute on this ſubject: and alſo, that on the 6th of that month, they deſired to refer the matter to the deciſion of the Governor General and Council; but that propoſal appears to have been rejected.

And Your Committee find, That Mr. *Davidſon* was, by the Preſident's caſting vote, appointed and ſworn in on the 21ſt of Auguſt.

And Your Committee find, That on the 22d Auguſt the Preſident propoſed certain Inſtructions for the General when he ſhould take the Field; and that on the 24th, Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* recommended others which they had prepared, and which, with ſome exception, were agreed to by the Committee; and from them it appears, that no particular plan was enjoined him, becauſe of the confidence repoſed in his military ſkill and experience; which he was deſired to exert to the utmoſt on the preſent occaſion, and to attack the Enemy on the firſt favourable opportunity.

Vide Appendix, No 7.

18th Auguſt. And Your Committee find, That a ſecond Letter had been written to *Bengal*, giving an account of *Hyder*'s progreſs, and attributing the delay of bringing an Army into the Field to oppoſe him, to the diſtant ſtations in which the Troops were divided when he made his irruption into the province, and alſo to the want of Money; in which article they ſolicited an ample and immediate aſſiſtance.

2 Auguſt. And Your Committee find, That it had been propoſed, that the Select Committee ſhould take into conſideration a Letter from thence, of 12th June, relative to the *Guntoor* Circar and the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Holland*; who having been ſent from *Fort St. George* to be Reſident at *Hyderabad*, had incurred the diſpleaſure of the Governor and Council, and they had ſuſpended him from the Company's ſervice; of all which, however, a more ample account will be given in another Report; and it is therefore judged ſufficient in this place, to obſerve, that the Preſidency of *Bengal* had thereupon appointed him to be their Reſident at the *Nyſam's* Court, with particular inſtructions to ſatisfy that Prince on account of the *Guntoor* Circar, and to promiſe a relinquiſhment of the grant of it from *Bazalet Jung*. It was propoſed, on the 2d and 7th Auguſt, by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, that the Select Committee ſhould take off the ſuſpenſion from Mr. *Holland*, and, in obedience to the requiſition made by the Governor General and Council, withdraw the Troops from the *Guntoor*, and reſtore it to *Bazalet Jung*.

Select Conſ. 7 Auguſt 1780. And Your Committee find, That this Motion was oppoſed on the 7th, by the Preſident and the General; and that the latter expreſſed an apprehenſion, that the Court of Directors might not approve ſuch a meaſure; and that it was therefore neceſſary to acquaint the Governor General and Council, that as they had given their ſanction to the means of acquiring the Circar, they muſt be anſwerable for the conſequences if they ſhould now inſiſt upon its being given up.

The Letter, however, for this purpoſe, having been long delayed, it appears that Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* moved on 22d Auguſt, that the Circar in queſtion ſhould be given up, as it was highly neceſſary at this juncture to ſecure the alliance of the Soubah, without delay.

22d Auguſt 1780. And Your Committee find, That it was thereupon reſolved to acquaint the Governor General and Council, that the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* was willing, notwithſtanding many objections, to make the ſacrifice on account of the preſent poſture of affairs; but that the Circar having been let at Rent to the Nabob, it was neceſſary to prevail upon him to give up his Leaſe, and that they promiſed to make application to him for his conſent.

No 84, Country Corr. And it appears, That a Letter was accordingly wrote him on the 2d of September, to deſire his concurrence in that meaſure.

Select Conſ. September 6. And it further appears, That the Letter to the Governor General and Council, drawn up in conſequence of the Reſolution recited above, is alſo dated the 2d September; and that it was laid before the Select Committee on the 6th, when Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* expreſſed their diſapprobation of it, as inconſiſtent with the ſentiments which they had already expreſſed on the ſubject of it.

But Your Committee find, That the Nabob, in a Letter dated the 17th Auguſt, and laid before the Board the 7th September, informed the Governor of the danger in which that diſtrict was of falling into *Hyder*'s hands, as there were no Troops nor Fortifications in condition to oppoſe his numerous Cavalry; and as moreover the Zemindars were diſaffected to the Company, and had ſent Vakeels to him. N. 85.

See alſo Letters from Lt. Douglas. Select Conſ. September 6.

And Your Committee find, by Letters from *Viſagipatam*, 5th Auguſt, That a new alarm had been ſpread through the other Circars alſo, by a very large body of Horſe, which appeared, and encamped, in the country of *Cuttack*, adjoining on the North to the *Cicacole* Circar, and that theſe Troops were commanded by a ſon of the Raja of *Berar*, but ſuppoſed to be under the controul, and in the pay, of the Court of *Poonah*, and conſequently inimical to the Company.

Select Conſ. 5 September. Letter from Ganjam, 25 Auguſt. And it appears, That the dread of their deſigns was ſo much the more reaſonable, as the accounts of the weak ſtate of the Circars left little hope of ſucceſsful reſiſtance againſt any conſiderable attack.

Letter from Anjengo. And Your Committee find, That the apprehenſions of the Preſidency was at the ſame time awakened for another part of their Poſſeſſions in a different quarter; for news reached the Select Committee, on the 21ſt Auguſt, that the Sardar of *Calicut* had led a conſiderable body of *Hyder*'s Forces to join the Nairs; and that having together driven the Company's Troops out of the Iſland of *Durampatnam*, they threatened *Tellicherry*, and the reſt of the Britiſh poſſeſſions on that part of the *Malabar* Coaſt.

See Letters from Captain Edington, dated Palamcotta, Auguſt 17 and 25, on Conſultation 6 Sept. Letter from Madura, dated 2 Sept. received 8th. And Your Committee find, That *Hyder*'s Horſe and Sepoys had alſo appeared about *Madura*; and that in the *Tinevelly* country the Polygars required aſſurances of being encouraged and protected by the Company and the Nabob, before they would be induced to draw any force together to reſiſt the Invaders. And the Commandant at *Palamcotta* ſuggeſted, that it would be expedient for him to be empowered to pledge the faith of the Company to them, as they were a formidable body, could they be depended upon; and he pointed out the neceſſity of his having all the Troops put under his orders, becauſe the Nabob's Manager had intended to appoint the Brother of one of *Hyder*'s Havildars to be Commander of the Nabob's Polygars and Troops.

Select Conſ. 2d Sept. 1780. And Your Committee find That Sir *Edward Hughes*, in a Letter dated the 28th of Auguſt 1780, informed the Preſident and Select Committee, that from the intelligence he had lately received, he thought there could be no doubt that the French would ſoon receive a reinforcement of Ships and Troops at the *Mauritius*, and that they meant to act offenſively againſt ſome of the Company's Settlements in that country, either jointly with ſome of the Country Powers, or ſeparately by themſelves.

Extract of Letter from Vellore, dated 25 Auguſt. Select Conſ. 1 Sept. 1780. Select Conſ. Sept. 6. Letter from Trichinopoly Received 8 Sept. no Date. No 87. Country Corr. And Your Committee find, That theſe diſtreſſes, brought from without, were heightened by the inteſtine miſchief of a mutinous ſpirit in the Nabob's Sepoys, even within the important fortreſs of *Vellour*, and by the general complaint of their want of Pay, and the conſequent danger of their Deſertion.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob alſo, at this criſis, ſent his Anſwer to the Governor's Letter of the 26th of July; and in it drew a melancholy picture of his ſituation, from his poverty and the deſolation of his country; the firſt he attributed to his being ſtripped of the *Tanjore* Country, which had obliged him to contract a great debt, and to borrow of individuals; the other he declared to be only the confirmation of his apprehenſions, which he had expreſſed often, both to the preſent and late Governor; and earneſtly entreated them to be

prepared

prepared againſt the certain intentions of hoſtility, which *Hyder* had long manifeſted. He rejoiced, however, in knowing that now at leaſt an Army was in the Field, to ſtop the progreſs of, and to puniſh, the unprovoked Invader of his dominions. He hoped, that in compaſſion for his diſtreſſes, and out of conſideration for the oldeſt and moſt faithful of the Company's Allies in *Hindoſtan*, his friends would raiſe the money neceſſary for the expences of War, which he, on the return of Peace, would refund.

Vide Appendix, N° 8.

And Your Committee find, That ſuch was the ſituation of affairs when Letters from Sir *Hector Munro*, of the 5th and 9th of September, informed the Select Committee, that *Hyder* had raiſed the Siege of *Arcot*, and was encamped within two miles of him, near *Conjeveram*. He added, that he meant to attack *Hyder* as ſoon as he could join Colonel *Baillie*, who had at laſt been able, on the 3d of September, to croſs the Rivers which had ſo long obſtructed his progreſs; but that to effect a junction, he muſt detach a ſtrong body of the Troops to ſtrengthen the Colonel on his march, while he himſelf ſhould remain where he was, to watch the Enemy and guard his proviſions, the want of which he foreſaw would ſoon end the campaign. He complained of the Nabob for not ſending a proper perſon with the Army, to ſecure a conſtant ſupply; and he wiſhed alſo to have a reinforcement of 200 Europeans from *Madras*, as there was now no danger of an Attack on that place.

Select Conſ. Sept. 11.

And Your Committee find, by a Letter from the Commandant of *Chingleput*, dated the 11th September, and by another from Sir *Hector Munro*, dated 12th September, That the news of the defeat of Colonel *Baillie*, and of the General's falling back to *Chingleput*, and of his intented retreat to the Mount, or by the way of *Sadras*, as he might find it expedient from the motions of the Enemy, or with a view to be ſupplied with proviſions, followed very ſoon.

Select Conſ. 12 and 13 Sept.

Your Committee judge it proper, in this place, to direct the Attention of the Houſe to the accounts given of theſe unfortunate events, by thoſe who were moſt competent to relate them, and to offer their ſentiments upon them; and they therefore here inſert at large, the Journal of the Proceedings of the Army from the 25th of Auguſt to the 15th September, delivered in, by the General to the Select Committee on the 21ſt September.

Extract of a Letter from General Sir Hector Munro *to the Select Committee; dated 21ſt September* 1780.

After having, with the greateſt difficulty, got as much Rice as would ſerve the Troops for eight days, I was obliged to order the Sepoys to carry four days Rice each; and with the utmoſt difficulty got bullocks ſufficient to carry the remainder. *Hyder Ally* having beſieged *Arcot*, and the relief of that place being conſidered of the greateſt conſequence, as the Nabob's Capital, and a place in which there was a great quantity of military Stores, as well as Proviſions, I was willing to move, as quick as poſſible, towards *Conjeveram*, imagining that an Army advancing towards *Arcot* might be the means of raiſing the ſiege; which, in fact, happened. Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, with a large detachment from the Northward, was advanced ſo far, that I had concerted meaſures ſo that he would arrive at *Conjeveram* the day after we got there.

The 25th of Auguſt I went to *St. Thomas's Mount*, where the Army was encamped. Captain *Campbell's* Regiment belonging to his Highneſs the Nabob, was with the Troops, but refuſed ſerving any longer, unleſs they received all their arrears of Pay; which the Ameer, who was there in perſon, not conſenting to, their arms and horſes were taken from them; about 56 of them, including 17 black Officers, offered to ſerve, and Lieutenant *James Campbell* took the command of them; Lieutenant *Young* with 33 European Troopers diſmounted, got ſome of the worſt horſes to mount them. Theſe were all the Cavalry I had; the diſmounted Troopers of Captain *Campbell's* Regiment were marched priſoners to *Madras*, and I have been informed, that the Ameer enliſted them all into his own Body Guard the next morning.

The 26th Auguſt the Army, conſiſting of His Majeſty's 73d Regiment, the 2d Battalion of the 1ſt Regiment, the Grenadier Company of the 2d Battalion 2d Regiment, with 5 Battalions of Sepoys, and a company of Markſmen, the two Troops of Cavalry, with a large train of Artillery, amounting in all to 5,209 Men, including Officers, (as the Corps were not complete) marched from the Mount to *Podepire*, 11 miles—27th to *Tripamadore*, 8 miles—28th to *Mootaimaicks* Choultry, 8 miles—29th to Camp near *Conjeveram*, 11¼ miles.

During theſe four days nothing very particular happened; the Enemy's Horſe followed us in great numbers, and wounded and took a few Men. The night we were at *Tripamadore* the weather changed, and rained moſt violently; this ſort of weather continued till our arrival at *Conjeveram*, by which the roads became very bad, and the country was all under water. I was now obliged to deliver to the Troops the four days Rice that I had brought with me. The Nabob had ſent a Perſon from the Durbar, who I underſtood was to attend and aſſiſt me till I met with *Niſiph Cawn* at *Arcot*; I ſent for him, and told him he muſt immediately get Proviſions for the Army, and Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, that I expected the next day; and I alſo deſired he would uſe his utmoſt endeavours to get intelligence of the Enemy's motions. His Anſwer was, that he was ordered by the Nabob to attend me, but had no power given him to procure me either proviſions or intelligence. I had now no hopes of proviſions but from the Paddy that might be found in and about *Conjeveram*, which I ordered the Cutwall to collect, and gave him guards of Sepoys to aſſiſt him in bringing it to the Pagoda.

30th. The Army remained on the ſame ground, expecting Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, which was to have joined this day.—The rains ſtill continued with great violence.

31ſt. We were this day informed by two deſerters, that *Hyder* had left *Arcot*, and was croſſing all his Army over the *Parlar*, and marching towards us. His Cavalry were in large bodies all round us. The rains ſtill continued both night and day. I received accounts from Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, that his detachment was ſtopped about five miles North of *Trepaſſore*, by a ſmall river, that was ſo deep that he could not paſs it.

Having information that *Hyder* had got poſſeſſion of a mud fort at *Muſſalpauk*, about ſix miles in our front on the left, where he had ſome Horſe and Infantry, and ſome Rocket Bays near it, a detachment of two Battalions of Sepoys, the Company of Markſmen, and a Grenadier Company, with ſcaling Ladders, marched at ſeven this evening to ſurprize them, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Harper*; but the Man who undertook to ſhew the road miſſed his way in the night, and after marching all night, the detachment returned in the morning, without having effected any thing.

Sept. 1ſt. The ground was ſo covered with water, that I was obliged to change my Camp nearer to *Conjeveram*.

2d and 3d. We remained on the ſame ground, but the rains ſtill continued moſt violently. This day I received a Note from Captain *Prendargaſt*, that *Hyder* quitted his ground before *Arcot* on the 29th Auguſt.—The Enemy were encamped at *Ball Chitty*'s Choultry, about five miles in our front.—I was obliged to give Paddy to the Battalion, to beat it out into Rice themſelves, as the quantity beat out by the Followers of the Army was not ſufficient for more than one day's conſumption for all the Troops.

Sept. 4th. This evening it rained extremely hard.—Lieutenant *Croker*, with the 17th Battalion, marched and attacked an advanced poſt of the Enemy in a tope in our front; he returned to Camp in the morning, having killed ſeveral of the Enemy, and brought back two horſes.

5th. The Troops remained in the ſame encampment. I received a Note from Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, informing me that he had croſſed the river the 3d.—The rains ſtill continued very violent.

6th. The Enemy moved their Camp this day to the North-eaſt.—We ſtruck our tents, and marched to a high ground, about two miles on the road to *Trepaſſore*, where we encamped.—The Enemy's Camp was about two miles to our left.—They had ſent forward a very large detachment, which attacked Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* at *Peerambaucum*, who repulſed them.—It rained moſt violently this day.

7th and 8th. I received a Note from Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, informing me, that on a review after the Action with *Hyder's* Detachment, he found it was not in his power to join me, but hoped to ſee me at *Peerambaucum*.—I found myſelf now in a very critical ſituation.—The only hopes of proviſions were from the Paddy I had collected in the Pagoda.—The Enemy was encamped within two miles of me.—Had I marched with my whole force, he moſt certainly would have poſſeſſed himſelf of my ground, and of *Conjeveram*, and thereby cut me off of all my Proviſions.—In this caſe we muſt have been ſtarved; I therefore, with the concurrence of the principal Officers of the Army with me, reſolved to ſend a ſtrong detachment to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, who was ſtill at *Peerambaucum*, 14 miles from me, on the *Trepaſſore* road, and to remain with the reſt of the Troops to watch the Enemy's motions.—At nine o'clock at night, Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher* marched with the Grenadier and Light Infantry Companies of the 73d Regiment, two Companies of European Grenadiers, one Company of Sepoy Markſmen, and ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers. It was my Intention that this Detachment ſhould have taken with them four ſix-pounders; but Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher obſerved, that he ſhould be better able to croſs the country without artillery.—The men left their knapſacks, and I ſent with them two days Rice, Ammunition on nine Camels, and Biſcuit and Arrack in pots, on Coolies heads.—I flattered myſelf ſo ſtrong a detachment, when joined to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie's* Corps, would enable him to join me; and I deſired Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher* to tell him to begin his march in the evening of the 9th of September, and march all night towards me; but if any thing happened that he thought might impede his march, I then deſired he would move with the detachment to *Irapadamour*, which was 20 miles in my rear, and inform me of it.

Sept. 9th. Our Army and the Enemy remained on the ſame ground. This evening the tents were ſtruck, and we lay on our arms all night. About twelve o'clock we heard ſome cannon and muſquetry, which ſoon ceaſed, and every thing remained quiet.

Sept. 10th. A little before day-light, we heard a very heavy firing of cannon and muſquetry, at a diſtance. The Company's Army, I underſtood, had moved: I alſo, at day-light, marched by my right, on towards where we heard the firing. When we had marched about four miles, I ordered three guns to be fired, as ſigns of our approach; and obſerving the ſmoke of the guns to be to our left, we moved in a direct line towards them. After marching about a mile and a half more, I repeated the ſignals, but had no return. We ſaw a great ſmoke, and of a ſudden all the firing ceaſed. We continued our march to the right, towards the *Trepaſſore* Road again, expecting to meet Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, not doubting but that he had repulſed the Enemy. After marching about two miles, we met one of our own Sepoys, wounded, who told us, that Colonel *Baillie* had been attacked, and entirely defeated. Though I could not depend on this information, yet not meeting the detachment, and the firing having totally ceaſed, gave me too much reaſon to ſuſpect ſome diſaſter. The ſecurity of the Army determined me, therefore, to return to *Conjeveram*, where we arrived about ſix in the evening. Several other wounded Sepoys came in this night, who confirmed the defeat of the detachment. The reports of the Sepoys differed ſo much as to particulars, that no credit could be given them; in one circumſtance only they ſeemed all to agree, which was, that either two or three tumbrils blew up, and that then the Horſe broke in upon the detachment. This is all the information I got of this moſt unhappy diſaſter.

I found there was barely one day's rice for the Troops; and I conſidered, that if I remained at *Conjeveram*, I ſhould be ſurrounded with all *Hyder's* Cavalry, ſo that I ſhould be every day more diſtreſſed for paddy and ſheep, and the horſes and bullocks muſt have ſtarved; nor had I any hopes of relief. I reſolved therefore to fall back to *Chingleput*, where I hoped to find Proviſions; I ordered all the baggage out of the Pagoda, which was not in a ſtate of defence, and threw the heavy guns and ſtores, that could not be moved, into the great Tank.

Sept. 11th. At three in the morning, we left *Conjeveram*; we marched all day. Our flanks and rear were continually haraſſed with not leſs than 6,000 of the Enemy's Horſe, who wounded ſeveral Men, and cut off ſeveral carts of baggage. A deep Nulla near *Skeveram* retarded our march much; and the Followers of the Army, with the Baggage, preſſed ſo cloſe on the line in this narrow Paſs, that many of the Coolies threw down their loads, and left them on the ground. We arrived at eleven at night at a river, within a mile and a half of *Chingleput*, ſo deep, that the rear of our Army did not paſs it till nine o'clock next morning.

Sept. 12th. I was much diſappointed on being informed by Lieutenant *Mackay*, who commands at *Chingleput*, that I could not get any Proviſions for the Troops, and that the Nabob's Hamildars had all run away from the country. After every endeavour, we could only get paddy ſufficient for one day's rice, and ſome ſheep for the Europeans. Colonel *Coſby* joined us here, with his Detachment from the Southward, conſiſting of ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers, three Battalion Companies of Sepoys, two Regiments of his Highneſs the Nabob's Cavalry, with ſix of his Light Infantry Companies, and two three-pounders. Had we had proviſions, I could have remained at *Chingleput* with this reinforcement, till I had heard from *Madras*; but neceſſity obliged us to make another forced march to *St. Thomas's Mount*.

Sept. 13th. We left all our Sick, and ſome of the Baggage, at *Chingleput*, and began our march at ſix in the evening, and arrived at the Mount on the 14th, about two o'clock in the afternoon: the Troops were quartered in the Barracks and Houſes; and the 15th the Army marched to *Marmelon*, where they are now encamped.

I have now, Gentlemen, in plain terms, informed you of every particular relative to the Army, that I can recollect worthy your obſervation; and give me leave to aſſure you, that in the ſhort time we have been from *Madras*, I have had more difficulties to encounter than ever I experienced ſince I have been a Soldier. I imagine it will appear, that the unexpected as well as uncommon quantity of rain, that fell from the 26th of Auguſt to the 6th of September, has been the cauſe of our misfortune, by ſwelling a ſmall river ſo as to prevent Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie's* Detachment from paſſing, from the 27th of Auguſt to the 3d of September; and what ſtill adds to the diſtreſs, I underſtand it is a river that has ſcarce ever been known to be impaſſable for any length of time. Had Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* joined us the 29th of Auguſt at *Conjeveram* (which

nothing

nothing but the rains could prevent) I ſhould have had it in my power to have attacked *Hyder*'s Camp at *Ball Chitty*, before his whole force had been collected. His ſituation favoured the attempt, being encamped in a wood, which would have given our Infantry the advantage over his numerous Cavalry; I ſhould alſo have had proviſions ſufficient to have ſerved the Army to *Arcot*, where we expected an ample ſupply; but the neceſſity I was under of remaining at *Conjeveram*, deprived me of theſe advantages. The quantity of Paddy I had collected in the Pagoda was our only ſupport, and had I quitted *Conjeveram*, the Enemy would immediately have occupied it, and we muſt have ſtarved. In the unfortunate affair of the 10th, as I am certain Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, his Officers, and the whole Detachment, would exert themſelves to the utmoſt, I am of opinion that the blowing up of the tumbrils was the ruin of the Detachment, the number of lives that muſt have been loſt by the exploſion, the confuſion it muſt have created in the ranks, and the want of ammunition, might have been the cauſe of the defeat of a much larger body, and I fear it was at this moment of their diſtreſs that *Hyder*'s multitude of Cavalry fell on them. The want of intelligence was a circumſtance in which I was much diſtreſſed: I found myſelf in a country ravaged with fire and ſword, and ſo ſurrounded with horſe, that Hircarras could with difficulty go out or return to Camp without being wounded by them. The inhabitants moſtly fled, and the few that remained ſeemed more in the intereſt of the Enemy than of their proper Maſter. It was to Captain *Pringle*, who is Captain of the Guides, that I was obliged in this particular, whoſe unwearied diligence provided me all the intelligence I did receive.

Great as the misfortune is, in the loſs of ſo large a Detachment, I hope we have ſtill reſources to bring a ſtrong Army to the Field; but in particular give me leave to fix your attention to Cavalry: The oppreſſion of the Artillery and Infantry for want of horſe is too great; the numbers of detachments obliged to be ſent out for proviſions haraſſes the Troops ſeverely; whereas, a certain number of regular Cavalry would cover your Troops on all marches, provide eſcorts for convoys, keep your Camp quiet by Patroles, and give relief to the Artillery and Infantry, ſo as to enable them to act with full force when actual ſervices require their exertion.—I beg this Letter may make a Number in the firſt Packet to *Europe*.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Your Committee think it proper to refer the Houſe to the Appendix, No. 9, for other Letters relative to theſe events; and they have there put a Letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated the 15th October 1780, and together with it, the Correſpondence between the General and the Governor, in Letters which appear to have not been laid before the Board; and alſo, the General's Correſpondence with Colonels *Coſby* and *Baillie*, and the Inſtructions which he gave to them and to Colonel *Fletcher*.

There will alſo be found annexed, a Return of the Detachment under Colonel *Baillie*, a Return of the Troops at the Mount on the 26th Auguſt, and of the Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, iſſued from 26th Auguſt to 15th September, and a State of the Troops which now, ſince the retreat from *Conjeveram*, were encamped on the *Madras* ſide of the *Marmelon* River; to which is added, the Minute of the General reſpecting Colonel *Baillie*'s Loſs, and ſome official Letters to the Secretary at War, and Incloſures, which he tranſmitted to *Europe*.

See alſo Appendix, N 2. Mr. Sadlier's Letter to Bengal,

And Your Committee have alſo here ſubjoined to thoſe Papers, which were produced or ſent by Sir *Hector Munro*, a Letter from Lord *Macleod* to the Secretary at War, and ſome Letters from Sir *Edward Hughes*, and alſo from other Officers who have given any accounts of theſe events.

And as it appears, That the firſt ſtep taken by the Select Committee, after receiving information of this misfortune, was to tranſmit an account of it to *Bengal*; Your Committee have thought proper to place alſo in this Number of the Appendix, the Conſultations of that Select Board on 13th September, and the Reſolutions formed in conſequence of them, and their Letter of the 14th to the Governor General and Council thereupon, that the Houſe may have before them in one view, all the circumſtances leading to, and immediately conſequential upon, the defeat, which Your Committee have been able to collect.

It appears, That to the neceſſity of aſſiſtance in money, for which this Preſidency had before, as has been ſeen, applied to that of *Bengal*, was now ſuperadded an urgent demand for a reinforcement of Troops; which, they ſay, the bare recital of their loſs would make evident, "eſpecially as it had been with the utmoſt difficulty that they could before, draught a ſufficient number of Troops from their garriſons to meet the Enemy in the Field." Letter to Governor General, &c. 14th Sept. 1780.

And Your Committee find, That this was enforced by a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, of the ſame date; who, after repreſenting the imminent danger of the Preſidency of *Madras*, entreats the Governor General and Council to lay aſide all plans againſt the Marattas, and unite in oppoſing *Hyder* and the French, who were certainly acting in concert. Vide Appendix, N° 9.

And Your Committee find by the General Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors, dated 15th October, that immediately upon the irruption of *Hyder Ally* in July, advertiſements had been iſſued for receiving Loans upon Company's Bonds; and that the ſupply raiſed by this means proving very inadequate, and having no other immediate reſource, they obſerve, that they had been obliged, in this exigency, to act contrary to orders, and to draw Bills on them to an amount exceeding £. 200,000.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob was required by Letter of 19th September, to return an exact and poſitive Anſwer to ſome queſtions put to him in regard to the contributions which might be depended on from him; and an Aſſignment of Territory was inſiſted upon, for all money which had been or ſhould be advanced for the payment of his troops. N° 91, Country Corr. Sel. Conſ. 22d Sept. Minute of Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon.

And Your Committee find, That the Anſwer of the Nabob to the Governor, dated the 1ſt October, contained an account of his great diſtreſs, and of his inability to aſſiſt, as he could wiſh, in furniſhing ſupplies; —that he had often given warning of the Enemy's intentions to invade the *Carnatic*, and was not then called upon to provide thoſe neceſſaries, which he had declared it would be very difficult to procure when the Enemy ſhould have entered his country—That now, when they had been two months in the *Carnatic*, he received a letter from the Governor, requeſting a ſupply of bullocks, ſheep, and rice; that, however, he would endeavour to procure them all, in as great number and quantity as he could;—and that he would exert himſelf to complete four regiments of Cavalry, which ſhould be put under the directions of the Commander in Chief during the War—That he would conſent to make aſſignments of Territory, for the ſums which ſhould be advanced by the Company to pay his Troops. N° 100, Country Corr.

It appears, That on the 6th of October, two Members of the Select Committee complained, That an alteration had been made in this Letter ſince they had ſeen it on the 2d.—Your Committee have not diſcovered what this alteration was; but it appears, that the Nabob, in ſeveral ſubſequent Letters, repeated his conſent to appropriate the revenues of *Tinnevelle*, *Ramnaut*, *Shevaganga*, and *Trichinopaly* for money advanced to pay the arrears due to his troops, and for their future payment; 20th October, N° 113. 25 October, N° 117.

ment; and that on the 30th of October, it was reſolved by the Select Committee, to diſcharge thoſe arrears, and to regulate the aſſignments in the manner then propoſed by the Preſident.

Minute Meſſrs. Smith and Johnſon, 13 Sept. Vide App. No 9.

And Your Committee find, That the Select Board now judged it to be a neceſſary meaſure to ſtrengthen the Fort of *Tanjore*; and it was propoſed to ſend a Detachment of Troops, who ſhould not be Tanjoreans, to reinforce the garriſon. And Colonel *Braithwaite*, who had on the 15th September been appointed to the command of that place, ſuggeſted an advice on the 23d of the ſame month, that a body of Horſe ſhould be raiſed in that country, where there formerly was ſome good Cavalry, which, having been ſince neglected, had deſerted to *Hyder*.

No 107, 11th October. No 116, 24 October. No 118, 13 October. Appendix, No 10.

And Your Committee find, That Letters were afterwards wrote to the Raja, to deſire his aſſiſtance for that purpoſe, and to put his Sebendy Corps under the direction of the Commandant at *Tanjore*; and alſo to requeſt from him a conſtant ſupply of proviſions, aſſuring him at the ſame time of protection: And it appears, that the Raja returned a very favourable Anſwer to theſe applications.

It appears, That the giving up the *Guntoor* Circar, which had been ſo long delayed, was now reſolved upon; and that the Select Committee, on the 14th September, wrote to Lieutenant *Douglas*, who commanded in that diſtrict; incloſing an order from the Nabob to his Managers, to withdraw from all further concern in that country. Lieutenant *Douglas* was alſo directed to write to *Bazalet Jung*'s Agent; and inform him of this intention, that he might take charge of the Circar till he ſhould receive inſtructions from his Maſter about it. The Company's Sepoys were to be collected together from different parts of the diſtrict, and to march immediately to *Ongole*, and to proceed from thence with all poſſible expedition to the Preſidency.

Your Committee have thought proper to put into the Appendix, No. 11. a Letter from the Governor to *Bazalet Jung* on this ſubject, which appears to have been wrote on the 23d September, in conſequence of a Motion made in the Select Committee by Mr. *Johnſon*; and in the ſame Appendix will be found a Letter from the Nabob on the ſame ſubject, dated 16th September; wherein alſo he deſired to be authorized to negociate a Treaty with the Nyſam.

Country Corr. No 92.

Country Corr. No 90.

And it appears, That the Select Committee came to a Reſolution on the 23d Sept. that the Governor ſhould write a Letter to that Prince, acquainting him with their having ordered the *Guntoor* Circar to be reſtored. This Letter appears to have been ſent on the 25th, and ſtates, That as his Highneſs had induced the Preſidency of *Bengal* to interfere for attaining that object, and they lament the long diſappointment they had found to their hopes of being able to pay him their arrears of the Peſhcuſh due for the other Circars; but deſire him to believe their aſſurances, that they will neglect no opportunity for the future of making good the balances; and they conclude with expreſſing a confident hope, "that his Highneſs would act according to the Treaties "ſubſiſting between him and the Company, and endea- "vour to the utmoſt of his power to check the deſigns "of their Enemies."

And Your Committee find, That it was reſolved, on the 13th September, by the Select Committee, to withdraw the greateſt part of the Troops from the other Circars, and to leave garriſons only in *Ganjam*, *Mazulipatam*, and *Vizagapatam*, the works of which were ordered to be ſtrengthened as much as poſſible; and that inſtructions were ſent to that effect, on the 14th and 16th September, to the Chiefs and Council of thoſe places; and at the ſame time they were directed to pack up their treaſure, and put it on board the *Nymph* ſloop of War, which Sir *Edward Hughes* had agreed to diſpatch with the packet to *Bengal*, and permitted it to touch at thoſe places on her return.

And Your Committee find, That Lieutenant *Douglas*, in obedience to his inſtructions, delivered up the *Guntoor* to *Bazalet Jung's* Manager; but was obliged to inform the Select Committee, by Letter dated the 24th September, that the Sepoys would deſert, if ordered to march to the Southward. And it appears that he was thereupon directed by Letter of 4th October, to leave them at *Ongole*; and that the four companies of the 7th Carnatic Battalion ſhould be ſent from thence to the Preſidency, according to his advice in a Letter dated the 1ſt October.

Letter dated 22 Sept. Select Cons. 27 Sept. Sel. Cons. 30 Sept. Letter to Capt. Edwards.

And Your Committee find, That a difficulty of a ſimilar nature, in another Circar, was not ſo happily concluded; for upon an attempt to embark the Sepoys for the Preſidency at *Mazulipatam* and *Viſagapatam*, they mutinied; and though at the firſt of theſe places order was reſtored by the addreſs of General *Stewart*, at the other they proceeded to acts of the moſt extreme outrage, killed ſome of their Officers, "and a complete "plunder of the place enſued, whereby the property of "every individual as well as that of the Company, had "ſuffered effectually."—It appeared that the mutineers then went off, accompanied by five companies of the Firſt Circar Battalion, which happened to be in garriſon there; and that there were great apprehenſions that the Sepoys in the *Cicacole* Circar would follow their example; and alſo, that the Zemindars would avail themſelves of that opportunity to throw off their allegiance; that *Sittaram Rauze* was not yet arrived at *Viſagapatam*, and that he kept away in a manner that had the appearance of premeditated delay; that on all theſe accounts there was much anxiety about the fate of that ſettlement.

Select Conſ. October 9. Letter from Maſulipatam, 2 Oct. Select Conſ. October 13. Letters from Viſagapatam, 4 and 5 October.

And it appears by further accounts, that *Viziram Rauze*, the Brother of *Sittaram Rauze*, had wrote Letters to the Zemindars to aſſiſt in ſuppreſſing the mutiny; but Your Committee find, by a Letter dated the 10th October, that the inſurgents had laid down their arms and part of their plunder, and had diſperſed.

Select Conſ. Oct. 18. Select Conſ. 30 Oct. Appendix, No 11.

And Your Committee find, That Sir *Hector Munro*, who had aſked and obtained leave to come to the Preſidency after he had encamped the remains of his Army on the Banks of the *Marmelon*, having again reſumed his ſeat in the Committee, propoſed and recommended there, on the 22d September, a mode, by which he hoped that the late misfortunes would be repaired, and the Army ſtrengthened as ſoon as poſſible, ſo as to enable them to oppoſe the Enemy. After explaining his plan for the ſtrengthening the principal garriſons; for raiſing Sepoy Recruits to complete their Battalions; for encreaſing their monthly pay to engage them in the ſervice, and perhaps alſo to tempt them to quit that of the Enemy; in ſhort, for the general regulation and diſtribution of the Forces, he urged the neceſſity of putting theſe meaſures into immediate execution; and then concludes in theſe words: "It is in Peace we ſhould pre- "pare for War. After the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, I had the "honour of addreſſing the Select Committee by Letter, "wherein I ſtated the defects in their garriſons and "ſtores, and pointed out the neceſſity of putting them "in ſuch a ſtate as to be ready on any emergency; and "I frequently recommended that the Troops ſhould "always be ready for the Field. I am ſorry to ſay that "any obſervations of mine had not the effect I could "have wiſhed. I ſhall ſay no more on what is paſt; it "is our buſineſs now to uſe every endeavour for the "public good. We ſhould have one voice, and one "hand, and if the ruling Power is ſteady and deter- "mined in its reſolutions, the executive part muſt and "will be properly attended to; nor can you make your- "ſelves more formidable to your Enemy, than by una- "nimity in your Council."

Select Conſ. 14 Sept. 1780. 15 Sept. Select Conſ. 23 Sept. Appendix, No 12. Sept. 1780.

And Your Committee find, That frequent conſiderations being now had of deviſing the moſt proper and effectual means for ſecurity and reſiſtance againſt the ſucceſsful Enemy, ſeveral Propoſitions were laid before the Select Committee, and ſeveral Reſolutions taken upon

upon them; the moſt material of which will be found in an Appendix, No. 13. And as the heavy loſs ſuſtained by the defeat of Colonel *Baillie*, made it moſt immediately obvious that the firſt neceſſary expedient was to endeavour to recruit the ſhattered Battalions, orders appear to have been diſpatched by the Select Board to different ſtations for that purpoſe; but as almoſt every diſtrict was now over-run by the Enemy's Troops, and communication thereby with the country greatly cut off, the means of gaining Recruits were of courſe much ſtreightened; it was found neceſſary to apply to the Nabob for leave to draft his Sebendy Corps, and alſo to order that recruiting money ſhould be increaſed to one pagoda. And as intimations were made to the Select Board, that the Europeans in *Hyder*'s ſervice were diſpoſed to deſert from it, they appear to have commiſſioned their Officers to hold out ſuch encouragement as might be likely to induce thoſe men to enter into the Company's Regiments. The Chief Engineer gave in a plan of meaſures neceſſary to be adopted for the defence of the *Black Town* and Fort; and it was particularly reſolved, on 25th September, to lay up ſix months ſtore of every kind of proviſion within the fort, as ſoon as poſſible; and the Preſident was deſired to take the neceſſary ſteps accordingly. The Commander of the Artillery propoſed, by Letter of 24th September, an augmentation of that Corps, which was agreed to be referred to the Court of Directors; ammunition and ſtores were ordered to thoſe places which were found to want them; and *Arcot* was reinforced by fifty Europeans from *Vellore*, ſo that the garriſon conſiſted, on the 26th September, of about 150 Europeans, beſides two companies of Sepoys commanded by the Company's Officers, and about 7,000 armed people; but the Nabob, ſtill anxious for the fate of his capital, of which *Hyder* had reſumed the ſiege, continually ſolicited freſh ſuccours, which could not be given to it.

Letter to Trichinopoly, 15 Sept. to Ongole, 16 Sept. &c. Select Conſ. 7 October 6. Letter from Ongole. Select Conſ. 19 October. Select Conſ. October 12. Minute of Sir H. Munro. Letter from Vellore, 5 Oct. Select Conſ. Oct. 10th. Letter to C. Lang. Select Conſ. 29 Sept. Select Conſ. 28 Sept. 28 October, Palamcotty, Trichinopoly, &c. Select Conſ. 23 and 25th Sept. N°95, 97, 99, 103, 108. 25th Sept. 27 Sept. 1 Oct. 6 D°, 12 D°. Appendix, N° 13.

It appears indeed to Your Committee, That much apprehenſion was at this time conceived for the ſituation of *Madras* itſelf, from the incomplete ſtate of the fortifications, the weakneſs of the garriſon, and the want of proviſions: And Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, in their Minute of the 11th October, made theſe, as well as the probable deſigns of the French from the Iſlands, the grounds of their deſire, that Sir *Edward Hughes* ſhould be requeſted not to quit that coaſt, but to bring his fleet into the Road, as ſoon as he could with ſafety.

But it appears to Your Committee, That the Admiral attended the Select Committee on the 12th October; and, after ſtating many urgent reaſons, which made it incumbent upon him to proceed to *Bombay*, obſerved moreover, That he did not think it probable that the French attack would be directed firſt to the *Coromandel* Coaſt; and that at all events, they were not to be expected during the enſuing monſoon; immediately after which, he ſhould hope himſelf to return.

And it appears, That the Committee then came to a Reſolution, not to make any further Requeſt to Sir *Edward*, to alter his Determination of proceeding to *Bombay*.

13 October. And it appears, That the Committee took the opportunity of ſending a packet by him to that Preſidency; in which they gave a relation of the defeat of their troops under Colonel *Baillie*, and remarked, with regret, the inconvenience they ſuffered from the abſence of thoſe Troops which they had detached to *Bombay*, to their Aſſiſtance, and that they wiſhed to have them returned to their Coaſt by the firſt Opportunity.

Appendix, N° 14. It appears, That the Select Committee, having received Advices from *Tellicherry*, that it was cloſely beſieged by the Nairs, aſſiſted with the Force of *Hyder Ally*, wrote to the Chief and Council, and to the Commandant of that place, inſtructing them, that as they conceived it not poſſible, without powerful ſupport, to keep poſſeſſion of it for any length of time, and as the ſituation of affairs rendered it neceſſary that the Troops ſhould return to the Preſidency with all poſſible expedition, they ſhould abandon the Settlement, and that Sir *Edward Hughes* would aſſiſt in bringing off the Troops, ſtores, and effects, and would tranſport them to *Anjengo*.

Dated 13th Oct. And it appears to Your Committee, That a Letter was written on the ſame day to Sir *Edward Hughes*, in which the Committee requeſted him to execute that ſervice. Appendix, N° 15.

15 October. And Your Committee find, That at this time a general Letter having been made up, and diſpatched by the *Nymph* Sloop of War, Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* delivered in a Minute, October 19th, expreſſive of their diſapprobation of the contents, as being a partial and unfair account of the tranſactions and events which it was meant to communicate to the Court of Directors; and they point out ſeveral circumſtances, which were omitted or miſrepreſented—they obſerved, "That they "might relate what had happened in the moſt favourable "manner their Records would allow, but on no account "to deviate from them; remarking, that by them, and "not by partial repreſentations, their conduct would be "judged; and that they therefore totally diſapproved "of every part of the Letter, which could not be cor-"roborated by the Minutes of the Committee."

It appears, That another joint Minute had been delivered in by the ſame Gentlemen, on the 14th inſtant, which they thought neceſſary to make the record of their ſentiments on the mode in which buſineſs was conducted in the Committee, that it might be ſeen how far any reſponſibility could be required of them in particular, who formed a part of the Government; that they would therefore point out the ruling influence which that inſtitution had thrown into the hands of the Governor, and conſequently, how much he was reſponſible for all meaſures that came before it.

They particularly remark his power of preſenting or ſuppreſſing all official information, and obſerve, "That "they had reaſon to think the late Preſident expected "before his departure, that the Company's poſſeſſions "on the Coaſt would be invaded by *Hyder*;—that they "likewiſe had reaſon to think that he knew magazines "were collecting on the frontiers of the *Carnatic*, at *Ben-"galore*, &c. and that they had been informed that Mr. "*Grey* wrote ſeveral Letters to him on that ſubject (al-"though only one appeared on record); but this in-"formation was never communicated to the Committee."

They then refer to ſeveral of their Minutes, which contained intelligence of *Hyder*'s deſigns, and of their advice to prepare to oppoſe him; and aſſert their opinion, that if thoſe meaſures had been attended to, it was probable that the Enemy would not have invaded the *Carnatic*, or that at all events the Army would have been in readineſs to have met him on his firſt appearance.—They condemn, in expreſs terms, many ſteps taken by the majority of the Committee ſince his irruption; and ſtate the conduct which they had themſelves purſued—"They think it neceſſary, in concluſion, to "deſire that the Court of Directors, and the Committee, "would refer to the Report of the late Preſident, rela-"tive to *Hyder*'s diſpoſition and intentions, as entered in "the Minutes of the Committee on 23d October 1779, "and to the Committee's unanimous Opinion thereupon; "and to Mr. *Smith*'s Minute 10th November, and to the "Committee's Opinion in conſequence thereof." (Appendix, No. 16.) in which Your Committee have alſo put a Letter from the Nabob to the Court of Directors, dated 17th October 1780. Appendix, N° 16.

Such were the ſteps which appear to have been taken at *Fort St. George*, in conſequence of the diſaſter, which had ſo weakened their power and reſources, as to occaſion a voluntary dereliction of ſome of their poſſeſſions, in order to be better enabled to preſerve the reſt.

Your Committee will now take a view of the proceedings at *Bengal*, on their receiving information of the irruption

irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, and of the heavy Loſs which had happened afterwards to *that* part of the *Madras* Army.

It appears, by the Conſultations of that Preſidency of the 4th September, That though a Motion was made to ſend a ſum of money to *Madras*, adequate to the emergency of the occaſion, provided they ſhould not be able to furniſh themſelves by the method they were purſuing, of raiſing money upon the Company's Bonds; yet, on farther reflection, it was agreed to wait till more particular accounts of the neceſſity ſhould be received, and a "further information had of the ſtate of that Preſi- "dency with relation to its diſpoſition for repelling the "actual or pretended invaſion, whichever it might prove, "and the other diſtinct ſervices to which they might "propoſe to apply the ſums afforded them; and eſpe- "cially as two modes of remittance were already pro- "vided, which, though not ample, would prove a ſuffi- "cient relief to their immediate wants."

Conſultation, 22, 25, 26, 27 Sept.

The accounts which followed ſoon after, of the defeat of Colonel *Baillie*, and of the alarming diſtreſs in which the Britiſh affairs on the Coaſt of *Coromandel* were involved, by the ſucceſsful progreſs of *Hyder Ally*, occaſioned meaſures of more immediate relief to be propoſed and adopted: It was reſolved to ſend a ſupply of 15 lacks of rupees, to tranſport to *Madras* immediately a conſiderable reinforcement of European Troops, and that ſeveral Battalions of Sepoys ſhould follow them at a proper ſeaſon, and in the manner which ſhould then be found moſt adviſable; for the ſeaſon was now too far advanced to prepare veſſels to carry ſo large a body of men provided, (which could hardly be hoped) that the Sepoys would ſubmit to an embarkation, and get the better of their repugnance to a paſſage by ſea.—The roads by land lay through a marſhy country, and were yet impaſſable, and there were yet alſo to be removed the doubts of the deſign with which the Berar Army was ſtationed in the very line of the route which they muſt take.—Sir *Eyre Coote* was deſired, and he agreed, to proceed himſelf immediately to the Coaſt, and take the command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment. And it was urged, that, "Though the danger impending on the "Company's intereſts in the *Carnatic* might be eaſily "repelled, even with the force which it already poſſeſſed "for its defence, yet, that no reliance could be placed "upon it, unleſs it ſhould be properly applied and con- "ducted;—that it did not appear to have been properly "applied, nor could be expected to be properly con- "ducted, unleſs Sir *Eyre Coote* would at this criſis ſtand "forth, and vindicate, in his own perſon, the rights and "honour of the Britiſh Arms."

Doubts alſo being then ſuggeſted, of the propriety of truſting ſo large a ſum as 15 lacks of rupees to the management of the Gentlemen of *Madras*, from an apprehenſion that they would "not only miſapply but waſte "it;" a Reſolution was taken, that the treaſure ſhould be conſigned to Sir *Eyre Coote*, and appropriated excluſively to anſwer military charges; "but that he ſhould "be authorized to advance any part of it on the requi- "ſition of the Preſident and Select Committee of "*Fort St. George*, ſhould he agree in the expediency of "doing ſo."

Theſe particulars were communicated to the *Madras* Board, in a Letter from the Governor General and Council of 2d October; wherein, after expreſſing a moſt ſenſible concern at the fatal check which the Company's arms had received, they declare, "that they purpoſely "forbear at preſent from making any obſervations on "that event, or on the ſteps which if taken would, in "their opinion, have prevented it." They inform them alſo of having ſent ſome ſalt proviſions in caſe of a ſiege, and of the means taken to provide them with grain; of their having reſolved to offer terms of Peace to the Marattas, and of having written to Sir *Edward Hughes*, requeſting him to direct, if poſſible, the operations of His Majeſty's Squadron againſt the poſſeſſions and ſhips of *Hyder*, on the Coaſt of *Malabar*.

In their Letter to Sir *Edward Hughes*, which was alſo of the ſame date with that to *Madras*, they particularly remark to him, that they had reſolved on a Peace with the Marattas; "that it had been long their wiſh to ſee an early iſſue to their differences, and were happy to "obſerve, that this wiſh ſeemed to accord with the "ſentiments ſtrongly conveyed to them in his Letter of "the 14th ult."

To theſe Reſolutions the Governor General and Council added another, which they came to, on the 10th October, of ſuſpending Mr. *Whitehill* from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*, for ſeveral cauſes aſſigned in their Secret Conſultations of that date.—They tranſmitted accounts of all theſe proceedings to the Court of Directors, in Letters of the 13th and 17th October; in the latter of which they refer to a Letter they wrote to *Fort St. George* on the 20th of January 1778, reſpecting the diſpoſition of the Troops on that Eſtabliſhment; and declare it to be their opinion, that, had that diſpoſition been attended to, or the advice contained in that Letter followed, the calamity which their Forces lately ſuffered and which was owing to a diviſion of the Troops at a moment of emergency, would not have happened.

Appendix, N° 17.

It appears to Your Committee, That Sir *Eyre Coote* arrived at *Madras* on the 5th November, and that he took his ſeat as Second in Council on the 7th, when the general Letter from the *Bengal* Preſidency, containing their order and reaſons for the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Whitehill*, was read; and alſo a Minute of Mr. *Whitehill*'s, in which he diſclaims and proteſts againſt the authority of the Supreme Council to deprive him of his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*, and holds every Member of Adminiſtration who ſhould ſubmit to it on the preſent occaſion to be anſwerable to the Eaſt India Company for the ſubverſion of the Government, and to him, for any loſs he may ſuſtain in his perſon or liberty.

And it appears in the Conſultations of the 8th November, that Mr. *Whitehill* was held to be ſuſpended by a Majority of the Council; and that Mr. *Smith*, as next to the Chair, ſucceeded to the Government.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and Select Committee informed the Court of Directors, by Letter dated 29th November, of the aſſiſtance which Sir *Eyre Coote* had brought to their Preſidency in money and Troops, and that a large reinforcement of Sepoys was expected to march from *Bengal* to join their Troops, as ſoon as the weather would permit; but its arrival at *Madras* could not be looked for, earlier than March; even on a ſuppoſition that the Detachment ſhould not be oppoſed on its march, either by the Troops of *Mooſajee Booſla*, the Raja of *Berar*, or by thoſe of the Nyiam, which it was impoſſible to ſay it might not, although neither of thoſe Powers had yet broke with the Company.

It appears to Your Committee alſo by this diſpatch, That the Pettah of *Arcot* having been carried by aſſault on the 31ſt October, after a ſiege of ſix weeks, the Fort ſurrendered to *Hyder Ally*, by capitulation, on the 3d of November; and that this loſs was conſidered to be of great importance, as there were lodged in it, a very large quantity of ſtores of all kinds, and as it was extenſive enough to afford protection and accommodation for the whole Army of the Enemy.

It appears alſo, That *Hyder*'s Cavalry having over-run and laid waſte the whole country, the chief ſupply of proviſions, and draught and carriage bullocks, for the Britiſh Army, was thus cut off. No money could be obtained from the Nabob, or from the Rajah of *Tanjore*. The Revenues of the Nabob, indeed, had ſuffered much from the incurſion of the Enemy, and the deſolation of his territories; but the Raja of *Tanjore* had not yet had a grain of his country touched. And, "thus," ſay they, "from

" from our paſt diſappointments and preſent proſpects, " we can place but little dependance on any other re- " ſource than that of *Bengal* for carrying on the War; " and as to the expences of the Civil Department, we " have very ſlender hope of procuring ſufficient to anſwer " them from any quarter."

And Your Committee find, That Sir *Eyre Coote*, in Letters to the Court of Directors, to one of His Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, and to the Secretary at War, exhibits a very ſtriking and melancholy picture of the ſituation of affairs on his arrival at *Madras*; where he found their preſent ſtate to be indeed more diſtreſſed and ſunk than he even could have had any idea of, and the proſpect of alteration appeared hardly leſs diſcouraging. He profeſſes to avoid a minute diſquiſition of the perſons or cauſes to which theſe misfortunes might be attributed; " but he ſhould hope that both would be brought " forward to public view; and that the Nation might " thereby have an opportunity of redreſſing itſelf of " thoſe who had wantonly injured its honour and inte- " reſts." He obſerves, that, regardleſs of the jealouſy which muſt have been expected in every native Power, from our having driven out our only European competitor from that quarter of the world, the Government of *Madras* had contrived, by an inexcuſable effort of bad policy, to ſtimulate that jealouſy into avowed reſentment—that this was ſtrongly inſtanced by their conduct in regard to *Hyder*, who, incenſed at their refuſal to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas, as by Treaty they were virtually bound to do, had ſince received other provocations from them to ruſh into open hoſtility; and though well-informed and aware of his intentions againſt the *Carnatic*, they had choſen not only themſelves to diſcredit them, but to diſſuade the belief of others; they had made no oppoſition to his entry into the province, nor taken the ſmalleſt precautions for their own ſecurity—that moreover, this inactivity had ſtill continued; and what ought to have been their firſt care, lay as much neglected as if no Enemy had been near. That the Troops were diſpirited, the Sepoys deſerting, the country deſolated, the inhabitants treacherous, all communications were cut off, their proviſions were conſumed, and their reſources exhauſted. The Nabob, ſo far from being able to give aſſiſtance in this exigency, had neither men, money, or influence, and looked up to the Company for the ſupport of his intereſts and credit—that *Arcot* had fallen into *Hyder*'s hands; an event which, whilſt it gave him almoſt every thing he would wiſh, produced effects the moſt embarraſſing to the Company's affairs, and to the conduct of the War on their part; that other forts and garriſons had ſurrendered without reſiſtance, and their Commanders were thereby to be ſuſpected of treachery; but that ſo ſhameful had been the neglect of every neceſſary for their defence, that they were furniſhed with an excuſe for ſo readily giving them up—even the neceſſary arrangements for the ſecurity of *Fort St. George*, the very foundation of our exiſtence on that coaſt, had not been made; no pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for their defence; the field artillery requiſite for a campaign, was ſo far from being in readineſs, that the carriages were then making up; that it was true, how ſurpriſing ſoever, that *Pondicherry* was, when evacuated, left not only not in a condition uſeleſs to the French, in caſe of their landing on that coaſt, but open and convenient for their reception—nothing but the fortifications deſtroyed, the French inhabitants left in ample poſſeſſion of their houſes; and in conſequence, they had riſen in arms, robbed the Reſident, and raiſed two or three Battalions of Sepoys, which they called *Hyder*'s, but which were evidently French. Large quantities of proviſions were laying up at *Carongolly*, in the neighbourhood of *Pondicherry*, which being on the ſea coaſt, could be intended only for the French on their arrival. To ſuch diſadvantages, ariſing from theſe misfortunes, and this miſconduct on their part, was to be added the increaſe of ſuperiority to the Enemy, by his good policy, as well as the ſtrength and ſucceſs of his arms; for, that *Hyder* had taken every meaſure which could occur to the moſt experienced General to diſtreſs us, and to render himſelf formidable; and " that his conduct in his " civil capacity had been ſupported by a degree of poli- " tical addreſs unequalled by any Power that had yet ap- " peared in *Hindoſtan*."

That the ſmallneſs of the Britiſh Force, and of their reſources, compared to thoſe of *Hyder*, augmented the difficulties of future conteſt with him—That his army, on the moſt moderate computation, " amounted to not " leſs than 70,000 Infantry (common report makes them " 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular Batta- " lions, 400 Europeans under the command of a Mr. " *Lally*, 100 pieces of cannon of different calibres, " which are worked by Europeans, in number 300, and " black Artillery diſciplined by us, and formerly in the " ſervice of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, and at the ſiege " of *Arcot* were ſo well ſerved, as repeatedly to have diſ- " mounted our guns upon the batteries; his approaches, " on that occaſion, were as well carried on as if con- " ducted by the moſt ſkilful Engineers. He has got " 30,000 Cavalry, of which 2,000 are Abiſſynean Horſe, " which conſtantly attend his perſon; 10,000 Carnatic " Horſe, well trained, half of which, we are well informed, " are compoſed of thoſe regiments which were diſbanded " from and deſerted the ſervice of the Nabob within " theſe laſt four years, and which were all diſciplined by " Engliſh Officers; the reſt of his cavalry are the com- " mon horſe of the country, under different Chiefs."—That to ſecure a ſupply of proviſions for ſo numerous an army, he had, beſides other reſources, 30,000 bullocks, which were conſtantly employed in that ſervice.

Sir *Eyre Coote* then ſtates the Force under his own immediate command; which, not exceeding 7,000 men in all, of whom only 1,700 were Europeans, was totally unequal to the undertaking of an attack upon *Hyder*, in his ſtrong poſts; but that he was taking every ſtep, and making every neceſſary arrangement, as well for encouraging the Sepoys, repairing the ſhattered condition of the Army, and for the ſecurity of our remaining poſſeſſions, as for facilitating his operations againſt the Enemy; and had written to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to Sir *Edward Hughes*, and to General *Goddard*, to unite in diſtreſſing *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* Coaſt, and to be particularly aſſiduous in promoting Peace with the Marattas.

It appears alſo, That in theſe diſpatches Sir *Eyre Coote* incloſes two Tranſlates of Treaties, which, as he was informed, had been really entered into; the one between the French and *Hyder*, and the other between that Prince and the Marattas; and they will be found in the Appendix, No. 18. Appendix, N° 18.

Your Committee having thus completed the Narrative of all tranſactions ſubſequent to the irruption of *Hyder*, including the accounts brought by the laſt diſpatches, it appears to them to be now properly the next ſtep of their enquiry, to learn what ſymptoms of diſcontent, or what indications of enmity, were diſcovered in *Hyder Ally*, at any time before his irruption into the *Carnatic*, in order that the Houſe may be enabled to judge of the degree of warning which the Company's Servants received of his hoſtile intentions.

And Your Committee having found it ſuggeſted in ſeveral of the late diſpatches, wherein any Remarks on the cauſes of the preſent Invaſion are made, that he had conſtantly manifeſted a ſpirit of reſentment againſt the Engliſh, ſince the time when the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* refuſed to ſend aſſiſtance of troops to co-operate with him againſt the Marattas, which he demanded in virtue of the Treaty concluded 3d April 1769, between the Preſidency and him:

Your Committee were led to examine that Treaty; a copy of which, with the Obſervations annexed, will be found in the Appendix, No. 19; and they deſire to

direct the attention of the Houſe to the Second Article of it, wherein it is ſtipulated, "That in caſe either of the "contracting Parties ſhall be attacked, they ſhall, from "their reſpective Countries, mutually aſſiſt each other to "drive the Enemy out."

Your Committee will not here make any political remarks upon this, or any other article of the Treaty in queſtion, as ſuch will be more properly introduced in a future part of theſe Reports; they mean at preſent to confine themſelves to the fact of *Hyder*'s demanding aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, and of any tokens of diſpleaſure or reſentment, in conſequence of their delay, or refuſal, to gratify him.

N° 210. And it appears to Your Committee, That on the 29th of May following the concluſion of this Treaty, *Hyder* wrote to the Governor of *Madras*, and after propoſing to unite *Jenagee Bonasila* with them in a new Treaty, which ſhould be made for that purpoſe, he ſignified his deſign of recovering ſome places which had been for two years in the hands of *Maudhorcow*, and deſired, "that "(conſiſtent with the friendſhip and regard ſubſiſting "between them, and the good appearance thereof in "the eyes of the world) he would ſend to his aſſiſtance, "for form ſake, an Officer with a Battalion of Sepoys."

1769. N° 216. And Your Committee find, That the Governor, in his Anſwer dated 16th June, excuſed himſelf from ſending the Troops for the purpoſe required, as ſuch a ſtep would amount to a Declaration of War againſt the Marattas, for which the Company had no juſt ground; and he therefore hoped, that *Hyder* would decline aſking of it.—He at the ſame time repreſented to him, that it would be improper for him to conclude any Treaty without conſulting the other Preſidencies.

1769. Mil. Conſ. Fort St. George. N° 239. And Your Committee find, by a Minute of the Preſident's of the 24th July, that he ſuppoſed it to be the intention of *Hyder* to draw the Preſidency into a War with the Marattas. And a Letter from *Hyder* to his Vakeel, of the 1ſt of July, makes it appear that he had requeſted the Battalion of Sepoys from the Preſidency, thereby to make a trial of their intentions, whether they would aſſiſt him with their Troops according to agreement, in caſe the Marattas began a War.

Appendix, N° 19. And your Committee find, by a Letter from *Hyder* to the Governor of *Fort St. George*, dated 7th March 1770 (No. 84.) that the Marattas had entered his territories, and had taken ſeveral forts—And he again deſires aſſiſtance in theſe words: "In conſideration of the Union "between us, the Army and Artillery, which are with "me, are your own; notwithſtanding, out of Regard to "the firm agreement mentioned in the Treaty between "us, if the Company be but pleaſed to ſend but a ſmall "force to join and act in concert with me to ſave the "good appearance, and to be talked of by the people, it "will be very proper."

1770. Mil. Conſ. Fort St. George, 30 April. And Your Committee find, by a Letter dated 21ſt March, from Meſſrs. *Church* and *Sibbald* to the Preſident and Council, who were then in *Hyder*'s Camp, that he had deſired them to inform the Governor and Council, that as there was a ſtrict friendſhip between them, which he ſhould, on his part, punctually maintain, he expected to be aſſiſted with a body of troops, &c. and that he was even willing to engage to give the Company three Lacks of Rupees, through the hopes of their aſſiſtance.—And theſe Gentlemen remark, that they much feared his former coolneſs would return again, if they did not comply.

Mil. Conſ. 12 March 1770. Mil. Conſ. 30 Apr. 1770, &c. And Your Committee find, That the *Madras* Board continually evaded compliance with theſe demands, under various pretences, and particularly on the ground of expecting the Commiſſioners, who had been then appointed to come into *India* with a general ſuperintending power.—The maxim of delay appears to Your Committee to have been reſolved on by the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*; and that the inſtructions from home confirmed them in adhering to thoſe Reſolutions, though the Marattas in the mean time gained great advantages over *Hyder*, and he became proportionably more earneſt in his repreſentations of the neceſſity which impelled him to require the aid ſtipulated by the Treaty.

Appendix, N° 20. And Your Committee find, by the Select Conſultation of the 29th of November 1771, wherein the Preſident ſtates the ſituation of the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*, that the former ſeemed determined to deſtroy *Hyder*, and annex his dominions to their preſent poſſeſſions; and that as he was unable to oppoſe them in the field, he could have nothing to depend upon, but the proviſions laid up in his principal forts, which muſt of courſe be greatly exhauſted.—And on the ſame Conſultation will be found the difficulties ſtarted by the Preſident, in regard to the conduct which the Preſidency ſhould hold between the contending parties, and particularly from their not having received poſitive inſtructions from the Court of Directors. It appears, however, that they at laſt determined not to make any declaration in favour of either ſide.

Appendix, N° 21. And Your Committee find, That on the 23d of January 1772, it was reſolved by the Governor and Council, to inform *Hyder Ally*, in Anſwer to a Letter from him, ſetting forth the advantages of joining him againſt the Marattas, that the orders received from the Company prevented their ſending their troops out of the *Carnatic* to the aſſiſtance of any one.

Country Corr. N° 16. And Your Committee find, by a Letter from *Hyder Ally* to the Governor of *Fort St. George*, dated the 9th of July 1772, that he had concluded a Peace with the Marattas, of which he adviſed them, in conformity to the friendſhip ſubſiſting between them.

N° 130. Appendix, N° 22.

13 Dec. 1771. N° 180. And Your Committee find, by ſeveral Records, ſome of which will be found in the Appendix, No. 23. that the Nabob, *Mahomed Ally*, frequently preſſed the Governor and Council to enter into alliance with the Marattas againſt *Hyder Ally*; and it appears, that His Majeſty's Miniſters Plenipotentiaries in thoſe parts, openly concurred in recommending negociations for that purpoſe; but Your Committee do not find, that in effect the Government of *Fort St. George* did conclude any ſuch engagements with them.

Select Conſ. 12 June 1771. Mill. 22 Apr. 1771. Appendix, N° 23.

And Your Committee find, by a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Madras*, the 8th of December 1774, to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, that *Hyder* had taken the opportunity, while the Attention of the Marattas had been engaged by their diſtractions at home, to recover the whole of the countries which they had within a few years paſt wreſted from him. And that it was evident, that by means of the French he was plentifully ſupplied with military ſtores; and that Adventurers of that nation were allowed, if not encouraged, to enter into his ſervice.

And it appears alſo by the ſame Letter, That a correſpondence had for ſome time been carried on between the Nabob and *Hyder Ally*; but, "that from the jealou- "ſies which they entertained of each other, there appeared "little probability of an hearty union ever taking place "between them."

Appendix, N° 24. And Your Committee find, That frequent accounts were received of *Hyder*'s attention to the augmentation and diſcipline of his Troops; and that for ſome years the uncertainty of his deſigns cauſed much conſultation, and that ſuſpicions were at ſundry times, during the Years 1775, 1776, and 1777, entertained of his hoſtile Intentions againſt the Company and the *Carnatic*, particularly by the Nabob, who alſo expreſſed his apprehenſions of the conſequences of an alliance between the French and *Hyder*, in caſe of a war with the former power.

Mil. Conſ. 23 Jan. 1775. Appendix, N° 25.

But it appears to Your Committee, That the ideas which the *Madras* Preſidency entertained of their ſtate of connection with *Hyder*, or apprehenſions from his increaſing power, will be beſt explained by a reference to their Letters, deſcriptive of the poſture of affairs with reſpect to the Country Powers. — And it appears by a Minute in the military Conſultations, on the poſture of affairs with regard to the Country Powers, 21 April 1777,

1777, That *Hyder*, then engaged in war with the Marattas, was expected to apply to the French for aſſiſtance; that he had received military ſtores by the way of *Mahé*, and it was ſuppoſed that the people embarked on board the man of war that carried thoſe ſtores, were intended for his ſervice: The Minute concludes thus: "Should, however, the deſigns of *Hyder* prove unſuc-"ceſsful againſt the Marattas, it is not improbable to ſup-"poſe the French would deem it a favourable oppor-"tunity to afford him the aſſiſtance which we have rea-"ſon to believe they have long premeditated againſt the "*Carnatic*."

Appendix, N° 26.

And Your Committe find, That the Governor General and Council, in their Letter of the 17th September 1777, to the *Madras* Council, deſire to receive a return of the actual State of the Troops under that Preſidency, and an Account of the Views and Connections of the different Country Potentates, their Strength and Reſources, together with their opinion of ſuch alliance as they would recommend to be formed in caſe of emergency.

Mil. Conſ. 27 Oct.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George* returned an Anſwer on the 16th of January 1778, and ſent the Return required; and took occaſion to obſerve how much they depended on the Nabob for money to pay their troops, and how neceſſary it would be to have always in the treaſury a ſufficient fund to anſwer the exigencies of War; but, that under the preſent ſyſtem they might be unable, were the *Carnatic*, or the poſſeſſions of the Company, ſuddenly, invaded, to put their troops in the field, ſo as to employ them to any good purpoſe. With reſpect to the views and connections of the different Powers, they obſerve, that the Marattas and *Hyder Ally* were engaged in war, and that on account of the late inteſtine diviſions of the former, *Hyder* appeared now in a condition to reſiſt them with ſome proſpect of ſucceſs. They ſtate the reſpective force of theſe Opponents, and particularly the great power and revenues of *Hyder*; and they obſerve, that he kept up a conſtant correſpondence with Monſieur *Bellecombe*, at *Pondicherry*, who endeavoured all in his power to engage him in the intereſt of the French. They give it as their opinion, that *Hyder Ally* might be made an uſeful Ally to the Company, but that they were afraid the Nabob would never be brought to act cordially in ſuch an alliance, as he had long entertained a rooted enmity towards *Hyder*, and had, on ſeveral Occaſions, manifeſted it, in Oppoſition to his own Intereſts.

Appendix, N° 27.

And Your Committee find, That a few days after the *Madras* Board ſent the account laſt related, the Preſident received a Letter, dated 5th January 1778, from *Hyder*, containing an account of a great Victory obtained by him over the Marattas, who had penetrated into the *Balaghaut*, with an army of 50,000 men; and that he gives this account of his ſucceſs to the Governor, from his conſideration of their alliance and friendſhip.

N° 25.

And your Committee find, That on the 13th February 1778, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, who arrived at *Madras* on the 8th, ſends an Anſwer of Congratulation, and at the ſame time informs *Hyder* of his having ſucceeded to the charge of Governor and Preſident of *Fort St. George*; to which *Hyder* replied 24th March, and after ſome expreſſions of civility obſerves, that for a length of time the Company and he had been allied by ties of friendſhip, and that he entertained no doubt of the new Governor's confirming and ſtrengthening them.

N° 67.

Appendix, N° 28. Fort St. George, Mil. Conſ.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor reported to the Council held on the 4th July 1778, an account of a converſation which he had had with *Hyder*'s Vakeel, on the ſubject of ſome overtures for an alliance, which he was authorized by his Maſter to propoſe; the principal Articles of which were, that *Hyder* would aſſiſt in placing *Ragonaut Row* in the Peſhwaſhip; that he ſhould be ſupplied by the *Madras* Government with military ſtores, artillery, and fire-arms, and with a body of troops, which he would pay for, either in ſpecie or by grant of lands: And that a general declaration was at the ſame time made by his Vakeel, that his wiſhes ever had been to cultivate a friendſhip with the Engliſh; that he had been deterred by cauſes which it was not neceſſary for him to point out, but that he was now ready to negotiate and to conclude a Treaty of Alliance and Friendſhip.

It appears, That the Governor then pointed out the advantages of an alliance with *Hyder*, whoſe Vakeel had hinted at the diſappointments which his Maſter had hitherto met with, to his deſire of cultivating that friendſhip, and he, (the Governor) attributed to that backwardneſs on the part of the Engliſh, that *Hyder* had been impelled to ſhew more attention to the French, than he otherwiſe would have done; and remarking upon the danger of his cementing a cloſer alliance with them, obſerved, "That it would be a circumſtance of fatal tendency, "and almoſt the only event which would endanger the "*Carnatic*, and the ſafety of the Britiſh poſſeſſions on "the Coaſt."

On theſe accounts he adviſed the meaſure of entering into a negotiation with *Hyder*, and to propoſe a meeting for that purpoſe with him, as the moſt eligible method of ſettling the Treaty.

To theſe ſuggeſtions the Board gave entire aſſent, and at the ſame time agreed to acquaint the Supreme Council of their Proceedings.

Your Committee find, That in conſequence of the Reſolutions of the Board, Letters were written to *Hyder*, and a Meeting propoſed, with a view of more eaſily accompliſhing an agreement upon proper terms; and that *Hyder* in his Anſwer, dated 31 July, received 16th Auguſt, informed the Governor, that "in truth, a ſin-"cere friendſhip had ſubſiſted from the beginning be-"tween the Company and him," and that he wiſhes to continue it; that he ſhould conſider of the propoſals mentioned by his Vakeel; but obſerved, that the great diſtance between them would prevent a meeting at preſent, which he ſhould hope hereafter to effect; and promiſed to write, when the march of his army was fixed, upon the ſubject of a Perſon of conſequence being ſent to his Durbar.

July 8, 1778. N° 95. N° 141.

Appendix, N° 29.

It appears to Your Committee, That in the mean time, Letters dated 25th June 1778, had been received from *Bengal*, which communicated accounts tranſmitted from *Bombay*, of *Hyder*'s friendly intercourſe with the French; and that the Preſidency of *Bombay* propoſed ſending a Reſident to his Durbar to endeavour to counteract their ſchemes; on which the Governor General and Council obſerved, that they ſhould make no objection, if the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, who had a perſonal animoſity againſt *Hyder*, ſhould conſent to it.

Mil. Conſ. 16 July 1778.

It appears alſo, That the *Madras* Council informed that of *Bengal*, by Letter of 19th July, of the circumſtances relative to the propoſed alliance with *Hyder*, and expreſſed their opinion of the importance of ſecuring his friendſhip, as they were on the eve of a War with *France*, but at the ſame time doubted of ſucceſs in completing a deſirable Treaty, as the former Government had formerly refuſed his importunities to form engagements of mutual aſſiſtance when he wanted ſupport, which he, on our refuſal, had applied for and gained from other foreign Powers; and therefore nothing but a regard to his intereſts, which point out the Engliſh as the moſt uſeful Allies to him, could induce him to enter into new engagements with them; and on account of the ſituation between them and *Hyder*, with reſpect to the *Carnatic* and the Company's poſſeſſions on that coaſt, they wiſh to ſend a Reſident to his Durbar from their Preſidency, rather than that one ſhould be ſent from that of *Bombay*; and add, that they are perſuaded it would be more agreeable to the Nabob.

Your Committee find, That in another Letter, dated 2d Auguſt 1778, to the Supreme Council, they remark, that it would not be poſſible to conclude engagements with *Hyder* on any other terms than mutual aſſiſtance; and that the Treaty of 1769 appeared to them fully to expreſs

expreſs the condition on which his friendſhip was now to be ſecured; "and that if that Treaty had not been "evaded by the former Government, they did not be- "lieve that *Hyder* would deſire any new engagements "at this time, &c."

Select Conſ. 29 Sept. 1778. And Your Committee find, That the Supreme Council aſſured the Preſidency of *Madras*, by Letter 14th Auguſt 1778, that they fully approved of the propoſals for forming a new alliance with *Hyder*; but obſerved, that they muſt require a total alteration with reſpect to the immediate objects of that alliance, as in reality, *Ragonaut Row* was not the end, but only made the means of accompliſhing their Deſigns in the Weſt of *India*; and they therefore deſired, that the firſt article might remain to be finally adjuſted by the communications which ſhould be received from Mr. *Elliot* in regard to the conditions he might have concluded with *Moodagee Boonſla*.

Appendix, N° 30.

And Your Committee obſerve, That Accounts having been received at *Madras* about this time, of our rupture with *France*, an Expedition was undertaken, and ſucceeded, for the reduction of *Pondicherry*; and Letters dated 30th October 1778, containing information of that ſucceſs, were ſent to the Nyſam and to *Hyder*, and the latter was deſired to acquaint the Governor more explicitly with his ſentiments on their intended Treaty, as the *Madras* Preſidency very much wiſhed to ſhew (now that they had put an end to the power of the French in *India*) their moderation and ſincerity of friendſhip towards thoſe who had given them Proofs of their good will, and deſire to live in amity with them.—That particularly in regard to him, they conſidered an alliance between him and the Company as for the intereſts of both, and therefore the Governor wiſhed to meet him to conſer with him on that ſubject.

N° 166.

And Your Committee find, That *Hyder* returned an Anſwer, dated 29th November 1778, expreſſive of his pleaſure at the reduction of *Pondicherry*, and promiſed to write on the ſubject of an interview with the Governor when he had finiſhed an Expedition, on which he was then engaged.

N° 190.

But it appears, That accounts were now received which tended to make the ſincerity of this congratulation doubtful; for Your Committee find, that the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* had addreſſed Enquiries, 4th Auguſt, to the Chief and Council of *Tellicherry*, about the State of *Mahé*, with a view to ſet on foot an expedition againſt it; and that Mr. *Church*, in his Anſwer of September 2d, informed them, that *Mahé* was in the country of the King of *Cartinaddy*, who, with the other Princes of the neighbourhood, were tributaries to *Hyder*, and that there was a prevailing report of his having directed them to aſſiſt the French in caſe of an attack upon them by the Engliſh: And it appears, that Mr. *Church* ſent further Accounts, 2d December 1778, and at the ſame time informed the Board, that 300 of *Hyder*'s Sepoys were in the garriſon at *Mahé*, and that 150 Europeans had marched from thence to *Mangalore* on 16th September, to join the army of *Hyder*, for whoſe ſervice they had arrived from *Mauritius* in July.

Select Conſ. 29 Sept. 1778.

Select Conſ. 17 Dec.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident recommended on 27th November 1778, ſeveral points for conſideration, relative to their undertaking an expedition againſt *Mahé*: And it appears that theſe informations occaſioned ſome doubts in the Select Committee which met afterwards upon this ſubject, whether they ſhould venture upon this enterprize at a diſtance from the *Carnatic*, as they might expect oppoſition in their march from *Hyder*'s dependants acting under his orders; and they were led the more to apprehend it, being aſſured by Letters from *Bombay*, dated 12th December, that *Hyder* was ſaid to have allowed the French to hoiſt his Colours in the Place, ſhould it be attacked by the Engliſh.

But it appears to Your Committee, That after many Conſultations, at ſome of which Sir *Eyre Coote* aſſiſted, they became determined in their opinions, that the advantages much exceeded the riſk, and delay was likely to be deſtructive of ſucceſs, and they therefore reſolved, on 7th December, to direct the attempt to be made immediately; and Sir *Hector Munro* was deſired to prepare an arrangement of the Troops neceſſary, and ſettle the liſt of ſtores; and that they ſhould not wait for an Anſwer from *Hyder* to a Letter, which it was reſolved that the Governor ſhall write to inform him of the deſign.

Select Conſ. 27 Nov. 30 Do. 4 Dec. 7 Dec. 10 Dec. 1778. 29 Dec.

And Your Committee find, That ſoon after theſe Reſolutions were made, the neceſſity of cultivating a good underſtanding with *Hyder*, whom the Governor obſerved not to be pleaſed with the capture of *Pondicherry*, became a ſubject of conſideration in the Select Committee 11th January 1779; and that it was agreed to ſend a Reſident to his Durbar to negotiate a Treaty with him, or in the view that at all events his real diſpoſition and deſigns might be known, and precautions taken on their part accordingly.

4 Jan. 1779.

Select Conſ. 14 Jan.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter was wrote to him on 16th January, in which he is requeſted to admit a Reſident at his Durbar, and in the concluſion of it is informed of the intended expedition againſt *Mahé*.

N° 10.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter of Inſtructions was given to Colonel *Braithwaite* on 18th January; wherein it was obſerved, that from the paſſive conduct of *Hyder Ally* during the operations againſt *Pondicherry*, the Board were inclined to think he had no ſerious intentions of aſſiſting the French, eſpecially now that they were at the laſt ſtake, and that therefore, on every ground, it was warrantable to conclude that he would not break with the Engliſh; and that as to ſecret ſupport on this occaſion by means of his Tributaries, Colonel *Braithwaite* would be ſtrong enough to encounter that; but at the ſame time, he was to be cautious not to riſk a defeat, if he had reaſon to believe that *Hyder* ſhould declare openly in their favour, and aſſiſt them with a very ſuperior force.

Appendix, N° 31.

It appears to Your Committee, That this ſtep became the more neceſſary, as the Nabob now communicated intelligence of the progreſs of *Hyder*'s arms towards the *Kiſtna*; and that there was great reaſon to believe, that, after reducing the *Cuddepah* and *Kannoul* countries, againſt which he was now about to march, and which, unleſs protected by troops from the Preſidency or from him, muſt certainly be ſubdued, he intended to proceed to an attack upon *Nellore* and the *Carnatic*; and that he was determined ſo to do, if the Engliſh made any Attempt upon *Mahé*, and that he had detached a large body of horſe to the frontiers for that purpoſe. It appears that this laſt information was communicated by the Nabob's Governor of *Arcot*, who at the ſame time repreſented the bad ſtate of the fortifications at that place.

N° 17. 29th Jan. 1779.

N° 18, 30 Jan.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob tranſmitted alſo intelligence 4th February 1779, which he had received from *Hyderabad*, that the *Bombay* Army had been ſurrounded and made priſoners by the Marattas, which ſeemed to give great ſatisfaction to the Nyſam. And it appears, that a Conſultation was held hereupon; and that the Preſident took occaſion to repreſent the ſtate of the Treaſury, and the difficulties which they ſhould have to ſupport an Army adequate to the ſervices for which it might be required; that methods muſt be deviſed, and the Supreme Council be conſulted on that head, for ſecuring the regular payment of the *Tanjore* ſubſidy, and of the Nabob's Peſcuſh, which would enable them to make great efforts;—that they had a ſtanding Army of twenty-ſeven thouſand men; and that beſides the charges neceſſary for their ſupport, they were burthened with the expences attending repairs of fortifications, "which muſt not on any account be neglected," and with other chargeable Articles.

4th Feb. 1779.

That

That theſe, among many other conſiderations, induced him to doubt whether the Expedition againſt *Mahé*, the Troops being now far advanced on their route, and the Fleet probably arrived at *Anjengo*, ſhould be proſecuted. On the one hand it was neceſſary to reflect on the danger of a Diviſion of the Forces; *Hyder* indeed was to be regarded as the Enemy of the Marattas, and not likely to rejoice in their ſucceſs, as his own had ariſen from their quarrels among themſelves; that he would alſo have to dread the Nyſam, who was a faſt friend to the Peſhwa; that thoſe three Powers were never likely to unite in Alliance, and therefore the Engliſh might hope to be preferred by *Hyder*, as he could have no expectations of ſupport, from the humbled Power of the French, and in caſe of an Union with him, *Mahé* would fall of courſe at any time.—On the other hand, they had expectation of being ſoon reinforced by Lord *Macleod*'s Regiment, and that to recede from the Expedition now that it was ſo far advanced, would have the appearance of apprehenſion, from the late bad ſucceſs at *Bombay*; that it was alſo to be remembered, that the French had the Iſlands of *Mauritius* and *Bourbon*, from which they might ſend freſh Forces to this Country, and if *Mahé* was not now reduced, *Tellicherry* would be in danger of being captured. 4th Feb.

And Your Committee find, That Sir *Eyre Coote* then gave his Opinion, that the troops ſhould not be recalled, but that they ſhould remain at *Angengo*, till better information could be had of what the French were meditating, or a knowledge of *Hyder*'s real intentions might allow a deciſion with ſafety.

Your Committee find however, That it was reſolved to proſecute the Expedition, and to inform the Supreme Council of every circumſtance which had occaſioned and determined their Conſultations.

And it appears to Your Committee, That a Letter was accordingly wrote to *Bengal*, on the 7th February 1779, in which it was alſo ſpecified, that it would admit of no doubt that *Hyder Ally* at preſent bore no favourable inclination to the Engliſh; that he was very ſtrongly in the intereſt of the French, and that probably the ſucceſs of the Britiſh Arms alone, in reducing *Pondicherry*, had determined him to preſerve a Neutrality. Appendix, No. 32.

Your Committee find, however, That this determination of *Hyder* was reported to be ſoon altered; and that on receiving accounts of the deſign againſt *Mahé*, he formed an immediate plan to go againſt the *Carnatic*, and wrote to his Vakeel at *Poonah* to ſettle a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Miniſters; that frequent Letters, containing ſuch and ſimilar intelligence, particularly of great bodies of *Hyder*'s Horſe being collected on the borders of the *Carnatic*, were now brought from the Nabob, and frequent Conſultations held thereupon; the general reſult of which was, that it would be neceſſary to make preparations for Defence. 11, 16, 18 Feb. 1779. No. 25, 28, 29.

And Your Committee obſerve, That on the 18th February Mr. *Smith*, one of the Members of the Select Committee, delivered in a Minute; in which he gives his Reaſons for thinking, That as at all times *Hyder Ally* ought to have been conſidered as the natural Ally of the Engliſh in thoſe parts, ſo this was a period in which his Friendſhip ſhould be particularly cultivated; and that they ſhould aſſure him, in unequivocal terms, of their ſincere deſire to perfect a good underſtanding with him.—He adviſes at the ſame time, that, "to facilitate the Negociation, and ſhew *Hyder* we are determined to act with vigour, and to ſupport the meaſure we have taken, a ſtrong Detachment ſhould be aſſembled at *Vellore*, under the command of an active and experienced Officer, and encamped without the walls, where it would occaſion little additional expence, except the Bullocks for the Guns, which ſhould be procured and kept in readineſs, as it would be very difficult to collect them at a ſhort warning."

It appears, That the Nabob alſo recommended the plan of drawing the Force of the *Carnatic* together, and forming Encampments in one or two places; for that when the alarm of the Enemy's Horſe ſhould ſpread through the country, it would be difficult to get Train Bullocks, Coolies, and other neceſſaries: And he declared, that he had no Treaſures, nor Bodies of Horſe, by which he could hope to make an effectual reſiſtance againſt the invaſion of his Territories, with which the Vakeel of *Hyder* had, in the name of his Maſter, explicitly threatened him. 18 Feb. 1779.

Your Committee find, That a Declaration, 22d February, was alſo formally made by *Hyder*'s Vakeel to the Governor, "That he conſidered *Mahé* as a Settlement dependent upon his Country, and that his intentions were, in caſe of any Attack upon it, to oppoſe it immediately, or by detaching a body of Troops into the *Carnatic*." 22 Feb. 1779.

It appears, That the Preſident, when he had reported this Meſſage to the Committee, deſired them to conſider, whether, on this intelligence ſo received, of a threatened Invaſion, it might not make it prudent to ſend directions to Colonel *Braithwaite* not to embark from *Anjengo* till further Orders, unleſs he ſhould have received ſuch advices from *Tellicherry* as might remove every idea of *Hyder Ally*'s deſigns of ſupporting the French at *Mahé*: And the Committee agreeing in opinion with the Preſident on the propriety of that meaſure, a Letter to that purpoſe appears to have been wrote and diſpatched the 22d February.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor further obſerved, that *Hyder* meant to oppoſe the Expedition againſt *Mahé*, and to give trouble in the *Carnatic*; and "though he would not believe ſuch to be his Intentions "till he had more convincing proofs than any already "received, yet to reſt the event on his judgment, and "neglect to take every precaution to guard againſt ſo "ſerious and alarming a circumſtance, would merit the "higheſt cenſure."

And Your Committee find, upon the Select Conſultations of 25th February 1779, a Letter from Major *Maclellan* at *Tanjore*; by which the Board was acquainted, that the report of *Hyder*'s having thrown Men into *Mahé* was without foundation;—that the general opinion on the *Malabar* Coaſt was, that he was dead.—The Major alſo ſtated what the Force conſiſted of, which was ſaid to be in garriſon there.

And it appears to Your Committee, That a Letter was, in conſequence of this intelligence, diſpatched on that day to Colonel *Braithwaite*, informing him, "That "though from repeated intelligence of *Hyder*'s deſigns, "the Committee had been induced to ſend him the Orders "of 22d inſtant; yet, from other circumſtances which "had ſince been communicated, and particularly from "the forwardneſs to which the Expedition was advanced, "they were now inclined vigorouſly to proceed in the "execution of it;" and then referring him to his firſt Inſtructions, they repeated the neceſſity of Diſpatch, that they might again have the benefit of his Forces for the defence of the *Carnatic*.

It appears, That on this day alſo, a Letter, which had been agreed upon in the Committee on 22d, at the Motion of the Governor, was ſent by him to the Nabob; in which he acknowledges the intelligence communicated by him, as a warning to be prepared againſt *Hyder*'s deſigns; and aſſures him, that all precautions ſhould be taken: He obſerves at the ſame time, that he was ſorry to hear of his Highneſs's inability to contribute towards forwarding the Preparations; that it would be to reflect ſeverely on his Government, and to judge him incapable of the foreſight which prompts every wiſe Prince to be on his guard againſt the worſt that can happen, if he ſhould really ſuppoſe him without Reſources; that the Company never were better able to protect him againſt all his Enemies, provided that he would furniſh the Aſſiſtance which ought to be expected from the *Carnatic*; that he muſt therefore take the liberty of reminding his Highneſs of

Arrears due from him, and of the neceſſity he now found himſelf under to call upon him for them; that indeed it was not poſſible to account for his deficiency of Money, as his Creditors, new and old, had received nothing from him; his Troops were all in arrear, the Country had been long in peace, and this ſeaſon particularly fruitful; that they muſt requeſt Accounts of the Proviſions and Stores which his Highneſs had laid up in his Garriſons; and that he would ſee his Troops regularly paid and well appointed, leſt on an Invaſion, *Hyder* might be able to draw the whole or the greateſt part of them to his Standard.

1779. And Your Committee find, That the Board acquainted the Supreme Council, the 25th February, of theſe tranſactions; and obſerved, That they could not ſay how far they might be able to avert *Hyder*'s threatened Invaſion —that it was an alarming circumſtance, from their total inability to prevent the ravages of Horſe; and that their reſources for War would be inſtantly cut off by their incurſions; — that in the preſent ſituation of the Preſidency, they muſt endeavour, if poſſible, to avoid a quarrel with *Hyder*; and they truſted, that by a proper firmneſs with regard to the Expedition to *Mahé*, they would not haſten it in any degree; that they had therefore determined not to relinquiſh it on the mere threats of *Hyder*, though they had cautioned Colonel *Braithwaite* to be upon his guard againſt a defeat.—They obſerve, that *Hyder*'s conduct called ſo ſtrongly for reſentment, that if they could entertain a reaſonable hope of ſupport from the *Carnatic*, or of Funds ſufficient to carry on an active War, they ſhould certainly recommend the neceſſary preparations for it; but that they were not in condition with reſpect to Revenue, even to oppoſe any powerful attempt either of the French or *Hyder*; that they would however exert themſelves, truſting that the difficulty of their ſituation would plead their excuſe for any Failures that might happen.

Appendix, No. 33.

1779. No. 36. *It* appears, That on the 28th February, a long Letter, dated 23d, was received by the Governor from the Nabob; wherein he ſtates many proofs he had given of *Hyder*'s enmity to them, and of attachment to the French; and that in having adviſed former Governors to make War upon *Hyder*, and an Alliance with the Marattas, he had conſulted only the good of his Country, and of the Company; he ſuggeſts a rule of conduct for the Government in the preſent circumſtances, and adviſes, that if they would endeavour (which he hopes to be their deſire) to divert *Hyder* from his intended Attack on the *Carnatic*, they ſhould uſe arguments of perſuaſion, and offer to deſiſt from their attempt on *Mahé*; but if they reſolved to quarrel with him, they ſhould fortify themſelves by Alliances againſt him, and turn their firſt attention to the Marattas, whoſe Friendſhip it might not be yet too late to ſecure; and although his Advice on that ſubject had not been taken before, he wiſhed now to be employed in attempting to bring about a Negociation with them.— He expreſſes great apprehenſion leſt *Hyder* ſhould ſeize upon the *Cuddepah* Country, which, he ſays, is an Appendage of the *Carnatic*, and that the loſs of it would be the loſs of all communication with the Northward, in the ſame manner as it was already cut off to the Weſtward; and that the whole *Carnatic* would be thereby blockaded.

No. 40. And Your Committee find a Letter from the Nabob, dated 1ſt March 1779, in which he obſerves, that as he had been deſired by the Governor to write to the *Poonah* Miniſtry, in order to open a Negociation for a Treaty between the Preſidency and the Peſhwa, he incloſed Letters which he had prepared accordingly for his approbation: And it appears, that the Governor, on the 21ſt of May

No. 78. following, wrote to the Nabob, acknowledging the receipt of this and ſeveral other Letters from him; wherein he had given intelligence of *Hyder*'s hoſtile deſigns againſt the *Carnatic*, and recommended Alliances with the Soubah and the Marattas, for the purpoſe of reducing him: And it appears, That the Governor in this Anſwer informed the Nabob, that as *Hyder* had retired from the *Cuddepah* Country, and was marching towards *Seringapatam*, the threatened danger of Invaſion was at preſent over, without having recourſe to the Alliances propoſed; but that as *Hyder*'s late proceedings might lead to a War with him, it became neceſſary to know what Reſources they ſhould have for carrying it on; and that no doubt his Highneſs, from the earneſt manner in which he had preſſed an union in a general Attack upon *Hyder*, even before he had invaded them, had well conſidered the vaſt Sums which it would require to execute ſuch a plan, and would inform the Governor what Proviſions he had made, and what extraordinary Supplies could be depended on from him.

Your Committee will here remark to the Houſe, That they have found many Letters from the Nabob, containing Papers of Intelligence relative to the continual augmentation of *Hyder*'s Forces, and his threats of employing them againſt the Poſſeſſions of the Engliſh and the *Carnatic*, becauſe of the Attack on *Mahé*. But your Committee conceive, that there could be no Evidence more ſtrong to perſuade the Preſidency of *Madras* of what *Hyder*'s diſpoſition and intentions were, than his own Letters on that ſubject, and any Acts of Hoſtility which he appears to have begun or incited againſt them; and therefore Your Committee think it proper chiefly to make uſe of theſe Teſtimonies for the information of the Houſe on this head; and they point out a Letter from *Hyder* to the Governor, dated 17th February, in which he ſays, "I ſee what you write concerning the No. 42. 1779. "French Factory of *Mahé*: In my Country there are "Factories belonging to the Engliſh, Dutch, Portugueſe, "Danes, and French, and beſides, there are many Mer- "chants there who are conſidered as my Subjects; if any "one entertains deſigns againſt thoſe Factories, I will, "without doubt, take the beſt and moſt conſiderable "Methods to give them aſſiſtance."

No. 59. And Your Committee find, That another Letter was received from *Hyder*, 7th April 1779, in which he complains of violences committed on his People at the Frontiers, by Killedars of the *Carnatic*; that he had before complained of them in vain; but "that out of friend- "ſhip for the King of *England*, and the Gentlemen of "the Council, he had as yet taken no ſtep to retaliate "the injury."

He again repeats what he had before wrote about the Expedition againſt *Mahé*, and of the Aſſiſtance which he ſhould give to thoſe whom he conſidered as his Subjects; and adds, "that the Governor and the Gentle- "men of the Council were acquainted with this, and at "any Rate would act as they ſhould think proper."

No. 62. It appears that an Anſwer was returned to this Letter by the Governor, dated 19th April; in which he expreſſes his ſurprize on peruſing *Hyder*'s Letters, and on hearing the Meſſage delivered by his Vakeel, "that he would "oppoſe any attempt made upon *Mahé* to the utmoſt of "his power;"—that he did ſuppoſe, if *Hyder* thought it neceſſary to interfere in our quarrel with the French, that he would take part with the Engliſh, not againſt them;—that he had never heard of any irregularity committed in *Hyder*'s Country by the Nabob's people, but that they ſhould have been puniſhed had he been made acquainted with their offence.

He declares, that it had been the conſtant aim of his Government to promote a good underſtanding with *Hyder*, from a full conviction that it was for the mutual intereſt of the Company and his Circar, that the friendſhip ſubſiſting between them ſhould be perpetual; but that if he *(Hyder)* perſevered in the conduct which he had obſerved of late, it did not appear how it could be much longer maintained; that the Company and their Allies were ſufficiently powerful to avenge every kind of injury that might be offered to them; that they would not be the aggreſſors in any quarrel; but once provoked into hoſtilities, they would not fail to exert all their ſtrength to puniſh the offender.

That

That there was reaſon to complain of *Hyder*'s conduct in reducing *Morarowrow*, who had been included in the Treaty of 1769 as a friend of the *Carnatic*; and reaſon alſo to complain of his proceedings againſt *Cuddepah* and *Kannoul*.

That it was reported he had ſome deſigns againſt *Bazalet Jung*, which made it neceſſary he ſhould be informed of engagements of friendſhip entered into between the Company and *Bazalet*, and of their having promiſed to aſſiſt him in the defence of his Country; and that it was therefore hoped he would lay aſide any intentions he had formed againſt him.

Appendix, No. 34.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel *Braithwaite* ſucceeded without difficulty in his enterprize againſt *Mahé*, which ſurrendered on the 19th March, a day or two after his arrival before it; that he informed the Board at the ſame time of his intention to ſend back part of the Troops, which he hoped would reach the Preſidency in three weeks, and that he found it neceſſary to detain the reſt of the Detachment "becauſe of the reports of *Hyder*'s "Troops coming."

And Your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe to the Appendix No. 35, where are ſubjoined ſuch Letters from and to Colonel *Braithwaite*, relative to his proceedings at *Mahé*, and on that part of the *Malabar* Coaſt, as appear to contain any information by which the deſigns of *Hyder* might be diſcovered.

And Your Committee will here only obſerve, That they find by theſe Letters, that the Colonel ſoon diſcovered the Nairs and petty Princes of the neighbourhood to be diſaffected to *Hyder*, which induced him to propoſe an advice to the Preſidency, that ſhould it be their plan to make any attack upon that Prince, they ſhould direct it particularly to thoſe quarters where he was moſt vulnerable; and he thought, that even if the Corps he commanded might be allowed to remain in thoſe parts, it would be a great check upon *Hyder*'s projects; that he believed his expreſſions of anger on account of the Expedition againſt *Mahé*, aroſe from his fear that the Engliſh would protect his revolting Dependants, and likewiſe becauſe he uſed to receive his ſupplies of ammunition and military ſtores through that Port. The French however, he ſaid, greatly complained of him; and Monſieur *Picot*, the late Commandant, aſſured the Colonel that he had promiſed to ſend 34,000 Troops to *Mahé*, of whom 8,000 were to have been horſe, to ſcour the Country.

12 April 1779. Your Committee find, however, That the Colonel was directed by the Government of *Madras* not to interfere in any diſputes between *Hyder* and the Nairs, or any of the Country Powers, whom he had repreſented as earneſt to acknowledge their ſubmiſſion to the Company, and united in a deſign to revolt againſt their own Prince.

Select Conſ. 22 Apr. 1779. It appears indeed, that the diſpoſition of theſe People had ſhewn itſelf by marks of open rebellion; and that *Hyder*'s Governor of *Calicut* was in great apprehenſions for that place, which was beſieged by them, and that the Company's Reſident had been ordered to quit it at a very ſhort notice.

And Your Committee find, That large bodies of *Hyder*'s Troops came down at laſt and relieved it, and fixed themſelves alſo in redoubts all round *Mahé*, and diſtreſſed it much for want of proviſions, which they would not ſuffer to be carried in, though they proceeded to no other act of direct hoſtility, but talked with much anger in their Camp of the aſſiſtance given to the revolters from *Tellicherry*. The Nairs themſelves, finding they were not to expect ſupport from Colonel *Braithwaite*, ſoon ſubmitted to *Hyder*, and began to infeſt, and to ſkirmiſh with, the Engliſh Troops.

Select Conſ. 24 June.

18 October. And Your Committee find, That Colonel *Braithwaite* having received orders to ſend his detachment to *Surat*, where it was to join General *Goddard*, he evacuated *Mahé* on the 29th November, after the Stores were ſhipped and the Fort blown up; and that *Hyder*'s Sardar of *Calicut* immediately took poſſeſſion of the ruins, and lodged ſome troops with twelve guns on the Mount:—

Letter from him dated 9 Dec.

That the Colonel on his arrival at *Tellicherry*, found it inveſted by the Nairs; and having obſerved that every act of *Hyder*'s Tributaries and Managers ſhewed them to be open inſtigators of this attack, he wrote to the Preſidency, that he had thought it prudent to reland the troops, and to remain there for the protection of the place; complaining greatly at the ſame time of the Gentlemen of the Council, who, as he had been well informed, had done many things to irritate *Hyder*'s Government without providing in any ſhape for their own defence. And it appears that his conduct was approved of by the *Madras* Board, who inſtructed him, however, to detach the European corps to join General *Goddard*, while he ſhould remain himſelf with the Sepoys till he ſhould think the danger removed; and they deſired, that if any juſt cauſe of offence had been given either to the Nairs or to *Hyder*, it ſhould be inſtantly removed, "for that it "was highly neceſſary in their preſent ſituation to avoid "all occaſions of adding to their enemies."

30 Dec. 1779.

Appendix, No. 35.

And Your Committee will now deſire to direct the attention of the Houſe to another ſource, from which intelligence ſeems to have been drawn of *Hyder*'s diſpoſitions and deſigns againſt the Company and their Poſſeſſions in *India*.

It appears, That the Select Committee of *Fort St. George*, in a Letter of 23d April 1779, informed the Supreme Council, that they had received intelligence of *Hyder*'s having completed a conqueſt of the *Cuddepah* Country, and that he was proceeding to make an attack upon the Territories of *Bazalet Jung*, whoſe Vakeel had expreſſed, in his Maſter's name, the ſtrongeſt apprehenſion of that event; that he had alſo written threatening letters to the Zemindars of *Veneatagerry* and *Calaſtry*, who are Tributaries to the Nabob; that in conſequence of their Negociations with *Bazalet Jung*, they had reſolved to ſend, for the protection of his Country, three Battalions of Sepoys, one Company of Artillery, and ſix Field Pieces; and they remarked, "that *Hyder*'s proceedings "in that quarter had added greatly to his power, and "given a much more eaſy acceſs to the *Carnatic* than he "had before; that they were of opinion, that immediate "meaſures ſhould be taken to compel him to retreat back "within his former limits, or if neceſſary, to reduce him "totally; for there was every reaſon to conclude, from "the language he held, and from the nature of his pro-"ceedings, that he would very ſhortly draw into hoſti-"lities, in which caſe it would be highly expedient that "they ſhould prepare to act defenſively."

And Your Committee think it incumbent on them, in this place, to lay before the Houſe ſuch papers as will briefly inform them of the nature and purpoſe of thoſe Negociations, which the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* appear to have entered into with *Bazalet Jung*; but Your Committee do not mean at preſent to make any remarks on the political propriety or expediency of them.

And Your Committee find, That on the 10th July 1778 the Preſident having obſerved to the Council, that great inconvenience aroſe from the opening which the French had of introducing Troops and military Stores to that part of the Coaſt by means of the Port of *Mootapillee*, in the Guntoor Circar, to which the Company had a reverſionary right; and having obſerved alſo, that the French already there had much influence with *Bazalet Jung*, (who, it appears, was in poſſeſſion of that Circar under grant for life, from his Brother *Nyſam ul Dowlah*, Subah of the *Decan*, and under articles not to diſpoſe of it without his Brother's conſent) propoſed to take meaſures for getting that Port at leaſt immediately into their hands; and having recalled to the remembrance of the Council, that a former ineffectual application had been made to the Nyſam, he now adviſed that they ſhould addreſs themſelves directly to *Bazalet*, and inform the Nyſam, by letter, of the motives for their doing ſo.

But it appears to your Committee, That in the month of November following the Preſident informed the Select Committee,

9th Nov. 177

Committee, that *Bazalet*'s Vakeel had ſignified to him, his Maſter's ſtrong deſire of obtaining marks of the Company's favour, which he was willing to purchaſe, by giving to them the Guntoor Circar at rent on certain terms; which the Governor then laid before them; and at the ſame time he preſented other Articles, which he thought himſelf ſhould be made eſſential to any agreement; the chief effect of which was, that the Company ſhould keep a body of Troops, to be paid out of the revenues of the Circar, for the ſole purpoſe of defending *Bazalet Jung*'s dominions, and not to be employed out of them; and that he (*Bazalet Jung*) ſhould conſent to diſcharge and diſarm the French then in his ſervice.—It appears, that the Committee approved of the amended Articles, and directed them to be communicated to the Vakeel, and by him to his Maſter; it appears that a Treaty was concluded on theſe terms with ſome trifling alterations, and that the French under the command of Monſieur *Lally* were diſmiſſed, and were afterwards taken into the ſervice of the Nyſam.

And your Committee find, that on 22d April 1779, an application was made by *Bazalet Jung*, for the ſtipulated ſupport of Troops on account of a threatened Invaſion of his country by *Hyder Ally*; and that there was a Detachment ſent accordingly to *Mootapillee* from *Madras*, under the command of Colonel *Harper*, who was inſtructed, that it was to be employed in the defence and protection of *Bazalet Jung*'s territories; and for the ſupport of his Government; and that he was to march by the ſhorteſt and moſt expeditious route to *Adone* or *Rachour*, as *Bazalet* might appoint.

And Your Committee find, by ſeveral Letters from Colonel *Harper*, That he marched from *Mootapillee* to *Innaconda*; and that intending to purſue his route towards *Adone*, through the *Cuddepah* Country, which had been lately conquered by *Hyder Ally*, he gave notice to *Hyder*'s Zemindars on entering it; but that he found the Paſſes defended by a Barrier, and a large body of Men belonging to *Hyder*, who oppoſed his march, and obliged him to fall back to *Innaconda* on the 14th Auguſt 1779.

And Your Committee find, That a Letter was thereupon written, 26th Auguſt 1779, to *Hyder*, by the Governor of *Madras*; in which he complained of the oppoſition made to the paſſage of the Troops through a part of the diſtrict of the *Cuddepah* Country; and obſerved, that it was the invariable practice of all Powers who lived in a ſtate of friendſhip and peace, to let their Troops paſs and repaſs through their territories; and that he was willing to perſuade himſelf, that *Hyder*'s Managers acted on this occaſion without their Maſter's knowledge or authority.

N° 117. But it appears to your Committee, That the Nabob, on the 24th Auguſt, communicated to the Governor a letter which he had received from *Bazalet Jung*, wherein was one incloſed from *Hyder Ally* to *Ifeecher Chawn*, his Vakeel at *Bazalet Jung*'s Durbar. *Hyder*, in this letter, expreſſed himſelf in terms of great diſpleaſure that the Guntoor ſhould be given up to the Engliſh; who, he ſaid, ought not to be allowed a footing in that part of the country, and wiſhed that his Killedars might be permitted to rent it, and that then nobody would dare to attack that Circar. He concludes his letter in the following words: "It is not in my power to conſent to "his Excellency's giving up the Guntoor Circar to my "old and bitter enemies, for it joins to my Country. If "the Engliſh are put in poſſeſſion, his Excellency and I "cannot agree. You, Sir, will explain all this in a "proper manner to his Excellency, and get his leave to "come to me in order to ſettle this affair.

"What are the Engliſh, whoſe name gives ſo much "alarm to the people of this Country? How did I en"counter them when I was at war with them? How "often were they not defeated by my victorious Troops? "This is well known to every body. Why ſhould they "be ſo much afraid, that their protection ſhould be "ſolicited?

"If his Excellency and I are joined, we ſhall ſtand in fear of no one."

And it appears that *Bazalet* diſcovered great apprehenſions on account of this Letter, and great impatience to have Colonel *Harper* and his Detachment with him.

And Your Committee find, That Colonel *Harper* received a Reinforcement of troops from *Madras*, but that he was long prevented from renewing his march from *Innaconda* by the want of proviſions and money; and that he was urged to proceed as quickly as poſſible, both by *Bazalet Jung* and by the *Madras* Council, who, being diſpleaſed with this delay, had, upon his offer to reſign the command, appointed 27 Oct. 1779. Colonel *Baillie* to ſucceed to it. But it appears that Co- 11 Nov. lonel *Harper* having at laſt ſet out on his march, he was 13 Nov. 1779. ſtopt by orders from *Bazalet Jung*; who cauſed him to be informed, that *Hyder Ally* had threatened to deſtroy his Country, himſelf, and Family, if he did not ſpeedily diſcontinue all correſpondence with the Engliſh; and that the Nyſam, his Brother, had wrote to *Hyder*, and deſired that they might jointly prevent the Engliſh from entering his territories; that *Hyder* had ſent ſome troops, and taken poſſeſſion of all the open country, and confined him in his Capital; and that the Nyſam, apprized of *Bazalet Jung*'s ſituation, had wrote to him, that if he would renounce all concerns with the Engliſh, and regain poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, he would reſtore him to thoſe countries which *Hyder* had ſeized on; and that if the Engliſh did not immediately comply, and march out of the Country, that he (the Nyſam) would beſtow the ſaid Circar upon *Hyder*, and that they would jointly extirpate the Engliſh from the whole *Carnatic*; and that, in ſuch circumſtances, he (*Bazalet*) had been obliged to ſubmit.

And it appears, That *Bazalet Jung* complained, that he had given Tunkars in the Guntoor Circar for the payment of thoſe Troops, which he ſtill retained; but on producing the Tunkars to Lieutenant *Douglas*, who commanded for the Company in the Guntoor, he would not permit any collection to be made; which gave great uneaſineſs to him, as his Troops would not march againſt the Enemy without receiving their pay.

It appears to Your Committee, That the Governor had wrote to *Bazalet Jung* on the 11th November, to aſſure him, that the Troops ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible to his relief, and to acquaint him, that the Guntoor was put under the management of the Nabob, who had been requeſted to give orders that the Balances ſhould be accounted for, to him in the moſt expeditious manner poſſible.

And Your Committee find, That the Select Committee having taken theſe Accounts into conſideration, reſolved, 20th November, to order the Detachment to return to *Innaconda*, and to inform *Bazalet Jung* of their concern for the neceſſity he found himſelf under, of concluding Terms with the Nyſam, as the Troops were actually on their march to ſupport him. But that, notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances, they conſidered the Treaty between the Company and him to be ſtill in force, and that he might command the aſſiſtance of their Troops at any future time that he ſhould require it; and that the Revenues of the Guntoor Circar ſhould be faithfully applied to maintain a force for that purpoſe, agreeably to the Treaty.

And Your Committee find, That the Nabob, on the 5th of December, tranſmitted to the Governor a letter from *Bazalet Jung*; wherein *Bazalet* repreſented the neceſſity he was under of requiring the reſtoration of the Guntoor Circar, for fear of the reſentment of the Nyſam and *Hyder Ally*.

But it appears to your Committee, That Inſtructions were agreed upon by the Select Committee, and ſent to Colonel *Baillie*, 30th December 1779; "That it would "be neceſſary for him to be upon his guard, in caſe of "any attempts being made againſt the Guntoor Circar— "That he ſhould only protect their preſent Poſſeſſions,

"and

" and not act offenſively againſt any Power without po-
" ſitive orders; but that he was empowered, in caſe of
" any movement towards the Guntoor Circar, either
" from the Nyſam or *Hyder Ally*, to call for the Sepoys
" under Lieutenant *Douglas*, and for as many Sepoys as
" could be ſpared from the *Mazulipatam* Diſtrict."

And Your Committee find, That a Letter, dated 31ſt December, was wrote by the Governor to *Bazalet Jung*, expreſſive of concern at his misfortunes, and the accidental cauſes of them, by the delay of the march from *Innaconda*; and reminding him, that application had been frequently made in vain to the Nyſam, for giving up the Guntoor Circar to the Company; that at laſt they had got poſſeſſion of it by his (*Bazalet Jung*'s) voluntary offer, and that therefore every thing had been properly concluded; that the Troops had been delayed at his deſire, that they ſhould remain on the borders of the Guntoor, or ſhould go into Quarters, if he had no further uſe for them.

Appendix, No. 36.

Your Committee having thus laid before the Houſe, very briefly, ſome ſtrong tokens of *Hyder*'s diſcontent, and purpoſe of reſentment, which ſeem to have diſcovered themſelves immediately from the two cauſes of the Expedition to *Mahé*, and the affair of the Guntoor Circar, they will proceed to examine, and produce for the information of the Houſe, ſuch meaſures as appear to have been taken to gain a more certain account of his diſpoſitions and deſigns.

And Your Committee find, That on the 23d October, the Preſident informed the Select Board, that he had purſued a method which he had thought it incumbent upon him to conceal, even from their knowledge, in the view of founding the real intentions of *Hyder*; whoſe letters and meſſages, ſince they had undertaken the Expedition againſt *Mahé*, and formed an Alliance with *Bazalet Jung*, had been couched in terms ſo hoſtile and unfriendly, that he could hardly believe they were genuine productions of *Hyder*. He ſuſpected the informations of the Nabob, from his well known enmity to *Hyder*, and he doubted whether the Vakeel might not have been tempted to pervert, or exceed, the intentions of his Maſter, eſpecially as there appeared no reaſon why he ſhould quarrel with the Preſidency, and bring on a War ſo contrary to his true intereſts. He had therefore thought it expedient to ſend a perſon privately to *Hyder*, with a Letter from himſelf, deſiring an explicit declaration; and that the Anſwer he had received gave him too much reaſon to apprehend that *Hyder*'s intentions were really hoſtile, both againſt the Company and the *Carnatic*; and it became neceſſary for the Committee to guard, as much as poſſible, againſt the conſequences.

It appears that in his firſt Letter, *Hyder* refers to another for a full anſwer to that of the Preſident; and obſerves further, that Mr. *Swartz* would acquaint him with ſeveral matters he had charged him with.

Your Committee muſt here remark, That they have not diſcovered any entry of further information from Mr. *Swartz* relative to the ſeveral matters he was charged with.

It appears that the Preſident's Letter was dated 11th June 1779, and that it contained an account of the motive which induced him to ſend Mr. *Swartz*, as he feared that deſigning people might have been at pains to diſturb the friendſhip which both had at heart from taking place; and he therefore acquainted him, that, if he was deſirous to enter into the bonds of friendſhip with the Company, he might put an entire reliance on the perſon who was ſent, and who would communicate every particular to him—that nothing would tend more to the cement of their friendſhip, than an Interview, in which he might aſſure *Hyder* perſonally of the ſincerity of his intentions, and uſe the moſt proper expedients to render their friendſhip laſting.

It appears that *Hyder* in his Anſwer, begins with a Remark, " That before, when a friendſhip, confirmed
" by a ſolid Treaty, ſubſiſted between the Company and
" and him, he imagined that it would increaſe daily, and
" not have been broke through; which he conſidered
" it to be by the Expedition to *Mahé*, and the ſending
" Troops to *Bazalet Jung*, and that he conceived there
" was a determination to break with him at all events.
" That out of conſideration for the friendſhip of the
" King of *England* and the Company, whom he had con-
" ſidered as one, but now thought otherwiſe, he had not
" yet taken revenge."—His concluſion is in theſe words:
" It is no matter!—But if you, henceforth forgetting all
" Treaties and Engagements of the Company, ſtill are
" intent on breaking with me, what advantage can
" attend writing to you? You are acquainted with every
" thing; it is right to act in all things with prudence
" and foreſight."

It appears that the Committee, on hearing theſe Letters read, agreed in opinion concerning the deſigns of *Hyder*, and reſolved immediately to acquaint the Governor General and Council of their ſentiments; and to write to General *Goddard*, hoping that a knowledge of their ſituation might induce him to make Peace with the Marattas.

It appears that a Letter, dated 30th October 1779, to that purpoſe, was immediately diſpatched to General *Goddard*, informing him alſo of the Force at *Mahé*, which was ordered to obey his requiſition to join him—and that no greater ſuccour could at preſent be ſpared from their own Eſtabliſhment.

It appears alſo, that a letter was diſpatched on the ſame day, 30th October, to *Bengal*, wherein your Committee find the following obſervations, ſucceeding an account of *Hyder*'s preparations, and of a probable rupture with him:
" A War with *Hyder*, let the event be ever ſo ſucceſsful
" on our part, would diſtreſs the *Carnatic* beyond mea-
" ſure, and prove a moſt expenſive burthen on the Com-
" pany; we ſincerely hope, therefore, that General *God-*
" *dard* may conclude a Treaty with the Marattas, and
" thereby free the Company from the neceſſity of engag-
" ing with the two moſt powerful States of *India* at the
" ſame time; which will probably be the caſe if he fails
" in his negociation: Should we be at peace with the
" Marattas, *Hyder* will be afraid to diſturb us, for, exclu-
" ſive of our ſtrength, which he could then have no hope
" of reſiſting, the determined enmity which the Marattas
" bear him would induce him rather to court our friend-
" ſhip than to provoke us into hoſtilities; and this is pre-
" ciſely the ſtate wherein only we can expect to preſerve
" that tranquillity in the *Carnatic*, which is ſo neceſſary to
" the affairs of the Company at all times, but eſpecially
" at this juncture."

Appendix, No. 37.

And your Committee find, That Mr. *Smith*, at the Select Committee of 11th November 1779, delivered in a Minute on the general ſituation of affairs, ariſing from the probability of an approaching rupture with *Hyder*, whom he conſidered as by far the moſt powerful and dangerous of any of the Country Princes, and repreſented in a ſtrong light all his advantages of power, riches, and ability; and foreſaw that the reducing him muſt be attempted ſooner or later. He thought a War could not be avoided, becauſe *Hyder* had manifeſted his intentions to provoke it, and that it being therefore neceſſary to conſider a plan for their future conduct, he ventured to ſuggeſt the neceſſity of laying their account that an Army ſhould be in the field in January, and every hour employed in making neceſſary preparations; he would adviſe the Committee to ſtrengthen the detachment under Colonel *Harper*, that it might be able to ſtop *Hyder*'s progreſs in thoſe parts, and recommended the collecting a ſtrong body of troops immediately to be cantoned at *Conjeveram* or *Vellore*.

It appears that the Committee were of opinion, That they had taken the only ſtep in their power, by writing to the Supreme Council, and collecting their Troops together as much as poſſible; and that their future conduct muſt depend upon what the Gentlemen of *Bengal* might determine—that they can purſue no active meaſures whatever, being entirely without the reſources neceſſary for putting a conſiderable body of Men into the Field.

Your Committee think it proper to obſerve in this place, That it appears, by a letter from Sir *Eyre Coote*, dated 2d April 1779, from *Bengal* to the Seleƈt Committee of *Fort St. George*, that he had ſtated to the Governor General and Council the neceſſity there was of ſending them a ſupply in ſome degree adequate to the great expence they were at, and the difficulties they would certainly be reduced to for want of a Treaſury, ſhould *Hyder* put his threats in execution by entering the *Carnatic*; and that the Governor General and Council had agreed to ſend them fifteen Lacks of Rupees.

Appendix, No. 38.

And Your Committee find, That in conſequence of accounts from General *Goddard* and from *Bombay*, that hoſtilities were likely to take place with the Marattas, the Seleƈt Committee of *Fort St. George* addreſs another letter, November 10th, to *Bengal*, repeating their expectation of an attack from *Hyder*, whoſe great preparations they continually hear of, and whoſe force at preſent is ſaid to conſiſt of 30,000 Sepoys and 20,000 Horſe; and that ſhould he enter the *Carnatic*, it would be out of their power to prevent the ravages of his horſe, which would greatly injure their revenues—That they wiſh to know in time what aſſiſtance they may depend upon, in order to take meaſures accordingly—They propoſe, as the beſt plan in caſe of being compelled to aƈt againſt *Hyder*, to carry the war into his country, by ſending a conſiderable force to *Mangalore* by ſea, from which they might very eaſily march to *Seringapatam*, and be more readily ſupplied with proviſions while engaged in beſieging it, than they could while defending the capital of the *Carnatic*—They obſerve, that the detachment ſent to proteƈt *Bazalet Jung*, and that ordered to join General *Goddard*, made no inconſiderable part of their troops; and that their remaining force, except by the King's regiment expeƈted from *Europe*, would be by no means adequate to the various ſervices required from them, and they therefore ſtill hoped to hear of accommodation with the Marattas, as they could not ſuppoſe the deſigned propoſals which they had ſeen, would be finally rejeƈted by the *Poonah* Miniſtry, unleſs ſome new requiſitions were added to them.

15 Nov. 1779. No. 158.

It appears, however, to Your Committee, That the Nabob communicated at this time to the Governor, intelligence of a Treaty between *Hyder* and the Marattas, and acceded to by the Nyſam, for uniting their forces, and commencing a general attack upon the Company's Poſſeſſions.

No. 161. 2d Dec.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor, in his anſwer to the Nabob, aſſures him, that in the firſt place ſuch an alliance is highly improbable, and could hardly be effeƈted; but that at any event he hopes, with the ſupport which his Highneſs is capable of affording, that the Company would be able to proteƈt him againſt all the Powers of *Hindoſtan*.

No. 168. 14 Dec.

But it appears to Your Committee, That freſh Accounts arrived from *Poonah*, which gave force to the rumours before communicated by the Nabob; and many particulars were now related of the terms on which *Hyder* had made Peace with the Marattas, and of the plan for carrying on War againſt the Engliſh in every part of *India*; and Your Committee find, That the Preſident paid attention to it in his Minute of 30th December, wherein he conſiders means to ſecure the neutrality of the Soubah. And it appears, that the Seleƈt Committee incloſed this intelligence in a letter to *Bengal*, dated 31ſt December, in which they thus expreſſed themſelves: "It is beyond "doubt, that a Treaty of Peace and Alliance has taken "place between *Hyder* and the Marattas."

And Your Committee find, That on accounts brought from *Tellicherry*, dated 9th December, that the troops had not been able to proceed from thence to join General *Goddard*, the Preſident propoſed to ſend a reinforcement to him from the Preſidency, notwithſtanding the critical ſituation of their own affairs, becauſe he thought it neceſſary for the purpoſe of obtaining Peace with the Marattas, that the Company's force there ſhould be made as reſpeƈtable as poſſible; and as they themſelves daily expeƈted Lord *Macleod*'s regiment at *Madras*, "they would be "enabled to form a ſufficient Army to cover the principal "garriſons in the *Carnatic*; and that as to the open "country, they could not pretend with infantry only, to "proteƈt it againſt the numerous horſe of *Hyder Ally*, "ſhould he make an irruption into it."—The Preſident's propoſal was approved of; and Captain *Panton* of the *Sea Horſe*, was deſired to convey the troops by ſea to *Surat*.

Appendix, No. 39.

And Your Committee find ſuch to have been the ſituation of affairs under the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, at the end of the year 1779, in reſpeƈt to their expectations of hoſtilities with *Hyder Ally*.

And Your Committee find, That the Governor ſent a letter on the 21ſt January 1780, to the Court of Directors, in which he obſerves, that every thing was quiet in the *Carnatic*; that nothing material had happened ſince the laſt diſpatch, though they had been kept in continual alarm, from various reports of the hoſtile intentions of *Hyder* and the Nyſam; the former, in conſequence of a Treaty which it was confidently affirmed (and ſcarcely admitted of a doubt) he had entered into with the Maratta State, and the latter from the friendſhip which had long ſubſiſted between him and the infant Peſhwa, and Miniſters at *Poonah*—That *Hyder* had hitherto contented himſelf with extending his conqueſts to the Northward, and had not yet invaded any part of the Nabob's poſſeſſions; and that every thing had been done on the part of their Government, to keep him quiet at ſo critical a juncture; and that, from the advance of the ſeaſon, without any movement having been made by him towards the *Carnatic*, he was inclined to think they ſhould remain in peace, eſpecially as the very ſeaſonable arrival of the fleet with the Troops would have a powerful effeƈt in preventing any deſign of an Invaſion, if ſuch had been ſeriouſly intended.

The Governor alſo mentions the reinforcement which they had ſent to join General *Goddard*, notwithſtanding their apprehenſions of the Nyſam and *Hyder*; and that it had left the coaſt on the 11th inſtant—that the troops from *Mahé* had alſo orders to join him; and that the 8th battalion of Sepoys would embark from *Pondicherry* in a few days for the ſame purpoſe.

He obſerves alſo, That he had ſent his conſiderations upon the preſent political ſtate of the Company in *India*, of which your Committee do not think it proper in this place to take any further notice than by inſerting the introduƈtory page, which is as follows:

"The meaſures lately purſued at *Bengal* and *Bombay*, "in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, having drawn on the Com-"pany the reſentment of the Maratta ſtate, given offence "to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, who is in friendſhip with that ſtate, "and a declared enemy to *Ragonaut Row*, and opened "the way to a rupture with *Hyder Ally*, by promoting "peace between him and the Marattas, and leaving him "at liberty to execute the threats which he has denounced "againſt the *Carnatic*, it is become a matter of ſerious "importance with the Company, to conſider how they "may beſt avert the evils that ſurround them, and what "line of conduƈt it may be proper to adopt, for eſtabliſh-"ing their affairs in future upon a ſolid and permanent "footing."

And your Committee find, by another letter from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, dated 7th February 1780, that "he "could ſpeak with confidence, that there was no likeli-"hood, at that time, of any troubles on that ſide of *India*; "as *Hyder Ally* had lately releaſed ſome Gentlemen who "had been detained by his Officer on the Malabar coaſt; "and as he had remained till that time at *Seragapatnam*, "and withdrawn ſome troops he had to the Northward."

And your Committee find in a Seleƈt Letter from *Fort St. George*, dated 3d April 1780, ſeveral obſervations on the growth of power and importance of *Hyder Ally*, and of his conteſts with the Marattas, who "ſeeing no proſ-"peƈt of relief from their wars with the Engliſh, were "forced

" forced to conclude a Treaty with *Hyder*, which they made " offenſive, that they might have the benefit of his aſſiſt- " ance againſt them."

And your Committee alſo find in this letter, an account of the tranſactions relative to the Guntoor Circar, and of the neceſſity which *Bazalet Jung* had repreſented himſelf to be under, of requiring the march of the troops to be ſtopped, and that the Circar ſhould be delivered back to him by orders from the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*—that they had complied with the firſt requeſt; but that as they had done every thing in their power to fulfil the agreement, they deemed it by no means incumbent on them to deliver up the Circar, and more eſpecially, as they had ſo much reaſon to believe that diſtrict would, in that caſe, have been given to *Hyder*—that they had therefore promiſed to account for the rent, and after deducting the expences for their troops employed in his ſervice, to remit the ſurplus, and had given him aſſurance, that he might call for that body of troops whenever the ſituation of his affairs ſhould require it.

They obſerve, That they indeed conſidered it as a fortunate circumſtance for the Company, that their troops were not required to proceed to *Adoni*, as, from the part taken by *Hyder Ally*, there was reaſon to fear they might have embroiled themſelves with him; and that indeed, having been aware of that at the time of the firſt propoſals for a Treaty with *Bazalet*, they ſhould not have agreed to them but from the expediency of procuring the diſmiſſion of the French troops—and that they ſhould now wiſh to take any opportunity of annulling the defenſive articles in the Treaty (continuing ſtill to hold the Circar at rent) and thereby of freeing themſelves from the only embarraſſment which could attend that connection.

They mention the appointment of Mr. *G—— Gray* to go to *Hyder Ally*, to ſolicit the releaſe of ſome Engliſh Gentlemen, and that he had ſet out on the 14th of January, but before he reached *Seringapatam*, *Hyder* had releaſed them—that Mr. *Gray* however, proceeded, and delivered this letter to *Hyder*, and at the ſame time aſſured him of their diſpoſition to cultivate friendſhip and good underſtanding with him—that *Hyder* made but an indifferent return to theſe overtures, ſeemed neither deſirous of their friendſhip, nor did he treat Mr. *Gray* with civility — that Mr. *Gray* returned with a letter from *Hyder*, which would be found in the Country Correſpondence of that year.

They conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that from that letter, and from one from Mr. *Gray*, the Court would be able to judge clearly of *Hyder*'s real diſpoſition towards them; and they remark, that his inſolent conduct could only be encouraged by their preſent troubles with the Marattas.

Appendix, No. 40.

Your Committee muſt here remark to the Houſe, that the books of Conſultations, and of the Country Correſpondence of the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, from 31ſt December 1779 to the 2d April 1780, were loſt on board the *General Barker*, which was caſt away on the coaſt of *Holland*, and that no duplicates had been brought in the other ſhips which ſailed from *Madras* at the ſame time, ſo that your Committee have not been able to gain any further account than they have already given of the tranſactions relative to *Hyder Ally* during that period.

But your Committee find that Sir *Edward Hughes*, in a letter dated *Madras Road* 5th April 1780, to Lord Viſcount *Weymouth*, obſerves, " that if any judgment can " be formed of *Hyder Ally*'s intentions from the language " he holds, they muſt be extremely hoſtile to the Britiſh " intereſts;"—and in ſupport of his obſervation, he encloſes a copy of the letter mentioned above from *Hyder Ally* to Governor *Rumbold*; and by this means your Committee have an opportunity of laying it before the Houſe, which we think it proper to do at length, becauſe it contains his explicit complaints againſt the Company's Servants on ſeveral grounds, and as far back as the Treaty of 1769.

Copy of a Letter from Hyder Ally *to Governor* Rumbold *dated 12th Rubby, at Amel, 1194 Heg. or 19th March* 1780.

" I had the pleaſure of receiving your letter by means of Mr. *George Gray*; and I underſtand the contents thereof, as alſo the repreſentations of the above Gentleman.

" When *Chunda Cawn* and the French formerly inveſted the Fort of *Trichinopoly*, the promiſes and engagements you then made have not been performed on your part; afterwards the Governor and Council concluded a Treaty of friendſhip between me and the Company; the ſubſtance of which was as follows: They would conſider thoſe who are my friends or enemies, to be friends or enemies to them, and that we ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other when circumſtances required. I aſſured myſelf that the Company would not ſwerve from their engagements. The Treaty above alluded to, you will have in your poſſeſſion, and which you'll pleaſe to peruſe. At the time of the War between me and the Marattas, although I did not ſtand in need of your aſſiſtance, yet, in order to know whether you regarded your engagements, I repeatedly requeſted you to ſend me a ſmall body of troops purſuant to your promiſes; but you then omitted to ſend them. Some time ago you wrote me you would aſſiſt *Bazalet Jung* with troops, and you did ſo accordingly, and a ſkirmiſh happened between my troops and thoſe of yours; beſides this, yours and my boundaries bordering on one another from *Dingadet* to *Cuddapah*, frequent diſturbances ariſe from the people on your ſide. The Commandant of *Tellicherry* in particular has afforded protection to the Nairs belonging to my country, and has given refuge to their families within his bounds, has ſupplied them with arms and ammunition, and incited them to raiſe diſturbances in my territories, and they have plundered a country worth 20 Lacks of Rupees, and are ſtill continuing to ravage it.

" When ſuch improper conduct is purſued, what engagements will remain inviolate? I leave it to the judgment of you and your Council to determine, on whoſe part the engagements and promiſes have been infringed."

" *Edward Hughes.*"

And Your Committee find, upon the Select Conſultations of *Fort St. George*, of the 24th April 1780, a letter from *Bombay*; wherein was encloſed one from *Hyder Ally* to the Governor of that Preſidency, received by him February the 1ſt 1780; in which *Hyder* acknowledged the receipt of a letter from the Governor, and acquaints him, that, agreeable to his requeſt, he had releaſed the Engliſh Gentlemen and their Families, but that he had many cauſes of quarrel (which he enumerates) with the Governor of *Madras*; and that he had given orders to his Officers to take care of themſelves, and to fight with the Engliſh people upon their entering his Country; that no diſpute had come between the Governor of *Bombay* and him; but that " upon the people " who occaſioned unjuſt quarrels, he reſented them."

A Letter of the 9th May, from Major *Cotgrave* (who ſucceeded Colonel *Braithwaite* in the Command at *Tellicherry*) informed the Select Committee, That the Nairs continued to inveſt that place, and that he was convinced they were not only encouraged, but aſſiſted by *Hyder*.

Appendix, No. 41.

And Your Committee find, That Lord *Macleod*, in ſeveral letters, and particularly in one of 1ſt June, made complaint to the Select Committee, of want of Proviſions for his Troops; of ill treatment from the Nabob's Sepoys; and chiefly of the Quarters, in which his men were ſo much crowded, that great danger to their lives was to be apprehended from it; and it appears, that Major *Maule* was hereupon ordered to give an account to the Select Committee, why he had not begun the Barracks.

And your Committee find, That on 12th June 1780, the Select Committee reſolved to order the Detachment under Colonel *Baillie* to remove into the Guntoor Circar, " becauſe, there being various reports of *Hyder Ally*'s

" movements

" movements and deſigns, it would be proper to have " thoſe Troops on this ſide the *Kiſtna*, in caſe of any " diſturbance in the *Carnatic*."

And that, on the 19th June, a Letter from Colonel *Lang*, dated at *Vellore*, 11th June, was read by the Select Committee; in which he gave intelligence of *Hyder Ally*'s march from *Seringapatam*, and of the great force he had collected at *Bengalore*; and at the ſame time were read other Letters, containing the like information.

19 June 1780. And Your Committee find, That on this occaſion Mr. *Johnſon* delivered in a Minute, to which Mr. *Smith* ſubſcribed; in which they ſuggeſt the great expediency of making preparations to reſiſt the hoſtile deſign of *Hyder Ally*, and of deliberating on meaſures for reinforcing the Garriſons, and for keeping up a Force at leaſt ſufficient to guard the Company's and the Nabob's Poſſeſſions, if they ſhould not be able to maintain an Army in the Field.

They adviſed, that an exact Return of Stores and Proviſions ſhould be ordered; and then obſerved, " That " the General was the beſt judge of the preſent diſpo- " ſition of the Army, and how far it might be expedient " to have the Europeans divided."

And Your Committee find, That the Select Committee of *Fort St. George*, in a letter, dated 28th June 1780, to the Governor General and Council, inform them, that *Hyder Ally* had conſtantly kept up an intercourſe with the French Governor at the Iſlands; that he had received great quantity of Military Stores from thence; that his forces (which he had been encreaſing for two years paſt) were now equipped for immediate ſervice; that part of them were actually advanced to the frontiers of the *Carnatic*, and intelligence was received, that he was employing people to clear the road leading to one of the principal paſſes; that in caſe of an invaſion, they would act in the beſt manner they could; but much feared their difficulties would be great for want of money.

And Your Committee find, That the Commandant at *Tiagar* repreſented, in a letter of 2d July, to the General, the defenceleſs ſtate of that place, which, being in the affinity to the Paſſes, was liable to an early attack in caſe of an irruption of the Enemy.

And it appears, That Mr. *Smith* delivered in a Minute, on 17th July, to the Select Committee; wherein he very ſtrongly urged the neceſſity of ſhaking off that ſupineneſs and inactivity in which they had hitherto remained, and of preparing themſelves to meet the attack of *Hyder*, which now ſeemed unavoidable; and he ſuggeſts a plan for immediate defence, till a larger Army could, if neceſſary, be aſſembled.

And Your Committee find, That information was brought from the Commander at *Amboor*, on the 21ſt July, that *Hyder*, his two Sons, and the beſt part of his Army, were come through the Paſs, and that his artillery was drawn up in in the road to *Changama*; and that all the people of the valley were fled.

And by a Letter, dated 13th October, from Lord *Macleod* to the Secretary at War, it appears, That about the 20th July, advices arrived at *Fort St. George* from different quarters, that *Hyder Ally* had invaded the *Carnatic* with a powerful army; but that no attention was paid by the people in power to that intelligence, which they treated with contempt—That the evening of the 23d, however, put the Invaſion beyond a doubt, even with the Government; for certain intelligence was then received, that *Porto Novo* on the ſea coaſt, and *Conjeveram*, not fifty miles from the Capital, had been plundered by the Enemy.

Appendix, No. 42.

Your Committee having thus ſtated the intelligence received by the Preſidency of *Madras*, of *Hyder Ally*'s intention to invade the *Carnatic*; his manner of invading it, and the various events that happened, and meaſures that were taken in conſequence of that invaſion; they will now proceed to report to the Houſe the reſult of their inquiries on ſeveral other points, which are neceſſary, in their opinion, for the information of the Houſe, that they may be the better able to judge of the cauſes of thoſe misfortunes to which the Britiſh Poſſeſſions on the Coaſt of *Coromandel* have of late been expoſed.

In the former part of this Report, the Committee have given ſome account of the great force with which *Hyder Ally* had invaded the *Carnatic*, according to the intelligence at that time received, and of the conduct by which he endeavoured to ſecure the conqueſts he had made; but as this intelligence appears to have been received in a moment of general alarm, your Committee think it proper to ſtate to the Houſe, the opinions which the Preſidency of *Madras* entertained of the character of this Prince, of his reſources, and of the troops he appears to have employed at two former periods, when the Company was not at war with him:

About the latter end of the year 1774, the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* deſired the Preſidents and Councils of the other Settlements, to tranſmit to them the beſt information they were able to procure of the ſeveral Princes in their neighbourhood.—In anſwer to this requiſition, the Preſident and Council of *Madras*, in a letter dated the 9th of December 1774, write as follows: " *Hyder Ally Cawn* poſſeſſes a valuable, exten- " ſive, and well-regulated Government—They cannot " give an accurate computation of his revenue or " forces, but all accounts agree, that he can bring into " the field a very numerous and well-diſciplined Army; " that he is no leſs exact in the payment of his forces, " than attentive to their diſcipline; and that his revenues " are ſaid to amount to three Crores of Rupees—that he " has taken the opportunity, while the attention of the " Marattas has been engaged by their diſtractions at " home, to recover the whole of the countries which " they had, within theſe few years, wreſted from him— " that as they cannot ſpeak with certainty of the reports " which prevail of his connection with the French, it is " almoſt improper for them to touch upon them; but " thus much is evident, that, by their means he is plen- " tifully ſupplied with military ſtores; and that adven- " turers of their nation are allowed, if not encouraged, to " enter into his ſervice."

In anſwer to a ſimilar requiſition, made by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in the latter end of the year 1777, the Preſident and Council of *Madras*, in a letter dated the 16th of January 1778, informed them, " That *Hyder Ally* had at that time in the field, a Force, " conſiſting, as they were informed, of about 30,000 " Sepoys with ſmall arms, 50,000 Matchlock Men, " 28,000 Horſe, and 37 Guns;" and they afterwards add, " that the Revenues ariſing from his different poſſeſ- " ſions are immenſe, amounting, as they believe, to three " Crores of Rupees; that his whole attention ſeemed " to be engaged by the Marattas, and his views confined " to the preſervation of his own dominions; that he had " a Vakeel at *Pondicherry* with Monſieur *Belleconibe*, " from whom he received every aſſiſtance the French " could then afford him; that Monſieur *Bellecombe* kept " up a conſtant correſpondence with him, and endea- " voured all in his power to engage him in the intereſt " of the French." And ſpeaking of the great and dangerous power of the Marattas, they further add, " We " think *Hyder* might on ſuch an emergency (a Maratta " War) be made an uſeful Ally, as his troops are more " warlike, better diſciplined, and better appointed than " thoſe of any other Power: but we are afraid the Na- " bob could never be brought to act cordially in ſuch an " alliance, as he has long entertained a rooted enmity " towards *Hyder*, and hath on ſeveral occaſions mani- " feſted it in oppoſition to his own intereſt. As to the " Soubah, little could be gained by a cloſer union with " him; and our opinion, both in reſpect to him and the " Marattas, is, that we ſhould endeavour, in caſe of a " war, to prevent their taking part againſt us; but that " we ſhould prefer *Hyder* as an Ally, whoſe aſſiſtance " might be the moſt ſerviceable."

And Colonel *Stuart*, in his Memorial of the 9th of December

December 1776, which was preſented to the Preſident and Council of *Madras*, and which they highly commend, ſpeaks of *Hyder Ally* as follows: "This man ſeems to be "in the mouths of almoſt every body, as a bugbear to "frighten and alarm; in *England* it is the ſame, and even "the Stock Jobbers play him off in *Change Alley*. I have, "with the moſt minute attention, collected from the Com- "pany's Records in *England* and elſewhere, informed "myſelf of every material circumſtance that led to, or "occurred in, what is called the *Balla Gaut* War, and "our differences with *Hyder* I know alſo how that "buſineſs concluded. I have in my poſſeſſion a copy of "General *Smith*'s Commentary upon that War, and "have particularly noticed *Hyder*'s Letters, Meſſages, "and Converſations in ſeveral periods of the War; from "all which it appears to me, that on *Hyder*'s part, it was "a War of ſelf-defence; and, becauſe I believe *Hyder* "to be a ſenſible man, and to know his true intereſt, I "conclude he was ſincere, when he explicitly declared "upon all occaſions, and particularly to Mr. *Hornby* "their Chief at *Tellicherry*, and by his meſſage by Mr. "*Stracey*, whom he ſent for that purpoſe to *Madras*, "that nothing was further from his wiſhes than a War "with the Company, becauſe he knew they would in the "end ruin him, but that in ruining him, he could ſo "protract the time, and increaſe their expence, as even "to diſtreſs the Company by their conqueſt; and what "is very remarkable, he warns Mr. *Hornby* of what he "next year performed, that he would force a Peace per- "ſonally, by riſking an Invaſion into the *Carnatic*. If "at that time when he was ſucceſsful, he concluded a "Peace without any material advantage or addition of "territory, for what reaſon now, having no difference "with him, does he want only to make incurſions to "burn and plunder this Country, when he muſt be ſen- "ſible, that ſuch conduct would draw upon him, not "only the ſtrength of this Preſidency, but alſo a regular "ſyſtem for his deſtruction, ſupported by the Influence, "Arms, and immenſe Treaſury of *Bengal*; and his de- "ſtruction would ſpeedily follow, not by a *Balla Gaut* "Land War; through the Paſſes, and penetrating at an "immenſe expence, to *Seringapatam* from hence, but by "the co-operation of Sea Armaments at *Mangalore*, and "from other parts on the *Malabar* Coaſt? I ſhall never "therefore be led to think, that, without any reaſon, he "will bring himſelf into ſuch difficulties; but if he does, "I hope the Force of the *Carnatic* alone will be ſufficient "to chaſtiſe him."

Your Committee will conclude the information they intend to give of *Hyder Ally*, by the following Account of his preſent Force, tranſmitted by Sir *Edward Hughes*, in his Letter to the Earl of *Hillſborough*, dated the 15th day of October 1780.

ACCOUNT of HYDER ALLY's Force now acting in the Centre of the CARNATIC, and laying Siege to its capital City, ARCOT.

European Cavalry,			
Mounted, under M. Pimorin	300		
D° - - - *M. Lally*	80	580	
D° Infantry and Artillery,			
Attached to the Guns of the different Sepoy Battalions	200		
Muſtees,			
Under the command of M. Janon, a Portugueſe	- -	80	
Topaſſes,			
Under the command of Janon	900	1,600	
D° - - - - - - Mr. Mills	700		
			2,260
Black Cavalry,			
Under Tépoo Saib, properly armed and accoutred, and clothed in red	100	200	
D°, D°, in green	100		
Under M. Lanſquenet, diſmounted	200	400	
D° Davis, D°	200		
Choſen Horſes, marked with Hyder's own chop;—half with himſelf, and half with Tepoo Saib	- -	26,000	
Irregulars (called Looty Wallens) of which no preciſe calculation can be formed, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of	- -	20,000	
			40,600
Sepoys,			
Under Mahomed Ally, cloathed in red, three Battalions of 1,000 Men each	- -	3,000	
—— Shaik Omar, cloathed in green, five Battalions (attached to Lally's Corps)		5,000	
—— Shaik Boudan, cloathed in red, four Battalions	- -	4,000	
—— Toleram (his own) Sepoys, attached to Mr. Samuel Mill's Topaſſes	- -	1,000	
			13,000
D° Irregular	- -	-	8,000
Matchlock and Pikemen	- -	- -	20,000
Rockets, 500 Camels, each carrying a Rocket Boy and a Matchlock Peon, with 20 ſpare Rockets; alſo a great number of Bullocks carrying Rockets, and a Man to each, the whole ſuppoſed to conſiſt of	- -	- -	1,000
Laſcars, ſuppoſed to be about	- -	- -	2,000
			86,860

Ordnance.

Heavy Guns, } Braſs, {20 / 50} 70
Field Pieces, }
Howitzers - - - 5

N. B. A large Detachment employed under *Meer Saib*, in deſolating the northern Provinces of the *Carnatic*, and the Guntoor Circar, not included in the above.

Your Committee will next proceed to lay before the Houſe, a State of the Company's Forces on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*; ſhewing, what were their numbers, what their condition and diſcipline, and in what manner they were ſtationed and diſtributed immediately before the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*.

The Committee of Secrecy that ſat in the year 1773, have given an Account of the Military Eſtabliſhments and Military Regulations under the Preſidency of *Madras*, which ſubſiſted at that time.

See Letter of the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, 6th Feb. 1777.

Your preſent Committee find, That in the beginning of the year 1777, in conſequence of the *Tanjore* Country falling under the military protection of the Company, the Preſident and Council of *Madras* augmented and new-modelled their Army, upon a plan firſt ſuggeſted in part by Sir *Robert Fletcher*, but afterwards much improved by Colonel *Stuart*, augmenting the number of Sepoy Battalions, viz. the Carnatic Battalions, from 12 to 16, and the Circar Battalions from ſix to eight, diminiſhing at the ſame time the Privates in each Company from 86 to 65, which, together with the Native non-commiſſioned Officers, brought the ſtrength of each Battalion to 750 Men; this, however, is excluſive of European commiſſion and non-commiſſioned Officers, in number 19, Native commiſſioned Officers, in number 20, Drummers 12, and Puckallys 10. For the information of the Houſe, the Committee have inſerted the Eſtabliſhment of one of theſe Sepoy Battalions in the Appendix. They at the ſame time raiſed five new Battalions, of the ſame eſtabliſhment and numbers, ſo that the Force of the Preſidency, according to the eſtabliſhments of that time, conſiſted of 29 Sepoy Battalions, amounting to 23,519 Officers and Men; to theſe are to be added a Troop of Cavalry, conſiſting of 48 Officers and Men, and two Regiments of European Infantry of two Battalions each, which, according to their eſtabliſhments, ſhould amount to 576 Men in each Battalion, non-commiſſioned Officers included, or 2,304 Men in the whole, beſides non-commiſſioned Officers and Staff, and ſix Companies of Artillery, amounting to about 600, commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned Officers included, beſides European Invalids and Penſioners, amounting to about 900.

Appendix, No. 43.

† See the Military Regulations above mentioned.

On the 29th of June, 1778, upon receiving information of the War with *France*, the Preſident and Council ordered that 20 Men be added to each of the Battalion Companies of 13 *Carnatic* and eight Circar Battalions, making an augmentation of 3,360 Men;—but on the 5th of November of the ſame year, the Select Committee ordered, That the Sepoy Battalions, to which this augmentation had been made, ſhould be reduced to their former eſtabliſhment, and that the overplus Sepoys which had been raiſed do fill up the vacancies in the other Battalions.

On the 16th of July, in the ſame year, they ordered their Corps of Artillery to be new modelled, making it conſiſt of eight Companies inſtead of ſix, each Company having one Captain, two Lieutenants, two Lieutenant Fire-workers, five Serjeants, ſix Corporals, 10 Gunners, 54 Matroſſes, one Drummer, and two Fifers, making 83; and the eight Companies, amounting in the whole to 664, beſides the Staff, conſiſting of one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, one Adjutant, one Quarter Maſter, one Serjeant Major, one Quarter Maſter Serjeant, one Drill Serjeant, one Drill Corporal, one Drum-major, and one Fife-major, in all ten, which in the whole makes the Corps to conſiſt of 674.

And on the 26th of the ſame month, they gave Orders for raiſing two more Battalions of Sepoys for the Defence of the Circars.

Your Committee do not find that any further Augmentations were made to theſe Troops till the 31ſt of July 1780, when, in conſideration of the Army's taking the Field, and the Garriſons in the *Carnatic* being weakened thereby, it was reſolved, That ſuch of the Battalions of Sepoys as remain in Garriſon, be ordered to augment their Companies 20 Men each. It appears by the Select Conſultations, 23d September 1780, that Sir *Hector Munro* then recommended augmenting the Sepoy Battalions to 100 Sepoys each Company; but Your Committee do not find that any Orders were iſſued in conſequence of this recommendation, the General's Minute being ordered to lie for conſideration.

Your Committee find, That the Preſidency and Council of *Madras* frequently repreſented, that the European Regiments were incomplete for want of a ſufficient Number of Recruits from Europe; but the Sepoy Battalions were in general complete.—And on the 22d of December 1778, ſoon after the ſurrender of *Pondicherry*, General *Munro* reported to the Select Committee, that the Sepoy Corps appear, by the Returns, to be complete to the eſtabliſhment of 750 Men; and that there were about 250 Supernumeraries to be diſpoſed of as the Committee ſhould think proper.

The following is an ACCOUNT of the effective State of the COMPANY's FORCES on the COAST of COROMANDEL, in January 1780.

Cavalry		48	
Artillery		562	non commiſſioned Officers included.
Infantry, 2 Reg[ts]		2,028	Rank and File, including non-commiſſioned Officers.
European Invalids and Penſioners		853	
Sepoys.	Carnatic, 21 Batt[s]	16,279	Native Officers included.
	Circars, 8 Batt[s]	6,295	
Total Native Troops, Officers included,		22,574	as alſo a Corps of Sepoy Independants, amounting to 763 Native Officers included, and 722 Sepoy Invalids and Penſioners.

In this Account no notice is taken of the two Battalions ordered to be raiſed for the Defence of the Circars, on the 26th of July 1778.

Letter of the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George in their Military Department, 29 October 1773.

It appears to Your Committee, That of the above Troops, the Nabob has long been engaged to pay 10 complete Battalions of Sepoys; the charge of which, together with the expence of the Garriſons, which he has alſo engaged to defray, amount annually to about four Lacks of Pagodas, as ſtated in the Letter of the Preſident and Council of *Madras* to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, dated the 7th of December 1774.

Letter from Fort St. George, 14 May 1776.

And it further appears to Your Committee, That the Rajah of *Tanjore* is under an engagement to pay annually to the Company four Lacks of Pagodas for the military defence of his country.

Your Committee find, by a Letter from Governor *Rumbold* to the Court of Directors, dated the 15th of March 1778, that the Troops of the Company on the coaſt of *Coromandel* were in excellent order. The Governor declares, that a ſpirit of diſcipline ſeemed to run through the whole, and that he had ſeldom ſeen a more

orderly

orderly body of men. And Governor *Rumbold*, in a Letter to the Chairman of the Eaſt India Company, dated the 31ſt October of the ſame year, expreſſes himſelf as follows: "I think it neceſſary to mention to you, in juſ-"tice to Brigadier General *Stuart*, that one great advan-"tage on our part, and which enabled us to carry the "Orders of the Court of Directors for attacking *Pondi-"cherry* into immediate execution, was the ſtate in which "we found the Army upon this Eſtabliſhment, at the "time of receiving thoſe orders, owing to the very ſea-"ſonable augmentation that had been made, and the pro-"per Military regulations and diſcipline which had taken "place, during the time he commanded the Troops."

And Sir *Eyre Coote*, in a Letter to the Committee of Correſpondence, dated the 18th January 1779, bears teſtimony to the diſcipline and good order of theſe Troops in the following words: "I have reviewed ſeveral of "your Corps ſince my arrival here, and can aſſure you "with much pleaſure, that they are brought to a per-"fection I could hardly have an idea of in this Country. "Your Artillery is equal to any thing in *Europe*; and "nothing is left us to wiſh, but an addition of numbers "to both. The Officers merit every thing that can be "ſaid in their praiſe, for the unwearied pains they have "taken to bring the Troops to the ſtate they are in at "preſent."

To the Forces above ſtated, is to be added the firſt Battalion of His Majeſty's 73d regiment, amounting, according to the eſtabliſhment, to 1,082 Men, non-commiſſioned Officers included; and it appears by the laſt Return, previous to *Hyder Ally*'s invaſion, that the effective ſtrength of this Battalion was, at that time, non-commiſſioned Officers 72, rank and file 846, Total 918. And it appears to your Committee, that 245 Recruits for this Battalion were ſent out in the Ships of laſt year, but were taken on their paſſage.

And your Committee find, by a Return, dated Camp at *Marmalon*, 1ſt November 1780, That the ſtrength of this Battalion, after the defeat of Colonel *Baillie*, conſiſted of non-commiſſioned Officers 55, rank and file 568; beſides miſſing, non-commiſſioned Officers 11, rank and file 117, being part of the two Flank Companies of the Battalion that were ſent with Colonel *Fletcher* to join Colonel *Baillie*, and are ſuppoſed to be now either killed, wounded, or priſoners; and beſides a detachment ſent to *Bengal*, conſiſting of, non-commiſſioned Officers 4, rank and file 50, 48 of which appear, by Sir *Eyre Coote*'s return, to have arrived with him ſince at *Madras*.

Your Committee alſo find, by the Return of the 30th of November 1780, that there is in the Garriſon of *Fort St. George* 100 European Militia, and in the *Black Town* 100 European and 1,500 Sepoy Militia, formed into two Battalions; beſides 100 native Portugueſe, and 100 Black Artillery, in the *Black Town*.

With reſpect to the diſtribution of theſe Forces, your Committee find, That it has ever been the uniform opinion of both Civil and Military Perſons, that for the defence of the *Carnatic*, as great a force as could be ſpared from the different Garriſons ſhould be collected in ſome central ſpot.

Proceedings of the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, in their Military Department, dated 18 Nov. 1776.

It appears to Your Committee, by the proceedings referred to in the margin, That this plan had been earneſtly recommended by Generals *Coote*, *Smith*, and *Fletcher*.

The Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in their Letter of the 26th of January 1778, after obſerving upon the diſperſed ſtate of the Troops appointed for the defence of the *Carnatic*, and particularly of the Europeans and Artillery, proceed to ſay, "Thoſe, who, when united, will "form a moſt reſpectable Corps, loſe almoſt their whole "apparent conſequence, and much of their real ſubſtance, "by ſuch a diviſion and diſſipation of them; we believe, "that the want of accommodation for the whole of your "European eſtabliſhment, may have rendered it, in ſome "degree, an act of neceſſity; and we have no doubt but "it has been occaſioned by ſome powerful cauſe; but "whatever it may have been, we cannot help recom-"mending as an object moſt worthy of your attention, "to deviſe the means by which your European forces "may be collected, and kept entire at your Preſidency, "or within its reach, for in that light we regard the "Quarters of *Poonamalle* and the Mount; that all the "other Forts and Paſſes be garriſoned by Native Troops; "and that not a man of the ſeveral ranks of European "Soldiers and Artillery be detached from their proper "Corps. You will agree with us in opinion, that it is "on the European Forces which the Company maintain "in *India*, that the preſent exiſtence of their power, the "future ſafety and duration of their Settlements, eſſentially "depend; and that theſe muſt loſe both their diſcipline "and ſtrength by being divided."

And in their Letter of the 17th October laſt, they ſay, "Had the diſpoſition been attended to, or the advice "contained in that Letter followed, the calamity which "their Forces lately ſuffered, and which was owing to a "diviſion of the Troops at a moment of emergency, would "not have happened."—And Colonel *Stuart*, in his Memorial before mentioned, of the 9th December 1776, propoſes the following plan for ſtationing the Troops, as beſt calculated, in his opinion, for the defence of the *Carnatic*: In time of peace, to have two Cantonments, one near *Conjeveram*, the other near *Tiagar*, *Volconda*, or *Trinamalle*; ſix Battalions of Sepoys, and the Grenadier Companies of ſome others, two Regiments of Horſe, two Companies of European Grenadiers, and two Companies of Artillery, to form the firſt Cantonment; and three Battalions, and ſome Sepoy Grenadiers, and a Company of Artillery, to form the other Cantonment: with a detachment from the European Companies, to work the guns of the Sepoys at each Cantonment.

In time of War, when the Army muſt be increaſed, the number at each Cantonment to be double, or more if thought neceſſary.

Sir *Hector Munro*, in a Letter to the Governor and Council of the 8th of November 1778, in treating of the diſpoſition of the Troops, ſoon after the ſurrender of *Pondicherry*, ſays, "It appeared to me alſo neceſſary, that they "ſhould be ſo diſpoſed, that a conſiderable body might "be formed, if neceſſary."

And Governor *Rumbold*, in his Letter to the Court of Directors of the 15th of March 1778, writes, "It is my "intention, with the advice of General *Munro*, to fix upon "ſome convenient ſpot, within a day and a half's march "of *Pondicherry*, ſuch as between *Wandewaſh* and *Gingee*, "or more immediately within the Jaghire, and there em-"body as great a part of your Army as can be ſpared "from the defence of the ſtraggling Garriſons in the *Car-"natic*; for if an Enemy were to land to-morrow, they "might get a footing before we could collect together "part of your Troops: I therefore judge it highly neceſ-"ſary to have an Army in readineſs to attack *Pondicherry*; "—at any rate, a body of Troops ought always to be in "readineſs in the *Carnatic*."

The following Diſtribution of the Troops on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, in January 1780, which has been laid before your Committee, will ſhew how far any of theſe Plans had at that time been complied with.

	Europeans.				European Invalids.	
	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Sepoys.	Artillery.	Infantry.
Cuddalore	—	4	1	446	1	28
Chingleput	—	—	1	63	4	275
Carrangooley	—	—	—	658	—	—
Conjeveram	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fort St. George	—	22	477	1,991	35	238
Mount	—	313	—	—	1	—
Madura	—	—	4	632	2	1
Madranticum	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ongole	—	2	2	158	2	—
Pondicherry	48	1	416	1,756	9	—
Permacoil	—	—	2	68	1	—
Palamcotah	—	—	7	789	3	—
Poonamalee	—	—	1	79	1	—
Surat	—	120	581	1,048	—	—
Trichinopoly	—	1	7	789	12	22
Tanjore and Diſtrict	—	—	36	3,954	19	—
Tiagar	—	—	—	—	4	—
Wandewaſh	—	—	—	—		—
Trippaſore	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vellore and Amboor	—	3	453	1,579	16	12
Vellum	—	—	—	—	4	—
Karrical and Nagore	—	—	5	399	—	—
Circars.						
Chicacole	—	—	12	1,187	—	—
Condapilla	—	—	4	316	1	—
Coringa	—	—	—	38	—	—
Ellore	—	—	10	1,187	2	—
Ganjam and Itchapore	—	—	15	967	3	—
Guntoor Circar	—	95	144	3,524	3	—
Mazulipatam	—	1	29	1,153	8	121
Rajahmundry	—	—	1	—	—	1
Samul Cottah	—	—	4	281	—	—
Vantapollam	—	—	—	—	—	—
Vizagapatam and Diſtrict	—	—	7	578	10	18

Your Committee do not find, that in conſequence of the intelligence received, ſubſequent to January 1780, of *Hyder Ally*'s hoſtile intentions, any orders were given for bringing together any conſiderable body of Troops, and forming them into an Army for the defence of the *Carnatic*, previous to the 24th day of July in the ſame year.

In addition to the obſervation made by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in their Letter of the 17th October before-mentioned, on the diſperſed ſtate of the Troops, Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his Letter to the Committee of Correſpondence of the *Eaſt India* Company, of 30th November 1780, expreſsly ſays, "That the Army was "left in the ſame divided ſtate as in time of the moſt "perfect Peace and Tranquillity; and the Places of "Strength, which whilſt we maintained, he (*Hyder Ally*) "could never become Maſter of the *Carnatic*, were en-"tirely neglected."

It appears by Lord *Macleod*'s Letter to the Secretary at War, of the 13th of October 1780, That even on the 20th of July no attention was paid by the Government of *Madras* to the intelligence then received of *Hyder*'s intentions; and on the 23d of that month, when his Lordſhip told the Governor, "that perhaps the report "of *Hyder*'s Invaſion might be true, and that he thought, "at all events, they ought to take ſome meaſures to "oppoſe him," the Governor anſwered, "What can we "do? we have no Money!" But added, "We mean "however to aſſemble an Army, and you are to command "it."— And Lord *Macleod*'s Letter to the Governor and Select Committee, of the 31ſt of that month, points out the difficulties and dangers to which the Troops, in forming a junction, would then be expoſed: and Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minute of the 29th of the ſame month, confirms the fact, "That no care had then been taken to aſſemble "an Army."

And Your Committee think it right here to refer to a former part of this Report, wherein it is ſtated, That the Preſident and Select Committee, in their Letter to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, of the 18th Day of Auguſt 1780, attributed the delay of bringing an Army into the Field to oppoſe *Hyder Ally*, to the diſtant ſtations in which the Troops were ſcattered when he made his irruption into the Province.

The motions of the Troops, and the endeavours uſed to form an Army, in order to attack *Hyder Ally*, and to relieve *Arcot*, and the unhappy diſaſters that enſued, from the ſaid 24th day of July until the arrival of Sir *Eyre Coote*; and the condition in which he found the Settlement, the Garriſons, and the remaining Troops, are already ſtated in the former part of this Report.

Your Committee will now inſert a Return of the Troops, and their diſpoſition, as tranſmitted by that General.— The Return is as follows:

Stations, and Dates of Returns.	Nations.	CORPS, &c.	European.				Native.							Horſes.	
			Commiſſioned Officers.	Serjeants, and other Non-commiſſioned.	Volunteers and Cadets.	Rank and File.	Staff.	Officers, Non-commiſſioned, and Private.	Labourers to aſſiſt in working the Guns, &c.	Smiths, Carpenters, Armourers, &c. &c.	Servants, Balmen, Water-Carriers, &c. &c.	Total, Officers, &c. included.	Wanting.	Effective.	Wanting.
Madras, September 1780.	Europeans.	Cavalry, one Troop; Engineers, Artillery, 1 Battalion and 8 Companies; 1ſt Battalion 73d Regiment; 2 Regiments, each 2 Battalions; Invalids, Penſioners, and Militia	253	581	81	3,942	—	—	—	—	—	4,857	517	32	—
	Sepoys.	Twenty-nine Battalions; Artillery, Sibindy, and Militia; Invalids, and Portugueſe Militia	335	138	—	—	269	28,628	—	—	—	29,370	64	—	—
	Laſcars.	Attached to Artillery and other Corps, and at Bombay	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,489	—	—	2,489	—	—	—
		Artificers with Artillery, &c.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	462	—	462	—	—	—
		Bheaſties, Bildahs, Leoapacks, and Coolies	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,500	1,500	—	—	—
		Total	588	719	81	3,942	269	28,628	2,489	462	1,500	38,778	581	32	—

The DISPOSITION of theſe TROOPS is as follows:

MADRAS TROOPS; 30th November 1780.

Artillery, 8 Companies:
- European Cavalry, 1 Troop — with the Army.
- 1½ Company — miſſing.
- 1 D° — Fort St. George.
- 2 D° — Malabar Coaſt.
- 3½ D° — with the Army.

European Infantry, 2 Regiments, 4 Battalions:

1ſt Battalion, 1ſt Regiment:
- 1 Company — Malabar Coaſt.
- 5 D° — Vellore.
- 3 D° were at Arcot; are returned to Madras, Priſoners, by Capitulation, not to ſerve againſt Hyder Ally during the War.

2d Battalion, 1ſt Regiment:
- 1 Company of Grenadiers — miſſing.
- 1 D° — Malabar Coaſt.
- 7 D° — with the Army.

1ſt Battalion, 2d Regiment:
- 7 Companies, including Grenadiers — Malabar Coaſt.
- 2 D° — miſſing.

2d Battalion, 2d Regiment:
- 1 Company of Grenadiers — miſſing.
- 2 D° — with the Army.
- 6 D° — Fort St. George.

Carnatic Sepoys, 21 Battalions:
- 1ſt Battalion — miſſing.
- 2d D° — with the Army.

3d D°:
- 2 Companies Grenadiers — Malabar Coaſt.
- 8 D°, D° — Madras.

4th D°:
- 2 Companies Grenadiers — Malabar Coaſt.
- 8 D° — Fort St. George.

5th D°:
- 2 Companies — Vellore.
- 2 D° were at Arcot; are returned to Madras, in Number 44; the reſt miſſing.

Carnatic Sepoys, 21 Battalions.	6th Battalion	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		8 D°	Trichinopoly.
	7th D°	6 Companies	missing.
		4 D°	Fort St. George.
	8th D°		Malabar Coast.
	9th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		8 D°	Tanjore.
	10th D°		Pallamcottah.
	11th D°		missing.
	12th D°	4 Companies	Kirrical & Nagore
		6 D°	Cudalore.
	13th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		8 D°	Tanjore.
	14th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	missing.
		1 D°	Wandewash.
		7 D°	Poonamalee.
	15th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	missing.
		1 D°	Wandewash.
		7 D°	with the Army.
	16th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	missing
		5½ D°	with the Army.
		1 D°	Permacoil.
		½ D°	Chingleput.
	17th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	missing.
		8 D°	with the Army.
	18th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		8 D°	Tanjore.
	19th D°	5 Companies, Grenadiers included	with the Army.
		1 D°	Tiagur.
		1 D°	Gingee.
		3 D°	Trichinopoly.
	20th D°		Malabar Coast.
	21st D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	missing.
		8 D°	with the Army.
Circar Sepoys, 8 Battalions, and 5 Independant Companies.	1st Battalion	6 Companies	Chicacole.
		4 D°	Vizagapatam.
	2d D°		missing.
	3d D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		2 D°	Mazulipatam.
		6 D°	Condapillie.
	4th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		8 D°	Mazulipatam.
	5th D°		Chicacole.
	6th D°		Ganjam & District.
	7th D°	5½ Companies, Grenadiers included	Samulcottah.
		2 D°	Fort St. George.
		2 D°	Mazulipatam.
		½ D°	Coringa.
	8th D°	2 Companies Grenadiers	with the Army.
		1 D°	Mazulipatam.
		7 D°	Ellore.
	Independants, 5 Companies		Ongole.

Sibendy Sepoys, 2,727	Tanjore, 3 Battalions, consisting of	1,749
	Mazulipatam	495
	Vizagapatam	300
	Ganjam	183
European Militia, 200.	In the Garrison of Fort St. George	100
	In the Black Town	100

Native

Native Portugueſe.	In the Black Town - - - - - - - - - -	100
Militia Sepoys.	In the Black Town, 2 Battalions - - - - - -	1,500
Black Artillery.	In the Black Town - - - - - - - - - -	100
Invalids.	{Europeans 828 / Sepoys - 850} in the Garriſons of - - - -	Fort St. George, Chingleput, Cuddalore, Trichinopoly, Mazulipatam, Vizagapatam.

N. B. The Troops under the head, "with the Army," are cantoned in the Environs of Madras; and thoſe mentioned "Miſſing," are thoſe that were in the actions againſt *Hyder Ally*, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*.

As two Detachments appear to have been ſent from the Army, under the Preſidency of *Madras*, and to have thereby diminiſhed the Force appointed for the defence of that Preſidency, Your Committee think it right, before they conclude this head of Enquiry, to ſtate the numbers which compoſed theſe Detachments, and by whoſe advice they were ſent.

Select Conſ. 7th Dec. 1778, fol. 724. Your Committee have already obſerved, That on the 7th of December 1778, the Select Committee at *Fort St. George* reſolved to make preparations for the Expedition againſt *Mahé*, and requeſted General *Munro* to prepare a Liſt of Warlike Stores, and an arrangement of Troops, neceſſary for the Expedition.

Do, 10th Do, fol. 761—762. The 10th of December General *Munro* recommended, that the following Troops be ordered on the Expedition to *Mahé*, viz.

Europeans, 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment; Sepoys, 4th and 20th Battalions.
Artillery, three Companies.
Laſcars, 200.

Do, 22d Dec. 1778, fol. 862. The 22d of December, in conſequence of advice being received from *Tellicherry* of the ſtate of the French at *Mahé*, and of the Country Powers around them, the Committee agreed to add another Battalion to the Force intended to be ſent to *Mahé*, which then ſtood as follows; viz.

1 Battalion of Europeans.
3 Companies of Artillery,
3 Battalions of Sepoys, and
200 Laſcars.

Do, 19 Jan. 1779, fol. 137. And, in a Letter from the Select Committee of *Fort St. George*, to the Select Committee of *Bombay*, the Force ordered on the Expedition againſt *Mahé* is ſtated as follows; viz.

1 Battalion of Europeans - - -	439	
3 Companies of Artillery - - -	150	Europeans.
		589
3 Battalions of Sepoys, each - -	750	Sepoys.
		2,250.

Select Conſ. p. 100. 22d April. Letter dated 23d March 1779. Your Committee find, That this force went to attack *Mahé*, and that after the ſurrender of that Fort, which happened on the 19th day of March 1779, a part of the ſaid Detachment, viz. Two Companies of Artillery, the Battalion of Europeans, except one Company, and two Battalions of Sepoys, excluſive of Grenadiers, returned into the neighbourhood of the Preſidency.

Select Conſ. 30th Auguſt 1779. And Your Committee find, That in conſequence of a requiſition made by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to the Preſidency of *Madras*, that they would give directions to the Officer commanding at *Mahé*, to join General *Goddard* with his Detachment as ſoon as the fortifications of that place were deſtroyed, the ſaid Preſidency gave orders, on the 18th day of October 1779, to Colonel *Braithwaite*, commanding their Troops at *Mahé*, to join General *Goddard* with his Detachment, conſiſting at that time of one European Company of Infantry, one Company of Artillery, ſix Grenadier Companies, and eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys, which was all the Force they thought themſelves warranted to ſpare in the ſituation of their affairs at that time.

Letter from the Select Committee of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, dated 3d April 1780, and Col. Braithwaite's Letter referred to therein. On the 30th of December 1779, they received Letters from Colonel *Braithwaite*, acquainting them, that having entirely raſed the fortifications, and removed the Stores from *Mahé*, he was preparing to carry into execution their orders for reinforcing General *Goddard* with his Detatchment, when a requiſition was made to him by the Chief and Factory at *Tellicherry*, for the whole Detachment to act in defence of that Settlement, which was cloſely preſſed by a powerful attack from the Nairs, ſupported, though not openly, by *Hyder Ally*, to whom the Gentlemen at *Tellicherry* had given offence, by protecting a Chief of the Nairs, who was obnoxious to him.

Under theſe circumſtances, Colonel *Braithwaite* thought proper to remove with his Detachment for the defence of *Tellicherry*; which was fully accompliſhed by the addition of this force, though the Nairs continued aſſembled in numerous bodies at a ſmall diſtance, making irregular attacks on the Company's Troops, and threatening to take any advantage that might offer, by the reduction of their ſtrength, to deſtroy that Settlement.

And your Committee find, That as ſoon as the Government at *Madras* received advice of the detention of the Troops at *Tellicherry*, in manner before mentioned, they determined, upon a Motion made by the Preſident, to ſend; at all events, immediately from thence, a reſpectable reinforcement to join General *Goddard*'s Army at *Surat*; and accordingly ordered a complete Battalion of Europeans, one Company of Artillery, and a Battalion of Sepoys, to hold themſelves in readineſs to proceed. His Majeſty's Ship *Sea Horſe* being then in their Road, with a large Country Ship called the *Horſendon*, the Battalion of Europeans and Company of Artillery were, in a few Days, embarked on theſe Veſſels, and ſailed for *Surat* the 8th of January. The Battalion of Sepoys, for want of Tranſports, could not proceed at the ſame time, but embarked from *Pondicherry* the 11th February, on the Ships *Beſborough*, *Duke of Grafton*, and *Atlas*.

And it appears to your Committee, by the Return dated the 30th November 1780, that the whole Force belonging to the Preſidency of *Madras*, which was then ſerving on the *Malabar* Coaſt, conſiſted of two Companies of Artillery, nine Companies of Europeans, and twenty-four Companies of Sepoys. Theſe numbers appear exactly to comprehend the before-mentioned Troops at *Tellicherry*, and the detachment ſent to *Surat*. And it does not appear to your Committee, that the force of the *Carnatic* had been weakened by any other Detachment when *Hyder Ally* invaded it.

It is proper, however, that your Committee ſhould here obſerve, That the Preſident and Council of *Madras* appear to have been always averſe to making any Detachment to the Malabar Coaſt, for the purpoſe of carrying on the War againſt the Marattas; and when the Preſidency of *Bombay* firſt applied to them for aſſiſtance, in the beginning of the Year 1778, they abſolutely refuſed to grant it; and in a Letter to the Court of Directors, dated

dated the 5th February 1778, which will be found in the Appendix, they ſtate their objections to this meaſure, declaring, that they ſhould be unjuſtifiable if they were to detach any part of their Troops upon ſo diſtant a Service, from whence it would be impoſſible to recal them, however preſſing the occaſion, in leſs time than five or ſix Months; and they add, that as far as they can judge from the preſent ſituation of affairs, it would not be prudent in them to detach any part of their Force on this Service, though it ſhould meet with the ſanction and approbation of the Supreme Council of *Bengal*: And when they were afterwards informed by a Letter from the ſaid Supreme Council, that they had reſolved to ſupport the views of the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, under certain limitations, and deſiring them, in caſe they ſhould renew their application for Troops, to comply with it, the Preſidency of *Madras* ſtill continued of the opinion before expreſſed; nevertheleſs, they thought it proper, in conſequence of the Letter received from *Bengal*, to deſire General *Munro* to inform them how the detachment required for *Bombay* might be moſt conveniently formed, that no time might be loſt, ſhould it be hereafter determined to ſend it.

See Letter from the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, dated the 14th March 1778

And your Committee find, That when on the 30th Auguſt 1779, they received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 2d of that Month, requeſting, that one Battalion of Europeans, three Batralions of Sepoys, and fifty Artillery Men, together with the detachment ſerving at *Mahé*, might be ſent to join General *Goddard*, they delayed taking this buſineſs under conſideration till the 18th October, and then ordered only the Detachment at *Mahé* to join General *Goddard*, which was detained at *Telicherry* in manner before ſtated; and when they afterwards ſent to *Surat* a further Reinforcement to join General *Goddard*, as is already mentioned, they made it leſs, by two Battalions of Sepoys, than that which the Governor General and Council had required of them; and they complain in ſtrong terms (as will be ſeen in their Letter of 3d April 1780, which will be found in the Appendix) that the true object of this Reinforcement was concealed from them by the Governor and Supreme Council.

It is proper that your Committee ſhould further obſerve, That the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in requeſting that theſe Detachments ſhould be ſent from the *Madras* Preſidency to join General *Goddard*, acted upon the advice of the Commander in Chief, Sir *Eyre Coote*, who gave it as his opinion, that from the laſt Returns the requeſt might with propriety be complied with; and in the Letter written by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to the Preſidency of *Madras*, on this occaſion, it is expreſsly ſaid, that the Commander in Chief had informed them, that one Battalion of Europeans, three Battalions of Sepoys, and fifty Artillery, might be ſpared from that Eſtabliſhment, now the works of *Pondicherry* are demoliſhed, without any riſk or inconvenience to the Service; and that the reſidue of the Forces under that Preſidency would be ſufficient for the protection of their Poſſeſſions. As your Committee find, however, that the expediency of ſending theſe Detachments to join General *Goddard* was largely diſcuſſed by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, they have thought fit to inſert at length in their Appendix, for the information of the Houſe, their proceedings on this occaſion.

Appendix, No. 44.

Beſides the Troops belonging to the Company, which we have already ſtated, there are alſo other Forces which ought to contribute to the ſecurity of the *Carnatic*; we mean the Troops of *Mahomed Ally*, the Nabob of *Arcot*: Your Committee called therefore for the laſt Return of theſe Troops; and were informed by the Servants of the Company, that they were not poſſeſſed of any Return of the Nabob's Troops. Your Committee find, That the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in their Letter to the Preſidency of *Madras*, of the 26th day of January 1778, deſire to be furniſhed with a Return of the Nabob's Troops. And Governor *Rumbold*, in his Letter to the Nabob of the 3d of April, earneſtly requeſted to receive from his Highneſs an exact Account of the Sepoys and Cavalry immediately paid and maintained by him; and in another Letter of the 26th of May following, the Governor again urges the Nabob to communicate to him ſoon the particulars he had requeſted. The Nabob returned an anſwer on the 1ſt of June, and all the account he gives therein of the Troops in his pay, is as follows: "I have "reduced my Sepoys to a number juſt ſufficient for "keeping up the collections of my Country, and defend-"ing the Forts in it."

"During the War with *Hyder Ally*, I had often heard "that our bad ſucceſs proceeded from our not having "Horſe; and I entertained a few under the Command of "*Morare Row* and *Fazel Beg*; but the Enemy's were "much better, and greatly ſuperior in number, ſo that "although the charge of maintaining them was great, "they were of little or no uſe.

"Before the firſt *Tanjore* Expedition, I raiſed two "Regiments of Horſe, and the ſervice they were of at "both Sieges of that Place is well known to the whole "Army. After *Tanjore* was taken, Mr. *Wynch* and Mr. "*Stone* often urged and preſſed me to raiſe a body of "Horſe: Since the increaſe of my Revenue could admit "of the additional Charge, and as I have nothing more "at heart than to ſatisfy and pleaſe my beſt friends, the "Company, I raiſed five Regiments more, which, in ad-"dition to the former two, now made my Eſtabliſhment "conſiſt of ſeven Regiments. I here acquaint you with "theſe particulars, that you may have an idea of the Sum "which I was obliged to lay out in buying Horſes and "Accoutrements, and raiſing Men for them. At this "time, when I was obliged to borrow large Sums of "Money for the above purpoſe, I received no Revenue "from the *Tanjore* Country; and, in my preſent ſituation, "I find it impoſſible to be at ſuch a Charge. From expe-"rience, I am convinced of the difficulties of keeping up "more than what can be regularly paid; this has made "me reduce my Horſe to four Regiments, which are "commanded by European Officers, and the Men "cloathed in the European manner; when I want Arms "and Broad Cloth for their uſe, I ſhall apply to you, that "I may be ſupplied with them out of the Company's "Stores. Theſe Regiments have been put by me under "the command of my beloved Son, *Ameer ul Omrah Be-"hauder*, who will take particular care in regulating and "diſciplining them. A part of the Country has alſo "been aſſigned towards paying off their Arrears and pre-"ſent Pay, that they may undergo no difficulty in future. "I have ſpent the beſt part of my Life in maintaining "my friendſhip for the Engliſh Nation, and fighting "againſt their Enemies, and I have educated my Children "in the ſame principles of Friendſhip for the Engliſh. "As I conſider my above-mentioned Son as my ſecond "ſelf, and my Blood runs in his Veins, he will find the "higheſt ſatisfaction in devoting it, with that of the "Troops, in the ſervice of the Engliſh, whenever it is "required, in the ſame manner as I have done, and be "ever ready, in conjunction with the Company's "Troops, either in defence of the Country, or in fighting "againſt the enemies of my Friends, to ſurpaſs even the "valour of European Troops.

"I have given you the above circumſtantial Account "for your information. The public Accounts of the "troubleſome ſtate of affairs in *Europe* have in ſome "degree helped to encreaſe my vigilance and anxiety to "have theſe things properly ſettled; but not only at this "time, but at all times, I am and ſhall ever be ready to "manifeſt my hearty friendſhip for the Engliſh Nation.

"As my Troops are now upon a good footing, and "their affairs ſettled, I ſhall ſoon diſcharge the Balance "of my Debt to the Company."

To this unſatisfactory account of the Troops of the Nabob, given by himſelf, Your Committee could add other information, which they find in the Records of the Company, concerning the numbers of theſe Troops at different

different periods; but as it makes the numbers different in each period, and relates to times antecedent to the Letter of the Nabob juſt ſtated, they do not think it neceſſary to inſert it in the body of their Report, but have added it to their Appendix: They will inſert here, however, an Account of the Nabob's Force, as it ſtood in the Year 1776, which was preſented to them by Colonel *Matthews*, whom your Committee thought fit to examine, as it is the fulleſt and moſt complete they have ſeen.

Appendix, No. 45.

Nabob Mahomed Ally Khan, his Force in the Carnatic.

		Number.
REGULARS.	Cavalry. 7 Regiments, of 5 Troops of 100 Men each, to which are attached 2 Companies of Light armed Infantry, and two Field-pieces drawn by Horſes; to the firſt and ſecond Regiments are 4 Companies attached; to each Troop and Company are European Officers - - - - - -	5,500
	Topaſſes. A Battalion of 10 Companies of 75 Men each — an European Captain, and two Subalterns to each Company -	750
	Artillery. Regimented 6 Companies of 100 Men each, chiefly Mahomedans and Rajputes—to each Company is an European Captain and 2 Subalterns - - - - - - - - This Corps was to be encreaſed to 1,000.	600
	Battalions of Sepoys 16, with European Officers, 10 Companies to a Battalion, and each Company conſiſts of 100 Men; theſe Men are in general much better than any in the Company's Carnatic Battalions - - - - - - - - -	16,000
	Irregular Cavalry - - - - - - - - - - -	3,000
	Bom Rajah, Venkatty Gurry Rajah, and Kallaſtry, have at the Nabob's command, Horſe and Infantry, at leaſt - - - - -	10,000
		35,850

In every Fort are Sebendy Sepoys or Peons, and the ſame kind of armed Men are employed under the different Phouſdars and Amuldars; alſo in every Fort are Gunners, either Topaſſes or Mahomedans.

The Number of European Officers in the Nabob's ſervice, nearly 200, of all Nations.

The Artillery-Men who manage the Guns that are attached to the Cavalry, are not included in the regimented Artillery, and may be reckoned at leaſt 300.

It would be endleſs if your Committee were to report all they find on the Records of the Company concerning the condition of the Nabob's Troops, which in general are repreſented as bad. Colonel *Matthews* informed your Committee, that in the Year 1766 the 16 Battalions of Sepoys which the Nabob then had, were in good order, though not ſo well diſciplined as thoſe of the Company; His Cavalry were in very bad order, exceedingly ill appointed, owing to his want of paying them; and that whole Regiments frequently mutinied and confined their Officers, and deſerted by 50 at a time to *Hyder Ally*. The Artillery was in general compoſed of Mahomedans: That he cannot ſay any thing of the condition of their Artillery at that time, as it was in the Southern part of the *Carnatic*, but that detachments of them have behaved exceedingly well at the ſieges of *Tanjore* and *Pondicherry*.

He further informed your Committee, That moſt of the good Recruits were enticed and enliſted into the Nabob's ſervice, which was the reaſon that the Company's Troops are, in one reſpect, worſe than they formerly were, conſiſting of Men of the lower caſts, inſtead of being of the higher caſts, or Moors, of which they uſed to be compoſed.

Colonel *Stuart*, in his Memorial preſented to the Preſident and Council of *Fort St. George* the 16th December 1776, obſerves, That the Nabob's Troops, from being irregularly paid, and therefore not kept in conſtant diſcipline and exerciſe, cannot, as he thinks, be much depended on in their preſent ſtate.

The Preſident and Council of *Fort St. George*, in their Letter of the 2d July 1777, ſay, That the Nabob's Troops, from the large Arrears continually owing to them, were not only become uſeleſs, but really dangerous to himſelf and to his Country; and they afterwards add, that they had reaſon to apprehend, from the conduct of ſome of his Cavalry, which had actually mutinied and confined their Officers, that there would ſhortly have been a general revolt of the whole Army belonging to the Nabob. And Governor *Rumbold*, in two Letters to the Nabob, dated the 7th Auguſt and 1ſt December 1778 (which your Committee have put in the Appendix) repreſents a mutiny of the Nabob's Cavalry, particularly of two Regiments, in the moſt alarming light.—He ſays, in his firſt Letter, that there is an abſolute neceſſity for diſcharging the 3d Regiment, that had mutinied, without loſs of time, and that the reſt of his Troops ſhould either be paid regularly, or totally diſbanded, otherwiſe the *Carnatic* will be in more danger from them, than all his Enemies together. And he concludes his Letter in theſe words: "That if ſome means be not immediately "taken to eſtabliſh them (the Nabob's Troops) on a "better footing, I ſhall earneſtly recommend to you to "diſband the whole, and truſt entirely to the Company "for the protection of your Country, which will be much "ſafer, and leſs expenſive to you, than the preſent mode." —And in his ſecond Letter, in which he gives an Account of the revolt of the 2d Regiment of Cavalry, he ſays, "That this Mutiny, in all its circumſtances, is like to "what has already happened in various parts of the *Car-*"*natic*." And, he afterwards adds, "That the danger "is now become ſo alarming to the peace of the Country, "and threatens ſuch violent conſequences to the Lives "of many innocent Men, that if ſome remedy be not "inſtantly applied by your Highneſs, the Company will "be obliged to interfere ſome way or other, to pre-"vent the danger from approaching too near their own "Door."

Appendix, No. 46.

Mr. *Sadlier*, in his Minute of 29th July 1780, ſays, "With regard to the Nabob's Troops, they are all many "months in arrears; his Infantry, through want of pay

" and want of diſcipline, could add no ſtrength to our " Army; part of ſix Regiments of Cavalry, formed by " him a few years ago, have deſerted to *Hyder*, becauſe " they were not paid; and the three Regiments now re- " maining, which includes all the Cavalry in the *Carnatic*, " from the ſame cauſe, are ready to follow the ſame " courſe."

Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his Letter to the Secretary at War, dated 1ſt December 1780, writes as follows:

" Obſerving the enfeebled ſtate of our Army here, and " the abſolute impoſſibility of reinforcing it from any of " the Detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or " the Southward, of which the fate of that under the com- " mand of Colonel *Baillie* furniſhes us a melancholy " proof, I naturally turned my eyes towards the Nabob " *Mahomed Ally*; but, figure my diſappointment, when, " inſtead of finding him in a condition to aſſiſt our Exi- " gencies, I learned from his own mouth, that he had " neither Men, Money, or Influence, and that he looked " to the Company for the ſupport of both his Intereſts " and Credit."

In what manner the Troops of the Nabob behaved in the moment of trial, when *Hyder Ally* invaded the *Carnatic*, and how far they contributed to the defence of his Poſſeſſions, is fully ſtated in the former part of this Report; it may be proper, however, to add, that Colonel *Matthews*, who has been at *Arcot* ſeveral times, being examined concerning the defence of that place, which was garriſoned by the Nabob's Troops, and about 150 Europeans, informed your Committee, that from his knowledge of the Fortifications of *Arcot*, he thought it might have held out a conſiderable time, even with the Troops that were in it when it was taken; that they defended the Petta, flanked with round Towers, with a very narrow Rampart, where Cannon could hardly be drawn, for a conſiderable time; and he ſhould have thought the ſame number of Men might have defended the Fort of *Arcot*, which is in all reſpects infinitely ſtronger, a conſiderable time longer than they did; though " he underſtands " *Hyder Ally*'s Troops are much improved in the art of " attacking places from what they were formerly." And being further aſked, whether the Nabob could in any reſpect defend his Country, if it was not for the Force of the Company? he anſwered, it would be impoſſible. And being further aſked, whether it would not have been more for the intereſt of the Company, that the Nabob ſhould have had no Troops at all, and that the whole Military Force neceſſary for the defence of the *Carnatic* ſhould belong to the Company? he anſwered, that he was clearly of that opinion; and that if it had been ſo, he thought *Hyder* would never have invaded the *Carnatic*; and, if he had, he would not have taken a ſingle Fort.

Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort St. George, on the 30 October 1780.

And Your Committee find, That as late as the 30th of October 1780 the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort St. George* thought it neceſſary, in order to obtain the aſſiſtance of the Nabob's Cavalry, to advance the balance of Arrears of Pay due to them for the uſe of the private Troopers, who are there ſaid to be in want of it, and will not ſerve unleſs their arrears are diſcharged; and at the ſame time to direct, that the ſaid Cavalry be paid for the month of October, according to a Return of its preſent ſtate, to be ſent to the Paymaſter at Camp, allowing the Commanding Officers for feeding the horſes at the rate of ſix Pagodas each per month, and to continue the ſame in future.

See 9th Report of the Committee of Secrecy, on the State of the E. India Company that ſat in 1773, p. 607, and following.
Sel. Conſ. Fort St. Geo. 29 June 1778.
Gov. Rumbold's Letters before mentioned, 7 Aug. and 1 Dec. 1778.
See Letter from Preſident and Council of Madras to the Gov. Gen. and Council of Bengal, p. 133.

It is proper that Your Committee ſhould here obſerve, That it appears to them by the Records of the Company, that the Preſidency of *Madras* have not been wanting, at different times, ſtrongly to recommend to the Nabob, to be more regular in the pay of his Troops, and more attentive to their diſcipline; and that, from the conſideration of many of the circumſtances before ſtated, it has been their conſtant wiſh to induce the Nabob either to diſband a conſiderable part of his Forces, or to reduce the whole, and to truſt for the defence of his Poſſeſſions to the Troops of the Company; but that the Nabob has hitherto refuſed to adopt this meaſure.

It is proper that Your Committee ſhould alſo obſerve; That as the Pay of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt of *Coromandel* depends, in part, on the ſum ſtipulated to be paid by the ſaid Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*, the Preſidency complain, that theſe ſums are often very much in arrear, and that they had great difficulty in obtaining payment of them, ſo that they are frequently in great diſtreſs on that account; and as the ſums are calculated principally for the Pay of the Troops in time of Peace, they are in great want, whenever hoſtilities commence, for reſources to defray the Extraordinaries of War. But as this ſubject will be treated more at large by Your Committee, when they report on the Revenues of *Madras*, they will enter no further into it at preſent.

Having thus ſtated the numbers and condition of the Troops belonging either to the Company or the Nabob, employed in the defence of the *Carnatic*, and of the Company's Poſſeſſions in thoſe parts, Your Committee directed their attention, in the next place, to the Military Preparations that were made by the Government of *Madras*, for putting the Fortreſſes in a proper ſtate of defence, by collecting proviſions, iſſuing ſtores, and by providing draft Bullocks, and every thing elſe that muſt neceſſarily attend an Army on ſervice.

Your Committee find, That Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his Letter to the Secretary at War, of the 1ſt of December 1780, ſays, " That the Government of *Madras* had " avoided taking any ſteps towards oppoſing *Hyder Ally*'s " entry into the *Carnatic*, and made not the ſmalleſt " preparations for their own ſecurity."

He adds, " It is hardly credible, but no leſs true, that " even after *Hyder Ally*'s invaſion, the ſame inactivity " prevailed in this Government; and, what ought to have " been their firſt care, lay as much neglected as if no " Enemy had been near. Even the neceſſary arrange- " ments for the ſecurity of *Fort St. George*, the very " foundation of our exiſtence on this coaſt, had not " been made."

And he further ſays, " That the Field Artillery, re- " quiſite for a campaign, are ſo far from being in readi- " neſs, that the carriages are only now making up,"

And giving an Account of the ſurrender of many of the Nabob's Garriſons, without offering the ſmalleſt reſiſtance, upon appearance of *Hyder*'s horſe before them, he obſerves, " That ſuch ready and unconditional ſub- " miſſion to the Enemy muſt ariſe either from treachery, " or a diſaffection of the Nabob's Government; but for " which, the unpardonable neglect of every thing ne- " ceſſary to the defence of the Forts, has furniſhed thoſe " who were ſtationed in them with an eaſy excuſe for " having ſo tamely given them up."

And, in repreſenting the difficulty of ſending ſupplies of Stores and Proviſions to the remaining Garriſons, he adds, " In both of which they have been kept ſcanda- " louſly deficient."

In his Letter to the Court of Directors of the 30th of November 1780, he ſays, " That the draft Bullocks " are deficient in Numbers, and of what there are, many " are ſo weak as to be inadequate to the ſervice required " of them—That Proviſions of every kind were ſo " ſcarce, that the Troops in camp could only procure a " ſcanty ſupply for one day's expence. The whole " Country around, within five miles of *Madras*, was en- " tirely plundered and laid waſte by *Hyder*'s cavalry; " that large Bodies ſtill continue to infeſt it, of courſe no " Proviſions are to be procured beyond that circle; " that both the Army and Inhabitants were maintained " chiefly by ſupplies from *Bengal*, and upon which, he " was ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for " their future ſupport."

And Mr. *Sadlier*, in his Minute of the 29th of July 1780, a few days after certain Accounts arrived of *Hyder Ally*'s irruption, ſays, " Inſtead of aſſembling ſuch part of our " Army as was capable of making ſome head againſt his " (*Hyder Ally*'s Force) and putting our Garriſons in a " ſtate of defence, and providing the means by which an " Army might be ſupported, our unhappy inactivity

" prevailed

" prevailed over every duty which we owed to our own " characters, to our Employers, or to the miſerable In- " habitants of a Country, now ſuffering from Fire and " Sword, which depend upon us for Protection."

He further adds, " That our Troops were ſcattered " in ſmall Detachments, without Stores or Guns; that " our principal Garriſons were without Ammunition, " Stores, or Proviſions, to enable them to bear a ſiege; " that a number of ſmall Forts in the *Carnatic*, ſuch as " *Wandewaſh*, *Carangooly*, *Arnee*, and many others, the " poſſeſſion of which have coſt us ſo much blood and " treaſure, are either left defenceleſs, or garriſoned by a " few Companies of the Nabob's Sepoys, who have not " been paid for 18 Months."

And for further information on this head, Your Committee think proper to refer to a former part of this Report, where it is ſtated, " That the Nabob complained " of the few Troops he had to defend the Garriſon " Towns, and that many of them required Stores and " Repairs to the Fortifications; and that his Capital " would ſoon be attacked, if it was not ſtrengthened " with additional Troops and Fortifications; that he " had lodged great Magazines of all kinds of Stores in " it, and the principal Forts of *Vellore*, *Gingee*, *Wande-* " *waſh*, and *Trichinopoly*."

They refer alſo to another part of this Report, where it is ſtated, " That the Rajah of *Tanjore*, and Major " *Maclellan*, who commanded the Company's Troops at " *Tanjore*, repreſented the neceſſity of reparation to the " Fortifications, and of Reinforcements to the Troops " for defence of the Country, and of Artillery-Men " to work the Guns in the Forts, there being none at " preſent there, but a few Invalids."

They refer alſo to Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*'s Minutes of the 18th of October 1780, before ſtated, where it is ſaid, " That the firſt intelligence they had of *Hyder Ally*'s " motions was accompanied by accounts that his Ca- " valry had actually burnt *Conjeveram*, and finding no- " thing to oppoſe them, were puſhing on towards *Ma-* " *dras*; and that the Majority neglected to take any " one ſtep by which their ſafety might be ſecured, until " the Enemy's Cavalry had entered into the heart of the " *Carnatic*, and penetrated to a great extent, both North " and South; and that for ſeveral days after the In- " vaſion, the ſame unhappy indifference and inactivity " prevailed."

They refer alſo to other parts of this Report, where it appears, that Sir *Hector Munro*, with his Army, were in great want of Proviſions, both while they were at *Conjeveram* and in their retreat from thence, being at the firſt of theſe places obliged to beat out Paddy (Rice in the huſks) for the immediate ſubſiſtence of his Troops; and unable to march from thence with the whole of his Force, in order to form a junction with Colonel *Baillie*, for fear of abandoning this, the only Store of Proviſion which he had.

And Your Committee find, that Major *George Maule*, Chief Engineer at *Fort St. George*, having, on the 31ſt of July 1780, repreſented to the Select Committee the neceſſity of expediting ſome works to the Fort, which, he ſays, would before that time have been in a complete ſtate of defence, had near the quantity of materials which he had every reaſon to expect been ſupplied; and having applied for ſeveral other things to be done, which he thought neceſſary for the defence of the Fort, the Select Committee gave orders accordingly.

For the further information of the Houſe on this ſubject, Your Committee have inſerted, in the Appendix, an Account of Ordnance and Military Stores ſent to *Fort St. George* from the Year 1775 to 1779, both inclu- ſive; and alſo an Account of Arms, Ordnance, Am- munition, Military Stores, and Proviſions, remaining at *Fort St. George*, in December 1779 and January 1780.

Appendix, N° 47.

And Your Committee obſerving, that Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his ſeveral Letters to the Secretary at War and the Court of Directors, complains that *Pondicherry*, ex- cepting the Fortifications which had been deſtroyed, is in every other reſpect open and convenient for the reception of the French, in caſe of their landing in that Country; that when it was evacuated by our Troops, on *Hyder Ally*'s Invaſion of the *Carnatic*, all the French Inhabitants were left in, undiſturbed and ample poſſeſſion of their Houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the conſequence of which has been, that they have riſen in arms, have robbed the Reſident, and with fixed bayoners at his breaſt, obliged him to ſign a paper, the contents of which he knew not, and have raiſed two or three Bat- talions of Sepoys, which they call *Hyder*'s, and which he, no doubt, pays for, but which bear evident marks of the choice of Men being French, as they are chiefly com- poſed of thoſe who were formerly in their ſervice, as ſtated before; and as the neglect of the Company's Ser- vants in this reſpect may be imputed as one cauſe of the preſent ſtate of the *Carnatic*; Your Committee have thought it right to enquire into the conduct of the Com- pany's Servants on this occaſion: And they find, by the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 22d, and 23d Articles of Capitulation for the Surrender of *Pondicherry*, dated the 17th October 1778 (all which are inſerted in the Appen- dix) That the Fortifications and public Buildings of *Pon-* *dicherry* were not to be deſtroyed until further Inſtruc- tions were received from *Europe*—that the Eccleſiaſtic and Religious Orders, as well as the Miſſionaries, were to be ſupported in the full enjoyment of their houſes, their property, and in the exerciſe of their religious functions, as long as they behave with propriety, and do not endea- vour to make converts of perſons profeſſing the Proteſ- tant Religion—that the French Subjects, except Military Officers, were permitted to remain at *Pondicherry*, without moleſtation, and to enjoy the ſame protection as the free Subjects of His Britannic Majeſty, and upon taking the Oaths of Allegiance to His Britannic Majeſty, were al- lowed to trade under the protection of the Britiſh Flag, and at all times to go whither they pleaſe—and that the Sepoys, or other Indians, of whatever caſt or religion they be, who had ſerved under the French Flag, ſhould not be troubled or moleſted in their poſſeſſions, or in their perſons, on account of their ſervices, and of their attachment towards the French Nation; and that they, as well as all other French European or Indian Subjects, ſhould be protected from the power of all Indian Princes.

Appendix, N° 48.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort St. George*, in their Letter to General *Munro*, of the 20th October 1778, approved, in general, the Articles of Capitulation, but expreſſed a wiſh that they had been left more at liberty with reſpect to the Fortifications of *Pondicherry*; but General *Munro*, in his Letter of the 23d of the ſame Month, defended his conduct in this reſpect, by referring to a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 15th April 1778, wherein it is ſaid, " In caſe of a ſuc- " ceſsful attack on *Pondicherry*, it will be expedient, as " War is not yet declared againſt *France*, that every " thing ſhould remain in the ſtate it may be in at the " time of the capture, as far as can be conſiſtent with the " ſafety of Company's the Poſſeſſions."

And Your Committee find, That on the 14th Ja- nuary 1779, the Preſident and Select Committee begun to make preparations for the demoliſhing the Fortifi- cations of *Pondicherry*; and having, on the 11th of March following, received further diſpatches from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 31ſt of Auguſt preceding, by Colonel *James Capper*, they unani- mouſly reſolved, That the Fortifications be demoliſhed without loſs of time; and that the Nabob be applied to, to aſſiſt on this occaſion with as many Labourers from his Country as he can poſſibly ſpare.

See Proceed- ings of the Pre- ſident and Se- lect Committee of Fort St. George, 11th of March 1779.

On the 31ſt of March, Inſtructions were given to Cap- tain *Thomas Giels for this purpoſe, directing him to con- fine himſelf to the demolition of the Fortifications, which* muſt be accompliſhed in the moſt effectual and expe- ditious manner.

And Your Committee find, That on the 29th of July 1779, the Preſident and Select Committee reſolved, That the only Building within the Town of *Pondicherry* that ſhould be deſtroyed was the Powder Magazine; and they gave directions for the deſtruction of it, as ſoon as the Miners could be ſpared from the Fortifications.

And Your Committee find, That on the 31ſt of October following, Captain *Giels* reported to the Preſident and Select Committee, that the Fortifications were effectually deſtroyed.

Your Committee think it proper next to obſerve, That it appears by the Proceeding of the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort St. George*, of the 11th March 1779, that it was Sir *Eyre Coote*'s opinion, "That the "Force of the Company was much too weak to afford "a proper Garriſon for that place and for *Madras*; and "that it would be utterly impoſſible to put an Army in "the Field without abandoning *Pondicherry* altogether, or "leaving it in a ſtate ſo inſecure as to render it a ſure "ſacrifice to any Force, however inconſiderable, that "might attack it."

With reſpect to the Inſtructions given at the time that the Troops were ordered to march from *Pondicherry*, in conſequence of *Hyder Ally*'s Invaſion, for removing from thence the French Officers and Veterans, and ſuch other perſons as it was improper to leave there, and the manner in which theſe Inſtructions were executed, Your Committee think proper to refer to Extracts of two Letters from Colonel *Braithwaite*, commanding the Troops at that place, of the 8th and 11th of Auguſt 1780; which are all the information Your Committee can procure on this ſubject, and are as follows:

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite *to the Preſident and Select Committee at* Fort St. George; *dated* Pondicherry, *8th Auguſt* 1780.

"Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

"In conſequence of the Governor's advice, to ſend "from hence the Military French Officers and Veterans, "and ſuch perſons as I thought improper to remain in "*Pondicherry* at this juncture, I ſignified, by Letter to "Meſſrs. *Piveron* and *Caginive*, and all the Military, "that it was your Orders that they muſt prepare to em-"bark in twenty-four hours on board His Majeſty's Ship "*Sartine*, in order to go to *Madras*.—My reaſons for "pitching on Mr. *Piveron* were, that as Attorney Ge-"neral for the French King, he might be excited to "take a leading part in any attempt to re-eſtabliſh the "French Flag here when I was gone, becauſe there "were many reports concerning him, and becauſe he had "long ſince promiſed to repair to *Madras*, to withdraw "an unjuſt Memorial he had written in to you, and had "not been as good as his word; and becauſe from his "ſituation he might have great influence over the minds "of the French Inhabitants, and the Natives lately ſub-"ordinate to the French Government: My reaſons for "pitching on Mr. *Caginive* were, that he was reported "to be a great Politician, and that his garden-houſe was "every evening a place of general rendezvous for the "French, when their diſcourſe naturally turned upon "their own Nation, and its preſent proſpects in *India*; "and I conſidered ſuch meetings as likely to animate "them imperceptibly to improper conduct, and becauſe "by Mr. *Guy*'s Report, he had ſhewn repeated contempt "of your Authority, by refuſing to ſhew the title by which "he held his Plantation.—However, upon a long private "converſation with theſe Gentlemen, in which I gave "them a great deal of advice, which they promiſed to "follow, I told them, that if they would declare in "writing what they ſo readily declared in diſcourſe, I "would take upon me to diſpenſe with their being "hurried away in this manner, and that I was ſure you "would approve of my conduct—they cheerfully ſigned "the encloſed Declarations, and I have permitted them "to remain; and I believe this alert on them has pro-"duced very good effects: I had other reaſons alſo for "permitting them to ſtay, which I ſhall have the honour "of communicating in my Letter to the Governor.—All "the Military who were in any ſituation to render Ser-"vice, I have ſent, as you will ſee by the encloſed Liſt. "They complain much, the Officers, as if they have been "ſuſpected of breaking their Paroles: I aſſure them no "ſuch thing is ſuſpected, but as the Committee is bound "to tranſmit them to *Europe*, and we may ſuddenly leave "this place, it is neceſſary they ſhould be at *Madras*, "that the Company may have it in their power to fulfil "their engagements; and beſides, ſhould we be con-"ſtrained ſuddenly to leave it, and the Enemy were to "come into it, it would be a ſhocking thing for you to "think that brave Gentlemen of Honour might be re-"duced to ſuffer the moſt inhuman treatment in conſe-"quence of their perſiſting in their Paroles.

"This argument ſeems to have weight with them, "not but they want to ſtay; and ſay, that even was a "French Fleet to come, they would never in any reſpect "act contrary to their Paroles; and as to *Hyder*, he "might cut them to pieces, but that they never would "ſerve him.

"I have ſhipped off all the Guns, among which are "nine of Mr. *Amelrick*'s, for which I ſhall give him a "receipt on the Honourable Company's Accounts. I "am ſorry to inform you, that upon Captain *Nodler*'s "having, as he paſſed through here, praiſed the braſs "twelve-pounders very much, I was at great trouble in "fixing Ammunition, and getting Bullocks for them, as "a Brigade for the European Battalion; but as Cap-"tain *Rigault* has poſitively declared them unfit for im-"mediate ſervice, I have diſmounted and embarked "them, and the European Corps will march without "Guns.

"I have alſo ſhipped off as much Powder and Shot as "His Majeſty's Ships can receive, and have ſent other "Stores to the *Sartine*, till the laſt boats were ſent back, "the Captain declaring that he could not receive a ſingle "thing more—I am now loading ſome Chillingas with "Powder to ſend to *Cuddalore*—I hope other convey-"ances may arrive, or I ſhall have much to deſtroy.

"I will not, Honourable Sir and Sirs, trouble you "with a detail of the difficulties I have had to encounter, "they will occur to you; and if in ſome things I may "have deviated from the regular mode preſcribed for "carrying on buſineſs, I truſt you will rather commend "than blame me for my exertions to put the Troops "under my command in motion, and of courſe to furniſh "them with what was neceſſary; alſo to diſencumber "myſelf of Powder and Stores in the ſecureſt manner; "and if it ſhall be found, in the end, that I have done "this in as expeditious a manner as the circumſtances "would admit, and without violating the Capitulation, "by uſing either force or menaces to any inhabitant of "*Pondicherry*, or poſſeſſing myſelf of an atom of their "property, or an hour of their labour, that has not been "paid for, I flatter myſelf that I ſhall have merit in "your eyes; that I ſhall be excuſed for having given a "Receipt for Money on the public Account; more "particularly when you will ſee that I have given my "own private ſecurity for nearly as much more.

"I have not ſignified to any one in *Pondicherry*, that "I have yet received poſitive orders to move, of which "I ſhall ſpeak farther in my Letter to the Governor.

"There were ſome Priſoners here under ſentence of "a Court Martial, the proceedings of which go by this "conveyance to the Judge Advocate General: As there "were ſix of them tried for deſertion to *Hyder*, I thought "them very improper incumbrances for this Detach-"ment, they are therefore ſent on board the *Sartine*— "Captain *Sydenham* has been written to concerning them, "and I have alſo adviſed the General of this meaſure "with them; I alſo ſend the French deſerters from "*Hyder*'s Army, who, I am convinced, is an impoſtor.

"It

" It would be unpardonable in me not to take this " earlieſt opportunity to inform you of the great aſſiſt- " ance I have received from Rear Admiral Sir *Edward* " *Hughes*, and all the Commanders of His Majeſty's Ships, " nay every individual in the Fleet.—They have ſhewed " that anxiety for promoting the public ſervice on this " occaſion, which is the admiration of all the Inhabitants " of *Pondicherry*, who have been little uſed to ſee ſuch " conduct in their Marine, and have done every thing " in ſo polite and hearty a manner, that I have not " words to expreſs my obligations to them. The Ad- " miral only waits for a wind, intending to continue his " courſe to the Southward as ſoon as he can.

" I cannot, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, conclude this " Letter without recommending to your humane conſi- " deration, the Officers and Veterans now ſent to you; " many of them leave very diſtreſſed families, and will not " be able even to ſupport themſelves at *Madras*, unleſs " allowed free quarters, and even perhaps ſome increaſe " of pay.

" I particularly point out to you, old M. *Manceau*; " his age and diſtreſſes would have induced me to paſs " him over, but his long and meritorious ſervices, as an " experienced and brave Officer, make him too dangerous " a man to be left within the reach of *Hyder's* people, " who would force him to be uſeful to him, in ſpite of " his unwillingneſs to act.

" I beg leave to call to your mind the particular ſitu- " ation of the women and children of the Detachment " under Colonel *Brown*, who were left here to receive a " monthly ſubſiſtence, which is actually ſtopped from the " Soldiers at *Surat*, and amounts to about one thouſand " Pagodas per month. I ſhall now refer you to the " monthly Returns, and ſhall only add, that there is a " fair proſpect of my moving by the night after to- " morrow; and that I ſhall carry with me fifty barrels of " Powder, and a great deal of ſpare Muſket Ammu- " nition, ſo as to be able, if it ſhould be wanted, to puſh " any immediate ſupplies into the little Frontier Forts. " I have already furniſhed *Cuddalore* with Powder and " Stores, and *Parmacoil* with fifty barrels of Powder; and " I hope to carry to meet the General a great number " of ſpare Bullocks, both draft and carriage; but, with " reſpect to Proviſions, as all here is the private ſtore of " the Inhabitants, I fear I cannot do more than furniſh " myſelf for my march.

" I have the honour to be, &c.

" *John Braithwaite.*"

Extract of a Letter from Colonel Braithwaite *to the Preſident and Select Committee at Fort* St. George; *dated Camp on the Red Hills, Auguſt 11th* 1780.

" Honourable Sir and Sirs,

" I have to aſſure you, that if you do not very ſoon " ſend protection to *Pondicherry*, the Inhabitants will be " gradually armed. I have reaſon to think the Minor " or Polygar is a great raſcal: he never would come to " me, or any of your Commanding Officers; and this " afternoon, as ſoon as the laſt guard of mine was come " away, he went in great ſtate to Mr. *Piveron*, and has " propoſed to arm a number of his own people, old " French Sepoys. He ſhould be ſent for to *Madras*.

" I have the honour to be, &c.

" *John Braithwaite.*"

Your Committee will conclude with calling the attention of the Houſe to the late period of the Seſſion at which they were appointed; and the hurry, in conſequence thereof, with which they have been obliged to prepare their Report. Owing to this circumſtance, they have been deprived of ſome parole evidence, which, they had reaſon to think, might have afforded information relative to the ſubject of their enquiry. To the ſame cauſe it muſt be attributed, if it ſhall appear that their Report is not framed with ſo much conciſeneſs as it might otherwiſe have been. They flatter themſelves the Narrative, and Obſervations they have ſuggeſted for the information of the Houſe, will appear to be faithfully and accurately collected from the materials upon which they are founded; and, as to any defects of a different nature, they muſt ſubmit themſelves to the indulgence of the Houſe.

Appendix, N° 49.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX, No. 1.

Fort Saint George, Monday 24th July 1780.

At a Select Committee;

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor; Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following letter from the Nabob:

N° 59, Country Correſpondence. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 23d July 1780.—Received D°.

I herewith ſend for your information, a letter I have juſt received from *Rajab Burbar*, dated yeſterday. What greater conviction can we have than this? no veil remains now to conceal the enmity of *Hyder* towards us. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſh from *Alba Rajab Burbar Behauder*; dated 19th Rejul 1194, in the evening. Appendix, N° 1.

Your ſervant herewith tranſmits to your Highneſs a letter he has received from the Aumildar of *Coliſpauk* yeſterday at four o'clock in the afternoon, giving an Account of the arrival of 2,000 of the Enemy's Horſe at that place, who had plundered and laid waſte all the Villages in that Neighbourhood, and that 5,000 Horſe more were aſſembled to the Weſtward. The people who brought this letter from *Coliſpauk*, told your ſervant, that *Hyder's* Horſe were ſcattered about the Country near *Calniour* and *Arne*, and laying waſte all the Villages; they alſo ſaid, that ſome of *Hyder's* people had carried away the family of *Mahomed Aſſum Cazon*, who were going to *Muliabad*.

Tranſlation of a Letter from the Aumildar of *Coliſpauk*; dated 18th Rejub, or 21ſt July 1780.

Hyder's Horſe are come through the Paſs, and about 2,000 Horſe were this day ſeen here at ten o'clock in the morning; the people in the Fort of *Caliſpauk* fired upon them; the Horſe plundered all the Villages around, excepting the Cuſba of *Caliſpauk*. It is ſaid that 5,000

Appendix, N° 1.

Horſe are coming this way, and the Grand Army is not far off. The Enemy's Troops croſſed the Paſs before intelligence could be received of it. I am juſt now in the Fort, where there is little powder or ſhot. You will be pleaſed to ſend us ſome.

N° 60. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 23d July 1780—Received Ditto.

I ſend you with this, paper of news from *Hyder Ally Cawn*'s Camp, dated the 18th Rejub, or 21ſt July, which is this inſtant come to my hands, with the tranſlation, of intelligence from *Choubatty*, ſent by the Tappie Man at *Woollendous Pettah*. What ſhall I ſay more?

Paper of News from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp, dated 18th Rejub, or 21 of July 1780.

This day *Hyder Ally Cawn* arrived at *Covinpatam*, where his Son, with the Horſe under his command, had come yeſterday. While *Hyder* was on his march from *Hurryduſg*, the intelligencies at *Tungricotta* complained to him of *Tim Naig* the head Peon. Upon this *Hyder* went himſelf to *Tungricotta*, and enquired into the complaint; when it appeared, the head Peon, *Tim Naig*, had ſent ſome of his family to a marriage at *Trichinopoly*, and had ſince wrote to them to take care of themſelves, and return ſoon, for that there would ſhortly be troubles in that Country. The Peon was accordingly found guilty, and hanged on the ſpot.

The Troops from *Huſſoor* and *Banaour* have joined *Hyder*, whoſe whole Army is now at *Coverepatam*. All the artillery and foot are put under the command of Monſieur *Lally*. *Hyder* means to join him in the attack againſt the Engliſh, and ſend his Son *Tippoo*, with a large body of Horſe, to lay waſte the Country. He intended writing to the Governor, but Monſieur *Lally* has told him, that he will not have a proper anſwer to his letter; they are always conſulting together. Mr. *Lally* was ſent to-day with the cannon and artillery, to croſs the Paſs of *Changaina*. It appears that there are letters from the *Mauritius*, which mention, that the French have had the ſuperiority over the Engliſh in *Europe*; that 800 Europeans have been ſent from the *Mauritius* to join *Hyder*; and that the French King had ſent him ſome preſents. This intelligence has given *Hyder* great pleaſure. The Sloop who brought it ſailed a few hours before the French Ships, from *Mauritius*.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs, *Hyder* has ſent ſecret orders to the Troops who were at *Singapetta*, at the Ghaut of *Timerallamutty*, to march to *Caliſhauk*.

Intelligence ſent by the Tappie Man from *Ottendour Petta*.

The *Trichinopoly* Tappies have not come in theſe two days; four thouſand of *Hyder*'s Horſe, and four thouſand five hundred Foot are arrived at the Village of *Yerour*, not far from *Tiaga*, and all the Inhabitants have taken the alarm and fled to the Woods and Mountains. The Tappy Man is afraid to remain longer at *Ottendour Petta*, and is removed ſecretly to a place diſtant one coſs from it, from whence he has wrote this.

24th July 1780.

The foregoing letter from the Nabob putting it beyond all doubt, that *Hyder Ally Cawn* has actually committed Hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*, the Committee reſolved, that the moſt expeditious means be taken for aſſembling an Army in the Field; and for this purpoſe, the following Troops are by the Commander in Chief's recommendation to be immediately ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs to march at a moment's warning.

His Majeſty's 73d Regiment at *Poonamalee*.
1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment at *Vellore*.
The Troops cantoned at *Pondicherry*, conſiſting of one Battalion of Europeans, and 4 Battalions of Sepoys.
15th Battalion of Sepoys at *Trichinopoly*.
21ſt D° - - D° at *Madras*.
Grenadiers of the European Battalion at *Madras*.
The Artillery at the Mount.

Reſolved, That all Officers abſent with leave, be directed to join their corps forthwith.

Ordered, That the Agent for providing draft and carriage Bullocks, be directed to get in readineſs, with all expedition, a ſufficient number for the Troops ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs to march from hence, *Poonamalee*, and the Mount.

The Commander in Chief deſired to hold a Committee of Stores as ſoon as poſſible, to determine the Field Train, Stores, &c. that will be requiſite for the Army, and to prepare them accordingly.

Reſolved, That a letter be immediately written to *Bengal*, adviſing the Governor General and Council there of the Hoſtilities commenced by *Hyder Ally*, and requeſting all the aſſiſtance and ſupport in their power, particularly in the article of Money; and that another letter be written to the Nabob, requeſting him to give orders for providing draft and carriage Bullocks, Proviſions, and every other article neceſſary for the Troops when they take the field, and preſſing him to furniſh us with Money to the utmoſt of his abilities.

John Whitehill.
Charles Smith.
Hector Munro.
Sam[l] *Johnſon.*

Agreeably to reſolutions of laſt Committee, the following letters were this day written:

To the Right Honourable Lord *Macleod*.

My Lord,

As in the preſent ſituation of affairs it is become expedient to aſſemble an Army in the Field, we requeſt your Lordſhip will favour us with your preſence at a Committee on Wedneſday morning, that we may have an opportunity of conferring with you in reſpect to the employment of His Majeſty's 73d regiment on this occaſion; in the mean time we requeſt you will iſſue the neceſſary orders to the regiment, to hold itſelf in readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt warning.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient
Fort Saint George, and humble Servants,
24th July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c.
Select Committee.

To Colonel *Roſs Lang*, commanding at *Vellore*.

Sir,

We deſire you will hold the 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment, in readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt notice.

We deſire you will ſend a return of the Tents that will be wanting for the 1ſt Battalion 1ſt Regiment.

We are,
Sir,
Fort Saint George, Your moſt obedient Servants,
24th July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c.
Select Committee.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Eccles Nixon*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*.

Sir,

We deſire you will hold the 15th Battalion of Sepoys in readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt notice, with the two 3-pounder Field-Pieces at *Trichinopoly*.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, *John Whitehill*, &c.
24th July 1780. Select Committee.

To

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, commanding at *Pondicherry*.

Sir,

We deſire you will hold all the Troops at *Pondicherry* in readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt notice. All the Military Stores now there (except ſuch as the Troops may want for their march) we would have ſent up to *Madras* by His Majeſty's Ship *Sartine*; which will be ordered to *Pondicherry* to receive them; likewiſe the Guns intended for the Nabob, but which he has not yet removed. You will be pleaſed to ſend a return of the Tents that will be wanting for the Troops ordered to be held in readineſs.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

To Colonel *Edward James*, commanding the Artillery at the Mount.

Sir,

We deſire you will hold the Corps of Artillery at the Mount in readineſs to march at the ſhorteſt notice; and ſend to *Madras* ſuch Artillery and Stores as do not come within the deſcription of Field Train.

You will be pleaſed to ſend a return of the Tents that will be wanting for the Corps of Artillery.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

To Mr. *William Auguſtus Dobbin*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident, &c. Select Committee, to order you immediately to ſet about preparing as many draft and carriage Bullocks as you can poſſibly procure.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Chas *Oakley*, Secretary.

Fort Saint George,
24th July 1780.

25th. Received the following Letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to write you, in conſequence of a cannonade I heard all yeſterday forenoon to the weſtward of this place; and on enquiry, find it was from the Forts of *Circherd* and *Pollacamore*, belonging to the Vancataguery Rajah, at ſome parties of *Hyder*'s Horſe; and laſt night about twelve o'clock, I received certain intelligence that a party, conſiſting of 150, had ſet fire to *Ardinge*, one of the firſt Villages in this Country, and carried off many of the principal Inhabitants priſoners. This Village is only 10 coſs N. W. of this place. I muſt beg leave to refer you to my Letters of the 8th and 11th of November, wherein I did myſelf the honour to repreſent to you the ruinous ſtate of this Fort, and the weakneſs of its Garriſon, which appear at preſent very conſpicuous. The Inhabitants, inſtead of coming under its walls for protection, fly from it to the Southward. I cannot help being a little alarmed, when I reflect on the quantity of Stores, &c. committed to my charge, in ſo defenceleſs a ſtate. The Guns that are mounted on the Works have not a carriage that will bear the ſhock of twice firing.

I have the honour to be, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Edwd *Edmonds*,
Captain.

Ongole, 21 July, 1780.
6 o'clock in the morning.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I take the liberty to inform you, that in conſequence of reports circulated by the Black people, of the advances of *Hyder*'s Horſe towards *Madras*, the Inhabitants of *Conjeveram*, and all the way from *Wandewaſh*, to upwards of about twenty thouſand, are aſſembled near this Fort. Permit me at the ſame time to acquaint you, that there is not one day's proviſion, I mean Rice, Gee, and Curry Stuff, in the Fort.

I am,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and reſpectful Servant,
Geo. Mackay.
Lieut. Comm^{t}.

Chingleput,
24th July 1780.

Wrote the following Letter to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*:

To Lieut. Colonel *Baillie*, commanding at *Inacunda*.

Sir,

As *Hyder Ally* has openly commenced Hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*, we are deſirous of employing the Troops under your command to annoy him in his Territories to the Northward. If from the information you have acquired, of the ſituation of the Fort at *Cuddapa*, you think it can be taken by your Detachment, we would have you uſe your endeavours for that purpoſe with the utmoſt expedition, and in any manner you may think likely to anſwer the end. Should you be of opinion that it cannot be done without heavy Cannon, you muſt wait until ſome can be ſent; and in the mean time employ the Detachment ſo as to anſwer our views of diſtreſſing the Enemy as much as poſſible; having an eye at the ſame time to the protection of our own Territories.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
25th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, 26 July 1780.

At a Select Committee;

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident.
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of the laſt Committee read, and approved.

The Committee having determined, that Lord *Macleod*'s Regiment ſhall take the Field with the Company's Troops, his Lordſhip was deſired, by Letter, to hold them in readineſs to march; and the Committee, wiſhing to pay every attention in their power, at the ſame time requeſted he would favour them with his attendance this day, that they might explain to him the ſervice for which the Regiment was required. His Lordſhip being accordingly now introduced, the Preſident informs him of the unprovoked hoſtilities commenced by *Hyder Ally*, and the neceſſity there is for the moſt powerful exertions to be made in the defence of the *Carnatic*. His Lordſhip in reply obſerves to the Committee, that as he was ſent out with his Regiment for the ſervice of the Company, ſo he will be happy now, and at all times, to employ it in ſuch manner as may be deemed moſt uſeful to their affairs. He then withdrew.

Reſolved, That a Letter be written to the Admiral, requeſting him to ſpare the *Sartine*, for the purpoſe of carrying Camp Equipage, &c. to *Pondicherry*.

Reſolved,

Appendix, N° 1.

Reſolved, That a letter be written to Colonel *Braithwaite*, Commandant at *Pondicherry*, acquainting him that the *Sartine* will be ſent there, and directing him to embark on her, and ſuch other veſſels as he can procure, all the Cannon, Stores, Gunpowder, &c. now lying at *Pondicherry*; deſiring him alſo, as ſoon as this neceſſary ſervice is effected, to march with the Troops under his command to *Wandewaſh*, provided his intelligence be ſuch, that he has reaſon to believe there will be no danger of his meeting a force much ſuperior to his own; but if he apprehends any danger of that ſort, he is in that caſe to march the Troops directly to *Madras*, by ſuch route as he ſhall judge moſt ſecure.

Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon*, on this occaſion, deliver in the following Minutes:

The more I reflect on the ſituation of the Troops cantoned at *Pondicherry*, the more am I perſuaded of the expediency of applying to Sir *Edward Hughes*, for the ſquadron to proceed thither; that in caſe Colonel *Braithwaite* ſhould think it would be attended with the ſmalleſt riſk to march to *Wandewaſh* or *Madras*, the Troops may be embarked for this place with the utmoſt expedition: Such fatal conſequences would enſue, were the detachment either cut off, or prevented from joining the Troops from hence, that I conceive it highly proper to afford ſome alternative to Colonel *Braithwaite*, ſhould he think it dangerous to attempt a junction by land.

Charles Smith.

The ſafety of the European battalion and of the three battalions of Sepoys at *Pondicherry*, is an object of the utmoſt importance; and therefore I am of opinion, application ought to be made to Sir *Edward Hughes*, for the ſquadron to proceed thither; and that orders be diſpatched to Colonel *Braithwaite*, for the embarkation of the Troops, in caſe he apprehends any riſk in their march from thence to *Wandewaſh* or *Madras*; but if he thinks otherwiſe, that then they be ordered to proceed over land directly.

I am aware it may be urged, that more time will be loſt by the Troops coming by ſea, than if they were ordered to march directly from *Pondicherry* to *Wandewaſh* or *Madras*: but I am of opinion, little inconvenience can ariſe from the ſailing of the fleet for *Pondicherry*; and that it may prove a fortunate circumſtance to have it ready there for the reception of the Troops, ſhould Colonel *Braithwaite* judge it expedient to embark them.

Samuel Johnſon.

Ordered, That a detachment from the Artillery, with eight field-pieces, be embarked on the *Sartine* for *Pondicherry*, to reinforce the Troops ordered from thence.

Reſolved, That orders be diſpatched to *Trichinopoly*, directing Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon* to ſend the 17th battalion of Sepoys immediately from thence to join Colonel *Braithwaite*'s detachment.

Read the following Letter from *Cuddalore*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with much concern that I have to acquaint you, that laſt night *Porto Novo* was plundered by a large body of *Hyder*'s Horſe. From every intelligence I have been able to collect in ſuch a time of confuſion as this is, that their numbers are not leſs than one thouſand, and ſome accounts add, that they are accompanied by an equal number of Sepoys; and at one o'clock this day they were encamped between *Porto Novo* and *Arriavelly*. All the Inhabitants in theſe bounds have taken refuge in this fort, and the whole country is in a ſtate of the greateſt confuſion and alarm. Whether they mean to come here I have not been able to learn; but I may venture to aſſure your Honour, &c. that no means will be wanting to protect this fort, and the Honourable Company's property therein, as far as the ſtate of our garriſon and fortifications will admit; but ſorry am I to ſay we are in a very defenceleſs ſituation, in conſequence of which I have been induced to apply to Colonel *Braithwaite* for aſſiſtance, and take the liberty of incloſing you a copy of my letter to him. To-morrow I hope to be able to ſend you more favourable accounts; but at preſent all the Inhabitants here are ſo much alarmed, that the intelligence we can poſſibly get is not entirely to be depended upon.

I remain, with the utmoſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Cuddalore, 23d of July 1778, at 9 P. M. *William Cuming.*

P. S. To add to all, we are very badly provided with guns and ammunition.

Read the following Minutes from the Committee of Stores:

Fort Saint George, 24th July 1780.

At a Committee of Stores;

PRESENT,

Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Col. *Edward James*,
Major *George Maule*,
Mr. *Bryan Scottney*.

1ſt. The Committee, at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, direct the Commiſſary of Stores to make out an indent of Ammunition, calculated for the under-mentioned ordnance, and the following force; viz.

Braſs Ordnance.

12 pounder	4
6 pounder	8
3 pounder	8
5½ inch howitzers	4
4½ inch howitzers	4

His Majeſty's 73d regiment.
The battalion of Europeans from *Vellore*.
Four companies of European Grenadiers.
Artillery.
Five battalions of Sepoys.

2d. The Military Storekeeper lays before the Committee, indents of ſtores wanted for the garriſons of *Tanjore* and *Chingleput*.

Agreed, that they be complied with agreeably to the Commiſſary's remarks.

3d. The Commiſſary of Stores lays before the Committee, a Liſt of Stores received from the Military Storekeeper in the month of June, muſters of which being examined, are approved.

Hector Munro,
Edwd James,
Geo. Maule,
B. Scottney.

Read the following Letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have nothing to inform you of but which you will have heard from Mr. *Cuming*, namely, that the Enemy have plundered *Porto Novo* of every thing valuable, and ſent their plunder off on Camels, and the Elephants they took to the Weſtward. Their main Army is ſaid to be advancing between *Venkaguery* and *Coverypatam*; the body near us is ſaid to conſiſt of three thouſand, and to be commanded by a German of the name of *Embeff*; they have four field-pieces and two cohorns, which move as briſkly

briſkly as the Cavalry. The party gone towards *Madras* is ſaid to be larger. I have offered to receive the 1ſt regiment (Nabob's) of Cavalry, and to aſſiſt them with money; but Lieutenant *Poney* wiſhes to wait a little longer on the *Red Hills*, in hopes of orders.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,

Pondicherry, 24th July 1780. *John Braithwaite.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the intelligence I have this moment received, *Tippo Saib*, with four thouſand Horſe, has entered the *Carnatic* by way of *Changamah* and *Caliſhpawk*, and is gone towards *Madras*. A village was deſtroyed laſt night by his people near to *Arnee*.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,

Vellore, 23d July 1780, 8 o'clock at night. *Roſs Lang.*

To *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

About an hour ago I received from Colonel *Braithwaite* an anſwer to a letter I wrote to him laſt night (a copy of which I encloſed to your Honour, &c.) informing me, that, from the preſent ſituation of affairs, it was not in his power to ſupply me with any reinforcement, ſhould it be neceſſary.

I remain, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Cuddalore, 24th July 1780, 8 P. M. *Wm Cuming.*

Fort Saint George, 26th July 1780, Select Committee.

Wrote the following letters:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Our laſt letter (of which we encloſe a duplicate) gave you information of the approach of *Hyder Ally*, with a large army, towards our frontiers. We now tranſmit two papers of intelligence juſt received from the Nabob; by which you will learn, that he has actually detached part of his Cavalry into the *Carnatic*, and is preparing to follow with his whole Army.

We are taking meaſures for aſſembling our Troops in a proper ſituation to oppoſe this attack, and defend the country in the beſt manner we are able; but the alarm already occaſioned by the report of an Invaſion, and the ravages which have been actually committed by *Hyder*'s Horſe, have driven the people from their habitations, and put an entire ſtop to the tillage of the ground.

Under theſe circumſtances, it will be impoſſible for us to draw reſources from the country in any degree equal to the expences which the war muſt inevitably produce; and if we do not obtain a ſpeedy ſupply of money from you, we ſee no probability of our being able to act with vigour and effect, proportionate to the exigency of our ſituation.

If we can be aſſured of ſufficient means to carry on the war, we ſhould propoſe an immediate and powerful diverſion on the *Malabar* coaſt, where the poſſeſſions of *Hyder* are more within the reach of our force, and might, by the aſſiſtance of the Squadron, become an eaſy conqueſt. The principal ſettlement belonging to *Hyder* on that coaſt is *Mangalore*, to which we ſhould firſt point our attention.

We are ſenſible, however, that theſe operations will depend much upon the ſtate of your affairs with the *Marattas*, at leaſt with reſpect to the force to be employed againſt *Hyder*, for it would be highly imprudent in us to detach any part of the Troops now remaining with us upon ſuch diſtant ſervice; and as you have the entire direction of the force on the other ſide of *India*, we doubt not you will conſider how it may be beſt applied to the annoyance of this new Enemy.

We have at *Tellicherry* a detachment of Troops from the coaſt, which might be of uſe, and which, if you think proper, we will direct to co-operate with the other Troops in any plan you may adopt. We ſhall only obſerve further upon this head, that the proper time for commencing any operations on the *Malabar* coaſt will be in the month of September or October, when the monſoon will admit of the Squadron going round.

As the Company have never, within our remembrance, experienced ſo wanton and unprovoked an attack as that againſt which we are now called upon to defend them, we are confident the ſeveral Preſidencies will unite heart and hand to humble and reduce within proper bounds the Power which has thus dared to inſult them; and we reſt aſſured, that your Honourable Board will exert itſelf in a particular manner on the occaſion, to ſupport the honour and intereſt of the Company, and promote the reputation which their arms have hitherto acquired in the wars of *Indoſtan*.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Fort St. George, 26th July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee to deſire you will order Captain *Davis*'s battalion, with two field-pieces at *Trichinopoly*, to march with all expedition to *Pondicherry*, and put himſelf under the orders of Colonel *Braithwaite*.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Fort Saint George, 26th July 1780. *Charles Oakeley*, Secretary.

To Lieutenant Colonel *James*, commanding the Artillery at the Mount.

Sir,

I am directed to deſire you will have in readineſs two field-pieces, with ammunition, and a proper number of Artillery to man them, for a detachment which will march from *Madras* to the Mount to-morrow morning.

I am directed alſo to deſire you will ſend to *Madras*, to be embarked on His Majeſty's ſhip *Sartine*, a detachment from the Artillery, with Laſcars ſufficient to man eight field-pieces.

After making theſe detachments from the Artillery, the Preſident and Select Committee deſire you will march with the reſt of the Artillery intended for the field, and the remainder of the field-train, to *Poonamalee*, ſending what may then remain of the Artillerymen to *Madras*.

I am,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,

Fort Saint George, 26th July 1780. *Charles Oakeley*, Sec.

Appendix, N° 1.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I shall keep a good look out, and keep every thing as quiet here as the general consternation will permit; and have advised the Commanding Officer of his Highness the Nabob's regiment of Cavalry on the *Red Hills*. I feel a want of field-pieces and some Artillerymen, for the security of these large limits. I have about eighty Europeans sick in the hospital, and a very large quantity of powder here, which I have before represented.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
Your very obedient and faithful Servant,
Pondicherry, *John Braithwaite*.
24th July, four in the morning.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Some of my scouts which went to the southward accompanied the plunderers of *Porto Novo* two days, but they could not keep up with them longer; they marched back with precipitation by the route they came, to lodge their plunder with the Army; they burned some villages, and their talk was, that as soon as they had lodged their plunder, they should return, and scour the country hereabout, and drive off the cattle towards the Army. They had accounts that *Hyder*, with his main body, artillery, and Europeans, had come to *Coveripatam*; and that his Son, who was there before with the advanced party, had advanced to *Trincomalee* and *Chilleput*, where much firing has been heard. They speak of the party gone towards *Madras* as 3,000 strong; that there was a party farther to the northward, and one to the southward; but they talked of these with such exaggeration, that there is no giving any credit to their stories. I am pretty well convinced that *Hyder* has not six hundred Europeans in his whole service, effective at least. These people did not speak as if *Hyder* himself, with the cannon, would advance till the French fleet arrived; as soon as it should appear on the coast, he was to come down and meet them there. They said *Tippoo Saib* had orders to take such forts as he could garrison, and put grain into them. The number at *Porto Novo* were about 1,000 Horse, and a few Foot cloathed, which on their return they mounted on camels and elephants above their loads; both Horse and Foot were well armed, and the former very well mounted. They talked of their plunder as worth three lacks of pagodas; from one Dutchman 80,000 dollars in specie, which they were so anxious to secure, that they marched thirty miles a day. I have scouts out to the westward, some of whom will I am sure go to their Army; by them I hope to be informed of their real strength. I think *Hyder* will not advance with infantry and cannon, unless the French were to arrive, which cannot well be before the monsoon; if he did, he would not be able to avoid an action, which I believe he is too cautious to risk. *Bon Enfan*'s wife is here; she has received a letter from him, advising her to move every thing from the gardens, as *Hyder*'s Horse will be down here very soon. Mr. *Piveron* yesterday gave an entertainment to all the principal French Gentlemen, the first I am told since the capture: The French in general seem quite easy, not disturbed at the thought of being left without Troops, and some of the Black men are carrying their effects to principal French houses; but there are some who are very downcast; they think that we know that no French fleet will arrive, and that they shall suffer in the end for *Hyder*'s present conduct.

I remain, with the greatest respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Pondicherry, *John Braithwaite*.
26th July 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 27 July 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esquire, Governor and President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since yesterday, I learn that *Hyder*'s Horse have retreated from *Chitty Rell*, towards the passes through which they entered the *Carnatic*. Some of their flying parties are still plundering about in the different villages, but they are reported as of no great consequence.

This fort and garrison are in very fine order; and I humbly beg leave to assure you, that there is nothing to be apprehended in this quarter, if *Hyder*'s whole Army surrounded it.

I am,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most respectful and obedient Servant,
Chingleput, *George Mackay*, Lieut Col.
26th July 1780.

Dispatched the following letters.

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, commanding at *Pondicherry*.

Sir,

The *Sartine* will sail immediately for *Pondicherry*, with six field-pieces, ammunition, &c. and a sufficient detachment from the Artillery to man them; also tents for a battalion of Sepoys. We desire you will, on her arrival, land these articles, and put on board the *Sartine* the cannon and stores of all kinds at *Pondicherry*, also as much gunpowder as the Captain may think proper to receive. The remainder of the gunpowder we would have you dispatch in the best and most expeditious manner you can, by boats, to *Madras*.

We have ordered the 15th battalion of Sepoys, with two field-pieces, to join you from *Trichinopoly*, and upon their arrival you will be pleased to march with your whole force to *Wandewash*; but if from any intelligence of the motions of *Hyder*'s army, you shall be of opinion that you cannot reach that place without running too great a risk, you will in that case either move this way, or take post in such manner as you shall judge most conducive to the security of the Troops until you can be relieved.

We are, Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, *John Whitehill*, &c.
27 July 1780. Select Committee.

To the Right Honourable Lord *Macleod*.

My Lord,

We have ordered the Artillery from the Mount, and the detachment that is to go from the garrison, to march as soon as possible to *Poonamalee*, to join the 73d regiment; and on their arrival there, we request your Lordship will move the whole to a place called *Eyacollan*, near *Conjeveram*, where they will be joined by a battalion of Europeans from *Vellore*.

We have the honour to be,
Your most obedient humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, *John Whitehill*, &c.
27 July 1780. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 28 July 1780.

Received the following letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esquire, President and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

I have had to-day no intelligence worth troubling you with, only that the Horse who made the attack at *Porto Novo* are gone to the westward. We are exerting our-

selves

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ſelves to defend this place in the beſt manner our *very ſmall means* will allow. Half of the battalion doing duty here are at *Nagore*, where, if I am not miſinformed, there is little or no property of the Honourable Company to defend, and here is a great deal; if the whole or any part of the *Nagore* Sepoys were ordered here, they would be of the greateſt utility, and if it was poſſible to add a few Artillerymen (of which we have only two, and them invalids) it would be of infinite ſervice. My duty, I think, obliges me to give you the above information, ſubmitting it to the deciſion and approbation of your Honour, &c.

I remain, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Cuddalore, 26th July 1780, 9 P. M. *William Cuming.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 23d at night, acquainting you that *Tippoo Saib* has entered the *Carnatic*; and by the intelligence that I have received this day, *Hyder Ally* is on his march by *Singepittan* and *Changarnab*, and go directly to *Pondicherry*; he has left all his heavy baggage at *Coverypatam*. A large body of Horſe and Poligars, I expect to hear every moment, have inveſted *Amboor* and *Lacet Gur*.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Vellore, 25th July 1780. *Roſs Lang.*

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 28 July 1780.

Diſpatched the following letter:

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Comittee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We are now to adviſe you, that *Hyder* (whoſe intentions for ſome time paſt have appeared hoſtile) has invaded the *Carnatic* with a conſiderable force; and his Cavalry have already done great miſchief by their ravages.

It were ſuperfluous in this place to ſtate the probable cauſes of this inyaſion. The only thing which now remains for us, is to conſider upon the beſt method of repelling it, and puniſhing the Author of ſo daring an inſult: for our part, we can act here only upon the defenſive. The war muſt be carried into *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* coaſt, and we truſt your ſituation will enable you to act with vigour on that ſide, at leaſt when the Maratta war is at an end. In the mean time we would propoſe, that ſome attempt may be made to ſtir up the Nairs againſt *Hyder*'s government, which we have always underſtood to be a very practicable meaſure. In ſhort, there is nothing within the compaſs of our united power that ought to be omitted on an occaſion which calls ſo loudly upon all the Preſidencies for the moſt ſpirited exertions.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, 28 July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in *India*.

Sir,

As you have been ſo good to ſpare us the *Sartine* to go to *Pondicherry*, we requeſt the favour of you to give orders to the Captain to receive two Officers and 71 Artillerymen, and 64 Laſcars, with their tents and baggage; alſo, at his return from *Pondicherry*, to receive ſuch articles as ſhall be tendered him by Colonel *Braithwaite*, and ſuch French Officers and others as he ſhall be deſirous of putting on board.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, 28th July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, commanding at *Pondicherry*.

Sir,

Although in our letter of the 27th inſtant we deſired you to march as ſoon as the 15th battalion ſhould join you; but as it is doubtful when that battalion may be with you, and as it is of material conſequence that a junction ſhould be effected between your Troops and thoſe detached from hence, we would have you march as ſoon as you are ready, giving information to Captain *Davis*, with ſuch inſtructions as may enable him to join you, or the Army, with as much ſafety and expedition as poſſible.

We would have you ſend the ſick in your hoſpital to *Cuddalore*.

The brigade of guns for the European battalion will be ſent with the reſt of the artillery from the Mount.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 28th July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Mr. *Richard Church*, Reſident at *Tellicherry*.

Sir,

We are now to adviſe you, that *Hyder Ally* has invaded the *Carnatic* with a large force, and his Cavalry have already done conſiderable miſchief. You will, in conſequence of this intelligence, be on your guard againſt every attempt that may be made on your ſide. We hope your troubles with the Nairs have ceaſed; and we would recommend to you to try every means in your power to ſtir them up againſt *Hyder*'s government, which we have always underſtood to be a very practicable meaſure.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 28th July 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* having this day delivered in the following Minutes, they were ordered to be ſent round for the peruſal of the Gentlemen of the Committee.

Mr. *Johnſon*'s Minute.

When I conſented, at the Committee on the 26th, that Colonel *Baillie* ſhould proceed againſt *Cuddapa*, matters did not appear to me to be ſo ſerious as they now do. It was then reſolved, that another Committee ſhould be ſummoned on Friday the 28th inſtant; and had we met, I meant to have propoſed, that Colonel *Baillie* ſhould be immediately ordered to proceed to the Preſidency with the utmoſt expedition; and I now beg leave to offer this as my opinion.

29th July 1780.

The 29th July 1780, in the evening.

Mr. *Smith*'s Minute.

Before I ſign the letter to Colonel *Baillie*, I think it incumbent on me to inform the Committee, that I underſtood the *Cuddapa* country was ſituated on the other ſide of the Paſſes, far diſtant from *Innacunda*. This being the caſe, ſhould Colonel *Baillie* proceed thither with his detachment, it will be no eaſy matter to recal him, ſhould his ſervices be required in the *Carnatic*. I therefore offer it as my opinion, and propoſe, that counter orders be ſent

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to Colonel *Baillie*, directing him to move with his detachment towards the Presidency with all possible expedition. By the junction of this detachment we may be enabled to form an Army sufficient, in all probability, to drive *Hyder Ally* out of the *Carnatic*, or at least to prevent his taking possession of any of the strong forts, which I otherwise very much fear he will do in spite of us, as I see no possibility of our now collecting together the Troops that are scattered in the different garrisons.

Upon which the President and Sir *Hector Munro* deliver in the following Minute:

As Colonel *Baillie*, in our minds, is much better for the present with his detachment where he is, as he may have it in his power not only to distress the Enemy, but thereby oblige *Hyder Ally* to withdraw some part of his force from the *Carnatic*; and as there may be some doubt if provisions can be immediately procured for a greater number than what are now under marching orders, it is our opinion, the letter to Colonel *Baillie* ought to go without any alteration.

Fort St. George, Select Committee,
29th July 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President, &c. Members of the Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I think it necessary to acquaint you, that in consequence of reports brought hither yesterday and to-day, of the plundering of *Porto Novo* by a considerable body of Horse, the Merchants and Inhabitants of this town have taken the alarm, and are preparing to retire to *Negapatam*, whither they are already sending their families and effects. I have in vain endeavoured to convince them of their safety, by representing to *Mahomed Cossim*, and others of the principal Inhabitants, that the Horse are merely plunderers, and will not dare to come where they know there are Company's Troops, particularly as they must cross several rivers before they can reach *Nagore*. These arguments have had but little effect upon their fears; and upon the next unfavourable report, whether true or false, they will, I doubt not, desert the town.

Though I think it improbable the Enemy may venture this way, we are going to prepare for their reception, by placing our three guns at the avenues to the principal streets, and Captain *Hughes* intends to take post at the mosque, which is the situation for the protection of the town; but here I must observe to your Honour, &c. that Captain *Hughes* is of opinion, that if the Enemy were to come hither in any considerable numbers, it would be impossible to prevent their plundering and burning many parts of the town, because he could not venture to divide his force, which, exclusive of the company at *Carical*, the half company at *Kivalore*, and the different guards here, consists of not more than 150 Sepoys fit for duty. I have had no authentic intelligence of the Enemy's numbers, nor of their intentions: Your Honour, &c. having, I presume, received information on these points, from the Chief of *Cuddalore*, can best judge whether or not it be necessary to order us a reinforcement.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Nagore, *J. Huddleston.*
25 July 1780.

Wrote the following letter:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, commanding the Troops in camp to the Northward.

Sir,

In our last letter we suggested to you the idea of marching against the principal fort of *Cuddapah*, and we are in great hopes you will be able, by active measures, to acquire possession of that whole district; but if, from any intelligence you may have obtained concerning the strength of the fort of *Sident*, you judge it cannot be taken without heavy cannon, you will inform us, that we may supply you from hence; and in that case, we would recommend to you to proceed against *Commum*, or act in any other manner you may judge most eligible for the distress of the Enemy.

Should Lieutenant *Douglas* at any time be in want of assistance for the protection of the *Guntoor* circar, you will afford him such as you may think expedient, or as you can spare from your force.

We are, Sir,
Your most obedient Servants,
Fort St. George, *John Whitehill*, &c.
29th July 1780. Select Committee.

P. S. We desire you will send the whole of Captain *Smith*'s battalion to *Madras* (relieving the two companies at *Ongole* with two other companies from your detachment) provided you can execute the service recommended to you without it, as we much want to strengthen the Army going into the field; but if you cannot possibly do without that battalion, you may keep it with you as long as it shall be absolutely necessary, and then send it hither with all expedition.

30th. This day came in the following letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. Governor and President, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since last I did myself the honour to write you, the behaviour of *Hyder*'s Horse has become every day more alarming; they have plundered villages to the northward of this, as far as *Yantipollam*; and I have just received certain intelligence, that yesterday they plundered and burnt the greatest part of the village of *Condacore*, a principal village in the district of *Vellore*; and look where I will towards the *Vankatogary* country, I see villages in flames; and the Inhabitants of this country, as well as the *Vankatajay*, are fled to the hills with what they could save.

I am also informed, that *Meer Saib*, *Hyder*'s General, is arrived from *Cuddapah* to *Commum* with a strong party. I have directed some of the waste places in the fort-wall to be repaired, which I hope will meet with your approbation.

I have the honour to be, with much respect,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
Ongole, *Edwd Edmonds*,
25 July 1780. Capt Command^t.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

For several days past reports have prevailed universally in the country, that a body of *Hyder*'s Horse had entered the *Carnatic*, and had plundered and burned several villages near *Arialore* and *Warianpollam*. This morning I have received intelligence that they have taken *Outalore*, in which there were a few of the Company's Sepoys, who have escaped.

On hearing these reports, I went to the Rajah, who very readily, on my representing the propriety of the measure, agreed to lay in large supplies of provisions; one lack of columns of Paddy, with Dall, Ghee, Curry-stuff, &c. in proportion, is already collected. People are employed to bring in 10,000 sheep, a hundred good draft oxen for the service of the Artillery, and ordered to be collected as they may be wanted.

The Rajah declared his readiness to supply any thing else in his power which might be wanted for the public service: he at the same time requested me to represent

to your Honour, &c. the defenceleſs ſtate of his country, as he could have no reliance on the Sebendies for any military purpoſe (indeed I believe there are very few, if any, of theſe now on country duty who have ever burned powder ſince they have been in the ſervice): That in a fortnight hence the ſeaſon for putting ſeed in the ground commences; that a very ſmall body of Horſe would frighten the Inhabitants, and drive away the cattle; this would prevent the ſowing of the ſeed, conſequently there would be no crop, nor no means of raiſing money for the public ſervice.

With only three battalions here, I ſhould not, if I may be permitted to offer my opinion, think it adviſable to ſend any large detachments to any conſiderable diſtance from the garriſon. At preſent the *Coleroon* is ſo high, that it affords protection to the *Tanjore* country, but it will probably be fordable in ten or fifteen days, when there will be nothing to prevent the depredations of Cavalry. As there are ſeveral breaches in the Fauſſe Bray wall, at which an enemy might enter without difficulty, I have taken the liberty to order the Engineer to put them in ſuch a ſtate of defence as to ſecure us againſt the effects of any immediate attack; and I have directed that a number of Palmyras, which are in garriſon, ſhall be pointed, ſo that they may ſerve for ſtockades. As theſe works will be attended with very ſmall expence, and as they appear ſo neceſſary for the ſafety of the fort, I hope you will approve of what I have done.

The Tondemans Vaqueel informs me, that his Maſter has intelligence of 5,000 Horſe having marched towards *Madura*.

As we have no Artillerymen in Garriſon, except a few Invalids, I have ordered the Laſcars to be inſtructed in long-gun practice; and I beg to aſſure your Honour, &c. that every thing in my power ſhall be done to put the fort, &c. on as reſpectable a footing as poſſible.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
Tanjore, Moſt humble Servant,
26 July 1780. *Alex^r Maclellan.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have collected ſeven hundred Bullocks, and a number of Sheep, and ſhall continue to collect, as at all events it ſecures the cattle, whether they ſhould all be wanted or not.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Pondicherry, Your faithful and obedient Servant,
23d July 1780. *John Braithwaite.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have received certain intelligence, that the ſeparate body of *Hyder*'s Army, that was encamped on this ſide of *Wandewaſh*, are moving towards this diſtrict. The number is computed at four thouſand.

I have loudly to complain of *Verafamy*, Renter of the Jagheer, and *Selember Pettah*, Renter of *Chingleput*, who are now here: they neither will provide a grain of Rice for the proviſion of this Garriſon, nor will they allow me to purchaſe any from the Country People.

The Paymaſter General's head Conicopola Gopolaya, who is a man of great property in this country, and a very faithful Servant of the honourable Company, ſent me word, as he underſtood I had not a grain of Rice in the Fort, I might ſend for all he had in his own houſe at *Colatoon*, to the amount of one thouſand three hundred pagodas worth, and uſe the whole for the uſe of the Soldiers, and be reſponſible to him for the Money.

To this I accordingly agreed, and this day ſent my People with Carts and Bullocks for the Grain; but theſe Renters, upon ſome pretence of the man's owing them money, will not allow me to fetch the Rice into the Fort, nor will they provide the Garriſon themſelves with any thing whatever. I will, honourable Sir, act for the beſt, as the time is critical. Every other article is in the greateſt order and readineſs.

I am,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Chingleput, Your reſpectful humble Servant,
29th July 1780. *George Mackay*, L^t.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

When I had the honour laſt to meet you in Committee, I ſignified to you my apprehenſions that the French might attempt to land a body of Troops from the *Mauritius* on this coaſt; and the intelligence I have very lately received from *England*, which I have communicated to you, ſtrengthens my former apprehenſions.

As it is of the greateſt importance to the ſafety of the Company's Poſſeſſions, and of the *Carnatic*, to prevent ſuch landing, and to defeat the deſigns of the Enemy, I ſhall proceed with His Majeſty's Squadron under my command to the Southward, as far as *Nagore* or *Negapatam*, where I ſhall be in a ſituation with the Squadron to endeavour to intercept any of the Enemy's Ships coming on this coaſt for that or any other hoſtile purpoſe.

If in the courſe of this ſervice I can be of any other uſe to the Company's affairs, it ſhall be particularly attended to.

I am, with great reſpect,
Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Superb, in *Madras Road*, *Edwd Hughes.*
30th July 1780.

Mr. *Smith* this day delivered in the following Minute:

I lament moſt ſincerely, that the Majority of the Committee are determined to perſevere in their Reſolution of ordering Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment to proceed into the *Cuddapah* country, as I am convinced it will prove a moſt deſtructive meaſure; and that by not recalling that Detachment, the *Carnatic* may be expoſed to the utmoſt hazard and danger. *Cuddapah*, and that country, are of very ſmall importance to *Hyder Ally*, and he will retake them at leiſure. As to our not being able to procure Proviſions for Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, I have no idea of it. I have now done my duty, and only deſire my Minute of laſt night and this day may be recorded for my juſtification hereafter, as I do hereby diſſent to the meaſure of the Majority, and hold them reſponſible for all its conſequences.

The 30th July 1780, in the morning.

This morning Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* ſent in to the Preſident the following Minute:

In the preſent critical and dangerous ſituation of affairs, we are of opinion, the command of the Forces aſſembling ſhould not be delegated, but that General Sir *Hector Munro* do take the Field, in whom the Army muſt be ſuppoſed to have the greateſt confidence, founded on his former ſucceſſes.

29th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee,
31ſt July 1780.

Read the following Letter from *Colonel Baillie* to the Governor:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

I beg leave to repreſent, that without ſome method is taken beyond *my powers* of finding this Detachment with

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Rice, they will be ſoon very much diſtreſſed. The incurſions of Hyder's Horſe have put a ſtop to our Supplies from the Southward, and the ſcarceneſs of the *Kiſtnah* bars us to the Northward. In hopes of particular directions from the honourable Committee, I have by fair promiſes hitherto detained our draft and carriage Bullocks; they now grow troubleſome, and without, we ſhall not have the ability to move. No *Madras* Tappal yeſterday or to-day.

Inacunda, 27th July 1780.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt humble and obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Agreed to write to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, directing him, in caſe he ſhould not be able after the receipt of our laſt Letter, to ſubſiſt his Detachment in the Enemy's Country, or from any other quarter, that he do immediately march this way, taking ſuch route as may appear moſt eligible to him.

Mr. *Johnſon*, in conſequence of the above Reſolution, carried by the Preſident and Sir *Hector Munro*, delivers in the following Minute, to which Mr. *Smith* alſo ſubſcribes:

As I obſerve it is carried by the Preſident's caſting vote, that Colonel *Baillie* ſhall not immediately return to the Preſidency, but that he do proceed againſt ſome Forts in the *Cuddapah* Country, I deſire, that my opinion of yeſterday be recorded, and I now diſſent from the meaſure, holding the Majority reſponſible to the Company for the conſequences.

30th July 1780.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

The Preſident has the higheſt confidence in the General's military abilities and experience, and is fully ſatisfied of his zeal and readineſs to ſerve the Company in any manner the Committee may point out; but the Preſident thinks, that, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, it is highly expedient to have the benefit of Sir *Hector Munro*'s advice, to enable the Committee to form their plans of operation; for without this advantage, he is apprehenſive they will find themſelves much at a loſs, particularly as there ſeems to be a want of that unanimity in the Committee ſo neceſſary to enſure ſucceſs to their meaſures. For theſe reaſons, and becauſe the Preſident preſumes that Lord *Macleod*, who is intruſted with ſo diſtinguiſhed and honourable a command in the King's Service, is fully competent to the charge of the Army, he propoſes, that the General do continue to give his aſſiſtance in the Committee, and that Lord *Macleod* be deſired to take the command of the Army, and be furniſhed with the neceſſary inſtructions for his guidance.

30th July 1780.

General *Munro*'s Minute:

Sir *Hector Munro* expreſſes the ſenſe he entertains of what the Preſident has ſaid concerning him in his Minute; he obſerves alſo, that he ſhall always be ready to ſerve his Employers in any manner the Committee may think proper; and whenever the Army is aſſembled, and the Committee are enabled to judge more clearly of *Hyder*'s intentions, he will proceed and take the command. In the mean time, he thinks he can render more ſervice by ſtaying at *Madras*, and that, excluſive of this conſideration, his health is at preſent very indifferent.

Reſolved, That Lord *Macleod* be deſired to take upon him the command of the Troops now aſſembling in the field, and that inſtructions be prepared for him, to be laid before the Committee.

The Commander in Chief recommending that the Troops that are to take the field from hence and from *Vellore*, be aſſembled at *Eyamcollam* near *Conjeveram*, it is reſolved, That a Letter be written to Colonel *Lang*, at *Vellour*, to ſend the European Battalion to that place, and that the Troops do march ſo as to join them on their arrival.

As the ſeveral Garriſons in the *Carnatic* will be much weakened by the Army's taking the Field, it is reſolved, That ſuch of the Battalions of Sepoys as remain in garriſon be ordered to augment their companies 20 Men each.

Read the following Letter:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I this day received a Letter from Captain *Noodler*, dated *Warrior Pollam*, 26th inſtant. He was on his way to *Anjengo*, but ſays, that the country all around thereabouts is peſtered with the Enemy's Horſe, particularly to the Southward, ſo that he cannot proceed. He deſcribes them as very irregular, ill mounted Horſe; ſays, that according to the beſt accounts there may be 1,500 or 2,000 or thereabouts, but that a Battalion of Sepoys would ſoon clear the country of them. I have diſpatched a Man to him, to communicate to him your orders for his joining his Corps. Lieutenant *Roberts* was here a few days ago in his way to *Tiagar*, and as there was good reaſon to think the direct Road was much infeſted with Cavalry of the Enemy, he went [illegible] to *Cuddalore*, hoping to get to *Tiagar* by the way of *Warrior Pollam*; while he was here, I diſpatched one of my Scouts with a Letter from him to the Serjeant who commanded at *Tiagar* in his abſence. This is returned, and has brought two Letters for Mr. *Roberts* which I have opened: the one is from the Serjeant, of which I have the honour to enclоſe you a Copy, the other is from the Killadar. He mentions the Garriſon to be in a good ſtate as to Proviſions, Ammunition, Stores, &c. which is confirmed by a Return of the Serjeant's. The Killadar wiſhes for a few more Sepoys (they have fit for duty eighty) to drive the ſtraggling parties of Horſe from the neighbourhood. I find they have 200 ſpare Arms, and I underſtood from Lieutenant *Roberts*, there would be no difficulty in raiſing Men. If his Highneſs thought proper to augment the force in his frontier Forts, many of the ſtraggling parties might be cut off, and ſtripped of their plunder. The Scout I ſent came back the direct road from *Tiagar*, but ſaw no Horſe; he heard of them, and ſaw ſome Villages burning; in going, he fell in with a part of thoſe who had been at *Porto Novo*, returning with their plunder; they were about 200, and paſſed on within three miles of *Tiagar*. I have been honoured this day with your order of the 27th, to which I ſhall pay punctual obedience, and cannot believe that any thing will occur to interrupt the march of ſo reſpectable a force as I ſhall have. Over and above the number of Battalions of Sepoys you deſcribe, I have his Highneſs's firſt regiment of Cavalry, which I have put in good ſpirits by the advance of four hundred pagodas to Lieutenant *Powney*. The European Battalion is grown ſtrong to what it was; no leſs than fifty-ſix Men have come out of the Hoſpital ſince the alarm of the Enemy's approach. I daily ſend out ſmall parties of Cavalry, and they go farther and farther round, which gives the Country People much countenance, and has enabled me to get in ſufficient draft Bullocks for the Field-pieces coming, and the two braſs 12-pounders here, which I am completing with fixed Ammunition; and I have trained a few Europeans of the Regiment to the Artillery ſervice, ſo that my force will be very reſpectable indeed. I have alſo got ſufficient carriage Bullocks, a good ſtock of Sheep, Arrack, Biſcuit, &c. I have ſent to *Cuddalore*, to deſire they will indent for Military Stores and Ammunition, which I ſhall ſupply them with. I have received thence only four Marquees, 12 Private, and two Bell Tents; and I obſerve that your Honours,

in

Appen ix, No. 1.

in your Letter of the 27th, ſpeak of ſending by the *Sartine*, Tents for one Battalion of Sepoys only.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Pondicherry, 29th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To Colonel *Roſs Lang*, commanding at *Vellour*.

Sir,

We deſire you, as ſoon after the receipt of this Letter as poſſible, to direct the European Battalion, with two Field-pieces, to march from *Vellour* to *Eyamcottam*: it lies on the South ſide of *Paloor* River, near *Conjeveram*, and is the place on which General *Smith* encamped the Army in the laſt War with *Hyder Ally*: We have ſent that part of the Army which is to go from hence, *Poonamalee*, and the Mount, to the ſame place, where it will join the Battalion from *Vellour*. In the marching of this Battalion you will be guided, with reſpect to the route and time of ſetting out, by the intelligence you may receive relative to the movement of *Hyder*'s Force, ſo that the Battalion may proceed in ſafety to the place of rendezvous; but in caſe you ſhould be of opinion, that the Battalion cannot march without danger of being interrupted by a ſuperior force, you will then write immediately to the Commanding Officer of the Troops at *Eyamcottam*, and keep the Battalion at *Vellour* until he ſhall have taken the proper meaſures to facilitate the junction: you will ſee the neceſſity of keeping the time of marching, and the route the Troops are to take, as ſecret as poſſible. We deſire you will order all the draft and carriage Bullocks you have provided to be ſent with the Battalion. We ſhall direct 100 European Invalids to march as ſoon as poſſible from *Chingleput* to *Vellore*, where they are to do duty. We deſire that all the Cadets at *Vellore* may accompany the Battalion when it marches.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George, 31ſt July 1780.

Received the following Letter:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to acquaint your Honour, &c. that I arrived here yeſterday, after having been obliged to wait much longer for Bullocks and Coolies than I expected, on account of the diſturbances in the Country. The Villages in my route from *Ongole* to this place are almoſt entirely deſerted, and ſome of them laid waſte, by the late incurſion of the Horſe.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
John Pringle.

Innacundah, 27th July 1780.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, dated the 21ſt Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from *Maſulipatam*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The conſideration of the Stores at this Garriſon having engaged our particular attention, on the occaſion of the reports which have lately prevailed of approaching troubles in the Country, we eſteem it our duty to make an immediate reference to your Honour, &c. in ſome few points, which may, by an unexpected turn in affairs, require your deciſive and ſpeedy orders. Our Garriſon Stores are exceedingly deficient, for we have only a ſmall quantity of a very few articles; the ſtate of our Military Stores has lately been fully repreſented to your Honour, &c. the Monthly Returns will ſufficiently explain what ſupplies of that kind it may be expedient to forward to us: one circumſtance, however, relative to this ſubject, we ſhould do wrong to omit upon ſuch an occaſion as this; we have ſcarcely an Artilleryman in the Fort, the number at leaſt does not exceed four or five. We have ſubmitted theſe few circumſtances to your Honour, &c. from an opinion it may be neceſſary that ſome ſteps ſhould be taken therein, and that we ſhould have been highly culpable were any thing to have happened from the want of ſuch an attention; we ſhall wait your orders herein. The Board have authorized me to explain the above to your Honour, &c. and I am, for myſelf and them, with great reſpect,

Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Edward Cotſford.

Maſulipatam, 4th Auguſt 1780.

By the *Duke of Portland*, which is going to *Bengal*, Stores of every kind will be ſent to *Maſulipatam*, agreeable to their laſt indent; but with reſpect to the Artillerymen, whom they have requeſted might be ſent, it is totally out of our power to ſpare any at preſent; they muſt therefore be directed to ſupply the want of them as well as they are able, by teaching Laſcars or Europeans the gun exerciſe; and it is agreed to order 12 or 15 of the Coffree Company at *Ganjam*, who have had ſome experience in this exerciſe, to be ſent to *Maſulipatam*.

Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes*, Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in the *Eaſt Indies*, to Mr. *Stephens*, dated *Superb*, in *Madras Road*, 30th July 1780.

A report prevailing here that *Hyder Ally* is advancing towards the *Carnatic* with a formidable Army, and ſome detachments of his Cavalry having already penetrated as far as *Porto Novo*, a ſea port town on this coaſt, which they have plundered, I have reaſon, from the intelligence I have lately received, to apprehend a junction may be intended between him and the French, with whom he has lately entered into an Alliance, and that it is not improbable they may attempt to land on this coaſt a body of Troops from the *Mauritius*; I ſhall therefore proceed to-morrow with His Majeſty's Squadron under my command to a windward ſtation off *Negapatam*, where I ſhall be in a ſituation to intercept any of the Enemy's ſhips, if they attempt coming on the coaſt.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lord *Macleod*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. the Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Gentlemen,

As you have done me the honour to appoint me to the command of the Army you propoſe to ſend into the Field, againſt the moſt formidable Enemy that ever invaded the *Carnatic*, I muſt now take the freedom to expreſs to you my ſentiments on ſo important an occaſion. I have never been preſent at any deliberation you have had, nor has my voice been called upon concerning your Plans of Operation, otherwiſe I would have communicated my opinion to you in perſon. Shortneſs of time now only allows me this mode of informing you of my ideas on the Plan you direct me to carry into execution. You propoſe that the 73d Regiment, joined by the Artillery from the Mount, a Company of European Grenadiers, and a Battalion of Sepoys from *Madras*, ſhall march to *Eyamcottam*, where they are to be joined by the European Battalion from *Vellore*, and afterwards by three Battalions of Sepoys, and a body of Europeans, under Colonel *Braithwaite*, from *Pondicherry*, at *Wandewaſh*.

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waſh. I underſtand that *Hyder Ally*, the Enemy you have to cope with, has entered the *Carnatic* in great force, and that large detachments of his Cavalry have penetrated as far as *Conjeveram*, which they have deſtroyed, and alſo *Porto Novo*, on the ſea-coaſt, which they have plundered; that is, they have had, and there is nothing to prevent their ſtill having, poſſeſſion of that very range of country through which the three Detachments are ſingly to paſs. I muſt take the liberty to obſerve to you, that the meaſure of forming a junction of your Troops from ſuch diſtances, in the face of ſo formidable an Enemy, neither whoſe entire force nor whoſe poſt you are thoroughly acquainted with, ſeems to me far too dangerous to be hazarded at this juncture. *Hyder* is an intelligent Enemy, who has moſt probably concerted his meaſures from a knowledge of our ſituation; his motions are rapid, and any miſtakes on our ſide may be of the moſt ſerious conſequences. The rendezvous you propoſe might have been the propereſt before the Invaſion, but the march of thoſe Detachments by the routes propoſed would at this critical time render them liable to be attacked ſeparately, and either the object of this junction rendered abortive, or ſome part of your Army receive ſuch a check as in my opinion would be imprudent to riſk in the firſt outſet of the War.

I deem the Corps aſſembled at *Poonamalee* as the baſis of the ſtrength of the *Carnatic*, and the protection of this Settlement. In my judgment, it ought not to move from the cover of your Fort, and from the neighbourhood of your Magazines and Stores, till it is joined by all the Troops you can draw together, and enabled to march in ſufficient force to act effectually in the Field againſt ſo numerous a body of Cavalry as are now ſaid to have entered the Country. I will not take upon me to point out in what manner the diſtant Corps ſhould be aſſembled; they ſhould be directed to march by routes which your knowledge of the Country point out as leaſt expoſed to be haraſſed by the Enemy, and the junction ſhould be formed near your Preſidency. A conſiderable part of your Forces, both European and Sepoys, are now in the Northern Circars. It is a maxim ſupported by the ableſt Maſters in the Art of War, that when the centre of a State is invaded, and in danger, the Troops ſhould be called from the extremities for the defence of the moſt material part, if you cannot guard the whole extent of your Country. It ſurely does not admit of a doubt whether a diſtant Province, or the centre of your Poſſeſſions, or the environs of your Capital, are moſt worthy to be preſerved: Colonel *Baillie*, with his Detachment, I therefore think, ſhould be ordered to march towards the *Carnatic* without delay. The Nabob has given the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that his three Regiments of Cavalry ſhall be paid their Arrears, and join the Army; after his ſolemn promiſes, I cannot doubt his intention: but a body of Cavalry are ſo eſſentially neceſſary on this occaſion, that I cannot help requeſting that his intention may be warmly preſſed to loſe no time in performing his promiſe. At the ſame time that I have thought it neceſſary to inform you thus of my ſentiments reſpecting the junction of the Troops, let me aſſure you that I have no other motive for doing ſo than zeal for the intereſt of the Company and honour of the Nation. I do not wiſh to multiply difficulties, but a proper regard to my reputation will not permit me to adopt a reſponſibility in the execution of Plans which do not coincide with my own judgment.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Macleod.

Fort St George,
31ſt July 1780.

Sir *Hector Munro*, in conſequence of the foregoing Letter, enters the following Minute:

If the Committee have nothing in view but guarding *Madras* and the Jaghires, Lord *Macleod* may be right with reſpect to the Troops being aſſembled at or near the Preſidency; but as it is not only intended to ſecure *Madras*, but, if poſſible, to prevent *Hyder Ally* from getting poſſeſſion of the principal Forts in the *Carnatic*, I, as a Member of the Committee, thought then, and do think now, that the Troops might and ought to be aſſembled rather near the ſcene of action, or where in all probability the operations of the Campaign will be carried on, than at or near the Preſidency. What confirms me the more in this is, that from all the information I have as yet had, there have but parties of irregular Horſe entered the *Carnatic*, as by the two Hircarrahs that came in to me laſt night, *Hyder*, with his Infantry and Artillery, is ſtill at *Calaſapauth*, which is near part of his own Territories; whilſt he remains in that poſition, his Cavalry cannot prevent the junction of the Army; and if the Committee do me the honour to deſire me to effect the junction, I think I may venture to promiſe them to perform it: but if, owing to various delays in getting the Bullocks, Stores, &c. &c. ready, ſo as that the Troops might move from their different cantonments for marching the Troops, and even this can be done, ſhould there be a neceſſity for it. In regard to Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, if no care is neceſſary to be taken of the Circars, if Colonel *Baillie* cannot diſtreſs the Enemy, I have no objections to his being ordered into the *Carnatic* with his Detachment; but ſhould it be thought that both or either may be of ſome conſequence, ſhould *Hyder*'s Army be ſo very ſuperior to ours in that event, when the Troops have aſſembled, they can act upon the defenſive, at the ſame time prevent *Hyder* from poſſeſſing himſelf of any of the principal Forts, provided proviſions are had for the Troops; and in this laſt event Colonel *Baillie* may be ordered up to join the Army.

The Preſident propoſes that Sir *Hector Munro* be now deſired to take upon him the command of the Army aſſembling in the Field, and that the following Inſtructions be delivered to him:

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. commander in Chief of the Honourable Company's Forces on the Coaſt of *Coromandel.*

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed to take the Command of the Troops aſſembling at *Poonamalee*, and march with them to *Eyamcottam*, near *Conjeveram*, where you will make the neceſſary diſpoſitions for forming a junction with the Troops coming from *Vellore*, *Pondicherry*, and *Trichinopoly:* To enable you the more effectually to anſwer the purpoſe, we empower you to iſſue ſuch Orders as you may find expedient to any Officer commanding Garriſons or Detachments of Troops in the *Carnatic.* We can find no particular place of operations for the Army, until the deſigns of the Enemy become more apparent; our views are at preſent to the protection and defence of the *Carnatic*; and the only Inſtructions we ſhall give you, are to act in ſuch a manner as you may deem moſt conducive to that end. When the Army is aſſembled, if, from the diſpoſitions which may be then made by the Enemy, you think you can leave the command, we wiſh you to come to the Preſidency, that we may have the benefit of your advice for our future operations; and in that caſe you will deliver over the charge of the Army to the next ſenior Officer, giving him every neceſſary information for his guidance; we are the more deſirous of your return, as we muſt in a great meaſure depend on the opinion which you may be enabled to give us of the ſtrength of *Hyder*'s Army, with the Train of Artillery attached to it, and likewiſe of the probability of our Troops being ſupplied with Proviſions, ſo that we may form a judgment whether it be moſt expedient to act upon the offenſive or defenſive during the Campaign. In the ſettling of this point, as ſeveral things will occur, which will be more fully

fully and more properly diſcuſſed at the Board than by Letter, we hope you will have it in your power to come to *Madras*, if it be but for a few days.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Approved by the Preſident and Sir *Hector Munro*: Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* wrote the following Diſſents:

Mr. *Smith*'s Diſſent.

Having attentively peruſed the Letter from Lord *Macleod*, I muſt expreſs that his ideas coincide very much with mine, and that I think with his Lordſhip, the junction of the Troops expected from different places ſhould be made nearer to the Preſidency than *Conjeveram*.

I think with his Lordſhip, that, inſtead of the Troops now aſſembled at *Poonamalee* marching to *Eyamcottam*, they ſhould take their ſtation at ſome convenient ſpot not far diſtant from *Madras*, that they may be ſupported in caſe of emergency, and from whence the General might march as occaſion ſhould require, to facilitate the junction of Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Detachment and that expected from *Vellore*. The former is of the utmoſt importance in the preſent ſituation of affairs, and every nerve ſhould be ſtrained to effect it; this once accompliſhed, the junction of the Detachment from *Vellore* can be no difficult matter, as the whole can then move to enſure its ſucceſs. On the other hand, ſhould the Troops at *Poonamalee* proceed to *Eyamcottam*, and *Hyder* make a rapid march in force, they might be expoſed to great hazard and danger, and the junction of the other Detachments be rendered more difficult and precarious; and ſhould any accident happen to any one of theſe Detachments, it might be attended with the moſt ſerious conſequences. At preſent I confeſs I apprehend little danger to the Capital, ſo cannot approve of his Lordſhip's idea of taking poſt near the Black Town wall; but until Sepoys are raiſed for the immediate defence of the Black Town, I muſt candidly own that I think it is at riſk, from ſo enterpriſing an Enemy as *Hyder Ally*, and who may, by forced marches, come upon us before we are prepared to give him a proper reception. Two Battalions of 2,000 Sepoys once raiſed and eſtabliſhed for the defence of the Black Town, will put it in a perfect ſecurity, and calm the minds of the Inhabitants, who at preſent are in conſtant alarm and apprehenſion. I truſt therefore the Committee will iſſue the neceſſary Orders for the moſt ſpeedy and effectual completion of this very deſirable object, and that proper Officers be appointed for this purpoſe. The Preſident mentioned Mr. *Sydenham*, the Town Major, for this buſineſs; and to this Officer I am willing to allow every Qualification that can be wiſhed for or deſired in an Officer: but, in my judgment, he muſt be ſomething more than man, if he is able properly to attend to the various duties of his ſtations as Fort Major and Aid de Camp to the Governor in ſuch critical and buſy times as theſe, and beſides find time to raiſe and form Battalions of Sepoys. There can be no heſitation as to the propriety of raiſing theſe Battalions for the ſafety and protection of the Black Town, as the Inhabitants have voluntarily offered to bear the Expence; and the riches contained within thoſe walls are too great to be left neglected and expoſed, when we have ſo fair an opportunity of effectually ſecuring them.

I think it highly proper that General Sir *Hector Munro* ſhall take the Field; but I cannot approve of giving him a latitude for returning to the Preſidency at his own diſcretion. The Committee muſt be, the beſt judges when they ſtand in need of his advice, and will deſire his perſonal attendance at their deliberations when the ſubject under debate cannot be diſcuſſed by letter; but in all other caſes I am of opinion that the moſt proper ſtation for the Commander in Chief, in theſe times of danger, is in the Field.

1ſt Auguſt 1780. *Charles Smith.*

Mr. *Johnſon*'s Diſſent.

I diſapprove of the Inſtructions propoſed to be given to General Sir *H. Munro*. If I may judge of the premature manner in which they were brought into Committee, they muſt have been previouſly agreed on between the Governor and General, on a ſuppoſition that no debate could ariſe on their propriety: but I am of opinion, that we ſhould not leave it in the General's option to remain with the Army, or to return to the Preſidency, as he may think proper. It is evident that from Camp he can give us every neceſſary information relative to the diſpoſition of our Army and that of the Enemy, with more preciſion than if at the Preſidency. I cannot foreſee any caſe in which his advice can be of greater ſervice at the Preſidency than at the head of his Army: It is from our Camp we muſt expect the moſt material intelligence; and therefore the General's reſidence there muſt be of the higheſt importance. It gives me the deepeſt concern, that difference in opinion ſhould at this critical juncture be conſtrued into an oppoſition to the meaſures of Government; that it tended to retard our operations againſt *Hyder Ally*, whoſe rapid progreſs requires the utmoſt vigilance and diſpatch. I therefore deem it incumbent to recapitulate the moſt material points in which the Preſident and General have differed from Mr. *Smith* and myſelf, ſince the 23d ult°, when the firſt advices were received here, from *Hyder* having actually invaded the *Carnatic*.

The Preſident and General inſiſted that more time would be loſt in embarking the Troops at *Pondicherry* on board the Squadron, than by marching them over land, and that the latter could be effected without endangering the Detachment. Had the opinion given by Mr. *Smith* and myſelf been followed at the time it was offered, theſe Troops would probably ere this have been at the Preſidency, and every apprehenſion of an attack on them by the Enemy removed. The Preſident and General were firſt of opinion, that Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment ſhould attack *Cuddapah*, in the Enemy's Country, and far beyond the Paſſes; Mr. *Smith* and myſelf were for its being ordered directly to *Madras*; but orders were given to Colonel *Baillie*, in conſequence of the reſolution of His Majeſty. When the Preſident and General had made further reflections on this ſubject, they thought it might be better to order Colonel *Baillie*, that in caſe he judged it hazardous to attack *Cuddapah*, he ſhould proceed againſt ſome other place. Mr. *Smith* and myſelf ſteadily adhered to our former opinion. Another letter was written to Colonel *Baillie*, in conſequence of this determination; but after ſeveral days were loſt, the opinion of Mr. *Smith* and myſelf was ultimately adopted. A proper ſituation for the Army at preſent, has been another ſubject of debate; and I am happy to find my opinion on this ſubject perfectly coincides with that of Lord *Macleod*, as recited in his Letter to the Committee of the 31ſt ultimo.

The reaſon aſſigned for the Army proceeding to *Wandewaſh*, is, to form a Junction with Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Detachment from *Poudicherry*. This, I apprehend, might be attended with the riſk of an attack on our Black Town, which the weakneſs of our Garriſon, and the great wealth of our Inhabitants, might naturally induce an enterpriſing Enemy to attempt; but at any rate, if they ſhould not ſucceed, they might at leaſt be able to cut off all communication between this and our Army, or oblige them to retreat from any objects they may at that time be engaged in. Had Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Detachment been brought here by the Squadron, both the hazards I have pointed out would have been avoided; Colonel *Baillie* might alſo have been much advanced in his way thither; and upon his joining our Army, would have, I ſhould hope, been able to force

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Hyder, beſides providing for the defence of the Black Town. Diſperſed as the Troops are now, I ſhall tremble for the main body, when they are at any diſtance from *Madras*, until the junction with Colonel *Braithwaite*, whoſe Detachment will certainly be in imminent danger, ſhould *Hyder* be near him in force at the time he begins his march from *Pondicherry*. I think the Nabob's reaſons for wiſhing that our Army ſhould be encamped near *Wandewaſh* are too obvious to need recital. It is very natural for him to be alarmed at the danger there is of loſing his favourite Capital, *Arcot*. He is deſirous of drawing the Army as near to it as poſſible, in hopes that the Enemy will be thereby intimidated from attacking it; but ſurely his partiality for any particular place ſhould not induce us to make any diſpoſitions which are not apparently calculated for our general ſecurity. There are not above 300 European Infantry, and a few Cadets, at *Vellore*, with about 260 Sepoys; theſe are in fact no more than neceſſary for the defence of that Fort; but if it be hereafter found neceſſary to draft a party, or the whole of the Europeans, to ſtrengthen the Army, I ſhould imagine there ought to be a Battalion of Sepoys left in the Fort.

I hope I have proved, that the Preſident and General have thought proper ultimately to adopt every material opinion given by Mr. *Smith* and myſelf, relative to the Order requiſite for Colonel *Baillie*. Rather than give up another point, they have been under the neceſſity of ordering a Company of Artillery, with ſix Field-pieces, to join Colonel *Braithwaite*, before he begins his march. Time will evince whether they may not alſo find it neceſſary to carry into execution all we have further recommended; but whatſoever may be the event, I ſhall be happy if our future deliberations can produce a Plan of Operations that may ſpeedily terminate a War, which I fear we cannot maintain but under manifeſt diſadvantages.

1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Agreed to write a Letter to Lord *Macleod*, to deſire he will proceed to *Poonamalee*, and if the Troops there are in readineſs, to march them to-morrow morning towards the place of their deſtination; informing him at the ſame time, that Sir *Hector* will join them at their march.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee, 1ſt Auguſt 1780.

Read a Draft of a Letter prepared in conſequence of laſt Committee. After ſome debate it was agreed, That Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment ſhould be ordered at all events to march this way; and the Letter was accordingly altered as follows:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, commanding the Detachment to the Northward.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your Letter of the 27th July; by which we are ſorry to perceive the diſtreſs you were in for Proviſions. As you had not then received our Letters, acquainting you with the hoſtilities commenced againſt us by *Hyder*, we are in hopes the orders for your movement contained in thoſe Letters will have enabled you to obtain Supplies of Proviſions in the Enemy's Diſtricts. We now deſire you will, with all expedition, move with the Detachment towards this place, keeping ſuch a route as may be moſt likely to furniſh you with Grain; and as we underſtand that your marching by *Bimm*, *Rous*, *Polham*, and *Tripaty* may poſſibly enable you to come up with ſome of *Hyder*'s Convoys with Proviſions for his Army, or by getting between him and the Paſſes, diſtreſs him much, we would recommend that route to you, provided you can effect it with ſafety, and the roads admit of your bringing forward your Artillery, &c.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Saml Johnſon.

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To the Right Honourable Lord *Macleod*.

My Lord,

We requeſt your Lordſhip will proceed to *Poonamalee* this evening; and in caſe the Stores, &c. ſhould all arrive at that place to-night, we would have you begin the march of the Troops early to-morrow morning towards *Eyamcottam*; proper Guides will be ſent you to-night. We have appointed Sir *Hector Munro* to take the command of the Army, and form the junction to be made with the Troops from *Pondicherry*, *Vellore*, and *Trichinopoly*; and Sir *Hector* will join you on the march to-morrow, or the next day.

We have the honour to be your Lordſhip's
Moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Thomas Fletcher*.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed with the Troops going into the Field, and on the junction of the European Battalion from *Vellore*, you are to take the command of that Battalion.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort St. George, *John Whitehill*, &c.
1ſt Auguſt 1780. Select Committee.

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, commanding the Troops at *Pondicherry*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee, to acquaint you, that from intelligence received of the motions of *Hyder*, they think it neceſſary to deſire, inſtead of marching to *Wandewaſh*, as before ordered, that you will proceed to *Chingleput*, and from thence to *Eyamcottam*, a place within 3 miles of *Conjeveram*, where the General, with the other Troops from hence, will join you. They deſire that you will ſend off an expreſs to the Officers commanding the Battalion from *Trichinopoly*, acquainting him with your route, and preſſing him to march as expeditiouſly as poſſible. You will acknowledge the receipt of this Letter, which is ſent in duplicate.

I am, Sir,
Fort St. George, Your moſt obedient Servant,
1ſt Auguſt 1780. *Charles Oakley*.

Received the following Letters:

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was favoured with your Orders of the 13th inſtant; and, agreeable to your Inſtructions, I will endeavour, as faſt as poſſible, to complete the deficiency in the Battalion occaſioned by the Detachment ſerving with the Trops at *Tellicherry*, excluſive of the augmentation ordered the 27th of July; and I alſo will put this Fort in the beſt ſtate of ſecurity poſſible. I am obliged to employ ſome of my Sepoys in repairing the breaches in the works, and I alſo have got a few extraordinary Artificers

to aſſiſt in repairing ſome of the Gun-carriages. If a few truſty old Gunners can be ſpared, they are much wanted here.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Madura, Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
25th Auguſt 1780. *Rob' Gibbings.*

N° 61. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 25th July 1780—Received the 26th ditto.

I now ſend you the Copy of a Paper of Intelligence juſt received from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp, dated 19th Rejub, or 22d inſtant. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp.

This night at twelve o'clock *Hyder* is at *Singarpetta*; he has ſent 20,000 Horſe with his Son *Tippoo* towards *Vellore*; they have no Baggage with them, and are arrived at *Tripatore*. *Hyder* has 6,000 Horſe, with Foot and Artillery, and Monſieur *Lally*. He intends marching by the Gaut of *Changama*, and, after taking *Trenamatic*, purpoſes leaving his Baggage, Bazar, &c. at that place, and to go againſt *Arcot* with his battering Guns and Horſe and Foot. His other deſign is to go firſt againſt *Pondicherry*, and, after leaving a Garriſon there with Monſieur *Lally*, to ſend for Military Stores, Grain, &c. which he may want, from *Covercalhunder* by Sea, and to fortify and ſtrengthen *Pondicherry*; afterwards he means to go to *Madras*. Monſieur *Lally* encourages *Hyder*, by telling him, that he has 800 Europeans with him, with which he will try his ſkill againſt the Engliſh; *Hyder* hopes in the mean time to receive freſh Troops from *Mauritius*, and is determined to ruin the *Carnatic* and chaſtize the Engliſh. He ſays, he has tried them already; that he knows them well, and that they have no conduct; that even now, although he had aſſembled ſo great a Force to enter into their Country, they had not manifeſted the leaſt glimmering of ability, and therefore now was the time to go againſt them. He has ſhewn great favour to *Govendrow Birky*, and given him the command of 4,000 Horſe, and he alſo conſults with him. To-morrow morning he leaves this, and marches to the Village *Senelpally*, at the entrance of the Gaut; his Ordnance and Artillery go along with him: He ſent for *Lookman Caun*, *Solomon Caun*, and other Jemmautdars, who command parties of Plunderers, and ordered them to march, and raiſe troubles in the *Trichinopolly* Country, and then to remain at the Pettah of *Aamzueg*, but not to go into the *Tanjore* Country. Three thouſand Horſe are already in the neighbourhood of *Arcot* and *Madras*. When they left this, he ordered them to halt at ſuch places as were moſt plentiful and beſt. *Hyder* is well acquainted with the ſituation of *Madras*, and intends to ſend a Force to ſurprize it. Great care is neceſſary; there is no occaſion to ſay more; may the Almighty prevent it! A Letter has been received from the Row *Pundit Purdhaun*, at *Poonah*, in which he tells *Hyder*, that his Forces are gone into winter-quarters, but that the War will go on after the rains are over; but that ſince the rainy ſeaſon was not commenced in the *Carnatic*, he deſires *Hyder* to attack the Engliſh there. Orders are gone to the Troops ſtationed at *Otoor Anuntgurry*, to go into the Country of *Velcondah*, and lay it waſte.

62. To the Nabob; dated 26th July 1780.

I have the honour to receive your Highneſs's Letter on the ſubject of *Hyder Ally*, whoſe motions, within theſe few days, have unveiled the deſign he ſeems to have entertained for ſome time paſt againſt the *Carnatic*.

Whilſt there was any poſſibility of his intentions being fruſtrated, or directed to another object, I choſe not to put the Company, or your Highneſs, to the expence of great Military Preparations, becauſe I am very ſenſible, after the exertions we have lately made againſt the French, that ſuch expence could not be provided for without much difficulty, and without neglecting other objects of great importance; but now, when Hoſtilities are actually commenced on the part of *Hyder*, it becomes expedient at all events to attend to the ſafety of the Country; and I truſt your Highneſs will exert yourſelf to the utmoſt on this occaſion, to promote the ſucceſs of our operations. Appendix, No. 1.

As I have given orders for aſſembling Troops in the Field, I earneſtly entreat your Highneſs to inform me what Supplies of Money you can depend upon furniſhing, and at what period, that I may take the neceſſary ſteps accordingly. I beg your Highneſs will alſo take the moſt effectual meaſures for collecting Bullocks and Proviſions for the uſe of the Army. Give me leave to add, that however deſirous I may be to defend the Company's and your Highneſs's Forts and Poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*, it will in a great meaſure depend upon the ample Supplies of Money your Highneſs can furniſh me with at this critical juncture: it will likewiſe determine me in what manner I ſhall write to the Supreme Council of *Bengal*, and how far I ſhall feel myſelf authorized, with conſiſtency, to engage them in the preſent troubles, ſo as not only to co-operate with this Government in what may tend to the intereſt of the Company, but alſo anſwer your Highneſs's purpoſes fully with reſpect to chaſtizing *Hyder Ally*, and for the protection of the Subjects, and the future ſafety of the *Carnatic*.

Intelligence ſent by the Nabob on the 26th July 1780.

63. Paper of News from *Wandewaſh*, dated 20th Rejub, or 23d July 1780.

On the 18th, at night, an alarm was ſpread of the arrival of *Hyder*'s Horſe; the Inhabitants of all the country around fled into the Fort; the villages were ſet on fire by the Enemy's Horſe. This place is ſo full of People, that there is not the ſpace of an hand's breadth left unoccupied, and People are ſtill coming in. In their flight, ſeveral have loſt their effects; ſome have come in wounded, and their Women taken away by them. Dreadful is the terror which reigns in this place amongſt all ranks of People. Guards and Centries have been placed all round the wall of the place, and Powder and Shot have been placed near the Guns. Agreeable to your orders, I applied to the Amuldar *Damalippa* for money to pay the Sepoys in the Fort; but he ſays he can give none; that the Inhabitants are all fled, and no revenue can be collected. Be pleaſed to ſend me your Inſtructions in what manner I am to ſatisfy the Sepoys in the Garriſon.

Arzee from *Azein Uddein*, dated Rejub, at night.

This day, the 20th Rejub, I have had certain intelligence that *Tippoo* has come into the paſs at *Changama*, with a large body of Horſe, plundered the villages of *Caliſpauk*, *Mudmungul*, and *Potour*, cut and mangled and maſſacred many of the Inhabitants. They afterwards came to *Arnee*, the Pettah of which was taken, and the Inhabitants put to death; they went from that to *Conjeveram*. Some of *Tippoo*'s Horſemen met Captain *Haddad*, and ſome Troopers belonging to your Highneſs, ſtationed at *Poondy*, whom they took priſoners. When *Tippoo*'s Horſe came to *Mundimungul*, twelve of your Highneſs's Sepoys ſtationed there fled into a pagoda, and fired upon the Horſemen, of whom they killed two or three; a Horſe was taken, and brought into *Vellour* by one of the Sepoys.

Arzdazht from Rajah *Burbur*, dated 21ſt Rejub, or 24th July 1780.

I have ſent your Highneſs a Paper of News, tranſmitted me by *Gulam Aly*, the Naib Killedar of *Shugurra*. To-day ſome Horſe came within half a coſs of the city; the

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the Peons ſtationed there took an Horſeman with his Horſe, and the reſt fled. All the Ryots of the country around are fled to this place. Your Highneſs knows how few Men there are to defend the city. You were pleaſed, out of your gracious favour, to honour this place with the name of The Aſylum of the World, and now all the People of this country have ſeized the ſkirts of your robe for protection againſt your Enemies. What ſhall I ſay more?

64. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 27 July 1780—Received D°.

I ſend you a Letter I have received this moment from Rajah *Burbur*, informing me of the ravages committed by *Hyder*'s Horſe in the *Carnatic*; that the Fort at *Changama* is taken, as alſo *Caliſpauk*, by ſtorm; and that they are now beſieging the pagoda of *Trinomalee*, which is fortified in the manner of a Fort, and the People in it are few. Yeſterday I ſent you the Letter I had received from Rajah *Burbur*, and one *Amer ul Omrah* had from the *Aumel* at *Nellour*. The diſtrict of *Nellour*, *Ongole Guntoor*, and *Vencatgurry*, are over-run with Horſe, and the villages deſtroyed. There has been a fight at the Fort of *Pubkomour*, in the diſtrict of *Vencatgurry*, and many killed on both ſides; but *Hyder*'s People fled, and burned all the villages in their way. The People in the Fort of *Reeinlever*, in the *Nellour* country, are now defending themſelves. All this intelligence I now ſend you, as I think it incumbent on me to give you information of all tranſactions. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdazht from Mah. Rajah *Burbur*.

I hear from the Hircarrahs who are come from *Hyder*'s Camp, that he has 40,000 Horſe, 35,000 Foot, and a large Artillery; that he marched from *Corripatam* the 20th of the month, with 15,000 Horſe and 15,000 Foot, and 20 pieces of Cannon, and Monſieur *Lally* with his Europeans, and that he is arrived at *Singarpitta*; that upon his arrival there, he ſent away 5,000 Horſe to the Eaſtward; and his Son *Tippoo*, with *Mahomed Aly*, a Commandant, are ordered to march towards *Trichinopoly* with 10,000 Horſe; *Modoo Cawn*, with 2,000 Horſe, is ſtationed at *Amboor*. The villages about *Vellore* are burned, and the country pillaged by the Enemy's Horſe. Your Highneſs is well informed of the ſcantineſs of Money and People to defend this place. May the Almighty grant his divine aſſiſtance, and proſper your affairs!

65. To the Rajah of *Tanjore*, dated 29th July 1780.

You have doubtleſs been already informed, by report, of the ſudden march of *Hyder Ally*'s Troops into the *Carnatic*. We cannot account for this invaſion otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing that *Hyder* has entered into ſome engagements with the French to diſturb the peace of the country. However this may be, the Company and their Allies are called upon to act with the utmoſt vigour in repelling this attack. I truſt you will ſhew yourſelf particularly zealous in a cauſe in which the welfare of your Government, as well as that of the Company and the Nabob, are ſo much intereſted. A large ſupply of Money is abſolutely neceſſary to carry on the military operations, and to this object I ſhall be thankful if you will contribute amply, and ſoon. The Nabob's country has already ſuffered conſiderably by the incurſions of *Hyder*'s Horſe. Your's being as yet uninvaded, I flatter myſelf you will find leſs difficulty in furniſhing Money to the Company. I requeſt alſo, that you will encourage, as much as poſſible, the exportation of Grain to *Madras*; the duties on that article are taken off at this port, a circumſtance which will, no doubt, when known to the People of your country, induce them to ſend large ſupplies. May your happineſs daily increaſe? What can I ſay more?

66. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 29th July 1780—Received ditto.

You have herewith a Copy of a Paper of Intelligence I have this day received from *Hyder*'s Camp, dated the 22d of Rejub, or 25 July. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from *Hyder*'s Camp.

Hyder is at this time encamped about one coſs diſtant from *Trinomalee*; all his Cannon is not yet arrived on this ſide of the paſs, and it will take up two days more before they come. It is *Hyder*'s intention to march to *Arcot* when all his Cannon arrives, and he thinks he will be in poſſeſſion of *Arcot* ſhortly. He intends the province of *Arcot* for his eldeſt Son, *Trichinopoly* for his ſecond, and *Trinivelly*, *Madura*, &c. for his third Son. He propoſes marching to *Madras*, after having taken poſſeſſion of *Arcot*; and ſays publicly, that in a few days the Engliſh ſhall not remain poſſeſſed of a hand's breadth of ground without the Fort of *Madras*. He imagines there are great riches in the Black Town, of which he hopes to get poſſeſſion. He has about thirty-five ſhips at *Mungalore*, of which he has ordered fifteen to come round to the coaſt of *Madras*, that he may load them with the riches and merchandize in *Madras*.

67. From the Rajah of *Tanjour* to the Governor, dated 24th Rejub, or 27th July 1780—Received 31ſt ditto.

I am told that *Hyder Ally* entertains hoſtile intentions to the Company, and has entered the Gaut with an Army, in order to invade the *Carnatic*; which aſtoniſhes me, for no one in *Indoſtan*, till this day, has been the Enemy of the Engliſh, without ſuffering for it. He is a wicked Invader, and will not ſucceed; for ſince he has taken into his head what cannot happen, it is a proof that the time of his adverſity has drawn near. I and my Family and Dependants reſt on the Company's protection, and will partake and ſhare with them all that may happen. The Almighty will proſper the Engliſh, and ſtrengthen their good fortune: it is my conſtant prayer that their Enemies may be reduced under their feet; and God will hear my prayer. The protection and ſafety of my country remain with the Company, and they will conſtantly purſue the beſt meaſures for its defence; I have no uneaſineſs on that account. You will be pleaſed to let me know what quantity of Grain, &c. you may want, and I will uſe my endeavours to procure it. Regard me ever as your ſincere friend.

68. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 1ſt Auguſt 1780—Received 2d ditto.

I have undoubted intelligence that *Hyder Ally Cawn* is waiting for his heavy Cannon, and as ſoon as it arrives with him, he is determined to lay ſiege to *Arcot*. That city being the capital of the *Carnatic*, and an immenſe quantity of Stores and Ammunition being lodged in the Fort of that place, I greatly fear that if (God forbid!) any miſchance ſhould happen to that country, all the Killedars in the different Forts will be alarmed, and great part of the Inhabitants will ſubmit to *Hyder*'s allegiance, which will tend to the great detriment of my affairs; I therefore entreat you, Sir, to give immediate orders to Colonel *Lang* to ſecure the defence of *Arcot* with the Troops under his command, to the utmoſt of his ability. What ſhall I ſay more?

69. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 1ſt Auguſt 1780—Received 2d ditto.

Your Army having taken the field in conſequence of our Enemy *Hyder Ally*'s having entered the *Carnatic* with an Army of Horſe and Foot, and a Train of Artillery, aſſiſted by the French, you and General Sir *Hector Munro* have repreſented to me the neceſſity there is for my Regiment of Cavalry joining the Army. The difficulties

ficulties I labour under, owing to the country of *Tanjour* being taken from me, are not unknown to you; the Cavalry belonging to me cannot go into the field without receiving their pay, and the collections of revenue of theſe countries, ſet apart for this pay, are now at a ſtand by the depredations of the Enemy: thoſe with whom I am now treating for the loan of one lack of Pagodas, tell me, that if in this time of trouble you will aſſiſt me with your credit, they will let me have the money; I have therefore to requeſt you will do me the favour to ſpeak to Mr. *John Douglas*, and ſatisfy him that when the Country is in peace, I will without fail repay the money borrowed of him. When the Regiments are paid, they ſhall be put under the orders of Sir *Hector Munro*, or any other Officer who commands the Army, until the troubles are over. What ſhall I ſay more?

72. From the Rajah of *Tanjour* to the Governor, dated 29 Rejub, or 1ſt Auguſt 1780—Received 6 ditto.

It has given me great concern to find that *Hyder*'s Horſe have plundered *Porto Novo* and *Conjeveram*, and laid waſte the *Carnatic*. As I am a dependant on the Company, he will no doubt order his Horſe to commit ravages in my Country when the fall of the waters will permit; it is therefore neceſſary that the defence of the country be provided for in time. As the Company ſupport me, it is left with you to protect my Country and Fort, and take meaſures for my welfare and that of my People; the whole expences of the Troops ſtationed for the defence of this Country amount to about two lacks annually, ſo that in time of peace the remainder of the four lacks of ſubſidy is a clear gain to the Company, which gives me great ſatisfaction; there are only three Battalions of Sepoys here, which will not be ſufficient to defend the Fort and Country of *Tanjour* in the preſent troubles, and the Sibendy are not for to encounter an Enemy; it will therefore be neceſſary that the Governor and Council do ſend more Troops for the defence of the Fort and Country of *Tanjour*; this was what was firſt agreed to. Formerly I had in my ſervice 4,000 Horſe and 20,000 Foot of various denominations, and in times of trouble defended my own Country; but now I have no Troops, and regard thoſe of the Company as my own, which ſets me at eaſe. The lands throughout my Country are now preparing to be ſown, and if any trouble ſhould happen (which God forbid!) at this time, I ſhall be a conſiderable ſufferer; it will therefore be neceſſary to provide for the defence of the Country, that it may be properly cultivated, and yield a plentiful harveſt, which will enable me to collect the revenues as uſual; but if the Country is over-run with the Enemy's Horſe, and laid waſte, all the Ryots will fly for ſafety, and no revenue can be collected; if the Country is not defended, it will not be in my power to keep my agreement; you will be kind enough therefore to regard my loſs as that of the Company, and ſend ſome more Troops to be ſtationed in different parts of the Country. Since *Hyder Naig* has commenced hoſtilities againſt the Company, I have no doubt but ruin will attend him, and the conſequences be fatal to him. I live under the Company's protection, and therefore offer conſtant prayers to the Almighty for their ſucceſs, and the overthrow of their Enemies. The Commanding Officer has taken meaſures for the defence of the Fort; you will be pleaſed to give him further orders to exert himſelf. I hope you will ſend more Troops for the defence of my Country againſt the Enemy; I ſhall not fail to give every aſſiſtance as far as lays in my power. Reſt aſſured, that I conſider myſelf under the Company's protection, and will not be wanting in their ſervice. I have taken the liberty of repreſenting the neceſſity of defending this Country properly againſt the Enemy; be pleaſed to conſider ſeriouſly of it, and extend your favour to my Government.

74. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 9th Auguſt 1780—Received ditto.

I herewith ſend you a Letter I have received from Rajah *Burbur*, dated 6th Shaban (8th Auguſt) in which he informs me the Enemy is beſieging *Chittaput*, which is ſtill holding out againſt him. Although there is no great reaſon to imagine that our affairs will ſuffer any thing conſiderably by his taking poſſeſſion of that place, yet I learn from Rajah *Burbur*'s Letter, that it is the Enemy's intention to go againſt *Arcot* and *Gingee*, after he has taken *Chittaput*, which is no more than ſix coſs diſtant from *Gingee*. There are great quantities of Grain and Stores of various kinds in the Forts of *Arcot*, *Vellour*, *Gingee*, *Wandewaſh*, and *Trichinopoly*; and I have, beſides what may be wanted for their Garriſons, laid in ſtore in theſe places large quantities of Grain for the Troops in the field: if (God forbid!) any one of thoſe places ſhould fall into the Enemy's hands, the Company's affairs muſt ſuffer greatly. The Fort of *Gingee*, although ſtrong, is very large, and the People in it are too few to defend it properly; if the Enemy ſhould get it into his poſſeſſion, the conſequences will be fatal; I therefore make no doubt that you will as ſoon as poſſible provide for the defence of the Forts above-mentioned. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdazht from Mah. Rajah *Burbur*, dated 6 Shaban, (8th of Auguſt) at 1¾ pahr of the night, or 10¾ pellr.

Your Servant ſent lately to *Hyder*'s Camp two Sepoys, in the dreſs of Faquiers, in order to bring me intelligence from thence; they remained there three days, and returned here this day; they ſay that the Enemy has taken *Trinomalee*, and is now beſieging *Chittaput*, which was ſtill holding out againſt him on Sunday evening laſt. It is ſaid in his Camp, that after he has taken *Chittaput*, he means to march againſt *Gingee* and *Arcot*. God Almighty only knows what his intentions are next!

75. From the Rajah of *Tanjour* to the Governor, dated 5th Shaban, or 7th Auguſt 1780—Received 14th ditto.

I have been favoured with your Letters, dated 18th and 29th July, which have given me great pleaſure. In the firſt of theſe you tell me to pay to Mr. *Baine*, the Paymaſter, whatever ſums of money "he may want for paying the Troops with me;" and you deſire me to remember, "that only one lack of Pagodas has been paid out of the four I had agreed to give as a depoſit, and that three lacks were ſtill due on that account."

Sir, the affair of the depoſit is freſh in my memory, but it is not in my power to pay the money; it is even difficult for me to diſcharge what juſt engagements I have made. You are well acquainted with theſe circumſtances, which I have often repreſented to you. In my preſent ſituation, how am I to find money to diſcharge this depoſit money? In the other Letter you ſay, "I may have heard that *Hyder*'s Horſe have invaded the *Carnatic*, to which he has been inſtigated by the French; that it is therefore incumbent on the Friends and Allies of the Company to exert themſelves, in order to chaſtize *Hyder*; and as my Government depends upon the Company and the Nabob, you make no doubt I will give every aſſiſtance in my power to the Company, in furniſhing money, which will be much wanted for the Troops employed in the field." I am convinced of this: it is not neceſſary at this time to mention the good treatment and ſervice the Nabob has done me; ſuffice it to ſay, that I am indebted to the Company alone for what I have. Since *Hyder* has attacked the Company, he will inevitably meet with ruin; after defeating the French, it will be no great wonder if the Engliſh ſhould overcome him. It is incumbent in all the Friends and Allies of the Company to aſſiſt them in proportion to their reſources; I on my part ſhall not be wanting in any thing which lays in my power; I wiſh for nothing more:

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more: but I have no money, and am without remedy. If I had resources, there would be no occasion for your writing upon the subject; I would mortgage or sell my jewels and effects, if I had any, in order to furnish money to the Company. It is to the Nabob's favour I am indebted for this situation. I have nothing but Stone Fort and the produce of the country left me. If I am told I may borrow money from the Soucars, there are none who will lend me any; they all excuse themselves on account of the troubles: This is not the season for collecting the revenue; on the contrary, money must be advanced to the Ryots, for the purpose of cultivation. The cheapness of Grain has occasioned a fall of revenue, out of which I am under engagements to pay the Company four lacks annually as Subsidy Money; and this I have faithfully performed till this time, though with great difficulty: I have not yet repaid those who lent me money to enable me to pay the Company; there is nothing due from me at this time; and if I remit any in advance, the Company I am sure will give me credit in the Subsidy Account. I have with great difficulty been able to raise thirty thousand Pagodas, which I have at two different times paid to Mr. *Baine*, the Paymaster, for which I send you his receipts. I have exerted my utmost abilities to get this money for the Troops here, but it is beyond my power to furnish any money at *Madras*. Mr. *Lewin*, through Mr. *Swartz*, has delivered me a message from you, to which I have given an answer; Mr. *Lewin* has probably informed you of it: I told him that I had paid in part of one lack of Pagodas, thirty thousand to Mr. *Baine* the Paymaster; and if you could get any one to lend me seventy thousand Pagodas, I was ready to give my bond to any such person, payable at the season of collecting the revenue: when this is paid to the Company, they will be pleased to credit me for the amount. You say in your Letter, that the Nabob's country has been ravaged and laid waste by the Enemy's Horse, but that mine has not yet suffered by them. As the rivers have risen, it is not in the power of any Horse to come into my country at this season, no more than in the *Trichinopoly* country, which they have not yet entered; but when they do, they certainly will come into my country also. You will be pleased to take measures to defend it against their incursions; the Company's Enemies are mine, and I trust you will not listen to the malicious insinuations of those who are interested against me. The Nabob has already plundered this country of all its riches, and left me without any thing: now that I have only the bare produce of the country, if the Enemy were to commit any depredations in it for a single day, I should be bereft of all resources whatever. You will therefore, I hope, take measures for preventing any incursions of the Enemy. You acquaint me, that the Governor and Council have taken off the duties upon Grain imported at *Madras*, and desire I will give orders to encourage the sending of Grain from this country to *Madras*. I have, in pursuance of your orders, sent for the Merchants and People here, and recommended to them to send Grain to *Madras*; I have also taken off all Duties upon Grain exported from hence. Last year I mortgaged a great quantity of Grain to Soucars, in order to pay money to the Company; and this Grain I have desired to be now sent to *Madras*, and I will pay them out of the produce it will fetch. If you will be kind enough to speak to the Merchants and trading People at *Madras*, to send for Grain from this country, I will give orders to all the Ryots and People throughout the country to dispose of what they have to them. The People here are not used to export Grain by sea, and it will be much better done by *Madras* People; however, I shall not be wanting in my endeavours to encourage it as much as possible. You may be assured, that I shall give every assistance I can to the Company, whom I look upon as my Protectors. May the Almighty ever make them victorious and triumphant over their Enemies, and successful in all their undertakings!

77. From the Rajah of *Tanjore* to the Governor, 14th August—Received 20th.

I have already represented to you the necessity of defending this Fort and Country during the present troubles; the Fortifications here are much in want of repair: you will be pleased to give orders to the Engineer to repair them as soon as possible. Mr. *Lewin* left this on the 11th August, and went to *Negapatam*, from whence he will proceed by sea to *Madras*; he will acquaint you with some particulars, which I request you will attend to.

APPENDIX, N° 2.

Fort Saint George. Extract of the Minutes of Consultation, the 29th July 1780.

MR. *Sadlier* delivers in the following Minute, relative to the present state of affairs.

Our affairs have long been approaching to that unhappy state at which they are now arrived. Private mismanagement, and not public calamity, has brought us to the brink of destruction. We are now in danger of losing all our possessions which have been conquered by the Company at such an expence of blood and treasure: but this is no time for retrospection; it is our duty now to take a view of the impending danger, and the resources which are still left us, and to make the most of the means in our hands to avert our ruin, before the opportunity is lost, and even exertion becomes fruitless.

Hyder Ally has long treated our Government with neglect and insult; and a Government which bears insult unavenged will naturally be supposed to bear injustice without resistance; and *Hyder* is too good a politician not to draw this conclusion, and avail himself of our weakness.

For some months past he has been assembling a large Army upon our frontiers, while his Vakeel was allowed to remain at *Madras*, to give him daily intelligence of the effect his motions had upon our Government. Still we remained inactive; we neither had resolution to question him about the cause of his intentions, or to provide against the danger.

Instead of demanding a categorical answer from *Hyder*, which would have determined the line of our conduct; instead of assembling such part of our Army as was capable of making some head against his Force, and putting our Garrisons in a state of defence, and providing the means by which an Army might be supported; our unhappy inactivity prevailed over every duty which we owed to our own characters, to our Employers, or to the miserable Inhabitants of a Country now suffering from fire and sword, which depend upon us for protection. We allowed the Enemy quietly to assemble their Troops upon our frontiers; we allowed our own Troops to remain scattered in different parts of the country, without Stores or Guns, by the assistance of which they might either defend themselves or act offensively; we took no pains to replenish an empty Treasury with Money, which is the sinews of war. Destitute of means, but more so of the abilities to exert them, we stood the stupid spectators of our own ruin; we would hardly believe it when it was come; and now our inactivity and want of exertion is equal to our temerity, our blindness, and want of timely precaution.

Hyder Ally has poured in his Cavalry, and has alarmed the whole Country; he himself has followed with his choice Troops, and is now in force in the body of the *Carnatic*; our Troops, scattered in small Detachments, without Guns or Stores, may be unable to form a junction, and possibly may be cut off one after another without the least resistance; our principal Garrisons neglected, without Ammunition, Stores, or Provisions, to enable them to bear a siege, may become an easy sacrifice; a number of small Forts in the *Carnatic*, such as *Wandewash*, *Carangooly*, *Arnee*, and many others, the

possession

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poſſeſſion of which has coſt us ſo much blood and treaſure, are either left defenceleſs, or are garriſoned by a few Companies of Nabob's Sepoys who have not been paid for 18 months, and who ſtarving, may, through hunger or revenge, be glad to change their Maſter. The Fort of *Arcot*, the Capital of the province, is perhaps before this time in the poſſeſſion of *Hyder Ally*, and all the Stores and Arms which have been hoarded there will fall a ſacrifice to our Enemies, and ſtrengthen their hands againſt us. The Fort of *Vellore*, ſo far from being able to ſend any relief to *Arcot*, cannot ſpare a Man from its own defence, while the villages are burning around it. The laſt intelligence of *Hyder* informs us, he was upon the plains between *Arcot* and *Pondicherry*; the defences of this latter place being deſtroyed, it is now as open as a fiſhing-town, with three Battalions of Sepoys in it, who have but two Guns to defend them, and but a few invalid Artillerymen to work theſe Guns, though they may have occaſion not only to combat with *Hyder*'s Troops without, but with the diſaffected French, our natural Enemies, within the place, who have been fed at our expence, when we hardly had money enough for our own occaſions: theſe three Battalions are now in the moſt imminent danger, and may be cut off by a part of *Hyder*'s Army, while the reſt of it, without oppoſition, may poſſeſs itſelf of *Arcot*; the whole of the country extending from the river *Coleroon* to the South, to the country of *Nellore* to the Northward, excepting the Garriſons of *Trichinopoly*, *Vellore*, and perhaps *Amboor*, may be in the poſſeſſion of *Hyder* in a month, and theſe Garriſons being cut off from Proviſions, and a communication with the Preſidency, with the country in *Hyder*'s hands, may be ſtarved into a capitulation.

The Enemy here even got poſſeſſion of *Porto Novo*, a ſea-port which opens to them a communication to the iſlands; they have plundered *Conjeveram*, a place within fifty miles of the Preſidency. The news of this laſt event arrived on the 23d, and till it arrived, not one of thoſe who aſſume to themſelves the entire management of the Company's affairs would believe that there either was an Enemy in the country, or that it was likely to be invaded. This is only the 28th, and within the ſhort ſpace of eight days we ſee the country over-run, and left, it would ſeem, a devoted ſacrifice to a powerful and barbarous Enemy.

But deplorable as this proſpect may appear, the worſt is yet to come; the Capital is in danger, and no effectual means have yet been taken to provide for its ſafety, or for the ſafety of thouſands who have fled to it for protection.

Let us take a view of things as they ſtood at the moment this alarm was given at *Conjeveram*, and the meaſures which have ſince been purſued.

We had at *Madras* a Regiment of Europeans, and two Battalions of Sepoys; the King's Regiment was at *Poonamalee*, and the Artillery at the Mount; three Battalions of Sepoys were ſtationed at *Pondicherry*, and the Battalions under the command of Colonel *Baillie* to the Northward; the reſt of the Troops were diſpoſed in the different Garriſons. *With regard to the Nabob's Troops, they are all many months in arrears; his Infantry, through want of pay and want of diſcipline, could add no ſtrength to our Army. Part of ſix Regiments of Cavalry, formed by him a few years ago, have deſerted to* Hyder *becauſe they were not paid; and the three Regiments now remaining, which includes all the Cavalry in the Carnatic, from the ſame cauſe, are ready to follow the ſame courſe.*

Our Treaſury was empty; the Nabob declared he had no money; the Rajah of *Tanjore* made the ſame declaration; the *Maſulipatam* Diſtricts of the Northern Circars are ſo far from being able to furniſh ſupplies, that the arrears of tribute now amount to ſeventeen lacks of Pagodas; *Sitteram Rauze*, the moſt wealthy Zemindar under the Company, had not paid his kiſts, and, inſtead of his being preſſed to pay them, a remiſſion of tribute was voted to him; *Bali Kiſtna* is in arrears, nor is it believed that he will ever be induced to make good his engagements.

Notwithſtanding this bad ſtate of our revenue, money might be raiſed, and enough of it too, had Government acted with ſpirit and reſolution; but I am ſorry to ſay, that both were wanting when both were moſt required. The Nabob's territories have remained in peace ever ſince the year 1769; conſiderable additions have been made to them ſince that time. The Nabob's expences were no ways adequate to his revenue; what then is become of the overplus? I know that his revenue has been diminiſhing annually; I know that the revenues of the other countries ſubject to our Government have been diminiſhing in the ſame proportion; and that our ſpecie has been tranſported to *China* and to *Europe*, at the rate of ten and fifteen lacks of Pagodas annually; but though much has been carried away, enough ſtill remained; and I inſiſt upon it, that the means are ſtill within our reach, if we will but exert ourſelves with activity and ſpirit.

It was our duty to have been in the field on the firſt alarm, and to have been ready to attack, inſtead of waiting to be attacked; but inſtead of that, when the danger approached within 50 miles of us, we were loſt in confuſion, and found ourſelves without reſource. The Horſe that plundered *Conjeveram* might, under an active and vigilant Officer, have penetrated into the Black Town of *Madras*, and ſet it on fire about our ears. Every one ſaw how much their lives and property were in danger; ſuch as had habitations in the Fort crowded into it for ſafety; ſuch as could not come into the Fort, crowded into the Black Town. The wealthy Armenians, and others, not thinking themſelves in ſafety within the Black Town wall, have lodged their Women and Effects in the Fort *Godowns*. The ſtreets of the Black Town are filled with People who cannot get a lodging; and many hundreds muſt ſoon meet that death they fly from, by the increaſe of dirt, and the famine which their numbers muſt occaſion.

The Nabob's property, his money and jewels, and almoſt all other property in which we can depend for our own defences, is lodged within the walls of the Black Town, inſtead of being carried into a ſtate of greater ſafety in the Fort; the Nabob's own perſon is left in danger, he is almoſt deſerted by thoſe who ought to protect him; and I am told he is ſunk in a ſtate of deſpondency, without hope, and may conſider himſelf a victim devoted to deſtruction.

Inſtead of taking the moſt vigorous means to avert the calamity already at our doors, to remove the fears of the People, to inſpire confidence in our Government, and to defend our lives, our property, and our honour, every act tends to increaſe the general idea of our weakneſs.

It would have been proper to have recalled the Regiment from *Poonamalee*, the Artillery from the Mount, to have reinforced them with two Battalions of Sepoys from the Fort, and to have encamped them on *Egmore* plain, for the ſecurity of the Black Town. The Squadron now lying idle in *Madras* Roads ſhould have been required for tranſporting the three Battalions under the command of Colonel *Braithwaite*, and *Pondicherry* ſhould have been evacuated; and there being no Enemy in force Northward, Colonel *Baillie* ſhould have been ordered to proceed with his Diviſion of the Army towards *Madras* with all poſſible expedition; and thus an Army ſhould have been formed, which by degrees would have become formidable, and would be able not only to defend the Preſidency, but to march to the relief of any place which was beſieged. The Commander in Chief ſhould put himſelf at the head of this Army on its firſt forming.

Inſtead of this mode of conduct, what has been done during theſe eight days that the alarm is ſpread? why, nothing that is not expreſſive of the utmoſt weakneſs and diſtraction. Inſtead of forming a Camp, from which Detachments might be ſent, the two Battalions here are

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haraſſed to death, and ſent out upon ſmall Detachments, which can make little or no reſiſtance. The Artillery has hitherto been allowed to remain at the Mount, and may be cut off at their Guns, for want of Infantry to ſupport them. The King's Regiment is left at *Poonamalee*, a place at the diſtance of 15 miles, where it may be cut off from the poſſibility of protecting the Black Town, or joining the Artillery. A body of *Hyder*'s Horſe may come to the Black Town by any route they think fit; they will find nothing but theſe Battalions of Sepoys, in weak and ſcattered bodies, ready to oppoſe their progreſs; they may ſet the Black Town in flames, and not only prevent us from being able to form an Army, but take away every reſource which we have got for maintaining one.

Inſtead of putting this Garriſon in a ſtate of defence, inſtead of aſſembling a Militia for its protection, and inſtead of preventing any thing from being admitted which is not valuable, the Fort-gates are open until the uſual hours, every thing is admitted, the Fort is become a thoroughfare for thouſands of ſtragglers; the gates are even opened in the middle of the night, when an alarm makes it convenient for a family to leave their garden; and in caſe of any real alarm, the concourſe of People at the gates might be ſo great, that it would be impoſſible to ſhut them; and the Enemy might pell-mell follow our own people in.

Such weakneſs has already been diſcovered, that nothing is impoſſible; and the idea of this weakneſs will ſpread to the Officers and the Troops, and ſtrike a general panic, which will haſten our ruin.

Inſtead of forming an Army near the Preſidency, I am told that the mad idea is entertained of aſſembling it by ſmall Detachments, from *Trichinopoly*, &c. upon the plains of *Arnee* and *Wandewaſh*, in the midſt of a country now in the poſſeſſion of an Enemy, who has an Army equal at leaſt to our whole Force when aſſembled; and that inſtead of defending the Black Town, which has not yet been plundered, a Detachment of Sepoys is ordered away to *Conjeveram*, which has already been plundered, and conſequently cannot ſuſtain any further damage.

In ſhort, were the meaſures taken intended for our deſtruction, and not for our defence, they could not be more effectual. My duty to myſelf and to the Company, my love for the Community, and my ſtation, all impel and give me a right to ſpeak in a language my feeling and my honour dictate to me; and I hope at leaſt, if my ſentiments are not adopted, that my character will be exempted from the ſhame and diſgrace to which our conduct has already, and will hereafter expoſe us to, in the eyes of the world.

Although my ſentiments might be collected with ſufficient preciſion from the foregoing opinion, yet I will here ſtate them again, that nothing may be left in doubt or uncertainty.

The King's Regiment from *Poonamalee*, and the Artillery from the Mount, ſhould immediately be made to encamp in a ſituation near the Black Town wall, the moſt proper for defending it in caſe of an attack; this body ſhould be reinforced by two Battalions of Sepoys here; the General ſhould place himſelf at the head of this little Army, and the moſt vigorous exertions ſhould be made to ſupply it with Guns, Stores, Bullocks, Laſcars, and every thing neceſſary.

The Militia ſhould be aſſembled for the defence of the Fort, together with a Regiment of Europeans, and the neceſſary number of Sepoys; the Governor ſhould put himſelf at the head of the Militia, and iſſue his orders from thence; the gates ought to be ſhut, that nothing might be admitted but valuable effects; and, to prevent the Fort from remaining a thoroughfare, the Garriſon ſhould likewiſe be reduced to the ſtricted military order.

The Squadron now in the road ſhould proceed to *Pondicherry* with all poſſible expedition; and bring up the three Battalions which are now there, under the command of Colonel *Braithwaite*; theſe three Battalions to join the main Body under the General's command. Until a Squadron can arrive, *Braithwaite* ſhould have a diſcretionary power to retreat to *Cuddalore*, if neceſſary; and Colonel *Baillie* be immediately ordered to proceed by the neareſt route.

The Army would then conſiſt of a ſtrong body of Europeans, and eight Battalions of Sepoys, and might advance as occaſion required.

While this Army was aſſembling, no pains ſhould be ſpared in procuring the neceſſary number of Stores, &c. &c. to enable it to march or act as occaſion might require.

A proper place ſhould be aſſigned for the ſecurity of the Nabob within the Fort His effects, and thoſe belonging to his Family, ſhould be admitted likewiſe; and ſhould have a place of ſecurity aſſigned to them during the preſent troubles.

Money ſhould be immediately ſent for paying off the Nabob's Cavalry, that they may be brought to act as ſoon as poſſible.

If theſe meaſures were taken as a ground-work for our operations, the neceſſary orders for the further defence of our territories could be given as occaſion required. Our firſt idea muſt be to inſpire confidence at home, and that confidence will extend in proportion to our ſucceſs.

29th July 1780. (Signed) *Anthony Sadlier.*

Mr. *Johnſon*, upon reading that part of Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minute of this day, wherein he obſerves, "that the "news of this laſt event arrived on the 23d; and till it "arrived, not one of thoſe who aſſumed to themſelves "the entire management of the Company's affairs, "would believe that there either was an Enemy in the "country, or that it was likely to be invaded;" thinks it neceſſary to remark, that he delivered a Minute, dated 19th June, at a Select Committee held the wherein he has given his ſentiments upon the approaching danger; and that Mr. *Smith* followed his example ſome time after, in a Minute delivered in, the 19th July.

A true extract.

Chas *Freeman*, Sub-ſecretary.

Extracts of the Minutes of Conſultation, dated Auguſt the 1ſt 1780.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute, in reply to the Minute of Mr. *Sadlier* on the preſent ſtate of affairs, entered in Conſultation of the 29th ultimo.

Mr. *Sadlier*, at the laſt Conſultation, having aſſumed to himſelf a cenſorial authority over the proceedings of the Committee, of which he is not a Member; and having, without the neceſſary information, not only conveyed the moſt pointed cenſure, but likewiſe the moſt illiberal reflections on the conduct and meaſures of Government, the Preſident and Commander in Chief deem it a duty incumbent on them to reply to ſuch parts of that inflammatory declamation as are in the leaſt worthy of their regard; and ſummarily to draw into one point of view a ſtate of the real ſituation of affairs, happily not ſo diſtorted as that produced by Mr. *Sadlier*. It would be an endleſs, and indeed an unprofitable labour, to attend this Gentleman through a labyrinth of diſjointed argument and angry invective; his talent at diſſention is glaringly apparent in almoſt every inſtance ſince he has been a Member of Adminiſtration; he ſeems grieved at not being of the Committee, and therefore he could wiſh to clog the wheels of Government entruſted to the management of others. To ſay nothing of the ſtrictures diffuſed with ſuch a laviſh hand throughout the Minute of Mr. *Sadlier*, it cannot but be a matter of admiration to obſerve the panic with which that Gentleman appears to have been ſtricken; every line breathes fire, ruin, and deſolation! Unhappily, a warm imagination has carried him beyond the limits of either prudence or diſcretion;

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he has aſſerted for fact that which never did exiſt; he has drawn concluſions from premiſes arbitrarily eſtabliſhed, without the appearance or probability of reaſon.

When a country, from a ſudden incurſion of an Enemy, or from any other accident, is brought to the neceſſity of acting with firmneſs and vigour, it ill becomes one of the Members of the Adminiſtration of that country to give way to apprehenſion, and to ſuppoſe, becauſe exertions muſt be made, that that country is ruined! The hour of danger is the hour of reſolution; political timidity then becomes the greateſt bane that can befal a Government, and conſequently a People over whom that Government preſides. If, as Mr. *Sadlier* aſſerts, the Committee were inattentive to the ſteps which *Hyder* has for ſome time paſt been taking with reſpect to the *Carnatic*, they moſt unqueſtionably would feel themſelves worthy of the ſevereſt diſpleaſure of their Employers; but if Mr. *Sadlier* had been in a ſituation to have known what the Committee had done, he would have known, that they have been by no means inattentive to *Hyder*'s motions. That they had repreſented both to the Company and to the Gentlemen at *Bengal*, the extent of his views; and had moſt circumſtantially informed the latter of every ſtep he had taken, previous to his attack upon the *Carnatic*. As to the categorical demands which Mr. *Sadlier* ſeems to think we ſhould have made to *Hyder*; as to the diſmiſſion of his Vakeel when the rumour of his intentions firſt ſpread abroad; thoſe are points which the Committee, who are alone the judges, neither thought it expedient nor adviſable in the then ſituation of affairs to carry into execution. *Hyder*, from the moment we marched againſt *Mahé*, threatened in return an invaſion of the *Carnatic:* his inclination was little to be doubted; but the ſeaſon of the year was allowed to paſs away, when he could moſt effectually have injured the Nabob; his uſual judgment ſeems to have failed him in this reſpect; he deferred the movement of his Troops until the grounds lay uncultivated; the Grain was collected in, and the monſoon was approaching, which would neceſſarily retard every operation in the field: under thoſe circumſtances therefore, and under the certainty that his main Army and his Artillery had not yet got through the Gauts, and that he himſelf, ſo far from being in the heart of the *Carnatic*, was ſtill in the neighbourhood of the Paſſes; under all theſe circumſtances, the Committee deemed themſelves vigilant in the truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedily as poſſible; when they took meaſures for the co operation of the Preſidency of *Bengal*; when they got the Nabob to collect additional Proviſions in his different Garriſons; and in ſhort, when, in the laſt reſort, they came to the determination of exerting every ſinew towards the puniſhment of a wanton, unprovoked infringement of the peace of 1769.

The alarm occaſioned by the entrance of *Hyder* into the *Carnatic* was certainly very great; but who, in the leaſt acquainted with the fearful diſpoſitions of the Natives, can wonder at their conſternation, and the more eſpecially, when that conſternation ſeems to have been cheriſhed and fomented by thoſe whoſe province it was to have quelled it as ſoon as it appeared? Are we to ſuppoſe that Individuals without doors are to remain in the belief of ſafety, when a Member of the Government itſelf declares, "The *Carnatic* is loſt, and we are "a loſt colony; that his ſentiments ſhall not be confined "to the Board at which he ſits, but that they ſhall be "communicated to the community at large, that they "may know their danger?"

Fear in a deliberative, as well as in an executive Officer of a State, is an unhappy depreſſion of that ſpirit which is peculiarly wanting in every act of moment; but when that fear, burſting through every reſtraint, and arrogating to itſelf the credit of a conſtitutional oppoſition, not only ſtrives to enfeeble the Councils by which that State is governed, but likewiſe endeavours to counteract its meaſures by ſowing diſaffection among the People, the evil becomes of magnitude, and the welfare of the whole points it out as neceſſary to be cruſhed. Appendix, No 2.

The extenſive knowledge of Mr. *Sadlier* does not confine itſelf to the condemnation of all the meaſures of the Committee, the ſprings of which he is evidently unacquainted with; he even ventures to arraign the conduct of Sir *Edward Hughes*, His Majeſty's Naval Commander in Chief in *India*; and, a little incautiouſly, calls the plan recommended by the Commander in Chief of the Army, a *mad one*; although it was founded on the cooleſt deliberation, and although the Nabob poſitively aſſerts, that neither at the Mount, nor at any place nearer than *Wandewaſh*, can a ſufficient quantity of Proviſions be collected for the Troops. Leſt, however, the ſentiments of the Nabob ſhould be ſuppoſed oppoſite, it will not be improper here to recite his own words, freely given in the preſence of the Preſident, the General, Sir *Hector Munro*, Lord *Macleod*, *Ummeer Ul Umrah*, and *Aſſaram Cawn*, the Dewan. "It would be impoſſible for me," ſaid the Nabob, "to ſupply the "Troops at the Mount, or at any place ſo near to *Madras*; at *Arcot*, *Wandewaſh*, *Gingee*, *Tiagar*, and *Trichinopoly*, I have already collected Stores, Proviſions, "Bullocks, &c. *Hyder* being on that ſide of the *Carnatic*, and *Wandewaſh* being the moſt centrical place "for aſſembling an Army, there I would wiſh it to join, "as from the parts adjacent, I can furniſh it with whatſoever ſhall be wanting; and at the ſame time both "my country and the poſſeſſions of the Company will "be protected." Whether the Select Committee, proceeding on their own knowledge, and on the judgment of the Commander in Chief of the Army, and ſupported therein by the ſentiments of the Nabob, are wrong, or whether Mr. *Sadlier* is right, the iſſue of the matter will finally determine.

The laſt reſource of intemperate minds is in bold and general ſcurrility; fatally indeed, the rancour recoils upon themſelves, and, inſtead of injuring thoſe they would wiſh to vilify, the opprobrium falls upon their own heads, and leaves a ſtigma which is not eaſily eradicated. Thus Mr. *Sadlier*, when he ſays, "We have ſtood the ſtupid "ſpectators of our own ruin," eſtabliſhes for a fact what is merely the offſpring of his own apprehenſion. Ruin has not fallen upon the *Carnatic*, nor ſhall ruin approach it, ſhould hands and hearts, zealous in the general welfare, be able to prevent it. To deſcend ſo far as to anſwer that part of the Minute which ſays, "the Nabob's "perſon is in danger; he is almoſt deſerted by thoſe who "ought to protect him, and that he is ſunk in a ſtate of "deſpondency without hope, and may conſider himſelf "as a victim devoted to deſtruction," would be injurious to his Highneſs; who is ſenſible of the anxious regard of this Government to his intereſt and honour, and highly unworthy of our own characters. The Nabob feels ſo totally the reverſe of all this, that he is warm and ſanguine that *Hyder* will eventually repent his having diſturbed the quiet of the *Carnatic*. But Mr. *Sadlier* goes a ſtep farther; we have already remarked his declaration at the Board, "that he would communicate his ſentiments "to the community at large, that they might know their "danger;" a declaration fraught with conſequences of the moſt evil tendency. But, not confining himſelf to this, he even proceeds to ſay, "the Committee have acted "under the Sanction of an uſurped authority." If in their wiſdom the Company have thought fit to eſtabliſh a Select Committee for the better management of their affairs; if in their diſcretion they have thought proper to limit the number of its Members; the daring inſult in ſuch language ſhewn to their authority, and that too by a Member of Adminiſtration, is worthy of the ſevereſt cenſure that can be paſſed. To encourage a ſpirit of diſaffection, is highly unbecoming in any man veſted with a ſhare of the Government of a country; but to aim at the ſubverſion of a Power fixed and eſtabliſhed in all its points by the moſt explicit orders, is a tranſgreſſion of that unpardonable nature, that Government would be

Appendix, N 2.

treacherous to their Conſtituents, and negligent of the public ſafety, were they to allow it to paſs with indifference or impunity: wherefore, as the commands of the Company are clear and deciſive with reſpect to the line which in caſe of neceſſity the Preſident and Council, as well as the Committee, are authorized to take, and as that neceſſity now exiſts in its moſt alarming form, the Preſident moves, and the General ſeconds the motion, That Mr. *Sadlier* be ſuſpended from the ſervice of the Company until the pleaſure of the Court of Directors ſhall be known.

1ſt Auguſt 1780. Signed, *John Whitehill*, *Hector Munro.*

The Preſident then puts the following Motion to the Board, That Mr. *Sadlier* be ſuſpended from the Company's ſervice till the pleaſure of the Court of Directors be known: whereupon the opinions of the ſeveral Members of Council are taken, and are as follow:

Mr. *Davidſon* is of opinion, That the Minute of Mr. *Sadlier* is wanting in that deference, reſpect, and decency which are due to Government; and the tendency of his conduct has been ſuch, that he approves of the Preſident's Motion.

Mr. *Johnſon* diſſents in the ſtrongeſt manner to the Preſident's Motion, and will proteſt againſt the meaſure as ſoon as he can recover from the aſtoniſhment he is in at ſuch a proceeding, and can collect his reaſons with ſufficient accuracy and preciſion; in the mean time makes this public avowal of the ſame ſentiments as are contained in the Minute of Mr. *Sadlier*.

Sir *Hector Munro* ſubſcribes to the Preſident's Motion.

Mr. *Smith* is totally againſt the Preſident's Motion; thinks it a very ſevere and very unmerited one, and will enter his Proteſt on the occaſion.

The Preſident is of opinion, That Mr. *Sadlier* be ſuſpended the Company's ſervice till the pleaſure of the Court of Directors be known.

Reſolved, in conſequence, That Mr. *Sadlier* be ſuſpended the Company's ſervice till the pleaſure of the Court of Directors be known.

(A true extract)
Chas *Freeman*, Secretary.

Extracts from the Minutes of Conſultation, dated the 8th September 1780.

Read, and ordered to be entered, the following Minute of Mr. *Smith*:

I conſider the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier* as arbitrary and unjuſt, therefore have diſſented and proteſted againſt the meaſure. His repreſentation, in many particulars, agrees with the ſentiments I have expreſſed in Committee; and doubtleſs very great allowances ſhould have been made for a Minute conceived in a critical ſituation, when the Writer thought there was imminent danger. I cannot ſufficiently regret the inattention ſhewn by the majority of the Committee to the ſeveral repreſentations made by Mr. *Johnſon* and myſelf, expreſſing our wiſhes to make the neceſſary preparations for war, on receiving various letters from his Highneſs the Nabob, informing us of *Hyder Ally*'s hoſtile intentions againſt the *Carnatic*, although we did not then record our ſentiments, more particularly on the 17th of July, and alſo in the Minutes delivered in by us on the 19th June and 19th July laſt; as I fear this inactivity has occaſioned the alarm and conſternation which prevailed on the morning of the 24th ultimo. The general report of conferences held by the Governor General and *Umur ul Omrah* (to which Mr. *Johnſon* and myſelf were not invited) ſerved to confirm that deſpondency and diſtruſt which prevails in this ſettlement.

An unreſerved communication of ſentiments from every Member of the Board appears to me eſſentially neceſſary for managing the Company's affairs; and every attempt to reſtrain it highly improper. To ſuſpend a Member for doing what he conceives to be his duty, is ſuch an act of arbitrary power as cannot be paralleled in the Company's records. Can it be expected that a Member will deliver his ſentiments with freedom and ſincerity, whilſt the terrors of ſuſpenſion hang over him? I fear not; and that this violent meaſure is more calculated to evince the power of the Majority, than to promote harmony and unanimity in our Councils. When I reflect on all that has paſſed on this occaſion, I find it very difficult to reſtrain my feelings at the conduct of the Majority, in endeavouring to ruin the proſpects of one of their own Members, for having painted our ſituation in a manner which does not accord with their ſentiments.

For the ſake of human nature, I hope that perſonal pique had no ſhare in this Reſolution; but, when it is known that the Preſident and General conſider themſelves as reflected on in Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minute, and that no cordiality has ſubſiſted between him and Mr. *Davidſon*, I think there will be too much reaſon for conjectures, which every man of ſentiment and feeling would wiſh to avoid.

The ſuſpenſion of a Servant of ſuch rank as Mr. *Sadlier* ought to be a matter of the cooleſt deliberation, and done without paſſion or prejudice.

I cannot conceive that our Honourable Employers will approve that a Servant of his ſtation and abilities ſhould be diſqualified from ſerving them, at a time when his experience and advice might be of moſt uſe, eſpecially when they will ſee that this violent meaſure has been effected without any ſpecific charge being exhibited againſt him (except that produced by the Preſident and General, who muſt be conſidered as Parties, and in this inſtance became Judges in his condemnation) or his being allowed time for making his Defence, although ſuch rule of conduct has been ordered and eſtabliſhed by the Court of Directors.

Madras, the Auguſt 1780. (Signed) *Charles Smith.*

Mr. *Johnſon* delivers in the following Minute, relative to the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier*; and begs leave to remark to the Board, that he ſhould not have ſuffered ſo much time to elapſe ſince that meaſure took place, without entering his Diſſent at large, had not indiſpoſition and multiplicity of buſineſs prevented his doing it ſooner:

Having diſſented in the ſtrongeſt manner to the Preſident's Motion for the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier*, purſuant to this declaration, I do hereby proteſt againſt the violence of that meaſure for the following Reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe that Mr. *Sadlier*'s character ſhould have exempted him from the violence under which he now ſuffers; his conduct while a temporary Member of Council, on the arrival of Mr. *Whitehill* to take charge of the Government, and previous to the return of Mr. *Smith* and myſelf to the Preſidency, was ſuch as deſerved applauſe: as Chief of *Maſulipatam*, he diſtinguiſhed himſelf for his moderation in the midſt of long diſputes, in which he was neceſſarily engaged, relative to the Civil and Military power; and it is enough to ſay that the Board was ſo much convinced of the propriety of his conduct, that their ſubſequent orders, dated on that ſubject, were grounded on his arguments; for his attention to the fortifications and defences of the place, when they might be ſubject to an attack in conſequence of the war with France; for diſintereſtedneſs of conduct which freed him even from the imputation of benefiting by his ſtation; for his attention to the Company's inveſtment; and laſtly, for that ſtrict œconomy ſo neceſſary to the Company's affairs.

A ſenſe of his merit in theſe inſtances drew from his Succeſſor, a ſenſible, impartial man, and from the Council of *Maſulipatam*, the moſt honourable teſtimony in his favour; and his conduct in this truſt pointed him out as a perſon whoſe capacity rendered him amply deſerving of that place in Government to which he was to ſucceed.

Appendix, No 1.

On his admiſſion into Council, he purſued the ſame honourable line of conduct; he ſpiritedly oppoſed the ſupercеſſion of the Company's Servants, upon the occaſion of Mr. *Caſſamajor*'s appointment to the Chiefſhip of *Vizagapatam*, in preference to the right of four ſenior Servants; he delivered in a ſtrong Minute againſt an alienation of the Company's revenue, which was made during the late Government nominally in favour of Mr. *Drake*, but really in favour of *Trevengadum*, the Beetle and Tobacco Farmer, who is now the preſent Governor's Dubaſh. This act of favour was ſhewn to *Trevengadum* in contradiction to the Report of a Committee appointed to inveſtigate his accounts, which at the ſame time proved, that he cruelly oppreſſed the Inhabitants to promote his private emolument. Mr. *Sadlier* ſhewed his attention to the Company's orders, by delivering in a Minute, containing his opinion of the mode beſt adapted for inveſtigating who were the Owners of the *Elizabeth*; this Minute was anſwered by Mr. *Whitehill*, which drew a Reply from Mr. *Sadlier*. Mr. *Sadlier* oppoſed in the ſtrongeſt manner an alienation of the Company's revenue in favour of *Sitteram Rauze*; and laſtly, when we were invaded by *Hyder Ally*, he boldly ſtepped forward in the hour of danger, to give his ſentiments of our preſent danger, and the meaſures which the Majority of Government ought to purſue.

I ſpeak of theſe facts with confidence, as they came within my own knowledge: I am ſorry the length to which I am obliged to confine myſelf will not allow me to be more explicit: thoſe who ſee Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minutes, will do juſtice to his abilities and to his intentions; and I doubt not but his unremitting attention to the Company's intereſt, his obedience to their orders, his deſire to fix the attachment of their Servants by preventing ſupercеſſion, and his anxiety to promote the welfare of the whole when it was in danger, will inſure him not only the warm applauſe of the Company whom he ſerves, but the Community, which he was deſirous to ſee protected.

But the integrity of Mr. *Sadlier*'s intention neceſſarily drew him into an oppoſition to the Majority of the Government; his principle we ſee puniſhed as a crime; and I am ſorry to remark, that the violence of the proceedings againſt him too ſtrongly indicate, that the Majority of Government were determined to make uſe of their power to ſuppreſs opinions which they could not contradict by reaſon or argument.

2dly. Becauſe, by the Company's orders, when a charge is exhibited againſt any of their Servants, they direct that a time be allowed for their defence, in order that the charge may be clearly and ſpecifically proved. If by the Company's orders, this juſtice is due to any Company's Servant, how much more ought it to be obſerved to a Member of Government? The Laws of *England* ſtrictly enjoin that no man ſhall be condemned unheard. But in the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier*, regard was neither paid to Cuſtom, to Law, to Juſtice, or to the Company's Orders; an imaginary crime was formed againſt him by the Governor, the General, and Mr. *Davidſon*; they found themſelves a Majority, and thought that a Majority could not only ſuperſede Law, but the Orders of that Power which conſtituted them the Government. They ſummoned a Council at 12 o'clock, without giving Mr. *Smith* or myſelf the ſmalleſt intimation of the buſineſs which was to be brought before it; they protracted the buſineſs till near one, that there might be as little time as poſſible for argument, and then producing this imaginary crime againſt Mr. *Sadlier*, which had been framed by them in private, they ſuſpended him from the ſervice, without giving him time either to defend himſelf, if he continued in the ſentiments on which he was condemned, or to retract if he found them erroneous.

3dly. Becauſe, from the manner of the charge brought in by the Governor and Sir *Hector Munro*, and ſeconded by Mr. *Davidſon*, againſt Mr. *Sadlier*, theſe Gentlemen made themſelves both Judges and Party in the deciſion againſt him. They, as Parties, framed the accuſation in private; and then bringing that accuſation, with nothing ſpecific alledged againſt Mr. *Sadlier*, in a Council aſſembled at a late hour for the purpoſe, they, as a Majority, paſs ſentence on a charge which they had thus fabricated, without giving the Accuſed a privilege not denied by Law to the loweſt criminal.

4thly. Becauſe Mr. *Sadlier* was ſuſpended from the Company's ſervice, though a Member of Government, for giving an opinion in his place at the Board, tending, as he thought, not only to the intereſt of the Company which he ſerved, but to the Community of which he is a Member. According to the conſtitution of the Company, the Council is inſtituted for the purpoſe of giving their opinion; if it is not free, conſtitutional Government does not exiſt. Any number of the Members of Council, who aſſociate themſelves for the ſuppreſſing opinion, may be conſidered a Faction, the conduct of which tends to ſuperſede ſyſtem and eſtabliſh tyranny.

5thly. Becauſe the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier* appears to be founded in private reſentment, and not on public utility. Many circumſtances tend to corroborate this fact, already ſufficiently proved by the weakneſs of the charge againſt him. The General declared, That *either he or Mr.* Sadlier *ſhould quit the Board*; and the Preſident, ſoon after Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minute was read, ſaid, That it contained many ſevere and injurious reflections againſt him and the General, which, for his own part, he ſhould anſwer; and that if the General did not *take proper notice of it*, he ſhould eſteem him unworthy of a ſeat at the Board. How much the Governor has excited the General's reſentment, is evident from the above declaration; and it is not unworthy of remark, the different line of conduct which he aſſigns to himſelf and to the General, in conſequence of Mr. *Sadlier*'s reflections.

6thly. Becauſe if the Majority of a Government can ſuſpend any of its Members for opinion, that Majority may go on ſuſpending, upon an idea of oppoſition, until the Governor, who has two voices upon an even diviſion of the Council, ſhall ſuſpend the laſt Member, and the Government thereby become abſolute and deſpotic.

7thly. Becauſe, if Mr. *Sadlier* was wrong in his opinion, thoſe who have now acted as Judges and Parties againſt him, might have refuted his errors, and vindicated their own conduct. If this vindication was clear, any declaration which Mr. *Sadlier* made to the Public could only prove a cenſure againſt his own judgment, and not againſt Government.

8thly. Becauſe Mr. *Sadlier*'s idea reſpecting the Nabob is not without foundation. The attack made by a party of Horſe, which penetrated as far as *Triplicane*, the place of the Nabob's reſidence, without meeting with any reſiſtance, has evinced the propriety of Mr. *Sadlier*'s reflections.

9thly. Becauſe the evident juſtice of Mr. *Sadlier*'s opinion vindicated its propriety: ſentiments nearly to the ſame effect had previouſly been delivered in, unknown to him, by Mr. *Smith* and myſelf; but had his opinion been immediately adopted, the junction which was not effected at the Mount till the 24th Auguſt, might have taken place much ſooner; and had the Troops, in compliance with that opinion, been ordered up by ſea, the Company would have ſaved the expence of marching them up from *Pondicherry*; a number of villages might have been ſaved, and People would have brought in Proviſions of all kinds, had the meaſures propoſed been at firſt adopted for the defence of the Black Town; but being neglected, the Cattle are driven away to woods and pollams; Grain is ſcarce, and our Army, though in the neighbourhood of the Preſidency, is indifferently ſupplied with every thing.

10thly.

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10th. Becauſe the language in which Mr. *Sadlier* expreſſes his ſentiments is vindicated by the practice of the Houſe of Commons, and of every popular aſſembly; the ſtate of our affairs warranted both manly warmth and ſpirited exertion. A generous mind might naturally be rouzed by a ſenſe of public calamity. If Mr. *Sadlier*'s language was diſorderly, he ought to have had the privilege of being brought to a ſenſe of decorum in his place, and during the time of Council. The mode of reſentment ſhewn was both irregular and unlawful.

11thly. Becauſe the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier* by the Preſident and Council, was contrary to the 6th paragraph of the Company's letter, dated the 10th April 1778; which veſts the power of ſuſpenſion in the Committee. The late Preſident, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, expreſsly ſays, in a Minute adopted by Mr. *Whitehill* and Sir *Hector*, "the power of ſuſpenſion and reſtoring again "is left *entirely* to them (meaning the Committee) on "every occaſion;" yet theſe two Gentlemen now act, not only in contradiction to the Company's orders, but to their own opinion.

12thly. To conclude: Becauſe the Preſident and Sir *Hector Munro*, followed by Mr. *Davidſon*, have, unconſtitutionally, and contrary to the Company's orders, ſuſpended a Member of Government, from whoſe judgment, abilities, and aſſiduity, our Councils might have reaped advantage in the preſent ſtate of our affairs: becauſe this act of violence cannot be vindicated upon any one principle tending to public utility, and can only be accounted for by their private reſentment againſt him: becauſe, by this act of violence, the three Members who ſuſpended Mr. *Sadlier* (one of which ſucceeds to Mr. *Sadlier*'s ſtation in rotation) have ſhewn it is their intention to puniſh as a crime that freedom of debate and freedom of opinion, without which our Government muſt degenerate into deſpotiſm.

Laſtly. Becauſe the Governor and Sir *Hector Munro* wiſh that judgment ſhould be paſſed on Mr. *Sadlier*'s opinion, and upon their conduct, from the *event of the matter*. This iſſue is unfair with regard to Mr. *Sadlier*, and could only hold good if they perſevered in the meaſures they attempt to vindicate; but notwithſtanding this indication, they have in more than one inſtance deviated from their own intended plan, and have adopted meaſures which had been propoſed by Mr. *Smith* and myſelf in Committee, and by Mr. *Sadlier* in Council; therefore, this deviation muſt operate againſt them in the mind of every unbiaſſed perſon, and clearly prove that they have ſuſpended Mr. *Sadlier* for a Minute containing advice which they afterwards, in ſeveral inſtances, were obliged to follow.

(Signed) *Samuel Johnſon.*

(True extracts.)

12th Sept. 1780. *Cha*^{s} *Freeman*, Sec^{y}.

Read the following Letter from Mr. *Sadlier*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Notwithſtanding the ſtrong impreſſions of ſurprize and indignation which I have uniformly entertained at the arbitrary and unjuſt conduct of the Preſident, who ventured to move, and Sir *Hector Munro*, who thought proper to ſecond, a Motion for my ſuſpenſion, on no other ground than for having exerciſed that freedom of debate, which is inherent in every Council under the Britiſh conſtitution, I did not intend to have addreſſed the Honourable Committee on the ſubject, had not Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* entered their Diſſents ſo ſtrongly againſt the Reſolution of Council of the 1ſt of Auguſt; and had not the Minute of Mr. *Johnſon* in particular ſuggeſted the neceſſity of this Addreſs, by pointing out the illegality of the meaſure, as well as that glaring contradiction of the Preſident and General, in venturing to exhibit on record, towards effecting my ſuſpenſion, a line of conduct ſo diametrically oppoſite to their own ſentiments, delivered in Committee during the Preſidency of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. In that period, the powers of the Select Committee were diſcuſſed, and Mr. *Whitehill*, as well as Sir *Hector Munro*, aſſented to the following opinion of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*; namely, "that the power of ſuſpenſion, and reſtoring again, is left "entirely to the Select Committee on every occaſion." That opinion was founded on the words in the 6th paragraph of the General Letter of the 10th April 1778, which eſtabliſhed the Select Committee, and which words are as follow:

"Par. 6th. If our Select Committee ſhall think fit "to ſuſpend any perſon or perſons from our Service, "ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall not be reſtored, other-"wiſe than by the ſaid Committee, except by orders of "the Court of Directors."

How far Mr. *Whitehill* and Sir *Hector Munro* were well founded in adopting ſuch an opinion, it is not now my buſineſs to diſcuſs. It is ſufficient to obſerve, that as they had adopted ſuch an opinion, they were bound to act to it, and not to follow a line in contradiction to it; as if determined to ſhape their conduct to their inclination, without regard to juſtice, conſiſtency, or the powers wherewith they are veſted; and without conſidering, that by ſo manifeſt an encroachment on thoſe powers, and ſo direct a violation of the Orders of their Superiors, from whom they own authority is derived, they, in a very high degree weaken, if not entirely deſtroy, the conſtitution of that very Government which they are called upon, and bound, to ſupport. To their reflections, however, I leave them, and have only to regret, that our Honourable Employers at home ſhould experience ſuch inconſiſtency from thoſe Servants in whom they repoſed ſo high a truſt, and whoſe ſituation called on them for a conduct of caution, deliberation, ſound policy, and ſubſtantial juſtice; in lieu of which, they have followed the haſty dictates of paſſion, prejudice, and reſentment.

The honourable ſtation to which I have been called, and of which I have been diveſted in ſo unconſtitutional a manner, calls upon me now to make this Appeal to the Honourable Preſident, and to Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, who are the only effectual and conſtitutional Members of the Select Committee now at the Preſidency, and to requeſt you to conſider of the merits of my ſuſpenſion, and to exerciſe that authority wherewith you are inveſted by the ſaid 6th par. of the General Letter of the 10th April 1778.

If in your judgment, or in the judgment of the Majority of you, I ſhall appear to deſerve that vote of ſuſpenſion, I muſt ſubmit to all the hardſhips of my ſituation, till the pleaſure of a ſuperior Power is known; but if, on the contrary, the voices of the Honourable Preſident and Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, or of the Majority of you, ſhould go hand in hand with my own feelings on this important occaſion, and, by acquitting me of every charge to my prejudice, ſhould reſtore me to my ſeat at the Board, I ſhall endeavour to diſcharge the duties of my ſtation ſo as to merit the continuance of your eſteem, and the approbation of my Superiors.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble, and
moſt obedient Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
13th Sept. 1780.

Agreed, That the foregoing Letter be referred to the Honourable Court of Directors.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Saml *Johnſon*,
Alex^{r} *Daviaſon*.

To

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Seleƈt Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

When I gave in my Letter of the 13th September to your Honourable Board, I had reaſon to hope, that the merits of that Addreſs would have undergone an immediate diſcuſſion. A regard to juſtice, and the reſpeƈt due to my ſtation, ſeemed to claim that attention from you; nor can I ſuppoſe any thing could have prevented it, but the melancholy intelligence which arrived about that period, and of which I was uninformed when I penned the Letter in queſtion.

The duty I owed to my Employers at home led me on to that Addreſs, in order to be again in the acknowledged poſſeſſion of that ſtation, to which, by their orders, I was called, and of which I was ſo cauſeleſsly and ſo unconſtitutionally diveſted; and to give me an opportunity of reſuming a part in the adminiſtration of affairs at a criſis which ſpoke its own importance in the ſtrongeſt light. The fatality which attended the operations of the laſt Campaign, and which would have been in a great meaſure prevented had my advice been taken, has thrown the affairs of this Preſidency into a moſt embarraſſed ſtate.

The more, however, our difficulties have increaſed, the more I conceive myſelf bound to offer my ſervices to the Public, and to expreſs my willingneſs to take upon myſelf a ſhare of the public reſponſibility.

The reaſons offered by Mr. *Johnſon*, in his diſſent to the vote of ſuſpenſion, and which firſt urged me to write the Letter of the 13th September, are ſo full, and the general tenor of my advice to the Board, as a Member of Government, in that very Minute for which I was ſuſpended, has appeared in the event to be ſo rational, that I will not ſuffer myſelf to entertain a doubt of your reſtoring me again to my ſeat at the Board, whenever you ſhall think fit to reconſider the merits of my ſituation.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Fort St. George,
7th October 1780.

Mr. *Johnſon* then moves, That Mr. *Sadlier*'s ſuſpenſion be taken off; and Mr. *Smith* ſeconds the Motion.

Sir *Hector Munro* againſt taking it off; and likewiſe, that, as Mr. *Sadlier* mentions his Letter of the 13th ultimo not having been immediately diſcuſſed at the Board, he begs leave to remind the Committee, that it was at the particular requeſt of Mr. *Johnſon*, who wiſhed to converſe with Mr. *Sadlier* on the ſubjeƈt of that Letter, before it was taken into conſideration.

Mr. *Smith* for the Motion.

The Preſident ſees no reaſon for taking off the ſuſpenſion.

Carried againſt the Motion, by the Preſident's caſting vote; but it is agreed, that all papers, &c. relative to Mr. *Sadlier*'s ſuſpenſion, be referred to the Honourable the Court of Directors, by the preſent diſpatch.

Extraƈt of a General Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 15th October 1780.

At a Meeting of Council, held the 29th July, Mr. *Sadlier*, who took his ſeat at the Board on the departure of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* for Europe, delivered in a Minute, cenſuring, in the moſt diſreſpeƈtful terms, the conduƈt of the Seleƈt Committee. This, added to Mr. *Sadlier*'s intemperate declarations at the time his Minute was read, induced your Preſident, ſeconded by your Commander in Chief, at the ſucceeding Conſultation, the 1ſt Auguſt, after fully ſtating their reaſons for ſuch a ſtep, to move Mr. *Sadlier*'s ſuſpenſion from the ſervice until your pleaſure were known; which was carried in the affirmative. Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* proteſted againſt this Reſolution of the Majority of Council, and delivered in Minutes to that effeƈt at a Meeting held the 8th September following.

That we may not be taxed with the moſt diſtant idea of unfairneſs in our conduƈt towards Mr. *Sadlier*, we incloſe you, by this earlieſt conveyance, Numbers in the packet, Extraƈts of our Proceedings, together with Copies of two Letters addreſſed by him to your Seleƈt Committee; containing every thing that has paſſed relative to his ſuſpenſion, fully to enable your Honours to paſs a final deciſion on the merits of Mr. *Sadlier*'s preſent ſituation.

Extraƈt of a Letter from *Anthony Sadlier*, Eſq. to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*; dated 16th October 1780.

To remind you of the political ſituation of public affairs, when I gave in that Minute, to Council which has been the oſtenſible pretence of my ſuſpenſion, I need only call to your recolleƈtion the contents of that Minute. The piƈture was not exaggerated; our danger, and the public apprehenſion were not leſs than I deſcribed them; our reſources were not greater, or our proſpeƈts brighter than may appear on that Minute. The facts ſtated upon the face of that Minute, were obnoxious to thoſe whoſe previous miſmanagement had involved the affairs of this Preſidency, elſe the language I uſed would not have offended.

To ſlight the ſtrength of an Enemy, has ever been held to be a moſt dangerous doƈtrine; and on the contrary, I know no man, except Mr. *Whitehill* or Sir *Hector Munro*, who could venture to paſs a cenſure on a Member of Government for ſtating, in fair and full terms, the ſtrength of the Enemy, and the propriety of being prepared to receive him. I agree with thoſe Gentlemen, that the hour of danger is the hour of reſolution, and it would be well for the *Carnatic* had that principle been put in praƈtice.

Till I had read the Anſwer of thoſe Gentlemen to my Minute, I could not have conceived it poſſible that a Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and the Commander in Chief of the Army, ſhould have attempted to claim a merit upon record for their attention to *Hyder*'s motions, becauſe they had repreſented both to the Company, and to the Gentlemen at *Bengal*, the extent of his views; and had circumſtantially informed the latter of every ſtep he had taken previous to his attack upon the *Carnatic*, to *Hyder Ally*, to be treated as a Company's covenanted Servant, and to be repulſed from the *Carnatic*, becauſe repreſentations have gone home of his incurſions on the Nabob's or the Company's diſtriƈts.

Had you arrayed your Armies, collected Proviſions, provided Ammunition for your ſeveral Detachments, our credit might have been ſaved, and our Poſſeſſions at preſent freed from an Enemy, whoſe conſequence is increaſed by your miſmanagement, and whoſe Soldiery are now in ſuch ſpirits with their ſucceſs, that I doubt much whether any Force that we have, or which we can procure for a length of time, will rout them from their preſent lodgment in the heart of the *Carnatic*.

And it ſhould be a matter of very ſerious charge againſt the Preſident in particular, for having ſuffered the ſame Vakeel to attend at his garden-houſe for three days after the Families on *Choultry Plain* had been driven into the Fort. The Preſident and General avow, that *Hyder* had threatened an invaſion of the *Carnatic* ſo far back as our attack on *Mahé*; and ſtill they have ſuffered us to ſpare, for the operations on the *Malabar* Coaſt, a large portion of our Forces, and have neglected to put the remaining Force in a ſituation which would inſure to us their ſpeedy and effeƈtual co-operation againſt *Hyder*. They ſay, *Hyder*'s uſual judgment failed him, becauſe he happened to poſtpone his operations for half a ſeaſon; that under the certainty of his main Army and the Artil-

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lery not having paſſed the Gauts, and under other circumſtances, in which they appear to avow their want of information as to *Hyder*'s motions, they deemed themſelves vigilant in the truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an Army as ſpeedily as poſſible, when they took meaſures for their co-operation with *Bengal*, and when they got the Nabob to collect Proviſions in his different Garriſons; and in ſhort, when they came to the determination of exerting every ſinew towards the puniſhment of a wanton, unprovoked infringement of the Peace of 1769. I would aſk theſe Gentlemen, how they can reconcile to themſelves, to the Company, and to the truſt repoſed in them, that they have ſuffered themſelves to be ſo groſsly ignorant of the motions of *Hyder?* They were bound, from their ſtations, to be well informed, and they ſhould not have ſpared to proper perſons the reward of good intelligence; by the want of that intelligence, no effort was made to aſſemble the Army till it was too late; the place of rendezvous was too diſtant, the Army was ill ſupplied, the principal detachment cut off, the Proviſions in the Garriſons of no ſervice, except to *Hyder*, who had taken part of them, and the co-operation (if any ſuch plan has been attempted) was ſuggeſted ſo late, that the poor remains of a fine Army were encamped within ſix miles of the Preſidency, after retreating before the Enemy, and being able with difficulty to prevent their being cut off, by the time that the Preſidency of *Bengal* had received their firſt information that *Hyder* had entered the *Carnatic*; and thus it is that they have puniſhed *Hyder* for his wanton infringement of the Peace of 1769.

Extract of a Letter from *Anthony Sadlier*, Eſq. to the Court of Directors; dated 17th October 1780.

Hyder Ally has, for a long time, threatened to invade the *Carnatic*. I ſaw the approaching ſtorm; I felt for the ſafety of your poſſeſſions; I ſaw the majority of the Committee inactive, or incapable of exertion; I knew the Company's reſources were exhauſted, and I did not believe that meaſures would be adopted equal to the exigency of your affairs at home, or the danger with which they were threatened from abroad.

A Minute, defining the power of the Committee, was laid before it by Mr. *Johnſon*, and was afterwards brought from the Committee to the Council, for their deciſion. Previous to this ſtep, the expected Invaſion from *Hyder Ally* took place; for ſeveral days the Government took no one ſtep to oppoſe the torrent, yet the Majority was confident of ſucceſs, and founded their hope upon the general idea of our ſtrength, without ſeeming to conſider that our force depended upon the manner in which it was employed.

The firſt alarm of the Invaſion was heard from *Conjeveram* on the 22d, and no Council was held until the 29th of July; during that long interval every ſtep taken ſhewed our weakneſs, and expoſed us to the contempt of our Enemies.

To the Honourable *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The peculiar hardſhip of my ſituation will, no doubt, claim your particular attention; and I therefore beg permiſſion to lay it before you, with that candour which is due to myſelf, and that deference which I ſhall always pay to Government.

The injuſtice I ſuffered, in being ſuſpended from my ſtation in the Service, and my ſeat at the Board, for delivering in an opinion in my place, tending, as I thought, and as the event has ſhewn, to promote public ſafety, at a time when the whole was threatened with danger, is a ſubject which has already been ſufficiently diſcuſſed; and it will therefore only be neceſſary for me to make a few remarks, leading to the purport of my preſent Letter.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* firſt diſſented, and then proteſted againſt my ſuſpenſion; declaring, amongſt other reaſons, that the Preſident and the General became both Parties and Judges in the accuſation on which they condemn me; they likewiſe concurred in my opinions, and were pleaſed to conſider the plan laid down by me in my Minute, as that which was beſt adapted to prevent the evils with which we were threatened. In conſequence of the powers of ſuſpenſion and reſtoration with which the Select Committee is inveſted, and which was allowed by a Minute delivered in by Sir *Thomas Rumbold* on the ſubject, to which I believe no Member diſſented, the queſtion relative to my ſuſpenſion was agitated before the Select Committee: Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* voted, in conſequence of their former opinion, for my reſtoration; but the queſtion was negatived by the late Preſident's caſting vote.

Actuated by the ſame zeal which induced me to deliver in the Minute on which I was ſuſpended, I entered into a correſpondence with the Governor General upon the then alarming criſis of the Company's affairs upon this coaſt. I made my Appeal publicly to his ſtation, and to his juſtice; and, as it was neceſſary that the Company ſhould be made acquainted with the ſame facts, I addreſſed a Letter to the Board here, with Copies of the Letters and Papers ſent to the Governor General, that they might be forwarded to the Court of Directors by the *Nymph* ſloop of war, then under diſpatch.

The opinions contained in theſe Letters were not formed from the event; they trace future conſequences, from cauſes which evidently did exiſt; and whoever will compare them with the information ſent home from the Majority of the Board, and conſider, at the ſame time, that we then had no account of the ſupplies which have ſince arrived from *Bengal*, will, I hope, do juſtice to the zeal which induces me to deliver my ſentiments upon theſe intereſting occaſions, and to my diſregard of every conſequence, when placed in competition with the ſincere concern I have in the proſperity of my Employers, in which the intereſt of the Nation is ſo intimately concerned.

My Letters to the Governor General, and to the Court of Directors, remained before the Board from the 17th until the 26th of October, the day after we had official information of the Reinforcement from *Bengal*, under the command of Sir *Eyre Coote:* then, and not till then, I received the following Letter from Sir *Hector Munro:*

Sir, *Fort St. George*, 26th October 1780.

Your Letters to the Court of Directors, and to the Governor General of *Bengal*, were brought to my houſe in the Fort yeſterday, as I was going to dinner.

What you ſay of me in the ſaid Letters, is equally falſe as malicious.

I deſire you to meet me to-morrow morning, at half paſt five o'clock, behind the Play-houſe on the Iſland, prepared with piſtols, to give me that ſatisfaction which is incumbent on you to give, and on me to demand.

Bring a friend with you: I will do the ſame.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

Anthony Sadlier, Eſq. *Hector Munro.*

My Anſwer to him was as follows; which was delivered on the ſame evening, a few hours after the Letter was received:

Sir,

I have received your Letter of this date. Let me recal to your mind, that we have both filled public ſtations in Government: we never had any differences as Individuals; and our conduct, in all ſituations where we have acted together, is not relative to ourſelves, but to the

the *Eaſt India* Company, whoſe Servants we are, and to the Community.

Remember, Sir, that for a public act, in diſcharge of the truſt repoſed in me, you, with others, thought fit to reflect upon my character, and to degrade me from my ſtation. Upon this trying occaſion I felt no perſonal injury, for I know my conduct would bear the teſt of enquiry. If you were conſcious of the ſame feeling, your Letter to me would have been unneceſſary. Called upon by ſtation, and a ſenſe of public danger, I was led to give my opinion of men and meaſures; in doing ſo, I commented upon your conduct, not in your individual, but your public capacity; inſtead of concealing what was written, I laid it open for your inſpection; and allow me to ſay, Sir, that a man whoſe actions are marked with ſo much candour, muſt be regardleſs of conſequences.

You inform me, you did not ſee my Letters before you were going to dinner yeſterday in the Fort, though they were delivered about noon on the 17th inſtant, which includes a ſpace of nine days. This appears ſomething extraordinary! We have within that time heard that General Sir *Eyre Coote* is coming from *Bengal* with a Reinforcement of Troops; the firſt official information in this important point was received laſt night, and your Letter was delivered to me about noon this day. The meaſures which the Governor General and Council have reſolved to purſue relative to this Government, are not yet known; one thing is certain, that after his arrival you will become Second in Command, and will then be more at liberty to diſpoſe of yourſelf; what judgment others may have entertained of your actions, as yet remains in doubt, and it is uncertain how ſoon you may be called upon to vindicate your conduct, or I to juſtify my aſſertions; the cauſe of your challenge is more properly the ſubject of a Court Martial than a duel; private reſentment will not rub out the ſtains of public miſconduct. You have ſtated no inſtance in which I have ſaid any thing either *falſe* or *malicious*; but if I am your Accuſer, I am ſo publicly, not privately. By having written to the Governor General, and to the Court of Directors, and uncertain as I am what reſolutions they may have come to upon the credit of my information, I conſider myſelf accountable to them in the firſt inſtance for the truth of my aſſertions. It is your conduct, not your courage, which you may have occaſion to defend; and believe me, that our meeting in the manner you deſire will not vindicate you upon that ground.

Both you and I are the Servants of the Public; our lives are not, and ought not, to be at our own diſpoſal in the preſent important criſis of affairs In your condemnation of me, you availed yourſelf of your ſeat and ſtation, and obliged me to vindicate my opinion, and juſtify my character by public Appeal. You have in the firſt inſtance placed me, and I ſhall ſtand upon that ground until we are publicly acquitted or condemned. The preſent call, in my opinion, is neither juſtifiable to your public ſtation, nor honourable to your private character. The Appeal being now before the Public, to them I ſhall leave our conviction or acquittal; whenever that judgment is obtained, if it ſhall appear that I have accuſed *falſely*, or acted *maliciouſly*, I will readily, moſt readily, afford you the ſatisfaction you require.

Fort Saint George, 26 Oct. 1780.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. &c.

Whoever will reflect upon this Letter, and the Anſwer, together with the relative ſituation of the Parties, would imagine, that Sir *Hector Munro*, finding himſelf publicly, and as he thought falſely charged, ſhould, upon the arrival of a ſuperior Officer, have demanded a Court Martial; and having once vindicated his honour, would entitle himſelf to that ſatisfaction from me which he required, and I in ſuch caſe did not refuſe to give.

Permit me to remark, that my Minute of the 29th July, on which I was ſuſpended, conveyed my ſenſe of the miſconduct of Government in ſtronger and more pointed terms than any of my ſubſequent writings. I wrote the former with all the apprehenſions of approaching danger to the Company, to the Community, to my Friends, and to myſelf; I wrote the latter with that fixed concern which takes place in the mind when the loſs is certain and irretrievable. Thoſe will judge beſt of my feelings, and of their cauſe, who can bring back their imagination to the incidents of the time in which my Minute was written. That line which the Governor thought the General ſhould have purſued in conſequence of that Minute, is ſtrongly marked by a circumſtance which gave occaſion to the fifth paragraph in Mr. *Johnſon*'s Diſſent againſt my ſuſpenſion; viz. Appendix, No 2.

" Becauſe the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier* appears to be " founded in private reſentment, and not on public uti- " lity; many circumſtances tend to corroborate this " fact, already ſufficiently proved by the weakneſs of " the charge againſt him. The General declared, That " *either he or Mr.* Sadlier *ſhould quit the Board*; and the " Preſident, ſoon after Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minute was read, " ſaid, " That it contained many ſevere and injurious " reflections againſt himſelf and the General, which, for " his own part, he ſhould anſwer; and that if the Ge- " neral did not *take proper notice of it*, he ſhould eſteem " him unworthy of a ſeat at the Board." How much " the Governor has excited the General's reſentment, is " evident from the above declaration; and it is not un- " worthy of remark, the different line of conduct which " he aſſigns to himſelf and to the General, in conſe- " quence of Mr. *Sadlier*'s reflections."

Theſe words, which ſhew the impreſſions of the General's Friend, ſtill remain unanſwered and unrefuted. If my arguments were ill founded, the Governor and the General ſhould have refuted them; if my language was perſonal, another mode of redreſs remained open. But inſtead of purſuing the direct and honourable line, a clandeſtine charge was formed againſt me by the Governor and the General; they availed themſelves of their ſtation to puniſh me by ſuſpenſion for my opinion, and, while my character remained under the impeachment, the latter, in hopes of vindicating himſelf, called upon me privately to anſwer for aſſertions conſequent to, and more moderate, than the opinion on which I ſtood publicly condemned.

It is proper here to fix the point of honour, as it occurred to me; and I therefore have recourſe to military practice, as the beſt criterion: an Officer who is put under an arreſt, does not think his honour reſtored until public reparation is made to him. I was degraded from my ſtation; I remained under the imputation of guilt until I was reinſtated. I had no channel of redreſs but from *Bengal*, or from the Court of Directors. And what muſt be thought of the man who, having unjuſtly attempted to injure my fame, called upon me in ſuch a manner, before redreſs could be obtained?

On the other hand, I had ſtated circumſtances of General *Munro*'s conduct as a Member of the Committee, and while he was at the head of the Army; which he thought injurious. Did he imagine that I would retract theſe opinions, to avoid the conſequences of his challenge? or did he conceive, that making a diſplay of his courage with me in a duel, would rub out the ſtains of public miſconduct? I imputed partly to Sir *Hector Munro*, as a Member of Government, the miſconduct, &c. which occaſioned the preſent Invaſion. I imputed to him in the ſame ſituation, a want of meaſures, which has rendered the Invaſion ſo formidable; and when he was at the head of the Army, I gave my reaſons for thinking that the loſs of a Detachment of the beſt and moſt gallant Troops in our Service, together with the diſgrace and loſs incident to this diſaſter, was owing to him, and to him only; and will his challenge to me, or any conſequence which could enſue from it, vindicate

Appendix, No. 2.

him upon that ground? he might indeed end a life which reflection would render insupportable, but no private act can justify him in the opinion of the world.

In consequence of certain opinions, in which General *Munro* was a party, the Governor General and Council thought fit to suspend Mr. *Whitehill*, and to confer the Government on Mr. *Smith*. I at least bore a part with Mr. *Smith* in the opinions which are universally supposed to have given occasion to this change; and I therefore thought there was a justice due to me by him, and Mr. *Johnson*, with whom I have acted, when they had power to redress the wrongs I suffer.

I understood yesterday in the morning, and not till then, that the question relative to my suspension was agitated in Council on the preceding day; the President and Mr. *Johnson* voted for its being taken off; and that Sir *Eyre Coote*, General *Munro*, and Mr. *Davidson*, voted against it. As it is the conduct of General *Munro*, in this instance, which has given occasion to the present Letter, permit me to state the situation in which he has placed himself.

He, in conjunction with the late President, Mr. *Whitehill*, clandestinely brought a charge against me; and the latter, instead of taking the more honourable mode pointed out by his Associate, availed himself of his station to suspend me from the Service. He was charged with being both Judge and Party in decision against me, and he submitted to the imputation without answering it. After contributing to disgrace me by depriving me of my station, he sent me a challenge, for public opinions conceived in milder language than that for which he thought fit to inflict public punishment; he did not send this challenge until it was heard that his influence in Government was to be superseded. A retrospection and enquiry might be expected to ensue from a change; and were it not for his own assertion, that papers of material import to himself remained nine days before the Board, previous to their being read by him, we might be induced to think that an apprehension of consequences made him more desirous to try whether he could not intimidate me into a retraction of sentiments, than to revenge an injury. I told him that my line was public, and not private; I desired him to vindicate his public honour, and that I would then give him the satisfaction he required: and yet he lays under every imputation without (as far as I know) endeavouring to refute them; which implies an acknowledgment of the accusations laid to his charge.

He submits to sit and vote in a Council from which another has been disgraced for holding the same tenets, and being a Party in the same misconduct with himself; and under these circumstances, which I have mentioned relative to me, he pretends to sit as a Judge, and give an impartial vote in what concerns my fame, my fortune, and my station.

Were it possible for a man to divest himself of all passion and prejudice in such a situation, a delicacy, which ever attends the ingenuous mind, would induce him to decline giving an opinion where his judgment led him to condemn. My opinion of General *Munro*'s public conduct remains upon record unrefuted; and how far he can justify his private honour in this instance, I leave to the determination of others; nor will I judge of it myself, for I cannot imitate him by condemning where I am not supposed to divest myself of partiality.

It gives me concern that I am thus obliged to unfold a circumstance which, for a time, I would otherwise have concealed; and that I am under the necessity of marking private character to throw a light upon public conduct. I believe that means have been used to draw a conclusion to my prejudice, from the challenge sent to me from General *Munro*; I am compelled therefore by necessity to publish the transaction, as I am determined that no imputation shall be thrown out, unanswered, either against my public or my private character.

I have but to remark to the Honourable Board, that had General *Munro*, from justice to me or to himself, declined to vote relative to my suspension, I should now be restored to the seat in Council from which I was arbitrarily driven; and if he acquiesces in the force of this representation, and withdraws his vote, I shall of course stand restored by the votes which have already passed upon the subject of my suspension. Whatever may be the fate of this Letter, I earnestly request that the Board will come to a speedy determination; and, if the event is unfavourable to my application, that they will make this Letter a number in the packet, in the vessel now under dispatch for *England*.

I have the honour to be,
With great respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient and
Fort St. George, most humble Servant,
16th November 1780. *Anth*y *Sadlier*.

(A true copy.)
*Cha*s *Freeman*, Secretary.

To the Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Esquire, President and Governor General, *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir,

The part which I have taken, to prevent the ruin which threatens this Settlement, has placed me in a situation which renders it necessary for me to appeal to your justice and to your station. I would endeavour to apologize for this intrusion, did I not know how interesting the subject must prove to you, who have always shewn so much concern for the Company's welfare.

I can now only give a short account of my conduct, and of the situation of affairs, and will defer my justification until the departure of The *Duke of Portland*, which is to sail in a few days.

I succeeded to Council on the departure of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. I came there without any connection which could influence my opinions or my conduct; but I found that this situation, which qualified me as a Company's Servant, made me obnoxious to a Party, which had contributed to bring the Company's affairs to the brink of ruin, and dreaded the admission of a man who might expose their measures.

From the misconduct of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, supported by Mr. *Whitehill* and Sir *Hector Munro*, and continued by them after his departure, the Company's affairs on this Coast were involved in almost inextricable difficulties; their resources were exhausted, their territories were impoverished, their revenue in arrear, their Army scattered, their Settlement without trade, and these evils daily increasing from the heavy exportation of Specie, both as an article of trade and remittance, at the rate of 10 and 15 lacks of Pagodas per annum.

When our resources were in that declining state, owing to the Men at the head of Government, we found ourselves invaded by *Hyder Ally*, at the head of a formidable Army.

This attack was no way unforeseen; it was encouraged by our weakness and venality; the same causes made us look upon the approaching storm, without endeavouring to provide against it; such a provision would have put a stop to the immediate and interested views of Individuals; those in trust, on behalf of the whole, only acted for themselves, and they hoped to escape with the spoil, and leave others to struggle with the difficulties which they had occasioned.

Sir *Thomas Rumbold* was assuredly possessed of a certain share of abilities, and he shewed it in nothing more than his timely escape; and you must well know, from your own experience, what dependance could be placed upon the integrity, the foresight, and the capacity of his Successors. It may not, however, be unnecessary to mention, that these Gentlemen, as they had assented to his measures, thought it necessary to support them after his departure.

When our territories were thus impoveriſhed; when, deſtitute of money to ſupport a war, and, I am afraid, of the abilities to conduct it, we heard from *Conjeveram* on the 22d July, that a party of *Hyder*'s Horſe had plundered that place, the conſternation which enſued is not to be expreſſed; and nothing could more ſtrongly mark the opinion entertained by the Community, both of the weakneſs of their Protectors, and the protection held out by them.

Every ſucceeding day brought in accounts of accumulating evils: *Porto Novo* was plundered, and the amount of 4 or 5 lacks of Pagodas were carried away from it in money and jewels; the whole of the villages round *Vellore* and *Amboor* were burnt to aſhes; while the Garriſons, inſtead of being able to afford aſſiſtance, tremble for their own ſafety. We were incapable of oppoſing theſe incurſions, through a want of timely preparation; even the village of *Poonamalee* was burnt and ſacked in the preſence of the only body of Troops which we have aſſembled; and we hear to-day, that the villages within the bounds of *Cuddalore* have ſhared the ſame fate.

Mr. *Whitehill* and Sir *Hector Munro* acknowledge that *Hyder* threatened an invaſion of our territories when we attacked *Mahé*, and that his intention ſince was not to be doubted. You will judge of Men who could make this declaration, and yet delay every preparation; it is known too, that *Hyder* prevented the march of our firſt Detachment deſtined to defend *Adoni*; that he treated our Ambaſſador, Mr. *Gray*, in a manner which left that Gentleman in no doubt of his intentions againſt us; that he has, for a length of time paſt, been collecting Stores at *Mangulore* upon our frontier, and that his Army has been aſſembling with the intention to attack us for ſome months. Still our credulity prevailed; our Governor would not believe the Invaſion was probable, until the attack upon *Conjeveram*, and the General did not give credit to it for ſome days after.

I was, from experience, better acquainted with *Hyder*'s capacity than any Man now in Council. I had been a year in the field, in an active campaign againſt *Hyder*, when we had both Men and Money, and when he had not ſo much of either as he has at preſent. I knew his addreſs, and the ſpirit of enterprize by which he is animated. I placed no dependance upon Men who had already ſhewn ſo little ability; and I ſaw that they loſt the opportunity which the fears of the People gave them on the firſt alarm, to ſecure to themſelves within the Fort, the only means which could have come within their reach for ſupporting a war.

To increaſe my anxiety upon this head, I learned that the General intended to remain at the Preſidency, and that he aſſented to the appointment of Lord *Macleod* to command the Army. We have no reaſon to doubt Lord *Macleod*'s merit, but we know that he has no local knowledge; and I was ſorry to ſee the General, whoſe proper ſtation is at the head of the Army, ſo inattentive to the honour of his profeſſion, and the duties of his ſtation.

The Treaſure, which upon the firſt alarm ſhould have been conveyed into the Fort, was carried into the Black Town, and that place was allowed in a manner to remain defenceleſs.

Notwithſtanding the Governor and Select Committee were ſo well convinced that *Hyder* was ſerious in his intention to attack them, they allowed the Army to remain ſcattered, without Guns and Stores for their defence. The Troops at *Pondicherry*, from the defenceleſs ſtate of the place, and their want of Guns, remained there in the utmoſt danger; they might have been tranſported here by ſea in a few days, but, inſtead of that expeditious mode, the Select Committee waited to hear of their diſtreſs; they then ſent down a Company of Artillery and ſome Guns to them on board the *Sartine*; this reinforcement did not arrive before the Troops there might have joined thoſe that were already near the Preſidency, and now this Detachment is ordered to march to *Wandewaſh*, within a forced march of the preſent encampment of *Hyder*'s Army. Appendix, N° 2.

The Troops at *Pondicherry*, and the Detachment under Colonel *Baillie* to the northward, were the only Forces which could immediately form an Army for the defence of the Preſidency, and the defence of the *Carnatic*. This Army, when aſſembled, would have been ſo inadequate to combat *Hyder*'s Force, as to render the utmoſt caution, with reſpect to its motions, expedient; yet the Governor and Select Committee, without providing the means of defending themſelves againſt an imminent and apparent danger, determined to invade the territories of the Enemy, where the invaſion could little affect them; and for that purpoſe ordered Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment to enter the *Cuddapah* Country. They have now, it is ſaid, reverſed that Order; and I fancy his Detachment may now be on the way towards *Madras*.

As People from all parts of the Country naturally flocked into *Madras* with their property, it was our duty to have afforded them moſt ample protection, and to have inſpired them with a confidence in our ſtrength. Government, thus eſtabliſhed in the opinion of a People who have long lived under its protection, might have expected their ready and willing aſſiſtance to promote its ſecurity; but, inſtead of placing their hopes of ſafety in our ſucceſs, diſtruſt of our Government, founded on a contempt for thoſe who conſtitute it, has filled the minds of the Natives with apprehenſions of the moſt alarming danger. They have fled from the walls of the Black Town to woods and pollams adjacent, and to neutral Settlements; and they have either carried away their Money and Effects, or have buried and concealed them, which, with theſe People, is the laſt act of deſpair.

The Nabob's Perſon is ſtill allowed to remain at *Chippauk*, and his Treaſures, as far as I have heard, were allowed to be carried to the Black Town, inſtead of being conveyed to the Fort. What has become of them ſince, is more, I ſuppoſe, than this Government can venture to ſay.

The Troops near the Preſidency were allowed for ſeveral days to remain in ſcattered parties; and when they were at laſt ordered to join, it was at *Poonamalee*, where you know they could prove no defence to the Black Town; and it might have been plundered, or ſet on fire, before Troops at ſuch a diſtance were apprized of its danger.

We who were making ſuch poor efforts at home, and ſhewed ſuch diſtraction in every meaſure, could not be ſuppoſed capable of defending countries at a diſtance from us. It was foreſeen, on *Hyder*'s firſt entrance, that he would plunder and deſtroy, if not poſſeſs himſelf of all the Countries South and Weſt of *Madras*. Daily intelligence confirmed this opinion; and yet I underſtood the intention was formed of aſſembling the Army by Detachment, near *Wandewaſh*, where we could not expect to collect Proviſions, and where our Detachments might have been cut off one after another, in attempting a junction.

Theſe accumulated miſtakes, too great for blindneſs itſelf to commit, filled me with more concern than I am able to expreſs. Judge what dependance could be placed upon Men who by their meaſures had brought the Community to ſuch a ſtate of ruin; and who, ſeeing its approaching deſtruction, took not one ſtep likely to prevent it. As a Britiſh Subject, I thought myſelf entitled to convey my ſentiments upon ſuch an alarming criſis; as a Member of a Britiſh Government, where freedom of ſpeech is conſtitutional, I thought this *right* doubly confirmed to me. In this laſt ſituation I thought, that if I had concealed an opinion tending to the general welfare, I ſhould have neglected a duty I owed to my Employers, to my own honour, and to the Community of which I am a Member. It was a matter of no concern to me, upon ſuch an occaſion, whether I was of a Com-

Appendix. No 2.

mittee, or of a Council; the alarm was great, the danger imminent; thoſe who were at the helm of affairs ſlept upon their truſt; and it was neceſſary to ſpur them on by ſome effort of ſhame, who did not ſeem moved by principle or ambition.

The Council was not ſummoned from the 22d (when the alarm arrived from *Conjeveram*) until the 29th. I had not ſeen Mr. *Whitehill* or Sir *Hector* during that time, nor had I been conſulted by them. When the Council was aſſembled, the Preſident informed them of his occaſions for Money, and propoſed that ſome ſhould be immediately raiſed by loan. Mr. *Davidſon* introduced a ſcheme for raiſing it by ſubſcription, from the Select Committee, Free Merchants, Company's Servants, Dubaſhes, Conicoplies, &c. Aware of the neceſſity, I readily aſſented to a ſcheme of borrowing, but had neither digeſted or adopted the mode propoſed; however, to get rid of the Motion, I ſuffered it to paſs without oppoſition, that Mr. *Johnſon* might introduce a Minute, given in by him to the Committee, defining its powers, and now brought from the Committee to the Council, to be entered and recorded on their proceedings. This being done, I declared that I had ſeen the Minute before; that I adopted the ſentiments it contained, and that Mr. *Johnſon*'s definition proved, by inconteſtable arguments, that we had been governed by an Uſurpation. Mr. *Johnſon*'s Minute goes incloſed, N° 1. I then delivered in my opinion, N° 2. of the preſent ſtate of our affairs; which was ſoon read. I declared that theſe were my ſentiments; that I wiſhed I could have conveyed them in language equal to the ſenſe I had of our danger, and our want of exertion; and that I ſhould hold the ſame ſentiments to the Community at large, that they might be apprized of their preſent dangers.

As to Supplies; I ſaid that we required Money; that thoſe who had been ſaid to have plundered the Community, on ſuch an occaſion ſhould contribute moſt for its relief; that our late Governor, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, was reputed to have carried home 15 or 18 lacks of Pagodas; that others muſt have received their proportion; and turning to Mr. *Whitehill*, I ſaid, that his ſubſcription might be expected to be ample, in proportion to his reputed fortune; that the Community would look for the example from the Committee, &c. and that I hoped the Preſident would ſubſcribe a couple of lacks. General *Munro* ſeemed anxious to be gone. I had addreſſed myſelf to him freely about the diſpoſition made for our defence, or, rather, for the want of a diſpoſition for that purpoſe; and Mr. *Whitehill* turning to him, ſaid, "If General *Munro* ſubmits to ſuch reflections as are "contained in Mr. *Sadlier*'s Minute and Language, I "ſhall deem him unfit for his ſtation."

The Council, thus agitated, broke up, Mr. *Whitehill* having ſuggeſted the idea of a Committee; and a few days afterwards it was known that the General was to take the field, and that *Baillie*'s Detachment was ordered to *Madras*.

Upon any other occaſion, when the diſorder was not malignant, and a ſtrong medicine neceſſary for its cure, I might not have adopted the pointed language I made uſe of; but I applied it as a ſtimulative to the ſluggiſh ſpirits of Men who ſlept in office when every exertion of activity was neceſſary. I thought myſelf vindicated by the practice of the Houſe of Commons, and of every popular aſſembly. Such words as I have ſaid are often addreſſed to the Firſt Miniſter of State; and if they are not ſaid to the King, they are every day ſaid of the King.

But no example, no ſenſe of juſtice, can prevent the exertions of power in the hands of corrupt Men. I was ſummoned to a Council held at Mr. *Smith*'s houſe, at 12 o'clock, 1ſt Auguſt. After waiting half an hour, to hear the buſineſs which rendered this late Meeting neceſſary, the accompanying Minute, N° 3, was read by the Secretary; and the Preſident's Motion being ſeconded by the General, and ſuſtained by Mr. *Davidſon*, in the manner ſhewn at the foot of the Preſident's Minute, I was, in conſequence, ſuſpended from the Company's Service, until their pleaſure is known.

Neither Mr. *Smith* or Mr. *Johnſon* had any intimation of the buſineſs which was to come before the Board; it was ſettled by a Junto in private, and that Junto, knowing it had the Majority, put the buſineſs to vote, without regard to what is ſaid in oppoſition.

Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* declared that they adopted my ſentiments, and obſerved, that their ſuſpenſion might enſue; but no regard was paid to their opinion.

Had I been ſuſpended by the Committee with whom the charge, ſuch as it is, originated, Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* being the Majority, in caſe the General took the field, the act might be reverſed: it was therefore neceſſary to call in Mr. *Davidſon*, who has attentively followed the Preſident, that he might, by this trick, ſecure to himſelf the certainty of a confirmed Majority.

It is remarkable, that nothing I ſaid in Council concerning Supplies, is brought in the charge againſt me. I ſeem to be principally condemned for intending to make the Community acquainted with my opinion; for daring to arraign the conduct of General *Munro*, and for uſing the word Uſurpation.

The Community know full well the cauſes of our approaching ruin: our Enemies know it likewiſe, and avail themſelves of it. I confeſs it might be wrong to expoſe the unavoidable defects in a Government when the moſt is made of the means; but when that is not the caſe, and the whole is liable to fall a ſacrifice, it is laudable to apprize the Community of the extent of their danger, in order that the moſt might be made of the reſources left them.

With regard to the word Uſurpation, uſed by me, and which appears the moſt important crime againſt me; it was before uſed in a Minute given in, reſpecting the powers aſſumed by the Committee during Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s government; and was again uſed by him in his Minute on the ſame ſubject, to which I gave my aſſent upon this occaſion. I, who but adopted the Motion made by a Member of the Committee, was conſidered as the Principal, while the Principal paſſed without cenſure.

Inſtead of uſing the forced declamation, which will be evident to you in the charge on which I am ſuſpended; inſtead of ſubſtituting empty ſound for fact, and aſſertion for argument; the Committee ſhould have vindicated their own meaſures, and then I ſhould have deſerved cenſure for the injury done them by ſuch an attack. If my Language was improper, the manner of the Houſe of Commons might be conſidered as a ſtandard rule of proceeding; which would have left me the choice of retracting or amending ſuch Language as was adjudged a breach of that order and decorum which the Majority might think proper to eſtabliſh, or leave me liable to the cenſure I may be thought to have incurred by ſuſtaining it.

Whatever I urged reſpecting the meaſures purſued or the powers of the Committee, was but matter of opinion. When opinion is not free, conſtitutional Government cannot exiſt. It is already ſhewn, that the Three which ſuſpended me, might, with more juſtice, have ſuſpended Mr. *Johnſon*, and with equal juſtice have ſuſpended Mr. *Smith*, both having adopted my opinions; and thus a Preſident may proceed by a caſting voice for ſuſpenſion, till the Government becomes deſpotic.

But, inſtead of endeavouring to juſtify themſelves, by vindicating their meaſures, they ſhew the neceſſity of my attack, by an impeachment of their conduct.

They avow that they knew of *Hyder*'s intentions, and that inſtead of making proviſions againſt the evil at home, they have written to *Bengal* and to *England*; and no doubt, becauſe they have written to *Bengal* and to *England*, that was a ſufficient excuſe for leaving their Troops ſcattered, their Garriſons without the means of defence, or themſelves without the means of applying it.

They

They allow too, that it was their intention to aſſemble the Army in a Country liable to be hourly over-run by the Enemy, becauſe the Nabob made a ſpeech, and becauſe the plan was formed on the *cooleſt deliberation* by the Commander in Chief. I am ſorry that the Commander in Chief's cooleſt deliberations are not founded upon better principles. Lord *Macleod* thought differently from the Commander in Chief on this occaſion; he was convinced by arguments conſonant with his reaſon and experience.

The Committee do not ſeem to have been well informed of the motions of *Hyder* and his Army, when they drew up the charge againſt me, though they had three days to con over their intelligence. There was a vacancy left in the original Minute, to be filled up with the ſituation of the Enemy, which was done by Mr. *Whitehill* in his own hand; and yet I have reaſon to believe the ſtatement is erroneous. If I am well informed, Mr. *Whitehill* has no direct communication with *Hyder*'s Army, and receives his only intelligence through the Nabob, or from Hircarrahs ſent out from hence. Your experience will convince you with what ſafety a perſon in his ſtation can depend upon ſuch intelligence for a knowledge of the Enemy's motions, by which his own ought to be regulated.

The Committee ſay, "that the hour of danger is the "hour of reſolution; political timidity is then the greateſt "evil that can befal a Government:" and again, "whe-"ther the Select Committee, proceeding on their own "knowledge and the judgment of the Commander in "Chief of the Army, and ſupported therein by the "ſentiments of the Nabob, are wrong, or whether Mr. "*Sadlier* is right, the iſſue of the matter will finally de-"termine."

An indulgence ought to be granted to my opinion, in proportion to the advantage which the Select Committee have obtained, from aſſuming to themſelves the management of all political and military affairs; as, not being a Member of the Committee, I could not have the benefit of information. I was excluded from official intelligence; the Returns of the Army; the Returns of Stores and Proviſions in the different Garriſons, and ſuch other means of judging and providing for the defence of a Country: I was not even confidential upon theſe points with any Member of the Committee; and therefore my opinions may be ſubject to ſome inaccuracies. It was founded upon my general knowledge of facts, as apparent to the Community as to myſelf; and I am ſorry to ſay, that upon ſuch information only, though a Member of Government, was I obliged to truſt when I ventured forth in behalf of public ſafety, to reſtore the authority which appeared violently wreſted from the Council, and to ſuggeſt ſuch meaſures as I thought might tend to inſpire confidence in Government; when our affairs rendered every vigorous and emulous effort both laudable and neceſſary. Though under theſe diſadvantages in giving my opinion, I am no way alarmed, but ſhall contentedly wait the conviction of a crime, for which I have been, by anticipation, ſuſpended from the Company's Service; I mean the iſſue of the matter which is to determine whether the Committee is wrong and I am right, or whether the public ſafety is endangered by my political timidity, or their political temerity.

It would be endleſs to trace the charge againſt me through all its abſurdities; your judgment will ſuggeſt to you more than I can expreſs, and therefore the attempt will be needleſs. I ſhall be obliged to enter more fully on the ſubject, and upon the cauſes of our preſent diſtreſs, in a Memorial I intended to preſent to the Board here, in juſtification of my own conduct; and I ſhall take the liberty of forwarding a Copy to you and to the Council when it is finiſhed. I truſt you will excuſe the length of this Addreſs, and the trouble I have given you. I ſhall not venture to ſuggeſt, Sir, the conduct to be adopted by you in conſequence of it; I humbly offer my appeal to your ſtation, and ſhall reſt contented whatever may enſue.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Fort St. George,
9 Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor General, *Fort William.*

Honourable Sir,

I have the honour to tranſmit you Duplicate of my laſt Letter and the Papers which accompanied it.

I intended myſelf the honour of ſubmitting to you by this conveyance, Copy of a Memorial I propoſe laying before the Board here, in my own vindication; and tracing the meaſures by which the Company's affairs upon the Coaſt have been brought into their preſent embarraſſed ſtate. I have not wanted aſſiduity in my endeavours to complete the Memorial, but I have had difficulty in obtaining Records, and the Members who voted againſt my ſuſpenſion have not yet delivered in their Minutes in my behalf; another opportunity will ſoon occur, when I expect to acquit myſelf of my promiſe to you.

Hydar has taken *Trinomalee*, a ſtrong fortified Pagoda; *Polore*, a place at the bottom of *Carnatah Guda*, together with *Chetpet* and *Arnee*, two very ſtrong places; and he is proceeding with the conqueſts of theſe ſmall Forts, garriſoned by Nabob's Troops, who are ill paid and ill diſciplined, and who conſequently are likely to make but a poor reſiſtance.

The Enemy's Horſe has carried fire and ſword through moſt parts of the Province, without meeting any reſiſtance. A party penetrated as far as *Choultry Plain*, and they have deſtroyed the village of *Poonamalee*, with many other nearer to the Preſidency. The plan followed by *Hyder*, is to drive the Cattle with the Inhabitants from this Country into his own; all cultivation will conſequently ſtop, excepting by thoſe who carry it on under his protection, and they will probably be puniſhed with death, if they dare to ſupply either our Army or our Detachments. As to the Grain in the Country, it is moſtly carried away or deſtroyed, ſo that the proſpect of famine alarms nearly as much as the terrors of the ſword. Our ſmall Army now at the Mount has already felt the want of Proviſions; though ſo near the Preſidency, it gets but little from the Country; every thing is ſent to it from hence, and Bullocks are ſo ſcarce that it is doubtful if the Army will be able to move for want of them.

At *Madras* we have ſcarce Paddy enough to ſupply the People for three weeks, nor can we depend upon Supplies from any place, excepting *Bengal*; the whole of the Coaſt is ſubject to incurſions, by which the greateſt part of the Country has already ſuffered.

The meaſures propoſed by me in the Minute for which I have been ſuſpended, have been adopted principally by thoſe Men who voted my condemnation. After ordering the Artillery to *Poonamalee* from the Mount, they have now ordered it back again with the King's Regiment, and I underſtand that the Army is to be aſſembled there; ſo that the Committee have laid aſide the meaſures they defended ſo ſtrenuouſly, of aſſembling the Army at *Wandewaſh*, notwithſtanding it was formed in conſequence of the cooleſt deliberations of the General, and concurring opinion of the Nabob.

Before my Minute was delivered in on the 29th July, it was determined to ſend the Detachment under Colonel *Baillie*, and to make a deſcent upon *Cuddapah*; that opinion was relinquiſhed, and another was formed of ordering that Detachment to invade ſome part of the Enemy's Territories where the attack would be moſt felt; but Colonel *Baillie* was at laſt ordered to join the Army now about forming here, according to my opinion. Without the junction of this Detachment, our

Army

Appendix, No. 2.

Army would conſiſt of no more than five Battalions of Sepoys, and ſomewhere about 1,500 Europeans; and with this handful of Troops did our Government determine to face an Enemy which we ought to conſider equal to our whole Force when aſſembled.

The Government perſevered in ordering the Troops from *Pondicherry* to march by land, which expoſed them to an attack from *Hyder*'s Army; he however has not availed himſelf of the opportunity given to him, and our Government will no doubt allow themſelves as much merit as if the ſafety of the Detachment was owing to the wiſdom of their precaution.

There are many other inſtances in which the Governor and General may give themſelves merit for the negligence of the Enemy. He probably could not believe that we were ſo ill prepared to receive him, and therefore acted more from his opinion of what our ſtrength was, than what it is at preſent reduced to. He might have taken *Arcot*, which, being conſidered as the Capital of the Country, would no doubt have had great influence on the different Courts of the Empire, from the ſucceſs and enterprize of the Enemy; but that place is now reinforced by a Company of Europeans and a Company of Sepoys, ſo that the Fort may poſſibly reſiſt the attack of *Hyder*, whatever may be the fate of the Peteph, which I now underſtand is inveſted.

I have the honour to tranſmit you Copies of a Letter delivered in by Lord *Macleod* to the Committee, dated 31 July; Sir *Hector Munro*'s Military Opinion, dated the 1ſt of Auguſt, in conſequence of Lord *Macleod*'s Letter; a Minute delivered in by the Preſident, endeavouring to prove the neceſſity of Sir *Hector*'s remaining at the Preſidency; and the Inſtruction to the Commander in Chief, dated the 1ſt Auguſt. It will not eſcape your obſervation, that Lord *Macleod* expreſſed the ſame ſentiments contained in my Minute, given in 29th July, and after my opinion was publicly known; Sir *Hector*'s opinion is a maſter-piece, and ſhews how well he is acquainted with the geography of the Country which he has to defend; the General voted to himſelf the Inſtructions of the 1ſt of Auguſt, both Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* having diſſented to the permiſſion of returning to the Preſidency, therein granted to him.

To convince you to what length the Governor and Sir *Hector Munro* can proceed in ſupport of the meaſures they have adopted, I have only to inform you, that the latter, finding the neceſſity he is under of taking the charge of the Army, has this day concurred with the former in voting, that Mr. *Davidſon*, their faithful *yes* and *no* follower, ſhall be admitted into the Committee to enſure a majority to the Governor in the General's abſence, in expreſs contradiction to the Company's Orders, inſtituting the Committee, conveyed in the following words:

" And having alſo thought proper to appoint a Select " Committee for tranſacting our political, military, and " naval affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require ſe- " crecy, at our Settlement of *Fort Saint George*; it is " our Order, and we hereby direct, that the ſaid Select " Committee do conſiſt of *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. our " Preſident and Governor, or our Preſident and Go- " vernor for the time being, *John Whitehill*, Eſq. the " Second Member of our Council for the time being, " Major General *Hector Munro*, our Military Com- " mander in Chief, or our Military Commander in Chief " for the time being, and *Charles Smith*, Eſq. the Fourth " Member of our Council, or the Fourth Member of " our Council for the time being.

" If our Military Commander in Chief ſhall at any " time be abſent from the Preſidency, then our Order " is, that our Preſident and Second and Fourth Mem- " bers of our Council ſhall be a Select Committee for " the purpoſes aforeſaid, during the abſence of the " Commander in Chief from the Preſidency."

Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Smith* have diſſented to this Reſolution, and their Diſſent, preparatory to their farther reaſons, makes a number in the packet.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
21 Auguſt 1780.

P. S. I have had the good fortune to get Copies of the Minutes delivered in by the General and the Governor, upon the admiſſion of Mr. *Davidſon* to the Committee, and they make a number in the packet. Any Comment from them would be quite ſuperfluous; they are ſufficiently expreſſive of the character and conduct of the Authors of them. Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* will, I ſuppoſe, inſiſt upon obedience being paid to the Company's Orders; as ſoon as the General goes to camp, they will probably, as the Majority of the lawful Committee, order the Secretary to aſſemble one, and may reverſe the illegal acts which have been committed by the Governor and General.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor General, *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir,

Accompanying I have the honour to tranſmit you Duplicate of my Letter of 21ſt ultimo, and of the Papers which accompanied it.

I likewiſe did myſelf the honour of addreſſing a ſhort Letter to you, when on board *The Duke of Portland*, with a ſhort Minute, which I then thought was delivered in by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, againſt the admiſſion of Mr. *Davidſon* as a Member of the Select Committee. Upon landing, I found that Mr. *Davidſon* was not to take the ſeat given to him till after the General's departure to command the Army. Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* have ſince written ſeparate Minutes, as you will ſee by the accompanying Copies taken of them as they were delivered in.

I hinted in the poſtſcript to my Letter, that I hoped Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* would inſiſt upon holding the power veſted in them during the General's abſence, as the lawful Majority of the Committee. But in this hope I was deceived; they apprehended conſequences from aſſerting their right, which deterred them from the attempt during the preſent critical ſituation of the Company's affairs.

In addition to the Minutes firſt delivered in, Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* have ſince proteſted againſt the admiſſion of Mr. *Davidſon* as a Member of the Select Committee; this Proteſt makes a number in the packet.

What puniſhment is due to Mr. *Whitehill*, for his diſobedience of the Company's Orders; how far both he and General *Munro*, aſſiſted by Mr. *Davidſon*, have ſubverted the Government, by depriving the lawful Majority of the power veſted in them by the conſtitution of the Company; how far the Government has in conſequence become an Uſurpation; and how far Mr. *Davidſon* is an inſtrument and party, are events which I leave for your better judgment to decide upon.

Mr. *Davidſon*, from his admiſſion into Council, was a ſimple Yes and No follower of the Preſident and General, without appearing to have any opinion of his own; and by ſubmitting to be brought into the Committee, to ſupport the Governor againſt the lawful Majority of that Committee, he tacitly acknowledges that it is his intention to perſevere in the ſame mode of conduct, without any regard to his own principle or the intereſt of the Company.

How far a Governor acting with a Man avowedly ſubſervient to his will, and in oppoſition to the conſtitution of that power from which he derives his authority, may be conſidered a deſpot; and how far that deſpotiſm may not be dangerous, when in the hand of ſuch a man as Mr. *Whitehill*, are likewiſe circumſtances which I ſubmit to your ſuperior judgment.

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The idea I entertained of the exertions to be uſed by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, for preſerving the Government in the lawful Majority of the Committee, and the plan which I believe they meditated in ſupport of their own opinion, of reſtoring me to the place in Council of which I was unjuſtly deprived, prevented me from taking any ſtep at firſt propoſed by me, until I ſaw the reſult of their deliberations; and conſequently the Memorial mentioned by me in my two laſt Letters to you remains unfiniſhed.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* (but particularly the latter) have delivered in very ſtrong Proteſts againſt my ſuſpenſion; theſe Proteſts make Numbers in the packet.

I am much obliged to theſe Gentlemen for the ſtrength of zeal and argument with which they have ſupported their ſenſe of the injuſtice done me.

Though Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* have declined to inſiſt upon the powers veſted in them, as the lawful Majority of the Committee, I am determined to bring my caſe before them for their conſideration. Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* will no doubt vote, in conſequence of their former ſentiments, that my ſuſpenſion be taken off; their voice will be over-ruled by the Governor and Mr. *Davidſon*, and I ſhall conſequently be kept out by violence, through the vote of a Man not entitled to give an opinion. My intended Letter upon this ſubject makes a Number in the packet.

I thought this ſtep neceſſary, either to give the Governor and Mr. *Davidſon* time to think of their error, or to mark the violence of their conduct in oppoſition to my rights, before I take my laſt ſtep in delivering in a Memorial, fully expreſſive of my opinion of the conduct of the Majority of the late and the preſent Adminiſtration.

A Minute from Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, moving for a reference to the Governor General and Council, makes a Number in the packet. This Motion was at firſt objected to by the Governor and Mr. *Davidſon*; but upon having the paſſage upon this ſubject in the regulating Act read to them, they deſired time to conſider, and I do not know that they have yet come to a determination.

I have deferred giving any detail of the motions of the Army, that I might not be interrupted in the Narrative. On the 21ſt, when I had the honour of addreſſing you, we had a ſmall Army at the Mount, conſiſting of about thirteen hundred Europeans, including the King's Regiment and the Artillery, four battalions of Sepoys, and a Regiment of the Nabob's Cavalry. Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, conſiſting of about three Battalions and ſix Companies of Sepoys, a Company and a half of Artillery, and two Companies of European Infantry, were on the way from the Northward. Colonel *Coſby* was ſent to collect ſuch Troops as could be ſpared from the Southward, which has not yet ſuffered from the Invaſion of the Enemy.

Hyder, after taking all the places mentioned in my laſt Letter, inveſted *Arcot*, which was garriſoned only with Nabob's Troops, until reinforced with about 100 Europeans, and two Companies of Sepoys from *Vellore*; the Nabob felt great anxiety for his Capital, and it was known that the Army from hence was intended for its relief.

On the 24th the General received Orders (Copy of which waits on you herewith) to proceed and put himſelf at the head of the Army at the Mount; he arrived there on the evening of the 25th, determining to march from thence the following morning.

When he was about to march, on the morning of the 26th, the Regiment of Nabob's Cavalry mutinied; their pay was in arrears more than twelve months; the beſt terms they could obtain was, that of being paid till the month of January; they would not accept theſe terms, and conſequently refuſed to go upon ſervice. The General, on this determination, ſurrounded them with part of the Company's Troops, made ſuch of them diſmount as inſiſted upon pay, and ſent them, to the number of two hundred and fifty Men, to *Madras*; thoſe who remained did not amount to one third of that number. The Mutineers (if they deſerve that name) were, a few days after, enliſted for the Ameer's Body Guard.

On his firſt march from the Mount, the General found himſelf in want of Carriage Bullocks, and was therefore obliged to leave a conſiderable quantity of Rice behind him; this, and the want of the Nabob's Cavalry, were heavy loſſes in a ravaged Country, where he had Horſe to encounter.

We have had very ſevere rains for ſome time paſt, which muſt have very much impeded the march of the Troops; they arrived at *Conjeveram* about the 29th inſtant, and were ſurprized to find that *Hyder* had not left the Country unprovided with Grain (Paddy) for their uſe.

Hyder, hearing of the approach of the Army, raiſed the ſiege of *Arcot*, which had been carried on with little ſkill, and took poſt, with his Troops, at *Muſſalpaut*, a place about ſix or eight miles from *Conjeveram*.

Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment arrived, without interruption from the Enemy, at *Gumlepunda*, about twelve coſs from *Madras*. On his way from thence to join the General at *Conjeveram*, he found his march interrupted for ſix days by a river, ſwelled by the rains, which had become impaſſable.

While detained by this river, a body of the Enemy's Cavalry lay on the oppoſite bank, ready to take advantage of any favourable circumſtance. About the 3d inſtant the Detachment paſſed the river, and proceeded on its march without interruption, until it arrived at *Peerambaucum*, at about thirteen miles diſtance from *Conjeveram*, where the General lay with the main Body, waiting until he was joined by this Detachment.

On the morning of the 6th inſtant, while the Detachment lay encamped at *Peerambaucum*, a large part of *Hyder*'s Army was ſeen marching to attack it. From Colonel *Baillie*'s diſtinguiſhed military talents, it cannot be doubted but every precaution was taken, and every exertion uſed, to defeat the Enemy. The action began at eleven o'clock in the morning, and continued until two o'clock in the afternoon, when *Hyder*'s Troops were beat off. Colonel *Baillie* wrote a ſhort Drum-head Letter to the Select Committee, giving an account of the action, before he could learn what loſs was ſuſtained on either ſide.

After this Letter, we had no information but what was received from Hircarrahs; their accounts are generally imperfect, but the want of other intelligence began naturally to excite our fears.

From what we could learn, though the Enemy were beat off on the 6th, they encamped near, and almoſt ſurrounded the Detachment, which was in want of Stores and Proviſions, and could not move without aſſiſtance.

Though the General was ſo near, and muſt have heard the action, he allowed the Detachment to remain without aſſiſtance until the 8th inſtant. In this interval of time, the Enemy were reinforced with freſh Troops; and the General, inſtead of marching the whole Army, ſent only a Reinforcement of one Company of Grenadiers and a Company of Light Infantry from the King's Regiment, two Companies of the Company's Grenadiers, and ten Companies of Sepoys, under the command of Major *Fletcher*, with a ſupply of Stores and Proviſions, but without Field Artillery.

By detaching ſuch a large part of the Force under his command, the General left himſelf almoſt as weak as the Detachment. If Colonel *Baillie*, with a ſuperior Force, could not advance without aſſiſtance, it was probable that Major *Fletcher*, with an inferior Force, would not be able to effect a junction. By ſeparating the Army, he riſked the ſafety of the whole, without any apparent cauſe.

APPENDIX, No. 2.

The Reinforcement under Major *Fletcher* ſeems to have joined Colonel *Baillie* on the 9th inſtant; and the whole, on the evening of that day, ſet out on their march to *Conjeveram*.

The Enemy employed their time between the 6th and the 9th in conſtructing batteries of twelve and eighteen pounders, in what they thought the moſt proper ſituations for obſtructing *Baillie*'s march in the road through which he was obliged to paſs; theſe Batteries opened upon him in his march with great effect. From information, and from what we at *Madras* heard, the cannonade began in the night of the 9th, and continued until ten o'clock the next morning.

We have it from report, that one of the Batteries was ſtormed by our Troops, but that we were obliged to relinquiſh it. The loſs ſuſtained by a long cannonade, when a moon-light night enabled the Enemy to point their Guns, and afterwards in the morning, muſt have been very great: our Troops were already harraſſed with fatigue; and through the want of Proviſions; and to increaſe their misfortune, the Tumbrils with Ammunition were blown up by the Enemy's Rockets, which added to the numbers ſlain by the Enemy, and left the Survivors without the means of defence.

We have it from report, that *Baillie* firſt formed his Men in a hollow ſquare, with the Baggage in the center; when the Tumbrils blew up, he altered the diſpoſition *, and formed them into a ſolid column, determining to relinquiſh the Baggage, and cut his way through the Enemy; but no diſpoſition was able to protect him againſt the impetuoſity of the Enemy, ſuſtained by numbers.

He was charged by *Hyder*'s beſt Horſe, commanded by *Charum Saib*, his ſecond Son, a youth of eighteen years of age, who is ſaid to have ſought this opportunity of diſtinguiſhing himſelf. The Enemy were received upon the point of our Men's Bayonets, but numbers were ready to ſupply the place of the ſlain, who puſhed on with unremitting ardour, and broke through the Column; our Men again rallied, but were a ſecond time broke; and from what we can learn, both from European and Sepoy Deſerters, a general maſſacre enſued.

Colonel *Baillie* was univerſally allowed to be as active, vigilant, and experienced an Officer as any in the Company's ſervice; it cannot therefore be doubted, that he failed either in exertion or precaution; he commanded veteran Troops, and Men who never faced danger but with alacrity, and who never before fought without ſucceſs: ſome of the Grenadiers were ſaid to refuſe quarter; the Artillery, when their Ammunition was expended, advanced in the front of their Guns, and defended themſelves until they were cut down. The number of Europeans killed and loſt to the ſervice may be about 700, beſides our Sepoys, and ſome of our beſt and moſt experienced Officers had fallen a ſacrifice to miſconduct.

If what we have heard is true, and we now have little reaſon to doubt it, what muſt be thought of the General for allowing the Detachment to remain ſo long unaſſiſted; for ſeparating his Army into three Diviſions, when the whole was not more than able to cope with the Enemy; for ſending a Reinforcement only, inſtead of ſupporting Colonel *Baillie* with his whole force; for not knowing and providing againſt the ſtrength of the Enemy, and for not having intelligence of the preparations making by them to oppoſe the march of the Detachment?

The General made a move towards *Baillie* with the remaining part of the Army, when it was too late; he heard on his march that *Baillie* was defeated, and immediately directed his march to *Chingleput* †, where he arrived the evening of the 11th, with the loſs of almoſt all the Baggage of the Army: he marched the firſt day for twelve hours, and after a halt continued it for twenty-ſix hours, though the Troops were in the greateſt want of refreſhment, until he arrived at *Chingleput*.

The only Letter received from him ſince the action, was dated the 12th, and received here the following day. He juſt mentions the defeat of Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, but gives no account of the loſs ſuſtained. I underſtand that he waits at *Chingleput* until his Troops are refreſhed, and then intends, if poſſible, to return to the Mount.

Fortunately, Colonel *Coſby*, with ten Companies and a Battalion of Sepoys, two Regiments of ill-paid Nabob's Horſe, containing about 700 Men, and a few Nabob's Artillery, who was on his march to join the General at *Conjeveram*, heard of his retreat as he was approaching, and directed his march to *Chingleput*, joined the General there on the 12th inſtant; this Detachment might have fallen a ſacrifice, had not *Baillie* employed the attention of the Enemy.

If the General does not haſten his march to the Preſidency, he may find himſelf intercepted by *Hyder*, and the only Army on which we can depend for the defence of the Preſidency, may ſhare the ſame fate with *Baillie*'s Detachment; *Hyder*, if he pleaſes, may march his Army down before him; and the leaſt we can expect in conſequence is, that the Black Town will be ſacked and burnt.

Hyder has certainly loſt many opportunities; he might have taken *Arcot*, or might have deſtroyed *Braithwaite*'s Detachment; but he has at laſt ſhewn that he is equal to the enterprize he has undertaken to perform.

This was what I prognoſticated from the beginning; but my opinion was miſconſtrued, and I have ſuffered ſuſpenſion for daring, from experience, to foreſee events.

Our Civil Government in *Madras* is in a ſtate as deplorable as our Army, we have no Money in the Treaſury, and do not know where we can make application for a ſupply. The ſhort-ſighted plan of raiſing Money by ſubſcription, which for a day buoyed up Mr. *Whitehill* and his adherent Mr. *Davidſon*, on the light bladders of hope, has failed; after the diſaſter our Army has met with, people will not lend their Money, for they can have no confidence in thoſe by whom it is to be diſburſed; the Nabob refuſes to advance a farthing, and the King of *Tanjore* has no Money to advance; inſtead of about 15 or 18 lacks of Pagodas due from the revenues of *Maſulipatam*, there is only one lack in the Treaſury there, and about two lacks of Rupees at *Ganjam*, which ſums are to be brought down immediately; that Money will ſoon be expended, and what then is this Government to do for more? Our operations in the field are unſucceſsful, and the Company is threatened with bankruptcy from the expence attending theſe operations.

It was my opinion, that the Governor and Council (inſtead of contenting themſelves with writing to *Bengal* and to *England*, as, on the defence of their own conduct tending to accuſe me, they ſay they have done) ſhould have had an Army in the field to meet *Hyder Ally*; and had that Army been well commanded and well equipped, it might have proved ſuch a check as to occaſion an entire change of policy in the Enemy.

As they omitted this precaution, and delayed until the Enemy were in the heart of the *Carnatic*, it was their buſineſs to avail themſelves of the conſternation which the firſt alarm occaſioned: the fears of the People were then excited; they ſaw no immediate reſource, but in the defence to be made by the Government under which they lived, and they would therefore have contributed largely for the defence of that Government.

A meaſure which at one time will have the appearance of violence, will at another be warranted by neceſſity. The Nabob ſhould have had a place aſſigned to

* N. B. It is probable the Enemy availed themſelves of the opportunity given them by the blowing up of the Tumbrils, and that Colonel *Baillie* had no opportunity of forming after the accident; the accounts given of his diſpoſition throughout are unſatisfactory.

† N. B. He returned to *Conjeveram* the evening of the 10th, and marched from thence to *Chingleput* the morning following.

him within the Fort, to ſecure his perſon from danger and inſult; his Property likewiſe ſhould have been lodged in a place of perfect ſecurity within the knowledge of the Governor and Council. The Nabob has for ſome time declined all attention to buſineſs, excepting through his ſecond Son, and pleads poverty whenever application is made to him for Money. The Company ſhould not carry on a war in defence of the Nabob's Territories at their own expence; nor ſhould they allow him to throw away the Poſſeſſions which they acquired for him with the blood of their Country: this regard for him and for themſelves, argue a different mode of conduct; and they ſhould have acted for him upon the preſent occaſion, as he ought to have acted for himſelf, were he entruſted with, and willing to defend his Poſſeſſions to the utmoſt.

Sitteram Rauze was at *Madras*; he is known to be very rich, and to have acquired that riches by plundering Families and Poſſeſſions which ought to be tributary to the Company; his tribute is no way in proportion to his revenue, and he ſhould therefore have been kept here until he paid all his arrears of tribute, and made an additional loan for carrying on the War.

A Reſident ſhould have been ſtationed at *Tanjore*, to ſee that all the revenues, not abſolutely neceſſary for the expences of the Rajah and his Houſehold, was paid into the Company's Treaſury.

The *Maſulipatam* Zemindars ſhould have been kept at *Maſulipatam*, and Taſheldars ſent to their reſpective Countries to collect the revenues, from which a ſufficiency ſhould have been paid to them; the ſame meaſures were neceſſary at *Ganjam*.

I apprehend that ſuch exertions would have made us reſpectable in the eyes of our Enemies, and would have lent confidence to our Friends; but they required a degree of exertion and integrity, of which the Majority of our Government is not poſſeſſed. All theſe different people, the Nabob, the Rajah, and the Zemindars, would perhaps have told by what means their Countries were impoveriſhed, and the Majority knew that their own conduct would not bear the light.

When theſe meaſures were taken at home, other exertions were neceſſary, which would prove ſucceſsful in proportion to the opinion entertained of the faith which could be placed in thoſe who held the management of the Company's affairs, the opinion entertained of their ſtrength, and the terms they offered.

The Nizam is undoubtedly jealous of *Hyder's* increaſing power, and would be happy if a fair opportunity offered to reduce that power, and to increaſe his own; we want no increaſe of Territory; to place the Nizam and *Hyder Ally* upon an equality, and to hold the balance betwixt them, would certainly be good policy in the preſent ſtate of the Company's affairs.

Our want of Cavalry on this Coaſt, prevents us from being able to face *Hyder* in the field with probability of immediate ſucceſs; he can plunder the Country, prevent the collection of our revenue, and haraſs our Army without oppoſition, or without hazarding a battle; we have no internal reſources, and our want of them prevents us from being able to continue a long war.

The Nizam has Cavalry which, when joined by a part of our Army, might plunder and poſſeſs themſelves of *Hyder's* Country in his own way, and oblige him to return thither for its defence; in caſe this plan took place, we muſt leave the open Country expoſed, which is the caſe at preſent, and ſhould only ſtrengthen our principal Garriſons ſo as to make them capable of defence. The Countries taken ſhould be given to the Nizam, with all the Forts, &c. upon condition that he paid the expences of our Troops, and made us a compenſation for our loſſes in proportion to the advantages he acquired.

Such are the outlines of the only plan by which it appears to me, that we can retrieve our affairs in caſe the Maratta War continues.

I have taken the liberty of writing to you without reſerve; and I ſhall be happy if my opinions meet with your approbation.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort St. George,
14th September 1780.

P. S. The General, with the Army, arrived at the Mount this morning from *Chingleput*. They began their march about five o'clock yeſterday evening; the diſtance is 30 meaſured miles, and it is really ſurprizing that they could do ſo much, after the fatigue they underwent on the 10th and 11th; but the General ſhews that he has an alacrity in retreating before an Enemy. The Campaign has laſted from the 26th Auguſt to the 14th September, and during that ſpace of 19 days, the General has contrived to get rid of his beſt Troops, and to leave *Hyder* the undiſturbed Maſter of the Country.

To the Honourable *Warren Heſtings*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor General, *Fort William.*

Honourable Sir,

I had the honour of addreſſing you on the 14th inſtant by the *Nymph* ſloop of war, under the care of Mr. *Sulivan*; I hope he has arrived ſafe, that you may have the earlieſt accounts of our diſaſtrous ſituation.

I informed you, that the remains of our ſhattered Army arrived at the Mount; it has ſince encamped on this ſide of *Marmelong*, where it remains at preſent in much diſtreſs for Proviſions, though ſo near the Capital, and may be conſidered in danger of being attacked, and its retreat being cut off by the Enemy.

The ſcattered accounts from which I was obliged to gather the information contained in my Letter of the 14th, has left it incomplete; I have ſince had an opportunity of converſing with different Officers who ſerved under General *Munro*; and I am very ſorry to ſay, that every report confirms the idea of his incapacity.

He was repeatedly urged by his Friends, to allow Colonel *Baillie*, with his Detachment, to join him at the Mount, by which all riſk would have been avoided, and not to incumber himſelf with heavy Cannon; he was likewiſe cautioned of making Detachments; but no argument would prevail. He marched on to *Conjeveram*, leaving *Baillie* expoſed to the danger from which he ſuffered; he impeded his march by dragging four 18 pounders, and two cohorns along with him, and, as you already know, inſtead of marching with his whole Army to ſupport *Baillie*, it was divided into three parts, in the face of an Enemy equal to the whole when aſſembled.

On the 6th inſtant, when Colonel *Baillie* was firſt attacked, the General's Army was ready, advantageouſly encamped near *Conjeveram*, the Tents were ſtruck and lodged within the Pagodas, but part of the Enemy's Army approached very near him, and he had an opportunity of bringing them to action with every probability of ſucceſs. Theſe circumſtances were ſo evident to the Officers under his command, that Colonel *Fletcher* offered himſelf to command the Grenadiers, and Major *Elphinſton* to ſupport him with the 73d Regiment, and bring the Enemy on to action, until the reſt of the Army could form and join them. The arguments uſed by theſe Officers were ſo convincing, that Lord *Macleod* approved of this enterprize. The General for ſome time appeared convinced, and ordered the Line under Arms, but afterwards countermanded his orders. At this time *Baillie's* Detachment was engaged with that part of the Enemy which attacked him, and the firing was heard in Camp: this proved an additional argument with thoſe who were for drawing the Enemy on to action; they urged, that if the Army, when joined with Colonel *Baillie's* Detachment, was equal to *Hyder's* whole Force, the Army and the Detachment of courſe was equal to that Force when divided. It was likewiſe urged, that if *Hyder* attacked the Army on one ſide, while the Detachment was engaged with them

APPENDIX No. 2.

them on the other, our Troops might be inſpired with a mutual confidence, and the Enemy would be diſcouraged by the idea of being caught between two fires. Theſe reaſons ſeemed to have ſome weight; the orders for the attack were renewed, but they were again countermanded, and the buſineſs of the day ended in diſappointment to the Troops, who were eager to engage, and in firing a ſalute, that *Baillie* might thereby be informed the General was near him.

The Detachment of Grenadiers under Colonel *Fletcher*, to reinforce *Baillie*, did not march from the Camp at *Conjeveram* until the evening of the 9th inſtant. It muſt have joined on the ſame evening, and the whole began their march on the morning of the 10th, ſo that the General allowed *Baillie* to remain without aſſiſtance from the 6th until the 9th inſtant.

The General, on the morning of the 10th, moved with the remainder of his Army to meet *Baillie*, but did not take the direct road. He had advanced about eight miles in the heat of the ſun, when he heard of the defeat, from a man who had eſcaped from the field of battle. He immediately changed his rear into his front, and made the beſt of his way back to *Conjeveram*, where he arrived about nine o'clock at night, after a haraſſing march of 12 hours.

The General determined to retreat from *Conjeveram* to *Chingleput*, but no orders were regularly given out for that purpoſe. It was neceſſary to leave the 18 pounders and the Cohorns behind, and, if poſſible, to render them unfit for ſervice; but this could not be done, there was no Sledge Hammer to break off the Trunnions of the Guns, nor a Spike to ſpike them with; the only precaution which could be uſed, was to diſable the Carriages, and throw them into a tank, from which they have been taken by the Enemy; the Cohorns were left in *Conjeveram* Pagoda, with a Three-pounder.

About two o'clock in the morning there was an alarm in Camp, and the General, with what Troops he could get, began marching immediately, without giving any intimation to thoſe he left behind. Colonel *James*, who commands the Artillery, heard, by accident, that the General was gone, and ſent to requeſt that he would halt until the Artillery could join him; but this requeſt was diſregarded, and every one was obliged to make his way in the beſt manner he could.

The Sepoys had been ſupplied with Paddy inſtead of Rice, from the time of their arrival at *Conjeveram*. Under the idea that incumbrances muſt be avoided, their Women were not allowed to follow them, ſo that the poor people, when relieved from duty, inſtead of taking that reſt which nature required, were obliged to employ their time in beating Paddy, and preparing and dreſſing their Food. You may conceive how hard this was upon them, during the confuſed halt for five hours at *Conjeveram*, on the night of the 10th, after the fatigue they had encountered, and were about to undergo: it was, no doubt, proper to reduce the number of Camp Followers, but proviſion ſhould certainly have been made for the people in conſequence.

The Army, from two o'clock in the morning of the 11th, continued its March for 28 hours, without halting until it arrived at *Chingleput*. The Rear Guard was attacked the whole day by *Hyder*'s Horſe, who were ſo confident from ſucceſs, that they frequently broke in upon the Line, cut the ſick and wounded in their Doolies; obliged the Coolies to throw down their Loads, and plundered a great part of the Baggage. The loſs ſuſtained during this march was very conſiderable, and from the low ſtate of the Treaſury, it cannot be eaſily repaired.

Colonel *Coſby*'s Detachments, which joined the General at *Chingleput*, was ſaved in a wonderful manner. A Sepoy gave him the intelligence of *Baillie*'s defeat, and of the General's retreat. *Coſby* diſbelieved, and was ready to puniſh him; but the Man perſevered with ſuch unremitting earneſtneſs, and deſired his life might pay the forfeit, if his intelligence proved falſe, that *Coſby* was induced to believe him.

Had *Hyder Ally* purſued his ſucceſs, he might certainly have cut off the General's retreat, firſt to *Chingleput*, and afterwards to *Madras*; but he took no pains to intercept him, which I am ready to impute to the great loſs he ſuſtained in the action againſt Colonel *Baillie*: the number of fine fellows in that Detachment could not have fallen an eaſy ſacrifice.

Since the loſs of his Baggage, the remains of our little Army has been much expoſed to the inclemency of the weather, which, added to exceſſive fatigue, has very much reduced the number of our Troops. The King's Regiment, which embarked 1,100 ſtrong, has not now above 210 effective Men; the other Corps, though they have not ſuffered in the ſame proportion, yet they are greatly reduced. The ardour which animated every private Soldier, while he had a hope of victory, is now loſt. The Europeans are diſpirited, and it cannot be expected that the Sepoys will again face Cavalry willingly, while under their preſent leader.

Though the Troops which remain to us are in no condition to take the Field, or to face the Enemy, they are kept in Camp at *Marmelong*, inſtead of being brought into Garriſon. The ground between *Madras* and *Marmelong* is altogether incloſed; the Enemy, by coming the *Poonamalee* road, from the weſtward, might poſſeſs themſelves of theſe Incloſures, and cut off the communication between the Garriſon and the Army.

The Nabob's Cavalry, which made a part of Colonel *Coſby*'s Detachment, are ſeveral months in arrears; the Horſe-keepers and Graſs-cutters are deſerted; and the Horſes are dying for want of Food. With about three Regiments of Cavalry within our bound, including the Ameer's Guard, we are ſhut up by the Enemy's Horſe; we already feel the want of Proviſions, and may conclude ourſelves as blocked up in Garriſon by ſtraggling parties of the Enemy's Horſe, who have now the whole *Carnatic* to range in unmoleſted.

Fortunately for us, the Enemy do not appear to make the moſt of their advantages; inſtead of following our Army, and ſubjecting us to the dangers already ſuggeſted, *Hyder* has returned with part of his Army, and has laid ſiege to *Arcot*; he ſeems earneſt in his deſire to poſſeſs himſelf of the Nabob's Capital.

In addition to our calamitous ſituation, we have every reaſon to apprehend, that our Road will be poſſeſſed by a French Squadron in the month of December or January, when our Fleet will be abſent on the *Malabar* Coaſt; in this caſe, I leave you to conceive what will be the probable conſequence.

In the midſt of theſe increaſing difficulties, our only hopes of relief are from *Bengal*. A change of Men, and conſequently of Meaſures, upon this Coaſt; a Peace with the Marattas, and an Alliance jointly with them and the Nizam, may ſtill leave it in our power to defend our Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt. Without ſome ſuch Meaſures I fear the whole of our Poſſeſſions here are irrecoverably loſt.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort St. George,
23d September 1780.

APPENDIX, N° 3.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 2 Auguſt 1780.

AS it will be of great importance to have a Detachment of Troops, which may move ſo as to intercept any Convoys of Proviſions or Stores that may be coming through the Paſſes, for the uſe of *Hyder*'s Army, it is reſolved, That one be formed for this purpoſe at *Trichinopoly*,

Trichinopoly, conſiſting of ſix Grenadier Companies of Sepoys from *Tanjore*, and the four Grenadier Companies of Sepoys now at *Trichinopoly*, alſo eight Battalion Companies from the Sepoys of that Garriſon, provided the two Regiments of Nabob's Cavalry, which are coming from the *Trinevelly* Country to *Trichinopoly*, ſhould not arrive there in time; but if they do arrive in time to aſſiſt in forming this Detachment, then they are to ſupply the place of the eight Battalion Companies.

Reſolved, That Capt. *Coſby* be appointed to command this Detachment, and that Inſtructions be prepared for him accordingly.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 3 Auguſt 1780.

To Captain *Henry Auguſtus Montague Coſby*.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed to *Tanjore* with all expedition, there to take under your command ſix Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers, and march with them to *Trichinopoly*, where you will be joined by four Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers belonging to that Garriſon.

You are to remain at *Trichinopoly*, until you can know from the Spies you will ſend to *Hyder*'s Camp, that he has moved forwards with his Army from the neighbourhood of the Paſſes; in which event you will march from *Trichinopoly*, taking with you the ſix Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers from *Tanjore*, the four Sepoy Grenadier Companies from *Trichinopoly*, and eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys from that Garriſon, unleſs the Nabob's two Regiments of Cavalry, with their Infantry and Artillery, ſhould arrive at *Trichinopoly* before you march; in which caſe you are not to take the eight Battalion Companies of Sepoys from that Garriſon, but the Nabob's Cavalry and the Grenadiers, unleſs it be abſolutely neceſſary. The Service we wiſh you to perform is as follows: as we underſtand that *Hyder* has laid up a Magazine of Grain at *Attoor*, and that his Supplies will probably come through that Paſs, you are to march the above Detachment, and endeavour to cut off *Hyder*'s communication with his Proviſion and Stores, by ſeizing them, or rendering them uſeleſs to him, by coming up with them on the march before they can get up to *Hyder*'s Camp, or join the main Body of his Army.

You are always to take care not to advance too far, or ſo near his Army as not to be able at all events to ſecure a retreat.

With reſpect to your carrying Field-pieces with you, that muſt depend upon yourſelf, and the expedition you will find yourſelf under the neceſſity of making, from your intelligence, as well as from the roads through which you muſt paſs.

We need not mention to you how much the ſucceſs of this Expedition depends upon the moſt inviolable ſecrecy.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 3 Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*.

Sir,

We have ſent Colonel *Coſby* to *Tanjore*, from whence he will proceed to *Trichinopoly*, to execute a Service, the particulars of which will be communicated to you by the incloſed Copy of our Inſtructions for his guidance. We deſire you will furniſh him with the Troops intended to be employed from your Garriſon, and give him every other aſſiſtance in your power to enable him to fulfil the object of his propoſed Expedition, in which it is neceſſary that the utmoſt ſecrecy ſhould be obſerved.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 3 Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Major *Alexander Maclellan*, commanding at *Tanjore*.

Sir,

We have ſent Captain *Coſby* to *Tanjore*, and we deſire that on his arrival you will put under his command the ſix Grenadier Companies of Sepoys belonging to the Battalions doing duty there; which are to be employed on a particular Service, for which he has received Inſtructions from us. The Companies will return to *Tanjore* as ſoon as the Service is over.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 3d Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 19th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire.

Sir,

I arrived off this place laſt night, and as we had heretofore met with very unfavourable winds, I intended landing here, in order to proceed on by land; but on writing to Mr. *Cuming*, he has adviſed me by no means to think of it, as *Hyder*, he ſays, has certainly parties of Horſe about *Chilumbram*, which would effectually ſtop our journey; neither could he ſpare me any Sepoys to protect the Money I have with me; I am therefore under the diſagreeable neceſſity of going on by ſea.

I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Off *Cuddalore*, 16th Auguſt 1780. Your moſt obedient humble Servant, *H. A. M. Coſby*.

Fort St. George Select Conſultations, 24 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Captain *Coſby*:

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

I am ſorry to inform you, that from having every proſpect of reaching *Nagore* as this morning, we were drove off the land in the night, and by the force of ſqualls and currents, were aſtoniſhed to find ourſelves again off *Cuddalore*; as I deſpaired of getting on by ſea, after ſo many diſappointments, I requeſted the Captain would let me have his Boat, in order to get aſhore at this place and purſue my journey by land at all events. After being ten hours in her, the Laſcars almoſt ſpent with fatigue of rowing, I have at laſt accompliſhed it; and am this moment ſetting off for *Tanjore*, which I hope to reach the third day from this, and ſhall immediately proceed from thence to *Trichinopoly* with the Sepoys. I am much mortified at ſo much time having been already unfortunately loſt, and remain,

Honourable Sir,

Your very devoted and obedient Servant,

Cuddalore, Auguſt 21ſt, 1780. *H. A. M. Coſby*.

Fort St. George Select Committee Conſultations, 30th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

This morning I had the honour to receive your commands of date the 3d current, from Captain *Coſby*, who will march from here this afternoon at four o'clock, with the ſix Grenadier Companies from the Battalions in this Garriſon.

I have ordered Lieutenant *Eaſtland* and Enſign *Lloyd* to proceed with the two Companies of the 18th Battalion, to which they belong, on a repreſentation from the

APPENDIX, No. 3.

Officer commanding that Battalion, as well as my own knowledge, that there are not other Officers in the ſame, of ſufficient rank or experience to ſupply their places, were they to proceed to join the Army, as by the Order of the 21ſt inſtant: in ſo doing, hope I have acted conſiſtent with the good of the Service, which I hope will meet your approbation.

By Directions left me by Major *Maclellan*, I have ordered Mr. *Gilleſbie*, Surgeon's Aſſiſtant, to proceed with this Detachment.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,
Hugh Robt Alcock.
Capt. Commanding.

Tanjore,
25th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c.
Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I ſhall proceed this afternoon at three o'clock, with the ſix Grenadier Companies, from this place to *Trichinopoly*, and hope to get there to-morrow evening, and the next day ſhall begin to croſs the rivers with the whole Detachment; the two Regiments of Cavalry are, I am told, expected at *Trichinopoly* as this day. I have received Sir *Hector Munro*'s Letter of the 17th, and ſhall, to the utmoſt of my power, comply with ſuch parts, or the whole of it, as circumſtances may enable me.

I have the honour to remain,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Tanjore,
Auguſt 25th 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
1ſt September 1780.

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c.
Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In conſequence of the permiſſion given to me by the Honourable Preſident, I have this day taken the liberty of drawing on you a ſet of Bills of Exchange, at ten days ſight, in favour of Mr. *John Douglas*, for ſix thouſand four hundred and thirty-one current Pagodas, which your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to duly honour, and order it to be placed to the debt of the loan made by the Honourable Company to his Highneſs the Nabob of *Arcot*, for the uſe of his Cavalry.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted and
obedient Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Trichinopoly,
27th Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
6 September 1780.

Read the following Letters from Captain *Coſby*:

Trichinopoly, Auguſt 27, 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived here yeſterday, and in about two hours after, two Regiments of Cavalry from the *Trinevelly* Country encamped on the Plain; the greater part of the Grenadier Sepoys belonging to the Garriſon, I found were in Camp at ſome diſtance to the weſtward, under the command of Captain *Bilcliffe*; but Orders are ſent to him to return with all expedition. This day we have paſſed the two Regiments of Cavalry, and the ſix *Tanjore* Companies, over the *Caveri*, and ſhall begin early to-morrow morning to get them over the *Cooleroon*, but as the paſſage of that river will be attended with more difficulty than the *Caveri*, cannot promiſe for their being all over to-morrow night, though you may depend on every poſſible exertion on my part, being extremely anxious to get the Detachment nearer the ſcene of action. The intelligence we have here is, that the Guns which *Hyder* has already ſent out of the *Carnatic*, are only thoſe he took in the Forts which have ſurrendered to him; therefore the firſt part of Sir *Hector Munro*'s Inſtructions, in his laſt Letter, I fear we ſhall be too late to comply with; and as to deſtroying the *Changamah* Paſs, ſo as to prevent *Hyder*'s retreat that way, preſume, from my knowledge thereof (having gone through it) that it will require a much longer time to effect it than is imagined: in the firſt place, the Paſs, though known by that name, is above fifteen miles further to the weſtward, and is the moſt acceſſible of any I have ſeen in the Country, and of ſuch a nature as not eaſily to be made much better or much worſe. I ſhall, however, march that way, and as my route will lead me paſt *Attour*, may have an opportunity of falling in with ſome of the Enemy's Convoys (ſhould they come that way) agreeable to my firſt Inſtructions. Any Letter that your Honour, &c. may have occaſion to ſend to me, and that may require expedition, had better be ſent ſo as to meet me at *Volcondah*, or on my march farther North. My movements will, I hope, at any rate induce *Hyder* to detach a conſiderable party againſt me, and by that means leſſen his main Army.

It is reported, that about two thouſand Horſe and one hundred Infantry are on their march from *Hyder*'s Army this way; if ſo, I think it is probable we may fall in with them.

I have the honour to remain,
with the trueſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obliged and
moſt devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Samiaveram, 29 Auguſt 1780, 7 o'clock, P. M.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Detachment has now entirely croſſed the rivers, and I ſhall march early to-morrow morning to *Uttaloor*, and continue the route directed with all poſſible diſpatch. Happy ſhould I be able to arrive in time to execute all or any part of your Honours or the Commander in Chief's Inſtructions. The Detachment is a very reſpectable one, and now conſiſts of the two Regiments of Horſe, who, although ſomewhat fatigued with their late long march, are yet in high ſpirits; four of the Cavalry Guns; the ſix *Tanjore* Grenadier Companies; the four *Trichinopoly* Grenadier Companies; and three Battalion Companies, which I have taken, as Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon* thought he could ſpare them (having four very good Artillery Companies of Sepoys to ſupply their place) and being already with the Grenadiers in Camp to the weſtward, as I informed your Honour, &c. in my Letter of yeſterday, they joined me here about four hours ago under the command of Captain *Bilcliffe*.

I remain,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Your much obliged and obedient Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
5th September 1780.

Received the following Letters:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived here this forenoon at 11 o'clock; but am much diſappointed at not being able to learn any accounts of our Army, by the motions of which I was in hopes

hopes of guiding my own with a greater degree of ſucceſs than I ſee a proſpect of under the above diſadvantage.

The account which the Honourable the Select Committee had of a Magazine of Proviſions having been laid up at *Attoor*, the deſtruction of which was the firſt object of this Detachment, I find from many of my people, was without foundation, which, from my laſt Orders, the Honourable Committee I preſume are now acquainted with, nor has any been ſent from thence to *Hyder*'s Camp; what he receives is by the *Changamah* Paſs, and as in my laſt Inſtructions from the Commander in Chief, I am directed to attempt to cut off his Convoys on the *Changamah* Road, and deſtroy that Paſs, or in caſe of not being able ſo to do, to join him as ſoon as poſſible, but the firſt recommended as of the greateſt importance to our Army, I intend to attempt it without loſs of time. I ſhall therefore leave here all my Tents, Guns, and heavy Baggage, and with the Detachment as lightly equipped as poſſible, with a few days Rice in their Knapſacks, march from hence by the moſt private Road I can find directly to *Changamah*; where, ſhould I be ſo fortunate as to fall in with any of them, it will be all I can flatter myſelf with the hopes of accompliſhing, as I am well aſſured he has, with many thouſand people appointed on purpoſe, repaired the Paſs beyond the power of this party (unprovided as it is with Tools) to hurt ſo as to ſtop him even for half an hour.

Should he happen to be on his march back whilſt I am at *Changamah*, it will, from the ſituation of the Country thereabouts, require all our activity to get clear of him, unleſs our Army is cloſe at his heels; in that caſe, I ſhall have the pleaſure of co-operating with it to advantage.

Until my arrival near this, *Hyder* had Peons in moſt of the Villages to collect the rents, and had given the Inhabitants Cowle, but they made off as faſt as poſſible on my approach.

I have the honour to remain,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your obliged and
devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Tiagar,
Sept. 2, 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since writing to you this forenoon, the people I had ſent on to explore the Country between this and the *Changamah* Paſs, in order to find out a ſhort and private Road, are returned; and although they were the people of this Country which I had employed in this Service, they have been unſucceſsful, and declare the impoſſibility of the Detachment's marching by any but the *Trincmalee* Road; and as the Enemy have a Garriſon there, and we are now forty odd miles from it, and the Country between this and that very open, they muſt unavoidably know of my approach; beſides which, the diſtance is ſuch, that I ſhall be under the neceſſity of halting near it, and obliged at laſt to leave it at leaſt twenty miles in my rear, as *Changamah* lies nearly Weſt of it; and as I ſhould have no way but the ſame to return, ſhould in ſo doing run a great riſque of falling in with *Hyder*'s whole Army. From theſe conſiderations therefore, I am under the neceſſity of giving up my firſt intention; and as I am quite in the dark as to the ſituation of our Army, having heard nothing of it ſince the 25th laſt month, I ſhall, as the moſt likely way of falling in with it, march directly to *Ginjee*, and which I hope will meet with the approbation of your Honour, &c.

I have the honour to remain,
with the moſt perfect reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your much obliged
and faithful Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Tiagar,
Sept. 2, 1780,
5 o'clock, P. M.

Should I on my march hear of the Army, I ſhall march to it wherever it is, by the ſhorteſt way.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
8th September 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour of addreſſing you twice on the 2d inſtant; the laſt of which would inform you, that I had laid aſide my firſt intention of marching to *Changamah*, as I found I could not get there but by paſſing cloſe to *Trinomalee*, which I ſhould be obliged to leave in my rear, and where the Enemy having a Garriſon, and the Country all about it poſſeſſed by them, I could have no hopes of ſurprizing any of their Convoys; and as I ſhould alſo be very far advanced to the Weſtward by doing it, and having no information of either our's or *Hyder*'s Army, I thought it moſt adviſable, and for the good of the Service, not in vain to haraſs and fatigue the Detachment, already much ſo by their long march, but to take ſuch a route as was moſt likely to favour a junction with the Army (to which ſuch a Detachment as this muſt be a conſiderable Reinforcement) and am now fully perſuaded it is beſt I did ſo. In the firſt place, the Proviſions that come to him are not in any large quantities at a time, and the loſs of a few Bullocks Loads of very little importance to him, as, I am well aſſured, he gets plenty from the Countries he has now got his people in; and unleſs I could have remained there, my barely going and returning would have been of little or no conſequence; at any rate, by no means equal to that of my joining the Army, ſhould what I am told here be true, which is, that it has yet got no farther than *Conjeveram*; my marching to this place will therefore, I preſume, give me the beſt chance of hearing from the General, and forming a plan for joining him.

I omitted to acquaint your Honour, &c. in my Letter from *Tiagar*, that a Hircarrah who came to me from *Changamah*, informed me, that ſome days before, ſix large Guns, which he underſtood were all *Hyder* had with him for breaching, went paſt that place in their way to *Bengaloor*, as alſo ſome ſick, from his Army; and that within the courſe of a few days, four or five thouſand Horſe have left his Service on ſome diſguſt; and that his Army is in general very ſickly. At my leaving *Tiagar*, I was informed that *Hyder*'s people had poſſeſſed themſelves of *Trilacoor*; and on my arrival near it, found it to be true; and by puſhing on ſome of the Cavalry, we ſurrounded the place before the whole had time to get off. The Amuldar, and thirty Sepoys and Peons, with fine Horſes, were taken in the little Mud Goſt that joins the Pagoda. I brought them to this place, and have delivered them over to the Killidar. They had been very troubleſome neighbours to the people here, many of whoſe Cattle they had plundered, and committed many cruelties. There is no doubt but that *Hyder* has, by ſome means, greatly attached the Inhabitants of the *Tiagar* and *Tricaloor* Countries to him, inſomuch that my Hircarrahs tell me, the news of my marching from *Tiagar* was communicated from Village to Village all the way to *Trinomallee*, from whence expreſſes were ſent to *Hyder*; and in my march yeſterday from *Tricaloor*, the Country being extremely woody, and intermixed with high rocks, the line was ſeveral times fired upon by Match-lock Fellows, collected together, I ſuppoſe, from different Villages by *Hyder*'s Amulders: ſome of them, till my approach, were iſſuing their Orders within ſix miles of this. I have ſent off people in ſearch of the Army, and hope ſoon to hear from the General; but as they may miſcarry, your Honour, &c. will no doubt think it proper to inform him where I am. In the mean time, I ſhall be prepared to act as occaſions may preſent.

I have the honour to remain, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
devoted humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Gingee,
5th September 1780.

I ſend this by way of *Cuddalore* as the ſafeſt Road.

Wrote

APPENDIX, No. 3.

Wrote the following Letter to the Commander in Chief:

To Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

We have three Letters from Captain *Coſby*, the laſt dated the 5th inſtant at *Gingee*. We inform you of this, that you may ſend ſuch Orders to him as you ſhall judge proper.

9th. Received the following Letter:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to incloſe you a Letter I received from Colonel *Coſby*, at ſix o'clock this evening, juſt as he was leaving his ground. I ordered all his Camp Equipage to be brought immediately into the Fort; his deſign is to ſurprize Chettaput, where there is every reaſon to expect he will meet with ſucceſs. One or two of the neighbouring Polygars belonging to his Highneſs the Nabob, taking advantage of the preſent troubles, ſend their people to plunder all the Villages round; they carried off ſeveral Bullocks that had been ſent out by the Amuldar of this place, and cut ſome of his Bullock-men's ears off. I had intelligence a few days ago, that one of theſe Polygars had come into a Village a few miles from this; I marched about ſeven in the evening (in expectation of ſurprizing him) with my Company; but he had unluckily got notice of my approach, and made off into the Jungal with great precipitation.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Colin Macaulay,

Gingee, 6 Sept. 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As from ſome information I have received from *Chittaput*, there is reaſon to think a ſudden and unexpected attack upon it may be attended with ſucceſs; and as I preſume, ſhould we ſucceed, it will be an acceptable piece of Service, I have prepared Ladders, and leaving my Camp ſtanding, ſhall march from here ſoon after dark, and expect to arrive there about one o'clock to-morrow morning. In caſe of a repulſe, it is probable I ſhall be obliged to return here; but I mean, if poſſible, to proceed on to *Wandewaſh*, as a ſituation nearer our Army.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt devoted and obedient humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Gingee, 6th September 1780, 5 o'clock, P. M.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 10th September 1780.

Received the following Letters:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour of addreſſing you yeſterday, and informing you of my intention of ſurprizing *Chittaput* in the night. In conſequence of it, I left my Camp ſtanding, and marched laſt night at ſeven, and about half paſt two this morning reached it; and having previouſly made the diſpoſition for the attack, with the particulars of which I ſhall not here trouble your Honour, &c. we had the good fortune to paſs the Ditch, and mount into the Fauſſe Braye; then our difficulties commenced: the Fauſſe Braye, from the bottom of the ditch to the top, is at leaſt thirty feet, ſo that it proved a moſt laborious buſineſs to get the Ladders (which being made for two abreaſt, were heavy) over, and the great croud, which, anxious to get into the Fauſſe Braye after their companions, kept conſtantly getting on them; it was half an hour before two could be got over, and even thoſe damaged; they were, however, planted againſt one of the Baſtions; but by this time the Enemy's Force was collected to receive us, and numbers of blue lights, all along the face and row of Pikes, preſented through every Embraſure, ſo that it now became impoſſible to get the people (excepting a few, who now and then attempted it) up the Ladders, though many examples were ſhewn them by their Officers; and by Mr. *Montgomery* and a Serjeant in particular, the firſt being the Commanding Officer of the leading Party, who got too near the top of the Ladder, but were obliged to come down again by the numbers that oppoſed them; the Enemy now alſo kept up a very heavy though not a well-directed fire, for finding that the attack on the Pettah ſide was only a falſe one, they aſſembled in great force to the real one. The Troops however in the Fauſſe Braye ſhewed the beſt countenance imaginable; and though they could not be prevailed on to mount the ſecond wall, ſhewed no inclination to quit the ground they had got; ſo that they were a full hour and a half, all which time I was in hopes ſomething might at laſt be done; but after trying every thing, and being repeatedly aſſured by the Officer in the Fauſſe Braye of the impoſſibility of getting their Men to aſcend the ſecond Wall, the day beginning to dawn, I ordered a retreat, which was ſo well covered by the fire of the Troops on the Glacis, that we brought over even our killed and wounded, and marched off in good order.

The falſe attack carried the Pettah, and penetrated to the great Gateway, where they killed upwards of forty of the Enemy; we hoped to have got admittance into the place. The Fort, naturally a very ſtrong and good one, has been greatly improved by *Hyder*'s Orders; the Ditch deepened, and Pits dug all over the Glacis; and there is in it for certain, at leaſt ſix hundred Men: notwithſtanding which, I am perſuaded we ſhould have ſucceeded, had it not been for the information ſent from hence to the *Chittaput* Killidar, by a Subadar of the Nabob's, whoſe Family was at *Chittaput*, to be on his guard, for that Ladders were making, and he imagined deſigned for an attack upon him; and this very Man was one of my Guides; he is now miſſing, which confirms the report. I flatter myſelf your Honour, &c. will think it was worth the trial, as, had it ſucceeded, it muſt have been a great check on *Hyder*, and afforded me an excellent ſtation to make excurſions from, towards the Forts of *Arnee*, *Trichinopoly*, *Paloor*, &c. now in his poſſeſſion.

Our loſs, conſidering what might have been expected, is very trifling; being certainly (killed and wounded) under forty; though not having yet got in the returns, I do not know the exact number. Amongſt the wounded is Captain *Bilcliffe*, ſhot in the arm; Enſign *Eaſtland*, badly wounded in the head.

I have the honour to remain,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
H. A. M. Coſby.

Camp, near *Gingee*, Sept. 7, 1780.

Should I not receive Orders to the contrary, I mean to march for *Wandewaſh* this afternoon, as I am told a heavy firing was heard towards *Conjeveram* yeſterday about 11 o'clock.

APPENDIX, N° 4.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 26th July 1780.

RESOLVED, That two Companies of Sepoys be ordered from *Nagore*, to reinforce the Garriſon at *Cuddalore*, and that Colonel *Braithwaite* be deſired to ſupply Guns and Ammunition as far as he can ſpare.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 27th July.

To Major *Alex' Maclellan*, commanding at *Tanjore*.

Sir,

Hyder Ally's Army having entered the *Carnatic*, we think it proper to adviſe you, that you may be upon your

your guard, and uſe every precaution neceſſary for the ſecurity of your Garriſon.

We ſhall ſend you an Officer and ſome invalid Artillerymen to *Tanjore*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
27th July.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*.

Sir,

Hyder Ally's Army having entered the *Carnatic*, we think it proper to adviſe you, that you may be as much as poſſible on your guard.

We now deſire you will immediately ſend one Company of Sepoys to *Gingee*, and another to *Tiagar*, to remain in thoſe places till further Orders.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
27 July 1780.

To Captain *Gibbings*, commanding at *Madura*.

Sir,

Hyder Ally's Army having entered the *Carnatic*, we think it proper to adviſe you, that you may be on your guard, and uſe every precaution neceſſary for the ſafety of your Garriſon, and the protection of the Country, as far as your Force will permit.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
27 July 1780.

The ſame to Captain *Edington*, commanding at *Palamcotah*.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 29th July 1780.

To Lieutenant *Douglas*.

Sir,

We deſire you will immediately proceed to your ſtation in the *Guntoor* Circar, and diſpoſe of your Sepoys in ſuch manner as you may think beſt calculated for the ſecurity of that diſtrict; and ſhould you be abſolutely in want of Reinforcement, you muſt make application to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, who will have directions to ſupply you with ſuch aſſiſtance as he may be able to ſpare.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
29th July 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

To Lieutenant *George Mackay*, commanding at *Chingleput*.

Sir,

We deſire you will ſend 100 of the European Invalids from your Garriſon to *Vellore*, taking the precaution of marching them when they are likely to meet with the leaſt interruption from the Enemy.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
31 July 1780.

To the Nabob.

I have juſt received your Highneſs's Letter of the 1ſt inſtant, acquainting me with the intelligence you have received of *Hyder*'s intentions againſt *Arcot*. I have in conſequence diſpatched proper Orders to Colonel *Lang*, and Engineers, to inſpect the place; and I requeſt your Highneſs will ſend Directions to your Killedar at *Arcot*, to put the Fort in the beſt ſtate of defence that he can, and to give every aſſiſtance that may be requiſite to the Engineers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Fort Saint George,
2d Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 2 Auguſt 1780.

Ordered the following Letter to be immediately diſpatched to Colonel *Lang*, at *Vellore*:

To Colonel *Roſs Lang*.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters. As the Nabob writes us that he has received certain intelligence that *Hyder* intends, as ſoon as he is prepared, to march againſt *Arcot*, we deſire you will ſend two Companies of Sepoys immediately to that place; and in caſe any further Reinforcement ſhould be requiſite before the European Battalion leaves *Vellore*, we deſire you will furniſh ſuch as in your judgment may appear proper.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

The Committee are concerned to obſerve ſuch arrears due to the Nabob's Cavalry, at a time when their ſervices are ſo much wanted; but as it is indiſpenſably requiſite to have a body of Horſe to act with the Army, the Committee are of opinion, that meaſures ſhould at all events be immediately taken to ſatisfy the Nabob's Cavalry for their arrears, ſo far at leaſt as may induce them to go into the field: they do not, however, approve the mode propoſed by the Nabob for raiſing Money upon this occaſion. If the Nabob cannot himſelf advance it, it were much better for the Company to ſupply what is neceſſary by way of Loan to the Nabob, than to become anſwerable to Individuals for the whole amount of the Sum which they might be inclined to advance on this occaſion, with intereſt, &c. This being agreed upon, and the Preſident informing the Committee, that the ſum which the Nabob deems ſufficient at preſent for ſatisfying the Cavalry, is about 75,000 Pagodas; it is reſolved, upon the Nabob's promiſe of aſſigning Countries for payment, to advance that ſum to the Commanding Officer of the Nabob's Regiment; and that all advances made by the Company on the account of the Nabob's Cavalry, be a ſeparate head in the Superintendant's books, entitled, "Loan to the Nabob, for the payment of his Cavalry."

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To Mr. *William Cuming*, Chief of *Cuddalore*.

Sir,

We deſire you will ſend hither, by boat, the Cavalry Stores and Accoutrements depoſited at your Settlement.

We learn from Colonel *Braithwaite*, that he has ſupplied you with ſeveral articles of Stores from *Pondicherry*.

We before adviſed you of our having ordered two Companies of Sepoys from *Nagore* to reinforce thoſe now at your Settlement; and if you are in want of any other aſſiſtance that we can poſſibly give, you will be pleaſed to inform us.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2 Auguſt 1780.

To Major *Alexander Maclellan*, commanding at *Tanjore*.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 26th ultimo; and much approve of the ſeveral cautionary ſteps you have

APPENDIX, No. 4.

have taken, in conſequence of the ſudden incurſion of *Hyder Ally*'s Troops.

Although we do not imagine that *Hyder* will attempt any thing in the *Tanjore* Country for the preſent, we have given directions to Captain *Burrows* to march the Sibendy into *Tanjore*, in caſe the Enemy ſhould proceed that way in force.

We have ſent by His Majeſty's Ship *Superb*, for the ſervice of your Garriſon, 1 Serjeant, 2 Corporals, and 2 Matroſſes (Invalids). We approve of your inſtructing the Laſcars in Artillery practice, as, by reaſon of the ſeveral Detachments of Artillery employed in the field, we are unable to ſpare any more at this time for garriſon duty.

In regard to the Fortification, any part that may abſolutely want repair, you have our permiſſion to ſet about, obſerving the utmoſt economy in your charges.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 2 Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Captain *Thomas Burrows*.

Sir,

Although we do not imagine that *Hyder Ally* means to attempt any thing in the *Tanjore* Country for the preſent, we think it proper to deſire, in caſe his Troops ſhould come in force to that Country, that you will collect the Sibendy Sepoys, and march with them into *Tanjore*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 2d Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Major *George Maule*, Chief Engineer.

Sir,

The Preſident and Select Committee are pleaſed to order, that you direct Lieutenant *Wickens* and another Engineer, to proceed to *Arcot*, at the ſame time delivering the incloſed Letter to Lieutenant *Wickens*, for his guidance.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Fort Saint George, 2d Auguſt 1780. *Charles Oakley*, Secretary.

To Mr. *John Wickens*.

Sir,

I am directed to deſire you will proceed to *Arcot*, and inſpect the ſtate of the Fort with reſpect to its defences, and how far you think it tenable, making your report to us in conſequence, as ſoon as poſſible.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Fort Saint George, 2d Auguſt 1780. *Cha' Oakley*, Secretary.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 3d Auguſt 1780.

To *Edward Cotsford*, Eſq. Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

Hyder Ally Cawn having commenced hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*, we think it neceſſary to adviſe you thereof; and to deſire you will be upon your guard, drawing your Troops together as much as poſſible, ſo that they may be able to act in a body for the defence of the Circars, in caſe they ſhould be attacked; which, however, we have no particular reaſon at preſent to apprehend.

We need not inform you, that it will be highly acceptable to us in the preſent exigency, to receive ſupplies of Money from your Settlement; and we truſt you will exert your utmoſt endeavours to furniſh us with the neceſſary articles, as we do not ſee how we ſhall otherwiſe be able to provide for the very heavy expences of the war.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 3d Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Mr. *Henry Caſamajor*, Chief, &c. Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

Hyder Ally Cawn having commenced hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*, we think it neceſſary to adviſe you thereof, and to deſire you will be upon your guard, drawing your Troops together as much as poſſible, ſo that they may be able to act in a body for the defence of the Circars, in caſe they ſhould be attacked; which, however, we have at preſent no particular reaſon to apprehend.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 3d Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

The ſame to the Chief at *Ganjam*.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 3d Auguſt 1780.

To Lieutenant *Roberts*, commanding at *Tiagar*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee to acquaint you, that they ſome days ago ordered a Company of Sepoys from *Trichinopoly* to *Tiagar*, which they ſuppoſe will be arrived nearly by the time you receive this Letter. They deſire me likewiſe to inform you, that you have permiſſion to raiſe as many Laſcars as you ſhall deem abſolutely neceſſary; and theſe they hope may be employed, if requiſite, in working the Guns.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Fort Saint George, 3d Auguſt 1780. *Charles Oakley*, Secretary.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th Auguſt 1780.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in *India*.

Sir,

We have had the honour to receive your Letter of the inſtant; and beg leave to expreſs our acknowledgments to you, for the great aſſiſtance you have given to Colonel *Braithwaite*, by means of the Squadron; which he himſelf has alſo expreſſed to us in very ſtrong terms.

As there appears much reaſon to think, from the operations of *Hyder Ally*, that he is ſtill in expectation of ſuccours from the French Iſlands, your preſent cruize to the Southward muſt prove of the utmoſt utility; and we would take the liberty to propoſe, if it does not materially interfere with any plan you may have formed for the future deſtination of the Fleet, that the cruize be extended to as late a period as poſſible.

We have the honour to be, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, 6th Aug. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Mr. *John Huddleſton*, Reſident at *Nagore*.

Sir,

We direct that you require of Captain *Hughes* to detach two Companies of Sepoys to *Cuddalore*.

We do not imagine that you are in any danger of an incurſion from *Hyder*'s Horſe at preſent; ſhould any however approach your way, we truſt, that by a proper diſpoſition of the Sepoys that will remain after the above

are

are detached, you will be able to ſecure the Company's property. We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 6 Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th Auguſt 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*, dated 6th Auguſt 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As ſoon as I ſaw the Admiral in the offing yeſterday evening, I wrote off to him, requeſting his aſſiſtance in regard to Money, and the conveyance of Powder. He brought the Fleet to an anchor in the Road, and informed me His Majeſty's Ships ſhould receive Powder and Shot, but gave me no hopes of being able to ſupply me with any Money. This day, attended by all the Captains, he came on ſhore, a circumſtance which employed moſt of our Boats and Boat People all the morning: however, I cannot regret it, as, upon a converſation with him, he determined to go off again, and raiſe what he could; and I have ſince had the honour to hear from him, that he will furniſh us with five thouſand Pagodas, which, with what I have before raiſed, will anſwer all our purpoſes. I have alſo prevailed upon the Captain of the *Sartine* to take two hundred more barrels of Powder, ſo that ſhe takes 450; the reſt of the Ships 890; and 212 I have ſent to *Cuddalore*, and 50 to *Permacuil*; in all ſixteen hundred and two barrels; but a ſmall portion of our ſtock.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 7 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant *George Mackay*, commanding at *Chingleput*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir,

I have the honour of receiving your Orders through your Aid du Camp, Captain *Sydenham*, reſpecting Grain, &c. for the uſe of this Garriſon. At preſent I have near 2,000 cullums in the Fort; and I expect, in the courſe of four days, to have, unleſs any accidents happen, 10,000 cullums more. This quantity will, I think, be ſufficient for the conſumption of this place until the rains ſet in.

As no ſteps are taken to ſecure the Grain of the different Villages from being either carried away or burnt, I humbly conceive it will appear to you, Honourable Sir, for the good of the Service, that I ſend for as much of it as I poſſibly can, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Enemy, and to keep it in ſtore for any Detachment or Part of our Troops who eventually, according to the ſituation of things, may immediately require a ſupply they otherwiſe would not have.

The Nabob's Managers will do nothing of themſelves. It therefore becomes a fourfold duty upon me to take all the pains I can to prevent a want of Rice, &c. as it is more than probable we will have occaſion for more than the utmoſt diligence can provide.

The greateſt part of the Horſe have retired to the grand Army, on the plains of *Trenamally*.

I can learn nothing of Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Detachment. I am,

Honourable Sir,

Your obedient and reſpectful humble Servant,

Chingleput, 5 Auguſt 1780. *George Mackay*, Lieut. Com^t.

Agreed, that Lieutenant *Mackay* be ordered to lay in as great a quantity of Grain and Cattle as he can poſſibly procure.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th Auguſt 1780.

Wrote the following Letter to Lieutenant *George Mackay*:

To Lieutenant *George Mackay*, commanding at *Chingleput*.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 5th inſtant, and much approve of your plan of ſecuring the Grain in the different Villages, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Enemy; and do therefore direct, that you collect as much as poſſible, with ſuch a number of Cattle and Sheep as you may be able to procure, and keep them in the Garriſon of *Chingleput*.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort St. George, 8th Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16th Auguſt 1780.

This day Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* delivered in the following Minute:

As ſuch numbers of the Inhabitants have deſerted the Black Town from apprehenſions of danger, ſome means ought to be deviſed for inducing them to return, and for evincing, that the Government are taking every precaution to guard their lives and property.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* therefore propoſe, that a ſteady and experienced Captain be immediately appointed to the command of the Black Town, and to diſcipline the Sepoys already raiſed, with two Subalterns; when the Battalions are completed, it is probable that it may be found neceſſary to appoint more Officers, that there may be one to command each Force.

Captain *Wood* we conceive to be an Officer qualified in all reſpects for this Service.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* will readily concur with the Committee in any other meaſures which can tend to prevent the further emigration of the Inhabitants, and quiet their apprehenſions.

The 16th Auguſt 1780. *Charles Smith*, *Samuel Johnſon*.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 17th Auguſt 1780.

In conſequence of Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*'s Minute of yeſterday, the Preſident now ſends round the following Reply:

As the Minute of Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* ſeem to imply that every method has not been taken to give ſecurity to the Black Town, and to inſpire confidence into the minds of the People; I ſhall beg leave to ſhew in a few words what has been done, and what is now doing, to anſwer theſe neceſſary purpoſes.

A ſufficient number of Guns have been mounted on the Black Town Wall; the Ditch is in ſome parts cleared, and in a few days, by the means of the people now employed, this neceſſary work will be finiſhed, and ſuch other meaſures taken as will put the Black Town in a reſpectable ſtate of defence; there are about 600 Sepoys enliſted for the uſe of the Black Town; and, by the Reports that have been made to me, I underſtand they are already conſiderably advanced in their diſcipline, and very capable of doing the duty that is required of them: beſides this, all the Troops belonging to the Garriſon

APPENDIX, No. 4.

riſon are in readineſs to march to the Black Town, if neceſſary: it will certainly be proper to have Officers appointed to the new-raiſed Sepoys; but the firſt conſideration with us is to complete all the Corps for the field; whatever Officers are appointed to the new Corps muſt go from this Garriſon; one of them is now conſtantly in the Black Town, and I mean to ſend another there immediately.

Upon the whole, nothing has been omitted that I can think of, for the ſecurity of the Black Town; I ſee no reaſonable ground for the apprehenſion which ſeems to have ſpread among the Inhabitants, or how it is poſſible for us to place them in greater ſafety, unleſs we take them into the Fort, or withdraw our Army from the field for the protection of the Black Town.

John Whitehill.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 11th Auguſt 1780.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* having delivered in the following Minute:

As the carnage made yeſterday by the Enemy's Horſe at *St. Thomé*, *Triplicane*, and ſeveral Garden Houſes on *Choultry Plain*, has greatly terrified the Inhabitants of the Black Town, and Villages adjacent; Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* propoſe, for alleviating their apprehenſions, to have ſmall Redoubts thrown up in ſuch ſituations as ſhall beſt ſerve to protect the bounds of *Choultry Plain*, and the Inhabitants of the neighbouring Villages.

As *Ameer ul Omrah* has a number of Horſemen unemployed at *Triplicane*, it is ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Committee, whether application ſhould not be made to him for ſtationing Vedettes from theſe, at ſuch diſtances as ſhall beſt ſerve for the purpoſe of Alarm Poſts.

11th Auguſt, 1780. *Charles Smith,* *Saml Johnſon.*

Sir *Hector Munro* has ſent the following in Reply:

I have not time to ſit down now to anſwer Minutes; but as Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* have been pleaſed to ſet forth in a Minute of this date, that, in order to quiet the minds of the Inhabitants of the Black Town, and of the Villages near *Madras*, as well as to defend *Choultry Plain* Gardens, they would propoſe building ſmall Redoubts in ſuch ſituations as ſhall be judged beſt for protecting the Bounds; as I differ in opinion with thoſe Gentlemen, I will now beg leave in a very few words to give my reaſons why I do ſo.

1ſt. Becauſe it would require a number of large Redoubts, and not ſmall ones, to anſwer the purpoſes of theſe Gentlemen; and would at the ſame time require a number of Men to defend them, who are not at preſent to be found for that Service.

2dly. Throwing up ſuch temporary Works would coſt ſome money and ſome labour, without anſwering any good purpoſe, for the reaſons I have already given. I will take the liberty of telling the Gentlemen what will anſwer much better; and that is, embodying a Militia of Horſe and Foot as ſoon as poſſible, and completing the two Battalions of Sepoys now raiſing for the protection of the Black Town without delay, and ſtopping up the croſs Roads.

The Ameer ſends out Videts every night, in conſequence of an application from the Governor and myſelf ſeveral days ago; but it is impoſſible for him to do ſo throughout the day, having here but a Body Guard of Cavalry.

Fort Saint George, Auguſt 11, 1780. *Hector Munro.*

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* ſent in the following joint Minute:

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* are of opinion, that whatever Stores are wanted at *Maſulipatam*, and can poſſibly be ſpared, ſhould be immediately ſent thither by *The Duke of Portland*, who may at the ſame time be directed to carry any Stores that may be wanted for *Vizagapatam*. Some Artillery-men ſhould alſo be ſent to *Maſulipatam*.

Charles Smith,
11th Auguſt 1780. *Samuel Johnſon.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee's Conſultations, 26th Auguſt 1780.

To Lieutenant *Walter Douglas*, commanding in the *Guntoor* Circar.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters of the 16th and 18th inſtant.

We approve of the march of the Troops to *Munglegerry*, and are glad to find you conducted it with ſo little loſs.

We have written to the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, to give you all the ſupport in their power; and we deſire you will acquaint them what Reinforcement you require, to keep poſſeſſion of the ſtrong Holds, which is all we can propoſe, until circumſtances will admit of our ſparing a ſufficient Force to act upon the offenſive. It will be proper that you correſpond with the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, and acquaint them, from time to time, with your ſituation.

The Gentlemen at *Maſulipatam* have directions to iſſue money for the payment of your Sepoys. You will in conſequence adviſe them in what mannner it may be remitted to you with leaſt riſk.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 26th Auguſt 1780. *John Whitehill,* &c. Select Committee.

APPENDIX, N° 5.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 31ſt July 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

BY the intelligence I have this day received, *Hyder Ally* was yeſterday at *Calipauk*. He has taken *Polloore*, and has ſent a body of his Troops againſt the *Carnatic* Gurs.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Vellour, Your very obedient Servant.
30th July 1780. *Reſs Lang.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 8th Auguſt 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite* to the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*; dated at *Pondicherry*, 6th Auguſt 1780.

I have been, and ſtill am of opinion, that *Tiagar*, *Ginjee*, and this place, are his objects, to cut off the Southern Countries; I have mentioned this often, and the incloſed Letter I have juſt received from Lieutenant *Roberts* at *Tiagar*, confirms me more and more in that opinion.

Tiagar, Auguſt 4, 1780, 6 o'clock, A. M.

Dear Sir,

I have this inſtant received intelligence of *Hyder Ally*'s whole Army, with a large Train of Artillery, being

arrived at *Manolorepet*, about thirty miles from hence, and are clearing the Road to this place; they have taken *Trinomalee*, and it is reported alſo a ſmall Fort on a hill near it, called *Sulufgur*; a ſmall Mud Fort, called *Calicurchy*, ſeven miles to the Weſtward of this, is alſo in *Hyder*'s poſſeſſion, and the People of that Diſtrict are gone over to him. I was favoured with your's of the 1ſt, yeſterday, and have received the Returns, &c. ſafe; if you have any particular news, particularly of our Troops taking the Field, I ſhall be much obliged to you to favour me with it, but I imagine it will require a clever Fellow to convey it: as long as I am able to ſend Letters, you ſhall hear every thing that paſſes this way.

I am, dear Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
G. Roberts.

P. S. Parties of Horſe have been for ſome days, and are ſtill all round us, carrying off all the Cattle in the Country.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir,

I think it my duty, though there is nothing particular happened ſince my laſt, to inform you, that the Horſe have entirely left this part of the Country, and that we are in peace and quietneſs.

I am, Honourable Sir,
Your's reſpectfully, and with
Chingleput, due obedience,
7th Auguſt 1780. *Geo. Mackay.*
Monday.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
Auguſt 13, 1780.

Received the following Letters:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Agreeable to Orders I received from Colonel *Lang*, I marched from *Vellore* yeſterday evening, with a Detachment, conſiſting of two Companies of Europeans and two Companies of Sepoys, complete, for *Arcot*, where I arrived between one and two o'clock this morning, without the leaſt obſtruction. As I have received no particular inſtructions from Colonel *Lang*, but to aſſiſt in the defence of the place, ſhould it be attacked, beg to know if I am to take the command of the Fort and Nabob's Troops upon me.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,
Arcot, *Tho*ˢ *Prendergaſt.*
Auguſt 8th 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In conſequence of repeated application from the Nabob's Manager at *Arcot* laſt night and this morning, I ſhall this evening ſend a Detachment of one hundred Europeans and two Companies of Sepoys, under the command of Captain *Prendergaſt*, to that place. I find that the People are relapſed into their former fears, ſo that by ſending this Detachment, it will eaſe their minds, and give the Nabob's Sepoys a confidence in themſelves; they are good People, and only want Officers they have a dependance on.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Vellore, *Roſs Lang.*
9th Auguſt 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

This morning the Rajah ſent to acquaint me, that *Hyder* had taken *Chittaput* yeſterday, and that he imagined he was on his march to *Arcot*. APPENDIX, No. 5.

I have the honour to be,
Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Arcot, *Tho*ˢ *Prendergaſt*,
10th Auguſt 1780. Commanding a Detachment of the 1ſt Battⁿ 1ſt Regᵗ.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have this inſtant received intelligence of the Fort of *Rawretnellore*, which I before mentioned to the Honourable Board being beſieged by the Enemy, being given up to them yeſterday, the Killedar being obliged to ſurrender it by his own Garriſon. The above information is from a Horſeman of the Nabob's, who was one of about 100 that was ſhut up there by the Enemy, and puſhed his way through them after the ſurrender of the place. There is no Force of conſequence of the Enemy's near this place at preſent, but ſtill parties of ſtraggling Horſe all over the Country. *Hyder Ally*, with his Army, has left *Trinomalee*, and is proceeded on towards *Chingleput*, as I am informed, having left only a ſmall Force at the former place.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Tiagar, Your moſt obedient
Auguſt 10th 1780, humble Servant,
at 1 o'clock, P. M. *Geo. Roberts.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
16 Auguſt 1780.

Received the following Letter:

Honourable Sirs,

I arrived in this Garriſon the 8th inſtant, with an Order from Lieutenant-Colonel *Nixon* to take upon me the command of the Fort, and to uſe my utmoſt endeavours to put it, with all expedition, into the beſt ſtate of defence; to defend it to the laſt extremity; and by no means to have any diſputes with the Nabob's Killedar. I was proceeding to act in obedience to theſe Orders, but was informed by the Killedar, that he could not poſſibly allow me to interfere with any thing but the interior duty of my own Company, until ſuch time as he had Orders from the Nabob. Every thing is carried on in an irregular and tumultuous manner by theſe People; and ſhould an Enemy appear before the place, you will plainly perceive how difficult it is for me to act up to my Orders. This I thought it my duty to acquaint you of.

I remain, Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,
Ginjee, *Colin Macauley*,
10th Auguſt 1780. Enſign.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
17 Auguſt 1780.

To Enſign *Colin Macauley*.

Sir,

I am directed to incloſe you the Nabob's Order to the Killedar of *Ginjee*, to deliver over the command of that place to you.

I am, Sir,
Fort St. George, Your moſt obedient Servant,
17 Auguſt 1780. *Chaˢ Oakley*, Secᵗ.

APPENDIX, No. 5.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to acquaint you, that I had sent a Detachment of Troops to *Arcot*, under the command of Captain *Prendergast*, which are safely arrived there.

I am sorry now to acquaint you, that the Troops in the Garrison of *Chittaput* abandoned it in the night of the 6th instant, and that it is in the hands of *Hyder Ally*. His Horse has surrounded *Arnee*, and I make not the least doubt that it will fall immediately, as a large Encampment was formed yesterday evening about four cos from it; there is, I am informed, only one Company and a half of the Nabob's Sepoys in *Arnee*. *Arcot* is the next place that *Hyder Ally* intends to attack.

I have the honour to be, with all due respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient, and devoted Servant,
Vellore, *Ross Lang.*
11 August 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Consultations,
24 August 1780.

Received the following Letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am this morning informed, that the Detachment of *Hyder*'s Army that moved from *Arnee* towards *Arcot*, was within four cos of the latter yesterday evening, and that *Hyder* himself marches this day, at twelve o'clock, for *Arcot*.

I have the honour to be, with all due respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Vellore, *Ross Lang.*
16 August 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. Governor and President, &c. Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The continued firing, as from *Arcot*, induces me to give credit to what a Frenchman, a Deserter from *Hyder*'s Camp, who arrived here this morning, says, of his besieging the Fort of *Arcot*.

His Army is reported exactly according to the number reported some time ago by Colonel *Braithwaite*. *Hyder*, it is said, means only this insult to the Nabob, whose capital, if he only could possess himself of and plunder, would in a great degree gratify his revenge and ambition. The Frenchman, who is now with me, says, that all the Europeans in *Hyder*'s service are guarded and looked after as if they were all Prisoners, and suspected of every thing that was faithless to his purposes. *Hyder* and his Son are at *Arcot*. The firing encreases every five minutes, and therefore, I will not delay a minute longer this information.

I am, Honourable Sir,
Your's most obediently
Chingleput, and respectfully,
26th August. *Geo. Mackay.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to address you the 22d; and yesterday at noon was honoured with a Duplicate of your Orders of the 9th, your Letter of the 14th and Duplicate, your Letter of the 16th, and your Letter of the 17th and Duplicate.

I am sorry your Orders did not arrive in time to send Sepoys to *Arnee*, as you will find by my Letters, that it had surrendered to *Hyder Ally* before the date of your Orders. As to sending Sepoys now to *Wandewash*, I think it impossible, as *Dobe* Gurr and the *Chuckley* Fort have been taken since *Arnee*, which shuts us up entirely to the South and South-East. *Hyder Ally*, with his Army, is at *Arcot*, and a large body of Horse at *Conjeveram*, so that I shall not attempt it.

The Sepoys I have ordered from *Amboor*, and I make no doubt but they will be here to-morrow morning. They will enable me to take a little more care of our Pettah, which at present is guarded by a set of mutinous Sepoys of the Nabob, for want of pay.

Your Orders regarding the battering Cannon shall be strictly attended to, and every thing shall be ready but Bullocks; we are short of Draft sixty, and Carriage ninety, which cannot be supplied here, nor is it possible to get them from *Arcot* at this time; but you will be pleased to observe, that after we have furnished Bullocks for the heavy Guns, that we have not one for our Field Artillery.

Hyder Ally, I hear, has begun three Batteries before *Arcot*, but there has not been any firing yet of either side, since he went there. I hope hourly to hear our Army has moved, for should he be able to take the Pettah, he will get great riches, and will distress our Army to a great degree, as the Nabob's Manager has collected every thing they can want, as far as lay in his power, into the Pettah. The Manager is a sensible clever man, but he is old, and is not a Soldier.

I have the honour to be, with all due respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient,
Vellore, and devoted Servant,
25th August 1780. *Ross Lang.*

P. S. *Hyder* has dismounted and taken the Arms from a Regiment of *Carnatic*'s Cavalry, that he suspected was going to desert.

APPENDIX, N° 6.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
12th August 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

TO-MORROW morning at day-break, my first Division will march from the Cantonment, and at four in the afternoon, the second; when this place will be entirely evacuated. I have got away all the Powder, and most of the valuable Stores; all the Guns, and a great many Shot; the rest I am now throwing into the sea, beyond the surf, as also such things as might be more particularly useful to an Enemy. I hope to march the 12th from the Red Hills.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Pondicherry, Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Aug. 10th 1780. *John Braithwaite.*
9 P. M.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 14th August 1780.

PRESENT,

The Hon. *John Whitehill*, Esquire, Governor, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

Minutes of last Committee read and approved.

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Letter:

Honourable

APPENDIX, No. 6.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is now above a fortnight ſince I communicated to you the Plan I had formed, and judged the beſt and moſt expeditious, for the rendezvous of the Army from the different Cantonments.

I alſo laid before you, the conſequences I expected from marching from *Conjeveram* (the place of rendezvous) to cover *Vellore* and *Arcot*; and at the ſame time to watch the motions of the Enemy, prevent if poſſible, his poſſeſſing himſelf of the principal Forts in the *Carnatic*; and, ſhould the Force I would have in the field be found ſufficient to attack him, it was my intention to do it as ſoon as I could poſſibly bring him to action.

I foreſaw the difficulties which would occur, was the whole Army to march from *Madras*, as well as the delay it would occaſion. They are ſtill the ſame. I now beg leave to acquaint you, that notwithſtanding all the efforts of the Governor and myſelf, notwithſtanding repeated aſſurances of the Ameer and the Nabob's Dewan, we have not, as yet, been able to muſter up above 200 Bullocks of 800, which are abſolutely neceſſary to carry forward proviſions for the Troops that were to march from *Poonamalee*.

The reaſons aſſigned at the Durbar, for not being able immediately to furniſh a proper number of Bullocks, is, that the Country People have drove them into the Pollams, to avoid the Enemy's Horſe.

As the greateſt part of the Troops are now in motion, it is impoſſible to effect the propoſed junction immediately, for want of Bullocks, as above; and as it would be highly improper, as well as imprudent, to halt the Troops who are now marching, it is neceſſary that Orders be ſent, without delay, to the Officers commanding each Detachment, to proceed to the Mount, or *Poonamalee*, where the whole muſt remain until a ſufficient number of Bullocks can be had for the purpoſe of carrying, at leaſt, eight days grain for the Army.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
Fort Saint George, humble Servant,
14th Auguſt 1780. *Hector Munro.*

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire,
Governor and Preſident, and Select Committee.

In conſequence of the foregoing Repreſentation, a Letter is now prepared, and ordered to be ſent to the Nabob, as entered in C. C. N° 76.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Sam' Johnſon.

C.C. N° 76. To the Nabob, 14th Auguſt 1780.

I have been day and night exerting myſelf to get the Army in readineſs to take the field, and march to the protection of your Highneſs's Forts, but I am ſorry now to obſerve, that the want of Bullocks is likely to create delay, which I muſt confeſs I did not expect from the aſſurances I have at different times received from your Highneſs on this head. Sir *Hector Munro* repreſented, about a week ago, that it would be abſolutely neceſſary that the Troops going from *Poonamalee* ſhould carry for the uſe of the Army at leaſt eight days proviſion, which would require 800 or 1,000 Bullocks; and he and I both expected from the promiſes that were made from day to day, that this number would have been now ready; ſo far from it however, there are not even 100 Bullocks prepared, and the remainder it ſeems cannot be obtained for ſome days.

Your Highneſs will ſee, in the moſt forcible manner, the conſequence of theſe delays; and I truſt ſuch exertions will be made on your part as to prevent any further diſappointment. I am told, there are a great number of Bullocks in the Pollams a few miles to the Weſtward, and that by ſending out ſmall parties of Sepoys to different places, we might be ſucceſsful in procuring what we want. I entreat your Highneſs to forward immediately moſt poſitive Orders to your Amuldars, to aſſiſt in this neceſſary buſineſs, and if you will acquaint me in what manner I can be ſerviceable either by ſending Sepoys or otherwiſe, a moment ſhall not be loſt.

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To the Officer commanding the Europeans at *Conjeveram*.

Sir,

In caſe Colonel *Lang* ſhall have ſent the European Battalion to *Conjeveram*, I am directed to deſire you will leave that place as ſoon as poſſible, and make to *Poonamalee*, where you will find Tents, &c. for the Battalion. If you want Biſcuit and Arrack, you will diſpatch a Letter to Lord *Macleod* at *Poonamalee*, who has directions to ſupply you.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Fort Saint George, *Charles Oakley*,
14th Auguſt 1780. Secretary.

To Colonel *Roſs Lang*, commanding at *Vellore*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee, to deſire you will endeavour, with all poſſible diſpatch, to throw two Companies of Sepoys into *Arnee*, and order two Companies of Sepoys from *Amboor* to *Vellore* in their room.

As you have ſent ſo large a part of your Garriſon to *Arcot*, the Preſident and Select Committee would have you keep the remainder of the Europeans at *Vellore* till further Orders.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Fort St. George, *Charles Oakley*,
14th Auguſt 1780. Secretary.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
15th Auguſt 1780.

This day the following Letters were received:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Detachment encamped to-day on the North Bank of the *Jungaloo*, a ſmall River nine miles Southward of *Ongole*. In conſequence of a heavy fall of rain laſt night, it is become impaſſable; and we wait with impatience its fall, to proceed.

I am moſt reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble and
Camp, obedient Servant,
10 Auguſt 1780. *William Baillie.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that the Detachment under my command encamped at *Ramnapatam* this morning; we are two days later than I expected, owing to three Rivers, which from *Ongole* impeded our march much.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Camp, Your moſt humble and obedient Servant,
13th Auguſt 1780. *William Baillie.*

Diſpatched

APPENDIX, No. 6.

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To Colonel *Roſs Lang*, commanding at *Vellore*.

Sir,

In caſe you ſhould not have been able to move the two Companies of Sepoys, as before ordered, into *Arnee*, the Preſident and Select Committee deſire you will ſend them to *Wandewaſh*, if poſſible; and that you will order all the Sepoys from *Amboor* to *Vellore*, excepting two Companies, which are to be left for the defence of *Amboor*.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Charles Oakley,
Secretary.

Fort St. George,
16th Auguſt 1780.

To Mr. *William Cuming*, Chief, &c. Council at *Cuddalore*.

Gentlemen,

We underſtand, from Captain *Geils*, that there is a great number of intrenching Tools belonging to him at *Cuddalore*: As there will be a want of theſe Articles here, we deſire, after ſetting apart ſuch as may be requiſite for your uſe, that you will ſend the remainder to *Madras*, making an eſtimation of their value. We deſire alſo that you will forward to *Madras*, by the firſt conveyances you can procure, the ſurplus Stores and Gunpowder ſent you from *Pondicherry*, after reſerving ſuch part as may be neceſſary to complete the quantity you ſtand in need of.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Committee.

Fort St. George,
16th Auguſt 1780.

To the Right Honourable Lord *Macleod*.

My Lord,

We requeſt your Lordſhip will march, with all the Troops under your command, Artillery, &c. to the Mount, ſo as to encamp there to-morrow night. We think it proper to acquaint your Lordſhip, that the Troops will not return to *Poonamalee*; there will be a Serjeant ſent from hence, who is to remain with the Company of Sepoys now there, to protect the Barracks and new Buildings. The Deputy Agent will carry with him all the Sheep that he has got, or can be procured.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Committee.

Fort Saint George,
16 Aug. 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
17th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to receive your commands of the 9th, late laſt night. Your information about the Horſe having left the neighbourhood of *Arcot*, has been wrong, for there has never been leſs than two thouſand that has kept hovering about, and always ſhewed themſelves every day in one part or other; and laſt night I was informed that they were yeſterday reinforced, and encamped between *Lallapatt* and *Arcot*, which is the high Road from hence to *Waulau Jau Pettah*.

As to marching the European Battalion to form a junction with the Army, I think that will be attended with great riſk at this time, *Hyder Ally* having arrived at *Arnee* at noon yeſterday; that it will be improper to order the Europeans out of this, until Sepoys can be thrown in here. To leave this Garriſon with two Companies only, which is all that is now here, will be running a great riſk, unleſs the Army was very near; however, whatever your commands may be, I will execute them to the beſt of my judgment; and I hope the Honourable the Committee will approve of my not moving the Europeans from hence, as *Hyder Ally* is now ſituated, until I receive their further Orders.

I have the honour to be,
with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
12 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
18th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having brought the Detachment thus far, it becomes neceſſary I acquaint you with my intention of marching for the Preſidency by *Naias Pell* and *Aſkamapett*, inſtead of the route mentioned in your Letter of the 1ſt inſtant. My reaſons are as follow: *Tripatty* and *Baumrazes Pollam* gives no proſpect of meeting with any of *Hyder Ally*'s Convoys, becauſe his People, if they at all paſs by the former, muſt afterwards paſs through the *Pelatta* and *Darnalcherrie Ghauts* and Land near *Vellore*; even this ſeems not probable, when he has ſo many and better Roads clear of our Garriſons. Further, the Pollam Roads for fifteen or twenty miles are ſo ſteep, narrow, and ſtony, it would take conſiderable time to conduct Field-pieces by it, as I know from experience founded on the march of our Army in 1765, after the Subah, from *Arcot* to *Vantabagurry*.

I halt to-morrow for Rice, but proceed early the next morning.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble and
obedient Servant,
Wm Baillie.

Camp at *Nellore*,
16 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
19 Auguſt 1780.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to inform you, that I arrived here this morning juſt as the day broke, having marched at nine laſt night from my ground near *Carringooly*. I have met with no impediment, nor have any of the Enemy's ſtraggling Plunderers appeared. I had pretty certain information of a very large body of Horſe from *Conjeveram*, that croſſed the River at *Shiveram*, in order to give me as much trouble as they could. Have no knowledge or ſuſpicion what diſappointed them, but they have never appeared, and I have brought up every thing this laſt march very well. *Hyder* muſt certainly have very bad intelligence, or muſt be much weaker in force, or in ſpirit, than he is reported to be, or he ſhould have made a puſh to engage my Detachment, for if he could not attempt that alone, he had little to expect from any attempt after a junction. It is true, I do not believe he would willingly engage ſuch a Force as mine in a pitched battle, unleſs to carry ſome great point; and ſurely if any thing could tempt him to riſk a battle, it muſt be the hopes of preventing a junction of the Force of the *Carnatic*; and had he had any intelligence, he would have known that the number of Followers which encumbered us, would have given him every advantage, for beſides theſe naturally belonging to the Troops, two or three thouſand collected with Captain *Davis*'s Battalion in the courſe of his march from *Trichinopoly*; and there are all thoſe belonging to Col. *Brown*'s Detachment. In ſhort, I am convinced, that for every fighting Man, I

APPENDIX, N° 6.

have ſix Women, Children, and old Men, who, upon the leaſt alarm, in ſpite of every precaution, fell back upon the Troops, and almoſt rendered it impoſſible to form them for effectual reſiſtance. If he had had ſpirit and intelligence, he muſt have known, that the laſt march but one I had ten miles of as bad a road perhaps as ever was paſſed, almoſt every ſtep knee-deep, till we came to the Plain *Mudrunticum*, where was the fineſt ſpot for him to have formed, with every advantage on his ſide, and when he muſt have attacked us to every advantage, jaded and fatigued, and in inevitable diſorder as we came out of the ſlough. It is true, I had taken every precaution, for I fully expected it, as he was within a very convenient diſtance to have met me on that ſpot; and I had a ſtrong advanced Guard, unincumbered, compoſed of his Highneſs's Grenadier Troopers, and five Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers; but to my aſtoniſhment not an Enemy appeared. I mention this, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, becauſe I conceive it to be a very ſtrong proof that this man is not to be ſeriouſly apprehended; and that, if he is at all faced and puſhed, he will retire out of the *Carnatic* as faſt as he came into it. I will add another proof of his want of intelligence, or Generalſhip: By ſome ſtrong inattention, the important Fort of *Carringooly* is at preſent garriſoned by a Havildar and twenty of his Highneſs's Sepoys only. I have very great reaſon to believe, from circumſtances which I cannot here mention, that it would have been yielded the firſt ſummons, had *Hyder*'s People from *Conjeveram* puſhed for it, ſo as to have got poſſeſſion of it the night before my arrival, as it commands the only road I had to take; that the conſequences would have been very ſerious. I was much diſpoſed, had I had powers, to have thrown my ſick Europeans and Sepoys into it, and two Guns, but I durſt not take ſuch a ſtep without authority; the Havildar even objected to receive any Ammunition from me without the Nabob's Orders, although I puſhed him much to receive it: perhaps he thought if he received Supplies, a greater defence muſt be expected from him. It is of importance, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, that that Fort ſhould be looked to; it is very large, has a good Ditch, and Fauſſe Braye, would afford an aſylum to the Inhabitants of its own Pettah, of the great and populous village of *Madranticum*, and to ſeveral neighbouring villages; and in my humble opinion, a large quantity of Grain and Ammunition ſhould be lodged there, from whence an Army in the Field might be ſupplied, as the River here is ſometimes impaſſable for many days together; and I am confident, that now, if that place had been capable of affording any aſſiſtance, my remaining on that ſide the River, which we muſt re-croſs to go towards *Arcot* or *Wandewaſh*, would have awed the Enemy very much; for report (but it is only report of People come from the *Arcot* ſide) ſay, that he counted much upon the well ſtate of the Country I had to paſs; and that upon hearing my approach, his Infantry and Artillery fell back to *Trincomalee*, and himſelf, with the Cavalry, to *Temmery*; but I have no confirmation of it, yet I do not doubt it, for the man who would not attack us under the advantages he had, I am convinced will wait till we attack him; and I ſuppoſe we ſhall hear of his attempting *Wandewaſh* and *Warritpollum*, or ſuch things as he can attempt by ſurprize. To the former (in conſequence of Mr. *Oakley*'s Letter of the 14th, containing your Orders, and which I received the evening of the 16th) I immediately detached Lieutenants *Flint* and *Parr*, two very diligent and good Officers, with two Companies of Sepoys, with a hundred rounds per man, at nine o'clock the ſame evening; and as they went without Tents or Baggage of any kind, and the diſtance was only ſixteen Malabar miles, I hope they reached it yeſterday morning. Not knowing the ſituation of that place, I thought proper to order Mr. *Munro* to advance to Lieutenant *Flint*, four hundred Pagodas, on account of theſe two Companies, and I have no doubt the Killedar is pre-diſpoſed to receive him, but I remember he refuſed to let me into the Fort, when I was going down with the Army to *Pondicherry*; and I have written to him twice for intelligence, but have received no anſwer. *Warritarpollam* requires attention: the original Poſſeſſor of that Country, and to whom the People are attached, is, I am informed, in *Hyder*'s intereſt much. Very much will depend upon immediate collections of Grain being made in the ſeveral Forts, as alſo Sheep, from whence the Army may be ſupplied. I have no doubt but his Highneſs the Nabob will exert his authority in this buſineſs: But Orders to the Aumildars will little avail for expediting Military operations; and I could wiſh the depoſit abſolutely to be made, before the want is felt. I ſhall, agreeable to my Orders from Sir *Hector Munro*, wait here, and exert myſelf in the matter of Bullocks and Proviſions. I have brought an hundred ſpare Draft Bullocks from *Pondicherry*, and I have met with two hundred here.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
With the greateſt reſpect,
Chingleput, Your faithful and moſt obedient Servant,
Aug. 18, 1780. *John Braithwaite.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
21 Auguſt 1780.

Received the following Letter from Col. *Braithwaite:*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c.
Select Committee of *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As I have written to the Governor and the General, I have not troubled you with Letters; not only on account of the uncertainty of their conveyance, but becauſe I had only difficulties to deſcribe, which I am not fond of; the ſubject matter of them will, no doubt, be communicated to you by the Governor and General; and I beg you to reſt aſſured, that if I had not perceived them to wear a very ſerious appearance, in regard to future as well as preſent movements, I could not have laid ſo much ſtreſs on them. I have a fine Force, and in high ſpirits, and if the difficulty I have mentioned is provided for, I am convinced they will know no other; but on this account, they have been a little clamorous. I have the honour to tranſmit to you this by Lieutenant *Yong*; who, agreeable to the General Orders, marches with the Men of the Regiment who ſerved in the late Troop. This, and being obliged to ſend ſixteen ſick into *Chingleput*, has induced me to call upon Captain *Mackay* to examine his Corps, and I have very good hopes to collect from him from twenty to thirty effective Men, and Volunteers for the field.

I have the honour to be,
With the greateſt reſpect,
Camp, near Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Chingleput, Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Aug. 20th, 10 P. M. *John Braithwaite.*

Wrote the following Letter to Colonel *Braithwaite:*

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, at *Chingleput.*

Sir,

I am directed by the Select Committee, in conſequence of your Letter to Sir *Hector Munro* of the 20th inſtant, to deſire you will exert yourſelf in getting as much Rice as will be ſufficient for your Detachment to *Vendelore*. You will uſe your utmoſt endeavours to be there to-morrow night, where you will find Rice, Biſcuit, and Arrack for your Detachment for one day, to carry you to the Mount on Wedneſday. It is much wiſhed you may arrive there on that day.

I am, Sir,
Fort St. George, Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
20th Aug. 1780. *Chas Oakley.*

APPENDIX, N° 6.

Fort St. George Select Conſultation, 24 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letters from Colonel *Braithwaite:*

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

If ſomething ſerious is not done, I can not only not move from here, but cannot ſubſiſt here. I have this day not received a Grain from any body, and have only procured eleven bullock-loads of Paddy, by ſecuring ſome adjacent villages. No Man of the Nabob's has yet, or will give me any aſſiſtance. A ſpy is come in, and tells me *Hyder* is encamped on the South ſide of the River of *Arnee*; that he left them the 13th; that they appeared alarmed, and were called to arms two or three times, upon trifling reports. I beg you, Sir, to think ſeriouſly of my ſituation.

I have the honour to be,
with much reſpect and eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp near *Chingleput*, Aug. 21ſt, 11 P. M.

To *Charles Oakley*, Eſquire.

Sir,

I have this moment received your Letter of the 21ſt inſtant and the Duplicate, both together, and I have but juſt this hour received 80 bullock-loads of Paddy, having been all yeſterday without; as ſoon as the People have beat it out and eat, I will march at all events for *Vendalore*, which is good twenty-two miles from hence, and reach it if I can to-morrow; but to be at the Mount to-morrow is impoſſible.

I am, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp near *Chingleput*, Tueſday, Aug. 22d, five in the evening.

Fort St. George Select Conſultations, 24th Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieut. *Geo. Mackay:*

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

All the Rice and Paddy which I had provided for the immediate occaſions of this Garriſon, I have ſent out for the uſe of Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Detachment, whoſe diſtreſs for Rice, Arrack, &c. and I may add for Tents, and almoſt every other article neceſſary for ſervice, would, I humbly conceive, induce you, were you upon the ſpot, to pity the ſituation of a fine body of Men, capable for the moſt important and honourable purpoſes. A flying body of Horſe appeared this day, and burned ſome villages near this place. The Colonel has ordered two Troops of Grenadiers to attack them this evening, if within thirteen miles of his encampment. All the encouragement theſe Troopers have had for proceeding ſo far with the Colonel's Detachment, was his own private generoſity, and which he muſt moſt liberally purſue for the ſafety and credit of the Service, before a Horſeman is contented, or will leave his Lines. The Renter has had no directions from the Nabob to ſupply Colonel *Braithwaite*'s Detachment with Rice or Proviſions, and in conſequence of which the Colonel is here now without any more Proviſions than his daily conſumption; for as there are about four or five hundred thouſand Souls about this place at preſent, who muſt have at leaſt half a meaſure of Rice a-piece a-day, how is it poſſible to furniſh a body of Troops ſuch as his with the ſupply he muſt neceſſarily ſtand in want of? All the Arrack, Sheep, and Grain, I had, I have ſupplied him with, though much to my own private diſadvantage, as the Colonel at a proper time will inform you. The hurry and confuſion of things prevent my having the time to copy this, which I hope you will be pleaſed to pardon.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient Servant,
Geo. Mackay, Lieut. Com^{t}.

To the Nabob.

As the General is on the point of taking the Field, I beg leave to mention to your Highneſs how neceſſary it is that ſome perſon of conſequence, inveſted with full authority from you, ſhould accompany him, in order to facilitate the ſupplies of Proviſions that will be required for the Army; I underſtand your Highneſs propoſes *Nudjif Cawn* for this ſervice; but as he is now at *Arcot*, it will be expedient, until he can join the Army, that ſome one elſe ſhould be appointed. I requeſt alſo your Highneſs will ſend immediate Orders to the Killedars of your different Forts where Grain is laid up, to report to our chief European Officers in ſuch Forts, the exact quantity of Grain in ſtore, ſpecifying how much Rice and how much Paddy, in order that they may furniſh the General with a particular amount thereof.

As I underſtand there is a large quantity of Stores at *Arcot*, I beg your Highneſs will give Orders that the General may be furniſhed with a liſt of them, and ſupplied with any articles he may want, which ſhall be afterwards replaced from the Company's Stores.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

Fort St. George,
23d Auguſt 1780.

From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 29th Auguſt 1780—Received 31ſt D^{o}.

I have received your Letter dated 23d inſtant, acquainting me of the "neceſſity there is for my ſending "ſome perſon with General *Munro*, until *Nudjif Cawn* "Bahaudar joins him at *Arcot*, in order to facilitate the "ſupplies of Grain and Proviſion for the Army. You "at the ſame time requeſt I will ſend Orders to my "Killedars, to give General *Munro* liſts of the Grain "and Stores that are in my Forts, and that General "*Munro* be ſupplied with whatever Stores he may call "for at *Arcot*, and that ſuch ſhall afterwards be returned "to me out of the Company's Stores." All this I underſtand. My friend! moſt of the Grain in my Country has been plundered and deſtroyed by the Enemy, and what is left remains expoſed in the fields or villages. The Ryots, from fear of falling into the Enemy's hands, or being cut off, have deſerted their homes, and fled for ſhelter to the woods and mountains. I had previouſly laid Grain in ſtore in the Forts of *Vellour*, *Arcot*, *Gingee*, *Wandewaſh*, and *Trichinopoly*, for the Engliſh Army, of which an account is herewith ſent you. General *Munro* carried from this a quantity of Grain ſufficient to laſt the Army until it arrives at *Arcot*, and *Nudjif Cawn* has my Orders to join it at that place. He will furniſh from the Forts above-mentioned what quantity of Grain may be wanted for the Army, at the deſire of General *Munro*.—My Killedars have already had Orders from me to ſend the General what Grain he may call for. *Nudjif Cawn* has my poſitive Orders for this, and I ſhall write him again. There was no neceſſity for ſending any perſon of conſequence with the Army from this to *Arcot*, becauſe I myſelf ſupplied them here with Proviſions, and the Enemy had ſo effectually laid waſte and plundered the Country between this and *Arcot*, that there is no Proviſions left in any one place. Yet as you deſired it in your Letter, I appointed *Mahommed Backer Cawn*, a perſon of truſt, for this ſervice, and he was accordingly introduced to General *Munro*, as the perſon appointed by me to go with him to *Arcot*. With regard to the liſts of Stores which you demand, they are at *Arcot*, and General *Munro* will take what Stores he may want, and

give receipts for them. What are not expended may afterwards be returned to me; and in return for thoſe that are expended, I make no doubt but I ſhall, agreeable to what you write me, have others given me out of the Company's Stores. I have already ſent Orders to Rajah *Burbur*, to furniſh General *Munro* with whatever Stores he may want; but as ſome accidents on the road may have prevented his receiving them, I incloſe you a freſh Order to him, which you may yourſelf forward to General *Munro*. What ſhall I ſay more?

Account of Paddy at *Arcot*, &c.

		Tons.	
At *Arcot*	Cuttums	67,539	2
At *Vellour*		49,161	—
At *Wandewaſh*		53,537	6
At *Gingee*		40,587	4
At *Trichinopoly*		200,000	—
	Cuttums	410,764	—

Fort St. George Seleƈt Conſultations, 1 Sept. 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Seleƈt Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We encamped at *Arnee*, four miles South of *Gumrabpundy*, about an hour ago, and march on to-morrow morning for *Conjeveram*, by the route of *Pereupttam* and *Tripaſſore*, agreeably to Orders of Major General Sir *Hector Munro*. I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt humble and

obedient Servant,

Wm Baillie.

Camp, 24th Auguſt 1780. (Noon.)

Fort St. George Seleƈt Committee Conſultations, 30th Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Seleƈt Committee *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I wrote Sir *Hector Munro*, in the morning, that I was prevented marching this day to *Tripaſſore*, agreeably to my intention, by a moſt extraordinary fall of rain laſt night. By way of getting higher ground, between twelve and one I moved about a mile, and diſcovered, as near as I can gueſs, two thouſand of *Hyder Ally's* Horſe. I have yet no further accounts. If this night proves fair, I ſhall proceed to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, with reſpeƈt,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt humble and

obedient Servant,

Wm Baillie.

Camp near *Vengute*, Aug. 26th, in the evening.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Seleƈt Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On the oppoſite ſide is copy of a Letter wrote to Sir *Hector Munro*, of this date,

I have the honour to be, moſt reſpeƈtfully,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient

humble Servant,

Wm Baillie.

Camp on the N. Bank of the *Cortelcar*, 3 P. M. 27th Auguſt.

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Forces on the Coaſt.

Dear Sir,

A ſecond heavy fall of rain laſt night has prevented our being this day at *Tripaſſore*. We are encamped on the North Bank of the *Cortelcar*, waiting its fall. When we came to it, the two thouſand Horſe, mentioned in mine of yeſterday, were upon the oppoſite Bank, but moved off on the firing of a few Cannon Shot. It ſeems odd, they neither in our ſhort march attempted any thing againſt our Baggage, nor burnt any Villages in our ſight.

I am reſpeƈtfully, &c.

(Signed) *Wm Baillie.*

Camp, 27th Auguſt, 3 P. M.

Received the following Letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Seleƈt Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The Detachment remains encamped on the North Bank of the *Cortelcar*. Every night ſeems to increaſe the fall of rain and depth of the River. Our Proviſions, I mean Rice too, ſo ſcarce, I have been under the neceſſity of opening ſeveral Paddy-holes in the Villages for our ſubſiſtence. Where Inhabitants are met with, they are protected, and regularly paid; and not finding any, as far as poſſible, an account taken, and the money collected, or receipts granted me, occaſionally to be produced. I in particular mention this matter, becauſe ſurely there will be numberleſs complaints of quantities taken, whereof there is no account. Many Villages, too diſtant for me to guard, muſt be not only plundered by the Enemy, but our own Followers.

I have the honour to be, reſpeƈtfully,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt humble and

obedient Servant,

Wm Baillie.

Camp, 29th Auguſt, 1 P. M. 1780.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 2d September 1780.

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Seleƈt Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The fall of this *Cortelcar* ſeems ſo little to be depended on, I wiſh the Honourable Committee would think of ſome mode to aſſiſt us. Perhaps Boats, or Cattamarans, could be ſent from *Ennore* to *Chullaveram*: it is true, it would be a very roundabout way; but better that, or any, than remain where we are. We have had two fair nights; notwithſtanding, the River is quite impaſſable; a ſtrong indication, or rather proof, of its being from a great ſource, and therefore not likely to fall ſuddenly.

I have the honour to be reſpeƈtfully,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt humble and

obedient Servant,

Wm Baillie.

Camp, 1 Sept. 1780, 6 P. M.

APPENDIX, N° 7.

Fort Saint George Seleƈt Committee, 21ſt Auguſt 1780.

Sir *Hector Munro* delivers in the following Minute:

THE critical ſituation, not only of public affairs, but the intricate predicament in which I find myſelf at preſent, make it an indiſpenſable duty, which I not only owe to my Employers, but to myſelf, to have things carried on in the Seleƈt Committee, in my abſence, ſo that my reputation as an Officer, and character as a Man, may have a fair chance given to them, whenever any reſponſibility falls to my ſhare.

The unfortunate diviſions, as well as difference in opinion, which Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* have held in oppoſition to the Governor and myſelf, and which have uniformly ſubſiſted of late in our deliberations both in Council and Committee, added to ſome other circumſtances which might be mentioned, leave me little room to expeƈt that any plan or operation of mine in the Field will be either permitted to be carried into execution, or

their

APPENDIX, N° 7.

their effects bid the fairest to have the most candid constructions put upon them.

It is therefore my determined resolution not to be answerable in any manner whatever for the actions of others, and which may affect myself in points as an Officer, which I hope I have held untarnished hitherto, and which I am determined, as far as in me lies, to keep inviolably so while I have an existence.

Therefore, and with a view to give the greater efficacy to what the Governor as well as myself think the best plan for carrying on the Service at this critical moment, and endeavour, if possible, to put it in execution without disputes or dissentions, which may retard it, I move, That on my departure to Camp, on the essential duty I am to be ordered upon, that Mr. *Davidson* be appointed an acting Member of the Select Committee during my absence.

Fort Saint George,
21st August 1780. *Hector Munro.*

The President also delivers in the following Minute:

The President is concerned, at a season like this, when the depredations of *Hyder Ally Cawn* loudly call for measures of unanimity and firmness, that the Commander in Chief of the Army should have reason to feel the absolute necessity for moving for the occasional admission of Mr. *Davidson* into the Committee. The uniform settled appearance of a determination in Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson* to oppose every plan adopted by the Majority of the Committee, is indeed too evident to allow of even the smallest hesitation in imagining, that, in the event of Sir *Hector Munro*'s departure for the Army, every plan hitherto laid down will be counteracted, and even perhaps totally laid aside. Under these difficulties, and seeing no prospect of a change of sentiments in those Gentlemen, and trusting that the candid and unbiassed judgment of Mr. *Davidson* will see matters in a different point of view, when he comes to be acquainted with them, the Commander in Chief seems unquestionably to have expediency sufficient on his side to warrant the recommendation of a temporary infringement of the Company's Orders. No man, the President is free to declare, has a greater repugnance at acting contrary to the commands of his Superiors than he has; but there are times when a Government must, however irregular, deviate from the line which is prescribed, and use that discretionary power which from necessity it is invested with. Plain truths speak for themselves; the records of the Board as well as the Committee, are proofs that little reliance is to be had on the concurrence of Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson* with respect to the measures to be pursued, if they shall be left with a decided Majority in the Committee.

The President believes they have made no secret of their intentions on this head; even the sudden transition of Mr. *Smith*'s departure by the way of *China*, from bodily infirmity into his continuance from public considerations, is a clue to a supposition, that these intentions were not hastily or immaturely resolved upon, but that they were the result of predetermined deliberation. In short, the President is firmly of opinion, that the Commander in Chief has cause sufficient for calling upon the assistance of the Committee in the manner he has done, when the measures he means to recommend, he is apprehensive in this critical situation of affairs, he has reason to apprehend will be frustrated the moment he quits the Presidency to carry them into execution, unless timely precautions are taken to prevent it: wherefore the President seconds the Motion of the Commander in Chief, for the admission of Mr. *Davidson* into the Committee during the absence of Sir *Hector Munro*; and further recommends, that he be sworn in before Sir *Hector Munro*'s departure for the field.

At the same time he embraces the opportunity of returning Sir *Hector* his best thanks, for the very liberal and constitutional support which he has invariably received from him since he has had the honour of sitting as President of this Committee.

John Whitehill.

Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson*'s Minute:

As the Court of Directors have expressly ordered, in their Letter to the President and Council of the 10th April 1778, that if the Commander in Chief shall at any time be absent from the Presidency, the President, and Second and Fourth Members of the Council shall be a Select Committee during the absence of the Commander in Chief from the Presidency, we are of opinion, that the appointing Mr. *Davidson* a Member thereof, is illegal; and do dissent and protest against the measure; and we do consider it as a dissolution of the Committee, and reserve to ourselves the liberty of replying to the Minutes of the President and the General.

Resolved, by the President's casting vote, That Mr. *Davidson* be appointed a Member of the Select Committee during the absence of the Commander in Chief from the Presidency.

Mr. *Davidson* is in consequence now sent for, and the oath of secrecy administered to him.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 22d August 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esquire, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

Minutes of last Committee read, and approved.

The President lays before the Committee the following Instructions, which he proposes for the Commander in Chief on his taking the Field:

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coast.

Sir,

We desire you will proceed and take the command of the Troops now assembling for the Field, to act against *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

To enable you the more effectually to form a junction of the Troops, and to employ them as shall seem most expedient to you for the protection of the Country; we empower you to issue Orders to any Officers commanding Garrisons or Detachments of Troops in the *Carnatic*.

After assembling the Troops, you will be pleased to move in such manner as may best enable you to cover the principal Forts, and to seize the first occasion that you shall think favourable for attacking the Enemy, and obliging him to quit the *Carnatic*. We confide so much in your military experience and abilities, that we mean not to recommend any positive plan of operations; but shall leave you in the free exercise of your own judgment and discretion, as to the mode of accomplishing the objects we have in view.

We sincerely wish you success, and are, Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servants,

Fort St. George, 22d Aug. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Resolved, That the consideration of the foregoing Instructions be postponed till the day after to-morrow.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 24th August 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esquire, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

Minutes of last Committee read, and approved.

The

The conſideration of the Inſtructions recommended by the Preſident the laſt Committee, for the Commander in Chief, being reſumed; Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* propoſe the addition to be made to them, which is contained in the following Draft ſubmitted by them to the Committee:

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Company's Troops on the Coaſt.

Sir,

We deſire you will proceed and take the command of the Troops now aſſembling in the Field, to act againſt *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

To enable you the more effectually to form a junction of the Troops, and to employ them as ſhall ſeem moſt expedient to you for the protection of the Country, we empower you to iſſue orders to any Officers commanding Garriſons or Detachments of Troops in the *Carnatic*.

After aſſembling the Troops, you will be pleaſed to move in ſuch manner as may beſt enable you to cover the principal Forts, and to ſeize the firſt occaſion that you ſhall think favourable for attacking the Enemy, and obliging him to quit the *Carnatic*, when we may hope for the ſpeedy reduction of the Nabob's Forts which *Hyder* has already taken.

When we reflect on the opportunity *Hyder Ally Cawn* had of attacking to advantage the Detachment commanded by Colonel *Braithwaite* in its march to *Chingleput*, we are induced to think he has no intention to hazard a general engagement, but means to attack as many Forts in the *Carnatic* as he thinks he can reduce before our Army is able to march.

It is reported he is now before *Arcot*; as this Capital is of the utmoſt conſequence, we are of opinion you ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible to its relief, but ſhould it have ſurrendered before your arrival, we leave to you the manner and time of attempting the recovery of it.

As the rapidity of *Hyder*'s motions have been experienced in our laſt War, we deem it almoſt ſuperfluous to mention the neceſſity there is for your being extremely vigilant to guard againſt any attack that he may attempt on the Black Town, with a conſiderable Force of Horſe and Foot.

We confide ſo much in your military experience and abilities, that we mean not to recommend any poſitive plan of operations, but ſhall leave you in the free exerciſe of your own judgment and diſcretion as to the mode of accompliſhing the objects we have in view.

We ſincerely wiſh you ſucceſs, and are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort St. George, 24th Aug. 1780.

Cha Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

The Preſident and Sir *Hector Munro* obſerve, that they have no objection to any part of the foregoing Inſtructions, except that which begins with "When we "reflect," &c. and ends with "before our Army is "able to march." The reſt being approved, is ordered to be copied fair, and delivered as ſoon as poſſible.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, Sunday 3d September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire,
Cha Smith,
Sam' Johnſon.
Sir *Hector Munro* abſent on Service.

Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* obſerve, that they had delivered in a Minute, which they wiſhed and meant to have ſubmitted to the Preſident's conſideration privately, before any Committee was held, or Mr. *Davidſon* had taken his ſeat, as they conſidered the Reſolution of the Committee of the 21ſt ult', and the oath then adminiſtered to Mr. *Davidſon*, were not ſufficient to conſtitute him a Member, that they think contains matter very worthy the conſideration of the Preſident, and might poſſibly induce him to alter his ſentiments with reſpect to the propriety of admitting Mr. *Davidſon* to be a Member of the Committee; but as the Preſident moves for the reading of the Letter from the Court of Directors, and as this cannot be done without Mr. *Davidſon*'s taking his ſeat, all that they have now left is, to deſire that their Minute may be read and entered on the Proceedings of this day, and in the mean time they enter the following Proteſts.

Previous to entering on any buſineſs, Mr. *Smith* deſires it may be recorded, that he conſiders the preſent and all future Committees at which Mr. *Davidſon* ſits as a Member, as unconſtitutional, and contrary to the expreſs orders of the Company; and therefore he holds the Preſident and the General reſponſible for all meaſures which may not be approved by Mr. *Johnſon*, or himſelf, whilſt Mr. *Davidſon* keeps his ſeat at the Committee.

3d September 1780. *Charles Smith.*

Mr. *Johnſon* agrees entirely in opinion with Mr. *Smith*; and thinks their conſenting for the preſent to ſit in a Committee which they deem unconſtitutional, the greateſt proof they can give of their attachment to the Company's intereſt; he hopes no reſponſibility can be required of them for meaſures concerted by a Committee of which they have ſo explicitly declared their ſentiments.

Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* then deliver in the following Minute:

"We are not inſenſible of the lapſe of time ſince the 21ſt ultimo, when this meaſure was reſolved on; we are very ſorry it was not in our power to deliver this Minute before the General's departure, but the nature of the ſubject required our moſt ſerious conſideration, and we were not prepared until Monday laſt. As we are of opinion it would be more regular to deliver it at Committee, we waited ſince in expectation of a ſummons, but none was ſent until yeſterday, and the meeting afterwards deferred. As a Committee is now unexpectedly aſſembled, we avail ourſelves of the opportunity to deliver it."

3d September 1780. Sunday. *Charles Smith.* *Sam' Johnſon.*

When Sir *Hector Munro*, in the Committee held on the 21ſt inſtant, moved, "That Mr. *Davidſon* be appointed an acting Member of the Select Committee during his abſence;" and when that Motion was ſeconded by the Preſident, with this addition, "that he (the Preſident) further recommends that he (Mr. *Davidſon*) be ſworn in before Sir *Hector Munro*'s departure for the Field," our ſurpriſe at a conduct ſo oppoſite to the poſitive Orders of our Superiors at home, and our indignation at the reaſons on which the General preſumed to make, and the Preſident to ſecond, ſo unconſtitutional a Motion, cannot be expreſſed. However, then we deemed it ſufficient, by a ſhort Minute, to reſerve to ourſelves the liberty of replying to the Minutes of the Preſident and the General, which we ſhall now do as fully as our abilities will permit, and in ſuch a manner as we hope will merit the approbation of our Honourable Employers; as the ſentiments which we now offer for the records of the Company, are the reſult of our beſt judgment, founded on the plain and unequivocal orders of the Court of Directors, free from pique, prejudice, or reſentment, and conſonant to the duty we conceive we owe to our Superiors, and to the dignity of that ſtation to which thoſe Superiors have been pleaſed to appoint us.

We regret, as much as the Preſident or Sir *Hector Munro* can do, that there has been any diviſion in Committee or in Council; but we poſitively deny that any

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ſentiment proceeding from us, whether by Motion on our parts, or by Diſſent to any Motion made by either of thoſe Gentlemen, originated from a principle of oppoſition to him.

We pointedly diſavow a conduct ſo repugnant to our private feelings, and ſo incompatible with our public duty.

We believe the Preſident will find it very difficult to ſhew one inſtance of an inclination on our part, to counteract any plan for the public ſafety, or for the honour or welfare of the Company; nor has the Preſident any right to impute to either of us a want of candour, or a bias in our judgment, from a principle of oppoſition.

However, leſt it might be ſuppoſed that we had ſeemingly formed a party againſt the Preſident and General, we appeal to the records for a refutation of any ſuch idea; and aſſert, that in theſe will be found many inſtances wherein we eſſentially differed in opinion from each other.

The Preſident has advanced, "that the records of the Board, as well as the Committee, are proofs that little reliance is to be had on the concurrence of Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, with reſpect to the meaſures to be purſued, if they ſhall be left with a decided majority in the Committee."

We, in anſwer thereto, ſay, that no conſideration can induce us to give up our judgment to the Preſident or the General, but where our own coincides with theirs; to thoſe records we appeal for our juſtification. Our Diſſents have not been wantonly made, or maliciouſly worded; they ſpeak our ſentiments, and the reaſons on which thoſe ſentiments are founded; they breathe neither pique, prejudice, or reſentment. We need not ſay how eaſy it would be for us to recriminate in this reſpect upon thoſe Gentlemen; but this is not properly our province. Recrimination is not argument, nor is partiality juſtice; to our Honourable Employers we ſhall leave it to decide, whether our conduct be cenſurable or praiſe-worthy.

The Preſident ſays, that "theſe difficulties, and ſeeing no proſpect of a change of ſentiment in thoſe Gentlemen, and truſting that the candid and unbiaſſed judgment of Mr. *Davidſon* will ſee matters in a different point of view, when he comes to be acquainted with them, the Commander in Chief ſeems unqueſtionably to have expediency ſufficient on his ſide to warrant the recommendation of a temporary infringement of the Company's Orders. No Man, the Preſident is free to declare, has a greater repugnance at acting contrary to the commands of his Superior than he has; but there are times when a Government muſt, however irregular, deviate from the line which is preſcribed, and uſe that diſcretional power which from neceſſity it is inveſted with."

We have not at preſent in India that ſort of expediency which can warrant the Preſident in acting ſo directly oppoſite to the expreſs Orders of our Superiors; and we are ſo very well ſatisfied of the ground of this opinion, that we conſider it as a deliberate act of the Preſident to ſubvert the Government of this Preſidency. The Orders of the Company are too expreſs, are too pointedly proviſional of the very ſituation in queſtion, to admit of any deviation thereſrom, under a preſumption of diſcretionary power.

We think it incumbent upon us to declare, that the meaſure now adopted is illegal and injurious; and, as far as we know, that it is without precedent. We are alſo of opinion, that it tends to introduce anarchy into the Conſtitution, and into the conduct of the affairs of the Company at this Preſidency. Nor do we heſitate to declare, that no queſtion of greater extent in all its conſequences, or more liable to fatal objections, has fallen to our lot ſince we have had the honour of being Members of this Government.

It appears to us incontrovertible, that Mr. *Davidſon* can have no legal voice in the Committee; and that every act done by the Preſident and Select Committee, to which he is a party, and ſtill more, if only ſanctioned by his opinion, and the double voice of the Preſident, may be deemed illegal, or at leaſt ſtrongly queſtionable; and it is but too obvious, that this may involve the affairs of the Company, and even Individuals, in circumſtances of confuſion and difficulty, which at no time ought to be hazarded, and far leſs under the preſent circumſtances of our affairs. Indeed, the conduct of the Majority of the Committee on this occaſion appears to us ſo contrary to reaſon, as well as to the Company's authority, that we can hardly regard it in any other light than a premeditated purpoſe of forming a diviſion in the Government, the natural conſequences of which we leave to the conſideration of thoſe Gentlemen, and to the reflection of their intended Coadjutor. Our intereſt in the queſtion is not greater than theirs; we think that too much is hazarded, and wiſh that there may be no mixture of paſſion or precipitation. It is our earneſt deſire to act with prudence and moderation, and to preſerve peace in our Councils, by a faithful adherence to the legal inſtitution under which we are conſtituted, as the only mode in which we can proceed with ſafety to ourſelves, and to the intereſts of the *Eaſt India* Company, having no other views or purpoſes to ſerve than the due diſcharge of that truſt which is repoſed in us as Members of their Government; and we doubt not but this will appear in the ſtrongeſt light, from the conduct which we have ſhewn in the firſt agitation of this queſtion. We then thought it our indiſpenſable duty to weigh the ſerious conſequences of a competition, which, if continued with equal obſtinacy by both ſides, might end in a confuſion more eaſily to be apprehended than remedied; and therefore determined to proceed with all poſſible circumſpection, without betraying our truſt by a criminal acquieſcence. We then declared in ſubſtance, and now repeat it, that the Committee cannot, by their own authority, bring any other Member to ſit or vote in that department, than ſuch as are appointed by the Company; it being incongruous in itſelf, that a power ſo derived ſhould counteract the authority on which it is founded, as the preſent meaſure certainly does. On ſome future occaſion it may be found neceſſary (as neceſſity will always prove a convenient plea to give a colour to every meaſure which men may ſee fit to adopt) to make a ſtill further addition of Members to the Select Committee, and even to the number of perſons limited as Members of the Council. This would only be going a ſtep further in the ſame track which is now deviſed; and we believe that the act, in theſe caſes, would be as legal as in this, when there is no rule but the pleaſure of the Framers, who ſubſtitute their own authority in the room of that which appertains only to their Superiors, the conſequences of which, where there is no check but the Diſſent of a Minority, and no definite appeal but to a power ſo diſtant in point of time, that all the miſchiefs which could ariſe may have their full effect before any relief can be applied: and it is worthy of notice, that the caſe of an illegal inſtitution, or ſelf-created power, as this appears to be, is much ſtronger, and of more dangerous tendency, than that of a legal authority, diſpenſing (in extraordinary caſes) with the rules and orders of that power by which it is conſtituted. If the inſtitution of the Committee be ſuch as we underſtand, it cannot be altered or qualified by any arguments or terms which have been made uſe of, to give a colour to the preſent meaſure. That authority alone which is competent to appoint it, has expreſsly limited it to four Members, of which the Military Commander in Chief is one; and the Orders by which it is eſtabliſhed, after naming the firſt Members, and the rank of all future Members, has this clauſe: "If our Military Commander in Chief ſhould at any time be abſent from the Preſidency, then our Order is, that the Preſident, and the Second and Fourth Members of our Council, ſhall be a Select Committee for the purpoſes aforeſaid, during the abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency."

From thence then it is clear, that this event was both foreſeen and provided againſt; nor need we bring it to remembrance, that it has already happened under the preſent inſtitution, during the ſiege of *Pondicherry*; but on that occaſion no ſubſtitute to the empty chair was ever thought of, (although Mr. *Smith* was prevented by ſickneſs from attending for a conſiderable time) nor do we believe that any body entertained an opinion that it could take place; it is a truſt that cannot be delegated or executed by proxy. The Order expreſsly ſays, that in the abſence of the Commander in Chief, the Preſident, the Second and Fourth in Council, ſhall be the Committee; but now the Commander in Chief, whilſt he is ſtill in Committee (and of courſe before that part of the Order which relates to his abſence can have any operation) together with the Preſident (by his double vote) determine that the Order of the Company in this reſpect ſhall be ſet aſide, and in effect abrogated by a new appointment of their own, which in reality is making the Committee to conſiſt of five Members at one and the ſame time; for it is no where ſaid or pretended, that the ſeat of the General is vacated by his abſence.

In delivering theſe opinions we have conſidered the great importance of the ſubject to the affairs of the Company, and indeed to the exiſtence of their Conſtitution, which is thus wounded. We are conſcious of our inability to ſpeak of it with that energy and preciſion which it deſerves; but we cannot, as honeſt men entruſted by our Honourable Employers, ſatisfy ourſelves with a bare diſſent to ſo extraordinary a Reſolution, or avoid removing any expreſs or implied reflection which this meaſure may be ſuppoſed to carry with it, in reſpect to ourſelves, as implying a diſapprobation of our paſt, or diſtruſt of our future conduct; which, if thoſe Gentlemen who attempt this inſult to our Employers, and to their Colleagues, can ſupport, we now call upon them to do, or elſe that it muſt ſtand confeſſed that they have no ſuch foundation; but upon this occaſion have adopted a meaſure no leſs irritating than violent, and ſo we doubt not but the Honourable Court of Directors will regard it; and further, that they will hold thoſe who are parties in it as we do, fully reſponſible for the illegality of this act, and for all the conſequences which may ariſe from it.

As to the conduct of Mr. *Davidſon* in particular, in thus accepting a duty of ſuch a nature, and of ſuch high importance, though clearly excluded by the expreſs Orders of the Company, we doubt not but it will hereafter be a very ſerious queſtion to him, whether any act which paſſes under the ſanction of his borrowed voice, can be free from exception, or even legal, and whether the whole tranſaction will not be regarded by that Power which alone can take cognizance of it, as a groſs inſult upon their authority, without overlooking the avowed purpoſe of this Gentleman's admiſſion to his temporary ſeat, which requires little other comment from us than our unreſerved declaration, that we never could have prevailed on ourſelves to act ſuch a part, without being deemed unworthy of a ſeat, either in Committee or in Council. It is true that he is a Member of the Council, but a ſeat in that Department is not alone ſufficient to entitle him to ſit and vote in the other, until a vacancy happens; it is obvious that the preſent meaſure may, on ſome future occaſion, be carried ſtill further, and one or more Members may be brought into the Committee, even without being Members of the Council, as it is not *that character ſolely* which gives them a qualification, *but the nomination of their Employers*, who may at their pleaſure appoint ſuch other perſon as they judge fit, to that other ſtation; and of this the caſes of the Reverend Mr. *Palk* (at that time one of the Company's Chaplains) and of Mr. *Henry Vanſittart* (though then only a ſenior Merchant) are in point, as they were each appointed Members of the Select Committee; indeed, it is well known that the confeſſed abilities of theſe Gentlemen recommended them to the Court of Directors.

How far ſuch diſtinguiſhed talents of knowledge and induſtry will render Mr. *Davidſon* conſpicuouſly uſeful to the Company, in the execution of that important duty in which it is thought neceſſary that he ſhall take a part, may have been diſcovered by our Colleagues, we muſt leave to their deciſion; we are free to declare, that they have not as yet been ſo very apparent to us.

But, totally averſe as we are to every thing that has the appearance of premeditated variance in our Councils, and ſincerely deſirous to avoid all grounds of complaint, whilſt we can proceed in the execution of our duty without a breach of the Company's eſtabliſhed inſtitutions, we would now propoſe and earneſtly recommend, that the proceedings of the Committee in reſpect to this meaſure, may be reviſed, and that they be corrected and reverſed. The Governor and General have in effect vacated the General's ſeat in the Committee during his abſence, though our Honourable Employers have determined that it ſhall not be vacated, and their's is the authority by which we all hold our ſeats. Of what avail then is the reſolution of forcing a new-created Member into a ſeat which is not yet vacant, and which no authority here can, at their own pleaſure, make ſo? If there is no ſuch power, ſhould the exerciſe of it be aſſumed in any Department? And leaſt of all, in that where our Employers have entruſted all their Political, Military, and Naval Affairs. Nor ſhould it be diſregarded, that it is done at a time when a powerful Invader is in the heart of the *Carnatic*, and when the poſſibility of the arrival of a Force on the part of our European Enemies, ought not in prudence to be forgotten. We do then moſt ſtrenuouſly recommend, that it be well conſidered to what conſequences ſuch a reſolution may lead, in many unforeſeen caſualties and events, as well as in others, which are more obvious; and how far the legality of the reſolutions, and the authority of the Committee under ſuch a diſqualification, may be queſtioned or impeached. Indeed, we truſt, that the conſideration of this important ſubject has not been hitherto conſidered with that temper and attention which it deſerves; and we ſtill have hopes, that being new reviſed, the arguments and reaſons which we offer will ſtrike with a force not leſs ſtrong, that they have not before been ſufficiently weighed.

We cannot help obſerving, that although there has been ſuch a conſiderable lapſe of time ſince the 23d ult. we have not yet ſeen thoſe Plans of future Operations, which the Preſident and General ſeem to fear may be impeded or fruſtrated by us, therefore can form no opinion of them; but when they are laid before us, then it will be ſeen what foundation there is for ſuch apprehenſions; we call upon the General to mention any circumſtance in our conduct which can juſtify him in ſuſpecting us of intending a wanton interruption of any Plan or Operation of his in the Field, or of a diſpoſition to miſconſtrue thoſe Plans or Operations by the effects which may reſult from them.

Our regard to the welfare of the Company, to our own ſecurity, and to the General himſelf, enſure him our hearty co-operation in any Plan which *wears the appearance of propriety*; and we ſhall be as ready as any one to ſet down to the fate of war any miſchance which may befal him, and as cheerful and cordial in our congratulations and teſtimonials of applauſe, for the ſucceſs which we ſincerely hope may crown our arms and his conduct, as any Member of Government, or of the community.

But at the ſame time that the General thinks it proper for him to ſhew ſuch ſolicitude in what reſpects his own duty and conduct in the Field, we think it incumbent on us not to forget that the Committee have many other branches of their duty to attend to, in which the buſineſs of negociation and Peace, as well as Military and Naval Affairs, fall within their province; and that this renders it the more neceſſary to avoid any infringement upon, or deviation from, the legal inſtitution thereof.

Mr. *Smith*'s reſolution to go home, proceeded from

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the imminent danger of his health, in the opinion of his Phyſicians, ſhould he continue to ſtay here; and the fortunate and unexpected turn which his diſorder took at the eve of his intended departure, made him reſolve to riſk a return of his complaint, as the ſituation of public affairs was too critical not to ſubject him to a heavy cenſure from his Employers, was he to quit his ſeat in Government in the hour of danger on any other conſideration than than of labouring under a diſorder which change of climate alone could remove.

Having, we truſt, fully proved the illegality, inexpediency, and impropriety of Mr. *Davidſon*'s admiſſion into the Select Committee, we move, That the Reſolution which was formed in Committee on the 21ſt of laſt month, relative to this buſineſs, may be now reverſed.

Charles Smith,
3d September 1780. *Samuel Johnſon.*

Fort St. George Select Committee,
6th September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Saml Johnſon,
Alexander Davidſon.
The Commander in Chief abſent on Service.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* deliver in the following Minute:

The Preſident having put a negative on the Motion, which we made at the laſt Meeting of the Committee, "for reconſidering and reſcinding the appointment of "Mr. *Davidſon*, in the capacity of a Member of the "Committee, during the General's abſence in the "Field;" and we having then avoided any other ſtep than a bare oppoſition to the meaſure, by entering our ſolemn Proteſt againſt it, after the delivery of a Minute, previous to Mr. *Davidſon*'s entering upon his new office, in which we expoſed its illegality and dangerous tendency, in the hopes that the reaſons we therein offered might produce a change of ſentiments in the Preſident; but that having failed, we might deem ourſelves inexcuſable, if we ſuffered the matter to reſt here; yet, ſenſible that the more we conſider the contingencies which may ariſe, and the future effects which theſe may produce, under the ſanctioned voice of a diſqualified Member, the more we find ourſelves impelled to propoſe and recommend any ſtep that may correct or leſſen ſuch evil conſequences; and in that view, we now offer an expedient, which we hope will not be refuſed: That the whole be referred to the Governor General and Council, and that all parties ſhall reſt ſatisfied with their deciſion of the matter. In making the propoſal, we conſider the nature of thoſe duties, for the diſcharge of which the Committee is expreſsly appointed, to wit, "the tranſact-"ing all Political, Military, and Naval Affairs;" and we aſſimilate the ſame to the powers with which the Legiſlature has thought proper to inveſt the Governor General and Council, in matters of war and of peace, which ſeems to eſtabliſh the moſt direct and poſitive connection between that Board and this Committee, ſo as to give the former a ſuperintendance, and even a controul in the moſt important functions of the latter; and this naturally leads us to think, that the reference which we now propoſe (and more particularly in the preſent ſituation of our affairs) will not be deemed improper. We are however aware, that the aſſent of Sir *Hector Munro* to this propoſal, may be deemed neceſſary; and we are willing that it ſhould be obtained. If the Preſident ſees it proper to ſuſpend his own opinion, as the laſt required in the order of voting, till that of the General can be obtained, we can have no objection. We only deſire that copies of every thing that has paſſed on the ſubject, may be ſent to the General (with the beſt expedition) to enable him to communicate his ſentiments thereupon, with all convenient ſpeed, and if then our Propoſals ſhall be adopted, it will follow, that a proper Addreſs ſhall be made to the Governor General and Council, by the Preſident and Select Committee, accompanied by copies of whatever has paſſed, or ſhall further occur upon the ſubject.

The Preſident moves the queſtion propoſed by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, in the foregoing Minute, which is carried in the negative by his caſting voice.

Mr. *Smith* then gives in the following Minute:

As by an Act of Parliament for eſtabliſhing Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the Company, we are directed and required conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, advice and intelligence of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to our knowledge, relating to the Government, Revenues, or Intereſt of the Company, Mr. *Smith* moves, That all papers relative to the admiſſion of Mr. *Davidſon* into the Select Committee, may be tranſmitted to the ſaid Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, that they may have authentic information of this remarkable, unprecedented, and unauthorized change in this Government.

The Preſident and Mr. *Davidſon* being deſirous that the conſideration of the Motion made by Mr. *Smith*, ſhould be deferred till next Committee, the ſame is agreed to.

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Fort St. George Select Committee,
2d Auguſt 1780.

MR. *Johnſon* delivers in the following Minute:

For the reaſons ſet forth in the Letter from the Supreme Council (dated the 12th June) which appears to me very ſatisfactory, I am of opinion no time ſhould be loſt in writing to the Subah, in conciliating terms, in taking off Mr. *Holland*'s ſuſpenſion, and in furniſhing him with inſtructions to acquaint the Subah, that we are come to the Reſolution of reſtoring the *Guntoor* Circar to *Bazalet Jung*, in the manner recommended by the Supreme Council. I move therefore, That the ſenſe of the Committee be now taken on theſe important matters.

Agreed, That the conſideration of Mr. *Johnſon*'s Minute be deferred till next Committee.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Saml Johnſon.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
Monday, 7th Auguſt 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Read the following Letter from the Governor General and Council:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c.
Select Committee, *Fort Saint George.*

Gentlemen,

In our Letter of this date, which has been already ſigned and diſpatched to your Preſidency, you have been informed

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informed of the Reſolutions we have taken to effect a ſettlement of the diſpute ſubſiſting with his Highneſs *Nizam Ally Khan*; but by an official miſtake, you have not in the ſame Letter been informed of the means we have determined to employ for the accompliſhment of this end. We now therefore think it proper to acquaint you, that as you have been pleaſed to remove the only obſtacle which prevented us from continuing Mr. *John Holland* as public Miniſter, on the part of this Government, at the Court of *Hydrabad*, we have reſolved to employ him in this capacity again: and having furniſhed him with freſh credentials, ſent him ſuch inſtructions as we thought beſt calculated to effect the purpoſe of the deputation.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Fort William, 12th June 1780. — *Warren Haſtings*, *Edward Wheeler*.

Hereupon Mr. *Johnſon* moves, That the Minute he delivered in laſt Committee may be taken into conſideration; and Mr. *Smith* ſeconds the Motion, That Mr. *Holland*'s ſuſpenſion be taken off.

Mr. *Johnſon*. For the Motion.

General *Munro*. Againſt it, for the reaſons he has already given.

Mr. *Smith*. For it.

The Preſident. Againſt it.

Carried againſt the Motion by the Preſident's caſting vote.

Sir *Hector Munro* delivers in the following Minute:

As the giving up the *Guntoor* Circar after getting poſſeſſion of it (and that with the approbation of the Supreme Council of *Bengal*) may be diſapproved of by our Employers at home, I am of opinion the Governor General and Council's laſt Letter ought to be anſwered fully; reaſons given why the *Guntoor* Circar ſhould not be given up, and if ultimately they inſiſt upon it being given up, they muſt in every reſpect be made anſwerable for the conſequences: and I am of opinion if it is given up, that *Bazalet Jung* ought to have it given to him, and not to the *Nizam*, as we had it from *Bazalet Jung*; but I am for holding it in our poſſeſſion until we have an anſwer to our next Letter on the ſubject from *Bengal*.

Hector Munro.

Fort St. George, 7th Aug. 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire.

Honourable Sir,

No doubt you are well informed that there is a large body of Marattas aſſembled at *Cuttack*. Reports are now propagated all over this Province, that their intentions are hoſtile againſt the *Ichapour* and *Chicacole* Countries and Circars in general. Whether this intelligence be true or falſe, it may not be improper that this place be put in ſome little ſtate of defence. The pittah wall is in ſuch a ruinous condition, that the Cattle belonging to the town paſs over it in all parts; to make it at all defenſible, a ſtockade is the only expedient to be adopted; and as that can be done at ſuch a trifling expence, as cannot be of any conſequence, it will be ſet about without delay.

There is a circumſtance come to my knowledge that ſerves juſt to create a ſuſpicion, although at any other period it ought to be treated with neglect. One *Duntaloor Vencaty Kiſtnama Rauze*, a Sirdar in the ſervice of the *Vizianagrum* Family, who commanded at *Curipum*, a centrical Fort near two Paſſes leading out of this Diſtrict towards the Maratta poſſeſſions, has lately left the command of *Curipum* in charge of a near relation, and is gone to *Cuttack*, where he has a Brother in a high military command of Foot among the Marattas. He gave out that he was going to worſhip at *Jagganaut*; but it is well known that a number of the *Curipum* Peons (report ſays 200) armed with firelocks, are gone after him, and in ſmall diviſions, that they might be unobſerved. As *Curipum* belongs to the Rajah, *Sitteram Rauze* muſt be acquainted with the above circumſtances.

I am *with great reſpect*,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Vizagapatam, 5th Auguſt 1780. — *J. H. Caſamajor*.

Wrote the following Letter to the Governor General and Council:

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
18 Auguſt 1780.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

We had the honour of writing you in duplicate, under date the 26th July, and now forward a triplicate.

Since that time, *Hyder Ally* has employed a conſiderable body of Horſe in ravaging the *Carnatic*; and he himſelf, with the reſt of his Army, has advanced as far as *Arnee*, and taken three or four ſmall Forts which were garriſoned by the Nabob's People. Our Troops being divided through a great extent of Country, it has neceſſarily taken up ſome time to aſſemble the Army; but this point is now nearly effected, and in a few days we hope to have a reſpectable Force in the Field, to act as occaſion may require. We flatter ourſelves you will excuſe our being earneſt with you upon the article of Money, but as it will be impoſſible for us to carry on this war without ſupplies from *Bengal*, we are anxious to be informed when, and to what extent, you may be able to aſſiſt us.

We ſent to you by *The Duke of Portland*, the four Deſerters, reſpecting whom you wrote us in your Letter of the 1ſt June; and we have given ſtrict charge to the Commander to keep them in cloſe confinement until he receives your Orders to deliver them. We incloſe herewith a paper, explaining the manner in which they deſerted, and the reaſon of their being entertained on this Eſtabliſhment.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servants,

Fort Saint George, 18 Auguſt 1780. — *John Whitehill*, &c. Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
21 Auguſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Mr. *Torleſs*, Reſident at *Anjengo*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The occaſion of this Addreſs is to adviſe your honour, &c. that laſt night a ſhip called *The Free Maſon*, ſent on ſhore Letters from Mr. *Church*, the Reſident at *Tellicherry*, to me; one is a duplicate, and dated the 17th ultimo, the other dated the 8th inſtant. In the former of which he ſays, "I diſpatch this Letter to acquaint you, that *Sardar Cawn* is come from *Calicut* with a large body of Troops belonging to the Naboh *Hyder Ally*, and have joined the Nairs againſt us; they are now attacking *Durmapatnam*, and we expect they will ſhortly attack us in every quarter. I deſire you will immediately adviſe the Preſidencies of *Madras* and *Bombay* of our ſituation, and write to the Governor and Council of the latter place to ſend, as ſoon as poſſible, our indent of Stores and Caſh; and we ſhall probably want ſome Rice."

APPENDIX. No. 8.

Under the 8th inſtant Mr. *Church* writes, " I am ſorry to acquaint you, that laſt night we evacuated the Iſland of *Durmapatnam*, which is now in the poſſeſſion of the Enemy, but we brought off our Troops with little loſs. You will pleaſe to adviſe the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Madras* of our ſituation.

I am, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Anjengo, Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
11th Aug. 1780. *J. Torleſs.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
22 Auguſt 1780.

Mr. Johnſon delivers in the following Minute:

At a Committee, held on the the Preſident and General were of opinion, that a Letter ſhould be written to the Governor General and Council, explaining our reaſons for not complying with their requiſition for reſtoring the *Guntoor* Circar to *Bazalet Jung*.

As conſiderable time has elapſed ſince theſe opinions were given, and I am ignorant of their reaſons, I think it incumbent on me to move, That this Letter be directly drawn out, and forwarded, that an anſwer may be received as ſoon as poſſible; even a day loſt in the preſent critical ſituation of affairs may be dangerous. I am of opinion, that the Governor General and Council wrote to us on this ſubject, after the matureſt deliberation; and that it is of the higheſt importance to ſecure the Soubah's alliance at this juncture, when it is ſo much wanted. It has been my invariable opinion, that our taking poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar without the conſent of the Soubah, was contrary to the fourth Article of the Treaty concluded between the Company and the Soubah on the 12th of November 1766; and therefore very dangerous and impolitic. I think it alſo neceſſary to remark, that this meaſure was carried into execution before I was a Member of the Committee, otherwiſe I ſhould have diſſented.

Monday, 21ſt Auguſt. *Samuel Johnſon.*

Reſolved, That a Letter be written to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, ſtating the embarraſſment we have been under in conſequence of their requiſition to us for reſtoring the *Guntoor* Circar, and the objections which occur to us againſt ſuch a meaſure; acquainting them, however, that in conſideration of the preſent poſture of affairs, we are diſpoſed to make this ſacrifice for obtaining the Soubah's friendſhip; but that as the *Guntoor* Circar was, upon its coming into our hands, let at rent to the Nabob, it becomes expedient that we ſhould have his concurrence, which we ſhall uſe our endeavours to procure.

Reſolved, That a Letter be in conſequence written to the Nabob on this ſubject.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Co. Cor. N° 84. To the Nabob, dated 2d Sept. 1780.

The Governor and General and Council of *Bengal*, in a Letter lately received from thence, have repreſented in very ſtrong terms, how much the Nizam is affected by the Treaty made with *Bazalet Jung*, for obtaining poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar; that they have in conſequence fully reconſidered all the proceedings on this ſubject, and are of opinion, that as in the preſent ſituation of affairs, the Company ſhould endeavour, by every means in their power, to preſerve the Nizam's friendſhip; ſo in this buſineſs of the *Guntoor* Circar, where he has taken umbrage at the manner in which our connection has been eſtabliſhed with *Bazalet Jung* independant of him, we ſhould remove the cauſe of his uneaſineſs, by placing things on the ſame footing as they ſtood before our agreement with *Bazalet Jung* took place; in which caſe he promiſes ſufficient ſecurity, that no French Force ſhall ever be maintained in the Diſtricts of *Guntoor*.

The Governor General and Council being anxious to ſatisfy the Nizam on the point, we have on our part acquieſced as far as we have the power; but as the *Guntoor* Circar is now rented by your Highneſs, under certain ſtipulations, ſubject to the Company's pleaſure, we do not think ourſelves warranted in delivering it back until your Highneſs ſhall have given your concurrence to the meaſure, which we accordingly requeſt; and we flatter ourſelves that your Highneſs will have no objection to it, upon the principle recommended by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and adopted by this Government.

N° 85. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 17th Auguſt: Received 7th September.

You have alſo herewith a Letter addreſſed to me by *Taje ud Dien*, the Aumil of *Guntoor*, which fully ſets forth the neceſſity there is for defending that Country; you will, I hope, uſe what means appear proper to you for that purpoſe. What ſhall I ſay more?

Letter from *Taje ud Dien Cawn*, Manager of *Guntoor*, dated 11th Shaban, or 9th Auguſt 1780.

I have already ſent your Highneſs a Letter, which you have received. *Meer Ally Riza*, with four thouſand Horſe, Guns, Military Stores, &c. marched from *Cummum*, and arrived againſt the Fort of *Purcha*, belonging to the Rajah of *Vencatgurry*, ſituated ſix coſs from *Innicondah*: Both parties have fought; about 10 or 15 people in the Fort were killed and wounded, and 10 or 12 Troopers: the Fort was at laſt delivered up to *Meer Ally Riza*. The ſon of *Sapponaire*, Killedar of *Courchain*, is arrived at *Innicondah*, and they are determined to take it; the Zemindars are become diſaffected, and carry on correſpondence with the Enemy; they have alſo ſent their Vakeels to him. This diſaffection, joined to the few Troops in the Country of *Guntoor*, want of Proviſions and Ammunition, will make it impoſſible to defend the Troops in thoſe parts, if Troops do not arrive from *Maſulipatam* and *Ellore*, &c.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
1ſt September 1780.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant *Walter Douglas* to the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George*.

The Sepoys with me have not received any pay for theſe three months, and are now much diſtreſſed. I have not, on that account, been able to ſend the two Companies belonging to the Circars to join their Battalions.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Munglegerry, Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
23d Auguſt 1780. *Walter Douglas.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
2d September 1780.

Received the following Letter:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

From the intelligence I have received within theſe four days paſt, I think there cannot be any doubt that the French at the *Mauritius* will receive a reinforcement of Ships

Ships of War and Troops this ſeaſon, and that they mean to act offenſively againſt ſome of our Settlements in this Country, either jointly with ſome of the Country Powers, our Enemies, or ſeparately by themſelves. In the laſt caſe, I am of opinion, that the lateneſs of their arrival at the *Mauritius*, and the approaching Monſoon on this coaſt, may make *Bombay* their object.

As it will be neceſſary for the Squadron under my command to return to *Madras* Road, in order to complete their Proviſions and Stores, ſo as to be in a condition to quit this coaſt before the middle of October, to proceed round *Ceylon* to the *Malabar* Coaſt, and *Bombay*, I purpoſe to quit this ſtation about the middle of next month, unleſs an Enemy come on the coaſt before that time. I am, with great regard,

Sir, and Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient

Superb, off *Negapatnam*, the 28th Auguſt 1780. humble Servant, *Edwd Hughes.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 5 September 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee, *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have been honoured with your Letters, dated 3d inſtant, adviſing that *Hyder Ally Cawn* has commenced hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*, and deſiring that I will be upon my guard, by drawing the Troops together as much as poſſible, to act upon the defenſive in caſe the Circars ſhould be attacked.

I have already repreſented to your Honour, &c. the preſent ſituation of this Fort, and took the liberty to recommend what I think is really neceſſary to put us into a ſtate of defence.

The Force in this Diſtrict conſiſts of—

1 Battalion of Sepoys,
3 Companies Sibbendy D°,
56 Coffries,
3 Private European Frenchmen,
2 Invalid Gunners,
7 Non-commiſſioned Officers.

The Sibbendy are now employed under the Renter, but in caſe of emergency, or any apprehenſion of danger, I ſhall think myſelf juſtified in recalling them; and with theſe and two Battalion Companies from this Garriſon, there will then remain eight Companies of Sepoys, and a party of Coffries, with one or two brigades of Guns, to be employed as occaſion may require in the Field.

I have ordered all ſuperfluous articles of Stores to be removed from *Aſka*; and completed the four Field-pieces with Stores and Ammunition; ſo that the Troops ſtationed at *Aſka* are ready to move at a moment's warning.

By training the Coffries and Laſcars, they are capable of working the Guns; but we want a few Non-commiſſioned Officers and Gunners, who, I hope, your Honour, &c. will think proper to ſend to our aſſiſtance.

I have received a Letter from Captain *Ewen Baillie*, informing me he is now in *Catteah*, in behalf of the *Bengal* Government; and as he wiſhes to return to *Calcutta* from hence by a ſea conveyance, I expect to ſee him here in a few days. In regard to news, he cannot be explicit; but expreſsly ſays, it will depend upon our political manœuvres with the *Bhuſtar* Rajah, whether the Troops with *Chimnajee Booſla* are to act in this quarter after the rains, or not.

I incloſe the return of Military Stores in this Diſtrict for the month of June.

I am, with reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient

Ganjam, 21ſt Aug. 1780. humble Servant, *John Turing.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th September 1780.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, a draft of a Letter which he propoſes to be ſent to *Bengal*, on the ſubject of the requiſition made by the Governor General and Council to them, for delivering up the *Guntoor* Circar to *Bazalet Jung*.

The ſame Letter is now read as follows:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William.*

Gentlemen,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 12th June.

The important requiſition contained in that Letter, added to the troubles which ſo ſoon followed the receipt of it, will, we flatter ourſelves, be conſidered by you as a ſufficient apology for not ſending an earlier anſwer. The ſubject has, indeed, engaged much of our attention, and we have turned it over and over again in our minds, with the view of meeting, as far as we poſſibly could, the objects which you propoſed for our compliance with your deſire.

It were needleſs to recapitulate what has paſſed relative to the *Guntoor* Circar ſince the year 1775, when the French Fleet ſtationed there firſt became a ſource of jealouſy to us; ſuffice to obſerve, that the meaſures which were taken to obtain the diſmiſſion of theſe Troops were ſuch as muſt have convinced the Nizam of the ſtrict regard we paid to our Treaties: yet the repeated applications we preferred to him on this ſubject availed nothing; the French were permitted to continue in the *Guntoor* Circar, and when the war with that nation broke out, he found it neceſſary to appoint a conſiderable Force to counteract their deſigns. At this time we alſo made a pointed requiſition to the Nizam, with no better ſucceſs than the former one; and ſeeing there was little probability of obtaining the end we ſought, by direct applications in this channel, we liſtened to the propoſals made to us by *Bazalet Jung*; and with your ſanction, entered into a Treaty with him, which freed us entirely from the inconvenience we had been ſo long endeavouring to remove.

From this review of things we confeſs it does not appear to us, that the Nizam has any juſt cauſe for complaint. When our rupture with the French took place, it certainly became a violation of Treaty in the Nizam to permit our Enemies to remain in *Bazalet Jung*'s Diſtricts, after we had formally demanded their diſmiſſion; nor could he, by the moſt rigid conſtructions of the Treaty of 1768, accuſe us of any breach of our engagements in the mode we purſued in conſequence of his neglecting to do us juſtice; but what, more than all we have ſaid, convinces us that we are right, is, that our proceedings, and the Treaty in conſequence, had the ſanction of your conſent and approbation.

You now require of us to deliver back to *Bazalet Jung* the *Guntoor* Circar, which we obtained on certain terms by virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty with him: Your motives ſeem principally to reſt upon the neceſſity of preſerving the Nizam's friendſhip; and this indeed is now become ſo urgent, that we are willing to make the ſacrifice you propoſe for effecting it. As to the mode of requiring us to give up the Circar, we do not wiſh in the preſent juncture to enter into the ſmalleſt diſpute about it; the difficulty which occurs to us in complying with your deſire, is of another kind. Nevertheleſs, we are heartily diſpoſed to remove it, and ſhall uſe our beſt endeavours for that purpoſe.

When we obtained the Sunnuds for the five Northern Circars, including that of *Guntoor*, the Nabob requeſted of the Company that he might have the *Guntoor* Circar at rent whenever it came into their hands, which they aſſented to; and accordingly, after the delivery of that

Diſtrict

APPENDIX. No. 8.

Diſtrict to us, upon the concluſion of the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, we farmed it to the Nabob for a certain term, ſubject to the pleaſure of the Company; and the Nabob now holds it upon this footing. We have written a Letter to his Highneſs, repreſenting what you have urged as to the expediency of giving up the *Guntoor* Circar in compliance with the Nizam's deſire, and expreſſing our hope that he will relinquiſh his claim upon it as Renter. So ſoon as we receive his anſwer, we ſhall acquaint you with it, and do every thing in our power to expedite this buſineſs agreeable to your wiſhes.

Before we conclude, however, we muſt expreſs the apprehenſion we feel, leſt *Hyder Ally Cawn* ſhould, upon its reſtoration, have influence enough to acquire the poſſeſſion of this Diſtrict to himſelf; we know that he has already, both by temptation and threats, endeavoured to obtain it; and ſhould he at any time hereafter ſucceed in his deſign, we ſhould find him a moſt troubleſome neighbour, as by the ſituation of the country, he would have it in his power to ſtop our communication by land with the Northern Circars, and in caſe of *Bazalet Jung*'s demiſe, it might coſt us a war to take poſſeſſion of our reverſionary rights to the Diſtrict.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, Sept. 2, 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* diſapprove of the foregoing Letter, as inconſiſtent with the ſentiments they have already expreſſed on the ſubject of it.

Read the following Letters from Captain *Edington*, commanding at *Palamcotah*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On receipt of your Letter of the 27th ultimo, I judge it my duty to conſult with and adviſe *Ally Noves Cawn*, the Nabob's Manager, in reſpect to the future protection of the *Trinevally* Country, and offered my aſſiſtance therein.

I recommend his immediate reconciliation, in the Nabob's name, with the Polygars, who, in place of enemies, might become uſeful friends; that he would aſſemble the Nabob's 9th Battalion of Sepoys, great part of which are now thrown away by being in Forts that are not defendable; that he would draft the beſt men out of forty Sibendy Companies, and form one Battalion of them at leaſt, and recruit the Sibendies to their old eſtabliſhment; that with this force, joined to the Polygars, and properly ſtationed, the country would be protected from inſults, unleſs a large detachment came againſt it; and that even then, from the nature of the country, much might be done. The Manager ſeemed to agree with me in opinion, but ſaid it was neceſſary to write to the Nabob. I continue preſſing him on theſe points, but ſtill he has no Orders. He promiſes to aſſemble the battalion of Sepoys that they may be put in ſome order, and to form another Battalion, as I have adviſed. The Polygars, he ſays, have offered of themſelves to aſſiſt the Circar; but time is waſted, and nothing done.

I do not wiſh to be underſtood as preferring a complaint of the Nabob's Manager; who, like moſt of thoſe in his ſituation, is of an indolent diſpoſition, and cannot be a judge of military operations.

Your Honours are pleaſed to direct me to protect the Country, as well as defend the Fort. I will not, for obvious reaſons, enter into particulars; the Fort and works are extenſive, and you know the ſtrength of the garriſon; my command is limited to the Fort, having no authority out of it. If it is meant I ſhould defend the country, I requeſt I may have ſufficient power to treat with the Polygars, that I may give them ſuch aſſurances of your Honour's protection, as will induce them to enter heartily into the Company's and Nabob's intereſt; that the Nabob's Troops may be put under my orders; and that a fund for the payment of them, and batta for the Polygars (which is all they aſk) be eſtabliſhed; for Troops that are not paid, cannot be depended on.

I muſt obſerve, that on enquiry who *Ally Novis Cawn* intended for the command of the Nabob's Troops and Polygars, he named the Killedar of *Coleade*, whoſe brother now commands *Hyder Ally*'s Troops at *Dendigul*. I was ſo ſtruck with this circumſtance, that I thought it incumbent on me to acquaint you with it; and it will ſerve to point the neceſſity of loſing no time in giving me ſuch powers, as from the above circumſtances you ſhall judge neceſſary.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your reſpectful and obedient humble Servant,
James Edingtoun.

Palamcotah, Auguſt 17th, 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I incloſe your Honours a copy of two Letters from *Hyder Ally* that were intercepted, and which *Hyder Ally Novis Cawn* brought this morning opened, and read to me. By the addreſs of that to the Polygars, it would ſeem that the firſt-named is the moſt conſiderable one of the Country; the fact is ſo very much the contrary, that he is not even deemed a Polygar, and has not above fifty men under him.

He has been for ſome months refractory, and took himſelf to the Hills; a circumſtance that leaves room to believe that the others mentioned in the letter, who are all conſiderable people, were not concerned with him; but that, to add to his own conſequence, he made free with their names without their conſent.

This point will be cleared up on the arrival of the Vakeel, who is ordered here under a ſtrong guard.

I addreſſed your Honours ſome days ago, wherein it might appear that I meant to reflect on *Ally Novis Cawn*; but in juſtice to him I muſt ſay, that he is now uſing every endeavour in his power for the ſafety of his Country, without money, which at ſuch time may be ſuppoſed cannot eaſily be obtained; he has, as I recommended to to him, got the greateſt part of the Nabob's Troops together.

He has alſo by the Nabob's Order wrote to the Polygars who are coming in, and in two days hence there will be near ſeven thouſand with their Chiefs in the neighbourhood of *Tinivelly*; a formidable body, could they be depended on; and I cannot help once more recommending to your Honours, empowering me to give the faith of the Company to the Polygars, in pledge for their future ſecurity, on equitable terms, otherwiſe their being aſſembled might prove a dangerous expedient in a country where there are not ſufficient Troops to overawe them.

I am, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your obedient humble Servant,
James Edingtoun.

Palamcotah, Aug. 25th 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 6th September 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor, and the Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to ſend you a general monthly return of the Troops under my command, for laſt month, and have included the Nabob's Artillery who do duty in the

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the Garriſon. Four Guards of this Corps mount daily on the four angle baſtions of the Fort; they are really very exact, well-behaved people, and, notwithſtanding they are generally in arrear of pay, the duty goes on cheerfully. Their wants however, begin to pinch them ſeverely now; and as they may be made eminently uſeful if regularly paid, I take the liberty of propoſing to your Honourable Committee, to permit your Paymaſter to iſſue monthly ſubſiſtence to them, in like manner as the Company's Garriſon is ſubſiſted, while they continue to do duty here; or that you will be pleaſed to ſettle ſome other mode of payment for them. I have the honour to remain,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient Servant,
Eccles Nixon.

Tricbinopoly,
September 1ſt 1780.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant *Walter Douglas:*

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, and Select Committee, *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Yeſterday and to-day there appeared (as far as I can judge) to be about 2,500 Horſe, under *Meer Saib*, near this place, the greateſt part of which went off this evening to *Guntoor*, with what intention I have not been able to learn. It is generally believed that theſe Troops have been ſent with the conſent of all the Zemindars: two of them have already, I am told, waited on *Meer Saib* with the uſual Salams.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
W. Douglas.

Munglegerry,
18 Auguſt 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
8th September 1780.

Received the following Letters:

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Accompanying this, I have the honour to tranſmit a general Monthly Return of the Troops, &c. belonging to this Garriſon. I alſo have the honour to acquaint you, that I have completed the eight Companies here, with the twenty additional Sepoys per Company, and that I will endeavour as faſt as poſſible to complete the deficiency in the Battalion occaſioned by the Detachment ſerving at *Tellicherry*. I am ſorry to acquaint you, that 300 of *Hyder Ally*'s Horſe, and 2,000 raſcally Sepoys and Peons, have entered the *Madura* Country, and have burnt 11 Villages. They have not as yet done much more damage.

The Renter of *Madura*, with what Troops he could collect, attacked them: he killed five Horſes, wounded two more, and killed ſome of their Peons. I have ſent one Company of my Sepoys to reinforce him, and hope to have good accounts from him this day or to-morrow. I hope my ſending the Sepoys to aſſiſt him will meet with your approbation.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Rob' Gibbons.

Madura,
2d Sept. 1780.

From the Nabob to the Governor—No Date—Received 8th September 1780.

I have received your Letter of the 26th July. My reaſon for having deferred anſwering it was, that I repeatedly expreſſed to you my ſentiments in the conferences we have had together, on the ſubject of the deſigns of *Hyder Ally Cawn*. It is now ſome months ſince I firſt adviſed you of not only the probable aim, but even of the firſt determination of that ambitious Chief, to diſturb the peace and tranquillity of the *Carnatic*. The alliance he had entered into with the French we were no ſtrangers to, and his preparations for War were univerſally known throughout *Hindoſtan*. The ſituation of the Maratta State put it beyond a doubt that nothing was intended againſt that quarter; my Country therefore was evidently the object which attracted his attention.

In the conviction that this opinion was not groundleſs, I ſeveral times repreſented both to you and Sir *Thomas Rumbold* (before his departure) the abſolute neceſſity there was of providing againſt the approaching ſtorm. At length the views of *Hyder* proved themſelves clearly to be what I had repreſented; and you now inform me that you have given Orders for the Army to aſſemble to ſtop his progreſs, and likewiſe to chaſtiſe him for the unprovoked attack he has made upon the *Carnatic*. This affords me the higheſt ſatisfaction.

I am very ſenſible how eſſentially neceſſary it is, that every exertion ſhould be made in the articles of Proviſions and Money. With regard to the latter, you know my difficulties. You know, that ſince the *Tanjore* Country was wreſted from me, and put in the hands of *Tulja Gee*, in defiance of my right, that I have experienced every kind of difficulty in diſcharging my engagements to the Company and my debts to Individuals, and paying my Troops. You are not unacquainted likewiſe with the large ſums I paid during the Government of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, which obliged me to anticipate the remaining reſources of my Country; nor can you be at preſent but an eye-witneſs to the diſtreſs I ſuffer by the depredations of the Enemy's Cavalry, which have overrun the whole *Carnatic* from North to South. In this ſituation, what can I promiſe? or, where am I to ſeek for that Money which you repreſent as abſolutely neceſſary? As to Proviſions, I have already informed you that I have large quantities of Grain in the Forts of *Arcot*, *Vellore*, *Wandewaſh*, *Tiagar*, *Ginjee*, and *Trichinopoly*, and have not a doubt but that the Army will be plentifully ſupplied from theſe ſeveral quarters; but as to the regular ſettlement of Kiſt, what am I to ſay? A great number of years are now elapſed ſince the Engliſh and myſelf, in ſupport of each other, firſt engaged the Enemies of the repoſe of the *Carnatic*. The fortune of our Arms was various; ſometimes we were victorious, at others unſucceſsful; at length, by the bleſſing of the Almighty, the cauſe of juſtice ſucceeded, and our Enemies were overthrown. The prodigious expence which theſe ſtruggles occaſioned, and which was alone to be defrayed by the revenues of the *Carnatic*, was a load which, in the beſt of times, it was difficult to bear; with great exertions however, at every interval of peace, I contrived to diſcharge a conſiderable part of the debt which had been contracted, not only in the defence of my own Country, but likewiſe in the proſecution of the national War carried on by the Engliſh againſt the French in *Indoſtan*. Still matters occurred which required freſh reſources; the adjuſtment of an old account was but the forerunner of a new one. In the former Expedition againſt *Myſore*, when my Friends took the Dewannee of that Country for themſelves, which was the cauſe of *Hyder*'s then invading and plundering the *Carnatic*, I paid ten lacks of Pagodas on account of the expences of that War, which I had no concern with: in this manner our affairs continued; for I never conſidered them but as inſeparable until the Country of *Tanjore*, through the glaring miſconduct of *Tulja Gee*, was re-annexed to the other parts of my Dominions, in the year of Chriſt 1773. I then conceived that for our future ſafety, and at the repeated requeſt of Governor *Wynch*, nothing was more eſſentially neceſſary than a reſpectable body of Cavalry; I accordingly raiſed ſeven Regiments, each of which was diſciplined by the Officers of the Company, lent for that purpoſe: theſe Regiments coſt me, all contingencies included, upwards of ſeven lacks of Pagodas per annum. However, upon the Orders of 1775, replacing *Tulja Gee*,

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Gee, contrary to my right in the Country of *Tanjore*, I found that this expence had been incurred for nothing. The arrears due to my Troops, and which Lord *Pigot* promiſed to pay from the revenues of the *Tanjore* Country, were not paid, and I was driven to the neceſſity of calling upon the Governor and Council to be Guarantees for the Loan, which I was compelled to make, to ſtop my mutinous Regiment from ruining my Country: thus, from the unfortunate moment that the Orders of 1775 were carried into execution, contrary to the repeated and moſt diſintereſted repreſentations which I could make, the affairs of the *Carnatic* have been declining.

To pay the Company the balance of their old debt, as well as their Kiſt of current charges, neceſſity forced me to draw aſſiſtance from private Individuals; to thoſe Individuals, excluſive of my new conſolidated Creditors, I was obliged to give all my own jewels, as well as thoſe of my Family, in ſecurity, and they are ſtill retained in that ſituation, for I have not been able to repay them: it is well known to you, that jewels to the amount of many lacks of Pagodas, have been ſold much under their value in the City of my Friends, which has brought great diſgrace upon me.

When the oldeſt and firmeſt Ally of the Engliſh in *Indoſtan*, is reduced in this manner to the utmoſt difficulty and diſtreſs; when, inſtead of being in a ſituation to entertain a body of Cavalry ſufficient for the defence of his Country, he is conſtrained to remain inactive while the Enemy is plundering and deſtroying every part of his Dominions, and many Lacks, Inhabitants, Bullocks, Sheep, &c. ſent off to the Enemy's Country; when, ſo far from being able to pay his Creditors, he is even obliged further to run in debt for the diſcharging of his engagements to the Company; when, in ſhort, all theſe troubles and anxieties fall unmerited upon his old age; what is he to do? or whither is he to turn himſelf for relief?

In every ſeaſon of life, in every hour ſince my firſt connection with the Engliſh, I have been uniform and invariable in the warmeſt ſentiments of affection; my Treaſury has alway been open at their command; I ceaſed not to furniſh them every aid for their expences in their Wars; we roſe together in proſperity, and we had but one common cauſe; what pain muſt it therefore give me, at a moment of exertion like this, to be unable to give you that ſatisfaction on the article of Money which you require. I have always agreed with every Governor to pay the current expences in the time of Peace; I ſee the expediency of it; but I am deprived of the ability of conforming to what is right: in this extremity therefore, let me entreat of you, Sir, to uſe every exertion in your power to procure what may be immediately wanted, and which I will diſcharge in time of Peace, as has always been the caſe, conſidering myſelf in every reſpect as Principal in the War now waged againſt the *Carnatic*. You are a judge yourſelf of how little now remains undiſcharged of the current expences, ſince my connection with the Company to this period of diſturbance. As to that which reſts on me, my cares ſhall be conſtantly employed; the Proviſions, Bullocks, &c. which I have collected in my different Forts, will ſupply the Army for a conſiderable length of time; the moſt poſitive Orders are and ſhall be given, that thoſe Magazines are conſtantly repleniſhed; the Army by this means will be enabled to keep the Field; and, with the bleſſing of God, and the wiſdom and bravery of General *Munro*, and the Troops under his command, *Hyder Ally* will have reaſon to repent that he, without provocation, commenced hoſtilities againſt the *Carnatic*. What ſhall I ſay more?

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
9th September 1780.

To Lieutenant *Walter Douglas*, Commander in the *Guntoor* Circar.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 9th ultimo.

In our former Letters to you, we have clearly explained our intention with reſpect to the *Guntoor* Circar. It is not poſſible for us to ſpare a ſufficient Force to protect the whole Country, and we can therefore only deſire you to keep poſſeſſion of the ſtrong holds, particularly *Innaconda* and *Munglegerry*; we deſire you will proceed yourſelf with the principal part of your Force to *Innaconda*, and after providing for this place and *Munglegerry*, if you can ſpare the remaining Sepoys of Captains *Smith*'s and *Bridge*'s Battalions, we would have you ſend them to the Circars and *Ongole*.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort St. George, 9th September 1780.

John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

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Fort Saint George Select Committee,
4th September 1780.

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c.
Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the intelligence I have this day received, *Hyder Ally* ſent away his heavy Cannon yeſterday evening towards *Arnee*; and this morning about three o'clock, he marched himſelf the ſame road. All is now clear about *Arcot*, and I hear our Army is on this ſide *Conjeveram*.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
devoted Servant,

Vellour, 30th Auguſt 1780.

Roſs Lang.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that the Detachment under my command croſſed the *Cortelear* this afternoon, and will march to-morrow to join the Army.

I am, moſt reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble and
obedient Servant,

Camp on the South Bank of the *Cortelear*, 6 P. M. 3 Sept. 1780.

Wm Baillie.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
6 September 1780.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* deliver in the following Minute:

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* obſerve, that there has been no public Letter from General Sir *Hector Munro* to the Committee, ſince he marched from the Mount (but in juſtice to the General, they acknowledge to have ſeen three Letters from him to the Preſident); they therefore think that the Preſident ſhould be deſired to mention to the General, that the Committee deſire he ſhould correſpond with them conſtantly on all material points.

Reſolved, That the Preſident be deſired to write to the General accordingly.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
8th September 1780.

Camp at *Conjeveram*, Sept. 5th.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I received Mr. *Oakley*'s Note, the Nabob's Letters to Rajah *Burbur*. Colonel *Baillie* has croſſed the River; I will not remain 24 hours on this ground after he arrives, but ſhall march to attack the Enemy, who are encamped about five miles in our front. You will perceive by the incloſed

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incloſed Copy of *Prendergaſt*'s Note to me, the cauſe for *Hyder*'s raiſing the ſiege of *Arcot*.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
11th September 1780.

Received the following Letter from Sir *Hector Munro*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Colonel *Baillie* informs me, that I muſt join him before he can move from his Camp at *Peerambaucum*. I ſhall march a Detachment from the Army towards him this evening, and remain with the reſt of the Army here to watch the motions of the Enemy, and cover *Conjeveram*. Near 200 Europeans ſick. There is an abſolute neceſſity for your ſending 200 ſteady Men of the European Battalion in *Madras*, and one Battalion of Sepoys to *Chingleput*, there to wait my Orders. If the Proviſions are not ſent, they can eſcort them there. I cannot ſend an Eſcort from the Army, and nothing can hurt *Madras* at preſent. I foreſee that want of Proviſions will ſoon end this Campaign, and the want of a proper Perſon from the Nabob, to attend the Camp, will effectually do it. Order the contents of the incloſed Indent (it is a duplicate of one ſent to the Governor) to *Chingleput*, to wait there with the Detachment and Proviſions. The Enemy two miles from us; we are watching each other.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
H. Munro.

Camp near *Conjeveram*,
9th September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
12 September 1780.

Honourable Sir,

By the incloſed Note, by order of General *Munro*, you will perceive how matters are. As no doubt he will particularly explain the ſituation of affairs to you ſo ſoon as he arrives here, I will add no more at preſent, than that there is not Proviſions for the Camp to be had in this place; and that unleſs Rice, &c. &c. is ſent by ſea to *Sadras* for them, without loſs of time, the conſequences may be fatal; whereas, if every aſſiſtance is immediately given in the way I have taken the liberty to mention, we will ſoon be in a ſituation perfectly to revenge ourſelves for the unavoidable accidents that have happened.

I am, Honourable Sir,
Moſt reſpectfully,
Your obedient Servant,
Geo. Mackay,
Lieut. Comm^{t}.

Chingleput,
11th Sept. 1780.

To Lieut. *George Mackay*, commanding at *Chingleput*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Commander in Chief to inform you, that he is within 4 miles of your Garriſon, with the Army, and that he intends to encamp near the walls of it during this night. He deſires you will order Pots, Straw, and Fire-wood, ready for the Troops on their arrival.

I am, Sir,
Your humble Servant,
James Campbell.

On the march,
Attow,
paſt 8 at night.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 13th Sept. 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Alexander Davidſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from the Commander in Chief:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

You will probably have heard of the unfortunate defeat of Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment. I know not the particulars; till then muſt be ſilent on the ſubject. The Troops now at this Fort have been marched, two days paſt, from day-light till dark the firſt day, and the ſecond till day-light this morning. No Rice here, therefore they muſt beat Paddy into Rice. Pleaſe, on receipt of this, to ſend Rice to meet us at the Mount, and ſome in boats to *Sadras*, as I cannot determine the route I ſhall take, till ſome Hircarrahs come from the Enemy's Camp, or near it, who are gone to bring intelligence of their motions. I will march on their arrival, or as ſoon after as I can get two days Rice beat out of Paddy. Enſign *Chalmers* is here, and Colonel *Coſby* arrived here this morning with his Detachment.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Chingleput,
12th Sept. 1780.

Mr. *Smith* thinks it incumbent on him, in the preſent alarming ſituation of affairs, to ſubmit the following reflections to the conſideration of the Committee:

A particular ſtatement of our dangerous ſituation ſhould be immediately tranſmitted to *Bengal*, acquainting the Governor General and Council, in plain and unequivocal terms, that we conceive the Company's Poſſeſſions on this Coaſt in imminent danger, unleſs they reſolve to ſend to our aſſiſtance a large body of Europeans and Sepoys, with all ſorts of military Stores, and at leaſt 30 lacks of Rupees, for the ſupport of the War; that theſe ſuccours ſhould be ſent to us without a moment's delay, that they may, if poſſible, be here before the ſetting in of the monſoon, or as early as they can be riſked on the Coaſt. When we reflect on the large armament expected from *France*, even theſe ſuccours, we fear, will be ineffectual, unleſs matters are accommodated with the Marattas.

Shipping ſhould be immediately procured, to bring from the Northern Circars all the Troops, except ſuch as are eſſentially neceſſary for the defence of *Maſulipatam*, and for the protection of *Vizigapatam* and *Ganjam*; all other places muſt be left to fate at preſent, and the Preſidency ſecured. By theſe vigorous exertions we may ſtill be enabled to take the Field after the rains, and to make head againſt *Hyder*. Sir *Edward Hughes*, in my opinion, ſhould be inſtantly requeſted to permit two of his ſhips to proceed to the Northward, to bring up the Grenadiers, and as many more Sepoys as they can take on board: by the time theſe ſhips can get to the Northward, the northerly winds will be ſetting in, and therefore it is probable that we may have a ſhort paſſage back again; they may alſo bring up what Money there is at *Maſulipatam*, *Vizigapatam*, and *Ganjam*. Should Sir *Edward Hughes* deem it improper to divide his Squadron, it ſhould be conſidered, whether ſome of the Company's ſhips now in the Road ſhould not be ordered on this Service; and whether private ſhips cannot be freighted. Captain *Coſby* ſhould be ordered to take the moſt effectual method of making his way good to the Preſidency, or to join the General; but if no particular mode or route can be pointed out to him, it muſt be left to his own diſcretion, only recommending the utmoſt expedition. It may be intimated to him, that, if he finds it impracticable to make his way good by land, he ſhould puſh down to *Cuddalore*, and endeavour to procure veſſels and boats to bring his Detachment to *Madras*; ſuch as cannot abſolutely be brought hither muſt remain there.

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Tanjore being of the utmoſt importance to the welfare of the Company, ſhould, if poſſible, be ſtrengthened; and for this purpoſe, Sepoys ought to be raiſed in the *Madura* and *Tinivelly* Countries: it may not be prudent at this juncture to truſt too much to the Tanjoreans, but to raiſe them in other places. The Polygars might be induced to permit our recruiting in their diſtricts.

The Gentlemen at *Maſulipatam* ſhould be cautioned to be on their guard, in caſe the Nizam takes up arms againſt us; and on their hearing any probable report thereof, to direct the different Preſidents to ſecure the Company's Inveſtments, and in boats or otherwiſe. It may alſo be neceſſary to give Orders for raiſing Sepoys, in lieu of thoſe they may ſend hither.

It may be prudent to order all the boats from *Pondicherry* to *Madras*, and to uſe means for preventing the French from procuring boats at *Porto Novo*; it may alſo be neceſſary to take meaſures for ſearching all veſſels going out of *Negapatam* and *Nagore*, leſt Monſieur *Lally*, or ſome other perſon, ſhould be diſpatched to the French Iſlands.

The proper diſpoſal of the French Priſoners is a matter deſerving the immediate conſideration of the Committee.

Charles Smith.

The Committee cannot avoid expreſſing the ſincereſt mortification and concern at the loſs of ſo conſiderable a Detachment as this commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*; which, after the joining of the Grenadiers of the Army, muſt have conſiſted of between five and ſix hundred Europeans, and upwards of three thouſand Sepoys; of whom not a ſingle Officer, very few European Soldiers, and few Sepoys, that as we yet know of, have eſcaped being either killed or taken Priſoners.

As this misfortune has reduced the Army in the Field to a very weak ſtate, it is abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould reinforce it without loſs of time: Reſolved therefore, that a Letter be immediately prepared for *Bengal*, repreſenting our ſituation in the ſtrongeſt terms to the Governor General and Council, and requeſting a Reinforcement, if poſſible, equal to the number loſt by the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 14 Sept. 1780.

This day the Army arrived at the Mount from *Chingleput*.

Wrote the following Letter:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Equire, Governor General, and Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

We have thought it neceſſary to requeſt of Sir *Edward Hughes* to ſpare us the *Nymph* Sloop, to convey to you, with all poſſible expedition, the ſtate of affairs upon this Coaſt.

You were adviſed in our Letters of the 27th July and 15th ultimo, that *Hyder Ally* had entered the *Carnatic* with a very conſiderable Force, and that we were preparing, as far as our means would permit, to repel this unprovoked hoſtility.

The greateſt part of the Army entered to act on this occaſion, was accordingly aſſembled at *Conjeveram*, and waited only for a Detachment of Troops coming from the Circars, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*.

This Detachment arrived on the 6th inſtant at *Peeram baucum*, a place about 15 miles diſtant from *Conjeveram*. *Hyder Ally* having intelligence of its march, ſent a large body of Troops to attack it; but Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, though much inferior in point of Force, had the good fortune, after an engagement of three hours, to defeat them. This action, however, was ſo ſevere upon his Troops, and the number of the Enemy, which ſeems at this time to have been reinforced, ſo very ſuperior, that Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* deemed it impracticable, without powerful ſupport, to effect a junction with the main Army at *Conjeveram*; and having communicated this opinion to the General, a conſiderable Detachment was ſent to his aſſiſtance. The General himſelf remained with the reſt of the Army near *Conjeveram* to watch the motions of the Enemy's main body, which was encamped at the diſtance of two miles from him.

Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* being thus reinforced, continued his march on the 9th inſtant, at night, towards the Army, extremely haraſſed the whole time by a large body of Cavalry, with Infantry and Guns. On the 10th inſtant, in the morning, by ſome accident, four of his Ammunition Tumbrils blew up nearly at the ſame time, and the Enemy (as we ſuppoſe, for we have no authentic account) taking advantage of the diſorder which muſt have been inevitably occaſioned by this misfortune, broke in upon the Troops, and entirely defeated them, having killed or wounded every Man of the Detachment. Nothing could have been more ſevere or unexpected than this ſtroke. Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, before it was reinforced, conſiſted of about 130 Europeans, Infantry and Artillery, and upwards of 2,000 Sepoys; and the Troops ſent to his aſſiſtance were compoſed of the Grenadier Companies of the Army, ſo that we imagine our loſs upon this occaſion cannot be leſs than 500 Europeans, and from three to four thouſand Sepoys, beſides Officers. General *Munro* has been under the neceſſity, in conſequence, of retreating with the Army to *Chingleput*.

The bare recital of this misfortune will, we think, be ſufficient to give you a true idea of our ſituation. It was with the utmoſt difficulty that we could draft from our Garriſons a ſufficient number of Troops to reſiſt the Enemy in the Field; and we cannot now, without expoſing our poſſeſſions to the greateſt hazard, recruit our Army in any degree equal to the loſs it has ſuffered; we muſt therefore have immediate recourſe to your Honourable Board for aſſiſtance; and we truſt that the exigency of the caſe will induce you to grant it ſpeedily. Four or five hundred Europeans, with three Battalions of Sepoys, and one Company of Artillery, may, we hope, be ſpared from the Force of your Eſtabliſhment; and we requeſt this number, or ſuch part as you can ſpare, may be ſent us, if poſſible, in December.

But beſides Troops, our occaſions for Money are very preſſing; we have no means whatever to anſwer the extraordinary expences of this War, and it will be totally impoſſible for us to carry it on, unleſs we can be ſure of receiving ſupplies of Money from you. We earneſtly requeſt your immediate attention to this object, and that you will do us the favour to inform us to what extent we can be aſſiſted. It would be a great relief to us, if a ſum of Money could be ſent immediately after the receipt of theſe diſpatches.

In a former Letter we took the liberty of ſuggeſting to you the advantages that might reſult from an attack upon *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* Coaſt. A diverſion on that ſide would be the moſt probable means of forcing him out of the *Carnatic*; and we ſincerely hope you may have come to ſome reſolution upon it, in which we ſhould be happy to contribute all that lays in our power. As the Squadron is going round to that Coaſt, the opportunity will be extremely favourable, and the ſucceſs of ſuch an enterprize cannot be doubted. But excluſive of this advantage, which would ariſe from a diviſion of *Hyder*'s Force, if you could acquire poſſeſſion of the Forts of *Mangulore* and *Callicut*, the French would probably be diſappointed in their views of aiding *Hyder*, or the Marattas, by landing their Troops at thoſe places, and this is indeed an object of the firſt importance; for we have already experienced how much *Hyder Ally* has benefited by his connections with the French, of whom there are four or five hundred now ſerving in his Army; and a

conſiderable part of theſe, as we are informed, were with the Troops that defeated Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment.

Mr. *Stephen Sullivan*, the Secretary to the Civil Department, having our permiſſion to proceed to *Bengal*, we take the opportunity of ſending this diſpatch by him; and we beg leave to refer to him for any particulars you wiſh to be acquainted with, and which we may inadvertently have omitted in our Letter.

As the Admiral ſends the *Nymph* only as far as *Baſalore* Road, we requeſt the favour of you to communicate your ſentiments and reſolutions to us upon the ſubject of this Letter, by an expreſs pilot veſſel, or by ſuch other means as you ſhall deem moſt proper.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Fort Saint George, 14th September 1780.

John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Copy of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. to *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Governor General, and Council of *Fort William*.

Sir, and Gentlemen,

I arrived in the Road on the 12th inſtant, with His Majeſty's ſhips named in the margin, in order to complete their proviſions and ſtores for the paſſage to the *Malabar* Coaſt and *Bombay*, at which place my arrival is moſt earneſtly preſſed by the Preſidency, by Letters of the 14th Auguſt laſt, incloſing Extracts of Intelligence from the Court of Directors, dated the 24th March laſt, giving information of ſeven capital ſhips, with ſeven thouſand regular Troops, and ſuppoſed to be intended againſt *Bombay*, and which correſponds with caution given me before I left *England*, as well as all the intelligence I have of late received.

Superb, *Exeter*, *Worceſter*, *Burford*, *Eagle*, *Nymph*.

On that day, it was greatly feared ſome untoward accident had prevented the junction of a large Detachment of Europeans and Sepoys, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, with the Army under the command of Sir *Hector Munro*; ſorry am I to tell you, that laſt night's advices from the Army have given certainty to the deſtruction, not only of the whole of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, but alſo of a reinforcement ſent to ſupport it, conſiſting of all the European Grenadiers and Light Infantry, and all the Sepoy Grenadiers of the Army, making together more than four hundred Europeans, and three thouſand Sepoys, with about fifty Officers; and in conſequence of this diſaſter, the Army under Sir *Hector Munro* has retreated to *Chingleput*, on its route to the Mount, in great want of every thing; and, as the report is, having loſt the whole of their Cannon and Baggage. In ſhort, Sir and Gentlemen, as far as my knowledge of Land Service aſſiſts me, it appears to me, under the preſent circumſtances, and with all the Force this Preſidency can poſſibly bring into the Field, they will be in no condition to face the Enemy, unleſs you ſend them a large and timely reinforcement of Troops; nor will Troops alone ſave this ſinking Settlement, for I am aſſured by the Governor, that they have no Money in the Treaſury, nor any evident means of raiſing it in any proportion adequate to their preſent exigencies.

Under all theſe circumſtances, I truſt you will not think me importunate, if I recommend to your moſt ſerious conſideration the imminent danger there is of the loſs of the Company's very valuable poſſeſſions on this Coaſt, unleſs you give that effectual and timely ſuccour of Men and Money abſolutely neceſſary to ſave them; for the preſent Force with *Hyder Ally* is not all they have to contend with. I have not a doubt, that a regular plan of operations is ſettled between him and the French, and that a very large body of regular Troops will, by ſome means or other, be ſent to *Hyder*'s aſſiſtance.

Strongly impreſſed as I am with this certainty, and the poſſibility, and even probability, that the French may bring a ſuperior Naval Force into theſe Seas, I think it my indiſpenſable duty to warn you, Sir, and Gentlemen, of the evident neceſſity there now exiſts, to guard not only the Company's Territories on this Coaſt, but even *Fort Saint George* itſelf, from the arms of *France* and *Hyder*, at this time, when the whole national ſtrength is required to make head againſt the combined Force of *France* and *Spain*, and our rebellious Colonies; and that this may be the more eaſily and effectually done, I moſt earneſtly wiſh and recommend, that, laying aſide all other plans of operation againſt the Marattas, or any other Country Powers, the three Preſidencies do heartily concur, by every means, both of Men and Money, and Treaties, to reduce this habitual Foe to the Engliſh Nation within due bound; in the effecting of which, and every other ſervice for the public good, you may be aſſured of my moſt ready concurrence, and beſt aſſiſtance.

As His Majeſty's ſloop *Nymph* is deſtined for farther ſervice of the utmoſt conſequence to the Public, and which requires her ſpeedy return to join me here, I have directed Captain *Stevens*, who commands her, to proceed no further than *Balloſore* Road; but I truſt, Sir, and Gentlemen, you will do me the honour to communicate to me fully, before I leave this Coaſt, your ſenſe of the ſtate of the public affairs, as well as your opinions on the moſt proper mode of conducting them, that my want of information may not preclude me from the active part I wiſh to take in all things for the intereſt of the Company and the Nation.

Superb, *Madras* Road, 14th Sept. 1780.

I am, &c.
Edwd Hughes.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18th Sept. 1780.

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant *George Mackay*, commanding at *Chingleput*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor, and Preſident, &c.

Honourable Sir,

Hyder's main Army is, I underſtand, encamped three miles on the other ſide of *Conjeveram*: his intentions are, it is ſaid, to attack and beſiege *Arcot*, ſo ſoon as every neceſſary preparation has been made. His loſs has been very conſiderable, and his Ammunition greatly expended.

Every one of our Sepoys who eſcaped from his Camp, are arrived here, and report, that had our Army had ſeven or eight days Rice in Camp, *Hyder* would have retreated (after the action with Colonel *Baillie*) towards *Trinomally*.

It ſeems he knew of all our reſources, and of every grain of Rice, &c. we had in Camp, and thereby acted a more daring part than he otherwiſe would have attempted.

I was directed by Sir *Hector Munro*, to collect and form into a body, all the Sepoys, whether wounded or unhurt, of Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment, who might come to this place. In compliance with his Orders, I will do my utmoſt for the public good; till ſuch time as I ſhall be honoured with your further Orders upon the ſubject, I will advance them ſome little Money, and take every care of them in my power.

I am, Honourable Sir,
Moſt reſpectfully,
Your obedient Servant,

Chingleput, 15th September 1780.

George Mackay,
Lieut. Comm'.

APPENDIX. No. 9.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 2d October 1780.

Read the following Minute, delivered in yesterday by Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson*:

In our Minute of the 3d ultimo, we mentioned, that we should be as ready as any one to set down to the fate of war any mischance which might befal the General. We hope our conduct since that period has justified this declaration, although we were under the greatest anxiety and suspense about the state of the Army. We suppressed our feelings, and waited six days after the Commander in Chief's arrival here, before we entered a Minute on the subject. We hoped he would see this in a proper light; but were much disappointed when we found he considered our requisition, although conceived in the most delicate terms, premature. After having perused the General's Letter to the Board of the 25th ultimo, we contented ourselves with observing, that it did not contain the information we wished. We hoped that this hint would be sufficient, and that he would be more explicit in his subsequent letters; but we are again disappointed, for his letter of the 23d ultimo relates merely to the measures he wishes to be adopted for recruiting the Army.

Under such circumstances we cannot reconcile it to the duty we owe to our Honourable Employers, the Public, and our own safety, to delay any longer giving our sentiments on the present alarming situation of affairs. We hope it will appear, that our conduct throughout has been uniformly devoid of pique, prejudice, or resentment; and so confident are we of this, that we will venture to appeal to the General's best friends, whether we have not been guided by the greatest moderation, amidst the confusion, dejection, and consternation which has prevailed since the accounts arrived of the flower of our Army being cut off, and of his retreat. It is true, we were apprehensive of the event; we foresaw the consequences which might result from the delays that had been used in ordering Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* to march directly with his detachment from the Northward, as we had proposed; and therefore bore the fatal news with more resignation than we should have done, had it come totally unexpected.

The disaster which has befallen us, is such as cannot be paralleled since the English had possessions in *India*. We have lost a great part of our best Officers, about 600 Europeans, and 4,000 Sepoys; the remains of our Army have been forced to retreat with the greatest precipitation; and *Hyder Ally*, fearless, and unopposed, now ravages the *Carnatic*. Surely then, it is incumbent on us to be fully informed of the extent of our misfortune, and not to lament in silence a loss which we fear cannot be repaired.

It is by no means our intention to pass any censure on what has happened, but wish for a thorough explanation, so that our Honourable Employers may not complain that the Government were deficient in sending them the necessary information of this melancholy event.

We are therefore obliged to reiterate our request, and to declare, that the General's Letter, &c. of the 21st ultimo, does not contain the information we desired. And we are of opinion, that it is highly proper and necessary he should lay before the Committee,

Copies of all Letters sent by him to the Governor, to the Select Committee, to Lieutenant *Baillie*, and to Captain *Cosby*, also of all Letters he sent to any other Officers, from the day of his leaving the Mount, until his return with the Army to *Marmalong*.

A Return of the Army on the day he marched from the Mount.

A Return of the Army on the day after his return with it to *Marmalong*.

A Return of the Army now encamped at *Marmalong*.

A Return of Ordnance, Tents, and other stores, lost and expended between the 26th of August and the 14th ultimo: And,

The last Returns made to the Commander in Chief, by Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, of the Troops and Stores under his command.

All these documents are essentially necessary for the guidance of Government in their future deliberations for carrying on the war, and will serve to elucidate past transactions.

The 1st October 1780. *Charles Smith*, *Samuel Johnson*.

The General acquaints the Committee, that he means to reply to the foregoing Minute, and that he intends, as far as he is able, to comply with their several requisitions.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Consultations, dated 6th October 1780.

Sir *Hector Munro* now delivers in the following Minute and Returns, with copy of his correspondence during the late campaign; but begs leave to remark, that there is one part of Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson*'s Minute which he cannot answer until he is furnished with a Return of Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher*'s detachment.

Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson*, in their Minute of the 1st of October, are pleased to make the following remark: "We contented ourselves with observing, that the General's Letter to the Board of the 20th ultimo did not contain the information we wanted; we hoped that this hint would be sufficient, and that he would be more explicit in his subsequent letters; but we are again disappointed, for his letter of the 23d ultimo relates merely to the measures he wishes to be adopted for recruiting the Army."

The Gentlemen seem to have forgot that when Mr. *Johnson* made the observation that my letter did not contain the information he and Mr. *Smith* wished, I desired him to commit them to paper, and that if it was in my power to comply with their demand, I would do it.

Colonel *Cosby*'s instructions are with the Secretary; I wrote him two or three letters, importing little more than what was contained in his instructions, and of which I had no copy, nor have I any of my notes (for they were no letters) to Colonel *Baillie*, except one or two Erse ones, which the Gentlemen are welcome to whenever they please. The having no cypher, made me write those in Erse, as they were of some consequence. Colonel *Cosby*, since his recovery from his last illness, has given me the few letters I wrote to him, and which I now lay before the Committee, as I shall my notes to Colonel *Baillie*, as soon as I can procure them from him. They were written and sent away in the night-time in a hurry, as Hircarrahs could not come into camp or go out of it in the day-time, owing to the number of the Enemy's Horse which were constantly round our encampment.

In Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson*'s Minute of the 21st September, they only demanded a general Return of the Troops, which I laid before the Committee the moment I got it from the Adjutant General; they also desired a Return of the deficiencies of Stores that went with the Army; they got it, and also the strength of the corps, except His Majesty's.

They have now asked those Returns in a different form, and some others, which I now lay before them, and which I could not do before, until they signified their wishes. I corresponded with none, to the best of my remembrance, but the Governor, whom I requested to keep my letters, and I now lay them before the Committee, as Messrs. *Smith* and *Johnson* in their last Minute have asked for them. I wrote a letter or two to Mr. *Flint*, and desired him to send to the Committee the Returns the said letters required of him, and which I believe Lieutenant *Flint* has done. I sent a few notes to Captain *Prendergast*,

Prendergaſt, which were written by Captain *Pringle*; all the copies that he kept I now lay before the Committee.

I have only to add, that I think my letter to the Committee contains ſomething more than merely my wiſhes to recruit the Army; and had Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment fortunately joined mine, I was not without the moſt ſanguine hopes that a correſpondence would ſoon have enſued between the Committee and me, not only of ſuch conſequence as to demand an inſpection, but would be ſuch as might reflect honour and reputation on their conduct, and on my actions.

Fort Saint George, *Hector Munro.*
6th Oct. 1780.

To *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

My dear Sir,

I received your note this moment, and as all the Troops in camp are much fatigued after a long march, it will be impoſſible for the eſcort to be ſent to meet the eſcort from *Madras* before ſix o'clock this evening; they ſhall go then, and keep marching until they meet your eſcort. I have in the mean time ſent *Jack* your Boy, and two Hircarrahs, on as faſt as poſſible, to deſire that the Officer who commands the eſcort may come on until he meets the one from camp, as above. There will be no accident happen, for we ſaw but nine or ten ſtraggling Horſe of the Enemy's this day. I ſhall do myſelf this pleaſure again to-morrow. Beſt compliments to all our friends. Believe me,

Camp near *Conditour*, My dear Sir,
paſt 3 o'clock afternoon, Your's affectionately,
26th Auguſt 1780. *Hector Munro.*

Dear Sir,

We are juſt arrived here, and intend to march about four o'clock to-morrow morning. I have had no complaints ſince we came to our ground; but our Rear-Guard is not as yet come up. I ſend you a note I received on the march this day.

I am, dear Sir,
Putapyer Village, Your's very ſincerely,
26th Auguſt, *Hector Munro.*
paſt 11 o'clock forenoon.

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro.*

Sir,

Hyder arrived at *Arcot* yeſterday morning; he has twelve heavy Guns, and twenty Field-pieces.

I am, Sir,
Vellore, Your obedient humble Servant,
22d Aug. 1780. *R. Lang.*

To the Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

Dear Sir,

The advanced Guard is juſt come to the ground of encampment. The rain was ſo heavy laſt night with us, and the night before with Colonel *Baillie*, that neither of us can get to *Conjeveram* till Tueſday morning. The Money is arrived. We heard a great many Guns this day, ſuppoſed at *Arcot*. I have ſent to Captain *Prendergaſt*, and will act according as I find his ſituation, or that he is near ſurrendering the place. We march at two o'clock to-morrow morning.

I am,
Camp at *Tripermadore*, Dear Sir,
27th Auguſt 1780. Your's, as uſual,
Half paſt 10 o'clock forenoon. *Hector Munro.*

My dear Sir,

Here we are without any accident happening: I ſhall encamp to-morrow at *Conjeveram*, where Colonel *Baillie* will alſo encamp; firing at *Arcot* as uſual. You will, no doubt, acquaint the Gentlemen of the Committee with our motions.

Camp, I am truly your's,
9 miles from *Conjeveram*, *H. Munro.*
28th Auguſt 1780.

To the Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

Dear Sir,

I wrote to you this morning from our laſt ground, recommending that Rice, Arrack, Sheep, and Biſcuit, &c. ſhould be laid in for the Army at *Chingleput* without one moment's delay, for if the Polar is up we can get at no proviſions of any kind; and it has rained without ceaſing for theſe four nights paſt and all this morning, which is moſt unfortunate for us. The Gentleman (as he is called) whom the Nabob ſent with us, promiſed to get me ſome Rice here, and two hundred Sheep; when I came to the ground, he told me he had no Orders but to attend me. As I neither want him for a Valet de Chambre, a Cook, or a Butler, or as a Guide, I deſired him to return from whence he came as ſoon as he pleaſed, for that I never would aſk him to do any one thing whatever; and as I ſhall moſt implicitly keep my word, he is now a *Gentleman* at large, to go where and when he pleaſes. So much for the Nabob's Gentleman. The time may come when he may be of opinion, that all the Gentlemen of his Family ought to have attended this Army; but little ſaid is ſoon mended, according to the old Proverb. The incloſed for the Nabob, from his Gentleman. They are firing away at *Arcot* as uſual. I hope ſtill to ſave it.

I am, dear Sir,
Camp at *Conjeveram*, Your's, as uſual,
29th Auguſt 1780. *H. Munro.*

P. S. Beſt compliments to all with you, and to our Friend *Oakley*.

To the Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

Dear Sir,

We encamped here laſt night, but as the waters are up, and *Baillie* not joined, I muſt wait his arrival on two accounts, the one as the Nabob's raſcally Killidar gave up *Coverypauk* four days ago to *Hyder*, and he is now *Hyder*'s Killidar there; the other is, that there is a large encampment on the other ſide the River oppoſite to this place, with a view, I ſuppoſe, as ſoon as they can croſs, to intercept Colonel *Baillie*. I mean to have a detachment in the Pagoda with the heavy Guns, to prevent the Enemy from taking poſt there. I can ſay nothing about the three men which were tried by a Court Martial, until I receive the ſentence. Colonel *Braithwaite* ſays, the proceedings were ſent to *Madras* in the *Sartine*; but I never ſaw it. The Nabob ought to write to *Bumrauze* and the *Venkategery* Rajah, to get Grain, Sheep, &c. ready for the Army directly, and let me know when I am to ſend an eſcort for it; but they muſt find Bullocks.

I am, dear Sir,
Camp at *Conjeveram*, Your's, &c.
30th Auguſt 1780. *H. Munro.*

Dear Sir,

I had a letter this day from *Baillie*, who has not been able, owing to the heavy rains, to croſs the Nulah, the day before yeſterday. Two of *Hyder*'s people were found this morning in the front of our advanced Picquets. They poſitively affirm that *Hyder*, with *Tippo Saib*, is on the oppoſite ſide of the River to *Little Conjeveram* with twelve Battalions of Sepoys, 40 Field-pieces, 6,000 Horſe, and 1,000 Peons. I told the two men if their intelligence proved true I would reward them, if otherwiſe, I would moſt undoubtedly hang them. I have ſent out 10 Hircarrahs, and ſhall acquaint you to-morrow what accounts they bring in. If it is true that *Hyder* is come in from *Arcot*,

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Arcot, he muſt intend to prevent, if he can, the junction of Colonel *Baillie* with this part of the Army, or he intends to puſh to *Madras:* In either event I ſhall be cloſe at his heels; and of this you will pleaſe to acquaint the Gentlemen of the Select Committee. Mean time I am, with eſteem,

Dear Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Camp at *Conjeveram*,
31ſt Auguſt 1780.

P. S. I wiſh you would eſtabliſh a Tapall to come to camp by the way of *Chingleput*.

To the Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

My dear Sir,

I have not miſſed writing to you a ſingle day ſince I left the Mount, and I received but one letter from you, that was yeſterday, which I anſwered immediately. *Hyder* is about eight miles in front of this, and he has got about 4,000 Horſe and Rocket Boys. About four miles from this, in our front, he is throwing up Redoubts, I ſuppoſe to ſtop our progreſs if he can, but when the rain will let one march to the place, I hope he will quit his Redoubts, *as he has abandoned the ſiege of* Arcot *without ſucceſs, which he did three nights ago, about* 12 *at night, when he ſent his heavy Guns towards* Arnee, and croſſed his whole Army over the Polar above knee-deep, and keeps not one Tent ſtanding but his own. I beg you will not let the Nabob forget to ſend to *Tamrauze* and the *Venkettagerry* Man to provide us with Grain and Sheep; we have not got one Sheep but what we have brought from *Penamallee*. Had I any proper perſon with me, with proper powers, we might, during our ſtay here, get Sheep from *Tripaſore*, and ſome might be ſent us from *Chingleput*; but here we are ſo helpleſs, as if dropped out of the clouds; as in an Enemy's Country inſtead of a Friend's.

I am, with much eſteem,
Dear Sir,
Your's,
Hector Munro.

Conjeveram,
1ſt Sept. 1780.

P. S. Keep all my letters, I requeſt of you.

To the Governor.—Decyphered.

Send the ſtores to *Chingleput* as per indent ſent you. I ſtay here for *Baillie*'s joining; when that happens I march to attack *Hyder*, who is now by report on this ſide *Coverypauk*. We have no intelligence from the Country; it's both ſhameful and diſgraceful to have it ſaid.

I am,
Your's, &c.
Hector Munro.

Conjeveram,
2d September.

Dear Sir,

I expect to be able to move from hence the day after to-morrow, unleſs beating of Paddy (for we have no Rice) prevents it. I am ſo vexed and ſo perplexed I have only to offer my beſt compliments to the Gentlemen of the Committee, and to aſſure you and them that I will embrace the very firſt opportunity of driving the Enemy from their preſent ſituation.

I am very reſpectfully,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

Camp at *Conjeveram*,
3d Sept. 1780.

To the Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

Dear Sir,

No change ſince my letter of yeſterday, but that many of the Sepoys refuſed this day to receive Paddy, and I have no Rice to give them; for God's ſake ſend ſome perſon of conſequence from the Nabob's Family, unleſs they mean to try experiments by making an Army live upon air. I have not miſſed one day in writing to you ſince I left the Mount, and I have had but one letter from you, and none from any other perſon, except a note from my friend *Davidſon*.

I am, dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
Hector Munro.

Camp, *Conjeveram*,
4th Sept. 1780.

Dear Sir,

I had it not in my power to write to you yeſterday, as the whole line was under arms from 9 o'clock in the morning till paſt dark at night; when we lay all night on our arms, without Tents on the ground, the Enemy two miles in our front. The cauſe for this was, that *Tippoo Saib* detached about 2,000 Foot, with ſome Guns, and 4,000 Horſe, towards *Baillie*; and yeſterday morning marched his whole Army, in order to ſupport that detachment; he manœuvred, ſo did we, and his plan was fruſtrated, by which means *Baillie* attacked the advanced party, and by the accounts of a Hircarrah that came in laſt night, he beat them off. The Hircarrah was under the neceſſity of throwing away a letter he had from *Baillie*, ſo that I know not at preſent where he is, but as I am reſolved to keep as near the Enemy's main body as I can, I expect to ſee Colonel *Baillie* to-morrow. Before I move at any diſtance from *Conjeveram* I muſt get Rice and Sheep. I have now but two days Rice.

I am,
Dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
H. Munro.

Camp, two miles and half North of *Conjeveram*,
7th of September 1780.

The Enemy's Army, as nearly as we can gueſs, between Horſe and Foot, amount to above 15,000, excluſive of Lutewallers or Irregulars.

To the Governor, &c. &c.

My dear Sir,

I hope you and my other friends will be ſo good as to ſuſpend your judgment reſpecting our late diſappointment, until we know the real cauſe; I believe all the Army will do me the juſtice to ſay, that every method which could be thought of, was tried to effect that junction with Colonel *Baillie*; but alas! our ſituation in this country is ſuch, that any unexpected change of weather may in a moment overturn the beſt concerted plans that human invention is capable of forming. I am not able to write more, but wiſh to be kindly remembered to all our friends.

I am always,
My dear Friend,
Your's,
H. Munro.

Chingleput,
12th September.

To the Governor, &c. &c. *Madras.*

Dear Sir,

Pleaſe to acquaint the Select Committee, that the Troops are encamped here, or rather quartered, until I receive their directions about them. I would imagine, encamping to-morrow on the *Madras* ſide of the *Marmalong* River, would keep the communication open with *Madras* at all times. If they are to move there, I beg Rice, Biſcuit, and a Buzar may be ſent out early in the morning.

I am reſpectfully, dear Sir,
Your's, &c.
H. Munro.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor, &c.

Sir *Hector Munro* preſents his compliments to Mr. *Whitehill*; has received his Letter, and alſo one from the Committee; he intends waiting here till he receives their directions relative to the Army, and its encampment, to-morrow morning.

St. Thomas's Mount, Sept. 14th 1780.

Copies of Letters ſent by General *Munro* to Colonel *Coſby*, from the 17th Auguſt, till the 7th Sept. 1780.

Sir,

As *Hyder* is ſending back his heavy Artillery over the *Changama* Paſs, if you could fall in with them, or if they ſhould have got clear of the Paſs, could you deſtroy the road through the Paſs, or fill it up, ſo as to ſtop him there in caſe we engage him, and have the good fortune to beat him, it would be of conſequence; but all this, or any part of it, muſt be carried into execution according as you get intelligence of his motions as above, near or at the Paſs, and when you get your Force together.

I am, with eſteem, Sir,

Fort St. George, 17th Auguſt 1780. Your moſt obedient Servant, *Hector Munro.*

(Duplicate.)

Sir,

I ſhall march this night, and ſhall proceed with the Army to *Arcot*, where you will let me know your motions. If you can, cut off *Hyder*'s Proviſions, and failing of that, fill up or deſtroy the road through the Paſs of *Changama*, to prevent his getting on his Artillery, without being obliged to halt his Army for ſome days, and may thereby give me an opportunity of coming up with him, ſhould he decline coming to a general engagement: either of theſe pieces of ſervice being put in execution, will be of very great conſequence; but if you cannot effect this, I would have you join me as ſoon as you can with the Cavalry.

I am, Sir,

Fort St. George, 15th Aug. 1780. Your moſt obedient humble Servant, *Hector Munro.*

Sir,

As Mr. *Roberts* acquaints me you was to be at *Tiagar* the 2d inſtant, I wiſh you to march with your whole Force to join me by the following route; from *Tiagar* to *Trincaloor*, *Gingee*, *Wandewaſh*, and *Conjeveram*. *Hyder*'s main body is now about three miles from our Camp, on this ſide the *Pollar*, ſo that if you have formed any plan which can be put in execution without retarding your march this way, you are at liberty to try it; at the ſame time your joining me ſoon is of great conſequence.

Camp at *Conjeveram*, 7th Sept. 1780. I am, Sir, Your moſt obedient humble Servant, *Hector Munro.*

Captain *Prendergaſt*.

Dear Sir,

The General deſires me to acquaint you, that your Letter to me of the 29th ultimo gave him great ſatisfaction, and he hopes you will take every opportunity of ſending him all the intelligence you can from your quarter. We had a rumour of the ſiege's being raiſed a few hours before your Letter arrived; he waits here a little time for reaſons you will be made acquainted with by and by; but mean, if any dangers threaten you, depend on ſpeedy relief.

Conjeveram, 2d Sept. 1780. I am your's, *J. P.*

To Colonel *Baillie*.

There are numbers of *Hyder*'s Horſe on the road which you are to come. Set out from *Tripaſore* at night-fall, and do not ſtop, if poſſible, until you arrive at *Conjeveram*.

Conjeveram, 2d September 1780. *Hector Munro.*

The General and I have had the pleaſure of receiving your Notes of the 31ſt ultimo, laſt night. I am deſired by the General to acquaint you, that he wiſhes you would have all the Bullocks and Bafs you can muſter in readineſs, as alſo as many Sheep as you can collect, in caſe he ſhould have occaſion to look towards your quarter for Proviſions. If the Paddy is not beat out into Rice, he depends on the zeal you have already diſcovered for the Service, for your ſetting people at work immediately in preparing that important article. The General deſires me to acquaint you alſo, that he has certain intelligence of Colonel *Goddard*, with his Men, and a great body of Marattas, having laid waſte the greateſt part of *Hyder*'s Dominions to the Northward.

I am, &c.

J. P.

I got your's of the 3d and 4th March from *Peerambaucum*, in the night-time, ſo as to arrive here by daylight; and unleſs I know the night you leave it, ſo as to be back here next morning at day-light, every thing here would be deſtroyed before we could return, the Enemy's Camp being but five miles in our front.

Camp at *Conjeveram*, 5 Sept. 8 A. M.

APPENDIX. No. 9.

STATE of OFFICERS and MEN present with the Detachment under the Command

	Artillery.										Infantry.												
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Lt Fire-workers.	Conductor.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Gunners.	Matroffes.	TOTAL.	Lieu^t Col.	Captains.	Brevet Capt^ns.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Adjutants.	Cadets.	Serj^t Majors	Q. M. Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Privates.	TOTAL.
Artillery	1	1	2	1	7	8	5	14	43	77														
European Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	3	-	2	1	1	3	3	7	89	104
Sepoys Corps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	7	19	4	-	3	4	17	-	-	-	24

PRESENT STATE of the Company's Troops

	FOR DUTY.																						
	Europeans.														Natives.								
	Commiss^d Officers.							Staff.			Non-com^d R. & File.				C^o. Offi^rs Non-c^d Rank & File.								
	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	L^t F^re W^rs.	Enfigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maflers.	Conductors.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Commandets.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.
Cavalry					1			1				3		30	33							
Artillery	1		1	4	3	6		1	1	2	2	26	18	250	294							
2d Battalion 1ft Reg^t	1	1	1	7	4		7	1	1		5	24	28	271	323							
Grenadiers, 2d Batt^n 2d d^o				1	4							5	3	92	100							
Cadet Company					1						27	3		1	4							
14th Battalion of Sepoys					1	1		5	1			6			6	1	6	5	10	9	645	676
15th Ditto					1	2		4	1			5			5	1	7	8	10	9	620	655
16th Ditto						1		4				5			5	1	7	8	11	9	582	618
17th Ditto						2		4	1			6			6	1	9	8	12	10	681	721
21ft Ditto						2		5	1			6			6	1	9	10	12	10	615	657
Company of Marksmen						1			1			2			2		1	2	5	1	98	107
TOTAL																							

RETURN of TENTS, STORES, &c. belonging to the different Corps under the Command of

	Field Officers Marques.	Walls.	Poles.	Shells.	Marques complete.	Walls.	Poles, Sets.	Shells.	Sepoy Tents.	Bell Tents compleat.	Fuzees with Bayonets.	D^o without.	Muskets with Bayonets.	D^o without.	Bayonets.	D^o Slings.	Pouches.	D^o Slings.	D^o Slings.	Halberts.	Drums complete.	Cord.	Braces.	Snares.	Sticks Pairs.	Bench Vice.	Hand D^o.
Artillery	1				1	2	16	2		5																	
73d Regiment					7					6																	
2 Battalions 1ft Reg^t	1				8						10	2	40	8												2	
14th Battalion Sepoys					4				10	22																	
15th Ditto					1				6	20	7		70				70										
16th Ditto					3				6	2										3	7	49	22	3	1	1	
17th Ditto				3					9	22	16		24		60	30			1			50	2				
21ft Ditto					2	2	14		9	22																	
TOTAL	2			3	26	4	30	2	40	99	33	2	134	8	60	30	70		1	3	7	99	24	3	3	3

of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*; taken from the Returns for Auguſt 1780.

APPENDIX No. 9.

Sepoys.								
Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Drummers.	Puchallies.	Sepoys.	TOTAL.
3	32	34	168	171	44	34	2,120	2,606

N. B. The Company of Guides preſent with the Detachments not included; Enſign *Moncrief*, Quarter Maſter, Mr. *William Raine* and Mr. *George Campbell*, Surgeons; Enſign *Mc Aliſter* doing duty the 1ſt Battalion of Sepoys, and *William Carr*, private of the 2d Battalion 1ſt Regiment, Camp Colourmen preſent with the Detachment, and not included in the above State.

Henry Malcolm,
Aj^t General.

encamped at the Mount, Auguſt 26th 1780.

	SICK.																			
	Europeans.													Natives.						
	Commiſs^d Officers.						Staff.			Non-com^d R. & File.				C^o Offic^t Non-c^o Rank & File.						
	Colonels.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	C. F. W^rs.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Conductors.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Commanders.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.
Cavalry																						
Artillery														3	3							
2d Battalion, 1ſt Reg^t													1	18	19							
Grenadiers, 2d Batt^n 2d d^o																						
Cadet Company																						
14th Battalion of Sepoys																	1	2	1		25	29
15th Ditto	ditto																	1	1		30	32
16th Ditto	ditto																1				26	27
17th Ditto	ditto																	1			46	47
21ſt Ditto	ditto																				18	18
Company of Markſmen																						
TOTAL																						

Colonel *James*; Camp, *Marmelon*, 4th October 1780; loſt from the 26th to the 13th September.

Screw Plate.	Hammers of Sorts.	Bellows, Pairs.	Pinchers.	Files, Sorts.	Bars, Iron.	D^o Shell.	Solder Powders.	Borax.	Copper D^o.	Hand Hatchets.	Bills, Hooks.	Mamooties.	Gunny Bags.	Europe Twine.	Bengal D^o.	Cotton Rope, Sk^s.	Thread, Pounds.	Wax Cloth, Pieces.	Hides of Leather.	Carriage Bullocks.	Private Tents.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	48
-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	15	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
1	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	20	12	46	16	1	-	-	1	14	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
-	-	-	-	7	-	2	-	-	-	30	-	20	-	5	3	5	-	5½	-	-	1
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
1	1	-	-	37	1	2	-	-	-	52	27	75	16	6	3	5	1	19½	-	-	97

The Quarter-Maſter's Stores belonging to the 14th, 16th, and 21ſt Battalions of Sepoys were loſt upon the March, but the Quantity thereof cannot be aſcertained, as the Accounts kept of them were loſt at the ſame time.

Edward James,
Col^o Com^t.

APPENDIX. No. 9.

A RETURN of Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, iſſued for the Army, and loſt on the Marches; from the 26th of Auguſt to the 15th of September 1780.

QUALITY of STORES.	Iſſued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Loſt on the March.	TOTAL.
Iron Guns,					
18 Pounders	—	4	—	—	4
3 D°	—	1	—	—	1
Braſs Mortars,					
4½ Inch	—	4	—	—	4
Field Carriages,					
24 Pounders	—	2	—	—	2
18 D°	—	4	—	—	4
3 D°	—	1	—	—	1
Round Shot fixed to Flannel Cartridges,					
6 Pounders	64	—	100	—	164
3 D°	30	—	60	—	90
Shells fixed to Flannel Cartridges,					
5½ Inch	1	—	—	—	1
Grape Shot fixed to Flannel Cartridges,					
6 Pounders	—	—	42	—	42
3 D°	11	—	28	—	39
Empty Flannel Cartridges,					
12 Pounders	44	—	—	—	44
6 D°	12	—	—	—	12
Filled Flannel Cartridges,					
12 Pounders	4	—	—	—	4
6 D°	46	—	—	—	46
Iron Round Shot,					
18 Pounders	—	800	—	—	800
6 D°	—	—	—	5	5
Empty Shells,					
4½ Inch	—	96	—	—	96
Bottoms for Round Shot,					
12 Pounders	—	—	—	6	6
6 D°	—	—	—	29	29
3 D°	—	—	—	17	17
Spunges with Rammer Heads,					
18 Pounders	—	12	—	—	12
12 D°	—	6	—	—	6
6 D	—	30	—	—	30
3 D°	—	10	—	—	10
5½ D°	—	4	—	—	4
4½ D°	—	8	—	—	8
Ladles with Wadhooks,					
24 Pounders	—	2	—	—	2
18 D°	—	7	—	—	7
12 D°	—	2	—	—	2
6 D°	—	4	—	—	4
3 D°	—	3	—	—	3
Live Fuſees,					
5½ Inch	—	140	—	—	140
4½ D°	—	100	—	—	100
Quilted Grape,					
12 Pounders	—	—	—	17	17
6 D°	—	—	—	21	21
5½ D°	—	—	—	2	2
Filled Tubes,					
12 Pounders	120	—	300	—	420
6 D°	284	—	—	—	284
3 D°	39	—	—	—	39
Pper Cylindars,					
6 Pounders	250	—	—	—	250
Cordages of Sorts,					
Europe, 4½ Inch - Coils	—	2	—	10½	12½
—— 3½ D° - D°	½	2	—	—	2½
—— 2½ D° - D°	—	—	—	7	7
Spun Yarn - Bolls	32	16	—	60	108
Sennett, 12 Pounders	—	—	—	2	2
6 D°	—	—	—	8	8
3 D°	—	—	—	4	4

QUALITY of STORES.		Iſſued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram.	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Loſt on the March.	TOTAL.
Country,						
5½ Inch	Coils	1	—	—	—	1
4½ Inch	D°	—	—	—	2½	2½
3½ Inch	D°	—	—	—	7½	7½
2½ Inch	D°	2½	—	—	—	2½
1½ Inch	D°	½	—	—	37	37½
Small Coir,	Bundles	10¼	—	—	—	10¼
Iron and Steel,						
Flat	Bars	4½	—	—	25	29½
Square	D°	½	—	—	10½	11
Bolt	D°	—	—	—	4	4
Rod	D°	1	—	—	—	1
Europe Steel	D°	5½	—	—	—	5½
Pioneers Tools,						
Mamooties		121	—	—	—	121
Pick Axes		25	—	—	—	25
Bill Hooks		—	—	—	38	38
Hand Hatchets		65	—	—	—	65
Felling Axes		—	—	—	19	19
Artificers Tools,						
Croſs-cut Saws		—	—	—	2	2
Hand D°		—	—	—	1	1
Planes		—	1	—	—	1
Augers		—	—	—	2	2
Grindle Stone		—	—	—	1	1
Beak Iron		—	1	—	—	1
Files of Sorts		—	32	—	—	32
Screw Plates		2	1	—	—	3
Sledge Hammers		2	1	—	—	3
Gimblets		—	2	—	—	2
Carpenters Adze		1	—	—	—	1
Gun Powder,		B^{s}. H^{ds}.				
Europe, 60 H.	Barrels	20 : 18	30	—	—	50 : 18
Country, 50 H.	D°	20 : —	30	—	5	25 : —
Artillery ſmall Stores,						
Port Fires		49	—	50	—	99
Match, Europe,	Sh^{s}	38½	—	—	30	68½
——— Country,	D°	60	40	—	15	115
Twine, Europe,	Sk^{s}	50½	50	—	—	100½
——— Bengal,	D°	8	60	—	102	170
Hambro' Line,	D°	—	—	—	9	9
Muſquet Cartridge Paper	Quires	46	—	—	230	276
Claw Hammers		1	6	—	2	9
Pincers,	Pairs	—	—	3	—	3
Tin Tube Boxes, 6 Pounders		3	—	—	—	3
Port Fire Stocks		1	4	—	—	5
Linſtocks		—	24	—	—	24
Hand Spikes, traverſing,						
12 D°		—	1	—	—	1
12 D°		—	1	—	—	1
D° purchaſing		3	49	—	4	56
Haverſacks		—	—	13	—	13
Tarpaulins, large		—	3	1	—	4
Gun, 12 Pounder		—	—	2	—	2
——— 6 D°		—	—	4	—	4
——— 3 D°		—	1	3	—	4
Powder Horns		—	4	—	—	4
Steel Belts		—	8	—	—	8
Gun Flags		—	—	—	2	2
Tar,	Duppers	3	7	—	20	30
Greaſe,	D°	3	7	—	20	30
Wax Cloth,	Pieces	99½	—	—	—	99½
Wax Candles		370	200	—	380	950
Gunny Bags, ſpare		14	20	39	—	73
Rattan,	Bundles	—	—	—	18	18
Chalk,	lbs.	—	10	—	90	100
Cocoa-nut Oil,	Gallons	2½	—	—	37½	40
Muſcove Lights		—	—	—	2	2
Lanthorns		1	6	—	11	18
Tin,	Sheets	1	20	—	—	21
Tanned Hides		—	—	—	2	2
Land Aprons		2	—	—	—	2

APPENDIX. No. 9.

QUALITY of STORES.		Issued to the Army.	Sent into Conjeveram	Sent to Col. Baillie.	Lost on the March.	TOTAL.
Artillery small Stores,						
Copper,	lbs.	3	—	—	17	20
Knives		—	10	—	—	10
Sciſſars		1	10	—	—	11
Sail Needles		9	86	—	—	95
Gunny D°		16	—	—	—	16
Powder Meaſures,	Sets	—	1	—	—	1
Drivers and Setters, $5\frac{1}{2}$ Inch		—	8	—	—	8
Palms		2	5	—	—	7
Artillery Stores,						
Drag Ropes,	18 P^r	—	6	—	—	6
———	6 D°	2	—	—	10	12
———	3 D°	—	—	—	1	1
Hand Jack		—	1	—	—	1
Leather Buckles		—	6	—	12	18
Tompions with Collars	18 P^r	—	4	—	—	4
D°	3 D°	—	4	—	—	4
D°	$2\frac{1}{2}$ Inch	—	4	—	—	4
Pewter Solder	lbs.	3	—	—	—	3
Spunge Staves		1	—	—	9	10
Wood Oil,	Bottles	—	—	—	4	4
Gin,	complete	—	1	—	—	1
Cloth Bags,	18 Pounders	—	1,700	—	—	1,700
Canvas Aprons		—	4	—	—	4
Shot Gunny Bags		—	116	—	—	116
Copper Funnel		—	1	—	—	1
Ammunition,						
Engliſh ſhotted Cartridges		68,108	20,000	50,000	28,197	166,205
——— Carbine D°		7,627	—	—	912	8,539
——— Piſtol D°		—	—	—	2,000	2,000
Blunt Cartridges		—	—	—	1,500	1,500
Looſe Muſket Balls		94,200	10,000	—	4,586	108,786
Muſket Flints		—	1,000	5,000	11,890	17,890
Carbine D°		270	—	—	1,750	2,020
Bayonets, ſpare		1	—	—	—	1
Shoulder Belts		2	—	—	—	2
Steel Ramrods		3	—	—	—	3
Hammers		270	100	100	7,390	7,760
Pickers		320	100	—	7,150	7,590
Worms		320	100	—	5,150	5,570
Log Line	Sk^s	3	20	—	—	23
Drum Heads		—	—	—	18	18
—— Cords		—	—	—	24	24
—— Braces,	Sets	—	—	—	100	100
—— Hoops, Batten		—	—	—	50	50
—— ——— fining		—	—	—	20	20
—— ——— Fleſh		—	—	—	20	20
Blue Cloth,	Pieces	—	4	—	—	4
White D°	D°	—	4	—	—	4
Muſket Cartridge Pouches, double		7	—	—	135	142
——— D° D° ſingle		19	—	—	21	40
Looſe Carbine Balls		—	—	—	5,700	5,700
Eſpontoons		2	—	—	—	2
Drum Sticks		—	—	—	2	2
Mortan Carts		—	2	—	—	2
Piſtol Flints		200	—	—	300	500
Muſkets with Bayonets		12	—	—	—	12
Carbines D°		2	—	—	—	2

Joſeph Moorhouſe,
Commiſſary of Stores to the Army.

APPENDIX. No. 9.

PRESENT STATE of the Company's Troops encamped near *Marmelon*, September 15th 1780.

DOING DUTY.

CORPS.	Europeans. Commiss[d] Officers. Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Lt. Fire Works.	Enfigns.	Staff. Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Conductors.	N. C[o] R[k] & File. Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Natives. C[d] Offi[s] Command[rs].	Subidars.	Jemidars.	N. Com[d] Rank & File. Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	-	29	32							
Artillery	1	-	1	3	3	6	-	1	1	2	2	26	17	231	274							
2d Battalion, 1st Reg[t]	1	1	1	7	1	-	7	1	1	-	3	18	22	166	206							
Cadet Company	-	-	-	-	1	-	-				20	2	-	1	3							
14 Battalion of Sepoys	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	1	5	7	7	6	419	445
15 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	1	1	-	4	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	1	5	6	7	7	383	409
16 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	1	2	-	3	1	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	1	6	7	9	7	415	445
17 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	-	2	-	5	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	3	1	6	6	8	7	439	467
21 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	-	2	-	3	1	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	1	5	7	9	8	388	418
Tanjore Detachment	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	-	5	4	12	5	354	380
Trichinopoly d[o]	-	-	-	1	2	-	5	1	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	1	5	7	10	5	471	499
TOTAL	2	1	2	13	18	6	33	8	2	2	25	75	39	427	541	6	37	44	62	45	2,869	3,063

SICK.

CORPS.	Europeans. Commiss[d] Officers. Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Lt. Fire Works.	Enfigns.	Staff. Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Conductors.	N. C[o] R[k] & File. Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.	Natives. C[d] Offi[s] Command[rs].	Subidars.	Jemidars.	N. Com[d] Rank & File. Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	TOTAL.
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-							
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	4							
2d Battalion, 1st Reg[t]	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	20	21							
Cadet Company	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-							
14 Battalion of Sepoys	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	24	25
15 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	21	22
16 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	32	33
17 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	11	13
21 D[o] - d[o]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	19	20
Tanjore Detachment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	13	14
Trichinopoly d[o]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	6	4	-	23	25	-	2	4	1	-	120	127

APPENDIX. No. 9.

PRESENT STATE of the Troops encamped at *Marmelon*, the 1st of October 1780.

FOR DUTY.

CORPS.	Europeans. Commiss[d] Officers. Colonel.	Lieut. Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	D° Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Lieut. Fire Works.	Staff. Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Conductors.	Surgeons.	D° Assi[ts] and Mates.	N. Com[d] Rank & File. Serjeants.	Drummers.	Trumpeters.	Rank and File.	Total.	Natives. C°Offi[rs]. Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemedars.	Non-commissioned Rank & File. Vakeels.	Farriers.	Armourers.	Trumpeters.	Drummers.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	Total.
1st Battalion 73d Reg[t]	-	-	2	1	-	8	-	-	7	1	-	-	1	1	28	12	-	298	338											
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	30	33											
Artillery	1	-	1	3	-	2	-	4	-	1	1	2	-	-	27	18	-	217	262											
2d Battalion 1 Reg[t]	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	17	22	-	156	195											
14 Battalion Sepoys	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	1	5	6	-	-	-	-	8	5	430	455
15 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	1	3	6	-	-	-	-	10	7	36	393
16 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	1	6	7	-	-	-	-	9	7	430	460
17 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	1	6	7	-	-	-	-	7	7	455	473
21 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	1	5	4	-	-	-	-	9	8	413	440
Tanjore Detachment	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	6	-	5	5	-	-	-	-	12	6	345	373
Trichinopoly d°	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3	1	4	6	-	-	-	-	10	5	448	474
2 Reg[t] Cavalry	-	-	-	1	-	2	3	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	4	10	3	1	-	7	-	4	210	240
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	1	1	27	32
Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	1	6	2	-	-	-	4	2	95	110
TOTAL	1	1	3	9	-	24	3	4	26	10	3	2	1	1	105	52	-	701	858	7	39	59	6	1	-	7	70	52	3,209	3,450

SICK.

CORPS.	Europeans. Commiss[d] Officers. Colonel.	Lieut. Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	D° Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Lieut. Fire Works.	Staff. Ensigns.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Conductors.	Surgeons.	D° Assistants & Mates.	N.C°R&F. Serjeants.	Drums, &c.	Rank and File.	Total:	Natives. C°Offi[rs]. Commandant.	Subedars.	Jemedars.	Non-com. Rank & File. Vakeels.	Farriers.	Armourers.	D° Mates, &c.	Drums.	Puckallies.	Rank and File.	Total.
1st Battalion 73d Reg[t]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	61											
Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	21												
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	9	12											
2d Battalion 1 Reg[t]	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	41
14 Battalion Sepoys	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	36
15 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6
16 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	48	51
17 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	40
21 D° - d°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	27
Tanjore Detachment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	36
Trichin[y] D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10
2 Reg[t] Cavalry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5
Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	5	1	91	97	-	4	9	-	-	-	-	1	-	438	252

Artillery, 2 Cadets, and 3 Invalids doing duty.—2d Battalion 1 Regiment Captains Pocock and Conyngham, Enfigns Capper and Haubary, and 13 acting Enfigns and 24 Invalids from Madras and Chinglepur.—14 Batt[n] Sepoys, Geo. Ure and Tho. Rice acting Enfigns Dodd and Darley.—15 Battalion, Enfigns Fifher & Strahan.—16 Battalion, Lieut[t] Waigh and Dawes, Enfigs Boſwell, alſo acting Enſi[n] Stuart, Mamon Glaſs, and Hamilton 17 Batt[n] Enfigns Geo Bruce, Wm. Sowell & acting Enſi[n] Graham—21 Batt[n] Enſi[n] Foules & Streble, and Meſſrs. Guile, Terry and Stuart, acting Enſi[ns].—1 Jemedar 1 Naig, 1 Drummer and 13 Privates, Artillery of the 1st Reg of Nabob's Cavalry doing duty in 2d R[t]

Edw. James, Col. Commandant.

APPENDIX No. 9.

An ACCOUNT; Remains of Ordnance, Ammunition, and Stores, under the Charge of the Commiſſary of Stores to the Army. Camp, 16th September 1780.

QUANTITY of STORES.	Remains 16 Sept. 1780.
Braſs Guns,	
12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
Braſs Howitzers,	
5½ Inch	4
Field Carriages, with Limbers, Boxes, &c.	
12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
5½ Inch	4
Round Shot fixed to Flannel and Serge Cartridges	
12 Pounders	290
6 D°	1,712
3 D°	1,120
Shells fixed to Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
5½ Inch	139
Grape Shot, fixed Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	115
6 D°	381
3 D°	241
5½ Inch	56
Empty Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	69
6 D°	1,066
3 D°	119
5½ Inch	50
Field, Flannel and Serge Cartridges,	
12 Pounders	108
6 D°	252
3 D°	147
5½ Inch	80
Spunges with Rammer Heads,	
12 Pounders	8
6 D°	39
3 D°	18
5½ Inch	8
Ladles with Wadhooks,	
12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
Filled Tubes,	
12 Pounders	1,769
6 D°	5,832
3 D°	3,235
Cordage,	
4½ Inch, Country — Coils	
3½ D° — D°	2½
1½ D° — D°	2
Small Coir — Bundles	6
Spun Yarn — Rolls	7
Iron,	
Flat, — Bars	18
Square, — D°	2
Bolt, — D°	4
Rod	40
Europe Steel, — Bars	26
Pioneers Tools,	
Momoatys	401
Pickaxes	69
Billhooks	148
Hand Hatchets	108
Broad Axes	93
Felling Axes	22

QUANTITY of STORES.	Remains 16 Sept. 1780.
Artificers Tools,	
Croſs-cut Saws	5
Hand Saws	3
Planes	16
Augurs	12
Chiſſels	2
Compaſſes — Pairs	
Grindle Stone	2
Beak Iron	½
Anvils	300
Files, of Sorts	1
Vices, ſtanding	2
Bench	2
Hand	7
Screw Plates	7
Sledge Hammers	1
Hand Hammers	1
Strevis Tinman	12
Gimblets	3
Soldering Irons	1
Braſs Adze	2
Copper Drivers	10
Vices, Copper	1
Cooper's Adze	5
Drawing Knives	5
Carpenter's Adze	37
Tumbrils	2
Artificers Carts	20
Gunpowder, Europe — 60lb. Barrels	
Artillery Stores,	
Port Fires	2,346
Match, Cotton — Skains	57
Match, Country — D°	157
Europe Twine — D°	148
Bengal D° — D°	142
Hamborough Line — D°	11
Muſket Cartridge Paper — Quires	255
Tin Tubes, Boxes with Straps,	
12 Pounders	8
6 D°	16
3 D°	20
Claw Hammers	34
Pincers for Tubes — Pairs	31
D° for Fuzees — D°	14
Port Fire Stocks	33
Lint Stocks	31
Hand Spikes, traverſing,	
12 Pounders	7
6 D°	31
3 D°	14
5½ Inch	8
Hand Spikes, purchaſing	62
Haverſacks	58
Tarpaulins, large	16
Tumbrils	34
Gun 12-pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
5½ Inch	4
Padlocks with Keys	90
Priming Irons	44
Steel Bitts	47
Gun Flags	2
Tar — ½ Dupper	4
Greaſe — D°	4

APPENDIX, No. 9.

QUANTITY of STORES.	Remains 16 Sept. 1780.
Wax Candles	1,500
Wax Cloth - P°	1
Canvas - Bolts	3
Gunny Bags for Muſket Ammunition, ſpare	17
Rattan - Bundles	2
Chalk - lb.	
Cocoa-nut Oil	
Muſcovy Lights	
Lanthorns	
Tin - Sheets	45
Copper Funnels	3
Sal Armoniac - lb.	8
Borax - lb.	8
Pewter Solder - lb.	9
Copper D° - lb.	12
Roſin - lb.	8
Camphire - lb.	2
Marline - Skains	11
Tanned Hides	
Country D°	
Lead Aprons	31
Quick Match - Skains	6
Mealed Powder - lb.	8
Copper	
Spunge Tacks - lb.	6
White Lead - D°	2
Raſps	12
Dredging Boxes	5
Knives	24
Sciſſars - Pairs	24
Sail Needles	100
Hour Glaſſes	2
Gunny Needles	100
Scales and Weights - Sets	2
Calliper Compaſſes - Pairs	2
Boudge Barrels	2
Saws for Fuzees	7
Engine for drawing Fuzees	1
Perpendiculars	2
Spirit Quadrants	1
Common D°	5
General Williamſon's Inſtrument	
Drivers and Setters, 5½ Inch - each	2
Sheel Gauges - Set	1
Palms	15
Drag Ropes, 12 Pounders - Set	4
6 D° - D°	14

QUANTITY of STORES.	Remains 16 Sept. 1780.
Drag Ropes, 3 Pounders - Set	7
5½ Inch D° - D°	4
Hand Jack	1
Leather Buckets	59
Gunſpikes { round	28
ragged	30
Spring	30
Relievers for Spring Spikes	31
Tompions with Collars, 12 Pounders	4
6 D°	16
3 D°	7
5½ Inch	4
Plyers	2
Muſket Ammunition,	
Engliſh ſhotted Cartridge	81,000
Carbine D° D°	23,200
Piſtol D° D°	
Blunt Muſket Cartridges	3,000
Looſe Muſket Balls	
Flints,	
Muſket Field	11,000
Carbine D°	
Piſtol D°	
Quarter Maſter's Stores,	
Muſkets with Bayonets	28
Carbines with D°	
Bayonets, ſpare	
Braſs Swords, Serjeants	
Drummers	
Shoulder Belts	170
Bayonet Scabbards	
Lock Caſes	
Steel Ramrods	
Hammers	360
Pickers	2,600
Worms	1,200
Log Line - Skains	68
Drum Heads	370
Cords	
Braces	
Snares	
Hoops, Batten	
Lining	
Fleſh	
Sticks	48
Double Muſket Cartridge Pouches	65
Europe ſingle D° D°	

Joſeph Moorhouſe,
Com. of Stores.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 9th October 1780.

Sir *Hector Munro* gives in the following Minute:

In my Minute of the 6th inſtant, I reſerved to myſelf permiſſion to write an Anſwer to one part of Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*'s Minute of the 1ſt of this month, when I could aſcertain the ſtrength of Colonel *Fletcher*'s Detachment.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* are pleaſed to ſay, 4,000 Sepoys and 600 Europeans, were loſt to the Service by the unfortunate diſaſter which happened to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment.

The native Sepoys of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Detachment were 2,606; of Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher*'s, 706: Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s Europeans, Non-commiſſioned, Rank and File, 207; Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher*'s, 301; making in all, of Sepoys 3,312, and of Europeans 508.

It is to be hoped, that one half of theſe will not be ultimately loſt to the Service, as, by all reports as yet received, there are between two and three hundred Europeans, excluſive of Officers, Priſoners with *Hyder*, and about 1,000 Sepoys; beſides that there are near that number of Sepoys come into different Forts in the *Carnatic*, and more are daily coming in. *Hector Munro*.

Lord *Macleod* to the Secretary at War.

Fort Saint George, 13th October 1780: Received 16th April 1781.

Sir,

I have the honour to incloſe you, returns of the 1ſt Battalion of His Majeſty's 73d regiment for ſix months, taking

taking up all occurrences ſince the laſt returns I ſent you by the Fleet, which ſailed from *Madras* the 7th of April of the preſent year.

You will ſee the heavy loſs the Regiment has ſuſtained ſince the laſt returns. Although the change of climate muſt have occaſioned the death of ſome men, yet I attribute the greateſt mortality from the Regiment, which conſiſted of above a thouſand Europeans when landed here, to their being crowded into barracks, which were never meant to contain above 400 or 500 men at moſt. Another very great cauſe of the ſickneſs, in my opinion, was the want of an Hoſpital.

Though the Battalion's deſtination was known to the Government here above a year before we landed, and *Poonamalee* was allotted, from the beginning, for our quarters, yet the Battalion was actually there on the ſpot above ſix weeks before the foundations of an Hoſpital were laid, which then was ordered on my repeated complaints and remonſtrances.

The five Officers, ſeven Serjeants, four Drummers, and 117 Rank and File, whom you will find taken up as miſſing in the return ſince the 9th of September, are the two Flank Companies of my Regiment. They were ſent, together with two European Companies of Grenadiers of the *Eaſt India* Company's Troops, ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers, and a Company of Markſmen, on the evening of the 8th of September, from our Camp at *Conjeveram*, to join Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, who was advancing from the Northern Circars with three Battalions and ſix Companies of Sepoys, above two hundred Europeans, and ten Field-pieces, to join us. Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher* commanded the Detachment from the Camp at *Conjeveram*, and made good his junction the 9th of September, in the morning, with Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*.

The 10th of September, in the morning, Colonel *Baillie*'s Corps was attacked by *Hyder Ally* with his whole Army, and cut to pieces. We have certain intelligence, that the misfortune was in a great meaſure owing to ſome of our Tumbrils blowing up, which deſtroyed the little Ammunition that was left, and occaſioned a great confuſion; of which the Enemy's Cavalry took advantage, and broke into the line.

I have pretty certain, though not official intelligence, that Lieutenants *Alexander*, *Geddes*, *Mackenzie*, and *Gun*, were killed in the action of the 10th September; and that Captain *Baird*, and Lieutenants *Lindſey* and *Melville*, were wounded; and that Captain *Baird* is ſince dead of his wounds, at *Arnee*.

The European Infantry ſtood firm as a wall while they had a ſhot left, and were almoſt all killed or wounded. I do not expect to ſee many of the latter belonging to my Regiment, as I am told they die daily, from want of proper care, and from harſh uſage. I hope by the next ſhip to get a good recruit, as otherwiſe, I am afraid, we ſhall in a ſhort time not be able to guard our colours.

As I am ordered, by the King's inſtructions, to inform you when opportunities offer, of what occurrences happen, I think it my duty, in obedience to His Majeſty's commands, to acquaint you of the preſent ſituation of the Country, ſo far as is within the reach of my own knowledge, and no further.

About the 20th of July, advices arrived here from different quarters, that *Hyder Ally* had invaded the *Carnatic* with a powerful Army; but no attention was paid by the People in power to this intelligence, which they treated with contempt. The 23d of July I took the liberty to tell the Governor, that perhaps *Hyder*'s invaſion might be true; and that I thought, at all events, he ought to take ſome meaſures to oppoſe him. His anſwer was, What can we do? we have no money. He then added, We mean, however, to aſſemble an Army, and you are to command it. That evening put however the invaſion beyond a doubt, even with the Government here; for certain intelligence was then received, that *Porto Novo*, on the ſea-coaſt, and *Conjeveram*, not fifty miles from this capital, had been plundered by the Enemy.

The 27th of July I received orders from the Select Committee to march the Troops aſſembling at *Poonamalee*, conſiſting of the 1ſt Battalion of my own Regiment, one Battalion of Sepoys, and the Artillery, with 24 Field pieces, amounting in all to about 1,650 men, to *Conjeveram* and to *Enicollen*, where I was to be joined by a weak Battalion of Europeans from *Vellore*, and was then to march to *Wandewaſh*, where Colonel *Braithwaite* was to join me with another weak Battalion of Europeans, and three Battalions of Sepoys, from *Pondicherry*. This order occaſioned my writing a Letter to the Select Committee on the 31ſt of July, of which I have the honour to incloſe you a Copy.

The 1ſt of Auguſt I received orders from the Select Committee to march early next morning towards *Conjeveram*, *Enicollen*, &c. provided the Proviſions and Stores ſhould arrive in Camp that night; but they did not arrive that night, nor are they yet arrived.—The ſame Letter informed me, that the Select Committee had appointed Sir *Hector Munro* to command the Army, and that Sir *Hector* would join me next day, or the day following, on the march.

By order of the Governor and Select Committee, I marched the 17th of Auguſt, in the evening, from *Poonamalee* to *Saint Thomas* Mount, where I arrived and encamped the Troops the 18th in the morning. The 24th, in the morning, I was joined by Colonel *Braithwaite* with his Corps, from *Pondicherry*. The 25th, in the evening, Sir *Hector Munro* arrived in Camp, and took the command of the Army. Next morning we marched towards *Conjeveram*, where we arrived the 29th Auguſt, and continued in that neighbourhood till the 11th September in the morning, waiting for Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*.

The events of the 8th, 9th, and 10th of September, have been already mentioned in part; I have only to add, that on the 9th the General gave orders for all the Tents to be ſtruck at eight o'clock that evening, and to be ſent, together with the Baggage, to *Conjeveram* Pagoda; which was accordingly done; the General declaring it, at the ſame time, to be his reſolution to march at ten o'clock that evening to join Colonel *Baillie*. The reaſons or intelligence that afterwards induced the General to alter this reſolution, were, I make no doubt, very ſolid; but are unknown to me. Between one and two o'clock in the morning of the 10th, a cannonade was heard from Colonel *Baillie*'s quarters, which laſted near an hour, and then all was quiet on that ſide; but a great noiſe was heard all night from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp. The 10th, at ſeven o'clock in the morning, we marched by our right to join Colonel *Baillie*; after marching ten or eleven miles, the Lines faced to the right about, and returned to *Conjeveram*. The General had probably then received advice of Colonel *Baillie*'s defeat. In the evening, the Army arrived at *Conjeveram*, where they reſted on their Arms a few hours; and the 11th, at two o'clock in the morning, began their retreat to *Chingleput*, where we arrived the 12th, in the morning.

The Troops ſuffered very much on this march from the length of it, from the exceſſive heat of the weather, and the want of victuals for two days. We likewiſe loſt a great deal of our Baggage, and ſuffered much from deſertion of Sepoys, beſides the loſs of many, both Europeans and Sepoys, who were cut down by the Enemy's Horſe.

The 13th, in the evening, we marched from *Chingleput*, and arrived at the Mount next day. The 15th, the remains of our Army marched to *Marmelon*, a few miles nearer to this place, where they ſtill continue encamped.

Hyder Ally, who had raiſed the ſiege of *Arcot* on our approach to *Conjeveram*, has renewed it, ſince the 16th of laſt month; and by all account the progreſs has hitherto been very ſlow.

I have

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I have never been able to get an exact account of *Hyder Ally*'s Force. In a Letter he wrote me the 5th of last month, in answer to one I had wrote to him, requesting him to take care of the Officers and Soldiers of the King's Troops, who were Prisoners with him, and promising to refund what money he should advance them, &c. &c. &c. he tells me, that he had 100,000 Horses; that is certainly a gasconade. The best accounts seem to agree, that his whole Force, at the time of his invasion, amounted to 85,000 men of every kind.

Fort Saint George, 13th Oct. 1780. I have the honour to be, &c. *Macleod.*

To the Right honourable *Charles Jenkinson*, &c. &c. &c.

Note, This Letter is also referred to in the Report, under Appendix, N° 42.

Sir *Hector Munro* to the Secretary at War.

Sir, *Fort Saint George*, 14th October 1780.

I would not have troubled you at this time with a Letter, were it not that *Hyder Ally Cawn* entered the *Carnatic* last July in a hostile manner, with a large Army of Horse and Foot. In the month of August he besieged *Arcot*, the capital of the *Carnatic*. It was judged proper to assemble an Army as soon as possible to raise the siege. I marched with His Majesty's 73d Regiment, and about 4,000 of the Company's Troops, from *Madras*, the 26th of August, to the relief of *Arcot*, and was to have been joined by Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* on the march, who was coming from the Northward with a large Detachment of the Troops. I settled it so with the Colonel, that were it not for the greatest fall of rain ever known at the season of the year, he would have joined me the second day after my arrival at *Conjeveram*, a large village about forty miles from *Madras*. Unfortunately a little dirty nullah, or small rivulet, about two days march from *Conjeveram*, kept Colonel *Baillie* seven days from crossing.

Hyder Ally raised the siege of *Arcot*, on my arrival with a part of the Army at *Conjeveram*; crossed his main body over the *Pollar* river; and having so much time given him, owing to eight days constant rain, he marched a Detachment to endeavour to prevent the junction of our Troops. Colonel *Baillie* was attacked, and beat off *Hyder*'s Troops.

I received a Letter from the Colonel after the action, acquainting me with it; and that after a general review of things after the engagement, he could not march until I should join him; for, had he crossed some days before, I intended marching towards him. But the provisions we carried from *Madras* being then expended, and none to be had (there being no magazines in the country) but some Paddy out of which the Rice is beat, and which Paddy we found at *Conjeveram*. Had I abandoned that place, and that the Enemy had possessed himself of the village (and which he most undoubtedly would have done, his main body being at that time within two miles of us) we must have starved, or thrown down our arms.

This, Sir, being our situation, I sent, with the approbation of several of the principal Officers with me, a Detachment to reinforce Colonel *Baillie* with nine Camels loaded with Ammunition for his Field-pieces and Musquetry. This Detachment consisted of ten Companies of Sepoy Grenadiers; one Company of Sepoy Markfmen; three Companies of European Grenadiers (the Grenadiers of the 73d Regiment made one of the three); and the Light Infantry Company of the 73d, making in all about 1,200 men. I had resolved to send four Field-pieces with the Detachment, but Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher*, who commanded it, requested I would not send any Artillery, as he would be more expeditious without any Guns. He marched off about nine at night, and joined Colonel *Baillie* next morning, and the whole marched next evening to join me, and were attacked on their march by the Enemy. Upon my hearing some guns fired, I ordered all our Tents to be struck, and the Troops to be ready to march; but after the firing of some Cannon and some scattered firing of small arms, the whole ceased for near four hours. I made no doubt but Colonel *Baillie*, with his Detachment, would arrive about daylight in the morning: instead of which, a very close cannonading began, and *Hyder* with his main body got on his march, and so did we, and were marching towards Colonel *Baillie*, but before we had marched five or six miles the firing ceased; a wounded Sepoy came in, who told me that Colonel *Baillie* was defeated, owing to three Tumbrils of Ammunition having blown up. He is a gallant Officer, and nothing but an accident which human invention or foresight could not have guarded against, occasioned this unfortunate disaster.

There have been no authentic accounts received as yet from Colonel *Baillie*, who is, with 32 Officers, about 300 Europeans, and 1,000 Sepoys, Prisoners with *Hyder*. All I know of it is from the report of private men, who came in daily, and who all agree in the blowing up of the Tumbrils; which accident might occasion the defeat of 20,000 men as well as of this Detachment.

This Presidency have sent to *Bengal* for a supply of men and money; if that requisition is complied with, the Army will be again soon in readiness to take the field against *Hyder*, who is now for the second time besieging *Arcot*. I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble Servant, *Hector Munro.*

P. S. You will be good enough to excuse my using a borrowed hand to write, having the rheumatism in almost all my joints.

Extract of a Letter from Vice Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes*, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships in the *East Indies*, to Mr. *Stephens*; dated *Fort Saint George*, the 15th October 1780.

Touching at *Pondicherry* in my way to windward, I found that the Garrison of that place had received orders to evacuate it, and march to join the body of the Army then collecting to oppose *Hyder Ally*. In this Garrison was a quantity of Gunpowder, Guns, Shot, and other military Stores, the Company's property, which it was necessary to remove, to prevent their falling into the Enemy's hands; part of which I sent to *Madras*, in His Majesty's ship *Sartine*, taking the remainder on board the several ships of the squadron.

Having been apprized that there was a number of large Brass Mortars and Guns, with Shells, Shot, Muskets, Carbines, Furniture for 2,000 Cavalry, and other military Stores, the property of the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, deposited at the Danish Settlement of *Tranquebar*, and the Nabob having given his consent to their removal from thence to this place, to prevent their falling into the Enemy's hands, I ordered the heavy Brass Mortars, Brass Guns, Muskets, and Carbines, to be received on board the several ships of the squadron, and employed the *Sartine* in transporting the Shells, Shot, Horse Furniture, and other military Stores, to this place: And having remained off *Negapatnam* with the squadron to the 10th of September, without any Enemy appearing on the coast, I returned to this road on the 12th, in order to complete the ships with Stores and Provisions for their passage to the Malabar Coast and Bombay; and the whole of the Company's and the Nabob's military Stores were immediately landed from the squadron.

On the 17th August His Majesty's sloop *Nymph* joined me off *Negapatnam* from a six weeks cruize off the *Foyar*'s *Hood* on *Ceylon*; and on the 14th of September, at the request of this Presidency, I dispatched her to *Ballasore* Road, with a Gentleman charged with mine and this Presidency's public dispatches to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; giving an account of the defeat and total loss of a large Detachment of our Army on this coast

coaſt by *Hyder Ally*, and ſoliciting immediate ſuccours of Troops and Money for the ſupport of the Company's Poſſeſſions on this coaſt. On the 7th I ordered the *Sartine* to proceed to *Vizigapatnam*, to bring up a body of Troops to reinforce our Army. On the 9th of this month, the *Nymph* joined me here, having executed her orders; and on the 13th the *Sartine* alſo joined me in this road, but without any Troops, who refuſed to embark, mutinied, and murdered ſome of their European Officers.

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes* to the Earl of *Hillſborough*; dated *Fort Saint George*, 15th October 1780.

This Preſidency is involved in a particular war for the defence of the *Carnatic* and the Company's Poſſeſſions on this coaſt, againſt their old and inveterate Enemy *Hyder Ally*; who, towards the end of laſt July, entered the *Carnatic* with an Army of more than 80,000 effective Troops; for a detail of which I beg leave to refer your Lordſhip to Paper No. 1. of this diſpatch.

The uncertainty of this attempt of *Hyder*'s, and the very low ſtate of the *Madras* Treaſury, are the cauſes aſſigned here, that the Forces of the Eſtabliſhment were not early collected to repel the Invader on his firſt appearance; and the great diſtance of that Force, ſpread in garriſons from *Pallamcottah* to the South, to *Ganjam* on the North, a tract of country extending 900 miles, together with the ſuddenneſs of the invaſion, and rapidity with which the Enemy's Cavalry overſpread the open country, rendered the march of ſmall detachments impracticable, and, as the event proved, hazardous to large ones; for, on the 10th of laſt month, a large detachment, which, after a march of nearly 200 miles, arrived within a very ſmall diſtance of the main body of our Army, and was joined by a reinforcement from that Army, conſiſting of the beſt European Troops in it, was overpowered by *Hyder*'s numerous Cavalry, and either cut to pieces, made priſoners, or diſperſed. My letter on this occaſion of the 14th of September, addreſſed to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, a copy of which, No. 2. I have taken the liberty to incloſe herewith for your Lordſhip's peruſal, will convey to your Lordſhip a clear idea of what I then felt, and ſtill feel, for the ſtate of our force on this coaſt. The remains of the Army, after a precipitate retreat, has lain within a few miles of this place, unable to face the Enemy, who are now employed in the ſiege of *Arcot*, the metropolis of this country, defended by a very unequal garriſon. What ſuccours will be ſent from *Bengal*, I cannot ſay; but, if a body of regulars from the French Iſlands of *Mauritius* and *Bourbon* ſhould land on this coaſt, to join *Hyder Ally*, an event much to be apprehended, not only the territories of the Company on this coaſt may be loſt, but even *Fort Saint George* itſelf will be in imminent danger.

Extract of a Letter from *Fort Saint George*, 15th October 1780.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Sir *Edward Hughes* having adviſed us of his intentions to diſpatch the *Nymph* ſloop to the Cape, we embrace the opportunity of ſending by that veſſel an account of the preſent ſituation of affairs upon this coaſt; and that it may be conveyed to you with all poſſible expedition, we have appointed Mr. *Thomas Lewin*, one of your Servants, to take charge of our packets, and directed him to proceed with them from the Cape by the firſt ſafe conveyance that ſhall offer after his arrival there.

Your Honours were informed in our addreſs of the 3d April laſt, that the war with the Marattas was carried on, and that *Hyder Ally Cawn* had for ſome time held a very doubtful conduct towards us. In the months of May and June we had various intelligence of this Chief's preparations and movements, which were given out to be againſt the *Carnatic*; but there was ſtill reaſon to ſuppoſe, and in this opinion the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* were very confident, that *Hyder* had really no intention of breaking with us. Appearances were, however, ſtrongly on the offenſive incurſion, and the event has verified them.

On the 24th July we received information that part of *Hyder Ally*'s Cavalry had actually entered the *Carnatic* in different places; and a few days after, we learnt that one body had penetrated as far as *Porto Novo* (a ſea-port near *Cuddalore*) and plundered it. The principal part of your Army which was cantoned at *Madras*, *Poonamalee*, *Saint Thomas*'s Mount, and *Pondicherry*, was directed to aſſemble at *Saint Thomas*'s Mount; and orders were ſent to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, who commanded a ſtrong detachment of Troops in the *Guntoor* Circar, to march towards the Preſidency, to join the reſt of the Army. In the mean time *Hyder Ally*, with the main body of his Troops, entered the *Carnatic* at the paſs of *Changama*; and having in about a fortnight made himſelf maſter of the forts of *Pollour*, *Chittaput*, and *Arnee*, belonging to the Nabob, and garriſoned by his people only, he ſat down the 22d Auguſt before *Arcot*. This place being of great importance, it was determined that the Army ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible to its relief. Accordingly, on the 26th Auguſt, Sir *Hector Munro* took the field with the Troops then aſſembled at *Saint Thomas*'s Mount, conſiſting of 1,184 European Infantry, 294 Artillery, 3,434 Sepoys, with 32 field-pieces, and moved towards *Conjeveram*. Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, with the detachment from the *Guntoor* Circar, conſiſting of 104 European Infantry, 77 European Artillery, and 10 field-pieces, was arrived at this time on the North bank of the *Cortelair*, a river about thirty miles North-weſt of *Madras*; and the General concerted meaſures ſo, that the detachment might reach *Conjeveram* the day after he himſelf and the reſt of the Army ſhould arrive there.

From the 26th, the day of the General's departure from the Mount, until the 29th, the day of his arrival at *Conjeveram*, and ſome days after, there fell conſtant and heavy rains, which are not very unuſual at this ſeaſon of the year: at the time they began, Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment was on the North ſide of a ſmall river called the *Cortelair*, about five miles from *Trepaſſore*: this river ſwelled ſo much by the rains, that Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* was unable to paſs it until the 3d September, when he ſet forward to join the Army at *Conjeveram*.

From this period until the 14th September, the military operations became ſo intereſting, that we think it neceſſary to have recourſe to a Journal of them delivered us by the General, which we ſhall tranſcribe for your information; [which, however, your Committee have omitted here, as it is inſerted in the body of the Report, pages 11, 12, 13.]

By the unfortunate defeat of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, we have loſt, in killed, wounded, and priſoners, about 508 Europeans and 3,312 Sepoys. As ſoon as we received intelligence of this diſaſter, we tranſmitted a particular account of it to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and requeſted a ſuitable reinforcement might be ſent in from thence with all expedition. We are in daily expectation of an anſwer to this application. After our Army retired from *Conjeveram*, *Hyder Ally* proceeded again to *Arcot*, before which he is now making his approaches; there are 150 Europeans and two companies of Sepoys belonging to you in that fort, and 5,000 armed people belonging to the Nabob. *Hyder* has been very ſlow in his progreſs, and we flatter ourſelves the Garriſon will be able to hold out till the rains ſet in. The moment the Army is ſufficiently reinforced to take the field, it will march again to the relief of *Arcot*.

The Governor General and Council of *Bengal* are ſtill proſecuting the war with the Marattas; and we underſtand

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ſtand General *Goddard* is preparing to go againſt *Baſſein*; the ſiege, it is imagined, will be commenced about the 1ſt of next month. We cannot yet ſay what reſolution the Governor General and Council may have taken relative to the war ſince the diſaſter which befel our Troops; but we ſincerely hope no pains will be ſpared to put an end to it immediately, as the ſucceſs of your affairs, in our judgment, now reſts ſolely on that event.

Sir *Edward Hughes* is going with the ſquadron to *Bombay*, from whence he means to return the beginning of February. We ſhall take this opportunity of giving what relief we can to the Factory at *Tellicherry*, which has been cloſely beſieged theſe two months by the Nairs, aſſiſted with a ſtrong body of Troops belonging to *Hyder*.

Our European force, by the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, by caſualties and ſickneſs, and by the abſence of near 700 men, who are ſerving on the *Malabar* Coaſt, is reduced to an alarming ſtate of weakneſs, conſiſting in effectives (including what remains of Lord *Macleod*'s regiment) of only 1,400 men. Thus circumſtanced, with a powerful Enemy in the heart of the *Carnatic*, and under the expectation of a conſiderable French armament, we cannot help requeſting, in the moſt earneſt manner, that you will ſend us as large a reinforcement as poſſible, by the earlieſt conveyances.

We have been put to the greateſt diſtreſs for the want of money to carry on the war, owing to a total failure in our uſual reſources, the *Carnatic*, waſted by the incurſions of the enemy. The Nabob pleads this in excuſe for not diſcharging any of his engagements.

The Rajah of *Tanjore*, whoſe country hath not been diſturbed in any ſhape, has yet given us no aſſiſtance, nor have we yet obtained any ſupply of money from *Bengal*, though the Governor General and Council have expreſſed an intention to aſſiſt us.

Under theſe circumſtances we had no alternative for ſupplying the various exigencies of the Service, but that of borrowing from individuals, and taking up money for drafts upon *England*. The Reſolutions we came to on this ſubject will be communicated to you from the Civil Department.

As we know not by what conveyance our diſpatches may go after their arrival at the Cape, we have thought it adviſable not to ſend our Conſultations by this opportunity.

It may be proper, however, to obſerve, that the Members of the Committee have differed in their ſentiments upon many material points which have come before them, both previous to, and ſince the commencement of the preſent troubles; but as we cannot, in this place, enter into any particulars, we requeſt you will poſtpone your judgment until you receive our Conſultations, which ſhall be ſent by the firſt proper conveyance.

The deſigns of the French in this quarter being, in the preſent criſis, an object of the utmoſt importance to your intereſts, we have judged it proper to appoint a Reſident at the Cape of *Good Hope*; chiefly with the view of communicating to you, and to the ſeveral Preſidencies in *India*, the earlieſt intelligence of their motions. The Gentleman we have named for this ſervice, is Mr. *Richard Lewin*, who has directions to embark in the *Nymph*, with an allowance of 200 pagodas a month.

Mr. *John Hollond*, ſenior, merchant, having been ſuſpended from your Service, we now tranſmit the proceedings regarding him; alſo, an Addreſs from him to your Honourable Court, which he has requeſted us to forward to you.

We are, Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful humble Servants,

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort Saint George,
15th October 1780.

Letter from Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. to the Court of Directors; dated 6 November 1780.

Gentlemen,

Excuſe me if I entreat your indulgence for a few minutes, reſpecting a letter addreſſed to you by Mr. *Sadlier*, dated 17th October 1780, as alſo to ſome letters written by him to the Governor General of *Bengal*, copies of which he has ſent to you, as full of wicked invectives as they are malicious falſehoods reſpecting my conduct.

I do myſelf the honour of ſending you herewith Lord *Macleod*'s and other Officers replies to ſuch parts of Mr. *Sadlier*'s letter as relate to them, which will ſhew what credit ought to be given to the aſſertions of that Gentleman; and I beg leave to refer to my letter of the 21ſt September 1780, to the Committee of *Fort Saint George*, for the operations of the Army.

It would be preſumption in me to take up the time of the Honourable Court of Directors, as well as paying myſelf a poor compliment, was I to follow Mr. *Sadlier* throughout the labyrinth of abſurdities he has advanced.

It is not to him, it is to you, Gentlemen, I am reſponſible for my actions, both in my Civil and Military capacity; and I can declare in the moſt ſolemn manner, that I have ever acted according to the beſt of my underſtanding, for the intereſt of the Company, and the honour of the Nation. To your ſuperior judgment I therefore ſubmit my conduct.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
and moſt humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

To the Honourable
The Court of Directors, &c. &c.

Colonel *James*, to Major General Sir *Hector Munro*.

Fort Saint George, 29th October 1780.

Sir,

The report of alarms in camp at night of the 10th of September, I cannot with propriety contradict, as the Army was then not in camp, but in the village of *Conjeveram*, ſome corps in one ſtreet, and ſome in another, as ſettled by the Quarter Maſter General, for the convenience of marching at two o'clock in the morning of the 11th of September, agreeable to a verbal order from the Commander in Chief, which, for many private reaſons, he thought proper to iſſue.

The occaſion of what has ſince been termed an alarm, was, the Black People collecting the Bullocks for the Stores, &c. ſome of which running down the ſtreets, awakened the Sepoys and Camp Followers till it became general. This, to the beſt of my memory, happened about 12 o'clock at night; about one I got in my palaquin, and proceeded to the right hand diviſion of Guns commanded by Captain *Regenill*, who with other Officers, was ſitting in a Pagoda, where the ammunition and ſtores were lodged. The Sub-conductors were loading the Bullocks, to be ready for marching; after remaining in this ſituation for the ſpace of half an hour, the Park Serjeant came and informed us, that the 73d Regiment was on their march; on which we all repaired to the Guns in the front of the Pagoda, and we immediately marched off. But leſt we ſhould not come up with the regiment, and it being exceſſive dark, I ordered my Adjutant to ride to the front or head of the line to acquaint the General; but before Lieutenant *Slipper* returned, we had juſt joined the regiment, and all was well. To this I am ready to be on oath.

Edward James.

Letter from Lord *Macleod*, to Sir *Hector Munro*, dated 29th October 1780.

Sir,

I have ſeen the paragraph of a letter from Mr. *Sadlier* to the Governor General of *Bengal*, dated 23d September 1780; in which he ſays, that when Colonel *Fletcher* on

the

the 6th of that month, aſked you leave to advance with the Grenadiers, to bring *Hyder Ally*'s Army to action, and that Major *Elphinſtone* offered to ſupport the Colonel with the 73d regiment, that I thought the circumſtances ſo favourable, that I approved of this propoſal; or words to that purpoſe.

Now Sir, I can aſſure you, that I never communicated my ſentiments on that ſubject to Mr. *Sadlier*, nor has he any authority to make uſe of my name.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt humble and moſt obedient Servant,
Macleod.

Copy of a Letter from Major *Elphinſtone* to Sir *Hector Munro*; dated 31ſt October 1780.

Sir *Hector Munro* having this morning ſhewn me a copy of a letter wrote by Mr. *Sadlier* to the Governor of *Bengal*, in which he mentions my having offered to ſupport Colonel *Fletcher*, who commanded the Grenadiers of the Army, with the 1ſt battalion of His Majeſty's 73d regiment, on the 6th of September;

I declare the following circumſtance to be the cauſe of that offer:—On the morning of that day Colonel *Fletcher* and I had ſome converſation, in which I ſaid, I would be happy to have the honour to ſupport the Grenadiers with the 1ſt battalion of the 73d regiment on any attack; on ſeeing the Grenadiers advancing to the front, I took the liberty of begging Sir *Hector Munro*'s leave to join them with the 1ſt battalion of the 73d regiment.

I never heard Sir *Hector Munro* ſpeak of engaging the Enemy but once; when intelligence was received that they meant to ſtand an action with our Army, he ſaid, he would indulge them when Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment joined him.

John Elphinſtone,
Major 1ſt Battalion 73d Regiment.

Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Sulivan* to Sir *Hector Munro*; dated 2d November 1780.

Sir,

I am honoured with your note of yeſterday. The packet from Mr. *Sadlier* for the Court of Directors, came to the Governor a few hours after Mr. *Lewin* had embarked on the *Nymph* with the Company's diſpatches. After a curſory peruſal of them, they ſent round to the Gentlemen of the Council, with a ſhort memorandum from the Preſident, intimating the time they were received. From that day, the 18th, I believe, until the 25th ultimo, your applications to me for a ſight of Mr. *Sadlier*'s letters were frequent; I as frequently communicated thoſe applications to the Governor, but they could not be complied with, as the papers had not been returned to him; on that day you told me, that for the firſt time you had ſeen the letters, the other Members of the Council not having finiſhed the reading of them until then.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Richard Sulivan.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant *Moorhouſe* to Sir *Hector Munro*; dated the 4th November 1780.

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, Commander in Chief.

Sir,

In anſwer to a paragraph of Mr. *Sadlier*'s letter of the 23d September, aſſerting, that hammers and ſpikes to diſable the heavy cannon left at *Conjeveram*, could not be got;

I declare, that on the 10th of September, in the evening, in preſence of Captain *Rigault* and Lieutenant *Slipper* of the Artillery, I ordered an European Artificer, with men, ſledge-hammers, &c. to go to the Sub-conductor in the large Pagoda, and if poſſible, to knock the trunnions off the 18-pounder guns, and to ſpike them. That he went to the Sub-conductor with the men and implements, and that the guns were ſpiked and thrown into a Tank, before the army marched, the 11th in the morning.

I have the honour to be, with much reſpect,
Sir,
Your very obedient Servant,
Camp at *Marmelon*, 4th Nov. 1780. *John Moorhouſe*, Com^{r} of Stores to the Army.

Copy of a Letter from *Alexander Davidſon*, Eſq.

Fort St. George, 17th Nov. 1780.

On reading Mr. *Sadlier*'s letter to the Board of the 16th inſtant, I obſerve, that although Mr. *Sadlier*'s papers were ſent to the Preſident about the 18th of October, they did not come round to me, then the junior Member of Council, till about the 27th of October, which I attributed to their conſiſting of about ſeventy ſheets. I remember perfectly, about a week or ten days after Mr. *Sadlier*'s papers had been delivered in (I think it was Friday the 27th of October) aſking Mr. *Freeman*, the acting Secretary (Mr. *Sulivan* being at *Bengal*) at the Council Board, concerning them; who replied, that I could not have ſeen the papers, as they had been near a week at Mr. *Whitehill*'s and Mr. *Smith*'s. General *Munro* obſerved, that he had not ſeen them till the 25th of October, in the afternoon, though he had enquired for them frequently of the Governor's Secretary, Mr. *R. J. Sulivan.*

Alexander Davidſon.

Copy of a Letter from Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. to the Court of Directors.

Fort St. George, 20th Nov. 1780.

Gentlemen,

I beg your forgiveneſs for this intruſion, and that you may be pleaſed to read the incloſed. The cauſe for your ever having had this trouble, is owing to a letter given in by Mr. *Sadlier* to the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, dated the 16th of this month.

I will make no other animadverſion on the ſaid letter, than to ſay, that his conjectures of my motives for writing the letter I ſent to him the 26th of laſt month, are as erroneous as they are falſe.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
The Honourable the Court of Directors. and moſt humble Servant,
Hector Munro.

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Fort St. George Select Committee, 15th Sept. 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Major Gen. Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

THE command of *Tanjore* being vacant by the death of Major *Maclellan*, Colonel *Braithwaite* is now appointed thereto by the Preſident's caſting vote; Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* diſſenting.

Fort St. George Select Conſultations, 22d September 1780.

The following Minute of Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* was this day ſent round for the peruſal of the Gentlemen of the Committee:

When we conſented that ſeventy-five thouſand Pagodas ſhould be iſſued from the Company's Treaſury for the payment of his Highneſs the Nabob's Cavalry, we were given to underſtand that his Highneſs would aſſign over to the Company, diſtricts for the ſecurity and punctual repayment of this ſum; and we expected that the Preſident would lay before the Committee a particular

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Account of the expenditure of this money, and of the ſecurity given by his Highneſs the Nabob. We alſo conſented to a further advance of eighteen thouſand Pagodas to be made to his Highneſs the Nabob's regiment of Cavalry, commanded by Captain *Dugald Campbell*, as we were aſſured that theſe Troopers abſolutely refuſed to march from the Mount without receiving this ſum; but they mutinied before the money could be ſent to them.

Nothing but the dangerous ſituation of affairs, and being fully perſuaded that his Highneſs the Nabob could not make theſe advances, would have induced us to give our conſent to this meaſure. We are ſenſible, that neceſſity is our only juſtification on this occaſion; and therefore are of opinion, that an exact account of what has been actually advanced ſhould be laid before the Committee, and that meaſures ſhould be taken, without further loſs of time, for procuring from his Highneſs the Nabob, aſſignments of the *Tinnevelly* and *Madura* Countries, not only to ſecure the ſpeedy repayment of this advance, but alſo aiding us to carry on the war with vigour.

The executive part of Adminiſtration being veſted in the majority of the Committee, we can only record our ſentiments, and thereby clear ourſelves from all reſponſibility for ſuch meaſures as have met with our approbation on being firſt propoſed, but have not been afterwards carried into execution in the manner agreed on in Committee.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite:*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor, and the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I return you my ſincereſt thanks for your appointment of me to the command of *Tanjore*, which I conſider at this time as a mark of your approbation and confidence in me, which I ſhall ſtudy to deſerve. I ſhall hope to be honoured with a letter of inſtructions for my conduct, before my departure; and I beg leave to repreſent, that in times like theſe, when communication with the Preſidency may become precarious, whether it may not be prudent to augment, in mere military matters, the powers of the Commanding Officer there, which, as I am informed, are particularly confined, ſo that he may be allowed to turn his thoughts towards the general protection and ſecurity of the country, and the defence of the ſmaller Forts, as well as the immediate defence of the fort of *Tanjore*. And I ſhould flatter myſelf this might be done, without in any way leſſening the conſequence of the Rajah; who may be adviſed to do in theſe matters, as from himſelf, whatever may be ſuggeſted to him from the Commanding Officer. We have ſeen, that ſuch of his Highneſs the Nabob's Forts as were not defended by any Officer of the Honourable Company's, or by any of their Troops, have uniformly ſurrendered to the Enemy almoſt as ſoon as he appeared; there is reaſon therefore to apprehend, that the ſame might be the caſe with thoſe of *Tanjore*, if not timely attended to.

The preſent military force in that country, it is true, does not admit of our extending our views much beyond the immediate defence of *Tanjore* itſelf; but as the ſeaſon of military operations is a little diſtant, there is time both to augment and improve it. At preſent, the three Sibbendy battalions, which conſtitute more than half the military ſtrength of that kingdom as to numbers, are almoſt without Officers, and, as I am informed, totally without diſcipline; and are ſo managed and diſpoſed of, that thoſe Officers who ſhould have commanded them, have aſſured me that they ſcarce know of their exiſtence: I ſhould hope therefore that the regulations and eſtabliſhments for thoſe battalions, which are planned in profound peace, may merit ſome farther conſiderations now, more particularly as there has been a neceſſity for withdrawing from *Tanjore* the beſt of the Honourable Company's regular battalions, I mean their Grenadier companies. Heretofore the Rajah of *Tanjore* was famous for his Horſe, and maintained ſo large a body as four thouſand, which we called Regular Horſe, moſt of which, for want of ſervice at home, have been obliged to ſeek it in the ſervice of *Hyder*, no doubt much againſt their inclination. As theſe people have ſtrong local attachments and prejudices, I ſhould imagine that were the Rajah now to exert himſelf, he might collect at leaſt ſix hundred Horſe, to be officered and paid by the Honourable Company; five hundred of them to be formed into a regiment, ever to act with the Army when in the field, the other hundred as a ſeparate Troop for home ſervice and that of recruiting, in order to keep thoſe in the field complete; and I ſhould think that thoſe ſix hundred in peace time, if kept up, might anſwer all the revenue purpoſes of the three Sibbendy battalions, which may be put on the Eſtabliſhment now without any additional expence, as three battalions have actually been loſt from it: and this body of Horſe will, I am ſure, prove the beſt and ſureſt baſis whereon to form a larger body, if future exigencies ſhould render it neceſſary. I ſhall only add to the liberty I have here taken, and which I truſt you will excuſe, that as I have nothing but Black Troops to depend upon, that they may be as much as poſſible completed with Officers and Serjeants, as, on their alertneſs, we muſt repoſe our chief confidence; indeed, if time permitted, it would be well to change the battalions now there, as they are now rather too much compoſed of *Tanjore* people; and as I have certain information that Captain *Noodler*, from his bodily infirmities, is at preſent quite incapable of field ſervice, and not likely ſoon to recover, that he may be permitted to go with me to ſuperintend all the Ordnance Department, and with powers to raiſe ſome Black Artillery and Laſcars for that particular ſervice.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Fort St. George,
23d September 1780.

On his arrival at *Tanjore*, he will receive ſuch inſtructions as have been ſent to former Commandants; ſhould he then repreſent any deficiency in his powers as Commandant, the Committee will take the ſubject into conſideration.

Agreed, in the mean time, That he be directed to put the place in the beſt poſture of defence.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 24th Sept. 1780.

To Colonel *John Braithwaite.*

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 23d inſtant.

With reſpect to the military powers of the Commanding Officer of *Tanjore*, we have endeavoured to make them adequate to the importance of that truſt; but if upon your arrival there, and after peruſing the ſeveral letters and inſtructions which have been written on this ſubject, and comparing them with the actual ſtate of things in that country, you ſhall find the powers confined, or the regulations that have been iſſued, either reſpecting the Troops in the garriſon, or the Sibbendy Corps not properly obſerved, you will inform us, that we may give the neceſſary orders in conſequence. In the mean time we have only to deſire that you will attend particularly to the ſecurity of the Fort, by putting it in the beſt poſture of defence that your means will permit, applying to the Rajah as often as may be requiſite for his aſſiſtance or concurrence.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
24th Sept. 1780.

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Fort Saint George Select Committee,
6th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of the laſt Committee read, and approved.

In conſequence of the letter written to the Nabob the 3d inſtant, Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* now deliver in the following Minutes:

We do not approve of the letter written to his Highneſs the Nabob by the Preſident: we are of opinion, that his Highneſs ſhould be requeſted to ſpecify particularly the medium rent of each country which he offers to aſſign over to the Company, and to promiſe that the revenues ſhall not be alienated for any other purpoſe whatſoever: we alſo think it is very proper that he be requeſted to deliver in to the Committee, an exact ſtatement to the 1ſt inſtant, of the balance due by him to his Cavalry, by which they may be enabled to deviſe a mode for diſcharging it.

We think it would have been ſufficient, had the Preſident ſent an extract from the Company's letter, relative to Captain *Tonyn*, without any recommendation; as Major *Cosby*, who now commands the Cavalry, we underſtand is much eſteemed by his Highneſs, and alſo by the Officers and private men of the corps. He has commanded them for years; and we are ſorry to ſee the ſervices he ſo recently performed, and his conduct at the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, ſhould be forgotten. We conceive this attempt to deprive him of his command a particular hardſhip, and that it will be very diſagreeable to his Highneſs.

Chas Smith,
6th October 1780. *Samuel Johnſon*.

We perceive, with much ſurprize, that his Highneſs the Nabob's letter to the Preſident, of the 1ſt inſtant, has been materially altered ſince we firſt peruſed it. We are of opinion, That after delivery it became a record, and ought not to ſuffer change on any pretence whatſoever. This mode of tranſacting buſineſs is pregnant with the moſt dangerous conſequences, and therefore we think we ſhould be wanting in our duty, if we ſuffered ſuch an act to paſs unnoticed.

Charles Smith,
6th October 1780. *Saml Johnſon*.

To the Nabob.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

The Army having been obliged to return to the Mount, in conſequence of the unfortunate accident which befel Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment; it becomes highly expedient that the utmoſt exertions ſhould be made for recruiting the loſs that has happened, and enabling our Troops to take the field again as early as poſſible.

For this purpoſe the Committee have thought it neceſſary to deſire I will write to your Highneſs, and requeſt your immediate anſwer to the following particulars:

1ſt. As there is ſtill ſome arrears of pay due to the two regiments of Cavalry belonging to your Highneſs now in camp, and as the men may be diſcontented and clamorous if they are not paid up to the preſent time, it will be requiſite to know from your Highneſs, how far you can ſatisfy them; and whether it be not poſſible for you to add another regiment from among thoſe doing duty about the perſons of your Highneſs and your Sons? The increaſe of Cavalry is ſo abſolutely neceſſary to the future operations of the field, that I am extremely anxious to ſee it effected, if poſſible, to the number of 1,500 or 2,000. I requeſt alſo that your Highneſs will put your Cavalry entirely under our orders during the preſent troubles.

2dly. The Committee wiſh to know from your Highneſs what aid you can really grant for ſupporting the heavy expences of the war, and at what periods; ſpecifying the ſums you think you may be able to pay to the Company in the courſe of the next three months.

3dly. In reſpect to rice, ſheep, and bullocks for the army, the Committee would be glad to be informed what quantity of each your Highneſs can get ready in the courſe of 18 or 20 days.

4thly. Whether you can engage the *Kaleſtry* and *Vencatgurry* Rajahs to join the Army with their people, and at what time.

5thly. How many of your Highneſs's Sepoys or Sibbendy can be ſent to garriſons, to complete our Sepoy corps for the preſent.

Fort St. George, 19th Sept. 1780. I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

N° 100. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 1ſt October 1780—Received 2d D°.

I have received your letter dated the 19th September, acquainting me of the Army having been obliged to return to the Mount, in conſequence of the unfortunate accident which befel Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, &c. that it became highly expedient that the utmoſt exertion ſhould be made for recruiting the loſs that had happened, that our Army might take the field again as ſoon as poſſible: that for this purpoſe the Committee thought it neceſſary to require my immediate anſwer to the following particulars, viz.

1ſt. That as there were ſtill ſome arrears of pay due to my two regiments of Cavalry now in camp, and as they might be diſcontented and clamorous if they were not paid up to this time, it was neceſſary I ſhould inform you how far I could ſatisfy them; and whether it were not poſſible for me to raiſe another regiment from among thoſe doing duty about the perſons of me and my Sons? that the increaſe of Cavalry is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that you wiſhed to ſee it effected to the number of 1,500 or 2,000; and that you requeſt alſo that I will put my Cavalry under your order during the preſent troubles.

The pain I feel on account of the unhappy diſaſter which has befallen Colonel *Baillie* and the other Officers, I am wholly unable to expreſs. Ever ſince the Engliſh firſt eſtabliſhed themſelves in *Hindoſtan*, they have acquired an exalted degree of reputation. This is the firſt inſtance in which from misfortune they have been unſucceſsful on this coaſt; and I hope, through the aſſiſtance of the Almighty, and the exertion of my friends, that it will be the laſt. It is true, my regiments have been involved in great diſtreſs for theſe five years paſt, ever ſince the *Tanjore* country was wreſted from me. They never received from that country any ſatisfaction on account of their pay, notwithſtanding Lord *Pigot*, when he took *Tanjore* from me, made me a moſt ſolemn promiſe that they ſhould be paid. They have ſeveral times mutinied, and ſurrounded the gates of my palace in a clamorous manner, but my friends took no notice thereof, nor did they pay the leaſt attention to the diſcharging the arrears of pay that were juſtly due to my Cavalry, or to the payment of what might become due in future; but on the contrary they declared the ſaid regiments to be the ſource of an unneceſſary expence, and repeatedly inſiſted on my diſcharging them from my ſervice, though I then knew the neceſſity of detaining them. Theſe troops were raiſed by the advice of Governor *Wyneb* and General *Smith*, after the reduction of *Tanjore*, when *Ragonaut Row* with 50,000 horſe had penetrated as far as *Serra*, with a deſign to deſtroy the *Carnatic*, and *Hyder Ally* had offered to join them. At that time I wrote a letter to the Governor, and told him, that as our Troops were then ſo well prepared and diſciplined, if any power attempted to diſturb our repoſe, we ſhould be able effectually to ſtop it. A

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copy of that extract goes inclosed for your information. My disbanding these regiments afterwards, was in compliance with the repeated desires and requisitions of my friends. As you now have wrote to me to raise other Troops, I am to inform you that all the horses which are about me and my Sons, excepting a few immediately necessary for our guards, shall be put into the regiments commanded by Colonel *Cosby* (who was lent to me by the Company for that purpose) and shall be put under the orders of the Commander in Chief until the war is over.

You desire I will recruit the army to the amount of two thousand. It is an established custom with all Princes, when they first get intelligence of the hostile intentions of an enemy, to prepare and hold in readiness what forces they have, to recruit and strengthen them, and to form alliance with the neighbouring Powers; that is the time when exertions can effectually be made: but in an hour like this, what is it possible for us to promise ourselves? The Enemy has a considerable footing in the *Carnatic*, and having previous to that possessed himself of the countries of *Cuddapah*, &c. it is almost impossible to procure either horses or men. However, in this critical juncture, such horses as I and my Sons are possessed of, excepting those I have already mentioned, either here or in the country, with as many Troops as can be obtained, shall be formed into two other complete regiments of Cavalry as soon as possible, and the two said regiments commanded by Captains *Dugald Campbell* and *M'Allister*, making in all four under the command of Colonel *Cosby*, shall be put under the order of the Commander in Chief. But I have two things to request from your friendship, 1st. As many horses may be purchased in the settlement, if you will be kind enough to provide me soon with 360, the said two regiments shall be completed with all speed. 2d. As in this time of war it is both necessary, and for the good of the service, that the arrears of pay due to them should be discharged, and that they should join the Army; but as it is not in my power to do so while distractions reign in my country, I do agree to appropriate to the Company for repayment of such advances as have been or hereafter shall be made on account of my Cavalry, the unassigned revenues of the *Tinnivelly*, *Shevegunya*, *Bainadperam*, and *Trichinopoly* countries, which will yield annually, should they continue undisturbed by the enemy, three lacks of Pagodas. This sum shall be paid to the Company by me, from the 1st of October 1780, and shall continue to be paid into their Treasury by regular Kists, for discharging the expences that shall be incurred during the present war in the *Carnatic* on the above account. Moreover, should peace be re-established in my country, I will exert myself to the utmost to increase those payments from other districts, that the said sum disbursed may be the more speedily discharged. The Company ever afforded me their assistance in money matters in times of trouble, and I always repaid them in times of peace. Upwards of two Crores have been paid to my friends in this manner: I hope therefore, you will not refuse it at this time, as the public affairs of the Company and mine are the same.

2dly. The Committee wish to know what aid I can really grant for supporting the heavy expences of the war. My Friend! my faith and uniform affectionate disposition is known to the whole English Nation; my Friends have at all times experienced it; most part of my life has been spent in assisting my Friends the English; from my first connexion with them, both my Father's treasury and mine hath been exhausted in chastising the common enemy. In every war, when my country has been laid waste, my Friends have assisted me with money, which money I have repaid in times of peace. But when troubles have visited it unattended by devastation, the exertions I have made have been such as to exceed even those which I have exerted myself to make in the intervals of tranquillity and peace; many instances of which I might mention, but the sieges of *Pondicherry* and *Mahé* will be sufficient, when my Friend was an eye-witness himself to the money and provisions of every kind which I supplied. As it is now upwards of two months since the enemy entered my country, possessed himself of many of my forts, appointed his own Aumildars to the management of my country; why should I fail to do every thing in my power to chastise him, and drive him from my dominions? My Friends are not ignorant of my situation, they knew well that *before* the enemy had raised disturbances, *even* when he first began to make preparations in his country, in order to invade and lay waste the *Carnatic*, I repeatedly acquainted my Friends of his designs, and desired to be informed of what our Army would stand in need of, while my country remained in peace, and that I would, to the utmost of my power, provide every thing necessary; declaring at the same time, that after the enemy should enter my country, it would be extremely difficult to procure supplies for the Troops that should take the field: With respect to this, however, I continued uninformed. Now, after the enemy has been upwards of two months in the *Carnatic*, I have received a letter from you, requesting a supply of bullocks, sheep, and rice. Since the *Tanjore* country was taken from me in the year 1776, I have seen my affairs decline day after day; I have been even in want of money for my own private expences: the whole produce of my country has not been sufficient to answer the demands that have been made upon me. My business has been carried on by borrowing of money, pledging of jewels and houses, and by giving up districts of my country to my creditors: but in times of trouble like these, no one can be found who will lend me money; confiding in my Friends, however, they will lend their assistance towards the prosecution of the war. When General Sir *Hector Munro* marched with the Army to *Conjeveram*, I furnished him bullocks, sheep, and rice, to as great an extent as in my power, and my agents likewise supplied Colonels *Baillie* and *Lang* with the same. After the departure of Sir *Hector Munro*, I sent 850 bullocks to the Army: What more you want, you will be pleased to inform me, that I may give orders to my agent to send as many as they can procure. I wrote before to you repeatedly, that there were great quantities of provisions in my country, and I now again repeat that there is more than a sufficiency in store for the use of the Army in the forts of *Arcot*, *Vellore*, *Gingee*, *Wandewash*, and *Trichinopoly*, besides which, there are great quantities of grain in different parts of my country, which the incursions of *Hyder*'s Cavalry prevented the inhabitants from securing in places of safety. The provisions collected at *Conjeveram* were seen by Sir *Hector Munro* himself, although the Enemy had already plundered that place. By the blessing of God, there are great numbers of bullocks and sheep in *Arcot* and *Trichinopoly*, but the enemy being in the road to those places, they cannot be brought hither. I could also send for some from *Nellore*, *Vencatgurry*, *Callistry*, and *Baumrauze*, but I have received intelligence that *Meer Ally Raza*, by *Hyder*'s orders, will march with a force to those countries; in which case it will be almost impossible to procure any cattle from those places. The *Tanjore* country still remains in a state of tranquillity; the Rajah has a private connexion with the enemy: It is possible for my Friend to procure bullocks and sheep from thence in great numbers, and to have them brought from thence in ships. I can supply sheep from the countries of *Trichinopoly*, *Ramnaut*, and *Tinnivelly*; there are seaports all along the coast; you will be so good to have them brought from hence. My writing this to you, is, because all these things should be kept ready at the seaports in great quantities for future services, to the end that we may not meet with difficulty in procuring them in the monsoon, when the Enemy's Horse have entirely over-run the country. You will be pleased to inform me as soon as possible of the number of bullocks and sheep you have already, and what more you will want to supply the Army till it shall arrive at *Arcot*, where there is

every thing in abundance. There are in *Arcot* part of the Troops belonging to the Rajahs of *Callifiry* and *Baumrauze*: as their countries are contiguous to that of *Cuddapah*, *Meer Ally Raza* has ſeveral times plundered them, and he is now ready again to invade them. Theſe Rajahs have kept Troops in their pollams, and when they find their pollams in any kind of ſecurity, they will come and join the Army, as I have ſent repeated orders to them to do ſo. At preſent, indeed, it would not be ſafe for them to move, large bodies of Horſe being diſperſed over every part of the country. Every man in the *Carnatic* will be ready to give his aſſiſtance when the Army takes the field: Now, agreeable to the common practice in *Indoſtan*, fear makes many of the Aumildars and others ſubmit to *Hyder*, as his did to me in the former *Myſore* war, when we penetrated into the *Balaghaut*. This, however, is but a temporary diſaffection, which they will immediately give proofs of, when our forces are in a condition to protect them; and ſuch of them as perſiſt in their diſobedience ſhall meet with condign puniſhment the firſt opportunity.

Thoſe who have nothing elſe to live on, but the ſcanty produce of their own labour, from neceſſity are compelled to cultivate the ground under the authority of that power which is ſupreme upon the ſpot.

Afflicted at the diſtreſſes of my country, there is no exertion I will not make:—Let me implore my Friends, that no time may be loſt in chaſtiſing the inveterate enemy of us both: I am a firm and ſteady friend to the Engliſh, and have been always united with them in their adverſe as well as proſperous days. What ſhall I ſay more?

No. 107. To the Rajah of *Tanjore*; dated 11th October 1780.

I have had the pleaſure to receive your letters, and underſtand the contents.

You may reſt aſſured, that every thing in my power ſhall be done for the ſecurity of the fort and country of *Tanjore* during the troubles. But it is abſolutely neceſſary at preſent, to bring into the field a ſufficient force to encounter the enemy, and for this purpoſe, I am obliged to draw Troops from every part. Orders have however been given for putting *Tanjore* into the beſt ſtate of defence, and I flatter myſelf you will readily acquieſce in every thing that is propoſed by the Commanding Officer, and give every aſſiſtance in your power.

As we find great difficulty in carrying on our military operations, for want of a body of Cavalry, we are uſing our endeavours to procure a ſufficient number, and I ſhall take it as a favour, if you will give me your aſſiſtance. The *Tanjore* Cavalry were always famous for their exploits, and I have no doubt, that with proper exertions, you will be able to raiſe at leaſt a thouſand men and horſes, which would be of great ſervice at this juncture, and give much ſatisfaction to the Company. You will be ſo good to let me know, as ſoon as poſſible, what you may be able to do in this reſpect, in what time, and at what expence; in the mean while, I requeſt you will begin upon this neceſſary buſineſs, that not a moment may be loſt.

Colonel *Braithwaite* has lately been appointed to the command of *Tanjore* in the room of Major *Maclellan* deceaſed, and I truſt he will prove agreeable to you.

The great diſburſements neceſſary for the ſupport of the war, oblige me again to apply to you very earneſtly on the ſubject of money: You know how ſtrongly the Company wrote to you on this ſubject in their laſt letter; I hope you want no further inducement to exert yourſelf in giving them an extraordinary aid at this juncture, when they are called upon to defend their poſſeſſions, and thoſe of their Allies, againſt a formidable enemy. If you cannot poſſibly find means of procuring ready money on this occaſion (which I hope however will not be the caſe) I truſt you will be able to put into our hands a quantity of grain, with liberty to mortgage or diſpoſe of it in ſuch manner as may enable us to raiſe a ſupply.

May your happineſs and proſperity be ever increaſing! What can I ſay more?

No. 113. From the Nabob to the Governor, dated 20th October 1780.—Received D°.

Out of friendſhip to me, and a deſire for the public welfare and chaſtiſing the enemy, you were ſo kind as to conſent to diſcharge the arrears of pay due to my three regiments of Cavalry. I herewith ſend you the account, and I doubt not you will diſcharge what is due to them, and give them their pay, and feed their horſes in future, commencing from the 1ſt October, as per the receipts ſigned by the Officers, and I engage to repay the Company whatever they ſhall advance for me on that account. What ſhall I ſay more?

No. 116. To the Rajah of *Tanjore*, 24th October 1780.

As it is expedient at this time to unite the Sibbendy corps in your country to that of the regular Sepoys, and to put the whole under the direction of the Commandant at *Tanjore*, we have come to that reſolution accordingly; and I requeſt you will in future make your requiſitions to the Commandant at *Tanjore* for ſuch of the Sibbendy as you may abſolutely want for the revenue ſervice.

No. 118. From the Rajah of *Tanjore* to the Governor; dated 14th Showal, 1194 Hegyra, or 13th October.—Received 25th D°.

Although the enemy has over-run the whole *Carnatic*, he has not yet been able to commit depredations on this ſide the *Coleroon*, as it is quite full at this ſeaſon, and therefore this and the *Trichinopoly* country are ſtill in a ſtate of tranquillity. I know it to be incumbent upon me to give every aſſiſtance in my power to the Company at ſuch a time, but I have neither money or Troops to do it, which gives me great uneaſineſs. You will be kind enough to let me know what quantity of grain, &c. will be wanted, and I ſhall uſe my utmoſt endeavours to provide it, and ſend it to you. I am now collecting ſheep, fowls, ſtraw, hay, &c. to put on board of boats, in order to be ſent to *Madras*, and I hope they will get there ſoon.

May the Almighty ever grant proſperity to the Engliſh, and make their enemies repent of their temerity! This is my conſtant prayer, which I hope will prove efficacious. Be pleaſed to regard me conſtantly your friend and well-wiſher.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 30th October 1780.

Read the following Letter from the Nabob:

No. 616. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 25th October 1780.—Received D°.

I have applied to my Friends for a loan of one lack and thirty-ſeven thouſand pagodas, which will diſcharge the arrears of pay due to my Cavalry to the end of September (excluſive of the contract for feeding their horſes); for the payments of which, and the money already advanced on this account, I have offered to aſſign the unappropriated revenues of the diſtricts of *Tenavelly*, *Ramnaub*, *Sheve*, *Ganga*, and *Trichinopoly*, yielding three lacks annually.

Now that a war has taken place in my country, I propoſe, for your future ſatisfaction, that in caſe when the country is in peace the kiſts are not punctually paid, as ſtated in the accompanying paper, you may appoint a perſon to receive the revenue from my Managers till the whole is repaid. I have taken all this trouble purely for the good of public affairs. At this time, when the enemy has entered into my country, I agree that my Ca-

valry,

APPENDIX. No. 10.

valry, which has for ſome years been diſciplined and regulated according to the European manner, may act in conjunction with the Engliſh army. What ſhall I ſay more?

Kiſt Bundy for the Repayment of the Money which the Company may advance for the Nabob's Cavalry; and, ſhould the country remain in peace, the money will be paid as follows:

From the diſtrict of *Tinnevelly*,	Pag^{s} 200,000
From *Trichinopoly*, - - -	50,000
From *Rammaut* and *Shuegunga* -	50,000
	Pag^{s} 300,000

To be paid as follows:

The laſt day of February 1781,	Pag^{s} 100,000
The laſt of May, - - -	100,000
The laſt of September, - -	100,000
	Pag^{s} 300,000

Dated 26th Showal, 1174 of Hygera, and 25th October 1780.

The Preſident then delivers in the following Minute:

As the above letter and account from the Nabob brings the buſineſs of his Highneſs's Cavalry at length to ſome ſort of concluſion, and as no time ſhould be loſt now that horſes are daily coming in for replacing thoſe wanting for the four regiments, which he has agreed to lend to the Company, the Preſident is of opinion, that the balance of arrears of pay due to the reſpective regiments, ſhould be paid into the hands of the European Commandant; two-thirds, amounting to pagodas 91,750, in notes or bonds, payable at the expiration of a limited time, or on demand, with intereſt; and the reſidue, amounting to Pag^{s} 45,875, in ready money, for the uſe of the private Troopers, who are in want of it, and who will not ſerve unleſs their arrears are diſcharged. The Preſident further propoſes, that the Paymaſter of the Army be directed to iſſue the pay and allowance to the Cavalry monthly, as he does to the reſt of the Troop^{s}, the pay-rolls and abſtracts, &c. being duly counterſigned by the Officers commanding the regiments. With reſpect to the contract for feeding the horſes, the Preſident is of opinion that the Commanding Officer ſhould ſtill hold them; but that the allowance for each horſe ſhould not exceed ſix pagodas per month. Should this meet with the concurrence of the Committee, the Preſident will, with their approbation, requeſt the Nabob to give immediate directions that the Cavalry be put, without further loſs of time, under the orders of the Commander in Chief of the Army.

Reſolved, agreeably to the opinion of the Preſident, That the arrears of pay due to the reſpective regiments of Cavalry, be diſcharged in the manner he has propoſed; viz. two-thirds, amounting to pagodas 91,570, in notes or bonds, payable at the expiration of a limited time, to be agreed on hereafter; and the remainder, amounting to pagodas 45,875, in ready money.

Ordered, That a return be delivered in of the Nabob's Cavalry in its preſent ſtate, to be ſent to the Paymaſter at camp, with directions to pay the Cavalry, agreeably to it, for the month of October, allowing the Commanding Officers for feeding the horſes, at the rate of ſix pagodas each per month, and to continue the ſame in future.

Extract of general Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors, 15 October 1780.

On a review of the ſtate of your treaſury when *Hyder Ally* invaded the *Carnatic* in July laſt, we judged it abſolutely neceſſary to iſſue advertiſements for receiving loans from the inhabitants of this ſettlement, for which Company's bonds were to be granted, payable in eight months after date, bearing an intereſt eight per cent. per annum. But the ſupply raiſed by this means proving very inadequate to the heavy expences of Government, and having no hope of any immediate relief that could be deemed effectual, either from the northern ſubordinances, from the Nabob, or from *Bengal*: in this exigency, after much deliberation, however averſe we are to act contrary to your orders in any inſtance, we found ourſelves under the unavoidable neceſſity, as the laſt reſource, to draw bills on your Honours, to an amount not exceeding £. 200,000.

We judged that the moſt adviſable method of putting this reſolution in force, was to fix the payment of the bills at 365 days after ſight, with an optional clauſe, empowering you to delay payment for one year after the bills became due, on allowing an intereſt of £. 5. per cent. per annum for that half year, and to publiſh advertiſements for receiving ſealed tenders, ſpecifying a rate of exchange, which, on a medium of the ſeveral offers, turns out 7*s*. 9¼*d*. per Pagoda.

And as we thought it but equitable that thoſe perſons who had diſintereſtedly contributed to the ſupport of Government, by lending money on bond at a low intereſt, in conſequence of our former reſolution, ſhould have every indulgence ſhewn them; we allowed thoſe who choſe it, to receive bills on you, at the medium rate of exchange, inſtead of their bonds, to prevent the ſmalleſt ſuſpicion being entertained of any impoſition on the public being intended on the part of Government, in iſſuing the firſt advertiſement, in conſequence of which thoſe Gentlemen had made their reſpective loans.

We cannot quit this ſubject without expreſſing to your Honours, the real concern we feel at having been obliged to reſolve on this meaſure, which nothing but the moſt urgent neceſſity ſhould have led us to adopt; at the ſame time we truſt we ſhall meet with your approbation for putting it in effect, in a manner the leaſt detrimental and diſtreſſing to the Company. We have further to notice to your Honours, that our preſent draft on you, has exceeded our firſt intention by the ſums of One thouſand three hundred and fifty-five pounds four ſhillings and two-pence ſterling, which irregularity was inevitable from the impoſſibility of calculating the amount of the offers more accurately amidſt ſuch a number of tenders as we received on this occaſion.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon,
Alexander Davidſon.

APPENDIX, No. 11.

Fort St. George Select Committee, 13th Sept. 1780.

RESOLVED, That directions be ſent to *Maſulipatam* and *Vizagapatam*, to hold the grenadier companies of the Sepoys in thoſe diſtricts in readineſs to be embarked for *Madras*.

Agreed that the Admiral be requeſted to ſpare the *Nymph* ſloop to carry our diſpatches to *Bengal*.

Wrote the following letter to Sir *Edward Hughes*:

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in India.

Sir,

As we wiſh to ſend ſome diſpatches of importance to *Bengal*, we ſhall be much obliged if you will ſpare us the *Nymph* ſloop for that ſervice, and requeſt of Captain *Stephens* to give a paſſage to Mr. *Stephen Sulivan*, whom we propoſe to entruſt with our letters.

We

We requeſt alſo that you will direct Captain *Stephens*, in his return from *Bengal*, to call at *Ganjam*, *Vizagapatam*, and *Maſulipatam*, to bring up from thoſe places to *Madras* ſuch treaſure as may be tendered to him.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, 13th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 14 September 1780.

To Mr. *James Henry Caſamajor*, Chief, and Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

From the unfortunate accident which has happened to Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, in its march to join the Army, we find it expedient to draw a reinforcement from the Troops in the Circars. We deſire, therefore, that you will hold the grenadier companies of the two battalions in your diſtricts in readineſs to embark, and inform Captain *Lyſaught* that he is to proceed with them on the arrival of the veſſels appointed to bring them up.

To ſupply the deficiency which will be occaſioned by theſe drafts, we allow you to recruit as many as to complete the ſtrength of the battalions.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 14th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Mr. *John Turing*, Reſident at *Ganjam*.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral letters. The Admiral having, at our requeſt, ordered the *Nymph* ſloop to call at *Ganjam* in her way to this place, we deſire you will pack up ready to ſend by her all the treaſure you have on hand, and which you do not immediately want for your Civil and Military diſburſements.

The *Nymph*, when ſhe comes in ſight of *Ganjam*, will hoiſt a Union Jack at her fore-top-gallant-maſt-head, upon which you will ſend on board the treaſure, that ſhe may not be detained one moment longer than is abſolutely neceſſary.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 14th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Mr. *James Henry Caſamajor*, Chief, and Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

The Admiral having, at our requeſt, ordered the *Nymph* ſloop to call at *Vizagapatam* in her way from *Bengal* to this place, we deſire you will pack up, ready to ſend by her, all the treaſure you can poſſibly ſpare, after providing for your immediate Civil and Military charges.

The *Nymph*, when ſhe arrives off *Vizagapatam*, will hoiſt a Union Jack at her fore-top-gallant-maſt-head; upon which you will be pleaſed to ſend off the treaſure, that there may be no unneceſſary delaying of the veſſel.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 14th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

The ſame to *Maſulipatam*.

To *Edward Cotsford*, Eſq. Chief, and Council at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

As we find it abſolutely neceſſary to reinforce the Army by drafts from the Troops in the Circars, we deſire you will hold all the Sepoy grenadiers of your diſtrict in readineſs to embark for the Preſidency. To ſupply the deficiency which will be occaſioned by theſe drafts, we give you permiſſion to recruit as many as may be neceſſary to complete the ſtrength of the ſeveral battalions.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 14th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Lieutenant *Walter Douglas*, commanding in the *Guntoor* Circar.

Sir,

The Soubah having requeſted that the *Guntoor* Circar might be delivered up again to *Bazalet Jung*, we have come to that reſolution accordingly; and we incloſe you the Nabob's order to his Manager there, to withdraw from all farther concern in that country. You will, in conſequence, write a letter to *Bazalet Jung*'s Agent, if he has any in the Circar, acquainting him, you are authorized by us to deliver over the country to his Maſter, and deſire him to take charge of it until he can receive his Maſter's orders. Having thus done, you will collect your Sepoys from the different parts of the diſtricts, proceed with them to *Ongole*, and uſe your utmoſt endeavours to procure boats to bring them to the Preſidency; where we wiſh them to arrive with the utmoſt expedition.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16th Sept. 1780.

To Mr. *James Henry Caſamajor*, Chief, and Council of *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

The *Sartine* frigate now proceeds to your ſettlement, to bring up the four grenadier companies of Sepoys under the command of Captain *Lyſaught* as mentioned in our letter to you of the 14th inſtant; we deſire therefore that you will embark them without loſs of time.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 16th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To *Edward Cotsford*, Eſq Chief, and Council of *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

We now ſend the Company's ſhip *Pondborne*, to bring up the eight grenadier companies of Sepoys mentioned in our letter to you of the 14th inſtant; we deſire you will ſend them on board with all poſſible expedition, and afterwards diſpatch the ſhip to the Preſidency.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 16th Sept. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 23d Sept. 1780.

Mr. Johnſon delivers in the following Minute;

The letter (of the 21ſt ult°) juſt received from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, evinces the bad conſequences that will probably enſue from the Committee having delayed anſwering their letter to them (of the 12th June) relative to ceding the *Guntoor* Circar to the Soubah: I have already recorded my opinion of this important ſubject; and cannot but regret that it was not adopted, inſtead of writing a vague anſwer to them, of our being obliged to wait for his Highneſs the Nabob's determination on the buſineſs. The Governor General and Council muſt be convinced that this was an evaſive anſwer to an explicit requiſition, and will hold us reſponſible for the conſequences. It was highly impolitic and

APPENDIX. No. 11.

dangerous to delay gratifying the Soubah in ſo reaſonable a requeſt; we may probably feel the bad effects of it now, when *Hyder Ally* has proved ſo ſucceſsful, and as it affords the Soubah ſo fair an opportunity to break with us.

I am very apprehenſive that *Hyder Ally* will take poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar on its being evacuated by Lieutenant *Douglas*; and I greatly regret that we did not adviſe *Bazalet Jung* of our orders to that Officer, ſo that his troops might have been ready to take poſſeſſion of it the moment the Company's ſhould march from it. To remedy, as far as now in us lies, the evils which may reſult from the inattention ſhewn by the Committee to this important buſineſs, I move for writing immediately to the Governor General and Council, that we have obtained his Highneſs the Nabob's conſent for ceding the *Guntoor* Circar, and in conſequence have ordered our Troops to be withdrawn.

I alſo move, that letters be written to the Soubah and *Bazalet Jung*, acquainting them with all that we have done in this buſineſs.

Samuel Johnſon.

I ſubſcribe to the ſentiments expreſſed by Mr. *Johnſon* in the foregoing Minute, and ſecond his motions.

Charles Smith.

Agreed, That a letter be written to the Governor General and Council, that we have ordered our Troops to be withdrawn from the *Guntoor* Circar, and the country to be delivered to *Bazalet Jung*; and that a letter be written to the Nizam in the moſt friendly terms, that his having intereſted himſelf in the reſtitution of the *Guntoor* Circar to his brother, we have, out of reſpect to him, ordered it to be delivered up.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 27th Sept. 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have this day received your letter of the 14th inſt. incloſing a letter from the Nabob to his Manager in this Circar, which I have forwarded to him at *Bezora*.

I have written to *Bazalet Jung*'s Agent at *Condavir*, agreeably to your commands, informing him that I am authorized by you to deliver over the *Guntoor* Circar to his Maſter, and deſiring him to take charge of the country, until he can receive his orders.

I ſhall as ſoon as poſſible collect the Sepoys from their different ſtations in this diſtrict, and proceed with them to *Ongole*, and ſhall uſe my utmoſt endeavours to procure boats to carry them to the Preſidency.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient, and moſt humble Servant,

Innacunda, 21ſt Sept. 1780. *Walter Douglas.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 30th September 1780.

Received the following letter:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with much concern that I find it neceſſary to inform you, that it is my opinion, that little ſervice is to be expected from the independant companies when ſent to the ſouthward, as it was expreſsly underſtood when they were enliſted, that they were always to remain in this quarter. I have carefully kept from their knowledge that their deſtination was to *Madras*, and have only given out, that we were going to *Ongole*; but I underſtand they are ſuſpicious, and begin to waver. The ſenior Subidar, who is a man in every reſpect to be depended on, informs me, that the vaſt number of Sepoys of Captain *Powell*'s and Captain *Nixon*'s battalions who have paſſed this way, and almoſt all of them wounded, has much alarmed our people. He ſays, that as ſoon as they know for certain that they are ordered to the ſouthward, that at leaſt one half of them will deſert, if they have an opportunity. The two companies of the 7th Circar battalion, I believe, are inclined to be of the ſame diſpoſition, but the two companies of the 7th *Carnatic* will readily embark for the ſouthward, being all of that country.

No attention on my part ſhall be wanting to bring off as many of the Sepoys as poſſible, but I have thought it neceſſary at the ſame time to acquaint you how far I think they are to be relied on.

There are in this place 140 barrels of muſket ball cartridges and gunpowder, part of which, together with 1,400 cartridge pouches, and ſome other ſtores were left by Colonel *Baillie*, all of which now ſending to *Ongole*, and ſhall leave them with Captain *Edmonds*, unleſs I receive your inſtructions to the contrary.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

Innacunda, 24th Sept. 1780. *Walter Douglas.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 4th October 1780.

Received the following letter from Lieut. *Douglas*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived here this morning with the detachment from the *Guntoor* Circar. On the 24th ult. I informed you of my opinion as to the ſervice to be expected from the five independant companies when ſent to the ſouthward: I have ſince ſounded their inclinations more particularly, and I find them ſo averſe to going to the ſouthward, that their being ordered to proceed, I am convinced, will be attended with the entire loſs of ſo many men to the ſervice; I therefore beg leave to ſuggeſt to you, that by leaving them to garriſon *Ongole*, the four remaining companies of the 7th *Carnatic* battalion may be ſent to *Madras*; and I the rather mention this, as I underſtand from Captain *Edmonds*, that there is no probability of his being able to raiſe recruits for that battalion in his part of the country. Should you not approve of this, the independant companies may be incorporated in the 2d Circar battalion, which is ordered to be recruited again, and the two companies of the 7th Circar battalion can be left to garriſon this place.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servant,

Ongole, 1ſt October 1780. *Walter Douglas.*

In conſequence of which, the following letter was written to Captain *Edmonds*:

To Captain *Edmonds*, commanding at *Ongole*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee, to deſire you will detain the five independant companies (lately arrived with you) to do duty in the garriſon of *Ongole*, and ſend up in the *Contractor* to *Madras*, in their room, the four companies of the 7th *Carnatic* battalion.

I am, Sir,

Fort Saint George, 4th October 1780. Your moſt obedient Servant, *Charles Oakley*, Secretary.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 9th October 1780.

Read the following letter from the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam:*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your commands of the 22d and 26th ultimo, and of the 9th, 14th, and 16th inſtant.

Conformably to your orders in your two laſt-mentioned letters, ſix companies of the Sepoy grenadiers of this diſtrict are preparing to embark in the ſhip *Ponſborne* for the Preſidency; the two remaining companies will be embarked in another veſſel, which we have taken up for that purpoſe. We had urgent reaſons, as ſuch and will, we hope, entirely juſtify the deviation from your orders, to diſpatch the *Ponſborne* without theſe two companies: The bad weather, and the condition of the roads between this place and *Samulcotah*, threatened a very conſiderable delay in their arrival here; and we diſcovered not only the grenadier Sepoys of this place, but amongſt thoſe arrived from the two other battalions, a ſpirit of diſcontent and diſlike to the voyage breaking out. It has, indeed, ſince proceeded to very diſagreeable lengths, and involved us in ſome difficulties, which however have been removed by the influence and addreſs of General *Stuart*, who has been engaged in this meaſure at our requeſt, and by the prudent conduct of Captain *Cheſshyre*. The whole tranſaction will be detailed in our next addreſs to your Honour, &c. The apprehenſions of new trouble if we detained the ſix companies for the arrival of the remaining two, together with the conſideration of the expediency of the *Ponſborne*'s ſpeedy departure upon other accounts, determined us to diſpatch her with them. The Captains of the ſeveral battalions have been directed to uſe all poſſible diligence to recruit Sepoys to ſupply the deficiency which will be thereby occaſioned in them.

We have been obliged to lodge the laſt quantity of powder (1,320 barrels) forwarded hither, in a place out of the fort, there being no place of ſafety within to receive it; moreover, the quantity we have already of this article in the fort, is not lodged ſo ſecurely as we could wiſh, or as it ought to be, being expoſed, by its ſituation in the bomb-proof of one of the baſtions, both to damp, and to the danger of explotion ſhould the place come to be attacked. We have found ſince we addreſſed your Honour, &c. laſt on this ſubject, that the bomb-proofs of the other baſtions are too damp for the purpoſe of lodging powder therein, and we have therefore, as in caſe of evident neceſſity, given orders for the conſtructing of a magazine to contain 1,500 barrels, the expence of which will not exceed that of the one we lately propoſed for 1,000 barrels, more than eight or nine hundred Pagodas. This magazine cannot be finiſhed under ſome months, and when it is, will not enable us properly to diſpoſe of all the powder now here; we ſubmit therefore to your Honour, &c. what to determine with reſpect to the quantity of this article we have on hand, which for want of a place of ſecurity wherein to lodge it, may, if left where it is (and we can put it no where better, or even ſo well) poſſibly become a heavy loſs.

The Storekeeper has repreſented to us, that the barrels in which the powder lately ſent to this place arrived, are in ſo bad a condition that the powder muſt be taken out to have the barrels repaired; further, that many of theſe barrels are unrepairable; upon this account, a quantity of new barrels will be wanted, not leſs than one thouſand. The Storekeeper has alſo repreſented, that he is diſtreſſed to get work of the above kind done, having only one cooper in pay, and no more being procurable here; this has been before noticed to your Honour, &c. and we muſt more particularly entreat your attention to it.

Our Inſpector of ſtores, Lieutenant *William Leybourne Lloyd*, being under that capacity in general orders to repair to the Preſidency, we have judged it neceſſary, for the reaſons hereafter aſſigned, to require of him to continue in this office at this place for the preſent, and until your further pleaſure may be known. Theſe reaſons are, firſt, that to preſerve the various articles of military ſtores which are lodged in this garriſon, to a very large amount, and particularly gunpowder, free from damage and in proper order, it is abſolutely neceſſary an Officer of the Artillery ſhould be upon the ſpot to ſuperintend the ſame, and to conduct the buſineſs of the laboratory. Secondly, that ſuch a perſon is now more particularly wanted, when by your orders, a corps of Laſcars, in number one hundred, are training to the exerciſe of the guns; and when the condition of nearly half the powder in the garriſon is ſuch, that it will be neceſſary to avail ourſelves of the firſt opportunity of fair weather to get it dried and examined. Thirdly and laſtly, we are of opinion, that at the preſent juncture it would be highly improper to leave a garriſon of this importance without one Officer of Artillery, and with only four or five private of that corps: we humbly preſume, that it is ſcarcely poſſible we ſhould have done amiſs, in requiring Lieut. *Lloyd*, upon theſe grounds, to remain here for the preſent, particularly, as an opportunity may probably offer after the time within which we may hope to receive your final determination in this matter, for him (Lieutenant *Lloyd*) to proceed to the ſouthward, ſhould that be reſolved on.

Mr. *Barnard* has tendered to us twelve Officers tents and eighteen Sepoy tents, both ſorts complete, which he has received from the agent of the late Mr. *Cadogan*, it having been requeſted by Mr. *Cadogan*, that Mr. *Barnard* would take charge of them until further inſtructions from him, Mr. *Cadogan*. Mr. *Barnard* offered theſe tents at the price tents of the ſame kind have been heretofore charged by Mr. *Cadogan* in his diſburſements; or ſhould not Mr. *Cadogan* at any time have charged for ſuch articles, Mr. *Barnard* then offered them at the price they have uſually been charged by other Paymaſters; the amount to be paid by your Honours, &c. to the executors or adminiſtrators of the aforeſaid Mr. *Cadogan*. As we are of opinion the ſervice to the ſouthward may ſtand in need of a ſupply of tents at this time, we have thought it expedient to receive theſe tents on account of your Honour, &c. from Mr. *Barnard*, on the terms he has propoſed; they go accordingly in the *Ponſborne*, and we have given a receipt for the ſame to Mr. *Barnard*, and engaged ourſelves that your Honour, &c. will make good the amount as ſoon as it can be ſettled, to the aforeſaid executors or adminiſtrators of the late Mr. *Cadogan*.

We have the pleaſure to inform you, that the two companies of grenadier Sepoys, of the 7th Circar battalion, arrived juſt as we were on the point of diſpatching this letter, and they now proceed alſo in the *Ponſborne*.

We ſhall avail ourſelves of the ſloop taken up as a tranſport for theſe two companies, to get ſuch part of Lieutenant *Douglas*'s detachment conveyed to the Preſidency, as may be conveniently embarked on her; and we ſhall write to Lieutenant *Douglas* that they may go on board at this port, or ſomewhere near to *Ongole*, which ever ſhall be moſt convenient.

We are, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Edward Cotsford,
James Hodges,
John Peter Loileau,
Thomas Barnard,
Alex' Pringle.

Maſulipatam,
2d October 1780.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee,
Friday, October 13th 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes

APPENDIX. No. 11.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following letters, this morning received from *Vizagapatam:*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Juſt as the grenadier Sepoys were on the parade, ready to embark on board the *Sartine*, at about twenty minutes before three o'clock in the afternoon, they refuſed to march, and immediately began to fire on their officers, and all the Europeans they could ſee; which diſperſed the reſt of the garriſon. Lieutenant *Criſp*, Mr. *Pennor* a Cadet, and Mr. *Rutherford*, were killed on the ſpot, and Mr. *Maxtone* was wounded in the head, and got off; their European officers were of courſe diſperſed, but they were led on by their Indian officers. Lieutenant *Brown* and Enſign *Towart* got on board the *Sartine*, after running great riſks, having been repeatedly fired at; and Lieut. *Brown* addreſſed us a letter, which miſcarried, a copy of which we now ſend; the other officers hid themſelves in different parts of the town. Captain *Lane*, who happened to be at *Vizagapatam* on leave, is wounded, but was aſſiſted by ſome of his Sepoys in getting off; Mr. *Crawford* was, by the fidelity of his ſervant, hid in one of their houſes; Mr. *Caſamajor*, with ſeveral other Gentlemen, was taken out of his houſe by ſome Sepoys, and confined in a ſmall guard room, and his life preſerved by the attention of a Sepoy, who prevented two men from firing who levelled at him; he, with the Gentlemen with him, were taken out ſeparately, at about ſeven o'clock in the afternoon, and examined by the Subadar *Shaike Mahomed*, who aſſumed the command of the mutineers; he was ordered to inform him where his own money was, as well as that of the Company's; he was obliged to reply to all theſe queſtions on pain of loſing his life; and a complete ſcene of plunder enſued, when the property of every individual, as well as that of the Company, has ſuffered effectually. This morning, about five o'clock, Mr. *Caſamajor* was told, that he muſt prepare for death, but that his life, as well as the lives of the other Gentlemen in confinement, ſhould be ſpared, provided Mr. *Caſamajor* would ſign a deed, nominating again *Guzzepetty Nazum Deo*, the diſmiſſed Zemindar of *Kimmedy*, to his ſtation in that country, and at the ſame time direct that ſome Sepoys, who had been embarked with the baggage in the morning of the 3d, ſhould be ſent on ſhore. Theſe conditions were dictated by the ſame Subadar *Shaike Mahomed*, and immediately complied with by Mr. *Caſamajor*. The mutineers then began their march out of the town, but took with them Mr. *Caſamajor* and the reſt of the Gentlemen who had been confined with him; they followed the mutineers about one mile out of town, and were then permitted to return to *Vizagapatam*, at the interceſſion of *Guzzepetty Nazum Deo*; and Mr. *Caſamajor* cannot in common juſtice avoid beſtowing every praiſe on *Guzzepetty Nazum Deo*, who, as ſoon as he heard the firing, came into the fort; and Mr. *Caſamajor*, and the reſt of the Gentlemen in confinement with him, attribute their ſafety entirely to the interceſſion of *Guzzepetty*. The reigning Zemindar of *Kimmedy*, *Jugganut Deo*, was in *Vizagapatam*, and he had with him a number of followers, but made off inſtead of rendering any aſſiſtance. From this recommendation of Mr. *Caſamajor*'s, of the ſervice rendered by *Guzzepetty*, we beg leave to recommend him to your protection, even ſo far as to confirm him as the Zemindar of *Kimmedy*, as the indiſcretion for which he was expelled was committed at the age of thirteen; he is undoubtedly the real heir, and his brother *Jugganaut Deo* has by no means deſerved the attention of the Company, which will appear on a review of his arrears of Jemmabundy. Mr. *Caſamajor* has alſo repreſented to us, that during his confinement, which was in the guard room in which Captain *Brule* was priſoner, that this man behaved with ſo much attention, and rendered him, and the Gentleman with him, ſuch ſervices as an interpreter during the night, that we muſt intercede for him, that he may be releaſed from confinement, and be allowed ſome trifle to ſubſiſt on. The Commandant of the Mutineers, *Shaike Mahomed*, having threatened that if any ſuccours came from *Chicacole*, that we ſhould feel his reſentment, we are now on board the *Sartine* frigate, and ſhall return to *Vizagapatam* to-morrow, where we hope that the Sepoys who ſhewed attachment will be collected, and we ſhall be in a better ſtate of defence ſhould thoſe mutineers return. We know not whither they are gone.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
With reſpect,
Your obedient humble Servants,
Ja^s Caſamajor,
Henry Crawford,
Charles Maxtone.

On board the *Sartine* frigate,
4th October 1780.

To *James Henry Caſamajor*, Eſquire, Chief; Captain *Lane*; *Henry Crawford*, Eſquire; or any Officer or Gentleman by whom this may be received.

Gentlemen,

Finding I could not be of uſe in quelling the unfortunate mutiny, after having been fired upon from houſe to houſe, with difficulty I made the beach, and got on board the *Sartine*, accompanied by Enſign *Towart*. Serjeant *Ellis* had ſwam acroſs the river, and we took him up from the battery at the mouth of it. Serjeant *Crouſe* I found in a boat, with ſome ſtores, at the beach, and took him on board; as alſo Serjeant *Collins*, who arrived at the beach juſt as the boat was puſhing off.

I am authorized by Captain *McKay* to ſay, that he can aſſiſt, by ſending aſhore fifty men with firelocks, provided with ammunition; Enſign *Towart*, ſome Gentlemen Volunteers from the ſhip, with myſelf, and the three Serjeants above-mentioned, will make ten more; in all, ſixty. If this reinforcement will be of any ſervice towards re-eſtabliſhing peace in the Settlement, you may depend on our appearance and utmoſt exertion aſhore, at any hour you may appoint.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your very obedient Servant,
Arch Brown,
Lieut. 11ſt Batt^n.

Sartine, 3d Oct. 1780,
¼ paſt 5 o'clock.
[Triplicate.]

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We addreſſed you yeſterday from on board the *Sartine*; this morning we came on ſhore. We find ourſelves in a predicament which we conceive dangerous. The revolt of the Grenadiers, of which we adviſed you, is in all reſpects an event that may lead to dangerous conſequences: It has annihilated our power and influence, in a great meaſure; at any rate, it has received ſuch a ſhock, that we feel ourſelves degraded as a Government. The conduct of the mutineers was adopted by five companies of the firſt Circar battalion, that had refuſed to be in garriſon here; they are all gone off with them, except about 40 men, and even theſe joined the insurgents: And as this revolt took place when we had not the leaſt idea that ſuch a diſpoſition prevailed in the troops, it is not improbable but that the remains of the 11ſt battalion and 5th battalion, now at *Chicacole*, have adopted ſimilar opinions. On a review of the general ſtate of affairs on the coaſt, the war with the Marattas and *Hyder*, and the probability of a French force landing, it is not drawing an improbable concluſion to ſuppoſe, that the Zemindars may avail themſelves of this criſis of events, and throw off their allegiance. We are here without any reſources, either of men or money; the former we ſuſpect, and for the latter we depend alone on the Zemindars. We have now ſtated to you our ſituation; and

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we add, that all we have to truſt to is, the attachment of 300 Sibbendy Sepoys, and half of them are now detached. In this repreſentation, we have not, in our opinion, either exaggerated in points of real ſtate, or conjecture. We therefore requeſt of you, Gentlemen, that you will determine on ſome plan of operations for us to purſue. This revolt has ſo effectually deranged this Government, and ſo reduced our conſequence, that we imagine ſome meaſures ought to be adopted that will give us the importance we have loſt; and we can think of no other ſtep ourſelves, than procuring us ſome Sepoys and about fifty Europeans from *Calcutta*, or ſending Southern people here, and ordering all the Sepoys in theſe diſtricts to the Southward. *Sitteram Rauze* is not yet arrived at *Vizigapatam*; he keeps away in a manner that has the appearance of premeditated delay. All theſe matters ſerve to create in us anxiety about the fate of this Settlement; and *Shaike Mahomed*, the man who heads the revolted Sepoys, is gone off with a great deal of money, is capable, daring, and full of enterprize, and what are his intentions is not at preſent to be conjectured. By this day's intelligence, he has taken the road to *Ankapillee*, and it is very probable that he has written to the Sepoys at *Chicacole* of his ſucceſs; at any rate common report favours that ſuſpicion. Could the *Sartine* ſtay here until this Government was again reeſtabliſhed, it would be of much aſſiſtance to the Settlement in caſe of an unfortunate event; but the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced that Captain *M Kay* cannot venture to ſtay here longer than to-morrow without violating his inſtructions: In juſtice to him, however, we muſt obſerve, that he has been ready in his offers of aſſiſtance, and the preſence of the *Sartine* contributed to render the revolt leſs permanent. We have nothing further to add on the ſtate of the Settlement, but that we wait your orders and reſolutions with ſome degree of anxiety, and the ſcene that was exhibited here for twenty four hours warrants us in our apprehenſions of every kind.

We have the honour to tranſmit you a duplicate of our Addreſs dated yeſterday.

Captain *Brule*, of whom we writ yeſterday, is deſirous of proceeding to *Madras*, to vindicate his conduct; and we believe, that had he offered his ſervices on the day of the revolt, he would have been attended to. We recommend him for forgiveneſs, and to have ſome allowance as a ſubſiſtence; he takes his paſſage on the *Sartine*.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
J. H. Caſamajor,
Henry Crawford,
Charles Maxtone.

Vizagapatam, 5th October 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18th October 1780.

Received the following letters:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

You have been addreſſed by the Chief and Council here under date 4th and 5th inſtant, relative to the unfortunate and unexpected revolt of the four companies of Grenadiers. All ſeems quiet here at preſent, but this event has raiſed ſuch a general ſuſpicion of all the Sepoys, that we know not where to place any confidence; thoſe at *Chicacole* are moſt of them related and connected with the mutineers; and when you conſider that out of four companies of Grenadiers, and five battalion companies of the firſt battalion, there were but a few who did not join the mutineers, I am ſure it warrants every apprehenſion of the remaining eleven companies of the two battalions at *Chicacole* and *Maringy*. There was an univerſal and complete plunder of all the property belonging to the Company and European inhabitants. All the Company's caſh in the treaſury, amounting to rupees 21,922. 11. 9. and the money of ſome of the Employs, fell into the hands of the inſurgents; and in the wreck of all property, all the Company's broad cloth, and a large proportion of the civil and military ſtores, fell into the poſſeſſions of the plunderers. The inhabitants of the place were as active in this ſcene as the inſurgents, and quantities of broad cloth, firelocks, &c. are hourly brought in. My own loſs amounts to 5,000 pagodas, and the other Gentlemen have alſo ſuffered conſiderably.

As ſoon as poſſible, a complete account of the public loſs ſhall be tranſmitted, and the orders and regulations we have iſſued ſince the revolt. Among other expedients, we have raiſed for the preſent 100 Gun Peons who have families in the town, and, with the aſſiſtance of the Sibbendy, they at preſent ſerve to garriſon this place, as our confidence in the regular Sepoys is for a time loſt; nor can any detachment be well ſpared from *Chicacole*, as the two battalions are now reduced to eleven companies, and two of them detached to *Maringy*. The mutinous party under *haike Mahomed* were, by the laſt accounts, entering into the *Totapilly* Country: The Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* has written to all the little Zemindars to ſtop them; but they yet compoſe a ſtrong body, and it is not a trifling force that can oppoſe them. I have written Mr. *Cotsford* and Captain *Bridges*, and as they will probably paſs near *Simul Cotah*, I am in hopes ſome of them may be picked up and puniſhed. They evidently are going to the Nizam's Country, or through the *Guntoor* Circar to *Cuddapah*.

Captain *Lane* is directed to recruit up the battalion to the eſtabliſhment, and conſider the mutinous companies as annihilated, and to receive only ſuch of them as preſerved their fidelity into the ſervice again, who are alſo to be rewarded with one month's pay.

I have the honour to tranſmit you a duplicate Extract of the intelligence tranſmitted on the 24th ultimo. In the courſe of correſpondence with Mr. *Turing*, it has occurred to him that the *Nagpore* Rajah may be offended at the ſeizure of his letters, and may in conſequence ſtop the dipatches to and from *Bengal*. I am convinced that when Captain *Lyſaght* intercepted and opened theſe letters, ſuch an idea entirely eſcaped his reflections, and until ſuggeſted by Mr. *Turing*, I never adverted to that point. I have in conſequence directed that the hircarrahs who were detained with the letters from the *Nagpore* Rajah, ſhould be diſmiſſed with preſents, and that they ſhould be told that their detention and that of the letters originated in a miſtake; and I alſo have forwarded the original letters to Mr. *Turing*, that he may ſend them to the *Nagpore* Rajah, with ſome apology in caſe he detains the tappal to and from *Calcutta*; and I hope what I have done in this matter will meet with your approbation.

Rajah *Sitteram Rauze* is expected to arrive to-morrow at *Vizagapatam*.

I am,
Honourable Sir,
with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
J. H. Caſamajor.

Vizagapatam, 9th October 1780.

Honourable Sir,

Since I addreſſed you yeſterday, I have advice that *Shaike Mahomed*, at the head of the mutinous Sepoys, was given to underſtand by *Berah Bundy*, the *Golconda* man, that he ſhould not paſs through his country; upon which he moved back with his party to a place called *Gudderallywauk*; and at 12 o'clock of the night of the 8th they laid down their arms, cloaths, accoutrements, and immediately diſperſed. I have ſent out two ſmall detachments to pick up ſtragglers, and as many of the arms as they can find. I am, Honourable Sir,

Your obedient humble Servant,
Jas H. Caſamajor.

Vizagapatam, 19th Oct. 1780.

N° 92. To *Bazalet Jung*; dated 23d Sept. 1780.

Your Excellency having ſome time ago expreſſed your deſire of having the *Guntoor* Circar reſtored into your hands,

APPENDIX. No. 11.

hands, in conſequence of the diſappointments which prevented our Troops marching for the protection of your country; and your brother, *Nizam Ally Cawn*, having alſo intereſted himſelf with the Governor General of *Bengal*, upon the ſame account, we have come to the reſolution of complying with yours and the Nizam's wiſhes in this reſpect, and have diſpatched the neceſſary orders to our Officer commanding in that country, to put your Agent into immediate and entire poſſeſſion of it, and to withdraw the Troops entirely from the diſtrict. I hope this will prove acceptable to you, and tend to ſtrengthen the friendly diſpoſitions which have hitherto ſubſiſted between us. May your happineſs and proſperity daily increaſe! What can I ſay more?

N° 94. To the Nizam; dated the 25th September 1780.

I received your Highneſs's friendly letter, congratulating me upon my acceſſion to the Government of *Madras*, for which I requeſt you to accept my acknowledgments.

Your Highneſs having intereſted yourſelf with the Governor General of *Bengal*, to procure the reſtoration of the *Guntoor* Circar to your Brother, *Bazalet Jung*, and to have things put upon the ſame footing that they ſtood before any engagements were made between him and the Company; I have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that orders have been ſent to our people in the *Guntoor* Circar, to put *Bazalet Jung* in full poſſeſſion of that country, and to withdraw themſelves from all further concern in it. This inſtance of reſpect to your Highneſs will, I flatter myſelf, be conſidered as a ſtrong proof of the Company's deſire to live in amity with you, and, I truſt, will promote and ſtrengthen the ſame diſpoſitions on your part.

I am concerned it has not been in my power to make any payments to your Highneſs, on account of the peſhcuſh for the Northern Circars. You have been acquainted, by former letters, of the great failures that had happened in the revenues of thoſe diſtricts, and other circumſtances, which occaſioned this deficiency. Your Highneſs will, however, do me the juſtice to rely on the aſſurances I now make, that every opportunity will be taken to make good the balances due upon this account.

Your Highneſs will doubtleſs have heard of the troubles created in the *Carnatic* by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, without any cauſe or provocation whatſoever. We are now making great preparations to take the field after the rains, and, I truſt, by the bleſſing of God, that the ambitious views of this Chief, *Hyder*, will ſoon have reaſon to repent of his raſhneſs. The conqueſts he had made, and the reſources which he commands, are ſubjects that muſt neceſſarily excite alarm and jealouſy in all the Powers around us; but I am ſenſible it is unneceſſary to mention theſe things to your Highneſs, whoſe wiſdom and penetration muſt long ago have diſcovered the truth of them; and I ſhall only obſerve upon the preſent diſturbances occaſioned by *Hyder Ally*, that I am ſatisfied your Highneſs will act according to the treaties ſubſiſting between you and the Company, and endeavour, to the utmoſt of your power, to check the deſigns of their enemies.

May honour and proſperity always attend your Highneſs! What can I ſay more?

N° 95. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 16th September 1780—Received 17th D°

I have received your letter of the 2d inſtant, in which you acquaint me, that the Governor General and Council had repreſented to you, how much the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah* was affected by the treaty made with *Bazalet Jung*, for obtaining poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar independant of him, which had given him umbrage; that in conſideration of this, you had determined to give up the circar of *Guntoor* to the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, as being the means of preſerving the Nizam's friendſhip. But as that circar is rented to me under certain ſtipulations, ſubject to the Company's pleaſure, you do not think yourſelves warranted in delivering it back, until I ſhall have given my concurrence to the meaſure; that you therefore hope I ſhall have no objection to it, for the reaſons recommended by the Government of *Bengal*. All this I underſtand, my dear Sir. Out of the ſingle conſideration that my Friends had for ſome years paſt earneſtly deſired to get poſſeſſion of the circar of *Guntoor*, for which they had obtained permiſſion of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in Mr. *Wynche*'s time, and at the repeated requeſt of Governor *Rumbold*, who knew the wiſhes of the *Bengal* Gentlemen in this matter, I commenced negociation with *Bazalet Jung*, and convinced him of the friendſhip and ſtrict adherence of the Company to their engagements; by which means I obtained his conſent to rent the circar of *Guntoor* to them, and get the French troops in his ſervice diſmiſſed and turned out of that country. The letter from *Bazalet Jung* to Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and myſelf, are manifeſt proofs of this.

It was never my wiſh to have taken poſſeſſion of the circar of *Guntoor* myſelf; but as it borders on the diſtricts of *Pulnard* and *Ongole*, which are in the *Carnatic*, and that for ages paſt the Zemindars of *Guntoor* pay duties to the Government at *Pulnard*, I thought that if *Guntoor* was rented to any body but myſelf, when it came into the Company's hands, ſome innovations from the former practices might take place, and it would give riſe to differences and complaints. On that account only I applied for the rent of that circar; but ſo far from benefiting a ſingle pagoda by it, I have hitherto ſuffered a conſiderable loſs: This you are not ignorant of. My ſincere wiſh is, and ever has been, that my welfare may be conſidered as blended with that of my Friends: And you will therefore act reſpecting the reſolution communicated to you by the Governor General and Council, as appears beſt to you for the advantage of the Company; for it is my ſincere deſire to do every thing which may tend to the ſucceſs of their affairs. It is adviſable and proper to give back the circar of *Guntoor* to *Bazalet Jung*, and to ſatisfy the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowla* reſpecting the balances of peſhcuſh due to him for the circar of *Rajahmundry*, *Ellore*, &c. that they may have proper ſenſe of the ſincere intentions of the Company towards them. The treaty made with *Bazalet Jung* took place through my means, and was ſanctified by the Company's ſeal, and the ſignatures of the Governor and Council, as you well know. If you will conſult of the beſt means to authorize me with power to treat with the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowla*, to bring him to join us, in order to puniſh *Hyder Ally Cawn*, who has taken poſſeſſion of my country, ruined it, and ſeized ſeveral forts in it; and if you will commence a correſpondence with the Nizam, as I ſhall adviſe you to, I may be able to try my endeavours to find at leaſt whether he will join us or not to chaſtiſe *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and what his intentions are. Whatever is to be done, I recommend to you to loſe no time, but do it immediately. What ſhall I ſay more?

APPENDIX, No. 12.

To General Sir *Hector Munro*, K.B. Commander in Chief of the Army.

Sir,

THE Preſident having informed us, that he has juſt received advice of your arrival at the Mount, and that you are deſirous of coming to the Fort; we ſhall be glad to have the pleaſure of ſeeing you as ſoon as you can conveniently leave camp.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 14th Sept. 1780.

John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX No. 12.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
15th Sept. 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident,
Chas Smith,
Major Genl Sr *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

The Commander in Chief being returned from camp, now reſumes his ſeat at the Committee.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations,
23d Sept. 1780.

Read the following Letter from Sir *Hector Munro*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The loſs we have ſuſtained in the unfortunate defeat of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, both in Europeans and Sepoys, calls on us to exert ourſelves to ſtrengthen the Army as ſoon as poſſible, ſo as to enable us to oppoſe the enemy: As Commander in Chief, I therefore conſider it incumbent on me to point out the beſt mode I can, ſo as to anſwer the end required. The loſs of the Europeans is the moſt difficult to be repaired; the large detachment ſent to the *Malabar* Coaſt, is a great diſtreſs to us at preſent, and till the communication is open with *Vellore*, we cannot avail ourſelves of the ſervice of the 1ſt battalion 1ſt regiment now there; the only reſource we have, is to ſtrengthen the European battalion now in camp with as many men as can be got from the European battalion now in garriſon at *Fort Saint George*. His Majeſty's 73d regiment, beſides the loſs of their flank companies, are much reduced by ſickneſs; I would hope, that as the weather is growing cooler, that, and reſt, may recover them; the companies of Invalids, the Recruits, and ſuch ſick who are not equal to field-duty, will form a body of Europeans ſufficient for *Fort Saint George*, while the Army is in the field; the Artillery cannot at preſent be augmented, unleſs there can be found men equal to that ſervice among the Recruits in *Madras*; I would therefore recommend that his Highneſs the Nabob be applied to for 200 of his Artillery corps now at *Trichinopoly*, and let them do duty with the corps of Artillery in the field; there will ſtill remain enough for *Trichinopoly*, and the Commanding Officer at *Tanjore* ſhould have authority to raiſe a black company of Artillery there, which, with a proper Officer and ſome Invalids, may ſtrengthen that garriſon greatly.

The battalions of Sepoys that ſuffered with the detachment, ſhould be recruited as ſoon as poſſible; an Officer ſhould be appointed to the command of each for the time being, and an Adjutant on the ſame terms, and the moſt proper places ſhould be choſen for their recruiting quarters: I would alſo recommend the augmenting the Sepoy battalions to one hundred Sepoys to each company; the detachment now at *Tellicherry* ſhould be ſent for and landed at *Anjengo*, and march to *Palamcottah*, and remain there in garriſon, or for further orders; but as this will take time, I therefore propoſe that orders ſhould be ſent to *Palamcottah* for five companies of the 10th battalion to march to *Madura*; and the 3d battalion now there, to march to *Tanjore*, there to be joined by the 9th battalion now in garriſon there, and both to march to *Nagore*, and come by ſea to *Madras*; or their march may perhaps be ſecure by the coaſt as far as *Cuddalore*. In order to ſtrengthen the garriſon of *Tanjore*, I would have 500 of the beſt men of Captain *Burrowe*'s Sibbendies, for the preſent, to do duty in *Tanjore*, and receive full pay. If the Nabob has any Sepoys at *Trichinopoly*, the three companies of Captain *Beleliff*'s battalion now there may be ordered to *Tanjore*. Beſides the twelve companies of Grenadiers ſent for, from the Northward, I would propoſe that two battalions more ſhould be ordered from the Circars to join the army. The five remaining battalions, together with Captain *Powell*'s battalion, which will be recruited, knowing that they will not be moved from the Northward, would ſoon be complete, to the new eſtabliſhment of 1,000 Sepoys each battalion. I propoſe this as the only means of ſtrengthening the Army immediately; but as I have no knowledge of the Circars, the Gentlemen of the Committee who have been there, will beſt judge if they can be ſpared. I ſhould imagine two battalions in the *Maſulipatam*, two in the *Vizagapatam*, and one in the *Ganjam* diſtricts, with Captain *Powell*'s battalion recruiting, might anſwer, as their numbers will be daily increaſing; the two battalions of Sepoys now in *Madras* ſhould be ordered to camp, and the two weakeſt battalions be ordered from camp to garriſon. Numbers of Sepoys who were in the action of the 10th September are daily coming in, and will form a corps in *Madras* for the preſent, but ſhould join the battalions they formerly belonged to as ſoon as they are recruited. The Army then would have the 73d regiment, 2 battalions 1ſt regiment, 7 *Carnatic* Sepoy battalions, 2 Circar battalions, 12 companies of Circar Grenadiers, and 10 companies of *Carnatic* Grenadiers, the preſent corps of Artillery, and 200 of the Nabob's from *Trichinopoly*. To this body of Artillery and Infantry, Cavalry muſt be added: the Europeans are a very ſmall body, only 33, they may be increaſed to 40. The Nabob has two regiments, but unleſs the Government of *Madras* ſee that they are ſatisfied as to their arrears of pay, they may refuſe to ſerve (as Captain *Campbell*'s regiment did) the moment you want them. The Nabob ſhould form two other regiments out of his own Guards and Recruits. The horſes that the Europeans have are the Nabob's, and very bad; they might be returned, and horſes purchaſed from the Gentlemen at *Madras* for them. The Rajah of *Tanjore* ſhould on this occaſion be required to raiſe a regiment of Cavalry, the expence of which ſhould be allowed in his kiſts. If they have not horſes enough in the *Tanjore* country, horſes might be purchaſed of the Gentlemen in *Madras*, as I am informed they are very willing to aſſiſt all in their power towards the public cauſe. The Rajah of *Travencore* ſhould be wrote to, to know if he will join us againſt *Hyder*; in caſe of his ſo doing, the force from *Tellicherry*, with the troops the Nabob is raiſing in the *Tinnevelly* country, may join with the King of *Travencore* and the friendly Polygars, and may, under proper Officers, attack *Hyder*'s ſettlements to the Southward. We ſhould know what part the Nizam and *Bazalet Jung* mean to take in this war. We have reaſon to expect men and money from *Bengal*. If troops can be got, it is on the *Malabar* Coaſt that *Hyder* ſhould be attacked; it is there he is moſt vulnerable. If once his coaſt is attacked, he will leave the *Carnatic* to protect his own country; and had we no war with the Marattas, they would gladly have aſſiſted. The places I imagine moſt likely to recruit the 1ſt, 7th, and 11th battalions of *Carnatic* Sepoys, and the ſecond battalion of Circar Sepoys, are as follow; the 1ſt battalion to be recruited to the Southward, the 7th at *Ongole*, there being four companies of that battalion already there, the 11th about *Arcot* and *Vellore*; and as the enemy at preſent are in poſſeſſion of the country round theſe places, letters ſhould be ſent by the Nabob to Rajah *Burbur*, and from the Committee to Colonel *Lang* and Captain *Prendergaſt*; and I imagine many men may be had: The 2d Circar battalion will of courſe be ordered to recruit in the Circars. In all caſes where men are immediately required to be raiſed for the protection of a State, and to oppoſe an enemy, in proportion to the exigency of affairs, certain advantages are offered to men to enliſt; I would therefore recommend ſome plan to be adopted for this purpoſe; either more bounty-money to Recruits, or perhaps an increaſe of a Sepoy's monthly pay would be the moſt effectual. It is true that the Company's Sepoys receive more pay, and are more regularly paid, than any of the Black Powers; but ſtill the increaſe of expence in our Settlements, makes their pay by no means adequate

APPENDIX. No. 12.

quate to the general expence of provisions. I must own, that I imagine an increase of their monthly pay would get you many Recruits, and would be the means of Sepoys leaving the enemy's service to enlist in your's. The increase of expence cannot be avoided; though economy should be attended to in every department, yet the articles absolutely necessary must be found: It is in peace we should prepare for war. After the siege of *Pondicherry*, I had the honour of addressing the Select Committee by letter, wherein I stated the defects in their garrisons and stores, and pointed out the necessity of putting them in such a state, as to be ready on any emergency; and I frequently recommended that the Troops should always be ready for the field. I am sorry to say that any observations of mine had not the effect I could have wished. I shall say no more on what is past, it is our business now to use every endeavour for the public good. We should have one voice and one hand, and if the ruling Power is steady and determined in its resolutions, the executive part must and will be properly attended to; nor can you make yourselves more formidable to your enemy, than by unanimity in your Council.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient Servant,
Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George, 22d Sept. 1780.

Ordered, That the above, and the General's Letter of the 21st instant, do lie on the table, for further consideration.

APPENDIX, No. 13.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 15th September 1780.

Dispatched the following Letter:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon*, Commandant at *Trichinopoly*.

Sir,

WE desire you will exert your utmost endeavours in procuring Sepoy Recruits, which are much wanted to supply the deficiencies that have lately happened in the Sepoy battalions now with the Army. You will report to us from time to time the number you may obtain; and employ proper persons to discipline them with all expedition. We are, Sir,

Your most humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George, 15th September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 16 September 1780.

To Captain *Edmonds*, Commandant at *Ongole*.

Sir,

The six companies of the 7th *Carnatic* battalion, which were with Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, having been almost entirely cut off in the late accident which happened to that detachment, we desire you will use your utmost endeavours to raise Recruits sufficient to replace them, without loss of time; and that you will report to us, as often as you shall think expedient, the number you may obtain; taking care that they may be disciplined as fast as possible. We are, Sir,

Your most obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George, 16th September 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 18th September 1780.

The Commander in Chief acquaints the Committee, that before he left *Conjeveram* he wrote a letter to Captain *Prendergast*, desiring him to apply to Colonel *Lang*, if necessary, for a further reinforcement.

Agreed, That Colonel *Lang* be acquainted with this, and directed to send as large a reinforcement as he can spare to *Arcot*.

Resolved, That orders be sent to the Chief and Council of *Cuddalore*, to take the necessary steps for bringing from *Pondicherry* all the *Mussoola* boats and boat-people belonging to that place.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnson.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, September 19th 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. Governor, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

Minutes of last Committee read, and approved.

Read the following Letter from the Chief Engineer:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. President and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I herewith take leave to lay before you a set of Memorandums, and Remarks thereon, respecting what ought, without loss of time, to be carried into execution, in order to enable you to put the Fort into a state of defence. It has become absolutely necessary that the Black Town should be defended as long as possible, that people, and every means of getting provisions and materials, may be secured, to do as far as possible what is requisite in the short space of time that we have before the monsoon. The Troops now in the Black Town, or that could be put into it in case of the absence of the Army, are surely by no means sufficient to guard the town against assaults, or so far quiet the apprehensions of the people, that any of them can be kept to do what is absolutely requisite for the Fort. I have for some time been employing the whole strength of the people under my direction, to put the Black Town in a state of defence; much smaller matter remains yet to be done; all the people there at work shall soon be brought to prosecute what is so much wanted in the Fort; but there must be a force in or near the town to assist in the collection of materials, and to enable us at all to keep the artificers at work. In the Memorandums and Remarks that I have sent you herewith, every thing is put down that hath occurred to me. I earnestly beg that the very insufficient state of the sea-line, the want of parapets on some of the works, and the incumbered state of the North glacis, may meet with primary consideration.

Were the bomb-proofs on the East line cleared of the earth that is still in them, and an additional thickness of brick-work put at top to secure them from the weather, they might be used as barracks, and enable you to clear out the King's barracks for a granary, so very much wanted in the Fort. After having thus fully stated what is to be done, I hope your Honour, &c. will pass orders that the means may be afforded me of carrying them into execution; in which I desire to assure you my utmost efforts shall be exerted.

I have the honour to be, with all respect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most devoted humble Servant,
George Maule,
Ch. Eng^r.

Fort Saint George, 18th Sept. 1780.

Memorandums

Memorandums of what is to be done at Fort St. George, 18th September 1780.	Remarks of the Chief Engineer,	Orders of the Select Committee thereon.
Par. 1. The ſeveral guns to be mounted on the works where embraſures are prepared for them.	1. A body of Laſcars acquainted with the buſineſs, are neceſſary, and I have earneſtly to requeſt, that the Laſcars now in camp, be ordered into the fort for this purpoſe.	1ſt. Ordered accordingly.
2. Platforms to be laid for ſuch guns as are to be mounted.	2d. Between 30 and 40 platforms are ready. The Military Storekeeper ſhould be directed to complete the original order for 150.	2d. Thoſe that are ready, to be laid, and the Military Storekeeper to be directed to make up ſuch as are wanting to complete.
3. Drawbridges for the ſeveral gates of the body of the place and outworks.	3d and 4th. Theſe are put in hand by order of the Governor ſome days ſince; but as the Contractor is in diſtreſs for money, he ſhould occaſionally be ſupplied, that theſe works may go on without interruption.	3d. Ordered accordingly.
4. Completing the paliſadoes in the covert way and ſea line.		4th. Ordered accordingly.
5th. Completing the maſonry of the eaſt line. The unfiniſhed arches of the caſemates therein are, in their preſent ſtate, weak, and not watertight.	5th. This is an object of very great importance, as the line is at preſent inſufficient either for defence, or lodging of troops. I take leave to recommend, that the Contractor for materials (to whoſe deficiency of ſupplies we are indebted for the preſent unfiniſhed ſtate of the works) be immediately ſent for by the Honourable the Committee, and deſired to inform them what ſteps he has taken in conſequence of the late advances made to him, and how ſoon a ſupply of materials may be expected. The army remaining in the vicinity of the fort, is the only ground whereon we can hope to collect a ſufficiency of materials for this eſſential work. As the brick cutters are at preſent afraid to work at the kilns, I would beg leave to propoſe, that a party of Sepoys be poſted there to protect the workmen, in furniſhing us with as many bricks as we can expect to receive before the rains ſet in. Charcoal ſhould be procured in as large quantities as poſſible, to burn ſuch ſhells as may be received by water either from the northward or ſouthward. I cannot expreſs myſelf too anxiouſly on this head, as I am convinced the uncompleted brick-work of the ſea line cannot withſtand the ſhock of any heavy rains; and I truſt the Committee will ſee it in the ſame ſerious point of view. All the carts that can be procured, ſhould be delivered over to the Contractor for the works, that he may bring into the fort the bricks that remain at the kilns.	5th. In conſequence of this paragraph, Mr. *Roebuck*, the Contractor for bricks, and chunam, is ſent for, and queſtioned as to the deficiency of theſe materials. With reſpect to bricks, the Contractor ſays that he has nearly ſufficient at the kilns to complete the fortifications, and that more might have been ready, were not his people afraid to work on account of the enemy's horſe. As to chunam, he obſerved, in his juſtification, that he had collected a conſiderable quantity of ſhells in the country, which he meant to bring hither by ſea; but as they could not be ſhipped without an order from the Nabob to the Manager of that part of the country where they had been collected, he had applied many days ago for this order; but, owing to the delays uſed at the Durbar, it had not been given till a day or two ago. We obſerve alſo, that he finds it extremely difficult to procure veſſels to tranſport the ſhells which are now collected to the northward, partly owing to the unwillingneſs of the owners to hire their veſſels for this purpoſe, and partly to the great demand of Muſſoola boats for the ſquadron, which prevents the paddy veſſels, now in the road, from landing their cargoes, and deprives him of the opportunity of employing ſeveral which he had been promiſed. The Committee are ſenſible that the Contractor muſt have met with obſtructions from the cauſes he mentions, though they cannot judge how far they may have operated to create the deficiencies complained of. He is however now poſitively enjoined by the Committee, to uſe his utmoſt exertions to procure the neceſſary ſupplies mentioned by the Chief Engineer; in which he is told he will have every aſſiſtance that the Government can afford, with reſpect to boats, and every other article; he is alſo directed, as ſoon as he can get boats, to go himſelf down with them to the northward, and ſee that no time be loſt in putting on board the ſhells which may have been collected by him.
6th. Stockades	6th. The	6th. Requires

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Memorandums of what is to be done at Fort St. George, 18th September 1780.	Remarks of the Chief Engineer.	Orders of the Select Committee thereon.
6th. Stockades of red wood at the N. E. and S. E. angles of the fort.	6th. The red wood is ready, but Laſcars are wanted for the purpoſe of driving the piles.	6th. Requires no order.
7th. Eſplanade to be entirely cleared of all the buildings and lumber.	7th. The red wood is now moving, but there are ſome bank ſals, &c. that ſhould be alſo removed.	7th. The Chief Engineer is to be directed to take down immediately all bank ſals, &c. on the eſplanade.
8th. The buildings on *Hag Hill* are only from 230 to 250 yards, or thereabouts, from the foot of the glacis of the N. W. works; the houſes ought, I think, to be cleared to 400 yards from the foot of the glacis, and the ground ſo far levelled as to admit of no cover.	8th. The Select Committee having referred this ſubject to the Court of Directors, I know not how far they may think what I propoſe eligible; if any ſerious attack is apprehended, it is of the utmoſt conſequence to the fort that this ground ſhould be levelled.	8th. This paragraph to be taken into conſideration at a future time.
9th. The huts, houſes, and horſe ſtables at the foot of the Iſland Bridge, ſhould be removed, and every thing on the Iſland, as far back as the burying ground; the play-houſe and powder platforms ſhould be demoliſhed.	9th. Theſe are now increaſing daily, and the Iſland is ſo covered with habitations, that we ſhould be in the utmoſt danger of hurting our own people were we under the neceſſity of firing the guns of the fort.	9th. Ordered accordingly.
10th. All cover on the ſouth front ſhould be removed.	10th. The boatmen, who have now poſſeſſion of the ſouthern beach, ſhould be removed to the northward, beyond the boundary of the eſplanade.	10th. Ditto.
11th. There are a quantity of gabions and faſcines in ſtore; theſe are ſo old as to have become entirely rotten and uſeleſs, but as fire wood. A freſh ſupply of theſe articles ſhould, with a quantity of piquets, be immediately procured, as well as the time and circumſtances will admit.	11th. As the proviſion of gabions and faſcines will be tedious, unleſs more than ordinary means be uſed, it ſhould be conſidered, whether it would not be adviſable to ſend an Officer with the party into the Pollams to the north-weſt, to collect a working party, and to make up there the number that may be neceſſary for the fort.	11th. The Chief Engineer to ſend a proper perſon to the Pollams, on this duty.
12th. A body of gabion-makers, to the number of 60 or 80, ſhould be immediately collected, and kept in pay in caſe of exigency.		12th. Approved, and ordered accordingly.
13th. Three hundred hurdles ſhould alſo be procured.		13th. Ditto.
14th. Beſides the paliſadoes for the covert-way, there ſhould be five or ſix thouſand ſpare ones, made of the ſtouteſt Palmiras, or ſuch other ſtuffs as can be procured.		14th. Approved, and ordered accordingly.
15th. There ſhould be immediately made up ten or fifteen thouſand wicker baſkets.		15th. Ditto.
16th. Ten thouſand cart loads of clay ſhould be brought into the fort.	16th. The carts of the inhabitants might be preſſed to bring this eſſential article into ſtore. We have no means of ſupplying ourſelves within the fort.	16th. Ditto.
17th. Entrenching, miners, carpenters, and ſmiths tools; ſand bags, crows feet, and ſpare timber for ſtentions of galleries, ſhould be provided, if there is not ſufficient in ſtore.		17th. To be referred to the Committee of Works, who are to report the deficiency there may be in theſe articles.
18th. A calculate of proviſions, firewood, ſtraw, pots, &c. ſhould be made, and proper places provided for lodging them.		18th. The Preſident is requeſted to enquire into this matter.
Fort St. George, 18th Sept. 1780.		*Geo. Maule*, Chief Engineer.

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To Mr. *John Turing*, Preſident at *Ganjam*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 27th ultimo.

As it is impoſſible for us to ſpare any additional Troops for the defence of your diſtrict, we hope, by a judicious diſpoſition of what you now have, that no material injury will ariſe, even ſhould an incurſion take place. We give you permiſſion to do what you have repreſented to be abſolutely neceſſary to the fort of *Ganjam*, truſting you will be as frugal as poſſible in the expence.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
19th Sept. 1780.

Read the following Letter and Minutes of the Committee of Stores:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Herewith we have the honour to lay before you our proceedings of the 20th inſtant.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Hector Munro,
George Maule,
Bryan Scottney.

Fort St. George, 20th September 1780.

At a Committee of Stores:

PRESENT,

Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Major *George Maule*,
Mr. *Bryan Scottney*.

1ſt. Agreed to recommend to the Honourable Select Committee, to direct that the under-mentioned gun carriages, mortar beds, platforms, &c. wanting to complete the ſtatement for *Fort Saint George*, be made up with all poſſible expedition.

Gun Carriages.	
36 Pounders	4
12 Pounder, medium	24
12 Pounder, ſhort	5
Platforms	110
Mortar Beds.	
13 Inch	4
10 Inch	9
8 Inch	10
5½ Inch	18
Howitzer Carriages.	
5½ Inch	2
Blinds of ſorts	33
Frontlets of ſorts	35
Baſkets for mortars	1,000
Mamoties	691
Pick-axes	396
Spades	838
Shovels	795
Broad axes	39
Sap hooks	40
Hand bills	210
Sand bags (ſmall)	3,000
Hand hatchets	385

2d. The Military Storekeeper begs leave to enter the following Minute:

When the agreement for making of carriages by Mr. *Scottney* was accepted, the price of the carriages for 10 pounders to the loweſt calibre, was fixed at the medium price of 73$\frac{4}{10}$ Pagodas each; there were 123 of 6 pounders, and upwards of 125 ſmaller. The Board having directed a ſtop to be put to the making of the ſmaller, Mr. *Scottney* hopes it will appear reaſonable to the Committee, that he be allowed for the 9 pounder carriages, now ready, the loweſt rate for which any offers were made by others for providing of thoſe kind of carriages.

As the making up the ſmall carriages was ſtopped by orders of the Honourable Select Committee, and as they would have compenſated for the expence of making up the larger, the Committee are of opinion, that Mr. *Scottney*'s requeſt is reaſonable. Agreed therefore to recommend, that it be complied with.

3d. The Commiſſary of Stores lays before the Committee, the following liſt of gun carriages, mortars, beds, &c. received from the Military Storekeeper:

Train garriſon carriages, 9 pounders	-	41
Truck carriages, 18 pounders, with beds		22
Tranſporting carriages	-	7
Money tumbril	-	1
Mortar beds, 4½ inch	-	4
Platforms	ſets -	10
Spare trucks	pairs -	8

Hector Munro,
George Maule,
Bryan Scottney.

Orders of the Select Committee thereon.

Par. 1ſt. Approved, and ordered.

Par. 2d. Agreed, That Mr. *Scottney* be allowed for the 9 pounder carriages, now ready, at the loweſt rate that any offers were made by others, as recommended by the Committee of Stores; but if Mr. *Scottney* ſhall hereafter make up the ſmaller carriages, the preſent allowance is to be deducted from his account.

Fort Saint George, Select Committee,
23d September 1780.

Read the following letter from Colonel *Lang*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 12th, and to incloſe you a letter from Captain *Prendergaſt*, commanding at *Arcot*.

Finding that the Nabob's Sepoys at *Arcot* have been much diſpirited at the late accident to Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, and that many of them behaved very indifferently when *Hyder Ally* was before that place before; and having been informed, that he is determined to return there very ſhortly, I have thought it highly proper, for the good of the Service, to ſend a reinforcement there yeſterday, of a Captain, two Subalterns, and fifty rank and file; I have alſo ſent fourteen privates in the room of their ſick, and ordered them to be ſent here this night to the hoſpital, where they will ſhortly recover: all which I hope will be approved of.

The officers and ſoldiers that were made priſoners in the action of the 10th, are now at *Arnee*; (except four) they are in *Hyder Ally*'s camp; and one of them is ſaid to be Colonel *Baillie*. They leave *Arnee* for *Bangalore* to-morrow. They have all been extremely well treated, by every account I have had.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
devoted Servant,
Roſs Lang.

Vellore,
17th Sept. 1780.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort St. George Select Committee,
25 September 1780.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* deliver in the following Minute:

As the completing the fortifications is an object of the higheſt

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higheſt conſequence, and it is retarded by want of chunam, notwithſtanding the chunam Contractor has been paid the advance he required; we propoſe that advertiſements be publiſhed, giving notice, "That the Preſident and Council will iſſue orders for receiving from any perſon or perſons, any quantity of chunam, not exceeding 10,000 Parras, at 7 Parras per Pagoda, provided the ſame be delivered in the fort on or before the 31ſt day of October next; and that advances of money will be made to each perſon contracting, in proportion to the quantity he ſhall agree to deliver, on his giving ſecurity for the performance of his contract, under a penalty of 25 per cent on the amount."

We are ſenſible that this price is much above what is paid to the Contractor; but an allowance ſhould be made for the difficulties attending the collection of ſhells, when the enemy's horſe are plundering in this neighbourhood.

Independant of this circumſtance, we think that were the extraordinary expence of this plan treble the amount, it ought not to be put in competition with the advantages which muſt reſult from it, as thereby the fortifications will be completed, and the property of the Company, and of individuals, ſecured.

The 25th Sept. 1780.

Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon.

Reſolved, That an advertiſement be publiſhed in the terms of the foregoing Minute.

The Committee being of opinion that ſix months ſtore of every kind of proviſion ſhould be laid up within the fort as ſoon as poſſible, the Preſident is deſired to take the neceſſary ſteps accordingly.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro,
Samuel Johnſon.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
28th September 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read the following letter from Colonel *James*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have frequently repreſented to your honour, &c. the neceſſity of augmenting the corps of Artillery, and completing it with officers and men. I again beg leave to point out to you how inadequate the corps is to the ſervice expected of it, and which it muſt perform before peace can be reſtored to the *Carnatic*.

The fate of Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, which conſiſted of the fineſt corps of Infantry that ever acted together in this country, pleads more forcibly for an augmentation of the Artillery than any thing I can urge.

This detachment had only ten field pieces, ill ſupplied with ammunition, owing to the want of ſpare tumbrils.

The whole corps of Artillery ſhould not on any occaſion be ſent to the field, becauſe, ſhould the Army be unfortunate, the defence of *Fort Saint George* muſt greatly depend on a well-diſciplined Artillery.

For the above reaſons I beg leave to ſubmit to your conſideration, the following plan for eſtabliſhing the Artillery on a footing conſiſtent with the defence of the *Carnatic*, and the preſent exigencies of the ſervice.

The corps of Artillery to be augmented to ten companies, each company to conſiſt of

Captain,	Lieutenants,	L' F. W.	Serjeants,	Corporals,	Drummers,	Fifers,	Gunners,	Mat'	Total.
1	3	2	7	7	2	2	12	58	88

To be formed into a regiment of two battalions, each battalion to conſiſt of

L' Colonel,	Major,	Captains,	Lieutenants,	Lieut. F. W.	Adjutant,	Q'. Maſter,	Serj. Major,	Q'. Mas' Major,	Drill Serjeant,	Drill Corporal,	Drum Major,	Fife Major,	Serjeants,	Corporals,	Drummers.	Fifers,	Gunners,	Matroſſes.
1	1	5	15	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	35	35	10	10	60	290

The regiment to be commanded by a Colonel, and to be conſtantly kept complete. One battalion to be ſtationed at the Mount ready for field ſervice, the other in *Fort Saint George*, and ſuch out-garriſons as the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee ſhall judge proper, and to be relieved every two years. A company of Laſcars, conſiſting of one Syrang, four Tindals, and eighty Laſcars, to be attached to each company of Artillery, who is to draw their pay, and return them the ſame as his men.

Should there be reaſons to prevent this plan being immediately carried into execution, I beg leave to recommend that another Lieutenant be added to each company on the preſent eſtabliſhment, and that the corps be completed with officers in the room of abſentees and thoſe in double employments, who, in ſo ſmall a corps, ſhould always be conſidered as ſupernumeraries.

I am, with much reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient
and faithful Servant,
Edward James.

Fort St. George,
24th Sept. 1780.

Although the Committee approve in general of the plan recommended by Colonel *James*, for an augmentation of the Artillery, they do not think proper to come to any reſolution upon it, without the ſanction of the Court of Directors. Indeed, were they diſpoſed to adopt it, they could not at preſent, for want of men; but with reſpect to the propoſal of adding another Lieutenant to each company on the preſent eſtabliſhment, the Committee are of opinion, and it is accordingly reſolved, That it be carried into execution.

Fort St. George, Select Committee,
28th Sept. 1780.

Read the following letter from Lieutenant *Flint*, commanding at *Wandewaſh*:

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

General *Munro* having ordered me to tranſmit to you a return of grain and military ſtores in this garriſon, I have the pleaſure to inform you that it contains

Colomn.—m.—s.				Colomn.—m.—s.		
2,669	7	3	of Rice, and	73,334	5	1 of Paddy.

The military ſtores being compoſed of all nations, it will take ſome time in preparing an exact return. He likewiſe deſires me to acquaint you if any grain could be collected from the country round, *Hyder* being in poſſeſſion of every village in the north, ſouth, and weſt, little can be expected from theſe quarters: *Chitumbrak Pillee*, formerly Aumildar of *Chittaput*, and now *Hyder*'s Aumildar of *Tuvatore*, being well acquainted with that country, collected all the grain of it, and from time to time ſent it to *Hyder*'s camp: this man has been, and

continues

continues to be, of great ſervice to him in furniſhing his army with this article. The country between this, *Chingleput*, *Atchewcaum*, and *Permacoil*, would gladly bring what grain they have for ſale to our Army, was it here, expecting hourly to have it ſeized by ſome of *Chitcumbrak Pillee*'s people. I beg leave to inform you, that ſeveral of the Sepoys who were in the action of the 10th, have come here badly wounded: ſome of them, as they were ſtripped of every thing by *Hyder*'s people, and in great diſtreſs, I have paid two fanams each daily, and ſhall continue doing ſo till your pleaſure be known.

I am,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
and very humble Servant,
W. Flint.

Wandewaſh,
17 Sept. 1780.

The Committee approve of the allowance made to the wounded Sepoys who are gone to *Wandewaſh*, and Lieutenant *Flint* is to be directed to continue the ſame till further orders.

Read the following letter from Lieutenant *Moorhouſe*, Commiſſary of Stores to the Army.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Though it is well known that whatever tends to facilitate the march of an army is of importance to its ſucceſs, it frequently happens, that for want of proper eſtabliſhments, the means provided for this end at an immenſe expence to the ſervice, prove of little uſe, and unequal to the buſineſs.

In all campaigns, the Company are at a conſiderable expence for Mamoty men to mend the roads, &c. Theſe men, for many reaſons, are under the charge of the Commiſſary of Stores to the Army; but being occaſionally raiſed, and paid daily as Coolies, they want ſtrength, ſpirit, and practice, to enable them to perform the duty for which they are entertained; and on the leaſt appearance of an enemy, they throw down their tools, and run away.

I beg leave, as this belongs to the Department I direct, to ſubmit to your conſideration the following plan for an eſtabliſhment of Pioneers inſtead of Mamoty men.

Two companies of Pioneers to be raiſed as ſoon as poſſible by the Commiſſary of Stores for the Army; each company conſiſting of 2 Serjeants, 3 Corporals, 5 Havildars, 5 Naigues, and 100 Black Pioneers. The Havildars and Naigues to be paid the ſame as thoſe of Sepoy corps. The private Pioneers to have two Pagodas per month, paid by rolls, ſigned by the Commiſſary of Stores to the Army: the Pioneers to be cloathed in blue jackets, and to be armed, 50 of each company with light piſtols, and 50 with pikes, ſix feet long. Theſe arms would be ſufficient to prevent their being overcome by a ſmall party of horſe, and are ſo light as not to impede their working.

I am, with much reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and faithful Servant,
Joſeph Moorhouſe,
Comm^{y} of Stores to the Army.

Camp,
24 Sept. 1780.

The Committee approve of the propoſal offered to their conſideration by Lieutenant *Moorhouſe*; and it is agreed, that the neceſſary orders be iſſued in conſequence.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
6th October 1780.

Read the following letter from Captain *Edmonds*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

It is with concern I inform you of the difficulty I find in getting recruits, in order to replace the ſix companies of the 7th battalion Sepoys; and can impute it to no other cauſe, than the Nabob's people recruiting at *Nellore* for their Sibbendy corps. This ſervice is attended with ſo much leſs danger and trouble than ours, that I ſcarce expect a man till they are completed, or ſome ſtop is put to their recruiting. There are two companies of good-looking men belonging to the Nabob, who came with ſome perſons from the ſouthward, on revenue buſineſs, and ſeem to want employment much. I did myſelf the honour, in my letter of the 20th, to requeſt your permiſſion for paying arrears due to ſuch as might return of the late detachment under the command of Colonel *Baillie*, on their re-entering into the ſervice.

I have the honour to be, with much reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Edward Edmonds,
Captn Commandant.

Ongole,
27th Sept. 1780.

Agreed, That Captain *Edmonds* be directed to entertain as many men from the Sepoys he mentions, as are willing to enter the ſervice; and to pay arrears of ſuch Sepoys of Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment, as may come to *Ongole*.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
12th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Mr. *Johnſon*, indiſpoſed.

Minutes of the laſt Committee read, and approved.

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

The loſſes unavoidably ſuſtained by the Europeans on the march from *Conjeveram* to *Chingleput*, the 11th ultimo, have ſo impoveriſhed their ſtock of neceſſaries, as to render the inconvenience they lie under, on that account, deſerving the attention of the Committee: I therefore propoſe, that one complete ſet of half-mounting be given to each of the Non-commiſſioned Officers and private Europeans who were on that ſervice; which, according to a calculation made for that purpoſe, will be attended with but a ſmall expence:

And, the better to enable the Sepoys to ſupport their wives and families when abſent in the field on ſervice, I could wiſh to ſee the pay of that uſeful body freed from as many deductions as poſſible. They have hitherto found themſelves in tents, which have often been pitched when there was a deficiency of barracks, to their great detriment and loſs, which has frequently occaſioned murmurings amongſt them. I therefore recommend it to the conſideration of the Committee, that in future the tents for the Sepoys be furniſhed at the expence of the Company.

And, as a further relief to the Sepoys now in the ſervice, and the more to incline men to enliſt at a time we ſo much want Recruits, I propoſe that in future the Sepoys be allowed to provide themſelves with ſlops, inſtead of an Agent being employed for that purpoſe, as they can furniſh themſelves equally as well for half what they at preſent are charged for them; and that the arrears due to them on that article be paid in caſh. To deliver out ſlops to the Sepoys at this late day, would be only encumbering him with a commodity he has already been at the expence of finding himſelf in theſe two years paſt: it would therefore be but juſt and reaſonable to pay him the money that has ſo long been kept from him: And theſe well-timed encouragements will no doubt have their due effects not only on the appearance, but the minds of the ſoldiery.

But as the Recruit will have no means of providing himſelf with a ſtock of neceſſaries, and as a further in-

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ducement for him to enter into the ſervice, I am of opinion that the preſent enliſting money for Recruits ſhall be increaſed by one pagoda each; which pagoda the Subidar of the Company will ſee appropriated to the above purpoſe.

Fort Saint George, *Hector Munro.*
12th October 1780.

N. B. I hope the Committee will take into their conſideration the loſſes that Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment muſt have ſuſtained in the action of the 10th September laſt; this I earneſtly recommend ſhould be done whenever they are releaſed or exchanged.

Hector Munro.

Reſolved, in conſequence of the report and the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, That the Non-commiſſioned Officers and private Europeans who were on the march from *Conjeveram* and *Chingleput* on the 11th ultimo, be allowed a complete ſet of half-mounting at the Company's expence.

Reſolved alſo, That the Sepoys be allowed in future to provide themſelves with ſlops, inſtead of an Agent being employed for that purpoſe, as the Commander in Chief repreſents that they can furniſh themſelves equally well for half the price they are now charged for them; and that the arrears due to them on that article be immediately paid them.

Reſolved likewiſe, in conſequence of the Commander in Chief's recommendation, That the preſent enliſting money for Sepoy Recruits be increaſed one pagoda each, for the purpoſes mentioned by the General.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Lang:*

To the Honourable *John Whitebill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs you the 1ſt; and ſince that I have had ſeveral people in from *Hyder Ally*'s camp, who inform me, that he is making batteries round *Arcot*, but is retarded very much by the cannon and mortars from the fort; they keep up a very briſk fire on the enemy. The 2d the enemy opened a battery of four guns on the Eaſt ſide of *Arcot*; and yeſterday morning a ſhot from the fort diſabled one of them, on which they ſhut it up. Accounts differ about the ſize of the guns; ſome ſay they were but ſmall field-pieces. However, all accounts agree, that the enemy's batteries are at ſo great a diſtance, that they cannot do any great injury to the fort.

This morning an European deſerter, a Huſſar belonging to *Lally*'s corps, came in here with his horſe. I requeſt to know what is to be done with him, whether the Honourable Company will take the horſe and his arms, or whether he may have permiſſion to ſell them to the higheſt bidder; a number of Europeans would come off, if they had an opportunity, and encouragement given them; in particular the Germans.

I have the honour to be,
with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Vellore, Your very obedient and devoted Servant,
5th Oct. 1780. *Roſs Lang.*

Reſolved to acquaint Colonel *Lang*, that the Huſſar deſerter from *Hyder Ally* has our permiſſion to diſpoſe of his horſe for his own emolument Agreed alſo, to deſire the Colonel will uſe his endeavours to bring off more deſerters from *Hyder*, by ſuch promiſes of rewards as may appear to him reaſonable and proper.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
September 25, 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitebill*, Eſq. Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

Minutes of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, dated this day, as entered in C. C. No. 95, incloſing copy of a Letter from Rajah *Burhar* at *Arcot*, and requeſting in conſequence that every poſſible meaſure may be taken to ſuccour that place.

There are now at *Arcot* 150 Europeans, and three companies of Sepoys, belonging to the Company, beſides five or ſix thouſand armed people belonging to the Nabob: theſe appear very ſufficient for the defence of that place; but if they were not, it would now be impracticable to ſend a reinforcement, as the enemy have inveſted the fort: as ſoon as the army is in condition to take the field, it will immediately proceed to the relief of *Arcot*.

Agreed to write a Letter to the Nabob to the above effect.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
19th October 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitebill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was this morning honoured with your commands of the 15th and 16th inſtant, of the ſame tenor; and I herewith incloſe a return of the men entertained ſince I received the firſt order to Recruit. Notwithſtanding my utmoſt endeavours, I have hitherto had but very bad ſucceſs, nor do I ſuppoſe I will have better in future; the young men here preferring the Nabob's Sibbendy ſervice, where they get batta, and little to do. For this reaſon, were your Honours to prevail on the Nabob to give orders for my having permiſſion to draft his Sibbendies (of which there are forty companies in this country of fifty men each) two good battalions might be quickly formed out of them; and the Phouſdar might complete the Sibbendies again at his leiſure. I took the liberty to ſuggeſt to your Honours, in a letter I wrote four days ago, the Company taking the Nabob's 9th battalion, at preſent in a ſtate of mutiny here, into their pay; and which, I ſhould imagine, his Highneſs would readily agree to, when it evidently appears to be ſo much for the good of his own and the Company's ſervice. If this ſhould be approved of, there will be three battalions almoſt inſtantly formed out of nothing, for at preſent they can hardly be ſaid to be better; and I will be anſwerable for their being quickly diſciplined, and fit for the field: arms and accoutrements to be ſent from the Preſidency as ſoon as poſſible. I ſhould eſteem it a great indulgence, ſhould the ſcheme take place, to have the naming of an Enſign, who I will alſo recommend as one of the fitteſt men in the country for an Adjutant, and who is on the ſpot.

The Rajah of *Travancore*, I hear, has ſent near two thouſand men to *Tinnivelly*, Sepoys and Crickmen, for the preſent ſervice; yet it has not been in my power to get the Phouſdar and Renter to ſend any aſſiſtance to *Madura*, which Captain *Gibbings* is perpetually preſſing me to do; and what would alſo be the ſure means of protecting the *Tinnivelly* diſtrict, at preſent entirely open to be plundered; neither will the Polygars give their aid unleſs accompanied by other troops.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Palamcotah, Your reſpectful and humble Servant,
28th Sept. 1780. *James Eidingtoun.*

Tranſlation of a Writing or Agreement, dated 19th Auguſt 1780.

I *Dullavoy Tremalayapak Moodelliyar*, do hereby give this Writing or Agreement to Colonel *Eidingtoun*, commanding at *Tinnivelly*: That *Ally Navas Cawn* had ſome time ago ſent for the Polygars, on account of the Government affairs, as likewiſe you alſo wrote them for the ſame purpoſe; but in the mean time the ſaid *Ally Navas Cawn* was diſmiſſed from the Aumildarſhip. At preſent,

in

in conſequence of my being as Aumildar and Commandant, and alſo you are as commanding at this place for the Company's affairs, I have deſired you to grant your Writing or Agreement to *Ponchalom Coorchy Cotta, Bomma Naig*, and *Sevaghery Veragana Rama Vannyan*, &c. Polygars, in order to make their appearance at *Tinnivelly*, and obey ſuch orders that ſhall be given or granted them by the Government there; but in caſe the ſaid Polygars are unwilling to obey the orders, and being deſirous to proceed to their reſpective places, I promiſe that I ſhall make no contrary, nor put them under confinement, and you ſhall alſo ſecure them ſafely to their reſpective places. Thus I give you this Agreement; therefore you will ſend for the ſaid Polygars without loſs of time. This Agreement or Writing ſhall continue good, until the ſaid Polygars are ſafely arrived to their reſpective places.

(Signed) *Tremalayapak Moodellyar.*

Agreed, That the Preſident be deſired to communicate the foregoing Letter to the Nabob, and to requeſt he will permit the Company to take his 9th battalion into their ſervice, and to enliſt another battalion from among his Sibbendy Sepoys.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 26th October 1780.

To Captain *James Eidingtoun*, commanding at *Palamcottah*.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters.

The Nabob, at our requeſt, has conſented to his 9th battalion of Sepoys being entertained in the Company's ſervice. As to paying their arrears, he cannot do it at preſent, nor can we undertake it; but you may aſſure them we will uſe our endeavours with the Nabob to obtain it, when the country is on peace, upon condition of their enliſting into our ſervice.

The Nabob has alſo conſented to our enliſting another battalion from among his Sibbendies, and you will accordingly make choice of a ſufficient number for that purpoſe, and diſcipline them with all poſſible expedition. On this particular occaſion we ſhall allow you to nominate the Adjutant.

Incloſed is the Nabob's order to his Manager at *Tinnivelly*, relative to the 9th battalion, and to the new one to be formed from the Sibbendies.

We have ſent by the Company's ſnow *Elizabeth* to *Magore*, a ſet of arms (accoutrements cannot be ſpared, they muſt be made up there for the 10th battalion) and 1,000 ſtand more to enable you to ſupply the new battalions to be raiſed, and ſuch as may be wanting for the Nabob's 9th battalion. Whatever part of them may not be required, you will carefully depoſit in the Company's ſtores. We ſhall deſire our Preſident at *Magore* to ſend the arms by boats from thence to *Tutocorin*, or ſome part near to it, and it will be proper that you have an eſcort in readineſs to convey them ſafe to *Palamcottah*.

Incloſed is a Liſt of the ſtores embarked on *Elizabeth*, as mentioned above. We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort St. George, 26th Oct. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Sent the following Letters:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Preſident and Select Committee to incloſe you an Account and Bill of Lading of 1,221 barrels of gunpowder, laden on the ſnow *Adventure* for *Adriapatam*, and intended for the uſe of your garriſon. You will in conſequence diſpatch an eſcort, without loſs of time, to ſecure and convey it to *Trichinopoly*.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servant,

Fort St. George, 28 October 1780. *Charles Oakley.*

Fort St. George Select Committee, 30th October 1780.

Read the following Minutes of the Committee of Stores:

Fort Saint George, 28th October 1780.

At a Committee of Stores;

PRESENT,

Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Colonel *Edward James*,
Major *George Maule*,
Mr. *Bryan Scottney*.

1ſt. The Honourable the Select Committee having approved of the following appointments of Field Train, which the Commander in Chief lays before the Committee: Agreed, That the Commiſſary of Stores in Camp make out a general indent to be approved of by the Committee.

2d. Colonel *James* lays before the Committee, an eſtimate of a Battering Train, to be got ready with ammunition and ſtores, to march on the ſhorteſt notice. Agreed, to recommend the ſame to the Select Committee, for their approbation.

3d. Major *Maule* lays before the Committee, the following Liſt of Stores, the proviſion of which he begs leave to recommend may be ordered:

All ſuch laboratory ſtores as are neceſſary for the defence of the place,
Platforms for mortars,
Cloth for ſauciſſons (brown and not congeed)
Forge and apparatus for heating balls,
Miners tools,
20,000 ſand bags, in addition to the quantity before ordered.

4th. Major *Maule* propoſes, that a box of a tumbril be made for the inſpection of the Committee, plated on both ſides with copper; and that an experiment be made on an old tumbril, whether a rocket will penetrate it. Agreed, to recommend the ſame to the Select Committee.

The Commiſſary of Stores lays before the Committee Liſts of Stores received from the Military Storekeeper, in the months of July, Auguſt, and September; muſters of which being examined, are appointed.

Hector Munro,
Edward James,
Bryan Scottney.

A Battering Train to be got ready, with Ammunition and Stores, to march on the ſhorteſt notice.

Iron Guns, 24 pounders - - -	10
18 D° - - - -	18
12 D° for enfiladery - -	12
Braſs Mortars, 8 inches, - - -	4
5½ D° - - -	10
Braſs Howitzers, 8 inches - -	4
4⅕ Inches recommended in preference to Mortars, as they can be occaſionally uſed in the field, and carry 12 pounder Grape - -	6
Iron round Shot, 24 pounders - -	10,000
18 D° - - -	18,000
12 D° - - -	24,000
Empty Shells, 8 inches, - - -	1,200
5½ D° - - -	2,000
4⅕ D° - - -	1,200

Tumbrils complete, with ammunition for the 4⅕ Inch Howitzers, and Grape for the Battering Cannon and 8 inch Howitzers.

Ordered, That the Battering Train, &c. recommended by Colonel *James*, be got ready with all expedition.

Ordered

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Ordered alſo, That Articles recommended to be provided by Major *Maule*, be got ready as ſoon as poſſible.

Agreed, The experiment recommended by Major *Maule*, in the 4th paragraph, be tried.

No. 95. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 25th September 1780—Received 26th D°.

I herewith ſend you a Letter I received laſt night from Rajah *Burbur*, dated the 21ſt inſtant. He writes me, that as long as he is poſſeſſed of life, he will do his endeavours to defend *Arcot*; but the ſafety of that place, and the holding out of the people who are there, entirely depend upon the aſſiſtance they receive from this place. Be therefore kind enough to acquaint me, as ſoon as poſſible, what you wiſh I ſhould write to Rajah *Burbur* in anſwer to his Letter, and what you yourſelf propoſe writing to Captain *Prendergaſt*. The fort of *Arcot* is full of military ſtores and proviſions for the Army, and it is beſides the capital of the *Carnatic*. If (God forbid!) the enemy ſhould get poſſeſſion of that place, through a delay of ſending aſſiſtance from this, the conſequences may be fatal, as it may deprive the Engliſh Army of the proviſions, &c. laid in ſtore there. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Maha Rajah *Burbur Babauder*; dated 21ſt Ramzan, or 21ſt September 1780.

I have addreſſed your Highneſs ſeveral times within theſe few days, which I diſpatched by tappies, &c. and hope you have received them. This day, being the 21ſt Ramzan, the Myſorean is arrived on the other ſide of the river, near *Wallajanagar*, with a number of foot, horſe, and heavy guns; he has alſo Monſieur *Lally* and his Europeans with him. He has ſent his Son, with ſome foot and horſe, with guns, towards *Pudparry*; there are alſo ſome of his horſe and foot near *Mujunpoor*, and they are raiſing batteries and digging trenches at all theſe places. Two days ago, fifty Europeans, ſent by Colonel *Lang*, came in here, as a reinforcement to our garriſon, and are now in the fort; there were 80 Europeans here before. I myſelf and *Arſhud Beg Cawn*, *Cheſt Tar Cawn*, *Fend ud Dien Cawn*, *Meer Gulam Ally*, the Naib of the city, are continually watching and taking care of the city, and placed guards on the gates. As long as I have breath in my body, I ſhall be devoted to the ſervice of your Highneſs; but the ſooner aſſiſtance is ſent us againſt the wicked intentions of the enemy, it will be the better, otherwiſe the conſequences may be fatal. It may not be in my power to forward you any more addreſſes.

No. 96. To the Nabob; dated 26th September 1780.

We have had the honour to receive your Highneſs's Letters of the 24th and 25th inſtant.

Your Highneſs writes, that you have received a Letter from Rajah *Burbur*, dated the 21ſt inſtant, informing you, that as long as he is poſſeſſed of life he will do his endeavours to defend *Arcot*, but that the ſafety of the place, and the holding out of the people who are there, depend entirely upon the aſſiſtance they receive from hence: you deſire, therefore, to know what you ſhould write to Rajah *Burbur* in anſwer to his Letter, and what I myſelf propoſe writing to Captain *Prendergaſt*?

Your Highneſs is well acquainted with the ſteps that have been taken for the ſafety of *Arcot:* There are now 150 Europeans, beſides two companies of Sepoys commanded by the Company's Officers, and I underſtand there are 6 or 7,000 armed people belonging to your Highneſs, in the town. With this force, if the Garriſon behaves well, which I truſt will be the caſe, I ſhould ſuppoſe *Arcot* very ſafe againſt any attempt of *Hyder*, until the rains ſet in, when his operations muſt ceaſe. As to ſending any aſſiſtance from hence at preſent, it would be attended with the greateſt riſk; but your Highneſs may aſſure Rajah *Burbur*, that as ſoon as the Army is refitted, which I ſuppoſe will be very ſoon, it will march to the relief of *Arcot*; and that in the mean time, with proper exertions on his part, it will not be poſſible for *Hyder* to take it.

Your Highneſs has not yet ſent me any Anſwer to the Letter I wrote you on the 7th inſtant, reſpecting the Cavalry, and other matters very neceſſary to be adjuſted: I requeſt your Highneſs will reply to that Letter as ſoon as poſſible.

I have written a friendly Letter to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, which I hope will be attended with good effects in the preſent juncture; and I think it would be very proper in your Highneſs alſo to write to him, and to endeavour, by every means in your power, to engage him in our intereſts.

No. 97. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 27th September 1780.

I herewith ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah *Burbur*, dated the 23d inſtant; acquainting me of the progreſs made by *Hyder Ally Cawn* in beſieging *Arcot*, and of his having carried his approaches cloſe to the city wall; that he is exerting himſelf to take poſſeſſion of it as ſoon as poſſible; and that the people there are greatly alarmed. You will thereby be made acquainted with all the particulars; and I make no doubt you will take ſuch ſteps as you think neceſſary for the ſafety of that place. What can I ſay more?

Letter from Rajah *Burbur*; dated 23d Ramzan, or 23d September.

I ſent your Highneſs an Arzdaſht on the 21ſt inſtant, acquainting of *Hyder* being arrived on the other ſide of the river near to *Waulaujannegar*, and that he had inveſted the city with his troops; he is now buſy in digging trenches to the Eaſtward: we fire night and day upon them; but as he has a great many Artillery-men, and quantities of ſtores, he carries on his approaches with activity. The people in the town are greatly alarmed for their ſafety and that of their women, and lift up their hands to Almighty, imploring his aſſiſtance. *Nejub Cawn* and myſelf are exerting ourſelves in your Highneſs's ſervice, which we ſhall do as long as we have life. The ſooner the Army arrives the better; but if (God forbid!) any delay ſhould happen in our receiving ſuccours, your Highneſs is well acquainted with our ſituation; many perſons of both ſexes, to preſerve their honour, will put an end to their lives. The enemy has carried his trenches nearer to us ſince yeſterday, and is now within muſquet ſhot of the city wall.

No. 99. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 1ſt October 1780: received 2d D°.

I ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah *Burbur*, dated the 26th September; adviſing me of the enemy's having dug two other trenches on the other ſide of the river, and that he has carried on his approaches to the Eaſtward cloſe to the city wall; that the people are greatly alarmed; and he requeſts aſſiſtance may be ſent to him from hence. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Rajah *Burbur*; dated 26th September 1780.

I hope your Highneſs have received the ſeveral Addreſſes I have ſent you, adviſing of the inveſtiture of this place by the enemy. He is now very buſy carrying on trenches to the Eaſtward, as alſo to the Weſtward, by the ſide of the river; and he has now dug two trenches more on the other ſide of the river. We fire ſhells and ſhot at them conſtantly, but they go on vigorously with their work. The people in the city, of all ranks, truſt in your Highneſs's never-failing proſperity, and lift up their hands to the Almighty for help. The enemy's trenches on the ſide of the river are cloſe to the city wall. It would be better if the Army could come here as ſoon as poſſible, otherwiſe, if any delay takes place, the city may fall into the enemy's hands. Notwithſtanding many people were ſent out of it, a great number of both ſexes remain;

remain; and ſhould the place fall, they know what treatment is to be expected from the enemy; it appears to them difficult for them to eſcape alive without being diſhonoured.

No. 103. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 6th October 1780: Received D°.

I ſend you for your information, a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah *Burbur*. If the city of *Arcot* ſhould fall into the hands of the enemy (which may the Almighty God forbid!) our affairs muſt ſuffer conſiderably. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Rajah *Burbur*; dated Showal, or 3d October 1780.

I have ſent your Highneſs repeated Addreſſes, which I hope you have received. The enemy has now completed two trenches more on the ſide of the river, and he has numbers of Artillery-men and materials in plenty; he goes on briſkly in carrying the approaches, notwithſtanding all the fire from the fort. All the people in the city are greatly terrified, and implore Heaven for aſſiſtance. The enemy's batteries are cloſe to the wall on the Eaſt and Weſt ſides, and they fire their muſquetry into the place: Four 2c lb. ſhot, one of 18, and ſome of 6 lbs. fell upon my houſe; this day ſeveral houſes near mine have been deſtroyed: If they fire rockets from the Eaſtern ſide, it will cauſe great alarm amongſt the people reſiding in that ſide. I have heard to-day, that the Myſorean, having received intelligence of the approach of the Engliſh Army, intends marching to *Conjeveram* with a large body of horſe and foot; that *Meer Ally Raza* has joined him with a conſiderable body of troops from *Cuddapah*, and is encamped on the South ſide of this place, from whence he means alſo to begin a freſh attack. If the Engliſh Army ſhould not come here ſoon, the conſequences muſt be fatal to this place, which may the Almighty forbid! A number of people have taken refuge here with their families, and cannot go out of the place; they will have nothing left for it, but to ſacrifice themſelves to preſerve their honour.

No. 108. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 22d October 1780: Received D°.

I ſend you a Letter I have juſt received from Rajah *Burbur*, dated the 6th Showal at night (5th Oct.) adviſing me of the enemy's having carried his trenches cloſe to the fort wall; that great quantities of ſhot have been fired into the Court; and that they are waiting with impatience for ſuccour from hence. What ſhall I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from Rajah *Burbur*; dated 6th Showal, at night.

I have been honoured with your Highneſs's commands of the 13th and 19th of Ramzan, adviſing me of General *Munro* coming here ſoon to chaſtiſe the enemy. Thanks to the Almighty, and to your Highneſs's never-failing proſperity, we are ſtill in ſafety here! The Myſorean is encamped with his whole force near *Wallajanagur*, and has inveſted this place in all quarters. The ſcarcity of grain and all ſorts of proviſions are ſuch, that both men and cattle within the walls are at their laſt gaſp. The enemy's batteries, on the Eaſt and Weſt ſide, are cloſe to the fort walls; and they fire great quantities of ſhot into the place, and many of the houſes are deſtroyed.

We are conſtantly firing on our ſide upon the enemy's works. Colonel *Lang* is not come here yet. I hope the Engliſh Army will come here ſoon, or elſe it is difficult to ſave the place. Captain *Prendergaſt* has received two or three Letters from General *Munro*, in which he tells him, that he will ſhortly be here to chaſtiſe the enemy; but no troops are yet come.

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Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12th October 1780.

MESSRS. *Smith* and *Johnſon* deliver in the following Minute:

Although the Court of Directors ſeem of opinion, that the French armament fitted out for the *Eaſt Indies*, is deſtined for *Bombay*; yet as a veſſel has ſailed from *Pondicherry* for the Iſlands within theſe few days, with advices of *Hyder Ally*'s ſucceſs, and of our ſituation, it is very probable their fleet will proceed to this coaſt; and therefore it becomes highly proper to conſider how far we are able to reſiſt their attempts, before the ſquadron under the command of Sir *Edward Hughes* ſails for *Bombay*.

Our eſtabliſhment has been greatly weakened by the loſs of above 3,300 Sepoys and 500 Europeans, beſides Officers, at *Tuccalum*, and by the 2d battalion of Sepoys and 700 Europeans, now on the *Malabar* coaſt; excluſive of theſe, we may alſo conſider Colonel *Lang*'s regiments at *Vellore*, of about 400 Europeans, as entirely ſeparated from us for the preſent.

When we reflect on the unfiniſhed ſtate of the Eaſt front of this fort, on the inadequate number of Europeans remaining to defend ſuch extenſive works, on the great probability of our not receiving reinforcements from *Bengal* before the latter end of December, and, what deſerves the moſt ſerious attention, that we cannot provide proviſions to ſuſtain a ſiege of four months; we apprehend this Settlement will be expoſed to imminent danger, ſhould this fleet proceed to *Bombay*.

It is generally allowed that Monſieur *Tranjolie*'s deſertion of *Pondicherry*, was the principal cauſe of its reduction; and therefore it behoves us to take warning from this recent error of an enemy.

It may be argued, that we have reaſon to expect men, money, and proviſions, from *Bengal*; but we think there is juſt ground for apprehenſions, that the Troops at leaſt cannot be embarked before December, and then the French fleet may be on this coaſt.

The *Maratta* War, and the low ſtate of the *Bengal* Treaſury, are alſo circumſtances very unfavourable to our expectations of ſuccour.

In this ſituation, we think there is great reaſon for apprehending danger, ſhould this place be ſurrounded by a vigorous and powerful enemy by land, and blockaded, if not attacked, by ſea.

If the ſquadron goes round to the *Malabar* coaſt, the probability is, it cannot return before March; but ſhould it go to *Acheen*, there is little doubt but it could be here early in January; in which caſe, ſhould there be no French fleet on this coaſt, it can proceed to *Bombay*, and return in May.

Madras is of the greateſt importance to the ſafety of *Bengal*; for ſhould the former fall, it is not probable the French would remain inactive, but make vigorous efforts to eſtabliſh themſelves in the latter. We alſo fear the Northern Rajahs are not well affected to us, and would join the Enemy, in hopes of gaining by the change.

Upon maturely conſidering all theſe circumſtances, we are of opinion, that the Committee ſhould make a ſtrong repreſentation to Sir *Edward Hughes*, on the abſolute neceſſity they conceive there is for his not proceeding to *Bombay*, and requeſting he will return the moment he conceives he can bring the ſquadron into this road with ſafety, as thereby the continuance of the Company's influence, if not the ſafety of this Fort, may be preſerved.

14th October 1780. *Charles Smith*, *Samuel Johnſon*.

In conſequence of the foregoing Minute, a Note is now ſent to the Admiral, to requeſt his preſence at the Committee: And the Admiral attending accordingly, is acquainted with the ſituation of affairs, and requeſted to give his opinion upon the propriety of the ſquadron going

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ing to *Bombay*, or watering at *Trincomalé*, to be ready, in caſe a French fleet ſhould come on this coaſt after the rains.

Sir *Edward Hughes* thereupon informs the Committee, That he thinks the ſquadron ſhould, upon every account, proceed to *Bombay*; that all the ſhips, and two of them in particular (the *Exeter* and *Eagle*) muſt go into dock as ſoon as poſſible, to be repaired; that excluſive of this, *Bombay*, and the Settlements on the *Malabar* Coaſt, are pointed out, by all our letters from *England*, as the firſt object of the French armament ſaid to be fitting out for *India*; that the troubles which now prevail in the *Carnatic*, having broke out only three months ago, and the late diſaſter which befel Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment having happened only one month ago, it is not likely that any accounts of theſe circumſtances, which may have been ſent from *Pondicherry*, will arrive in time, or have ſufficient weight to alter the original deſtination of the armament planned in *France*; that ſuppoſing the deſtination ſhould be changed, yet there is no probability of any French armament coming on this coaſt during the approaching monſoon, or for ſome time after, and that he hopes to be here himſelf, with the ſquadron from *Bombay*, by the end of January, or beginning of February; laſtly, he obſerves, that the ſecurity of *Bombay* is particularly recommended to him from *England*, in conſequence of the ſuppoſed deſtination of the armament from *France*.

Sir *Edward Hughes* then withdraws; and the Committee reſolve, in conſequence of the reaſons urged by Sir *Eaward*, That it would not be adviſable to make any requeſt to him, to alter his former determination, of proceeding with the ſquadron to *Bombay*.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Hector Munro.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
13th October 1780.

To the Honourable *William Hornby*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

We are ſorry to acquaint you, that on the 10th ultimo a detachment of our Troops, conſiſting of about 500 Europeans, and upwards of 3,000 Sepoys, was, by an accident of three or four ammunition tumbrils blowing up while they were engaged with the Enemy, entirely defeated, and almoſt the whole killed, wounded, or taken priſoners. This unfortunate event has ſo weakened our Forces, that we cannot act in the field without conſiderable ſuccours: we have written lately to *Bengal* on this ſubject, and doubt not the Governor General and Council will give us all the aſſiſtance they can ſpare; but as we know not yet what number of Troops we may expect from thence, we cannot help looking towards the conſiderable detachments from this Preſidency now ſerving on the *Malabar* Coaſt: we have 16 companies of Sepoys, and about 100 Europeans, at *Tellicherry*; and about 600 Europeans, and a battalion of Sepoys, with General *Goddard*.

With reſpect to the Troops at *Tellicherry*, if that place cannot be ſupported without ſo conſiderable a Force, we think it would be expedient, in the preſent poſture of affairs, to abandon it altogether. At all events, as it is indiſpenſably requiſite that we ſhould have the *Madras* Troops upon this coaſt without delay, we have requeſted Sir *Edward Hughes* to conſult with Mr. *Church* and Major *Cotgrave* upon the beſt and moſt expeditious means of tranſporting them to *Anjengo*. We hope alſo, that the detachment under Colonel *Browne* may be ſpared very ſoon; and in this caſe we earneſtly requeſt you will provide for their return to this coaſt the firſt opportunity.

We think it proper to inform you, that Sir *Edward Hughes*, and the Captains of the Squadron (excepting Captain *Panton* and Captain *Mitchell*) have been paid allowances from the Company here to the end of September.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Fort Saint George, 13th Oct. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

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Fort Saint George Select Committee,
13th October 1780.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. Rear Admiral of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Forces in *India*.

Sir,

AS the ſquadron is on the point of departure for *Bombay*, we think it proper to communicate to you the ſtate of the Company's ſettlements at *Tellicherry*; which, by our laſt advices from Major *Cotgrave*, the commandant there, was cloſely beſieged by the Nairs, aſſiſted with the force of *Hyder Ally*. Major *Cotgrave* has under his command, of the Troops belonging to this Preſidency, 16 companies of Sepoys, and about 100 European Infantry and Artillery: we much wiſh to have this force returned to the coaſt by the way of *Anjengo*; and we ſhall be obliged, if, at your arrival at *Tellicherry*, you will conſult with Mr. *Church*, the Reſident, and Major *Cotgrave*, upon the ſpeedieſt and moſt expeditious means of executing this ſervice; in which we are ſatisfied you will give all the aſſiſtance in your power.

We beg leave to incloſe herewith letters from Major *Cotgrave*, Mr. *Church*, and the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, which we requeſt your care of.

We have directed the *Ponſborne* to proceed with you to the other coaſt; and we requeſt ſhe may be employed to aſſiſt in tranſporting our Troops from *Tellicherry* to *Anjengo*, and that you will deſire the Captain afterwards to make the beſt of his way to *Bombay*.

As it is of much importance that we ſhould, if poſſible, ſend home the anſwers which we expect from *Bengal* to the diſpatches lately ſent thither, we beg leave to requeſt, in caſe thoſe anſwers do not arrive by the 15th, the time you propoſe for the *Nymph*'s ſailing, that ſhe may remain here till the 18th or 20th at fartheſt, when there is ſcarce a doubt but we ſhall receive the advices we expect.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Fort St. George, 13th October 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

To Major *John Cotgrave*, commanding at *Tellicherry*.

Sir,

We have received your letter of the 21ſt Auguſt. We hope you may have been able to defend the ſettlement of *Tellicherry* until the arrival of Sir *Edward Hughes*'s ſquadron, by which you will receive this letter. The ſituation of affairs on this coaſt renders it abſolutely neceſſary that the Troops with you ſhould return with all poſſible expedition by the way of *Anjengo*; and we direct accordingly, that they may be embarked in ſuch manner as Sir *Edward Hughes* ſhall judge moſt expedient.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, 13th Oct. 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Mr. *Richard Church*, Reſident at *Tellicherry*.

Sir,

We underſtand, by a letter from Major *Cotgrave*, dated in Auguſt, that *Hyder Ally*'s troops had joined the Nairs, in their attack upon *Tellicherry*. As we conceive it will not be poſſible for you, without powerful ſupport from *Bombay*, to keep poſſeſſion of the place for any length

length of time, and as from all accounts we apprehend the Government will not in the preſent circumſtances be able to afford you that ſupport, we would ſuggeſt to you, whether it might not be prudent, in this caſe, to abandon the ſettlement, after embarking the Troops, ſtores, and effects belonging to it. As we are much in want of Major *Cotgrave*'s detachment, we have ſent orders to the Major to return; and have deſired Sir *Edward Hughes* to conſult with you and Major *Cotgrave*, upon the ſpeedieſt manner of tranſporting it to *Anjengo*; in which we requeſt you will give every aſſiſtance in your power, as its early arrival on this coaſt may be of great importance.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Fort Saint George, *John Whitehill*, &c.
13th October 1780. Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 16.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
19th October 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read, and approved.

Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* deliver in the following Minute, containing their obſervations on the general letter by the *Nymph*:

We do not know of any reaſons for ſuppoſing that *Hyder Ally* had no intention of breaking with us; but we poſitively aſſert, that the Select Committee were unanimouſly of a different opinion in October laſt, as appears by their Minute of the 23d of that month; and that Mr. *Smith* moſt ſtrenuouſly recommended (in a Minute dated the 10th November) the cantoning a ſtrong body of Troops at *Conjeveram* or *Vellore*, to be held in readineſs for action.

Indeed, to this partial account, we ought to candidly own, that the firſt intelligence we had of *Hyder Ally*'s motions was accompanied by accounts that his Cavalry had actually burnt *Conjeveram*, and finding nothing to oppoſe them, was puſhing on towards *Madras*; this occaſioned ſo general a conſternation, that almoſt all the families on *Choultry Plain* fled into the fort, and the inhabitants of all the adjacent villages into the Black Town; the very next day (and not a few days after) we heard of his having plundered, not only *Porto Novo* to the ſouthward, but alſo *Ventapollam* to the northward.

The Troops were not ordered on the alarm to aſſemble at the Mount, they were firſt ordered to aſſemble near *Wandewaſh*. The Preſident and Commander in Chief perſevered in that opinion ſome time, notwithſtanding the advice given by Lord *Macleod* and us; the Secretary ought to have referred to the Commander in Chief's Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt on this ſubject. Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* was firſt ordered to attack *Cuddapah*; that order was countermanded, and he was directed to proceed againſt ſome other fort, as he might think proper. After about ſeven days were loſt in this manner, definitive orders were ſent to him for proceeding to *Wandewaſh*. Had his firſt orders been for proceeding to the Mount, we believe there is no doubt but that he would have arrived at the *Cortelair* while it was day, and joined the main body of our Army before the enemy could be in readineſs to attack him. We might relate what has happened in the moſt favourable manner our records will allow, but on no account to deviate from them; it is by them, and not by partial repreſentations, our conduct will be judged: and therefore we totally diſapprove of every part of this letter, which cannot be corroborated by the Minutes of the Committee.

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This is a very partial repreſentation of our ſituation, and does not imply any difficulty in reinforcing our Army; but it is a fact not to be controverted, that we cannot, with the leaſt appearance of ſucceſs, take the field, until we receive a conſiderable reinforcement of Europeans and Sepoys from *Bengal*; that this cannot be reaſonably expected before the latter end of December; and therefore the ſafe of his Highneſs the Nabob's capital of *Arcot* is very uncertain.

We know that *Tellicherry* is blockaded by ſea and land; and that there is a very great probability of the garriſon having been obliged to ſurrender for want of proviſions and ammunition. We do not expreſs any anxiety for their ſafety, nor do we mention what relief we intend to ſend them.

We do not write with ſufficient energy on the ſevere loſs we have ſuſtained by Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s defeat, nor on the neceſſity of our receiving ſpeedily a ſufficient reinforcement from *England*. To give great force to this application, it ought to be mentioned, that the European regiment at *Vellour* (near half of which have been detached to *Arcot*) may be conſidered as entirely cut off from us until the Army takes the field, and a communication is opened with *Vellour*. We think it would be but common juſtice to mention the loſs we have ſuſtained by Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s being made priſoner, and the death of Lieutenant Colonel *Fletcher*, officers of approved bravery and undoubted merit.

We are of opinion, that we ought to have aſſigned ſome reaſon for our not immediately ceding the *Guntoor* Circar to *Bazalet Jung*, conformably to the earneſt requiſition made to us by the Governor General and Council, dated the 12th June laſt; as we are apprehenſive our total ſilence on that ſubject may be imputed to a wilful neglect and inability to defend our conduct: this appears to us the more neceſſary, as it is probable it will be taken notice of by the Governor General and Council.

Read alſo the following joint Minute, delivered in on the 14th inſtant, by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*:

As the preſent alarming ſituation of affairs on this coaſt will excite the particular attention of our Honourable Employers, we think it our indiſpenſable duty to record our ſentiments on the mode in which buſineſs is conducted; that it may be clearly ſeen how far any reſponſibility can be required of us in particular, who form a part of this Government.

In ſtating the conduct of the Select Committee, it may not be improper to ſhew the ruling influence which that inſtitution has thrown into the hands of the Governor; and conſequently how much he is reſponſible for all meaſures that come before it.

The Select Committee has the direction of every military and political meaſure. It conſiſts but of four Members, and any one of them joining with the Governor, gives him a decided majority, which in effect places the executive power in his hands.

The Governor has always been the channel through which all correſpondence has been held with the Country Powers; all intercourſe with their Vakeels is managed by him; he diſburſes what he pleaſes for ſecret ſervices, and it is to him that intelligence is brought; all conferences with the Nabob are entruſted to him; it is his duty to make himſelf acquainted with the ſituation of the country in which he governs, and all the countries that are any ways connected with it; it is therefore his duty to communicate his information to the Board, who, by having the whole before them, may be able to judge of the meaſures proper to be purſued.

As from this important truſt the Governor becomes the ſource of intelligence and information to the Board, every political incident may be ſuppoſed to originate with him.

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The truſt thus repoſed in the Governor, doubtleſs requires that he ſhould be a man of abilities, integrity, candour, and experience; the more theſe qualities are requiſite, every defect becomes the more dangerous, in proportion to the difficulties by which the Government is ſurrounded.

All the official information comes through the Governor; he may on many occaſions preſent or ſuppreſs it, as he thinks proper: without neceſſary information, the beſt intentions of a Council may be fruſtrated; and thus a Governor may ſacrifice the intereſt of his Employers, by not putting it in the power of his colleagues to provide againſt approaching danger.

To obtain information, to open every channel through which it may be procured, and to be able to diſcriminate between that which is important or otherwiſe, is one of the moſt eſſential duties of a Governor. The meaſures to be purſued in conſequence, after communication, depend upon the Council, but to procure information is chiefly the province of the Governor; and if that is not obtained, it is obvious no political meaſures or military plans can either be properly conducted or arranged.

We have reaſon to think the late Preſident expected, before his departure, that the Company's poſſeſſions on this coaſt would be invaded by *Hyder Ally*: we likewiſe have reaſon to think, that he knew magazines were collecting on our frontiers at *Bangalore*, &c. We are informed Mr. *Grey* wrote ſeveral letters to him upon this ſubject, although but one appears on record; but this information was never communicated to the Committee.

Mr. *Johnſon*, in a Minute (ſeconded by Mr. *Smith*) on the 19th of June, in conſequence of various reports they had heard of *Hyder*'s intentions to invade the *Carnatic*, moved, That the Committee would take into conſideration the means for maintaining an Army in the field, and if that was impracticable, that they would deliberate upon meaſures for reinforcing our garriſons, and for keeping up a force, at leaſt ſufficient to protect the Company's and Nabob's poſſeſſions: he likewiſe required a return of the ſtores and proviſions in the different capital forts, that the Committee might be enabled to judge of what was further neceſſary. Had this opinion been followed, our Troops, which were then ſeparated, might have been formed into a body within the ſpace of a month; without obſtruction or difficulty they might have marched into the heart of the province, and would have been ready to face the enemy on their firſt entrance.

But upon this and other occaſions we had too much reaſon to believe, that a meaſure ſuggeſted by us, was of itſelf a ſufficient reaſon for its meeting with oppoſition from the majority of the Committee; the advice conveyed in this Minute was not regarded; our apprehenſions were thought groundleſs, and the opportunity loſt which might have totally prevented the enemy's invading the *Carnatic*. In this opinion we were further confirmed, in finding that no more attention had been ſhewn to the Minute delivered in by Mr. *Smith* of the 17th July (recommending the ſame precautions might be taken) than had before been paid to the Minute of Mr. *Johnſon*.

In a Minute delivered in by the Governor and General on the 1ſt Auguſt (in reply to one which Mr. *Sadlier* had entered at Council on this ſubject) avowedly with intention to vindicate their own conduct, and moving for Mr. *Sadlier*'s ſuſpenſion; they ſay, "*Hyder Ally*, from the moment we marched againſt *Mahé*, threatened in return an invaſion of the *Carnatic*; his inclination was little to be doubted," &c. &c. How far this confeſſion operates in their vindication, we will leave to our Honourable Employers; frequent information proved, that it was not only the inclination but the intention of *Hyder Ally* to invade the *Carnatic*. Two Members of the Committee propoſed, that we ſhould make the neceſſary preparations in conſequence; and yet the inclinations of *Hyder Ally* were ſo apparent to the majority, they neglected to take any one ſtep by which our ſafety might be ſecured, until the enemy's Cavalry had entered into the heart of the country, and penetrated to a great extent both north and ſouth.

For ſeveral days after the invaſion took place, the ſame unhappy indifference and inactivity prevailed; the Troops at *Poonamalee* and the Mount were allowed to remain ſeparate, inſtead of being aſſembled for the defence of the Black Town, as we at that time recommended; the inhabitants were under the greateſt alarm, becauſe they thought proper means were not taken to protect them: inſtead of finding near our capital an aſylum for their property, their cattle, and their effects, they thought themſelves in danger within the walls of the Black Town; they fled into woods and pollams; they carried their cattle and their effects with them; ſuch as could afford it, fled by ſea; and we beg to ſubmit it even to the majority, Whether this is not the cauſe to which we may principally impute the difficulty we had in fitting out the Army from the Mount, and our want of neceſſary proviſions for that part of it which has ſince returned?

Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* with his detachment, inſtead of being immediately ordered down to *Madras* to join the Troops which could be collected near the Preſidency, was firſt ordered into the *Cuddapah* country; then into ſome other part of *Hyder Ally*'s territories, where the attack might be more effectual; and at laſt, down to *Madras*. It is true, when the expedition againſt *Cuddapah* was firſt propoſed, we concurred; but within the ſpace of three days we were ſenſible of the impropriety of the meaſure, and moved, that he ſhould be ordered directly to *Madras*; but this was not attended to, although if it had, his march towards *Cuddapah* would have been prevented. By theſe different orders, ſeveral days were loſt after the invaſion took place, and at a time when every moment was of importance.

The detachment which marched from *Pondicherry* under Colonel *Braithwaite*, inſtead of being brought up by ſea, upon the firſt alarm to *Madras*, as propoſed by Mr. *Sadlier* and us, where it might have been landed in the ſpace of eight days, was allowed to remain for a conſiderable time, as if it were in an open town, although without Artillery (which was ſent to them afterwards) and then ordered to march through a country, which might be conſidered in the poſſeſſion of the enemy. Col. *Braithwaite*, with his detachment, fortunately joined the Army at the Mount, about the 23d of Auguſt: it is well known that his march was not only attended with inconceivable fatigue and hazard, but in ſome ſituations, when there was great difficulty in dragging the guns over ſwampy ground, his detachment was in imminent danger in caſe of an attack, as appears by Colonel *Braithwaite*'s letter to the Committee. We deem it proper to obſerve, that independant of the great loſs of time, this march by land made a very conſiderable difference of expence, which might have been ſaved by bringing the Troops by ſea; this in any caſe deſerved conſideration, but in the preſent low ſtate of our finances was really important.

The majority of the Committee firſt determined to aſſemble the Army by detachments in the middle of the province, although then in the poſſeſſion of the enemy; they defended this meaſure in their Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt, already quoted, but they afterwards found themſelves under the neceſſity of relinquiſhing it, and of adopting in part the meaſure of aſſembling the Army near the Preſidency, as had been propoſed to them.

We conceive, had Mr. *Johnſon*'s motion of the 19th June (which was ſeconded by Mr. *Smith*) been attended to, it is highly probable the enemy would not have invaded the country, and in any event, the Army would have been in readineſs to meet the enemy on their firſt appearance. Had Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment been ordered from the northward to *Madras*, when the invaſion took place, and had Colonel *Braithwaite*'s detachment been ordered up from *Pondicherry* by ſea, the former would have eſcaped the melancholy fate to which it became expoſed, the ſafety of the latter not have been

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ſo injudiciouſly hazarded; and the Army, when joined, might have been ready to march at leaſt ſeven days ſooner, which would have proved of the higheſt importance, to the relief of *Arcot:* had the troops near the Preſidency been aſſembled for its protection, our bounds would have been ſtocked with every neceſſary; we might have felt but little of our preſent diſtreſs, and our army might have been eaſily equipped; in fine, we are convinced our affairs would now have a different aſpect, and our honour been ſaved. However, it might be thought uncandid not to do the Preſident and General the juſtice to obſerve, that although they took no notice of our Minutes, or made the neceſſary diſpoſitions in caſe of an invaſion, they do not forget to vindicate their conduct, by declaring in their Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt, that they repreſented, both to the Company and to the Gentlemen at *Bengal*, the extent of *Hyder Ally*'s views, and had moſt circumſtantially informed the latter of every ſtep he had taken previous to his attack upon the *Carnatic*. It is true indeed, that theſe Gentlemen in the ſame Minute further ſay, "that under the certainty that the main Army and the artillery of *Hyder Ally* had not yet got through the Ghauts, and that he himſelf, ſo far from being in the heart of the *Carnatic*, was ſtill in the neighbourhood of the Paſſes, they deemed themſelves vigilant in the truſt repoſed in them, when they reſolved to aſſemble an army as ſpeedily as poſſible!" We appeal to our Superiors, whether this is not in effect an evaſion of the queſtion, and whether the introducing theſe circumſtances (which at this time we believe were very uncertain) is not intended to give a colour of excuſe for the delay which happened in making the neceſſary preparations; when it is not denied, as it cannot, that *Hyder Ally*'s forces had then actually burnt, plundered, and deſtroyed many conſiderable places in the *Carnatic*, even down to the ſea ſide, and had carried off a very large booty from *Porto Novo* to the ſouth, had done conſiderable damage northward at another large manufacturing town called *Ventapollam*, not far from *Maſulipatam*, and had ravaged the country to the weſtward?

It was not in our power to prevent theſe evils; we could do no more, nor can we at preſent, than vindicate ourſelves from having any part in the meaſures purſued. From the departure of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, we ſaw the Preſident and General united in every meaſure which has been carried into execution, with very little regard to the arguments uſed by us; our oppoſition to theſe meaſures, though formed upon good grounds, and conducted with moderation, was deemed diſſenſion; our advice was ill received, and hardly ever followed, but through neceſſity. The meaſures by which the majority ſupported their power, ſhew that the means were but little conſidered, ſo the end was obtained. We ſhall not ſay how much the Governor endeavoured to inculcate ideas to our prejudice, that he might thereby promote his own views; but of this we are certain, our conduct was miſconſtrued, and our endeavours to ſerve the Public imputed to a factious diſpoſition.

Mr. *Sadlier*, a Member of Council, convinced that the meaſures of the majority were deſtructive, and rouſed by a ſenſe of public danger, gave an opinion, pointing out the evil tendency of what had already been done, and propoſing a plan of operations: his arguments are the ſame as we have already expreſſed; they carried conviction to our minds; we joined in them, and we hoped the majority would do ſo likewiſe: but the event turned out otherwiſe, and Mr. *Sadlier* was ſuſpended for giving an opinion, which, had it been adopted, would probably have prevented every ſucceeding miſchief.

When we ſaw power exerting itſelf to ſuppreſs well-grounded opinion, we could not but feel for ourſelves; we might have fallen the next ſacrifice, and would thereby have been prevented from conveying to the Company our opinion in oppoſition to what we thought improper meaſures.

But the jealouſy of the majority was carried to a height that convinced us it was pre-determined our opinions ſhould have no weight.

The General firſt determined to remain at *Madras*, and Lord *Macleod* was appointed to the command of the Army; when, in conſequence of his letter to the Committee, the General relinquiſhed the deſign, and took the command upon himſelf, he joined the Governor in voting, that he ſhould have leave to return from the Army to *Madras* when he thought proper: but not thinking this Reſolution ſufficient, and that it might be abrogated in his abſence, he went ſtill greater lengths; he expreſſed doubts of us in a Minute, dated 21ſt Auguſt, without aſſigning any cauſe, and not only in oppoſition to the Orders of the Company, which fixes the Members of the Select Committee, but in violation of the conſtitution of their Government, which places the power in the hands of the majority (having firſt contributed to this unwarrantable ſtep by the unjuſt ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Sadlier*) moved, that Mr. *Davidſon* be appointed a temporary Member of the Select Committee during his abſence.

The Preſident, in effect, acknowledged this act to be violent, and yet ſupported it for the ſuperficial reaſons aſſigned by the General. We have already delivered in Minutes on this ſubject; but we will here take notice, that it was not alone the Orders of the Court of Directors which theſe Gentlemen deviated from, and totally diſregarded; but that on this occaſion, they acted in direct oppoſition to an opinion and ſentiments, which in decency claimed at leaſt an equal attention from them; for the truth of which, we mean to appeal to their own words in their joint Minute of the 1ſt Auguſt, where they cenſure Mr. *Sadlier* for expreſſions, which they conſidered as a reflection on the Committee. Their words are theſe: "If in their wiſdom the Company have "thought fit to eſtabliſh a Select Committee, for the "better management of their affairs; if in their diſcre- "tion they have thought proper to *limit the number of its* "*Members*; the daring inſult which is in ſuch language "ſhewn to their authority, and that too by a Member "of Adminiſtration, is worthy of the ſevereſt cenſure "that can be paſſed. To encourage a ſpirit of diſ- "affection, is highly unbecoming in any man, veſted "with the ſhare of the Government of a Country; but "to aim at the ſubverſion of a power *fixed and eſtabliſhed* "*in all its points by the moſt explicit Orders*, is a tranſ- "greſſion of that unpardonable nature, that Government "would be treacherous to their Conſtituents, and negli- "gent of the public ſafety, to allow it to paſs."

It is then neceſſary for us to take notice, that the extraordinary meaſure of bringing Mr. *Davidſon* into the Committee, which the Preſident and General thought proper to adopt within a few days after they had delivered the aforegoing ſentiments, ſtands ſtrongly reprobated by theſe ſentiments, ſo that no clearer evidence of their condemnation can be required, than what is contained in their own words.

We are aware that thoſe ſentiments had been adopted by the Preſident and the General to ſerve the purpoſe which they had then in view, the ſuſpenſion of a Member of the Board, not only for his temerity in finding fault with the conduct of the majority of a Committee, which the Company in "their wiſdom thought fit "to eſtabliſh, and in their diſcretion to *limit the number* "*of its Members*, ſo that it became a power *fixed and* "*eſtabliſhed in all its points by the moſt explicit Orders*;" but for the daring inſult which was ſhewn by him to the authority of the Company, as theſe Gentlemen then wiſhed it to be ſuppoſed, is offering a reproach to the Committee.

But it is the leſs obvious that when theſe ſentiments had once been adopted, and applied in ſupport of the authority of the Company, and of the rights eſtabliſhed by that authority, they recoil with a tenfold force againſt thoſe in whoſe minds they ſeem totally to have been obliterated, when it anſwered their purpoſe to purſue a

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different conduct, by trampling upon that authority, and thoſe powers, for which they were before ſo ſtrenuous.

Although we think not only the Commander in Chief's Letter to the Committee of the 21ſt ult. but alſo thoſe he wrote to the Preſident individually, during his ſhort campaign, contain many material circumſtances deſerving particular obſervation; yet we ſhall content ourſelves with only one remark, which is, that as the General could find time to adviſe the Governor daily of his operations, he might with equal facility and greater propriety, have addreſſed ſimilar Letters to the Committee; and it is the more to be regretted he did not, as we ſaw but four or five of them, and even theſe were never read at the Board, although it now appears (on their being produced at our requeſt) that they contain many matters very neceſſary for our information, and ſuch as required the moſt ſerious conſideration.

We will not, however, take upon us to ſay what might have been the reſult of our deliberations, or what our own particular ſentiments would have been, had thoſe Letters been then recorded; but, from the attention we have uniformly ſhewn to every matter of importance, we perſuade ourſelves the Honourable Court of Directors will do us the juſtice to believe that our beſt endeavours would have been exerted to prevent, as far as depended on us, the fatal diſaſter which has befallen the Company; and here we think neceſſary to mention, that our anxiety at not hearing from the General for ſeveral days, forced us to enter a Minute on the 6th ult. wherein we obſerved this inattention to what we conceived was a very eſſential part of his duty.

Having now briefly ſtated the line of conduct we have purſued, ſince we were confirmed in our ſuſpicions of *Hyder Ally*'s deſigns, it only remains, that we ſubmit the ſame, with all due deference, to the judgment of our Superiors.

14th October 1780. *Charles Smith*, *Samuel Johnſon*.

We think it neceſſary to requeſt, that the Honourable Court of Directors and the Committee will be pleaſed to refer to the Report of the late Preſident, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, relative to *Hyder Ally*'s diſpoſition and intentions, as entered in the Minutes of the Committee on the 23d October laſt; to the Committee's unanimous opinion thereon; to a Minute delivered in by Mr. *Smith*, on the 16th of November laſt, and to the Committee's opinion in conſequence thereof.

(Tranſlation.)

From his Highneſs the Nabob *Wau Lau Jaw Ummeer ul Hind, Omdat ul Mulk, Aſuph ud Dowlah, Unwur ud Dien, Khan Bebauder, Zupbur Jung, Sepoy Salaur*, Soubahdar of the *Carnatic, Pauyen Ghaut*, to the Honourable the Chairman and Directors of Affairs for the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

By your late Preſident Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, I acknowledged the receipt of your Letter of the 28th January 1779, and expreſſed to you the great ſatisfaction I experienced from the ſentiments of regard and affection which it contained. In a reciprocal dependance upon the faith of each other, we firſt began our connection; for upwards of thirty years we continued in one uniform plan of mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport; nor would a difference of opinion have ever ariſen between us, had not the deſigns of evil-diſpoſed men miſguided the better judgment of the Company, both as to their own and to my intereſt and honour. That cloud, however, I truſt in the Almighty, has long ſince been diſperſed. The Company cannot but have ſeen, in its fulleſt extent, the injuſtice, of which I had more than common reaſon to complain; and I make no doubt, but in the end I ſhall receive at their hands the moſt ample redreſs for thoſe injuries which have unmeritedly been ſhowered upon an unſhaken friendſhip. From the advices which my beſt Friends will receive from their Preſident and Council by this conveyance, they will perceive, that what I have for many years predicted, hath at length come to paſs; that *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the inveterate enemy of both the *Carnatic* and the Engliſh intereſts in *Hindoſtan*, hath invariably been bent upon the deſtruction of their influence and power. When repreſentations, not founded in apprehenſions, or in doubtful information, are laid before a Government, they ſhould be liſtened to; ſuſpicion even ſhould be admitted to have ſome influence, when the common ſafety is at ſtake. It is now more than twenty years ſince *Hyder Ally Cawn* entered into a bond of amity with the French; and ever ſince that time, he has been meditating the ruin of the Engliſh. Anxious about my Friends, as well as about myſelf, I never ceaſed communicating to them the certainty I had of his having hoſtile intentions towards us. I repeatedly told them, it was highly expedient to be prepared againſt ſo formidable a Power; that his motions would be ſo rapid, when he once began, that they would not find it an eaſy matter to impede his progreſs; that he only waited the favourable moment, and that then he would carry fire and deſolation through the very heart of our dominions: but every thing I advanced was attributed either to jealouſy, or reſentment againſt that ambitious Chief; my advice was diſregarded; and nothing would convince them that my intelligence was true, until he was in poſſeſſion of a great part of the *Carnatic*, and had advanced even as near as *Conjeveram*. A force then was aſſembled; but misfortune attended, for the firſt time, thoſe arms, which had hitherto met with ſucceſs: the flower of the Britiſh Troops were either cut off, or taken priſoners, and the remainder compelled to ſeek ſhelter in a precipitate retreat. Unaccuſtomed to ſo ſingular an advantage, the inſolence of *Hyder* hath indulged itſelf in the higheſt exultation; he hath laid ſiege to my capital of *Arcot*, his Horſe have penetrated within view of your fort of *Madras*, and he now ſees himſelf in poſſeſſion of the whole extent of country between the kingdom of *Miſore* and this Preſidency. How frequent, and how long unavailing muſt be my advice to my Friends? From the dawning of this bold Uſurper's power, I have pointed out to them the neceſſity of being watchful of his motions. I ſaw, and I repreſented to them, the deſigns he premeditated; I urged them to be prepared; but, unhappily, my ſentiments did not accord with thoſe of their Repreſentatives. At length, the proof is brought to their very doors, and they regret they were not more attentive. Joined from my earlieſt youth in an inſeparable link of friendſhip and affection with the Engliſh, my heart cannot but bleed when I ſee their affairs ſo different from the brilliancy with which they appeared in former days. The guidance of Providence then ſeemed evident in their meaſures, their Councils were uniformly deciſive, and their name became in conſequence renowned through *Hindoſtan*. Engaged now in hoſtilities in every quarter of the Eaſt, a general Confederacy threatens them with the moſt ſerious difficulties; nor have they a ſingle Power to rely upon, but their old and faithful Friend the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. But what exertions can he be capable of, when a ſcene of devaſtation is exhibited in every part of his dominions? Sinking under a load of heavy debt, moſtly contracted with Britiſh individuals for the public Service, exhauſted in Treaſury, and anticipated in Revenue, what are the Reſources of the *Carnatic* to produce? Had, indeed, the voice of Friendſhip been heard, theſe evils would not have exiſted: The *Tanjore* Country, in defiance of every principle of right, would not have been wreſted from him: The body of Cavalry which he raiſed, and was to have paid from its revenues, and which were commanded by the Officers of his Friends, would have prevented that ruin which has ſince been ſpread by *Hyder Ally*; and his numerous Creditors would, in the proſpect of payment of their juſt claims, have been ſatisfied and happy. How fatally are matters reverſed! But the hour of danger demands exertion, and

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not complaint; we are involved in difficulty, and ſpirit and activity are alone what can extricate us. In this view, I have given my ſentiments freely both to your Preſidency here and to the Gentlemen of *Bengal*. The former I have begged to aſſiſt me with their credit, as they have done in all former periods of diſturbance; and the latter I have implored to be expeditious in bringing to a concluſion the unprofitable War which they have, under the greateſt diſadvantages, waged with the *Marattas*. Should the Government of *Bengal* acquieſce in the propriety of this meaſure, *Hyder* may yet feel that chaſtiſement which he merits for the unprovoked attack he has made upon us. The *Marattas*, left to themſelves, will ſoon renew their hoſtilities againſt him; while we, with the Forces which we have on the *Malabar* ſide of *India*, and thoſe we may collect here, will, with the bleſſing of God, be enabled ſo to hem him in, as to render it in future impracticable for him to diſturb the quiet of his neighbours. Your Governor and Council will acquaint you of my having put my Cavalry under their orders for the preſent War, and of their having aſſiſted me with a ſmall loan to diſcharge the arrears which are due to them. To repay this, and to enable them to reap every benefit from the Cavalry in future, I have agreed to appropriate certain revenues, which in the ſpace of a very ſhort time will entirely clear the debt that may be contracted on this account. My Friends know how punctual I have always been in the article of money. Since my firſt alliance with them, I have paid into their Treaſury upwards of two crores of Pagodas, twenty-ſix lacks of which was in the Government of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*; ſo that when this War broke out, I was indebted to them no larger a ſum than about ſeventy thouſand Pagodas. To accompliſh this, indeed, I have been compelled to mortgage all my jewels, and all my other valuable effects; and what hath been of greater anguiſh to my mind, to ſee the diſtreſſes without being able to relieve them, the total bankruptcy of almoſt all my private Creditors. Juſtice, and a regard to your own honour, demand that ſomething ſhould be done for thoſe living under your immediate protection. The orders of 1775, relative to *Tanjore*, plunged both them and me into the ruinous ſtate in which we are at preſent. The hand that uninformed gave the blow, ſhould, on a full conviction of the injury, redreſs the grievances it hath occaſioned: on this ſubject I need not dwell; you yourſelves are ſenſible that little reliance was to be had on the man in whoſe favour thoſe extraordinary orders of 1775 were paſſed. The ſieges of *Pondicherry* and *Mahé*, when he might have aſſiſted, proved to you that he was ungrateful; neither can he now be brought to furniſh you with the moſt trifling ſupplies, although he is perfectly aſſured that the neceſſities of your Government are urgent. Of what utility then hath the reſtoration of this Zemindar been to the ſtate of your affairs in *Hindoſtan*? Diſſipated, and ſecretly diſguſted with your authority, he would gladly throw himſelf into the arms of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, or any enemy that might appear againſt you. His intrigues are ſtill carrying on with your moſt formidable Foes. Even on *Hyder*'s entering the *Carnatic*, he privately ſent him a Vakeel, with a preſent of three lacks of Rupees. Juſtice out of the queſtion, is it policy to continue foſtering in your boſom, one who hourly wiſhes your deſtruction? How much better would it be, were the reſources of that country turned to the payment of public and of private demands; and to the defraying the expences of a body of Cavalry ſufficient for the protection of the *Carnatic*. The time may perhaps arrive (but I truſt in the favour of God it will not) when theſe ſentiments may ſtrike with weight, but when it may be too late to draw thoſe benefits from them which they are now capable of producing.

May the Almighty direct you in your councils, and proſper you in your affairs. What can I ſay more?

Given at *Madras*, this 17th day of October 1780.

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Extract—Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute, entered on *Fort William* Secret Conſultation, 4 September 1780.

IN the firſt place, a ſum of money, adequate to the emergency of the occaſion, ſhould be ſent to *Madras*, provided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the method they are now purſuing, of raiſing money upon the Company's bonds; and that there may be as little delay as poſſible in furniſhing this ſupply, if neceſſary, I would recommend that it be taken from the War Depoſit in the New Fort, as being a fund apparently provided for ſuch exigencies.

The particular manner in which our Troops on the coaſt are diſtributed, in garriſons ſituated at a diſtance from each other, and the communication between them partly cut off by *Hyder*'s Cavalry, may render it a ſervice of no leſs difficulty than danger to aſſemble an Army ſufficiently ſtrong to riſk an engagement with the very formidable Force he is reported to have now in the field. I feel this circumſtance with the more ſenſible regret and concern, as the diſtance from hence puts it beyond a poſſibility to give any aſſiſtance that could afford them immediate relief. However, in order to lighten the burden, and to give ſpirit and confidence to ſuch operations as the *Madras* Adminiſtration, from their own diſcernment, and local obſervation, may find it expedient to purſue againſt *Hyder* (for to their own conduct it muſt, in a great meaſure, now be left) as well as to ſave the Nizam from attempting any thing againſt the Circars, to deter *Hyder* from turning his views towards thoſe Northern dominions, and to be in readineſs to act in concert with what force may now be in the Circars, againſt the French, who, as they are at this time expected, may attempt a landing on that coaſt; I ſay, for theſe important purpoſes, I would recommend a ſufficient Army being formed to the Southward.

The Governor General's Minute, entered on Conſultation, 4 September 1780.

The other ſubjects of the General's Minute being of a different nature, and wholly unconnected with the queſtion immediately before the Board, I ſhall conſider as diſtinct queſtions.

The 1ſt is, "That a ſum of money adequate to the "emergency of the occaſion, be ſent to *Madras*, pro- "vided they are not able to furniſh themſelves by the me- "thod they are now purſuing, of raiſing money upon the "Company's bonds; and that there may be as little de- "lay as poſſible in furniſhing this ſupply, if neceſſary, "that it be taken from the War Depoſit in the New "Fort, as being a fund apparently provided for ſuch exi- "gencies." As the terms of the queſtion do not admit or require an immediate conſideration of it, and we have already provided two modes of remittance, which, though not ample, will prove a ſufficient relief to the immediate wants of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*; I hope the General will conſent to ſuſpend the final determination upon it, until the approach of the ſeaſon in which his Propoſal, if approved, muſt be carried into execution. In the mean time we may hope to be informed of the ſtate of that Preſidency, with relation to its wants, its reſources, its diſpoſition *for repelling the pretended or actual Invaſion, whichever it may prove*, and the other diſtinct ſervices to which they may propoſe to apply the ſums afforded them by this Government.

Theſe Provinces, already very much exhauſted, will not bear greater drains, nor can any thing ſhort of extreme neceſſity juſtify us in repeating them. It is, therefore, at leaſt reaſonable to expect that they will furniſh us with previous information upon the points which I have enumerated; nay, it may ſo happen, that by the neglect

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neglect of this precaution, we may furniſh them with the means of employing the Company's arms in an unnatural and deſperate oppoſition, even to the authority of this Government, which was appointed for their controul, and to whoſe protection they muſt finally owe their exiſtence.

On this occaſion I muſt remind the Board of the demand which was made to them ſo long ago as the 12th June laſt, for the reſtitution of the Circar of *Guntoor*, or *Murtazanagur*, to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and of the repetition of that demand in our letter of the 21ſt ultimo. Their ſilence will juſtify us in crediting the reports, which, though not of official authority, have doubtleſs reached every Member of this Board; that the Forces of that Preſidency, which were ſent to take poſſeſſion of *Murtazanagur*, ſtill continue there in defiance of our orders, and that the management of it has been aſſigned in form to the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. Hence I draw a ſtrong ſuſpicion, that they will not eaſily be induced to reſign it; and this is an additional and very powerful inducement with me, to defer the conſideration of the preſent queſtion, until we know whether the Preſidency of *Madras* will yield to our authority, or compel us to uſe the means with which we are conſtitutionally armed for that purpoſe, to ſupport and enforce it; if ſuch ſhall be, as I truſt it will, the reſolution of this Board.

Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute in anſwer to the preceding, entered on Conſultation the 18th September 1780.

I agree with the Governor General, in the propriety of deferring to ſend further ſupplies for the relief of the Preſidency of *Madras*, until the Adminiſtration there ſhall have adviſed us on thoſe points which the Governor General ſtated, and which are ſo very neceſſary for our information, in order to guide us, as to the nature of the aſſiſtance to be given them.

The Board agree with the Commander in Chief, in the ſentiments expreſſed in the above Minute; and refer it to him, to take ſuch precautions, and to paſs ſuch orders, as may be immediately neceſſary to guard againſt the event of an Invaſion.

Fort William Secret Conſultations, 25th September 1780.

The Governor General delivers in the following Minute:

This is not a time either for long deliberation at home, or the formal and tedious proceſs of negociation abroad. The calamity which has befallen us upon the coaſt, and the alarming ſuperiority which *Hyder Ally Cawn* has acquired in the *Carnatic*; the deſpondency of the Government of *Fort Saint George*; the conſternation and diſtruſt which ſeem to have ſpread themſelves among all thoſe who are ſubject to its authority; its utter want of preſent means and reſources; the diminution of their military ſtrength, and its declared inſufficiency for the War which it is to ſuſtain; and above all, the authentic information which we have received of a great naval and military armament prepared by the Court of *France*, and deſtined, beyond all doubt, to co-operate with *Hyder Ally*, demand the moſt inſtant, powerful, and even hazardous exertion of this Government, to avert the event portended by ſo many concurrent difficulties; to this point, every other conſideration muſt now give place: Without further preface, I propoſe the following Reſolutions:

1ſt. That the ſum of 15 lacks of rupees be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George* in ſpecie, and laden for that purpoſe on the Honourable Company's ſhip *The Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*.

2d. That the treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the preceding purpoſe, and other exigencies of this Government.

3d. That a large detachment of European Infantry and Artillery be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George* by *The Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*. To this propoſition, as a neceſſary and eſſential part of it, I muſt add the following; viz. That the Commander in Chief be requeſted, and I do for my own part make it my moſt earneſt and particular requeſt, that he will proceed himſelf immediately to the coaſt, and take the command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment.

The Commander in Chief will pardon this formal and official ſolicitation; I know the ardour of his zeal for the public Service, and that this principle will of itſelf compel him to be, wherever it ſhall moſt require his preſence; but I think this a caſe in which it would mark too great an indifference to the public welfare, and too cold a ſenſe of the utility of his ſervices, to leave the offer of them to his unſolicited option. I make no ſcruple to avow, that although I am convinced that the danger impending on our intereſt in the *Carnatic* might be eaſily repelled, even with the Force which it already poſſeſſes for its defence, yet I cannot place any reliance upon it, unleſs it ſhall be properly applied and conducted; *that I do not think that it has been properly applied, nor expect that it will be properly conducted, unleſs Sir* Eyre Coote *will at this criſis ſtand forth and vindicate, in his own perſon, the rights and honour of the Britiſh arms.* I mean not to compliment; his military experience, and, above all, the high eſtimation in which his name is held by the world, and eſpecially by that part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the only poſſible inſtrument to retrieve our paſt diſgraces, or to preſerve the Britiſh intereſt and poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic* from utter ruin. Our Armies, which have been ſo long formed to the habits of conqueſt, will not eaſily recover from the impreſſion of the dreadful reverſe which has lately befallen them, nor be brought to act with their former confidences under unſucceſsful Commanders; the addition of numbers will not relieve their apprehenſions, and will but contribute to oppreſs the hands which have been already proved too weak to ſuſtain the weight of an inferior charge.

4th. That an immediate offer of Peace be made to the *Maratta* State, in the mode and on the conditions following; viz. That as the Miniſters of that State have profeſſed a deſire for Peace, which has been equally the wiſh of this Government, even from the commencement of the War; and as the attainment of it ſeems to have been hitherto impeded by the difficulty of managing a Negociation between the Principals, ſituated at ſo great a diſtance from each other; to preclude all further delays, we do at the ſame time offer Peace, and bind ourſelves to the obſervance of it, on their acceptance and ratification of the conditions which ſhall be prepared for that purpoſe.

This is all I propoſe as immediately neceſſary. The Commander in Chief will offer ſuch a plan for the diſtribution of our Troops, and other military arrangements, as appertain to his ſeparate province.

Extract from the Secret Proceedings of the Honourable the Governor General and Council, the 26th September 1780.

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires,
Lieut. General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.

Mr. *Francis* delivers in the following Minute on the Propoſitions

Propoſitions recorded by the Governor General on yeſterday's proceedings:

Mr. *Francis.* I am earneſtly deſirous of giving every aſſiſtance and relief to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, that prudence, and a due regard to our own ſafety, will admit of. Our endeavours to provide for the ſecurity of the Company's other poſſeſſions in *India*, ſhould always be guided and limited by the fundamental principle laid down for us by the Court of Directors in our general inſtructions, *to make the ſafety and proſperity of* Bengal *the principal object of all our deliberations and reſolutions.* And I truſt, that the Board will not loſe ſight of this principle in the preſent debate.

1ſt. I ſee many objections to the Governor General's firſt Propoſitions; the ſum of 15 lacks in ſpecie is much too great for this Government to ſpare from its own preſſing occaſions. Nor do I think ſo great a ſum ought to be truſted at once to the Gentlemen of *Madras*, if our Treaſury were full. If we ſupply them gradually, and with moderation, it is probable that they may apply our money with œconomy to the ſervice for which we intend it; if not, I very much fear that it will not only be miſapplied, but waſted. Before we part with any thing, we ought to look into the ſtate of our own Treaſury, and ſee what ſupplies can be afforded from it, conſiſtently with the immediate demands, and other indiſpenſable ſervices, of this Government.

I think the preſent ſupply for *Fort Saint George* ſhould not exceed half the ſum propoſed, nor could any thing but their preſſing neceſſities extort even this ſum from me in the preſent ſtate of our Treaſury.

2dly. If it depended on me, I would rather take meaſures to increaſe the depoſit in the New Fort, than proclaim our diſtreſs to all *India*, by taking away the little reſidue now left there. It is a dreadful conſideration, that a Government, ſuch as this, ſhould not at all times have a reſerve of 20 or 30 lacks in ſpecie at its command.

3dly. On the firſt part of the third Propoſition, I muſt ſubmit to the judgment of the Commander in Chief, whether a *large detachment of European Infantry and Artillery* can be ſpared with ſafety from the defence of *Fort William* and of theſe provinces; it is not aſcertained by what conveyance they are to be ſent. The *Kingſton*, it is ſaid, may be ready in ten days; but this is the only ſhip now under orders for ſailing; and it is to be feared, that even ſhe will arrive on the coaſt at a time when it may be very difficult, if not impoſſible, to land either the ſtores or men. I deem this to be a point of very great conſequence; and I hope the Board will attend to it, as the Governor General declares, *that he is convinced the danger impending on our intereſts in the* Carnatic *might be eaſily repelled, even with the Force which it already poſſeſſes for its defence, if properly conducted.* I concur in the requeſt propoſed to Sir *Eyre Coote*; but I do not ſee the ſame neceſſity for ſending a reinforcement of Troops.

4thly. I am of opinion that we ought to make Peace with the *Marattas* at all events, becauſe I deem it a caſe of indiſpenſable neceſſity, which ſuperſedes all other conſiderations. It is undoubtedly much to be deſired that they ſhould join with us againſt *Hyder Ally*; but in our preſent circumſtances it is of itſelf a point of ſo much conſequence, and will give you ſo great a relief, to put an end to the War with the *Marattas*, that I think it ought not to be embarraſſed with any conditions which they can reaſonably refuſe.

Queſ. If your Maſter is ſo deſirous of friendſhip with the Engliſh, what occaſion is there for keeping up a large Army at *Cuttack*, which he muſt do at a great expence?

Anſ. My Maſter is obliged to keep up appearances, in conformity to a plan concerted by *Nizam Ally Cawn.*

Queſ. What is his preſent ſtrength?

Anſ. I do not know my Maſter's preſent force at *Neſſore*, but I know that 30,000 Horſe are at preſent at *Cuttack.*

Queſ. Will you be anſwerable that if we deſire to ſend a reinforcement to our Settlement on the coaſt, their paſſage ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the Army now at *Cuttack*, or otherwiſe, by the Rajah?

Anſ. I will be anſwerable that they ſhall not be oppoſed or interrupted by the Army now at *Cuttack*, or otherwiſe, by the Rajah.

Queſ. Are the whole of the 30,000 Horſe at *Cuttack* paid by your Maſter, or is any number of them paid by the Miniſters at *Poonah?*

Anſ. They are all paid by the Rajah my Maſter.

Queſ. Are they all abſolutely under his command, and do they receive no orders from *Poonah?*

Anſ. They are entirely under his orders, and have no connection with the Miniſters at *Poonah.*

Queſ. Are there not 5 or 600 Horſe in the Army at *Cuttack*, called *Poonah* Wollas, as denominated from *Poonah?*

Anſ. There are men who have come from *Poonah*, who may be called *Poonah* Wollas, but they are all the Rajah's ſervants.

Queſ. If *Hyder Ally Cawn* ſhould have entered into an alliance with the French King, and have received from him ſuch an aſſiſtance of ſhips of war and ſoldiers as would give him a ſuperiority in the War in which he is engaged with the Engliſh in the *Carnatic*, how do you underſtand that ſuch an event would intereſt the Peiſhwa, and the other Rulers of the *Maratta* State?

Anſ. The Peiſhwa, and the other Rulers of the *Maratta* State, would not be pleaſed with ſuch an event, as they would have every bad conſequence to expect from ſuch an acquiſition of powers and ſtrength to *Hyder Ally*, who is their natural Enemy, and has already conquered their country as far as the *Kima*, and on ſuch an acceſſion of ſtrength would not ſtop there.

Queſ. In the third of the requiſitions ſtated by *Devander Pundit*, on the behalf of the Peiſhwa, it is expreſſed, that no demand for the reimburſement of expences ſhall be made on either ſide; *Pundit Purdham* and the Engliſh Gentlemen ſhall recover their heavy expences by uniting themſelves, and jointly attacking their Enemies: Whom do you underſtand to be meant by the term Enemies?

Anſ. Hyder Naig: there is no other Enemy.

The Board proceed to conſider the Governor General's Propoſitions, delivered in his Minute recorded yeſterday.

Firſt, That the ſum of fifteen lacks of Rupees be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George* in ſpecie, and laden for that purpoſe in the Honourable Company's ſhip the *Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras.*

Sir *Eyre Coote.* I agree to the Propoſition.

Mr. *Wheler.* I am of opinion that we cannot furniſh from our preſent funds ſo large a ſupply as fifteen lacks of Rupees, neither am I fully convinced that the Preſidency of *Madras* is in immediate want of it; I am therefore for dividing the ſum propoſed to be ſent into equal ſhares, remitting the half of it by the ſhips now deſtined to carry the Company's Troops, and the remainder after the change of the monſoon.

Mr. *Francis.* My opinion on the Governor General's ſeveral Propoſitions, is contained in my Minute, which I have already recorded.

The Governor General. I agree to the queſtion. I ſhould be glad to join with the other Members of the Board, in forming any means for reſtricting the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* to the application of this money ſolely to their Military charges.

Reſolved, That the ſum of 15 lacks of Rupees be immediately ſent to *Fort St. George*, in ſpecie, and laden for that purpoſe on the Honourable Company's ſhip the *Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras.*

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Read the Governor General's 2d Propoſition; viz.

2d. "That the treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the preceding purpoſe, and other exigencies of this Government."

Sir *Eyre Coote*. I agree to the Propoſition.

Mr. *Wheler*. I conſider the depoſit of treaſure now in the New Fort, to have been made for the purpoſe of defraying ſuch extraordinary demands as this Government, from time to time, might become ſubjected to, either from the effects of war or other public calamities. I underſtand, that a moiety of the original depoſit hath already been replaced in the general Treaſury, with a view of applying the ſame to our preſent exigencies, and I do not believe we ſhall be enabled to defray the preſent unſatisfied and growing demands upon our Treaſury, without the application of the remainder, or without every other poſſible means of exertion; I am therefore for applying it agreeable to the terms of the queſtion.

Reſolved, That the treaſure depoſited in the New Fort, including the moiety lately taken from it, be all replaced in the general Treaſury, to be applied to the purpoſe mentioned in the foregoing Reſolution, and to the other exigencies of this Government.

Read the Governor General's 3d Propoſition; viz.

"That a large detachment of European Infantry and Artillery be immediately ſent to *Fort Saint George*, by the *Duke of Kingſton*, and the other veſſels which are now on the point of ſailing for *Madras*; and that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to the coaſt, and take the command of the Army on that eſtabliſhment."

The Commander in Chief delivers in the following Minute:

26th September 1780.

Sir *Eyre Coote*. I cannot help feeling, in the higheſt ſenſe, the diſtinguiſhed terms in which the Governor General has ſolicited me to undertake the immediate command of the forces on the coaſt of *Coromandel*; nor am I leſs ſenſible of the honour done me by the other Members of this Board, by their having joined in a requiſition ſo much to my credit. I ſhould do injuſtice to thoſe motives which actuated my return to *India*, and to the expectations which both my King and my Country formed from it, did I not, on this occaſion, expreſs the readineſs with which I now conſent to undertake a ſervice, in the ſucceſs of which the honour and intereſt of the Britiſh Nation are ſo materially concerned; and I flatter myſelf I enter upon the arduous taſk with a degree of zeal and fortitude equal to what I did many years ago, in a ſimilar conjuncture of the affairs of both the Company and Nation in that part of *India*; and that my efforts will be crowned with ſucceſs. At the ſame time I ſcruple not to confeſs, that I feel myſelf embracing the road to honour and glory under a diſadvantage which I did not then experience, a diminution of perſonal activity, which the addition of years has involuntarily entailed upon me.

The other difficulties which I have to encounter, in taking upon me the command of an Army diſheartened and diſpirited by the late unfortunate defeat by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the Governor General has ſufficiently elucidated; it only therefore is left for me to add, the further conſideration of my having to overcome an enemy who can bring treble the number of our forces into the field, and who, from their late conduct, appear to be in higher diſcipline than any we have yet encountered amongſt the Native Powers of *Indoſtan*.

Whilſt the ſteps which are neceſſary to be taken for the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions here, and for the relief of our diſtreſſes at *Madras*, from their nature obliges us to relinquiſh the proſecution of the offenſive war which we had commenced againſt the Marattas from this ſide of *India*, I agree entirely in opinion with the Governor General, that Orders ſhould be ſent, in the manner and on the principle he has pointed out, for a ceſſation of hoſtilities in the reſpective quarters on the other ſide of *India*; and that propoſals for Peace, and an offenſive and defenſive Alliance, on the terms he has ſtated, ſhould be immediately offered to them. I cannot help looking upon the preſent ſeaſon as one favourable for that purpoſe; and I conceive the late victory *Hyder Ally* has obtained over us, added to his conduct in latter years, whereby he has evinced a diſpoſition to encroach upon the Maratta dominions, will render them extremely jealous of his power, and induce them rather to wiſh for a connection with us, than to act in concert with him againſt us.

The very accurate and juſt deſcription which the Governor General has given of the danger that at preſent impends on the intereſts of the Britiſh Nation in *India*, I am perſuaded, will have the ſame influence upon the mind of every other Member of this Board as it has had upon mine, and tend to produce that freedom of deliberation, concord, and unanimity in our Councils, ſo neceſſary for the public good. In full confidence that no other view can exiſt amongſt us, I with the greater cheerfulneſs undertake that part of the Service which falls to the lot of the ſtation I fill; and, relying on the ſupport of this Board therein, moſt readily repoſe my Military character and credit in their hands.

In conformity to the requeſt made at the cloſe of the Governor General's Minute, I now deliver in a ſtate of our force on this eſtabliſhment, and of the diſpoſition propoſed to be made of it, for the protection of theſe Provinces, and for the relief of *Madras*.

The preſent ſtrength in Troops at the upper ſtations, at and above *Chunar Ghur*, is as follows:

2 Regiments of Cavalry,
3 Companies of Artillery,
Captain *Mayaffre*'s Detachment,
1 Regiment of Europeans,
2 Battalions Company of Rangers, and
21 Battalions of Sepoys.

Propoſed diſpoſition of the Corps.

Gaulior,

To be garriſoned with three battalions of Sepoys, Captain *Mayaffre*'s detachment of Artillery, and the company of Rangers.

The four remaining battalions, at preſent with Major *Camac*, to return, and the detachment of Cavalry with him, to join the 2d and 3d Regiment.

Daranagur.

One battalion of Company's Sepoys, 1,000 of the Vizier's Infantry, and ſuch a number of *Finula Cawn*'s Troops as may be thought neceſſary.

An Army to be formed at *Allahabad*, or in any central poſition thought moſt eligible, of the following Troops:

2 Companies of Artillery,
2 Regiments of Europeans,
10 Battalions of Sepoys,
1,000 of the Vizier *Candahar*, or beſt Horſe; if 1,000 cannot be obtained, as many as can poſſibly join.

N. B. From the above two companies of Artillery, the ſmall detachments, *Daranagbur* and *Chunar Ghur*, to be ſupplied.

Chunar Ghur.

One battalion of Sepoys as uſual.

Bahar Province.

The two regiments of Cavalry to be ordered down here, to be joined by 4 battalions of Sepoys, the third company of Artillery from the field, and 1,000 Horſe, if they can be procured, from the Rajah of *Benauds*.—*Beggah* battalion to make one of the 4 battalions for this ſervice.

Thus the Troops at the upper ſtations to be diſpoſed of for the preſent; and there will then remain 3 battalions

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ſions of Sepoys from the before-named number of 21 battalions, for other ſervices. Our force, with the ſaid 3 battalions included, at and below *Berrampore*, will then be,

Artillery 6 companies, and the remainder of Captain *Mayaffre*'s company,

Firſt and third regiments of Europeans, and 18 battalions of Sepoys.

To be employed as follows:

At *Berrampore*, covering the city, or ready for any other ſervice that might occur,

One company of Artillery,
One battalion of Europeans, and
Four battalions of Sepoys.

Madras Detachment.

The proceeding of the Troops by land or ſea for this ſervice, ought to be determined by the part the Maratta force at *Catac* mean to take. If they are friends, our armament for the coaſt might proceed by land; but if they are hoſtile to our cauſe, as one of the firſt objects is to aſſiſt the Preſidency of *Madras* as ſoon as poſſible, the detachment for that ſervice ſhould proceed by ſea; but whether the Sepoys can be brought voluntary to embark, is by no means a certain point. If the embarkation could be adopted, the detachment ſhould conſiſt of

2 Companies of Artillery,
1 Battalion of 3d regiment, completed to 300 rank and file, and
4 Battalions of Sepoys.

This is on a ſuppoſition that the *Catac* forces are in oppoſition to us, in which caſe, 4 battalions at leaſt will be wanted on the *Midnapore* ſide, with the preſent detachment of Artillery there, and the chain of Troops, as above ſtationed, will be able to oppoſe the Enemy whenever they attempt entering the Provinces. There will alſo then remain, for the immediate protection of *Fort William* and this quarter,

3 Companies of Artillery,
1 Regiment of Europeans,
6 Battalions of Sepoys.

But if it can be proved that we have no oppoſition to apprehend from the force at *Cuttack*, then recommend that the Army for the aſſiſtance of *Madras* ſhould proceed by land; viz.

2 Companies of Artillery,
1 Battalion of Europeans,
300 Rank and file, and
8 Battalions of Sepoys, with a light field train.

They would arrive by land in the *Carnatic*, at this ſeaſon of the year, as ſoon as by embarkation, if the Sepoys would without heſitation embark; for ſuch a force as mentioned could not with ſafety proceed by ſea from hence till late in November or December, when the height of the N. E. monſoon would be abated on the coaſt. From the movement by land, the different Country Powers will alſo be awed; the Nizam particularly kept in check, and *Hyder*'s Troops oppoſed, if they ſhould again make the Circars their object. If this mode is adopted, as it is on the ſuppoſition that the Marattas at *Cuttack* are not inimical, the upper Nations will not then want ſuch a powerful chain of Troops for their defence; and from the connected poſition of the different body of Troops ſtationed as before-mentioned, any part of them, when wanted on exigency, can be drawn down for the protection of *Bengal* in general, or of the Preſidency in particular. If the eight battalions were to proceed to *Madras* by land, there would be no occaſion for four battalions at *Midnapore*; two would be ſufficient for the ſervice required there, and theſe might be drawn from *Berrampore*, that the force at the Preſidency might not be weakened.

The Independent Corps at *Chittagong*, and *Ramgur* light Infantry, are not included in the above diſpoſition of the Troops; they are ſuppoſed occupying their preſent poſts, as well as the corps of Militia, at their different ſtations.

Calcutta, Sept. 27th 1780.

The Governor General. The ſeaſon of the year, and the marſhy ſtate of the roads through which an Army muſt paſs from hence to the *Carnatic*, eſpecially through the diſtricts of *Midnapore*, *Tellaſore*, and the whole province of *Oriſſa*, will render it impoſſible to march an Army by land until late in the month of November. We have not ſhipping to tranſport the requiſite number of Sepoys by ſea, neither if we had, would it avail us; the remembrance and tradition of the paſt ſufferings of thoſe who have been tranſported by that mode of conveyance, would be an inſuperable object on the part of the Sepoys themſelves, eſpecially at this ſeaſon. I muſt beg leave, therefore, to change the terms of the queſtion, and ſubſtitute for what we would wiſh to do, what we can do. I ſhould agree with the General, and do agree with him in the propoſition for ſending a conſiderable reinforcement of Sepoys, as well as Europeans, to *Madras*; but this muſt reſt for a future Reſolution; and I mean to add on another day a freſh motion to that effect: for the preſent queſtion I propoſe, from the terms of the General's Minute, that two companies of Artillery with their complement of Laſcars, and one battalion of one of the regiments of Infantry, completed to 300 rank and file, be immediately embarked, as many as can be on board the *Duke of Kingſton*, the reſt on any of the ſhips offered for that ſervice by Mr. *Ferguſon*.

Agreed, That the Commander in Chief be requeſted to proceed himſelf immediately to the coaſt, and to take the command of the Army upon that eſtabliſhment.

Reſolved, That two companies of Laſcars, and one battalion of one of the regiments of Infantry, completed to three hundred rank and file, be immediately embarked for the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as many as can be on board the *Duke of Kingſton*, and the reſt on any of the ſhips offered for that Service by Mr. *Ferguſon*.

Ordered, That returns be made to the Commander in Chief of the number of ſhips offered by Mr. *Ferguſon*, and of the number of men that each ſhip can carry.

Agreed, That a diſpoſition of the Troops propoſed by the Commander in Chief, and ordered that a copy of it be ſent to Brigadier General *Stibbert*, after the departure of Sir *Eyre Coote*, that he may iſſue the neceſſary Orders for carrying the ſame into execution when the ſeaſon will permit.

Adjourned till to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(A true Extract)
E. Hay,
Acting Secretary.

Extract from the Secret Proceedings of the Honourable the Governor General and Council, under date the 2d of October 1780.

At a Council;
PRESENT,
The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires,
Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*.

The Secretary lays before the Board, two drafts of Letters to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, and to Sir *Edward Hughes*, for their approbation:

Gentlemen,

We have received your ſeveral Letters of the 3d, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th ultimo, with the packets from the Honourable Court of Directors accompanying them, and the other papers ſaid to be incloſed.

We have not read, without ſenſible concern, the account which you have ſent us of the fatal check which the

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the Company's arms have received, in the defeat of a conſiderable detachment of their Troops by the forces of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and of the conſequent neceſſity under which the remaining Army was obliged to retreat to *Chingleput*. We purpoſely forbear at preſent from making any obſervations on this event, or on the ſtep which, if taken, would in our opinion have prevented it. The ſituation of affairs in the *Carnatic*, and the danger to which the intereſts of the Company are expoſed by them, are ſerious and alarming, and call on us for every exertion we can make to aid and ſupport your Preſidency, without hazarding the ſafety of our own. Since the arrival therefore of the diſpatches which you have ſent us by Mr. *Sullivan*, our time has been chiefly occupied in paſſing ſuch Orders and Reſolutions as appeared to us beſt calculated to promote this end; and theſe we ſhall now make known to you.

Unable as we are to ſpare the ſervices of Sir *Eyre Coote* at this juncture, without the greateſt inconvenience to our own affairs, we have yet yielded to the neceſſity of the occaſion, and requeſted him to proceed immediately to your Preſidency, and to take the command of the Army under it: he has cheerfully complied, and will take his departure from *Bengal* in a few days, on the ſhip *Duke of Kingston*. We have reſolved alſo to aſſiſt you with the following detachment of European Infantry and Artillery. This ſeaſon of the year will not now permit of our ſending you Sepoys by land, nor is the number of veſſels in the river at preſent unemployed, ſufficient to carry you a reinforcement of theſe Troops by ſea, even if all objection to ſuch mode of conveyance, ariſing from the prejudice of the Sepoys themſelves againſt it, were ſet aſide; but we have it in contemplation to aid your operations, by ſending you a detachment of Sepoys in the courſe of the next or the enſuing month.

Force under Orders to proceed to *Fort Saint George*:

European Infantry - - - - - - -	330
D° - Artillery, 2 companies - -	200
Complement of Laſcars to the Artillery	630

Beſides the above, a corps of Volunteers, conſiſting of between 40 and 50 Gentlemen, and the detachment of His Majeſty's Troops which has lately been on duty here as a guard to the Commander in Chief, will ſhortly embark for your Preſidency.

Having underſtood that you was in ſome want of Gunpowder, we have given Orders that 200 barrels ſhould be ſent you by the *Duke of Kingston*; and the following ſmall ſupply of Ordnance will alſo accompany the Troops on this ſhip:

Two 12 pounders } with carriages of a new con-
Four 6 D° — } ſtruction.

Your earneſt application for ſupplies of money from us, and the dependance which you place on theſe, and theſe only, to anſwer the expences of the war in which you are engaged with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, have induced us to reſolve on appropriating to the ſervice of your Preſidency, the ſum of fifteen lacks of Rupees, ten of which will be ſent on the *Duke of Kingston*, and the remaining five on the *Free Maſon*, a country ſhip, which will ſail in a few days. This treaſure, which we have thought proper to conſign to Sir *Eyre Coote*, is intended to be employed for the payment of the Troops under his command; and though it be our general purpoſe that it ſhould be excluſively appropriated to anſwer Military charges, we have authorized him to advance any part of it upon your requiſition, ſhould he agree in the expediency of doing ſo. If therefore the *Free Maſon* ſhould arrive at *Fort Saint George* before Sir *Eyre Coote* reaches it, and the treaſure be landed, we beg leave to make known to you, and deſire that it be depoſited in your Treaſury, and remain there untouched until Sir *Eyre Coote*'s arrival.

With reſpect to ſupplies of grain, our former Letters will have informed you of the means which we have taken to provide them; and we truſt that the quantity which Mr. *Ferguſon* and Captain *Roddam* have engaged to deliver at your Preſidency, will anſwer your immediate wants for ſome time to come. A ſmall ſtock of ſalt proviſions will be likewiſe ſent you on the *Duke of Kingston*; it is intended for the uſe of the garriſon in the event of a ſiege: we do not think fit to ſend you a larger ſupply at preſent, nor until we hear from yourſelves that you are in want of it. You will not omit to inform us when you may have occaſion for it, that we may provide you with a further quantity.

Immediately on receipt of your Letter of the 9th ult°. requeſting, that one of the Honourable Company's ſhips might be ſent round with half her lading as ſoon as poſſible; we iſſued the neceſſary Orders for the *Duke of Kingſton* to be made ready for this purpoſe. The ſtate of the ſhip would not admit of her departure ſo ſoon as we wiſhed, but we yet hope that ſhe will be able to ſail in a few days. She will be accompanied by two of our pilot veſſels, which will carry Troops, and may be of conſiderable uſe in conveying thoſe ſent round on the large ſhips, to a ſhorter diſtance from the ſhore than that at which large ſhips can with ſafety lie from it at ſo late a period.

In our letter to the Admiral of this date, which we incloſe, and requeſt you will forward it to him by the ſafeſt and ſpeedieſt conveyance, ſhould he have left *Fort Saint George* on its arrival there, we have ſuggeſted the benefit that might ariſe from the operations of His Majeſty's ſquadron againſt *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions and ſhips on the coaſt of *Malabar*, and we doubt not of his ready attention to this object, if the immediate ſervices of the ſquadron at *Bombay* ſhould not appear to him more neceſſary and important.

Having now made known to you, Gentlemen, the Orders and Reſolutions which we have paſſed on receipt of your laſt advices, for the furtherance of the intereſts of the Company under your Preſidency, and for the ſupport of the rights of their Ally the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, we might be content to cloſe our Letter to you in this place; but alſo having paſſed an important Reſolution, by which, though this Government is particularly concerned in it, the general ſituation of the Company's affairs at the other Preſidencies may be eſſentially affected, we think proper to make it known to you; and we truſt to your prudence in withholding it at preſent from public knowledge, that the ſucceſs of our object may not be baffled by any attempts of the Enemies of the Company, who might uſe their endeavours to oppoſe it; without further preface therefore, and to conclude our Letter, we now inform you, that we have reſolved on a Peace with the Maratta State, in ſuch mode and on ſuch conditions as appeared to us beſt calculated to obtain ſo deſirable an iſſue to the war, in which we have long been engaged with it.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 2d October 1780.

To Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B &c. &c. &c.

Sir,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your ſeveral Letters, under date the 28th Auguſt, 1ſt, 6th, 13th, and 14th ultimo. We take the earlieſt opportunity of replying to ſuch as need an anſwer, and hope that this Letter will reach you before you quit the coaſt.

We cannot expreſs to you the concern which we have felt at the information given to us, in your Letter of the 14th ultimo, and conveyed to us at the ſame time by the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*. The occaſion is too important and alarming not to demand our earlieſt attention to the ſituation of the Company's affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and every uſeful exertion which we can make for the retrieval of their loſſes, and the defence of their rights and territories, as well as thoſe of their Ally the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, invaded and attacked by the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

We ſhall firſt acquaint you with the meaſures on which

which we have reſolved, for the general intereſt of the three Preſidencies, at this important criſis, and afterwards inform you of the ſteps which we have taken for the relief of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*; but in making known to you the former, we rely with confidence on your prudence in withholding it for the preſent from public knowledge, that the ſucceſs of the object may not be defeated by the arts of thoſe, who may be intereſted in oppoſing it. Having ſaid thus much, we proceed to inform you, that we have reſolved on a Peace with the Maratta State, in ſuch mode, and on ſuch conditions, as appear to us beſt calculated for the attainment of it. It has been long our wiſh to ſee an early iſſue to our differences with them; and we are happy to obſerve, that this wiſh ſeems to accord with the ſentiments ſtrongly conveyed to us in your Letter of the 14th ultimo.

With reſpect to the relief which we have determined to afford to the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, it ſeems to us ſubſtantial, and we truſt will be attended with the beſt effects. Sir *Eyre Coote* will proceed in a few days to take the command of the Army on that Eſtabliſhment. His high rank, his former ſervices, his military experience, and above all, the high eſtimation in which his name is held by the world, and eſpecially by that part of it where it was principally acquired, mark him as the fitteſt inſtrument to retrieve our paſt diſgraces, and to preſerve the Britiſh intereſts and poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic* from utter ruin.

The following force is ordered to prepare immediately for a ſervice on the Coaſt, and will be embarked in a few days:

European Infantry - - - - - - -	330
D° Artillery, 2 companies - - - -	200
A corps of Volunteers - - - - - -	45
And a detachment of His Majeſty's regiment, ſerving as a guard to the Commander in Chief - - - - -	50
Complement of Laſcars to the Artillery	630

It is impoſſible, at this ſeaſon, to ſend a reinforcement of Native Troops; but we have it in contemplation to order a detachment of four or five battalions to the Coaſt, in the courſe of the next or the enſuing month.

We have reſolved on ſupplying the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* with 15 lacks of Rupees, and the ſame will be conveyed thither by the *Duke of Kingston* and a country ſhip, that will ſail in a few days.

We had before engaged for the delivery of a large ſupply of grain at that Preſidency in the courſe of this month, and that of January and February; and we have lately ordered a ſupply of other proviſions for the garriſon, in the caſe of a ſiege.

Theſe are the material points in which we have reſolved to aſſiſt the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George*; more could not be expected from us, nor more aid now given by us; and we have the ſincereſt confidence, that what we have done, if properly applied, will anſwer many good and uſeful purpoſes.

We truſt to the aſſurances which you have given us, and to our knowledge of your zeal for the Company's intereſt and honour, from which thoſe of His Majeſty and the Nation cannot be diſtinct, when we perſuade ourſelves of your entire readineſs to co-operate and aſſiſt in diſtreſſing the formidable Enemy to whom they are now oppoſed; and under this conviction we beg leave to ſuggeſt to you, the advantage that might reſult from the operations of the ſquadron under your command, againſt his ſhips, ports, and ſettlements, on the coaſt of *Malabar*. This we conceive might be effected in your way to *Bombay*; but we ſubmit the thought only to your better judgment, which will be guided by events, by your expectation of the French on that ſide of *India*, and by the poſſible neceſſity of your early arrival at *Bombay*.

Fort William, the 2d October 1780. We have the honour to be, &c.

Approved the drafts, and ordered that they be copied fair. APPENDIX. No. 17.

Fort William Secret Conſultations, 10 October 1780.

Agreed that the following Letter be written:

To the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

Having for good and ſufficient reaſons, ſtated in a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee, of this date, a copy of which we ſend to you incloſed, reſolved to ſuſpend *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, we do hereby order and declare *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, ſuſpended from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, agreeable to powers delegated to us for that purpoſe by the Act of the 13th of His preſent Majeſty; and to this order and declaration we direct you pay implicit obedience and attention.

Fort William, 12th October 1780. We are, &c. *P. Francis.*

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company, dated the 13th of October 1780.

1. The Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George* having, in a late letter to us, expreſſed a deſire that one of the Company's ſhips at this port ſhould be ſent round immediately to that Preſidency, with half her lading, to complete the remainder of it there, and to convey their diſpatches to *England*; we have not only complied with their requeſt, by diſpatching the ſhip *Duke of Kingston* to *Fort Saint George* with all poſſible expedition, but, for the more ſpeedy conveyance of their public packets to you, fitted out one of our largeſt pilot veſſels to accompany the *Kingston* to the Coaſt, and to proceed from thence to Europe with all haſte, as ſoon as their diſpatches ſhall have been put on board. By this opportunity we think it neceſſary to ſend you a brief account of the preſent ſtate of your affairs in *India*, propoſing to tranſmit you more ample explanations in the courſe of the enſuing month, when the homeward-bound ſhips in this river will be diſpatched, and carry to you as uſual the copies of our proceedings. Mr. *Dempſter*, who has hitherto been the ſecond officer of the ſhip *Walpole*, has been appointed by us to the command of the veſſel now going, and has charge of this letter.

2. The Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, will doubtleſs ſend you an accurate account of the ſtate of the Company's affairs under their direction, and in particular of a late ſerious diſaſter, which a large detachment of your Troops have ſuffered, near *Conjeveram*, in endeavouring to effect a junction with the main Army collected at that place, under the command of General *Munro*. For the accounts which they have ſent us of it, we beg leave to refer you to the Secret Conſultations, 22d September. They required from us every aſſiſtance, and we have freely granted it; we have ſent them men, money, and proviſions, and we have made our requeſt to Sir *Eyre Coote*, to the great inconvenience of our own affairs, to go round to the Coaſt to aſſume the command of your Forces on that Eſtabliſhment; he has cheerfully complied with our propoſals, and takes his departure from *Bengal* for that purpoſe in the ſhip *Duke of Kingston*. The great and ſucceſsful ſervices rendered by Sir *Eyre Coote* to the Company on that coaſt are well known; and, at the ſame time that they mark him as the fitteſt inſtrument to retrieve their paſt diſgraces, and to do honour to their arms, afford us the moſt flattering hopes that your affairs in that part of *India* will ſoon wear a more cheerful aſpect.

3. The force which we have ſent to *Fort Saint George*, to reinforce the Army there, is as follows:

Artillery, 2 companies.
Officers of Artillery - - - - - - 17

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Non-commiſſioned Rank and File -	200
Laſcars attached to the 2 Companies	660
One company of Volunteers - - -	45
Six companies of European Infantry.	
Commiſſioned Officers - - - - -	27
Battalion Staff - - - - - - -	10
Non-commiſſioned Rank and File -	373

4. At this ſeaſon of the year we have not been able to afford them the aid of any Native Troops; the lands through which Troops marching to *Fort Saint George* muſt travel, are now rendered impaſſable by the floods of water over them, and without any conſideration of the almoſt inſurmountable difficulty of prevailing on the Natives to go round by ſea, we are prevented from ſending them by this means, by the want of a ſufficient number of ſhips to convoy thither ſuch a reinforcement of them as would anſwer the deſired purpoſe of their going; but we have reſolved to detach a large Force, conſiſting of ſeven or eight battalions of Sepoys, for the protection and defence of the Northern Circars, as ſoon as the ſeaſon will permit of their travelling by land, ſhould no change in the ſituation of our affairs here make it dangerous or impracticable for us to do ſo.

5. With reſpect to proviſions, we have already engaged for the ſupply of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* with a large quantity of grain; we have ſent them a ſmall quantity of ſalt proviſions for the uſe of their Garriſon; and we have informed them, that as far as we may be able, we will ſupply their occaſions for more, when they make them known to us.

6. With reſpect to the treaſure which we have ſent to them, as it is a handſome, ſo we truſt it will be a ſeaſonable ſupply. We have not ſpared the ſum of fifteen lacks of Rupees, the amount of the ſupply, without great inconvenience to ourſelves. The demands on us at home are large and preſſing; but on a general conſideration of the Company's intereſts, we have not heſitated, and ſhall not heſitate, to uſe every exertion within our power and ability, both in this and every other inſtance, to contribute our utmoſt to ſupport them: the treaſure which has been diſpatched, we have conſigned to the Commander in Chief, and we have nominated a Paymaſter for the immediate charge of it. It is intended for the payment of the Troops under Sir *Eye Coote*'s command, and is wholly to anſwer military expences; but we have empowered him alſo to make uſe of it in ſupplying the requiſitions of the Preſident and Select Committee, if he ſhall agree in the expediency of doing ſo.

10. We proceed now to inform you of an important Reſolution, which we have lately found it neceſſary to paſs for the ſupport of the authority of our Government, to enforce a due obedience to our orders, and to manifeſt to the Native Powers of this country, that the controlling Power, which they know to be veſted in us by the laws, will, if occaſion ſhould require it, be effectually exerted for the honour of the Engliſh Nation, and in ſupport of our promiſes and treaties. The alternative at our choice was, the removal of Mr. *Whitehill* from the Government of *Fort Saint George*, or by our indolence and inattention to the ſupport of your honour and our own authority, to give licence and permiſſion to the dependant Preſidencies to diſobey our orders, and, by acts done at their pleaſure, to annul our treaties and engagements. For the other reaſons which have actuated us in the removal of Mr. *Whitehill* from the Government of *Fort Saint George*, and for every particular immediately neceſſary to your information, we beg leave to refer you to our Select Conſultations of the 10th inſtant; we ſhall only beg leave to obſerve further on this ſubject, that our letters from Mr. *Holland*, our Reſident at *Hydrabad*, and from the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* himſelf, plainly ſhew us, that the opinion entertained by the latter of the extent of our authority and ability to ſee reſpect ſhewn to it, was greatly ſhaken by the proceedings of the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George*, in oppoſition to the ſenſe of our orders to them; and that it was difficult to perſuade him that we really had the power we poſſeſs. The effect of the continuance of ſuch an opinion in this inſtance, and at this period, when he was impreſſed with the idea of an injuſtice done him, is obvious. The papers and proceedings referred to in our Conſultations of the 10th inſtant, have for the moſt part been tranſmitted home, and are therefore now before you. The moſt material paper which you have not yet received on this ſubject, is our letter to *Fort Saint George* of the 12th June, and that goes a Number in this packet.

11. We now deſire your attention to ſuch principal ſubjects as concern our own Government in particular, and which we deem important to your information.

The late diſtreſſes of your Servants, and of the Company's affairs, on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, having, as we before acquainted you, required every exertion which we could make for their relief, we have given them, and ſhall give them, every ſupport in our power; but we cannot maintain Armies in all parts of *India*, nor are we likely to ſupport a ſucceſsful War againſt all the Powers of it, combined againſt us. The deſire expreſſed by the *Marattas* for a Peace, have induced us, on the 26th ultimo, to paſs the important Reſolution of offering it to them. The means taken to obtain it, and the terms and conditions of it, will appear to you in the copy of the Treaty which we have agreed to propoſe; and we have the great ſatisfaction to believe, that the Company's real honour, and the preſervation of the rank which they have ever held in *Indoſtan*, will not only not be impaired, but ſtrengthened, by the means which we have purſued for cementing an alliance with the principal Power in it. Orders have been ſent to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, to Brigadier General *Goddard*, and to Major *Camoe*, commanding a body of your Forces in the ſervice of the Rajah of *Ghood*, to deſiſt from all hoſtilities and military operations againſt the *Marattas*, on a requiſition in writing to that effect, and a notification from the Peiſhwa, that ſimilar orders have been given on his part to the Officers in command of his Armies.

12. We have reaſon to believe that General *Goddard*'s operations muſt have been commenced, and as we hope, indeed, againſt *Baſſim*. We beg leave to refer you to the Treaty for the ſtipulations which we have propoſed reſpecting this place. We know in what valuable light the acquiſition of it, is conſidered by the Company, and we have done all we could to leave them the poſſeſſion of it; but we know at the ſame time in how valuable a light it is conſidered by the *Marattas*, and we were not willing to throw further difficulties in the way of an accommodation at this dangerous criſis of your affairs, by inſiſting poſitively on the preſervation of the acquiſition to the Company.

13. The poſition of a large body of Troops belonging to the Rajah of *Berar*, in our frontier, having occaſioned a good deal of alarm in the provinces, and the ſuſpicious appearance which it bore of their deſigns to invade them, has taken up much of our attention. It is impoſſible to declare with certainty what their real intentions are, but we have every aſſurance given us, and a ſtrong evidence to induce us to believe, that the Rajah of *Berar* is not hoſtile to the Company. The part which he is taking to effect a Peace between this Government and the *Maratta* State, is a ſtrong proof of his friendly diſpoſition towards us; and there is other teſtimony, of the fulleſt nature, to confirm us in the belief of it, and ſufficient to announce him the worſt character in *India* if he prove himſelf the Company's Enemy. We beg leave to aſſure you, that every meaſure will be taken for providing againſt the worſt event; and the diſpoſition made of the Troops by the Commander in Chief, appears on our Conſultations of 26th September herewith ſent you. An examination of *Benerana Pundit*, the Rajah's Miniſter,

ter, at one of our late meetings; being particular and important, we beg leave to deſire your attention to the queſtions put to him, and his replies.

Signed { *Warren Haſtings*, *P. Francis*, *Edwd Wheler*, *Eyre Coote*.

Extract of General Letter from *Bengal* to the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

We take this opportunity of again ſubmitting to your obſervation, copy of a Letter which we wrote to *Fort Saint George* on the 20th January 1778, reſpecting the diſpoſition of the Troops on that Eſtabliſhment. Had this diſpoſition been attended to, or had the advice contained in this letter been obſerved, we are of opinion that the ſad calamity which your Troops, and the former ſuperiority of your arms, have lately ſuffered, would not have happened. The melancholy diſaſter to which we allude, has been owing to a diviſion of your Troops at a moment of emergency: Had our recommendation been attended to, they would have been ſo diſpoſed as to have been able to effect a junction on the ſhorteſt notice.

We are ſorry for ſo fatal an occaſion to prove the truth of the prediction which induced us to give this advice. We are, Honourable Sirs,

Your moſt faithful humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Ed^d Wheler.

Fort William,
the 17th Oct. 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*; dated 20th January 1778.

Gentlemen,

We have received from the Commanding Officer of your Troops, a General Return of the Forces on your Eſtabliſhment; on which ſome obſervations have occurred to us, which we think it incumbent on us to impart to you.

In the diſtribution of the Army, we remark, that numerous as the Garriſons dependant on your Preſidency are, each has its proportion of European Infantry and Artillery, which are thereby ſo diſperſed that their conſtitutional ſtrength (we mean that ſtrength which they derive from the ſuperior diſcipline) muſt be greatly diminiſhed. The following Abſtracts will better amplify this remark, and the concluſion which we have drawn from it, than any reaſoning on the ſubject.

Abſtract Diſpoſition of the Europeans and Artillery.

	Europeans.	Artillery.
Mount	—	266
Fort Saint George	538	10
Poonamalee	399	
Trichinopoly	329	40
Tanjour	243	46
Velour and *Amboor*	547	
Vizagapatam	172	88
Inferior Garriſons	129	55
	2,357	505

Thoſe, who when united together will form a moſt reſpectable Corps, loſe almoſt their whole apparent conſequence, and much of their real ſubſtance, by ſuch a diviſion and diſſipation of them. We believe that the want of accommodation for the whole of your European Eſtabliſhment, may have rendered this, in ſome degree, an act of neceſſity; and we have no doubt but it has been occaſioned by ſome powerful cauſe; but whatever it may have been, we cannot help recommending it as an object moſt worthy of your attention, to deviſe the means by which your European Forces may be collected and kept entire at your Preſidency, or within its reach; for in that light we regard the Quarters of *Poonamalee* and the Mount; that all the other Forts and Paſſes be garriſoned by Native Troops, and not a man of the ſeveral ranks of European Soldiers and Artillery be detached from their proper corps. You will agree with us in opinion, that it is on the European Forces which the Company maintain in *India*, that the preſent exiſtence of their power, the future ſafety and duration of their poſſeſſions eſſentially depend; and that theſe muſt loſe both their diſcipline and ſtrength by being divided.

For the ordinary and more active military duties in time of peace, the Native Troops may be as uſefully employed as the European, and therefore ought to be ſo employed as to eaſe and ſpare the latter; the loſſes of which cannot be ſo eaſily recruited, eſpecially at this time.

Theſe reflections we ſubmit to your judgment, deſiring you to receive them not as intended to cenſure your preſent arrangements, but as occurring naturally from the apparent inſpection of the Return unaſſiſted with any explanation.

We requeſt you will favour us with a Return of the Nabob's Military Eſtabliſhment and Diſpoſition in the *Carnatic*, that we may be better enabled to form and offer you our opinion on the plan of defence and operations to be mutually followed by the ſeveral Preſidencies, in caſe of a general War, or any commotions in the country, which may require the Troops of the Preſidencies to co-operate for the more effectually quelling them.

In our letter of the 17th September laſt, we requeſted you would tranſmit us a Return of the actual ſtate of the Forces at your Preſidency, with your ſentiments on the means of completing your Eſtabliſhment, of co-operating in the moſt effectual manner with this Preſidency and that of *Bombay*, and mutually aſſiſting each other in caſe of an invaſion of either, and of the moſt eligible plan for making a diverſion in favour of your Settlement, if an Enemy ſhould appear on that ſide *India*.

We ſhall likewiſe be glad to receive an account of the views and connnections of the Country Powers, their ſtrength and revenues, together with the opinion of ſuch alliances as you would recommend to be formed with them, in caſe of any emergency; to this letter we have received no anſwer; we therefore beg leave again to repeat the ſubject to you.

We are, Gentlemen,

Fort William,
the 20th Jan. 1778.

Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
(Signed) Governor General and Council.

A true Copy.
E. Hay, Acting Secretary.

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Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 29th November 1780.

Honourable Sirs,

BY the *Nymph* ſloop, which ſailed for the Cape the 18th October, we did ourſelves the honour to addreſs a letter to you, adviſing of the hoſtilities that had been commenced by *Hyder Ally* in the *Carnatic*, and the unfortunate defeat of a conſiderable detachment of your Troops, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*. A duplicate of this letter was ſent to *Bombay*, to be forwarded by the way of *Buſſora*; and we now incloſe a triplicate herewith.

The check given to your arms by the diſaſter which befel Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, and the real loſs of men ſuſtained

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ſuſtained on that occaſion, were circumſtances ſo alarming, that we loſt not a moment in applying to the Preſidency of *Bengal* for ſuccours; and we have the ſatisfaction to obſerve, that the Governor General and Council were extremely zealous and active in affording them.

Immediately on the receipt of our advices, they came to the reſolution of ſending Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, with a reinforcement of Troops, to the Coaſt by ſea. He arrived here accordingly on the 5th inſtant, and brought with him two companies of European Artillery, with their complement of Laſcars, a battalion of European Infantry, conſiſting of 370, and 40 Gentlemen Volunteers, together with 15 lacks of Rupees for the ſervices of the War, the diſburſements of which is left by the Governor General and Council ſolely to his direction.

Before Sir *Eyre Coote* left *Bengal*, it was alſo reſolved that a detachment, to conſiſt of eight battalions of Sepoys, and one company of Artillery, ſhould march from thence ſo ſoon as the weather would permit; and by letters from *Bengal* of the 28th ultimo, we learn, that orders had been iſſued for forming that detachment, to be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Pearce*, the Commanding Officer of Artillery on that Eſtabliſhment. It is imagined that at ſooneſt this detachment cannot have begun its march until the 15th inſtant; and allowing it meets with no oppoſition from either the Troops of *Moodajee Boeſla*, the Rajah of *Berar*, or of thoſe of *Nizam Ally* (which it is impoſſible to ſay it may not, although, as neither of theſe Powers have broke with us, we hope and wiſh the contrary) it cannot poſſibly reach this place earlier than March.

We informed you in our letter by the *Nymph*, that when our Army had retired from *Conjeveram*, in conſequence of the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, *Hyder Ally* moved towards *Arcot*, and laid ſiege to the Pettah of that place; which fell into his hands by aſſault the 31ſt ultimo, after a reſiſtance of ſix weeks: the Fort ſurrendered to him by capitulation the 3d inſtant.

The fall of *Arcot* is certainly an event of great importance to *Hyder*; it is the capital of the Nabob. There were lodged in it a very large quantity of military ſtores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to *Hyder* in proſecuting his further views of conqueſt; and it is large enough to afford protection and accommodation for his whole Army. But theſe are not the only advantages accruing to him from the capture; he has conducted himſelf with a degree of policy which was hardly to be expected from a man of his tyrannical and ſanguinary diſpoſition. The inhabitants of *Arcot* and other conquered places, have been treated with great lenity, and he has continued the Nabob's Manager, and the ſeveral inferior Amuldars, in their reſpective offices, with a view of attaching them to his intereſts.

Under theſe circumſtances we cannot but be apprehenſive that the embarraſſments we have to ſurmount are much greater than thoſe which would ariſe merely from *Hyder*'s ſuperiority of force. The whole country too being completely over-run and laid waſte by large bodies of Cavalry, is another circumſtance extremely diſtreſſing to us, as it cuts off our chief ſupplies of proviſions and draft and carriage bullocks for the uſe of the Army, and renders the Nabob in a great meaſure unable to give us that aſſiſtance in thoſe articles which are abſolutely required.

We cannot obtain any money from the Nabob, or the Rajah of *Tanjore*; the Nabob is indeed, we believe, very much diſtreſſed by a total failure in the revenues of that part of the *Carnatic* which has been ſubject to the incurſions of *Hyder*'s Horſe; but the Rajah of *Tanjore* has not yet had a grain of his country touched. Thus, from our paſt diſappointments and preſent proſpects, we can place but little dependance on any reſource than that of *Bengal* for carrying on the War; and as to the expences of the Civil Department, we have very ſlender hope of procuring ſufficient to anſwer them from any quarter.

From the beſt accounts we have obtained, *Hyder Ally*'s Force conſiſts of Foot, and Horſe, and pieces of cannon.

All the Forces we have that could be carried into the field, leaving but a ſmall garriſon at *Fort Saint George*, would not, including all denominations, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, exceed 5,000 effective men; they are at preſent cantoned in three grand diviſions upon *Cheultry Plain*, on account of the monſoon. Every poſſible arrangement is making by us, and by Sir *Eyre Coote*, to act defenſively, and, if practicable, to act offenſively after the rains, but the General thinks our Force as yet inadequate to this laſt.

Sir *Eyre Coote* has written letters to Sir *Edward Hughes*, to the Select Committee at *Bombay*, and to General *Goddard*, to unite in diſtreſſing the poſſeſſion of *Hyder* on the *Malabar* coaſt, by every means in their power.

(Signed) *Charles Smith*,
Eyre Coote,
Samuel Johnſon,
Hector Munro,
Alexander Davidſon.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* to the Honourable the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, &c. Committee of Correſpondence, Eaſt India Houſe; dated *Fort Saint George*, 30th Nov. 1780.

Gentlemen,

I had not reached *Calcutta* in my return from a diſagreeable and fatiguing journey, which I undertook in order to viſit the different military ſtations under your *Bengal* Preſidency, and to make ſuch arrangements at each, as might appear neceſſary for the preſent and future good management of ſo important a department of your ſervice, when I received intelligence of *Hyder Ally Cawn*'s having invaded the *Carnatic*; and which was ſoon followed by the melancholy accounts of his having completely defeated a very conſiderable detachment of the Troops of this Eſtabliſhment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, and compoſed of ſome of the beſt men, both Officers and Privates, in the Army.

The news of this diſaſter, and the further diſtreſſes in which it had involved your intereſts on this coaſt, induced the Governor General and Council to requeſt of me to proceed hither, and to take upon me the command of the Army. The manner in which this call was made on me, with other particulars, will be beſt explained by your peruſal of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council upon the occaſion; to which permit me the liberty of referring you, and alſo of adding, that the principle upon which my return to the charge of your military affairs in *India* was ſolicited, the expectations the public naturally entertained therefrom, were, excluſive of my own deſire to render every ſervice in my power to my King and Country, too powerful incentives for me to heſitate a moment about entering upon the undertaking, however difficult or hazardous.

I accordingly left *Calcutta* on the 13th ultimo, and embarked on board the *Kingſton* Indiaman, with a detachment from the *Bengal* Army, of two companies of European Artillery, and their complement of Laſcars; brought along with me, on other veſſels, a battalion of European Infantry, conſiſting of 370 men, 40 Gentlemen Volunteers, and 15 lacks of Rupees for the ſervices of the War, and which, together with the future ſupplies which will be ſent me from *Bengal*, you may depend upon my applying to the moſt uſeful purpoſes, and diſburſing with all poſſible œconomy.

I arrived here on the 5th inſtant; and, I am ſorry to ſay, found your affairs here in a more diſtreſſed ſtate than I had formed any idea of. It would be an endleſs taſk for me to enter into a minute diſcuſſion either of the conduct of thoſe who have been inſtrumental to our preſent difficulties, or of the cauſes to which they may be aſſigned.

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aſſigned. I muſt truſt to your own diſcernment, in peruſing the proceedings of this Government, to diſtinguiſh between both; and I ſhall not be diſpleaſed to learn that you therein find ſufficient matter to enable you to redreſs yourſelves for the injuries done to your intereſts.

When I had the honour of addreſſing you on the fall of *Pondicherry*, whereby the intereſts of the French Nation in *India* were moſt effectually eradicated, and thereby every advantage given to us that could poſſibly be wiſhed for, of eſtabliſhing our own on a firm and permanent baſis, by forming alliances, and preſerving a friendly intercourſe with the Native Powers, I little imagined that there was even a poſſibility of working ſo ſpeedy a revolution as that which has happened. To aſcribe it to any other cauſe than mal-adminiſtration in your affairs, would be to deceive you, and to miſlead the Public.

It was not enough that we had confirmed our own intereſt, by annihilating the influence of our common Enemy, the French (a circumſtance in itſelf ſufficient to awaken the jealouſy of every Native Power in *India*) but we muſt proceed to open inſult and indignity; and as if a policy inſeparable from our real intereſts, every pains ſeem to have been taken to offend both *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam: They both, with the greateſt candour, declare the greateſt ſenſe they have of injuries done them, upon the grounds of the Treaties ſubſiſting between them and the Company, and their ſerious intentions of avenging themſelves of us. By means of a ſeaſonable interpoſition of the authority of the Governor General and Council, you will find, from their Proceedings, that the Nizam has hitherto been reſtrained from coming to an open rupture. And although every preſent redreſs has been given him, which was in their power to grant, I can by no means conceive his reſentment to be entirely removed; and did I not perceive the great probability there is of *Hyder*'s ſucceſſes againſt us alarming his fears for his own poſſeſſions, I would not enſure his neutrality for an hour.

To excite *Hyder Ally* to become an avowed Enemy, was a piece of bad policy, for which no excuſe can be alledged. Ever ſince the Treaty of 1769, this Government has been circumſtantially informed, from time to time, of the improvements which he was daily making in his military ſervice, both in point of numbers and diſcipline; your own ſentiments, nay orders, for cultivating a more intimate friendſhip and connection with him, have long been in its poſſeſſion. His conduct and converſations, and I may add writings, ever ſince our refuſal to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas, which we were virtually bound by Treaty to do, and more particularly ſince the reduction of *Mahé*, have been uniformly declaratory of his enmity towards the Engliſh; and latterly, although the intelligence they received from all quarters pre-adviſed them of *Hyder*'s real intentions, and were further warned by occurrences which were to all the reſt of the world convincing proofs of his hoſtile diſpoſition, ſtill did they chooſe to diſcredit the whole themſelves, and to diſcourage the idea in others. The conſequence was, that no ſteps were taken to oppoſe *Hyder*'s entry into the *Carnatic:* the Army was left in the ſame divided ſtate as in the time of the moſt perfect peace and tranquillity; and the places of ſtrength, which, whilſt we maintained, he could never become maſter of the *Carnatic*, were entirely neglected.

Having, by the above preface, diſcharged my duty to you, Gentlemen, as my Employers, in guiding your attention to the ſources from whence you may trace the origin of the preſent diſtreſſes in your affairs, I ſhall now proceed to acquit myſelf of the further debt I owe you, and my own credit, as a military man, from whom great expectations are entertained, by informing you of the ſituation in which I found every thing on my arrival.

With an Enemy at the door, even the neceſſary arrangements for the ſecurity of *Fort Saint George*, the very foundation of our exiſtence on this coaſt, had not been made; no pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for our defence; I found it few in number, and the Sepoys ſo diſpirited from want of proper care and encouragement, as to be daily deſerting: The Field Artillery requiſite for a campaign, ſo far from being in readineſs, that the carriages, &c. are only now making up: The draft bullocks deficient in numbers, and of what there are, many ſo weak as to be inadequate to the ſervice required of them: Proviſions of every kind ſo ſcarce, that the Troops in camp could only procure a ſcanty ſupply for one day's expence: The whole country around, within five miles of *Madras*, entirely plundered and laid waſte by *Hyder*'s Cavalry, large bodies of which ſtill continue to infeſt it; of courſe no proviſions are to be procured beyond that circle: Both the Army and Inhabitants maintained chiefly by ſupplies from *Bengal*; and upon which, I am ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for their future ſupport; a circumſtance than which we can have no more convincing proof of the bad policy in renting the Company's lands under this Preſidency to the Nabob, and of thereby rendering ourſelves ſo entirely dependant upon him for every kind of ſupplies; and which, by keeping them in our own hands, we might ourſelves command: It is a ſyſtem which, from the preſent experience of its bad effects, I am induced to recommend to your ſerious conſideration for remedy.

Obſerving the enfeebled ſtate of our Army here, and the abſolute impoſſibility of reinforcing it from any of the detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or Southward of this place, of which the fate of that under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* furniſhes you with a melancholy proof, I naturally turned my eyes towards the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*; but, figure my diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a condition to aſſiſt our exigencies, I learned from his own mouth, that he had neither men, money, nor influence; and that he looked to the Company for the ſupport of both his intereſts and credit. Add to this, I can neither find from himſelf, nor diſcover from my own enquiries, that he has a ſingle friend or adherent in the whole country; on the contrary, the very villagers of the Company's jaghire lands interrupt and moleſt the meſſengers going to and from the forts in which we have Garriſons, as alſo thoſe who are ſent out to procure intelligence; ſo that the very people who we ought to find our friends, are become more injurious to us than if they were avowedly to take up arms againſt us. Thus, you perceive, we muſt entirely depend upon our own exertions.

Two days before my arrival, *Arcot*, the capital of the *Carnatic* (which, knowing its importance for the ſupport of our influence in the country, I eagerly wiſhed to have been in time to have relieved) fell into the hands of *Hyder*; an event which, whilſt it has given to him almoſt every thing he could wiſh, has effectually ruined the Nabob's intereſts in the country, and produced other effects which tend in particular to increaſe my embarraſſments. He has by this capture got poſſeſſion of a city ſufficiently large to canton his whole army, of a number of fine cannon, and a very conſiderable quantity of other military ſtores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to him in either maintaining what he has already acquired, or in proſecuting his further views of conqueſt. The Polygars, as well as the Officers of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, who were ſtationed at different places for the collection of his revenues, are all attending at *Hyder*'s Durbar, and have been uniformly confirmed in their reſpective offices. Beſides *Arcot*, many other Garriſons of the Nabob's have fallen; and, although capable of defence, without offering the ſmalleſt reſiſtance; in ſhort, have moſt of them ſurrendered upon the appearance of *Hyder*'s Horſe before them. Such ready and unconditional ſubmiſſion to the Enemy muſt ariſe either from treachery or a diſaffection to the Nabob's Government; but for which the unpardonable neglect of every thing neceſſary to the defence of the forts, has furniſhed thoſe who were ſtationed in

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them with an eaſy excuſe for having ſo tamely given them up. *Hyder* has thrown in them very adequate Garriſons, with a ſufficiency of military ſtores, and is now ſtocking them with proviſions, and repairing the works. He is alſo putting *Arcot* in the beſt ſtate of defence poſſible, and is at the ſame time employed in completing his Artillery park. His Army, upon the moſt moderate computation I have yet had given to me, does not conſiſt of leſs than 70,000 Infantry (common report makes them 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular battalions; 400 Europeans under the command of a Mr. *Lally*; 100 pieces of cannon of different calibres, which are worked by Europeans, in number 300, and Black Artillery diſciplined by us, and formerly in the ſervice of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, and at the ſiege of *Arcot* were ſo well ſerved as repeatedly to have diſmounted our guns upon the batteries. His approaches upon that occaſion were as well carried on as if conducted by the moſt ſkilful Engineers. He has got 30,000 Cavalry, of which 2,000 are Abyſſinian Horſe, which conſtantly attend his perſon; 10,000 Carnatic Horſe well trained, half of which, we are well informed, are compoſed of thoſe regiments which were diſbanded from and deſerted the ſervice of the Nabob within theſe laſt four years, and which were all diſciplined by Engliſh Officers; the reſt of his Cavalry are the commen Horſe of the country under different Chiefs. Every avenue leading from hence to *Arcot*, and from hence to thoſe Ports in which we have ſtill Garriſons, is occupied by large detachments of Horſe, and where neceſſary, alſo by Infantry, and the places at which they are poſted fortified; ſo that beſides being deprived of the means of getting good intelligence, we are totally cut off from all communication with our Garriſons, and conſequently unable to ſend them ſupplies of either ſtores or proviſions, in both of which they have been kept ſcandalouſly deficient. In ſhort, *Hyder* has taken every meaſure that could have occurred to the moſt experienced General to diſtreſs us, and to render himſelf formidable in his preſent ſituation.

Hyder's conduct in his civil capacity, has been ſupported by a degree of political addreſs unequalled by any Power that has yet appeared in *Hindoſtan*. To the inhabitants in general he affords every protection; and particularly on the capture of *Arcot*, he iſſued a proclamation againſt plundering the people of the town, ſent guards from his own Army to protect the houſes of the Bankers, cut off the heads of ſeveral of his people who were found plundering in defiance of his authority; and after making enquiry who had been ſufferers (who proved to be chiefly the petty Merchants) he diſtributed amongſt them to the value of about £. 3,500 ſterling, and which he only required ſhould be repaid to him when they were able. Such well-timed lenity cannot fail of attaching the people to his Government.

It may poſſibly be aſked how he contrives to find proviſions for ſo numerous an Army? Beſides what he is able to collect in the *Carnatic*, and beſides what the Merchants bring of themſelves from his country, he has got 30,000 bullocks of his own, which are conſtantly employed in bringing him ſupplies from thence.

I have been thus circumſtantial in my accounts of *Hyder*'s ſtrength, and of his mode of conduct, that you may ſee in the fulleſt manner what we have to combat againſt, and what difficulties I in particular have to ſurmount. The unprepared ſtate in which I found the Army here on my arrival, is already ſet forth to you in the preceding part of this Addreſs; nor will I enter upon a diſcuſſion of its inferiority, when compared with that of the Enemy, or of its incapacity to attack *Hyder* in the ſtrong poſts he now occupies; but leave you to form your own judgment from a particular Return of the Force which I could have carried into the field, and which I herewith incloſe. Nevertheleſs, had *Arcot* held out a ſhort time longer, I ſhould not have delayed a day beyond what muſt unavoidably have been taken up in the neceſſary preparations for a march, to have proceeded immediately towards raiſing the ſiege. There is one effect which has been produced by the fall of *Arcot*, and which I cannot omit mentioning to you, viz. a diſaffection amongſt the Sepoys, who are principally natives of that place, and have got their wives, families, and other relations in it. Many have already evinced their averſion to the Service, by deſerting; a circumſtance which affords too much room to apprehend infidelity when we take the field, and the more particularly as I ſhall probably make *Arcot* my firſt object.

From the diſappointment I naturally ſuffered on finding things ſo ſituated as to prevent me from entering immediately on action, I have experienced a temporary relief and conſolation, by the ſetting-in of the North-eaſt monſoon, which has commenced with very heavy rains, and furniſhed me with a good pretence for throwing my little Army into cantonments: and for obviating an idea prejudicial to our intereſts, which it might otherwiſe have given birth to, of my having deſerted the field, I have formed three grand diviſions on *Choultry Plain*, which lays at the diſtance of between three and four miles to the Southward of *Madras*, and have myſelf taken up my reſidence with one of them, in order to be in readineſs to embrace the firſt opportunity that may offer, of gaining an advantage over the Enemy. I have alſo occupied and ſtrengthened what were originally the advanced poſts from the Army, that no ground might be loſt by cantoning.

I am employing the time afforded by this interval of inactivity, in the moſt uſeful manner in my power, by making every neceſſary arrangement for the ſecurity of your Garriſon of *Fort Saint George*, and by repairing, by every means within my reach, the ſhattered condition of the Army, and endeavouring, by granting every poſſible encouragement to the Sepoys, to attach them to our ſervice.

As the only preſent meaſure which can tend to facilitate my operations againſt the Enemy, and one which promiſes the faireſt proſpect to the general ſucceſs of the War, I have written to your *Bombay* Adminiſtration, to Sir *Edward Hughes*, and to Brigadier General *Goddard*, to unite in diſtreſſing his poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* ſide of *India*; and to be particularly aſſiduous in promoting peace with the Marattas. The particulars of the Reſolution which the Governor General and Council came to on this latter ſubject, you are fully informed of by their own letters and proceedings. It only therefore remains for you to be aſſured, that no endeavours on my part ſhall be left unexerted to forward ſo important and deſirable an accommodation.

If we can only make peace with them, *Hyder Ally* will repent but once of his hoſtile operations againſt us. On the contrary, ſhould the Marattas continue our Enemies, and to act againſt us, and the French armament arrive with the Troops to join *Hyder*, it is impoſſible to ſay to what difficulties we may be reduced.

You will naturally imagine and expect that *Pondicherry* is no longer in a condition to be uſeful to the French, in caſe of their landing in this country: what then muſt be your ſurprize, on being informed, that (except in point of fortifications, which you are already adviſed have been deſtroyed) it is in every other reſpect open and convenient for their reception. It was evacuated on *Hyder*'s invaſion of the *Carnatic*, without deſtroying the public buildings, and without removing one of the French inhabitants, who are left in full and undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the conſequence of which, as I have been informed by a letter from the Third of your Factory at *Cuddalore*, has been, that they have aroſe in arms, have robbed the Reſident, and obliged him, with fixed bayonets at his breaſt, to ſign a paper, the contents of which he knew not; have raiſed two or three battalions of Sepoys, which they call *Hyder*'s, and which he no doubt pays for, but which bear evident marks

of the choice of men being French, as they are chiefly compoſed of thoſe who were formerly in their ſervice. Large quantities of proviſions are now laying up at *Caringoley*, in the neighbourhood of *Pondicherry*; and which, as *Hyder* cannot, from the ſituation of the place, being on the ſea-coaſt, poſſibly mean for his own uſe, muſt be intended for the ſervice of the French on their arrival.

I do myſelf the honour to incloſe you a general and ſubſidiary Return of your Forces in *India*, formed upon the lateſt advices I have received from the ſeveral ſtations; you will find alſo amongſt them, a Return, ſhewing the ſtate of the Army on my arrival here, and its preſent ſtate; you have likewiſe a Return of the detachment which was defeated under Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, with the caſualties thereof, drawn from the moſt authentic accounts I have been able to procure.

I would do injuſtice to the ability and aſſiduity with which Lieutenant Colonel *Arthur Owen* has acquitted himſelf in his office of Adjutant General, and to the ſervices I have received from him in that capacity, did I omit, on this occaſion, recommending him to your notice; and as an Officer of military knowledge and experience, he is highly deſerving of whatever countenance or favour you may at any time think proper to ſhew him.

I hope that by the next opportunity which offers, I ſhall have it in my power to ſend you more agreeable accounts; in the interim reſt aſſured, that I ſhall uſe my utmoſt endeavours to re-eſtabliſh your intereſts, and to ſupport the honour of the Britiſh arms in this part of *India*. I have the honour to be,

with much reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
Eyre Coote.

Fort Saint George,
30th Nov. 1780.

P. S. Since writing the above, having obtained Perſian copies of Articles of Treaties ſaid to ſubſiſt between the French and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and between him and the Marattas, and which being poſitively aſſured are real, I herewith incloſe you tranſlates for your information.

E. C.

(A true Copy.)

Sam. Wilkes,
Clerk to the Committee of Secrecy.

East India Houſe,
11th May 1781.

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Eyre Coote* to the Right honourable *Charles Jenkinſon*, Eſq. His Majeſty's Secretary at War, &c.; dated Head Quarters, *Choultry Plain*, the 1ſt December 1780.

Sir,

When I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you, on the 30th of January and 27th of February laſt, I troubled you with ſome detail of my ſituation in this Government, both with reſpect to political and military matters; and ſhall now take the liberty of informing you further, that the inimical proceedings of the Board towards me, during the ſtay I was neceſſarily obliged to make in the upper provinces, increaſed ſo much, as at length to exclude me entirely from all knowledge of their tranſactions, and to deprive me of every military power whatever, from the forming Armies, and placing Officers at the head of them, down to the common details of the Service. I was, in ſhort, conſidered at laſt as nothing more than a channel for the conveyance of their orders, and many of thoſe were ſuch as I too plainly ſaw the evil tendency of to the Army, and the Service in general, and therefore doubly felt the want of power to prevent them.

As my motives for coming to this country were purely public, and I had no wiſh to gratify but that of ſhewing my zeal, and exerting every faculty in the ſervice of His Majeſty, and for the good of my country, ſuch a ſituation accorded but ill either with thoſe views, or, I may venture to ſay, with my character in life. Truſting, therefore, to the well-known indulgence of my Sovereign, where he ſees the motive juſtify the meaſure, I determined to quit a ſcene, where I was waſting both time and health in vain. For what purpoſes could I hope to effect, when I ſaw a Coalition formed between Gentlemen whoſe ideas and opinions had hitherto been ſo oppoſite, that I never had been able to bring them to any degree of conciliation, apparently with the view of ſetting me aſide, both as a Member of the Board, and as Commander in Chief.

I may be excuſed the giving it this interpretation, from the uniform courſe of ill treatment I met with, and from not having obſerved any fruits ariſe in conſequence of this union. But by the time I reached the Preſidency, events had happened of ſuch a nature, as rendered it impoſſible for me to leave the country without uſing my beſt efforts to aſſiſt in averting the evils which threatened it on all ſides.

The unfortunate affair between the Governor General and Mr. *Francis*, had greatly weakened the credit and conſequence of our Government here; while the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, where he has burnt and pillaged the whole country, even to the gates of *Madras*, demanded its moſt immediate and ſpirited exertions.

My own feelings would have urged me, and juſtly ſo, at a more favourable period of time, to demand of the Board their reaſons for their extraordinary conduct towards me, that both their accuſations, if they had any to make, and my juſtifications, might appear to our Employers at once, whoſe judgment upon my conduct I rather ſolicit than dread: but under ſuch circumſtances, I could not heſitate to ſacrifice every private claim to the neceſſities of the Public, and, turning my whole cares to the forming ſuch military arrangements as might beſt ſecure our valuable poſſeſſions here, I called for the attention of the Board to the plans I laid before them, and offered the moſt ready concurrence in every meaſure which was ſuited to the exigencies of our ſituation.

I had the ſatisfaction to find them thoroughly diſpoſed to unite in providing for our ſafety, and in giving every poſſible aſſiſtance to the Government of *Madras*; while, from being aware of the ill conſequences already reſulting from them, they voluntarily reſcinded thoſe reſolutions which had paſſed in contradiction to my military regulations during my abſence.

This change in conduct, and the real hazard we are in, encourages me to look forward with more hope of proper ſupport in the field. An unfortunate check we have met with upon the coaſt, obliging me to repair thither with a reinforcement, which, though by no means adequate to the ſervice I am going upon, is as much as can be ſpared from this eſtabliſhment, while the Maratta War continues, it is at length agreed to enter into another negociation for Peace with them, which, if we can effect upon proper terms, and induce them to join us againſt *Hyder*, who is certainly their rival in power and conſequence, this War may be brought to a happy, and perhaps ſpeedy concluſion; but ſhould they prefer taking advantage of our preſent ſituation, to aſſiſt in diſtreſſing us; ſhould the Nizam ſeize the ſame favourable opportunity to act againſt us; and ſhould the French appear with force ſufficient to encourage and ſupport their ſeveral operations, all of which are events too likely to happen, it is impoſſible for me, Sir, to anſwer for the conſequences, reduced as we now are in the ſtrength of our European Troops, and under the greateſt difficulties to find money, even for our current expences.

Thus far in this Addreſs I wrote in *Bengal*.

I arrived here the 5th inſtant, and am ſorry to ſay, I found affairs in general in a more diſtreſſed ſtate than I had formed any idea of.

It would be an endleſs taſk for me to enter into a minute diſcuſſion, either into the conduct of thoſe perſons who have been inſtrumental to the preſent difficulties, or of the cauſes to which they may be aſcribed. I truſt, however,

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however, that both may be in good time brought forward to the public view, and that the Nation may thereby have an opportunity of redreſſing themſelves on thoſe who have wantonly injured their honour and intereſts.

By the fall of *Pondicherry*, the influence of our common Enemies, the French, may be ſaid to have been annihilated in this country; and every advantage thereby given to us for eſtabliſhing our own upon a ſolid and permanent baſis, by forming alliances, and preſerving a friendly intercourſe with the Native Powers. Thus circumſtanced, it was not to be imagined that there was even a poſſibility of working ſo ſpeedy a revolution as that which has happened. Regardleſs of the jealouſy which would naturally ariſe in the mind of every Native Power in *India*, from our having removed the only European competitor we had in this quarter of the world, they proceed to offer them inſult and indignity; and as if a policy inſeparable from our real intereſts, every pains have been taken to offend both *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam; both of whom, ſenſible of the injuries done them upon the grounds of the Treaty ſubſiſting between them and the Company, with the greateſt candour avow their intentions of reſenting them. By means of a ſeaſonable interpoſition of the authority of the Supreme Council, the Nizam has hitherto been reſtrained from coming to an open rupture. They redreſſed him as far as was in their power; but I by no means conceive his reſentment to be entirely removed; and did I not ſee the great probability there is of *Hyder*'s ſucceſſes againſt us, alarming his fears for our own poſſeſſions, I would not inſure his neutrality for an hour.

To excite *Hyder Ally* to become an avowed Enemy, was a piece of bad policy in the Agents of this Government, for which no excuſe can be alledged. Ever ſince the Treaty concluded with him in 1769, they have been circumſtantially informed of the improvements which he was daily making in his military ſervice, both as to numbers and diſcipline. His conduct and writings, ever ſince they refuſed to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas (which by Treaty they were virtually bound to do) have been uniformly declaratory of his enmity towards the Engliſh.

Deſerving as theſe circumſtances were of the conſideration of a well-meaning Government, the men in authority here perſiſted in their ill-judged policy, until they had provoked him into open hoſtilities. And although informations were tranſmitted them from all quarters, of his intentions to invade the *Carnatic*, nay occurrences convincing to all the world of ſuch being his views, ſtill did they chooſe, from a determined obſtinacy (for ſuch I muſt call it) to diſcredit the whole themſelves, and to diſcourage the idea in others; and that they might not appear, by their public conduct, to contradict what they were deſirous the world ſhould believe, they moſt perceptibly avoided taking any ſteps towards oppoſing *Hyder*'s entry into the *Carnatic*, and made not the ſmalleſt preparations for their own ſecurity.

It is hardly credible, but no leſs true, that even after *Hyder Ally*'s invaſion, the ſame inactivity prevailed in this Government; and what ought to have been their firſt care, lay as much neglected as if no Enemy had been near. Even the neceſſary arrangements for the ſecurity of *Fort Saint George*, the very foundation of our exiſtence on this coaſt, had not been made; no pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for our defence; I found it few in number, and the Sepoys ſo diſpirited from want of proper care and encouragement, as to be daily deſerting. The Field Artillery requiſite for a campaign, ſo far from being in readineſs, that the carriages, &c. are now making up; the draft bullocks deficient in numbers, and of what there are, many are ſo weak, as to be inadequate to the ſervice required of them: Proviſions of every kind ſo ſcarce, that the Troops in camp could only procure a ſcanty ſupply for one day's expence: the whole country around, within five miles of *Madras*, entirely plundered and laid waſte by *Hyder*'s Cavalry, large bodies of which ſtill continue to infeſt it, of courſe no proviſions are to be procured beyond that circle: both the Army and inhabitants maintained chiefly by ſupplies from *Bengal*; and upon which, I am ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for their future ſupport.

Obſerving the enfeebled ſtate of our Army here, and the abſolute impoſſibility of reinforcing it from any of the detachments ſtationed either to the Northward or to the Southward, of which the fate of that under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* furniſhes us a melancholy proof, I naturally turned my eyes towards the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*; but figure my diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a condition to aſſiſt our exigencies, I learnt from his own mouth, that he had neither men, money, nor influence, and that he looked to the Company for the ſupport of both his intereſt and credit! Add to this, I can neither find from himſelf, nor diſcover from my own enquiries, that he has a ſingle friend or adherent in the whole country; on the contrary, the very villagers of the Company's jaghire lands interrupt and moleſt the meſſengers going to and from the forts in which we have Garriſons, and alſo thoſe who are ſent out to procure intelligence; ſo that the very people whom we ought to find our friends, are become more injurious to us than if they were avowedly to take up arms againſt us; which might not have been the caſe, had the Government here kept thoſe lands in their own hands, inſtead of renting them to the Nabob. Thus you ſee, we muſt entirely depend upon our own exertions.

Two days before my arrival, *Arcot*, the capital of the *Carnatic* (which, knowing its importance for the ſupport of our influence in the country, I eagerly wiſhed to have been in time to have relieved) fell into the hands of *Hyder*; an event which, whilſt it has given to him almoſt every thing he could wiſh, has effectually ruined the Nabob's intereſts in the country, and produced other effects which tend in particular to increaſe my embarraſſments. He has by this capture got poſſeſſion of a city ſufficiently large to canton his whole Army, of a number of fine cannon, and a very conſiderable quantity of other military ſtores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to him, in either maintaining what he has already acquired, or in proſecuting his further views of conqueſt. The Polygars, as well as the Officers of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, who were ſtationed at different places for the collection of his Revenues, are all attending at *Hyder*'s Durbar, and have been uniformly confirmed in their reſpective offices. Beſides *Arcot*, many other Garriſons of the Nabob's have fallen, and, although capable of defence, without offering the ſmalleſt reſiſtance; in ſhort, have moſt of them ſurrendered upon the appearance of *Hyder*'s Horſe before them. Such ready and unconditional ſubmiſſion to the Enemy muſt ariſe either from treachery or diſaffection to the Nabob's Government, but for which, the unpardonable neglect of every thing neceſſary for the defence of the forts, has furniſhed thoſe who were ſtationed in them with an eaſy excuſe for having ſo tamely given them up. *Hyder* has thrown into them very adequate Garriſons, with a ſufficiency of military ſtores, and is now ſtocking them with proviſions, and repairing the works. He is alſo putting *Arcot* in the beſt ſtate of defence poſſible, and is at the ſame time employed in completing his Artillery park. His Army, upon the moſt moderate computation I have yet had given to me, does not conſiſt of leſs than 70,000 Infantry (common report makes them 100,000) of which there are 20,000 in regular battalions; four hundred Europeans under the command of a Mr. *Lally*; one hundred pieces of cannon of different calibres, which are worked by Europeans, in number 300, and Black Artillery diſciplined by us, and formerly in the ſervice of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, and at the ſiege of *Arcot* were ſo well ſerved, as repeatedly to have diſmounted our guns upon the batteries: his approaches on that occaſion were as well carried on as if conducted by the moſt ſkilful Engineers. He has got 30,000 Cavalry,

Cavalry, of which 2,000 are Abyſſinian Horſe, which conſtantly attend his perſon; 10,000 Carnatic Horſe, well trained, half of which, we are well informed, are compoſed of thoſe regiments which were diſbanded from and deſerted from the ſervice of the Nabob within theſe laſt four years, and which were all diſciplined by Engliſh Officers; the reſt of his Cavalry are the common Horſe of the country, under different Chiefs.

Every avenue leading from hence to *Arcot*, and from hence to thoſe forts in which we have ſtill Garriſons, is occupied by large detachments of Horſe, and where neceſſary, alſo by Infantry, and the places at which they are poſted fortified; ſo that beſides being deprived of the means of getting good intelligence, we are totally cut off from all communication with our Garriſons, and conſequently unable to ſend them any ſupplies, either of ſtores or proviſions, in both of which they have been kept ſcandalouſly deficient. In ſhort, *Hyder* has taken every meaſure that could have occured to the moſt experienced General to diſtreſs us, and to render himſelf, in his preſent ſituation, as formidable as poſſible.

Hyder's conduct in his civil capacity has been ſupported by a degree of political addreſs unequalled by any Power that has yet appeared in *Hindoſtan*: to the inhabitants in general he affords every protection; and particularly on the capture of *Arcot*, he iſſued a proclamation againſt plundering the people of the town, ſent guards from his own Army to protect the houſes of the Bankers, cut off the heads of ſeveral of his people who were found plundering in defiance of his authority; and, after making enquiry who had been ſufferers (who proved to be chiefly the petty Merchants) he diſtributed amongſt them the value of about £. 3,500 ſterling, and which he only required ſhould be repaid to him when they were able. Such well-timed lenity cannot fail of attaching the people to his Government.

It may poſſibly be aſked, how he contrives to find proviſions for ſo numerous an Army? Beſides what he is able to collect in the *Carnatic*, and beſides what the merchants bring of themſelves from his country, he has got thirty thouſand bullocks of his own, which are conſtantly employed in bringing him ſupplies from thence.

I have been thus circumſtantial in my account of *Hyder*'s ſtrength, and of his mode of conduct, that you may ſee in the fulleſt manner what we have to combat againſt, and what difficulties I in particular have to ſurmount.

I do myſelf the honour to incloſe a general and ſubſidiary Return of the Forces in *India*.

The Army which I immediately command, and can now carry into the field, including Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, does not exceed 7,000, of which 1,700 only are Europeans, and the remainder Sepoys and Black Cavalry. The ſmallneſs of this force, when compared with that of the Enemy, and the great diſadvantages under which it muſt take the field, with reſpect to proviſions, are circumſtances which I am perſuaded are in themſelves ſufficiently convincing to render all comment of mine unneceſſary, to prove to you its inequality to the undertaking of attacking *Hyder* in the ſtrong poſts he now holds. Nevertheleſs, had *Arcot* held out a ſhort time longer, I ſhould have made an attempt towards raiſing the ſiege.

I am at preſent employed in making every neceſſary arrangement for the ſecurity of the Garriſon of *Fort Saint George*, and in repairing, by every means within my reach, the ſhattered condition of the Army; and am endeavouring, by granting every poſſible encouragement to the Sepoys, to attach them to our ſervice.

As the only preſent meaſure which can tend to facilitate my operations againſt the Enemy, and one which promiſes the fareſt proſpect to the general ſucceſs of the war, I have written to the *Bombay* Adminiſtration, to Sir *Edward Hughes*, and to Brigadier General *Goddard*, to unite in diſtreſſing his poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* ſide of *India*; and to be particularly aſſiduous in promoting peace with the Marattas.

After the mention which I have already made of the fall of *Pondicherry*, you will naturally imagine, and expect, that it is no longer in a ſituation to be uſeful to the French, in caſe of their landing in this country: what then muſt be your ſurprize, on being informed that, excepting the fortifications, which have been deſtroyed, it is in every other reſpect open and convenient for their reception? It is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe, that with ſo many and obvious reaſons for the Government here to have rendered that place totally incapable of any immediate ſervice to either a Native or Foreign Power, they could have acted ſo impoliticly, and with ſo little foreſight, as they have done. They evacuated it on *Hyder*'s invaſion of the *Carnatic*, leaving behind all the French inhabitants in undiſturbed and ample poſſeſſion of their houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the conſequence of which has been, that they have riſen in arms, have robbed the Reſident, and with fixed bayonets at his breaſt, obliged him to ſign a paper, the contents of which he knew not; and have raiſed two or three battalions of Sepoys, which they call *Hyder*'s, and which he no doubt pays for, but which bear evident marks of the choice of men being French, as they are compoſed of thoſe who were formerly in their ſervice. Large quantities of proviſions are now laying up at *Caringolly*, in the neighbourhood of *Pondicherry*, and which, as *Hyder* cannot, from the ſituation of the place, being on the ſea coaſt, mean for his own uſe, muſt be intended for the ſervice of the French on their arrival.

You will obſerve from the Returns, the very reduced ſtate of His Majeſty's 73d regiment, which preſents to us too ſtrong a proof, that Highlanders conſtitutions are not ſuitable to this climate, although they are apparently men of robuſt habits: the ſame mortality prevailed in Col. *Morris*'s Highland regiment, when I commanded it here laſt war. I muſt therefore recommend, that in future, in recruiting for the *India* Service, as few as poſſible of them be ſent out. Whilſt on this ſubject, I am ſorry to remark, that on an occaſion, when a reinforcement of Europeans was conſidered as neceſſary for the protection of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, this battalion of Lord *Macleod*'s regiment ſhould have been allowed to leave *England* 150 deficient of its full complement, at the ſame time that another battalion was raiſed, from which it might, without difficulty or detriment, have been completed.

I hope it will be in my power to give you more favourable accounts by my next diſpatches; and requeſt you will in the mean while reſt aſſured of my utmoſt endeavours to ſupport the honour of the Britiſh arms in *India*; obſerving however, that nothing effectual can be expected, without great exertions from Government at home. I have the honour to be,

with much eſteem,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient, and moſt humble Servant,

Eyre Coote.

Head Quarters, *Choultry Plain*, the 1ſt December 1780.

P. S. You will obſerve, that you have likewiſe a Return of the Detachment which was defeated under Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*, with the caſualties thereof, formed from the moſt authentic accounts I have been able to procure.

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Eyre Coote* to the Earl of *Hillſborough*, dated Head Quarters, *Choultry Plain*, 1ſt December 1780.

I am preparing to exert my beſt abilities for the defence and ſecurity of theſe valuable poſſeſſions.

Our actual ſituation in reſpect to *Hyder Aily*, the Marattas, and the other Country Powers, and the unfortunate check we have met with from the former upon the Coaſt, I have already mentioned to the Secretary at

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War; therefore ſhall not take up more of your Lordſhip's time than is neceſſary, by repeating either thoſe or other matters relative to myſelf; but, as a means of giving you a clear view of our proceedings, I beg leave to incloſe in your Lordſhip's packet, ſome Minutes which have been given in, at our Board ſince my return from the upper Provinces, upon thoſe ſubjects.

Thus far in this Addreſs I wrote in *Bengal*.—I arrived here the 5th inſtant, and am ſorry to ſay I found affairs in general in a more diſtreſſed ſtate than I had formed any idea of. It would be an endleſs taſk for me to enter into a minute diſcuſſion, either of the conduct of thoſe perſons who have been inſtrumental to the preſent difficulties, or of the cauſes to which they may be aſcribed. I truſt, however, that both may in good time be brought forward to the public view, and that the Nation may thereby have an opportunity of redreſſing themſelves on thoſe who have wantonly injured their honour and intereſts.

By the fall of *Pondicherry*, the influence of our common Enemies, the French, may be ſaid to have been annihilated in this country, and every advantage thereby given to us for eſtabliſhing our own upon a ſolid and permanent baſis, by forming alliances, and preſerving a friendly intercourſe with the Native Powers. Thus circumſtanced, it was not to be imagined that there was even a poſſibility of working ſo ſpeedy a revolution as that which has happened. Regardleſs of the jealouſy which would naturally ariſe in the mind of every Native Power in *India*, from our having removed the only European competitor we had in this quarter of the world, they proceed to offer them open inſult and indignity; and, as if a policy inſeparable from our real intereſts, every pains has been taken to offend both *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam; both of whom, ſenſible of the injuries done them, upon the grounds of the Treaty ſubſiſting between them and the Company, with the greateſt candour avow their intentions of reſenting them: by means of a ſeaſonable interpoſition of the authority of the Supreme Council, the Nizam has hitherto been reſtrained from coming to an open rupture; they redreſſed him as far as was in their power: but I by no means conceive his reſentment to be entirely removed; and did I not ſee the great probability there is of *Hyder*'s ſucceſſes againſt us alarming his fears for his own poſſeſſions, I would not enſure his neutrality for an hour.

To excite *Hyder Ally* to become an avowed Enemy, was a piece of bad policy in the Agents of this Government, for which no excuſe can be alledged. Ever ſince the Treaty concluded with him in 1769, they have been circumſtantially informed of the improvement which he was daily making in his military ſervice, both as to numbers and diſcipline. His conduct and writings ever ſince they refuſed to aſſiſt him againſt the Marattas (which by Treaty they were virtually bound to do) have been uniformly declaratory of his enmity towards the Engliſh. Deſerving as theſe circumſtances were of the conſideration of a well-meaning Government, the men in authority here, perſiſted in their ill-judged policy until they provoked him into open hoſtilities. And although informations were tranſmitted them from all quarters, of his intentions to invade the *Carnatic*, nay, occurrences convincing to all the reſt of the world of ſuch being his views, ſtill did they chooſe, from a determined obſtinacy (for ſuch muſt I call it) to diſcredit the whole themſelves, and to diſcourage the idea in others: and, that they might not appear by their public conduct to contradict what they were deſirous the world ſhould believe, they moſt perceptibly avoided taking any ſteps towards oppoſing *Hyder*'s entry into the *Carnatic*, and made not the ſmalleſt preparations for their own ſecurity.

It is hardly credible, but it is no leſs true, that even after *Hyder Ally*'s invaſion, the ſame inactivity prevailed in this Government; and what ought to have been their firſt care, lay as much neglected as if no Enemy had been near: even the neceſſary arrangements for the ſecurity of *Fort Saint George*, the very foundation of our exiſtence on this Coaſt, had not been made. No pains had been taken to repair the ſhattered condition of the very ſmall Army that remained for our defence; I found it few in number, and the Sepoys ſo diſpirited from want of proper care and encouragement, as to be daily deſerting: the Field Artillery requiſite for a campaign, ſo far from being in readineſs, that the carriages, &c. are only now making up: the draft bullocks deficient in numbers, and of what there are, many are ſo weak as to be inadequate to the ſervice required of them: proviſions of every kind ſo ſcarce, that the Troops in camp could only procure a ſcanty ſupply for one day's expence: the whole country around, within five miles of *Madras*, entirely plundered and laid waſte by *Hyder*'s Cavalry, large bodies of which ſtill continue to infeſt it; of courſe no proviſions are to be procured beyond that circle; both the Army and Inhabitants maintained chiefly by ſupplies from *Bengal*, and upon which, I am ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for their future ſupport.

Obſerving the enfeebled ſtate of our Army here, and the abſolute impoſſibility of reinforcing it from any of the Detachments ſtationed either to the northward or ſouthward of this place, of which the fate of that under the command of Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* furniſhed a melancholy proof, I naturally turned my eyes towards the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*; but figure my diſappointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a condition to aſſiſt our exigencies, I learnt from his own mouth, that he had neither men, money, nor influence; and that he looked to the Company for the ſupport of both his intereſt and credit! Add to this, I can neither find from himſelf, nor diſcover from my own enquiries, that he has a ſingle friend or adherent in the whole country; on the contrary, the very villagers of the Company's jaghire lands, intercept and moleſt the meſſengers going to and from the forts in which we have Garriſons, as alſo thoſe who are ſent out to procure intelligence; ſo that the very people, whom we ought to find our friends, are become more injurious to us than if they were avowedly to take up arms againſt us; which might not have been the caſe, had the Government here kept thoſe lands in their own hands, inſtead of renting them to the Nabob. Thus, you perceive, we muſt entirely depend upon our own exertions.

Two days before my arrival, *Arcot*, the capital of the *Carnatic* (which, knowing its importance for the ſupport of our influence in the country, I eagerly wiſhed to have been in time to have relieved) fell into the hands of *Hyder*; an event which, whilſt it has given to him almoſt every thing he could wiſh, has effectually ruined the Nabob's intereſt in the country, and produced other effects which tend in particular to increaſe my embarraſſments. He has, by this capture, got poſſeſſion of a city ſufficiently large to canton his whole Army, of a number of fine cannon, and a very conſiderable quantity of other military ſtores, which muſt prove highly ſerviceable to him in either maintaining what he has already acquired, or in proſecuting his further views of conqueſt. The Polygars, as well as the Officers of the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, who were ſtationed at different places for the collection of his Revenues, are all attending at *Hyder*'s Durbar, and have been uniformly confirmed in their reſpective offices. Beſides *Arcot*, many other Garriſons of the Nabob's have fallen, and, although capable of defence, without offering the ſmalleſt reſiſtance; in ſhort, have moſt of them ſurrendered upon the appearance of *Hyder*'s Horſe before them. Such ready and unconditional ſubmiſſion to the Enemy, muſt ariſe either from treachery or a diſaffection of the Nabob's Government; but for which, the unpardonable neglect of every thing neceſſary to the defence of the forts, has furniſhed thoſe who were ſtationed in them with an eaſy excuſe for having ſo tamely given them up. *Hyder* has thrown into them very adequate Garriſons with a ſufficiency of military ſtores, and is now ſtocking them with proviſions

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I am at preſent employed in making every neceſſary arrangement for the ſecurity of the Garriſon of *Fort Saint George*, and in repairing, by every means within my reach, the ſhattered condition of the Army, and endeavouring, by granting every poſſible encouragement to the Sepoys, to attach them to our ſervice.

As the only preſent meaſure which can tend to facilitate my operations againſt the Enemy, and one which promiſes the faireſt proſpect to the general ſucceſs of the war, I have written to the *Bombay* Adminiſtration, to Sir *Edward Hughes*, and to Brigadier General *Goddard*, to unite in diſtreſſing his poſſeſſions on the *Malabar* ſide of *India*; and to be particularly aſſiduous in promoting peace with the Marattas.

After the mention which I have already made of the fall of *Pondicherry*, you will naturally imagine, and expect, that it is no longer in a ſituation to be uſeful to the French, in caſe of their landing in this country: what then muſt be your ſurprize, on being informed that, excepting the fortifications, which have been deſtroyed, it is in every other reſpect open and convenient for their reception? It is hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe, that with ſo many and obvious reaſons for the Government here to have rendered that place totally incapable of any immediate ſervice to either a Native or Foreign Power, they could have acted ſo impolitically, and with ſo little foreſight as they have done. They evacuated it on *Hyder*'s invaſion of the *Carnatic*, leaving behind all the French inhabitants in undiſturbed and ample poſſeſſion of their houſes, with only a Reſident to tend over them; the conſequence of which has been, that they have riſen in arms, have robbed the Reſident, and with fixed bayonets at his breaſt, obliged him to ſign his name to a paper, the contents of which he knew not; and have raiſed two or three battalions of Sepoys, which they call *Hyder*'s, and which he no doubt pays for, but which bear evident marks of the choice of men being French, as they are chiefly compoſed of thoſe who were formerly in their ſervice. Large quantities of proviſions are now laying up at *Caringolly*, in the neighbourhood of *Pondicherry*, and which, as *Hyder* cannot, from the ſituation of the place being on the ſea-coaſt, mean for his own uſe, muſt be intended for the ſervice of the French on their arrival.

I cannot bring this letter to a concluſion without expreſſing the concern which, as a Member of the ſuperior Government in *India*, I muſt feel, in its being ſo long after the expiration of the laſt extenſion of its powers, kept ſo entirely in the dark, as to the line of conduct which, in managing thoſe important poſſeſſions of the Britiſh Nation, ought to be purſued. We act, no doubt, to the beſt of our judgment in every inſtance, where it appears neceſſary we ſhould exert ourſelves for the ſupport of good Government and the public intereſts; but it is natural to imagine that were we honoured with a communication of what are the views of the Crown relative to the future diſpoſal of theſe valuable poſſeſſions, we ſhould execute the truſt repoſed in us with greater confidence; and, conſidering the preſent ſituation of the Britiſh dominions in the Weſt, ſurely thoſe here, cannot be deemed unworthy of the notice of Government.

I hope it will be in my power to tranſmit to your Lordſhip more favourable accounts of affairs here, by the next opportunity which may offer; but I beg leave to repeat, that nothing effectual can be done without great exertions from Government at home.

Your Lordſhip will in courſe lay the ſubject of this Addreſs before His Majeſty, and permit me to requeſt you will, at the ſame time aſſure him, that no efforts or endeavours ſhall ever be wanting on my part, to promote the intereſts and welfare of the Britiſh Nation in *India*, and to ſupport the honour of His Majeſty's Service. I have the honour,

Head Quarters, *Choultry Plain*, &c. &c.
the 1ſt Dec. 1780. *Eyre Coote.*

P. S. Since

APPENDIX. No. 18.

P. S. Since writing the above, having procured copies of Articles of Alliance ſubſiſting between the French and *Hyder Ally*, and the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*, and having been aſſured they are real, I beg leave to incloſe Tranſlates of them for your Lordſhip's information.

(Tranſlate.)

Articles of a Treaty of Alliance between *Hyder Ally Khan* and the Marattas, given by the latter.

1ſt. That a mutual and perpetual friendſhip take place between us, in good faith and confidence.

2d. That you pay the full amount of your tribute, and likewiſe the annual ſum of 12 lacks of Rupees.

3d. Having determined to attack *Surat*, you muſt not preſerve a friendſhip with the Engliſh, nor countenance *Ragonaut Row*. Whilſt we are employed on this buſineſs, you are to invade the *Carnatic*.

4th. After we have conquered *Surat*, we will then proceed to your aſſiſtance. On the other hand, ſhould you firſt accompliſh your buſineſs in the *Carnatic*, you will of courſe come to our aſſiſtance. The conqueſt of *Surat* and the *Carnatic* being finiſhed, we will proceed together againſt the country of the Nizam; and having conquered it, divide it equally between us.

5th. Should the Engliſh propoſe Peace with us, we will not conclude it without your advice; but we will firſt interpoſe our endeavours to accommodate matters between you and them, and then conclude Peace ourſelves.

6th. We obſerve the friendſhip ſubſiſting between you and the French, the countenance you ſhew them, and your deſire to aſſiſt them. If you are ſerious in this buſineſs, it is well. In the event of a War, whatever Troops they may want, we will ſupply them; but all expences attending theſe Troops are to be paid by you.

7th. Any perſon ſhewing enmity towards us, we will unite together, and chaſtiſe them; and, as a compenſation to you for agreeing to this buſineſs, we relinquiſh to you the country on this ſide of the River *Kiſtnah*.

8th. Upon the payments to the preſent time, you require a diſcharge for the Chout. Give us two years advance of the ſum of 12 lacks, to be paid annually, and we will grant a diſcharge.

9th. Should we prevail over the Engliſh, we ſhall then conſult about future arrangements.

10th. In courſe of the War, ſhould *Ragonaut Row* be taken priſoner, you require him to be given up to you. This, as he is our particular Enemy, we cannot agree to; but, on knowing your reaſons, we will endeavour to accommodate ourſelves to them.

11th. You require that *Reza Ally* Cawn* be delivered up: provided you will engage by every ſolemn vow, ſuch as ſhall be to us a ſufficient ſecurity, that he be not ill-treated or diſgraced, we will ſend him to you.

Eaſt India Houſe,
11th May 1781. A true Copy.

(Tranſlate.)

Articles given by the French to *Hyder Ally Khân*, of Treaty and Alliance.

1ſt. That a laſting friendſhip take place between us; and that we unite to chaſtiſe the Engliſh.

2d. When the ſhips with our Troops arrive, you will fix upon †*Coreal* Bunder for their landing.

3d. After their arrival our Fleet ſhall join your's, and proceed to *Madras*.

4th. A ſmall body of our Troops to attend you by land, and be obedient to your orders.

5th. Whatever bunders (ſeaports) we ſhall conquer, guards ſhall be placed in them by each of us; but the Executive Power to reſt with us, and you are not to interfere.

6th. Whatever other places may be conquered by us, ſuch as *Arcot*, &c. we ſhall lay no claim to, but be entirely at your diſpoſal.

7th. Whatever bunders (ſeaports) we may conquer, you ſhall ſhare an equal proportion of the plunder which may be thereby acquired: that all military ſtores taken in the Forts ſhall be your's; nor will we make any claim on them.

8th. Should terms of Peace be at any time propoſed betwixt us and the Engliſh, we ſhall firſt accommodate your diſputes before we finally decide; nor will we hold ſuch intercourſe without your conſent and approbation.

9th. After we have conquered the Engliſh, and concluded every thing, we will ſtation with you 2,000 Europeans with Officers, who ſhall be paid by us; but you are to defray the expences of ammunition and other ſtores for their uſe.

10th. Whatever expences in the preſent War with the Engliſh may be incurred on our account, we will grant a bond for; and as ſecurity for the payment, you keep in your hands ſuch of the acquiſitions by conqueſt as you may judge proper. We ſhall never undertake any meaſure without your advice and approbation.

11th. With reſpect to *Tanjore*, knowing your wiſhes, ours are the ſame: in this buſineſs we are highly ſatisfied, nor will we enter any part of that country.

12th. That in the affairs of the country we act in concert.

Eaſt India Houſe,
11th May 1781.

(A true Copy.)

APPENDIX, No. 19.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, 4th April 1769.

At a Conſultation;

PRESENT,

Charles Bourchier, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Joſias Du Pré,
Alexander Wynch,
Samuel Ardley,
George Dawſon,
John Call,
John Andrews,
George Stratton,
James Bourchier,
George Mackay.

MR. *Stracey* being returned, lays before the Board the Treaty executed on the part of *Hyder Ally Cawn*; which is ordered to be now entered. The Board then proceed to make ſuch obſervations on the ſeveral Articles of the Treaty, as may be neceſſary for the information of our Honourable Maſters; in doing which, it is neceſſary to conſider,

1ſt. The motives and reaſons which induced us to accede to them.

2d. The natural conſequences to be expected therefrom.

With regard to the firſt point propoſed to be conſidered, we have, in the courſe of our proceedings, urged the reaſons which induced us to adopt meaſures for bringing about a Peace; and as it is intended to collect together the ſeveral arguments that have been uſed to ſhew the abſolute neceſſity of that meaſure, that our Honourable Maſters may ſee at one view the motives for our conduct, it will only be here neceſſary to ſhew, that the ſeveral Articles of the Treaty are as favourable as in our preſent ſituation could be obtained; and to recite in a ſummary way the conſequences which may naturally be expected therefrom.

A Treaty

* Son of *Chunda Saheib*, the former French Nabob of the *Carnatic*.

† Seaport on the Malabar Coaſt, near to *Mahé*.

A Treaty of perpetual Friendſhip and Peace, made and concluded between the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George*, in behalf of the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, for all their poſſeſſions, and for the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*, on the one part; and the Nabob, *Hyder Ally Cawn Behauder*, for the country of *Myſore*, *Hyder Nagur*, and his other poſſeſſions, on the other part; on the following conditions.

TREATY.

Article 1ſt. That all hoſtilities ſhall immediately ceaſe on the concluſion of this Treaty, which is to be perpetual, or as long as the Company may exiſt: that Peace and Friendſhip ſhall take place between the contracting Parties (particularly including therein, the Rajah of *Tanjore*, the *Malavar*, *Ram Rajah*, and *Morari Row*, who are Friends and Allies to the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*) alſo all others the Friends and Allies of the contracting Parties, provided they do not become the aggreſſors againſt either of them; but if they are aggreſſors, they are not to be aſſiſted by either party.

Article 2d. That in caſe any of the contracting Parties ſhall be attacked, they ſhall, from their reſpective countries, mutually aſſiſt each other to drive the Enemy out. The pay of ſuch aſſiſtance of Troops, from one party to another, to be after the following rates; viz. To every Soldier and Horſeman, 15 rupees per month, and every Sepoy 7½ rupees per month. The pay of the Sardars and Commandants, to be, as it ſhall be agreed on at the time.

Article 3d. The Preſidency of *Bombay*, and all the factories and places which were before, or are now, under their Government, are included in this Treaty of Friendſhip; and the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn Behauder* engages, out of his friendſhip and regard to the Company, to grant to them (the factories) privileges, and exemptions in trade, in the ſame manner as they before held them; moreover, to releaſe all the Sardars, Europeans, Sepoys, &c. who may have been taken on that ſide, and this immediately on the arrival of a proper perſon from the Governor and Council of *Bombay* for that purpoſe; and alſo to ſettle the particulars of the privileges of trade and other matters relative to the ſandal wood and pepper, &c. articles of trade. And as there is now eſtabliſhed between the contracting Parties (the Company and the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*) a perpetual Peace, there is no doubt but the Preſidency of *Bombay* will exchange with the ſaid Nabob a Treaty to the ſame purport as this, reſpecting the affairs of the ſaid place, &c. and all the factories on that ſide, in the courſe of this War, it is hereby

OBSERVATIONS.

It muſt appear remarkable, that when the *Carnatic* is included in the preſent Treaty, that the Nabob, who is the Governor thereof, is not made a party. To illuſtrate this matter, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that we were very deſirous that the Nabob ſhould be inſerted as one of the contracting parties, but the enmity ſubſiſting between him and *Hyder Ally*, is ſo deeply rooted in their hearts, that we believe nothing can ever induce them to be on fair terms with each other, much leſs to enter into any ſincere engagements of friendſhip; and although we have repeatedly repreſented to the Nabob the abſolute neceſſity of concluding a Peace, yet we are convinced he would rather ſuffer his whole country to be laid waſte, and ſubmit to all the fatal conſequences ſo juſtly to be apprehended from proſecuting the War, than conſent to a Peace with a man he ſo much deteſts. He has, it is true, given his aſſent to the ſeveral Articles of the Treaty, and promiſed to authorize us, by a writing, to ſettle for the *Carnatic*, but that proceeded entirely from his ſeeing us determined to conclude a Peace; and he had no other alternative to purſue.

Article 1ſt. The reaſon why the King of *Tanjour*, and the other perſons mentioned in this Article were inſerted, has already been explained in the account which Mr. *Du Pré* gave us on his return from the conference with *Hyder Ally*, the 30th of March, at night. And as *Hyder Ally* ſo ſtrenuouſly inſiſted on the King of *Tanjour*'s being particularly mentioned, it appeared neceſſary that he, as well as the others, ſhould be inſerted as Friends and Allies to the *Carnatic*, that we might make a merit with them, our having included them in the Treaty.

Article 2d. As we have reaſon to believe that *Hyder Ally*'s principal motive for concluding a Peace with us, was, that he might, in caſe of need, obtain our aſſiſtance, it is not to be wondered at, that he ſhould ſo ſtrenuouſly preſs that the alliance ſhould be made both offenſive and defenſive, as hath in our former proceedings been ſet forth. The offenſive part we abſolutely rejected; and wiſhed and endeavoured to decline the defenſive as far as could be done without abſolutely breaking off the Treaty, as we were fully ſenſible of the difficulties in which we might thereby be involved: but no Peace could be expected without it; and it was with the utmoſt difficulty *Hyder Ally* would conſent to the Article even in its preſent form. We are ſorry to ſay it leaves us but too much cauſe to apprehend future troubles and embarraſſments, which will require our utmoſt care and attention to obviate. This Article muſt therefore be conſidered as ariſing from political neceſſity, not choice.

Article 3d. The difficulty which attended adjuſting this Article appears fully on the face of our proceedings. Upon the whole, we have reaſon to be well ſatisfied with the manner in which it now ſtands, which is as favourable as our ſituation could poſſibly allow us to expect; and we have reaſon to hope and think, from the favourable diſpoſition which *Hyder Ally* expreſſed towards the Company, that matters with regard to the Preſidency of *Bombay* will be ſettled to their ſatisfaction.

APPENDIX. No. 19.

hereby agreed and ſtipulated, that they ſhall be mutually forgiven, and no claim or demand on any account made for them hereafter.

Art. 4th. The above Nabob engages, that all the Officers, Europeans, and Sepoys, belonging to the Preſidency of *Madras*, ſhall immediately be releaſed on the arrival of a proper perſon at *Bengulure* to demand them; alſo, that all the Sardars and people belonging to the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*, who may have been taken in this War, ſhall likewiſe be releaſed. The Engliſh Company engaging on their ſide to releaſe the people belonging to the ſaid Nabob, who may have been taken alſo in this War.

Art. 4th. Requires no other remark, than that the releaſe of ſo many Europeans both on this and the Malabar Coaſt, who had during the War been taken by him, was a very material motive for our concluding a Peace, as thoſe poor people muſt otherwiſe have continued to languiſh in confinement, and, if the War had laſted much longer, would probably have periſhed in priſon.

Art. 5th. The contracting Parties mutually engage and agree, that the forts and places which may have been taken by either party from the other in this War, ſhall be mutually reſtored, except the Fort of *Carvor* and its Diſtricts. And whereas the Engliſh Company have in the Forts of *Colar* and *Vencatigherry* (excluſive of the former ſtores therein) many cannon ſhot, powder, ball, and muſkets; the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* engages, that the ſaid Company ſhall have permiſſion to bring away the ſame without any loſs or moleſtation being given them therein; and as ſoon as they are withdrawn, the ſaid forts ſhall immediately be evacuated and reſtored to the ſaid Nabob.

Art. 5th. The mutual reſtoration of places, we have reaſon to think equally advantageous to the Nabob as to *Hyder Ally*; conſidering that the places we held in the *Balla Ghaut* could not be maintained without more expence than they would yield advantage, and that the advices we received daily from the *Tinnevelly* country, of the progreſs made by *Meer Phazel Ulla Cawn*, *Hyder's* Officer, the defection of the Nabob's Troops there, and the combination of the Polygars to favour the Enemy, gave us juſt reaſon to apprehend the loſs of that whole country, as many principal forts had already been given up to the Enemy. With reſpect to *Carvor*, it did belong to the *Myſore* country, and was taken during the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, and retaken latterly by *Hyder Ally*, and now claimed as an appendage to the *Myſore* dominions; we wiſhed, and uſed all poſſible endeavours to get it reſtored to the *Carnatic*; but finding *Hyder Ally* inflexible on this Article, we thought it more adviſable to yield the point, than riſque the continuance of the War.

In Witneſs whereof the ſaid contracting Parties have interchangeably ſigned and ſealed two Inſtruments of the ſame tenor and date; viz. the ſaid Preſident and Council, on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company and the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*, in *Fort Saint George*, this 3d day of April, in the year of the Chriſtian æra 1769; and the ſaid Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn Bebauder*, at his camp at *Madavaram*, the twenty-fifth day of the moon Zeckyd, in the year of Hegyra 1182.

The Preſident is deſired to apply to the Nabob for orders of his Officers at *Kiſtnagherry*, *Vaniambady*, and *Tripettore*, for the delivery up of thoſe places to the Officer we may appoint to receive them, that they may be reſtored to *Hyder Ally*, agreeable to the Treaty.

Agreed that Meſſrs. *Du Pré*, *Andrews*, and *James Bourchier*, be appointed a deputation to proceed to *Hyder Ally Cawn*, with proper preſents, on behalf of the Company.

Chas Bourchier,
Joſ. Du Pré,
John Call,
Sam' Ardley,
George Stratton,
Ja' Bourchier,
Geo. Mackay.

Extracts from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 210. From *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 29th May: received 10th June 1769.

I have acquainted Major *Bonjour* of ſome circumſtances relative to the joining and uniting of three Sardars, *Ianojee*, yourſelf, and me; a memorandum of which I made the Major take down in writing, that he might be very particular thereof in his account to you. By *Veenajee's* means alſo, I have ſent you a Letter lately received by me from *Ianojee*, which I am to requeſt you will return after taking a copy of it in the Engliſh language. In conſequence of the Peace and Alliances which by God's bleſſing, has been concluded on between us, to our mutual ſatisfaction, we ought both to be in the ſtricteſt union, and together conſider of ſuch a plan as may weaken and diſgrace our enemies, and prevent them from entering either into your country or mine. Actuated therefore by that friendſhip and regard ſubſiſting between us, I take the liberty to acquaint you that *Ianojee Bhoſilla* has for this long time been on a footing of friendſhip, and is deſirous of an alliance with me; when we three therefore are joined, ſo far will it be from the power of the fourth to penetrate into either of our reſpective countries, that he will be afraid even for his own ſafety. Let me recommend therefore to you, to ſend to *Ianojee* a proper Vakeel with Letters, in order to eſtabliſh a Treaty of Union; and I will ſend one to him to perfect a Treaty, purporting the junction and alliance of us three, and our aſſiſting each other when neceſſary. I am convinced that after our Vakeels are gone to him, he will ſend a truſty one in return, whom I ſhall ſend to you on his arrival with me.

I am deſirous of recovering four of my places, which for theſe two years paſt have been in the hands of *Maudavarow*, and the taking of which, by God's bleſſing, will not require above a day each. You will therefore (conſiſtent with that friendſhip and regard ſubſiſting between us, and the good appearance thereof in the eyes of the world) ſend Major *Bonjour* to me for form's ſake, with a battalion of Sepoys and two field pieces. As the above four places are ſituated near our countries, and as it is by no means adviſable that Maratta Garriſons ſhould be therein, on the contrary, abſolutely neceſſary for them to be cleared, I have therefore, induced by my friendſhip, mentioned this circumſtance to repeating at the ſame time my above requeſt for the Major, &c. and referring you to him and *Venajee Pundat* for further particulars. Always let me be made happy by the receipt of Letters from you, adviſing of your health. May your happineſs increaſe!

N. B. The

N. B. The Letter from him to Mr. *Dupré* is of the ſame purport, and the ſame date.

A Letter from *Ianojee Boonſilla* to *Hyder Ally Cawn*:—
No Date.

It is a long time ſince I had the pleaſure of receiving your agreeable Letters, which will afford joy and encouragement to the hearts of ſincere friends; a neglect of which I impute to no other thing but your being engaged very much in buſineſs. The following occurrences have lately happened; *Maudavarow* entertained long animoſity againſt me, for which reaſon this year he feigned a greater friendſhip than former years, and firſt ſwore the cuſtomary oath upon green leaves, called Bala, and a yellow ſtuff, called Bandah; and maintained a correſpondence of Letters, and ſent proper Vakeels; the mutual preſents were ſent: thus through his deceitful means, ſent his Divan *Devucara Pundet*, and gained me under his influence, which made me remain quite unprepared with regard to the Troops and ſtores. In the interim, the ſaid *Modavarow* on a ſudden, and by long marches, arrived in the Subah of *Barad* and *Gonovoya*, with an Army of 40,000 Horſe, and plundered them. I depended upon the grace of God; and within a little time I collected an Army of 15,000 of the beſt Horſe, and by the aſſiſtance of *Modjee Bhoonſillah*, *Samajee Bheonſillah*, and *Nambajee Bhoonſillah*, who are now in perfect union with me; and likewiſe by the aid of the old Sardars, am waiting for a proper opportunity, and Troops are daily gathering together from different parts. Whatever may be the will of Providence, ſhall come to paſs. But as this is an affair of great importance, it cannot be managed with a better ſucceſs, without a junction of ſome good friends and brave Sardars. There is a Proverb which ſays, That if two hearts are united, they may break the mountains to pieces, and diſperſe great multitudes of people. The ſaid *Modavarow* gave you many improper treatments. I on my part ſhall alſo proceed with continual marches, in order to arrive at the places where that faithleſs man (meaning *Modavarow*) remains, in a ſhort time. I wonder you are paying large ſums of money every year to him, notwithſtanding which, you are under the ſame apprehenſions: this can produce no benefit. If you reſolve to ſpend the ſum which you are paying to him, and do ſome buſineſs, your name and reputation ſhall be rewarded in this world, and remain firm to the day of judgment; wherefore, if we unite and endeavour to extirpate that faithleſs man, it will be very proper. *Anna Punt*, ſon to *Daven Wolcar*, and *Gopal Parry*, brother to *Raganaut Row*, who are the enemies to *Maudavarow*, with a large Army, and by the aſſiſtance of *Ranab* and *Jaut*, attacked ſome of *Modavarow*'s Sardars and Managers, ſuch as *Sindiah*, &c. agreeable to the Great Mogul's command and the Vizier's directions, and expelled them from the Country of *Worjan Malvah*, and other parts of *Indoſtan*; and as *Modavarow* is engaged in War with me, he could go to their aſſiſtance. If you at this juncture endeavour to remove his people from the management of the country in your neighbourhood, it will be very adviſable. You cannot meet with ſuch an opportunity as this again. I remain in this expectation. You'll ſend me a ſatisfactory anſwer by a ſenſible man, to whom I may communicate my intentions. After I know your anſwer, I ſhall act accordingly. Don't let this fair opportunity be loſt.

No. 216. To *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 16 June 1769.

I have had the pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 29th ult. the contents of which I obſerved. *Major Bonjour* alſo being arrived, has acquainted me with the matters you gave him in charge; and I have converſed with your Vakeel *Venajee Pundut* on the ſame ſubjects.

It gives me great ſatisfaction to obſerve, that the free communication of thoughts, the ſoul of friendſhip, which has and is likely to take place between us, your imparting to me your ſentiments on ſuch important affairs, and tranſmitting to me your Letters from *Janogee*, are ſtrong proofs thereof, and are eſteemed by me in the higheſt manner, as tokens of that ſincerity of regard which is both our intereſts ſo much to cultivate: on my part, in every thing conſiſtent with the Company's welfare, and what they owe to their other Friends and Allies, you may depend on my utmoſt endeavour to promote this good end. But I ſhould be wanting in that openneſs you have ſet me the example of, did I not inform you of what occurs to me reſpecting the Troops you deſire; which is, that the ſame would be doubtleſs an open declaration of War againſt the Marattas, for which the Company have no juſt ground: this being the caſe, I am ſure you will agree with me in the impropriety of this ſtep on my part, and therefore decline aſking of it; for friends ever conſider each others ſituation and intereſt. Reſpecting my ſending a Vackeel to *Janogee*, and the alliance you propoſe making between us three, I muſt inform you (as indeed you have before been during the courſe of the late negociation) that although the Company's affairs in *India* are conducted under three diſtinct and independent Governments, yet in all undertakings of conſequence, the three muſt unite in ſupport of the whole; you will therefore, I am certain, concur with me in opinion, that in a matter of ſuch importance, and which may ſo eſſentially affect their departments, it is abſolutely neceſſary for me previouſly to conſult, and have the approbation of, the other two branches. Your Vackeel *Venajee Pundut* is fully acquainted of my ſentiments in this reſpect; and to him I beg leave to refer for further particulars; aſſuring you, that you will ever find me ſteady to my engagements; and requeſting, till I can have the pleaſure of ſeeing you, I may have that of frequently hearing from you, adviſing of your health and proſperity. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX No. 19.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 24th July 1769.

PRESENT,

Charles Bourchier, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Joſias Du Pré,
John Call,
John Andrews,
Samuel Ardley,
George Stratton,
George Dawſon,
James Bourchier,
John Whitehill.

Letters from *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Preſident, Mr. *Du Pré*, and his Vakeel, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 237, 238, and 239: adviſing, That, as we had judged it improper to aſſiſt him with the battalion of Sepoys he requeſted, in recovering the places which had been taken from him, as ſuch a ſtep would cauſe a rupture with the Marattas, which we had no juſt cauſe for, he had acquieſced, and would lay aſide for the preſent, his intentions againſt thoſe places; repreſenting, that the Marattas purpoſe entering both his country and the *Carnatic* to collect money; that in caſe the Marattas have any deſigns againſt the *Carnatic*, he would be ready to aſſiſt us with a large force; and that, on the other hand, ſhould they attack his country, he expects we ſhould aſſiſt him againſt them; repreſenting, that no time ſhould be loſt in coming to a reſolution, and taking meaſures accordingly; and that after the Enemy have entered the country, it will be needleſs to ſay, we muſt conſult with the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay*, deſiring we would acquaint him immediately with our determination, and ſend *Meeda Kiſſna* to him, to whom he has ſome matters to communicate.

There is not the leaſt doubt but that *Hyder Ally* will employ every means to induce us to join him againſt the Marattas; the late propoſal he made of our aſſiſting him with a battalion of Sepoys, and two guns, could only be intended

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intended to ſurprize us into a rupture with *Maudavarow*, well knowing that were we once to take up arms, we could not lay them down at pleaſure. It is therefore neceſſary that we ſhould uſe every poſſible precaution to avoid engaging in any diſpute whatever. Should *Hyder*, by any unjuſtifiable meaſures, draw the Marattas upon him, we may with great reaſon refuſe him any aſſiſtance, as being the aggreſſor. Reſolved therefore, That a Letter be wrote, thanking him for the caution he has given us, to be upon our guard againſt the deſigns of the Marattas, but which we hope will not be directed againſt the *Carnatic*, as we ſhall on our part ſtudiouſly avoid giving them any juſt cauſe to attack us; that he is the beſt judge how far the operations he is now employed in, againſt the *Cuddapah*, *Canoul*, &c. diſtricts, may excite a jealouſy of his intentions, and produce the effect we apprehended from the attack he propoſed againſt the places taken by the Marattas. As to his deſire that *Mooda Kiſtna* may be ſent to him, he is to be informed, that *Moodu Kiſtna*, through ſickneſs, is unable to undertake ſuch a journey, which indeed is unneceſſary, as his Vakeel *Venajee* reſides here, through whoſe means all matters may be tranſacted. *Ruccun ud Dewlah* having, in a Letter dated 30th ultimo, No. 251, repreſented, that the *Cuddapah*, and other countries againſt which *Hyder Ally* has directed his late operations, and is now employed on, are dependant on and tributary to the Soubah of the *Decan*, and deſired we will write to him on the ſubject; it is reſolved that he be acquainted, That his proceedings againſt thoſe diſtricts are contrary to the 1ſt Article of the Treaty, the Soubah being in firm alliance and friendſhip with the Company.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Country Correſpondence: repreſenting, That *Ally Zeman Cawn*, one of *Hyder*'s Sirdars, had wrote a Letter to *Bangar Tachem Naigue*, Polygar of *Vencatagerry*, adviſing him to ſend a Vakeel to *Hyder Ally*, that a friendſhip might be ſettled between them, which is contrary to the cuſtom of all nations, and inconſiſtent with the Treaty lately concluded; adviſing alſo, that although near four months are expired ſince the concluſion of the Treaty, yet that he retained in his hands *Cuttaleer* and *Cautputtoor*, belonging to the Circar of *Trichinopoly*: Agreed, That theſe matters be repreſented to *Hyder Ally*, and that he be informed we are inducted to believe that theſe proceedings, ſo contrary to the Treaty of friendſhip lately eſtabliſhed, are without his orders, but which is is neceſſary he ſhould be adviſed of.

Ch^r Bourchier,
Joſ. Du Pré
John Call,
Saml Ardley,
Geo. Stratton,
Ja. Bourchier,
John Whitehill.

No. 237. From *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 1ſt; and received 8th July 1769.

I have had the pleaſure of your Letter, and obſerve what you ſay reſpecting the ſending the battalion of Sepoys I deſired. As *Maudavarow* had ſince theſe two years taken three or four of my places, which I propoſed recovering, I mentioned this circumſtance to you, prompted by my friendſhip and regard, and likewiſe made the above requeſt relative to the Sepoys. Your anſwer to which is, "that you ſhould be wanting in that openneſs I had ſet you the example of, did you not acquaint me with your own thoughts on this ſubject; which were, that the ſame would have the appearance of a rupture with the Marattas, which the Company did not think proper to cauſe at this preſent; and that you were convinced, on reflection, I ſhould be of the ſame opinion with you." It is very certain, where friendſhip and ſincerity prevail between parties, there the advice or counſel of either are conſidered in the light of both; I ſhall therefore, agreeable to your deſire, lay aſide for the preſent my intentions againſt thoſe places: but as it is expreſſed in the Treaty of Peace, "That in caſe any "enemy raiſes diſturbances either in your country or "mine, both are to join in the expulſion of ſuch an "enemy," I now acquaint you, that the Marattas, envious and jealous of the friendſhip and alliance eſtabliſhed between the Company and me, are deſirous of breaking the ſame, and, by penetrating into both our countries, reap the advantage thereof. You muſt have heard from others, of their having for this long time had in their heads an expedition to the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*, and to collect from it lacks every year. Such being the caſe, as I am a well-wiſher to the Company as well as you, I propoſe, out of the ſincerity of my regard and attachment, that ſhould the Marattas after the rains ſhew any ſiniſter views againſt the *Carnatic*, to join with you a large force to repel their diſturbances; deſiring you at the ſame time, that ſhould they on the contrary proceed to my country, that you join me alſo with a proper force for the ſame purpoſe; for where friendſhip ſubſiſts in perfection, the countries of each other are one. I hope, therefore, from this time you will begin to reflect on all this, and acquaint me with the reſult, as, after the enemy's penetrating either into your's or my country, your then pleading an excuſe *that you muſt conſult with the Governors of* Bengal *and* Bombay, can be of no benefit; the ſaying, you know, expreſſes, that "the remedy ſhould precede the diſeaſe." My mentioning this to you is not ſolely from the conſideration of my own intereſts, but from my attachment to the Company alſo; in ſhort, for both our good, and the detriment of the common enemy. Give me leave to repeat again therefore, my hope that you will conſider, and will reflect on all this, and acquaint me with the reſult. For further particulars I refer you to *Venajee Pundut*, my Vakeel. Always favour me with Letters, adviſing me of your health, that I may rejoice and be glad. May your happineſs increaſe!

P. S. Send *Moodoo Kiſtnah Meedelery* to me here, as it is neceſſary for me to acquaint him of ſome certain matters.

No. 238. From *Hyder Ally Cawn* to Mr. *Dupré*; dated the 1ſt of July 1769.

I had the ſatisfaction of receiving your kind Letter, and obſerve what you write me of the battalion of Sepoys I requeſted of you. *Maudavarow* took three or four places from me two years ago, and is ſtill in poſſeſſion of them; I want to get them cleared from his hands; for which reaſon I acquainted you, by way of friendſhip, and wrote for a battalion of Sepoys. The Governor returned an Anſwer to me, importing, that if the ſame is ſent, it will ſet on a quarrel with the Marattas; that the Company do not think it adviſable at preſent; and that he is certain I will be of the ſame opinion as himſelf Out of regard to what you and the Governor was pleaſed to write me, I ſhall decline taking thoſe places for the preſent. When late a Peace was concluded, it was ſpecified in the Treaty between us, that if any enemies attempt to diſturb my countries or yours, we muſt endeavour to expel them jointly with each other. The Marattas, knowing that friendſhip and union were eſtabliſhed between the Company and myſelf, entertained a hatred and malice, and deſign to cauſe a difference between the Company and myſelf, and diſturb our countries, and benefit themſelves by it. They have had a deſign for this long time paſt, to undertake an expedition againſt the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*, and procure ſeveral lacks every year; of which I ſuppoſe you heard by other hands. You are a well-wiſher to the Company, I am alſo a well-wiſher to them; for which reaſon I write to you by way of friendſhip and union, that after the Monſoon, if the Marattas make any attempt againſt your country, I ſhall endeavour to remove them, by joining you with a proper

proper army; ſhould they enter my country, you ſhould on your part join me with proper force, and remove the enemy, becauſe in matters of union and ſincere friendſhip, each other's countries are to be deemed in the ſame light; I hope therefore that the Governor and yourſelf conſult upon this matter at this very time, and ſettle proper meaſures before-hand upon this buſineſs, and adviſe me with it; becauſe, that after the enemy's entrance either into your country or mine, it will be to no purpoſe to plead an excuſe of knowing the advice of the Governors of *Bengal* and *Bombay*. One ſhould be mindful of proper remedy before any diſorder happens; and I do not write this with a view of ſelf-intereſt, but with a view of the Company's welfare, the mutual good, and the deſtruction of our enemy. I hope therefore that you and the Governor will conſider, hold a conſultation, and ſettle a method upon the ſubject, and adviſe me. For other matters I refer you to *Venajee Pundat*, my Vakeel. Continue your kind correſpondence of letters, adviſing me of your welfare, that I may rejoice. May your happineſs increaſe!

No. 239. Extract of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn* to *Venajee Pundat*.

I received the Governor and Mr. *Dupré*'s letter; and obſerve the contents, but could not underſtand any particular by it. Since a Peace was concluded between me and the Engliſh, I think they ſhould aſſiſt me againſt the Marattas, if they were to march againſt me; I ſhould in like manner aſſiſt the Engliſh, if the Marattas were to march againſt them. As it was agreed that both ſhould remain in union, it is better that both ſhould be of one mind; but it is not proper to keep one thing in heart, and ſpeak another by mouth. I received certain intelligence from ſome creditable perſons in the Maratta Army, that their firm reſolution is to come into the *Carnatic* after the monſoon, with a deſign to get a large ſum of money in theſe parts. It is not to be thought that they will decline coming into theſe parts; if I let them remain in poſſeſſion of three or four places belonging to me, which they have already poſſeſſed, they certainly will come. As to my part, I am paying them every year the money agreed on. It is my opinion, if they come, their deſire is to get a large ſum of money from the Engliſh. If the Engliſh and I ſhould act jointly and ſincerely, it can't be in their power to do any thing. If the Marattas march againſt the Engliſh, I ſhall aſſiſt the Engliſh; the Engliſh ſhould aſſiſt me, if the Marattas come againſt me; all this was agreed on before. If the Marattas come, and act againſt me, the Engliſh will certainly ſay in that juncture, That they muſt write to *Bombay* and *Bengal*, and muſt hear from them to aſſiſt me; wherefore, if I know their intentions clearly at this time, it would enable me to conſult proper meaſures for my future proceedings. While we both, the Engliſh and I, are friends, we ſhould not give room for others to do any thing. I write all this with a view of the mutual ſafety and welfare of the Company. I have force enough to retake the three or four places the Marattas are in poſſeſſion of, as aforeſaid. I lately requeſted the Engliſh to ſend me a battalion of Sepoys, thereby to make a trial of their intentions, whether they would aſſiſt me with their Troops, according to their agreement, in caſe the Marattas began a war with me in future. I repeat, that after the monſoon, the Marattas will certainly come; and I hear their intention is to receive a large ſum of money from the Engliſh; wherefore, if the Engliſh and I be in union to prevent their ſchemes, it will be for our ſafety. For all which, we ſhould talk face to face, and determine it; wherefore, I deſired the Governor to ſend *Meeda Kiſtna Moodalier* to me; you will alſo ſpeak to his Honour about it. I ſent anſwers to the letters received: you will deliver them to the Governor and Mr. *Dupré*, and ſpeak yourſelf in a proper manner. The Governor and Council may conſult again upon the ſubject, and write me their real intentions clearly. You will, on your part, write me very fully.

No. 255. To *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 27th July 1769.

I have received your letter of the 1ſt inſtant; the contents of which I fully obſerved.

You tell me, that the Marattas, jealous of the friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Company and you, are deſirous of breaking the ſame; and, by penetrating into both our countries, to reap the advantage thereof. You therefore deſire I would conſider well, as the remedy ſhould ever precede the diſeaſe. This I underſtand.

Your putting me in this manner upon my guard, by acquainting me thus early of the danger you think I have to apprehend, I eſteem a ſtrong proof of the ſincerity of your regard; and you may be aſſured I ſhall take care accordingly to put matters on a proper footing; and for that purpoſe, and conformably to your advice, ſhall continue to write to the Governors of *Bengal* and *Bombay*, to concert meaſures with them for the peace, ſecurity, and advantage of the Company and their Allies, the good effects of all which will appear in good time. Meanwhile it is my hopes, that the intentions which you ſuppoſe the Marattas to entertain at this time, of diſturbing your Government, and that of the *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*, will not take place; they ſhall have no provocation on my part. You are certainly the proper and beſt judge of your own affairs; and knowing as you do, perfectly, the connections and intereſts of the Powers of *Indoſtan*, can with a diſcerning eye penetrate into the future conſequences of preſent actions, and determine how far they may excite jealouſies. I am not ſo competent a judge of this matter; nevertheleſs, out of regard to the firm friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, I thought proper to give you this hint, leſt your preſent operations, by creating a jealouſy of your intentions, ſhould produce in the end the ſame effect as the direct attack you inform me you had meditated upon certain places, which *Maudavarow* took from you ſome years ago; but from which attack you now ſay you will deſiſt, agreeable to my deſire. I am farther induced to mention this to you, as I have lately received a letter from the Subah's Court, informing me that *Cuddapah*, &c. diſtricts, againſt which your late and preſent operations have been and are directed, are tributary to and under the protection of the Subah of the *Decan*; and that the Sardars of thoſe places are faithful ſervants of the Circar, and Jaghirdars of the King. Upon this ſubject, conſidering your regard for juſtice, it will be ſufficient I refer you to the firſt article of the Treaty of Peace, and inform you, that before the concluſion of that Treaty, the Company had entered into a firm alliance and friendſhip with his Highneſs.

I do not know whether it was by your orders, or to your knowledge, that one of your Sardars, *Ally Zaman Cawn*, wrote a letter lately to *Banjor Yachem* Naigue, Polygar of *Vencatagerry*, adviſing him to ſend a Vakeel to you, and promiſing his intereſt to ſettle a friendſhip between you and the ſaid Naigue. This is very ſtrange. It is known to all the world, that the ſaid Naigue is an immediate dependant and faithful ſervant to *Carnatic Payen Ghaut*; and as that circar is in firm friendſhip and alliance with you, of courſe the ſaid Naigue muſt be ſo likewiſe. What further views your ſaid Sardar may have had, I am unacquainted with; but as it is contrary to the cuſtom of nations, for one Sovereign or his Officers to write in ſuch terms to dependants and ſervants of another, while peace and friendſhip is ſubſiſting, I thought it neceſſary I ſhould inform you of this matter, that you may enquire concerning the ſame; which I hope you will do, and adviſe me thereof.

Although four months are elapſed ſince the concluſion of the Peace, whereby it was agreed, that all places taken on both ſides ſhould be mutually reſtored, yet I am informed that *Cuttala* and *Cauiputtoor*, places belonging to the Circar of *Trichinopoly*, are not yet, or very

APPENDIX. No. 20.

lately were not, given up. This, I am perſuaded, muſt be contrary to your order; but it is fit you ſhould be informed of all theſe circumſtances.

I ſhould very willingly ſend *Moodoo Kiſtnah* to you, as a further means of cementing and increaſing the friendſhip between us; but he is grown ſo infirm and ſickly, that he is utterly unable to endure the fatigue of ſuch a journey; and indeed it ſeems to me the leſs neceſſary, as you have here ſo capable and faithful a ſervant as *Venajee Pundat*, through whoſe means all neceſſary intelligence may be conveyed reciprocally between us.

APPENDIX, No. 20.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, 12th March 1770.

PRESENT,

Joſias Du Pré, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley,
George Stratton,
George Dawſon,
Richd Brickenden,
George Mackay,
General *Smith*, abſent,
Mr. *Brooke*, indiſpoſed.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

ALTHOUGH little hath been ſaid on our Minutes in the courſe of the laſt two months, touching the ſtate of our political affairs, the Board have not been unattentive thereto; but as the ſeaſon is now approaching when the Marattas muſt determine either to remain the whole year on this ſide the *Kiſtnah*, or to repaſs it, the Board think it expedient now to review what hath paſſed, to conſider the preſent ſtate, and to form from thence what judgment they can of the future. It has been noticed in our Minutes, that application has been made to us by *Hyder Ally*, both by letter and by his Vakeel, for aſſiſtance. It has alſo been mentioned that a Vakeel has been ſent by *Maudavarow* to the Nabob, and to us, to demand our friendſhip and aid againſt *Hyder*; and it has been often repeated, that notwithſtanding the Treaty with *Hyder*, we had a juſt plea for not ſending any ſuccours to him, conſidering him as the agreſſor; and that the Marattas have no claim upon us for aſſiſtance. There is little cauſe to doubt but that the Marattas would demand the chout of the *Carnatic*, if they were diſengaged from the war with *Hyder*; and it is moſt probable they would do ſo, and detach a party of Horſe to enter the *Carnatic*, even during the War, if they were not apprehenſive that ſuch a ſtep would induce us to join our Forces to *Hyder*'s; on the other hand, *Hyder* ſeems to have been under great apprehenſions of our uniting with the Marattas againſt him, and as has already been obſerved, both have been earneſtly preſſing us for aid. The part we have acted has been that of endeavouring to keep alive the hopes and fears of both parties, by not determining in favour of either, and without promiſing aſſiſtance to the one or the other, giving both grounds to hope we would not aſſiſt his adverſary; which is in reality the fact, and our deſign in this conduct has been to protract the time and the War until the ſeaſon ſhall make it neceſſary for the Marattas to return, or reſolve to remain on this ſide the *Kiſtnah*; the ſeaſon is now at hand, and ſix weeks more will probably determine that point, to us ſo important. The queſtions at preſent are, Whether it is adviſable ſtill to perſevere in the ſame paſſive conduct, without taking any other meaſures? or, Whether any other, and what, meaſures ſhall be taken? We have now for two months perſevered in the ſame conduct, with a view to delay the time. With *Hyder Ally* our pleas have been, firſt the diſpatch of the *Britannia* to *Europe*, and the departure of the late Preſident; then the great avocations of the new Preſident, in reviewing and taking charge of his new department; and laſtly, that however well inclined we might be to ſupport the friendſhip eſtabliſhed, yet the late orders received from Europe reſpecting the Gentlemen coming out with full and unlimited powers over all the Companies affairs in *India*, made it neceſſary that we ſhould wait for their arrival. With the Maratta Vakeel, the negociation has paſſed through the Nabob; as *Madavarow*'s letter to the Preſident only enforces in general terms that maintenance of inviolable friendſhip, and refers for other matters to the Nabob; the Preſident has ſeldom ſeen the Vakeel, ſpoke reſervedly on every ſubject but that of general friendſhip, and left the reſt to the Nabob, who has aſſured the Vakeel of our good-will to his Maſter, but that our forms of deliberating upon every meaſure repeatedly in conſultation, eſpecially in matters of ſuch importance, neceſſarily demanded time.

Theſe excuſes and delays cannot ſtand us in ſtead much longer; and what we have to apprehend is, that ſhould the Marattas gain any ſignal advantage over *Hyder*, the deſpair of our aid may induce him to ſubmit to their terms, whilſt yet they have time enough left to turn their arms againſt the *Carnatic*; or, if *Hyder* gain the advantage of them, ſo as to oblige them to retire, his pride would be ſo much exalted, and his ſpirits raiſed, that it is to be doubted whether reſentment againſt us, for not aſſiſting him, might not induce him to diſturb our tranquillity; or, laſtly, if the two parties remain equal, whether they may not unite to invade the *Carnatic*, perceiving that we amuſed both without deſign to aſſiſt either. It is therefore propoſed, that in order to raiſe freſh doubts, new fears, and new hopes, in both parties, as well as to be prepared for every event, that a certain number of the Troops at *Vellour*, and of thoſe at *Trichinopoly*, be ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs to take the field; that a light field train for each be alſo prepared, and draft and carriage bullocks, with all other neceſſaries, be got ready; that a camp be marked out at a convenient diſtance from each place, and tents pitched, but that the Troops remain in garriſon till further orders.

And the Preſident having deſired General *Smith* to prepare a ſtate of the Troops to be ſo held in readineſs, and of thoſe to remain in garriſon, the ſame is now laid before the Board.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that after the laſt letter to *Hyder Ally* was wrote, and before it was ſent away, he received one from him, as entered in Country Correſpondence; to which a draft of an anſwer is now laid before the Board, which is approved.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 84. From *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 7th March 1770; and received 14th April 1770.

I was extremely glad to receive your agreeable letter. Your ſucceſſion to the Government, which was my long deſire, gave me ſuch an infinite joy and ſatisfaction, that it is impoſſible for me to expreſs them by words; if ſo, how is it poſſible to commit them in writing? May God grant you joy upon the occaſion, and daily increaſe your name and reputation, and that the Company's buſineſs may be diſpatched or regulated with daily ſucceſs through your good conduct and management.

I lately wrote to you fully, concerning the circumſtances of war between *Maudavarow* and myſelf. Now, by way of friendſhip, I take the liberty to adviſe you what happened afterwards to this day. When it was reported of *Maudavarow*'s coming to theſe parts, I, with my whole Army and Artillery, lay encamped near *Malſoor*, belonging to *Shanore*, oppoſite to his way; but he, turning from that road, marched by the way of *Cheetal Durg*, 25 coſs diſtance from the place of my encampment, into my own territories, and took poſſeſſion of

five

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five or ſix ſorts inhabited by ſome inhabitants, and put his own Garriſon in them; and then having left *Gopall Row*, *Reelcant Row*, *Shajee Boonſela*, *Ananda Row Raſte*, and *Devalet Row Gorpada*, who were his Sandars, with 10 or 12,000 Horſe for the defence of them, proceeded forward; and as the ſaid *Gopall Row*, &c. lay encamped within 20 cofs from me, I, by the help of God, went and attacked them by night; but they, not being able to maintain their ground, rode upon the horſes without ſaddles, and fled. A large number of horſes, camels, pallenkeens, tents, flags, and other goods, were taken as a prize by Muſſelmen; and after their camp was thus plundered, I halted one day at the place of their encampment; and on the next day I returned to the place of my own encampment. *Maudavarow*'s people who were in the ſaid fortreſſes, were entirely taken priſoners and cut off; and the fortreſſes were retaken. A body of 8,000 Horſe belonging to me, which were ordered lately by way of hurting party round *Maudavarow*'s Army, fell upon his catchee or ſupply of ſtraw, &c. and ſkirmiſhed about his Army, and ſeized about 3,000 Horſe: to this day, by the bleſſing of God, they are ſeizing more every day, at 100 or 200 Horſe at a time. I ſhall alſo march towards *Maudavarow*; and, by the help of God, whatever may happen hereafter, you will hear of it. In conſideration of the union between us, the Army and Artillery which are with me, are your own; notwithſtanding, out of regard to the firm agreement mentioned in the Treaty between us, if the Company be but pleaſed to ſend but a ſmall force to join and act in concert with me, to ſave the good appearance, and to be talked of by the people, it will be very proper. It is a thing very apparent, that the good harmony and ſincere friendſhip between the Company and myſelf, will be beneficial to many affairs, and be a means to ſtrike a terror into the Enemy, and to increaſe the friendſhip and regulate the affairs of both parties. By the bleſſing of God, you are acquainted with all matters, and it will be needleſs for me to write.

By way of a friendſhip and freedom, I take the liberty to ſend 4 horſes of a good colour, that came from *Velayet* or Turkiſh Country, and bought by myſelf, together with 5,000 Star Pagodas, as a price for a kalet or rich veſt, &c. and deſire your acceptance of the ſame, that I may be glad, as I remain in the campaign with my Army clear of baggage, and have not with me my joſhacana and ſeelcana (that is, cloth and jewels, tents and ſtable of elephants) for which reaſon I ſend you the above money as a price for the kalet and elephant. Make no difficulties, but be pleaſed to accept them that I may be glad. Continue your correſpondence of letters adviſing me of your health, as it will afford me an infinite ſatisfaction. May your happineſs and gladneſs increaſe.

A note incloſed.
3 horſes of abaras colour.
1 D° abluck-black colour.

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Letter from Meſſrs. *Church* and *Sibbald*, to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*.

To the Honourable *Joſias Dupré*, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Incloſed is a duplicate of our laſt Addreſs, under the 21ſt February. Agreeable to what we therein wrote you, we ſet out from *Urgond* ſhortly after, and arrived at this place yeſterday, where we found the Nabob. We had an interview with him in the evening, when we acquainted him, that we were ready to attend on any matters he might have to offer, regarding your ſide, and ſhould communicate them to your Honour, &c. agreeable to your orders. He deſired us immediately to inform you, that as there is at preſent the ſtricteſt friendſhip between him and the Honourable Company, which he will punctually maintain on his part, he expects you will aſſiſt with a body of Troops, agreeable to Treaty, againſt the Marattas, who, not ſatisfied with the chout which he ſays he has duly paid them, ſtill continue moſt unjuſtly to ravage and plunder his territories. The force he requires is 300 Europeans and 3,000 Sepoys, with the uſual Artillery to ſuch a body; and ſays, their pay ſhall be according to the 2d article of the Treaty; beſides which, he engages to give the Honourable Company the ſum of three lacks of Rupees. Through the hopes and expectations of their aſſiſtance, he now ſeems well inclined to ſettle our privileges on this ſide on an advantageous footing; but we much fear, ſhould your Honour not come into his meaſures, that his former coolneſs will return again. He waited at this place for our arrival, and ſet out this morning for *Seringapatam*, where, at his earneſt requeſt, we have agreed to accompany him; and it is moſt probable we ſhall be with him, ſhould no orders from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to the contrary, till we can have the pleaſure of receiving your anſwer to this, which he has deſired us to requeſt may be ſent with all poſſible expedition. As we are informed by the Nabob, that the Honourable *Joſias Dupré*, Eſquire, has ſucceeded the late Preſident, we beg leave to offer our congratulations on that occaſion, wiſhing him all imaginable ſucceſs in his Government.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Richd Church,
J. Sibbald.

Belloor,
21 March 1770.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations; Monday, 30th April 1770.

PRESENT,

Joſias Du Pré, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Richd Brickenden,
George Mackay,
General *Smith* abſent.

Letters from Meſſrs. *Church* and *Sibbald*, received the 20th inſtant, read as follow:

Triplicate, dated 21ſt March at *Belleur*: adviſing, That in a conference they had had with *Hyder Ally*, he had demanded that we ſhould aſſiſt him with 300 Europeans and 3,000 Sepoys, with the uſual train of Artillery to ſuch a body of Troops, the expence of which he would defray according to Treaty, and moreover make the Company a preſent of three lacks of Rupees; that from the hopes of ſuch aſſiſtance, he ſeemed inclined to ſettle the Company's privileges on the Malabar Coaſt on an advantageous footing; and repreſenting their apprehenſions, that in caſe we ſhould not comply with his demand, that his former coolneſs will return; and deſiring our anſwer with all expedition.

Duplicate, dated at *Nurſingpoor* the 25th March: acknowledging the receipt of our letters of 13th and 26th February, which they had communicated to *Hyder Ally*, and with which he ſeemed well ſatisfied; dated at *Seringapatam* the 2d inſtant: repeating their requeſt, at the deſire of *Hyder*, to be furniſhed with an expeditious anſwer to their letter of 21ſt March; and adviſing of their intentions of continuing with him at leaſt three months longer.

We have hitherto, under various pretences, deferred giving a poſitive anſwer to the repeated demands made by *Hyder Ally* for aſſiſtance, as well from a deſire to avoid engaging in freſh troubles, as from the hope of being able to gain time until the arrival of the expected Commiſſioners, without whoſe concurrence we ſhould be unwilling to determine finally on the part we are to act; but

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but as it is uncertain when they may arrive, and as *Hyder* will probably expect a decisive answer to his demands, especially if the Marattas should not return this season, and it may not be in our power to observe any longer the same neutral system; it becomes necessary to state the motives and reasons for and against our taking part either with the Marattas or *Hyder Ally*, and the consequences to be apprehended from our engaging with the one or the other. It has already been observed (and we believe it will not admit of a doubt) that our assistance added to the Marattas, will enable them to reduce *Hyder Ally* entirely; but what are the consequences to be expected, were *Hyder Ally* subdued, and the whole Mysore country added to the dominion of the Marattas? The power of the Marattas, which is already too great, would be thereby increased, and rendered more dangerous. We could not expect that the Marattas would, in consideration of the assistance afforded them, suffer the *Carnatic* to remain in peace and tranquillity; on the contrary, it is most justly to be apprehended that they would take the first opportunity of exacting whatever demands they might think proper from the Nabob, and which their situation would then enable them to do at pleasure, and the *Carnatic* must of course be constantly exposed to their ravages and devastations. These are certainly the very obvious consequences to be apprehended, were the Marattas to conquer the Mysore country, and which, with our assistance, they could not fail doing. Let us now consider what effects our assisting *Hyder Ally* against the Marattas may produce.

It has always been allowed that *Mysore* is the most effectual and natural barrier to the *Carnatic* against the designs of the Marattas; and although our assistance given to *Hyder Ally* would not enable him to reduce the Marattas power, it would nevertheless prevent their gaining possession of that country, which ought to be a principal object of our attention; for, were that barrier removed, it is not the consideration of our having acted for or against the Marattas that would save this province from their depredations. Another, and that too not the least consideration that should weigh with us in this matter, is the article of the Treaty: it is certain the Treaty was an act of necessity, and the impossibility of our engaging to furnish any certain quota of Troops when demanded, was fully and clearly explained to *Hyder Ally* at the time of our entering into it. But although we thus in some measure reserved to ourselves the option of assisting *Hyder Ally*, or not, in case he were attacked, as it suited our own convenience, we certainly cannot, without a manifest violation of that Treaty, take part with the Marattas against him. Should *Hyder Ally* be able, without our assistance, to withstand the attempts of *Mauduvarow*, and after all oblige him to return to his own country without effecting his designs on *Mysore*, we must in that case expect that *Hyder Ally* will thereby acquire greater power and influence than ever; and that he will not only tax us with the breach of Treaty in not having assisted him when his country was so much endangered, but will take the first opportunity of revenging himself on the *Carnatic*, for the devastations of his country by the Marattas.

It has always been allowed, and that too with just reason, that nothing can reduce the Maratta power but dissentions among themselves; and it is fortunate for the other Powers in *Indostan*, that the Maratta Chiefs are always ready to take every advantage of each other; if therefore *Maudavarow* should determine to remain in the Mysore country after the swelling of the rivers, we may reasonably hope, that even the appearance of our assisting *Hyder Ally* against him, will encourage the Maratta Chiefs to avail themselves of his absence, by attacking his country when they are sensible he cannot return to its protection; by which means their differences would be increased, and they would thereby be engaged in quarrels among themselves, which alone can ensure the peace and tranquillity of their neighbours.

Having thus expressed our sentiments with regard to the consequences to be expected from our assisting either the Marattas or *Hyder Ally*, and as we would wish to have the advice and opinion of the Commissioners on a matter of so much importance; it is agreed to defer coming to any determination thereon, in the hope that those Gentlemen will arrive before matters are brought to such a crisis as to oblige us to resolve finally on the part we are to act. In the mean time, the President is desired to request of the Nabob to give the Committee a meeting, in order that his opinion may be obtained with regard to the measures to be taken.

Jos. Dupré,
Warren Hastings,
Saml Ardley,
Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Richd Brickenden,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Consultations, the 29th October 1770.

PRESENT,

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Joseph Smith,
Saml Ardley,
John Smith,
Richd Brickenden,
Henry Brooke,
George Stratton,
Geo. Mackay.

Read a Letter from Messrs. *Church* and *Sibbald*, dated at *Seringapatam* the 10th instant: advising, That *Hyder* had earnestly represented to them the necessity of our assisting him; that the Marattas would hearken to no terms of peace; and requesting they would represent the same to us: advising, that he had given out his intentions of proceeding to *Bengalcure*, but that they rather think he will remain where he is, and endeavour to make a stand against the Marattas there, or in some parts of the Bednore country, from whence he can draw sufficient supplies of provisions.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Consultations, the 14th January 1771.

PRESENT,

Josias Dupré, Esquire, Governor, President,
Warren Hastings,
Samuel Ardley,
John Smith,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
George Mackay.

Read the following Letter from Mr. *Sibbald*, at *Onore*:

To the Honourable *Josias Dupré*, Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Inclosed is duplicate of my Address of the 15th instant; and yesterday I received a letter from the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*, in which he has so very pressingly desired me to address your Honour, &c. on the subject of assistance, that I am under the necessity of troubling you with this, as I could not evade the appearance of complying with his request, without giving him some disgust. As the Nabob's letter to me fully contains all he has desired me to represent to your Honour, &c. on the above subject, and in some measure sets forth his present situation, I have thought it not improper to inclose you a translate thereof; to which I beg leave to refer you.

The Nabob will, I believe, leave *Seringapatam* shortly, and fall back with his Army towards *Nagar*, as a very large

large body of the Marattas are within ten coſs of that place; their preſent demands are reported to be of ſo very extraordinary a nature as to afford no probability of a ſpeedy accommodation.

I remain, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
James Sibbald.

Onore, 17th Dec. 1770.

The Letter from *Hyder Aly Cawn*, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 11, is alſo read, and which being very expreſſive of his ſituation, it is ordered that a copy thereof be tranſmitted to the Court of Directors by the firſt opportunity.

No. 11. Tranſlate of a Letter from the Nabob *Hyder Aly Cawn* to Mr. *James Sibbald* at *Onore*; dated in *Seringapatam*, the 18th of the moon Shawbem, and received the 16th of December 1770.

I have received your letter, and obſerve that you have ſent that from the Honourable Governor and Council of *Chinaputtam* to *Bombay* to be explained, and as ſoon as you receive the anſwer, I deſire you will ſend it me. I now deſire you will write again to the Honourable Governor and Council of *Chinaputtam*, and deliver your letter immediately to my Hircarrah, and I will forward it. You know what I have often told you, that my country is a wall to the *Carnatic*, and I have theſe many years kept the Marattas employed, ſo that they could not give trouble to your circar; therefore it is the intereſt of your Company to defend me againſt the Marattas, for if they were to get poſſeſſion of my country, the next thing would be to give your circar trouble: but, when the Engliſh and my circar is one, then who ſhall be our enemies, or who ſhall give us trouble? You know my dermurdar with your circar is to aſſiſt them againſt all their enemies, either Europeans or others; and if I was at any time to receive but one note from the Governor of *Chinaputtam*, that they wanted my aſſiſtance, I ſhould be immediately ready; and this I have told and aſſured you many times. In like manner I hope they will always act by me, as our dermurdar in this requeſt is the ſame; and as the Engliſh word and faith is a virtue, I have to this day aſſured myſelf that every thing will be done as I could wiſh. You have the news of my country, and that the Marattas are every day giving more trouble, and that *Gopul Row*, with his Horſe, is burning my country about *Ammuntfroor*, and coming nearer every day to *Mirgeer*. All this you write to *Chinaputtam*, to the Honourable Governor and Council, and deſire that they will not make delay, but ſend an anſwer ſoon, for the Marattas are enemies to every body, and the ſooner the buſineſs is done, the better for all. In the ſame manner you muſt write to *Bombay*, and do the buſineſs quickly, as you are Dawlutſhew of my circar, and the Engliſh and I are now one. Deliver your letters to the Hircarrahs, to be forwarded to me, as I have before deſired, and let me hear every day of your health, &c.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 29th November 1771.

PRESENT,

Joſias Dupré, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley.

RECEIVED this evening, advice that a party of Maratta Horſe had advanced as far as *Calachâvetum*, which they had plundered.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Letters, &c. delivered to him by the Nabob.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Trimbuck Row* to *Maudavarow Sadaſive*, the Maratta Vakeel, dated 20 November, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 166.

N. B. This Letter is worthy of attention, and is therefore entered here alſo at full length, with Remarks.

Extract of a Letter from *Trimbuck Row* to *Maudava Row Sadaſive*; dated 20th November 1771.

LETTER.

A. In the beginning of your Letter you tell me, that the Nabob had ſent his Troops to *Tanjour*, to demand the annual Peiſhcuſh from thence, which had not been received for two years paſt; and that although it was by no means the Nabob's deſign to take that country, ſtill there was no doubt but I ſhould receive letters from them, purporting, in various modes, their inability of making reſiſtance; to which, however, I ſhould pay no regard, but keep in view the Nabob's firm friendſhip, and that of *Anundarow*, whom you had diſpatched, would acquaint me of all particulars.

B. You doubtleſs remember what you wrote me, and the meſſage you ſent me by the ſaid *Row*. In hopes of the Nabob's friendſhip, agreeable to what I wrote to you, I did not agree to ſend aſſiſtance to the other [illegible] but diſmiſſed *Anundarow* with all ſpeed; no letter, however, of your negociations have I received.

REMARKS.

A. The Nabob, it is certain, did inform the Preſident, in the beginning of the expedition againſt *Tanjour*, that it was neceſſary to amuſe the Maratta Vakeel, who expreſſed his apprehenſion that the great preparations which had been made, and the formidable Army which was aſſembled, were not intended merely to recover the Peiſhcuſh and charges of the Rajah, but in fact to conquer the whole country, a meaſure of which the Marattas would certainly not remain peaceable ſpectators. Accordingly, the Nabob did aſſure *Maudavarow Sadaſive*, that his intention was only to call the Rajah to a proper account for his diſobedient conduct, take from him the Peiſhcuſh, and ſome conſideration for the charges of the expedition, as other Soubahs had done; that, no doubt, the Rajah ſeeing his errors, would repent, and comply; and matters would end properly; but if the Marattas interfered, the Rajah would be encouraged in his obſtinacy, and compel us to the neceſſity of taking his Fort from him. At the ſame time, the Nabob ſaid there were only pretences to quiet the Marattas, and prevent their diſturbing our operations, but that it was neceſſary to take the Fort, and totally reduce the Rajah, who was now become dangerous.

B. About the ſame time the Nabob informed the Preſident, but deſired it might be then kept a profound ſecret, that he had ſo ſettled matters with the Maratta Vakeel, that he hoped he ſhould have no diſturbance from the Marattas during the expedition. The charm by which it was effected, was a preſent of a lack of Rupees to *Trimbuck Row*, and conſiderable ſums more in preſents to other Sardars, and to the Vakeel; upon which the Vakeel had promiſed to write *Trimbuck Row*,

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LETTER.

C. And I am continually receiving your letters from *Tanjour*, adviſing of the batteries being advanced cloſe to the ditch of the fort; that every morning or evening it was expected to be ſtormed; that they (the Tanjoreans) had no further ability of reſiſtance, and that the Gentoo Government there would be loſt. It appears to me, that the Nabob keeps you by promiſes, ſweet words, and a great deal of kind treatment, and carries his views to the reduction of the place, having entirely eraſed from his mind the promiſe which he made to you; and as to us, he thinks we are totally engaged in the expedition againſt the Naigue.

D. His engagement to you was, that in ſix weeks time meaſures would be taken for aſſiſting *Serumunt* *; that Orders were coming from *Europe*, and that he would give you an anſwer; and that in the interim the country in the *Payen Ghaut*, which was to have been given to him as a Jaghire, ſhould not be laid waſte; all which were political expreſſions, and I am ſurprized that you, with all your wiſdom, did not ſee into them: at all events, however, I am not to blame. What has been ſaid on this ſide has been done. You ſwallow deceit, and write what is not performed. Now alſo you have wrote me a long letter, but do not mention a ſyllable of matters being adjuſted with *Tanjore*; the War ſtill continues; God forbid it ſhould ſo happen, but if the Fort of *Tanjore*, which *Serumunt* eſteems in the ſame light as *Poonah*, ſhould be loſt, which way ſhall we be able to ſhew our faces? At laſt, inſtead of friendſhip, we muſt have enmity with the Nabob. I ſee by your manner of writing, that after the buſineſs is ruined, you will tell me, you did not imagine it would be ſo. I think it neceſſary to ſend an Army in the *Payen Ghaut*, to lay waſte the Country of the Naigue. Acquaint me now of the real ſtate of matters there, and do not bring upon yourſelf a bad character in the opinion of the *Serumunt*. You tell me, that Peace has probably been made with *Hyder Naigue*. I am aſtoniſhed! What, when there is ſuch a well-wiſher and truſty perſon as you there on the part of *Serumunt*, and the Nabob, ſuch a firm friend of his alſo, keeps you there in hopes of aſſiſtance, how ſhould Peace be made? Even now our friendſhip ſtill remains, and if the Nabob looking forward will make Peace with the Rajah of *Tanjore* in an equitable manner,

E. And ſend to the aſſiſtance of the *Serumunt* the ſame body of Troops as is employed there; he will acquire a name, and experience the friendſhip of the *Serumunt*.

REMARKS.

At the time of writing the letter on which we are now remarking, this money had not been paid, and therefore, ſays *Trimbuck Row*, *no effect of your negociation have I yet ſeen.* The money however is now paid, which may probably appeaſe the angry Chief for awhile. See the Nabob's Letter to *Trimbuck Row*, entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 165, and dated 29th November.

C. Notwithſtanding what he ſays in this paragraph, *Trimbuck Row* had actually received the news of the Peace with *Tanjour*, but it ſuited his purpoſe to conceal it. The plain meaning is this: You, ſays he to the Vakeel, are receiving douceurs from the Nabob, and join with him in deceiving me. As I cannot march the Army profeſſedly to enforce the payment of my promiſed douceur, I will come under pretence of ſuccouring *Tanjour*, which I find the Nabob means to take.

D. About the beginning of September, at the time the Army was in motion, and about the time that the arrangements related in the notes A. and B. were made, the Nabob informed the Preſident, that the Maratta Vakeel was more urgent than ever for a deciſive anſwer to this propoſition about aſſiſtance; and it was neceſſary, at all events, to find ſome expedient for a delay, that would carry us near the time of the rains, as we might hope the *Tanjour* expedition would be at an end; he deſired the Preſident would give the Vakeel a meeting, and endeavour to put him off with hopes: accordingly the Nabob and the Vakeel met the Preſident at the *Garden Houſe*; after much converſation in the uſual Aſiatic manner about it, and about it, the Vakeel ſaid, he had been waiting a long time here to little purpoſe; that our waiting for Orders, put him in mind of a debtor who, as a general anſwer to all his creditors, wrote over his door, "Come and "be paid to-morrow;" they came again and again, and found it was ſtill to-morrow. He was anſwered, That our latter ſhips might certainly be expected to arrive before the change of the monſoon, which would be in about ſix weeks; that no doubt, in that time we ſhould receive Orders, and he ſhould have an anſwer, whether we would or would not aſſiſt them. He replied, And ſuppoſe at the end of ſix weeks you ſhould not have received theſe ſame Orders, what then? Why then, he was told, they might take what ſteps they thought proper: we could ſay no more. This, but much more effectually, the palliative mentioned in note B, produced a promiſe from the Vakeel, that we ſhould not be diſturbed for ſix weeks.

E. It is worthy remark, that not only in this letter, but in the whole courſe of the Maratta negociation, very little attention has been paid by them to the Company's Government here. We have been invited to an interview juſt when it ſuited a preſent purpoſe, but every thing has been managed by the Nabob; and when Sir *John Lindſay* was here, much Court was paid to him alſo. Accordingly, the Company's Forces are generally ſpoken of in all the letters and advices from the Maratta camp, as if they were at his command: "We expect you to join us, and bring with you the Feringues "or Engliſh;" this is the uſual ſtyle.

Maadavarow.

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I have left 10,000 Horſe oppoſed to *Hyder Naigue*, and am advanced myſelf, with the main body of the Army, near to *Bengalore*. I have diſpatched *Kiſtbun Row Balacount* with 15,000 Horſe and 10,000 Pundaras towards *Kiſtnagherry*, and it is my deſign likewiſe to proceed there myſelf by and by. Send me an anſwer to this letter with the utmoſt expedition.

The report of the Hircarrahs who brought this Letter:

They ſay they ſet out the 20th of November, and at *Cudapanatam* met the Hircarrahs who carried the news of the Peace with *Tanjour*. *Trimbuck Row*'s Army was then three days journey from *Cudapanatam*.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Morari Row* to the Nabob, dated 24th November, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 167: urging the Nabob to ſend aſſiſtance to *Trimbuck Row*, and either to pay a viſit to him, or ſend his ſon *Omdat ul Omrah*; adviſing of *Trimbuck Row*'s arrival near the Paſſes, whom he had prevailed on not to enter them; recommending to the Nabob to pay *Trimbuck Row* a viſit, or ſend his ſon; and offering to come himſelf to the Nabob, when every thing will be ſettled.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Morari Row* to his Vakeel *Sacreeputrow*, dated 23d November, No. 168: directing him to repreſent to the Nabob, the impropriety of his having undertaken an expedition againſt *Tanjour*, and neglected that, on the other ſide the Paſſes; that he and *Trimbuck Row* would have obliged the Rajah to ſubmit to proper terms; that *Trimbuck Row* had propoſed ſending 15,000 Horſe to the Rajah's aſſiſtance, and to enter the Paſſes with 20,000 more; that he had accordingly arrived between *Boodicotah* and *Antagerry*; that he had diſpatched 12,000 Horſe into *Hyder*'s Country, on this ſide the Paſſes: recommending, that the Nabob ſend an Army of Europeans, Sepoys, and Artillery, to the aſſiſtance of the Marattas, when the management of the country on the other ſide the Paſſes will fall into the Nabob's hands.

The following Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob, and delivered by him to the Preſident at the ſame time, are alſo now read.

Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob from the Maratta Army, under date the 28th November 1771.

Adviſe, That the 25th, in the evening, *Trimbuck Row* aſked *Hyder Naigue*'s Vakeel, what his maſter had wrote? that the Vakeel told him his maſter had mentioned he would pay the ſum of fifty lacks of Rupees in ready money, and give Soucar bills for twenty more, payable at a fixed period, and would alſo ſend his ſon *Teepo* with a force to meet him. To which *Trimbuck Row* replied, telling him to inform his maſter, in four days he would acquaint him. The intelligencer then ſays, that *Trimbuck Row*'s intention is this, that as by the *advancing of his Troops*, the affair of *Tanjour* has been acquieſced, a terror muſt now be ſtruck in the *Arcot* country, the Chout that is to be given by the Nabob paid (a lack of Rupees, more or leſs) aſſiſtance obtained, and if the Nabob will not come to ſee him, that one of his ſons would come, and Peace being eſtabliſhed, that he then ſhould proceed againſt *Hyder*, with the Troops of aſſiſtance ſo obtained; and if the Nabob ſhould neither give money nor aſſiſtance, but be in friendſhip with *Hyder*, in that caſe, ſome favour muſt be ſhewn to *Hyder*, the Ghauts paſſed, and an expedition undertaken againſt the *Arcot* country. That the 26th of November, *Appajee Ram* received further letters from *Hyder*; telling him, at all events to make Peace, and that he would agree to ſend aſſiſtance; in conſequence of which, the ſaid *Appajee Ram* went to *Morarow*, and acquainted him thereof; after which they both went to *Trimbuck Row*, and the former told him, You have hitherto, Sir, been of opinion your deſires were not complied with; I have now a letter from my maſter, ſaying, that he will comply therewith; ſhew your kindneſs therefore, and make Peace; the ſum of fifty lacks of Rupees ſhall be paid to you, in ready money, and a Soucar's bill given, and *Teepo Saib* will come to your aſſiſtance with 2,000 Horſe, 4,000 Sepoys, and ten pieces of cannon. That after this, *Morarow* alſo told *Trimbuck Row*, *Hyder*'s Vakeel, ſays he, will act agreeable to your deſire; give us therefore ſuch of the diſtricts you have taken, as may appear to you proper, and ſome how or other make Peace. To which *Trimbuck Row* replied, after my arrival in the *Arcot* country, I will give an anſwer reſpecting the buſineſs. The caſe is, that if the Nabob will make Peace, and ſend his aſſiſtance, *Bengalour* muſt be taken; but if they*, being in friendſhip with *Hyder*, neither make Peace, nor ſend aſſiſtance, but on the contrary come to make War againſt us, in that caſe ſome favour muſt be ſhewn to the Naigue, the whole of the countries I have taken from him, *Chittebalapore* excepted, reſtored to him, what money he gives accepted, his aſſiſtance taken, and then we muſt proceed againſt the *Arcot* country. The Nabob, it is true, is in friendſhip with the *Serungunt*; but he may poſſibly think I am inſolent, and muſt be puniſhed, and on that account has entered into no negociation, nor even ſent away my Vakeel. That after this converſation, *Trimbuck Row* and *Morarow* had a private conference together, and it was determined to diſpatch letters to the Nabob, which accordingly each of them has done. That *Teepo*, *Hyder*'s ſon, had attacked the detachment under *Waumaurow* (which had attempted the ſiege of one of *Hyder*'s forts) defeated the ſame, took fifty horſes and an elephant; in conſequence of which, *Waumaurow* had wrote to *Trimbuck Row* for a reinforcement of 2,000 Horſe, but no anſwer had been ſent to his letter at the time of this intelligence being diſpatched. That upon the march of the Maratta Army lately, *Hyder*'s Horſe had attacked the rear thereof, and had carried off three camels load of artillery ſtores, and ſoot camels, and between 50 and 60 bullocks load of baggage belonging to the Army. That ſecret advice had been received at the Maratta camp, that *Hyder* had collected together 4,000 Horſe, 10,000 Sepoys, and 10,000 Carnatic Peons, and had got fifty pieces of cannon, ready mounted upon their carriages. That upon the repreſentation of a perſon in the Maratta camp to *Morarow*, that if the Army was to proceed to the *Arcot* country (where there are a great many Pagodas) the country would be plundered, and that he, as a Friend to the Nabob and *Maudavarow*, ſhould prevent the Army paſſing the Ghauts; *Morarow* ſaid, that he had wrote a letter to the Nabob, to which, if a proper anſwer was received, it was well; if not, he would go himſelf to the Nabob, taking with him only a palankeen and two horſes, perſuade the Nabob, and bring him back with him. The intelligencer here ſays, he is of opinion, that anſwer ſhould ſoon be diſpatched to *Morarow*'s letter; for if not, he thinks the advanced part of the Army will paſs the Ghauts. That *Trimbuck Row* had received a letter from *Opparow*, adviſing of his having croſſed the Paſs of *Boudecotah*, and arrival in the country towards *Paulicut* and *Singarapitta*; and that *Trimbuck Row*, in conſequence of the great diſtance *Opparow*'s and *Waumaurow*'s corps were from him, would march from *Huſſoor* by the road of *Boudecotah*, croſs the *Coepum* Paſs, and proceed towards *Cauveripatam* and *Kiſtnogherry*.

The Committee think it neceſſary to obſerve, that the advices we receive from the Nabob upon any critical occaſion, generally lead to the queſtion, and ſupport the meaſures the Nabob wiſhes us to take. *Hyder Ally* in the above intelligence paper, is repreſented as not only ſoliciting for Peace, but offering to join the Marattas to enter this province. This is contrary to our advices; and the Preſident acquaints the Committee, that *Hyder*

* Supposed to mean the Nabob and the Engliſh.

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Ally's Vakeels had aſſured him, that although their maſter had a Vakeel with *Trimbuck Row*, yet there was one article inſiſted on, which their maſter would not conſent to, viz. to join the Marattas to invade the *Arcot* country. How far the Nabob's intelligence may be depended on, or what credit may be given to our advices, and the aſſurances of the Vakeel, we cannot ſay.

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, That the Nabob had informed him, that from the above letters and intelligence, he thought there was no room to doubt but the Marattas would enter the province; and therefore deſired that the Committee would immediately deliberate on the meaſures to be taken.

It is with infinite concern, the Committee obſerve the repeated and earneſt repreſentations of the Board and this Committee, in their ſeveral addreſſes of the 31ſt of January, 6th of April, 4th of June, 10th of Auguſt, and 29th of September, to the Court of Directors, of the very critical ſituation of affairs with reſpect to the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*, which were ſo fully and clearly explained, in order to enable them to give us their ſentiments and orders, with reſpect to the conduct they would with us to obſerve in ſo important and intereſting a matter; we ſtill find ourſelves not only without orders, but without the leaſt intimation of their opinion thereon. It is true, that the expectation and non-arrival of thoſe orders, have furniſhed us with a plea for procraſtination for ſome time paſt; but we fear that will not long avail us, at leaſt with regard to the Marattas, whom (as we are told) nothing will divert from the intention of entering this province, but our ſending a force to aſſiſt them in reducing *Myſore*. The Committee therefore think they can no longer delay taking under their moſt ſerious conſideration, the meaſures neceſſary to be purſued in this critical juncture; and although our ſentiments ſhould not be conformable to the orders we may hereafter receive, yet we can never be accuſed of raſhly adopting meaſures, without having firſt fully explained all circumſtances to the Court of Directors, and waited their orders as long as poſſible, conſiſtently with the ſafety of the *Carnatic*, and the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions.

The better to enable the Committee to determine on this important ſubject, it is neceſſary to ſtate in brief, the preſent ſituation of the Marattas, *Hyder Ally*, the Nabob, and ourſelves.

The Marattas have now been engaged in a continued war of two years with *Hyder Ally*, and have ſhewn a determined reſolution to deſtroy him, and annex the *Myſore* dominions to their preſent poſſeſſions. The *Myſore* country is already impoveriſhed and depopulated, and all but the principal forts have fallen into the hands of the Marattas. The Nabob aſſures us that they have cut off all communication with the *Biddenure* country, from whence *Hyder* uſed to draw his ſupplies, and as he is unable to oppoſe them in the field, he can have nothing to depend on, but the proviſions laid up in his principal forts, which muſt of courſe be greatly exhauſted. The Marattas have publiſhed their intentions of invading the *Carnatic*, and have actually advanced to the borders; and ſome ſtraggling parties have plundered *Caleſpuck*; the Nabob is of opinion they certainly will enter the province as ſoon as the ſeaſon ſhall favour them, which will be about the beginning of January, when the crops are on the ground, from which time they will have till the latter end of April to ravage and lay waſte, even ſhould they propoſe returning into their own country this ſeaſon. By late advices we learn, that *Narrain Row*, with a body of 20,000 Horſe, was on his march to join them; and whether they be intended to reinforce the Troops now in the *Bala* Ghaut, or to relieve ſome of thoſe who have been long on ſervice, ſuch a body of freſh Troops will be a great addition to this ſtrength.

With reſpect to the Nabob, he ſeems, as well he may, to be under great apprehenſions of the conſequences of their entering the province; and declares, that as the country will be entirely ruined, the Army will have nothing to ſubſiſt on but the grain in the forts: that it will be utterly out of his power to furniſh any money for the expences of the Troops, beyond that now due from him for the current charges, amounting to about four lack of Pagodas.

With regard to ourſelves, we have not the means of providing ſupplies for the Army, or of procuring money for our current expences, but by the aſſiſtance of the Nabob. The whole revenues and reſources of the *Carnatic* are in his hands, and when the country is ravaged and deſtroyed, they muſt of courſe fail.

This being the preſent ſtate of affairs, it remains to be conſidered, what meaſures appear the moſt eligible for the ſecurity of the *Carnatic*, and the Company's poſſeſſions in it; and for this end, there appears but three modes to be purſued:

1ſt. Either to join the Marattas, which, for the preſent, may prevent their entering the province; or,

2dly. To join *Hyder Ally*, provided he can furniſh money for the expences of the Army, and can procure ſufficient ſupplies of proviſion for their ſubſiſtence; or,

3dly. To collect together a body of Troops, in ſome central poſition, where they may beſt oppoſe the Enemy, either by detachments or otherwiſe, and be enabled to cut off the ſupplies from the Maratta Army.

With reſpect to the firſt propoſition, of joining the Marattas, it might here appear needleſs, after having ſo fully and clearly expreſſed our ſentiments on the ſubject, in many parts of our proceedings, and in our letter to the Court of Directors, to enter into a freſh diſcuſſion thereof; it might ſuffice to declare, that our ſentiments continue invariably the ſame. Nevertheleſs, the Committee think it neceſſary, now, to recite the reaſons and motives which have weighed with them againſt ſuch a meaſure, that the whole may appear at one view, and which will come properly under the following heads:

1ſt. The Orders of the Company.

2dly. Our Treaty and engagements with *Hyder Ally*.

3dly. The opinion of the other Preſidencies. And,

4thly. The dangers and fatal conſequences to be apprehended from ſuch a meaſure.

Although we have not yet had any anſwer from our Conſtituents, to our repeated repreſentations of the embarraſſments we labour under, for want of their clear and preciſe inſtructions with reſpect to our conduct in the preſent critical ſituation of affairs; yet it is evident, from the whole ſpirit of their orders to this and the other Preſidencies for ſome years paſt, that they look upon the growing power of the Marattas with jealouſy and apprehenſion; and that they eſteem it a very dangerous ſyſtem to lend them any aſſiſtance, to reduce or weaken the few remaining powers of *India*, capable of oppoſing their ambitious views, which evidently tend to the conqueſt of all *Indoſtan*. In theſe ſentiments we have repeatedly expreſſed our clear and hearty concurrence. We cannot therefore ſuppoſe that the orders we may receive will be contradictory to, or inconſiſtent with them, eſpecially when it will appear to the Court of Directors, from our late advices, that there is every day freſh cauſe to be apprehenſive of the growing power of the Marattas, by reaſon of the advantages they have acquired in the Northern Provinces, and the ſuperiority they have gained over *Hyder Ally*.

We come now to the ſecond conſideration, which has weighed with us in refuſing to aſſiſt the Marattas, viz. Our Treaty and engagements with *Hyder Ally*.

In the Article of the Treaty with *Hyder Ally*, reſpecting the aſſiſtance to be afforded to either party, it is provided nevertheleſs, That if the party requiring ſuch aſſiſtance ſhall have been the aggreſſor, the other party ſhall not be obliged to furniſh any aid. This clauſe was inſerted, as we expected he might, by acts of hoſtility, bring a War upon himſelf, and we ſhould then ſtand excuſed from aſſiſting without a breach of our engagements, in caſe we found it inconſiſtent with the intereſt of the

Company, or inconvenient to our affairs, to afford him any ſupport. We will not pretend to ſay, that the attack made on him by the Marattas was occaſioned by the ſteps he took after the concluſion of the Peace in 1769, which however was ſufficient to give umbrage. We believe that their attempts to ſubdue him would have been equally the ſame, had he refrained from whatever might be conſtrued an aggreſſion againſt them. He had not diſcharged the ſum he had agreed to pay them upon a compromiſe with them in 1767; his military and enterpriſing genius made him a dangerous neighbour to them, and ſuch a one as might, if ſuffered to acquire more ſtrength, moſt effectually oppoſe their plan of conqueſt in the South; theſe were ſufficient to draw on him the Maratta War, which has oppreſſed him now more than two years. Nevertheleſs, as his conduct towards his neighbours in levying contributions on them, and even not ſparing ſome diſtricts belonging to the Marattas, or under their protection, may, without forcing the ſenſe, be conſtrued an aggreſſion with reſpect to them, the clauſe in the Treaty furniſhes us with a juſt plea to decline aſſiſting him. But although we thus ſtand excuſed from complying with his requiſitions for aid, we are clearly of opinion that we could not, without a manifeſt breach of the Treaty, aſſiſt his Enemies; and we have declared to him, that although many circumſtances have prevented our uniting with him, yet that he may be aſſured that we will not take part with the Marattas againſt him.

We next proceed to the third conſideration againſt aſſiſting the Marattas; viz. the Opinion of the other Preſidencies.

The very valuable and extenſive poſſeſſions which the Company enjoy in *Bengal*, together with the advantage derived from the trade on the Malabar Coaſt, are certainly objects which demand our moſt earneſt attention, to the ſecurity and permanency of which, we ought to pay the greateſt regard in all our engagements. The Nabob is deſirous of aſſiſting the Marattas, and is ſupported by the King's Miniſter: he is not under any compulſion or reſtraint from us, and is at liberty to purſue ſuch ſteps as he ſhall judge moſt conducive to his own intereſt; but if his plans and meaſures are oppoſite to the ſyſtem recommended by the Company, ſhall we ſuffer ourſelves to be dragged into them contrary to our judgment, and contrary to every warrant of our Conſtituents? It was from an earneſt deſire that the three Preſidencies might act upon one uniform plan, and that no meaſures might be adopted at one Preſidency, that ſhould anyways claſh with the intereſts or views of the others, that we have conſtantly communicated to the Gentlemen of *Bengal* and *Bombay* our ideas and opinion on the ſtate of affairs: and there is no point which has been more attentively diſcuſſed by the ſeveral Preſidencies than that now before us, and no one in which we have more clearly and expreſsly concurred in opinion: we could therefore never be juſtified in an alliance with the Marattas in direct oppoſition to the ſentiments of the other Preſidencies, and after a clear and manifeſt conviction of the dangers of ſuch a meaſure. It has been the conſtant and uniform tenor of the Company's recommendation to this, and we believe alſo to the other Preſidencies, to be mutually aſſiſting to each other, and concert meaſures for that purpoſe; and they expreſsly tell us, that *Bengal* is the object of their greateſt attention, and that this Preſidency is only valuable as a barrier to it. [Vide Separate General Letter, dated 17 March 1769, Par. 25, and Letter to Select Committee, 17 March 1769, Par. 2 & 3.]

We have in former Minutes referred to the many paſſages in the late Letters from the Court of Directors which expreſs their ſenſe of the Power of the Marattas, the danger of raiſing that Power, and the expediency of ſupporting the Power of *Myſore*, as a barrier againſt the South: we refer to them again.

Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors.

Separate General Letter, 25th March 1768.

Par. 45. The Marattas, inſtead of being reduced, are like to be aggrandized by their conqueſts of the *Myſore* dominions, which brings them ſo much nearer to the *Carnatic*; the Soubah's weakneſs and indigence ſeems beyond all relief; and *Hyder Ally*, if leſs formidable to the Soubah and the Marattas, is more likely to be an Enemy to us, and to embrace every opportunity of diſturbing the *Carnatic*.

General Letter, 13th May 1768.

Par 7. It is with the utmoſt concern we find that the victory you have gained tends to involve us ſtill farther in this chaos of Treaties and Engagements, and you ſhould ſtill think your Enemy ſo formidable as to call in foreign aſſiſtance, though you have a moral certainty that the attack of the Soubah's dominions from *Bengal* muſt oblige him to a precipitate march to his capital, and the *Myſore* dominions, and *Hyder Ally*'s poſſeſſions on the Malabar ſide, all lay expoſed to your attacks: that you ſhould have recourſe to the Marattas for that aſſiſtance is ſtill more alarming, and from the ſpirit of your negociations with *Maudarow*, and your wild propoſal to *Bengal*, of putting up one of *Shaw Allum*'s ſons, we fear all the barriers of the Maratta Power will be broken down, and they will add the *Decan* and *Myſore* dominions to their extenſive Empire, and haſten that event you deſigned to avert, we mean, their conqueſt of the whole.

Par. 8. We ſhould have hoped, that the experience of what has paſſed at *Bengal*, would have ſuggeſted the proper conduct to you; we mean, when our ſervants; after the battle of *Buxar*, projected the extirpation of *Shujah Dowlah* from his dominions, and the giving them up to the King. Lord *Clive* ſoon diſcerned the King would have been unable to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the ſtrongeſt barrier againſt the Marattas and the Northern Powers, and therefore wiſely reſtored *Shujah Dowlah* to his dominions: ſuch too ſhould be your conduct with reſpect to the Nizam and *Hyder Ally*, neither of whom is it our intereſts ſhould be totally cruſhed.

Separate General Letter, 17th March 1769.

Par. 3. In our Letter of the 25th March laſt, we gave you our ſentiments at large with reſpect to the negociations with the Soubah of the *Decan*, and the conſequences apprehended from the Treaty you had entered into with him; and by our before-mentioned letter, under date 13th May, we expreſſed the dangers we apprehend from your calling in the Marattas to your aſſiſtance.

Par. 17. Your proceedings of the 28th April, ſtill leave us reaſon to apprehend you may enter into engagements with the Marattas for a body of Horſe, which we think will have very fatal conſequences, by haraſſing and laying waſte your own country as well as the Enemy's; and we apprehend, notwithſtanding the vaſt ſum of money they will coſt, they will be of very little uſe, it not being probable they will expoſe themſelves much for our ſervice; and when you have occaſion to diſengage yourſelves from them, diſagreements may ariſe of dangerous conſequences.

Letter to Select Committee, 17th March 1769.

Par. 4. Judge then our anxiety at ſeeing a ſyſtem adopted, ſo repugnant to our views as that of ſupporting *Mahomed Ally* in the *Myſore* country. We repeat, we ſhall not think ourſelves ſecure while we have a Soldier or Sepoy in that country; nor till we ſee it given to ſome Power who may preſerve it as a barrier againſt the

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Marattas, and who may be an uſeful Ally, ſhould we ever have occaſion to call in the aſſiſtance of a Country Power.

General Letter, 30th June 1769.

Par. 5. We muſt ſay, that upon principles of policy, we wiſh for a Peace with *Hyder Naigue*, whenever it can be obtained upon the moſt moderate terms; for our policy is to avoid every thing that tends to the increaſe of the Maratta power, which is evidently the misfortune of this War; for you are reduced to the neceſſity of being yourſelves the propoſers of new provinces to be added to the dominion of the Marattas, already poſſeſſed of half the Mogul empire.

Par. 6. Whether the Marattas have accepted or not of your offer, certain it is they will make the moſt uſe they can of the embroils of others; it is by this conduct they have arrived to their preſent degree of power, and our beſt policy is to check their growth by every opportunity, or at leaſt to avoid lending our force for their aggrandizement, which we certainly do, as often as we engage in Wars with the few remaining Chiefs of *India*, who are yet capable of coping with them.

Par. 7. *Nizam Ally* and *Hyder Naigue* are two of thoſe Chiefs, and it is our true intereſt to preſerve a good underſtanding with them.

Separate General Letter, 23d March 1770.

Par. 12. The Marattas and *Hyder*, you ſay, were at War, and it undoubtedly was our intereſt, on many accounts, to ſee the power of the Marattas, if not of both the contending parties, weakened, but by no means to interfere in the diſpute. Every Maratta that fell in the conteſt might almoſt be conſidered as one of our enemies ſlain. But you have diverted *Hyder*.

The Court are, if poſſible, ſtill more explicit in their Orders to *Bombay*: (See Extracts ſent us by the Select Committee there, in their Letter of the 5th of May 1771, from the Honourable Company's commands, under date 30th June 1769, entered in the Minutes of this Committee, 5th June laſt) in which they expreſsly ſay, that the whole tenor of their Letters to the other Preſidencies is to the ſame effect; accordingly, in our correſpondence with thoſe Preſidencies on the ſubject of the Marattas, it appears that they adhere to the ſyſtem recommended by the Court of Directors; and *Bombay* enters heartily into their ideas, that they are on the eve of actually declaring War in favour of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, in oppoſition to the Marattas. Suppoſing then that we were ever ſo well inclined to gratify the Nabob, to indulge his revenge againſt *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and gain him the preſent favour of the Marattas, by ſending the Company's forces to conquer for them the *Myſore* country, and eſtabliſh their power at our door: how could we juſtify the oppoſing the Company's forces of the *Bombay* Preſidency that may be acting with *Hyder Ally*; for we have reaſon to believe, from their laſt letter of the 21ſt October, that they will ſend him aid if he ſupplies them with money. We are aware of the anſwer, for it is already uſed by perſons of high character. It is this: Orders from home can only be temporary; and as times and circumſtances change, ſo meaſures and ſyſtems ought to be changed. It is a ſenſible obſervation, and as a general maxim we adopt it. Let us conſider how it may be applied to the particular caſe before us. When this Preſidency, in the year 1769, was on the very brink of ruin for want of money, and by that want was compelled to conclude a diſhonourable Peace, ſtrongly impreſſed with the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing ſome reſources in time of danger, and in failure of ordinary ſupplies, we ventured to recommend to *Bengal* the making a prudent reſerve; and *Bengal*, as ſtrongly convinced as we, concurred in opinion with us. Private or perſonal motives could not poſſibly have any part in this propoſal; ſafety to the Company's valuable poſſeſſions was the ſole object. It is true we had no authority to make ſuch a propoſal; but there were orders againſt it; and we ſurely had the general authority implied in our truſt, of doing the beſt in our judgment for its preſervation in caſes unprovided for. Had we erred in judgment, as the intention was laudable, and on public motives, we ſhould have thought it might have ſufficed to ſay, the plan was not ſuitable to the circumſtances of the Company's affairs at home, and therefore at all riſks muſt be laid aſide; but we are not to expect ſuch gentleneſs. We are ſtigmatized for making a Peace, to which we were compelled for want of money to wage War. We are harſhly cenſured for propoſing means to avoid ſuch another diſgrace, or worſe. This is the language in which we were reprimanded. We are told, that nothing but *infatuation* could have produced a ſyſtem of guarding againſt diſtant evils abroad, by ſuffering the Company to ſink under *immediate diſtreſs* at home. The diſtant evils were thoſe of War with the French, the Marattas, or other powerful neighbours, of which we are in conſtant danger. The *immediate* diſtreſs at home, is the neceſſity of paying a large ſpecific ſum to our Government, which ought to protect us; and a large dividend to the Proprietors of Stock, who have their capital at ſtake. We were commanded to lay aſide *ſo deſtructive a plan*; to wit, that of guarding againſt dangers abroad, by curtailing preſent advantages at home. *And a poſitive injunction* is added in theſe words; "That you do not at "any time engage in plans of *ſo important a nature*, with-"out our knowledge and concurrence, as it behoves you "to *concert with us only* ſuch ſyſtems as materially affect "the very exiſtence of the Company." And after this, ſhall we either deviate ourſelves, or *concert with the other Preſidencies*, a deviation from a general ſyſtem eſtabliſhed for all of them; a ſyſtem which does indeed moſt materially affect the very exiſtence of the Company? Forbid it prudence!

We now come to the fourth and laſt conſideration againſt an Alliance with them; viz. the dangers and fatal conſequences, to be apprehended from ſuch a meaſure.

We believe no one can doubt but the views of the Marattas evidently tend to the ſubjection of all *India*; this has been manifeſted by their conduct for ſome years paſt, but more eſpecially of late; and the advantages they have gained over the *Jauts* and *Rohillahs*, the obtaining poſſeſſion of the perſon and family of the Mogul, together with the ſuperiority they have acquired over *Hyder Ally*, are circumſtances but too favourable to their ambitious deſigns. Their purpoſes would be anſwered in ſeveral ways, if we could be prevailed on, to ſend the Company's forces to their aſſiſtance; firſt, it would inſure to them the conqueſt of the *Myſore* country, the principal forts of which, without our aid, may yet hold out a long time, and put them to the expence of a great force to ſtarve them out. If we join them, we muſt ſee that neither *Bengal* or *Bombay* can oppoſe them, for they cannot think the Company's ſyſtem ſo abſurd, as that one Preſidency ſhall oppoſe another; but if we do not join them, they know that *Bengal* and *Bombay* too, look upon them with jealous eyes; if we once join them, we muſt not expect that our labours will end with the reduction of *Myſore*; we muſt follow them to the conqueſt of *Biddenure*, and wherever they pleaſe to carry us, or fight our way back through them, and through a vaſt and deſolate country without proviſions; and thus our ſtrength being waſted in making conqueſt, and acquiring wealth and ſtrength for them, what ſhall afterwards give protection to the *Carnatic*, and the Company's poſſeſſions under this Preſidency? The Nabob will anſwer it in two words; and the late Plenipotentiary would echo back this reply, Maratta Faith! Maratta Faith! Of all the faithleſs Powers on earth, the Marattas are the moſt faithleſs; and ſhall we then ſubmit our necks to ſuch a yoke? Some excuſe may be made for the Nabob; but what ſhall be ſaid to the late Plenipotentiary, who, charged with the honour of the crown, could nevertheleſs humble himſelf

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himſelf before the Muſnud, and ſubmit to become the inſtrument of inſulting us; wantonly inſulting us with the *time when*, *the place where*, and the manner *how*, the Peace was made with *Hyder?* A Peace to which the want of aid from his idols compelled us; and yet, without a bluſh, could urge us to comply with the threats of a Maratta Chief; and at all perils ſend the Company's forces, the Britiſh forces, to his aid! Such are the honours the late Plenipotentiary endeavoured to acquire for the crown of *Great Britain*; the honour of humbling the *Eaſt India* Company before the throne of *Mahomed Ally Cawn*. *Hyder Ally* was the power in the South beſt able to withſtand their efforts, and oppoſe their deſigns: the reduction of him they therefore looked upon as a neceſſary ſtep to their views of univerſal conqueſt. And it is certain, that were they once poſſeſſed of the *Myſore* country, the *Carnatic* would be next expoſed to their ravages; by which means the country muſt be ruined. And if we have not money to pay our Troops, and proviſions to ſubſiſt them, the forts muſt ſoon fall into their hands. The *Decan* has now but little power of reſiſtance, and would become an eaſy prey to them; and they would then be enabled to bend their whole force againſt the Northern Powers. Theſe are the conſequences naturally to be expected from the reduction of *Myſore*; and although the Nabob may flatter himſelf, that a junction with the Marattas, to enable them to accompliſh it, might for the preſent free himſelf from their ravages, we are fully perſuaded that ſuch a meaſure would in the end be productive of ruin to the *Carnatic* and the Company.

From all which reaſons and conſiderations the Committee are clearly of opinion, that they ought not to enter into an offenſive alliance with the Marattas; and that the Nabob ſhould be acquainted, that we never will engage in ſuch a meaſure, unleſs commanded ſo to do by the Court of Directors.

We come now to the ſecond propoſition; viz. to join *Hyder Ally*, provided he can furniſh money for the expences of the Army, and can procure ſupplies of proviſion for their ſubſiſtence.

We have in our deliberations on this ſubject, repeatedly declared it as our opinion, that the ſupporting of *Hyder Ally*, that is, the *Myſore* Government, as a barrier to the Maratta power, would tend the moſt effectually to ſecure the peace and tranquillity of this province; and that in caſe the whole power and reſources of the *Carnatic* were at our command, ſuch a ſyſtem would be the moſt prudent and eligible; but while the Nabob not only objects to ſuch a meaſure, but urges the propriety of joining the Marattas to ſubdue *Myſore*, and in which he has been ſupported by His Majeſty's Miniſter, it would be imprudent in the Company alone to undertake it, as not having the means of carrying it into execution, and as it might cauſe a ſeparation of intereſts, which we ought as far as poſſible to avoid. We have annexed to the propoſition the condition of *Hyder's* being able to furniſh money and proviſions, ſince without them it would be impoſſible to undertake any thing in his ſupport. With regard to money, we know not how far his abilities may extend; but as to proviſions, we think it impoſſible he ſhould be able to furniſh ſuch ſupplies as would ſuffice for our Army, unaccuſtomed to the hardſhips the country Troops often ſuffer. We had proof enough of this in the laſt War. In this ſtate of uncertainty, and conſidering the Nabob's utter averſion to any meaſures in ſupport of *Hyder Ally*, we think we ought not to join him, or make any declaration in his favour, particularly as ſuch a declaration would in fact be an open declaration of offenſive War againſt the Marattas, which might endanger the Company's Charter: at leaſt ſuch has been the doctrine of His Majeſty's late Miniſter. If we are attacked, it will be neceſſary we ſhould take meaſures for our defence, and whatever ſteps ſhall appear expedient for that purpoſe, will be juſtifiable; which brings us to the 3d and laſt propoſition; viz.

To collect a body of Troops in ſome central poſition, where they may beſt protect the country, either by detachments or otherwiſe, and diſtreſs the Enemy by cutting off their ſupplies.

We have frequently declared it as our opinion, that it is impoſſible for Infantry effectually to prevent the ravages of Horſe. In theſe ſentiments we *ſtill* continue. We are nevertheleſs of opinion that we ought to oppoſe them as far as we are able; and it is not impoſſible but that, by vigorous and active meaſures, ſome advantage might be gained, or at leaſt that the Enemy may be ſo diſtreſſed by having their convoys intercepted, as to be obliged to abandon the province. Whereas, were we to put the Troops into garriſon, and ſuffer the Enemy to ravage and lay waſte at pleaſure, our reſources and proviſions would be exhauſted to no purpoſe, and no one advantage could accrue. We are therefore of opinion that General *Smith* ſhould be inſtructed, after placing ſufficient garriſons in the forts in the South, to hold the remainder of the Army in readineſs to march; that the Nabob be conſulted with regard to the moſt proper ſtation, and the ſupplies of money and proviſions he can furniſh. And as it will be neceſſary to prevent, if poſſible, *Hyder Ally* from making up matters with the Marattas, which he will no doubt do if he hath no aſſiſtance from us, the Committee are of opinion that a letter ſhould be wrote, expreſſing our good inclination towards him, but that we are at preſent unable, for want of orders from Europe to take any meaſures; that thoſe orders are ſhortly expected; and that in the mean time he be deſired to inform us, what aſſiſtance of money and proviſions we may expect from him, in caſe the orders we receive ſhould authorize us to join him.

Agreed that the foregoing Minutes be communicated to the Council.

The following Letters from *Trimbuck Row* and *Morari Row* to the Nabob, which were received yeſterday, incloſed in a note from the Nabob, are now read:

No. 170, from *Trimbuck Row:* accuſing the Nabob of making uſe of excuſes and evaſions, inſtead of ſending aſſiſtance, which is contrary to the friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Nabob and *Madarow*; that he, *Trimbuck Row*, had underſtood from *Morari Row*, that the Nabob was determined to join him, to be revenged of *Hyder*; that *Madarow Sadaſive* had wrote him two months ago, that the Nabob and the Preſident had ſolemnly promiſed that aſſiſtance ſhould certainly be ſent in ſix weeks, inſtead of which the Nabob had proceeded againſt *Tanjour*; that he had ſent a Force to ſuccour the place, and propoſing to mediate between the Rajah and the Nabob, and to unite in the Circar's affairs.

No. 171; from *Morari Row:* accuſing the Nabob of not performing his engagements, recommending the ſettling with *Tanjour*, and joining in the Circar's buſineſs, agreeable to his promiſe.

The Committee think it only neceſſary to obſerve on the above Letters, that without forcing an inference, it ſhould ſeem from them, as well as from other Letters and Advices from the *Bala* Ghaur, that the Nabob has not contented himſelf with barely making excuſes for not complying with the demands of the Marattas for aſſiſtance, but that he has gone further; that he has actually promiſed it; and which he might be induced to do from three motives: the firſt, that by promiſing to aſſiſt the Marattas in the reduction of *Myſore*, in which they would acquire great advantages, he hoped to prevail on them to defer their demand on him for Chout: ſecondly, as he hoped to annex to his poſſeſſions the *Barbamaul* country, &c. which appeared by the Letters he lately received

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received from *Trimbuck Row*, had been promiſed him as a Jaghire: and thirdly, to gratify his revenge, as expreſſed in *Trimbuck Row*'s Letter.

The Nabob, it is true, well knew how averſe we have conſtantly been to ſuch a meaſure, but he has all along entertained hopes, that either by the influence of His Majeſty's Miniſter, or the diſtreſſes to which he might be able to expoſe us, he ſhould compel us to adopt his plan.

Joſ. Dupré,
Warren Haſtings,
Saml Ardley.

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Extract of Fort *St. George* Military Conſultations, the 27th July 1772.

PRESENT,

Joſias Dupré, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Smith,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
John Maxwell Stone,
George Mackay,
Mr. *Stratton* abſent.
Mr. *Charles Smith* indiſpoſed.

READ a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn*, No. 130, adviſing of his having made Peace with the Marattas. Ordered, that the receipt thereof be acknowledged.

No. 130. Copy of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 9th; and received 23d July 1772.

You have probably learned from others, in what manner the victorious Troops of the Circar, ſurrounding the Maratta Army, uſed to make frequent attacks upon it, carrying off horſes and camels, and intercepting its proviſions. The Marattas at laſt, finding it difficult to procure a ſier of rice for a Rupee, and grain, &c. articles being ſcarce in proportion, greatly diſtreſſed, made propoſals for Peace, and *Morarow Rauſtya*, &c. Sardars, were the Mediators, and ſtrenuous for the ſame. Accordingly, in conſequence thereof, and particularly in conſideration of what you wrote to me ſome time ſince, I concluded a Peace with them; of which I adviſe you, in conformity to the friendſhip ſubſiſting between us. Always let me have the pleaſure of receiving friendly Letters from you, and adviſing of your health.

May your happineſs and proſperity increaſe!

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

No. 16. Copy of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated the 31ſt December 1771.

The 29th inſtant I had the pleaſure and ſatisfaction of receiving your Letter of the 11th, acquainting me, that "the Marattas, for theſe two years paſt, have been ſolicit-"ing you with intreaties and with threats, to join them "with the Company's Forces, which you have refuſed: "and that, in the ſpace of a month or ſix weeks, you "ſhould receive the Company's inſtructions, when you "ſhould comply with my propoſal," all which I duly obſerved. By God's bleſſing, you are a wiſe Sardar, and well informed of all circumſtances. I am entirely convinced both of your friendſhip, and the ſincerity of your engagements, and that you will act conformable to your promiſe, and to what you write me. The Marattas have, by various modes, likewiſe deſired my aſſiſtance, as you have been adviſed by ſeveral Letters lately ſent; and they have not even yet laid aſide all thoughts of it, although my Anſwers to them, both before and now, have been and are clear and explicit. Indeed, this matter of aſſiſtance is now the chief point in diſpute between the Marattas and me, and the bar that prevents the adjuſtment of matters. Conſidering therefore the keeping of a Vakeel with their Army, as entirely to no purpoſe, I ſent for him to me; and accordingly he arrived here the 27th inſtant. With an eye to the future, as well as for both our benefits, I informed you that the Marattas were all deceit, watching the opportunity of taking advantage of others; that their aim was to ſpread their ravages as far as poſſible; that their coming into this country was attended with various bad conſequences; and therefore, that the Company's and my Troops ought to be joined in the puniſhing and expelling them therefrom. I now alſo, conformable to the ſincerity of friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, and with a view to our mutual good in future, beg leave to mention, that by our junction and union, the Enemy, impreſſed with the utmoſt awe and dread, will deſiſt from their troubles, and requiſitions, and demands, and with ſhame be expelled from theſe parts without the attainment of their object; but ſhould it ſo happen that the Marattas this time acquire even the ſmalleſt thing from the Company's territories, it will be a bad precedent; for in that caſe, having once got a taſte of the ſweets, they will every year, prompted by their inſatiableneſs, invade this country, requiring impoſſibilities; whereas, ſhould their hopes of this nature be now entirely cut off, they will never dare to caſt ſo much as a look towards the Company's poſſeſſions, and both our countries will ever remain in tranquillity and ſecurity; the conſideration of which (agreeable to the friendſhip and union between us) induces me to mention, that if, conſulting your name and reputation, and the good of affairs in future, you ſhall poſitively determine on the junction of our Forces to expel the Marattas, and will adviſe me thereof, I will come myſelf, with my Troops and a conſiderable artillery, into the *Bana Mehaut* country; when, the junction of our Forces being effected, by God's bleſſing, the expulſion of the Marattas will, with the greateſt eaſe, be accompliſhed. I have been informed by my Vakeels, agreeable to what you mentioned to them, that it is moſt probable I ſhall be aſſiſted by the Governor of *Bombay*, as he had wrote to you on this ſubject: he has alſo wrote to me thereon. And what is conſiſtent with the friendſhip and engagements ſubſiſting between us, is this, that in time of need we ſhould join and aſſiſt each other. The plan that occurs to me for the Company's benefit, the extending the reputation of all their Sardars, and the reducing the power of the enemy, is, that the Troops dependant upon *Madras*, and my Troops, ſhould join together, and take, as their line, the oppoſing and puniſhing the Marattas here; and while this is doing, that the Troops dependant on *Bombay* begin their operations from thence, towards conquering and reducing the ſeveral places in the *Cocun* Country, a country worth a crore of Rupees, and ſituated near to *Bombay*. Conformable to this plan, I have lately wrote to the Governor of *Bombay*, telling him that the Marattas were engaged in theſe parts, and had left the *Cocun* country entirely expoſed; that ſuch another opportunity would never offer for the conqueſt and reduction thereof. That having therefore firmly reſolved on the ſame, he ſhould acquaint me of it, when I would diſpatch my fighting ſhips, with four or five thouſand experienced people, uſed to the ſea, on board, and under the command of a truſty Sardar, to join him; and whatever Forces belonging to the *Cocun* diſtricts, ſituated either on hills or on the plain, might be taken, together with whatever money or effects ſhould belong to the Company, I have nothing to do therewith, my object being the increaſe of "friend-ſhip between us." As this is the time for buſineſs, and acquiring a reputation, you will alſo write to him ſeparately on this ſubject, whatever may be proper, in conſideration of the friendſhip and freedom of communication

(void

(void of ceremony) ſubſiſting between us. You tell me, "that proviſion is eſſentially neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of the Troops, &c. and that, as my country has ſuffered through the incurſions of the Marattas, in caſe of the Company's Forces proceeding there, it will be difficult, if not impracticable, to procure the ſame." The Marattas, it is true, have taken and plundered five or ſix ſmall weak forts belonging to my country, places of reſidence for the inhabitants; but, by God's bleſſing, in the principal forts and places thereof, proviſions of all ſorts are in ſuch quantities, as to lay in heaps; indeed, I may ſay that each place has enough for the conſumption of the Company's and my Armies for the ſpace of a twelve-month. Make yourſelf, therefore, entirely at eaſe in this reſpect. By the Almighty's favour, in caſe of the Company's and my Troops joining, not only the Marattas will not be able to remain in this country, but immediately on our ſaid junction, they will ſet off, nor ſtop even to take breath, till their arrival at the river *Kiſtna*. I flatter myſelf that you will reflect on all theſe circumſtances, and ſoon let me have the pleaſure of receiving a favourable Anſwer to this Letter; in expectation of which I ſhall wait. For further particulars I refer you to my Vakeel. Always let me have the pleaſure of receiving Letters from you, adviſing of your health.

May your happineſs and proſperity increaſe!

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 23d January 1772.

Read a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn*, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 16: ſetting forth the advantages of our joining him againſt the Marattas, and the meaſures neceſſary to be taken by the Troops of this Coaſt and *Bombay*; repreſenting, that there are ſufficient ſupplies of proviſions at his principal forts, to which a draft of an Anſwer is now read and approved; informing him, that the orders we have received from the Company, prevent our ſending their Troops out of the *Carnatic*, to the aſſiſtance of any one.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 15, in anſwer to the Preſident's of 11th December, on the ſubject of aſſiſting the Marattas; and containing the Nabob's reaſons for ſuch a meaſure, which being only a repetition of the arguments which have been repeatedly urged by him, and anſwered by us, the Board think it unneceſſary to make any remarks thereon.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 22d April 1772.

PRESENT:

Joſias Dupre, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident.
Warren Haſtings,
Sam. Ardley,
John Smith,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
George Stracey,
Mr. *Brickenden* indiſpoſed.

THE following Letter, received from Sir *John Lindſay* the 19th inſtant, is now read:

Madras, 18th April 1772.

Gentlemen,

Notwithſtanding the little ſucceſs of my laſt Addreſs to you, my zeal for the public good, and that duty which I think inſeparable from the character with which I have the honour to be inveſted, will not ſuffer me to be ſilent when the Britiſh influence in this country ſeems ſo evidently on the decline. I mean to write, however, in the greateſt friendſhip, and though we may differ in opinion, it is by no means any part of my intention to give the ſmalleſt offence. In the diſcharge of that very important truſt repoſed in me, you muſt allow that I am obliged to give every poſſible attention to the political concerns of this country; and though I cannot obtain from you that confidence I could wiſh, yet I ſhould be happy to give you mine, as it is my earneſt deſire to remedy, as much as lies in my power, every inconvenience you may think you labour under. As things are at preſent circumſtanced, ſuffer me then to be open, and to communicate my thoughts to you freely. Should we think differently, you will readily aſcribe it, I hope, to my being unacquainted with the ſecret ſprings of action; and I flatter myſelf it will be a ſufficient apology to you for this repreſentation, when I tell you, that I think it a duty I owe to my Sovereign, to the Public, and to myſelf.

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To attempt an hiſtorical detail of the tranſactions of this Preſidency with the Nabob of *Arcot*, and the ſurrounding Powers, ſince the definitive Treaty, would be a kind of preſumption. To you who are ſo well informed, to mention the light in which every one of theſe appear to me, and to give you my opinion of them all, would be tedious, and I think unneceſſary at preſent. I ſhall however take the liberty to mention a few which appear to me to be more immediately neceſſary to be attended to in the preſent ſituation of affairs; which I hope you will forgive, eſpecially as this will ſerve to give you ſome idea of the opinion which may be formed by unprejudiced minds, of tranſactions, the ſecret motives of which they are totally unacquainted with.

The Peace which this Preſidency thought proper to make with *Hyder Ally*, eſpecially when I conſider the place where, the time when, and the manner how, I cannot help thinking exceedingly diſhonourable; nor from all that I know, can I be convinced of its expediency. That it was impolitic to the laſt degree is evident, for in itſelf it laid the foundation of new Wars, and gave the ſevereſt blow which the Engliſh reputation could experience in *India*.

Beſides, from his old friendſhip and preſent connections with the French, ſincerity to the Engliſh is not to be expected from *Hyder Ally*, however his diſtreſſed ſituation may induce him to make offers and propoſals, which on a future day he may neither have inclination or ability to execute; and it does not appear to me at all unnatural to ſuppoſe that he will think it conſiſtent to join our Enemy, ſhould ever a national War happen in this country.

I never have been able to form what appears to me occaſional conjecture, why the offers of the Marattas have been treated with ſo much contempt and neglect; and that the *Carnatic* ſhould be expoſed to their depredations, and the Company's intereſts in it, to ruin and deſtruction, when advantageous terms, and very tempting offers of friendſhip, have been repeatedly made. I was willing to perſuade myſelf, that the reaſon of ſuch an apparent diſpoſition to ſupport *Hyder Ally*, without any appearance of preſent or future advantage to the Company, in the leaſt, to be compared with the propoſals of the Marattas, could only be to maintain their power, and to attempt the eſtabliſhment of a kind of balance in *India*. Had I been witneſs to vigorous meaſures; had I ſeen the appearance of preparations in the leaſt equivalent to ſo great an undertaking, I ſhould in all probability have concluded you thought you had good reaſon for ſuch conduct, but which I am not able to diſcover. Scarce any thing like warlike preparations, though it is now eight months ſince you expreſſed your apprehenſions of an approaching War with one of the moſt formidable powers in *India*; when I aſſured by your Preſident, that carriages for a battering train are wanting, and that even two months would ſcarce be ſufficient to put ſuch a body in motion as might be neceſſary to overawe the Rajah

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of *Tanjore*; what can I think? I acknowledge it was my opinion from the beginning, that, to ſupport *Hyder* againſt the Marattas, the utmoſt exertion of the whole force of this Preſidency would not have been ſufficient: that in ſpite of his utmoſt efforts, joined with them, the *Carnatic* would have become a prey to this powerful Enemy; that both the Nabob and Company would have been ſufferers, to what extent is difficult to ſay. And I cannot help obſerving, that there are too many good reaſons at this day to juſtify my opinion. Though at firſt I was anxious to ſuppoſe a poſſibility of maintaining the Peace of the *Carnatic*, by aſſiſting neither; yet I could alſo foreſee that good policy would ſoon require a part to be taken: that joining neither, from the diſpoſition of the contending parties, was by no means the way either to obtain or preſerve advantages: that it was more than probable, the Marattas of themſelves would in a ſhort time oblige *Hyder* to come to their terms, even ſhould their power be inſufficient to take his country from him: that then the time might come, when the Company's friendſhip, being no longer wanted, their poſſeſſions, trade, and revenues in the *Carnatic*, would become a prey to that Power whoſe friendſhip they had deſpiſed; and in all likelihood to the additional revenge of *Hyder Ally*, for a breach of that Treaty which he was ſuffered to dictate at the gates of *Madras*.

I do not mean, Gentlemen, to give you a poſitive opinion of the part you ought to take, or in the leaſt to direct your conduct. But if you will be ſo obliging to indulge me with permiſſion, I will take the liberty of mentioning what occurs to me, with reſpect to the preſent ſituation of affairs in this part of *India*.

The Marattas are acknowledged to be the moſt formidable power in *India*, and are, in a manner, neighbours to all the three Preſidencies; it would appear then, that their friendſhip was, for every reaſon in the world, preferable to a War; they ſeem anxious to eſtabliſh a friendſhip with the Engliſh; they have made very conſiderable offers to obtain it, which the Nabob, I underſtand, has communicated to you, and which appear to me very advantageous: and I know not whether ſtill more conſiderable conceſſions might not be obtained, if there was the leaſt appearance of an inclination to pay any attention to their proffered friendſhip: they have always ſhewn a friendly diſpoſition to the Company, and if there ſhould be any threatening appearance to the contrary at this time, the connection of this Preſidency with their Enemy, may in ſome meaſure account for it.

Hyder Ally's propoſals I know not, neither indeed can I conceive what offers he can make, by any means of ſo much advantage to the Company as theirs; but his former friendſhip, and even his preſent connections with the French, are not unknown; and with reſpect to his power, I acknowledge I cannot ſee that it ever could have been ſuperior, nor can I conceive at preſent that it is by any means equal, to a vigorous exertion of the force of this Preſidency and the *Carnatic*. As there does not appear to me any advantage from his friendſhip, nor much danger from the contrary, I cannot ſee any reaſon for ſupporting ſo dangerous a connection. As the offers of the Marattas appear to me advantageous, and as a refuſal of their friendſhip will be next to a declaration of war, which will be deſtructive to the *Carnatic*, and may be dangerous to the Company's intereſts in this country; where is the choice? Should it be between peace and war, it would be eaſy; but ſhould an inevitable war be the conſequence even of aſſiſting neither, which do you think would be the moſt eligible friend, and which the moſt dangerous enemy? I beg leave, Gentlemen, to put you in mind, that you are at preſent judges in a very great court; and that there is ſcarce a poſſibility of any temporary advantage whatſoever being an equivalent to that permanent influence, which it is the intereſt of your Employers, which it is the intereſt of the Nation to maintain in this country. I will not take upon me to adviſe you to aſſiſt the Marattas; but I think I can venture to ſay, their friendſhip ought not to be deſpiſed; and that a war with ſuch a formidable Power ought, from every principle of ſound policy, to be avoided. If you do not think yourſelves in a condition to aſſiſt with the Company's Forces, or if you have any other reaſon for refuſing them, I ſhould think ſome expedient might be fallen upon to ſatisfy them, and to clear yourſelves, by ſuffering the Nabob to follow ſuch meaſures as he may think proper for the peace and tranquillity of his country, and that the Troops under your orders, which he pays, may be put under his direction for that purpoſe. As I am fully perſuaded it is for the advantage of the Company, let me intreat of you, in friendſhip, to conſider the Nabob's intereſts and the Company's as connected; and when I reflect upon the long friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Nabob and the Company, the mutual obligations they are under to one another, and that their intereſts are inſeparable and the ſame; when I know and conſider that he has given large jaghires, and a conſiderable revenue, to maintain Troops to defend the *Carnatic*, where the Company hold ſuch poſſeſſions; every reaſon in the world appears to require that defence and aſſiſtance of you their repreſentatives. But can you really think that it is in your power to maintain peace in the *Carnatic*, and your influence in *India*, by aſſiſting neither? If ſo, it will make me exceeding happy; and if the conſequences prove it, it will be much to your honour indeed; however, ſhould the ſituation of affairs point out the neceſſity of taking a part, and ſhould an unequal deſtructive war be the conſequence of not embracing deciſive meaſures in time, I ſhould be apprehenſive you will find ſome difficulty of juſtifying ſuch conduct, either to your Employers or to your Country.

With reſpect to your internal management (if I may be allowed the expreſſion) I ſhould have thought it political to have been at ſome pains in convincing the Nabob how much the Company had his proſperity at heart, and, inſtead of giving him cauſe to be apprehenſive of his ſafety, and that of his country; inſtead of giving encouragement by inactivity to his rebellious ſubjects to throw off his authority, and even to attack his territories; had there been no Treaty in the caſe, I ſhould have thought it ſound policy to have encouraged, ſupported, protected, and aſſiſted him. But, when a poſitive Treaty is made under your auſpices, and guaranteed by the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, he appears to me to have an evident claim on your juſtice, from that good faith which every one has been accuſtomed to expect from the Engliſh.

And in the preſent caſe, when I conſider that ten lacks of Pagodas are to be paid to the Nabob's creditors within this year, provided his country remains in tranquillity, it appears to me not only a great national object to do every thing in our power to enable the Nabob to fulfil his promiſe, but it is even a duty which we all owe to the widows and orphans, whoſe diſtreſſed circumſtances ought to awaken every generous ſentiment within us. How am I to account then, Gentlemen, for your extraordinary inactivity in ſuffering a rebellious ſubject to over-run one part of his country, and in calmly looking on while the Marattas are ready to enter another, without uſing the leaſt endeavour to prevent a rupture with them, which may be attended with the worſt conſequences, both to the intereſts of your private Friends and public Employers?

I am the more particularly called upon to addreſs you at preſent, becauſe I underſtand you have acquainted the Nabob, That, as His Majeſty had ſent out ſuch extraordinary powers to *India*, you can do nothing. I ſhall therefore take the liberty to tell you, Gentlemen, that the powers deputed to me from His Majeſty, were intended to ſerve the intereſts of the Nation, and of your Employers; and it is natural to think that the ſanction of your Sovereign's name, by a ſpecial power commiſſioned for that purpoſe, might be of advantage in regaining a conſequence and a reputation, which it was the opinion at home the Com-

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pany's Servants had loſt in *India*. But if ever there was any opportunity of anſwering thoſe intentions, your want of confidential communication has almoſt, if not altogether, prevented it. However, as you have abſoluely refuſed to co-operate with me as King's Miniſter, in any one thing for the public good, I cannot ſuffer you to avail yourſelves of that ſubterfuge, and by that means to charge me with the conſequences, that the powers I had from His Majeſty prevented you from doing your duty. I therefore beg leave to ſay, as I have on every occaſion laboured to eſtabliſh harmony in all our tranſactions; as it has been my conſtant wiſh to have thoſe political points in which we differed in opinion, explained to me, and as I never have in the ſmalleſt degree uſed any one endeavour to counteract your operations to ſerve the Public; ſo now I declare, that the plenipotentiary powers deputed to me from the Crown, ſhall be wholly directed for the public good, to ſerve the intereſts of the Company, if you will but give me the ſmalleſt hint how this can be done to the beſt advantage. And as I value not either perſonal conſideration or perſonal conſequence, I ſhall willingly reſign to you the honour, the merit, and reputation; but permit me to entreat of you not to allow the influence of your Conſtituents materially to ſuffer, either by an attachment to a Party which may be judged ſo very detrimental to their real intereſts, or by perſiſting in a dangerous inactivity, till all opportunity of re-eſtabliſhing the Company's loſt reputation and declining intereſt be for ever gone.

I ſhould be happy to do good with the power with which His Majeſty has thought proper to inveſt me; but ſhould that be prevented, I never can conſent to ſuffer any ſuppoſed reſtraint from His Majeſty's authority to be made uſe of, as a plea to juſtify inactivity, or any other conduct which may not be approved. Therefore, though you will not accept of the aſſiſtance which I have offered you in his name, it ſhall never be ſaid that His Miniſter oppoſed any one meaſure you ever took to ſupport the real intereſts of your Employers, the character of the Company, or the reputation of the Nation, while I have the honour to be inveſted with that character in *India*.

Under the ſanction of the character of His Majeſty's Miniſter, I have taken this liberty. I have alſo recommended a generous ſupport of the Prince of this country, whom you had taken under your protection, which I know to be perfectly conſiſtent with the views of His Majeſty, and even the directions of your Maſters. I have recommended fidelity to the Treaty between him and the Rajah of *Tanjore*, you yourſelves made and guaranteed; and I have endeavoured to point out what appeared to me very ſtrong reaſons for doing ſo, beſides that good faith for which the Engliſh were once ſo famous in *India*.

The peace and tranquillity of this country, Gentlemen, are in many reſpects in your power. I would have aſſiſted, and am ſtill ready to do ſo to the utmoſt extent of my commiſſion, and to the beſt of my abilities. But if I ſhould be ſo circumſtanced, as not to be able to ſerve the Company according to His Majeſty's moſt gracious intentions, no conſideration whatever ſhall induce me to ſacrifice the public intereſt; therefore, whatever you do for yourſelves, I am now to take the liberty to tell you, that no purpoſe whatſoever, of ſaying that I have either oppoſed or prevented you, ſhould any miſfortune happen from the very extraordinary political arrangements in this country. You will forgive me for ſaying, that hitherto the cauſe muſt be ſought for ſomewhere elſe, and not either in the application or miſapplication of the powers which our Sovereign has thought proper to ſend to *India*.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
John Lindſay.

The principal points in the foregoing Letter, which demand our conſideration are, the recommendations contained therein of an offenſive alliance with the Marattas; and the reflections on our conduct with reſpect to the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*. It may not, however, be improper previouſly to remark, that from the ſimilitude of arguments and expreſſions which appear in the above Letter, and in that from the Nabob of the 7th inſtant, there is great room to believe that they are a joint work.

Although Sir *John Lindſay* tells us, that he does not mean to give an opinion of the part we ought to take, or in the leaſt to direct our conduct, and that he will not take upon him to adviſe us to aſſiſt the Marattas; and although he does not indeed, in expreſs words, recommend an offenſive alliance with them, but urges the neceſſity of embracing their friendſhip, which he unjuſtly accuſes us of having contemned, neglected, and deſpiſed; nevertheleſs, it is evident from the whole tenor of his letter, that he means to engage us in an offenſive alliance with the Marattas againſt *Hyder Ally*, and all his arguments clearly tend to urge and preſs us to ſuch a meaſure.

We have frequently, in our deliberations on this ſubject, expreſſed our opinion very clearly and fully againſt an offenſive alliance with the Marattas. In this we are juſtified by the repeated ſentiments of the Court of Directors, expreſſed in their commands for ſeveral years paſt, againſt diſtant operations, and engaging in alliances with the Country Powers. Theſe ſentiments of the Court of Directors, it is true, are not expreſſed in ſuch terms as naturally convey the idea of abſolute and determinate orders: nevertheleſs, we ſtand in ſo unhappy a predicament, that we have no ſafety, but conſidering them as ſuch, for the whole tenor and ſpirit of the diſpatches of laſt ſeaſon (as we have noticed in other inſtances) are proofs that ſentiments ſo expreſſed are abſolute orders. At the ſame time, candour obliges us to acknowledge, that the ſentiments of the Court of Directors are perfectly conformable to our own.

Their orders of the 27th June laſt, received per *Delphin*, are very poſitive and expreſs; they are as follow:

"We have only here to enjoin you to avoid, as far as in "you lies, becoming parties in any diſputes between the "Powers of *India*, and to pay the moſt ſtrict obedience "to our orders, for confining your views to our preſent "poſſeſſions, the peace and ſecurity of which are the "utmoſt ſcope of our wiſhes, as they will neceſſarily tend "to advance the commercial and vital intereſts of the "Company."

Theſe, if there were no other, would be very ſufficient motives to induce us to be very cautious of entering into alliances or engagements with the Country Powers in general. But with regard to the Marattas, the Honourable Court have very clearly in many parts of their commands, expreſſed their apprehenſions of the danger of an alliance with them, or of adopting any meaſures which may tend to increaſe their power. We have in different parts of our proceedings referred to their commands on this head: but as the matter comes now before us, recommended ſo earneſtly by the Nabob and Sir *John Lindſay*, we think it neceſſary to recite here at length the ſentiments of the Court of Directors thereon; they are as follow:

Separate General Letter, 30th March 1768.

Par. 41. The Marattas, inſtead of being reduced, are likely to be aggrandized by the conqueſt of the Myſore dominions, which bring them ſo much nearer the *Carnatic*; the Soubah's wretches and indigence from whom all relief, and *Hyder Ally*, if left formidable to the Soubah and Marattas, is more likely to be an enemy to us, and to embrace every opportunity of diſturbing the *Carnatic*.

General Letter, 13th May 1768.

Par. 7. It is with the greateſt concern we find that the victory you have gained tends to involve us ſtill further in this chaos of wants and engagements, and that you ſhould

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ſhould ſtill think your enemy ſo formidable, as to call in foreign aſſiſtants, though you have a moral certainty that the attack of the Soubah's dominions from *Bengal* muſt oblige him to a precipitate march to his capital; and though the Myſore dominions, and *Hyder Ally*'s poſſeſſions on the Malabar ſide, all lay expoſed to your attacks: that you ſhould have recourſe to the Marattas for that aſſiſtance, is ſtill more alarming; and from the ſpirit of your negociations with *Maudarow*, and your wild propoſal to *Bengal*, of putting up one of *Shaw Allum*'s Sons, we fear all the barriers to the Maratta power will be broken down, and that they will add the *Decan* and Myſore dominions to their extenſive empire, and haſten that event you deſigned to avert; we mean their conqueſt of the whole.

Par. 8. We ſhould have hoped, that the experience of what has paſſed in *Bengal*, would have ſuggeſted the proper conduct to you; we mean when our Servants, after the battle of *Buxar*, projected the extirpation of *Sujah Dowlah* from his dominions, and the giving them up to the King. Lord *Clive* ſoon diſcerned the King would have been unable to detain them, and that it would have broken down the ſtrongeſt barrier againſt the Marattas and the Northern Powers, and therefore wiſely reſtored *Sujah Dowlah* to his dominions: ſuch too ſhould be your conduct with reſpect to the Nizam and *Hyder Ally*, neither of whom it is our intereſt ſhould be totally cruſhed.

Separate General Letter, 17th March 1769.

Par. 3. In our letter of the 25th March laſt, we gave our ſentiments at large with reſpect to the negociations with the Soubah of the *Decan*, and the conſequences apprehended from the Treaty you had entered into with him; and by our before-mentioned letter, under date the 13th May, we expreſſed the dangers we apprehended from your calling in the Marattas to your aſſiſtance.

Par. 17. Your Proceedings of the 28th April ſtill leave us reaſon to apprehend you may enter into engagements with the Marattas for a body of Horſe; which we think will have very fatal conſequences, by haraſſing and laying waſte your own country as well as the enemy's; and we apprehend, notwithſtanding the vaſt ſums of money they will coſt, they will be of very little uſe, it not being probable they will expoſe themſelves much for our ſervice; and when you have occaſion to diſengage yourſelves from them, diſagreements may ariſe of dangerous conſequences.

Letter to Select Committee, 17th March 1769.

Par. 4. Judge then our anxiety of ſeeing a ſyſtem adopted ſo repugnant to our views, as that of ſupporting *Mahomed Ally* in the Myſore Country; we repeat, we ſhall not think ourſelves ſecure while we have a Soldier or a Sepoy in that country, nor till we ſee it given to ſome Power who may preſerve it as a barrier againſt the Marattas, and who may be an uſeful Ally, ſhould we ever have occaſion to call in the aſſiſtance of a Country Power.

General Letter, 30th June 1769.

Par. 5. We muſt ſay, that upon principles of policy we wiſh for a peace with *Hyder Naigue*, whenever it can be obtained upon the moſt moderate terms; for our policy is to avoid every thing that tends to the increaſe of the Maratta power, which is evidently the misfortune of this war; for you are reduced to the neceſſity of being yourſelves the propoſer of new provinces to be added to the dominion of Marattas, already poſſeſſed of half the Mogul empire.

Par. 6. Whether the Marattas have accepted or not of your offer, certain it is they will make the moſt uſe they can of the embroils of others; it is by this conduct they have arrived at their preſent degree of power, and our beſt policy is to check their growth by every opportunity, or at leaſt to avoid lending our own force to their aggrandizement; which we certainly do, as often as we engage in wars with the few remaining Chiefs of *India* who are yet capable of coping with them.

7. *Nizam Ally* and *Hyder Naigue* are two of thoſe Chiefs, and it is our true intereſt to preſerve a good underſtanding with them.

Separate General Letter, 23d March 1770.

Par. 12. The Marattas and *Hyder*, you ſay, were at war; and it undoubtedly was our true intereſt, on many accounts, to ſee the power of the Marattas, if not of both the contending parties, weakened, but by no means to interfere in the diſpute. Every Maratta that fell in the conteſt, might almoſt be conſidered as one of our enemies ſlain. But you have diverted *Hyder*.

The dangers of alliance with the Marattas, or any other meaſure which may tend to increaſe their power, are fully and clearly expreſſed in the foregoing Extracts; and the late conduct of the Marattas in *Bengal*, and in the *Bala Ghaute*, not only juſtifies, but adds great weight to the apprehenſions expreſſed by the Honourable Court on this head; ſince it is evident, that their operations are not now merely for the purpoſe of collecting their Chour, but that their views therein are to conquer the whole peninſula. Of this the Nabob muſt be ſenſible; and that were we only to make an appearance of joining the Marattas againſt *Hyder Ally*, the only Power in theſe parts capable of making any oppoſition againſt them, the reduction of the Myſore country to the Maratta yoke would be accelerated, if not the immediate conſequence of ſuch a meaſure. Notwithſtanding which the Nabob can perſevere in preſſing us thereto, and Sir *John Lindſay* take upon him, under the ſanction of His Majeſty's name, to ſecond the Nabob's ſolicitations, although he muſt be ſenſible we could not acquieſce therein, without a moſt manifeſt breach of our engagements with *Hyder Ally*. Indeed, we are clearly of opinion, that if the Company were to take a part with either, and the power and reſources of the *Carnatic* would be united, or brought to co-operate heartily with the Company, the ſupporting of *Hyder Ally*, as a barrier againſt the Marattas, would be far more eligible than to throw the whole power into the hands of the Marattas, by uniting with them to reduce *Hyder Ally*, and add the Myſore dominions to theirs: but we have not had, and have not, an idea of attempting it, in oppoſition to, or even independently of, the power and reſources of the *Carnatic*.

As to the alternative propoſed, and which the Nabob has alſo recommended; viz. That thoſe Troops under our orders, and which the Nabob pays, may be put under his direction; it is only neceſſary for us to refer to the Company's orders relative to the Sepoys in their ſervice, paid by the Nabob (which muſt be the Troops meant by Sir *John Lindſay*), which orders we here think it neceſſary to write at length, as well as ſuch parts of the commands of the Court of Directors as relate to the expediency of the Nabob's depending on the Company for the protection of the *Carnatic*.

Extracts of a Letter from the Honourable Court of Directors, dated 19th February 1766.

Par. 32. The Nabob's requeſt, which you communicate to us in the 2d paragraph of your letter of the 27th March, has engaged our moſt ſerious attention. He is deſirous, you ſay, that about 10,000 Sepoys may be continued in our ſervice, the charges of which corps the Nabob will undertake to defray. The ſubject is of great importance; for although the advantages immediately reſulting are obvious, nevertheleſs we are apprehenſive that conſequences dangerous, though remote, may enſue, if wiſe precautions be not taken to avert them. However, as upon the whole we truſt that prudence and circumſpection may guard againſt them, we have reſolved to comply with the Nabob's deſire; and do accordingly

cordingly allow you to retain that number in our ſervice: and that you may clearly underſtand our reaſoning on this ſubject, we ſhall point out to you the advantages we expect the Company will receive from this meaſure; and on the other hand, the conſequences we apprehend; to obviate which, we ſhall lay down ſome rules for your obſervance.

33. The benefits we expect to receive, are, that the Company will be diſburthened of the expence of maintaining a body of 4,000 Sepoys, which, by our Regulation of the 30th December 1763, were to be kept up in our pay on your eſtabliſhment; for we underſtand that 10,000 Sepoys to be maintained at the Nabob's charge, are not to be excluſive of the before-mentioned eſtabliſhment, but are deemed ſufficient for all purpoſes; and if this corps be properly trained and attached to us, ſo as that we may have at all times a dependance on them, we hope from thence to be ſo much the more powerful on the Coaſt, in caſe of a war with *France*, and at all times to keep the Nabob more firmly in our intereſt, by thus having under our own orders and controul, almoſt the whole military force by which the province is to be protected and kept in obedience; an advantage which cannot fail to render the Company ſo much the more reſpectable in the eyes of the neighbouring Powers.

34. The dangers we apprehend ſpring from this conſideration, that theſe Troops being natives of *India*, it may well be doubted whether much dependance can be placed on their affections when oppoſed to Country Powers; for if they feel (as it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe they do) the ſame natural bias towards their countrymen which is ſo prevalent in all men, we fear they may incline to deſert our cauſe, ſhould any difference ariſe hereafter between us and the Nabob; an event, which although we ſee not at preſent any cauſe to ſuſpect, ſhould not however be deemed chimerical, ſince our competitors are ſo nearly intereſted in ſuch a diviſion, and ſo capable of arts to effect what intereſt dictates; ſhould that event, we ſay, take place, a defection in this corps, thus armed and diſciplined, might be productive at ſuch a criſis of more miſchievous conſequences than all the benefits we may ever receive from them can compenſate. But as their ſuperiority over Sepoys in the country ſervice conſiſts only in their diſcipline, which (wanting European Officers) they ſoon loſe under the country government, as we are aſſured, theſe apprehenſions, ſtrong as they are, do nevertheleſs yield to our firmer hope and expectation that ſuch general regulations may be eſtabliſhed, and ſuch temporary expedients be adopted, as may obviate thoſe dangers, and ſecure the Company's real and permanent advantages. You on the ſpot may probably be able to form a plan more conducive to theſe ſalutary purpoſes than any which can ſuggeſt itſelf to us here; nevertheleſs, theſe Articles ſeem to us eſſential.

Article 1ſt, 2d, and 3d, relate to the eſtabliſhment as to number, and the appointment of Officers.

Article 4th. That the utmoſt care be taken, as well at the time of enliſting, as at all times afterwards, to inculcate the opinion, that they are wholly and ſolely dependant on the Company, ſubject to their order and controul, and no other Power whatſoever; and, as much as poſſible, it ſhould be concealed that the Nabob is under agreement to reimburſe the Company for their pay.

Article 5th. That they be cloathed in an uniform, remarkably diſtinguiſhed from ſuch Sepoys as the Nabob himſelf may entertain for the guard of his perſon, or for any other purpoſe.

Article 6th. That a Paymaſter of Sepoys be appointed from amongſt our covenanted Servants at the Preſidency; that we have an office for tranſacting the buſineſs of that department; and that ſuch of the Sepoys as ſhall from time to time be at the Preſidency, be monthly and regularly paid at the public office, not by iſſuing the pay of each company to the Subadar, but that each man be paid by the Paymaſter himſelf; and that ſuch Sepoys as are in the out-garriſons be in like manner paid, every man ſeparately by the Paymaſter of the garriſon, who (as has been the cuſtom for ſome time) muſt continue to be appointed from amongſt our covenanted Servants.

Article 7th. That the Britiſh colours, ſuch as are carried by our European battalions, without any diſtinction, and that ſuch diſtinguiſhing colours as the companies of the ſeveral battalions may bear, be alſo very remarkably diſtinguiſhed from the colours borne by the Nabob's own Sepoys.

Article 8th. That as theſe Sepoys muſt be divided in different parts of the country, great care muſt be taken that the ſame body do not remain too long in one place, but that at certain convenient times, thoſe in one garriſon be relieved from another, that ſo all in their turn may do duty in our forts and ſettlements.

Article 9th. That in the Nabob's principal forts, the garriſon do conſiſt of a number of Europeans and Sepoys, ſo proportioned, and with ſuch precautions, as may beſt prevent the ill conſequence that might otherwiſe enſue in caſe of a revolt in the latter.

Article 10th. Regarding Articles of War.

Article 11th. The money for payment of theſe Troops, for cloathing them, and all other incidental charges, muſt be iſſued from our caſh, in like manner as practiſed in reſpect to our European Troops, and the amount thereof, monthly or annually, at the cloſe of your books, muſt be transferred to the debt of the Nabob's account, by whom you are to be reimburſed in ſuch manner as ſhall be ſettled and agreed on.

Par. 35. Theſe are the principal Articles which occur to us; if you can add or ſubſtitute any others more conducive to the ends we have in view, you are at liberty to do ſo, giving us your reaſons. We expect that you will not treat this ſubject lightly, but give us your opinion very particularly concerning the doubts we have expreſſed.

Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors, regarding the neceſſity of the Nabob's Dependance on the Company.

Separate General Letter, dated 24th December 1765.

Par. 8. By the reduction of the rebel *Uſoff Cawn*, we have at length the ſatisfaction to find the Nabob placed in full and peaceable poſſeſſion of all the provinces ſubject to his government; and we have given you our thoughts above, of ſome of the meaſures which appear neceſſary to check attempts from without, and preſerve peace and tranquillity within. Another object which ſhould equally engage your attention, is the conduct of the Nabob himſelf towards the Company. It has hitherto been his immediate and undoubted intereſt to act in concert and cloſe alliance with us; and, as it is our firm intention to ſupport him in his government, we hope he will continue to think himſelf bound by the ſame tie to depend on our ſupport, ſolicit our friendſhip, and unite with us in meaſures for the common benefit; nevertheleſs, as opinions are apt to change with times and circumſtances, and perhaps the ſeeds of ambition, which have hitherto been choaked by diſtreſſes of various kinds, may in proſperity and affluence ariſe and ſhoot into exceſſes, not altogether compatible with the ſyſtem we ſhould approve, it ſeems therefore very neceſſary that ſuch a precautionary plan ſhould be adopted as may, without giving the Nabob any reaſonable cauſe of diſguſt or complaint, preſerve to the Company ſuch a degree of power and influence in the province, as may make any attempts to our prejudice dangerous to him, and conſequently ſubject his actions to controul, ſo far as may be neceſſary. He has hitherto deſired, at leaſt acquieſced with ſeeming approbation, that garriſons of our Troops ſhould be placed in his forts; it is not improbable, but that after having ſome time enjoyed the bleſſings of peace, he may forget his own weakneſs, and not ſeeing danger immediately before him, with to have his protectors removed, that he may ſeem to figure in a higher character in the

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eyes of his ſubjects and neighbours. Should ſuch an event happen, it may require ſome addreſs to avoid giving him diſguſt, and at the ſame time a degree of firmneſs to perſiſt in your preſent plan: but perſiſt you muſt; for we eſtabliſh it as a fundamental point, that the Company's influence and real power in the province cannot be any way ſo effectually maintained as by keeping the principal forts in our hands. But this ſhould be ſo managed, as that he may always think they are, as in reality we mean they ſhould be, kept for him as Nabob of the province; and to that end, amongſt other regulations, let the commanding Officers be confined ſolely to the duty of the garriſon, and ſubjected to ſuch rules as that the Nabob may have no reaſonable cauſe of complaint.

Separate General Letter, dated 25th March 1768.

Par. 8. The entire reliance of the Nabob on the Company for the protection of the *Carnatic*, you are, according to our former orders, by all prudent ſteps, to endeavour to effect; and doubt not of your benefiting yourſelves of his apparently favourable diſpoſition to that meaſure. We are deſirous of his embracing our protection, rather than his own inclination, than that he ſhould unwillingly be prevailed on by you to order it.

9th. The force of arguments advanced for placing the defence of the country in our hands, diſcharging moſt of his Sepoys cannot, from experience, admit of controverſy, and the introducing that ſyſtem is of the utmoſt importance, from your concluſion that twelve battalions leſs would be ſufficient for the defence of the *Carnatic* againſt all invaders. Theſe are now kept up by the Company and the Nabob, and, as it appears, it would be the means of eſtabliſhing peace and tranquillity, increaſing his revenues, and very conſiderably diminiſhing his expences.

10. We are very ſenſible that in a matter of ſuch delicacy, you will have many difficulties to encounter; from his apprehenſion that his reputation and authority will be leſſened by it, and the obſtacles which his dependants will throw in your way to excite his ſuſpicions and jealouſy. Such impediments, we depend upon your cautious management to remove; and that you will, with the tenderneſs and good grace the nicety of the caſe requires, engage him without diſguſt, and by degrees, to diſcharge the whole of his uſeleſs rabble, and depend entirely on our Troops for the defence and ſecurity of his poſſeſſions.

Separate Letter, dated the 19th of March 1771.

Par. 31. From the whole tenor of your proceedings, and from the whole courſe of the war, we perceive the many diſadvantages the *Carnatic* labours under from the want of ſome uniformity of ſyſtem between the Nabob and the Company, with reſpect to the military eſtabliſhment and operations. As the defence of the *Carnatic* always reſts on the Company in caſe of an invaſion, ſo it is reaſonable and proper that the Nabob ſhould ſubmit to be controlled by them, with reſpect to the number and diſciplining the Troops.

We come now to conſider the reflections made by Sir *John Lindſay* on our conduct, with reſpect to the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjour*.

We have already ſaid, and we repeat, that we look upon the Rajah's conduct in taking up arms againſt the *Maravar*, or *Nalcoty* Man, in the manner he has done, as unjuſtifiable: but we muſt at the ſame time declare it as our opinion, that the Nabob's earneſt ſolicitations for our proceeding immediately againſt him, do not ariſe from any regard to the *Maravar*, or *Nalcoty* Man, or from any deſire of obliging the Rajah to make them ſatisfaction; but from the hopes he has, that when we have once taken up arms, we may be led to perſevere, until we have annexed *Tanjour* to his poſſeſſions. This, we ſay, we believe to be one among the many motives that influence the Nabob's conduct. We are fully juſtified in theſe ſentiments, from the whole tenor of the Nabob's behaviour towards the Rajah ſince the concluſion of the Treaty in 1762, with which the Nabob was much diſſatisfied at the time, and he has taken every opportunity ſince, of endeavouring to engage us in a quarrel with the Rajah; and it has required the utmoſt attention of this Government to preſerve even the appearance of harmony between them. The Court of Directors have fully expreſſed their ſenſe of the Treaty, and of the Nabob's unfavourable diſpoſition towards the Rajah, in the following paſſages of their commands:

Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors, regarding the Nabob and Rajah of *Tanjour*.

Separate General Letter, 30th December 1763.

Par. 2d. Your making a peace between the Nabob and the King of *Tanjour* was an event ſo much to be deſired, that we cannot but be highly pleaſed with it, eſpecially as the terms are not only agreeable and advantageous to both parties, but as in all probability a rupture with that Prince would have engaged us in a quarrel as an ally of the former; and when once the flame was lighted up, there is no knowing how it might have ſpread, at a time too when the ſtate of our military force was not in a condition for undertaking a new war, beſides involving us in moſt heavy expences, the certain conſequence of military operations.

3d. Your proceedings in the whole of this negociation have been judicious, and Mr. *Dupré* has acquitted himſelf therein in a very able and ſatisfactory manner.

4th. The twenty-ſix lacks of Rupees, which have been recovered by the ſaid Treaty, and are in full for all arrears due to the Nabob from the King of *Tanjour*, is in fact an happy acquiſition to the Company, as it is to be applied towards the diſcharge of the Nabob's debt.

Separate General Letter, 26th April 1765.

Par. 13. We are very ſorry to find the Nabob ſo unreaſonably oppoſe the repairs which the King of *Tanjour* is deſirous of making to the banks of the *Cavimy*. If the Nabob ſaw his intereſt in the ſame light we do, he ſhould be deſirous, above all things, of maintaining a peace and friendſhip with the King of *Tanjour*, content himſelf with what he now poſſeſſes, and ſtudy the means of eſtabliſhing order, and maintaining tranquillity in his government. It is certain that the Nabob's exiſtence, as ſuch, depends on the ſtrength of the Company; he is too ſenſible not to feel this, and will not, we hope, take any ſteps that may bring on new troubles without your concurrence. It is neceſſary that a reſpectful decency ſhould be obſerved in all your negociations with him; but at the ſame time it is juſt and proper, that, in ſuch a caſe as this, you ſhould ſhew a firmneſs becoming the Power you repreſent. You have guaranteed the Treaty made in 1762 between him and the King, and have therefore a right to interfere in the ſubjects of contention that may ariſe between them, though not immediately expreſſed in the Treaty. In the preſent diſpute it ſeems to us very reaſonable, that the King ſhould have the liberty of repairing the banks of the *Cavimy*, ſo far as he has in former times been allowed to do, and even more, if new encroachments of the river ſhould require it, provided the Nabob ſuſtains no damage or injury thereby; and ſo far you will do right to inſiſt on. This juſtice requires; and, conſidering the two Powers in a political light, we think it is for our intereſt that each ſhould be maintained in his proper rights.

Separate General Letter, 24th December 1765.

Par. 4. We are well pleaſed to learn that you have at laſt made the Nabob ſenſible how much it is his intereſt to maintain a friendſhip and harmony with the King of *Tanjour*. Whether he is ſincere or not in theſe profeſ-

ſions,

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ſions, it is well that he ſeems ſo; and it muſt be your care to keep him in that temper, and prevent his attempting any thing unjuſtly to the Rajah's prejudice. The great reluctance he has ſhewn to ſuffer the banks of the *Caviny* and *Amauil* to be repaired, is no favourable proof of the diſpoſition he bears toward the Rajah's Government. The improvement and extenſion of our commerce on the Coaſt (an object we have greatly at heart) depends ſo much on the peace of the *Carnatic*, that it is become a neceſſary part of our ſyſtem to watch over and preſerve its tranquillity. This being eſtabliſhed as a fundamental principle, you muſt endeavour to form your conduct thereon, and prevent, as much as you prudently can, one power from encroaching on another.

Separate General Letter, 4th March 1767.

Par. 17. We are well pleaſed that the King of *Tanjour* has fulfilled his engagements, and that there ſubſiſts a friendly intercourſe and correſpondence between you and him; you muſt loſe no opportunity of raiſing in him the idea of a firm dependance on our friendſhip. You will not want opportunities, we apprehend, of giving proofs of your impartiality, for we diſcover, in many inſtances, a want of cordiality between him and the Nabob; amongſt others of great injury the *Trichinopely* country was like to ſuſtain by the Tanjoreans breaking down a ſtone Annauil, which upon enquiry, was found to be of no conſequence: we fear the Nabob will ever be ſeeking pretences to provoke him, in hopes of annexing ſome part of the *Tanjour* country to his own; and the river *Caviny* will afford numberleſs ſubjects. It would therefore be well worth your endeavours to obtain as preciſe an account as can be got of the ancient uſages and rights which were acknowledged by the Kings of *Trichinopely* and *Tanjour* reſpectively, touching the waters iſſuing from that river; and thereby you may be enabled, on good grounds, to mediate in ſuch diſputes, without injuring the Nabob, or (to gratify his paſſions) ſacrificing the rights of the King.

It is true, the Honourable Court have ſince, in their commands per *Duke of Grafton*, urged the reaſonableneſs that the Rajah ſhould bear a proportion of the expence of laſt War, and that meaſures ſhould be taken to compel him.

However, whatſoever may be the Nabob's motives for thus preſſing us to a meaſure for which we are not prepared, and at a time when we are threatened with danger, which our utmoſt efforts will, we fear, be inſufficient to avert, we are clearly of opinion, that the proceedings of the Rajah againſt *Maravar* and *Nalcoely* Man, and his conduct in withholding the tribute due from him, would fully authorize our calling him to a ſevere account; and we ſhould not defer taking meaſures for that purpoſe, if our ſituation in other reſpects warranted ſuch an expedition: but in the preſent ſtate of affairs, when we are threatened by the Marattas in theſe parts; and the Soubah, inſtigated by *Fazel Deg Cawn*, is watching an opportunity of raiſing diſturbances in the Circars, it would be the height of imprudence to ſuffer either the Nabob's ſolicitations, or the taunts and reflections of Sir *John Lindſay*, to drag us into a meaſure which appears to us to be attended with ſo many difficulties and dangers.

A draft of an anſwer to the above letter being prepared, it is agreed to meet again to-morrow morning, to read and conſider the ſame.

Joſ. Dupré,
Warren Haſtings,
John Smith,
Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
John Whitehill,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 12th June 1771.

PRESENT,

Joſias Dupré, Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley.

Wrote the following Letter to the Select Committee at *Fort William:*

To the Honourable *John Cartier*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Fort William.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your favour of the 20th of April, reached us the 28th ultimo.

We are much concerned at the reſolution you acquaint us the King has taken to put himſelf into the hands of the Marattas; as ſuch an event muſt, we apprehend, greatly increaſe their influence, and of courſe promote their views, which evidently tend to the entire conqueſt of *Indoſtan.*

Nothing material has happened between the Marattas and *Hyder Ally* ſince our laſt advices of 20th May; the former ſtill remain ſome coſs diſtant from *Seringapatam.*

Hyder Ally ſtill continues to preſs us for aſſiſtance, which we have it not in our power to grant, as it is impoſſible for us to attempt any thing without the revenues and reſources of the *Carnatic*, which are entirely under the controul of the Nabob; who, on the other hand, earneſtly preſſes us to a junction with the Marattas to ſubdue *Myſore:* in this ſyſtem he is warmly ſeconded by Sir *John Lindſay*, who has urged every poſſible argument to induce us to come into the Nabob's meaſures. We have told them plainly, that we can never acquieſce in a plan which appears to us ſo dangerous in itſelf, ſo inconſiſtent with our engagements, and ſo contrary to the intereſts and views of the Company's other ſettlements.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Joſias Dupré, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
12th June 1771.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 14th December 1771.

PRESENT,

Joſias Dupré, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Warren Haſtings,
Samuel Ardley.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 180, on the preſent ſtate of affairs; and containing his reaſons for joining the Marattas.

As there are ſome paſſages in the ſaid Letter which require explanation, independant of the arguments urged by the Nabob in ſupport of his plan, the Committee think it proper to enter the ſaid Letter on their proceedings, with ſuch explanatory Remarks as appear neceſſary; and which is accordingly done as follows:

APPENDIX. No. 23.

No. 180. From the Nabob; dated, and received 13th December 1771.

LETTER.	REMARKS.
A. In my letter ſome time ago, I acquainted you particularly of the force and power of the Marattas; and their promiſe, that in caſe we aſſiſt them in puniſhing *Hyder Ally Cawn*, they will deliver up the country belonging to the *Payen Ghaut*, and ſhew us other inſtances of their kindneſs. Hitherto by our joint ſcheme of informing them that the whole matter had been wrote to the Gentlemen in Europe, and that orders were expected from thence, we have paſſed the time over in ſuch manner, that they have not thought of entering into this country, but have always enquired concerning their requeſt. Now, however, conſidering the great length of time, which it has taken to receive the letters from *Europe*, they are come into the *Payen Ghaut* country; and intend, if aſſiſtance is granted them agreeable to their deſire, to perform their former promiſe of kindneſs; but if not, ſuſpecting the ſame to proceed from a conſideration of an engagement of friendſhip to *Hyder Ally Cawn*, they intend to lay waſte my country. Accordingly, whether it was with a view of ſtriking a terror throughout the country, or that the ſame was done through a miſtake of the Pundauras (from whichever it proceeded) but immediately on their paſſing on this ſide of the Ghauts, and making a motion in ſome of the villages, ſuch as *Caliſpauk*, &c. the inhabitants of the country (on whom its cultivation depends, and who, in this dry ſeaſon, with the water from the wells, had ſowed a little grain, and were waiting for the time of reaping the ſame) greatly alarmed, fled, with their women, children, and cattle, to places of ſafety, by which the grain ſo ſowed has ſuffered greatly. My ſituation is ſuch, that out of the collections to the Company, may be paid, in lieu of the current charges to the creditors, alſo may be given, and the charges of the Sepoys in my ſervice with my own neceſſary expences, may likewiſe be carried on. (God forbid it ſhould ſo happen) but if nothing is received from the country, I have no means whatever of ſupporting all theſe charges; and in caſe of the Maratta Army coming into this country, and diſturbances happening therein, I do not think that a ſingle village will remain in quiet, nor the inhabitants, or their cattle, be in ſafety; for the country in a very ſhort time may be laid waſte, and cannot recover itſelf for a great length of time; in which caſe, it will be out of my power to procure either grain or money, even from any part, or to ſend proviſions from one place to another. In thoſe forts indeed, where grain has been laid up in ſtore, in ſome ſufficient for the people there for the term of ſix months, and in others ſtill more, ſufficient for the fighting men in the Company's Army that is ready; but my apprehenſions are, where we are to get grain after the Army and Garriſons ſhall have expended the above. I underſtand from you, that the Company likewiſe have no money. Should it be thought, that by joining with, and the aſſiſtance of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, theſe ravages may be ſtopped, the ſame is by no means practicable; for even when the ſaid *Cawn* was in the higheſt of his power, he could not ſtand againſt them, and what can he do now that power is ſo much curtailed? What motive can there be to induce me to conſent to my country being ruined, and its inhabitants plundered of lacks, by being at enmity with the Marattas?	A. 'Tis true, the Nabob has told us ſo; but when, at a conference with *Mauderow Sadaſheo*, as appears by Minutes of Committee the 4th February 1771, he was deſired to explain what advantage he had to offer, he declined to mention any thing until we ſhould firſt declare our intentions to join, or not to join the Marattas.
B. Their chaſtiſement, by the mode you propoſe, does not appear to me poſſible.	B. When the Preſident communicated to the Nabob the opinion of the Board (ſee their Minutes of 13th inſtant) the Nabob ſaid, "That ſince we were reſolved not to join the Marattas, his country muſt be totally ruined, for he was of opinion that we could not prevent their plundering and burning; neither could we come up with them, for they would not fight us;" which brought on the following converſation:

LETTER.

REMARKS.

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Preſ. I think ſo too.

Nab. Then how can you think of making War with them?

Preſ. I do not; but if they make War on us, we muſt defend ourſelves.

Nab. Well, and how will you defend yourſelves?

Preſ. In the firſt place, all the grain in the country muſt be ſecured in the forts.

Nab. The Circars grain has been laid in ever ſince July; there has been little ſince.

Preſ. What belongs to the inhabitants ſhould alſo be ſecured.

Nab. There is but little remaining; the inhabitants have been living on it, and it is very near conſumed by this time.

Preſ. So much the better, the Marattas will find nothing here to ſubſiſt on; how will they be able to obtain ſupplies of proviſions?

Nab. Oh! They have lacks of Bungarys that bring them conſtant ſupplies. All the country is open to them, through *Cuddapah* quite to *Poonah*.

Preſ. Then I think the plan of operations ſhould be this: inſtead of haraſſing our Troops, as we did the laſt War, and by which I think we could not prevent their plundering the country, we ſhould keep in their rear, and apply our whole attention and endeavour to cut off their ſupplies. Great pains ſhould be taken to obtain good and timely information of their convoys of proviſions; and, as they muſt come through ſome of the Paſſes, we ſhould endeavour to intercept them. I think this plan may be attended with ſucceſs; and though it will not prevent their ruining the country this time, it may oblige them ſoon to retire from it.

Nab. You never can prevent their getting ſupplies.

C. If the plan indeed I have repreſented, mentioned in converſation, could be adopted, in ſome meaſure, the eſſentials for that purpoſe, might be got together; but in the preſent ſituation of affairs, I think the entering into a War with them, is begetting freſh diſturbances in the country; and after ſuſtaining vaſt loſs, ſacrificing the lives of many Europeans, and exerting ourſelves in War for years: it does not appear to me poſſible to extirpate them. As I am, in every ſenſe, the Company's firm friend, as they are my benefactors, and the protectors both of myſelf and country, and as the tranquillity of my country is the means of carrying on their trade, I have therefore, for the information of you, the Company's Repreſentatives here, wrote thus plainly, in order that you may adviſe me (whoſe good is included in that of the Company) of what you may think moſt beneficial for the tranquillity and proſperity of the country, the ſafety of the inhabitants, and the Company's trade. It is not with a view of ſupporting the Marattas I write this; my objects therein are the tranquillity and protection of my country (the inhabitants of which it is my duty to take care of) and the conſideration, that in the preſent ſituation of affairs, thoſe objects cannot be obtained but by giving them aſſiſtance. Every letter and every intelligence I have received from the Marattas, &c. I have immediately ſent to you, that you might be informed of its contents; now likewiſe I ſend you incloſed, the following letters, viz. from *Maudhoorow Pundit Purdhaun*, both to you and to me; a tranſlation of one from *Maudhoorow Sudaſhee*, and a letter from Rajah *Burbur*, regarding the ſituation of the people. What can I ſay more?

C. This plan is, for the three Preſidencies to form a general confederacy with the Powers who are jealous of the Marattas, and attack them at once on all ſides; *Bengal* on the ſide of *Malva*, *Bombay* to march to *Poonah*, and this Preſidency on the ſide, only aſſiſting the other Preſidencies.

The Committee think it neceſſary here to recapitulate the many arguments and reaſons againſt acquieſcing in the plan recommended by the Nabob, of joining the Marattas againſt *Hyder Ally*. It will be ſufficient to return him an anſwer, acquainting him, That we can by no means impute the preſent conduct of the Marattas to any ſuſpicions they have entertained that our refuſal to comply with their demands and threats, is in conſequence of our engagements. This is evinced by their conduct in engaging in a confederacy againſt this province in 1768, when we were actually at War with *Hyder Ally*, and which we have no doubt they would have carried into execution, had not *Madava Row* been called off to reduce *Ianojee*. It will be alſo neceſſary to acquaint the Nabob, that notwithſtanding the inſult offered to this Government, in demanding aſſiſtance with *threats* in

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caſe of refuſal, and which the Nabob ſtiles a *requeſt*, we are utterly averſe to War, and are deſirous of living in Peace with the Marattas; that we are determined not to commence hoſtilities until we are actually attacked, when we muſt defend ourſelves in the beſt manner we are able; that the orders of our Conſtituents, which muſt be our guide, will not allow us to entertain a thought of aſſiſting the Marattas; that theſe orders can, however, only affect the Troops under our command; that the Nabob is at liberty to take ſuch meaſures as he ſhall judge beſt for the ſecurity of his own country; though we cannot avoid declaring it as our firm and clear opinion, that whatever advantages he may promiſe himſelf, by gaining the preſent favour of the Marattas, in aſſiſting them to reduce the *Myſore* Country, that ſuch a meaſure will, in the end, be productive of certain and utter ruin to this province.

A Draft of a Letter to the Nabob to the foregoing effect, being prepared; Reſolved, That it be communicated to the Council for their approbation.

Jeſ. Dupré,
Warren Haſtings,
Saml Ardley.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 18th December 1771.

Received the following Letter per Tappals from the Select Committee at *Fort William:*

To the Honourable *Joſias Dupré*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have been favoured with your letter under date the 28th September, incloſing an extract of one to you from the Select Committee at *Bombay.*

By the lateſt advices, his Majeſty was encamped at *Naby Gunge*, ſome diſtance beyond *Turruckabad.* The ſlow progreſs he has made in the proſecution of his expedition, ſeems to have been occaſioned by the total want of unanimity in the Maratta Councils. The diſſentions among their ſeveral Chiefs procraſtinate the plan of giving him aſſiſtance, and will prevent their undertaking any thing of conſequence in the courſe of the preſent ſeaſon; at leaſt nothing appears to us that can at this time enable us to form any opinion of their intentions.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Cartier,
Samuel Middleton,
Claud Ruſſel.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 10th June 1773.

To *Thomas Moſtyn*, Eſq. at *Poonah.*

Sir,

The commands of the Honourable Court received this year, earneſtly recommend our obſerving, as far as poſſible, a ſtrict neutrality between the Marattas and *Hyder Ally Cawn.* We are, with eſteem, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Alex. Wynch,
John Smith,
Joſ. Smith,
J. M. Stone.

Fort Saint George, 10th June 1773.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 8th December 1774.

This day the following Letter was diſpatched to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William:*

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William.*

Gentlemen,

WE have already had the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 24th October; and ſhall now proceed to give you the cleareſt information in our power of the poſture of affairs under this Preſidency, reſpecting the Country Powers, their intereſt, and probable connections with each of them, with the Company and other European Nations.

We ſhall firſt ſpeak of the Marattas. This State has been involved, for ſome time paſt, in conteſts reſpecting the perſon who ſhould hold the office of Peiſhwa. The objects of one party have been to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, the uncle of the late *Mahadarow*, in the above office; and the objects of the other, to procure it, nominally at leaſt, for the family of *Narrain Row*, who was aſſaſſinated at *Poonah* in the courſe of laſt year. Until lately, the latter party, by the aſſiſtance of the Soubah of the *Decan*, ſeemed to have greatly the ſuperiority: *Ragonaut Row* was obliged to fly the *Decan*, and a ſon of *Narrain Row*, ſince the commencement of thoſe diſſentions, was appointed to the office of Peiſhwa, the buſineſs of the government being conducted by the leading men of that party. By late advices, however, we learn, that *Ragonaut Row*, having found the aſſiſtance of two powerful Maratta Chiefs of *Indoſtan*, has re-entered the *Decan*, and, if we may form any judgment from appearances, ſeems likely, in a great degree, to recover his authority. For further information, we beg leave to incloſe to you a letter, which the Select Committee have lately received from Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Company's Reſident at *Poonah.* What changes the diſſentions in this State may cauſe in the political intereſt of this part of *India*, we cannot take upon us to ſay; we may have our hopes, that the loſſes which each party has ſuſtained in the conteſts, and the attention which each will be obliged to pay to the re-eſtabliſhment of his particular intereſt, will, for ſome time at leaſt, confine this reſtleſs Power within the limits of their own country, and give peace to their neighbours.

As the Maratta poſſeſſions are extended through almoſt every part of *India*, it cannot be expected that we ſhould be able to give either an accurate account of their revenues, or their force, which, upon an emergency, and when their Government is united, they can bring into the field.

We know of no connection that this Power has with any European or Country Power; the temporary one formed by one of the parties with the Soubah of the *Decan*, excepted.

The Marattas at *Nagapore*, ſince the death of *Iannogee*, have been divided into two parties; at the head of one is *Sabajee Bhoonſalah*, and *Moodagee Bhoonſalah* at the head of the other, each contending for the regency. The former has co-operated with the Soubah and the party at *Poonah*, and has been ſupported by them; and the other has taken part with *Ragonaut Row.* This State, we underſtand, is tributary to the Maratta Government at *Poonah*, at leaſt nominally ſo. The force it is able to bring into the field, when in its vigour, may amount to, it is ſaid, thirty or forty thouſand Horſe. The revenues are conſiderable. We know of no connection this Power has with any European Nation.

The Soubahſhip of the *Decan*, which, in the time of the father of the preſent Soubah, was ſo powerful, and had ſuch rich poſſeſſions annexed to it, has now loſt the greateſt part of its ſtrength. In the diſſentions which prevail in the Maratta Government, the Soubah, tempted by the promiſes made to him, has taken an active part, and joined the party, called the Miniſterial Party at *Poonah*, againſt *Ragonaut Row.* He has lately, we underſtand, received aſſignments of countries from that party, to the amount of twelve lacks and fifty thouſand Rupees; and ſome money, we are informed, has alſo, at different times, been advanced to him.

Of

Of his forces and revenues we can ſay nothing with certainty; his collections from his Tributaries are chiefly made by military force, which of courſe muſt exhauſt a conſiderable part. With this *Cawn* the Company entered into a Treaty in the year 1768; in conformity to which, they now pay him an annual Peiſhcuſh of five lacks of Rupees for the circars of *Muſtaphanagar*, *Rajah Mundry*, *Ellore*, and *Chicacole*; a copy of which Treaty was before tranſmitted to your Preſidency, and to which we beg leave to refer. We do not know that this *Cawn* has any connection with other European Nations: as Soubah of the *Decan*, the Nabobs of *Cuddapah* and *Cannoul*, alſo the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, are his Tributaries, and are bound, we underſtand, to aſſiſt him when called upon.

Bazalet Jung, the brother of the Soubah of the *Decan*, holds the Circars of *Adoni* and *Murtazanagur* as a jaghire; the latter, by the Treaty of March 1768 with the Soubah, is to revert at his death, or on his miſbehaviour, to the Company. In the *Murtazanagur* Circar is a ſea-port town, called *Mootapilly*, from whence he is ſupplied by the French with military ſtores, &c. His country yields about twenty lacks of Rupees yearly; he has a force of about three hundred Horſe and Foot, beſides Sepoys and Black Cavalry. He is ſaid to be attached to the French.

Mararow is a Maratta Chief, whoſe country is ſituated to the Southward of the *Kiſtnah*; reſpectable on account of his family, and reputation as a ſoldier. His force at preſent is not conſiderable: he is tributary to the *Poonah* Government.

Hyder Ally Cawn poſſeſſes a valuable, extenſive, and well-regulated Government. We cannot give you an accurate computation of his revenues or forces, but all accounts agree that he can bring into the field a very numerous and well-equipped army; that he is no leſs exact in the payment of his forces, than attentive to their diſcipline; and that his revenues are ſaid to amount to three crores of Rupees. He has taken the opportunity, while the attention of the Marattas has been engaged by their diſtractions at home, to recover the whole of the countries which they had, within theſe few years paſt, wreſted from him. As we cannot ſpeak with certainty of the reports which prevail of his connections with the French, it is almoſt improper for us to touch upon them; but thus much is evident, that by their means he is plentifully ſupplied with military ſtores, and that adventurers of their Nation are allowed, if not encouraged, to enter into his ſervice.

With this *Cawn* the Company entered into a Treaty in the year 1769, which ſtill ſubſiſts; a copy thereof was tranſmitted to your Preſidency.

We come now to ſpeak of the Nabob of *Arcot*, the Company's ancient ally. The poſſeſſions he holds, including the *Tanjore* Country, are eſtimated by the laſt accounts at upwards of two crores of Rupees: the force, by the beſt information we can procure, conſiſts of ten battalions of Sepoys, who may be conſidered as Regulars, being commanded by European Officers, accoutred and diſciplined after the European manner; and a battalion of five hundred Topaſſes; he has alſo four regiments of Cavalry, with guns and Artillerymen attached to each, and he is at preſent raiſing two more, beſides the Irregulars he maintains, which muſt be eſtimated at between ten and twelve thouſand. The regiments of Cavalry are his beſt Troops, having been diſciplined by European Officers lent to him from this Eſtabliſhment.

As the Company's intereſts on this Coaſt are ſo materially affected by their connections with the Nabob, and as miſunderſtandings and jealouſies have long ſubſiſted, which, notwithſtanding our utmoſt endeavours to remove, do ſtill exiſt; we think it neceſſary to enumerate ſome circumſtances which may ſerve to give you an idea thereof.

Some time after the capture of *Tanjore*, when they had reaſon to be alarmed by the preparations of the Dutch, in collecting a conſiderable force at *Nigapatnam*, and when an army of Marattas was threatening the peace of the *Carnatic*, we thought it neceſſary to repreſent to the Nabob the neceſſity of putting a garriſon of the Company's Troops into *Tanjore*, for the better ſecurity thereof; but although every argument was uſed for that end, he would not conſent to it, declaiming, that he conſidered the place ſufficiently ſecure in the charge of his own Troops. When any meaſures are adopted by the Nabob, which in our opinion are inconſiſtent with good policy or the intereſt of his country, we never fail to uſe our endeavours by reaſon and argument to perſuade him from them; but having no controlling power over him, the option ſtill remains with himſelf, either to acquieſce in our ideas, or to adhere to his own opinion.

To this inſtance of want of confidence he has ſince added another: it has been reſolved to ſurvey the roads of the *Carnatic*, as the inconveniencies reſulting from the want of a thorough knowledge of the country, has been moſt ſeverely felt during the *Myſore* War; and a part had actually been ſurveyed without any objections from the Nabob; but when meaſures were lately taken for accompliſhing this work, and the Nabob was requeſted to give ſuch orders to the Aumildars for aſſiſting the Surveyors as he might think neceſſary, he appeared to be ſo alarmed at the idea of ſurveying his country, that, however unwilling, we found ourſelves neceſſitated to poſtpone this uſeful undertaking.

We are not only reſponſible for the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions, but we are alſo charged with the protection of the *Carnatic*, without any certain reſources to provide for the exigencies of a war: to the Nabob we are obliged to look for money, proviſions, bullocks, and, in ſhort, for almoſt every article neceſſary to enable us to equip and maintain an Army in the field; and conſequently it reſts with him, either to give thoſe ſupplies or not, as the meaſures we recommend may coincide with his views. The truth of this was fully evinced upon a recent occaſion, when we were threatened with an invaſion by the Marattas, as we have mentioned before. The Nabob ſeemed averſe to every meaſure which in prudence we thought neceſſary to adopt for the ſafety of the country; and we were given to underſtand, that as his reſources depended ſolely upon the revenues of his country, in caſe that was involved in war, it would be out of his power to ſupply us with either money or proviſions; and that it was in conſequence of his declaration, that we applied to your Preſidency for a ſupply of money, when it was uncertain how ſoon the *Carnatic* might be attacked. The danger of ſuch a ſyſtem is too apparent to require animadverting on. Theſe are circumſtances which materially concern the Company's intereſt; and we have repeatedly repreſented them in the moſt earneſt manner in our diſpatches to the Court of Directors.

Our expences on the Coaſt in time of peace, are generally about fourteen lacks of Pagodas, and the inveſtment for *Europe* requires ſix lacks, which makes the diſburſements on the Coaſt amount to twenty lacks of Pagodas. The annual accounts of the revenues, upon a mean calculation, may be eſtimated at upwards of ſixteen lacks; and the ſums paid by the Nabob in certain kiſts, in the courſe of the year, for the pay of the Troops kept by the Company on his account, and the expences of the garriſons defrayed by them, at about four lacks, making in all twenty lacks of Pagodas: but of theſe receipts, near eight lacks are to be paid by the Nabob; for excluſive of the money advanced on his account, eſtimated as above at four lacks, he has, by the Company's orders, the Enciriam lands at rent for Pagodas 3,68,350 per annum, which is likewiſe received in certain kiſts payable in the courſe of the year; but this reſource, from the Nabob's own declarations, muſt become precarious in time of war.

With regard to the connexions of the Nabob with other Europeans and with the Country Powers, we incloſe you herewith copies of the Treaties ſubſiſting between him and the French, the Dutch, and the Rajah of

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of *Travencore*. We know not of any other Alliances that he has entered into independent of the Company: a correſpondence has, for a conſiderable time paſt, been carried on between him and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, but from the jealouſies which they entertain of each other, there appears little probability of a hearty union ever taking place.

The force of the French at *Pondicherry* is nearly as follows: between nine hundred and a thouſand Europeans, and about four hundred Blacks, including Sepoys, Coffries, and Sibbundars; their revenues and cuſtoms are ſaid to be one hundred and thirty four thouſand Rupees a year; and their annual expence two hundred and ſixty-four thouſand Rupees.

With reſpect to the Dutch, they have ſent back the Troops which we have before obſerved they had collected at *Nigapatnam*, ſoon after the reduction of *Tanjour*, and have reduced their military eſtabliſhment to its former force, and the Sepoys which they entertained at the ſame time have ſince been diſbanded.

We learn by private advices, that the Portugueſe at *Goa* have lately received a conſiderable reinforcement of Troops from *Europe*, and two men of war; and that two others are expected, with a farther ſupply of Troops on board.

We have the honour to be;
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
Alexander Wynch, &c. Council.

Fort Saint George,
7th Dec. 1774.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 23d January 1775.

PRESENT,

Alexander Wynch, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
John Maxwell Stone,
Edward Stracey,
Francis Jourdan.

READ a Letter from the Nabob, No. 7, Country Correſpondence, dated 17th inſtant.

The Nabob repreſents, the formidable preparations of *Hyder Ally Cawn*; the Nabob's apprehenſions of the conſequences of his alliance with the French, in caſe of a War with that Power; and reports of *Hyder Ally*'s intention to attack the *Travancore* Rajah.

A^r Wynch,
Joſeph Smith,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Saml Johnſon,
J. M. Stone,
Ed^d Stracey,
Francis Jourdan.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

No. 7. Extract of a Letter from the Nabob; dated 17th January 1775.

Hyder Ally Cawn, taking advantage of the civil diſſentions and broils among the Marattas, has for theſe two years paſt been raiſing numerous forces, and has taken poſſeſſion of countries that belonged to them. He is ſtill raiſing Horſe, Sepoys, and other Troops; and as the Engliſh have not ſupplied him with ſuccours, agreeble to the terms of the Treaty of Peace, he has taken great offence. Incloſed I ſend you copies of a paragraph of an Arzdaſht I received from *Seid Mohammed Cawn*, the Manager of *Tirunnavelly*, and of the copy of a Letter which came incloſed therein from the Rajah of *Maleavor*. It is probable that *Hyder Ally Cawn*, in confidence of the number of his forces, the wealth of his treaſury, and the good underſtanding he maintains with the Portugueſe, French, and Dutch, will make an attack upon *Maleavor*. Formerly, objections were raiſed againſt aſſiſting the Marattas, on account of the cauſe there was to apprehend their becoming too powerful a neighbour; but *Hyder Ally Cawn* is already grown ſo ſtrong, as to give freſh grounds for ſuch an apprehenſion with regard to him. He is not a perſon that will ſit quiet, when he finds an opportunity of acting; and pray God, that in caſe of a War with the French, his alliance with them produce not effects to the country that it will be hard to remedy!

Tranſlation of a Letter from his Highneſs the Nabob to Governor *Wynch*; received 4th December 1775.

I have repeatedly informed you, both verbally and by letter, of the extraordinary increaſe that *Hyder Ally* is making in his Horſe, Sepoys, and Peons, as alſo of the reinforcements he is drawing from other countries, by ſending people with money to entertain Soldiers for his ſervice; and of the great quantities of artillery and military ſtores he is preparing. It is likewiſe well known that he has employed people to entice into his ſervice the Company's Europeans, by offering them money, many of whom have deſerted to him; but, by the bleſſing of God, they are prevented by my people, who catch them upon the road.

The Maratta Troops uſed formerly to enter the *Myſore* country every year, and plunder it, and frequently cantoned their Troops there, which much weakened *Hyder*, and prevented his making diſturbances in other countries; but for theſe three years paſt they have made no incurſions into this country, on account of their domeſtic quarrels, by which he has had an opportunity of daily increaſing his forces, and re-taking the countries which the Marattas formerly poſſeſſed themſelves of; and not content with that, he has lately encroached on the territories of his neighbours, and has taken poſſeſſion of *Ratungeery*, the Zemindar of which is ſubject to *Viſapoor*; but ſtill not ſatisfied, he marched againſt the Troops of *Bazalet Jung*, who were beſieging the fort of *Ballary*, the Zemipdar of which is ſubject to *Adoni*. He has defeated and plundered the ſaid Troops, and has taken poſſeſſion of the ſort of *Ballary*, as you have been fully informed of, by the paper of intelligence that I ſome days ago incloſed to you. In caſe *Hyder* ſhould attempt to take *Adoni*, *Cannoul*, and the territory of *Morarow*, thoſe three Powers cannot pretend to defend their poſſeſſions, but muſt ſubmit to him.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 21ſt October 1776.

PRESENT,

The Hon. *George Stratton*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
James Stuart,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Read a Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *James*, commanding at *Trichinopoly*:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to tranſmit to you my Monthly Returns for September, which I hope will prove correct, and be received in due time.

I think

I think it my duty alſo to tranſmit to you the intelligence juſt received from *Seringapatam*, as interpreted by Mr. *Swartz*.

I remain with true reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt devoted Servant,
Edwd James.

Trichinopoly,
5th October 1776.

Intelligence from *Seringapatam*.

Hyder Ally reſides in the fort with his ſon *Teepo Saib*, and his younger ſon *Karam Saib*; the garriſon conſiſts of 5,000 Sepoys, 10,000 Matchlock-men, 130 guns, 50 of which are very large, 100 elephants, 300 camels, 40 Europeans, 30 Topaſſes, commanded by the European officers.

Out of the fort, at the diſtance of four miles, is *Hyder Ally*'s camp, conſiſting of 40,000 Horſe, 45,000 Sepoys, 60,000 Matchlock-men, 4,000 Spearmen, 30 guns, 900 elephants, 1,200 camels, 120 Europeans, 1,000 Topaſſes, commanded by fourteen European officers.

Hyder Ally is daily recruiting and collecting of Troops from all quarters, he has completely repaired *Seringapatam* in thoſe places which were damaged by the flood.

Hyder Ally has ſent a ſtrong detachment to *Savenor Bungavanam*, and thoſe Northern parts of his country, to keep the Marattas quiet; the detachment is commanded by *Meer Saheb*.

There is Peacebetween *Gobiatonaj* and *Ragoba*; it is ſaid they have joined *Nizam Ally*; it is alſo ſaid that *Murarwar*'s ſon, whom *Hyder Ally* has taken priſoner, has made his eſcape, and will join *Nizam Ally*. It is currently reported at *Dindegall Carroor*, *Satam*, &c. that *Hyder Ally*'s preparations are for this place and *Madura*.

Trichinopoly, 5th October 1776.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations,
4th November 1776.

Extract of Intelligence from the Nabob, 2d Nov. 1776.

That *Hyder Ally Cawn* was making great preparations, and had ordered all his vaſſals and tributaries to hold themſelves ready to march, as it was imagined, againſt the *Carnatic*.

The Preſident acquaints the Board he underſtands, from the beſt intelligence, that the preparations now making by *Hyder Ally* are intended againſt the Marattas, 20,000 of whom he is informed were advanced to the banks of the river *Kiſtnah* on their way to the *Myſore* country.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations,
the 18th November 1776.

PRESENT,

The Hon. *George Stratton*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Archd Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.
Colonel *Stuart* indiſpoſed.

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire.

Sir,

A Sepoy, in eleven days from *Seringapatam*, has juſt brought me the following intelligence; viz.

That *Hyder Ally* has a body of 10,000 Horſe aſſembled at *Seringapatam*, and has iſſued orders for 15,000 men to be embodied with all ſpeed: that his ſtores, field-pieces, tents, and other field equipage, are all completed; that it is the common opinion at *Seringapatam*, that he intends entering the *Carnatic*, and by the way of *Changamah*, as his Arcan have been lately examining that Paſs. That great rains have fallen in the *Myſore* country, and, from the badneſs of the roads, it will be impoſſible for Troops to move in leſs than a fortnight.

I ſhall order out people immediately to the different Paſſes into the *Carnatic*, that I may give you timely notice (ſhould his intention be againſt us) which way he enters.

I remain, Sir,
Your moſt obedient and humble Servant,
Wm Champneys.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations,
the 2d January 1777.

PRESENT,

The Hon. *George Stratton*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
James Stuart,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Read a Letter from Captain *Bruce*, commanding at *Amboor*:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that a Sepoy of my battalion returned this morning from *Seringapatam*, and informs me, that he left that place the 15th inſtant; that *Hyder Ally* and his ſon were there, and that orders were given ſome time ago to keep every thing in readineſs to take the field. There ſeemed to be no particular preparation at preſent for doing ſo, as moſt of his Artillery were diſmounted; that their Cavalry were at their different cantonments, ſome of them at a conſiderable diſtance from *Seringapatam*; but that Sepoys were in the neighbourhood without their guns, and that he was entertaining as many people as he could get to complete his Infantry. He has, I am aſſured, ſeveral of his Subidars in the *Bermault* country recruiting; and that they ſend their recruits into the *Myſore* as they get them. It is ſtill certainly reported, that he ſhortly intends to take the field, and that his Operations are againſt the *Carnatic*; I ſhall keep conſtantly people at *Seringapatam*, and flatter myſelf ſhall be able to give you the earlieſt intelligence of his motions.

I remain, Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thos Bruce.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations,
the 21ſt April 1777.

PRESENT,

The Hon. *George Stratton*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

BY Intelligence lately received of the motions of the neighbouring Powers, we are given to underſtand, that the Marattas are in the field with an Army of 60,000 Horſe, that they have paſſed the river *Kiſtnah*, and in two actions which they have had with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, they have been ſucceſsful; that *Hyder* has been obliged to march the greateſt part of his force againſt them, and from an apprehenſion for the ſafety of his family, has removed them to *Kodamore*, and *Murarwar*, who had been long confined at a ſtrong fort, called ſituated on a rock, that the Nizam has taken the field, with a very conſiderable Army, and on being joined by the

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Nabob of *Cuddapah* and *Cannoul* with 4,000 Horſe, propoſes marching againſt *Hyder*, to retake ſome places, which he was diſpoſſeſſed of laſt year.

Hyder being reduced to this ſituation, it is natural to ſuppoſe he would apply to the French for aſſiſtance; and, indeed, we have every reaſon to believe military ſtores have lately been ſent to him by the way of *Mahé*, and it is not improbable but the people embarked on board the man of war that carried their ſtores, are intended for his ſervice, though the French give out they were ſent to relieve that garriſon; and in this conjecture we are confirmed by the myſterious manner in which *Hyder*'s Vakeel has viſited Monſieur *Bellecombe*, the preſent Governor of *Pondicherry*; he was received in a ſecret manner at midnight; and after holding a conference with Monſieur *Bellecombe*, ſhortly departed from *Pondicherry*, firſt having every aſſurance of ſupport and aſſiſtance from the French Nation; and that if more Troops than could be ſpared him ſhould be wanting, that French ſupplies ſhould be ordered from the Iſlands.

From this ſtate of the poſture of affairs on this ſide of *India*, we have reaſon to believe that the *Carnatic* will be viſited with troubles, unleſs a peace, which is very improbable, ſhould be concluded between *Hyder*, the Marattas, and the Nizam. Should, however, the deſigns of *Hyder* againſt theſe two perſons prove unſucceſsful, it is not improbable to ſuppoſe the French would deem it a favourable opportunity to afford him the aſſiſtance which we have reaſon to believe they have long premeditated againſt the *Carnatic*.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 7th November 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Geo. Stratton*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
George Mackay,
Colonel *Stuart* and Mr. *Jourdan* indiſpoſed.

The following draft of a Letter to the Nabob, read, and approved. Entered in Co. Cor. No.

To the Nabob.

Your Letter of the inſtant, with news of the intention of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, I have received: this intelligence has given me much concern.

As your Highneſs is of opinion, that the preparations making by that Power are with hoſtile intent to the peace and tranquillity of theſe parts, I cannot but deem it neceſſary, conſidering this Government as the guardian and protector of your affairs in the *Carnatic*, to repreſent to you, that our ill ſucceſs and great loſſes in the late war with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, were, amongſt other cauſes, in ſome meaſure owing to your Highneſs's not having laid up in the different garriſons ſufficient ſtores of proviſions at the beginning of the war.

This your Highneſs is well acquainted with, and it is therefore expedient I ſhould take every precaution in my power to prevent the like misfortune, ſhould this country be again viſited with trouble; and to enſure this, I muſt recommend the following matters to your Highneſs's moſt ſerious conſideration:

Firſt. It is neceſſary that your Highneſs ſhould immediately order your Killedars, in ſuch forts as are garriſoned by the Company's Troops, to ſhew to the Commanding Officers in thoſe forts, ſuch magazines of powder and proviſions as may be collected in them; and upon no account whatſoever to expend any of thoſe ſtores without the knowledge and conſent of the reſpective Commandants.

Secondly. To enſure ſucceſs to our operations, your Highneſs ſhould order to be collected in thoſe forts above-mentioned, proviſions ſufficient not only for the expenditure of their reſpective garriſons, but likewiſe for our Army, ſhould it take the field.

The proviſions I would recommend to your Highneſs to have collected are ſheep and bullocks, rice, ſalt, and curry ſtuff, alſo draft and carriage bullocks, with their bags; and that this may be accompliſhed with diligence and care, your Highneſs will be pleaſed to ſend proper Officers of the Circar to the different garriſons, whoſe whole attention ſhould be confined to that object alone. At the ſame time your Highneſs will do me the favour to inform me, what quantities of proviſions are already in ſtore, and what addition you may be enabled to make to them.

Thirdly. As money is the great ſpring of action in time of trouble, it is eſſentially neceſſary for me to be acquainted with preciſion from your Highneſs, the mode you mean to adopt for the payment of the Company's kiſts, and of the expences of the Army, ſhould it take the field. My mind is anxious in this reſpect, for without a certainty before hand, how can I promiſe myſelf ſafety to your country in caſe of war, when your Highneſs knows ſo well the manner in which the kiſts, now in times of peace, are paid into the Company's Treaſury?

APPENDIX, No. 27.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, 27th October 1777.

Read the following Letter from *Bengal*:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Preſident, &c. Council, *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

ALTHOUGH we have no immediate proſpect of a rupture between *Great Britain* and any of the States of *Europe*, yet as ſuch an event is by no means improbable, we think it of the utmoſt conſequence to be prepared againſt it; we therefore requeſt that you will be pleaſed to tranſmit us a Return of the actual ſtate of the Troops at your Preſidency, with your ſentiments upon the means of completing your eſtabliſhment, of co-operating in the moſt effectual manner with this Preſidency in caſe of invaſion, and of the moſt eligible plan for making a diverſion in favour of *Bombay*, if an Enemy appears on that ſide of *India*.

We ſhall likewiſe be glad to receive an account of the views and connections of the different Country Potentates, their ſtrength and reſources, together with your opinion of ſuch alliances as you recommend to be formed in caſe of emergency.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richd *Barwell*,
P. Francis.

Fort William,
17th September 1777.

Although we think the late advices from *England* (with which the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* could not be acquainted at the time they wrote the above letter) do not afford any ground to believe there is a probability of a rupture for ſome time with any of the European Powers, yet it is certainly very proper to be as much as poſſible on our guard, by concerting with *Bengal* meaſures neceſſary to be taken in caſe ſuch an event ſhould happen; Reſolved, therefore, That the beſt account we can obtain, upon the points mentioned in the above Letter, be ſent to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; and that we communicate our ſentiments to them, as far as we are yet enabled from the ſhort experience we have had to form a judgment, of the views and connections of the different Country Powers, their ſtrength and reſources, and the alliances neceſſary to be formed in caſe of emergency.

APPENDIX No. 27.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 16th January 1778.

Diſpatched the following Letter to the Governor General and Council:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In our Letter of the 9th December, we acknowledged the receipt of your favour, dated the 17th September, and informed you of our intention to reply to it in a ſhort time. We ſhall now, in conſequence, proceed to give you our ſentiments in the cleareſt manner we are able, upon the ſeveral points ſtated in that Letter.

Although we do not find, from the lateſt intelligence that has been received, that there is any probability of an immediate rupture with any of the States of Europe, yet the unſettled ſituation of affairs at home, which, by the laſt accounts, was likely to continue for ſome time longer, ought certainly to put us, as much as poſſible, upon our guard againſt an event of ſuch importance to the well being of the Company's poſſeſſions in *India*. We ſhall therefore, on our part, communicate with you on this ſubject moſt cheerfully, and be ready at all times to join our beſt endeavours to maintain the preſent ſecurity.

Agreeable to your requeſt, we have ordered a Return of the actual ſtate of the Troops at this Preſidency to be made out; by which you will perceive, that in Europeans we are deficient of the proper eſtabliſhment two hundred and twenty men. The few recruits ſent out by the Company for theſe two or three years paſt, have proved very inadequate to our wants. Our force is become ſtill more weakened by our late engagements with the Rajah of *Tanjore*, for the protection of his fort and country; ſo that we apprehend, were there any occaſion to call for the exertion of our whole ſtrength in the field, we ſhould be very deficient in the proper complement of Europeans. With reſpect to the means of completing the eſtabliſhment (concerning which you deſire our ſentiments) we can only ſay, that repeated repreſentations have been made to the Court of Directors on this ſubject; but the difficulties they are under in procuring recruits on account of the American War, has, we believe, hitherto prevented their ſending the proper number; we have therefore no means or proſpect of completing our eſtabliſhment of Europeans, but with your aſſiſtance; and we ſubmit it to your conſideration, whether it may be expedient to afford ſuch aſſiſtance at this time from your Preſidency.

Our preſent eſtabliſhment of Sepoys, conſiſting of twenty-nine battalions or upwards, of twenty-three thouſand men, are, in general, complete; five of thoſe battalions were raiſed laſt year, on account of *Tanjore*, and the late Commander in Chief recommended alſo, that three regiments of Black Cavalry ſhould be maintained by the Company on the ſame account, as ſoon as ſufficient funds could be provided for their ſupport; but this meaſure hath not yet been adopted; and the ſubſidy paid by the Rajah of *Tanjore* will not, at preſent, admit of our raiſing any additional force for the general protection of the *Carnatic*.

As it is not unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, in caſe of a war with *France*, that the earlieſt and moſt formidable attack will fall on our poſſeſſions in *India*, we deem it an object of great importance to be effectually prepared for repulſing the firſt efforts of the French, which will probably be directed againſt our Settlements on this Coaſt. In this view it may be proper to apprize you of the particular ſituation in which we ſtand with reſpect to ſupplies of money.

The revenues of the Company under this Preſidency amount, by the moſt favourable computation, to ſomewhat more than 15 lacks of Pagodas; of which about 10 lacks are under the immediate management and controul of the Company, and the remainder, ariſing from the jaghire and *Poonamalee* farm, are under the controul of the Nabob, and are accounted for, by him to the Company in certain ſtipulated kiſts; beſides this, we receive annually about 2 lacks from our imports and drafts on *England*. With theſe funds, ſuppoſing the Nabob regular in the performance of his engagements, we are able to defray our ordinary charges in time of peace, and provide an inveſtment of near 6 lacks of Pagodas: more we cannot do; and our Treaſury, with the beſt œconomy, is never in a condition to anſwer any extraordinary demand that may come upon it.

Being dependant on the Nabob not only for the revenues of the jaghire of *Poonamalee*, but alſo for the reimburſement of near four lacks of Pagodas, expended annually in the payment of the Troops expreſsly maintained by the Company for the defence of the *Carnatic*, we are frequently ſubject to great inconveniencies for want of money, and we feel them particularly at this time, from the ſituation of the Nabob; which appears to be, and we believe really is, a good deal embarraſſed by an enormous load of private debt, for which he had given aſſignments and orders upon almoſt the whole revenues of the *Carnatic*, and thereby deprived himſelf of the means of fulfilling his engagements punctually to the Company. The Nabob has lately written us a Letter, informing us, that he has concluded certain articles of agreement with his private Creditors, which have enabled him to diſengage his country entirely from theſe incumbrances; and he promiſes to grant no further aſſignments of any kind whatſoever upon his revenues. We have not yet had time to deliberate on the above Letter, and can only ſay therefore at preſent, we ſhall think it our duty to take all poſſible care that the Nabob's arrangement with his private Creditors does not interfere with, or impede the payment of his debt to the Company, for which we ſhall endeavour to obtain ample proviſion.

Whilſt we continue thus dependant on the Nabob for money, and have no reſources within ourſelves to anſwer any failure on his part, the Company's affairs will be continually expoſed to danger, and we can be at no certainty even for money to pay the monthly charges of our Troops; a circumſtance which cannot fail of impreſſing us with very diſagreeable apprehenſions: but if we are liable to this ſtate of inſecurity in time of peace, how much more reaſon have we to be alarmed, ſhould a war find us in a ſituation ſo incapable of employing the Forces of the Company with effect? Having no money in our Treaſury, and poſſeſſing no controul over the reſources of the *Carnatic*, we ſhould probably, in ſuch an event, be reduced to the utmoſt diſtreſs before we could receive the benefit of foreign aid.

This ſubject has been frequently treated of in former advices to the Company from this Government; and many forcible arguments drawn from the experience of paſt times, have been produced, to ſhew the propriety of having always a ſufficient fund in our Treaſury to anſwer the exigencies of war. The more we think upon the ſubject, the more we are convinced ſuch a fund is neceſſary; and that without it, under the preſent ſyſtem, we might be unable, were the *Carnatic* or the poſſeſſions of the Company ſuddenly invaded, to put our Troops in the field ſo as to employ them to any good purpoſe. We flatter ourſelves, that what we have ſaid will engage your ſerious attention; and as the Company's poſſeſſions on this Coaſt lie more open to a powerful invaſion than thoſe of *Bengal* or *Bombay*, and will, in all probability, be the firſt of attack in caſe of a war with any European State, we doubt not you will conſider the propriety of ſending us a ſufficient ſupply of money, to enable us on any emergency of this kind to act with vigour, until we can be further ſupported from *Bengal*.

You are pleaſed to deſire our opinion upon the beſt means of making a diverſion in favour of *Bombay*, ſhould an enemy appear on that ſide of *India*. We think the

French

APPENDIX. No. 27.

French are the only European Power in a condition to form deſigns againſt any of our ſettlements; and were they to meditate an attack upon *Bombay*, the only diverſion which it appears to us could be made, would be by ſending our Troops againſt *Pondicherry*, which, in its preſent ſtate, would be an eaſy conqueſt.

With reſpect to the probable views and connections of the different Powers around us, their ſtrength and reſources; theſe are ſubjects upon which we can write with little degree of certainty, for the means we have of procuring intelligence are not to be depended upon, and we cannot put the Company to that expence which is neceſſary to procure good intelligence, without the hazard of incurring blame; however, we ſhall, as you deſire, give you all the information in our power upon theſe points.

We ſhall ſpeak firſt of the Maratta Government, which holds the firſt rank amongſt the ſtates of *India* for real ſtrength and powerful reſources for War. Their preſent views ſeem principally turned to the conqueſt of *Hyder Ally*, who has been the moſt troubleſome opponent they have met with in the South; fortunately for *Hyder*, the late inteſtine diviſions amongſt them have enabled him to recover the greater part of the countries of which he was diſpoſſeſſed before theſe diviſions took place; and he appears now in a condition to reſiſt them with ſome proſpect of ſucceſs. He has at this time in the field, as we are informed, a force conſiſting of about thirty thouſand Sepoys with ſmall arms, fifty thouſand Matchlock-men, twenty-eight thouſand Horſe, and thirty-ſeven guns; and the Marattas have aſſembled a body of ſixty-ſeven thouſand Horſe and about fifty thouſand Matchlock-men, and are encamped within five miles diſtance from him. In this ſituation, it is probable, an engagement will very ſhortly happen, which may prove deciſive; the Marattas expect to be reinforced by Troops from the Soubah of the *Decan*, and his brother *Bazalet Jung*; and if this reinforcement arrive in time, there is little doubt but they will be greatly an overmatch for their opponent.

With reſpect to any connections which may have been formed by the Maratta State, we can only ſpeak from conjecture: it ſeems probable, that ſome engagements may be in agitation, or perhaps concluded between that State and the Soubah, and they have lately maintained, we believe, a cloſe correſpondence with the French, as appears from the proceedings of *M. Saint Lubin*, at *Poonah*, and the grant which they have given to the French at *Choule* on the *Malabar* coaſt, of which you have been already adviſed.

Hyder Ally's military ſtrength, as appears by the force he has now in the field, is very powerful; and the revenues ariſing from his poſſeſſions are immenſe, amounting, we believe, to three crores of Rupees. His whole attention ſeems at preſent engaged by the Marattas, and his views confined to the preſervation of his own dominions. He has a Vakeel at *Pondicherry* with *M. Bellecombe*, from whom he receives every aſſiſtance the French can at preſent afford him. *M. Bellecombe*, as we are adviſed, keeps up a conſtant correſpondence with *Hyder*, and endeavours all in his power to engage him in the intereſts of the French.

The Government of the Soubah *Nizam Ally Cawn*, is ſo weak, that we believe his chief views are chiefly confined to his own preſervation; and it is not probable that he has lately formed connections with any of the other Country Powers, except perhaps ſome temporary engagements with the Marattas. The Nabob has however juſt received intelligence, that a perſon of ſome conſideration lately arrived from the Soubah's Court at *Pondicherry*, and was received with great reſpect and civility by *M. Bellecombe*; but the purpoſe of his coming is not yet known.

With regard to our Friend and Ally the Nabob, we ſhall only ſay a few words, as his ſituation is ſo well known. He has lately reduced his own Troops conſiderably, and inſtead of ſeven regiments of Cavalry, which he before kept up, he has now only four. The revenue of his country may be reckoned from 25 to 30 lacks of Pagodas annually. The Nabob has no connection but with the Engliſh; we believe him ſincerely and ſteadily attached; and, as far as we can judge, he has no views independant of their friendſhip and ſupport.

Our ſentiments upon the proper alliance to be formed with any of the other Powers in caſe of invaſion, are briefly theſe:

The Maratta ſtate is already too powerful, and we are of opinion that no alliance could be formed with them for our advantage, without entering into engagements which would lead to aggrandize them ſtill more, and ultimately prove dangerous to ourſelves.

We think *Hyder* might on ſuch an emergency be made an uſeful Ally, as his Troops are more warlike, better diſciplined, and better appointed, than thoſe of any other power; but we are afraid the Nabob could never be brought to act cordially in ſuch an alliance, as he has long entertained a rooted enmity towards *Hyder*, and hath on ſeveral occaſions manifeſted it in oppoſition to his own intereſts. As to the Soubah, little could be gained by a cloſer union with him; and our opinion both in reſpect to him and the Marattas is, that we ſhould endeavour, in caſe of a War, to prevent their taking part againſt us, but that we ſhould preſer *Hyder* as an Ally, whoſe aſſiſtance might be the moſt ſerviceable.

We think it neceſſary to inform you, that we have juſt received a letter from the Gentlemen at *Bombay*; requeſting, that 200 Europeans, a battalion of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery-men, may be had in readineſs at *Palamcotah*, to march to *Anjengo* at a moment's warning. We have the honour to incloſe a copy of their letter, and to acquaint you, that upon careful deliberation, we are clear in our ſentiments, that ſuch a force could not in prudence be ſent from the Coaſt at the preſent juncture, when we have ſo near a proſpect of War, when our eſtabliſhment is incomplete, and when our fortifications here and the fortreſs at *Tanjour* are not in ſo finiſhed a ſtate (which you will obſerve by the incloſed reports) as to render it ſafe to detach any part of the Troops ſtationed for their defence: but were there not theſe powerful motives for declining a compliance with this requeſt of the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, we ſhould in another view conſider our acquieſcence as improper; for we conceive the meaſure in agitation there will not be undertaken without your conſent and approbation, and we ſhould be very unwilling, were it even in our power, to make ſuch preparations before the meaſure had the ſanction of your concurrence, unleſs the exigency of the caſe were very preſſing; which is not apparent from the letter we have received.

We lately took under conſideration the Nabob's claims on the Rajah of *Tanjour*, which were repeatedly brought before the Gentlemen of the laſt adminiſtration, and frequent demands were made of the Rajah, to depoſit a ſum of money upon that account into the Company's Treaſury, until the deciſion of the Court of Directors on the Nabob's claims could be had; but the Rajah was ſo poſitive in his refuſal to make any payments on behalf of the Nabob, that nothing was obtained from him. When the matter came before us, we thought it ſo reaſonable that the Rajah ſhould depoſit a ſum of money for the purpoſes above-mentioned, that we came to the reſolution of requiring from him four lacks of Pagodas on this account; and we were the more induced to this ſtep from a review of the low ſtate of our finances, and the conſideration that ſuch a ſum remaining even in depoſit within our reach, would be acceptable to the Company.

Upon theſe principles we proceeded; and thinking that the buſineſs might be ſooner and more effectually concluded by deputing a Member of our Board to negociate with the Rajah, than by a correſpondence of letters, we ſent Mr. *Perring* on that ſervice; which he executed in a few days, very much to our ſatisfaction.

The Rajah ſhewed the ſame averſion to the Nabob's claim that he had manifeſted upon every former application, but conſented to depoſit the money from a motive

of friendſhip to the Company, ſubject to whatever orders they might ſend out. On the controverted claims, the Rajah repreſented his inability to complete the payment of ſo conſiderable a ſum from his revenues in leſs than ſix months, having, beſides this money, three lacks of Pagodas to pay in the courſe of the next four months, on account of his annual ſubſidy to the Company; we therefore agreed to receive the depoſit from him in the following payments; viz.

On 30th January	- -	Pag^{s} 50,000
28th February	- - -	100,000
30th March	- - -	50,000
30th April	- - -	50,000
30th May	- - -	50,000
30th June	- - -	100,000
		400,000

We have formerly explained to you particularly, the influence acquired by the French in the *Guntoor* Circar, and the Troops of that nation entertained in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*. The preſent ſtate of this force, which is commanded by *M. de Lally*, is one troop of European Cavalry, one of Indian, conſiſting of one hundred each; two companies of Topaſſes, two thouſand Sepoys, and four thouſand Peons. The Zemindar of *Gumſoor* ſituated in the diſtrict of *Ganjam*, having frequently withdrew his tribute, and being now conſiderably in arrear to the Company, we have deemed it neceſſary to aſſemble a force conſiſting of two battalions and ſix companies of Sepoys, in order to compel this Zemindar, if neceſſary, to pay his arrears; but we hope he may be induced by theſe preparations to diſcharge what is owing from him without reducing us to that neceſſity.

Since writing the foregoing, we have received intelligence from *Hyder*'s country of ſo late a date as the 8th inſtant, by which we find that *Hyder* attacked the Maratta Army on the night of the 5th inſtant, and gained a conſiderable advantage over them. The particulars are explained in the paper of intelligence, and we have the pleaſure to tranſmit a copy of it for your peruſal.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servants,
John Whitebill, &c.
Council.

Fort Saint George,
16th Jan. 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 28.

Extracts of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 12. Copy of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 5th January 1778: received 25th D^{o}.

AT this fortunate time the Almighty Diſpoſer of Victories has been pleaſed to crown my arms with ſucceſs. My victorious followers, bent upon the chaſtiſement of the Maratta infidels, were in purſuit of their leaders, *Hurry Pundet Perker* and *Puriſtram*, who had entered the *Bala Ghaut* country by the road of *Sannere*, with an Army of 50,000 Horſe, committing their uſual depredations in the Zemindary of *Purnelly*, yet not daring to face the approved warriors of *Iſtam*, they fled before our victorious Army till they came in the diſtrict of *Adoni*, where they pitched the tents of their adverſe fortune. I was at this time in the *Bulhar* country, about 12 coſs diſtant, from whence I directed my march againſt theſe plunderers, and ſoon came up with them: the fire of my Artillery, and the brave conduct of my officers were ſuch, that the Enemy were ſeized with a panic and fled at our approach. The Alligators of the Sea of War [meaning the cannon] did ſuch execution againſt them, that they were entirely routed; ſeveral of their principal Chiefs were ſlain and wounded and made priſoners; moſt of the ſurvivors in croſſing the *Tunghudra* at *Hugely*, in their flight were drowned in that river; our Army found an immenſe booty in their camp, conſiſting of horſes, camels, and valuable effects: we, however, kept purſuing them as far as the North ſide of the *Kiſtna*; and at this time are only within a few coſs of them.

It is from my conſideration of our Alliance and Friendſhip, that I have given you the above account of the ſucceſs of my arms. I hope and beg you will not fail to let me have accounts of your welfare, which will always give me ſincere pleaſure. May your fortune and happineſs be ever increaſing!

No. 25. To *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

I have the pleaſure to inform you I arrived here the 8th inſtant from *England*, and have taken charge of this Government, agreeable to the Company's Orders: you may always reſt aſſured of my endeavours to ſtrengthen and promote the friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Circars of the Company, the *Payen Ghaut*, and the *Bala Ghaut*.

I am happy to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th January to Mr. *Whitebill*, wherein you inform him of the victory obtained by your Army over that of the Marattas; permit me to offer you my congratulations upon your ſucceſs, which appears in a particular manner to have been owing to your own wiſe conduct, and the great bravery of your Troops. I beg you will conſtantly adviſe me of your proſperity that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

Fort Saint George, *Thomas Rumbold*.
13th February 1778.

No. 67. From *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor; dated 24th Suffor, or March 1778: received 4th May.

I have received your agreeable Letter, congratulating me on the victory obtained over the Marattas, and acquainting me of your arrival at *Madras*, and your having, agreeable to the Company's Orders, taken charge of the Government of that place, which has given me infinite ſatisfaction. Your congratulations, I make no doubt, are ſuch as proceed from a real and ſincere friendſhip; and I am well convinced the affairs of your ſettlement will receive new luſtre from your management of them. You have been pleaſed to write me, that I may be aſſured you will, as far as in your favour, promote the friendſhip and union which now ſubſiſts between the Company and me.

It is a length of time ſince the Company and me have been allied by ties of friendſhip, and I entertain no doubt of your confirming and ſtrengthening them. I have ſent you a few trifles as marks of my friendſhip, which I beg your acceptance of. Believe me ever deſirous of hearing of your welfare, and pleaſe to continue to give me accounts of it.

May your happineſs ever increaſe!

No. 72. To *Hyder Ally*; dated 18th May 1778.

I had the pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 24th March. I beg leave to repeat again my aſſurances to you, that I ſhall be happy to ſtrengthen the ties of union between the Company and your Circar, as I am ſenſible it will be for the advantage of both; and I doubt not on your part that every thing neceſſary will be done to effect this deſirable end. I have opened myſelf more fully on this ſubject to your Vakeel, who will write you particularly. Continue to ſend me accounts of your welfare, that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX. No. 29.

APPENDIX, No. 29.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

No. 141. From the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor; dated 6th Rejub 1192, or 31ſt July 1778: received 16th Auguſt 1778.

I HAVE received your friendly Letter, which has given me much pleaſure, and I underſtand the contents of it. You write me, that my Vakeel, *Venagie Pundit*, has repeatedly informed you of the ſincerity of my friendſhip for the Company, and that the ſame ſentiments are impreſſed in your heart; that it is therefore neceſſary that we ſhould come to an explanation of means by which we may advance our mutual friendſhip, which may be for the good of both. It is a truth that from the beginning a ſincere friendſhip has ſubſiſted between the Company and myſelf; *Venagie Pundit* has perhaps mentioned this to you, and it is my deſire to be in friendſhip with the Company. You write me, that the abovementioned Vakeel has on my part mentioned ſome propoſals to you, which you would conſider of and write me afterwards; I on my part ſhall alſo conſider of the propoſals mentioned by you to my Vakeel: you write me particularly concerning this, that I would give you an opportunity of an interview with me; I alſo deſire the ſame, but the diſtance is ſo great between us, that at preſent it is impracticable; yet, with the aſſiſtance of the Almighty, ſome time after this we ſhall have a meeting together. You ſay that a perſon of conſequence will be ſent here from you, if it is agreeable to me: upon this ſubject I ſhall write you after the march of my Army is fixed. What can I ſay more?

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 4th July 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

The Preſident deſires to enter the following Minute:

In conſequence of the complimentary Letters that paſſed between the Nabob *Hyder Ally* and myſelf, on my arrival, he referred me to his Vakeel, to explain fully to me ſome particular circumſtances not mentioned in his letters: his Vakeel has accordingly communicated to me the following Propoſals, which he has been directed to make to this Government by his maſter:—

1ſt. That he will accompany any Troops we may ſend to aſſiſt the placing of *Ragonaut Row* in the Government of *Poonah*, and to negociate for ſuch aſſiſtance through the brother-in-law of *Ragonaut Row*, who has the command of 4,000 Horſe in *Hyder*'s ſervice.

2d. He has deſired his Vakeel to propoſe to this Government the ſupplying of him with military ſtores, artillery, and ſmall arms, for which he will pay the Company in any manner the Board may approve.

3d. He is deſirous of receiving the aſſiſtance of a body of our Troops, the expences of which he will agree to defray and ſatisfy the Company, either by paying them in ſpecie or grant of lands.

4th. He has deſired his Vakeel to aſſure this Government, that his wiſhes ever have been to cultivate a friendſhip with the Engliſh; but that he has been debarred from cauſes there is no neceſſity for him to point out; but that he is now ready to negociate in any manner this Government ſhall deviſe, and to conclude that Treaty of Alliance and Friendſhip which muſt be binding upon both, and replete with advantages to the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company and to himſelf.

It appears from the records, that the advantages of a Treaty with *Hyder*, who, from the ſituation of his country ſhould be conſidered as our natural Ally, and from his ſtrength and reſources almoſt the only one who could prove of real ſervice to us, has been approved and wiſhed for almoſt by every ſucceſſive Government for ſome years; but ſome ruling influence has always thrown obſtacles in the way of every attempt to bring about ſo deſirable an event; of this *Hyder* ſeems fully ſenſible, and his Vakeel takes occaſion to hint at the diſappointments his maſter has been ſubject to whenever he has ſhewn a deſire to cultivate a friendſhip with the Engliſh; this probably has made him on all occaſions more attentive to the French than he otherwiſe would have been, had he met with proper encouragement from us. Before my arrival, the Board fully gave their ſentiments, and the advantages likely to reſult from a firm connection with *Hyder Ally*, in their letter to the Supreme Council, under date 16th January.

I entirely on that point coincide with them in opinion; and the preſent ſituation of affairs adds weight to every argument in favour of ſuch an union; for which a neglect on our part obliges him to ſide with the French, and enter into a cloſer alliance with them; I am perſuaded it would be a circumſtance of fatal tendency, and almoſt the only event that would endanger the *Carnatic*, and the ſafety of our poſſeſſions on this Coaſt.

I therefore ſubmit to the conſideration of the Board, whether ſuch a Letter ſhould not be wrote to *Hyder*, in anſwer to the repreſentations made by his Vakeel, as may be the means of falling on ſome method, either by propoſing a meeting with him, or in whatever other manner may appear eligible, to ſee if any engagements for the mutual benefit of the Company and himſelf, can be entered into, that may not too much embarraſs us with reſpect to the diſpoſition of our forces, and the ſteps we ſhall be obliged to take in caſe of a rupture with France; and I alſo ſubmit to the Board, whether it will not be expedient to addreſs the Supreme Council on the occaſion, and acquaint them with the propoſals made by *Hyder*, and the letter we have wrote to him in conſequence.

The Board approve of the Preſident's Propoſals; and it is reſolved, That Letters be prepared accordingly.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
P. Perring.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 95. To *Hyder Ally*, dated 8th July 1778.

I had the pleaſure of writing a Letter the 18th May, in anſwer to one from you, containing many kind expreſſions of friendſhip and congratulation upon my acceſſion to this Government; your Vakeel has ſince, in repeated declarations, confirmed to me your aſſurances of regard to the Company, and deſire of ſtrengthening the union that has ſo long happily ſubſiſted between them and your Circar. Theſe ſentiments correſpond ſo juſtly with my own, which are equally ſtrong in favour of this union, that there remains nothing now but that we ſhould come to a more particular explanation of the means by which we may advance our mutual intereſts on this ſubject. Your Vakeel has made ſome propoſals to me in your name, which I ſhall conſider maturely, and write you in conſequence. In the mean time I cannot help expreſſing my wiſh that you would afford me an opportunity of having an interview with you, or of ſending ſome perſon of conſequence to explain my intentions fully, and conclude ſome agreement with you, that may

tend to the mutual intereſt of yourſelf and the Company. Write me conſtantly of your welfare that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, No. 30.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 16th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from the Governor General and Council:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Council, *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

The Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in a Letter dated the 9th May, have informed us, that from the friendly intercourſe which has appeared for ſome time paſt to ſubſiſt between the French and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, they think it would be a very proper meaſure to keep a Reſident at his Durbar, to endeavour to penetrate and counteract their ſchemes; and they requeſt to know if we approve of this meaſure, to which they preſume the Nabob can have no reaſonable objections, as they are aſſured both the French and Dutch maintain Reſidents at his Court.

In reply, we have told them, that we have no objection to their making the appointment they propoſe, if the Nabob of the *Carnatic* can be brought to give his aſſent to it; but conſidering the perſonal animoſity which he has conceived againſt *Hyder Ally*, we think he might juſtly take umbrage at the appointment of an Engliſh Reſident to his Court, without his knowledge and acquieſcence. We cannot agree to give our ſanction to the execution of any meaſure that might be diſagreeable to him, particularly where the intereſt of his Government appear to be ſo much involved, without conſulting him, and endeavouring, if poſſible, to obtain his participation and concurrence. We therefore requeſt, that you will uſe your endeavours to convince him of the propriety of this appointment, and to obviate any jealouſy that it might create. When you ſhall have obtained his conſent, you will immediately adviſe the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, who will wait for ſuch a notification from you; and as the meaſure is not indiſpenſably neceſſary, we have deſired them to decline carrying it into execution without ſuch authority.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
Richard Barwell,
P. Francis,
Edwd Wheeler.

Fort William
25th June 1778.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 19th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

Diſpatched the following Letter to *Bengal*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq. Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

APPENDIX No. 30.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have had the honour to receive your Letters of the 1ſt and 25th ultimo; and beg leave to make our acknowledgments to you, for the ſupply of treaſure we have received by the *Seaherſe*.

We conſider it important, and particularly at this time, when we are on the eve of a War with France, that every proper means ſhould be uſed to ſtrengthen our connection with *Hyder Ally*, by ſuch engagements as may effectually ſecure him to our intereſt. *Hyder* has long ſolicited, and even importuned, this Government, to enter into a cloſer union with him; but the conſideration of temporary inconveniencies ariſing from ſuch an union, which could only be formed upon engagements of mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport, has hitherto obſtructed the meaſure, and *Hyder* has conſequently been left, in times of difficulty and diſtreſs, to ſeek aid of foreign nations, particularly the French, who have always yielded him ſupplies of men and ſtores, as far as their ability would permit.

The reluctance on our part to accept the repeated offers made by *Hyder* at a time when our aſſiſtance might have been uſeful to him, will, no doubt, render it more difficult to obtain advantageous terms from him at a juncture when we ſhall probably ſtand in need of aſſiſtance, or at leaſt of a neutral conduct, on his part. However, whilſt we continue to preſerve ſo great a ſuperiority in *India*, it appears to us that the intereſts of *Hyder* will always point out our nation as the moſt uſeful Ally; and from that cauſe only can we expect that he will enter into new engagements with us. His Vakeel has lately made ſome Propoſals to our Preſident, and we wrote, in conſequence, a friendly letter to *Hyder*, expreſſing, in general terms, our deſire to ſtrengthen the connection between him and the Company, and deſiring him to afford us an opportunity of coming to a more particular explanation of the means by which this object might be accompliſhed to our mutual ſatisfaction. A copy of *Hyder*'s Propoſals, and of two letters written him in conſequence, are incloſed for your information; and we beg leave to requeſt your ſentiments on the ſubject, and ſanction, if you approve the meaſure, to conclude a freſh Treaty with him, upon ſuch terms as may be advantageous to the intereſts of the Company and the Nabob.

We are of opinion, conſidering the ſituation of *Hyder* with reſpect to the *Carnatic* and the Company's poſſeſſions on the coaſt, that it would be more proper to ſend an intelligent perſon from this Preſidency to reſide at *Hyder*'s Court, than from *Bombay*. Whatever perſonal diſlike the Nabob may have entertained againſt *Hyder*, we think he muſt ſee the advantage and neceſſity of a cloſer union with him at this juncture, if only to detach him from the intereſts of the French; and in that caſe, we are perſuaded it muſt be more agreeable to the Nabob to have a Reſident ſent from hence to *Hyder*'s Court, than from any other ſettlement. We ſhall urge the matter to him, and acquaint you with his ſentiments.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Saml Johnſon,
P. Perring.

Fort Saint George,
19th July 1778.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 2d Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Preſident and Council in *Bengal*.

In your Letter of the 7th ultimo, you recommended it to us to negociate and conclude ſuch conditions with *Hyder Ally*, in addition to the preſent Treaty, as may ſerve to cement a good underſtanding with him, and to enſure his aſſiſtance in caſe of neceſſity; carefully avoiding any engagements with him that may draw the Company's forces from the defence of their own poſſeſſions, and of the *Payen Ghaut*.

We acquainted you, in our Letter of the 19th ultimo, that we did not imagine it would be poſſible to conclude any engagements with him, but on terms of mutual aſſiſtance; and it is certain, that this has been his only motive for ſeeking a cloſer connection with us for ſome years paſt: indeed, the Treaty concluded with him in 1769, appears to us fully to expreſs the conditions on which we may now ſecure his friendſhip; and if that Treaty had not been evaded by the former Government here, we do not believe that *Hyder* would deſire any new engagements at this time, or that it would be neceſſary for us to conclude any with him.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Fort St. George, 2 Auguſt 1778.

Thomas Rumbold, &c. Select Committee.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 19th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
General *Munro* abſent on ſervice.

Read the following Letter from *Bengal*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your favours of the 19th and 23d ultimo.

We very much approve your propoſals of forming a new alliance with *Hyder Ally*, on the condition of mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport; of which you will have underſtood, by our letter of the 7th ultimo, to have been entirely conſonant to our ſentiments; and for this purpoſe we agree with you in opinion, that it will be more proper to ſend an intelligent perſon from your Preſidency to treat with him, than from that of *Bombay*, where their attention and all their means are likely to be ſo much occupied with the care of their own ſafety, as to leave them little of either for foreign engagements.

The articles propoſed by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, though very equitable to the ſituation of affairs to which they are adapted, require at this time a total alteration, with reſpect to the immediate objects of your alliance.

We have never regarded the ſupport of *Ragoba* as the end but as the means of accompliſhing our deſigns in the Weſt of *India*. The plan which was propoſed by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and adopted by us, in that view having failed, we know not from what cauſe, and the impending War with France rendering it impracticable for that Preſidency, in its preſent ſtate, and under their preſent expectations, to take any direct part in the ſupport of *Ragoba*, who appears to have no reaſonable ground to expect any from the partizans of his own nation, we conceive that the attempt to reinſtate him in the Government of the Maratta dominions would not only oblige us to withdraw our forces from the immediate defence of the Company's poſſeſſions, but involve us in the ſupport of a War for the benefit of his pretenſions, which might be attended with endleſs difficulties: he could afford us no aſſiſtance, but would rather incumber than contribute to forward our operations, by the influence of his name. Beſides, any engagement of this nature which you might form with *Hyder*, would poſſibly lead you into meaſures repugnant to the conditions which Mr. *Elliot* may conclude with *Moodajee Booſla*, and in that caſe could not conſiſtently be fulfilled; and as you have neither a force you can immediately ſpare to co-operate with *Hyder* in the ſervice propoſed, nor he has, we imagine, any ſtrong perſonal attachment to *Ragoba*, or immediate intereſt in his ſucceſs; we recommend, that the firſt article remain to be finally adjuſted by the communications which your deputy may receive from Mr. *Elliot*, whom we ſhall order to correſpond with him. In the mean time, that a conformity may be preſerved in the inſtructions which you ſhall give to the perſon you may appoint, and the objects which we have committed to the charge of Mr. *Elliot*'s negociations, the Governor General will tranſmit to your Preſident a copy of Mr. *Elliot*'s inſtructions: we have not yet entered them on our proceedings; and we wiſh that they may continue in the poſſeſſion of your Preſident alone, until the ends of them ſhall be ſo far attained, that no inconvenience can reſult from truſting them to the Records of the Select Committee; we ſhall then alſo inſert them in our own.

We approve in general of the other conditions propoſed to you by *Hyder Ally*'s Vakeel, but leave it to you to accept or amend them in ſuch a manner as you ſhall judge moſt conducive to the Company's intereſt.

As it is impoſſible that any ſupply of men or money which we might now reſolve to ſend you, could arrive upon the coaſt in time to be of ſervice in conducting the expedition againſt *Pondicherry*, which, if begun ſo early as you give us reaſon to expect, muſt, we think, have terminated before any reinforcement could be thrown into it by the French, which ſhould render ſuch ſuccours from us indiſpenſable; we truſt, that our late ſupply of money will have been ſufficient for the preſent occaſion. That we may be the better enabled in future to judge of our exigencies, we requeſt, that you will tranſmit to us a complete Eſtimate of your revenues and other reſources and diſburſements for the preſent year, including the 30th April next, which we have repeatedly applied to you for, but have not yet been furniſhed with; we alſo requeſt that you will ſend us an Eſtimate of the revenues of the *Carnatic*, and an account of the manner in which they are applied, becauſe, as we know that the Nabob is largely indebted to the Company, we think that they ought likewiſe to be in ſome meaſure appropriated to their ſervice.

As our eſtabliſhment of Europeans is greatly deficient of men, and as we obſerve, by the Letter which you have received from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, that a reinforcement of Regular Troops will be ſent to your Preſidency by the ſhips now on their way, we requeſt that you will not detain any of the recruits intended for this place.

We have ordered 630 barrels of powder to be taken on board the *Jaſon*, which will ſail to your Preſidency in a few days: this is all that we can poſſibly ſpare from our own magazines.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Fort William, 14th Auguſt 1778.

Philip Francis,
Warren Haſtings,
Edward Wheler,
Richard Barwell.

APPENDIX, No. 31.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 27th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith,

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

The Preſident recommends to the Committee to take into ſerious conſideration the ſeveral points neceſſary to be determined on, previous to an expedition taking place for the reduction of the French Fort and Factory of *Mahé*; and if they find it practicable to purſue the ſcheme, that we deſire the attendance of Sir *Edward Vernon*, to aſſiſt us with his opinion reſpecting the beſt mode of carrying our reſolution into execution. The Preſident is perſuaded the objects are of material conſequence to our poſſeſſion, and that if we prove ſucceſsful, the French will not have a foot of land in *India*, and their political views and intereſt will be entirely fruſtrated; but the Preſident doubted, from our preſent ſituation, whether we ſhall be able to undertake the expedition, ſo provided in every reſpect as to render our ſucceſs certain; and he ſtates to the Committee the following material queſtions for their determination:

1ſt. Whether our Treaſury, in its preſent ſtate, and the reſources we expect, will be able to furniſh the ſum abſolutely neceſſary to provide for the occaſion?

2d. Whether we have ſufficient ammunition and ſtores to furniſh the detachment with the quantity that will be required, without leaving our poſſeſſions on this Coaſt not properly provided, in caſe of any attack or invaſion?

3d. Whether the force neceſſary for the reduction of *Mahé*, as mentioned in General *Munro*'s Letter, can be ſpared without riſk, in caſe of any diſturbances happening in the *Carnatic* from the views of the ſurrounding Powers, or in caſe of any attempt from the French?

4th. Whether it will not be prudent to wait till we hear from *Hyder Ally*, or have more certain accounts of the diſpoſition of the different Rajahs, whoſe countries border on *Mahé*, and through which our Troops muſt march?

5th. Whether, if the French from the Iſlands, on hearing of the reduction of *Pondicherry*, ſhould have landed a body of Troops at *Mahé*, before the arrival of our ſquadron and land forces there, our detachments may not run a riſk of being defeated by a ſuperior European force, would in every reſpect be attended with ſerious conſequences to our future operations and preſent ſafety?

In order that the ſeveral points recommended in the foregoing Minute may be conſidered with proper attention, and the Members fully prepared to give their ſentiments upon them, it is agreed that the Minute ſhould be ſent round for their ſeparate peruſal, and that the ſubject be again introduced before the Committee on Monday next. As Sir *Edward Vernon*'s preſence will be neceſſary on this occaſion, it is reſolved to requeſt his attendance on Monday.

The article of money appearing the firſt and moſt material object to be conſidered in the preſent undertaking, it is agreed, in caſe the expedition to *Mahé* be otherwiſe found practicable, to repreſent our wants to the Nabob, and endeavour, if poſſible, to obtain from him a lack, or a lack and fifty thouſand Pagodas, in advance for this ſervice; but as the Committee are extremely doubtful whether they ſhall be able to procure any thing extraordinary from that quarter, the Preſident propoſes the following queſtion to the Committee:

Whether, in caſe they cannot obtain any extraordinary ſupply from the Nabob, or by way of loan upon the Company's bond, the expedition to *Mahé* is of ſuch conſequence, that we ſhould be authorized in drawing bills upon the Company for the ſum which ſhall be found abſolutely neceſſary to defray the expence of that expedition, ſuppoſing, in other reſpects, it ſhould be found eligible to purſue it?

Reſolved unanimouſly in the affirmative.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 30th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill, Eſquire,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Extract of General *Munro*'s Minute:

With reſpect to the Preſident's 3d query, it is impoſſible for me to ſay what the views of the ſurrounding Powers in the *Carnatic* may be, or what attempts the French may make from *Europe* (from any part of *India* they can obtain none); but as affairs ſtand at preſent, I think it impoſſible that any bad conſequences will happen before the reduction of *Mahé*, provided the expedition againſt it, is ſet on foot immediately.

With regard to hearing from *Hyder Ally*, reſpecting the march of the Troops through his country, or that of any other Country Powers, it may be too late if we wait for anſwers from them; and I would give them that as a reaſon for not waiting their anſwer, at the ſame time they ſhould be acquainted with the march of the Troops. If *Hyder Ally* and the King of *Travencore* do not interrupt the march of the Troops, I would not fear what any of the whole Rajahs on the Malabar Coaſt could do.

Extract of Mr. *Smith*'s Minute:

Although I think we may expect conſiderable aſſiſtance from *Bombay*, I would not reckon upon it in our calculations of the force neceſſary to undertake the expedition, becauſe it is poſſible that intervening circumſtances might prevent the timely junction of the Troops, and ſo the whole enterprize prove abortive; but I beg leave to recommend to General *Munro* to conſider his eſtimate, and, reflecting on the neceſſities of the *Carnatic*, make ſuch diminution as he poſſibly can, without hazarding the ſucceſs of the undertaking.

I think it probable that we ſhall hear from *Hyder Ally* before all things neceſſary can be prepared, and the Army in a condition to march; though, whatever his anſwer may be, I am of opinion that we ſhould perſiſt in our reſolution. It is ſeldom the policy of an Eaſtern Prince to ſupport a Foreign Power, and the more he may be inclined to favour the French, ſo much the more neceſſary becomes it, for us to deſtroy their channel of communication.

We have as yet no reaſon to ſuppoſe that conſiderable ſupplies have arrived at *Mahé*; and we may, I think, hope that a force ſufficient for its defence will not arrive before it may be inveſted by us. We have no certain accounts of any force from *Europe*; and, for want of ſhipping at the Iſlands, they were not in a condition to afford relief to *Pondicherry*. But ſhould they be inclined to ſupport *Mahé* from thence, it is in my opinion an additional inducement only to adopt and execute our meaſures with vigour.

Upon the whole, after weighing the expence of the undertaking in men, money, and ſtores; the danger in which the *Carnatic* may be expoſed by the abſence of ſuch a force; the probable temper and conduct of the Country Powers; and the chance of meeting from the French inſurmountable oppoſition, I am firmly of opinion that thoſe conſiderations are light in the ſcale, oppoſed to the danger to be apprehended from their in-

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trigues while they remain maſters of *Mahé*; and therefore, that the expedition be undertaken as ſoon as the weather and other circumſtances will admit.

30th November 1778. *Charles Smith.*

Reſolved, That a Letter be prepared to Sir *Edward Vernon*, to deſire he will inform us how far he can aſſiſt with the ſquadron in forwarding an expedition to *Mahé*.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 4th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill, Eſquire,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

This day the following Letter was ſent to Sir *Edward Vernon*:

To Sir *Edward Vernon*, Commodore and Commander in Chief of His Majeſty's Ships in *India*.

Sir,

You have been acquainted with our reaſons for wiſhing to form an expedition againſt *Mahé*; and we have had the pleaſure to receive from you the ſtrongeſt aſſurance of co-operations on the part of the ſquadron, in caſe we find it practicable to put our deſign in execution.

The greateſt difficulty that occurs to us at preſent, is to find means of conveying our force to *Mahé* with all the ammunition and ſtores neceſſary for the undertaking. General *Munro* is of opinion, that the force ought to conſiſt of a battalion of Europeans, two companies of Artillery, and two battalions of Sepoys (in all about 400 Europeans and 1,600 Sepoys). The time neceſſary to collect this body of men, and march it over land to *Mahé*, ſuppoſing it to meet with no obſtruction in the way, would be two months; but the principal objection to this mode, is the difficulty of marching men through ſuch a vaſt extent of country belonging to the Rajahs and Chiefs, with whom the Company have no connection, and on whoſe good will, no ſort of dependance can be placed. The Europeans would be utterly unequal to the fatigue only of ſo large a march, and were they to attempt it, one fourth part would not reach *Mahé* in condition to act. Our Sepoys might be more ſucceſsful in this point; but when we conſider that their propoſed number is not large, that there is every reaſon to apprehend oppoſition on the march, and that they can be at no certainty in regard to proviſions, an article in which it is in the power of every petty Rajah to diſtreſs them, we perceive many difficulties in the way of ſending even this part of our force over land.

Our opinion therefore is, that the whole ought to be tranſported by ſea, if poſſible; and we ſhould be glad to be informed by you, what aſſiſtance the ſquadron might be able to render in a ſervice of this kind, with the addition of the two *Bengal* armed ſhips which have joined it. We could, if neceſſary, aſſemble our Troops as far South as *Nagore*, and embark them at that place; and we might be alſo able by the end of the preſent month, to provide two or three large ſhips, by way of tranſports.

If the ſquadron, with this aſſiſtance, could convey the whole, or nearly the whole force we have mentioned, to *Mahé*, we think every nerve ſhould be ſtrained to ſet the expedition on foot before the French have time to ſtrengthen themſelves in that quarter; and we are accordingly diſpoſed to exert ourſelves to the utmoſt, in executing the part which may depend on us; but ſhould the ſquadron be unable, from any cauſes whatever, to afford the aſſiſtance required, in that caſe, the only plan remaining for our conſideration, is that of marching the Sepoys over land, and tranſporting the Europeans and ſtores by ſea.

We have already metioned the difficulties that may be apprehended by ſending any part of the force over land; but we wiſh alſo to know how far the Europeans only might be accommodated with a paſſage by the help of the ſquadron.

To ſave time, and avoid the uncertainty of any attempt to bring the ſquadron at this ſeaſon of the year from *Trincomalee* to the Coaſt, we might be able to procure tranſports ſufficient to convey the Europeans and ſtores from hence to *Trincomalee*, provided the ſquadron could there aſſiſt in taking part of the Europeans, and accommodating them for the remainder of the voyage. In this caſe, it would be proper that we ſhould know how long you mean to continue the ſquadron at *Trincomalee*, or how long you would continue it there, conſiſtently with the plan you may have formed for its future deſtination.

It would be impoſſible for us, at this ſeaſon, to procure ſhips for tranſports, in time to put all the Troops, ſtores, and proviſions on board before the end of this month, as we do not expect a ſingle veſſel in our Road till the 25th, ſo that it might be the 10th January before our Troops could be at *Trincomalee*.

We requeſt likewiſe, that you would be pleaſed to inform us, how long you could continue with the ſquadron on the Malabar Coaſt for the purpoſes of the expedition; and whether we might, in caſe of neceſſity, expect any aſſiſtance from it in conveying our Troops back to this Coaſt. We have the honour to be, Sir,

Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
4th December 1778.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 7th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from Sir *Edward Vernon*:

Thomas Rumbold, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

I have had the honour to receive your Letter of yeſterday, upon the ſubject of the intended expedition to *Mahé*, and requeſting to know what aſſiſtance I could render in a ſervice of that kind, with the ſquadron under my command, in tranſporting the Troops, &c. thither. His Majeſty's ſhips being ill calculated for tranſports, and the ſquadron conſiſting only of the *Rippon* and two frigates, with *Charlotte* armed ſhip (having ſent the *Reſolution* to the Streights of *Malacca*) I cannot give you any certain hopes of conveying the whole force by ſea, even if you ſhould be able to provide the ſhips you mentioned by the end of this month; for I do not think an attempt of the ſquadron to get up to *Nagore* ſhould be hazarded, becauſe if it ſhould miſcarry, of which there is a great probability, it might render the expedition abortive: but if you will pleaſe to procure tranſports of any kind, to convey the European Troops to *Trincomalee*, I will wait there for them until the 10th of next month, or longer if the ſervice require it, and ſtrain every nerve to afford the whole of the number you mention a paſſage in the ſquadron to *Mahé*, and to give the expedition every other aſſiſtance in my power.

I am ſorry, Gentlemen, that the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced as to render it exceedingly inconvenient for the ſquadron to afford you the aſſiſtance I could wiſh, in conveying your Troops back to this Coaſt. In the midſt of a War, I think it highly neceſſary to keep the ſhips under my command clean, and ready to proceed on any ſervice; and for the purpoſe of docking them at *Bombay*, I muſt

I muſt endeavour to gain that port by the middle or latter end of March. The time taken up in performing that ſervice, may be ſo much as to render it hazardous for the ſquadron at that ſeaſon of the year to touch at *Mahé*, on their return to this place.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
the 5th Dec. 1778. *Edward Vernon.*

The Committee being of opinion that the expedition to *Mahé* may be undertaken, in conſequence of the aſſurances given by Sir *Edward Vernon* in the foregoing Letter; it is reſolved accordingly, That preparations be made for it with all poſſible expedition.

General *Munro* is deſired, with the aſſiſtance of the Committee of Stores, to prepare a liſt of the warlike ſtores neceſſary for the expedition; he is alſo requeſted to lay before the Committee an arrangement of the Troops neceſſary, that they may be collected as ſoon as poſſible.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 10th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

General *Munro* recommends that the following Troops be ordered on the expedition to *Mahé*:

The 1ſt battalion 1ſt regiment, now at *Tanjore*, to be relieved by the battalion regiment now here.
The 4th battalion of Sepoys now at *Pallamcotah*.
The 20th battalion of Sepoys now at *Trichinopoly*.
Three companies of Artillery.
Two hundred Laſcars.

The General alſo recommends the following movement of Troops:

The 10th battalion of Sepoys to march from *Tanjore* to *Trichinopoly*, there to remain till relieved by the 19th battalion, and then to proceed to *Pallamcotah*, there to remain.
The 20th battalion to march to *Pallamcotah*, and wait there for orders.
The 18th battalion to march from *Pondicherry* to *Tanjore*.
The 9th battalion to march from *Cuddalore* and *Villinour* to *Tanjore*.
The 19th battalion to march from *Cuddalore* to *Trichinopoly*.
Colonel *Braithwaite* is appointed to command on the expedition to *Mahé*.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 190. From *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor; dated 9th Zecaycole, or 29th November 1778: received 16th December, ditto.

I have received your Letter, acquainting me of your having taken the fort of *Pondicherry*, which has given me pleaſure, and I doubt not but that it will give ſatisfaction to your Friends. I underſtand what you have wrote reſpecting an interview with you. I am at preſent engaged in an expedition, and when I have finiſhed it, I ſhall write to you. Continue to give me accounts of your welfare. What can I ſay more?

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 17th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from the Company's Agent at *Tellicherry*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, and the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your Letter of the 8th November I received this morning from the Reſident at *Anjengo*, and beg leave to congratulate your Honour, &c. on the ſucceſs of our arms againſt *Pondicherry*.

In addition to what I have informed you in my laſt Letter, I am now to adviſe you, that the French have continued, with the greateſt diligence, putting *Mahé*, *Fort Saint George*, &c. in the beſt ſtate of defence, particularly ſince they have heard of the ſurrender of *Pondicherry*, and of the rumour that Troops are coming from your Preſidency to attack *Mahé*. Of the 300 Europeans that were in garriſon there, 150 of them were ſent to *Mangalore* on the 16th of September, to join the Army of Nabob *Hyder Ally*, for whoſe ſervice they arrived from *Mauritius* in July laſt; their own Troops conſiſt of 150 Europeans, 300 Sepoys and Tiveys, beſides 300 of *Hyder Ally*'s Sepoys, 300 Nairs from the Prince of *Chirrika*, ſent them ſince my laſt Letter.

The ſeveral Princes in our neighbourhood, as already adviſed you, are the Prince of *Cherrika*, King of *Cartenaddu*, and *Country Nair*, all Tributaries to *Hyder Ally*, who has ſent them, as I am well aſſured, orders to aſſiſt the French with Troops in caſe they are attacked by us. The force each of thoſe Princes can raiſe, is as follows: the Prince of *Cherrika* 3,000 men, King of *Cartenaddu* 3,000 men, and *Country Nair* 300 men, Nairs, Tiveys, and Meplas; but they cannot bring any Artillery into the field of any conſequence. However poſitive the Nabob's orders are to thoſe Princes to aſſiſt the French, I think I am warrranted to ſay, from the general conduct of the Malabar Powers, and the overtures that have been lately made me by the King of *Cartenaddu* and *Country Nair*, that they will aſſiſt us, or at leaſt remain neuter, unleſs the Nabob ſhould ſend a further force to *Mahé*, capable of enforcing his orders, or that the French ſhould receive a reinforcement from the *Mauritius*, both which they give out that they expect. I cannot entertain the ſame favourable idea of this Prince of *Cherrika*'s diſpoſition towards the Honourable Company, as the Honourable Governor and Council of *Bombay* have thought proper to reject the claim of levying a ſum of money on the province of *Rhandatariah*, which has been long mortgaged by his Predeceſſors to the Honourable Company, and which is ſtill under their protection, for he has already ſent 300 men to *Mahé*, as before noticed, and is daily ſending them Coolies to aſſiſt upon their works: though the force of thoſe Princes may appear large upon paper, yet they are in general but an undiſciplined rabble.

I now cloſe you a Return of this Garriſon: we have not a gun in it larger than a 12 pounder, one eight-inch and three five-and-a-half howitzers, beſides royals and cohorns, and only two or three pounder field-pieces. On the 3d ultimo, the day we received private advice of the ſurrender of *Pondicherry*, and of Troops coming from the Coaſt for the ſiege of *Mahé*, the Honourable the Governor and Council of *Bombay* were informed of the want of heavy cannon and gunpowder, in caſe the expedition took place.

Your Honour, &c. may depend upon our making every preparation in our power to aſſiſt the Troops with proviſions, and ſuch other articles as they may require, and our Commanding Officers may point out.

I cannot avoid expreſſing my hopes, that no obſtacle will ariſe to prevent your carrying your intentions into execution againſt *Mahé*; for ſhould the French be reinforced from the Iſlands, which they are daily in hopes of, this Settlement in all probability will be immediately attacked. I am, very reſpectfully,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
Tellicherry, moſt humble Servant,
2d December 1778. *Richd Church.*

APPENDIX. No. 31.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 29th December 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
Sir *Eyre Coote*,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Extract of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute:

Sir *Eyre Coote* expreſſes great ſatisfaction at the ſucceſs of our operations hitherto, and warmly approves the expedition we have ſet on foot to deprive the French of their laſt hold at *Mahé*.

Sir *Eyre* is then particularly acquainted with the number of Troops intended for this ſervice, and the diſpoſition we had made for aſſembling at *Anjengo:* that we had ordered the 3 battalions of Sepoys to march over land, and intended, if we could poſſibly procure conveyances ſufficient, to ſend the battalion of Europeans with 3 companies of Artillery, by ſea, to join the ſquadron at *Trincomalee*, and proceed with it round to *Anjengo*; that to execute this laſt part of our plan, we had been totally at a loſs hitherto for want of conveyances, as no ſhips that could be engaged for that ſervice had yet arrived in our road ſince the breaking up of the monſoon; and that if the *Stafford*, which is juſt arrived, could be employed in tranſporting the Europeans to *Trincomalee*, it might be of uſe to the expedition.

Sir *Eyre Coote* obſerves hereupon, that every meaſure which could tend to expedite the general plan which has been formed for the reduction of *Mahé*, ought undoubtedly to be purſued; and if the employment of the *Stafford* for any purpoſe relating to it be found expedient, he ſhould on his part cheerfully acquieſce; but he thinks it deſerving the conſideration of the Committee, whether the *Stafford* can unload her cargo for this place and *Bengal*, which is conſiderable, and be properly fitted as a tranſport in time, for the purpoſe ſhe may be wanted.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 10. To *Hyder Ally*; 16th January 1779.

I had the pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 29th November, and underſtand the contents.

Conſidering the firm friendſhip that ſubſiſts between the Company and your Circar, and the neceſſity there is for the intereſt of both, that it ſhould continue ſteady and unſhaken to the end of time, I now write you on a ſubject which appears to me of importance, ſo far as it tends to promote a more regular intercourſe and correſpondence between us.

The ſubject I mean is this: the Government here has appointed a Gentlemen of rank in the Company's Service to proceed to your Durbar, and remain there in a public character, in the ſame manner, and for the ſame purpoſe, that your Vakeel reſides in *Madras*. He will be empowered to give you the ſtrongeſt teſtimonies of our friendſhip, and to repreſent and explain every particular that you may wiſh to be acquainted with. I can have no doubt of your cheerful acquieſcence in a meaſure that will tend ſo much to a mutual benefit; and all, therefore, that I have to requeſt of you is, that you will pleaſe to order the neceſſary paſſports to be ſent me as ſoon as poſſible, that the Gentleman, who is intended to go to you, may depart without a loſs of time.

I think it proper to adviſe you, that we are preparing to attack the French ſettlement at *Mahé*; and I am confident, from the regard you have always expreſſed for the Company and the Engliſh Nation, that you will rejoice at every inſtance of our ſucceſs againſt their avowed enemies. May your health and proſperity ever increaſe. What can I ſay more?

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 4th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.
Sir *Eyre Coote*, indiſpoſed.

Extract of the Preſident's Minute:

The ſituation of affairs, the diſtreſs we are in for money, and the uncertainty of what ſteps may be taken by the French or the Country Powers, and in particular *Hyder Ally*, who does not ſeem to be very well pleaſed with our conqueſt of *Pondicherry*, makes it appear to me to be imprudent to move from the ſeat of Government at this juncture.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 5th January 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Bombay*, to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

The conduct of the Nabob *Hyder Ally* manifeſts a diſpoſition very favourable to the French; he has ſent ſupplies of proviſions, and even money, we believe, to *Mahé*; and we have had intimation, that he has given the French Governor there, permiſſion to hoiſt his colours in the place, ſhould it be attacked by the Engliſh; for which we hear, by private advices, you are making preparation. It is ſaid alſo he intends ſending his fleet with proviſions to the French Iſlands; and that his ſhips will be armed with detachments of French ſoldiers, which were ſent to him from *Mahé* before the account arrived of the rupture with *England*.

We know not what effect your ſucceſs againſt *Pondicherry* (which we have alſo learnt by private advice) may have on the Nabob's conduct; but we have now a Gentleman, Mr. *James Sibbald*, under orders to proceed to his Durbar, whom, however, we propoſe detaining until we are at ſome certainty with reſpect to your intention regarding *Mahé*, and the part the Nabob will take if that ſettlement ſhould be attacked.

We conclude, that if his Highneſs the Nabob of *Arcot*, had any objection to our ſending a deputy, you would have ſignified the ſame to us. The Governor General and Council acquaints us, under the 25th of June, they had written to you on the ſubject; and we beg leave to aſſure both you and him, that our only view in this meaſure, is to endeavour to counteract the ſchemes of the French, and to bring *Hyder* into a diſpoſition more favourable to the Honourable Company; for which purpoſe we have a latitude from them to furniſh him with ſupplies of arms and warlike ſtores.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 11th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.
Sir *Eyre Coote* indiſpoſed.

Extract of Mr. *Smith*'s Minute:

I ſhall take this opportunity of ſaying a few words on a ſubject, which, though not immediately connected with the affairs of *Tanjore*, is touched upon in his (the Preſident's Minute) and appear to me to require our moſt early and moſt ſerious conſideration. The Preſident obſerves, "That *Hyder Ally* is not pleaſed with our

"conqueſt

" conqueſt of *Pondicherry*." The preſent critical ſituation of affairs, in daily expectation of receiving intelligence from *Europe* of our actual declaration of War, at a time when we have no money in our treaſury, nor any certain reſource to ſupport even our Peace eſtabliſhment; on the other hand, *Hyder Ally*'s proſperous ſituation, being at Peace with the Marattas, and freed of all apprehenſions from them by their own internal troubles; his power and reſource, and above all, his ſuppoſed favourable diſpoſition towards the French, from whence only they can derive the leaſt probable hope of regaining their poſſeſſions in this country, or keeping the only one that now remains to them; theſe conſiderations ſtrongly evince not only the policy of cultivating a good underſtanding with *Hyder Ally* at this juncture, but alſo the danger of neglecting it. I am therefore of opinion, that no time ſhould be loſt in ſending a proper perſon to negociate a Treaty with *Hyder Ally*, agreeable to what has been long ſince unanimouſly determined by the Committee.

Charles Smith.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 14th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Sir *Eyre Coote*,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.
Mr. *Whitehill* abſent.

Extract from the Preſident's Minute:

Before I conclude, let me add, that there is now a dull calm before the engines of War are thoroughly ſet in motion, which point them out as the criterion for taking our meaſures; if after all it ſhould appear in the ſequel not to have been neceſſary, there is no harm in having endeavoured to ſupply our Treaſury; but if it ſhould appear to have been a wiſe and prudent meaſure, we ſhall have the merit of ſaving the Company from deſtruction. The next conſideration to ſupply our Treaſury, is to form ſuch alliance as may ſecure us from any attempts, if our endeavours, with reſpect to money, ſhould not ſucceed.

The Council General have ſtrongly recommended our forming a Treaty with *Hyder*, and have given us a full power to conclude one. Our correſpondence with him has not been attended with that readineſs on his part which we expected from him; but I am perſuaded we ſhould not loſe ſight of the object, and nothing will ſo effectually bring it about, as ſending a perſon to him; a proper pretence may be made uſe of, and we ſhall be able to judge of his intentions; it is better to know him for an enemy than a doubtful friend; and I muſt confeſs I ſhall be under ſome apprehenſions for our detachments now proceeding to *Mahé*, unleſs we are aſſured what line of conduct he means to obſerve.

I have always been of opinion, that the not keeping up a proper communication with the Country Powers, has been a principal error in our politics. The French have never neglected having an Agent at the different Courts of *Indoſtan*, whoſe repreſentations have often proved detrimental to our intereſt, and whoſe inſinuations of our ambitious deſigns have operated to our diſadvantage.

I think it highly neceſſary that ſome proper perſon, at this particular time, ſhould be ſent to the Nizam, as well as to *Hyder*, that we may be fully acquainted with their views and deſigns; to ſend one to *Hyder* is, on many accounts, more particularly neceſſary, his infirm ſtate of health render his life every moment in danger; nay, it is aſſerted, that at any rate he cannot live many months: it is more than probable from the diſtracted ſtate his poſſeſſions will fall into on his demiſe, that his ſon *Teepo Saib* will look to us for ſupport; the ſituation of his country render him a natural ally, a barrier againſt all invaſions, and being important as a friend, he is dangerous as an enemy.

I am happy to call the Committee's attention to the ſeveral points I have mentioned, while we have the aſſiſtance of the knowledge and abilities of Sir *Eyre Coote*, who is deſtined to take a part in the management in ſo conſiderable and valuable a part of the Britiſh Empire as our poſſeſſions in *Indoſtan*.

Extract of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute:

The attachment of *Hyder Ally* to the intereſts of the French, which has been manifeſted upon ſeveral occaſions, and which there is reaſon to believe may ſhew itſelf more conſpicuouſly in caſe they ſhould hereafter be in a condition to act againſt us with any probability of ſucceſs, render it highly neceſſary that we ſhould be minutely informed of his motions, in order that we may be prepared to counteract them, ſhould they prove hoſtile towards the Company. For this purpoſe it is reſolved, that one of the Company's ſervants be ſent to attend at the Court of *Hyder Ally* in a public character; and that a Letter be immediately written to *Hyder* informing him of this appointment, and requeſting the neceſſary paſſport.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 18th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Tho' Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Sir *Eyre Coote*,
Charles Smith.
General *Munro* abſent on ſervice.
Mr. *Whitehill* abſent.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George*, to Colonel *Braithwaite*.

You will obſerve that the foregoing inſtructions are framed on the ſuppoſition that you will meet with no impediment in the execution of our deſign from any other power but the French, and we ſincerely hope this may prove to be the caſe; but as it is impoſſible to ſay at preſent how far *Hyder Ally* may be diſpoſed to favour the intereſts of our enemy by ſtrengthening or attempting to relieve the garriſon of *Mahé*, or how far our operations may be affected by the War in which the Gentlemen of *Bombay* are engaged with the Maratta Government, we deem it expedient to communicate to you our ideas upon both theſe points, and to prepare you, as well as we are able, againſt every event that may poſſibly happen in the courſe of this ſervice.

We are inclined to think from the paſſive conduct of *Hyder Ally* during our operation againſt *Pondicherry*, that he has no real deſign of ſupporting the French intereſt at preſent in oppoſition to us; indeed it ſeems unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that *Hyder*, if he had any ſuch intention, would reſerve it only to be employed when the French were driven to their laſt ſtake, and beyond almoſt the poſſibility of recovering even the ground they had loſt; whatever appearances therefore he may aſſume in their favour, we are warranted on every ground to conclude that he will not break with us, by openly aſſiſting the French on the preſent occaſion; and as to ſecret ſupport that he may be able to afford them, either directly, or by means of his tributaries in the neighbourhood of *Mahé*, we think your force is ſufficient to encounter his.

Though we have ſuch ſtrong and convincing reaſons to believe *Hyder Ally* will in the preſent ſituation of affairs take no open and direct part in favour of the French, yet ſhould he, from any motives that cannot now be diſcovered, be induced to ſwerve from the conduct he has hitherto obſerved, and declare openly in their favour, and ſhould you be of opinion from that declaration, or

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from his actions, that he means to oppoſe our undertaking with a ſufficient force to render the ſucceſs of it in your judgment too hazardous; in that caſe we would have you immediately deſiſt from the enterprize, without expoſing our Troops to the riſk of a defeat.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 19th September 1778.

Read the following Letter from Mr. *Richard Church*, the Company's Agent at *Tellicherry*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

On the 1ſt inſtant I was honoured with your Letter of the 4th ultimo.

I ſhall now, agreeably to your requeſt, give you all the information I am able, of the ſettlement of *Mahé*, its fortifications and garriſon.

The incloſed paper which I have received from our Commanding Officer, is an account of the preſent ſtate of the fortifications at *Mahé*; it ſhould have been executed with more exactneſs, had time permitted.

The Garriſon conſiſts of about 300 Europeans and 300 Sepoys and Tivies; they have three companies of Militia, mere nominal force, being compoſed chiefly of the natives, upon whom they can place no great dependance.

Mahé ſtands in the territory of the King of *Cartinaddu*, whoſe anceſtors gave the French a grant of a factory there. The preſent Prince is not in their intereſt, and would, I have every reaſon to believe, join us, or remain neuter, as he did in the laſt War, if we were to attack *Mahé*, for he is very highly incenſed on account of their not aſſiſting him agreeably to Treaty againſt *Hyder Ally*, to whom he is now tributary. The country on this ſide *Mahé* river belongs to *Country Nair*, whoſe diſtrict comes within 800 yards of our fort of *Moylan*, which is near two miles from *Tellicherry*, and ſix miles from *Mahé*: this Nair is under the influence of the French, as his country is commanded by *Fort Saint George*, and the redoubts of *Chimbrah* and *Coricbee* on this ſide the river. The Nair may be able to raiſe about 300 Nairs and Tivies, and in all probability would remain quiet, as he did laſt War, if he thought we had a force here ſuperior to the French.

The Prince of *Cherricka*, by whoſe country we are ſurrounded to the Northward and Eaſtward, is an ancient Ally of the Company's; but as this Prince is tributary to *Hyder*, which ever ſide *Hyder* embraces, the Prince muſt take at firſt. I have been well aſſured, that *Hyder* has already ſent orders to the Prince and King of *Cartinaddu* to aſſiſt the French, but whether offenſively as well as defenſively againſt us, I cannot learn.

I am informed that the fort of *Mahé*, the redoubts and batteries belonging to it, would require at leaſt 1,000 Europeans to garriſon them properly; but unleſs the French can make a firm friend of the King of *Cartinaddu*, *Mahé* could not at any time make a long defence againſt an European enemy, as the King can cut off their proviſions by land.

I am, very reſpectfully,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servant,
Richard Church.

Tellicherry, 2d Sept. 1778.

The fortifications of *Mahé* and *Fort Saint George* are nothing like what they were in 1761, when it was ſurrendered to the Engliſh, except battery *de Roach* A, which is in the ſame place and manner as in 1761; and the bound hedge from A to B, the ſame as the two hills CC, whereon ſtood forts *Dauphine* and *Caude*, the French have fortified within theſe two months, but only with a ſtockade of cocoa-nut trees and earth. The principal fort D is but ſmall, about ſixty yards each face of the annexed figure, with about ten embraſures on each face, and caſemates all round within; the fort walls high, and built of ſtone and chunam, without any ditch or covered way; under the fort by the river ſide is the battery, marked E; the aſcent without to the bamboo hedge, from the South Eaſtward, is ſteep and high; the N. E. ſide by the river is plain, but commanded by the two hills C C, and *Fort Saint George*, F. *Fort Saint George* appears to me to be of the annexed figure E, the fort about 200 yards round within; the works are of earth, and high, with a very little ſlope to them at preſent; and having been cleaned and repaired ſince the month of July, within are barracks, magazine, and ſtore-room of ſtone and tiles; it ſtands on a high hill, about eight or nine hundred yards from the centre of *Mahé*, and commands the whole town; the beach GGG, cannot be ſeen from *Fort Saint George*. *Curachy* redoubt erected on the beach, about three miles on this ſide *Mahé*, is the ſame as formerly, but the French have lately raiſed a parapet thereon; it is high, may hold four ſmall cannon, and a ſhed for Troops.

J. W.

Agreed, That a copy of Mr. *Church*'s Letter, and of the account of *Mahé*, be ſent to General *Munro*, and his opinion requeſted in reſpect to an expedition to that place, and the number of Troops neceſſary to be employed on it.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 166. To *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 30th October 1778.

The French Nation, jealous of the great power of the Engliſh, and diſregarding the Treaties ſubſiſting between them, have lately by various acts, in *Europe*, broke the bands of friendſhip, and ſet themſelves as enemies againſt us: in conſequence thereof, we have commenced War upon the people of that nation in *India*, and have ſeized upon all their factories and ſettlements in *Bengal*, and upon this coaſt the capital fortreſs of *Pondicherry* has been ſubdued by victorious Troops; and the Governor, with all the European Officers and Soldiers in that Garriſon, have fallen into our hands, and will be ſent to *Europe* very ſhortly. Knowing you to be a ſincere friend and well-wiſher to the Company, I write you this intelligence, that you may rejoice. The power of the French in *Indoſtan* being at an end, and that of the Engliſh raiſed to a degree that cannot be equalled by any other European Nation, the Company now have a fairer opportunity than ever, of ſhewing their moderation and ſincerity of their friendſhip towards thoſe who have given them proofs of their good-will and deſire to live in amity with them. I have always conſidered the alliance between the Company and you as favourable to the intereſts of both, and on that account have written you friendly Letters, expreſſing my inclination to unite with you upon a more ſolid and permanent foundation. Your laſt Letter upon this ſubject was not ſufficiently explicit; I therefore now write to requeſt you will acquaint me with your ſentiments, and, if you continue in the ſame deſires that you have formerly communicated to me, I ſhall be glad to meet you myſelf in any convenient place that you may appoint, or ſend ſome proper perſons to confer with you, and adjuſt ſuch matters as may tend to ſtrengthen the alliance between us. May your happineſs and riches be ever increaſing! What can I ſay more?

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Extracts of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 17. From the Nabob; dated 29th January 1779: received 30th January 1779.

I HEREWITH ſend you ſome papers of intelligence, which I have received from the Court of the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla*, and the country of *Kennoul*. What can I ſay more?

Intelligence from *Kennoul*; dated 19th Zehudge 1192; received 26th of ſame month.

Adali Cawn, an *Afgan* Officer of Horſe, formerly in the ſervice of the Nabob of this place, returned here lately from *Hyder*, and ſays, that it is *Hyder*'s intention to march againſt this place whenever he has taken *Chilluldurg*, which he is beſieging at the preſent. After he takes this, he will go againſt *Cuddapah*, and from thence march into the *Nellore* and *Arcot* countries. If the Engliſh and the Nabob *Wallau* give protection to the *Cuddapah* and *Kennoul* people, by ſending ſome Troops to their aſſiſtance, *Hyder* will be prevented from taking the fort of *Sedhout*, in the *Cuddapah* country, and will in all likelihood relinquiſh his deſign againſt theſe places, and the *Arcot* country. The ſafety of the latter depends on the fall of *Sedhout* and the *Cuddapah* and *Kennoul* countries.

No. 18. From the Nabob; dated 30th January 1779: received 31ſt January 1779.

I herewith ſend you a letter I have juſt received from *Maha Rajah Burbur*, my manager at *Arcot*, which contains intelligence from *Balla Ghaut*. What can I ſay more?

Arzdaſht from *Maha Rajah Burbur*; dated 10th Mohrem 1193, or 29th January; received 30th January.

Intelligence has been received by the Merchants of *Wallajanagur* from *Balla Ghaut*, that it is the firm intention of *Hyder Ally* to oppoſe the Engliſh Troops whenever they came into his country, to take the fort of *Mahé*; and that he will give every aſſiſtance in his power to the French: he has accordingly appointed a body of four thouſand Horſe to march to the twelve *Mahls* on the borders of the *Carnatic*, and another body of his Troops is ſhortly to march to *Mahé*, to the aſſiſtance of that place; it is likewiſe his intention to march himſelf with a large Army into the *Carnatic*, whenever accounts are received of the Engliſh Troops being arrived at *Mahé*. The overthrow of your Highneſs's enemies, and your own ſucceſs, are things never to be doubted; but yet as the preſent ſituation of affairs require caution and timely management, I think it neceſſary to repreſent to your Highneſs that there are very few ſtores of any kind in the fort of *Arcot*. The wall of the city has fallen down in two places in the South ſide: I am greatly in want of bricks to repair the wall, but it will take up ſome time to make them; I therefore requeſt your Highneſs's permiſſion to take ſome from the houſe of the late *Sifder Ally Cawn*, in order to ſet about repairing immediately the breach in the city wall.

No. 20. From the Nabob; dated 4th February 1779; received D°.

Conſidering how you are at all times anxious to have intelligence from the different Country Powers in *Hindoſtan*, I incloſe for your peruſal ſome papers of news, which I have juſt received from *Hydrabad*: however diſagreeable this intelligence may be to you, I thought it neceſſary you ſhould be made acquainted with it. In my Letter to you of 3d December laſt, I mentioned, that a propoſal had been made to me by ſome of the people of *Poonah* to have the difference accommodated. If my friends had at that time wrote an anſwer to the advice I gave them, I hoped to have been able to have ſettled it in a way the moſt honourable for them. What ſhall I ſay more?

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 4th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Sir *Eyre Coote*,
John Whitehill.
General *Munro* abſent on ſervice,
Mr. *Smith* indiſpoſed.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Minute, with intelligence juſt received from the Nabob.

I am concerned to lay before the Committee, a Letter from the Nabob, containing advices from his Vakeel at *Poonah*, of a very ſerious nature; and though we may ſuppoſe the account of the unfortunate ſituation of the *Bombay* Army is greatly exaggerated, and that when we hear from *Bombay*, we ſhall be informed of ſome favourable circumſtances, ſtill from the circumſtantial account received, we have no reaſon to doubt but the event of the expedition for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, has been unfortunate and diſgraceful both to our arms and Councils; and our preſent ſituation, with reſpect to the different Powers of *Hindoſtan*, renders it abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould immediately take into conſideration our own ſtate and reſources, as well for the defence of the *Carnatic*, as to afford aſſiſtance to any other parts where the Company have poſſeſſions or alliances that may ſtand in need of our ſupport. The firſt conſideration is the ſtate of our Treaſury; I have already on many occaſions repreſented to the Committee the difficulties we have to ſtruggle with, and that the utmoſt we can expect, is to ſupply our exigencies on a Peace Eſtabliſhment, and provide our inveſtment, which being an object of conſequence to the Company, ought not to be neglected. Our ſituation has been repreſented to the Governor General and Council, but I am of opinion, we may ſtill in a more particular manner addreſs them again on the ſubject, and requeſt that they will not only afford us aſſiſtance from the *Bengal* Treaſury, that we may be ſupplied with a fund to enable our Army to take the field, ſhould circumſtances make it neceſſary, but that they will give us their opinion on thoſe points we have already ſubmitted to their conſideration, and upon ſuch others as we may now propoſe to them: 1ſt. I would recommend, that we fully ſtate to them the ſituation of the *Tanjore* country, and the meaſures we have taken in conſequence, in order to ſecure the regular payment of the Rajah's Subſidy, and the Nabob's Peiſhcuſh, which, if punctually remitted to our Treaſury, will not only greatly aſſiſt in keeping up our preſent eſtabliſhment, but will contribute, with other means, to ſecure in time ſuch a ſupply as will enable us to act with vigour as occaſion may require. The *Tanjore* reſources ought to be taken care of; neceſſity obliges us to watch over them with attention, and ſhould the preſent negociation entruſted to General *Munro*, fail of producing the deſired effect, I am perſuaded it is our duty to take ſuch meaſures that no miſmanagement, or any cauſe whatever, may deprive us of that ſupport which is abſolutely neceſſary to contribute to the protection of the *Carnatic*, *Tanjore*, and our Northern ſettlements; for where is the force for the defence of thoſe ſeveral countries, but what is kept up, diſciplined, and paid by the Company?

2d. It will be neceſſary that we take the opinion of the Governor General and Council, how we are to act in

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in case of a failure in the Nabob's engagements. I hope we shall never be drove to take any measure inconsistent with his rights, or disagreeable to his feelings; but without we state with precision our difficulties, we may find ourselves embarrassed, and at a loss to act in particular points, when our distresses press with force upon us. It is true, we have lately received a *very* considerable sum from the Nabob; but the account delivered in by me to the Committee, dated the 30th of November last, will shew that he was, at the end of January, greatly in arrears of the amount which, by his own voluntary agreement, he engaged to pay to that period, and the debt is monthly increasing. Our expences are certain, and must be provided for; our burthens at present are great, for exclusive of our standing Army, upwards of twenty-seven thousand men, we have the heavy expence of completing our fortifications, which must not on any account be neglected, and we have the maintenance of the French prisoners, military and civil, with a number of articles to be provided for, which the capitulation of *Pondicherry* obliges us to fulfil. All attention and support is certainly due to the Nabob, as our old and faithful ally, connected with us by every tie, and demanding from us every indulgence; for if we take a view from the Southern boundary of *Indostan* to the Northern extremity, where the English forces have proved victorious, where shall we find one Native Prince who has not severely felt the effects of our power, and that is now lamenting the rapid success of our arms, and the credulity that ever induced him to trust to our engagements? *Mahomed Ally* can alone boast, that we have not entirely violated every principle on which he has depended, and who, with his family, it is to be wished, may long remain instances of our national faith. But at the same time I express these sentiments towards the Nabob, it is necessary that we insist on a punctuality in fulfilling his engagements, or that the Committee are furnished with some line to guide their conduct, when they find him fail in his engagements. To various causes may be imputed his reluctance to part with money, and the several circumstances may have contributed to give him disgust. We have no right or ground to suppose his reluctance proceeds from disaffection; we are to consider his load of debt, the increased expences of the establishment, the decrease, from various causes, and perhaps from some mismanagement, of his revenue, the disappointments he has been subject to, in matters where he conceived himself to be justly entitled to decisions in his favour; and lastly, to the impositions of individuals, and the attendant passion so common to them of advanced stages in life, of hoarding up for future unforeseen contingencies; all these may have operated to increase the difficulties of obtaining from him the necessary supplies of cash. That such difficulties have frequently existed, no one acquainted with this Government can doubt; but the reflection alone of our depending on precarious circumstances for certain and unavoidable expences, on which our very safety depends, render it absolutely necessary to have the advice of the Governor General and Council, to assist our resolutions, if ever we should be obliged to go beyond the line that we wish to be preserved.

Another material circumstance in the present state of affairs, I am of opinion, may with propriety be mentioned to the Council General; the *Bengal* detachment destined to assist our operations on the Malabar Coast must now of necessity return, even if they had not the difficulties to encounter in their further progress, which we have received intelligence must attend them in case they attempt to proceed. It is probable a more safe, easy, and shorter march, may be effected by their obtaining permission to pass, under certain restrictions, through the *Berar* country, into our Northern Circars, from whence by sea they might return to *Calcutta*; or they may march with safety along the Coast through *Cuttak*. The presence of such a force to the Northward would prove a sufficient check on the Soubah, should he be induced by the late news from *Poonah*, which there is no doubt has been agreeable to him, from his open declarations in favour of the Peishwa, to form any schemes to our disadvantage, or to interrupt the peace of our Northern Circars; at any rate, four or five battalions of Sepoys from *Bengal*, or even the detachment which we understand has been sent by another route to reinforce Colonel *Goddard*, would give security to that part of the country, and enable us to act with more vigour, should the French, with *Hyder Ally*, form any design of entering the *Carnatic*. It will also be proper to acquaint the Governor General and Council of our having sent Mr. *Holland* to the Nizam, with our reasons for the measure, that they may correspond with him on any points they deem necessary.

Having now fully given my sentiments on what I think necessary to be represented to the Governor General and Council, I shall proceed to consider another object of great importance; I mean the expedition that has been set on foot for the reduction of *Mahé*; and I shall state to the Committee the several circumstances that appear, to me for and against the march of the detachment destined on that service.

There can be no doubt but the reduction of *Mahé* is a very material object, if it can be effected without risk to the *Carnatic*, by parting with so considerable a force at this particular period. The detachment is far advanced on their way. Every measure is taken to secure their passage to *Tellicherry*. His Majesty's squadron is probably by this time at *Anjengo*, and the difficulties we had to surmount are now mostly got over, by our having a ship ready to convey the stores round to *Tellicherry*. The Rajah of *Travancore* has assured us of supplies of provisions for our Troops till they embark from *Anjengo*; and I think there is no doubt the place must fall, unless the Garrison is considerably reinforced from the Islands, or assisted openly by *Hyder Ally*. The capture of *Mahé* must leave the French without hopes of an establishment in *India*, unless assisted by a very considerable force from *Europe*. These several reasons are strong inducements for pursuing the plan we have formed. The detachment will also be ready to assist the Presidency at *Bombay*, should the late unfortunate measures have occasioned more distress and danger to that settlement than we have as yet had accounts of; and could we depend on the arrival of Sir *Edward Hughes* with the expected regiment from *Europe*, I am of opinion the force we have sent against *Mahe* may with safety for a time be spared from the *Carnatic*, as the putting a stop to the expedition at this juncture would have too much the appearance of having done it from the apprehensions arising from the late bad success of the *Bombay* Troops against the Marattas. On the other hand, in our present uninformed state of the views of the French, or of any attempts they may make with their forces from the Islands on this coast or to the Northward, we certainly run some risk in dividing our force, which if kept together will be sufficiently formidable to repel any attempts, either from the French or Country Powers. The lateness of the season before our operations against *Mahé* can possibly commence, with the probability that the *Bombay* Presidency will have, immediately after their late disaster, strongly requested Sir *Edward Vernon* to proceed with the squadron for the protection of *Bombay*, who will most likely think it his indispensable duty to afford that object a preference to all others, are points worthy of consideration. Our detachment, if they march on to *Anjengo*, from the accounts we have received, will not be able to remain there long, from the difficulty of supplying them with provisions; and the most material circumstance to be considered, is the chance of the failure of the enterprize, which would be attended with the worst consequences, especially following so close on the late unfortunate check the *Bombay* Troops have met with. It appears to me, that the success of the Marattas will rather incline *Hyder* to a connection with the English; for he has always been a well-wisher to *Ragunaut Row*,

and his Country has only been releaſed from the incurſions of the Marattas by the late diviſions amongſt the ſeveral Chiefs. He will, from their preſent junction, have to dread their reſentment, joined to that of the Nizam's, who has uniformly declared himſelf in favour of the Peiſhwa, and who has for ſome time been made uneaſy by *Hyder*'s attempts on the confines of his country. I am perſuaded that it is impoſſible, from the different intereſts of thoſe Powers, the Marattas, the Nizam, and *Hyder Ally*, that they can ever be united; and that the latter, having very little if any hopes of ſupport from the French, will the more readily endeavour to ſtrengthen himſelf by an alliance with us. I have ever conſidered ſuch an alliance as our firſt and principal object, and *Mahé* would then fall into our hands of courſe, and every view of the French be entirely fruſtrated. I have been thus particular, that the Committee may immediately come to ſome determination, either that the expedition may proceed, or be countermanded. Not an hour is to be loſt. I hope the Gentlemen of the Committee will give their ſentiments fully on this queſtion.

One circumſtance I ſhall beg leave to add, which is, if we deſiſt from proſecuting the expedition, it is probable the Factory of *Tellicherry* will fall into the hands of the French.

Extract of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute:

The Governor, in his Minute, having requeſted the Gentlemen of the Committee to give their ſentiments fully upon the meaſures which ought to be purſued by this Preſidency, in order to ſupport our national honour and the military reputation we have acquired in this country, both of which have received ſo ſevere a ſhock from the defeat of the *Bombay* Army, and the mortifying treatment they have met with from the Marattas in conſequence of it, I feel myſelf, as Commander in Chief of the Forces in *India*, more particularly called upon to offer my opinion upon ſo intereſting a ſubject.

I might touch upon the meaſures which have been purſued by the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, and perhaps juſtly and properly obſerve, how much to the benefit of the Company, and the general good, that Army might have been employed againſt the National Enemy; which has now, from its failure in an ill-timed expedition, increaſed the difficulties we have to ſtruggle againſt, and expoſe us to dangers, which could not have approached us but through their means; I ſhall leave theſe matters, however, to the wiſer diſcuſſion of our Employers, and proceed to ſay,

I agree entirely with the Governor's firſt propoſition, in regard to the neceſſity there is for repreſenting to the Supreme Council the ſtate of our Treaſury, and the ſituation of the Tanjore Country, as well as to require their ſentiments upon the meaſures which the Board here ought to adopt, in caſe the Nabob's engagements ſhould not be ſo punctually fulfilled as the neceſſity of our affairs may demand; and I imagine thoſe repreſentations cannot fail to have the deſired effect, in inducing them to give ſuch ſpeedy and proper aſſiſtance as may enable the Governor and Council here to purſue the diſintereſted and ſpirited plan, which they have hitherto ſupported alone, ſo much to the National benefit, and to their own honour.

The propriety of ſecuring our Northern Circars, is next recommended to our conſideration; and I ſtrongly feel the neceſſity there is for having a ſufficient body of forces in thoſe parts to check attempts, which at this critical juncture, may poſſibly be made upon them. As affairs are now circumſtanced, I do not ſee from whence that force can be ſupplied, unleſs from the *Bengal* Army; and as I am of the Governor's opinion, that their return to the Preſidency may be effected with ſafety by either of the routes he mentions, I alſo entirely agree with him, that a requiſition of them ſhould be immediately made to the Supreme Council.

I confeſs I feel myſelf particularly embarraſſed in giving my ſentiments upon the *Mahé* expedition; the Governor has ſtated the reaſons for and againſt it, with his uſual candour and preciſion.

The dangers to which we may be expoſed upon this Coaſt, by ſuch a diviſion of our forces, is matter worthy of ſerious conſideration; nor, though we feel that the parting with ſo large a body of Troops weakens us very conſiderably, do I think it adequate in ſtrength to the buſineſs it is meant to effect; remembering that we cannot hope now for any aſſiſtance from *Bombay*, where we ought to have found it, and that we proceed merely upon ſpeculation in regard to the oppoſition we may meet with from the French, from *Hyder Ally*, or from both.

If the French either mean to moleſt us here, or to oppoſe us on the other Coaſt, with the conſiderable force they have aſſembled at their Iſlands, they muſt arrive before the capture of *Mahé* can be effected, and in ſuch caſe, we ſhall of courſe be too weak to reſiſt them in either place.—If they give up all thoughts of retrieving their affairs in this part of the world, which I think it can be hardly imagined they ſhould, even in that caſe the neceſſity for the expedition ceaſes, as *Mahé* muſt ſoon fall of itſelf, more particularly, ſhould we form any connections with *Hyder Ally*; a meaſure which cannot but prove of great utility to us, and for the effecting which, I heartily give my opinion and concurrence.

For theſe reaſons I cannot but acknowledge I feel myſelf againſt the expedition, and had I been preſent at the time it was planned, ſhould moſt certainly have diſſented from the meaſure.

But when I conſider that the detachment has now proceeded ſo far on its way, and feel with the Governor, that to recal them at this time might carry the appearance of apprehenſion in conſequence of the advantage lately gained by the Marattas; when I reflect upon the bravery of the Troops, the ſpirit and abilities of the Officers who conduct them, and truſting that they will continue under the orders of this Preſidency (for on no other will I ever conſent to have them placed) I am again encouraged, and aſſure myſelf, that although they may not ſucceed in the enterprize they undertake, we can never meet with diſgrace from their miſconduct.

Upon the whole, as things are at preſent ſituated, I am againſt recalling them, but think it might be very proper for them to remain at *Anjengo*, until ſome better information of what the French are meditating, or a knowledge of *Hyder*'s real intentions towards us, may allow us to decide with ſafety and certainty as to their future motions. *Eyre Coote.*

Reſolved, That the expedition to *Mahé* be proſecuted, notwithſtanding the diſaſter that has befallen the *Bombay* Troops; and that a Letter be immediately prepared for *Bengal*, communicating the intelligence received from *Poonah*, and ſtating our own ſituation, and the probable views of the ſeveral Country Powers, in conſequence of the ſucceſs obtained by the Marattas over the *Bombay* Army; alſo, the reſolution we have taken in regard to the expedition to *Mahé*.

Thomas Rumbold,
Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 7th February 1779.

Diſpatched the following Letters:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, *Fort William.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Incloſed we have the honour of tranſmitting to you a paper of intelligence, received by the Nabob from his Agent at *Poonah:* its authority is too ſtrongly marked to leave any doubt on our minds concerning the particulars;

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and as we have now only to hope that the effects of ſo conſiderable a check in the progreſs of the Company's arms, may not create ſome attempts to diſturb our poſſeſſions on this ſide *India*, or to fruſtrate the expectations we had formed of putting a final and ſpeedy period to the power of the French.

The ſubject indeed is of ſuch a nature as to awaken all our reflections; and we ſhall beg leave here to ſtate to you briefly, what occurs to us from a review of our ſituation, with reſpect to the Powers around us, and a conſideration of the probable effects that may have been cauſed by the unfortunate enterprize in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*.

It will admit of no doubt that *Hyder Ally* at preſent bears no favourable inclination towards the Company; and that he is very ſtrongly in the intereſts of the French. Had we not commenced the War in this country with ſo great a ſuperiority, *Hyder* would moſt likely have appeared, and taken an active part againſt us in the beginning: the ſucceſs of our arms againſt *Pondicherry*, probably determined him to perſevere in the line of neutrality he had adopted; and we had every reaſon to think we might have purſued our operations to the point at which we aimed, without any moleſtation whatever from him, had not the misfortune of the *Bombay* Troops cauſed ſo material a change in the face of affairs. *Hyder*, now perceiving ſo glaring an inſtance of weakneſs and diſgrace, may be encouraged openly to reſiſt our propoſed attempt on *Mahé*, which he conſiders in ſome ſort as under his protection.

With reſpect to the Nizam, his avowed attachment to the *Poonah* Miniſters, and the warmth with which he remonſtrated to your Board and to this Government, againſt the deſigns which he underſtood had been formed in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, ſufficiently ſhew how he muſt have received the news of our diſaſter, and how materially this misfortune will contribute to ſtrengthen the inclinations he will naturally have conceived to our prejudice.

The diſpoſitions of the Peiſhwa and the Miniſters at *Poonah*, upon this event, may be eaſily conceived: the effects of their reſentment may be ſuſpended for a time, but we can never ſuppoſe they will reſt ſatisfied with the advantages they have acquired, much leſs can we expect they will unite in friendſhip, or in meaſures with thoſe who have attempted ſuch dangerous deſigns againſt them.

Thus, by one ill-timed and unfortunate enterprize, the reputation of our arms is ſullied, and the friendſhip of the principal Indian States hazarded or loſt for ever, and that too at a period when we are engaged in a War which calls for the exertion of all our force, and the good will of every State in alliance with us.

In the midſt of theſe unpleaſing reflections, we feel no ſmall degree of ſatisfaction at the ſucceſsful meaſures that have been purſued againſt the French; by removing them from our neighbourhood, we are at liberty to act with much greater ſpirit and ſecurity, and we yet too flatter ourſelves that it is within the power of the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Madras*, by prudent and vigorous meaſures, to repair the miſchiefs that have been occaſioned by the miſcarriage of the *Bombay* Troops, to wipe away the diſcredit that has fallen on the Company's arms; and to keep in awe the Powers that may be diſpoſed to take advantage of our ill ſucceſs on that ſide of *India*.

On the receipt of the intelligence from *Poonah*, it became a queſtion with us, Whether it would be ſafe or prudent to purſue the expedition we had ſet on foot againſt *Mahé*? We ſaw the additional riſque to which it was expoſed, and the inconvenience of ſending ſuch a body of Troops at this time out of the *Carnatic*; but we perceived alſo the particular advantages that would reſult from the ſucceſsful execution of our meaſures; we ſaw, that this was the only opportunity that might offer for removing the diſadvantageous impreſſions which have been occaſioned every where by our late defeat: that the appearance of diffidence or timidity on this occaſion, would ſtrengthen and confirm thoſe impreſſions which have been occaſioned every where by our late defeat; and probably operate more to our prejudice than any failure that could happen from the proſecution of the enterprize. And laſtly, that the withdrawing our Troops would be inevitably followed by the capture of our Settlement at *Tellicherry*, which, though perhaps not important in itſelf, would, in the eyes of the Country Powers, be conſidered as a victory of no ſmall conſequence to the French; and perhaps induce thoſe who are now wavering, to declare openly in their favour. Upon the whole, our concluſion was, that the expedition ſhould be proſecuted; and we came to that reſolution accordingly.

We have ſome hopes that *Hyder Ally*, who ſecretly favoured and wiſhed well to the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, ſeeing the danger to which he may be expoſed from the reſentment of the Maratta State, will be glad to avail himſelf of our ſupport; and in that caſe we may be able to detach him entirely from the intereſts of the French, and render him a moſt uſeful Ally to us: indeed, we are ſo convinced of the good policy of uniting cloſely with *Hyder* in a defenſive alliance, that we ſhall embrace every occaſion to effect it. We have lately appointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to his Durbar, and have written to him for the neceſſary paſſports, which we expect daily.

As our Northern Circars lie ſo open to invaſion from the dominions of *Nizam Ally*, and as there is but too much reaſon to doubt the ſincerity of his friendſhip for the Company, we think it highly expedient at this juncture to have the beſt intelligence of his deſigns, and to be timely informed of any motions he may make towards thoſe provinces; for this purpoſe, as well as to ſettle every thing that may be neceſſary for obtaining the *Guntoor* Circar for the Company, and procuring the diſmiſſion of the French Troops from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, we have appointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to the Court of *Nizam Ally*, in quality of Reſident; he will have inſtructions to correſpond with your Board, and to communicate every information you may require from that quarter. The Northern Circars being too extenſive to be properly defended by the ordinary force maintained there, and the protection of the *Carnatic* and *Tanjore* requiring all the Troops that are ſtationed for their ſecurity; we are apprehenſive, were any ſudden attack made on our poſſeſſions to the Northward at this juncture, while we have ſo large a detachment employed on the expedition to *Mahé*, we might not be able to collect a ſufficient force in time to repel it. Conſidering the value and influence of thoſe poſſeſſions to the Company, we think it our duty to attend particularly to their ſafety; and with that view we beg leave to communicate a thought which has occurred to us, and which may poſſibly be improved by you to ſome uſeful purpoſe.

We underſtand that Colonel *Goddard*'s detachment, by the laſt accounts, was ſituated near the confines of the *Berar* Revenue; ſhould it be found neceſſary to withdraw that detachment from the object to which it was deſtined, we would propoſe to your conſideration, whether it might not be an eligible meaſure to march it towards the coaſt of *Orixa*, ſomewhere about the *Chicacole* Circar: how far it might be practicable to direct its progreſs through the countries dependant on the Rajah of *Berar*, we cannot determine; but we are of opinion, if that could be done without much difficulty, the plan may be deſerving of your attention; the march of the detachment by that route would be the moſt effectual means of checking any hoſtile deſigns of the Soubah upon the Circars, or of repelling any actual invaſion that may be attempted on our poſſeſſions there; and we think it poſſible too that by marching your Troops towards the Coaſt, they might

reach

reach *Bengal* nearly as ſoon, if not ſooner, than by any other route. We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Fort Saint George, 7th Feb. 1779.

Tho' Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 33.

Extracts of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 25. From the Nabob; dated the 11th of February 1779: received ditto.

I HAVE hitherto communicated to you every intelligence which I thought of importance, and now ſend you incloſed, copy of a Paper of News I have received from the *Bala Ghaut*. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp; dated the 7th of Mohrem, or the 26th of January 1779.

Intelligence was brought to *Hyder Ally*, while he was beſieging the Fort of *Chitteldurg*, that the Engliſh were ſending forces againſt *Mahé*, a French Factory which is in his country. Upon this, he immediately determined to make it up with the Zemindar of *Chitteldurg*, and it was agreed between them, that the latter ſhould pay *Hyder* a yearly Peiſhcuſh of two lacks of Rupees; the Brother of the Zemindar is to join *Hyder*'s Army with a body of Troops, and what diſtricts have been taken from the Zemindar are to be reſtored to him. *Hyder Ally* is raiſing freſh forces, and is ſending people every where with money for that purpoſe. It is his firm intention to make one attack againſt the Engliſh, whatever be the conſequence. He has wrote to his Vakeel at *Poonah*, to ſettle a Treaty of Peace with the Maratta Miniſters. It is ſaid that the Engliſh have been totally defeated by the Marattas, near *Poonah*. Five hundred Europeans and three thouſand Sepoys have been killed, and the reſt of the Engliſh Army diſperſed, and *Ragonaut Row* made a priſoner. Two Engliſh Gentlemen are at *Poonah*, endeavouring to make terms with the Marattas.

No. 28. From the Nabob; dated the 16th of February 1779: received the 17th ditto.

I conſider any loſs of the Company as my own, and therefore think it my duty to give you inſtant advice and intelligence from *Hydrabad* and *Hyder Ally*'s Camp. I now beg leave to incloſe you ſome Papers of News juſt arrived from *Hydrabad*. I have received accounts that *Hyder Ally Cawn* has not agreed to the terms which were to have taken place between him and the Zemindar of *Chitteldurg*, by which the latter was to ſend his Brother with a body of his Troops to join *Hyder*'s Army: the particulars of this intelligence I now alſo incloſe you. *Hyder Ally* is now exerting all his endeavours to reduce the Fort of *Chitteldurg* as ſpeedily as poſſible, and after he hath taken it, it is his firm intention to aſſiſt the French, if the Engliſh Troops are ſent againſt *Mahé*; for he will not let that place be taken by them. He will march thirty thouſand Horſe into my Country, and that of the Company, which he will lay waſte. He has repeatedly wrote to his Vakeel to this effect, and enjoined him to make you and me acquainted with his intention. The Vakeel has accordingly waited twice upon me, and told me what his Maſter ordered him. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp; dated 10th Mohrem.

Hyder Ally Cawn had entered into terms of accommodation with the Zemindar of *Chitteldurg*, but they have diſagreed again, becauſe the Zemindar refuſes to ſend a body of his Troops to join *Hyder*'s Army. The ſon of the Zemindar, *Bermha*, ſaid, that life was but ſhort, and that he would give *Hyder Ally* more trouble, but never would make peace with him to aſſiſt him with Troops. There is a tank cloſe to the Fort, and *Hyder*'s Horſe are encamped under the ſhelter of the bank of this tank. The guns of the Fort are ſilenced. *Hyder* will not retreat without taking the place.

Ragonaut Row and the Miniſters of *Poonah* are reconciled, and they now meditate ſome expedition, and to ſend away *Sinde* and *Holkar* with their forces, but it is not yet known where they are intended for. *Hyder Ally* intends ſending up part of his Army, under the command of his Son, to the borders of the *Jung Buddura*; and *Meer*, his Son-in-Law, is to be ſent towards *Corripattam*, and the twelve Mahals. There are at preſent two or three French Gentlemen with *Hyder Ally*; they preſs him to give them his aſſiſtance, and he has told them they ſhall have it, after he has taken *Chitteldurg*. They are preparing to get powder and all manner of ammunition and ſtores ready in his camp; and they are daily levying freſh forces. He has ſent orders to the different Forts near the *Payen Ghaut*, to have them well ſtored with proviſions; and has ordered the Zemindars of *Pungnour* to join his Army with their reſpective forces.

No. 29. From the Nabob; dated 18th February 1779: received 19th ditto.

I now ſend you incloſed a Letter from Maha Rajah *Burbur*, adviſing me of the arrival of *Hyder*'s Troops at a place twelve coſs diſtant from *Chingum*, which is in the *Carnatic*, and that ſome more are expected. I have beſides received repeated advices of the arrival of *Hyder*'s Horſe at *Kiſhengurry* and other places on the borders of my country. If theſe Horſe are intended to invade this country, as has been intimated to me in the meſſage delivered by *Hyder*'s Vakeel, the ſituation of the Ryots will be a moſt deplorable one, for they will loſe all that they have. It is therefore adviſable to collect all your forces from the Circars and other places in the *Carnatic*, and to form encampments in one or two places; for when the alarm of the Enemy's Horſe is ſpread through the country, it will be difficult to get train-bullocks for the artillery and coolies; I ſhall not then be able to provide them: I am poſſeſſed of no treaſures, and have no bodies of Horſe. The crop is in moſt part of the country fit to be cut; in others, where it is cut, it has not yet been converted into money. I have not yet collected what I am to pay the Company. I am your Ally, and your loſs is mine. May the Almighty avert the preſent evil! What can I ſay more?

Copy of a Letter from Maha Rajah *Burbur*.

I have received a Letter from the Aumil at *Chingum*, acquainting me that he had received intelligence that the Troops of *Hyder Ally* were arrived at the village of *Cenayettoor*, twelve coſs diſtant from *Chingum* [a Paſs S. W. of *Madras*] and that they expected more Horſe along with freſh men: this has given great alarm to all the inhabitants of *Chingum*.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 18 February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Sir *Eyre Coote*,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith.

Extract of Mr. *Smith*'s Minute.

The meaſure of appointing perſons to go to *Hyder Ally* and the Soubah, has already taken place; and I agree with the Preſident, that our having hitherto neglected it has been a principal error in our politics. The good policy of framing an alliance with *Hyder Ally*, muſt be obvious to every one who reflects on the general ſituation of the Company's affairs, the relative ſituation of *Hyder* and the Marattas, and the very particular circumſtances which mark the preſent juncture. *Hyder Ally* being the only barrier againſt the enormous power of the Marattas, ſhould always have been conſidered as our natural Ally.

The

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The late War againſt him, which coſt the Company ſo many lacks, was a War againſt ourſelves, not only as it almoſt ruined the Company's affairs, but as it ſo ſtrengthened the hands of the Marattas, by weakening *Hyder*'s, that he had nearly ſunk under their force, in the conteſt between them which immediately ſucceeded the peace of 1769. Had the Marattas entirely ſubdued him, the conqueſt of the *Carnatic* would have been their next object, at leaſt it would always have been at their mercy. If then an alliance with *Hyder* be eligible at all times, how much more ſo is it at this alarming juncture, when there is reaſon to apprehend, that without his alliance, we may be obliged to cope ſingly with the Marattas, joined by whatever forces the French may bring into their country? In addition to theſe circumſtances, let it be conſidered, that *Hyder* has it in his power to prevent our giving the laſt blow to the French power in *India*, by obliging us to deſiſt from the expedition now on foot againſt *Mahé*; and that he has actually threatened to do it, which I conſider as a ſtroke of policy calculated to force us to ſeek his alliance, or, ſhould we neglect to make him our Friend, to prevent our becoming more formidable to him as an Enemy. This is the only interpretation I can put on his late meſſage, for I have too good an opinion of him as a politician, to ſuppoſe that he would take part againſt us merely for the ſake of ſupporting a deſperate cauſe. He knows our power, and that our aſſiſtance would effectually ſecure him againſt that of the Marattas, which he has ſo ſeverely felt. But I am ſorry to obſerve, that experience has perhaps rendered him cautious of truſting implicitly to any aſſurances we may make him; and that being the caſe, it is not at all wonderful that he ſhould be averſe to letting a place fall into our hands, which is ſituated in his country; and while it continues with the French, is the ſame as if in his own poſſeſſion. But could we once remove the doubts he entertains of our ſincerity, and convince him that we really mean to eſtabliſh an union and alliance with him, I am perſuaded, that inſtead of ſuccouring *Mahé*, he would aſſiſt us in reducing it. Theſe weighty conſiderations ſhould, I think, be deciſive with us, for inſtructing the perſon who is to go *Hyder Ally*, to aſſure him, in unequivocal terms, of our deſire to cultivate the moſt perfect good underſtanding with him; of the ſincerity of this aſſurance, as well as to ſtrengthen and conſolidate the friendſhip ſubſiſting between him and the Company, we are willing to enter into a freſh Treaty of Alliance with him, on ſuch terms as ſhall be for the mutual advantage and ſecurity of both parties. The inſtructions to the Reſident might contain the outlines of the Treaty, and ſuch terms as we ſhould be willing to accede to. In the mean time, to facilitate the negociation, and to ſhew *Hyder* we are determined to act with vigour, and to ſupport and perſevere in the meaſures we have taken, I would ſubmit to the Committee, whether it might not be adviſable to cauſe a ſtrong detachment to be aſſembled at *Vellore*, under the command of an active and experienced Officer, and encamped without the walls, where it would occaſion little additional expence, except the bullocks for the guns, which ſhould be procured and kept in readineſs, as it is very difficult to collect them at a ſhort warning. I ſhall only add, that our late diſgrace on the Malabar Coaſt is an additional argument for our immediately forming an alliance with *Hyder*, and for our being prepared to act againſt him in caſe his conduct make it neceſſary.

Charles Smith.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 22d February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
General Sir *Eyre Coote*,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith.

The Preſident reports to the Committee, That *Hyder Ally*'s Vakeel has formally acquainted him, that he had received inſtructions from his Maſter to declare to this Government, that he, *Hyder Ally*, conſiders the Settlement of *Mahé* as bordering and dependant on his country, and of courſe as under his protection, together with all the other European Settlements on the Malabar Coaſt; that he cannot therefore ſuffer hoſtilities to be commenced againſt any of them; and if we perſiſt in executing the deſign we had formed againſt *Mahé*, it is his intention to oppoſe it immediately, or by detaching a body of Troops into the *Carnatic*.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, three Letters from the Nabob; by which it appears, that ſome of *Hyder*'s Horſe are arrived near the borders of the *Carnatic*, and that more are daily expected.

The Preſident propoſes, that an Anſwer be wrote immediately to the Nabob, in conſequence of his Letter; thanking him for the early intimation he has given us of the intelligence he has received, and to aſſure him, in caſe *Hyder* ſhould attempt to enter the *Carnatic*, that we will take ſuch meaſures in conſequence of his recommendation, as we find proper and neceſſary for the defence of his Highneſs's dominions, and the poſſeſſions of the Company; and that the firſt and moſt material ſtep to be conſidered, is a proper ſupply of treaſure, and that we therefore moſt earneſtly requeſt his Highneſs will immediately fulfil the engagements he entered into, and pay up the balances due from him to the end of this month: that it is with concern we obſerve the remonſtrances his Highneſs is pleaſed to make in his Letter, that he is without treaſure and without Horſe; that it appears the more extraordinary to us, when we conſider the length of time that the *Carnatic* has remained in tranquillity without any interruption to the collections; and that it is a general complaint from the Creditors of his Highneſs, that they have not been able to obtain any payments from him, notwithſtanding his frequent promiſes to them; that with reſpect to the Company's demands, we are ſorry to obſerve, that his Highneſs's debt to them, is monthly accumulating, notwithſtanding our repeated repreſentations to him, ariſing as well from our own diſtreſs for paying our military eſtabliſhment, as from the repeated orders of the Company to inſiſt on his Highneſs's punctual compliance with his engagements; that with reſpect to Horſe, was his Highneſs to keep his regiments complete, and regularly paid, on the footing we have ſo often recommended to him, that they would be excellent Troops, and of infinite ſervice in caſe of any invaſion of the *Carnatic*; but their being always in arrears, is a further proof how ſmall are the ſupplies of caſh that iſſue from his Highneſs's treaſury, and makes us at a loſs to account for the expenditure of the reſources of the *Carnatic*.

Thomas Rumbold.

The Committee approve of what the Preſident has propoſed; and it is agreed to write a Letter to the Nabob accordingly.

The Preſident requeſts the Gentlemen of the Committee will take into conſideration our preſent ſituation, and the intelligence we have received of a threatened Invaſion of the *Carnatic*; and give their opinions, whether it will not be prudent and proper to ſend directions immediately to Colonel *Braithwaite* not to embark from *Anjengo* till further orders, unleſs he ſhould have received ſuch advices from *Tellicherry* as may remove every idea of *Hyder Ally*'s deſign of ſupporting the French at *Mahé*, and that he has the greateſt probability of making an eaſy and ſpeedy conqueſt of that place.

Thomas Rumbold.

The Committee agreeing in opinion with the Preſident, the following Letter is now written, approved, and ordered to be immediately diſpatched.

To

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, commanding the Troops marching to *Anjengo*.

Sir,

I am directed by the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee, to deſire you will not embark the detachment at *Anjengo* till you receive their further orders, unleſs you ſhould have had received ſuch advices from *Tellicherry* as may remove every idea of *Hyder Ally*'s deſign of ſupporting the French at *Mahé*, and that you have the greateſt probability of making an eaſy and ſpeedy conqueſt of that place.

Extracts of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 25th February 1779.

Extract of a Letter from Major *Maclellan*, at *Tanjore*, to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

The reports of *Hyder*'s having thrown men into *Mahé*, are without foundation. The force ſaid to be in garriſon there, conſiſts of 150 Europeans, 250 diſciplined Sepoys, and 30 Country Peons, belonging to the *Caleſtry* Rajah; the lower fort appears ſtrong towards the ſea-line, and *Fort Saint George* ſeems in good order.

It is the general opinion on the Malabar Coaſt, that *Hyder* is dead. The Governor's Renters, &c. have been ordered to ſettle their accounts at *Mangalore*; however, ſome people, who have dared to ſay that he was dead, have had their tongues cut out.

The lateſt accounts received at *Tellicherry* from *Bombay*, ſay, that the Army was ſurrounded above the Ghauts, and their communication with the ſea cut off; 150 Europeans and 500 Sepoys, with two field-pieces, under the command of Captain *Eames*, had marched to endeavour to join them.

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*.

Sir,

Although the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee, from the anxiety they were under in conſequence of repeated intelligence received of the deſigns of *Hyder Ally*, in favour of the French, were induced to ſend you the orders they did through me in a Letter dated the 22d inſtant; yet from other circumſtances, which have ſince been communicated to them, and particularly from the forwardneſs to which the expedition is advanced, they are much inclined to proceed vigorouſly in the execution of their deſign, truſting that your judgment and diſcretion will ſupply the reſt: They have directed me therefore to refer you again to their firſt inſtructions, and to deſire you will govern yourſelf as nearly as poſſible by them, attending particularly to the neceſſity of executing the enterprize with the greateſt diſpatch, that they may have the benefit of your force early again for the protection of the *Carnatic*, and the valuable poſſeſſions of the Company on this Coaſt.

I am, Sir,

Fort Saint George, 25th February 1779. Your moſt obedient Servant, *Cha*^{s} *Oakley*, Sec^{y}.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 33. To the Nabob.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

I have had the honour to receive your Highneſs's ſeveral Letters of Intelligence relative to the motions and deſigns of *Hyder Ally*, and beg leave to return you many thanks for your early communication of it. Should *Hyder* make any attempt to enter the *Carnatic*, and diſturb the tranquillity of the country, we ſhall certainly take every precaution in our power for its ſecurity. The firſt and moſt material thing to be conſidered, is a proper ſupply of money for the expences of our Army which may be obliged to take the field. I am no leſs amazed than concerned to hear from your Highneſs, before even the approach of danger, and before you have loſt a grain of your revenues, that you are totally without reſources for the protection of your own dominions, which have been ten years in a profound peace; this is a diſcouraging circumſtance to the Company, who entertain ſo large a force for the defence of the *Carnatic*, truſting to your engagements, and to the natural reſources of the country for the neceſſary funds both in peace and in war. I am willing to believe your Highneſs's declaration of inability to ſupply money or Troops to oppoſe the incurſions of an Enemy, proceeded haſtily from the firſt impreſſions cauſed by the report of *Hyder*'s intentions, and not from a deliberate review of your ſituation: to ſuppoſe the *Carnatic* in ſo weak a ſtate as your Highneſs repreſents by that declaration, would be to reflect ſeverely on your government, and to judge you incapable of that prudent foreſight which prompts every wiſe Prince to be on his guard againſt the worſt that can happen. By the bleſſing of God, the Company were never better able to protect you againſt your Enemies than they are at this moment, provided you will only furniſh that aſſiſtance and ſupport to their endeavours which the reſources of the *Carnatic* may and ought to afford for its own protection. Having thus touched generally on the ſubject of the advices which you have tranſmitted me, I muſt requeſt permiſſion to remind you again of your engagements, and the arrears into which you are fallen. Your Highneſs may well remember the large balance due from you at the end of November, and what paſſed in conſequence, when the Select Committee requeſted you to give them a meeting. At that meeting, as will appear by the incloſed copy of the Proceedings, your Highneſs, after many excuſes for the repeated failures that had happened in your payments, promiſed in the moſt ſolemn manner to ſend us the ſum of three lacks of Pagodas in the month of January, excluſive of the balance of Soucar Bills, which your Highneſs had given in payment of former kiſts, and which were not anſwered by the Soucars; inſtead of performing this promiſe, your Highneſs paid in the month of January little more than two lacks, beſides the balances of the Soucars Bills, ſo that the demands on your Highneſs for arrears are as great now as they were in November, though this be the period for the collections, at which your Highneſs promiſed to make good all deficiencies. What can be ſaid in anſwer to your Highneſs's plea of poverty and want of reſources, when, at the moſt fruitful ſeaſon of the year, and at the period when you ſeemed not yourſelf to entertain a doubt of your being able to ſatisfy all demands, your Highneſs is yet as backward in your payments as you were in the month of November? If we obſerved any money iſſued to your private Creditors, or any thing extraordinary to your Troops, we might in ſome meaſure account for the deficiency; but knowing as we do, that your Creditors, new and old, have received nothing, or next to nothing, and that your Troops are all in arrears, we are totally at a loſs to account for the expenditure of the revenues. Your Highneſs will be ſo good to excuſe the freedom of theſe remarks, which ariſe naturally out of the ſubject of the Company's diſtreſs for money, and the cauſes to which it may be attributed. This is the end of February; nothing has been received from your Highneſs in the courſe of the month, and there is a large balance due.

Soon after my arrival here, I wrote repeatedly to your Highneſs for accounts of the proviſions and ſtores laid up in your different Garriſons, but never could obtain them. If the *Carnatic* be invaded, we ſhall without theſe accounts be totally at a loſs how to take our meaſures; with regard to your Troops, under proper regulations, they might be of eſſential ſervice, and I hope and requeſt therefore that your Highneſs will ſee them regularly paid, and well appointed for ſervice. In their preſent ſituation, there is great reaſon to apprehend that *Hyder*, were he to enter the *Carnatic*, might be able to draw the whole, or the greateſt part, to his ſtandard.

Fort Saint George, 25th February 1779. I have the honour to be, &c.

APPENDIX. No. 33.

Letter to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William.*

We intended closing our Letter in this place, but having received some important intelligence relative to the designs of *Hyder Ally*, we lose not a moment in communicating it to you. The Vakeel of *Hyder* has formally acquainted the President, that his Master, considering the settlement of *Mahé*, together with all the European settlements on the Malabar Coast, as under his protection, means, in case we are determined to proceed in the expedition we have formed against it, to oppose our Troops directly, or by an invasion of the *Carnatic*; and we have actually received accounts from the Nabob, of which we inclose a copy, advising that some bodies of *Hyder*'s Horse are arrived near the borders of the *Carnatic*, and that more are expected daily.

The plain and explicit declarations of the Vakeel, added to this intelligence, leaving us in little doubt respecting *Hyder*'s intentions, we have written to Colonel *Braithwaite*, who commands the expedition to *Mahé*, to be particularly on his guard; attending to all the cautionary orders which we gave him in our original instructions for the expedition.

We cannot say how far we may yet be able to avert *Hyder*'s threatened invasion of the *Carnatic*. It is certainly an alarming circumstance, when we consider our total inability to prevent the ravages of Horse, and that our resources for War will be instantly cut off by their incursions. In the present situation of this Presidency, we must endeavour, if possible, to avoid a quarrel with *Hyder*; and we trust, that by a proper firmness with regard to the expedition to *Mahé*, we shall not hasten it in any degree; we have therefore determined not to relinquish the enterprize upon the mere threats of *Hyder*, though we have thought it expedient by our instructions to guard Colonel *Braithwaite* against the risque of a defeat.

The conduct of *Hyder* on this occasion is, however, such as calls strongly for resentment, particularly when we consider the late friendly intercourse that has been observed between him and this Government; and could we entertain a reasonable hope of support from the *Carnatic*, and of funds sufficient to carry on an active War against him, we should certainly recommend the necessary preparations for it.

So it is that we labour under discouragements, which will not permit us to act with so much vigour, and though it seems highly probable from our situation, that we shall be obliged in the present War to sustain the principal efforts of our enemies, and that the future success of the French on this coast may determine their success in every other part of *India*, yet it is certain that we are by no means in a condition with respect to resources, even to oppose any powerful attempt, either of the French or of *Hyder Ally*; we shall notwithstanding exert ourselves to the utmost of our abilities, trusting that the difficulties of our situation will plead our excuse for any failures that may happen.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble Servants,
Tho' Rumbold, &c.
Council.

Fort Saint George,
25th February 1779.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correspondence.

No. 37. From the Nabob; dated 28th February 1779; received 2d March D°.

Hyder Ally Cawn's Vakeel acquaints me, that he has received a Letter from him, in which he says, that when Governor *Rumbold* arrived here from *Europe*, he wrote to him in friendly language; and now, in contradiction to that, Mr. *Rumbold* was sending English Troops against *Mahé*; that he had received intelligence that the Troops had actually marched, and that he [meaning himself] had ordered his Troops to march also; and he desired his Vakeel, in the same Letter, to acquaint the Governor and me of this: the Vakeel likewise told me, he had already informed you of it. I now send you the intelligence papers I have received from the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowla*'s camp, relative to the affairs at *Poonah*. You have also inclosed, advices received from my Aumils in different parts of the country, from the camp of *Hyder Ally Cawn*; all which, mention his invading this country. All these papers of intelligence, which are twelve in number, I send you for your information. What can I say more?

Intelligence from *Hyder*'s Camp; dated 25th Mohrem.

Hyder is still at *Chitteldurg*; he had confined the Zemindar at that place, and the Zemindar's brother had found means to escape. *Hyder* on that account returned to *Chitteldurg*, from *Sera*, and was greatly displeased with his son, and ordered the Zemindar to be sent to *Seringapatam*. Accordingly the Zemindar, and all his dependants, chained neck and foot, were put in a hundred doolies, and sent away to *Seringapatam*, with 500 Sepoys, under the command of *Mahomined Ally*. *Hyder* will soon go back to *Sera*. He has sent for *Mukdoon* from *Bednor*: it was his intention to have sent the forces of *Corcalbunder* with *Mukdoon* to *Mahé*; but he received intelligence in the mean while, that *Sunda Walla*, a Zemindar, had come into his country, and plundered some villages: he has therefore ordered *Muckdoon* to go against the Zemindars. *Hyder* has sent for the general Muster Reports of his Forces; it appears by it, that they consist of 21,761 Horse, and 31,400 Foot, and Carnatic Peons about 60,000; of these last about 4,000 were killed before *Chitteldurg*. He now wants to complete the number, and is sending every where money to enlist Frenchmen. *Hyder* is determined to make War against the English, if they come to *Mahé*; and if they desist, he will go against *Sonda*. The Zemindars of *Mahé*, and *Couche*, and *Cobicot*, and other of the Malabar Country, have wrote to *Hyder Ally*, that they only wish to keep in terms with him, and have nothing to do with the English, whom they will not allow to pass through the country. *Hyder* has wrote to them in answer, that he will give them his protection.

Intelligence from *Sera*; dated 26th Mohrem.

Mararget Mana is come, by orders from *Hyder*, with 2,000 Horse, to *Coveripatam*; *Sirnowar Row Berki* is soon to join him with 8,000 Horse; they are ordered to go afterwards to the Ghaut of *Chingum*, and to divide into four bodies; one is to remain there, another is to go towards *Trichinopoly*, the third towards *Amboor*, and march into the *Carnatic*, the other is to enter by the Ghaut of *Chingum*; they are ordered to lay waste the country, and *Hyder* himself will remain encamped in the *Bala Ghaut*. A friend of mine in *Hyder*'s camp has given me this intelligence. Three Frenchmen are in *Hyder*'s camp, and they do all in their power to persuade *Hyder Ally* to march into the *Carnatic*. Every thing that passes *Madras*, or at your Highness's Durbar, is known to *Hyder*; how he comes by this I know not.

Letter from the Aumil of *Chingum*; dated 18th Mohrem.

The Aumil of *Tripatoor* has received orders from *Hyder Ally* to place Chokies in all the Ghauts where there are none; the Aumil accordingly came yesterday to *Singatpetta*, and stopped up the Ghauts with hedges of them, and placed guards every where. I hear that some Horse are come to forage at *Kisthengurry*. I have sent a man to bring me intelligence, of which I shall advise your Highness when I receive it.

Letter from the Aumil of *Caliſpach*, &c. received 2d Suffer.

I hear that 1,000 Horſe are at *Mottoor*, in the diſtrict of *Tripatoor*, near the Ghaut of *Chingum*. The inhabitants thereabouts are greatly alarmed, and leaving daily their habitations with their effects. The people here have received the alarm from them; all intercourſe is ſtopped between the country people here and thoſe of *Chingum*.

Letters from *Anoar Ally Cawn*, the Killedar of *Vellour*; dated 29th Mohrem.

I underſtand from *Mahomed Behauder*, the Naib Killedar of *Muttipally*, that *Hyder*'s Horſe, which are ſtationed at *Kiſthengarry*, plunder the country as far as *Muttipally*, and greatly diſtreſs the inhabitants. The Aumil of *Mourotgand* has wrote me of the arrival of *Hyder*'s Horſe at *Trippatoor*, and that the inhabitants of *Chingum* are much alarmed, and bringing their cattle and effects to the mills and woods thereabouts; and he deſires me to ſend a company of Sepoys to him, to prevent that place from the ravages of the Horſe.

APPENDIX, No. 34.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 36. From the Nabob; dated 23d February 1779: received 28th D°.

I HAVE lived in ſtrict friendſhip and alliance with the Company and Engliſh Nation near forty years, during which time I have ſpent the beſt part of my life, and all my treaſures, in reducing their Enemies. When thoſe Enemies were ſuperior to them in force by ten to one, I have in every reſpect continued the unalterable and firm friend of the Engliſh, and conſidered their loſs as my own. When the King and the Princes of this country ſaw the rectitude which the Engliſh obſerved in all their dealings, and their attachment and ſincerity, they deſired to make friendſhip with them, through my mediation, and to have their protection. I have repeatedly given aſſurances of this to former Governors, and we have had frequent opportunities of trying who were our friends and foes, and of ſettling our affairs in *Indoſtan* in ſuch a manner, that we ſhould have no fear of having our tranquillity afterwards diſturbed. In all the letters which I wrote after the firſt reduction of *Pondicherry*, to Meſſrs. *Pigot*, *Palk*, *Bourchier*, *Dupré*, and *Wynch*, to which I refer, I never omitted the leaſt circumſtance, tending to ſhew the rooted enmity which *Hyder Ally* entertained againſt us, and his attachment to the French. What greater proof could there be of his enmity to us, where he had no power, than his adviſing the Zemindar of *Tanjore* to break with us, and not remit me the Peiſhcuſh due to me? In my Letter to Governor *Pigot*, of the 13th Auguſt 1762, I forwarded to him the original of a Letter, under *Hyder Ally*'s own ſeal, to the Zemindar of *Tanjore*, adviſing him not to pay me the Peiſhcuſh, and that he would aſſiſt him with ten thouſand Horſe. The copy of that Letter is upon record. I have taken every opportunity to ſhew the propriety of leſſening the power of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and agreed to give every aſſiſtance my Circar could afford, in money, troops, and proviſions, for the Army. Beſides this, I engaged to bring 70,000 Maratta Horſe, and 50,000 Foot, to join us. Some truſty perſons, on the part of the Marattas, were here with the Governor and Council and me for ſeven years together, and intreated us to give them our aſſiſtance, making us the moſt ſolemn aſſurances of friendſhip, and agreeing to give us up ſome countries on this ſide the Ghauts, which belong of right to the *Carnatic*; and the ſecuring thoſe Ghauts had been recommended ſtrongly to me by the Company in their Letter of the 4th March 1767, and by Governor *Pigot* in his Letter of the 8th November 1763: the Marattas alſo agreed to give the Company the privilege of the ſandal wood and pepper trade in the *Bednoor* Country, in the manner they wiſhed for. But my Friends were deceived by the plauſible language and appearance of friendſhip uſed by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, and ſuppoſed him their friend, and were not acquainted with his inward hatred to them; ſo that we loſt the fair opportunities which had offered to us when *Hyder Ally* marched againſt *Morarroto*, with an intention to reduce him (although he was expreſsly included in the Treaty made with *Hyder Ally Cawn*). *Morarrow* wrote us in the moſt intreating terms, that he was the friend of the Company, and was included in the Treaty between them and *Hyder Ally*, and begged us to give him our aſſiſtance, or at leaſt to write to *Hyder Ally Cawn* to deſiſt from his hoſtile deſigns againſt him: I myſelf gave Lord *Pigot* the paper of intelligence received from *Goully* at that time, and talked to him a great deal upon that ſubject, but it had no effect. Had not *Morarrow* been reduced, he would at this time have given us his friendly aſſiſtance. *Hyder Ally* is ſince much increaſed in power, riches, and dominions: War is commenced in *Europe* between the French and Engliſh; he is certain that French Troops will very ſoon arrive here, and he will give them every aſſiſtance he can, by ſupplying them with money, and every thing elſe. His Vakeel brought us a meſſage agreeable to the orders received from him; what greater declaration of his enmity to us can there be than this? If you will be kind enough to peruſe the copies of my Letters from the beginning of Mr. *Pigot*'s government to the end of Mr. *Wynch*'s, and thoſe which I wrote to the Company; you will do me the juſtice to acknowledge, that I wrote what was juſt and true; and that the diſpoſition ſhewn by *Hyder Ally* is very little different from what I repreſented it would be in thoſe Letters. How am I to relate every circumſtance that has happened in the courſe of thirty-two years? I took every opportunity to write to my Friends on this ſubject, on the ſhorteſt terms, and the Company's Records and mine are full of it. When *Hyder Ally* had only 5,000 Horſe, and the Rajah of *Myſore* was in full poſſeſſion of his dominions, and the Marattas had worſted *Hyder*, ſo as to oblige him to fly to *Bangalore*, notwithſtanding the Marattas had 16,000 Horſe in the *Serra* Country, *Hyder* ſent ſome of his Horſe with *Muckdoom Naik* to the aſſiſtance of *Pondicherry*, and plundered the *Carnatic*, without minding the power of the Engliſh, and the forces under Admiral *Stevens* and *Corniſh*; *Pondicherry* was taken by the means of the gallant conduct of General *Coote*, and the aſſiſtance I offered in ſupplying the Army with proviſions; but *Hyder* neglected nothing to prevent its fall; ſince that time he has ever diſplayed his rooted enmity to us: it is not therefore aſtoniſhing that he ſhould, at this time, when he is a hundred times more powerful and rich than he was then, avail himſelf of the opportunity, when his Enemies the Marattas are engaged on the *Bombay* ſide, to give his aſſiſtance to the French at *Mahé*. Had he not been taken up at *Chitteldurg*, there is no doubt but he could have ſent forces to the relief of *Pondicherry*. If the Engliſh Troops go againſt *Mahé*, he will act up to the meſſage ſent us, by deſtroying my country, and that belonging to the Company; he has ſent for Troops from the *Mauritius*, which he will employ in his ſervice. My preſent ſituation is ſuch, that I cannot bear any freſh troubles or misfortunes. I underſtand from the public accounts, that the Engliſh Troops are returned to *Bombay*, without executing the purpoſe which they intended; and the Peace of the Marattas is broke. The Officers of the Engliſh Troops have done wiſely in returning to *Bombay*, for there were but a few Troops left in that place; had any misfortune happened to the Army, it would have been attended with great danger. It is not neceſſary that the Governor and Council of *Bombay* ſhould give up *Salſette*, and the other places. The

APPENDIX. No. 34.

Bengal Troops are on the borders of the *Nirbuddas*; I know not what may happen to them, or how long the War may laſt with the Marattas. There is no money in the Company's Treaſury here. The crop is ready to be cut and ſold; but it will take three or four months to collect the revenues of this ſeaſon. The expence of our Troops muſt be defrayed. If (God forbid!) any trouble ſhould happen in the country, we ſhall have the greateſt difficulties to encounter, and all our reſources will be ſtopped. When you ſee how earneſtly I adviſed in my Letters to former Governors, to make War againſt *Hyder*, and to leſſen his power, you will find plainly that in ſo doing, I had no other view than the good of my country, as well as that of the Company, and the happineſs of my people. At that time I inſiſted that Peace ſhould be made with *Hyder*, after having brought him low, that there might be no danger in future of his raiſing freſh troubles. My country had been laid waſte by him, and there was no occaſion to make Peace with him on diſgraceful terms. What I have now wrote you is merely to preſerve Peace in the country. Some, from intereſted motives, have given out, that I am prompt to this by my hatred to *Hyder Ally*, and a deſign againſt his country. I have no intereſt in Alliance or War with *Hyder Ally*, or the Marattas; and my only conſideration is the good of the Company, and the preſervation of my country. As I am better acquainted than others with the ſituation of affairs in this country, I now tell you plainly, that although it may be very proper to take *Mahé*, it is adviſable, at this time, to defer it to another opportunity, and anſwer the meſſage delivered by the Vakeel, in ſmooth language; and to write to *Hyder Ally*, that as there ſubſiſted a Treaty of Friendſhip between him and you, you did not imagine that there was any difference between you; that the one's Enemy was the Enemy of the other; that the Maratta Troops, which had often entered into his country with hoſtile views, had often demanded your aſſiſtance; which, out of regard for the friendſhip you entertained for him, you had refuſed; and that the Marattas diſpleaſed with this, had plundered the *Carnatic*: that yet you had not forſaken your friendſhip for him; and, agreeable to the Treaty with him, you had ſent your Troops againſt them; that you had ſince received his meſſage by his Vakeel, by which you underſtand that it was contrary to his wiſh, and that it might be the ſource of a miſunderſtanding between him and you; that this had greatly ſurpriſed you, becauſe that you had conſidered the puniſhment of your Enemies would have been pleaſing to him, and that it was but friendſhip to do ſo; you may write to him, that it was (God forbid!) your intention to Circar; but that ſince his Vakeel had delivered ſuch a meſſage, and that you had a great conſideration for his friendſhip, you would leave the puniſhment of your Enemies to himſelf.

By this *Hyder Ally Cawn* may be induced to deſiſt from the hoſtile intentions he entertains. If you ſhould think of taking *Mahé* juſt now, it is only bringing a War into the *Carnatic* and the Circars. If you mean that the French ſhould not have a ſettlement on the ſea coaſt, when *Hyder* is diſpoſed to ſerve them, and be our Enemy, he has many places in his country that he can give them. You ſhould avail yourſelf of the preſent opportunity, and collect, as ſoon as poſſible, what money you can from *Tanjore* and the Circars, to provide for your future expences. Any Troops which may be ſent to your aſſiſtance by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, may with eaſe be ſent into the Northern Circars; and the Troops there and the *Carnatic* may be diſpoſed of properly; before that time we may expect the regiments from *Europe*, which muſt be kept here. Peace muſt be made with the Marattas; and we ſhall have their Horſe, and thoſe of the other Sardars, with whom I am in friendſhip, to join us, and *Mahé* may then be taken, and *Hyder Ally* will be afraid of us. In my Letter of the 3d December laſt, I mentioned to you the Propoſal made by the people of *Poonah*; had my Friends acted conformable to my advice, perhaps affairs would not have been in the ſituation they now are in. Even now, although much time has been loſt, if my Friends will declare their intention, I may be able to carry on a friendly negociation with the Marattas, and try again what I can do.

My reaſon for troubling you with this long Letter, ariſes from a conſideration of the duty I owe to my ſubjects, and the regard I have for my friendſhip for the Company, and the ſucceſs of their trade, and the neceſſity of a Peace in the *Carnatic* and Circars; and I have not ſpared any thing in offering my advice. I have juſt received intelligence, that *Hyder Ally* intends to go againſt *Cuddupah* and *Kennoul*; the Phouſdars of both theſe places are not in a condition to reſiſt him; it is therefore, without doubt, that he will reduce them very ſoon. *Cuddupah* is an appendage of the *Carnatic*; and if he takes it, the communication with the Northward will be ſtopped by him, in the ſame manner as it is to the Weſtward, where I cannot ſend a ſingle Morcerror with diſpatches, without being ſtopped. In this caſe the *Carnatic* is, as if it was blockaded. *Hyder Ally* only does this to diſtreſs me as much poſſible. What other proof can be wanted of his enmity, than reducing to his obedience all thoſe whom he thinks are my Friends, and declaring that he will aſſiſt the French, who are the Enemies I fear, and that he will join them to invade the *Carnatic*? What ſhall I ſay more?

Letters referred to by the Nabob, in the foregoing Letter.

To Governor *Pigot*, dated 2d September 1760, 14th June 1761, 8th March 1761, 1ſt January 1762, 27th July 1762, 13th Auguſt 1762, 2d April 1763.

To Governor *Palk*, dated 19th March 1764, 5th April 1764.

To Meſſrs. *Smith*, *Call*, and *Makay*, 10th October 1767, 30th September 1768.

To Governor *Bourchier*, 28th January 1769, 4th February 1769, 15th March 1769, 20th March 1769.

To Governor *Dupré*, 7th June 1770, 17th Auguſt 1770, 25th November 1770, 24th March 1771, 7th April 1771, 19th July 1771, 5th December 1771.

To Governor *Wynch*, 31ſt January 1775, 2d June 1775, 4th December 1775.

To Governor *Rumbold*, 3d December 1778.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 40. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 1ſt March 1779: received 5th ditto.

You repeated lately your requeſt, that I would write to *Iſwahi Modoo Row*, the *Pundit Purdhaun*, and other Miniſters at *Poonah*, to eſtabliſh a Treaty of Friendſhip between them and the Company. It is ever my ſincereſt deſire, that the Princes of *Indoſtan* and the *Decan*, ſhould be friendly connected with the Engliſh Nation and the Company, and that I ſhould be the means of ſecuring and eſtabliſhing friendſhip between them; and that an alliance with the Marattas may, through my endeavours, prove agreeable to the Engliſh Nation: out of the above conſiderations, I now beg leave to incloſe drafts of letters, which I propoſe writing to *Iſwahi Madoo Row*, the *Pundit Purdhaun*, *Inkkaram Pundit*, one of the Miniſters of *Poonah*, and to *Madoorow Sadaſhair*, a man of diſtinction, who was formerly a long time here, in order to ſettle a Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance between us and the Marattas, and who lately, when Colonel *Upton* made the Treaty of Peace, was the means of forwarding it.

I beg you will be kind enough to inform me, whether you approve of theſe Letters, that I may immediately diſpatch *Kiſhenrow*, a man of truſt, with them, who will exert his endeavours to bring about renewing the Treaty

which was made with Colonel *Upton*. When the Marattas commence hoſtilities againſt *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the Engliſh Forces will join them, and aſſiſt in diſpoſſeſſing *Hyder* of his country; and if *Hyder* come againſt us, the Marattas will engage to join us. If my Friends will determine to do this, the power of our Enemy may with great eaſe be reduced through the aſſiſtance of the Marattas, and even may expect great advantages from it. If you ſhould not approve of it, I beg you will ſpeedily communicate your ſentiments upon it to me, that I may not remain in a ſtate of doubt or ſuſpence. What ſhall I ſay more?

No. 78. To the Nabob; dated 21ſt May 1779.

I have received your Highneſs's ſeveral Letters, acquainting me with the motions of *Hyder Ally*, the particulars of his conqueſts in the *Cuddapah* country, his intentions againſt *Kinnoul*, *Adoni*, and *Raychoor*, and lately his determination to invade the Circars and the *Carnatic*; from all which you infer the abſolute neceſſity of reducing him before he ſhall have gained more ſtrength; and recommended, that Alliances be formed with the Soubah and the Marattas for that purpoſe. I am obliged to your Highneſs for the intelligence you have ſent me from time to time, relative to the motions and deſigns of *Hyder*; and I am confident the means you recommend for oppoſing them, are ſuggeſted no leſs by your regard for the welfare of the Company, than by your anxious deſire to ſubdue a Power which is become ſo formidable to the *Carnatic*: although, from the intelligence which has come in to us, we had great reaſon to expect an immediate invaſion from *Hyder*; yet I have now the pleaſure to acquaint your Highneſs, that *Hyder* has ſuddenly retired from the *Cuddapah* Country, and is marching towards *Seringapatam*. The cauſe of his departure, it is ſaid, proceeds from the approach of a large body of Marattas towards his country, though poſſibly it may have been occaſioned by the diſturbances on the Malabar Coaſt, where the Rajahs tributary to *Hyder* have taken up arms, and beſieged his fort at *Calliut*.

Thus, for the preſent, the threatened danger is removed, without having recourſe to the Alliances propoſed by your Highneſs; but as the late proceedings of *Hyder*, both towards the Company and your Highneſs, may poſſibly lead to a War with him, I think it highly neceſſary that we ſhould know beforehand what reſources we can depend on for conducting it; and here I can have no doubt, from the earneſt manner in which your Highneſs has been pleaſed to recommend to us to unite with the Soubah and the Marattas in a general attack on *Hyder*, even before he has invaded us; that you have well weighed the extent of ſuch an undertaking, and conſidered the vaſt ſums that will be required to execute it. I may therefore with confidence requeſt your Highneſs will inform me, what proviſion you have made, and whether we can depend on you for the extraordinary ſupplies that will be required on this occaſion.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 12th March 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident, &c. of *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*.

We ſend incloſed for your information, a copy of a Letter received a few days ago from *Hyder Ally*.

No. 42. From the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor; dated 29th Mohſem, 17th February: received 7th March 1779.

I have had the pleaſure to receive your Letters, the contents of which I underſtood. I ſee what you write concerning your intention againſt the French Factory of *Mahé*. In my country there are factories belonging to the Engliſh, Dutch, Portugueſe, Danes, and French, and beſides them, there are many merchants here, who are conſidered as my ſubjects; if any one entertains deſigns againſt thoſe traders, I will, without doubt, take the beſt and moſt conſiderate methods to give them aſſiſtance; if you are not already acquainted with this, you may inform yourſelf of thoſe who have been Members of your Council. What ſhall I ſay more?

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 59. From *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor; dated the 30th Suffer, or 19th March 1779: received the 7th April D°.

The Gentlemen of your Council have no doubt given you an account of the former War, and the Treaties agreed to on both ſides.

As the frontiers of both our countries join, it is proper, in caſe of a Peace or good underſtanding between us, that there ſhould be no encroachments or violence uſed on either ſide; yet your Killadars and Talookdars, not conducting themſelves as was fit, have raiſed troubles, and behaved like thieves in the country on this ſide of my frontier. In order to put a ſtop to theſe mal-practices, I wrote at different times to my Vakeel, to repreſent this to *Sujah ul Dowlah* (the Nabob) and you and the Council, which my Vakeel accordingly did, and made you acquainted with it; but nothing has yet been done, and the outrages committed by your people ſtill continue. The cattle belonging to the inhabitants of my country is carried away, and many villages have ſuffered by theſe depredations. Out of conſideration for my friendſhip for the King of *England*, and the Gentlemen of the Council, I took no ſteps to retaliate the injury. Now you have ſet on foot an expedition againſt *Mahé*. There are many factories in my country, belonging to the Dutch, Engliſh, French, Portugueſe, and Danes, who trade in my country on the footing of ſubjects; none of thoſe poſſeſs forts or countries which ſhould give cauſe to any other to attack them, and if any one ſhould attack them, it will be proper for me to give aſſiſtance to thoſe whom I conſider my ſubjects. You and the Gentlemen of Council are acquainted with this, and at any rate will act as you think proper. What ſhall I ſay more?

No. 62. To *Hyder Ally*; dated the 19th of April 1779.

I have received two Letters from you, dated the 17th of February and 19th of March; both on the ſubject of the expedition we have formed againſt the French ſettlement at *Mahé*: your Vakeel has alſo acquainted me with your ſentiments and intention on that head.

Conſidering the Treaty of Friendſhip ſo long eſtabliſhed between the Company and your Government, and the aſſurances that have been ſo often given by you of your determination to cultivate and improve the connection by every means in your power, I could not but imagine, that it would prove agreeable to you to hear of the ſucceſs of our arms againſt the French, and that you would be pleaſed with our proſecuting it, by an attempt againſt *Mahé*, the only ſettlement that remained with them after the reduction of *Pondicherry*. Under theſe circumſtances, I leave you to judge of the ſurprize I felt on peruſing your Letters, and on hearing the meſſage delivered by your Vakeel, in which you declare, that you conſider the French ſettlement at *Mahé* as under your protection, and that it is your intention to oppoſe any attempt we might make upon it, to the utmoſt of your power. Is it the part of friendſhip to aſſiſt and ſupport the Enemies of your Friends? Surely not. Relying upon the Treaty concluded between us, I did ſuppoſe, if you thought it neceſſary to interfere in our quarrel with the French, that you would take part with us, and not againſt us. I am not fully acquainted with the nature of your claims on the country in which *Mahé* is ſituated;

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but I never underſtood them to be ſuch as could juſtly authorize any interference in diſputes between European States which have ſettlements there, or in its neighbourhood.

In regard to what you write in your Letter, concerning ſome irregularities committed in your country by the Nabob's people ſituated near its borders, I never heard before of any complaints of this nature, otherwiſe I ſhould have examined into them, and given you all reaſonable ſatisfaction, ſince, if any irregularities were committed, the people who were guilty of them ſhould have been puniſhed.

It has been the conſtant aim of my Government to promote a good underſtanding with you, from a full conviction that it is for the mutual intereſt of the Company and your Circar, that the friendſhip ſubſiſting between us ſhould be perpetual; but, if you perſevere in the conduct you have obſerved of late, I do not ſee how it can be much longer maintained. By the bleſſing of God, the Company and their Allies are ſufficiently powerful to avenge every kind of injury that is offered to them; at the ſame time, it is their wiſh and deſire to be on terms of friendſhip with all the States of *India*, and, upon this principle they will carefully avoid being the aggreſſors in any quarrel; but once provoked into hoſtilities, they will not fail to exert all their ſtrength to puniſh the offender; and, with juſtice on their ſide, they entertain not a doubt of ſucceſs.

If I am diſpoſed to complain, you have furniſhed me with ample grounds in the reduction of *Morarow Row*, who was included in the Treaty made with you in 1769, as a Friend and Ally of the *Carnatic*; and by your proceedings againſt the Zemindars of *Cuddapah* and *Cannoul*; with reſpect to *Bazalet Jung*, againſt whom I hear alſo you have ſome deſigns, I muſt inform you that the Company have entered into engagements of Friendſhip and Alliance with him, and having promiſed to aſſiſt him in the defence of his country, I hope you will lay aſide your intentions, if you have formed any againſt him.

May your health and happineſs always increaſe! What can I ſay more?

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 2d April 1779.

WE have particular ſatisfaction in acquainting you that *Mahé*, with all its dependencies, ſurrendered to Colonel *Braithwaite* the 19th ult. Colonel *Braithwaite* diſpatched the advice to us as ſoon as the Governor of *Mahé* had acceded to his terms; which are in general, that the French ſhall be Priſoners of War, to be tranſported to *Bombay*, from thence to *France* or *England*, as the Preſident and Select Committee may deem expedient, and the fortifications, public buildings, &c. are to be diſpoſed of as the Company ſhall think proper; Colonel *Braithwaite* was in conſequence preparing vigorouſly to deſtroy the forts by mines; and he tells us that the greateſt part of our force will be with us again in about three weeks, from the date of this Letter, 19th March. As ſoon as we receive the Articles of Capitulation, we ſhall ſend you a copy of them.

The ſucceſs of this expedition has indeed exceeded our warmeſt expectations, and cannot fail at this juncture of being attended with important advantages; we beg leave to congratulate with you on the occaſion.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
2d April 1779.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 5th April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Tho' Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

The following Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*, dated 19th, was received on the 31ſt ult.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that I arrived here on the 14th inſtant. I found Major *Kelly* had occupied and fortified two hills in our bounds advancing towards *Mahé*, and had that morning advanced four companies of Grenadier Sepoys into the French bounds. I went to the advanced poſts that evening, and determined upon one farther advanced. The 15th I determined on a ſpot for a battery to reduce the fort *Couretry*, a new work, formed by the ſcraping, only acceſſible either as to the lower or upper fort but by rope ladders, which were very long, and which the enemy drew up after them. To reduce this part was abſolutely neceſſary, as it ſecured my rear, as I ſhould advance further, and kept open my communication by ſea with *Tellicherry*. Having determined to begin my battery that night, I wrote to Monſieur *Picott*, the Governor of *Mahé*, ſummoning him to ſurrender; to which he anſwered, that he would defend the place as long as he could. The alacrity with which our people worked was great, and the whole country was aſtoniſhed at their working, in day-light, within five hundred yards of the Enemy's guns.

The French fired a few ſhot from *Courchy*, *Fort Saint George*, and *Chimbana*, but without effect, and I found their Black allies began to make overtures to come over to me. Our battery would have opened with four eighteen pounders as to-morrow, but Monſieur *Picot* ſent out propoſitions to ſurrender. I own I was aſtoniſhed, for we have not fired even a muſket ſhot, and the hills yet between us were ſuch that I thought it an Herculean labour even to get the guns to it unexpoſed. I did not chooſe to accept the terms, but dictated others, which he muſt ſign by four o'clock, or abide the conſequences, as I was determined after that time to receive no propoſitions: and the firſt of mine was, that *Courchy* ſhould be immediately ſurrendered, and our colours hoiſted as a ſignal to me that every thing elſe was accorded to. All this was done, and Captain *M'Leod*, with his Sepoy Grenadiers, took poſſeſſion of it about two o'clock, and before four the Articles came back, by which I ſhall to-morrow morning be put in poſſeſſion of *Fort George* and *Chimbara*, very high and ſtrong ſituations commanding *Mahé* and the approaches to it; and to-morrow evening I ſhall receive the forts *Dauphiné* and *Conde*, with all their dependencies. Monſieur *Picot* had done every thing that man could do; and had they had men, money, ammunition, and proviſions, I ſhould have deemed the place impregnable, it conſiſting of a number of forts, upon almoſt inacceſſible heights, ſtrongly fortified in themſelves, and protecting each other; fortunately for us, I believe they wanted all theſe things: I have not now time, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, to ſend you particulars; the French and priſoners of War to be tranſported to *Bombay*, from thence to *England* or *France*, as the Governor and Select Committee ſhall think proper: if they go to *England*, they are not to carry any merchandize or effects which may be contraband, or anywiſe interfere with the Honourable Company's trade. The fortifications, public buildings, &c. are to be diſpoſed of as the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company may think proper. I ſhall as ſoon as poſſible diſpatch to you my Aid de camp, Mr. *Bate*, with the colours, Capitulation, &c. I am already preparing to return to you directly to *Madras* two companies and two battalions, except the Grenadiers; I ſhall find it

abſolutely neceſſary, from the ſtate of the country, and the reports of *Hyder*'s Troops coming, to keep one company of Artillery, one of Infantry, one battalion of Sepoys, with the Grenadiers of the other two battalions: this will make me ſtrong, and not weaken you very much; the Troops I ſend will be with you I hope in three weeks from this day; in the interim I will go on vigorouſly in preparations to deſtroy the fort by mines. I beg your excuſe for this haſty ſcrawl;

And am, with reſpect,

Moylen, 19 March 1779. Your faithful Servant, *John Braithwaite.*

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Tho' Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Minutes of laſt Committee read; and approved.

Read the following Letters from Colonel *Braithwaite:*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs to you an haſty Letter written on the 19th inſtant, informing you of the ſurrender of fort *Mahé* and its dependencies, in conſequence of which I now diſpatch to you Lieutenant *Bate*, my Aid de camp (whom I ſhould think it a great indulgence to have returned if I remain) with the colours and Capitulation; a copy of which I have ſent to the Honourable the Governor and Select Committee of *Bombay*. I never was more aſtoniſhed than when I received the propoſals for the ſurrender of the place; Monſieur *Picot* had but two days before declared, in anſwer to my ſummons, that he would defend the flag of his King as long as he could. We had not as yet fired a ſingle ſhot, not even from a muſket, and the French only about forty, without any effect. It is true we had almoſt completed a battery of four eighteen pounders againſt the fortreſs of *Courchy*, which was garriſoned by one French Officer, three Artillery, and fifty of what they call *Hyder*'s Sepoys; it conſiſted of an hill projecting to the ſea, which was cut into two ſort of batteries, one above another, neither of which were acceſſible but by rope ladders; even the loweſt was a great height, and they were perfectly ſteep or ſcarped away, and the upper one was prepared with hand grenades, carcapes, &c. to be thrown upon the loweſt, if carried; between our camp and *Courchy* was a jungly country, interſected with a ſalt ſcoulet, and the ground marſhy, except on the height, and between *Courchy* and *Mahé* high hills, which hid one from the other; all this country was committed to the *Courchy Nair*, who had about nine hundred men. I found means to bring him over to our intereſt. His attachment to the French had made him very poor, they having been obliged to levy contributions on all their old Friends. I believe Monſieur *Picot* muſt have diſcovered my intercourſe with this man, and what might follow was ſuſpected, I ſuppoſe, but could not in his ſituation be remedied or reſented. The people of this country pay implicit obedience to their little Chiefs. I threatened on one hand, and addreſſed his poverty on the other, and he gave us no moleſtation, though our people worked cloſe up to the *Nair*'s; he retired as we advanced. Monſieur *Picot* could not but ſee that he was betrayed on this ſide, and had reaſon to ſuppoſe he ſoon would on all ſides, as all the Nairs or little Lords of this country are in arms to ſhake off *Hyder*'s Government, and joining each other daily begin to form armies thereabout; *Mahé* might be expected ſoon to join with their brethren, and to betray the French, who are here conſidered as *Hyder*'s Friends. The Nairs about *Calicut* are beſieging it, and *Hyder*'s Governor is under great apprehenſions, as they grow more numerous daily. A day or two ago the Honourable Company's Reſident there, Mr. *Freeman*, was ordered to quit it at a very ſhort notice, and was obliged to come away in an open boat. I believe the ſame is threatened at *Onore*; and a black ſervant of Mr. *Church*, who was ſent to *Mangalore* to buy rice, has been whipped and confined. They rumour here that *Hyder*'s forces are coming this way; ſome are coming I know, with two guns, and I believe by their numbers they are only meant for the relief of *Calicut*; this ſtate of the country has induced me, though it does not come within the letter of your inſtructions, to keep ſome Europeans in *Mahé*, agreeable to the opinion of Mr. *Church*; whether the Honourable Company ſhall determine to ſtand neuter, or to take a ſide, is not ſo much the thing as to take care that neither party, in this time of warfare, may be able to poſſeſs themſelves of any of theſe ſtrong holds; indeed it is become as much a matter of neceſſity as reſolve, as I find great difficulty in procuring ſhipping for thoſe I mean to ſend round. The Troops which I have fixed upon to ſtay here, till I receive your orders, are, Captain *Noodler*'s company of Artillery, one company of European Infantry as they ſtand, Captain *Mairhead*'s battalion of Sepoys, and the Grenadier companies belonging to Captain *Fraſer* and Captain *Walker*'s. This, with the ſmall force at *Tellicherry*, will enable you and the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, to purſue any plan which you may reſolve on. I ſhall puſh on the buſineſs of mining *Mahé*, and ſhall be ready to deſtroy it, or deliver it over to the orders of *Bombay*, as you ſhall determine. You have a wiſh, that it ſhould be deſtroyed as ſoon as taken: it is not poſſible to do it, with fewer people than I keep, without working a very tedious operation; nor could it be done at any rate, before I can hear from you in anſwer to this, although the people work conſtantly. I ought to add to thoſe abovementioned to ſtay here, Mr. *Brook* the Engineer, two Pioneer Officers, and one hundred Laſcars; and I beg leave to be indulged with Lieutenant *Cotton*, as Brigade Major in the field, or Town Major in the place, as circumſtances may happen, and Enſign *Samſon* as Quartermaſter; and that you will allow Mr. *Thewles* to act as my Secretary, as he draws no pay for it. I requeſt it alſo as a particular favour, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, that if you think it improper that I ſhould remain here, as under your orders only, that you would recal me to the Coaſt. I am ſenſible that, acting under the *Bombay* Preſidency, from my rank, and the ſtate of their Officers, I ſhould be the ſenior Officer on the Eſtabliſhment; but having conſidered that matter well, and knowing how much I have ſuffered in my health by going to the Northward, I am apprehenſive that I ſhould be miſerable to myſelf all the colder months, and uſeleſs to my Employers, from an aſthmatic complaint which conſtantly oppreſſes me in certain latitudes and ſituations, but never affects me in others. I hope therefore, that if you deſtroy *Mahé*, or remove the commanding Officers here from under your immediate and only command, that either being done, I may be removed back to the Coaſt, and, if poſſible, employed to the Southward, where I have always enjoyed good health. The Troops I ſend back to you are, Major *Clifton*, with the ſtores, and two companies of Artillery; Major *Kelly*, with Engineers and Pioneers Officers, except thoſe before named; Major *Short*, with the battalion of Europeans, ſave one company; Captain *Fraſer*, with the fourth battalion of Sepoys, the Grenadier companies excepted. Theſe will proceed directly to *Madras*; and Captain *Walker*, with the third battalion of Sepoys, Grenadiers excepted, will proceed to *Anjengo*, and, adviſing you of his arrival there, and to *Madura*, and wait your orders. The plan I am endeavouring to carry into execution, in regard to the ſhipping, is, that as His Majeſty's ſhips muſt go to *Bombay*, they can only be uſeful in conveying the French priſoners to *Bombay*, which the Commodore having conſented to, I have embarked them, agreeable to the incloſed liſt. All

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are gone, but thoſe marked in the margin, to whom I have given leave to ſtay a few days, till the *Royal Admiral* ſails, as alſo Monſieur *Picott*, who will ſtay in *Tellicherry*, and the Commodore will ſail this night with them, of which I have ſent advice, with a duplicate of this liſt, to *Bombay*. The European ten companies, with the ſtores, detaining the powder and muſket ammunition, on board the *Royal Charlotte* and *Reſolution*: the fourth battalion on the *Ravenſworth*, taken up for that purpoſe; and the third on board the *Revenge* and *Bombay* grab. When I had the honour to addreſs you laſt, my anxiety to get the Troops back, as it was a matter about which you expreſſed a ſolicitude, made me venture to ſay, that they would be with you in three weeks; but the Sea Gentlemen will not be hurried, I mean the Commodore; and are ſo jealous leſt my requeſt ſhould be underſtood as orders, that we make but a ſlow progreſs, and it will be reluctantly that they crowd their fighting ſhips. Captain *Baddam*, in the *Ravenſworth*, is the only merchant ſhip that will be detained, or taken up; he does not much like going round to your coaſt, and demands high terms, though not in proportion, if he carries a battalion, to that aſked by the Manchors, who will not carry a man to *Anjengo* under fifteen Rupees. I hope, however, to get all ſettled off by the end of the month.

Every thing has been done at *Mahé* that art could do, to add to the natural ſtrength of the Garriſon of *Mahé*. To think how much has been done, and how ſmall the means, is aſtoniſhing! Had reinforcements arrived, every thing was prepared for them, and *Mahé* would have required a very large force to reduce it. The handful of Europeans the French had in *India* was ſuch, that they could not place any confidence in their Allies; they feared the conſequences, and it deprived them of ſpirit, and the event has proved their ſuſpicions were not without foundation, and they abuſe *Hyder* as the moſt treacherous of villains; nor are they leſs ſparing in their cenſure on Monſieur *Picott*; they ſay he ought to have expended his powder, though but little, and that he will be hanged. I think, as he did not ſurrender at the firſt ſummons, let the ſuſpicions of the Natives have been what they would, he might have tried at the defence of ſome one part with his Europeans. *Mahé* is, as Lieutenant Colonel *Brown* reports to me, extremely well found in artillery and ſtores of all kinds, of the beſt ſorts, and judiciouſly arranged; they are now under examination, and as ſoon as I receive the Returns, I ſhall tranſmit them to you, and *Bombay*. Colonel *Dupelipſis* tells me, there are above an hundred pieces of cannon, all in excellent condition; but as he is a great enemy of Monſieur *Picott*'s, he perhaps exaggerates things; and, in truth, many things were wanting, ſuch as confidence in their Allies, more of them, money, and power; and I can clearly exculpate Monſieur *Picott* from one aſperſion, which is, that he ſold the place to me.

I have congratulated you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, on the reputation your forces have acquired; I am confident that the idea of not being able to reſiſt Troops which had taken *Pondicherry*, worked more upon the minds of the whole than they are willing to allow; and Monſieur *Picott* did not find them ſo brave before the capitulation, as they would be thought, ſince their reſiſtance from the beginning was like that of Black Men who expected to be taken, and are therefore unwilling to provoke the Enemy; and finally, they ſurrendering without putting us to the expence of a cartridge: all this could not be the fault of one man: agreeable to the deſire of the King of *Travencore*, who expreſſed a great deſire to have early information of my ſucceſs, I write a few lines by this opportunity, as alſo to the Nabob, who, I believe, expects ſuch marks of attention; and this I hope you will approve. I cannot, in juſtice to Major *Kelly*, conclude this Letter without expreſſing my approbation of his merits. I found he had been very active before my arrival, and his exertions ſince have been unremitting. And here, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, let me entreat you to take into conſideration again; as this expedition has been ſo ſhort, in caſe of the Officers and Soldiers upon it, the expence they have been at, and the loſs they have ſuſtained on the march by the deſertions of villainous ſervants, and by the haſty and careleſs manner in which their baggage was obliged to be embarked, ſo that there are but five trunks that have not been broke open and robbed; and I can ſafely aver as a truth, that they have all been loſers, and ſome conſiderably ſo. They have not aſked me to make this application, nor have I told I will; but it would give me great pleaſure to hear that you think thoſe who return at leaſt entitled to double batta.

I am juſt this moment honoured with your Letter of the 3d inſtant, incloſing the warrants neceſſary to hold Courts Martial, which I hope I ſhall never have reaſon to uſe; and the remarks of the Commander in Chief. I will not trouble you upon ſo diſagreeable a ſubject, further than to ſay, that the order complained of was given with Major *Clifton*'s previous knowledge, as a compromiſe of a hitherto doubted; after conſideration he objected to it, and it never took place at all; for to avoid an iſſue on the buſineſs, I changed the mode, and appointed Major *Short*, his ſenior, to command the diviſions. Major *Clifton* ought therefore not to have complained without ſhewing me his Letter. I think, I wrote to General *Munro*, who was then to the Southward.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Maylon, Your faithful and obedient Servant,
March 23d 1779. *John Braithwaite.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the pleaſure to inform you, that I have juſt received information that all the ſtores are out of the *Concord*, and are either already embarked on the other ſhips, or are in boats for that purpoſe, anſwerable to the invoices from *Madras* and *Pondicherry*, and will arrive in the ſeveral ſhips at the ſame time with the Troops. Had the ſituation of the country not required the detention of the Troops mentioned in my laſt, I do not ſee how I could have ſent more, as there are no more ſhips to be had, and thoſe now employed will be much crowded.

I cannot, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, give you at preſent a better account of *Mahé* and its dependencies, than by ſending you a copy of Mr. *Picott*'s Letter to me on the ſubject; Monſieur *Marain*, the perſon referred to in that Letter, being too much indiſpoſed to do any buſineſs. Of the parties mentioned, the *Courchy* and *Caungolty* Nair, and the *Payoparteo* Nair, have been to acknowledge their ſubmiſſion to the Company, and have promiſed fidelity, and I hear the King of *Cartinattu* is on his way: theſe are poor Princes, their domains of no great extent, and their eſtate conſiſts in pepper and cocoa-nut chiefly: I have recommended to them a temperate and mild behaviour, to avoid quarrels with each other, and ſo to conduct themſelves, as to deſerve the Company's protection and good-will, aſſuring them, that it will be their own fault if they do not meet with it. In regard to the rice and Rupees paid to them by the French, I have told them, that theſe are matters which I muſt receive orders about, and that they by their good behaviour ſhould endeavour to deſerve favourable ones; and in regard to thoſe matters, I ſhall do nothing without your orders.

The report is ſtill ſtrong, that *Hyder* is ſending down a large body of Troops this way; if he does ſend any, I believe it will only be to reduce the Nairs, who govern the multitude of little Principalities here, and ſeem to be united in a deſign to revolt. Theſe I have often ſpoken to having hinted ſomething of the kind; I anſwered, that I had not been long enough in the country to ſay any thing concerning the politics of it.

Callicut is ſtill invelled, and I have heard a conſtant firing not far off, which I find to proceed from a party

of about 500 of *Hyder*'s people ſurrounded by the Nairs: theſe people of *Hyder* were endeavouring to reach *Callicut*. This ſtate of the country obliges me to keep the Troops cantoned here, ſo as to occupy the ſeveral poſts, in readineſs for any ſervice. I know the batta, and neceſſary charges conſequent to ſuch a ſituation, are more than you would wiſh to pay; but I do not ſee how it can as yet be avoided. Indeed, with regard to the batta, without it the Troops could not well ſubſiſt, every thing being very dear and ſcarce; however, I have told the Officers, that the quarters occupied by the Troops muſt be repaired and roofed out of it at their own expence; and I believe, as to what expences paſs under my inſpection, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, you will not have cauſe to complain of any; the expenſive charges which will ariſe from this expedition, will come from *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*, and of thoſe I have never been informed in any way, of courſe have given no voucher, and I ſuppoſe that I ſhall not be deemed in any way reſponſible.

I am aſſured, by Mr. *Picot* and others, upon honour, that *Hyder* ſtood engaged to ſend 34,000 Troops to *Mahé*, of which 8,000 were to be Horſe, to ſcour the country all round, and to cut off all ſupplies of proviſions attempted to be ſent us; he alſo promiſed to ſend them a large ſupply of rice from *Mangalore*. The Troops were daily aſſembling, as they heard by Meſſenger after Meſſenger, and the rice was ſhipping, but neither ever came, and they abuſe him as the greateſt villain upon earth.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Mahé, Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
April 3d 1779. *John Braithwaite.*

The Committee much approve of Colonel *Braithwaite*'s conduct on this expedition, and that of the Officers and Troops under his command.

Agreed alſo, to acquaint Colonel *Braithwaite*, that he is not to interfere in the diſputes between *Hyder* and the petty Rajahs on the Coaſt, but to confine his attention entirely to his own ſecurity.

Agreed to write to the Gentlemen of *Bombay*, in reply to theirs of the 13th January and 12th February, acquainting them of the apparent intentions of *Hyder Ally* to diſturb the peace of the *Carnatic*.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 30th Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs a Letter to you, June 5th, by way of *Anjengo*; but the weather proved ſo bad, that after repeated trials, the boat put back again; ſince that time no poſſible means of ſending a public diſpatch have occurred.

I began the exploſion here on His Majeſty's birth-day, on which occaſion the whole ſea-face of Fort *Mahé* was blown up; ſince then, notwithſtanding a continuance of the heavieſt rains I ever ſaw, our work of deſtruction has gone on; and the ſeveral forts and works of this colony, which had been ſo lately put in order at great expence, are now in ruins.

The King of *Cartinatte*, who had applied to me for aſſiſtance againſt *Hyder*'s people, finding I would not interfere, abandoned his country, and took to the hills, and a new one was put in his place; with whom, and all *Hyder*'s people round us, we have been upon very bad terms; they have preſſed cloſe upon us on very ſide, and eſtabliſhed themſelves in redoubts around us at about a mile diſtance. I was informed through ſeveral channels, that ſecret orders had been given by *Hyder*, to keep a large force near us; and that, if a favourable opportunity offered to ſurpriſe us, they were to do it: his principal objects were (as alledged by my information) the ordnance and ſtores here. At the firſt ſetting in of the monſoon, they ſent in to buy rice in ſuch quantities, that it plainly appeared they meant ſomething more than barely ſupplying themſelves. To avoid the diſtreſs and deſertion which muſt have followed a failure in that article, I prohibited the exportation of it, upon which my neighbours ſtopped all proviſions and buzar articles of every kind, from coming in. After ſome days correſpondence, a report prevailing of our having entirely defeated the French Fleet, they allow us to be ſupplied again, but with a very bad grace. I then found, that among *Hyder*'s Sepoys, there were ſome who had relations with us; theſe, and women, were employed to ſeduce our Sepoys away, with offers of great pay and promotion, however, with very little ſucceſs, and ſome of our Sepoys ſecured the perſons employed to ſeduce them, for which I rewarded them. I wrote to a Bramin, Manager of *Hyder*'s, reſiding in the Cartinatte Country, a few miles from hence, to inform him, that I had ſecured a number of people in *Hyder*'s ſervice, who had been uſing every art to ſeduce our Sepoys, of which I had proofs, ſome of them having advanced to ſome Sepoys ten Rupees each; that I ſhould be juſtified in hanging theſe, but that I was no friend to cruelty or violent meaſures, and that if ſome few men that had deſerted from me, were returned, I would ſend back thoſe I had ſecured. He promiſed to anſwer my Letter the next day, but has left the country without doing it; and the King of *Cartinatte* has again ſtopped all our proviſions; but, I ſhould imagine, will ſoon alter his ſtile, as *Hyder* ſuddenly called all his people from this country, and about *Callicut*, to *Seringapatam*, where he is making great warlike preparations: one of my Spies has been killed, and others have returned, ſaying, that ſo good a look-out is kept, that there is no poſſibility of getting, juſt now, through the Paſſes. My intelligence is, that the Berar Marattas have entered *Hyder*'s country to the Northward, to the amount of ſixty thouſand; that he thinks War inevitable with the Nizam and our Nabob, who are united againſt him; that he is making great warlike preparations; that he is to have three Armies, one deſtined to protect *Mangalore* and manage us on this Coaſt, one to enter the *Carnatic*, and one to oppoſe the Marattas; by all accounts, he is very uneaſy and very ill. An European Portugueze, his Commandant of Artillery, deſerted from him ſome days ago, and paſſed through here in his way to *Goa*, where he was a Captain: he ſays, *Hyder* is never communicative to any Europeans, nor can they well diſcover what is going forward, but that he is uneaſy, and making great preparations for War, and gives out, that a large French Fleet and force will arrive on this Coaſt in the courſe of next month. Some perſons tell me, that this Captain has not deſerted, but is proceeding to *Goa* on *Hyder*'s buſineſs. If War with *Hyder* is intended, this is his weak ſide; the diſaffection of the country is ſuch, could they hope for any ſupport from us, they would (very few excepted) revolt. From this ſide, *Hyder*'s dominions may be attacked to the greateſt advantage; if it were meant totally to reduce him, it is not to be doubted, but in the preſent ſituation of affairs, even that might be effected, before any French force will appear in this country. Were we once maſters of the avenues leading from this coaſt to *Hyder*'s country, his power and conſequence would be juſt ſo much as we pleaſed to give him, and no more; his communication with the ſea being cut off, his reſources would be at an end; it is this coaſt that has conſtantly recruited his armies with numbers of Europeans, who have borne the brunt of his moſt ſerious military operations, and have made him what he is; and it is from this coaſt that he ſupplies himſelf with all his military ſtores.

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I hope I ſhall be pardoned in thus offering my ſentiments to you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs; which I do, not in the ſuppoſition that you can want information in thoſe matters, but that I think, as it has fallen in my way to be aſſured of *Hyder*'s urgent neceſſity for poſſeſſion on this coaſt, it is my duty to inform you of it; as alſo, that I have been told by a Frenchman, whoſe veracity I will not vouch for, that when *Hyder* found that both *Bengal* and *Madras* were ſending ſuch large force to the Malabar Coaſt, he conſidered it in a very precarious ſtate, and formed the intention of opening a communication with the ſea on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, by the reduction of *Cuddapah* and *Eazalet Jung*'s country, that he might ſtill act unitedly with the French, and that a diſpatch had been ſent from *Mangalore* to *Mauritius*, ſoon after the reduction of this place, with the plan of operations intended, the firſt object of which was the Circars; and that Mr. *Bellecombe* and *Hyder* kept up a conſtant correſpondence. However, I have uniformly maintained a ſtrict neutrality on this coaſt, and have reſiſted every effort uſed to induce me to interfere; and am ſorry to ſay, that the conſequence has been, that thoſe who ſhewed themſelves willing to owe their exiſtence to the Honourable Company, have been ſcattered and diſperſed, while thoſe who have been uniformly attached to the French intereſts have triumphed; and by their inſolence on all occaſions, indicate that they impute our non-interference rather to the fear of *Hyder* than any thing elſe. *Hyder* himſelf has, I believe, a very different ſenſe of the matter; but the precarious ſtate in which his affairs are in this country, has obliged him either to countenance ſuch an opinion, or give up his expectations from the French, and throw himſelf upon the Company. The inſolence of his people round us has been ſuch, that they muſt either have known that I had poſitive orders not to take any party, or they have depended on my not being able to march out, and leave the great quantity of ordnance and ſtores here in ſo defenceleſs a ſituation; for I cannot help obſerving, that their arrogance has increaſed in proportion as I have deſtroyed my defences; and our ſituation here has been for ſome weeks paſt, during a moſt inclement ſeaſon, extremely fatiguing to the Troops, there having been every reaſon for the exertion of the ſtricteſt duty and alertneſs: the ſoldiers have been ſenſible of the neceſſity for this fatigue, and have gone through it without murmuring, and reſiſted every temptation to deſert. But now that *Hyder*'s people are gone, the weather fine, and the duty eaſier, the Sepoys become more and more anxious to return to their families; and I cannot but be of opinion, that if they are not very ſoon called home, or employed on ſome active ſervice, the deſertion from them will be very general. Not having heard any thing from either the Preſidencies of *Madras* or *Bombay* ſince the beginning of May, I know not what meaſures have been taken for our return, or when we are to move. However, to encourage them, I have made every diſpoſition as if we were very ſoon to move, by going on moſt rapidly with the deſtruction of the works, and moving down the greateſt part of the ordnance to the river-ſide, and arranging things for embarkation.

I cannot, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, too much commend the behaviour of this little detachment, in a very fatiguing and uncomfortable ſituation; in particular that of the Sepoys, who have maintained their attachment to the Honourable Company, although (now almoſt in rags) conſtantly expoſed to the heavieſt rains, in a ſeries of ſevere duty, and while every temptation was thrown in their way, to induce them to leave it; and I hope the Honourable Board will be induced to ſhew them ſome particular mark of their approbation; and I could wiſh that in particular, that when they return they might be allowed to return the whole, or as much of the way as poſſible, by land: I am convinced, that beſides their natural averſion to the ſea, it would gratify their pride exceedingly; which I am ſure it would not be expenſive to do, as the march is practicable by the coaſts, and the ſeas become ſo ſmooth, as to allow of boats keeping up with all the equipage. When I requeſt this, it is in the opinion that their return will be the reſult of peaceable meaſures having been determined on with *Hyder*. Should you not approve this, I would yet requeſt that they may be landed at *Anjengo*, as the wives and families of all the Sepoys now here are living in the Palamcottah, Madura, or Trichinopoly Countries. Should War be determined on with *Hyder*, and ſhould you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, determine to take an active part in it on this coaſt, I flatter myſelf you will truſt the execution of your reſolves to me; and you will permit me to obſerve, that the Navy and Army might operate on this coaſt to moſt advantage at a ſeaſon when you have little to do or fear. During the height of your monſoon, this coaſt enjoys the mildeſt weather; the months of October, November, December, and January, are not only fair, but extremely temperate as to heat, on this coaſt. Three companies of Artillery, one battalion of Europeans, and five complete battalions of Sepoys, I am confident, with a good field-train, would effectually conquer this whole country, provided they had the aſſiſtance of the Navy and a battering train, for the reduction of *Mangalore*; and their force, provided the *Bombay* Gentlemen took the Garriſons here off their hands, would then be equal to the reduction of the Coimbatore Country in its return, or to enter the Myſore Country in favour of other operations; and I think the time required for the operations would fall within the ſeaſon for acting on either coaſt. Were ſuch a meaſure ever to be adopted, the Kings of *Travancore* and *Cananore* might be depended upon, from views of aggrandizing themſelves; and I ſhould imagine that the Honourable Company might, with great ſafety and advantage, divide *Hyder*'s poſſeſſions on this coaſt between them. In my idea of the reduction of this country, I ſuppoſe *Hyder* to have his attention in ſome meaſure drawn off by an incurſion of the Marattas, or the Soubah of the *Decan*; and I am confident that he muſt fall under ſuch a joint attack. But it is ſuppoſed here, that, doubting of the French ſupport, he is anxious to make not only peace but an alliance with the Berar Marattas. The French here, who have been conſtant correſpondents with *Seringapatam*, ſay he will ſucceed, becauſe the Berar Marattas are averſe to *Ragobah*, who has eſcaped to Colonel *Goddard*'s Army at *Surat*. Should your intentions, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, be to continue any forces on this coaſt, I could wiſh that an offer were made to the Sepoys here now, to return, if they preferred it; ſuch an offer would greatly encourage ſuch as were coming, and in my opinion would effectually ſecure theſe we have here; whereas, ſhould they be obliged to ſtay beyond the time which I diſcover them to have as it were fixed in their own minds, I fear I could not depend on them; in ſpite of all our art to infuſe a contrary belief, they are of opinion, that if they do not return before the monſoon on the other coaſt, they ſhall never go back at all. I make every preparation in my power for the embarking the ordnance and ſtores, but the boats are ſo ſmall, and the boat people ſo much more aukward than at *Madras*, that I fear it will take me up fifteen days at leaſt, let the ſhips come when they will; ſo that if ſhips do not arrive early in next month, I doubt if they venture round to our coaſt, but will carry the whole to *Bombay*; and there are two iron thirteen-inch mortars with iron beds, ſo complete and good of their ſort, that I muſt own I am anxious in particular that you ſhould have them at *Madras*. You will find that I have not had occaſion to uſe any of the powder ſent from *Madras*; that found here more than ſufficing for all our purpoſes, which pleaſes me, as I am convinced it is an article you muſt have great demand for, as little or none was found in *Pondicherry*.

In caſe of their not being wanted on this coaſt for the Honourable Company's ſervice, it might perhaps pleaſe the King of *Travencore*, and be to the advantage of the captors,

tors, if we were permitted to make an offer of the firelocks to him, and ſave the Honourable Company the expence of tranſporting round ſuch arms as they will not iſſue to their Troops; this I mention merely as an idea that has occurred to ſome Gentlemen here. I have never hinted any thing of the kind myſelf, nor am I at all convinced in my own mind that he would purchaſe them, were I permitted to offer them.

I cannot conclude this Letter, without mentioning one circumſtance to the honour of the Madras Sepoys: out of fourteen companies here, on hard duty, with every temptation offered them, we in the laſt month loſt only two, and they were Chucklers; out of three companies at *Tellicherry* (which came from *Bombay*) in the ſame time they loſt fourteen.

I have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
Mahé, 14th Aug. 1779. *John Braithwaite.*

Ordered to lie on the table.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 27th of September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs you by the *Mercury* packet, under date the 14th ultimo. The day after ſhe ſailed, the King of *Cartinatte* advanced a chain of guards all around us, within muſket ſhot; they ſtopped every one from going in or out of this place, and turned back Officers who went to take their uſual walk, with great inſolence. One of theſe guards was between us and a place where the French uſed to dry their powder, of courſe within their limits, although no bound is actually marked on that ſide; at all events their guards were poſted, as I could learn, near enough to pick off our centinels, at the ſame time a large body of Nairs croſſed the river, and were poſted in all the houſes about the hill whereon Fort *Saint George* ſtood, and which entirely commands this place, and where I only kept an Havildar and twelve Sepoys. As I ſaw the different advanced guards of the Nairs, ſeemingly about to eſtabliſh themſelves, I ſent to them to deſiſt and retire, or I ſhould fire upon them; they agreed to deſiſt from work, but ſaid they would not retire without orders from the King. On the 16th I ſent to the King, to acquaint him, that it was not cuſtomary with us to allow people with arms to advance ſo near us; that as he had ſtopped all proviſions, and ſhewed himſelf as hoſtilely inclined towards us as his inſignificant ſituation permitted, I muſt conſider him as an Enemy; if he did not cauſe his people to retire, I ſhould drive them off: he ſent me word that he acted by the Nabob's (*Hyder*) orders, and that he was taking care of his own country; that *Tellicherry* aſſiſted his Enemies; that where his people were, they were neceſſary, but that they ſhould not do any work or harm. Although it was very galling to be thus ſhut up, and our Sepoys began to grow diſſatisfied at the inſolence of theſe people, and wiſhed ardently to drive them, I remained quiet all the 17th; that evening I learnt that *Hyder*'s Killedar had, on the 15th in the morning, ſtopped at *Mangalore* a Pattemar from *Bombay* to *Tellicherry*. On the 18th I had intelligence, that the Prince of *Cherical* was preparing with the force ſent over to him by the King of *Cartenatte*, to eſtabliſh himſelf on Fort *Saint George* hill, and to erect a battery there of guns, which he was to bring from a fort at twelve miles diſtance only; and that having done ſo, he was to leave the Cartenatte and Courchy Nairs to defend it, and cut off our communication with *Tellicherry*, at leaſt to plunder the bounds and great Pettah there; that *Sardar Cawn* was to move with *Hyder*'s Forces from *Callicut*, only 36 miles from us, into the Cartenatte Country, under pretence of defending it againſt any attempt of the old King of *Cartenatte*; and that then (*Sardar Cawn* being at hand, and Fort *Saint George* ſecured) the King of *Cartenatte*, with his Nairs, was to make a deſperate attempt on this place; but that *Hyder*'s people would not appear, and would condemn the affair if unſucceſsful. Mr. *Church* at the ſame time informed me, that the Prince of *Cherical* now ſtopped every thing from coming into the Tellicherry Diſtrict, and that *Sardar Cawn* was preparing to move this way; my Spies alſo brought me information that forty boats were ready for *Sardar Cawn*'s order, on a river about 15 miles from hence, to paſs his Army this way; that the report was, that he had ſome buſineſs with the King of *Cartenatte*, and was then to return to *Seringapatam*.

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I immediately diſpatched over the river one company of Grenadier Sepoys and two Companies of the 20th battalion, under Lieutenant Abbot, with ſome Artillery, two field-pieces, and a very ſtrong working party, with tools to put that hill in ſome ſtate of defence. I likewiſe ſtrengthened my poſts on the ruins of *Chimbara* and *Courchy*, to preſerve my communication with *Tellicherry*, and ſet about ſecuring myſelf in the beſt manner I could, working inceſſantly. While, on the 19th the King of *Cartenatte*'s advanced guards, early in the morning, ſeized two of our Laſcars at a tank between us and them, and alſo a horſe-keeper of Mr. *Baker*'s, and detained them: I immediately wrote to the King to complain of this outrage, to inſiſt upon the releaſe of my people, deſiring him to withdraw his guards, or take the conſequence upon himſelf; that I would, as long as poſſible, avoid bloodſhed, but that the Engliſh Company muſt not be inſulted. This Letter I ſent by a Peon of my own, the King's houſe being in ſight of this place. My Peon did not return; but in the evening the King ſent one of his own people to me with a Letter, in which he took no notice of having received any from me; but advanced, that the French had always paid a kind of tribute in rice, and a kind of capitation tax on his ſubjects who lived in their bounds; that nothing had been paid ſince Auguſt laſt; that Auguſt was the time of payment; that he deſired I would ſend him the amount immediately, and he would ſend me a receipt. I wrote him for anſwer, that I had nothing to do with any King of *Cartenatte*; but that one day one man was King, another day another; that it was quite indifferent to me who was the King, provided he gave no offence; but the French had received every aſſiſtance they wanted from the country, whereas every impediment was thrown in the way of the Engliſh: that if he had any demands on the French, he muſt ſettle it with them; and that if the Engliſh meant hereafter to allow any thing to a King of *Cartenatte*, it would be in conſequence of his good behaviour, and their future arrangement with the Nabob (*Hyder*); that it was no ſubject for me and him to enter into the diſcuſſion of at that time; that I deſired the return of my Peon with an anſwer to my Letter, and exhorted him to avoid a conduct which could only end in bloodſhed. I heard nothing from him all the next forenoon. In the afternoon the waſherman of Lieutenant Roſs's company of Grenadier Sepoys, went out to a tank between us and their advanced guard with ſome linen to waſh; the advanced guard of Nairs ſeized him, and carried him and his linen off about five in the afternoon. I waited till near ſun-ſet, when, hearing nothing from the King, and finding

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finding that the guards had erected pandals, as if firmly reſolved to maintain their guard, I ordered Lieutenant *Roſs*'s company under arms, and to go out and recover their waſherman. I gave Lieutenant *Roſs* orders in writing to advance within muſket-ſhot and then to halt, and a perſon forwarded to demand the waſherman and linen, and to order the guards to retire; and in caſe of refuſal, to drive them off and burn their pandals. Lieutenant *Roſs* accordingly advanced to within muſket-ſhot, and ſent to demand the waſherman, and that they would retire; they anſwered they knew nothing of the waſherman, and could not retire, becauſe they had orders to ſtay there. He then produced a man that was with the waſherman when he was ſeized, but had eſcaped; they then ſaid, that if he would wait an hour, they would try to find the waſherman. At this time he ſaw great numbers aſſembling to a tope behind the guard, which conſiſted of forty men; and he (having only with him fifty) ſaid he would not wait a moment, unleſs they delivered up one of their men, as an hoſtage for the delivery of the waſherman; this they poſitively refuſed, and told him, if he advanced, they would fire upon him; he did advance, and they fired and wounded three Sepoys, one of whom died immediately after his coming in here; he then gave his fire, and killed eight on the ſpot, and wounded ſome, who were ſeen to ſtagger and limp off with the others. In obedience to my orders, he did not purſue them an inch, but burnt the pandals, and returned. At the ſame time all the other advanced guards ran away, as did alſo the King. He retired to a fort about 12 miles off, where he is collecting all his people, but every thing in this neighbourhood has remained quiet ever ſince that afternoon; no more guards have advanced, and we begin by ſtealth, little and little, to get in a few things from the country. The King of *Cartinatte* wrote immediately to *Sardar Cawn*, who ſeemingly put himſelf into a great paſſion; confined the Company's Interpreter at *Callicut*, and his guard of Sepoys, and vowed vengeance againſt *Mahé* and *Tellicherry*; however, within theſe few days, the boats which were ready for him to paſs the river have diſappeared: there is no report of his coming this way; he has releaſed the Company's Interpreter and his guard; and the Killedar of *Mungalore*, after detaining her about 20 days, has releaſed the Pattancar from *Bombay* to *Tellicherry*.

A few days after our little diſturbance, the Prince of *Chericall*'s Nairs made an incurſion into the Tellicherry Diſtrict, near Mount *Dilly*, where we have a ſmall fort commanded by a Serjeant. The Serjeant writes Mr. *Church*, that he killed about forty of them with grape-ſhot; ſince then every thing has been quiet: in all this, *Hyder*'s people did not appear, nor have they written a line, either to Mr. *Church* or me, before or ſince this affair.

Hyder's ſituation is much as it was when I had the honour to addreſs you laſt; he has, however, poſitively prohibited the exportation of rice from any place on this coaſt, either to *Tellicherry* or *Mahé*, and the Nairs, his tributaries, prevent every thing from coming by land, ſo that I am obliged to fit out two prize gallivats, which belonged to the French, and arm them, leſt we ſhould be ſtarved. One of them (the ſmalleſt) carries this diſpatch to *Anjengo*, and a Letter to the King of *Travencore* from me, requeſting that he will allow M. *Torleſſe* to get rice from his country for our uſe, and the larger will be ready to ſail in about a fortnight, to fetch the rice away. At preſent we are not in immediate want; as we are ſupplied by boats from *Tellicherry*; but as this is the ſeaſon at which the ſupplies were always laid in, the ſtore was not calculated to laſt much longer, and it becomes abſolutely neceſſary to provide againſt ſuch a calamity as want. The rice we now get from *Tellicherry* is thirty per cent. dearer than I laid in before the monſoon, which laſted till the 5th of this month. Our Sepoys would grow very uneaſy if they had not a proſpect of a ſupply on lower terms.

I am ſorry that the ſituation of the country, and the conduct of our neighbours, has put it out of my power to curtail any of the expences of this detachment. The Troops have thoroughly earned their batta, and I am convinced that both Officers and men would be heartily glad to be rid of it, to be on the other coaſt; for we are here pent up, wanting many of the neceſſaries of life, and the whole has been on duty at their ſtations, with half the Officers, awake every night for upwards of ſix weeks paſt: indeed I begin to be very anxious for ſhipping to carry away our ſtores, being convinced that the appearance of a very ſmall French ſquadron would induce *Hyder* to make a puſh for them openly: that he has tried by every means to get hold of them, is not to be doubted, and probably flattered himſelf, as our defences were ſo ruined, the Nairs would be able to effect it without his appearing. I have the moſt aſſured information, that every meaſure was ſettled for the attempt on this place, if I had not taken firſt the ſteps I did to prevent it, ſince which they ſeem quite diſconcerted, but ſeem obſtinate in the article of proviſions, and in detaining my Peon, &c. priſoners.

The *Courchy* Man (whatever might have been his intentions before) as ſoon as I had again taken poſſeſſion of Fort *Saint George*, and was eſtabliſhing my poſts there, which command his country, came over to me, though I could not ſee him for two months before; and told me, that I did right, for that miſchief was intended, but that I ſhould effectually diſappoint my Enemies, and he hoped I would protect him.

The late Kings of *Cartinatte* and *Catiole* warned me of my danger, and hoped for the Honourable Company's ſupport. I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
with reſpect,
Your faithful and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Mahé, Sept. 8th, 1779.

As the ſeaſon will not admit of Letters being ſent to Colonel *Braithwaite* by the way of *Anjengo*;

Ordered, That the receipt of his ſeveral Letters be acknowledged; that he be told we approve of his conduct in the execution of the truſt repoſed in him, and are much pleaſed with the ſteadineſs which they have ſhewn upon this ſervice. That with reſpect to the ſtores, we would have him embrace the firſt opportunity that offers of ſending them either to this place, *Bombay*, or *Bengal*, and if neceſſary, to write to *Bombay* for veſſels to bring them away. That we cannot at preſent write to him determinately as to the future deſtination of the Troops under his command, but hope to be able to do ſo, in 10 or 15 days at fartheſt.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 18th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith.

Reſolved, That directions be given to Colonel *Braithwaite*, to obey any requiſitions that may be made by General *Goddard*, for the force at *Mahé*.

This force, which conſiſts of one European company of Infantry, one company of Artillery, ſix Grenadier companies, and eight battalion companies of Sepoys, is all that we can ſpare in the preſent ſituation of affairs with *Hyder Ally*, and the uncertainty we are in with reſpect to the arrival of Sir *Edward Hughes*'s Fleet with the King's Troops.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite* to the Preſident; dated *Mahé*, 17th September 1779:

Honourable Sir,

I find that for a month paſt Portugueſe and other ſettled

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ſettled at *Calecut*, this place, *Tellicherry*, *Onore*, and *Mangalore*, who uſed to correſpond with *Seringapatam*, have received no anſwers to their Letters. Some Sepoys wives, and other travellers, who have come through *Hyder*'s country from the *Carnatic*, have all been ſtopped and ſearched for letters; thoſe who had any, were obliged to deliver them up, when they were ſuffered to paſs on: among them was a Sepoy from *Bencoolen*, on his return to *Bombay*; he had ſeveral Engliſh Letters, which were taken from him by a Commandant of *Hyder*; he deſired a receipt for them, that he might not be puniſhed at *Bombay*, and was chabooked. I cannot hear any tidings of perſons I ſent out ſome time ſince to procure intelligence from *Seringapatam*; and I fear, after this outrage to my Peon, I ſhall not get any perſon to ſtir among theſe people; our Sepoys, who on our coaſt uſed to procure intelligence, can do nothing here, as their want of the country language immediately diſcovers them. I have ſpared no pains or expence for intelligence, but cannot ſay I depend much on any I receive in regard to *Hyder*; the beſt I get is from a Frenchman; he is poſitive that *Hyder* aims at theſe ſtores, but ſays he expects a French force, and does not think he will act if they do not arrive. Mr. *Church*, as far as I can learn, is as much puzzled to get good intelligence from that quarter as I am, although ſo long Reſident of a populous diſtrict in this country: he diſcovers, as well as myſelf in general, that *Hyder* is very averſe to the Engliſh, and is making great warlike preparations; and that he himſelf is expected at *Nagnier*; and that he perſecutes with violence ſuch Country Powers as he thinks have any attachment to the Engliſh, who, for want of protection, are obliged to take refuge among the hills. A ſmall country veſſel, from *Mocha* to *Tellicherry*, and now going for *Anjengo*, gives me this opportunity of writing; Mr. *Church* aſſures me it is a ſafe one; and I think no time ſhould be loſt in informing you of this late inſult, and the ſituation of things here, which I could not venture to do by a coaſting boat, and our larger armed gallivat will not be ready to ſail before the 24th at ſooneſt. You certainly, Sir, have much better grounds to go upon in regard to *Hyder*'s intentions than any we can have; but as things appear here to me, it looks as if *Hyder* only waited for the arrival of a French force, or till your monſoon begins, when, if your fleet goes to *Trincomalee*, and the *Bombay* Gentlemen are ſufficiently engaged with the Marattas, that then he will, with a very large force, endeavour to diſlodge the Engliſh from their ſettlements on this Coaſt; in the mean time he is endeavouring to reduce us to every diſtreſs by the means of his tributary Nairs, and to take every advantage of the particular ſituation of this detachment, and the ſtores here; and then, ſhould he have occaſion to alter his plan, he will blame the Nairs and his Officers in this country, and diſavow them. I hear from all quarters, that the Artillery and ſtores here are a great object with him: he is upon no terms with the Dutch; has no opinion of the Portugueſe; and does not know where to look for ſupplies, which he thinks the Engliſh will never ſupply him with.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 15th November 1779.

Read a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*, as follows:

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident and Governor, Committee, at *Madras*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Not long after diſpatching a duplicate to you this [illegible] of my Letter of yeſterday, I was honoured with [illegible] of the 25th ultimo, by the arrival of the [illegible] from *Anjengo*.

[illegible]s, Gentlemen, to expreſs my thank- [illegible] approbation which that [illegible]rtunities of doing it more eſſentially in the courſe of my duty. So flattering a Letter from you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, of ſo late a date, has almoſt done away the chagrin occaſioned by the Letters I received from *Bombay*. I anticipate from it, that I ſhall not be reduced to the diſagreeable neceſſity of quitting a ſervice which I have hitherto had ſo much reaſon to be ſatisfied. I am confident, that you will have adopted ſome plan, if my detachment muſt go on, to employ me elſewhere. I am confident that you will not diſgrace an Officer whoſe conduct you have honoured by your approbation, by ſubjecting him to the orders of one who is his junior, although now become his ſuperior, by the partiality of the Preſidency to which he belongs. I have the higheſt reſpect for the character which Brigadier General *Goddard* bears; but I cannot forget the reſpect due to my own, from myſelf leaſt; could I for a moment, I ſhould ceaſe to be worthy of your ſervice.

By the means of my gallevats, and the attentions of the Governor of *Cochin*, I have collected about a month's ſtock of proviſions; and it is well I did, for ſo far from ſupplying me, I am told, they are beginning to cry at *Tellicherry*; and I have juſt heard this evening, that the Prince of *Cherical*, *Hyder*'s Manager, has entered their country with four thouſand Nairs, and is laying it waſte and driving off their cattle: this I heard from the Portugueſe Dubaſh to the Company there, not from Mr. *Church* himſelf.

The King of *Cartinatte* ſticks cloſe to me ſtill, with about five thouſand Nairs and Raggamuffins, which he calls Sepoys. He threatens us every day, that he will attack all our poſts in the night; but he never will, unleſs *Hyder* ſends a force down; whereas, on the contrary, *Hyder* is calling up forces from hence in great haſte, and ſending large bodies to the Northward. It is poſſible when we have blown up our works, and retreating, the King of *Cartinatte* may endeavour to diſturb us, but I think I can cover the embarkation ſo as to receive very little or no damage. The Malabar Powers who expected the ſupport of the Company, being diſappointed, are making up matters with *Hyder* daily. I believe, he means to unite them againſt our intereſt, and foreſeeing that we ſhall have other employment, will leave this country totally to the Nairs, keeping ſome of their head men as hoſtages at *Seringapatam*, and withdrawing from them all the money he can.

I have the honour to be, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Mahé,
20th October 1779.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 30th December 1779.

Received the following Letter from Colonel *John Braithwaite*:

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Governor and Preſident, Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Ships being now arrived from *Cochin*, and ſundry boats from the Northward, and no account of the *Succeſs* cruizer, which was charged with diſpatches from me, and on board of which were paſſengers Doctor *Beckett* and Enſign *Lucas*, in order to return to the Coaſt for their healths ſake, there is too much reaſon to believe that ſhe is totally loſt; I therefore now, by a Puttamar, tranſmit to you duplicates of the diſpatches I ſent by her, hoping, that in the mean time the Governor and General have received Letters which I wrote to them ſince.

Our embarkation of ordnance, &c. went on extremely well till the ſtorm, which is ſaid to have been the moſt dreadful that has happened on this Coaſt within the memory of man. The *Succeſs* and *Happy* cruizers are now

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given over as entirely loſt; the *Bombay* grab was totally diſmaſted, the *Drake* loſt her mainmaſt, and was obliged to throw ſome of her guns overboard; but the *Eagle*, half full of water, and near foundering, eſcaped with the leaſt real damage; four of the ſhybars, on board of which was ſhot and ſhell as ballaſt, have been loſt; as alſo the large armed gallivat, which I uſed to ſend to *Cochin* for proviſions; ſeveral country ſhips were loſt, and among them four gallivats of *Hyder*'s, ſaid to be freighted with ammunition, &c. for the Nairs, and ſome European Gunners; how true this may be I cannot ſay, but the bodies of two Europeans were found near one of the wrecks.

As ſoon as the veſſels were again in a condition to receive ſtores, &c. (which was the 22d) we again commenced the ſhipping off, and completely carried away every thing (except ſome anchors) and blew up the remaining works, and embarked the 29th. To have tranſported the anchors would have taken us up one day more, which in the preſent ſituation of affairs, I did not deem expedient. We burnt all the houſhold furniture, timber, cordage, and civil ſtores, as they could not be carried away. *Tellicherry* was at this time hard preſſed by the Nairs, and calling out for aſſiſtance; the Reſident and Factors had delivered over the keys and charge to Captain *Whippey* the Commandant, who by a Council of War, called for all the forces I could bring, that was not deſigned for General *Goddard*. I wrote to him and the factory, to know if they had good intelligence in regard to *Hyder*; I was unwilling to embroil the *Madras* Eſtabliſhment in a quarrel, which had been, according to my idea of things, wantonly brought on, by giving protection at *Tellicherry* to the depoſed King of *Cartinatte*, and refuge to all the *Colicle* people, againſt whom *Hyder* was incenſed. I found alſo, that the factory had called in to their aſſiſtance two thouſand *Coliole* Nairs, to moſt of whom they had delivered out arms and ammunition. I was of opinion, that if they had only the Nairs to deal with, they were ſtrong enough, and I wiſhed to be clear of the buſineſs; as, if my Sepoys returned to the Coaſt, another battalion would be ſent to reinforce Brigadier General *Goddard*; and I had private intelligence that *Sardar Cawn* had orders not to enter into the diſputes between *Tellicherry* and the Nairs, unleſs the *Madras* Troops at *Mahé* took it up, in which caſe he was to join the Prince of *Chericall*. The Commandant and Factory both wrote me, that they did not believe that *Hyder* would interfere; but the former ſtill required aſſiſtance. I then propoſed to him, that I would ſend him four companies of Grenadier Sepoys under Captain *M'Leod*, with Lieutenant *Saxon* of the Artillery, one Corporal, four Gunners, and thirty Laſcars, with two field-pieces: and with theſe Captain *Whippey* was perfectly ſatisfied; but the Grenadier Sepoys, as ſoon as they knew my intention, were a little diſcontented, though no order had been yet given. I then wrote to Captain *Moore*, commanding the ſhips and veſſels, to inform him of my deſign to ſend the European Infantry and Artillery with 70 Laſcars to *Surat*, under the command of Captain *Lamotte*, of the force I meant for *Tellicherry*, and requeſting boats under convoy for the 20th battalion of Sepoys to *Anjengo*, and by that means another battalion might be there embarked for *Surat*.

It would be tireſome to you, and an almoſt endleſs labour, were I to attempt to tranſmit to you the laborious and diſagreeable correſpondence I have been involved in, in the courſe of my duty here; it will ſuffice to ſay, that Captain *Moore* reſiſted every application for carrying any of your Troops to *Anjengo*; ſaid it was a paradox to him, how carrying Troops to the Southward would forward the diſpatches of any to the Northward; that his orders were to carry Troops to the Northward; and finally, that it was the opinion of the Gentlemen at *Tellicherry*, that our preſence was neceſſary there, and that he would carry none to the Southward; but that as I objected to the then ſtate of proviſions at *Tellicherry*, he would leave the *Eagle* and eight boats there, to carry away the *Madras* Troops before they could experience the miſeries of a famine. Accordingly I ordered the detachment for *Surat*, as before deſcribed, to proceed to *Surat*, and landed here the 30th with the Sepoys, the remaining Laſcars, and two field-pieces. The keys and charge were delivered up to me by Captain *Whippey*; and the Reſident offered me a dark room in the corner of his houſe, the uſual office of a Portugueze writer, telling me all the reſt of his houſe was taken up by guells, whom he had received in, ſince the troubles. I found this place in the extremeſt confuſion. Multitudes of people in arms, without any viſible ſign of utility, ſcattered every where, and without leaders; nor was it eaſy to know whether they were Enemies or Friends; a prodigious uſeleſs expenditure of ammunition; and that every man, be him whom he would, who brought a bad firelock to the Company's ſtores, got a good one in exchange; ſo that out of upwards of 1,500 ſtand of arms (1,000 of which I had furniſhed) not above 200 remained. I found the fort itſelf choaked up with buildings; and what they call the limits or place, incloſed by an outward wall, ſtill more crowded, without any ſtreet, or even a communication to move a gun, or ſupport any of the baſtions; the houſes crowded within up to the very walls, and even touching them; without the gate of which was a ſhort eſplanade, about a quarter muſket ſhot; after which all was thick topes, and the Pettah, or very extenſive town and Buzar, extremely populous, and no place of refuge for the inhabitants; who, if the Nairs broke in, muſt all be maſſacred, or preſs in ſuch crowds toward the limits, as to prevent their being defended. Captain *Whippey* had therefore taken the advantage of an exterior defence without the Pettah, formed to the left by the river and ſome ſmall fortified poſts, and an extenſive range of Paddy fields between him and the Enemy, with tolerable defenſive banks on our ſide, terminated by hills and an high road to the right, which was covered by *Maylon* fort; this line of it could be defended; covered the whole, and kept the inhabitants tolerably quiet; but it was extenſive, I think at leaſt four miles. The Enemy had fortified themſelves on the oppoſite hills, from whence they fired from ſmall guns, and had lined the topes on the oppoſite ſide of the Paddy fields, whence they had twice attempted to force over; in which attempt they had been repulſed, but the *Tellicherry* people had an Officer wounded, and many people killed and wounded; the Enemy had alſo attempted to lodge themſelves on the next hill to *Maylon*. A party, with ſucceſs, went out to prevent them; but the Officer commanding it (Lieutenant *Williams*) and a great many of his people, were killed. I found that Captain *Whippey* had advanced a battery of ſand bags, intended for two eighteen pounders, for the purpoſe of diſlodging the Enemy from a neighbouring hill, where they had a gun which was inconvenient to *Maylon*. The battery was reported to me as ready when I arrived, and the guns were to go out that night; and as Captain *Whippey* depended much on the effect they would produce, I did not object; but as I found there was only a Captain and thirty men of this eſtabliſhment, for the defence of this advanced battery, I, at two in the morning, ſent out a company of Grenadier Sepoys under Enſign *Dundas*, and one of the twentieth battalion under Enſign *Thompſon*, with the guns, and to ſupport the battery, and was myſelf going at day-break to ſee it; but found, before I could get there, that, as I had foreſeen, it was attacked on all ſides. No people could behave with more reſolution than the Nairs and Malays who attacked; they got in at the embrazures; on our people's bayonets they were repulſed; and, I believe, chiefly by a manœuvre of Enſign *Dundas*'s, who ſallied out with about 16 of his Grenadier Sepoys, and took them in flank, and diſperſed them; but five of his men were killed on the ſpot, and four wounded. Enſign *Thompſon* was killed in one of the embrazures, reſiſting the entrance of the Nairs. The *Madras* company in

the battery that day, had one Officer killed, ten Sepoys ditto, and nine wounded; three more Sepoys of ours belonging to another company, which I had ſent to ſuſtain the battery, were ſlightly wounded; and ſeveral of our Malays and Tivies, who were ſent below to ſkirmiſh in the jungle, were killed and wounded. Upon the whole we had 44 killed and wounded. Since then the Enemy have made no puſh.

From the ſhocking ſtate of the fort and limit wall, I have adopted Captain *Whippey*'s ſcheme, and am briſkly employed ſo as to give this accidental line ſome flanks, if poſſible, to cover the whole petta and inhabitants from the maſſacre and confuſion which muſt follow, if ſo ſavage an Enemy as the Nairs penetrate: I have therefore appointed Captain *Whippey* Commandant of *Tellicherry*, under my orders, and am myſelf encamped without to ſupport the lines with my Troops.

There is reaſon to believe that this buſineſs will become more ſerious; I am totally ignorant upon what footing you ſtand with *Hyder*, but every act of his here has been uninterruptedly hoſtile, though ſomewhat underhandedly as yet; and *Sardar Cawn*, the Nabob *Hyder*'s General at *Callicut*, has moved to *Mahé* with about 6,000 men, and twelve pieces of cannon; he has ſeized a Daniſh ſhip in the roads of *Callicut*, made all the people in her priſoners, amongſt whom are two Engliſh Ladies and ſeven Gentlemen, moſt of them arrived from *Suez*; they have been plundered of every thing, and all their papers and diſpatches (ſome I hear from the Directors) ſeized, and no remonſtrance has produced any effect. On board this veſſel he has embarked cannon and ſtores of all kinds, as alſo on eight large Manchoos, which are landing at *Mahé*. Part of this force is on this ſide *Mahé* river, and taking poſſeſſion of *Fort Saint George* hill and the ruins of *Courchy*; ſome of his principal Officers have been with great military parade and large eſcorts, in all the poſts of the Enemy, from whence cannon have been fired whilſt they were there, and they have reconnoitred us all round.

Thus ſituated, I have thought it neceſſary to re-land the European Infantry and Artillery, and have written my reaſons for it to *Bombay*, and to Brigadier General *Goddard*; but I was obliged to proteſt againſt Captain *Moore*, and threaten hard to get them on ſhore; he actually ſailed away two leagues with them after I demanded them, and wiſhed Captain *Lamotte* to raiſe a mutiny, and to uſe force to prevent him, ſo that when I wrote the Letter to *Bombay*, of which I have now the honour to incloſe you a copy, I was not ſure that I ſhould have them. I hope the reaſons held forth in that Letter may prove ſatisfactory to you. My ſituation has all along, on this Coaſt, been very diſagreeable, the ſyſtem of the Gentlemen at *Tellicherry*, having been covertly a conſtant oppoſition to that which you ordered me to adopt; and I believe, by my Letter from *Bombay*, contrary to their orders from thence; I ſhall never be able, in my own mind, to acquit them of being the latent cauſe of all the inconveniencies we have ſuffered at *Mahé*, and of their own preſent troubles. Depending on our proximity, they have, according to the beſt information which I can get, done things to irritate *Hyder*'s Government, at the ſame time without providing in any ſhape for the defence of *Tellicherry*. They knew that in the end, neceſſity muſt compel me to come to them; and ſo it has, much againſt my will; for here I find myſelf, in diſobedience to your orders, protecting the old King of *Cartenadu*, and in alliance with the fugitive *Coliote*, rebels to *Hyder*'s Government, who had long ago offered me money, in vain, to take them under my protection. To protect them might have been neceſſary for the Company's commercial views; if ſo, it ſhould have been done on a ſettled plan, and *Tellicherry* rendered reſpectable.

I have oppoſed all this buſineſs for a month, through a voluminous correſpondence, but in vain. I could not abandon a ſettlement of the Honourable Company's calling out for help: I wiſhed to embroil *Madras* as little as poſſible: but Captain *Moore* cut the matter ſhort, by ſaying, he would only carry us to *Surat* (where the Sepoys refuſed to go) or to *Tellicherry*; and if I did not want his ſhips and veſſels for that purpoſe, he would fail. He knew that we had only three days proviſion in *Mahé*; and indeed, his conduct all along has been very ſtrange: when he came, and I began to embark the ſtores, I deſired a receipt every day for every thing ſhipped off. He told me, that would be very inconvenient; that if I ſhould ſend every thing off to his ſhip, he would diſtribute them to the proper ſhips and boats to carry them as they came; and that after all he would give my Commiſſary a receipt for the whole: but the buſineſs being over, he told me, it was true he had ſaid ſo, but there had been a gale of wind, ſome ſhips and boats had been loſt, ſome things had been re-landed at *Tellicherry*; that he could not in ſuch caſe take any reſponſibility, or give any receipt; that in caſes like this, there muſt be great loſſes, and they muſt be expected. Thus, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, after all your pains and expence, after our care and watchfulneſs over them, the *Mahé* ſtores are no farther aſcertainable by me to you, than by tranſmitting to you the returns I have ſent to *Bombay*, which twenty witneſſes can atteſt the ſhipping off.

Immediately on ſending the Europeans on ſhore, Captain *Moore* ſailed with all the cruizers but one, leaving the *Eagle* and eight boats here. I cannot help being of opinion, that the preſence of ſome of His Majeſty's ſhips on this Coaſt is very neceſſary. *Hyder* has many armed veſſels, as well as the Mararas, and this is their ſeaſon for cruizing; and I imagine the *Bombay* ſhips will be all up about *Surat*. I have taken the liberty to endeavour to convey my ſentiments to Sir *Edward Vernon* on this head, by a Letter viâ *Cochin*, which may be forwarded to him, I believe, at *Trincomalee*, where I hear he is; and I will venture to take the liberty to ſay, that if ever you ſend any of your Troops round to this Coaſt, and deſign any ſecond movements of them, it will be neceſſary to be done by ſhips under your own orders; for in the courſe of this expedition, His Majeſty's ſhips excepted, the reſt have paid very little attention when I have ſaid I had your orders to do ſo and ſo.

As it is poſſible that *Hyder*, whoſe proceedings are ſo myſterious and inſcrutable, may, from our being in ſuch ſtrength here, or other political reaſons, I would certainly, could I have any good information to that effect, ſend on the Europeans by the firſt poſſible opportunity; and if you mean that a battalion of Sepoys ſhould yet go from the Coaſt to *Surat* in lieu of thoſe here, who to a man have declined that ſervice, it would be well, if you think proper, that they were ſet in motion directly for *Anjengo*. To have the better proſpect of ſea conveyance and protection, was my inducement for writing to Sir *Edward Vernon* the Letter, of which incloſed I have now the honour to tranſmit you a copy. I alſo tranſmit to your Honours my Letter to Sir *Eyre Coote*, open, which I take the liberty to requeſt you to forward.

I have endeavoured, in a moſt perplexing ſtate, ſecretly thwarted on all ſides, to diſcharge the truſt repoſed in me with zeal and fidelity; and if I have acquitted myſelf to your ſatisfaction, I ſhall not repine or repent of my labour, having nothing more at heart than to prove myſelf,

With great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful
and obedient Servant,
John Braithwaite.

Camp at *Tellicherry*,
9th Dec. 1779.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations,
30th December 1779.

Sent the following Letter to Colonel *Braithwaite*:

To Colonel *John Braithwaite*, commanding the *Madras* Detachment at *Tellicherry*.

We have received your Letters, dated the 2d, 9th, and 10th November, and 9th December.

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We are very ſenſible of the difficulties you have had to encounter, and much approve of the diligence and diſcretion you have ſhewn on the occaſion. We are ſorry at a time when we have ſo many calls for our Troops, that you ſhould have been drawn, by the apparent imprudence of the Gentlemen at *Tellicherry*, into meaſures we ſo much wiſhed to avoid; however, the defence of the ſettlement of *Tellicherry*, was an object that could not be neglected under any circumſtances, and your activity on this occaſion is very commendable; but we wiſh, nevertheleſs, that the European Infantry and Artillery had been ſent to *Surat*, becauſe we are of opinion, that their ſervice at this time with General *Goddard* would have been more uſeful than at *Tellicherry*, particularly as you do not ſeem to think that the place was in danger from the Nairs only, and *Hyder*'s people have not, by your account, openly aſſiſted them.

We are ſtill anxious to reinforce General *Goddard* with your Europeans; and, if circumſtances have not materially changed ſince the date of your laſt Letter, we would have you embrace the firſt opportunity of ſending them to *Surat* or *Bombay*. With reſpect to yourſelf, as we have ſo much confidence in your care and circumſpection, we deſire you to continue in the command of *Tellicherry* with the *Madras* Sepoys, until you ſhall think the preſent danger is removed, or until the place be ſufficiently reinforced from *Bombay*, when we give you permiſſion to return to the Coaſt, and to ſend the Sepoys by the way of *Anjengo*.

We deſire you will, in our name, ſtrongly recommend it to the Chief and Council to eſtabliſh tranquillity by every means in their power, and if any juſt cauſe of offence has been given either to the Nairs, or to *Hyder Ally*, we wiſh it were inſtantly removed; for, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, it is highly neceſſary that we ſhould induſtriouſly avoid all occaſions of adding to the number of our Enemies.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
30th Dec. 1779.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 29th May 1779.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*; dated at *Mahé*, 10th May 1779.

Herewith I have the honour to ſend you complete returns from this place, which I have not before been able to do, by which you will ſee our ſtrength, what we have belonging to *Madras*, and what was ſurrendered here as belonging to his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty.

The mines in that part of Fort *Mahé* near the ſea (as nothing can approach us there at this ſeaſon) will be ſprung in ten days, by which time *Fort St. George*, *Chenibara*, and *Courcby*, will be completely deſtroyed; and I hope by the time the ſeaſon permits us to embark, we ſhall be ready to return, if you think it neceſſary to recal us; but if you have not concluded matters with *Hyder*, I will venture to aſſert, from what I ſee of the ſtate of his country, that the ſtay of this detachment will be a great check. With ſuch a force as the Honourable Company have now on the Malabar Coaſt, I do not think he will attempt to invade the *Carnatic*; if he attempts ſuch a thing, it will be after the return of this detachment, when the Gentlemen at *Bombay* have engaged their own attention and that of the Maratta State, by the operations which it is ſaid are to take place.

I am informed from *Tellicherry* that *Roodo Cawn*, *Hyder*'s Manager at *Calicut*, has invited Mr. *Freeman*, the Engliſh Reſident, to return from *Tellicherry*; but that he does not mean to go till he receives orders from *Bombay*.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 14th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Monro*,
Charles Smith.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*, dated at *Mahé*, the 20th May 1779.

The arrival of *Hyder*'s detachment in this country has convinced me that I did not keep one man more than was abſolutely neceſſary to make ſure, of what has been ſo eaſily yielded to us, and I make the Honourable Company reſpectable on this Coaſt. His force in the neighbourhood is now increaſed to eight battalions of Sepoys, beſides the Horſe and Country Troops I before had the honour to mention to you; but they ſhew no diſpoſition to moleſt us, nor have they, on the other hand, ſhewn any mark of attention. My ſpies ſay, they are with much anger in their camp of the aſſiſtance given to the revolters from *Tellicherry*.

As the conduct of *Hyder*'s people, though by no means offenſive, is by no means complaiſant, and as none of thoſe who are much attached to him have expreſſed any ſatisfaction at our acquiſitions, I know not what he may attempt, as the demolition of the place goes forward, and the rains abate; however, I am convinced I ſhould always be in a condition to ſtand upon the defenſive; and hope the proviſions here collected will be ſufficient to keep us from want; but his numbers gradually increaſe. It is reported here that *Lally* with his corps has engaged in *Hyder*'s ſervice, and that his views are turned towards the Nizam; and I have certain information of his having taken *Cuddapah*: then he is ready either for the Carnatic, the Circars, or *Bazalet Jung*'s country; but if the latter is ſupported, I think he will not croſs the *Kiſtnah*, but find work enough on this ſide. The general idea is, that he is not well diſpoſed towards the Engliſh.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 13th May 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Monro*,
Charles Smith.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*; dated at *Mahé*, the 21ſt April 1779.

The chief articles of trade were arms, guns, ammunition, &c.: and I believe it was from this place that *Hyder* was chiefly ſupplied, indeed I am told, to a very great amount; and it is that, which will make him feel the expulſion of the French more ſenſibly than any thing elſe. He begins to be ſerious now in checking the revolters. Incloſed, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, I ſend you a tranſlation of the laſt Caſin received from my ſpies. This day the King of *Cartinatte* retreated to within ſight of Fort *Condé*, and is apparently croſſing the river above in great confuſion. I have ſent out word that neither party muſt come too near us, as I have nothing to do with their quarrels. I have had no meſſage from *Hyder*'s Officer, nor have I ſent any immediately to him. I do not believe they mean to diſturb us; had they any ſuch intention, they would have ſhewn it by an attack on *Chambara*, the fort lately defended by the Prince of *Cheriyal*, as I have deſtroyed it of its guns, and left only an Havildar and 12 ſepoys in it, as a guard to the flag ſtaff, till it be deſtroyed.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read; and approved.

The Committee having at their laſt meeting reſolved to ſend three battalions of Sepoys and a company of Artillery, for the protection of *Bazalet Jung*'s country, it is now ordered that this force, together with ſix field-pieces, and a proportionable quantity of ſtores, be got ready to proceed with all poſſible expedition; and that the command be given to Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 23d April 1779.

Extract of a Letter to *Bengal*.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have juſt received from Colonel *Braithwaite*, the Articles of a Capitulation for the ſurrender of *Mahé*, and incloſe a copy for your information. Colonel *Braithwaite* keeps with him a company of Grenadier Europeans, a complete battalion of Sepoys, and a company of Artillery, to take care of the conqueſt, until the fortifications be deſtroyed: the remainder of our Troops he has returned to this Coaſt.

Since writing the foregoing, we have intelligence from the Nabob, that *Hyder* has made a conqueſt of the *Cuddapah* Country, and taken the Phouſdar priſoner; that he is proceeding to ſubdue the Phouſdar of *Cannoul*, and that he means alſo to make a conqueſt of the territories of *Bazalet Jung*; of which laſt meaſure the Vakeel of *Bazalet Jung* has, in the name of his Maſter, expreſſed the ſtrongeſt apprehenſions: that he has alſo written threatening Letters to the Zemindars of *Vencatagherry* and *Calaſtry*, who are tributary to the Nabob. In conſequence of late negociations with *Bazalet Jung*, we have reſolved to ſend immediately, for the protection of his country, three battalions of Sepoys, a company of Artillery, and ſix field-pieces.

Hyder's proceedings in that quarter have added greatly to his power, and given him a much more eaſy acceſs to the *Carnatic* than he had before.

Conſidering all theſe circumſtances, we are of opinion, that immediate meaſures ſhould be taken to compel *Hyder* to retreat back within his former limits, or, if neceſſary, to reduce him totally; for we have every reaſon to conclude, from the language he holds, and from the nature of his proceedings, that he will very ſhortly draw us into hoſtilities; in which caſe it will be highly expedient that we ſhould be prepared to act deciſively; and we requeſt you will favour us with your ſentiments and determination upon this Letter as ſoon as poſſible.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
23d April 1779.

Extracts from *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 137. To *Hyder Ally*; dated 26th Auguſt 1779.

I acquainted you that the Company had entered into a Treaty of Friendſhip with *Bazalet Jung*, and had in conſequence engaged to lend him the aſſiſtance of Troops for the protection of his government and country. Agreeably to this Treaty, we ordered ſome Sepoys under the command of one of our Officers to march to *Adoni* by the neareſt route; and that route lying through a part of the diſtrict of the *Cuddapah* Country, which you lately reduced, I truſted our people might proceed without moleſtation, it being the invariable practice of all Powers who live in a ſtate of Friendſhip and Peace, to let the Troops of their Friends paſs and repaſs through their territories, with the ſame freedom that their own Troops might do; deſirous, however, of behaving towards you on this occaſion with attention and civility, I directed the Commanding Officer of our Sepoys, to write to your Managers in the *Cuddapah* Country before he marched; and I wrote letters alſo to them myſelf, with which, no doubt, they informed you. The Letters which the Managers ſent to our Officer gave him no reaſon to expect that any oppoſition would be made; and though they were not ſo friendly as they ſhould have been, I could not ſeriouſly think that they would guard and ſtop the Paſſes through which our people are to march, and to treat them as Enemies inſtead of Friends. This, however, to my very great ſurprize, has really happened; our Troops found the Paſſes guarded, and every diſpoſition made to oppoſe their march; in conſequence of this they returned very properly to their former ſtation within our territory.

Conſidering the Treaty of Friendſhip that has long ſubſiſted between the Company and you, I am entirely at a loſs for this conduct in your Manager, unleſs, as I am willing to perſuade myſelf, they have acted on this occaſion without your knowledge or authority. I write this Letter, therefore, to acquaint you with all the circumſtances, and to requeſt you will give ſuch orders that our Troops may paſs through the diſtricts before mentioned. May your health and happineſs ever increaſe!

No. 138. Tranſlation of a Letter from the Nabob *Bazalet Jung* to *Mahomed Amin Ul Dien*, one of his Servants, at preſent with Colonel *Harpur*.

I have now undoubted intelligence that the Ghaut is ſtopped and ſhut up. *Hyder Ally Cawn* not long ago wrote me, that it was improper in me to make an alliance with the Engliſh, for that in that he would not continue upon friendly terms with me; and he deſired I would let him rent the *Guntoor* Circar from me. I received another Letter from him after he received the accounts of the Engliſh Troops being arrived at *Mootapillee*; in which he told me again, that I muſt neither give up the *Guntoor* Circar to the Engliſh, nor ſend for a body of their Troops. At the time that *Iflecher Cawn* was with *Hyder* at *Brickunder Gun*, the latter deſired him to tell me that the Engliſh, after they had got the French diſmiſſed from my ſervice, would get the *Guntoor* Circar into their hands, and never be of any ſervice to me; that it therefore would be better to give up the Circar to him, which would be a certain advantage to me. I anſwered to this, that the Engliſh would not break the engagements which they had entered into with me, and would faithfully pay me, what rent they ſhould ſtipulate for the *Guntoor* Circar. *Hyder*, after this, wrote me again, not to do this by any means; that it was an injudicious ſtep; and he again requeſted I would give up that Circar to him. And I replied, that I had already given up that Circar to the Company, with whom I had entered into a Treaty; that if he had made the application before it had taken place, I might perhaps have entered into a negociation with him about it, but that it was not in my power to de-

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viate from the engagements I had made. I have as yet received no anſwer to this, but by the ſteps which *Hyder* has taken, it ſeems as if he meditated ſome pernicious deſigns againſt me. He has ordered his Troops to aſſemble from different quarters, as if he intended to attack this country, and it was on that account that I wrote ſo very preſſingly for the Engliſh Troops coming here without delay, leſt they ſhould meet with any obſtacle in the way. It is much to be lamented that they are not come. What is to be done next, the Almighty knows: I have reſigned myſelf to the Divine Providence. Loſe no time in acquainting Colonel *Harpur* of this, and let him write to the Governor, without delay, for a reinforcement. If the Company are to render me a ſervice, this is the time for it; when the opportunity is loſt, their friendſhip will be of no ſervice to me. The Company have ſerved many people, and exerted themſelves for them; they ſhould at ſuch a time as this, exert themſelves for me; if they ſhould delay doing this, their friendſhip will be of little advantage to me. Intelligence has juſt been received at the houſe of *Koki Sipana* the Soucar, that *Hyder* has marched from *Seringapatam*, with an intention of coming againſt this place. My ſituation is deplorable. Let what is to be done, be done with ſpeed. The road by *Atcoor* is ſhut up, and the communication precarious. My Letters may not, perhaps, reach you. Do not wait for any more, but tell this to *Fattah Ulla Cawn*, to apply to Colonel *Harpur* to write to *Madras* about this. If aſſiſtance is not given me in ten or twelve days at fartheſt, all they can do will be of no ſervice to me. I yet truſt in the faith and engagements of the Company; they will raiſe their reputation in ſaving me. I have wrote you all this for your information. Loſe no time in procuring the aſſiſtance required.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the pleaſure to inform you, that I have received intelligence from Captain *Lucas*, of his having arrived the 2d inſtant at *Mootapilly*, with two companies of Infantry, half a company of Artillery, and the beſt part of the firſt battalion of Sepoys, and that one veſſel and four boats, with Sepoys on board, had not then arrived. Every thing neceſſary for their march has been diſpatched from this place, except ſheep and coolies, which Mr. *Douglas* has engaged to furniſh, his ſtation being much nearer than ours; ſo that I hope to hear, in a few days, of their having ſet off to join me.

I am, reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
moſt obedient Servant,
Hr Harpur.

Camp, *Inacunda*, 4th September 1779.

No. 149. To *Bazalet Jung*; dated 11th November 1779.

I had the pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 8th November, and underſtand the contents. The Company will never fail to execute their engagements with you to the utmoſt of their power; and relying upon that, you ſhould ſet your mind at eaſe. It is true, by unforeſeen accidents, and chiefly on account of the ſcarcity of proviſions, our Troops have not been able to reach you ſo ſoon as I wiſhed and intended; but my deſire of getting you the earlieſt aſſiſtance, is evident, from the expedition that was uſed in ſending the Troops from hence, and in the large reinforcement I afterwards added to them, by which they are become much ſtronger, and better able to protect your country; I have alſo ſent another Commander to take charge of them, and it will now reſt with you, only to prepare every thing for their reception, and to ſee, that on their march they be furniſhed with proviſions and every other neceſſary they may require. As it may be difficult to ſend money from hence regularly to pay them, ſhould they be at any time in want, you will be pleaſed to ſupply them, and adviſe me thereof, that your account may receive credit for it.

I obſerve that you write concerning the payment of the tuncas and orders you have given on the Zemindars of *Guntoor*: as that country is placed under the management of the Nabob, I have requeſted his Highneſs to give orders, that the balances due to you, be accounted for in the moſt equitable and ſpeedy manner poſſible. Let me hear conſtantly of your welfare that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 20th November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Chr Smith.

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Yeſterday I did myſelf the honour to addreſs you on the ſubject of my march from *Inacunda*, and my reſolutions of proceeding with expedition for *Adoni*. Laſt night *Falutto Cawn*, who remained behind, on account of indiſpoſition, wrote me a Letter (in conſequence of very important ones ſaid to have arrived from *Bazalet Jung*) deſiring me to halt here to-day. He is this moment arrived, and acquaints me with the purport of his Letter from *Bazalet Jung*, which Mr. *Forſter* has interpreted, and which I beg leave to incloſe you; the circumſtances it contains will prevent my going forwards. I ſhall be marching within a few coſs of this place, juſt to exerciſe the Troops, till I may be honoured with your further inſtructions.

I am reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
obedient humble Servant,
H. Harpur.

Camp 4 coſs N. Eaſt *Inacunda*, 13th November 1779.

An Interpretation of the Intelligence which *Fatah Ullah Khan* gave me this morning.

Yeſterday, being the 3d of the month Zacadah, two Horſemen arrived from *Adoni*, and brought to *Fatah Ullah Khan* four Letters from the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*; one for the Nabob *Walajah*, one for the Governor, one for *Aſchan Khan*, and one for himſelf. In the Letter to *Fatah Ullah Khan*, his Maſter writes him, that the Nabob ſhall ever regard, in the ſame ſort with his life, the Treaty he has made with the Engliſh; but he is deeply affected that the peculiar caſt of the times have brought him to that paſs, in which he is forced, for ſome time, to ſuſpend and conceal the appearance of friendſhip with his new allies. It is now ſix months ſince the Engliſh began their march to yield him aſſiſtance, and he has been waiting with the greateſt anxiety for their arrival; with theſe hopes, he did not raiſe any Troops of his own.

The Nizam his brother, and *Hyder Ally*, by reaſon of his entering into an alliance with the Engliſh, have become the Enemies of his life. The Nizam ſome time ago wrote to *Hyder*, that he *(Bazalet Jung)* had made a Treaty with the Engliſh, which Treaty would be highly diſadvantageous to them both, and in the end prove the loſs of their kingdoms; that therefore they jointly ſhould prevent the Engliſh from entering the country of *Bazalet Jung*; and that he *(Hyder)* ſhould immediately ſeize on his poſſeſſions. In conſequence of the Nizam's Letter, *Hyder* ſent two thouſand Horſe and ſix thouſand Sepoys, and took poſſeſſion of all the open country; they alſo

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ſurrounded the diſtricts which are contiguous to *Adoni*; that *Bazalet Jung* had given tunkas in the *Guntoor* Circar for the payment of thoſe Troops which he ſtill retained, but on producing tunkas to Mr. *Douglas*, he would not permit them to make any collections. Theſe people returned to *Adoni*, and gave *Bazalet Jung* great uneaſineſs. *Hyder* had at that time, by ſeizing on the *Adoni* Diſtricts, ſtopped the collection of three or four lacks of Rupees; and on *Bazalet Jung*'s ordering his Troops to attack the Enemy, they refuſed to act until the receipt of their arrears. The daily ſtocks of proviſions with which the Fort uſed to be ſupplied, was now ſtopped, and the great ſupply which was already in it, had been wholly deſtroyed by the blowing up of the grand magazine. The Nizam being apprized of *Bazalet Jung*'s ſituation, deſired him to ſend a Vakeel to his Court. On the arrival of the Vakeel, the Nizam told him his Maſter (*Bazalet Jung*) might now ſee how fruitleſs his connections with the Engliſh had proved, and that the conſequence would be ruin to this country, and deſtruction to his life; but that if he would renounce all concerns with the Engliſh, and regain poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar, that he (the Nizam) would reſtore him to thoſe countries which *Hyder* had ſeized on. The Nizam alſo wrote *Bazalet Jung* to this effect, and ſent him a ſupply of one lack of Rupees; that *Hyder Ally* had written to him (*Bazalet Jung*) that he ſhould immediately deſtroy the country, himſelf, and family, if he did not ſpeedily diſcontinue all correſpondence with the Engliſh. Under theſe perilous circumſtances *Bazalet Jung* and *Sadat Ullah Khan* had reſolved, without delay, to join the Engliſh detachment; when *Bazalet Jung* received a Letter from the Nizam, requiring him, without loſs of time, to break with the Engliſh, and reſume the poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar; and that if they (the Engliſh) did not immediately comply, and march out of the country, that he (the Nizam) would beſtow the ſaid Circar upon *Hyder*, and that they would jointly extirpate the Engliſh from the whole *Carnatic*. On *Bazalet Jung*'s making this reſolution of joining the Engliſh detachment known to his own people, they would not ſuffer him to take that ſtep, but deſired him to join his Brothers. On ſeeing his own Troops impeding his junction with the Engliſh, and revolving in his mind his own diſtreſſes, he thought it moſt expedient to accept the Nizam's terms, and accordingly wrote to him to that effect. *Bazalet Jung* has written to the Governor the reſult of his deliberations, and hopes that concealing a ſhort ſpace of time his regard, will be thought adviſable and agreeable to the preſent poſture of affairs; that as ſoon as the times aſſume a more favourable appearance, the friendſhip which he will ever entertain for the Engliſh Company will be ſtrongly cemented, and laſt for ever. *Fatah Ullah Khan*, on the part of his Maſter, requeſts that I would ſtop the progreſs of the detachment until further orders from the Preſident and Select Committee, to whom *Bazalet Jung* has fully written on the preſent ſubject.

(A true interpretation) *H. Harpur.*
Geo. Forſter.

The Committee having taken the foregoing Letters into conſideration, are of opinion, that, agreeable to *Bazalet Jung*'s requeſt, the detachment ſhould be directed to ſtop their march immediately; and a Letter is ordered to be prepared, and ſent to the Commanding Officer, deſiring him to continue where he now is, or to return to *Inacunda*, as he ſhall judge moſt proper; and directing him to ſtrike off ſuch expences as ſhall appear ſuperfluous to him on this new order.

Reſolved alſo, That a Letter be written to *Bazalet Jung*, acquainting him with the order for ſtopping the march of the detachment, in conformity with his deſire; explaining to him fully all the ſteps which have been taken on our part for executing our engagements, and the concern we feel that he ſhould have found himſelf under the neceſſity of concluding terms with the Nizam, which was to deprive him of the aſſiſtance of our Troops at ſo critical a time, and when they were actually on their march to ſupport him: that notwithſtanding his circumſtances, we conſider the Treaty between the Company and him to be ſtill in force; that he may command the aſſiſtance of our Troops at any future time that he ſhall require it; and that the revenues of the *Guntoor* Circar ſhall be faithfully applied to maintain a force for that purpoſe, agreeable to the Treaty: that we are not at all pleaſed with the interference which the Nizam has thought proper to uſe in this new alliance, nor with the reflections which he has thrown out to diſcredit our intentions, ſo contrary to the friendſhip he has always profeſſed for the Company; and that in the preſent uncertain ſituation of affairs, we ſhall keep our Troops on the borders of the *Guntoor* Circar, to protect our poſſeſſions, and counteract the deſigns of any perſons who may be diſpoſed to diſturb the public tranquillity.

Ordered, That the Letter to *Bazalet Jung* be prepared, and diſpatched as ſoon as poſſible.

Thoˢ Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Chaˢ Smith.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 152. To *Bazalet Jung:* dated 20th November 1779.

I underſtand, by a Letter from Colonel *Harpur*, that you have ſent orders to *Ameer Saib*, who is with him, to proceed immediately to *Adoni*; and that he is in conſequence marched without waiting for Colonel *Harpur*, who told him our Troops would be ready to go in two days. *Ameer Saib* and Rajah *Behauder* likewiſe told Colonel *Harpur*, that the Nizam agreed to give you aſſiſtance; and that Mr. *Lally* was preparing to croſs the *Kiſtnah*, and enter into *Adoni* Country.

If this intelligence be true, I am ſurprized you have not mentioned it to me yourſelf; nor can I account for your ſending orders to your people with Colonel *Harpur* to march without waiting for him. Upon this ſubject, I can only repeat what I have ſaid in my laſt Letter, that nothing in my power has been omitted to give you timely aſſiſtance; and the force I have ſent is fully adequate to protect your country. Our Troops, I have no doubt, will be with you in a few days; therefore you ſhould ſet your mind at eaſe, and rely on their ſupport for removing all cauſes of apprehenſions. I underſtand from the Nabob, you have written to him in terms of the greateſt deſpondence, as if your country and yourſelf were in the greateſt danger, and deſpairing of the ſupport we had promiſed you: this is not worthy of that firmneſs which ſhould accompany you in your preſent ſituation, nor doing juſtice to my friendſhip, which, as you well know, has been exerted to the utmoſt for your relief.

If the Nizam be diſpoſed to give you aſſiſtance, I am glad of it; as the Nizam and the Company are, by the bleſſing of God, in ſtrict alliance, his Troops and ours may act together in your defence; and I have no doubt you will take all poſſible care, that a perfect agreement and harmony may take place between them. As to Mr. *Lally* and his people, you will remember the nature of your engagement with us, and proceed accordingly: it is, however, impoſſible that our Troops and thoſe under Mr. *Lally* can act in conjunction; if therefore they enter your territories, ours muſt halt for further orders, or till you have directed their removal from the diſtrict of *Adoni*.

Before I conclude, I muſt mention a circumſtance that appears neceſſary to communicate to you. Having reſolved to appoint another Officer to command our Troops in the room of Colonel *Harpur*, the Letter acquainting Colonel *Harpur* of this ſtep was, for the ſake of expedition, ſent by the Nabob's Tappal, and came into the hands

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hands of *Fattula Khan*; but *Fattula Khan*, for reaſons which I am not yet informed of, did not deliver the Letter to Colonel *Harpur*, wherein he is very culpable. Thus you ſee that your people have contributed in ſome degree to occaſion the delay which has happened. Your proſperity is however now at hand; let me hear ſpeedily of your welfare, that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 21ſt November 1779.

Wrote the following Letter to Colonel *Baillie*, commanding the detachment on its march to *Adoni*:

Sir,

We have received two Letters from Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*, of the 12th and 13th inſtant. The Letter adviſing us that *Fatulla Cawn* had, in the name of his Maſter, requeſted that the detachment might proceed no further, for reaſons which he (*Fatulla Cawn*) fully explained to Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*, and which have been communicated to us; we direct, in conſequence, that the march of the detachment may be ſtopped, and that you will encamp it on the borders of the *Guntoor* Circar, within our own territory, and there wait our further orders. As there will be no neceſſity for continuing the ſame expences which muſt have been incurred on the ſuppoſition of the detachment marching to *Adoni*, you will reduce them as much as poſſible, keeping up only a ſufficient number of bullocks for the ſervice of the field-train and carriage of the ammunition and ſtores. We ſhould ſuppoſe *Inacunda* a proper place to take poſt at; but you will be the beſt judge, on viewing the ſituation of the country, and conſidering how the detachment can be beſt ſupplied with proviſions. We underſtand that Colonel *Harpur* has advanced about 4 coſs from his former encampment; and ſhould the ſpot, he is now encamped on, be within the territory of *Guntoor*, and in other reſpects eligible, it may be as well for the preſent to keep the Troops there, inſtead of marching them back.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Tho' Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Extracts from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 154. *Bazalet Jung*; dated 24th November 1779.

I wrote you two Letters of the inſtant, explaining to you fully the ſteps I had taken to aſſiſt you with Troops, according to my engagements; the reaſons why theſe Troops had not yet reached you; and the orders I had given, by which there would be no doubt but they would arrive in your diſtricts within eight or ten days from that time. Theſe Letters I hope you have received. Agreeably to the aſſurances I gave you, the Troops, properly equipped with guns and warlike ſtores of all kinds, marched from *Inacunda* the 12th of this month towards *Adoni*. On the 13th in the evening, the Commanding Officer received a Letter from *Fatulla Cawn*, in conſequence of very important ones ſaid to have juſt arrived from you, deſiring him to halt. *Fatulla Cawn* then explained to the Commanding Officer the purport of your Letter to him; which was in brief as follows; viz. That the Nizam and *Hyder Ally* were both extremely offended at you for entering into an alliance with the Engliſh, and giving up the *Guntoor* Circar to them; that they had threatened your total deſtruction, if you did not immediately renounce that alliance; and that *Hyder Ally*'s Troops had ſeized and laid waſte the diſtricts of *Adoni*, and obliged you to remain within your capital; that the Nizam, being apprized of your ſituation, told you again, that if you would renounce all concern with the Engliſh, he would reſtore you to thoſe countries which *Hyder* had ſeized on. That theſe, with other circumſtances which you mention in your Letter, had at length compelled you in a manner to accept of the Nizam's terms, and that you had accordingly written him to that effect; that you had written to me the reſult of your deliberation, and hoped, that concealing for a ſhort time your regard for the Engliſh, would be thought adviſable, and agreeable to the preſent poſture of affairs, but that as ſoon as the times aſſume a more favourable appearance, the friendſhip which you ſhall ever entertain for the Company, would be cemented and laſt for ever.

I confeſs it was with much ſurprize and concern that I received the foregoing account of your ſituation, and the determination you had taken upon it, particularly as nothing had been omitted to relieve you, and as the Troops I had ſent for that purpoſe were on their march, and likely to be with you in time to reſtore you fully to your poſſeſſions in ſpite of all your Enemies. The reaſon why they were not with you before, I have already explained; and if you reflect a little, you will be convinced that I exerted myſelf in a remarkable manner to fulfil my engagements. You know, that ſo early as the month of June I ſent a body of Troops to march to your aſſiſtance, but owing to ſome miſunderſtanding or neglect on the part of your people, the Commanding Officer was unable to procure a ſufficient quantity of proviſions for them. The delay which this occaſioned, and the conſequences of that delay, you are well acquainted with; and you know alſo, with expedition I ſent a ſtrong reinforcement to the Troops in order that they might force their way to you againſt all oppoſition, and offered you the moſt effectual ſupport. You now write, that your ſituation has obliged you to come to an accommodation with the Nizam, upon his own terms; and deſire me to poſtpone the aſſiſtance promiſed you by the Treaty, until the times are more favourable. I have in conſequence ſent orders to ſtop the march of the Engliſh Troops, and directed them to encamp on the borders of the *Guntoor* Circar, where they will remain during the preſent uncertainty of affairs, to protect our poſſeſſions, and to puniſh any perſons who ſhall dare to diſturb their tranquillity.

I ſincerely hope your agreement with the Nizam will anſwer the purpoſe you expect from it, by reſtoring you the diſtricts which have been ſeized on; at the ſame time I muſt lament, that the Nizam ſhould require from you, as the condition of his friendſhip, that you ſhould forbear availing yourſelf of our ſupport, repreſenting us to you in terms ſo injurious to our honour, and ſo inconſiſtent with that regard which he has always profeſſed for the Company. I flatter myſelf however, that the reports will have no effect with you, but that the friendſhip which has commenced between you and the Company, will increaſe, and laſt for ever. You may depend upon my punctual performance of the Treaty; and though you have thought it expedient for the preſent, to deſire our Troops may not be ſent to you, you may reſt aſſured that they ſhall always be kept ready for your ſervice, and that you may command their aſſiſtance at any time you think proper.

With reſpect to the *Guntoor* Circar, I ſhall undoubtedly fulfil my engagements, by accounting annually with you for the revenues, after paying the expences of the Troops ſet apart for your aſſiſtance, agreeably to the Treaty. I have written to the Aumildar, concerning the balances due to you from the Zemindars, and will give the neceſſary orders that they be paid to you by inſtalments, in ſuch manner as not to interfere with the revenue; which I have no doubt you will approve. I cannot aſſign any reaſon why your tunkas and orders upon the Zemindars were not attended to, unleſs it proceeded from your own ſervants, who, ſeeing their authority about to expire, might, and I believe did, collect every thing they could. As to Lieutenant *Douglas*, our Commanding Officer there, we gave him poſitive orders to aſſiſt in the recovery of your demands, which we are ſure he would not diſregard. I ſhall be moſt happy to hear that you are freed from all your troubles, and placed in a

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ſtate of proſperity, which may daily increaſe during your whole life. Write me of your welfare, that I may rejoice. What can I ſay more?

No. 166. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 5th December 1779: received 6th ditto.

I herewith ſend you two Letters from the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, brought here by one of his ſervants; one of them is addreſſed to you, and the other to myſelf, and I requeſt the latter may be returned to me after you have read it.

Letter from the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, to the Governor; no date.

In conſideration of my friendſhip towards the Company, and the requeſt made by them to deliver up the *Guntoor* Circar for a certain rent, I demanded a body of two thouſand men for the protection of my country; theſe Troops did not arrive in time, and his Highneſs being highly diſpleaſed, repeatedly iſſued commands to me, that it was very improper to give up the Circar of *Guntoor* to the Engliſh; and that if I regarded his pleaſure, I ſhould take back the Circar of *Guntoor*, and countermand my application for the Engliſh Troops; that in that caſe he might continue his friendſhip, but if I did not agree to thoſe terms, he would be my Enemy: *Hyder Ally Cawn*, on the other ſide, is diſpleaſed for the ſame reaſon, and has given orders to his people to ſeize and poſſeſs themſelves of my country. You have been informed of all this, and of my ſituation, which has been explained at large in former Letters, and now my life and government are in danger. For three or four months I waited in expectation of the Company's Troops, and the perſon ſent by the Company to his Highneſs did not endeavour to reconcile this buſineſs to him, which might have ſet aſide all his doubts; nothing has been ſaid by you or me tending to the detriment of his Highneſs's affairs, or of *Hyder Ally Cawn*. After the exploſion of the powder magazine in the fort, a magazine of ſtores and grain took fire and was deſtroyed, and my affairs were reduced to the loweſt ebb: this misfortune, and the difficulties I and the people left with me were brought to, beſides the clamours raiſed by the Soucars, and others whoſe tunkas on the *Guntoor* Circars were not diſcharged, altogether rendered my ſituation very diſtreſſing: the ſupplies of proviſions were cut off, and I had no authority left whatever: my ſituation is not to be deſcribed. There was no other remedy but to comply with his Highneſs's commands, for I had nothing left. I had put an entire confidence in the Company's friendſhip and word, but as things have happened, I am under the neceſſity, conſidering my ſituation, of writing to you in compliance to his Highneſs's commands; that I expect from the friendſhip of the Company that they will relinquiſh the Circar of *Guntoor*, and recal the Troops they intended to ſend me; this will put an end to the troubles on both ſides, or elſe my life and government are in danger; you will therefore, agreeable to my requeſt, deliver back to me the Circar of *Guntoor*, and ſtop the march of the Troops; on this depends my ſafety. You will know the particulars from *Caga Saud Ulla Cawn*. What ſhall I ſay more?

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 30th December 1779.

Extract of the Preſident's Minute:

I have alſo to recommend to the Committee, that an account of the conduct of *Bazalet Jung*, and what paſſed in conſequence of his ſeveral Letters, with reſpect to our Troops, be tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council.

Colonel *Baillie* writes, that there is at preſent not the leaſt appearance of troubles in the quarters where the Troops under his command are now ſtationed; but as the times are ſo unſettled, and we are not certain what movements may be made, either by the Nizam or *Hyder Ally*, it may be neceſſary to caution Colonel *Baillie* to be on his guard, and, in caſe of any attempts being made againſt the *Guntoor* Circar, or any other of the Circars, the Troops aſſembled at *Ellore*, after leaving a ſufficient Garriſon there, may have directions to join him, in order to ſtrengthen his detachment, and move as occaſion may require, for the ſecurity of the Northern Diſtricts; the Sepoys alſo, under Lieutenant *Douglas*, may be held in readineſs. The orders to Colonel *Baillie* ſhould be only to protect our preſent poſſeſſions, and not to act offenſively againſt any Power, without our poſitive orders.

The Committee approve of the Preſident's ſentiments, and deſire him to conſider of the proper mode of having ſecurity ready to tender to the Nizam, in caſe we ſhould be called upon for the ſpeedy payment of the Peſhcuſh.

Agreed alſo, That Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* be empowered, in caſe of any movement towards the *Guntoor* Circar, either from the Nizam or *Hyder Ally*, to call for the Sepoys under Lieutenant *Douglas*, and for as many Sepoys as can be ſpared from the *Maſulipatam* Diſtrict; and that the neceſſary Letters be written, conformably to the Preſident's recommendation.

Agreed, That the Gentlemen at *Bengal* be informed of our proceedings in regard to the *Guntoor* Circar.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

No. 171. To *Bazalet Jung*; dated 28th December 1779.

I received the Letter you were pleaſed to write me (without date) giving an account of your affairs, the diſappointment and diſtreſs you have ſuffered by our Troops not marching in proper time to your aſſiſtance, the engagements you were, in conſequence, obliged to enter into with the Nizam, and the neceſſity you were under in conſequence of thoſe engagements, of requiring us to deliver up to you the *Guntoor* Diſtrict; all which I perfectly underſtand. I have often repeated, and do now aſſure you, of the ſincere concern I feel for the misfortunes you have ſuſtained; and you will, I think, do me the juſtice to believe, that, as far as depended upon me, every thing was done to relieve you, agreeable to my promiſes. It were unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, becauſe a delay happened in the march of our Troops, partly owing to the difficulty they met with in procuring proviſions, bullocks, &c. from your people, and partly owing to cauſes which could neither be foreſeen nor prevented, that there has been remiſſneſs in performing the Treaty. The intention, in this caſe, only ſhould be conſidered, and not any untoward circumſtances that may have happened to fruſtrate that intention.

It is with much ſurprize and concern I find, by your Letter, that the Nizam has expreſſed himſelf in terms ſo hoſtile and diſreſpectful to the Engliſh, his Friends and Allies. This, I apprehend, muſt have ariſen from ſome miſconception, or from the evil reports of thoſe who wiſh to create a difference between us. As to the *Guntoor* Circar, you are well acquainted with the reaſons which induced this Government, ſome years ago, to requeſt the French might have no footing in it. Frequent applications were made to the Nizam on this ſubject, to little purpoſe; but, from a deſire of living on terms of friendſhip with him and with you, we did not purſue any other meaſures but thoſe of friendſhip. At length, the propoſal made by you, of renting the *Guntoor* Circar to the Company, on certain conditions, ſeemed calculated to remove all objections; and I cannot poſſibly ſee any good reaſons why the Nizam ſhould now raiſe difficulties on the ſubject. Our part of the agreement, on this occaſion, has been, and will be, punctually performed. The ſurplus revenue, after deducting the expence of the Troops and Sibendy kept for the protection of the country, will be faithfully remitted. An ac-

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count of the expence already incurred for theſe ſervices, and of what may ariſe in future, with an account of the revenue, ſhall, at proper ſtated times, be ſent to you, that you may be convinced we have not the leaſt idea of benefiting by the agreement, or of adding to the diſtreſs you labour under.

Immediately on the receipt of your Letter deſiring me to ſtop the march of the Troops, they were ordered to halt, and return to *Innaconda*; and this, I have no doubt, will be conſidered as a proof of my deſire to comply with your wiſhes, and remove from the mind of your Brother every idea of a deſign, on our part, to interrupt the peace of his government. Our Troops ſtill remain on the borders of the *Guntoor* Circar with no deſign but to prevent troubles; and if you have no further occaſion for them, we ſhall ſoon order them into quarters. May your proſperity and happineſs be ever increaſing! What can I ſay more?

Cha' Oakley, Sec'y.

[For a fuller account of this ſubject, ſee Appendix to the Second Report, No. 79 to 94, incluſive.]

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 23d October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Tho' Rumbold*, Baronet,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K.B.
Charles Smith.

THE Preſident acquaints the Committee, that the critical ſituation of our affairs with *Hyder Ally*, induced him lately to take a ſtep in the view of ſounding the real intentions of that Power, which he deemed it incumbent on him even to conceal from the knowledge of the Committee; and he hopes the expediency of ſuch a conduct will be juſtified by the nature of the information he wanted to procure. He then goes on to obſerve, That the Letters and Meſſages received from *Hyder Ally* ſince we undertook the expedition againſt *Mahé*, and formed an alliance with *Bazalet Jung*, had been couched in terms ſo hoſtile and unfriendly, that he could hardly conceive they were the genuine productions of *Hyder*; and as it is well known the Nabob's enmity to *Hyder Ally* is ſuch, that he would avail himſelf of every occaſion that might offer of promoting a rupture, he (the Preſident) thought it not impoſſible but that *Hyder*'s Vakeel here might have been tempted to prevent or exceed the intentions of his Maſter in his repreſentations to this Government, and particularly as he (the Preſident) ſaw no juſt cauſe that *Hyder* had to quarrel with us, and bring on a War, ſo contrary to his true intereſt. Under the influence of theſe doubts and opinions, he judged it expedient to ſend a perſon privately to *Hyder Ally* with a Letter from himſelf, (which is entered in C. C. No. 139.) deſiring an explicit declaration of *Hyder*'s real intentions towards the Company and *Carnatic*. The perſon (Mr. *Swartz*) went accordingly, and was received with great civility by *Hyder*; who at his departure gave him a Letter in anſwer to the Preſident's (which is entered in C. C. No. 142.) by which he (the Preſident) has too much reaſon to apprehend that *Hyder*'s intentions are really ſuch as they have for ſome time appeared from his Letters; hoſtile both againſt the Company and the *Carnatic*, and that it is become neceſſary for the Committee to guard as much as poſſible againſt the conſequences.

The Letter from the Preſident to *Hyder Ally*, and the Anſwer, together with another Letter from *Hyder* ſince received, as entered in C. C. No. 142, being now read, the Committee agreed in opinion with the Preſident, concerning the deſigns of *Hyder*; and that the only meaſure which can yet be taken with propriety, is to adviſe the Gentlemen at *Bengal* of our ſentiments on this ſubject; which is accordingly agreed to: Agreed alſo, that Brigadier General *Goddard* be informed of our ſituation with *Hyder*, which we hope will prove a ſtrong inducement to him, to come to an accommodation with the Marattas upon any reaſonable terms.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 139 From *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor, in anſwer to his Letter of the dated 28th September 1779: received 16th October ditto.

I have received your Letter, the contents of which I underſtand. Mr. *Swartz* came here ſome time ago, and brought me a Letter from you, to which I have wrote an Anſwer, containing all the particulars, and ſent it to you by him. He alſo will acquaint you with ſeveral matters which I have charged him with. I return you the Engliſh Letter for Mr. *Swartz*, which came incloſed in your's. Continue to write me of your welfare. What ſhall I ſay more?

No. 142. Copy of a Letter from the Governor to the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*; dated 11th June 1779.

After the uſual compliments;

Since my arrival from *Europe*, I have wrote you ſeveral friendly Letters, to which I have received Anſwers; but thoſe have cauſed me great aſtoniſhment, for I cannot conceive you would write to me in the manner they are expreſſed, after the friendly profeſſions I had made.

As many intereſted and deſigning people do not wiſh that there ſhould be a friendly alliance between you and the Company, I am led to think ſuch people have been at pains to diſturb the friendſhip between us, and prevent the union which we both have at heart, from taking place; in order therefore to aſſure myſelf of your real intentions, and to remove every doubt from my mind, I have thought of one expedient, which is to ſend a man in whom I can confide, who will proceed to you without pomp or numerous attendants, and whoſe going to you is a ſecret to every body here, even to *Vinajee Pundit*, your Vakeel. By this perſon I have ſent the copies of all the Letters received from you, and of all I have wrote to you ſince my arrival, that he may explain to you every part of them; if, notwithſtanding the ſincerity of my profeſſions, you ſtill do not wiſh to be friendly connected with us, you will acquaint the perſon whom I have ſent with your ſentiments, and permit him to return to this country; but if it is your deſire to enter into the bonds of friendſhip with the Company, you may put an entire reliance on the perſon whom I have ſent to you, who will communicate to you every particular you may be deſirous of knowing.

It is my wiſh in that caſe, as I before wrote to you, to meet you in any convenient place you may think proper, as nothing will tend more to the cement of our friendſhip, than an interview in which I can aſſure you perſonally of the ſincerity of my intentions, and uſe the moſt proper expedients to render our friendſhip laſting. If, however, ſuch a meeting cannot be effected, a perſon of rank ſhall be ſent to you from hence to treat with you, and bring matters to a concluſion. May our friendſhip ever increaſe!

Upon a Rickah:

I intended by the bearer to have ſent you a few things as tokens of my friendſhip, but conſidering it might render his going too public, I have deferred ſending them till another oportunity.

From *Hyder Ally Cawn* to the Governor; no date: received by Mr. *Swartz*.

I had the pleaſure of receiving your Letter by Mr. *Swartz*, containing friendly aſſurances towards me, and a deſire that the friendſhip between the Company and me may be firmly eſtabliſhed.

Before

Before this, when a friendſhip confirmed by a ſolid Treaty ſubſiſted between the Company and me, I imagined it would increaſe daily, and would not be broke through. You, ſetting aſide all faith and Treaties of the Company, have lately ſent Troops againſt *Mahé*, a French factory ſituated within my territories, and plundered it; and beſides this, have committed depredations in the countries of *Callicut* and *Cahingury*, belonging to me. There are, in my countries, many factories belonging to the Engliſh, Germans, Dutch, Portugueze, Danes, and others, amongſt thoſe, was one belonging to the French, and there was no perſon in it who bore the profeſſion of arms; it was no more than a factory, ſuch as the Engliſh, on many places of the ſea-coaſt. Notwithſtanding the friendſhip ſubſiſting between the Company and me, you, without any regard or conſideration for it, ſent your Troops, and deſtroyed the factory of the French, and pillaged the countries belonging to me: what propriety was there in this? You wrote me beſides, that you were ſending a body of your Troops to the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, from which I conceive you pay no regard to the friendſhip between the Company and me, but do whatever your inclination leads you to, and are determined at any rate to break with me. I was convinced, that the King of *England* and the Company were one, and that there would not be the ſmalleſt deviation from the Treaties made by the Company; but I now think otherwiſe from your proceedings.

Having a conſideration for the friendſhip of the King of *England* and the Company, I have made no repriſals, or taken any revenge till this time: it is no matter; but if you, henceforth forgetting all Treaties and engagements of the Company, ſtill are intent on breaking with me, what advantage can attend writing to you? You are acquainted with every thing; it is right to act in all things with prudence and foreſight.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 30th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith.

Wrote and diſpatched the following Letters:

To Brigadier General *Goddard*, commanding the Army at *Surat*.

Sir,

We have ſent orders to Colonel *Braithwaite*, who commands our Troops at *Mahé*, to obey any requiſition you may find it neceſſary to make for the aſſiſtance of thoſe Troops; but we ſincerely hope the neceſſity will be avoided, by the concluſion of an honourable Treaty with the Marattas.

We think it proper to acquaint you, that from the conduct of *Hyder Ally*, we have the greateſt reaſon to ſuppoſe his intentions are hoſtile towards the Company, and that he means to take the firſt favourable occaſion of breaking with them. Thus circumſtanced, a peace with the Maratta State is the moſt deſirable thing that can happen, as it will enable us effectually to keep *Hyder* in awe, and to employ our arms at the ſame time in ſuch manner as the great national War in which we are engaged may require. We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 30th Oct. 1779.

Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We had the honour to receive your Letter of the 2d Auguſt, acquainting us with your reaſons for thinking the French at the Iſlands meditated an attack on *Bombay*, and requeſting in conſequence that we would detach 1 battalion of Europeans, 3 battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery-men, from the Forces belonging to this Preſidency, to join the Army commanded by Brigadier General *Goddard*, whom you ſhould direct to grant the moſt effectual ſupport in his power to the Government of *Bombay*, for defeating any hoſtile attempt that might be made againſt it.

We ſhall always be led by inclination as well as duty to co-operate with you to the utmoſt of our power, in any plan you may adopt for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions; but in the preſent caſe we hope there will be no neceſſity for ſuch great ſuccour to aſſiſt the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, even ſhould they be attacked, ſince we underſtand their force is very equal to their protection againſt any attempt which can be made by the French in their preſent ſtate; and we are inclined ourſelves to this opinion, becauſe, having written to *Bombay* in the month of July, to inform the Preſident and Council of the intelligence we had received relative to the intentions of the French, they do not in their Letter expreſs the leaſt apprehenſion of the inſufficiency of their force; and we ſhould ſuppoſe further that, had they any doubt upon this head, they would have detained the *Aſia* man of war, which was ſent from *England* purpoſely to aſſiſt in their defence, and which they allowed to leave *Bombay* in the month of Auguſt to join the Admiral at this place.

But after all, we conceive the French at the Iſlands will not be in a condition to fit out an armament againſt *Bombay* without conſiderable ſupport from *France*; and, as far as we can learn from private intelligence, their Nation is too much preſſed, both in *Europe* and in the *Weſt Indies*, to ſpare any reinforcement for this country.

Brigadier General *Goddard*, in a Letter to General Sir *Hector Munro*, dated the 15th Auguſt, after mentioning that he is authorized to make a requiſition of the force at *Mahé*, writes as follows:

"At preſent it is impoſſible for me to ſpeak with any certainty of the effect of my negociation with the Maratta State, or whether I may have occaſion for this reinforcement or not; but as I ſhall make it my care to have every thing prepared for the tranſportation of the Troops, I hope you will previouſly furniſh the Officer who is in charge of them with ſuch directions as may prevent any cauſe of delay on their embarkation, ſhould circumſtances ſo fall out as to render their junction neceſſary."

We have likewiſe a Letter from our Commandant at *Mahé*, incloſing a copy of one from the Governor at *Bombay* to him; in which he writes, "Brigadier General *Goddard* acquaints me, that he has been adviſed from *Bengal*, that the Troops under your command at *Mahé* will be inſtructed to obey his requiſition to join his Army, ſhould he not ſucceed in his negociations with the Marattas." From theſe Letters we ſhould conceive that the object of the reinforcement was principally to ſupport General *Goddard*'s negociations with the Marattas; and this is a matter of ſo much importance, that we are diſpoſed heartily to concur with you in promoting it. We have ſent directions to Colonel *Braithwaite* to obey any requiſition that may be made by Brigadier General *Goddard* for the Troops at *Mahé*, which conſiſts of one company of European Infantry, one company of Artillery, ſix companies of Grenadiers, and eight companies of Battalion Sepoys. We think it proper to mention, however, that we are under ſome doubt whether the Sepoys will voluntarily embark on this new ſervice, ſince they have been abſent from the Coaſt nine months; and though they went to *Mahé* by ſea with uncommon alacrity, and have behaved remarkably well there, they have expreſſed an anxious deſire to return to the Coaſt; and Colonel *Braithwaite* wrote ſome time ago, that if they were detained from it much longer, he was apprehenſive that a conſiderable number might deſert; we are inclined, notwithſtanding, to believe they will be prevailed upon

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upon to proceed if the ſervice require it; but ſhould they not, we have deſired the earlieſt notice may be given us, that we may replace them by an equal number, which can be ſent from our Southern Garriſons to *Anjengo* in a very ſhort time, and embarked from thence.

As to any further reinforcement than the above, we are apprehenſive our ſituation will not admit of it, at leaſt for the preſent. The non-arrival of the Fleet leaves us at great uncertainty concerning the King's Troops; and the ſeaſon being now too late for the ſhips to come on the Coaſt, we are at a loſs where or when to expect them: we muſt obſerve likewiſe, that the conduct of *Hyder Ally* makes it abſolutely neceſſary for us to be as much as poſſible on our guard. The language he holds in his correſpondence, and the great preparations he is making for War, manifeſt a ſtrong inclination of breaking with the Company; and we believe he only waits a favourable conjuncture, which may ſoon happen, to declare himſelf openly. A War with *Hyder*, let the event be ever ſo ſucceſsful on our part, would diſtreſs the *Carnatic* beyond meaſure, and prove a moſt expenſive burthen on the Company. We ſincerely hope therefore, that General *Goddard* may conclude a Treaty with the Marattas, and thereby free the Company from the neceſſity of engaging with the two moſt powerful States of *India* at the ſame time, which will probably be the caſe if he fails in his negociation. Should we be at peace with the Marattas, *Hyder* will be afraid to diſturb us, for, excluſive of our ſtrength, which he could then have no hope of reſiſting, the determined enmity which the Marattas bear him, would induce him rather to court our friendſhip, than to provoke us into hoſtilities; and this is preciſely the ſtate wherein only we can expect to preſerve that tranquillity in the *Carnatic*, which is ſo neceſſary to the affairs of the Company at all times, but eſpecially at this juncture.

We earneſtly requeſt you will be pleaſed to ſend, by the firſt proper conveyance, the five lacks of Rupees which we were promiſed, as in Auguſt laſt, and which are much wanted to anſwer our extraordinary demands.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort St. George,
30th Oct. 1779.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

MINUTES of laſt Committee read; and approved.

Read the following Letter from Sir *Eyre Coote*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The multiplicity of buſineſs I have been engaged in, has prevented me from embracing an earlier opportunity of informing you of my arrival here the 23d of laſt month, and of my taking my ſeat at the Board the next day, when I ſtated the neceſſity there was, for ſupplying you in ſome degree adequate to the great expences I was ſenſible you were at, and the difficulties which you would certainly be reduced to, for want of a treaſury, ſhould *Hyder* put his threats in execution by entering the *Carnatic*.

I have now the pleaſure to acquaint you, that the Governor General and Council have agreed to ſend fifteen lacks of Rupees for the ſupporting of the Government, ten of which are to be embarked on board the *Stafford*, Captain *Hutchinſon*, who will have orders to proceed directly to *Madras*; the remaining five will be ſent by ſome other ſhips, in order to divide the riſk.

As much will depend upon the Letters that were expected from *Hyder Ally* when I left *Fort Saint George*, I am moſt anxious to know the contents of them, flattering myſelf, from the converſation I had with his Vakeel, that they will prove ſatisfactory.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
10th November 1779.

Mr. *Smith* delivers in the following Minute:

Having attentively conſidered what the Preſident has entered on our Minutes of the 23d ultimo, relative to his having ſent the Rev. Mr. *Swartz* with a Letter to *Hyder Ally*, together with the Anſwer which the Prince has returned; and having from thence extended my reflections to the general ſituation of the Company's affairs here, and connected it with the probability of an approaching rupture with *Hyder Ally*; I have thought it incumbent on me, to embrace the earlieſt opportunity of ſubmitting to the Committee my opinion on theſe important ſubjects. Of all the Country Princes, *Hyder Ally* is by far the moſt powerful and moſt dangerous: his connections with the French; his having ſea-ports to introduce Troops and military ſtores; his Army, conſiſting of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, in number and diſcipline greatly ſuperior to any other Country Power, with abundance of cannon and ſmall arms; theſe advantages, added to a rich treaſury, his vicinity to the *Carnatic*, and laſtly, the abilities and enterpriſing ſpirit by which he has attained his greatneſs; threaten the moſt fatal conſequences, unleſs his power be circumſcribed, while it remains in ours to effect it. In ſupport of what I have ſaid, as to the power and reſources of *Hyder Ally*, I ſhall quote part of a Letter from Lord *Clive*, in the month of October 1766, to the then Preſident here. "The chief ſtrength of the Marattas is Horſe, the chief ſtrength of *Hyder Ally* is Infantry, cannon, and ſmall arms; from the one you have nothing to apprehend but ravages, and plundering, and loſs of revenue; from the other, *extirpation*."

The reducing ſo aſpiring a man as *Hyder Ally* within bounds, muſt be attempted ſooner or later.

I would not be underſtood to recommend precipitating the Company into a War with *Hyder Ally* in the preſent juncture, but I doubt, if it can be avoided. *Hyder*'s conduct with regard to *Mahé*, his ſending ſhips to the *Mauritius*, the reduction of *Cuddapah*, his late conduct reſpecting Colonel *Harpur*'s detachment, his advancing part of his Troops towards *Adoni*, and the ſtile and ſpirit of his Letter by Mr. *Swartz*, indicate, in my opinion, the moſt hoſtile intentions, and ſcarcely leave us any option, unleſs we recede from our engagements with *Bazalet Jung*, and leave him to fall a ſacrifice to his reliance on our faith. Such being my opinion of our preſent ſituation with regard to *Hyder Ally*, I ſhall proceed to explain myſelf further, and offer my beſt advice reſpecting our future conduct, not ſo much from a preſumption that I ſhall ſuggeſt any thing to the Committee that has not already occurred to them, as for my own juſtification hereafter, that in caſe of any adverſe fortune, my Employers may have no cauſe to reproach me with having been inattentive to their concerns. In this (in my mind) critical period, I muſt confeſs, I have been much too ſanguine in my ideas of *Hyder*'s diſpoſition towards us; however, being now convinced of his hoſtile intentions, if the Committee are of the ſame opinion, I would propoſe, that the Government General at *Bengal* ſhould be immediately adviſed of it, as alſo of our ſituation at large, and every circumſtance pointed out that can enable them to form a judgment on a ſubject of ſuch importance. I would alſo recommend the conſidering of ſome plan to be ſubmitted to the Government General, for proſecuting the War with vigour, and bringing

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it to an happy and ſpeedy concluſion, which, I am perſuaded, the united ſtrength of the three Preſidencies, properly directed, would eaſily effect. In the mean while, I think, we ſhould lay our account with the Army's taking the field in January, and employ every hour between this time and the end of December, in making the neceſſary preparations for that purpoſe; and as the detachment now under orders to proceed to *Bazalet Jung*, will be of the utmoſt importance, either for ſtopping *Hyder*'s progreſs in that quarter, or acting offenſively againſt him, in caſe he ſhould oblige us to do ſo, I propoſe that it be ſtrengthened by drafting from the Northern Circars at leaſt two other battalions, which I imagine might well be ſpared, as the detachment will then afford real protection to thoſe provinces, while Sepoys, ſcattered and divided as they are at preſent, cannot.

Laſtly, I ſubmit to the Committee, the propriety of collecting a ſtrong body of Troops, immediately to be cantoned at *Conjeveram* or *Vellore*, and held in readineſs to act as occaſion may require.

Charles Smith.

The Committee are of opinion, that they have already taken the only meaſures in their power, in conſequence of the late intelligence received from *Hyder Ally*, by writing fully to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* on the ſubject, and by collecting their Troops as much together as poſſible, to defend the country in caſe of invaſion. Their future conduct muſt depend on what the Gentlemen at *Bengal* may determine: upon the preſent critical ſituation of affairs, and until they know what part thoſe Gentlemen mean to take, they can purſue no active meaſures whatſoever, being entirely without the reſources neceſſary for putting any conſiderable body of men into the field. As to reinforcing Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*'s detachment, ſuch a meaſure, ſhould it be found neceſſary, may be taken hereafter.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 10th November 1779.

DISPATCHED the following to *Bengal*:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, and Council, at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since we had the honour of writing to you laſt, we have received Letters from General *Goddard*, and from the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, intimating a great probability that hoſtilities will take place with the Marattas, and adviſing, that requiſition has been made to our Commandant at *Mahé*, to proceed as ſoon as poſſible, with his force to *Surat*.

In this ſtate of affairs on the other Coaſt, we deem it expedient to mention to you again, the critical ſituation we are in with reſpect to *Hyder Ally*, whoſe conduct of late has given us the ſtrongeſt reaſons to believe that his intentions are hoſtile towards the Company and the *Carnatic*, and that he will ſeize the firſt favourable occaſion of breaking with us. The cauſe of his reſentment, as appears from his letters, is the attack made on the French at *Mahé*, who, he ſays, were under his protection; and our alliance with *Bazalet Jung*, which has given ſome check to his views of conqueſt in that quarter.

Hyder Ally has long been making warlike preparations, and his force now aſſembled at *Seringapatam* conſiſts, as we are informed, of 30,000 Sepoys and 20,000 Horſe; ſhould he enter the *Carnatic*, it will be totally out of our power to prevent the ravages of his Horſe, and of courſe we muſt ſuffer materially in our revenues, and in the means of ſupporting our expences of every kind; in this caſe, the only dependance we ſhall have, will be on the efforts you will be able to make in our favour, and we could wiſh to know in time what aſſiſtance we may rely on, that our meaſures may be taken accordingly.

If we be compelled to act againſt *Hyder*, the beſt, and indeed the only proper plan in our opinion, is to ſend a conſiderable force by ſea to *Mangalore*, to penetrate by that way to *Seringapatam*, and at once to lay ſiege to his capital; this would be the moſt effectual means of diſtreſſing *Hyder*, and putting an end to the War. The communication between *Mangalore* and *Seringapatam*, might be kept open, and our Troops ſupplied from the ſea with proviſions and other neceſſaries, with much leſs riſk from *Hyder*'s Cavalry than by any other mode that could be adopted.

We think it proper to mention to you, that the force we have ſent into *Bazalet Jung*'s country to protect it, in conſequence of our engagements, conſiſts of one company and a half of European Artillery, two companies of Infantry, and four battalions of Sepoys. Theſe Troops added to the detachment ordered to join General *Goddard* from *Mahé*, make up no inconſiderable part of our Army, and the force we have left, unleſs reinforced by the battalion of King's Troops expected from *England*, will be by no means adequate to the various ſervices required from them.

Having in this and former Letters, fully acquainted you with our ſituation, we ſhall only expreſs our ſincere hope that the Company may at this critical juncture be freed from the greateſt inconvenience, if not danger, of maintaining a War againſt the two moſt powerful States in *India* at a time when their attention is ſufficiently taken up in guarding againſt the deſigns of a natural Enemy, who is waiting every opportunity to diſtreſs them; we think Peace with *Hyder* is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that we ſhall neglect no meaſures in our power to attain it; and we ſtill flatter ourſelves, that the Marattas may be brought to terms of accommodation; ſince the Propoſals for a Treaty with them, which you tranſmitted for our information, were ſo fair and equitable, ſuppoſing no other requiſition have been made, that we cannot be perſuaded they will finally reject them.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 29th November 1779.

Read a Letter from the Nabob, dated the 27th inſtant, as entered in C. C. No. 158. incloſing a paper of intelligence from his Agent at *Hydrabad*: which mentions, that a Treaty had been concluded between the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*, and acceded to by the Nizam, for uniting their forces, and commencing a general attack upon the Company's poſſeſſions in every part of *India*.

Agreed to acknowledge the receipt of the foregoing Letter from the Nabob; to acquaint him, that we have no account from any other quarter, of the proceedings mentioned in his paper of intelligence; and that they are ſo improbable, that we cannot give much credit to them. Nevertheleſs, ſhould any deſign of the nature therein mentioned be attempted, we ſhall always be ready to defend his country, as well as the Company's poſſeſſions, againſt all invaders: and we have no doubt, with the ſupport he is able to give us, that we ſhall be ſtrong enough to diſappoint every effort that ſhall be made againſt us.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 161. To the Nabob; dated 2d December 1779.

I have received your Highneſs's Letter of the 27th November, with a copy of intelligence from the Court of *Nizam ud Dowlah*. I hope and believe that the facts therein mentioned have not taken place; and indeed ſuch an alliance is ſo improbable, and attended with ſo many difficulties, that I do not ſee how it can be effected At any event, however, I am in no pain for the conſequences ſaid to be propoſed from it; and I truſt, by the bleſſing

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of God, and the ſupport which your Highneſs is capable of affording, that the Company will maintain you in your poſſeſſions and authority, in ſpite of all the Powers of *Hindoſtan* united againſt you.

No. 168. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 14th December 1779: received 15th D°.

I ſend you incloſed a paper of intelligence which I have juſt received from *Poonah*. What ſhall I ſay more?

Intelligence ſent by *Raw Gee* at *Poonah*; dated 15th Zecayed, or 24 November 1779.

I have, in a former addreſs, acquainted your Highneſs that Colonel *Goddard* was coming here to have an interview with the *Pundit Purdhaun*.

Colonel *Goddard* was at *Bombay* on his way thither. I am ignorant of the ſubject of his conferences with the Gentlemen there; but I have heard Colonel *Goddard* and *Ragonaut Row* had diſagreed on account of ſome money matters. It had been ſettled that *Ragonaut Row* ſhould have ten anas, and the Engliſh the remaining ſix anas in the Rupee. And the Engliſh, at this time, demanded money of him for the expences of the Troops, and deſired him to raiſe Horſe. *Ragonaut Row* was diſpleaſed at this, and told them, he would give them what he had agreed for; and if they aſſiſted him in placing him in the Government of *Poonah*, they were to be at the expence of maintaining the Troops till that time: that it was to repay them that he had promiſed the ſix anas in the Rupee. Colonel *Goddard*, upon this, ordered the people, who had been ſent by *Ragonaut Row* to different places about *Surat*, to leave their ſtations; and he wrote to the *Pundit Purdhaun*, that it was his intention to reduce his country; that he was at liberty to ſend his Aumils, who had left the country through fear; and that he himſelf intended coming to him. *Anand Bbay*, the wife of *Ragonaut Row*, made up matters between him and the Engliſh, and ſatisfied Colonel *Goddard*, who returned to *Surat*, and ſent back to *Poonah Nebal Chund*, one of the Vakeels who had been ſent to him. *Nebal Chund* arrived at *Poonah* the ſame day that *Dewagee Pundit*, the Vakeel of *Mcodagee Boonſala*, had taken his leave of *Nana Pebu Newez*. The Letters of Colonel *Goddard*, and the meſſage he ſent by the Vakeel, contained an offer of renewing the Treaty made with Col. *Upton*; that nothing that had happened ſince ſhould be regarded; but that the Maratta Government ſhould make good one crore and twenty lacks of Rupees, which had been expended by the Engliſh; and that *Ragonaut Row* ſhould have a jaghire given him in the *Guzerat*.

The Maratta Miniſters and *Dewagee Pundit* conſulted together, and agreed, that as the troubles had laſted now ſeven years, during which they had not been at liberty to purſue their conqueſts, it would be better to ſettle matters at any rate. Shortly after *Sundee* and *Holkar* came to take leave of the *Dewajee Pundit*; he related to them the particulars of Colonel *Goddard*'s meſſage. *Sindee* anſwered, that it was unreaſonable, for the Engliſh made Treaties and broke them; and they had ſomething new every day. That notwithſtanding they had been defeated, they ſtill would not depart from their bad intentions, and it was therefore neceſſary to chaſtize them; that if they choſe to abide by the terms ſettled at *Tulicanoor*, it was well; but if not, they muſt ſuffer for it. He ſaid it was improper to treat with the Engliſh, for that they were a bad people, and would not fulfil their engagements; that he would take it upon himſelf to chaſtize them, and bring back *Ragonaut Row*.

Nana Peper Newez was ſilent upon this; and *Dewagee Pundit* took his leave, and went away. *Sindi* alſo returned to *Sam Cawen*, and *Holkar* went to *Wohar Canoon*. *Hurry Pundit* and *Nana Peker Newez* conſulted together, and agreed it would be better to ſettle matters agreeable to Colonel *Goddard*'s offer, but on condition that the Engliſh ſhould abide by the terms ſettled, and be ſincere: that with regard to the money they demanded, they ſhould tell them, that if they had expended money, it was by their own miſconduct; that they had broke the Treaty, and commenced the War themſelves. To whom was it that they were applying for money; that the Maratta Government had, by the conduct of the Engliſh towards them, been obliged to expend near three crores of Rupees; that they had loſt money of their principal Sudars, and a number of Horſe; and they had loſt every year a revenue of one crore of Rupees: that *Hyder* kept poſſeſſion of countries, which yielded an annual revenue of one crore more, having ſeized the opportunity to forward his affairs; that all this was owing to the Engliſh, who had broke the Peace, which they had agreed to keep: that ſtill they made no reprifals, but they were aſtoniſhed at the demand of money made of them: who was to repay them for the expences they had ſuſtained? with regard to *Ragonaut Row*'s jaghire, they agreed to tell Colonel *Goddard* that they would abide by what had been formerly ſettled on that account; and that *Ragonaut Row* might go and enjoy his jaghire at *Sanſri*.

Nanar Peker Nevez and *Hurry Pundit* gave all this in writing to *Nebali Chund*, and ſent him back to Colonel *Goddard* on the 29th of Showal. They told him privately at the ſame time, that they would give up ſome diſtricts, by way of aſſignment; and if the Engliſh inſiſted hard for a jaghire in *Guzerat*, for *Ragonaut Row*, they would conſent to it. They are now waiting for the anſwer to thoſe propoſals. They have heard ſince, that after the Vakeel arrived at *Surat*, Colonel *Goddard* went again to *Bombay*; and after conſulting for fifteen days with the Gentlemen there, he is come back to *Surat*. Although the ſums propoſed are agreeable to thoſe of the Engliſh, yet it is reported that the *Bombay* Gentlemen do not wiſh for Peace: they are deſirous of having a War; for Colonel *Goddard* told the Vakeel, that no Peace could take place, unleſs ready money was given. The Vakeel's Letter, however, has not yet been received. The *Row Pundit Purdhaun* waits for an anſwer to the Letter he has wrote to the Governor General of *Bengal*.

Hyder Ally Cawn's Vakeel, *Nurſing Row*, was here at *Poonah* ſome time, and delivered ſeveral Letters from his Maſter. He has ſettled for 25 lacks of Rupees; and he is alſo to give up certain countries to them. *Nurſing Row* has now been diſpatched with preſents of elephants, &c. to *Hyder*. It is reported that the Engliſh Troops who were going to *Adoni*, were forced to return, but the reaſon is not known. It is ſaid that *Hyder*'s Troops, to the number of 15,000, Horſe and Foot, have taken poſſeſſion of the country of *Adoni*; and that *Bazalet Jung* has wrote to his brother for aſſiſtance: that the Nabob *Nizam ud Doulah* has ſent his ſon with 5,000 Horſe, and the French in his ſervice, to *Bazalet Jung*. It appears that a rupture will take place between the Engliſh and *Hyder* this year. The French who were with *Bazalet Jung* ſent their Vakeels to the Maratta Miniſters, but they conſidering that their numbers were ſmall, and that they could be of no ſervice to them, but might give umbrage to the Engliſh, would give no countenance to them; for although the Engliſh were to blame, yet they would not do any thing to diſoblige them.

Sukaram Punait and *Boyapa Punſund* are ſtill confined in the ſame place. *Mero Pundit* has been allowed to come to *Ahmudnagur*, on account of ill health, but is now again ſent to the fort near that city. Some ſeditious people entertained a deſign of poſſeſſing themſelves of the fort, but the ſcheme was diſcovered, and ſome principal men were ſent from *Poonah* to ſettle matters there. Some of thoſe concerned in the plot have been puniſhed, and their wealth confiſcated for the uſe of the Government. *Hyder Ally Cawn* has agreed to pay the Maratta Government 25 lacks of Rupees. All the country on the South ſide of the *Jung Budra* is to remain in his poſſeſſion; he is alſo to keep thoſe on the other ſide of the *Kiſtnah*, on condition that he invades the *Carnatic*. If the Engliſh give up aſſiſting *Ragonaut Row*, and ſend their

their Troops to oppoſe *Hyder*, the Maratta Miniſters are to aſſiſt him with their Troops, or elſe they are to engage the Engliſh on the *Bombay* ſide, and *Hyder* is to attack them in the *Carnatic*. He is not to make Peace with the Engliſh, until matters are ſettled here with him; and the Maratta Miniſters on their part are not to make Peace with the Engliſh, till *Nizam ud Dowlah* and *Hyder*'s affairs are ſettled. They deſign alſo to ſend *Modagee Boonſala*'s Troops into the *Chicacole* and the other Circars, to prevent the *Bengal* Troops from coming to the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh.

Intelligence has been received here, that the Engliſh Troops marching to *Adoni*, through part of *Hyder*'s country, were oppoſed by *Hyder*'s Troops, and that they were obliged to retreat; that a rupture is now commenced between them; it is his intention firſt to poſſeſs himſelf of *Adoni*, and then to claim from the Engliſh the Circar of *Guntoor*.

The Maratta Miniſters were overjoyed at this intelligence, and have ſent a perſon along with *Nurſing Row* to ſettle matters with *Hyder*. They have wrote to *Bazalet Jung* in terms of reproach; they tell him, that ſince he knew the Engliſh were their Enemies, and thoſe of his brother, what could he mean by entering into friendſhip with them, and giving them his country? they adviſe him to drop all thoughts of it, ſince it is contrary to their pleaſure and that of his brother, or elſe that he may repent of it. It appears from the Letters and Meſſages ſent by *Hyder*, that his deſign is to go to War with the Engliſh.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 30th December 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honouable Sir *Tho' Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

Having fully conſidered our preſent ſituation with reſpect to the Country Powers, and having too much reaſon to ſuppoſe, from the declaration of the Governor General and Council, that a War with the Marattas is inevitable, as alſo from the intelligence we have received, that nothing yet has been ſettled by General *Goddard*, I ſubmit to the Committee's conſideration, whether our laſt Letters to Mr. *Hollond* and the Nizam are ſufficient to quiet the mind of the latter with reſpect to the Peſhcuſh, or of any deſigns on our part to diſturb the tranquillity of his Government; for as his attachment to the Maratta Miniſtry has been declared by himſelf, and it is probable in caſe of a War with them, will lead him to take an active part againſt us, eſpecially if what is ſo confidently aſſerted prove true, that *Hyder Ally* has entered into the combination, and concluded a Treaty with the Miniſtry at *Poonah*.

It is incumbent on us not to afford the leaſt pretence, either for the Nizam or the Governor General or Council, to impute to this Government any ſhare in the meaſures that have already involved the Company's affairs in difficulties, and are likely to be attended with a ruinous and deſtructive War. I have ſtill, from circumſtances, ſome faint hope that Peace may take place; but ſhould the contrary happen, and the Nizam inſiſt on the immediate payment of the Peſhcuſh, as a condition of his remaining neuter, whether it might not be proper, as our Treaſury is unable to ſupply ſuch a ſum, either to take meaſures for drawing bills on *Bengal*, or of giving Soucar ſecurity for the payment of the whole or part of the Peſhcuſh in a limited time?

It is with much concern I obſerve, from the Letters of Colonel *Braithwaite*, that the detachment under his command has not been able to proceed to join General *Goddard*; and notwithſtanding the critical ſituation we are in here with reſpect to *Hyder Ally*, and the conduct of the Nizam ſo much depends on the negociation of General *Goddard* with the Marattas, and the bringing about a Peace with them, which probably may be the ſooner obtained by his Army being ſtrengthened as much as poſſible, that I conſider it adviſable, at all events, to ſend him a reinforcement; and would recommend that one battalion of Europeans and one company of Artillery be ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs to embark immediately; that Captain *Panton*, of His Majeſty's ſhip *Sea Horſe*, be applied to receive part of them on board, and that we endeavour to procure ſuch country ſhips as are in the road, which, with the *Beſborough* and *Britannia* that may be daily expected, will carry the detachment immediately to *Surat*. I wiſh if poſſible to ſend a battalion or two of Sepoys, or order them to *Anjengo*, to be embarked from thence. Captain *Panton* informs me, that at this time of the year veſſels may reach *Surat* in twenty or twenty-five days from hence; and the ſituation of affairs appears to me in ſuch a light as to require ſome immediate exertion of our force. We may daily expect the arrival of Sir *Edward Hughes* with Lord *M'Leod*'s regiment on board, which will add conſiderably to our ſtrength on the Coaſt, and enable us to form a ſufficient Army to cover the different principal garriſons in the *Carnatic*. As for protecting the open country againſt the ravages of *Hyder*'s Horſe, ſhould he declare againſt us, it is impoſſible with our Troops, that are compoſed of Infantry only. Should General *Goddard* be ſo fortunate to conclude a Peace with the Marattas, we ſhall have nothing to apprehend from any quarter; but on the contrary, ſhould he be preſſed by the Marattas, and not be ſufficient in force to make head againſt them, the conſequences may be fatal to that part of *India* as well as deſtructive to the Company's intereſt in general. The ſhips from hence, with the detachment, may touch at *Mahé*, and convey the Troops from thence, if they have not proceeded before, to join General *Goddard*.

The Committee approve of the Preſident's Propoſitions, and Sir *Hector Munro* is deſired to conſider how the detachment can be moſt expeditiouſly formed. The Preſident is deſired alſo to conſult with Captain *Panton* upon the means of tranſporting it to *Surat*, and to obtain ſufficient tonnage for that purpoſe.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, 31 December 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Select Committee to the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*.

Incloſed we have the honour to ſend you a copy of an inteiligence paper lately received from *Poonah*, and tranſmitted to us by the Nabob. We have undoubted information that a Treaty of Peace and Alliance has taken place between the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
31ſt December 1779.

To *Alexander Panton*, Eſquire, Commander of His Majeſty's ſhip *Sea Horſe*.

Sir,

The ſituation of affairs on this Coaſt rendering it expedient that General *Goddard*, who commands the *Bengal* Army at *Surat*, ſhould be reinforced by a body of Troops from hence; we mean in conſequence to profit by the conveyances that may offer for ſending them; and we are induced earneſtly to requeſt you will on this occaſion aſſiſt us with His Majeſty's ſhip *Sea Horſe*, as the ſervice

is

APPENDIX. No. 40.

is important, and requires every effort that can be employed to support and countenance it.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Fort Saint George,
31ſt December 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 40.

Letter from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. to the Honourable the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company.

Fort Saint George, 21ſt Jan. 1780.

Gentlemen,

I TAKE the opportunity of a veſſel ſailing for *Buſſorah*, to inform you of the arrival of Sir *Edward Hughes* with his ſquadron, and ſeveral of your ſhips under his convoy. The *Reſolution* and *Hawke*, with his permiſſion, proceeded directly to *Bombay*. The *Talbot* has been ſome time arrived at *Bengal*. You have before been adviſed of the arrival here of the *Ganges* and *General Barker*. The *Ceres* and *Prince* parted company with the fleet at ſea, and are hourly expected. At preſent every thing is quiet in the *Carnatic*, and nothing very material has occurred ſince my laſt diſpatch to you, though we have been kept in continual alarm from various reports of the hoſtile intentions of *Hyder* and the Nizam; the former in conſequence of a Treaty which it is confidently affirmed (and ſcarcely admits of a doubt) he has entered into with the Maratta State; and the latter from the friendſhip which has long ſubſiſted between him and the Infant Peſhwah and Miniſters at *Poonah*. *Hyder* has hitherto contented himſelf with extending his conqueſts to the Northward, and has not yet invaded any part of the Nabob's poſſeſſions: every thing has been done on the part of this Government to keep him quiet. At ſo critical a juncture, and from the advance of the ſeaſon, without any movement having been made by *Hyder* towards the *Carnatic*, I am induced to think we ſhall remain in Peace, eſpecially as the very ſeaſonable arrival of the fleet with the Troops, will have a very powerful effect in preventing any deſign of an invaſion, if ſuch has been ſeriouſly intended. By the laſt accounts from General *Goddard*, he had not been able to bring about a Treaty with the Marattas on the terms he contended for; and viewing the ſituation of your affairs in that quarter, and how evidently neceſſary it appeared, that General *Goddard* ſhould be rendered as formidable as poſſible, either to give him ſufficient weight to bring about Peace, or to continue the War, if poſſible, to advantage, your Select Committee here, determined, notwithſtanding their apprehenſions of the Nizam and *Hyder*, to ſend a very conſiderable reinforcement to join General *Goddard* at *Surat*. Accordingly we embarked with all expedition, one battalion of Europeans, one company of Artillery, with ſix field-pieces, on board His Majeſty's ſhip *Sea Horſe*, the *Morning Star* (an armed veſſel belonging to the *Bombay* Preſidency) and the *Horſendon* (a country ſhip which we freighted for the purpoſe). They left the Coaſt the 11th inſtant, and we have no doubt but they will have a ſpeedy paſſage to *Surat*. The Troops from *Mahé* have alſo had orders to join General *Goddard*, and the 8th battalion of Sepoys will embark from *Pondicherry*, in a few days, for the ſame purpoſe. This conſiderable reinforcement, forming a junction ſo unexpectedly with the *Bengal* Army, cannot fail to give great weight to General *Goddard*'s negociations, and I hope will be productive of the beſt conſequences. A day or two after your Select Committee came to the reſolution of reinforcing General *Goddard*, the *Nymph* ſloop of war arrived with the intelligence that Sir *Edward Hughes* with the fleet, might be expected in the courſe of a fortnight, which relieved us in ſome meaſure from the apprehenſions entertained in conſequence of our parting with ſo large a force.

I have the honour to incloſe you ſome conſiderations on the preſent political ſtate of the Company in *India*. A taſk ſo liable to different opinions, on which ſo much has been already ſaid and wrote, I hope will meet from you with every favourable indulgence; and as it is impoſſible to enter into a work of ſuch a nature, without pointing out thoſe ſeeming errors that require to be remedied in the Company's political ſyſtem, I am to requeſt, that what I have found neceſſary to remark may not be conſtrued as reflections on any particular perſons, but intended only to point out thoſe defects that may in future be guarded againſt, and cannot come under conſideration at any time more eſſential, than when a renewal of charter may be expected, and regulations be formed by the Legiſlature, for the ſecurity and Government of the Company's valuable poſſeſſions in *Aſia*. I am further to entreat your indulgence, when I preſume to obſerve, that as the preſent Adminiſtration here has been conſidered, and declared by yourſelves, to be a temporary Government, in conſequence of the late unhappy diſputes in your Settlement, it will be very neceſſary in any future arrangement to conſider the character, abilities, and local knowledge of ſuch Gentlemen as may be intended for the Government of this Preſidency. For me to remark from my own obſervations or opinion, on thoſe who may appear, from many circumſtances, unequal to the taſk, would be a diſagreeable and invidious undertaking; but there can be no reaſon why I ſhould not point out to you diſtinguiſhed merit. A courſe of thirteen years ſervice; a continual employment in the offices of Civil and Military Secretary; a thorough acquaintance with your political intereſts; a knowledge of your affairs in different departments; great abilities, joined to moderation and firmneſs, with a proper zeal for your ſervice, demand from me, not only a recommendation, but as a duty I owe to your intereſts, to make you acquainted with thoſe requiſites in Mr. *Charles Oakley*, now the Secretary to the Select Committee; and whether you mean to make any appointments in your future Government from home, or from the ſervants on this Eſtabliſhment, he may be of real ſervice to your affairs, whenever you may think proper to bring him forward in your ſervice; which merits your early conſideration.

We ſhall diſpatch to you, in the courſe of next month, the *General Barker* and *Norfolk*, fully laden from hence, to be joined by the *Ganges* and *Talbot* from *Bengal*. They will proceed under convoy of one, if not more, of His Majeſty's ſhips.

It is with concern I acquaint you, that I ſhall be under the neceſſity of returning to *Europe* on the *General Barker*; ſuch has been my ſtate of health, that it has been matter of ſurprize my conſtitution has held out againſt the repeated ſevere attacks I have laboured under. I am the more particular in mentioning my ſituation, becauſe, whilſt I have the honour of receiving your approbation of my conduct, I quit the management of your concerns with great regret and reluctance; but was I to attempt remaining, and eſcape with life through the approaching hot ſeaſon, I could not do juſtice to your affairs, from my inability to give the neceſſary application to them.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and faithful
humble Servant,
Thomas Rumbold.

Fort Saint George,
21ſt January 1780.

Extract of Select Letter from *Fort St George*, dated the 3d April 1780, to the Court of Directors.

Par. 13. We have adviſed your Honours from time to time of the diſpoſition and movements of *Hyder Ally Cawn*. This Chief, by means of our wars with the Marattas, is now grown to a formidable height of power, and

and his genius is ſo aſpiring, his reſources ſo various, and his authority throughout every part of his dominions ſo completely eſtabliſhed, that he is become an object of the firſt importance in the political ſyſtem of *India*. Before we were engaged in diſputes with the Marattas, that Nation turned all its views to the reduction of *Hyder*'s power, and waged inceſſant war for that purpoſe: during many years, *Hyder*, by his ſuperior and active genius, was able to withſtand their attacks, which, though very powerful, were of no long continuance; and whenever the Marattas quitted his country, he always found means to recover himſelf ſo far as to be prepared for their next invaſion. In this perpetual ſcene of warfare between the two firſt Powers of *India*, your affairs were every where carried on in perfect peace and ſecurity, your Force was extremely reſpected, and your friendſhip courted by the parties at war, and by every other State in *India*. This then was ſo preciſely the ſituation in which we think you ſhould and might eaſily have continued, that nothing could poſſibly have altered it, but the engagements entered into by the Preſidency of *Bombay* with *Ragonaut Row*, and the different attempts formed in conſequence to overturn the reigning Government at *Poonah*: the views of the Maratta State became by thoſe means inſtantly turned from *Hyder* to the Company: they withdrew all their Forces from his country, to defend themſelves againſt the attacks of *Ragonaut Row* and his jallies. *Hyder* availed himſelf of this opportunity, to recover the conqueſts that had been made from him by the Marattas, and to recompence himſelf by conqueſts upon them; and the Marattas at length ſeeing no proſpect of relief from their Wars with the Engliſh, were forced to conclude a Treaty with *Hyder*, which they made offenſive, that they might have the benefit of his aſſiſtance againſt us.

Par. 14. Such have been the effects produced by our diſputes with the Marattas; and if the Country Powers were capable of taking all the advantages which a combination might give them againſt us, we ſhould ſeverely feel the weight of their united operations; but, fortunately for the Company, their jealouſy of each other is too ſtrong to admit of any ſincere or permanent agreement; and we think even now, notwithſtanding the provocations which the Marattas have received by our meaſures in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, were we to grant them any reaſonable terms of accommodations, they would inſtantly turn their arms againſt *Hyder*, and leave us once more to the enjoyment of that tranquillity which we experienced from their former conteſts with this Chief.

Par. 15. We adviſed you in our Letter of the 14th October, that we had made a Treaty with *Bazalet Jung* for obtaining poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar, and effecting the entire excluſion of the French Troops from that quarter. We informed you likewiſe, that by one of the articles of that Treaty, we had engaged, in conſideration of *Bazalet Jung*'s diſmiſſing the French Troops from his ſervice, to furniſh him with a detachment from our Army for the defence of his country. This detachment having been aſſembled in the *Guntoor* Circar in the month of June, and afterwards augmented by a reinforcement, that it might be more adequate to the purpoſes intended by it, was directed to proceed to *Adoni*, the capital of *Bazalet Jung*'s territories, by the ſhorteſt route. In the mean time, both the Nizam and *Hyder Ally* appeared extremely jealous of the connections formed between us and *Bazalet Jung*, and employed every artifice in their power to break it. The Nizam went even ſo far as to recommend in the ſtrongeſt terms to his brother, that the *Guntoor* Circar might be given at rent to *Hyder*; and *Hyder*, with a view of terrifying him into a ſubmiſſion, invaded his country with a conſiderable force, and threatened the entire conqueſt of it, if he heſitated to renounce his engagements with us. *Bazalet Jung* was much perplexed by thoſe efforts to counteract his meaſures, and though he ſeemed to be very anxious for the arrival of our detachment of Troops to defend him againſt the operations of *Hyder*, he was unable to make the neceſſary proviſion for their march, and they were detained on this account until the end of November before they could proceed. At length *Bazalet Jung*, cloſely preſſed on one hand by the danger which aſſailed him on the ſide of *Hyder Ally*, and on the other, by the earneſt importunities of his brother, wrote us a Letter, repreſenting the neceſſity he was under of ſubmitting for the preſent to the urgent ſituation of his affairs, and deſiring in conſequence that we would ſtop the march of the detachment, and cauſe the *Guntoor* Circar to be delivered back to him. The firſt part of his requeſt, about which he ſeemed the moſt anxious, we inſtantly complied with; but as we had done every thing in our power to fulfil the agreement, we deemed it by no means incumbent upon us to deliver up the Circar, and more eſpecially as we had ſo much reaſon to believe this diſtrict would in that caſe have been given to *Hyder*; we therefore acquainted him upon this article, that, as he had already granted the diſtrict to us on certain terms, which we had faithfully obſerved, we could not think of reſtoring it, but that we ſhould punctually account with him for the rent, and, after paying the expences which had been incurred by the Troops appointed for the defence of his country, remit the ſurplus to him; and we informed him likewiſe, that as this body of Troops would be ſtill kept apart for the original purpoſes of the Treaty, he might call for its aſſiſtance whenever the ſituation of his affairs ſhould require it. We have ſince, with a view of diminiſhing the expence of the detachment, ordered it into quarters at *Ellore*, where, upon its arrival all the extraordinary charges of batta, &c. will be ſtruck off.

Par. 16. We conſider it upon the whole, as a favourable circumſtance for the Company that our Troops were not required to proceed to *Adoni*, as from the part taken by *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam, to break our connection with *Bazalet Jung*, there was much reaſon to apprehend, if our Troops had marched on, that we might have been embroiled with one of theſe Powers. Indeed, we foreſaw the poſſibility of ſuch an event, when the firſt propoſals for a Treaty with *Bazalet Jung* were made, and certainly ſhould have avoided every kind of defenſive engagement, could we have accompliſhed the objects we had in view upon any other terms; but as the queſtion was ſimply reduced to this, whether we ſhould allow the French Troops to continue in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung* and the *Guntoor* Circar, and port of *Mootapillee* to be employed as the means of ſupporting, recruiting, and eſtabliſhing theſe our Enemies on the borders of your Northern poſſeſſions; or by giving that aſſiſtance ourſelves to *Bazalet Jung* which he derived from the French Troops, procure their entire diſmiſſion from that quarter, and by having the *Guntoor* Circar in our own hands, cut off every proſpect of reinforcement and ſupplies in future; it appeared to us, that a defenſive alliance, under theſe circumſtances, was by much the leaſt evil, and upon this principle we were governed in our proceedings. We think, however, that if *Bazalet Jung* ſhould, from the extreme jealouſy and averſion, which his brother and *Hyder Ally* ſeem to have entertained againſt this connection, be deſirous of annulling the defenſive articles in our Treaty, and permitting the reſt, which concerns only the renting of the *Guntoor* Circar to the Company, to ſtand as at preſent, ſuch a Propoſal ought by all means to be accepted; and we mean accordingly, if any opportunity of this kind ſhould offer, to releaſe you from thoſe articles, and thereby free you from the only embarraſſment which can poſſibly attend this connection.

Par. 65. In our Committee of the 5th January, you will find a Minute from the Preſident, accompanied by a copy of a Memorial from Mr. *Hare* and other Engliſh ſubjects, who came in a Daniſh veſſel from *Suez* for *India*; and having put into the port of *Calicut*, belonging to *Hyder Ally*, on the *Malabar* Coaſt, were made priſoners by his Manager there (*Sardar Cawn*) and thrown into confinement, where they were ſtripped of their property,

APPENDIX No 41.

and extremely ill uſed. The Memorial was addreſſed to *Sardar Cawn*, ſetting forth the circumſtances under which theſe perſons laboured, and ſoliciting their liberty, and the reſtoration of things which had been taken from them; but without effect. The Preſident conſidering this ill uſage as authorized, or at leaſt connived at by *Hyder* himſelf, propoſed that a Gentleman ſhould be diſpatched to him, to demand the releaſe of the Engliſh ſubjects; and Mr. *George Gray* was appointed for this ſervice. He ſet out accordingly the 14th January, but before he reached *Arnigaptam*, *Hyder* had releaſed them, and ſent them to *Madras*. Mr. *Gray* however proceeded, and delivered our Letter to *Hyder* on this ſubject; at the ſame time, giving him aſſurances of our diſpoſition to cultivate friendſhip and good underſtanding with him. *Hyder* made but an indifferent return to theſe overtures; he ſeemed neither deſirous of accepting our friendſhip, nor did he treat Mr. *Gray* with that civility which might have been expected. Mr. *Gray* very properly, as we had deſired him, ſeeing that his longer ſtay would anſwer no good purpoſe, and might provoke further ſlight, and perhaps inſult, deſired leave to depart; and accordingly returned to *Madras*, with a Letter from *Hyder*, which is entered in Country Correſpondence this year, No. 29. On reference to that Letter, and one from Mr. *Gray*, entered in our Minutes of the firſt inſtant, your Honours will be able to judge clearly of *Hyder*'s real diſpoſition towards us. His unfriendly, not to ſay inſolent conduct, could only have been encouraged by our preſent troubles with the Marattas, in which he finds ſo much advantage, as we have already explained.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to forward to you incloſed, a duplicate of my Letter of the 21ſt ult. (Original viâ *Buſſorah*. It is with infinite pleaſure I inform you, that from the late conduct of *Hyder Ally*, in releaſing ſome Gentlemen that were detained by his Officers on the *Malabar* Coaſt, and from his remaining till this time at *Seringapatam*, and withdrawing ſome Troops he had to the Northward, I can ſpeak with confidence, that there is no likelihood at preſent of any troubles on this ſide of *India*; and I flatter myſelf, that during the courſe of the ſeaſon, ſome effectual meaſures will be taken to bring about a Peace with the Marattas. It does not appear to me, that any great advantages can ariſe from a continuance of the War, which muſt be attended with very great expence, and exhauſt thoſe reſources that might be much better applied. The tranquillity that reigns at preſent in every Department of your Service on this Coaſt, leaves me nothing further to add in this Letter, as our addreſſes from the Select Committee and Board by the ſhips now under diſpatch, will inform you of every material tranſaction of your internal Government.

I am, with great reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
faithful humble Servant,
Thomas Rumbold.

Fort Saint George,
11th Feb. 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 41.

Extract of Fort *St. George* Select Conſultations, 24th April 1780.

PRESENT,

Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*,
S. Johnſon.

READ the following Letter from the Governor and Council at *Bombay*:

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee, at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Letters of the 17th December and 3d, 6th, and 7th of January, and have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that the detachment under Colonel *Brown* is ſafely arrived at *Surat*.

We are very ſenſible of your attention to the general intereſt of the Company, in furniſhing ſuch a reſpectable addition to the ſtrength of the Army under General *Goddard*; for as matters now ſtand, the proſecution of the War with vigour appears the only means of obtaining a ſafe and honourable Peace, for which, we wiſh with as much ardour as you do. General *Goddard* has hitherto proceeded with ſucceſs, having concluded a Treaty with *Futty Sing*, one of the Maratta Jaghiredars, by which he has engaged to ſeparate himſelf from the intereſt of our Enemies, and to make ſome valuable ceſſions of territory to the Company; in conſideration of which, our Army has reduced the city of *Ahmedabad*, the capital of the *Guzerat* province, which is to be put in poſſeſſion of *Futty Sing*, if he duly performs his engagements.

It will be of ſuch great importance to keep on terms with *Hyder Ally* during the continuance of the Maratta War, and to compoſe the troubles on the *Malabar* Coaſt, that we have determined to ſend a Gentleman to his Durbar, to endeavour to cultivate a good underſtanding with him. The preſent juncture ſeems favourable; and we have been the more encouraged to this meaſure, from ſome inſtances of attention ſhewn by the Nabob to this Government. Theſe are explained in the incloſed copy of a Letter from the Nabob to our Preſident; in which, having expreſſed ſome diſſatisfaction at the conduct of your Government, the Preſident has taken occaſion, in his anſwer (likewiſe incloſed) to offer the Nabob to make uſe of his good offices with you, Gentlemen, to remove all grounds of jealouſy; and we ſhall accordingly inſtruct Mr. *Horſley*, the Gentleman appointed to this commiſſion, to receive *Hyder*'s repreſentation on this ſubject, and to tranſmit them to you with ſuch information as he may be able to obtain of his diſpoſition towards the Honourable Company.

The European force under Major *Cotgrave* is not ſo conſiderable that a temporary delay in their joining General *Goddard* can be very material, eſpecially ſince the arrival of the reſpectable reinforcement under Colonel *Brown*; whereas, their quitting *Tellicherry* at this juncture, might greatly endanger the ſafety of that ſettlement, and give an unfavourable turn to the negociations, which appear likely to be opened with the Enemy. The moment circumſtances will admit, we will ſend the Europeans to join the Army, and return the Sepoys belonging to your Eſtabliſhment to *Anjengo*.

We are of opinion that Major *Cotgrave*, in ſome parts of his conduct at *Tellicherry*, has greatly exceeded the authority veſted in the military Commanding Officer in ſuch circumſtances by the late regulations; but as we hope, before your interference can take effect, that a ceſſation of the troubles will have left him at liberty to quit *Tellicherry*, it is not neceſſary to enter into particulars, though we flatter ourſelves, that on any future occaſions, the impropriety of ſending military forces to this Coaſt, independent of our authority, will not eſcape your obſervations.

We requeſt you will forward the incloſed packet to the Governor General and Council, by a ſafe and expeditious conveyance; and have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Wm Hornby,
D. Draper.

Bombay Caſtle,
7th March 1780.

Tranſlation

APPENDIX No. 41.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn Behader*; no date: received the 1ſt February 1780.

After compliments:

I have your Honour's friendly Letter, ſaying, my people do not permit the Engliſh ſhips to anchor in my ports, and deſiring that I will order the releaſe of nine or ten Engliſhmen, their Families, equipage, papers, &c. who are detained at *Calicut*; all which I obſerve; and anſwer, That a diſpute has ariſen upon account of the preſent Governor of *Madras*, his not obſerving the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and this Circar. He did ſend his Army to deſtroy the Settlement of *Mahé*, that is in my dominions; and he moreover wrote me, that he was aſſiſting *Bazalet Jung*, and had for that purpoſe ſent his Army to paſs to *Adoni* through my country. My people therefore oppoſing theſe Troops, occaſioned a ſkirmiſh between them; at laſt the ſaid Governor's Army retired back into its limits. Our limits are very cloſe; and his people do always moleſt mine, and ruin the country. In this unfriendly manner he treats me, and quarrels with my people always. I did thereupon order my Officers to take care of themſelves, and to fight with the Engliſh people, upon entering my country.

The country of Nairs came into my poſſeſſion five or ſix years ago; ſince which time the Reſident of *Tellicherry* has protected them and their Families; and, by ſupplying them with powder, balls, and muſkets, diſturbs my country; by which a territory of twenty lacks of Rupees is entirely ruined; and I cannot get the ſame increaſed. I wrote him, that as a friendſhip has ſubſiſted between me and the Governor of *Bombay* for a long time, that therefore he ſhould put a ſtop to theſe diſturbances; but he did not; all which has obliged me to prepare. The Engliſh factory, for a long time, never met with any hindrance on my part; and I deliver to them the ſandal, pepper, &c. as uſual. The balance that was due to the Factor of *Onore*, I have paid him, agreeable to his account. Some time ago your Reſident at *Onore* adviſed me, that he was, in conſequence of your orders, returning to *Bombay*, leaving his Brother [meaning the other Factor] in the Factory; and which he did accordingly: your Honour will therefore order the preſent Factor to bring the uſual things according to my indent, deliver them to me, and receive the quantity of ſandal, pepper, &c. I have, in conſequence of your Letter, diſpatched the aforeſaid Engliſhmen with their Families, equipage, and papers, to *Sata Guddah*, in the diſtrict of *Madras*, ſupplying them with conveyances, biggarees, &c. No diſpute has come between your Honour and me; but upon the people who occaſion unjuſt quarrels I reſent them. Your Honour will always favour me with your friendly Letters, as it will afford me pleaſure to hear of your welfare.

Copy of a Letter to *Hyder Ally*; dated *Bombay*, 8th February 1780.

After compliments:

I have received your Letter, and have great pleaſure in the inſtance it conveys to me of your friendſhip, particularly with your ready compliance with my application for the releaſe of the Engliſh Gentlemen, who had been detained by your Governor at *Callicut*. I obſerve what you write with regard to the diſſatisfaction you have received from our Engliſh Troops having taken *Mahé*; which you ſay is in your dominions, and from the protection given by the Reſident at *Tellicherry* to the Nairs: to both theſe points it is proper I ſhould give you a clear and friendly Anſwer. *Mahé*, as you well know, had been for many years in the poſſeſſion of the French; and during the former War between us and them, we conquered it as well as all their other places in *India*. When Peace was made between us, our King ſhewed favour to them, and gave back to them *Pondicherry* and *Mahé*; of which places, on the breaking out of the preſent War, we have again diſpoſſeſſed them. They are our Enemies; you are our Friend, and ſhould rejoice at our ſucceſs. The French held *Mahé* as we hold *Tellicherry*, long before you conquered the country of the Nairs; there could therefore be no breach of friendſhip with you in our attacking *Mahé*: theſe things, I make no doubt, have been repreſented falſely to you by your enemies and ours. As to the conduct of the Reſident at *Tellicherry*, in protecting the Nairs, this is the truth; the perſons who came to live at *Tellicherry*, if they live peaceably and quiet there, are protected. This can occaſion no difference between you and us; but when our Troops arrived to fight with our Enemies (the French at *Mahé*) the *Chenika* Nair went with his Nairs to help them, though we gave him no offence (Mr. *Church*, our Reſident, is not ſuch a man) he ſaid it was by your order; but this I cannot believe, becauſe it would be contrary to your friendſhip with us. When he aſſiſted our Enemies, we had no occaſion to deſire his friendſhip; we had other Friends; but I aſſure you the Reſident, Mr. *Church*, of *Tellicherry*, never could intend to give aſſiſtance to any one againſt you, for which he had no orders; and if he had done ſo, I would have puniſhed him for it. You ſay no diſpute has ariſen between you and me, but the people who raiſe quarrels without a cauſe, you reſent their behaviour. My Anſwer with regard to the *Cherika* Man is juſt the ſame. If the *Cherika* Nair hears your orders, ſend him notice of our friendſhip, as I ſhall to the Nairs who are now fighting againſt him, and the quarrel will ceaſe; for I have never intended to give any hindrance to your buſineſs in the *Malabar* Country. Our Troops have long ago left *Mahé*, which we do not deſire to keep, but to root out our Enemies. This may convince you. I intend in a few days to ſend you an Engliſh Gentleman, a truſty and a wiſe man, who will ſatisfy you on all things that you deſire to know, and convince you how much I wiſh that our friendſhip may ſtill increaſe. I ſhall direct the things for which you will write to me, to be provided and bought, and in all other reſpects ſhall be glad always to give you every mark of my ſincerity and friendſhip. I am very ſorry to hear of the differences that have happened between you and the Governor of *Madras*, on the ſubject of *Bazalet Jung*, becauſe the Governor of *Madras* and I act under the ſame Circar. I return you thanks, however, for informing me of theſe affairs, and though they are not in my hand, yet I hope a true friendſhip may be able to come between, and accommodate all matters of diſpute and doubt, that friendſhip between you and our whole Nation may increaſe. If what I propoſe is agreeable to you, I hope you will ſend your Hookums and Randanies to *Mangalore* and *Onore*, that on the above-mentioned Gentleman's arrival at either place, he may proceed without delay, and meet with treatment ſuitable to his character. I am convinced of your friendſhip and honourable conduct towards the late Reſident of *Onore*, who has informed me of all particulars; for all which I return you thanks.

But I have a matter of complaint to make to you with reſpect to the delivery of the ſandal-wood of your country, which I find is delivered in a large quantity to the Agent of Mr. *Bolts* at *Mangalore* and *Biliapatam*, to the great detriment of the Honourable Company and myſelf; and this Agent of Mr. *Bolts* is ſelling it to people who are no ways concerned either with me or the Company, to my prejudice. I wiſh your health, and may our friendſhip daily increaſe!

(True Copies.)

Edwd Ravenſcroft, Secr.

Read the following Letter from Major *Cotgrave*:

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident and Governor, &c. &c. &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to incloſe you a copy of a Letter which I received from the Honourable the Select Committee

APPENDIX. No. 42.

mittee of *Bombay*. The orders of which the Reſident and Factors complain, are as follow:

" *Tellicherry*, Saturday, 5th February 1780.

" General Orders.

" All ſtrangers or others, on their firſt landing, to be ſent to the Commanding Officer's tent, and none, of whatever nation, to be admitted into the Fort, upon their firſt arrival, without his ſpecial permiſſion. This order, though formerly iſſued by Colonel *Braithwaite*, the Major is ſurpriſed has not been ſtrictly complied with. The Major further orders, that no boats be ſuffered to go on board any ſhips or veſſels in the road or offing, without his ſpecial leave; and that all packets, letters, or cajans, arriving by any boats or patamars, be ſent up by a man of the Bankſall Guard to Head Quarters."

My reaſon for iſſuing the order regarding the boats was, becauſe I imagined Mr. *Church* (on the appearance of a ſhip in the offing) wrote to the Captain, and by that means prevented my getting a paſſage to *Surat*; but when I found it was of no uſe I revoked it.

I beg leave to aſſure your Honours, that I never have had the leaſt diſpute with Mr. *Church* or his Council; on the contrary, we were on terms of intimacy till I found he took underhand means to detain me, and then I confeſs I left off viſiting him, but nothing further paſſed.

On the 5th in the morning, at day-break, about a thouſand of the Enemy's ſelect men made a deſperate attack on our lines; they brought ſcaling ladders with them, and a few penetrated and cut down a Soubahdar, three Sepoys, and ſeven or eight of the Militia; they were, however, ſoon beat back with the loſs of two hundred and ſeventeen men killed and wounded.

There is as little appearance of an accommodation with theſe people as there was the firſt day of my arrival here; and I am convinced that *Hyder* not only encourages but aſſiſts them.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
Tellicherry, moſt humble Servant,
9th May 1780. *Jn° Cotgrave.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, K. B. to Lord Viſcount *Weymouth*: dated *Superb*, *Madras* Road, 5th April 1780.

I beg leave once more to repeat to your Lordſhip, that the ſituation of this country requires tranquillity, and a cloſe attention to the real intereſts of the induſtrious Natives; which, though a leſs dazzling, will be found by the Company and the Nation to be a more efficacious method of obtaining permanent proſperity and real opulence, than any acceſſion of territory or extent of conqueſt can poſſibly beſtow.

I have reaſon to think the Marattas are well inclined to treat, and our late ſucceſs in the *Guzaret* Country will I hope be made uſe of to re-eſtabliſh Peace with them, on an honourable footing; but if any judgment can be formed of *Hyder Ally*'s intentions, from the language he holds, they muſt be extremely hoſtile to the Britiſh intereſts; as a Letter he wrote to the Governor ſo late as the 19th of March, in anſwer to an attempt to bring on a negociation by the means of a Mr. *Gray*, is replete with the ſevereſt ſtrictures on the conduct of the Company's Governors on both Coaſts; and that your Lordſhip may have an opportunity to judge of it more fully, I have incloſed a tranſlated copy for your peruſal.

APPENDIX, No. 42.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 5th June 1780.

READ the following Letter from Lord *Macleod*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In a Letter from Major *M'Kenzie* to me of the 24th inſtant, is the following paragraph: " I beg leave to re-
" mind your Lordſhip, that the regiment is often diſ-
" treſſed for proviſions, as the Sepoys are often pre-
" vented by the country people from driving in the ſheep
" for the daily ſupply."

This treatment of the King's Troops is moſt cruel and unjuſt, and to me appears the more extraordinary, after the repeated aſſurances which the Ameer, who I underſtand manages the Nabob's affairs at *Poonamalee*, ſo often gave to Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and to myſelf, that proviſions ſhould be regularly furniſhed, and no more cauſe given for complaint.

The repeated breach of this promiſe gives me too much reaſon to think that the ſame may continue; I muſt therefore, Gentlemen, moſt earneſtly deſire and entreat your powerful and effectual interpoſition, that the regiment may be furniſhed with good and ſufficient proviſions, and no more cauſe given for complaint: as, if redreſs is not ſpeedily given, I ſhall be under the very diſagreeable neceſſity of ordering detachments of the King's Troops to ſupport the Sepoys in the execution of their duty, let the conſequences be what they may; for while the regiment has money to pay, and arms in their hands, they will not, they cannot ſtarve.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
Fort Saint George, moſt humble Servant,
25th May 1780. *Macleod.*

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, that upon receiving the above Letter from Lord *Macleod*, he waited upon the Nabob, and requeſted him to give effectual orders for ſupplying the regiment; and that he has no doubt the Nabob will pay due attention to this point in future.

Read the following Letter from Lord *Macleod:*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor and Preſident, and the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The inſtant I received your Letter of the 27th inſtant, incloſing the copy of a Petition from the inhabitants of the village of *Noumul*, I ſent it to the Commanding Officer at *Poonamalee*, with orders to make the ſtricteſt enquiry into the truth of the matter, and to let me know the reſult. I have received two Letters from Major *M'Kenzie* on that ſubject, the copy of a Letter from Major *Elphinſton* to the Ameer, and the Declaration of a Subedar, of a Naig of Sepoys, and of the Linguiſt of the Garriſon at *Poonamalee*; which all concur to prove that the aſſertion of the inhabitants of *Noumul*, that they had not ſold ſpirituous liquors to the Troops, is falſe.

It cannot eſcape your notice, Gentlemen, that the inhabitants of *Noumul* were ſupported by ſome of the Nabob's Troops in oppoſing the Sepoys; and that theſe Troops did attack and beat your Soldiers, when doing their duty according to orders: I ſhall therefore ſay no more on this ſingular event.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
Fort St. George, moſt humble Servant,
the 31ſt May 1780. *Macleod.*

Right Honourable Lord *Macleod.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to peruſe the Letter from the Select Committee to your Lordſhip, and the Petition from *Noumul* to the Committee. I do not find any thing againſt the Soldiers of the regiment in the Petition; it ſeems to be againſt Major *Elphinſton*, or me, and the Sepoys. The incloſed copy of a Letter to the Ameer will give your Lordſhip a juſter knowledge of the facts than what is repreſented in the Petition. I ſhall make every enquiry poſſible,

poſſible, as your Lordſhip deſires; and in obedience to your commands, I ſend the Letters back by expreſs.

I have the honour to be
Poonamalee, Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient
29th May 1780, humble Servant,
8 o'clock morning. *James Mackenzie.*

To the Right Honourable Lord *Macleod.*

My Lord,

Soon after the arrival of the regiment here, and repeatedly ſince, the Sellers of pernicious toddy and arrack in the adjacent villages, were ſtrictly forbidden to give any to the Soldiers of the regiment; but for their own advantage they have diſregarded theſe orders, and drunkenneſs, riots, and puniſhments have been the reſult.

On or about the 10th of this month many Soldiers were ſeen drinking at *Noumul*; Major *Elphinſton* ſent two different meſſages to the Toddy-ſellers to come up to him, which they diſregarded; the conſequence was what is ſet forth in the incloſed Declaration, which we believe to be ſtrictly true. We believe further, that the Petition of the Inhabitants at *Noumul* is a continued ſeries of falſehood. We wiſh, however, with them, that the Governor and Select Committee may enquire fully into the matter, that the offenders may be brought to puniſhment. We think it indiſpenſably our duty to ſupport our Sepoys, upon whom, in a great meaſure, our exiſtence depends, againſt the inſults of the Inhabitants, which they frequently meet with.

I am, my Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient humble Servant,
Poonamalee, *James Mackenzie*,
May 30th 1780. Major 73d Reg.

The Declaration of the Linguiſt of the Garriſon at *Poonamalee*, of a Naig of Sepoys, and of a Subedar; 30th May 1780.

The Linguiſt and Naig ſay, that they were ſent by the Commanding Officer, with four Sepoys, to bring up to him the Toddy-ſellers at *Noumul*; that they took two of them into cuſtody.

That ſeeing the People of the village gathering, they tied their hands with cords; that the Inhabitants, aſſiſted by four Sepoys and two Havildars of the Nabob's Troops, to the number of two hundred, or upwards, with an Amenah, beat the Linguiſt and Sepoys, and reſcued the Toddy-ſellers; that one of the Sepoys of the Garriſon was ſent to acquaint the Commanding Officer.

The Subedar ſays, that in conſequence of the above report, he marched with half his company, with orders from the Commanding Officer to reſcue his own Sepoys firſt, to fetch the Toddy-men and the Nabob's Sepoys who had been guilty of the riot; that upon his appearance at *Noumul*, the Inhabitants hid themſelves; that he however found a Havildar, two Sepoys of the Nabob's Troops, and four Inhabitants, whom he brought to the Commanding Officer.

Declares, that no houſes were forcibly entered; no plantations deſtroyed; and nothing taken away by his people, except as above.

Says further, that the Inhabitants never quitted their habitations, as ſet forth in the Petition.

Read another Letter from Lord *Macleod.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Governor and Preſident, and the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

When I arrived at *Madras*, it was impoſſible for me to have any idea of the quarters at *Poonamalee*, and what number of Troops could be commodiouſly lodged at that place, but I was very ſoon convinced, that 500 men were the moſt that could with propriety be quartered there. I took the earlieſt opportunity to mention this circumſtance to the then Governor, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, who was ſo ſenſible of the truth of what I told him, that he repeatedly aſſured me, that ſufficient barracks ſhould immediately be built for the commodious accommodation of the whole regiment, before the hot ſeaſon came on. The land-winds are already begun, and will, as I am informed, be followed by the rainy ſeaſon; and hitherto there is no foundation laid for new barracks at *Poonamalee.*

The duty I owe to the King my Maſter, to the regiment, and to myſelf, and likewiſe the attention I owe to the intereſt of the Honourable the *Eaſt India* Company, at whoſe earneſt and repeated requeſt and ſolicitations the King's Troops were ſent to this country, for the protection of their Settlements, obliges me, Gentlemen, to requeſt, that you will, without further loſs of time, either order ſufficient barracks to be built at *Poonamalee* for the accommodation of the regiment, which yet, notwithſtanding the many deaths, exceeds 1,000 Europeans, including Soldiers Wives; or that you will be pleaſed to give the regiment more ſpacious and convenient quarters in ſome other Garriſon, where they may continue united in one body, conformable to the Commander in Chief's orders to me. The regiment continuing any longer in the crowded quarters they now occupy, cannot fail proving fatal to the lives of many men, of which they have already had too melancholy a proof.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
Fort Saint George, moſt humble Servant,
the 1ſt June 1780. *Macleod.*

Major *Maule* to be called upon to inform the Committee why he has not begun the barracks.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th June 1780.

Mr. *Johnſon* delivers in the following Minute, to which Mr. *Smith* ſubſcribes:

As there are various reports of the warlike preparations making by *Hyder Ally*, and that he has engaged 4 or 500 Laſcars, as if reſolved to commence hoſtilities, I beg leave to ſubmit to the conſideration of the Board, whether it may not be expedient for us to make ſome arrangements which may be requiſite for our ſafety; and ſince that we are alſo preparing for ſuch an event, therefore, in my opinion, we ought to have the exacteſt accounts which can be procured of *Hyder Ally*'s Forces, and where they are ſtationed, by which means we may be enabled to form ſome judgment of his intentions.

We can now take into conſideration the means of maintaining an Army in the field, and if we find this impracticable, can deliberate on meaſures for reinforcing our garriſons, and for keeping a force at leaſt ſufficient to protect the Company's and Nabob's poſſeſſions; as it is from them, our reſources for money and proviſions muſt principally ariſe in times of danger and diſtreſs.

A proper return of the ſtores and proviſions in the different capital forts, will enable us to form a judgment of what may be further wanting to put them in a proper ſtate of defence.

The ſtate of *Pallemcotah* and *Madura* requires immediate attention, as the ſwelling of the rivers may next month put it out of our power to reinforce them.

Tanjore, I doubt not, is in a proper ſtate, but we ſhould be perfectly ſatisfied on this head, as from thence we have reaſon to expect great aid in caſe of an invaſion.

The General is the beſt judge of the preſent diſpoſition of our Army, and how far it may be expedient to leave the Europeans divided.

Saml Johnſon,
Madras, *Chas Smith.*
the 19th June 1780.

APPENDIX. No. 42.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 28th June 1780.

Dispatched the following Letter:

To the Honourable *Warren Hastings*, Esquire, Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the honour to transmit to you, a copy of a Letter received from Mr. *George Smith*, dated at the *Cape of Good Hope*, the 24th April; together with extracts of news.

You will be able to judge from these papers, what credit is due to the report of a French armament preparing for *India*, and whether it be advisable to take any immediate steps in consequence. We shall regularly send you any further intelligence that may come to our hands, and heartily co-operate with you in frustrating the designs of our Enemies. Should such an armanent really come abroad, the object of it, we conceive, must be to aid the Marattas or *Hyder Ally*, and indeed the motions of this last Chief strongly indicate an expectation of powerful support from the French. He preserves a constant intercourse with the Governor at the Islands. Vessels have come to him from thence with military stores, and he has during the course of the last and present year, been making great warlike preparations. His Army is now assembled near *Bengalore*, and equipped in every respect for immediate action. Part of it is actually advanced towards the frontiers of the *Carnatic*, and our intelligence mention that he is employing people to clear the road leading to one of the principal Passes.

Such is the appearance of things at present. If an invasion take place, we shall act in the best manner we are able for the defence of the country, but we fear our difficulties will be great for want of money, as our ordinary supplies even depend upon the growing revenues, which in case of invasion will fall very short.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble Servants,
John Whitehill, &c.
Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
28th June 1780.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 3d July 1780.

PRESENT;

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esquire, President,
Charles Smith,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnson.

Minutes of last Committee read; and approved.

Read the following Letter from Lieutenant *Roberts*, commanding at *Tiagar*:

To Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B. Commander in Chief of the Forces.

Sir,

As there is a report of *Hyder Ally*'s collecting a large body of forces, with an intention of entering the *Carnatic*, I think it my duty, as commanding at *Tiagar*, to represent to you the insufficiency of the garrison for its defence, having only one company of the Nabob's Sepoys in it, and though there are nine guns mounted in the fort, some 24, 14, and 12 pounders, there is not a single Gunner belonging to the garrison, and only seven Lascars. It may not be improper to observe that there were always some Invalid Gunners, one Tindle, and fifteen Lascars, till just before the siege of *Pondicherry*, when they were recalled, and have never been replaced.

As you, Sir, are no doubt acquainted with the natural strength and situation of *Tiagar*, which from its affinity to *Hyder Ally*'s frontiers, which are not above 20 miles, render it liable to a sudden attack, and its distance from any Company's garrison, not being within 60 miles of the nearest, prevents it from receiving any immediate relief, I shall beg leave to leave you, Sir, and the other Gentlemen of the Honourable Board, whom I should be glad you would make acquainted with my situation, to judge of the necessity of reinforcing the garrison, being the best judges of the consequence of it.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
G. Roberts.

July 2d 1780.

Ordered to lie on the table.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 17th July 1780.

Fort Saint George, 3d July 1780.

At a Committee of Stores:

PRESENT,

Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Colonel *Edward James*,
Major *Geo. Maule*,
Mr. *Bryan Scottney*.

1st. The Honourable the Select Committee having ordered the indent for *Vellore* to be supplied, except the gun carriages; agreed to apply for their directions, whether the guns and mortars which have been ordered for that place, are to be sent without carriages and beds, or whether they are to wait till carriages and beds are ready for them, if the Select Committee shall be pleased to order them to be made up. Agreed also to represent, that it would be useless to send them without carriages and beds, which cannot be so well made if the guns and mortars are sent away, and the guns cannot be conveniently removed without carriages, there being no proper mode of conveyance.

The guns and mortars to be detained until carriages are made for them.

2d. Colonel *James* represents to the Committee, that the gun carriages, tumbrils, &c. at the Mount, except the six pound carriages lately sent from *Madras*, are, by being long exposed to the weather, rendered unfit for field service; he therefore desires to be supplied with new or serviceable gun carriages in lieu of those which are damaged, as there is now a shed erected which will preserve them in future. Agreed to recommend to the Honourable Select Committee, that the gun carriages which require repairing be exchanged.

To be exchanged, as recommended by the Committee of Stores.

3d. As

Ordered

3d. As ſix of the new 6lb. carriages which were ordered to be made up and kept in ſtore for field ſervice, have been ſent to *Surat*; agreed to recommend to the Honourable Select Committee, that ſix new carriages be made up in their room.

Ordered accordingly.

4th. The Military Storekeeper lays before the Committee, indents for tents for the uſe of the 6th, 9th, and 18th battalions of Sepoys. The Committee are of opinion, that they ſhould not be complied with at preſent, there appearing to be no immediate neceſſity for them.

Approved.

Hector Munro,
E^d James,
G. Maule,
B. Scottney.

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
19th July 1780.

Mr. *Smith* enters the following Minute:

The conduct obſerved for a length of time by *Hyder Ally*, has given us but too much cauſe to believe his intentions are hoſtile towards the Engliſh; and from the late reports, which ſeem well authenticated, it appears not to admit of a doubt but his object is to diſturb the Peace of the *Carnatic*, an event which would not leſs affect the intereſt of the Nabob than the Company. It is confidently aſſerted he is already on this ſide the Paſs, within a few days march of *Madras*, with a very conſiderable Army of Infantry, Cavalry, and a large train of Artillery. In this alarming ſituation, I think it incumbent on us to make ſome vigorous effort, without loſs of time, to oblige him, if poſſible, to retire from the *Carnatic*. By remaining totally ſupine and inactive, we only encourage him to attempts againſt us, which he would ſcarcely venture upon, were we any way prepared to repel his attacks. The exhauſted ſtate of the Treaſury was a ſufficient argument againſt incurring any additional expence, whilſt the extremity of War could poſſibly be avoided; but in the preſent juncture of affairs, our wiſhes in this reſpect muſt give place to conſiderations of a more preſſing and urgent nature. If the Nabob be unable to furniſh the neceſſary ſupplies of caſh, a ſum of money ſhould be raiſed on loan to anſwer the preſent exigency, and every preparation towards forming a ſtrong cantonment, ought, I think, to be forwarded with the utmoſt diſpatch, in order that the Troops may be ready to take the field on the ſhorteſt notice; for unleſs ſome deciſive meaſure be adopted without delay, I ſee nothing to prevent *Hyder Ally* from advancing even to the gates of *Madras*. I am of opinion, therefore, that we ought immediately to take ſteps for collecting a body of Troops wherever they may be moſt wanted, to be in readineſs to act as neceſſity may dictate; this, I conceive, may be eaſily and ſpeedily effected by withdrawing the greateſt part of the Troops at *Pondicherry* and *Poonamalee*; which, together with the Artillery at the Mount, added to ſuch force as can be ſpared from this garriſon, will place us in a ſituation to act defenſively, and fruſtrate any hoſtile deſigns he may have againſt us, until a larger Army can, if neceſſary, be aſſembled.

19th July 1780. *Charles Smith.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee,
4th July 1780.

Received the following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Nixon*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Governor, &c.
Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have received intelligence from an Hircarrah, whom I purpoſely ſent out, of the march of *Hyder Ally*'s Army from *Seringapatam* to *Bangalore*, where he arrived on the 10th inſtant; and that a detachment was ſent off with *Tippo Saib* towards *Calaſtry*. The man who brings the intelligence marched with the Army five days, and aſſures me his report is true. A merchant of this place, whoſe relations live near *Carow*, and who uſed to trade thither, informs me that orders have been received three days ago in all the frontier towns, to ſtop every ſpecies of trade and communication with this country.

I remain, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient Servant,

Trichinopoly, 28th June 1780. *Eccles Nixon.*

Received the following Letter from Captain *Keating*:

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have juſt received intelligence of twelve battalions of Sepoys, each battalion two guns, are arrived and encamped two miles the other ſide *Riatotta*. They came there the 1ſt of this month, and the Sepoy ſays, they came there from the encampment at *Oſſoor*.

I have the honour to remain with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,

Amboor, 5th July 1780. *Wm Keating.*

Received the following Letter from Colonel *Lang*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the intelligence I have received from the *Myſore* Country, the greateſt part of *Hyder Ally*'s Army was at *Oſſoor* on Friday laſt, and he was to leave *Bangalore* on Saturday to join them; he has ſent ten thouſand Horſe to the Northward to join *Meer Saib*.

The public report in *Hyder Ally*'s Army is, that he is coming into the *Carnatic* with his Troops only: his banzar and baggage are all to be left within the Paſſes.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient and
moſt devoted Servant,

Vellore, 10th July 1780. *Roſs Lang.*

Received the following Letter from Captain *Keating*:

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Juſt now I have intelligence of *Hyder*'s two Sons, with all the Troops that were at *Bangalore*, being arrived and encamped at *Oſſoor*; they arrived there the 6th inſtant: *Hyder* himſelf is at *Bangalore*, but his tents are pitched in the encampment at *Oſſoor*.

I have the honour to remain, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,

Amboor, 11th July 1780. *Wm Keating.*

APPENDIX. No. 42.

Received the following Letters:

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

This moment my Sepoys are arrived with intelligence of the whole of *Hyder*'s Army having marched from *Oſſoor* the 10th inſtant, and encamping at a place called *Sadamanarpilly*; and that *Hyder* himſelf arrived there the ſame day from *Bengalore*. The Troops that were at *Riacotta* are alſo marched to join the Army; but a number of Matchlock People are ordered to the Paſſes at *Riacotta* and *Patnagurdam*: the arrival of a number at the latter place, I have had information of laſt night.

I have the honour to remain, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
very humble Servant,
Amboor, 14th July 1780. *Wm Keating.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the intelligence which I have this day received from the *Myſore* Country, *Hyder Ally* is at *Oſſoor*, with his Foot and guns; *Tippo Saib* is arrived at *Kiſtnagurry* with the whole of the Cavalry which *Hyder* had with him: *Hyder Ally* is ſhortly to follow to *Kiſtnagurry*.

The public report is, that *Tippo Saib*, with the Cavalry only, is to be ſent into the *Carnatic*, to deſtroy the country, and *Meer Saib* is to be ſent in at the *Damalcherry* Paſs, with Cavalry only, for the ſame purpoſe.

Hyder Ally is to remain at *Kiſtnagurry*, till he finds where our Army aſſembles, and then he is to come into the *Carnatic* with his Foot and guns.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient
and devoted Servant,
Vellore, 15th July 1780. *Roſs Lang.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 19th of June 1780.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Lang*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Select Committee, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the intelligence from the *Myſore* Country, *Hyder Ally* has marched from *Seringapatam* eight coſs on the North road, and all the guns and ſtores he has been ſending to *Bangalore* for ſome months paſt, are in readineſs to join him the moment he arrives there.

The force *Hyder Ally* has with him, is given out to be
Thirty thouſand Horſe.
Twenty thouſand Sepoys.
Forty thouſand Colliries.

I have the honour to be, with all due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your very obedient devoted Servant,
11th June 1780. *Roſs Lang.*

Fort Saint George Select Committee, July 21ſt. 1780.

Received the following Letters:

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Two of my people juſt bring me intelligence of *Hyder*, his two ſons, and the beſt part of his Army, having come through the Paſs, and are now encamped at a place called *Coverypatam*; that all their Artillery are drawn up on the road to *Changama*.

Since the arrival of the camp there, the whole people of the valley are run away.

I have the honour to remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Amboor, 18th July 1780. *William Keating.*

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

I did myſelf the honour to write you ſome time ago concerning the ravages committing daily in the *Vankatagerry* Rajah's Country, by the Troops of *Hyder Ally*, ſtationed at *Commam*. They were pretty quiet for ſome time, but lately began afreſh. Some Peons of the *Vankatagerry* Rajah's ſurprized a party conſiſting of forty Horſe the other day near *Chircurpar Pettah*, and either killed or made priſoners the greateſt part of them. This has obliged *Meer Saib*, *Hyder*'s commander at *Cuddapah*, to augment the force at *Commam* very conſiderably. The exact number I have not yet learnt, but ſoon hope to be able to inform you.

I have the honour to be, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Ongole, 19th of July 1780. *Edward Edmonds*, Captain.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, 12th June 1780.

The Preſident obſerves to the Committee, that, as there are various reports concerning *Hyder Ally*'s movements and intentions, he thinks it a proper meaſure, in caſe of any diſturbance in the *Carnatic*, that Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie*'s detachment ſhould be on this ſide the *Kiſtnah*; he therefore moves, that they be ordered into the *Guntoor* Circar.

Mr. *Johnſon*. I think the detachment ſhould not be moved until the Nabob conſents to pay the extra expences.

General *Munro*. I am of opinion, that as the *Kiſtnah*, when overflown by the rains, is impaſſable, and that the Troops, if wanted, cannot then be marched into the *Guntoor* Circar, they ſhould at all events be immediately ordered on this ſide the *Kiſtnah*; and I am further of opinion, that the Nabob, as renter of that country, has nothing to do with the extra expences, as they were put there at the particular deſire of *Bazalet Jung*, who alone ought to defray the charges of that detachment.

Mr. *Smith*. I am of opinion that the detachment ſhould be ordered on this ſide the *Kiſtnah*, agreeable to the Preſident's Motion.

Fort Saint George Select Committee, July 19th 1780.

Received the following Letter from Colonel *Lang*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

By the intelligence I have received from the *Myſore* Country, *Hyder Ally* is arrived at *Roycottah*; his Army laying at *Kiſtnahgurry*, *Coverypatam*, and *Royacottah*.

The public report continues in his Army, that he poſitively will enter the *Carnatic* in three diviſions, and that he expects a great body of Marattas from *Badam*, on the banks of the *Kiſtnah*.

I have the honour to be, with due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
Vellore, 17th July 1780. and devoted Servant, *Roſs Lang.*

Extracts of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 43. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 11th May 1780: received 12th ditto.

I have already taken every opportunity to inform my Friends of the hoſtile intentions of *Hyder Ally Cawn* towards us, and his connection with the French; they have alſo been told of the diſpoſition of *Hyder*'s Troops, ſent by him to the confines of my territories in order to pillage them, and thoſe belonging to the Engliſh; my Friends are alſo well convinced by the tenor of his preſent conduct, his letters to them, and his behaviour to the Gentleman that was deputed to him, that he is hoſtilely inclined towards them.

It has been on this account that I have repeatedly wrote and ſpoke to you on the propriety of making Peace with the Marattas; a conſiderable part of your Troops being now detached to that quarter, *Hyder* imagines the field is open for him, and with the aſſiſtance and friendſhip of the French, he has formed intentions of breaking with us. I underſtand from Letters I received yeſterday from Rajah *Vencatiput Naig*, and my Taſſildar in the diſtricts of *Podla* and *Durſi*, that *Ally Reza*, *Hyder Ally*'s Phouſdar at *Cuddapah*, has marched with his Troops, and is raiſing diſturbances in the countries of *Nellour* and *Calliſtry*; and that he has taken a ſmall Fort called *Sittarampoor*, which belongs to the *Carnatic*, and has pillaged and deſtroyed ſeveral villages. I ſend you with this for your information, the original Letter from Rajah *Vencatiput Naig*, and a tranſlation of a Paper of Intelligence from *Padla* and *Durſi*. It is *Hyder*'s intentions to take *Oudgnir*, one of the principal fortreſſes of the *Carnatic*. Now that from his pride and ambition he has of himſelf begun making War within the *Carnatic*, it is not proper in us to look tamely on, and ſee diſtricts taken out of our hands: I therefore requeſt you will conſult what proper meaſures are to be followed, in order to put a ſtop to his depredations in the *Carnatic*: you might ſend for his Vakeel, and deſire him to write to his Maſter, to give over raiſing thoſe troubles; and if you think proper, you might write to *Hyder* yourſelf on the ſubject, ſince he now has openly commenced hoſtilities in the *Carnatic*.

Paper of Intelligence from the Nizam Court; dated 29th Rubby ul Sani, or 5th May 1780.

It is reported here, that *Hyder*'s Troops are aſſembling at *Cuddapah*, *Cummum*, and other places, with a deſign of entering the *Carnatic*; and that *Hyder* himſelf intends marching ſhortly. It is the Nabob *Nizam ul Dowla*'s intention to remain ſpectator, and not to interfere, but to ſettle his differences with *Hyder* by the means of the Marattas: he waits with anxiety to ſee *Hyder* raiſe troubles in the *Carnatic*, and the flame of war raiſed between him and the Engliſh, that he may by theſe means ſee them effectually reduced by the *Poonah* Miniſters and *Moodogee Boonſela*. His Highneſs truſts ſolely to the *Poonah* Miniſters, and looks upon their Enemies as his own; he has much at heart the reduction of the Engliſh, and has taken great pains to effect it; he conſtantly writes to *Poonah* on the ſubject.

Letter from the Rajah of *Calliſtry*, *Vencatyput Naig*, to the Nabob.

This day, the 5th of Jemmadi ul Awel (10th May 1780) intelligence has been brought from *Outrerady*, that *Meer* is arrived at *Sitterampoor* with 4,000 Horſe, and after taking that place, has laid waſte all the villages around it. The whole country will be ruined unleſs your Servant marches there himſelf. If your Highneſs, through the gracious favour you have ever ſhewn your Servant, will be pleaſed to ſend two battalions of Sepoys, and a hundred Europeans, the country will ſoon be cleared of the Enemy; at any rate your Servant will go there, and truſt to the will of the Almighty.

Letter from the ſame to the Nabob's Dewan, *Seyed Aſſum Cawn*.

This day, the 4th of Jemmadi ul Awel (9th May 1780) intelligence was brought here that *Meer*, with 4,000 Horſe, has taken the Fort of *Sitterampoor*, and laid waſte all the villages around. The whole country muſt be ruined unleſs I go there myſelf; I ſhall accordingly ſet out to-morrow, the 5th of the month. You will, I hope, repreſent this to his Highneſs, and get his orders to ſend a hundred Europeans, and two battalions of Sepoys, with ſome guns, or this country cannot be ſettled. I ſend you incloſed a Letter I have received from *Outerady*, which you will be kind enough to lay before his Highneſs, and procure his aſſiſtance. I have been in his Highneſs's ſervice ſince the death of his Father; if he is now pleaſed to grant me aſſiſtance, I will go to *Outerady*, and chaſtize the Enemy, and put that country in order. If my requeſt is not granted, the will of Providence muſt be fulfilled. You might order the Troops from *Arcot* to march hither, and write to Rajah *Burbur* for that purpoſe.

No. 51. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 29th June 1780: received 2d July.

With regard to the ſtores in my different Garriſons, of which you requeſted to have a liſt, the caſe is this: the other heavy charges I am at, have rendered my ſituation ſuch that I have not had it in my power to provide ſtores for my Forts. I have only been able to keep in readineſs what ſtores I have in them, ſince the time of former Governors, of which liſts were ſent to them. You have herewith, for your information, a liſt of what grain there is at preſent in my Forts. The guns, powder, and ſhot, which were ſent from thoſe Forts to *Pondicherry*, and expended there, have not been replaced.

The ſituation of affairs requiring, at this time, that the ſame number of ſtores be ſent to thoſe Forts, I beg you will be ſo kind as to give orders for it. What ſhall I ſay more?

Accounts of Grain in the Forts; viz.

Arcot -	Cullums	67,530	2 Tons
Vellour - - - -		49,100	—
Wandewaſh - - -		53,537	6
Gingee, - - - -		30,587	4
Tritchinopoly - - -		100,000	—
	Cullums	300,764	—

No. 52. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 30th June 1780: received 2d July ditto.

I herewith ſend you what intelligence I have received from *Hyder Ally*'s camp and *Changama*, &c. places in my country, with a Letter I have from my intelligence at *Kannoul*, reſpecting what was ſaid by *Durm Doſs*, the Manager of the *Kinnoul* Phouſdary, who was ſent by him to negociate with *Hyder*, and has been there for a twelvemonth paſt; you will from theſe underſtand, that his intentions are to march this way. It is the cuſtom of news-writers to write down whatever intelligence they hear from different parts; entire reliance cannot therefore be placed upon all the news they ſend, but at the ſame time the whole is not entirely without foundation. It is on that account adviſable, and conſiſtent with prudence, to put faith in what comes from good authority, and make uſe of it for the good of our own affairs, by taking the ſteps which appear moſt proper. If the intelligence received proves falſe, it is well; but if (which God forbid!) it ſhould prove true, the being upon our guard before the danger approaches too near, will aſſuredly be in our favour. You are a wiſe and intelligent man, and will take ſuch ſteps as your prudence will point out. I alſo ſend you with this, a copy of an Intelligence Paper from *Poonah*. What ſhall I ſay more?

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(Incloſure.)

Letter from *Mahammed Shuffy*, at *Kannoul*; dated 29th Sammadi ut Awel, or 3 June 1780.

Dirm Doſs gives the following account of the Enemy: his thoughts are bent day and night on entering and deſtroying the *Carnatic*; he is never at reſt, but conſtantly employed in getting ready ſtores, and making preparations to execute his intentions. He talks of nothing from morning to night but the *Carnatic*, and of demanding no leſs than ſeven crores of Rupees, with intereſt, for the affair of *Tritchinopoly*. He has with him, beſides the Zemindars Troops, 50,000 Horſe, and near 100,000 Foot; beſides this, he is daily raiſing freſh Troops, particularly Horſe, for which he ſends at a great diſtance; he has 20,000 of his own. The good order in which his Foot Soldiers are, is not to be deſcribed. He has wrote to the Maratta Miniſters reſpecting his deſigns of invading the *Arcot* Province, and deſires their aſſiſtance; and they have aſſured him that they will give it to him. If they do not ſend their Forces ſoon, he means to wait until the rivers have riſen, when no Troops can come to the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh.

The Enemy (*Hyder Ally*) one day lately in public Durbar, ſaid, "We muſt ſee what will be the event of encountering the Engliſh; they are an obſtinate ſet of Caffres (Infidels) and will not let go their hold till the laſt; it will be neceſſary to diſtreſs them at firſt with our Horſe, and be ſo hard upon them, that they may not be able to face us again; and if they do face us a ſecond time, it will not be difficult to deſtroy them entirely; ſhould they have the better of us at firſt, it will not be eaſy to chaſtize them, but we will always have it in our power to ruin and deſtroy the country with our Horſe, and not allow the Engliſh to get proviſions."

From ſuch and the like diſcourſes of the Enemy, it appears that he is in ſome dread of meeting the Engliſh in open battle; but his intentions are hoſtile; and may the Almighty preſerve your Highneſs from them!

Intelligence from *Hyder Ally*'s Camp: dated 20th Semmadi ut Sani, or 25th June 1780.

Hyder is ſtill at *Bangalore*, and has ordered five guns, with powder, &c. from the Fort, to be ſent to Camp. His Vakeel at *Madras* writes him, that the Europeans think of making war with him, and are collecting their Troops for that purpoſe; that they are, however, intoxicated with pride, and careleſs of their affairs. *Hyder* has wrote an Anſwer to the Vakeel, to give him a particular account of the number of Troops at *Madras* and other places. He thinks of ſending a detachment under the command of his Son into the *Tritchinopoly* Country, and to march himſelf to *Madras* by the way of *Vellour* and *Arcot*; he propoſes alſo ſending *Meer Ally Reza* into the countries of *Trippetty*, *Vellour*, &c. to raiſe diſturbances there. He has wrote to *Hurry Deſſeya*, the Aumil of the Barmahals, to clear and repair the road of the Ghauts of *Hufrydurp* and *Raicotto*. He has fixed his march from *Bangalore* for the 9th of Rejub (12 July) and on a ſuppoſition that the Europeans are not aware of it, and not prepared to oppoſe him, he intends marching at once to *Madras*.

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Eſtabliſhment of a Sepoy Battalion.

Captain	1		
Lieutenants	3		
Enſigns	7		
Adjutant	1	—	19 Europeans.
Serjeant Major	1		
Quarter-maſter Serjeant	1		
Serjeants	5		
Commandant	1		
Subadars	9	Officers 20	
Jemidars	10		
Havildars	50		
Naiques	50	— 750	Native.
Privates	650		
Drummers	12	— 22	
Puckallys	10		

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Extract of the Proceedings of the Governor General and Council in their Secret Department, the 2d Auguſt 1779.

THE following Minute from Sir *Eyre Coote* having been circulated, the Minutes which are entered after it were delivered by the Members of the Board.

29th July 1779.

Sir *Eyre Coote*. Having lately received ſome advices, mentioning preparations at the French Iſlands for a deſcent upon ſome of our poſſeſſions in *India*, particularly *Bombay*, to which I the more readily give ſome credit, knowing that that Preſidency and the Circars are the leaſt ſecured, I am induced to propoſe, That the Governments of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay* be recommended to reinforce the Army under General *Goddard* with the following proportion of Troops, which, from the laſt Returns, I think they may with propriety comply with; viz.

From Madras,
1 Battalion of Europeans,
3 D° — Sepoys,
50 — Artillery.

From Bombay,
300 Europeans,
2 Battalions of Sepoys, and
100 Artillery.

As the works of *Pondicherry* are now deſtroyed, the quota from *Madras* may the more eaſily be ſpared. The Troops they have at *Mahé*, 1,100 Sepoys, one company of Grenadiers, and 50 Artillery, may immediately embark to join General *Goddard*; the reſt may be completed from the Southern ſtations, and will certainly be with him before any operations of the Enemy can be commenced.

The Forces of *Madras*, and of this Eſtabliſhment, are, in my opinion, fully ſufficient to protect our poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India*; moreover, we are in daily expectation of a great addition to our ſtrength from *Europe*; I therefore alſo recommend, that drafts be ſent from hence to complete the original number of General *Goddard*'s detachment.

The advantages we may expect to derive from this propoſed reinforcement, will be, the ſecurity of *Bombay* againſt any attack of the French, by having ſo ſtrong an Army in the field; the expediting of the much-deſired Peace with the Marattas (if it is not already accompliſhed); and the rendering of our Force on the *Malabar* Coaſt of ſuch reſpect, as to check any deſigns which either the Marattas or *Hyder Ally* (the only Country Powers from whom we have any thing to dread on that ſide of the continent) may be inclined to form, of taking part with our national Enemies.

On the whole, I ſubmit this plan, as the means which in my judgment will enſure the peace and ſafety of all our poſſeſſions; for while we have ſo reſpectable a force in that quarter, where we may expect the firſt efforts of the French, we may be certain that it will confine their attention to it, and prevent them from diſturbing our more valuable territories in the other parts of *India*.

Eyre Coote.

Mr. *Francis*. I move, That the Commander in Chief may be requeſted to inform the Board of the particulars of

of the intelligence he has received from the French Iſlands, and the authority on which it is founded. The Board have yet no materials before them, to judge of the propriety of the meaſure recommended.

Philip Francis.

Mr. *Barwell.* The cautionary meaſures propoſed by Sir *Eyre Coote*, appear to me ſo well calculated for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions, that I am induced to give them my immediate and hearty concurrence.

Richd Barwell.

Governor General. I agree moſt heartily to the propoſal made by the Commander in Chief.

Warren Haſtings.

Mr. *Wheler.* I will endeavour to prepare my opinion againſt the next meeting of the Board.

Edward Wheler.

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following Minute:

I muſt own I feel myſelf not a little injured by Mr. *Francis*'s Requiſition; and will venture to ſay, that a ſimilar inſtance cannot be found upon the Company's Records, and that it is unknown in any ſervice, for a Commander in Chief, or any General Officer, to be be called upon to ſupport his opinion and aſſertion by giving up the authors of his ſecret intelligence, upon which theſe may be founded. I therefore peremptorily refuſe it; and if the opinion I have given on the 27th, ſhould not guide the Board in the mode of defence propoſed for *Bombay*, I hope I ſhall ſtand exonerated, ſhould any fatal conſequences happen to that place.

Eyre Coote.

Mr. *Francis.* Nothing can be perſonally of leſs moment to me, than whether my propoſition be carried or not. As a Member of the Government, I think it my duty to oppoſe the eſtabliſhing a precedent which I deem inconſiſtent with the forms and ſpirit of our Inſtitution. Every Member of this Board has an equal right to be informed of the facts or grounds on which a reſolution is taken; no ſeparate excluſive truſt is veſted in any one of us; nor is any one of us at liberty to delegate the truſt veſted in him to any one of the other Members; but if, as in the preſent inſtance, I am not to know what the intelligence is on which the Board reſolves to act, nor by what authority ſuch intelligence is ſupported, I certainly am no judge of the neceſſity or propriety of the meaſure ſaid to be founded on ſuch intelligence, and am ſo far forth deprived of the exerciſe of the truſt repoſed in me by Parliament. I did not mean, however, that the Commander in Chief ſhould give up his authors, if it was neceſſary to conceal them.

For theſe reaſons, which I hope will not be thought to imply diſreſpect to any Member of the Board, I adhere to the Motion.

Mr. *Wheler.* I muſt join with Mr. *Francis* in expreſſing my wiſhes that Sir *Eyre Coote* would be pleaſed to communicate to the Board the intelligence he has received of preparations making at the French Iſlands, and upon which he founds his preſent Motion to reinforce General *Goddard*; becauſe I think, that before the Board paſs their determination on a ſubject which may affect the ſafety of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in *India*, they ought to have every information before them it is capable of.

I entirely agree with Sir *Eyre Coote*, that it is poſſible the French may be induced to make ſome attempt on our poſſeſſions in *India* by their Forces from the Iſlands, and if they have a conſiderable body of men there, more than ſufficient for the purpoſe of defence, I hardly ſee any other uſe to which it can be applied.

I agree likewiſe with Sir *Eyre Coote*, that *Bombay* is likely to be the object of their attack; becauſe if they acquire the place, they will at one and the ſame time have a Port for their Fleet, Docks, and Allies in their neighbourhood; whom we have every reaſon to ſuppoſe are, by repeated provocations, made our Enemies: but I confeſs it does not occur to me, how the ſending a reinforcement to General *Goddard* at *Surat*, and weakening *Bombay* itſelf, by detaching the greateſt part of the Garriſon, can contribute to the ſafety of that place.

To illuſtrate that further, I need only take a view of the ſituation of *Bombay*, that of General *Goddard*'s Army in reſpect to it, and the mode of attack to which *Bombay* is open. It is certain, that this attempt can only be made by ſea, and equally ſo, that the French ſhould, for this purpoſe, have either a ſuperior Fleet to ours, or expect to find the Garriſon of *Bombay* ſo weak, that it muſt fall before our Fleet could relieve it from any other part of *India*. And, if they do reſolve on this attack, it is hardly within the bounds of probability that we can receive any intelligence of it, or the Governor of *Bombay*, before the Fleet and Army are within ſight; conſequently the place will be inveſted by ſea and land before any ſuccours can be thrown into it. How the Garriſon of the iſland of *Bombay* is to be relieved by Troops under General *Goddard* after this event, I do not underſtand, more eſpecially, as I am informed, that it would be attended with great difficulty, and much time, to march the Troops from *Surat* to the neareſt part of the continent oppoſite to the iſland of *Bombay*.

I conclude, therefore, that the Troops at *Surat* can be of no ſervice in caſe of an attack on *Bombay*, and that we ought therefore, ſo far from ſending Troops to the former place, to bring down, if poſſible, the Troops that are there, into the neighbourhood of *Bombay*; for which, I am told, the iſland of *Salſette* is very convenient. Nor do I conceive, that even if it ſhould hereafter be expedient to act againſt the Marattas, the ſituation of our Troops will be at all altered for the worſe, but rather mended.

On the ſecond queſtion, of ſending Troops from the Coaſt:

When I conſider the great extent of country they have to cover and defend, the ſmall number of Europeans they have for that purpoſe, the low ſtate of their finances, the neighbourhood of powerful Enemies in *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam, and the probability of the French force being employed either againſt the Circars, or to act in concert with the former, I am equally againſt weakening or detaching the force of that Preſidency.

On the third queſtion, of ſending drafts from hence to complete the original number of General *Goddard*'s detachment, I ſee many, and what appear to me inſurmountable difficulties.

Such reinforcement muſt conſiſt of Native Troops, Sepoys, who, if prevailed on to embark, the ſeaſon of the year renders the voyage next to impracticable; by land, the difficulties are equally great. The Army under General *Goddard* was near a year in performing its march, though he met with no oppoſition: I do not conceive that detachment of drafts will be more likely to march with ſafety acroſs *India*, than General *Goddard*'s detachment, but rather that they will be expoſed to greater difficulties; in the mean time, the expence is certain and enormous, and the money muſt be drawn directly from and ſpent out of *Bengal*.

I am equally at a loſs to judge how the Army propoſed to be tranſported from the Coaſt of *Malavar*, is afterwards to be maintained there, or by what means remittances can be effected to ſupport ſuch an Army, and the expences of a War on the *Malabar* Coaſt; but I am confident, that theſe remittances would, if practicable, prove the ruin of the Company's valuable poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India*.

I am therefore equally againſt this as the other Propoſitions, and give it as my opinion, that *the* true and only line of policy to be obſerved in the preſent ſtate of affairs in *India*, is, to concenter our Troops on the *Malabar* Coaſt to the neighbourhood of *Bombay*, which I deem the ſureſt means of preſerving that place againſt the attacks of the French; and that we ſhould puſh whatever advantages we actually poſſeſs

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poſſeſs to their proper object of obtaining a laſting Peace on that ſide of *India*.

General *Coote*. I entirely agree with Mr. *Wheler*, with regard to the ſituation that our Army ſhould be placed in for the ſecurity of *Bombay*. When I propoſed reinforcing General *Goddard* for the defence of that valuable Settlement againſt the French, I could not have the ſmalleſt idea that our Army was to remain where it now is; and the very mode of reinforcing it with part of the *Bombay* Troops, is a ſufficient proof that it was not my plan in any reſpect. The preſervation of *Bombay* is the firſt object. The beſt method of defending it, I will venture to ſay (and appeal to the opinion of the firſt Officers in *Europe*) is by an Army in the field, ſo ſtationed as to be able to give the Garriſon immediate ſuccour, either by throwing freſh Troops into it, from time to time, or engaging the beſieging Enemy. The ſituation that *Bombay* is now in, from the beſt intelligence I have received (and I may ſay I have intelligence that I can depend upon) is ſuch as renders it, in my opinion, abſolutely neceſſary that ſomething ſhould be done for the preſervation of it. Public as well as private reports from *Europe* mention a French armament being deſtined, and actually ſailed for the *Eaſt Indies*. By the laſt accounts from the Cape, a 74-gun ſhip put in there, with a greater number of ſick on board than could be ſuppoſed to have ariſen from her complement of men; and the report was, that they were all the ſick of a ſquadron to which ſhe belonged. A 74-gun ſhip ſailed into the *Mauritius* when our cartel ſhip was laying off the harbour. This ſhip, before the man of war arrived, was under orders to go to the iſland of *Bourbon*, there to remain till they diſmiſſed her; but immediately after the arrival of the 74-gun ſhip, a party of French was ſent on board, in order to aſſiſt in weighing her anchor more expeditiouſly; and ſhe receiving orders from a 36-gun frigate lying cloſe by her, and which had been placed there as a guard upon her, to ſail due North till ſuch time as the frigate fired a gun; ſhe ſailed 20 leagues in that direction; and in the middle of the night the ſhip fired a gun, and then ſhe ſhaped her courſe for *Madras*; ſo that it is very natural to ſuppoſe, at leaſt the ſeafaring Gentlemen whom I have converſed with on the ſubject think ſo, that ſhe was ordered to ſhape that courſe to prevent her falling in with any French ſhips that might be bound for the iſland. When I was at the Cape, they moſt undoubtedly had 5 or 6,000 regular Troops at the Iſlands; and I am well informed that they have been ſince reinforced, but with what numbers I do not know. I am likewiſe informed, that the Duke de *Lazun*'s legion is on board the Fleet, which I ſuppoſe is come to *Mauritius*, part of them, perhaps, may be left behind at *Senegal*; for it is a part of the ſame Fleet, if not the whole, that took *Senegal*. As to the protection of *Bombay*, it can receive none but what we give it. It cannot come from Sir *Edward Hughes*, nor the Forces under his convoy; they were not arrived at the Cape when the laſt accounts came away, though expected there. The Troops he brings out, are raw Troops, and will require ſome time for refreſhment at the Cape; the leaſt that can be allowed is ſix weeks. They muſt go the outward paſſage, and make *Ceylon*, after which they cannot get to *Bombay*, ſuppoſing them determined to make the trial, till after Chriſtmas; therefore that Settlement, in caſe of an attack from the French, muſt either defend itſelf, or ſubmit to the Enemy. It is my buſineſs, as the Commander in Chief in *India*, to propoſe ſuch meaſures for the defence of the Company's Settlements, and to recommend the diſpoſal of their ſtrength in ſuch manner as will moſt effectually contribute to that end; when I have done this, I have done my duty. It is with the Board wherever I may have the honour of ſitting, to determine the propriety of my propoſitions.

Mr. *Francis*. The queſtion is much altered by the explanations with which the Commander in Chief has favoured the Board. If it be intended that Brigadier General *Goddard* ſhall move down with his force from *Surat* to *Bombay*, and take the moſt advantageous poſition which his judgment ſhall point out to him, for covering *Bombay* againſt an invaſion, I approve of the idea, and join in it; but I beg leave to ſay, that this intention does not appear upon the face of the motion. No orders are propoſed to Brigadier General *Goddard* to move from his preſent ſtation, nor any general inſtructions recommended to him upon the ſuppoſition that the French may appear upon that Coaſt. From the terms of the motion I ſhould conclude, that the reinforcement was to proceed from *Bombay* to *Surat*, and there to join General *Goddard*; underſtanding the Motion in that ſenſe, I muſt confeſs I thought it liable to the ſame objections which have been ſtated by Mr. *Wheler*: if it is not ſo, there can be no difference of opinion on this part of the Propoſition. The Commander in Chief is undoubtedly the beſt judge, whether the force which he means to draw out of *Bombay* will be more uſefully employed for the purpoſe of defending that place, by joining Brigadier General *Goddard*'s Army in the field, that is in a ſtation calculated to cover *Bombay*, or by being kept in the body of the place. On this point I ſubmit to the Commander in Chief's authority. I agree that the *Madras* Troops now at *Mahé* ſhall proceed to *Bombay*, or to the neighbourhood of that place, and there join General *Goddard*, but not to *Surat*. With reſpect to any further detachment from the forces at *Madras*, I muſt declare that my opinion entirely concurs with that of Mr. *Wheler*; and that if I recede from it, it is ſolely from the confidence I place in the ſuperior judgment of the Commander in Chief, who aſſures us that the forces of *Madras*, and of this Eſtabliſhment, are fully ſufficient to protect our poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India*, after making the detachment in queſtion to the other Coaſt. With reſpect to our reinforcing Brigadier General *Goddard*'s Army by drafts from hence, I am ſorry that ſuch a meaſure ſhould be found neceſſary, becauſe I deem it a very great addition to the weight and difficulty of maintaining a War on the *Malabar* Coaſt. I ſhould acquieſce, however, if the mode of conveying the drafts from this ſide to the other ſide of *India* were ſtated and aſcertained. I foreſee great difficulty in the attempt, and no probability that our Sepoys, ſuppoſing them arrived at their deſtined ſtation, will continue to ſerve for any length of time, at ſo great a diſtance from home. The deſertions, I fear, will at leaſt keep pace with the ſupplies, and the operation will be endleſs.

Agreed to the Motion of the Commander in Chief, for reinforcing the Army under General *Goddard*.

Governor General. The firſt duty of this Board upon the ſubject now before us, and the firſt expreſs object of the Commander in Chief in his Minute, is to provide for the defence of *Bombay* in the event of an invaſion from the French. So far the opinions of the Board ſeem to be united, and perhaps we ſhall agree in what I now recommend to that effect; viz. That in our advices to Brigadier General *Goddard*, we inform him of the ſubſtance of the preſent Reſolutions: that our deſign in endeavouring to furniſh him with this addition of ſtrength, is to enable him to give ſuch effectual aſſiſtance and ſupport to the Government of *Bombay*, in the caſe of a French invaſion, as may defeat it; that therefore he muſt regard this as his firſt object, until there ſhall be no longer any actual ground of apprehenſion from the French; and make ſuch a diſpoſition of the detachment under his command, as to inſure his co-operation with the garriſon of *Bombay*; at the ſame time, that he is not to withdraw his attention from the other points which we have given him in charge.

Mr. *Barwell*. I have already given my opinion upon the Propoſition of the Commander in Chief; I did not limit that opinion to any partial object, but had in view the general intereſts of the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and a final ſettlement with the Maratta Government. I approve

prove entirely of the inſtructions now propoſed by the Governor General, which ſeem not to have omitted any point to which it is neceſſary General *Goddard* ſhould give his attention. None ſtrike me at preſent; ſhould any afterwards occur to my recollection, I leave to myſelf a latitude for extending theſe propoſed orders.

Mr. *Francis*. At a time when the French are expected to attack *Bombay*, every reaſon, which heretofore induced the Board to wiſh for a ſpeedy accommodation with the Marattas, muſt acquire additional ſtrength.

I am ſorry that any circumſtance, foreign from the immediate execution of his inſtructions, ſhould have engaged Brigadier General *Goddard*'s attention, or diverted it for a moment from the object we have ſo urgently recommended to him.

His reſolving to protract the concluſion of any thing deciſive in the negociation with the Durbar, until he can hear from us, is unauthorized, and may be attended with fatal conſequences. If a Peace be not concluded before the expected arrival of the French on the *Malabar* Coaſt, we may be morally certain that we ſhall then have both the French and the Marattas to contend with. The entrance into *India*, which has been happily ſhut, will again be opened to our natural Enemies. The Marattas will be ready to receive and aſſiſt them, and if once they get footing upon the Continent, their being driven out again will depend upon the event of a new conteſt, in which we are far from having a certain proſpect of ſucceſs. For theſe reaſons, I would direct Brigadier General *Goddard* to adhere literally to his inſtructions, and cloſe with the Marattas as ſpeedily as poſſible. As to the views now held out to us by *Ragobah*, or any new advantages ſuppoſed to be attainable by our having him with us, I would poſitively order Brigadier General *Goddard* not to engage in them on any account. *Ragobah* is a deſperate ruined man, whoſe ſituation may make it indifferent to him what terms he conſents to, or what promiſes he makes; but he has no power, and can perform nothing. In the mean time, the negociation with the Durbar, which it is ſo much our intereſt to conclude, will be protracted; the French may arrive upon the Coaſt, the Marattas of courſe will take advantage of that circumſtance, and either refuſe to treat with us at all, or inſiſt on conditions which they would not pretend to at the preſent moment.

With reſpect to *Ragobah*, I would adhere to the orders given to Brigadier General *Goddard* in our laſt Letter of the 8th July; viz. "We entirely approve of the "offer which you have made to *Ragonant Row*, and "direct that you continue to afford him the protection of "your camp ſo long as he ſhall continue to demand it, "provided he ſhall not forfeit his right to it by any act "of infidelity, or attempt to defeat the effect of your "negociations, to which you will give your entire atten"tion, without regard to any other conſideration.

"For the reſt we leave you to act under our Inſtruc"tions of the 5th April, in which we ſee no cauſe to "make any alteration on account of this event."

Governor General. If I had not been ſufficiently underſtood, I ſhould have thought it unneceſſary to have added an article to General *Goddard*'s preſent Inſtructions, had he not himſelf ſuggeſted doubts, where I think he ought to have entertained none. I have propoſed to refer him to his preſent Inſtructions, for the ſole rule of his conduct; and have only ſaid, what I believe agrees with the ſenſe of every Member of the Board, that if he can obtain better terms, in addition to thoſe we have already preſcribed, he may do it, but we do not enjoin it; nor is he to ſuffer the great object of his negociation to be ſuſpended or impeded by the proſecution of any other views. Much might be ſaid in anſwer to the other parts of Mr. *Francis*'s Minute. I wiſh to avoid debate. I ſhall therefore only briefly obſerve, that it is not with the Maratta State that Brigadier General *Goddard* has to treat, but with the partizans of a Government diſtracted and totally deprived of its conſtitutional form and powers; and that the event ſuppoſed of the arrival of a French armament, while our negociations with them were in ſuſpence, would be more likely to excite a decided diviſion among them, and to throw the principal ſtrength of the Maratta Nation into our own hands, than to unite it againſt us, when it is remembered that the firſt invitation of the French proceeded from the firſt Member of the Civil Government at *Poonah*, and muſt, if ever it takes place, give him the aſcendant over the men who now rule by the ſword.

Mr. *Wheler*. I agree to the Governor General's Propoſition, as it now ſtands explained.

Sir *Eyre Coote*. I agree to the Governor General's Propoſition.

Mr. *Francis*. Undoubtedly General *Goddard* will not refuſe any extraordinary advantages that may be offered to him. The danger is, that while he is purſuing them, he may miſs the opportunity of concluding upon the terms already preſcribed to him.

Agreed to the Governor General's Propoſition: and

Reſolved, That the following Letters be written to *Fort Saint George*, to *Bombay*, and to General *Goddard*.

To *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

From the accounts which have been lately received of the ſtrength of the French at the Iſlands, we have reaſon to apprehend that an invaſion is intended againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*; we therefore deem it of the utmoſt importance to provide for the ſafety of that Settlement, by reinforcing the Army commanded by General *Goddard* with a reſpectable addition of Troops, and to direct him to grant the moſt effectual ſupport and protection in his power to the Government of *Bombay*, for defeating any hoſtile attempts which may be made againſt them. The Commander in Chief has informed us, that one battalion of Europeans, three battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, may be ſpared from your Eſtabliſhment, now the works of *Pondicherry* are demoliſhed, without any riſk or inconvenience to the ſervice; and that the reſidue of the forces under your Preſidency will be ſufficient for the protection of your poſſeſſions; beſides which, as you may daily expect a conſiderable addition of ſtrength from *Europe*, we earneſtly recommend it to you to iſſue immediate orders to the Officer in command of the forces at *Mahé*, to detach from thence as great a number of men as he can ſpare at this time, to join General *Goddard* without delay, and the remainder of his force when *Mahé* ſhall be diſmantled. We alſo requeſt that you will be pleaſed to complete the reinforcement, recommended by the Commander in Chief to be ſent to General *Goddard*, as expeditiouſly as poſſible, from the moſt convenient ſtations of your Army, allowing him to fix the rendezvous.

Fort William, the 2d Auguſt 1779. We are, &c.

To *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

From accounts which have been lately received of the ſtrength of the French at the Iſlands, we have great reaſon to apprehend that an invaſion is intended againſt your Preſidency; we deem it therefore of the utmoſt importance to provide for its ſafety, by reinforcing the Army commanded by General *Goddard* with a reſpectable addition of Troops. We ſhall direct him to be prepared for the expected event, and to make it his firſt object to afford you the moſt effectual ſupport and protection in his power, for defeating any hoſtile attempts which may be made againſt you.

The Commander in Chief has informed us, that one battalion of Europeans, three battalions of Sepoys, and 50 Artillery, may be ſpared from the *Fort Saint George* Eſtabliſhment; and that you can likewiſe contribute 300 Europeans, two battalions of Sepoys, and 100 Artillery, for this ſervice, without any inconvenience or diſtreſs to

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the garriſons where your Army is now ſtationed. We have written to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, on the ſubject of their ſupply; and we earneſtly recommend it to you to iſſue immediate orders for your quota of this reinforcement to be aſſembled, and to join General *Goddard* at ſuch place of rendezvous as he may appoint, without delay.

Fort William, 2d Auguſt 1779. We are, &c.

To Brigadier General *Goddard*.

Sir,

We have to acknowledge the receipt of your Letters of the 12th and 18th of June, from your camp near *Surat*.

We receive great ſatisfaction from the circumſtantial intelligence which they contain reſpecting the ſtate, diſſentions, and probable views, of the different parties exiſting in the Maratta Government.

We do not diſapprove of your endeavouring to obtain the additional conceſſions propoſed in your Letter of the 12th June; nor did our Inſtructions of the 5th April, though reſtricted to certain points, preclude you from availing yourſelf of any occaſion which might be preſented to you, to exact other conditions by which the intereſts or influence of the Company might be certainly promoted, provided they did not impede or retard the accompliſhment of your original commiſſion. In this ſenſe, and with theſe proviſions, we repeat, that we ſhall approve of the addition of the demands recommended in your Letter of the 12th June, to thoſe which we have already preſcribed in our original Inſtructions, if you ſhall not have concluded a Treaty with the Maratta Government before the receipt of this Letter.

From advices which have been lately received of the ſtate of the French forces at *Mauritius*, and from other concurring cauſes, we have reaſon to apprehend that an attack has been meditated againſt the Company's ſettlement of *Bombay*: we have therefore thought it expedient to apply to the Preſidencies of *Fort Saint George* and *Bombay*, to reinforce the Army under your command, as ſoon as poſſible, by detachments from their Eſtabliſhments, conſiſting of the following corps and numbers;

From *Bombay*,

300 European Infantry.
2 Battalions of Sepoys.
100 Artillery.

From *Fort Saint George*,

1 Battalion of European Infantry.
3 Battalions of Sepoys.
50 Artillery.

We have deſired the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to iſſue immediate orders for the march of as great a part of their quota from *Mahé* as can be immediately ſpared, and for the others to join you when the works are demoliſhed; the remainder of the number will be detached from the moſt convenient ſtations of their Army.

We mean further to recruit your corps with ſuch a number of Sepoys drafted from *Bengal*, as may be requiſite to augment it to its original complement.

Our deſign in endeavouring to ſupply you with this additional reinforcement of Troops, is, to enable you to give ſuch effectual aſſiſtance and ſupport to the Government of *Bombay*, in the caſe of a French invaſion, as may defeat it. You muſt therefore regard this as your firſt object, until there ſhall be no longer any actual ground of apprehenſion from the French, and make ſuch a diſpoſition of the detachment under your command, as will enſure your co-operation with the garriſon of *Bombay*. At the ſame time, you are not to withdraw your attention from the other points which we have given you in charge.

We have acquainted the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* and at *Bombay*, that you will fix the places of rendezvous for the junction of theſe Troops with your Army; we therefore deſire, that you will make them acquainted as early as poſſible with the ſituation which you ſhall judge the moſt convenient for that purpoſe.

Fort William, 2d Auguſt 1779. We are, &c.

Approved.
(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Francis*. I cannot approve of the firſt part of this Letter, for the reaſons aſſigned by me in the courſe of the debate. With reſpect to the ſecond part, I ſtill think that, ſuppoſing the apprehenſion of *Bombay*'s being attacked to be well-founded, Brigadier General *Goddard* ought to be ordered to move from *Surat* towards *Bombay*.

APPENDIX, No. 45.

Fort Saint George Military Conſultations, 8th December 1774.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; dated 7th December 1774.

WE come now to ſpeak of the Nabob of *Arcot*, the Company's ancient Ally. The poſſeſſions he holds, including the *Tanjore* Country, are eſtimated, by the beſt accounts, at upwards of two crores of Rupees. His force, by the beſt information we can procure, conſiſts of ten battalions of Sepoys, who may be conſidered as regulars, being commanded by European Officers, accoutred and diſciplined after the European manner; and a battalion of five hundred Topaſſes. He has alſo four regiments of Cavalry, with guns and Artillery-men attached to each; and he is at preſent raiſing two more, beſides the irregulars he maintains, which may be eſtimated at between ten and twelve thouſand. The regiments of Cavalry are his beſt Troops, having been diſciplined by European Officers, lent to him from this Eſtabliſhment.

Extract of a Separate Letter from *Fort Saint George*, dated 4th July 1775.

21. His (the Nabob's) ſecond ſon, *Ummeer ul Umrah*, has ſeven diſtinct corps, conſiſting of Cavalry, light armed Sepoys, and Artillery; 12 battalions of Sepoys, with near 1,000 Artillery; all which are far better diſciplined than thoſe of any of the Country Powers. Some of his black Cavalry, we are informed, are as well diſciplined as any of the Engliſh Troops; his Artillery attached to them may vie almoſt with Europeans. He has the *Tanjore* and *Trichinopoly* Countries, with orders upon moſt of the Southern Countries for the payment of the Army. He was not put in the command of Troops already formed. Before his time they were a rabble to be held of no account. He has formed them himſelf; he has promoted every man in them. He pays them himſelf, and all look up to him for honour and wealth.

29. We beg your Honours will be pleaſed to conſider, that he (the Nabob) has refuſed to entruſt your ſervants with *Tanjore*; that he has fortified it in the ſtrongeſt and moſt expenſive manner; while with difficulty he expends ſmall ſums on other forts. That although he has 10,000 Sepoys kept by you for him, he has 12 battalions of 1,000 Sepoys each, ſeven regiments of Horſe, and near 1,000 Artillery, and 500 Topaſſes.

APPENDIX, No. 46.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

No. 132. Copy of a Letter to the Nabob; dated 7th Auguſt 1778.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

I BEG leave to incloſe you two Letters from the Commanding Officer at *Palamcotah*, relative to the mutiny of the 3d regiment of your Cavalry for want of pay; and the inſolence and cruelty with which they have treated the European Officers, who ſtill remain under confinement in a very alarming ſituation. A ſlight peruſal of theſe Letters, with the experience you have lately had of ſimilar behaviour in other regiments of your Cavalry, will ſet before your eyes, in a much ſtronger light than I can do, the alarming conſequence of ſuch proceedings at any time, but particularly at this period, when all our efforts are required to maintain the peace and ſecurity of the country, and when our Enemies are ſeeking every occaſion to diſtreſs and perplex our affairs; nothing ſurely can afford them more juſt cauſe of exultation than to ſee the *Carnatic* thrown into confuſion by your Highneſs's own Troops, and to obſerve the Company's forces employed in reducing theſe Troops to obedience, inſtead of acting in conjunction with them for the protection of the country.

It were waſte of argument to prove to your Highneſs, ſince experience hath already ſhewn it ſo forcibly, that mutinous Troops are enemies of the very worſt ſort, ſince they have it in their power to execute, almoſt in an inſtant, whatever miſchief they intend, and there is no guard or ſecurity againſt them. Another truth, equally conſonant to reaſon, is, that Troops that have once mutinied are never afterwards to be truſted. The ſtricteſt diſcipline will not enſure their obedience; when they have gained their point by violence, they feel their own ſtrength, and will take advantage of it upon every future occaſion of diſguſt, however trivial.

What I mean to infer from this preſent repreſentation to your Highneſs is, that there is an abſolute neceſſity for diſcharging the regiment that has mutinied without loſs of time, and that the reſt of your Troops ſhould either be paid regularly, or totally diſbanded, otherwiſe the *Carnatic* will be in more danger from them than all your Enemies together. Let me entreat your Highneſs to conſider ſeriouſly the conſequence of theſe mutinous proceedings, now that our Troops are chiefly collected in one place to act againſt *Pondicherry*, and whilſt two of your regiments are actually ſerving with the Army; if ſome means be not immediately taken to eſtabliſh them on a better footing, I ſhall earneſtly recommend it to you, to diſband the whole, and truſt entirely to the Company for the protection of your country, which will be much ſafer, and leſs expenſive to you than the preſent mode. I beg your Highneſs will ſend me an anſwer to this Letter immediately, as I want to write to Captain *Barrington* at *Palamcotah*, in reply to his Letters concerning the mutiny.

I remain your Highneſs's, &c.

No. 181. Copy of a Letter to the Nabob; dated 1ſt December 1778. APPENDIX No. 46.

I have the honour to incloſe your Highneſs a copy of a Letter from the Officers of the 2d regiment of your Cavalry to the Select Committee; adviſing, that the men of that regiment have mutinied for want of pay, and put them (the Officers) in ſtrict confinement, where they now remain in the greateſt danger. This mutiny in all its circumſtances, is ſo like what hath already happened in various parts of the *Carnatic*, that it were needleſs for me again to repeat the ſentiments I have ſo often expreſſed to your Highneſs on this ſubject. I muſt, however, freely declare to you, that it is a matter of no leſs concern than aſtoniſhment to me, that your Highneſs ſhould ſuffer an evil of this great magnitude to increaſe daily, and take no meaſures whatever to ſtop its progreſs. The danger is now become ſo alarming to the Peace of the country, and threatens ſuch violent conſequences to the lives of many innocent men, that if ſome remedy be not inſtantly applied by your Highneſs, the Company will be obliged to interfere ſome way or other, to prevent the danger from approaching too near their own door; for it is impoſſible in the preſent ſituation of affairs, to foreſee to what extremity it may proceed. If your Highneſs will, notwithſtanding the experience you have had, ſuffer your Troops to be twelve and eighteen months in arrear, can any thing elſe be expected from them, but what you ſee daily happen? Men who are anxious of doing their duty, and deſerving well from your Highneſs, will never ſuffer themſelves to be famiſhed while they have arms in their hands, and are in a condition to procure themſelves relief. Indeed, when I conſider the extremities to which ſome of your regiments have been driven for want of pay, I am amazed they have acted with ſuch moderation, as they have appeared to have done in ſeveral inſtances. There are no Troops perhaps in any part of the world, that would in the like circumſtances have carried their patience to ſuch a degree of forbearance; but there are, indeed, no other Troops that have ever been put to ſuch ſevere trials. In a political view, theſe proceedings tend ſo much to diſturb the Peace of the country, and to invite Foreign Powers to inſult us, that the moſt particular care ſhould have been taken to guard againſt them, eſpecially at a time when we are employing our endeavours to ſecure the tranquillity of the *Carnatic* from the dangers of the only forcible Power that can invade it, and have already ſucceeded ſo far as to eſtabliſh it beyond the reach of that Power, if we do but make a proper uſe of our ſucceſs. From all theſe conſiderations, which are very important, I muſt again repeat the requeſt I have often made to your Highneſs, either that you will put your Cavalry at once under the Company's orders, aſſigning a ſufficient revenue for their ſupport, or that you will provide yourſelf for their maintenance, ſo as to make them faithful and uſeful to you in time of need; or, laſtly, if that be impracticable, that you will diſcharge them all together from the footing they are at preſent: their apparent ſtrength is real weakneſs, and, inſtead of protecting your country, or becoming formidable to your Enemies, they may prove more dangerous to you than any other will, you can have to combat with.

Before I conclude this Letter, I beg leave to call your attention to the ſituation of the Officers of the 2d regiment, who are now confined, and to requeſt you will take the expedient meaſures for obtaining their releaſe.

APPENDIX. No. 47.

APPEN-

ACCOUNT of Ordnance and Military Stores

ORDNANCE.

Years.	Braſs Guns.		Braſs Mortars.		Braſs Howitzers.		Iron Guns.	
		Cwt. qrs. lbs.		Cwt. qrs. lb.		Cwt. qrs. lb.		Cwt. qrs. lb.
1775.	4	12 — 20	—	— — —	—	— — —	—	— — —
1776.	6	42 — 26	8	16 3 18	2	4 1 20	—	— — —
1777.	60	224 2 2	2	20 2 20	5	15 — 8	39	1,522 2 7
1778.	32	91 3 6	—	— — —	1	2 1 5	54	1,528 — 16
1779.	4	20 1 16	—	— — —	2	8 2 13	18	849 1 9
	106	391 — 24	10	37 2 10	10	30 1 18	111	3,900 — 4

East India House, the 5th May 1781.

An ACCOUNT or RETURN of Arms, Ordnance, and Military Stores at *Fort Saint George*, the 31ſt January 1780.

Iron Ordnance:

		No.
Engliſh.	42 Pr	1
	32	5
	18	18
	12	18
	9 ſhort	4
	6	3
	3	3
	½ ſhort	2
Foreign.	20 Pr	23
	14	9
	9	6
	8	8
	7	18
	5	7

Braſs Ordnance:

		No.
Engliſh.	12 Pr, ſhort	11
	9	1
	6, ſhort	20
	6, long	2
	3, ſhort	58
Foreign.	32 Pr	1
	28	1
	18	1
	5½	1
	5 Swivels	1
	2, ſhort	1
	8 oz.	1
	4 Dr	2

Mortars:

		No.
Braſs Mortars, Engliſh	13 inch	1
	10	1
	8	8
	7	1
	5½	8
	4½	16
	4	5
	3½	1
	Hand Grenades	3
Braſs Mortars, Foreign	13 inch	6
	10	1
	8½	2
	7½	1
	6½	1
	4½	6
	4⅛	3
	4	1
	3½	1
	2	1
Iron Mortars, Foreign	15	1
	13	1
	6½	1
Braſs Howitzers, Engliſh	5½ inch	2
	4½	4
Iron Howitzers, Engliſh	8 inch	1
	7	1
Petards.	8 inch	1
	6	1

Shot and Shells:

		No.
Round Shot.	46 Pr	85
	42	3,721
	40	1
	32	13,910
	30	5
	28	1,696
	26	4,600
	24	7,873
	22	42
	20	2,864
	18	25,754
	17	347
	16	7
	15	19
	14	1,618
	13	58
	11	520
	10	535

APPENDIX. No. 47.

-D I X, No. 47.

ſent to *Fort Saint George* in the undermentioned Years; viz.

Military Stores.									Amount.	
Muſkets, Carbines, and Fuzees, with Bayonets, and Blunderbuſſes.	Piſtols.	Swords, Hangers, and Cutlaſſes.	Iron Shot.	Cwt. qrs. lb.		Iron Shells.	Cwt. qrs. lb.		Prime Coſt of Sundries for the Uſe of the Military.	Total Prime Coſt.
12,160	960	2,300	14,074	472 — 7		40	28 — —		£. 10,253	£. 29,360
15,990	2,040	2,550	10,000	262 1 8		—	— — —		15,186	39,453
12,250	2,000	1,500	9,000	313 — 18		3,191	421 1 13		6,580	30,110
5,520	—	500	1,000	106 — 18		—	— — —		9,279	19,412
13,080	—	—	61,790	8,347 3 17		17,671	4,558 1 3		10,532	40,706
59,000	5,000	6,850	95,864	9,501 2 12		20,902	5,007 2 16		£. 51,848	£. 159,041

Errors excepted,
Sam. Nicoll, Accountant.

Shot and Shells—*continued.*

		No.
	9 Pr.	23,694
	8	925
	7	8,947
	6	4,464
	5½	21
	5	476
	4½	1,387
	3	34,019
	2½	3,113
	2	2,992
Round Shot fixed to Bottoms.	3 Pr	3,077
	2	12
Empty Shells.	13 inch	1,989
	10¼ D°	91
	10 D°	469
	9¼ D°	1,491
	9½ D°	306
	8¼ D°	1
	8 D°	2,414
	7¼ D°	107
	7¼ D°	51
	7 D°	112
	6¼ D°	3
	6½ D°	216
	6¼ D°	33
	5¼ D°	30
	5½ D°	845
	5¼ D°	1
	4½ D°	2,413
	4¼ D°	1,803
	4 D°	1,287
	3½ D°	3,010
	3½ D°	1,207
	3¼ D°	945
	2¼ D°	325
	2½ D°	10
Shells fixed to Bottoms.	5½ inch	123
	4½ D°	204

		No.
Grape Shot quilted.	32 Pounders	6
	20 D°	180
	8 D°	38
	6 D°	30
	4 D°	201
	3 D°	1,184
	2 D°	141
	1 D°	6
	8 inch	63
	5½ D°	83
Tin Caſe Grape.		
6 Pounders		8
2 D°		5
Iron Balls for Grape	Cwt.	285 : 2 9
Double-headed Shot		2,050
Lead Shot	Can.	19 : 2 : 20
Carcaſes, empty.		
13 inch oblong		37
9 D°		20
Gunners Stores:		
Rattan Buckets		11
Lead Aprons		38
Linſtocks		268
Powder Horns		28
Buff Slings for D°		243
Elevating Screws		110
Canvas Pouches		36
Tanned Hides		2
Copper Salting Boxes		46
Powder Cloth		31
Copper Clouts		28
Mortar Baſkets, 13 inch		105
Match Grenadiers	Sk.	98
Worſted for Quick Match	lb.	194
Country	Sk.	3,261
Gunners Utenſils.		
Mortar Spunges, 13 inch		1
10 D°		10
8 D°		18

APPENDIX No. 47.

Gunners Utenſils—*continued.*	No.
Mortar Spunges, 5½ D°	19
4½ D°	14
Howitzer Spunges, 5½ D°	19
40 D°	2
Spunges with Rammer-heads.	
42 Pounders	2
32 D°	9
24 D°	121
20 D°	60
18 D°	54
12 D°	52
4 D°	2
3 D°	31
1 D°	6
Long Hand Spikes	22
Spunge Staves, Europe	162
Country	9
Reliefs	2
D° with Staves	6
Gun Searchers, Braſs-mounted	12
D° Iron-mounted	5
Scrapers with Staves	13
Wadhooks	59
D° with Staves	4
D° with Staves and Ramheads	2
Copper Ladles.	
32 Pounders	7
24 D°	24
18 D°	20
12 D°	47
9 D°	40
6 D°	26
3 D°	61
1 D°	5
Copper Ladles with Wadhooks.	
32 Pounders	6
28 D°	2
26 D°	1
20 D°	19
16 D°	2
14 D°	4
8 D°	1
5½ D°	2
3½ D°	3
3 D°	12
2½ D°	2
2 D°	1
1 D°	7
Copper Ladles with Staves.	
18 Pounders	1
12 D°	6
6 D°	2
Copper Powder Meaſures	29
D° large	Sets 11
D° ſmall	Sets 4
Braſs Shot Gauges	Sets 6 and 28
Braſs Shell Gauges	Sets 3 and 8
Iron Shot Gauges	12
Iron Shell Gauges	7
Copper Funnels	16
Steel Bitts	594
Priming Irons	338
Fiſh with Staves	4
Fiſhes	18
Spring Spikes	51
Steel Spikes	220
Reliefs	36
Spunge Heads.	
42 Pounders	8
32 D°	19
24 D°	19
18 D°	49

Gunners Utenſils—*continued.*	No.
Spunge Heads.	
12 D°	81
9 D°	122
6 D°	54
4 D°	21
3 D°	38
2½ D°	11
2 D°	57
Rammer-heads.	
42 Pounders	4
32 D°	36
24 D°	15
18 D°	42
12 D°	101
9 D°	165
6 D°	65
5½ D°	1
4½ D°	15
4 D°	14
3 D°	17
2 D°	34
1 D°	24
Rammer-heads.	
8 inch	1
5½ D°	25
Tompions.	
32 Pounders	37
24 D°	178
18 D°	141
12 D°	145
9 D°	40
7 D°	1
6 D°	49
3 D°	22
2½ D°	2
2 D°	16
1½ D°	7
8 inch	18
5½ D°	13
Neceſſaries for the Powder Houſe.	
Braſs Mortar for beating Powder	3
Copper Boiler with Cock	1
Steel Punches	42
Copper Saltpetre Pans	9
Canvas Bags for Powder Barrels	539
Brimſtone	Cwt. 74 : 1 : 12½
Braſs Wire-work for Sieves	Feet 192½
Braſs Wire Sieves, double Bottoms	76
Ditto - - - ſingle Ditto	55
Hair Duſters	53
Lawn Sieves	Sets 4
Hair Sieves	D° 8
Leather Sieves	3
D°	Sets 4
Lawn Sieves	13
Materials for the Powder Mills:	
Iron Stove Pan, 1 Pr.	Cwt. 27 : 1 : 24
Cooling Pans, 8	D° 7 : 1 : 16
Iron Pots	1
Braſs Pots	12
Braſs Boxes for Powder Mill	31
Braſs Crows	4
Buſhel Meaſure	1
Iron Crow, large, 1 Pr.	Cwt. 2 : 1 : 0
Iron Crampion, Trivet, Bars, and Staples	3 : 0 : 21
Firelocks:	
Pocket Piſtols	P^rs 6
Braſs Barrel Piſtols	5
Iron Piſtols	2,903
Fuzees	18

Fowling

APPENDIX. No. 47.

Firelocks—*continued.*	No.
Fowling Pieces	18
Iron Blunderbuſſes	82
Braſs Blunderbuſſes	26
Muſkets with ſcrew Barrels	8
Cups for Grenade Pieces	30
Carbines with Ribs	6,948
Carbines with Ribs, new, Pungle Conſtruction	106
Carbines with Ribs different bore, repaired	160
Carbine rifled Barrels	1
Muſkets of Sorts	11
Muſkets 2d Sort	52
Short Muſkets	1,430
Long Muſkets	1,247
French Muſkets, with Bayonets	116
Trading Gun	1
D° with Bayonets, Pungle's Conſtruction	199
Buccaneer Pieces	169
D° fine long	21
Long Guns	2
Short Muſkets with Bayonets	4,695
Muſkets with Spring Bayonets, new, 2d Sort	5,225
Muſkets with Spring Bayonets, ſhort, Pungle's Conſtruction	199
Carbines with Bayonets, for Artillery	2,533
Muſkets with Spring Bayonets, new Conſtruction, 2d Sort	1,802

Small Arms:	
Bayonets	3,615
Hand Bayonets	63
Country Swords	80
Braſs-hilted Swords, French	3,066
Halberts	161
Eſpontoons	166
Braſs Hilts for Swords	78
Braſs-hilted Swords for Serjeants	90
Braſs-hilted Swords for Huſſars	17
Braſs Baſket Swords	76
Sword Blades	2,086
Ditto ſmall	120
Hanger Blades	22
Braſs-hilted Hangers	20
Iron Baſket Swords	4,472

Armoury Stores:	
Europe ſingle Cartridge Pouches	2,210
Country double D° D°	4,643
Bulgar double Muſket Cartridge Pouches	31
Europe double Grenadier Pouches with Braſs Dawning Boxes	300
Europe double Muſket Cartridge Boxes	868
Europe ſingle Carbine D°	431
Europe double Carbine D°	3,146
Country double Carbine D°	366
Buff Shoulder Belts for Artillery	114
Buff Shoulder Belts	3,228
Europe Leather Sword Belts	24
Buff Waiſt Belts	111
Buff Sword Belts	40
Buff Bandeliers with Swivels	2,241
Bulgar Bandeliers with D°	1
Europe Leather Waiſt Belts	747
Country Leather D°	917
Shoulder Belts, Country	3,595
Europe Muſket Slings	2,704
Country D°	2,934
Swivels for Bandeliers	96
Braſs Dawning Boxes	100
Huſſar Pouches	41
Sword Scabbards	1,679
Bayonet Belts	425
Lock Caſes	6,278
Bayonet Scabbards, Country	4,528
Country Slings for Pouches	87
Piſtol Stocks	288

Armoury Stores—*continued.*	No.
Buckets for Carbines	24
Cotton Shoulder Belts	15
Cotton Pouch Belts	142
Country Cartridge Paper	Qrs. 28,489
Muſket Stocks	620
Cotton Laſh for Belts	Cubits 349
Carbine Pouches, Country	8

Armoury Petty Stores:	
Flints	300,062
Hammers	20,965
Pickers	12,664
Screw Worms	25,263
Steel Ramrods	4,881
Braſs Guards	2,147
Braſs Heel Plates	1,318
Braſs Loops	522
Braſs Caps for Piſtols	120
Old Braſs Work for Muſkets	lb. 203
Wooden Ramrods	10

Neceſſaries for the Armoury:	
Standing Vices	24
Bench Vices	3
Beak Irons	2
Rubbers	158
Files	52
Screw-Plates	41
Bellows for proving Shells	1
Cocoanut Oil	Meaſures 87
Taps for Screw-plates	138
Scowrers	209
Anvils	5
Hand Vices	5
Iron Steddy	1

Neceſſaries for the Gun Room:	
Portfire Sticks	192
Marking Irons	19
Tin-plates	447
Canvas Shoes	P^r 624
Pincers for Fuzees	P^r 128
Ditto for Tubes	P^r 13
Machine for pointing Cannon at Night	Set 1
Braſs common Quadrants	4
Braſs Spirit Quadrants	6
Braſs Compaſſes	P^r 1
Braſs Pocket Callipers	2
Braſs Callipers, large	6
Spirit Perpendiculars	4
Iron Shell Scrapers	21
Wax Candles	M^d 8: 6½
Lamb Black	lb. 6
Braſs Scale	1
Sheet Copper	M^d 16: 15
Muſcovia Lights	4
Claw Hammers	6

Pioneers Stores:	
Mamoties	1,146
Breaſt-plates	30
Head-pieces	18
Pole-axes	257
Helves for Axes	184
Iron Crow-feet	Cwt. 29: 1: 18
Handles for Marmoties	74
Felling Axe	1

Coopers Tools:	
Braſs Drivers	15
Adzes	17
Vices	20
Grinding Stone	1

APPENDIX. No. 47.

Drums and Appurtenances:		No.
Braces, Europe		146
Country		1,040
Hoops, Batten, Europe		11
Country		131
Lining Europe		107
Country		126
Flesh, Country		336
Fifes, Country		398
Sticks	Pr	39
Brass Drums, Europe		28
Country		36
Brass Fife Cases, Do		7
Drum Slings		6
Snares, Europe		49
Country		269
Heads, Europe		86
Country		72

Buntin for Colours:		
Red Buntin	Yards	773
Blue Do	Yards	594¾
White Do	Yards	76½
Blue Bettilas	Pc	7½
Gun Flags		2

General Stores:		
Scythes		279
Hand Jacks		8
Brass Pentagrapher		1
Wax Cloth	Pieces	20
Ticken	Yards	3,457¾
Gunny Bags		150
Double Yokes		968
Gunny Carriage Bags for Powder Barrels		697
Do for Shot		2,673
Park Pickets		46
Single Yokes		21
Mortar Carts		10
Tumbrils		36
Cattamaran Timbers		40
Mantelets		5
Scaling Ladders		2

Tents and Tarpaulins:		
Large Tarpaulins		107
Timbril Do		14
Gun Do		30
Small Do		30
Field Officers Tents		7
Officers Tents		21
Private Tents		24
Do for 21 Men		1
Bell Tents		58
Field Officers Inner Tents		9
Walls for Do		7
Officers Inner Tents		46
Walls for Do	Sets	23½
Fly for Officers Tents		1
Neceffary Tent		1
Laboratory Tent		1

Quarter Masters Stores:		
Melting Ladle		1
Dipping Do		6
Canteens		52
Copper Dishes		6
Copper Shot Sieves		3
Reels		1
Iron Mould for Round Shot	Pr	10
Brass Ditto for Musquet Balls		14
Brass Mould for Grape		1
Iron Do Do		5
Brass Do Carbine		16
Do Piftol		7
Iron Do Musquet		23

Quarter Master Stores *continued.*		No.
Iron Mould for Carbine		4
Do French		66
Knapsacks		10
Handcuffs	Pr	32

Garrison Stores:			
Trail Carriages,	32 Pdr		1
	20		3
	18		14
	1		6
Field Carriages,	24 Pdr		12
	18		11
	12		8
	6		6
	3		15
	8 Inch		5
	4½		4
Truck Carriages, 18 Pdr			20
Gin Blocks	Pr		2
Wooden Horfes			329
Sentry Boxes			88
Wheelbarrows			13
Iron Trucks			382
Iron Work for Carriages, new	Cwt.	31: 2: 0	
Do Do old		9: 1: 15½	
Brass Spanish Arms			1
Wooden Cheeks			1
Mortar Beds, 4½ Inch			2

Horfe Furniture:		
Country Boots	Pr	42½
Leather Holfters		14
Heel Leather		10
Holfter Pipes	Pr	10½
Reins		9
Stirrup Leathers	Pr	9
Curry Combs		2

Scales and Weights:		
Iron Weights	5 Pz Cwt	2: 2: 0
Brass Do	3	1: 1: 22
Stilliards	Prs	3
Large Steel Beams		3
Brass Scales without Beams	Pr	1
Poil Weights	Sets	3
Triangles	Prs	2
Brass Scales, small	Pr	3
Copper Do with Weights	Sets	9
Copper Scales		1

Laboratory Stores:		
Tin Tube Boxes		168
Havrefacks		15
Iron Bottoms for Grape		2,286
Engine for Fuzees		7
Empty Tin Tubes		512
Do Copper Do		11,516
Brass Rocket Moulds		6
Brass Portfire Do		7
Rofin	Cwt	3: 1: 9
Turpentine		1: 3: 23½
Boudge Barrels		15
Laboratory Tables		6
Do Chefts		2
Blue Lights		104
Forming Tables		6
Benches		12
Portfire Paper	Qr	2,683
Portfires		526

Lock Work for Muskets:		
Hammers		283
Cock Pins		649
Cocks of Sorts		5,173
Pans		754

Tumblers

APPENDIX. No. 47.

Lockwork for Muskets—*continued.*	No.
Tumblers	201
Hammers and Shear Springs	4,867
Musket Locks	1,995
D° French	565
French Fuzee Locks	20
French Pistol D°	119
Old Lock Works	Cwt 40:0:25

Fixed Ammunition:	
Tubes filled, Copper	3,267
Live Fuzees, 13 Inch	1,241
10 D°	1,148
8 D°	768
7 D°	1,126
4½ D°	3,503
Hand Grenades	2,730
Round Shot fixed, 3 Pdr	1,220
2 D°	78
Grape Shot fixed, 12 D°	11
3 D°	148
Tin Case Grape fixed, 2 D°	4

Cartridges, filled:	
Cloth Cartridges, 42 Pdr	4
32 D°	80
24 D°	147
18 D°	140
12 D°	247
9 D°	391
6 D°	699
6 D° with Wads	270
Flannel Cartridges, 12 D°	39
6 D°	125
5½ D°	42

Cartridges, empty:	
Flannel Cartridges, 12 Pdr	163
9 D°	200
3 D°	2,772
Cloth Cartridges, 32 D°	20
28 D°	150
26 D°	1,000
24 D°	8,948
20 D°	1
18 D°	6,806
14 D°	12
12 D°	602
6 D°	2,853
5½ D°	1,000
5¼ D°	500
5 D°	317
4½ D°	54
4 D°	1,243
3½ D°	250
3 D°	3,900
2 ½ D°	88
1½ D°	198
1 D°	790
8 Inch	42
5½ D°	7
4½ D°	209

Musket Ammunition:	
Carbine Ball Cartridges	7,540
Blunt Cartridges	12,375

Director of the Laboratory:	
Meal Powder	lb. 385
Rockets, 2 Pound	10
Fuzees, empty, 4½ Inch	7,515
Fire Ball Cases, 8 Inch	302
5½ D°	1,699
4½ D°	52
Tinman's Shears	Pr. 1
Canvas Aprons	396
Mealing Blocks	4

Director of the Laboratory—*continued.*	No.
Ammunition Boxes	28
Shot Boxes	15
Empty Leagers	22
Cutting Tables	2
Rocket Frame	1
Saltpetre Spadles	8
Copper Skimmer	1
Mealing Tables	2

Bottoms for round Shot:	
12 Pdr	92
9 D°	864
6 D°	1,167
4 D°	421
3 D°	562
2½ D°	881
2 D°	733

Bottoms for Grape Shot:	
42 Pdr	29
32 D°	107
24 D°	251
18 D°	162
12 D°	59
9 D°	459
6 D°	658
4 D°	886
3 D°	684
2 D°	962
8 Inch	2
5½ D°	239
4½ D°	180

Bottoms for Shells:	
5½ Inch	200
4½ D°	359

Bottoms for Hen and Chickens:	
13 Inch	29
10 D°	139

Fire Ball Formers:	
8 Inch	8
7 D°	1
5½ D°	18
4½ D°	2

Bottoms for Tin Case Grape:	
2½ Pounders	657

Spindles for Grape:	
24 Pounders	4
9 D°	31
3 D°	210
5½ Inch	17
4½ D°	152

Wooden Setters:	
13 Inch	8
10 D°	72
8 D°	94
7 D°	1
5½ D°	289
4½ D°	25
For Hand Grenades	4

Wooden Drivers:	
13 Inch	33
10 D°	32
9 D°	14
8 D°	53
7 D°	17
5½ D°	102
4½ D°	17
For Hand Grenades	25
Saltpetre refined	lb. 450
Sulphur refined	lb. 189
Composition Boxes	18
Composition Ladles	71

APPENDIX. No. 47.

Director of the Laboratory *continued.*	No.
Portfire Drifts	12
Fuzees D°	197
Driving Blocks	2
Fuze Blocks	8
Wooden Numbers	40
Cutting Knives	12
Iron Squares	2
Braſs Setters	4
Rocket Rammers	5
Drawing Knives	3
Copper Chiſſels	5
Iron D°	4
Iron Gauges for Drifts	1
Iron Punches for Shells	3
Triangle for Pendulum	1
Rolling Boards	18

Paper Cylinders:

5½ Inch	495
4½ D°	525
3 Pounders	3,068

Formers for Cannon and Howitzer Carriages	52

Cylinder Formers:

12 Pounders	2
9 D°	3
6 D°	2
4½ D°	1
3 D°	3
2 D°	2
1½ D°	1
1 D°	1
5½ D°	2
4½ D°	2

Tin Caſes, empty:

9 Pounders	125
4 D°	200
3 D°	33
5½ Inch	84

Canvas Bags for Grape:

42 Pounders	10
32 D°	15
24 D°	26
6 D°	248

Vitry Bags for Grape:

3 Pounders	131

Sundry Stores:

Sledge Hammers	3
Iron Calliper Compaſſes	Pr. 1
Hand Saws	7
Wooden Wad Gauges	13
Tin Water Pots	11
Bullock Collars	25
Gun Scrapers	100
Drawing Knives for ſcraping Guns	6
Iron Hammers for cleaning Guns	4
Range Pickets	26
Spun Yarn	Rolls 178
Sinnett	Balls 172½
Wads, of forts	6,712
Coir Nets for Wads	63
Wooden Shot Gauges	26
Wood Frames for Spunges	8
D° for Hand Spikes	4
Double Yokes with Traces	26
Drag Ropes	Sets 81½
Wooden Buckets	10
Leather Buckets	77
Augurs	7
Chaulking Irons	12

Sundry Stores *continued.*	Nº.
Wooden Fids	12
Rope Collars for Cannon and Tumbrils	23
Marline Spikes	31
Chairs	5
Deſks	4
Gunters Scales	2
Braſs Gauges for Muſkets, &c.	1
Mills for glazing Powder	2
Provet	1
Iron Pitch Kettles	2
Traces, Europe	36
Wooden Shell Gauges	15

Unſerviceable Stores:

Iron Guns:

Engliſh,	32 Pounder	3
	24 D°	4
	12 D°	5
	9 D°	3
	6 D°	8
Foreign,	28 D°	2
	24 D°	2
	20 D°	1
	14 D°	2
	9 D°	2
	6 D°	1

Braſs Guns:

Engliſh,	12 Pounder	1
	6 D°	4
	4½ D°	1
Foreign,	22 D°	1
	20 D°	1
	6 D°	1
	3 D°	1

Braſs Mortars.

Engliſh,	13 Inch	1
	4 D°	1
Foreign,	2 D°	1
Iron Mortar, Foreign, 13 Inch		4
Mill Stone		12

Ship Carriages:

24 Pounders	27
12 D°	16
6 D°	3

Trail Carriages:

12 Pounders	2
9 D°	4

Field Carriages:

24 Pounders	2
18 D°	2
9 D°	2
6 D°	3

Mortar Beds:

13 Inch	3
10 D°	2
8 D°	6
5½ D°	2
Gin	1
Park Pickets	7
Single Yokes	20
Double Yokes	349

Errors excepted.

(Signed) *B. Scottney,*
M. Storekeeper.

Eaſt India Houſe,
22d June 1781.

John Annis,
Auditor of *India* Accounts.

APPENDIX. No. 48.

ACCOUNT Remains of Proviſions and Stores belonging to the Honourable Company, under the Charge of the Garriſon Storekeeper, to the 31ſt December 1779.

Paddy	Garce. 383:	Merculls. 180 1/16
Rice	247:	90
Wheat, Surat		343
Biſcuit	Maunds	9
Lamp Oil	Candy 8: 13:	3 lb.
Ghee		15 1/2

Garriſon Stores:

Ropes	8,000
Matts	7,450
Rattan Baſkets	1,430
Common D°	6,470
Straw	Bundles 16,957 1/2
Firewood	2,460,148
Pots and Pans	27,687

Materials for Weighing:

Iron Beam	1
Scales and Weights	Sets 2

Proviſions:

Salt Beef, Europe	Tierces 57
D° Pork	22
Vinegar	Half Hogſheads 10
Batavia Arrack	Leaguers 132 1/2 and 12 1/2 Gallons.
Sugar	35: 18: 9

Live Stock, not particularized, amounting to Pag[a] 9,736

Dead Stock:

Copper Pot	1
Jars	81
Teak Horſes	83
Palmyras	2,466
Teak Joiſts	1
Tarpaulins	4
Red Wood	Cand 4

(Signed)

Fort Saint George, 31ſt December 1779.

C. B. Dent, Garriſon Storekeeper.

Memo[m].

There are not any Accounts received of arms, ordnance, and military ſtores, in the different garriſons in the *Carnatic*.

The above Accounts are formed as near as poſſible to the order of the Honourable Committee.

Eaſt India Houſe, 25th June 1781.

John Annis, Auditor of Indian Acc[ts].

APPENDIX, No. 48.

Copy of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 22d, and 23d Articles, of the Capitulation for the ſurrender of *Pondicherry*; dated 17th October 1778.

Article 12th.

The fortifications and public buildings in *Pondicherry*, ſhall in no ways be deſtroyed, until inſtructions are received from *Europe*.

Article 13th.

Granted, as long as they behave with propriety, and do not endeavour to make converts from amongſt the people profeſſing the Proteſtant Religion.

Article 14th.

Such of the inhabitants who chooſe to remain in *Pondicherry*, and who have not been mentioned in the foregoing Articles, will, on taking the Oaths of Allegiance to His Britannic Majeſty, be allowed to trade under the protection of the Britiſh Flag; the private property of all perſons now in *Pondicherry* will be ſecured to them; ſuch as chooſe to diſpoſe of their property will be permitted to do it, arms and warlike ſtores excepted. Granted, with reſpect to the veſſel called the *Briſſon*, if ſhe is proved to be private property of the merchants now in *Pondicherry*,

Article 12eme.

Les fortifications, le Gouvernement, les magazins, et autres edifices appartenans au Roi, ſeront conſervés dans leur Etat actuel dont il ſera dreſſé, par l'Ingenieur en Chef de cette place, procés verbal conjointement avec les Commiſſionaires de S. M. B. et il n'y ſera fait aucune degradation.

Article 13eme.

Le libre exerciſe de la Religion Catholique Apoſtolique et Romaine, ſera conſervé en entiere, les egliſes ſeront reſpectées, les Eccleſiaſtiques et Religieux ſeront maintenus dans la pleine joüiſſance de leurs maiſons, et toutes leurs autres proprietés, et priviléges des Sauvegardes ſeront données à cet effet principalement au Privet Apoſtolique; à fin qu'il puiſſe exercer ſans crainte et avec decence les fonctions de ſon Etats; les miſſionaires auront la liberté d'aller d'un lieu à un autre, pour continuer leurs reſpectables fonctions, et ils recevront ſous le pavillon Anglais la même protection dont ils jouiſſaient ſous le pavillon Français; et l'on aura ſurtout pour Mr. l'Evêque de *Rabraca* actuellement à *Pondicherry*, tous les egards qu'il mérite par ſa piété, plus encore que par ſa dignité.

Article 14eme.

Les Officiers Militaires et Civils, les habitans, les negociants, et toutes autres perſonnes quelconques, tant Europiennes qu' Indiennes, et de toute autre nation, actuellement dans *Pondicherry* et dependances, comme auſſi les abſens dont les affaires ſont gerées par des procureurs, conſerveront, avec la liberté de leurs perſonnes, l'entiére et paiſible propriété et poſſeſſion de leur bien, meubles et immeubles, merchandiſes, et autres effets; même leurs vaiſſeaux; comme auſſi l'exerciſe de leurs créances et contracts, tant à *Pondicherry*, que dans tels comptoir ou manufacture que ce ſoit, ils pourront les garder ou en diſpoſer, envers les Français comme envers les Anglais,

APPENDIX. No. 49.

Pondicherry, but liable to inſpection with reſpect to her cargo, before ſhe ſails from the road of *Pondicherry*.

Article 15th.

Granted, except to the Military Officers, who muſt go with their corps; but they may leave Power of Attorney to perſons to act for them.

Article 16th.

Anſwered in the foregoing Article.

Article 22d.

Granted.

Article 23d.

Granted.

Anglais, et les converter en effets d'exportation, qu'ils auront la liberté d'envoyer ſoit à *l'Iſle de France*, ſoit dans des ports neutrés dans le cours de quinze mois qui ſuivront le preſent, ſans être ſoumis à aucun droit. Les negociants auxquels le vaiſſeau le *Briſſon* appartient pourront l'expedier pour *l'Iſle de France*, en parlementaire avec les paſſagers et merchandiſes, qu'ils voudront y embarquer; les paſſeports néceſſaires ſeront accordés à cet effet.

Article 15eme.

Les ſujets François, que leurs affaires ou la ſituation de leur fortune retiendront à *Pondicherry*, auront la liberté d'y reſter: ils n'y ſeront moleſtés en aucune façon: ils y jouiront de la même protection qui eſt accordée aux ſujets de S. M. B. et il leur ſera permis dans tous les tems de ſe tranſporter où bon leur ſemblera.

Article 16eme.

Les militaires dont les affaires exigent la preſence à *Pondicherry* pourront y reſter, après toute fois qu'ils auront obtenu la permiſſion de Monſieur *de Bellecombe*, et dans ce cas ils participeront à toute la faveur de l'Article précédente.

Article 22eme.

Les ſujets François, Européens ou Indiens, qui reſteront dans les places ou poſſeſſions Françoiſes ou Anglaiſes, n'auront rien à demeler avec les Indiens, et le Gouvernment Anglais les garantira de toutes vexations et prétenſions de leur part en leur accordant la même protection qu' aux ſujets de S. M. B.

Article 23eme.

Les Sepayes et autres Indiens, de quelque caſte ou religion qu'ils ſoient, qui auront été ſous le pavillon Français, ne pourront être récherchés ni inquiétés en leurs biens, ou en leurs perſonnes, pour cauſe de leurs ſervices, et de leur attachement envers la nation Françaiſe: le gouvernement Anglais les prendra même ſous ſa protection dans le cas ou ils ſeraient perſecutés par quelque puiſſance Aſiatique.

APPENDIX, No. 49, and Laſt.

Copy of a Tranſlation of Two Paroles, incloſed in a Letter from Colonel *Braithwaite*.

I WHO have hereunto ſigned my name, declare, That ſince the ſurrender of *Pondicherry* to the Engliſh, I have held no correſpondence whatever, either directly or indirectly, with *Hyder Ally Cawn* himſelf, or with any other perſon, either European or others, in his ſervice, or employed by him; nor have I, by any other means whatever, been acceſſary to the preſent diſturbances in the *Carnatic*, by the invaſion of the ſaid *Hyder*, as is reported, allied with the Officers and Troops of the French Nation: And I hereby promiſe to perſevere in the ſame conduct, that is to ſay, that I will hold no correſpondence, either directly or indirectly, with the Enemies of the Britiſh Nation now in *India*, to the diſadvantage of the ſaid Britiſh Nation, but that I will conduct myſelf in every reſpect during my abode in *India*, ſo as to give no offence either by my converſation, correſpondence, or behaviour, to the Engliſh Government: this I promiſe of my own free will and with pleaſure, conſidering it as a duty incumbent on me in my preſent ſituation. In witneſs whereof I have ſigned my name hereunto.

(Signed)

Pondicherry, this 7th day of Auguſt 1780. *Piveron de Mortat.*

I, who have hereunto ſigned my name, declare, on my honour, That I have never in any inſtance, intentionally ſhewn any contempt of the Honourable Governor and Committee of *Madras*, or for their orders, or entertained any doubt of the authority of the Engliſh Government over *Pondicherry*, as was ſpecified in the laſt Capitulation. I alſo declare, on my honour, that ſince the ſurrender of *Pondicherry* to the Engliſh, I have never held any correſpondence, either directly or indirectly, with *Hyder Ally Cawn* himſelf, or any perſons, Europeans or others, in his ſervice, or employed by him; nor have I been, in any reſpect, acceſſary to the preſent diſturbances in the *Carnatic* by the invaſion of the ſaid *Hyder*, as is reported, allied with the Officers and Troops of the French Nation: And I hereby promiſe to perſevere in the ſame conduct, that is to ſay, that I will hold no correſpondence, either directly or indirectly, with the Enemies of the Britiſh Nation now in *India*, to the diſadvantage of the ſaid Britiſh Nation, but that I will conduct myſelf in every reſpect during my abode in *India*, in ſuch manner as to give no offence to the Engliſh Government either by my converſation, correſpondence, or behaviour: and this I promiſe of my own free will and pleaſure, as a duty incumbent on me in my preſent ſituation. In witneſs whereof I have hereunto ſigned my name.

(Signed)

Pondicherry, this 7th day of Auguſt 1780. *L. Caſanove.*

END OF THE FIRST REPORT.

SECOND

REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Reported by the LORD ADVOCATE *of* SCOTLAND (HENRY DUNDAS, Esq.)
27th June 1781.

SECOND REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

The 27th June 1781.

The COMMITTEE of SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, and to report the ſame to the Houſe, with their Obſervations thereupon, in the Courſe of their Enquiries having found ſeveral Special Matters relating to the Conduct of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, and *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, whilſt they were reſpectively Governors and Preſidents of *Fort St. George*, and its Dependencies, and alſo of their reſpective Councils, which appear to them proper to be communicated to the Houſe; have thought it their Duty to make a Report of thoſe Special Matters as early as it has been poſſible for them ſo to do, without waiting till their further Enquiries ſhall have enabled them to complete a General Report on the Cauſes of the late Diſaſters in the *Carnatic*, which they have Reaſon to believe will demand their greateſt Diligence and Attention for a conſiderable Space of Time longer.

Vide Commiſſion, Appendix, No 1.

YOUR Committee find, That on the 11th day of June 1777, the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company granted a Commiſſion under their Seal, ſtating, That in the year 1775 they had appointed Lord *Pigot* Preſident and Governor of *Madras*; and that he having taken upon him the Government aforeſaid, had been violently removed from his office, of which they highly diſapproved—they thereby reſtored, conſtituted, and re-appointed Lord *Pigot*, immediately after the publication of the Commiſſion at *Fort Saint George*; and alſo conſtituted and ordained *Thomas Rumbold* to be 2d in Council, Major *Hector Munro* 3d, but not to riſe to any ſuperior rank, *John Whitehill* 4th, *Charles Smith* 5th, *Samuel Johnſon* 6th, *Peter Perring* 7th, *Alexander Davidſon* 8th, *John Hollond* 9th, and *James Daniel* 10th; provided, that when any three of the above-mentioned *Rumbold*, *Whitehill*, *Munro*, *Smith*, *Johnſon*, and *Perring*, ſhould arrive to take upon them their office of Councillors, then the appointment of *Davidſon*, *Hollond*, and *Daniel*, ſhould be void. That this Commiſſion gives to the Governor and Council full power and authority to rule and govern all Factors and Servants, and all Soldiers and Inhabitants in *Fort Saint George* and elſewhere, ſubject nevertheleſs to the ſuperintending and controlling power of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, authorized by the 13th *George* III. and according to ſuch Inſtructions and Directions as they ſhould from time to time receive under the hands of thirteen or more of the Directors.—That the Commiſſion eſtabliſhed a ſucceſſion to the Government, and offices of Councillors in regular gradation, with an exception to General *Munro*; and that this Commiſſion was not accompanied with any collateral Inſtructions, and was in the ſame terms with thoſe to all their Governors.

Sir *Thomas Rumbold* appeared to your Committee to have bound himſelf by three ſeparate Covenants, entered into with the Company, to the following purport: Vide Covenants, Appendix, N° 2.

The 1ſt Covenant, dated 25th June 1777, recites Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s engagement to ſerve them as Councillor for 40,000 Pagodas per annum, to be computed from

from his embarkation; and he becomes bound to obey all Orders of the Directors, made or to be made, and to fulfil all Orders which he then received, or ſhould thereafter receive; that he would reſiſt all ſuch as ſhould endeavour to break thoſe Orders, and give intelligence of ſuch endeavours to the Court of Directors, and ſpecify the names of the perſons ſo diſobeying: and alſo covenanted to abſtain from trading, directly or indirectly, and bound himſelf not to plead or demur to any Bill ſeeking a diſcovery of illicit trade.

That by the 2d Covenant, 26th June 1777, he engaged, whilſt he remained in the Company's Service in any ſtation or capacity, that he ſhould not, by himſelf or others, receive any grant of lands, or rents iſſuing out of lands, from any Indian Princes (ſtating their various deſcriptions) or their ſervants, or any money, jewels, or other effects, for any ſervices to be performed by him to them; and that all ſuch gifts ſhould be conſtrued to be for the uſe of the Company.

That by the 3d Covenant, dated 27th June 1777, in conſideration of his being appointed Governor, and of 40,000 Pagodas per annum ſalary, and of being allowed to reſide in the Fort Houſe, with the uſe of the plate and furniture, and of being allowed a commiſſion on Coral as uſual, he bound himſelf to carry on no trade except that of the Company, and alſo excepting the ſale of ſuch goods and merchandize as he ſhould have upon hand unſold at the time of his taking upon him the Government, and alſo excepting the collection of ſuch debts as ſhould be owing to him at that time, in reſpect of trade theretofore carried on; and further bound himſelf, that before he ſhould proceed to recover any ſuch debts, he ſhould deliver, or cauſe to be delivered, to the Preſident and Council at the Council Board, on oath, a ſpecific and particular Account of all ſuch Loans (if any) as he ſhould have been concerned in, and ſhould ſpecify and declare how ſuch loans reſpectively were due and ſecured, and deſcribe the whole tranſaction from the beginning of ſuch loans: and alſo, that he would accept and take ſuch ſalary and allowances in full ſatisfaction of all fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever, and that he would not, directly or indirectly, on any pretence whatſoever, take or receive any others. —He further covenanted to ſpecify in the ſame manner all goods and merchandize of which he ſhould be poſſeſſed, and to diſpoſe of the ſame in the ſpace of three months; that he ſhould lend no money to the Country Powers or their Agents, and if any ſuch loans had been made, that he ſhould ſpecify and declare all the circumſtances from its commencement.—That this Covenant contains the ſame clauſes as the former reſpecting his pleading or demurring to a bill of diſcovery; and that the penalties are 100 per cent. on trade; the ſame on any money lent to Princes or their Agents; and 200 per cent. on all preſents.

The ſalary and emoluments appeared to your Committee to be about £. 16,000 per annum, and that the commiſſion on Coral appears to amount to about £. 2,000 per annum; the whole making about £. 18,000.

And your Committee find, That the Government of *Madras* is rendered ſubordinate to the Government General of *Bengal*, by Act 13 *Geo.* III. c. 63; which enacts, That the Governor-General and Council, or the major part of them, ſhall have, and they are hereby authorized to have, power of ſuperintending and controlling the government and management of the Preſidencies of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen* reſpectively, ſo far and inſomuch as that it ſhall not be lawful for any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making War againſt any Indian Princes or Powers, or for negociating or concluding any Treaty of Peace, or other Treaty, with any ſuch Indian Princes or Powers, without the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Governor General and Council firſt had and obtained, except in ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity as would render it dangerous to poſtpone ſuch hoſtilities or Treaties until the orders from the Governor General and Council might arrive, and except in ſuch caſes where the ſaid Preſidents and Councils reſpectively ſhall have received ſpecial Orders from the ſaid United Company; and any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, who ſhall offend in any of the caſes aforeſaid, ſhall be liable to be ſuſpended from his or their office, by the order of the ſaid Governor General and Council: and every Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, for the time being, ſhall, and they are hereby reſpectively directed and required to pay due obedience to ſuch orders as they ſhall receive, touching the premiſes, from the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being, and conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the ſaid Governor General and Council, advice and intelligence of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the Government revenues or intereſts of the ſaid United Company; and the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being ſhall, and they are hereby directed and required to pay due obedience to all ſuch orders as they ſhall receive from the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and to correſpond from time to time, and conſtantly and diligently tranſmit to the ſaid Court, an exact particular of all advices or intelligence, and of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the Government, commerce, revenues, or intereſt of the ſaid United Company.

Vide Appendix, Nº 3.

They alſo found, That Mr. *Whitehill* having been appointed Third in Council, and having entered into Covenants of the ſame nature, ſtated in the Appendix, ſet out for *India*, by land, ſoon after his appointment, and arrived at *Madras* on 31ſt Auguſt 1777; and that being the ſenior Councillor then on the ſpot, he acted as Preſident and Governor till the 8th of February following, when Sir *Thomas Rumbold* arrived at *Madras*.

Appendix, Nº 2.

They find, That the *Eaſt India* Company are in poſſeſſion of the Northern Circars, for which Phirmaund was granted by the Mogul *Shaw Allum*, dated 12th Auguſt 1765, and another grant by the Nizam of the *Decan*, dated at *Hyderabad* (his capital) on the 12th November 1766; that on the 12th April 1775, the Court of Directors gave explicit orders to their Governor and Council at *Madras*, reſpecting the Northern Circars and jaghire lands, to the following purport: They repreſented, that one object of the early attention of the Governor and Council muſt be to acquire a complete knowledge of thoſe territories which had been granted to the Company on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, and to eſtabliſh a judicious and permanent ſyſtem for their future management, ſtating certain reaſons why it is expedient to increaſe their ſtrength in their own poſſeſſions without diminiſhing the reſources for inveſtments, and for carrying on the Government; and that they are well aſſured the jaghire lands and Northern Circars, eſpecially the latter, would be found capable of anſwering that deſirable purpoſe, if duly explored and properly regulated; they therefore directed, that when the affairs of *Tanjore* ſhall be finally adjuſted, a Committee of the Council of *Fort Saint George*, conſiſting of five Members, ſhould be appointed to make the circuit of the Northern Circars; that they ſhould aſcertain, with all poſſible exactneſs, the produce of the country, the number of inhabitants, the ſtate of the manufactures, the fortified places, the groſs amount of the revenues, the articles from which they ariſe, the mode by which they are collected, the charges of collection, the ſpecific proportion uſually received by the Rajah or Zemindar, and that which cuſtom and uſage allotted to the Cultivator as the reward of his labour; and that the Committee of Circuit were alſo particularly to enquire what ſecurity the Native had for his property, what Courts there were, for the adminiſtration of Juſtice, and how far ſimilar regulations to thoſe then lately eſtabliſhed at *Bengal* by the Preſident and Council of that Preſidency, might, with propriety, be introduced into

Vide Treaties, Appendix, Nº 4.

Vide Letter, 12th April 1775. Appendix, No. 5.

the Northern Circars; that it was by no means their wiſh to deprive the hereditary Rajahs or Zemindars of their annual income, on the contrary, that they meant to ſecure it to them without leaving them under the neceſſity of keeping an armed force to compel payment thereof; and alſo, that it was their earneſt deſire to deliver the inhabitants, ſo far as it might be in their power, from undue exactions and oppreſſions; and that the impropriety of ſuffering any Zemindar to become formidable to his neighbours, or too powerful, would not admit of a doubt; that they never approved the policy of the Company's late Governor and Council, in conſenting to accept a ſmall Tribute, or ſuch compoſition for lands as *Sitteram Rauze* might think proper to make, without aſcertaining in any degree the value of ſuch lands; and, that if it was true, that his power had theretofore rendered it dangerous to riſk his diſpleaſure by admitting competitors to bid for lands, ſo it was high time to correct that ſyſtem, and to diſallow the keeping of other Troops than the Company's in the Circars, more eſpecially as ſuch Troops were not ſubject to the Company's orders, but rendered their tenants leſs dependant than they ought to be upon the Company's authority and controul: and in order to enable the Company to ſtrike at the root of that evil, the Committee of Circuit were directed to take the moſt effectual meaſures for aſcertaining the ſtrength of each Rajah, Zemindar, or Landholder in the Circars; the expence of his houſehold and that of his Troops; the means he might have of defraying ſuch expences, and the number of regular Sepoys which it would be neceſſary for the Company to maintain in the reſpective diſtricts, in order to keep them in due ſubjection: and as an addition of military ſtrength within the Company's poſſeſſions ſeemed ſo abſolutely neceſſary, and as they could have no doubt but that with proper œconomy a conſiderable force might be maintained in the Circars, and the annual Rent or Tribute remitted to the Company's Treaſury at *Fort Saint George* be nevertheleſs conſiderably increaſed, they therefore reſolved, that every military man reſiding in the Circars ſhould be abſolutely under the Company's command, obliged to ſerve the Company wherever he might be wanted, and not left at liberty to take part with the Company's Enemies in caſe troubles ſhould ariſe in the country. And after having fully inveſtigated the provincial accounts of the Circars, if any of the Zemindars ſhould prefer receiving their income from the Company, and relinquiſh their hereditary claims, the Directors had no objection to allowing them ſuch ſtipends as ſhould be found reaſonable, in lieu of the benefits ariſing from their Zemindaries. And as it was the Company's intention, on the expiration of the preſent leaſes, that the Committee of Circuit ſhould proceed to let the lands for a term of years, in the ſame manner as had been practiſed at *Bengal*, it was the Company's order, that the Zemindars ſhould have their option of retiring upon ſtipends, or of continuing to rent the lands at a proper valuation; but it was a poſitive command, that the proportion of the produce to be received by Farmers of every denomination, ſhould be aſcertained and exactly defined; and that it ſhould be an expreſs condition in every leaſe, that all Farmers who ſhould exact more than their due proportion from the undertenants, ſhould forfeit their farms; and the Governor and Council were to take eſpecial care that the means of redreſs, in caſe of impoſition or oppreſſion, ſhould be rendered as eaſy as poſſible: and the Court of Directors, in their Letter, ſtated theſe as the outlines of the plan which they wiſhed to ſee adopted for the Circars. That in regard to the jaghire lands, many conſiderations induced them to keep the ſame in the Company's immediate poſſeſſion; and unleſs the Nabob agreed to ſuch arrangements as the Company deemed neceſſary for mutual advantage, the Directors would no longer conſent to his renting the jaghire lands, as it almoſt enabled him to ſhut the Company up within the walls of *Madras*, and even to prevent them from obtaining a proper ſupply of proviſions for their Settlement; they therefore directed that the Governor and Council ſhould conclude no agreement with the Nabob for the above-mentioned lands for more than one year, and that it ſhould be an expreſs condition in ſuch agreement, that the Committee of Circuit ſhould be at full liberty to explore the country, and to aſcertain the real produce and revenue thereof, in the manner deſcribed in the Inſtructions reſpecting the Northern Circars.

And Your Committee find, That on the 28th June 1776, Sir *Robert Fletcher* delivered it as his opinion in Council, that the time limited by the Company for the appointment of the Committee of Circuit had been long expired, and that the eſtabliſhment of it ought no longer to be delayed; and alſo find, that from this time forward down to the 24th Auguſt (the day on which Lord *Pigot* was impriſoned) much altercation took place in the *Madras* Conſultations, reſpecting the nomination of the perſons who ſhould ſerve on this Committee of Circuit, this matter being implicated with the diſſentions which ſubſiſted between Lord *Pigot* and a part of his Council.—It appeared to Your Committee, That Meſſrs. *Stratton* and his Council, after the depoſition of Lord *Pigot*, took up the conſideration of this matter on the 29th of Auguſt 1776, and appointed three new Members to be of the Committee of Circuit in the room of three Gentlemen whom they had ſuſpended from their offices in Council; and that on the 1ſt of November 1776, inſtructions were ſent to the Committee of Circuit, which then conſiſted of Meſſrs. *Johnſon*, *Floyer*, *Perring*, *Hollond*, and *Crawford*, with Meſſrs. *Tuder*, *Jackſon*, *Ruſſel*, and *Gregory*, who were appointed their aſſiſtants:—That in theſe inſtructions, the Governor and Council referred almoſt entirely to the Letter from the Court of Directors of the 12th of April 1775, obſerving, that it was ſo explicit that nothing could be added to it; and directing, that as ſoon as certain Members named ſhould arrive at *Vizagapatam*, the Committee ſhould proceed to carry on their enquiry in the moſt expeditious and effectual manner poſſible; and Your Committee obſerve, that the Governor and Council ſtated in theſe Inſtructions, that when their Preſident (Mr. *Stratton*) was in the *Chicacole* Circar, *Jaggernaut Rauze*, the preſent Renter of the Havilly Lands (for which the Company now received only 170,000 Rupees per annum) offered, if they were let to him, that he would give 210,000 Rupees per annum for 10 years, and 410,000 Rupees per annum for 10 years more. In expectation of a conſiderable improvement from this circumſtance, the Select Committee required that the value of theſe lands ſhould be aſcertained with ſome degree of preciſion.—Your Committee perceived a great diſpoſition ſhewn in theſe inſtructions, to advert to the hereditary rights of the Zemindars, and a deſire that in every diſtrict enquiry ſhould be made into the nature of the grants, by which lands of every deſcription were holden, by whom thoſe grants were made, what the produce was, and to what purpoſe applied.

And Your Committee find, That on the 4th January 1777, a quorum of the Committee of Circuit proceeded on their buſineſs, being allowed Colonel's pay and batta for themſelves, and Captain's pay and batta for their aſſiſtants, in conſequence of a requeſt by Letter of the 28th of January 1777; which was afterwards objected to by the Court of Directors, as greater than was neceſſary.—It appears to Your Committee, That Mr. *Stratton*'s Government much approved of the inſtitution of the Committee of Circuit, from their advering to it immediately upon their acceſſion, and from the inſtructions which were given by them:—That Mr. *Whitehill* and his Government no leſs approved of it, appeared from the *Madras* Revenue Conſultations of the 5th of December 1777; which ſtates, that the Board obſerved that a variety of cauſes had combined to impede the execution of the Directors orders, relative to the Committee of Circuit, and that they were juſtly ſenſible of the advantages to be derived from the due diſcharge of that important

Fort St. George. Rev. Conſ. fol. 162. Appendix, No. 6.

Ibid. from fol. 179 to 218.

Fort St. George, Mil. Conſ. fol. 859. Appendix, No. 7.

Rev. Conſ. 1776, fol. 343. Appendix, No. 8.

Fort St. George, Rev. Conſ. 1777, fol. 24. Appendix, No. 9.

Ib. fol. 78. Appendix, No. 10.

Fort St. George, Rev. Conſ. 1777, fol. 726. Appendix, No. 11.

important commiſſion, and that they reſolved the buſineſs ſhould be proſecuted without loſs of time, and therefore proceeded to fill up the vacancies which had happened.

Fort St. George, Rev. Conſ. 1777, fol. 775—778. Appendix, No. 12.

It alſo appeared to Your Committee, That certain offers having been tranſmitted from *Ganjam* to Mr. *Whitehill* and the Council, for increaſing the Company's revenue upon long leaſes, they kept the Company's orders in view, and forbore to give any opinion of the means propoſed, until they ſhould receive the Report of the Committee of Circuit; and reſolved, that the higheſt offer for one year only ſhould be accepted; and that they wrote a Letter to *Ganjam* on the 10th of December 1777, to that effect, and on the 17th continued the jaghire lands to the Nabob for one year only.—From hence it appeared, that the two Governments which preceded that of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* ſaw this meaſure in the ſame light with the Court of Directors.

Fort St George, Rev. Conſ. 1777, fol. 789. Appendix, No. 13. Ib. 791—796. Appendix, No. 14.

Your Committee find, That two months after the date of this Minute, viz. on the 8th of February 1778, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* arrived at *Madras*, and took upon him the Government; and that in about ſix weeks after, viz. on the 24th of March 1778, he began the abolition of this Committee. At a Conſultation on that day, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Mr. *Whitehill*, General *Munro*, Mr. *Smith*, Mr. *Johnſon*, and Mr. *Perring* being preſent, the Preſident appears to Your Committee to have delivered in a Minute, which ſtates, That when the Court of Directors appointed five Members of the Board for this ſervice, he finds by the Records, that their orders had not for ſome time been put in execution; but that at laſt a Committee had been formed and ſent: that the expence was great, and from the reduction of the Members of the Council, it was impoſſible that any could now be appointed for that ſervice. "I recommend (ſays he) as a "much more eligible plan for the preſent, that the "Committee do not proceed, but that the Zemindars "of the different diſtricts in the Northern Circars be "directed to repair immediately, and without loſs of "time, to the Preſidency, which I am perſuaded will "give us an opportunity of gaining the moſt complete "knowledge of the ſtate of the Company's Circars, ſo "important to them. I am the more confirmed in this "opinion when I reflect, that hitherto the different Zemindars have in ſome degree been taught to conſider "the ſubordinate Settlements under which they were, as "the Government itſelf, and a communication between "them and the Preſidency has been in a great meaſure "cut off. The ſettling the Jemmabundy (or tribute) "here, will give them a confidence in this Government, "and teach them to look up to us for protection. They "will of courſe be very ready, in all caſes where they "may ſuppoſe themſelves injured, to make a final appeal to this Board; and I have no doubt we ſhall, "from a thorough inveſtigation, and from the information we receive, obtain a perfect knowledge of thoſe "Circars, in a ſhorter time than we can, from the enquiries of the Committee of Circuit for that purpoſe, "travelling under many diſadvantages, and at a great "expence. It will be the means of removing all intrigues and intereſts, which ever operate to the detriment of the Company. As I purpoſe entering more "fully into this ſubject in a future Minute, I move that "the Zemindars in all the Northern Circars be immediately ordered to proceed to the Preſidency, to ſettle "the enſuing Jemmabundy; and that the Company's "Dubaſhes (Agents) at the different Subordinates, who "have generally been employed in the buſineſs of revenue, be ordered here alſo."

Fort St. George, Rev. Conſ. 1778, fol. 80—84. Appendix, No. 15.

Your Committee alſo find, from the ſame Conſultations, That the Members of the Council concurred with their Preſident in theſe terms, and "taking into conſideration the ſubject of the Preſident's Minute, are "ſenſible of the propriety and force of the arguments "he has made uſe of in ſupport of, the points which are "therein recommended; and being perſuaded that they "are calculated to promote the intereſt of the Company, "they do not heſitate to give their hearty concurrence "towards the attainment of that deſirable end.

"Reſolved therefore, That the appointment of a "Committee of Circuit be for the preſent ſuſpended; "and that the Gentlemen who compoſe that Committee, "be informed that they are no longer to conſider themſelves as Members thereof.

"Reſolved, for the reaſons ſet forth in the Preſident's "Minute, That the annual Rent or Jemmabundy of the "ſeveral diſtricts of theſe Northern Circars, be in future "ſettled at the Preſidency; and that the Gentlemen at "the ſeveral ſubordinate Settlements be directed to ſig"nify to the Zemindars under them, and to the Mut"medars of the reſpective countries, that it is our order "they proceed hither for this purpoſe, without loſs of "time; and that the Dubaſhes alſo repair hither.

"And the more effectually to ſecure compliance with "this order, it is further reſolved, That the Preſident "do write a ſeparate Letter to each of the Zemindars, "a copy of which is to be tranſmitted to the Chiefs and "Councils of the reſpective Settlements for their in"formation; they muſt alſo be directed to repreſent, in "the ſtrongeſt manner, to the Zemindars, the neceſſity "of implicit acquieſcence on their part, and the danger "of incurring our diſpleaſure, by ſhewing the ſmalleſt "reluctance or unwillingneſs to obey our commands, "which they are to be told will be enforced in caſe they "ſhould not meet with a ready compliance."

Your Committee find, That the Preſident then obſerved to the Board, that having carefully peruſed the Records reſpecting *Vizieram Rauze*, it will be neceſſary to be particularly urgent with him.—That he propoſed, that the Letter to *Vizieram Rauze* ſhould be varied accordingly; and that the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam* ſhould be inſtructed to impreſs upon his mind, the neceſſity of paying immediate attention to their orders, and the conſequences which muſt inevitably attend delay; and that he recommended that this Zemindar ſhould be furniſhed with an eſcort of two companies of Sepoys, which was ordered accordingly.

In the abolition of the Committee of Circuit, Your Committee do not find that any deliberation, or any time for conſideration, was required on the part of the Council, but that this matter was adopted by them as ſoon as it was propoſed by their Preſident.

It appeared to your Committee, That in the circar of *Chicacole*, *Vizieram Rauze* is Zemindar of *Vizinagram*, whoſe territory is of great extent, and whoſe diſpoſition is deſcribed by Letter from the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, dated 6th November 1777, to be that of a man of no great ability, and impoſed upon by his Brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, a man in their eſtimation of very bad public character; and that *Jaggernaut Rauze*, Duan of *Sitteram Rauze*, is repreſented in all the evidence laid before Your Committee, as a man of ability and juſtice. —Your Committee thought proper on this ſubject to examine Colonel *Matthews*, whoſe reſidence in the Circars from 1773 to 1776, enabled him to judge of the character of the three perſons above mentioned; and he gave the Committee the following information reſpecting them:

Fort St. George, Rev. Conſ. 29 Sept. 1777, fol. 349.

18 Nov. 618 to 666; 692—707. Appendix, No. 16.

Vide Appendix, No. 17.

That *Vizeram Rauze* was the Rajah, but the power of the country was in the hand of *Sitteram Rauze*, whoſe Dewan *Jaggernaut* was, although underſtood to be attached to *Vizieram Rauze*, with whom he was connected by marriage. He deſcribed *Sitteram Rauze* as a very ſenſible man, but who would ſtick at nothing to carry his point, and has been guilty of many atrocious crimes. He repreſented *Vizeram Rauze* as rather weak than otherwiſe, but a mild-tempered and humane man—rather improper to manage his affairs, as being addicted to pleaſure, and no ways attentive to buſineſs.—From his knowledge of *Jaggernaut Rauze*, Colonel *Matthews* thought, that with his aſſiſtance as Dewan, the affairs of the country might have been managed by *Vizieram Rauze*;

Rauze; meaning however, in ſaying this, that the adminiſtration ſhould reſt entirely with *Jaggernaut Rauze*, who was a man of ſenſe, of general good character, and conſidered as one who would manage the affairs of the country with lenity and juſtice.

Vide Appendix, No. 18.

Revenue Conſ. 1777. 733—743. No. 19.

It appeared to Your Committee, That on the 25th November 1777, a little more than two months preceding the arrival of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, *Vizieram Rauze* had been ordered down to *Madras* by Mr. *Whitehill* and Council; the reaſon for which is ſtated in their Letter to the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, to be, that it is neceſſary he ſhould attend at the Preſidency, in order to give particular information reſpecting ſome points contained in a Letter from them of the 6th November, which treated of the general ſtate of the *Chicacole* Circar; but that Mr. *Johnſon*, who had been Chief of *Vizagapatam*, diſſented from this Reſolution, for the reaſons aſſigned by him and the Subordinate Council in their Letter to the Preſidency of the 30th of Auguſt, to which he referred.

1777. Rev. Conſ. 692—707. Appendix, No. 20.

Your Committee, however, find, That Mr. *Whitehill* and Council, on the 27th of November, wrote to *Vizieram Rauze*, ordering him to *Madras*, and acquainting him, that out of compliment a company of Sepoys ſhould eſcort him thither.

Fort St. George, Mil. Conſ. 1777. 1384. Appendix, No. 21.

On peruſing the Letter alluded to by Mr. *Johnſon*, the reaſons aſſigned appeared to be theſe—The approaching harveſt—the expected inroads of the Hill People, and of the Marattas—*Vizeram Rauze*'s large debts—the diſturbances which continually attend his abſence, which are deſcribed to be ſuch as deterred the weavers from their work (which was already in ſome meaſure the caſe, from the bare report of his intended journey) and conſequently that the inveſtments would be impeded.—That the difficulties which the Committee of Circuit had hitherto met with, would be augmented to ſuch a degree, that their buſineſs muſt be ſuſpended until the Rajah's return; whereas, if he remained, the inveſtigation of his Zemindarry might be reported to the Committee in three months; a circumſtance that would aſcertain the Tribute in future, and which would probably increaſe it above two lacks for the firſt inſtalments; but that this increaſe would unavoidably be loſt on the next inſtalments, if the Enquiry were impeded or ſuſpended.

Appendix, No. 22.

It appeared, That this Letter, adopted by Mr. *Johnſon* in his Minute, earneſtly requeſted, that the Rajah's orders ſhould be countermanded, or if he ſhould have ſet out, that he might be directed to return ſpeedily; and proceeded in theſe words: "As to *Sitteram Rauze*, his abſence will be highly pleaſing to all degrees of people; and we cannot help expreſſing our ſincere wiſh, that he may never be permitted to return, as we are fully perſuaded this is the only means of keeping the Circar in perfect tranquillity."

Your Committee found, That on the 24th of December 1777, the Gentlemen of *Vizagapatam* repreſented to the Preſidency of *Madras* the reluctance of *Vizieram Rauze* to comply with their orders, giving as a reaſon, that he was much in debt; that his credit was ſunk by his being out of poſſeſſion of his ancient reſidence; that he was apprehenſive of deſtructive inroads from his neighbours during his abſence, and that he was ready to ſettle with the Council at *Vizagapatam* for any reaſonable Tribute.—Theſe reaſons are confirmed by Letter from the Rajah himſelf of the ſame date, which accompanied the former; wherein he ſays, that *Jaggernaut Rauze* will in a few days ſet out for *Madras*, and that his Vakeel will accompany him with his preſents, and that theſe two will tranſact his buſineſs—That it is now the time of harveſt, which requires his whole attention; that he muſt diſcharge his debt to the Soukar or Banker, incurred by procuring a draft in favour of the Company—"That he has got to pay the Company's "payments entirely;" and that the diſturbances in his country have not yet ſubſided, which, againſt his will, prevent his coming to *Madras*.—And Your Committee alſo find, That he complains in general of his poverty, and that his Brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, is contriving his ruin.—It appeared to Your Committee, That previous to this time *Sitteram Rauze* had voluntarily come to *Madras*; for on the 17th December, the Preſident, Mr *Whitehill*, acquainted the Board, that *Sitteram*, who had been ſome time at *Madras*, had applied to deliver in propoſals for the renting the *Havilly* Lands, which appear to have been accepted in Mr. *Whitehill*'s Government, and will be ſtated hereafter.

Fort St. Geo. Rev. Conſ. 13 Jan. 1778, fol. 15. Appendix, No. 23.

Ib. folio 21—28.

Ib. 800—806. Appendix, No. 24.

It further appeared, That on the 27th of February 1778, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* acquainted the Board, That not having had leiſure ſince his arrival to underſtand ſufficiently the affairs relating to the Revenue Committee of Circuit and *Chicacole* Circar, deſired the Board would defer the conſideration of theſe ſubjects; which was aſſented to; but that on the 15th of April, when the conſideration of theſe matters was reſumed, the Chief and Council at *Ganjam* were ordered to direct all the Zemindars dependant on that Settlement to repair to *Madras* without loſs of time, together with *Ball Kiſtnab*, the Company's Interpreter—That like orders were given to *Mazulipatam* at the ſame time, and thoſe of *Vizagapatam* had been ordered down by Letters of the 4th of April 1778.

Fort St. George, Rev. Conſ. 1778, fol. 75. Appendix, No. 25.

Ib. 146.

Ib. fol. 125—149. Appendix, No. 26, No. 27. No. 28.

The ſentiments of the ſubordinate Chiefs and Councils with regard to this meaſure, appeared to Your Committee from their Letters on this ſubject; for on the 3d May 1778, the Gentlemen of *Mazulipatam* acquainted the Preſidency, that a tranſlation of the Governor's Letter had been circulated among the Zemindars, together with a preſſing Letter from the Chief, recommending immediate obedience; to which Letter ſeveral Anſwers had been received, which muſt have been unfavourable, as the orders are repeated to the Zemindars on the 15th of May—this Letter of the 3d of May is found to contain the following paſſage:

Rev. Conſ. 1778, fol. 189.

"The departure of the Zemindars, &c. to the Pre-
"ſidency, at this time, leaves us little room to hope
"that they will be able to negociate bills with their Sou-
"cars, ſo that we may receive any conſiderable part
"of the heavy kiſts (inſtalments) now due from them
"during their abſence, which otherwiſe we were in ex-
"pectation they would have accounted for in full, they
"having been ordered, and many of them having actu-
"ally repaired hither, for that purpoſe."

Rev. Conſ. 15 May 1778 Appendix, No. 29.

It appeared to Your Committee, That on the 15th May, at the ſame time that the orders to the Zemindars were repeated, the Preſident obſerved, that calling down the Zemindars had not impeded the payment of the balances, amounting to upwards of 3,68,000 Rupees. The Correſpondence above-mentioned ſhewed to Your Committee the ſentiments of the Gentlemen at *Mazulipatam*; and the ſentiments of the Zemindars themſelves appeared by ſeveral Letters, written by ſome of the moſt conſiderable of that claſs, to the Chief of *Mazulipatam*; ſtating the irreparable injury which an abſence from their lands would occaſion to their private affairs, and conſequently to the regularity of their payments to the Company; and that on the 21ſt of May the Council of *Mazulipatam*, in an Anſwer to a Letter from the Board, repreſented that they had uſed their utmoſt endeavours, and that the moſt effectual means had been taken which they could deviſe, to obtain a compliance with their orders; and acquainted them of eight Zemindars by name, who had taken leave, or ſet out; and that on the 11th of July, the Gentlemen of *Mazulipatam* further repreſented the difficulties of certain Zemindars to proceed to *Madras*—one in particular aſſerting, that he ſhould find the greateſt difficulty in raiſing a ſum to defray the expence of his journey, having ſcarcely ſufficient to ſupport himſelf and his Family; and that others had promiſed to go, as ſoon as they could raiſe money to defray their expences.

Appendix, No. 30. 254—257. 255.

Appendix, No. 31.

Rev. Conſ. 12 June 1778. fol. 284. Appendix, No. 32.

Folio 317. 335. Rev. Conſ. 20 July 1778. fol. 399. 401. 409.

The following paſſage is found to conclude this Letter: "The departure of the principal Zemindars "from

Appendix, No. 32. fol. 405.

" from theſe countries leaving us deſtitute of pecu-
" niary reſources, whilſt our demands are likely to in-
" creaſe, we find it neceſſary to make a particular re-
" preſentation thereof, and flatter ourſelves, that the
" ſupply which, from the ſtatement that will be now
" laid before you, may appear to be neceſſary, will be
" granted as ſpeedily as the nature of ſuch buſineſs
" will admit; we find it neceſſary however to entreat,
" that you will grant us ſome immediate aſſiſtance, with-
" out which our Chief reports to us, that all our buſi-
" neſs muſt be at a ſtand."

Appendix, No. 31. fol. 420. On this repreſentation, the Board at *Madras* appears to have allowed them to draw monthly bills on the Preſidency.

The ſentiments of the Company's Servants, and of the Zemindars in *Ganjam*, were collected by Your Committee from the following documents:

338—356, 421. Appendix, No. 33. On the 25th May, the Company's Servants at *Ganjam* wrote to the Board in theſe terms: " From the tenor of " the Zemindars Letters to the Chief, as well as from " our own knowledge, we are well aſſured of their ina-" bility, were they ever ſo well inclined, to proceed to " the Preſidency at this juncture; and we ſhould hold " ourſelves wanting in the duty we owe to your Ho-" nours, &c. did we not point out, to the beſt of our " knowledge, the difficulties which would ariſe from " ſuch a procedure—In the firſt place, we beg leave to " make a ſtatement of the balances due to the Company " from the Zemindars you have been pleaſed to order " up from the Preſidency.

" We are convinced that theſe Zemindars would with " cheerfulneſs proceed to the Preſidency, were they in " a capacity to defray the expences of ſo long a jour-" ney; but we can with a degree of certainty inform " you, that theſe Zemindars, ſo far from being in a " capacity to travel, are ſcarcely enabled to maintain " their Families with common decency at home." In this Letter ſeveral Petitions are incloſed, preſented by the principal Zemindars, repreſenting their inability to perform the journey, for want of money, and many other reaſons; and among others, one of them makes this apology, that he is ſo exceedingly fat, that he has been unable to walk out of his houſe for many years.

Rev. Conſ. 20 July 1778, folio 392. Appendix, No. 34. The effect of this meaſure, in calling down *Vizeram Rauze*, was ſtated by the Gentlemen of *Vizagapatam*, on the 3d of July, in theſe terms: " Unleſs we receive " your aſſiſtance, in the courſe of a month we ſhall be " in great diſtreſs for means to make the uſual monthly " payments. Our *inveſtment* is already nearly at a " ſtand." And this they aſcribe to *Sitteram Rauze*'s want of punctuality in the making of his large payments due, and to the abſence of *Vizieram* and *Jaggernaut* at the Preſidency.

Fol. 422—424. Appendix, No. 35. And Your Committee find, That the Chief of *Ganjam* writes to the Preſidency, on the 13th of June 1778, ſtating, That he ſhould make the Rajah of *Gumſoor*, when he arrived, ſenſible of his diſreſpectful ſilence to his Letter—" Your Honour," ſays he, " may eaſily " conclude, from their ſavage ignorance, how difficult " an undertaking it will be to perſuade *Vickeram Bunge*, " the Rajah, or indeed any other Rajahs, to comply " with the orders of the Board with regard to their pro-" ceeding to the Preſidency. Poverty, and their large " balances to the Company, and their inability to diſ-" charge them, are the only excuſes which ought to be " admitted."

Your Committee have ſtated above, That the Board at *Mazulipatam* had, by Letter of the 23d May, apprized the Preſidency, that certain Zemindars had ſet out; and they find that this Letter was received at *Madras* on the 12th June, and that on the 15th, which was three days afterwards, the Preſidency directed the Gentlemen at *Mazulipatam* to adverriſe for propoſals to rent the ſeveral farms under their management, for 5, 8, or 10 years; but that on the 3d July they were informed from *Mazulipatam*, that no propoſals whatever had been received.

Rev. Conſ. 22 June 1778, 234, &c. fol. 363. June 15. Appendix, No. 36. 475. It appears to your Committee, That the Court of Directors, in their General Letter to *Madras*, dated 10th of January 1781, animadvert upon this, and acquaint that Preſidency, that it does not appear to them that any propoſals could be expected, as almoſt all thoſe whoſe ſituation enabled them to bid, were at that time called down to the Preſidency. Appendix, laſt No.

Thus it appeared to Your Committee, That remonſtrances were made from every one of the ſubordinate Settlements, from whence the Zemindars were ordered to *Madras*; and that the Zemindars themſelves, in every one of them, complained of it as a great hardſhip impoſed upon them, as ruinous to their own private affairs, and conſequently detrimental to the intereſt of the Company.

In one inſtance the Preſidency appears to have felt, in ſome degree, the weight of the reaſoning both of the Zemindars and their own Servants; for in a Letter to *Ganjam*, 21ſt July 1778, they diſpenſed with the perſonal attendance of the Zemindars, and ordered the Renters and Muſmedars of the ſix principal Zemindars to repair to the Preſidency. Appendix, No. 37. 472—473.

It alſo appears to Your Committee, That notwithſtanding this uniformity of opinion in all the ſubordinate Settlements, and this univerſal reluctance on the part of the Zemindars, that the Governor and Council (excepting Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon*) never relinquiſhed the meaſure; but on the contrary, that the Preſident's Minute of the 20th of July 1778, ſtates many of them as having arrived at the Preſidency. Appendix, No. 38. 421.

Your Committee finding much reaſon to rely on the experience and judgment of Colonel *Matthews*, examined him as to the general opinion at *Madras* and in the Circars, reſpecting the policy of aboliſhing the Committee of Circuit, and requiring the perſonal attendance of the Zemindars: he informed them, that when he arrived at *Madras* in July 1778, he found many of the Rajahs and Zemindars there, but that ſeveral had refuſed to come, for it was in general eſteemed by the people of the country to be an unjuſt and unneceſſary meaſure; and that the general opinion was, that the lands might have been let as well without their coming to *Madras*; and that undoubtedly the Committee of Circuit, being on the ſpot, would beſt have judged of the value, and not have received diſtant reports from others; and that from his knowledge of the ſituation and diſpoſitions of the Zemindars and other inhabitants of the Circars, the bringing the former down to *Madras* was certainly a very offenſive meaſure. The diſtance from *Vizagapatam* to *Madras* he informed them was 550 miles, and from *Ganjam* 720.—Colonel *Matthews* alſo informed Your Committee, that he was of opinion that it was more for the intereſt of the Company, and the ſecurity of the revenue, that the country ſhould be under *Jaggernaut*, than under *Sitteram Rauze*. Vide Appendix, No. 17.

The next object of Your Committee's attention, was the manner in which the different Zemindars had been treated with, during their reſidence at *Madras*, in regard to the leaſes of their lands; which appeared never to have been by the Board collectively, nor in conſequence of any inveſtigation before them, but merely by the Governor in perſon, whoſe report was in every inſtance held to be ſufficient.

Appendix, No. 39. Rev. Conſ. 1777, fol. 622 —713. Ibid. 650. They find that the firſt negociation in perſon was between *Sitteram Rauze*, when he came to *Madras*, and Mr. *Whitehill*, then Governor; for it appears, that on the 18th of November 1777, propoſals had been communicated by the Committee of Circuit, from *Paduah Rauze*, for renting the Havilly Lands in the *Chicacole* Diſtrict, and *Coſſimcotah*; but that on the 19th of December the Preſident (Mr. *Whitehill*) laid before the Board other propoſals from *Sitteram Rauze*, which exceeded the former by 5,000 Rupees on each individual article; and that theſe lands were, without further inveſ- Ibid. 802.

tigation,

tigation, or without any conditions favourable to the under-tenants, let to *Sitteram Rauze* for a term of ten years. Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* are found to have diſagreed to the acceptance of theſe propoſals; but by Mr. *Perring*'s joining with the Preſident, the queſtion was carried by the caſting vote of the latter. Your Committee found the Records of the Company contained very unfavourable repreſentations of the character and diſpoſition of *Sitteram Rauze*, and evinced, that he had been deprived of conſiderable power and authority, to which this act, in a great meaſure, reſtored him.

1777. Rev. Conſ. 692—707.

Your Committee find, That the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* repreſented, by a Letter of the 17th January 1778, that the practice had ever been to receive reports of the ability and character of thoſe who propoſed for leaſes from the Chief and Council; and that although they had been mortified by being overlooked in this inſtance, yet they were impelled by duty to ſtate many inconveniencies from this new arrangement; that *Padnab Rauze* had no idea of being out-bid by any one at the Preſidency, and if he had ſuſpected it, he would have bid more, and was ready to give 40,000 Rupees more than *Sitteram Rauze* had offered; that *Padnab* was a man of ſubſtance, and much beloved as a juſt man, but as to *Sitteram Rauze*, they refer for his character to his former behaviour in this very diſtrict, and the character given of him by the Committee of Circuit.—It further appeared to Your Committee, That on the 10th of April, about a month after Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s arrival, the Gentlemen of *Vizagapatam* acquainted the Preſidency, that *Sitteram Rauze*'s Manager would pay nothing till he had orders from his Maſter at *Madras*; and alſo acquainted them, that they had undeniable proof that 131,000 Rupees, in money and grain, had been ſent to *Sitteram Rauze*, at *Madras*, and that bills were negociating to the amount of 70,000 more, which, together, is a ſum equal to one year's rent to the Company. They repreſented the tenants as cruelly oppreſſed to make up this ſum, and ſtate the reaſon of their making this communication to be, that ſome part of his arrears might be ſecured.

Appendix, No. 40. Rev. Conſ. 2 Feb. 1778, fol. 62.

Appendix, No. 41. Ibid. fol. 139.

Ibid. 140.

From the Conſultations of the Select Committee, Your Committee found that the Preſident was directed by the Board to communicate this intelligence to *Sitteram Rauze*, and on the 24th of April that he reported, that *Sitteram* had aſſured him that his firſt inſtalment ſhould immediately be paid by his orders. The whole of this tranſaction appears to have been conducted by the Preſident alone, and that this promiſe given to him by *Sitteram Rauze*, was immediately acquieſced in by the Board as ſatisfactory. But Your Committee do not find that any ſteps were taken in conſequence of the information which they had received reſpecting the large remittances to *Sitteram Rauze*, as had been ſuggeſted from *Vizagapatam*.

Appendix, No. 42.

Appendix, No. 43. 245—278.

It appears that the factory of *Vizagapatam* again repreſented to the Preſidency, that they were in the utmoſt diſtreſs by reaſon of the attendance of the Zemindars at *Madras*. The Conſultations of the 20th of July ſhewed Your Committee, that the Board was again perfectly ſatisfied with the Preſident's reporting that the Zemindars had aſſured him of their having left orders for paying their arrears, and managing their buſineſs during their abſence; and that in particular *Sitteram Rauze* had aſſured him, that he had ordered his inſtalment due on the 25th of February, to be paid up.

389—392.

394. Appendix, No. 34.

Thus Your Committee found, that the ſame kind of promiſe was accepted by the Preſident in July, which had been made, but not obſerved, in April preceding, and that the Board, as before, acquieſced in the Preſident's acceptance of it.

426—447. Appendix, No. 44.

Sitteram Rauze having, as above ſtated, obtained his leaſe of the Havilly lands for ten years, Your Committee find, that the Preſident, on the 20th of July, entered largely into the affairs of the *Chicacole* diſtrict; obſerving, that the Jemmabundy of the diſtricts dependant on *Vizianagram* had been long thought very inadequate, and far ſhort of what other Zemindars had paid to the Company: and that as the Zemindar was now eaſed of all military expence, the Company would expect a ſum equal to thoſe expences.

Your Committee further find, That the Preſident obſerved much on the neceſſity of having a man of abilities appointed Duan or Miniſter to *Vizeram Rauze*; and as *Sitteram Rauze*'s abilities could not be doubted, he propoſed him to be appointed by the Board, Duan to his elder brother the Rajah, in terms of commendation. And it appears, that the prevailing motives with the Preſident were, that *Chicacole* was the diſtrict from whence the Company had the greateſt expectation; that it now paid leſs than formerly; that the collections ought to be regular, and the revenue greater, as the military expences were now borne, not by the Rajah, but by the Company; that 3,05,000 Rupees only were paid to the Company, although ſeven times that ſum was collected; that theſe were not times to trifle with the revenue or inveſtments; that this appointment was greatly for the benefit of the Company, and free from all private views; and that there was an abſolute neceſſity, under all the circumſtances of that diſtrict, that *Sitteram Rauze* ſhould reſume his power and management.

Your Committee find, That the Board approved immediately of this reaſoning, with the exception of Mr. *Johnſon*, who adhered to the opinions he had formerly given, when Chief at *Vizagapatam*. It appears to Your Committee, That they next proceeded on the 29th of July, to force a reconciliation between the two brothers, and for this purpoſe called them before the Board; at which time *Vizeram Rauze* was addreſſed by the Preſident in theſe words: "We are convinced that it is a "meaſure which your own welfare and the intereſt of "the Company render indiſpenſably neceſſary; but "ſhould you continue obſtinately to withſtand the preſ- "ſing inſtances that have repeatedly been made to you by "the Board, conjunctively as well as ſeparately, we ſhould "be under the neceſſity of taking ſuch reſolutions as "will, in all probability be extremely painful to you, but "which, being once paſſed, can never be recalled." To this Your Committee find, that *Vizeram Rauze* made the following anſwer:

Appendix, No. 45 & 46. 442. 439 to 496.

"I ſhall conſider myſelf henceforward as diveſted of "all power and conſequence whatever, ſeeing that the "Board urge me to do that which is contrary to my "fixed determination, and that the reſult of it is to be "the loſing of my country." It does not appear that either of them were called before the Board, while the Duanſhip was in agitation, that matter having been propoſed by the Preſident, and immediately acceded to by a majority of the Council; but that on the preſent occaſion, *Vizeram Rauze* was told by the Preſident from the Chair, that on account of his obſtinacy in not being reconciled to his brother, it was neceſſary to appoint *Sitteram Rauze* his Duan; and that he proceeded to ſtate what the duties of that office would be, and among others, "That *Sitteram Rauze* was to take into immediate con- "ſideration, the ſettling of the tribute to be paid in "future to the Company, and the neceſſary Sibbendy, "or Civil and Military expences." A formal charge appears to have been delivered to each of the brothers, and the commiſſion of Duan ordered to be made out accordingly.

439. 504. 527.

Your Committee find, That the Court of Directors, in their general Letter to the Preſidency of *Madras*, dated the 10th of January 1781, expreſs "great ſur- "priſe and concern at this, which they term injurious "treatment, that *Vizeram Rauze*, the ancient Rajah of "*Vizianagram*, received at the Preſidency, when deaf "to his repreſentations and entreaties, they in the moſt "arbitrary and unwarrantable manner appointed his "ambitious and intriguing brother *Sitteram Rauze*, Duan "of the Circar, and thereby put him in poſſeſſion of "the revenues of his elder brother, who had juſt told "them that he fought his ruin."

Appendix, laſt No.

Your Committee find, That in ſubſequent Conſultations *Vizieram Rauze* is ſpoken of by the Preſident and Select Committee in very unfavourable terms; and that a Letter was written in the beginning of Auguſt to *Vizagapatam*, ſeverely reflecting on *Jaggernaut Rauze*, ſtating, that the Rajah's arrears of tribute are imputable to him; and it is aſſerted, that he had been guilty of chicane and intrigue, and that he had employed his influence to the moſt deſtructive purpoſes, withholding the collections committed to his charge; and therefore it is ordered that he ſhall undergo the ſtricteſt examination when he returns; that the balances due from him ſhould be recovered with unremitting attention, and precautions ſhould be taken againſt his artifices, by not ſuffering him to leave *Vizagapatam*, till he ſhould have paid thoſe balances.

Rev. Conſ. 29 July. 501. 3 Aug. 504. Rev. Conſ. 520.

It appears to Your Committee, That at the ſame time that this Letter, ſo full of reflection againſt *Jaggernaut Rauze*, was written at *Madras*, the Gentlemen of *Vizagapatam* had written to acquaint the Preſidency, that the only payment which they had received had been from *Jaggernaut*, but that the whole balances due amounted to 6,50,051 Rupees.

18 Aug. fol. 533. Appendix, No. 47.

Your Committee find, That on the 18th of Auguſt the Preſident reported to the Select Committee, that a reconciliation had taken place between the two brothers; and alſo ſtated, that the late advices from *Vizagapatam*, of *Jaggernaut's* being in a way to pay his balances, ſhewed the propriety and good effects of the meaſures which had been taken; and that *Vizieram Rauze* had aſſured him, that he ſhould order his balances to be paid by his Agent in *Chicacole*.

533. Appendix, No. 47.

The Preſident appears to Your Committee, to have next adverted to the ſtate of *Mazulipatam*, and to have acquainted the Board, that he had perſonally made enquiries of the Zemindars from thence, now at the Preſidency, with a view to an increaſe of tribute and diſcharge of arrears; that he had nearly completed his enquiries, and meant to lay them ſoon before the Board, as he was deſirous the intention of calling up the Zemindars ſhould be accompliſhed without loſs of time, that they might be ordered back. Your Committee find, That the Select Committee expreſſed great ſatisfaction at the ſucceſs of the Preſident's negociation with the tributaries of the Northern Circars, and recommend a ſpeedy concluſion, as he would ſoon be otherwiſe engaged in buſineſs in the Military Department.

Appendix, No. 47.

28 Aug. 1778, 649. Appendix, No. 48.

On the 2d of October, the Preſident appears to your Committee to have entered very largely into the ſtate of *Mazulipatam*, obſerving, that although the object in calling up the Zemindars was the payment of balances, they were ſo loaded with debt that there was little hope of any ſuch payments; that, however, he had brought them, with difficulty, to accede to 12½ per cent. addition on the old Mooriſh ſettlement.

Appendix, No. 49. 568.

Your Committee find, That this agreement of their Preſident with the *Mazulipatam* Zemindars was immediately accepted by the Select Committee. The Court of Directors, in their General Letter of the 10th of January 1781, appear to Your Committee to have expreſſed great diſſatisfaction at the Select Committee, for their having diſpenſed with all other evidence and information on this ſubject, than what was afforded by the Preſident's converſations with the Zemindars, and his reports of them; urging, that their inveſtigation ſhould have been public, and ought to have been ſuch as might enable the Court of Directors to form a future judgment upon the matter, and ſhould have been conformable to the directions laid down for the conduct of the Committee of Circuit. It alſo appears to your Committee, that the Court of Directors complain, in very ſtrong terms, of the Preſident's being almoſt "the only channel of "intelligence," whoſe opinions and declarations are the only grounds tranſmitted to *Europe*; on which no ſatisfactory concluſion can be founded.

Appendix, No. 50. Ibid. 650.

Laſt No. of Appendix, from Par. 62 to 76.

As to *Chicacole*, Your Committee find, That the Preſident obſerved, that by the mode of bidding, people are tempted to offer too much. The account, ſays he, given by the Committee of Circuit, leads us to imagine the value of the countries to be much greater than in reality they are ſaid to be: it is not from accounts collected from different people intereſted, and others diſcontented, and wiſhing for a change of Government, that the true value of a country can be eſtimated: the collections alone ought to determine the rent to be received—That he had found it difficult to bring the two brothers to increaſe their rent of three lacks 5,000 Rupees to four lacks 5,000 Rupees. And it appears to Your Committee, That a Letter from *Vizeram Rauze* was read after the Preſident had called for his Minute reſpecting the Circar at this Conſultation, deſiring to be reſtored to his Fort, and to have the diſtrict of *Ancapilly* in farm; in which letter he changed his language as to *Jaggernaut Rauze*, repreſenting him at the time of making his requeſt in a different light from what he had formerly done.

Appendix, No. 52. 699.

Your Committee find, That this Letter had the deſired effect, and the Fort, with its walls and baſtions, was given up to him as inſignificant, though it had before been taken out of his hands as being the means of diſturbance and oppreſſion; and that the Preſident proceeded to obſerve, that ſince delivering in the former petition, he had obtained a verbal agreement from *Vizeram*, to pay 90,000 Rupees for *Ancapilly*; which was immediately accepted by the Board. They alſo find, that the adoption of *Sitteram Rauze's* ſon by *Vizieram* (which he had notified at the ſame time that he ſent the petition above mentioned) was confirmed by the Board, and *Sitteram* was accepted as ſecurity for the Company's tribute.

707.

709.

It appears to Your Committee, That on the 6th of October the two brothers are again called before the Board, and *Vizieram Rauze* was deſired to pay a larger tribute to the Company.

710.

To this he anſwered, that his country was hilly and unwholeſome, and hoped the Board would give him credit for inability to pay more; and Your Committee find, that this Minute immediately follows upon it: "The "Board are reduced to the diſagreeable neceſſity of de-"claring, that their beſt endeavours have been uſed to "increaſe the tribute; but as they have been ineffectual, "and there is little proſpect of accompliſhing it, agreed, "that the Preſident do once more endeavour to prevail "on him *(Vizieram)* to raiſe the tribute."—That on the 8th of October, the Preſident reported his having endeavoured to prevail in this point, but that *Vizieram* was inflexible; and that, on the Preſident's repreſentation, a leaſe for five years was ordered, at 4,05,000 R. and that two days after, the Preſident, on the 10th of October 1778, aſſured the Board of his wiſhes for the increaſe of the revenues, ſtated the diſmiſſing of the Zemindars, and that they were highly ſatisfied, and had expreſſed their wiſhes that Vakeels from them might remain at *Madras*; and that on the 20th of November following he repeated, in a Minute, the ſame doctrine, of the neceſſity of Zemindars looking up to the Preſidency only, and keeping Vakeels there.

Appendix, No. 52. 712. 713. 714.

744.

From this inveſtigation of the tranſactions with the moſt conſiderable Zemindars, it appeared to Your Committee, that the enquiries which the Court of Directors very anxiouſly enjoined, before any leaſes ſhould be made, was in no degree attended to; and that the regulations on behalf of the under-tenants which they had preſcribed, were equally diſregarded; nor did the Board, from what appears to Your Committee, ever take any other means of acquiring information, than the bare aſſertion or report of their Preſident, who appears to have negociated, in every inſtance, with the Zemindars in perſon.

The profeſſed object of calling down the Zemindars having been the payment of balances, and the increaſe of revenue in time to come, it became neceſſary for Your Committee to ſee how far either of theſe objects had been accompliſhed, or what ſteps had been taken towards it.

Your Committee had found, as above ſtated, That in December

Appendix, No. 18.

December 1777, proposals from *Ganjam*, which had appeared to the Presidency favourable in themselves, were nevertheless refused, because the investigation enjoined by the Company had not been gone into; and the Presidency had continued the Nabob's lease of the jaghire lands for one year only, from the same regard to the orders of the Court of Directors. This submission to orders appears to have soon been laid aside; for Your Committee found, that proposals had been received on the 2d February 1778, from *Padnah Rauze*, offering 40,000 Rupees for the Havilly lands more than *Sitteram* had offered; but the benefit of these proposals, was lost to the Company for ten years, by concluding with *Sitteram Rauze*.

Appendix, No. 39.

Rs.

Chicacole Havilly Rent.

The rent of the Havilly lands payable by *Sitteram*, - - - - -	2,35,000
His arrears at this time were - -	1,80,530

Other Lands in Chicacole.

Vizianagrum Rent.

Rev. Cons. 1777, fol. 522.

In order to ascertain the value of the other lands, and the rent which might have been expected for them, Your Committee find, That recourse must be had to the Report of the Committee of Circuit, 16 August 1777, in which they acquainted the Presidency, that they had examined accounts of lands for ten years back, amounting to fourteen lacks net revenue, ten of which belong to the Rajah; and that by the enquiries they had made, and information they had received, they had every reason to be assured that the several countries under *Vizieram Rauze* yield at least a revenue of twenty lacks; and that his Military Establishment being 11,000 men, cost him 50,000 or 60,000 Rupees per month; and they subjoined the terms, which in their opinion would be the proper basis of an agreement with him, in order to secure the revenue and reduce his force, which had always kept the Company in some degree of uneasiness.

Rev. Cons. 662.

It appeared to Your Committee, That *Vizieram Rauze's* rent, before the last agreement made with him for the Zemindary of *Vizianagrum*, was 3,05,000 Rs. and that the Committee of Circuit estimated the total value of the produce at twenty lacks; and that this was confirmed by *Sitteram's* declaration to the Board, on 29th July 1778, when he affirmed, and was not contradicted, that when he began the management of these lands, they produced seven lacks; but that when his administration ceased, they had increased to twenty-two lacks. This very witness to the increased value of these lands, was himself made the Minister over them, at the rent of 4,05,000 Rupees; as Your Committee have stated above.

496.

Last No. in Appendix.

It appears to Your Committee, That this rent, which the Directors, 10th January 1781, considered as very inadequate, is stated by the President in his Minute of the 2d October above-mentioned, to have been accepted because the brothers had declared their inability to pay more, and that a certain revenue is preferable to speculative schemes, and that an increase might be attempted with greater hopes of success, when there should be no apprehensions from the French; and it has been already stated, that at the same time the Presidency restored the Rajah to his Fort: a measure which the Court of Directors (10th January 1781) considered as a direct opposition to the advice of the Committee of Circuit, and the general directions of the Company, and as enabling *Sitteram* to be extremely troublesome in that quarter; and no increase of rent, as the Directors observe, was demanded on account of the Company's being at the expence of the military defence of that country, which had been attended with an expence to the Rajah of 6x lacks a year.

Your Committee find, That the great object of the Board, in putting the power into *Sitteram's* hands, was said to be the speedy recovery of balances; and it has appeared that he was nominated in July 1778, and yet in January 1779, his and his brother's balances were no less than 5,57,999 Rupees, besides the expence of an expedition undertaken on his account by Colonel *Braithwaite*, and 1,03,030, for which *Jaggernaut* was directed to account with *Sitteram*.

Rev. Cons. 6 Nov. 1778, 799, 805, 808.

Your Committee also find, That upon the adoption of *Sitteram's* son, it was agreed that all under leases should for the future be made in the adopted Rajah's name; and that his name should be used in all Acts of Government; and that *Sitteram Rauze*, his father, who was in reality to enjoy the power, was accepted of by the Board as a security for this young man. It appears from the *Madras* Revenue Consultations, that the balance due from *Chicacole* on the 6th of November 1778, was - 78,400

709.

Rev. Cons. 1778, 799. Rev. Cons. 1779, 39.

And in January 1779, had increased to - 92,275

Increased in three months - - - 13,875

And Your Committee further find, That at the time when *Sitteram* was appointed Duan, the rent had not been settled, but was referred to his future consideration and adjustment.

500.

Your Committee find, That the Court of Directors in their Letter to *Madras*, dated 10th January 1781, disapprove, in the strongest terms, of the leases granted of the *Chicacole* district, which they consider as greatly inadequate; and disapprove, in terms equally strong, of restoring *Sitteram Rauze* to a degree of power, which he had been found to abuse and convert to the Company's detriment; and complain heavily of their enabling him the more effectually to repeat this conduct, by restoring the Fort, with its walls and bastions.

Last No. Appendix.

Appendix, No. 53.

And Your Committee find, That the *Madras* Select Consultations of the 13th October 1780, contain an account of the revolt of the Sepoys at *Vizagapatam*; and that the Letter from Mr. *Cajanajer*, and the other Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam*, upon that occasion, throws some light on the comparative attachment of the two brothers to the Company's interests, and also shews the importance of the Zemindars, in cases of difficulty and danger. In this Letter your Committee find the following passage:

"On a review of the general state of affairs on the "Coast, the War with the Marattas and *Hyder*, and the "probability of a French force landing, it is not drawing an improbable conclusion to suppose, that the "Zemindars may avail themselves of this crisis of events, "and throw off their allegiance. We are here without "any resources either of men or money; the former we "expect, and for the latter we depend alone on the "Zemindars. We have now stated to you our situation, and we add, that all we have to trust to, is the "attachment of 300 Sibbendy Sepoys, and half of them "are now detached—in this representation we have not, "in our opinion, either exaggerated in points of real "state or conjecture. We therefore request of you, "Gentlemen, that you will determine on some plan of "operations for us to pursue; the revolt has so effectually deranged this Government, and so reduced our "consequence, that we imagine some measure ought to "be adopted, that will give us the importance we have "lost; and we can think of no other step ourselves, "than procuring us some Sepoys, and about 50 Europeans, from *Calcutta*, or sending Southern people here, "and ordering all the Sepoys in these districts to the "Southward. *Sitteram Rauze* is not yet arrived at "*Vizagapatam*; he keeps away in a manner that has the "appearance of premeditated delay; all these matters "serve to create in us anxiety about the fate of this Settlement—and *Shaik Mahomed*, the man who heads the "revolted Sepoys, is gone off, with a great deal of "money, is capable, daring, and full of enterprize; "and what are his intentions is not at present to be conjectured: by this day's intelligence, he has taken the "road to *Ankapilly*, and it is very probable that he has "written to the Sepoys at *Chicacole* of his success; at "any rate common report favours that suspicion."

This Letter also states, "That the mutineers party "under *Shaik Mahomed*, were, by the last accounts, entering into the *Potapilly* Country—That the Rajah,

"*Vizieram Rauze*, had written to all the little Zemindars "to ſtop them; but that they yet compoſe a ſtrong "body, nor is it a trifling force that can oppoſe them."

Appendix, No. 54. Your Committee having examined what balances have been paid by the *Chicacole* Zemindars, and what ſtill remained due amounting to 7,84,001 Rupees, as well as what the terms of their leaſes were, proceeded to make the ſame enquiry with reſpect to *Mazulipatam*; and found, that

Mazulipatam Rents 1778, fol. 652—660. Appendix, No. 49. On the ſecond of October the Preſident ſtated to the Board many reaſons why few or no balances were to be expected from the *Mazulipatam* Zemindars, and that much indulgence to theſe countries was abſolutely neceſſary; to which repreſentation the Preſident ſubjoined the old Mooriſh Rental, and declared that 12½ per cent. upon that rental was as great an addition as could be made, and that it would be cruel to exact more. The exhauſted ſtate of the Company's Treaſury, and unavoidable increaſe of public expences, were urged by the Governor as reaſons for taking low rents, which the Directors, in their General Letter, have thought more applicable to the oppoſite concluſion; due care, he ſaid, muſt at the ſame time be taken, to recover outſtanding balances. And upon theſe terms it appears to Your Committee, That many leaſes were let, without any more accurate enquiry into circumſtances which could point out where the juſtice of the caſe lay, between the renter and under-tenants on the one hand, and the Company on the other.

10th Jan. 1781. Of this alſo Your Committee find, That the Court of Directors, in their Letter of the 10th of January 1781, expreſs themſelves in the ſtrongeſt terms of diſapprobation, and complain of the inconſiſtency and precipitation of the Select Committee, and particularly of their diſpenſing with that inveſtigation which they had ſo warmly recommended to the Committee of Circuit; and endeavour to ſhew that the whole account given of the manner in which the Preſidency granted the whole of theſe diſtricts for five years, in their Letter of the 17th of October 1779, is evaſive and contradictory; and alluding to the enquiries which they meant to have ſet on foot, through the medium of the Committee of Circuit, they conclude in theſe words:—"The Court's Inſtruc- "tions were poſitive and unequivocal, they could not be "miſtaken: no diſcretionary power was given you to "depart therefrom; you have done it at your own "riſque, without producing one good reaſon for ſo "doing.

"It is impoſſible for us to aſcertain the amount of "damage to be ſuſtained by the Company in conſe- "quence of your engagements, becauſe the countries "have not been examined in the manner directed by the "Court; but it is incumbent upon us to convince you, "and all our ſervants in *India*, that diſreſpect to the "authority, and wilful diſobedience of the Orders of the "Company, ſhall not be permitted, nor delinquents ſuf- "fered to eſcape with impunity."

Laſt No. Appendix. And Your Committee find, That the Havilly lands of *Mazulipatam* were let on the 10th of Auguſt 1779 (as appears by the *Madras* Letter to the Court of Directors, dated the 14th of October 1779) to *Letchema Narſin Valoo*, for one lack of Pagodas, although another perſon, named *Vencata Pentato*, had offered 25,000 Pagodas more, and that another man alſo had a leaſe of the ſalt farms at 42,500 Rupees per annum; all theſe points being carried by the Preſident's caſting vote—And it appears, that the reaſons aſſigned by the Preſident, and thoſe who agreed with him, for rejecting the propoſals for the greater rent, were, that the propoſer had been Agent to a Banker, was not a reſponſible perſon, and did not reſide at *Mazulipatam*, yet he was favourably ſpoken of by Meſſieurs *Johnſon* and *Smith*.—In all thoſe reſpects, theſe reaſons do not appear to be ſupported by any proof or enquiry—the obſervation on the place of reſidence ſeems, in the opinion of the Directors, expreſſed in their General Letter (10th January 1781) to have had little application to the ſalt works; and no ſufficient reaſon is aſſigned (in their opinion) why they were not let to the higheſt bidder: and that upon the whole, a loſs will be incurred of 2,25,000 R.

Mazulipatam Havilly Lands. Rev. Conſ. 10th Auguſt 1779. Vide Appendix, No. 55. The Preſident appears to have further declared, That except *Pentato*, no one had offered above 1,000 Pagodas more than the offer which was accepted; but Your Committee find no reaſon aſſigned why this ſum was loſt to the Company: the difference between the offer rejected and that which was received, amounts, on a five years leaſe, to 2,25,000 Rupees.

Itchapore. Your Committee found, That the *Ganjam* Zemindars had been ordered down to *Madras*, as above ſtated, and among others, a man named *Ball Kiſtnah*, the Company's Dubaſh and Interpreter, as he is ſtyled in the Order; ſome of the Zemindars having been themſelves diſpenſed with, on ſending Repreſentatives; but as to *Ball Kiſtnah*, the Order was repeated on the 28th of July 1778, and 28th February 1779, with a good deal of warmth, threatening him with the danger of incurring their higheſt diſpleaſure, and a guard of Sepoys.

Folio 457. Appendix, No. 56. It appeared to Your Committee, That the Gentlemen of *Ganjam* had repreſented to the Preſidency, that this very man had, under cover of another name, been the real renter of the *Ganjam* Havilly lands, which were in arrear 1,82,666 Rupees, and that for *Vizianagur* he was in arrear 60,350 Rupees, which he had engaged to pay—And this appears to your Committee to be acknowledged by the Board in a Letter to *Ganjam*, 21ſt May 1779.

Appendix, No. 57. Your Committee find, That on the 26th of April, this man preſented propoſals for renting of the diſtrict of *Itchapore*, including the Havilly lands, and the ſea and land cuſtoms; and that he offered to pay,

3 Firſt years	3,50,000	per annum.
2 next - -	4,25,000	
5 next - -	4,30,000	

Appendix, No. 58. And it appears, That on the 2d July, Mr. *Perring* expreſſed himſelf of opinion, that *Ball Kiſtnah* was the fitteſt perſon to be the renter; though he acknowledges, that he offers leſs than the Chief and Council had been able themſelves to collect, and that this opinion was not uncontradicted; for Mr. *Johnſon* ſhewed from experience it had been found diſadvantageous to let the whole to any one renter; and that the Havilly lands ought to remain in Mr. *Maunſel*, the Collector's hands, who had done his duty in every reſpect.—It alſo appears, that General *Munro* ſtated the arrears to amount to 40,000 Pagodas, and recommended a reference back to *Ganjam*.

Appendix, No. 59. Your Committee find, That on the 13th of July the *Ganjam* Gentlemen had ſtated their receipts for the laſt five years at five lacks and upwards.—*Ball Kiſtnah*, on the 29th of July, is found to have changed his propoſals, and then to have offered a regular annual payment, amounting in ten years to 4,15,000 Rupees annual, and a regular diſcharge of balances, to the amount of 40,000 Rupees per annum. This laſt article the Directors, in their Letter 10th January 1781, ſtate to have been, in truth, a favour to himſelf, as he had been in fact the renter from whom thoſe balances were really due, and were then payable to their full amount. *Ball Kiſtnah* affirmed, that five lacks was unreaſonable: and the Preſident declared his opinion to be, that no proper controul over theſe lands could be placed in the hands of the Chief and Council, unleſs they are let to one perſon, and thought the offer ſhould be accepted; and then endeavoured to prove, by deductions and compariſons, that this offer, though apparently leſs, is in reality greater than the former rent.—This matter appears to have been deferred a few days at the requeſt of Meſſrs *Smith* and *Johnſon*; and being reſumed on the 6th of Auguſt, the Preſident gave additional reaſons in ſupport of his former propoſition, which reaſons the Court of Directors conſider in their Letter above-mentioned, as founded on a ſtatement relating to *Itchapore*, in which this man's deficiencies were entirely omitted.—Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* appear to have diſſented, the former ſtating the paſt

Appendix, No. 60. Laſt No. Appendix. Appendix, No. 61.

rent to be 5,55,000 Rupees, which was correſpondent to the account from *Ganjam*, and General *Munro* did not perſiſt in his reference back to *Ganjam* for their opinion; ſo that the leaſe was ordered for ten years accordingly.

Laſt No. Appendix, Vide Letter, 10th Jan. 1781.

By comparing the rent which was accepted with that which Mr. *Smith*, uncontradicted, ſtated it to have formerly been, the loſs to the Company will appear to be 14 lacks, independant of any loſs ariſing on non-payment of old balances, thoſe balances amounting to 1,82,666 Rupees.

It does not appear to your Committee, That any balances whatſoever were paid at *Madras* by the Zemindars and Renters who came down to that Preſidency; but on the contrary, that they were increaſed by their abſence from home, or at leaſt that it furniſhed an excuſe for not liquidating them; and from what has been here ſtated, it does not appear to Your Committee, that the Preſidency took pains to get proper data to proceed upon, but diſregarded ſuch information as the Committee of Circuit and the ſubordinate factories afforded them; for it appears on the *Madras* Conſultations, 15th September 1779, that the Gentlemen of *Ganjam* repreſented ſtrongly againſt the agreement with *Ball Kiſnab*, on which the Preſident obſerved, "That he differs ſo much in ſentiment from "the tenor and aſſertions of this Letter, that, inſtead of "ſpeaking in favourable terms to the Court of Directors "of the conduct of theſe Gentlemen, he ſhall, before "the diſpatch of the next ſhip, give his opinion fully on "the ſubject of the Letter, and ſhall accompany his "opinion with ſeveral papers in his poſſeſſion in ſupport "of it."

Appendix, No. 62.

Your Committee having found, from the documents above ſtated, That all bargains were made by Sir *Thomas Rumbold* perſonally with the Rajahs and Zemindars, which were only ratified by the Board, without any inveſtigation of their own; and that no balances were paid, but teeps (or drafts) granted, amounting to 1,30,000 Pagodas, and having ſeen that the Zemindars were at *Madras*, in a courſe of negociation with the Governor, from the beginning of May to the beginning of October; and having found, from the different Minutes of Council, that the Preſident's Motion for giving the office of Dewan to *Sitteram Rauze*, was made by the Preſident on the 20th of July 1778, and immediately aſſented to by the Council; and alſo that 1,81,000 Rupees were ſtated to them to have been remitted to *Sitteram Rauze*, and further ſums negociating; and having examined the terms on which the other countries were let, it was thought proper to advert to ſome private tranſactions of the Governor, which took place in the month of Auguſt immediately following the grant of this Dewanſhip to *Sitteram Rauze*, and during the courſe of his negociation with the Zemindars at *Madras*.

1781.

Your Committee having been informed that Captain *Foxall*, commander of the *Royal George* Eaſt Indiaman, had carried ſome treaſure to *China* on Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s account, ordered that Gentleman to attend. He informed Your Committee, That he had ſailed from *Madras* to *China* early in Auguſt 1778; that he knew ſome treaſure had been put on board of his ſhip by reaſon of applications having been made to him either by Sir *Thomas*, or his Dubaſh, for that purpoſe; and that Mr. *Perry*, his Purſer, has ſeen it counted or weighed—he believed there were eight boxes. He informed them that this treaſure was not entered in the book kept by the Officer on board, called the Boatſwain's-book, an omiſſion which he diſcovered by means of a robbery of the ſhip in the river of *Canton*, at which time ſome of the boxes were ſtolen; wiſhing to find out the extent of the loſs, by comparing what remained, with what was originally ſhipped, he had called for his Boatſwain's-book, and finding no entry, he ordered an entry to be made of what remained, as of the date of his leaving *Madras*.—That this treaſure was conſigned to Meſſrs. *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou*, at *China*—That he ſigned the bill of lading, which he now knows nothing of, and delivered this treaſure in conſequence of an order from the Board in *China*.

Appendix, No. 63.

Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s Solicitor, it appeared, had demanded reparation from him for this loſs, in April or May 1781. He told Your Committee, That he had twice called on Sir *Thomas Rumbold* ſince his return from *Spain* (1ſt January 1781) where he had been a priſoner, but had not ſeen him at either of thoſe times—That Sir *Thomas Rumbold* had returned his viſit, and ſaw him; but that no converſation on this ſubject then paſſed.—Since that time, however, about a fortnight before his examination, he had of his own accord waited on Sir *Thomas*, and repreſented to him, that he was unable to repay the loſs, having loſt £. 3,000 by his late capture.—To which Sir *Thomas* anſwered, that he was ſorry, but that the money belonged in part to Sir *Hector Munro*, without ſaying how much.—Captain *Foxall* alſo ſaid, that the whole treaſure was 12 or £. 13,000, and that the half had been ſtolen.

Capt. *Foxall* further informed Your Committee, That in 1778, beſides his own ſhip, the *Latham*, Captain *Prince*, and *Hillſborough*, Captain *Collett*, had ſailed from *Madras* to *China*; and alſo the *Lord Holland*, Captain *Lawſon*, and *Glatton*, Captain *Doveton*, after he had ſailed.—That *Prince* had told him of his having a little treaſure on board for Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, but he had converſed with no one elſe on the ſubject of treaſure. He alſo informed Your Committee, that he knew of no omiſſion of goods then ſhipped at *Madras*, in the Boatſwain's book, except this particular article; and that *Elkington*, his Chief Mate, was a careful man—That this treaſure was put on board, late in the evening, before his departure, a circumſtance uſual in ſhipping all valuable effects. He added, that unleſs the entry of the treaſure appeared either in the Boatſwain's book or Captain's journal, it would not appear to the Company in any other way, that it had been ſhipped; and that if it had not been for the accident of the robbery, it never would have occurred to him to look into the Boatſwain's book.—Upon examining the Boatſwain's book and the Captain's journal, by deſire of the Committee, Captain *Foxall* found, that the remaining part of the treaſure, landed at *Canton*, was not entered.—He then corrected his examination, by telling the Committee, that one of the cheſts belonged to a Mr. *Ferguſon*.

Mr. *Pigou* having been named by Captain *Foxall* as Conſignee of the treaſure ſhipped with him, he was next examined, and ſaid, That he had conſignments both of public and private treaſure during the year 1778, but had left all his books, papers, and memorandums in *China*—That from *Madras* he had received by the *Latham* 50,000 Pagodas, which at 8s. is £. 20,000, on account of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—By the *Hillſborough* 56,000 Pagodas, 50,000 being on Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s account; and that 39,000 Pagodas were invoiced by the *Royal George*, of which 14,000 Pagodas and 3,000 Dollars were ſtolen out of the ſhip—That he and his partner were directed to pay 25,000 Pagodas to the Agents of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and Sir *Hector Munro*, and 150,000 Dollars to Meſſrs. *Hutton* and *Gordon* on account of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—That as to the 25,000 Pagodas, he does not know whether it was intended to remit them to *Britain*, but the 150,000 Dollars were intended for *England*.

Appendix, No. 64.

Mr. *Pigou* being examined as to the conſignments from *Madras* in 1779, ſaid, That by the *Sea Horſe*, one of the [illegible] ſhips, 20,000 Dollars were remitted for Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and that ſhe had a large amount in ſpecie beſides this on board, but he did not know on whoſe account.

He alſo informed your Committee, That in the years 1778 and 1779, Meſſrs. *Roper* and *Cromelin* had large conſignments of treaſure from *Madras*, but did not know on whoſe account—That above 1,000,000 of money was lying in the hands of Chineſe Merchants, belonging to Britiſh ſubjects, the uſual intereſt being 18 per cent.

and ſometimes more; and that the Dutch, Danes, and Swedes, take up money and give bills to a large amount, and ſuppoſed that Britiſh ſubjects often remit through thoſe channels.

Your Committee has already ſtated, That Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, by his third Covenant, had bound himſelf to deliver into the Board, upon oath, a particular of all Loans formerly made, and of all merchandize on hand, before he ſhould proceed to recover the one, or diſpoſe of the other—Upon an accurate examination of the proceedings of the Board during the whole of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s Government, no proceeding to that effect was to be found.

Your Committee has alſo ſtated, That in the ſame Covenant he had bound himſelf to receive no emolument whatever, except the ſalary and perquiſites ſpecified therein, which have been ſtated to amount to 18, or perhaps £. 20,000 per annum: yet the Committee find, That between the 8th February (the day of his arrival) and the beginning of Auguſt, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* had ſhipped the following ſums from *Madras* to *China*.

			£.
By the *Latham*	50,000 Pagodas	-	20,000
By the *Hillſborough*	50,000	- - -	20,000
By the *Royal George*	39,000	(Part of Sir *H. Munro*'s)	13,000
And in 1779, by the *Sea Horſe*	20,000 Dollars	-	5,000
			£. 58,000

Upon examining all the Boatſwain's books of the different ſhips which had carried Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s treaſure from *Madras* to *China*, it appeared that no entry or delivery of it had been made in any one of them, although the public treaſure ſhipped by the Company was entered and delivered with all the neceſſary particularity.

Another circumſtance of a ſingular nature was found on the proceeding of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*—The late Mr. *Redhead* had been Secretary to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and died at *Madras*; his executors, after his death, obtained a warrant of arreſt againſt *Sitteram Rauze* for the balance of 70,000 Rupees, promiſed to Mr. *Redhead*; but no ſtep appears to have been taken by the Members of Government to prevent this, nor are the Directors made acquainted with it by them. And the following Codicil appears upon the face of Mr. *Redhead*'s will, now in the *India* Houſe:

Appendix, N° 63.

"As the Nabob *Omeir Ull Omrah* has an order from his father to pay me the ſum of one lack of Rupees, I hope his regard to me will be ſuch as to induce him to pay the ſame, in order to enable the payment of the bequeſts of this my will and teſtament. My Attornies in *England* are, *General Joſeph Smith*, *Edward Law*, *Henry Hanſon*, and *James Simpſon*, Eſquires, *London*."

Your Committee alſo examined *John Stables*, Eſquire, who informed them, That he, together with *Thomas Raikes* and *Robert Mackreth*, Eſquire, had been the Agent of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, during the time he was abroad, and that the remittances received by him and the other Gentlemen from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, were as follows:

	£.	s.	d.
Auguſt 7, 1778. Bill from *David Killican*, at *Calcutta*, in the Preſidency at *Fort William*, on the *Eaſt India* Company, due 16 Auguſt 1779, dated 17 December 1777, at 12 months ſight - - - - -	5,000	0	0
Bill from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, drawn by *Alexander Grant*, on *Hugh Grant*, Eſq; from *Fort St. George*, for - -			
Dated 20 Feb. 1778, 60 days ſight.	70	0	0
D° from *David Killican*, on the *Eaſt India* Company, dated 28 January 1778 -	1,000	0	0
D° from D° Sir *Thomas Rumbold* at *Fort St. George*, — *Thomas Powell* on *John Eames*, dated 4 July 1778, - - - -	70	0	0
Bill from Sir *Thomas Rumbold* at *Fort St. George*, *Richard Doveton* on *Richard Neave*, Eſq; dated *Madras* 7 Auguſt 1778, - - - - - -	2,000	0	0
D° from D° at D°, *Thomas Shaw* on *Peter Shaw*, dated *Madras*, 12 October 1778, - - - - - -	100	0	0
D° from D° at D°, Bill of Exchange from the Preſidency of *Fort St. George* on the Company, dated 30th June 1778,	2,125	10	10
From D° at D°, a Bond of *John Whitehill*'s, on Account of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, dated 9 April, - - -	8,000	0	0
A Bill of Exchange from D° at D°, Meſſrs. *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou* on the Company, dated 10 January 1779, -	3,123	16	5
D° from D° at D°, from the Swediſh Supercargoes at *Canton*, on the Swediſh *Eaſt India* Company, dated 28 December 1778, due 13 March 1780,	4,775	15	6
D° from D° at D°, *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou*, Supercargoes at *Canton*, on the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, dated 10 January 1779, - - - -	9,268	1	9
D° from D° at D°, from *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou*, a Bill drawn by the Swediſh Supercargoes on their *India* Company, dated 21 December 1778, - -	31,042	10	6
D° from D° at D°, *John Utterſon* on Commiſſioners of Victualling Office, drawn from *Fort St. George*, dated 7th November 1778, - - - -	5,000	0	0
D° from D° at D°, *Matthew Raper*, junior, Supercargo at *Canton*, on the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, dated 10 Jan. 1779, - - - - - -	10,769	12	11
D° from D° at D°, *Edward Golding*, Eſq; drawn from *Fort St. George*, on the *Eaſt India* Company, dated 1 January 1779, - - - - - -	958	6	8
D° from D° at D°, a Bill of Exchange from the Daniſh Preſidency at *Tranquebar*, on their *Eaſt India* Company, dated 10 March 1779, - - -	1,916	13	4
D° from D° at D°, *George Baldwin* at *Cairo*, his Remiſe through *Treves* of *Venice*, on *Nathan Modigliani*, dated 20 November 1779, - - -	699	0	0
D° from D° at D°, from *William Henry Pigou*, a Bill from Swediſh Preſidency at *Canton*, on their Company, dated 16 December 1779, - - -	5,000	0	0
D° from D° at D°, *John Utterſon*'s Two Draſts from *Fort St. George*, on Commiſſioners of Navy, dated 30 September 1779, - - - - -	7,000	0	0
D° from D° at D°, the Daniſh Preſidency at *Tranquebar*, on their Company, dated 21 June 1779, - - -	1,823	7	6
D° from D° at D°, *George Taſwell*'s Bill from *Fort St. George*, on *William* and *Thomas Raikes* and Mr. *Greenland*, 2 October 1779, - - - - -	1,450	0	0
D° from D° at D°, a Bond of *Quinton Crauford*'s at *Fort St. George*, dated 23 July 1779, - - - - -	5,750	0	0
D° from D° at D°, from *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou* at *Canton*, their Preſidency on the *Eaſt India* Company, dated 31 December 1779, - - - -	5,554	3	4
D° from D° at D°, Bond of *John Huddleſtone*'s, Eſq; at *Fort St. George*, dated 19 March 1780, not due till March 1783, - - - - -	4,600	0	0
D° from D° at D°, Bond of *Quinton Crauford*, Eſq; at *Fort St. George*,			

dated

	£.	s.	d.
dated 1 October 1779, due 1ſt October 1781,	5,750	0	0
A Bill of Exchange from Sir *Thomas Rumbold* to *Arthur Cuthbert* on the Board of Ordnance, dated *Fort Saint George*, 4 February 1780,	5,000	0	0
D° from D° at D°, *Thomas Moore* on Commiſſioners of Victualling Office, dated *Fort St. George*, 4th February 1780,	9,375	0	0
D° from D° at D°, a Bond of *John Whitehill*'s, dated April 4th 1780,	13,616	0	7
	150,837	19	4

D° from D° at D°, *Francis Welden*, for 100 Pagodas—not received.

Had Sir *Thomas Rumbold* any other Agents in *England* that you know of, beſides thoſe you have already named?

None to the beſt of my knowledge; and I have every reaſon to believe he had no others.

He remitted to *Goſling* and *Clive*'s (not through our hands) the ſum,	16,250	0	0
By Bill on the Daniſh *Eaſt India* Company for 3,750 l. and paid 2d Oct. 1779,	5,750	0	0
And D° on the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, paid 3 January 1781,	10,500	0	0
	16,250	0	0

He alſo informed Your Committee, That he learnt from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, in converſation, that he had in *Bengal* at the time of his laſt going to *India*, about £.90,000, part in Company's cash, part in bonds and mortgages at intereſt, on ſome of which, three or four years intereſt was due; and that he had left a ſpecification of his fortune in *India*, ſealed up, with his Truſtees, which they had ſince his return delivered back unopened.

Being aſked, If he knew of any part of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s property in *Bengal* having been remitted to him at *Madras*, or any other place on his account? Mr. *Stables* referred to certain papers, which he delivered in, and are ſtated in the Appendix; this he acquainted your Committee to be Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s expreſs authority and deſire.

Appendix, No. 66.

Mr. *Stables* further informed Your Committee, That he knew nothing of any part of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s fortune left in *India* or *China*, nor of any money, diamonds, or other effects, brought home by him, having no reaſon to believe that any ſuch were brought.

On the 18th of June Your Committee received from the hands of their Chairman, a Letter written by Sir *Thomas Rumbold* to him, ſtating his deſire that certain Papers, which accompanied his Letter, purporting to be duplicates of a Journal, and a Ledger of his buſineſs, both commencing 31 December 1769, and ending 28th February 1772, might be read by them; and by the concluding article of theſe Papers, a balance is ſtated as due in *India* to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s eſtate of Rupees 9,92,293: 4: 11: Theſe Papers are inſerted in the Appendix.

Appendix, No. 66.

Your Committee next examined the conduct of the Preſidency of *Madras* towards the Sovereign Princes, whoſe friendſhip or enmity is of importance to that Settlement, and the general intereſts of the Britiſh Nation in *Indoſtan*; and they found that the five Northern Circars had been ceded by the Emperor *Shaw Allum* in 1765; and that on the 12th of November 1766, the Nizam made a Treaty with the Company relative to the ſame diſtricts; by which Treaty it is amongſt other things expreſsly ſtipulated, That the Company ſhall pay to the Nizam five lacks a year by inſtalments; and that *Guntoor* (which is one of them) ſhall be in the poſſeſſion of his brother, *Bazalet Jung*, during his life; or during

Appendix, No. 4.

his Highneſs's pleaſure.—*Guntoor* having been theretofore granted to him in jaghire, and if *Bazalet Jung* ſhall diſturb the Nizam's Country, it was ſtipulated that the Engliſh ſhould take immediate poſſeſſion, they having the reverſion, and having been before bound to maintain the Peace of the Nizam's Country—they alſo found that on the 23d of February 1768 another Treaty had been concluded with the Nizam, making ſome variations in certain Articles of the former Treaty, but confirming ſo much of it as related to the *Guntoor* Circar in the very terms which had before been uſed.

Your Committee further found, That in the month of April 1779, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and the Council of *Madras* concluded a Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, for the ſurrender of the *Guntoor*, on certain terms, without the participation of the Nizam, which had been expreſsly ſtipulated for both in 1766 and 1768.

1779. Fort Saint George, Country Corr. No. 65. Appendix, No. 80.

In order clearly to underſtand the nature and effect of this tranſaction, and to judge of the reaſon alledged by the Government of *Madras* for this diſregard of the Nizam; it was neceſſary to trace this matter down from the year 1775, at which time the Preſidency firſt conceived the idea of taking *Guntoor* into the Company's poſſeſſion, but not without the concurrence of the Nizam.

It appeared to Your Committee, That previous to 1775, many Letters had been written by Mr. *Whitehill*, when Chief of *Mazulipatam*, to the Preſidency of *Madras*, and by Officers ſtationed there, repreſenting *Bazalet Jung*'s having connected himſelf with Mr. *Lally*, who had brought ſome ſtores and troops into the *Guntoor* Circar, by the port of *Mootapilly*; and that the Government in April 1775, directed Mr. *Whitehill* to keep a watchful eye over them.—It further appeared, That the ſame kind of information was ſent in May following; and on the 5th of June the Board of *Madras* reſolved to write to *Bengal*, relative to making *Bazalet Jung* diſmiſs thoſe French troops, and incloſed the letters which they had received from *Mazulipatam*.—That on the 31ſt of July, the Preſidency received an anſwer from *Bengal*, dated the 5th of July 1775, authorizing them immediately to take ſuch ſteps as may produce the effect of obtaining the diſmiſſion of the French; and that a body of Troops ſhould be formed, which, together with the Nabob's, might march to the frontiers of that country; and as *Bazalet Jung* had called in foreign aſſiſtance, they recommended the inſiſting on the diſmiſſion of that aſſiſtance; and conclude with this injunction: "On failure of which you "will ſignify that your Troops will take poſſeſſion of his "country, and that you will endeavour, by negociation "with the Nizam, either by an offer of the whole re-"venues, or otherwiſe, to obtain an immediate ceſſion "of it to the Company."—The conſideration of this anſwer was deferred; and on the 7th of Auguſt, General *Smith* was directed to eſtimate the force which would be neceſſary for this purpoſe; which he performed on the 14th of Auguſt; but ſtated his arguments in favour of negociating with the Nizam rather than his brother; and theſe were adopted by the Board unanimouſly.—It appeared to Your Committee, That the Preſident on this occaſion argued ſtrongly for negociating with the Subah (or Nizam) according to the Treaty of 1768; and that a Letter was accordingly written to the Nizam, urging him to conſent to obliging *Bazalet Jung*, 1ſt, either to diſmiſs the Europeans from his ſervice, and truſt to the Engliſh for the protection of his country, which is in reality theirs, though conditionally veſted in him; or 2dly, to let the whole Circar, at an annual rent previouſly to be agreed on.—It was reſolved to defer the ſending of this Letter till the Nabob ſhould be more acquainted with it; who appears, by the Preſident's Report on 21ſt of Auguſt, to have been averſe [illegible] with the Nizam.—It appeared, That [illegible] Nizam, but detained till [illegible] known; Rated the [illegible] were [illegible] and the Company, [illegible] between Engliſh to all ſuch Treaties, [illegible] of the [illegible] had

Appendix, No. 67.

Appendix, No. 68.

Appendix, No. 69.

Appendix, No. 70.

Appendix, No. 71.

Appendix, No. 72, & 73.

not adhered to the meaning of them in harbouring French Troops.—It further appeared, That on the ſame day (the 13th of September) the Preſident acquainted the Governor General and Council of their reaſons for treating with the Nizam, and were told in return to that Letter (23d of October) That the Governor General and Council would wait the reſult of the Nizam's anſwer before they gave any further Inſtructions: and it alſo appeared, That a Motion was made by Sir *Robert Fletcher* upon this ſubject of taking poſſeſſion of *Guntoor*, in which the point is fully debated, and in which he was ſingle.

Appendix, No. 74.

No. 75.

The Nizam's anſwer (which was tranſmitted to *Bengal* on the 22d of November) appears to Your Committee to have ſtated, That he had actually ſent a perſon of diſtinction to have the Europeans in his brother's ſervice removed from *Adoni*, and "every Article (ſays he) of "the Treaty ſhall remain fixed to a hair's breadth."

No. 76.

Your Committee find, That on the ninth of November the Government of *Bengal* wrote to *Madras* in theſe terms: "If the Nizam ſhall not agree to the terms pro- "poſed, or if he ſhall give an evaſive anſwer, we then "ſhall approve of your deputing a perſon to his Court; "but his commiſſion is merely to be confined to the "affairs of the *Guntoor* Circar, agreeably to the Inſtruc- "tions which we have already given you, which are to "deprive the French of any footing in that country;" and that the Select Committee, having tranſmitted the Nizam's anſwer to *Bengal*, of courſe waited for a further Letter from thence, before they took any additional ſtep.

Appendix, No. 77.

It appeared to Your Committee, That on the 2d of January 1776, the expected Letter from *Bengal* was received, bearing date the 11th of December 1775; and on this ſubject was in the following terms: "In our Let- "ter of the 5th of July, we left it open to you, to take "poſſeſſion of *Guntoor*, unleſs *Bazalet Jung* ſhould diſ- "miſs all the foreigners in his ſervice: without poſitively "directing the meaſure, we authorize you to carry it "into execution, if you ſhould think it adviſable, con- "ſidering the general poſture of things in the *Carnatic*. "If the Nizam obtains the removal, and we are put in "poſſeſſion of *Mootapilly*, the object of our firſt Inſtruc- "tions will be anſwered; if not, we ſtill allow you the "ſame latitude to take poſſeſſion of *Guntoor*, and ſhall "be ſatisfied with the accompliſhment of this by any "juſt means."

No. 78.

In the whole courſe of this correſpondence, it appeared that the Governor of *Madras*, as well as the Governor General and Council, never loſt ſight of the Treaty of 1768, but, on the contrary, that they made the Nizam the principal Party in the negociation, the Council of *Madras* expreſsly ſtating the terms of that Treaty as the ground upon which they ought to addreſs themſelves to the Nizam, and not to *Bazalet Jung*.

It appeared to Your Committee, That after this period, the influence of the French with *Bazalet Jung* had frequently been repreſented to the Preſidency of *Madras* as prejudicial to the intereſt of the Company; and that on the 10th of July 1778, the Preſident and Select Committee expreſſed their conviction of the evil tendency of this influence, in a Minute to that effect.

Appendix, No. 79.

Mil. Conſ. 1208.

Your Committee find, That on the 30th November, the Preſident, after ſtating that he had frequently converſed with *Bazalet Jung*'s Vakeel (who repreſented his Maſter as extremely deſirous of the Company's good will) produced a Treaty, propoſed by *Bazalet Jung* to be entered into between him and the Company, and ordered a Letter to be written to *Bazalet Jung*, approving of his propoſals, and alſo another to the Governor General and Council, deſiring their opinions on thoſe propoſals; the purport of this Treaty appeared to be, that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould cede the *Guntoor* Diſtrict to the Company, for a certain annual payment to be made him, free of all charges, civil and military, and that he ſhould diſmiſs the French Troops in his ſervice, in lieu of which his country ſhould be defended by thoſe of the Company; and that on the 22d December 1778, the

Appendix, No. 80. 1778.

Select Conſ. 633.

Appendix, No. 81.

13th Dec. 1778. Select Conſ. 1778, 865. Country Corr. 164—921.

heads of the Treaty appear to have been tranſmitted by the Preſident to *Bazalet Jung*. The Letter to *Bengal*, which accompanied a copy of theſe articles, appeared to be in very general terms, not ſpecifying who the Parties were to be, or what ſhould be the mode of negociation.

And Your Committee find, That on the 22d February, the Governor General and Council's Anſwer was read at the Board; wherein they ſay, "In regard "to the alliance propoſed to be formed with *Bazalet* "*Jung*, we highly approve of the meaſure in general, "and leave it to you to negociate and finally conclude a "Treaty with him."

Appendix, No. 82. 303—307.

Your Committee find, That on the 19th April the Preſident propoſed that a force ſhould be ſent under Colonel *Harpur*, for the protection of *Bazalet Jung*'s country; which was agreed to by the Board; and that they acquainted the Government of *Bengal* that they had ſo done, as *Hyder Ally* threatened an attack on the *Cudopah* Country.

Appendix, No. 83. Select Conſ. 1779. 23d April 1779. No. 84. Select Conſ. 84, 136—138.

Your Committee find, That on the 22d of April, much about the time of concluding the Treaty, inſtructions had been given to Mr. *Hollond* (who had juſt been appointed to an embaſſy at the Nizam's Court, on a moſt important ſubject, hereafter to be mentioned) in which mention was made of the affairs of the *Guntoor* Circar. The Select Committee therein explaining their idea that *Bazalet Jung* had infringed the Treaty of 1768, by entertaining the French Troops in his ſervice, entered into a diſcuſſion of that point, which will appear in the inſtructions themſelves, ſtated at length in the Appendix; and added theſe words: "We leave it to your judgment "to preſs our views in this reſpect upon the Nizam, as "far as may be neceſſary to obtain his concurrence and "good offices towards their completion."—Your Committee find, That Mr. *Hollond* afterwards, in a Letter from *Hyderabad*, dated the 9th of May, acquainted them, that, "With regard to the renting of the *Guntoor* Circar "from *Bazalet Jung*, as you did not lay any ſtreſs upon "it in your inſtructions, and as I was informed that my "mentioning it would be totally uſeleſs, I have thought "it beſt for the preſent to paſs it over in ſilence;" but it does not appear to Your Committee by whom Mr. *Hollond* was ſo informed. Your Committee found, that the Troops which the Preſidency had ſtipulated to place in *Bazalet Jung*'s country, were put under Colonel *Harpur*'s command, and inſtructed to aſſemble at *Mootapilly*, and march to *Adoni*, the capital of *Bazalet Jung*'s other poſſeſſions in the *Decan*; and that in the courſe of Colonel *Harpur*'s march, he was directed to follow a route leading through *Hyder*'s country, which might have been avoided by taking another road, and croſſing the *Kiſtna* in two places.—That Colonel *Harpur* ſoon found, by two Letters from *Hyder*'s Manager, that his detachment would not be permitted to go through a narrow paſs in the Hills, called *Ateour*, which *Hyder* had guarded; and that when this was communicated by Colonel *Harpur* to the Preſident and Select Committee, they expreſſed themſelves, on the 3d of Auguſt, to be of opinion, that *Hyder* did not ſeriouſly intend to obſtruct the paſſage; but directed Colonel *Harpur* to be on his guard, and that the Preſident ſhould write to *Hyder* upon the ſubject.—That on the 12th Auguſt, Colonel *Harpur* acquainted the Select Committee, that *Hyder*'s Manager had collected Troops, was throwing every impediment in his way, by cutting down trees, &c. and that he apprehended a ſtand would be made againſt him; that at length meaſures having been taken to ſurround his detachment, on the 14th of Auguſt he marched back into the *Guntoor* Circar: and it does not appear to Your Committee, that the Select Committee had taken any previous meaſures to ſecure *Hyder*'s permiſſion to make this attempt of marching through his country.

1779. Select Conſ. 274—278.

Appendix, No. 87. 96—170.

Appendix, No. 88. Ibid. 699, 700, 701.

No. 89.

Appendix, No. 90.

1779. 23d Auguſt. Select Conſ. 769. Ibid. 779. No. 911.

It appeared to Your Committee, That *Bazalet Jung*, during the courſe of this expedition, was very impatient for its progreſs, and had written ſeveral Letters, full of anxiety, on that ſubject; having drawn upon himſelf the

the diſpleaſure of the Nizam and of *Hyder Ally*.—And Your Committee further find, That in a Letter of the 29th of Auguſt 1779, the Nabob ſent to the Governor a copy of a Letter which he had received from *Bazalet Jung*, expreſſive in the ſtrongeſt terms of *Hyder* and the Nizam's reſentment, on account of his Treaty with the Engliſh; incloſing copies of Letters to him from both thoſe Princes on that ſubject, expreſſive of their hoſtile intention towards *Bazalet Jung* and the Company.

Appendix, No. 92. Country Cor. 1779. No. 112, 115, 116, 117.

Your Committee found, That the Letter written by *Hyder Ally* to *Bazalet Jung* contains this paſſage: "In "every part throughout *Indoſtan*, where the Engliſh "have eſtabliſhed their influence and got a footing, "under the colour of giving protection and aſſiſtance, "experience has ſhewn what treatment thoſe have met "with who have had any connection with that Nation." He inſtances the Princes in the neighbourhood of *Bengal*: "My opinion," ſays he, "is, that they ought not to "have a footing in this part of the country—It is not "in my power to conſent to your giving up the Circar "to my old and bitter Enemy.—If the Engliſh are put "in poſſeſſion we cannot agree—Why ſhould their pro-"tection be ſolicited—how often have I defeated them?"

Your Committee alſo find, That the Letter from the Nizam to *Bazalet Jung* contains this paſſage: "You "well know the diſpoſitions of the Europeans; when "they get any thing into their hands, they never part "with it; witneſs the State of *Soujah Dowlah*, &c. It "is highly improper to throw ſo much power into the "hands of Europeans," and ſays, "That *Hyder* will be "little better than a Zemindar, if their power ſhould "increaſe."

Appendix, No. 93. 1779. Select Conſ. 903.

And Your Committee find, That on the 29th of September, Colonel *Harpur* was again directed to proceed from *Innacunda*, where his camp was, to *Adoni*, by ſuch route as *Bazalet* ſhould propoſe, or ſhould appear to himſelf practicable.

Appendix, No. 94. Ibid. 914, 915. Country Corr. No. 127.

Your Committee further find, That on the 4th of October 1779, the Preſident produced to the Board a Letter from the Nabob, deſiring to have the management of *Guntoor*; ſtating, that he had heard "That leave "had been given for this to the Repreſentatives of his "Friends," and alſo ſtating as his principal reaſon, that he wiſhes to adminiſter juſtice in that country according to his own form. This Letter appeared to be dated on the 19th September, and not to have been delivered in till the 4th October, and conſequently that it muſt have been above a fortnight in the Preſident's private poſſeſſion. The terms propoſed by the Nabob appeared to have been as follows: that he ſhould have the management of the *Guntoor* Circar for ten years, at the following rent, viz. firſt two years 200,000 *Madras* Pagodas, next three years 205,000 D°, next three D° 210,000 D°, next two D° 215,000 D°; in all 270,500 for ten years.

Your Committee find, That Mr. *Smith* requeſted to know of the Preſident, Whether the ſubject of the Nabob's Letter ſhould be conſidered and be determined in the Committee or by the Council? and that the Preſident was of opinion, That it ſhould be ſettled in the Committee; and that Mr. *Smith* thought it ought to be determined on by the Council in their Revenue Department; and it appeared, that the Preſident declared, that if he ſhould hereafter find it neceſſary, he ſhould enter his reaſons at large for thinking the Nabob's propoſals ſhould be determined on in the Committee. Mr. *Smith* obſerving, that if he ſhould find it neceſſary, he ſhould apply to them. Your Committee find, that Sir *Hector Munro* and Mr. *Whitehill* were of opinion, that it ſhould be taken into conſideration in the Committee.

Appendix, No. 94. Select Conſ. 1779. 916—918.

It alſo appears to Your Committee, That the Preſident then laid before the Board, Accounts of the produce of the *Guntoor* Circar for four years, as ſent him by *Bazalet Jung*, and that thoſe accounts were entered accordingly.

Appendix, No. 95.

Your Committee further found, That the Preſident laid before the Select Committee the following Extract from the Company's Letter, dated 4th March 1767:

"You inform us, that as ſoon as our authority ſhall "be perfectly eſtabliſhed in the Circars, you think it "will be for our intereſt to give the management of the "Circar of *Condavir* (or *Guntoor*) to the Nabob of "*Arcot*, at a reaſonable rent; the reaſons you offer in "ſupport of this opinion are very ſatisfactory: ſuch a "boundary as the river *Kiſtna* muſt certainly prevent "all colour of diſpute touching the limits; and the "Troops employed in the protection of the *Arcot* Pro-"vince may hold that alſo in obedience; and you will "take care to obtain from the Nabob as high a revenue "as could be procured in any other way:" and deſired the opinion of the Committee, Whether or not the propoſals made by the Nabob ſhould be accepted, ſubject to the Company's approval, and under ſuch further limitations as the Committee ſhall think proper for the ſecurity of the revenue and the welfare of the inhabitants.

Your Committee find, That Mr. *Smith* thought the letting of the *Guntoor* Circar a very important matter, and not having ſeen the Letter from the Nabob, propoſing to rent it, or the other papers now delivered in by the Preſident, until that day, was not prepared to give an opinion upon them, and requeſted therefore that the conſideration of the affair might be deferred till the next Committee.

It appears to Your Committee, That Sir *Hector Munro* and Mr. *Whitehill* agreed in opinion with the Preſident; who obſerved, that as it ſeems to be the wiſh of the Company, that the Nabob ſhould have the *Guntoor* Circar at rent whenever it came into our hands, he does not ſee how, with that part of the Company's Letter before them, the Committee would be juſtified in rejecting the Nabob's propoſals; that he is againſt delay in this buſineſs, as the ſeaſon is very far advanced, and the revenue will ſuffer, if ſome meaſures are not ſpeedily adopted; that he ſhould have propoſed the ſubject before, but was deſirous of obtaining every neceſſary information of the value of the country, which he has accordingly done; that as he looks on the poſſeſſion of the *Guntoor* Circar to be of very material conſequence to the Company, and has propoſed every meaſure to the Committee that he thought likely to obtain it, he is deſirous the Company ſhould know by the ſhips now under diſpatch all the ſteps that have been taken in the negociation and ſettlement of the country, which he flatters himſelf cannot fail of meeting with their approval, and do credit to this Government, whether conſidered in a political light, or as eaſing the Company of ſome part of the burthen of their military expences.

8th Oct. 1779. Appendix, No. 96. Country Corr. No. 123. Appendix, No. 97.

And Your Committee find, That in conſequence of this Reſolution of the Board, the Preſident acquainted the Nabob, that his offer, under certain ſtipulations, was accepted; but they alſo find, that after the invaſion of the *Carnatic*, viz. on the 23d of September 1780, the Preſident and Select Committee of *Madras* acquainted *Bazalet Jung*: "That he having deſired to be reſtored to "his country, and the Nizam having intereſted himſelf "with the Governor General of *Bengal* on the ſame ac-"count, they have ordered their Troops to be with-"drawn;" for, in the month of June preceding, the Governor General and Council appear to have ſent their poſitive orders to *Madras*, for reinſtating *Bazalet Jung*, and for withdrawing their Troops and Servants, forbidding the ſubordinate Preſidency to exerciſe any judgment upon the ſubject, but directing them to pay immediate obedience to their orders, as they never meant the Nizam ſhould be overlooked. It does not appear to Your Committee, that any Anſwer was ſent from the Board at *Madras* to this Letter, till the 2d of September 1780, which they account for by acquainting the Governor General and Council, that they had received no Letter ſince the 25th June again and again, and deſiring upon that they had authority to conclude [illegible] with *Bazalet Jung*,

13th June 1780. Appendix, No. 98.

Appendix, No. 99.

Jung, from the Letters of 5th July, 9th November, and 11th December 1775, and 31ſt December 1778: and Your Committee find, That they then acquainted them of their having let the Circar to the Nabob, but that they had written to deſire his reſignation of it.—It appears to Your Committee, That on the receipt of this Anſwer at *Bengal*, the Governor General entered a Minute, and that a Letter was written in conſequence of it, denying that there either was, or in fair conſtruction could be, any authority given in thoſe Letters to break the Treaty of 1768, by overlooking the Nizam, as theſe Letters contained no more than a general acquieſcence to treat with *Bazalet Jung*: and he adds, that the Government of *Bengal* was not made acquainted with the concluding of that Treaty in April 1779 till the 18th of February 1780, which was ſeveral months afterwards; and that no Anſwer had been given, or any notice whatever taken of poſitive orders from *Bengal*, for the reſtoration of *Bazalet Jung*, dated 12th June, to the 3d September, above two months after; and that in ſubſequent Letters of the 17th September, the ſubject was ſtudiouſly avoided: and that the Governor General concluded this Minute with moving, That Mr. *Whitehill* ſhould be ſuſpended (that Gentleman having ſucceeded to the Government on Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s departure, in the month of April preceding) which was voted unanimouſly; and the order for that purpoſe brought to *Madras* by Sir *Eyre Coote*, when he arrived to take the command of the Army.

Appendix, No. 100. 10th October 1780.

Appendix, No. 101.

Your Committee find, That Mr. *Whitehill* entered a Minute on that occaſion; which does not appear to contain any Anſwer to the facts ſtated in the Letter from *Bengal*, but conſiſts of an argument againſt the authority of the Supreme Council in the preſent caſe, and an exculpation of his own conduct, as the Treaty had been originally made by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*.

Appendix, No. 102.

Your Committee further find, That after the vote of ſuſpenſion had been paſſed on Mr. *Whitehill*, he was ſtill permitted to deliver in another Minute, in which he aſcribes it to his own forbearance and diſcretion, that a civil war ſhould not be raiſed in the Settlement upon this occaſion, if force were uſed to remove him from his ſeat in Council.

Your Committee next adverted to the manner in which this tranſaction with the Brother of the Nizam had been repreſented to the Directors, the ſentiments they entertained, and the conduct which they held upon it; and found, that when this matter was in agitation in 1775, the Government of *Madras*, on the 4th July 1775, acquainted the Court of Directors with the ſteps which had then been taken to prevent the growth of the French intereſt in *Guntoor*; from which Letter it will appear, that the intereſts of the Nizam, and the Treaty of 1768, were fully attended to: And Your Committee further find, that on the 10th July 1778, it had been ſtated to them, by a General Letter, that the French party in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice had aſſumed a conſequence, which alarmed *Bazalet Jung* himſelf, and that the Preſident had paid attention to propoſals received from him on that ſubject; and it alſo appears, that on the 17th October, another General Letter from *Madras* acquainted the Court of Directors, that they had hopes of concluding this matter with *Bazalet Jung*: And Your Committee find, that on the 13th March 1779, the Court of Directors was informed, by another General Letter, that the Treaty would ſoon be concluded, the objects of which are ſtated in a General Letter from *Madras* (dated the 14th October 1779) to be not of a pecuniary nature, but neceſſary for the ſecurity of the Circars, and the Nabob's Northern poſſeſſions, againſt the ravages of *Hyder Ally*, to which theſe countries are open.

Appendix, No. 103.

Dated 11th Oct. 1779.

Appendix, No. 103, 104, 105, and 106.

Your Committee alſo find, That on 31ſt October 1778, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, in a Letter directed to the Chairman of the *Eaſt India* Company, repreſents his views in obtaining the removal of the French Troops from the *Guntoor* Circar, and getting the actual poſſeſſion of it, to be, that it may remain under the Company's management.

Appendix, No. 107.

And Your Committee find, That in this Letter the Directors are told, that the diſcuſſions which had taken place with the Zemindars called down to the Preſidency, would ſtrike at the root of many evils, and that he had no doubt that their heavy balances would be paid by them.

The Letter of the 14th October above mentioned, is found by Your Committee to acquaint the Directors, That the Preſident had employed himſelf in aſcertaining the value of the *Guntoor* Circar for the few laſt years of *Bazalet Jung*'s collections; and that as the Nabob, by the Letter of the 4th March 1767, had been promiſed the *Guntoor* Circar whenever it ſhould come into the Company's hands, his Highneſs had put them in mind of that promiſe, and had made the propoſals above ſtated, thereby offering a higher rent than had been collected in any of the four preceding years. That the produce of the country could be realized only in one or two ways; either by collecting it, in which caſe any deficiency muſt be made good by the Company to *Bazalet Jung*, or by letting it to the Nabob, the only reſponſible tenant.

Your Committee, in order to enable the Houſe to judge of the meaning of the paſſage cited from the Letter of the 4th March 1767, examined the whole of that Letter, and found that the paragraph (No. 12) immediately preceding that which was relied on, contained reaſons againſt continuing the Company's jaghire lands in the hands of the Nabob for more than a year, which the Court of Directors repreſent as equally applicable to the caſe of the Circars. And Your Committee alſo examined a Letter of the 1ſt April 1766, which had given occaſion to that of the 4th of March 1767, and without which Your Committee conceived the latter could not perfectly be underſtood. Your Committee found, That the Letter of the 1ſt April 1766, was written ſoon after the ceſſion of the Northern Circars; and ſtated, that the Preſidency of *Madras*, by reaſon of ſome pecuniary tranſactions, were induced, at one time, to entertain thoughts of letting the whole Circars to the Nabob; but that they had abandoned that idea, from being convinced of the propriety of keeping them in the Company's hands, and in order to avoid giving offence to the Nizam, whoſe country adjoins to the Company's Circars, and who was jealous of the Nabob's deſigns on the *Decan*: but that as to *Guntoor*, Your Committee find that they expreſs themſelves in theſe words: "As it lies on this ſide the *Kiſtna*, and is intermixed with the Nabob's country to the Northward, and the Troops which he is obliged to keep there to guard that country, will at the ſame time preſerve tranquillity in *Condavir* (i. e. *Guntoor*) it may be for your intereſt to give him (the Nabob) the management of it, at a reaſonable rent, as ſoon as your authority is perfectly eſtabliſhed."

Appendix, No. 108.

Laſt No. Appendix. General Letter, 30th Jan. 1781.

Appendix, No. 109.

Your Committee find, That the Court of Directors, in their General Letter of the 10th January 1781, ſay, "That they ſhall not waſte time in pointing out the "very different ſituation of affairs at preſent, compared "with the period of 1767, nor by pointing out what "many years experience has ſhewn, that none but the "Company's Troops ſhould be truſted in any part of "the Nabob's country: that a leaſe to the Nabob for "ten years is directly contrary to the letter and ſpirit "of repeated inſtructions; and that the conduct of the "Preſident and Majority of the Council in this reſpect "amounts to little leſs than open contempt of the au-"thority of the Court of Directors: that if the Pre-"ſident and Select Committee had conſidered the "twelfth paragraph of the Letter relied on, of the 4th "March 1767, and reflected on the repeated repreſenta-"tions which had been made againſt ſuffering the jag-"hire lands to be under the Nabob's Managers, they "muſt have ſeen the application of them to this ſub-"ject, and would not have eſtabliſhed the Nabob's

Laſt No. Appendix.

"people

" people in a country, of which they had ſo recently " acquired the poſſeſſion, and which ſeparates the Com- " pany from their Northern Diſtricts."

Your Committee find, That the Court of Directors, in this Letter, deny that the Letter of 1767 imports any promiſe to the Nabob, or that he claims any ſuch promiſe, as he goes no further than to ſay, that he has heard that leave had been given to grant him a leaſe of this Circar.—The Directors then obſerve, That as to the oſtenſible clauſe which ſubjects the bargain to their future approbation, they are really concerned to find their Servants capable of ſheltering themſelves behind a ſubterfuge which they ought to have been aſhamed of ſtating, knowing, as they muſt, the inconvenience and embarraſſment that would unavoidably attend the operation of that proviſo, if the Company ſhould think fit to annul the agreement—That, however, they do expreſsly diſallow the agreement, and poſitively direct the *Guntoor* Circar to be reſumed for the Company—That *Hyder Ally* could not be expected to remain an indifferent ſpectator, if, in addition to the oſtenſible plea of expelling the French from the *Guntoor* Circar, that country were put into the hands of the Nabob, his inveterate enemy; and that the Preſidency, as they themſelves repreſent, had been informed by the Nabob, that *Hyder* was acquainted with every thing that paſſed at his Durbar—That Colonel *Harpur*'s march of 6 days through *Hyder*'s country, without his conſent, was highly imprudent; and that if *Bazalet Jung*'s country is kept, and they are unable to afford him the ſtipulated protection, he will probably fall a ſacrifice to the reſentment of the Nizam and *Hyder Ally*; Par. 150. adding this obſervation: " The latter has, by your im- " prudence, had an opportunity of acquiring and mani- " feſting additional conſequence; the reſult may render " him ſtill more troubleſome, and the concluſion be un- " favourable to the Company's affairs on that ſide of " *India*."—Your Committee further find, that in this General Letter the Court of Directors animadvert upon the manner of letting this Circar to the Nabob, which they term precipitate and unjuſtifiable; and that they agree with Mr. *Smith* in opinion, that the Nabob's propoſals ought to have been conſidered in the Council at large in their Revenue Department, and not in the Select Par. 153—4. Committee—That *Bazalet Jung*, and his accounts, were made a ſubſtitute for a Committee of Circuit, with this difference, that the Committee of Circuit's Reports would have come before the Board at large, but *Bazalet Jung*'s repreſentations were, by the cuſtom of the Service, ſubject in the firſt inſtance to the Preſident's inſpection only—That they commend Mr. *Smith*'s conduct, in wiſhing for time to conſider of the accounts and propoſals till the next Committee; but that this requeſt, which they deem reaſonable, was refuſed.

Your Committee further find, That the Directors obſerve that the Nabob's Letter was above a fortnight in the Preſident's poſſeſſion, and, when brought to light, a majority appeared ripe for deciſion; that the queſtion was forthwith put, and carried, for a ten years leaſe, with as little ceremony as if it had been for the purchaſe of a bale of cloth; as though it had involved no one conſideration of importance, nor been of the leaſt conſequence to the peace of the country, or welfare of the Company, although the Preſidency had every reaſon to believe, from the ſtrong repreſentations of *Hyder* and the Nizam, that it would be extremely difficult to reconcile them to the meaſures, or to fulfil their ſtipulation with *Bazalet Jung*, even by force of arms.

Your Committee having examined the origin and progreſs of this Treaty reſpecting the *Guntoor* Circar, and the effect it produced on the minds of the Nizam of the *Decan* and *Hyder Ally*; and having alſo examined the conduct of the Supreme Council upon that occaſion, as well as the ſentiments and conduct of the Court of Directors, proceeded next to examine another important tranſaction that was going on with the Nizam, and which is intimately connected with the tranſaction with his Brother *Bazalet Jung* above ſtated.

It appears to the Committee, That on the 27th January 1779, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* delivered in a Minute, accompanied with certain Letters of intelligence which he had received; from all which, together with a conſideration of many points reſpecting the affairs of the *Carnatic*, he was induced to propoſe to the Committee, that Mr. *Holland* ſhould be ſent to the Nizam's Court; and he urges it as neceſſary, " if no other conſequence " were to ariſe from it, than our being at a certainty of " the views and intentions of the Nizam, and to obtain " ſuch intelligence as we now only receive by chance; " the ſettlement of the *Guntoor* Circar; the payment of " the Nizam's Tribute; the being at ſome certainty with " reſpect to any intrigues the French may be carrying " on, are all objects of importance; and the ſending " ſome perſon immediately to *Hyderabad*, as well as to " *Hyder Ally*, appeared to him abſolutely neceſſary." 1779. Select Conſ. 168, 199. Appendix, No. 110.

Your Committee find, That the Tribute here alluded to, payable to the Nizam, is five lacks of Rupees, ſtipulated to be paid to him when the Circars were ſurrendered in 1765, and is called Peiſhcuſh—And it appeared, that the Committee agreed to this propoſal, and ordered a Letter to be written to the Governor General and Council, acquainting them with this meaſure; which Letter, dated 7th February, ſets out with acquainting them of their having intelligence from *Poonah*, " that " the Company's arms had ſuſtained a diſgrace; and " with reſpect to the Nizam, they ſay, that his avowed " attachment to the *Poonah* Miniſters, and the warmth " with which he remonſtrated to your Board, and to " this Government, againſt the deſigns which he un- " derſtood to be formed in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, " ſufficiently ſhew how he muſt have received the news " of this diſaſter, and how materially this misfortune " will contribute to ſtrengthen the inclination he will " naturally have conceived to our prejudice. As our " Northern Circars are ſo open to invaſion from the do- " minions of *Nizam Alli*, and as there is but too much " reaſon to doubt of his friendſhip for the Company, we " think it highly expedient, at this juncture, to have the " beſt intelligence of his deſigns, and to be timely in- " formed of any motions he may make towards the pro- " vinces. For this purpoſe, as well as to ſettle every " thing that may be neceſſary for obtaining the *Guntoor* " Circar, and procuring the diſmiſſion of the French " Troops from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, we have ap- " pointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to " the Court of *Nizam Alli*, in quality of Reſident: he " will have inſtructions to correſpond with your Board, " and to communicate every information you may re- " quire from that quarter." Vide Treaty in Appendix. Appendix, No. 111. Select Conſ. 212, &c. 215, 216.

And Your Committee find, That the Inſtructions given to Mr. *Holland* on this occaſion, were to the following purport: That he ſhould endeavour to remove from the mind of the Nizam any unfavourable impreſſion he may have received reſpecting the Maratta War, and the expedition ſet on foot by *Bengal*; to ſubſtitute others more favourable in their ſtead, and to cultivate the friendſhip eſtabliſhed between the Nizam and the Company by the Treaty of 1766. But as ſome circumſtances had happened, with reſpect to the *Guntoor* Circar, which might be thought to affect the terms of that Treaty, they enter into an explanation of the danger to be apprehended from the French Troops which were in his ſervice; and acquaint him, that they had opened a negociation with *Bazalet Jung* on that ſubject, incloſing a copy of the Treaty propoſed by that Prince, together with their Anſwer; and inform him, that they ſhortly expect a final concluſion of it. They acquaint Mr. *Holland*, that it is left to his judgment to open this matter with the Nizam, in order to obtain his [illegible] and informs him, the Treaty of 1766 having been concluded with the Nizam only, they have [illegible] on their applications Appendix, No. 12. Ibid. 197.

applications to him, conſidering him as reſponſible for the due execution of that part which concerns his Brother. They then ſtate to Mr. *Hollond*, that, in their opinion, *Bazalet Jung* has infringed the Treaty, by entertaining French Troops, and that they have for that reaſon retained the Nizam's Peiſhcuſh, or Tribute—That this muſt however be explained to the Nizam, ſo as to remove any doubts about the future regular payment of his Peiſhcuſh. And they further direct Mr. *Hollond* to convey every neceſſary intelligence to the Supreme Council, as well as to themſelves, and to be as early as poſſible in all communications to both Preſidencies.—And Your Committee find, That on the 19th April 1779, the Select Committee reſolved to acquaint Mr. *Hollond* (who had arrived at *Hyderabad* on the 6th) with the ſteps which had been taken to aſſiſt *Bazalet Jung*, that he might avail himſelf of it with the Nizam, in order to engage him to take a part with his Brother in checking the dangerous deſigns of *Hyder Ally*: but Your Committee do not find the Anſwer to this Letter entered upon the *Madras* Conſultations, either within the time in which Letters appear in the uſual courſe to have been received from *Hyderabad*, or at any after period.—It appeared to Your Committee, That Mr. *Hollond*, in September following, tranſmitted to *Bengal* his whole correſpondence with the Preſidency of *Madras*, and among others a copy of this Anſwer, which appears to have been written on the 17th May, and contains an account of the Nizam's being greatly offended with the Preſidency.—And it further appears to Your Committee, That Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, in a Letter to Mr. *Hollond*, dated 10th June, acknowledges the receipt of this, together with another Letter of ſubſequent date, viz. 24th of May. But Your Committee cannot aſcertain the day on which it was ſo received by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, as he only mentions his having duly received it: but Your Committee find, from examining the dates and receipts of many Letters from *Hyderabad* to *Madras*, that 10, 11, or 12 days is the uſual time required for tranſmitting them from the one place to the other; and that in the preſent inſtance 18 days had elapſed between the 17th May (the day of the date) and the 5th June, when a very important ſtep was moved by the Preſident, which added greatly to the Nizam's reſentment.

Appendix, No. 113. Select Com. 19th April 1779, 84—87.

Appendix, No. 113.

Appendix, No. 114.

Your Committee find, That this Letter of Mr. *Hollond*'s, dated 17th May (addreſſed to the Preſident and Select Committee) informs them, That, in his audience of the Nizam, he had ſtated to him the meaſures taken in ſupport of his Brother, and the hopes which were entertained that he would aſſiſt the Preſidency with Troops, to check *Hyder Ally*; but that, from the change in his Highneſs's countenance, he ſaw that he was much diſtreſſed; and that when he requeſted an Anſwer, the Nizam told him, that affairs of this nature were attended with ſerious conſequence, and required mature deliberation, and gave ſeveral reaſons why he could not furniſh Troops or proviſions.—Your Committee further find, That Mr. *Hollond*, in this Letter, repreſents, that in a ſecond conference with the Nizam, his Highneſs obſerved, that it was extraordinary, when a perſon was ſent for the purpoſe of ſtrengthening their friendſhip, that the Company ſhould engage in meaſures ſo little likely to produce that effect—That he read over the articles of the Treaty of 1768, and ſaid, that entering into engagements with his Brother was a direct violation of it—That the Preſidency had no right to interfere in the concerns of his Family; and that he ought to have been conſulted.—And it appears to Your Committee, That Mr. *Hollond* endeavoured to excuſe this, by obſerving, that the Preſidency were ſo well aſſured that *Hyder Ally* intended immediately to attack his Brother's country, that there had not been time for conſulting him; but that the Nizam denied that *Hyder* had any ſuch intention, and always reverted to the Treaty, ſaying, that nothing could be urged in vindication of the ſteps which had been taken, and that if the Treaty was to be obſerved, the Troops ſhould be ſtopped from marching into the country; if it was not to be regarded, he ſhould be obliged to oppoſe them.—Mr. *Hollond* adds, that the Nizam had informed him, that *Hyder Ally* intended ſpeedily to fall on the *Carnatic*, in his former manner of plundering and burning, and avoiding pitched battles; and that he has no doubt of the Nizam's wiſhes to form an alliance with the Engliſh againſt *Hyder Ally*.

Your Committee find, That previous to the date of the foregoing Letter, the Nizam had written a Letter to *Madras* (received on the 10th May) in which he expreſſed ſatisfaction at the appointment of Mr. *Hollond*, and repreſented himſelf as determined to adhere ſtedfaſtly to Treaties; and that Mr. *Hollond* acquainted the Preſidency of his arrival at *Hyderabad* on the 6th, and the honourable reception given to him by the Nizam two days after his arrival; and that at the ſecond interview with the Nizam, he had aſſured him, according to inſtructions, of the Company's intentions to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaty of 1768; and that with reſpect to the Peiſhcuſh for the Circars (in full confidence of his giving all reaſonable ſatisfaction with regard to the Circar of *Guntoor*, and the Troops in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice) it was their intention to give orders for paying the arrears, and diſcharging the Peiſhcuſh regularly in future, according to kiſt; and that his Highneſs made the ſtrongeſt and moſt earneſt declarations of his deſire to be upon terms of the cloſeſt friendſhip with the Company; ſaying, "That he had never deviated in any inſtance from "the Treaties ſubſiſting, had reſiſted ſolicitation to ſup"port the French, and had cauſed his Brother to diſmiſs "*Lally* and his Troops from *Guntoor*," which Mr. *Hollond* informs them the Nizam had taken into his own ſervice, to prevent their joining *Hyder* and the Marattas, as the Nizam alledged. And Your Committee find, That the Anſwer which the Preſident propoſed to be made to Mr. *Hollond*'s Letter, appearing on the Select Conſultations of the 5th June, directed him to ſtate to the Nizam, that it was wiſhed the French Troops had been ſent to the ſea-coaſt, where they might have been ſent, together with other French priſoners, to their native country, that they might not diſturb the peace of the different States of *India*. And Your Committee alſo found, That the Governor's Minute then proceeds in theſe words: "I "muſt now requeſt the Committee's permiſſion to lay "before them my ſentiments on a particular point, if "poſſible, to be negociated with the Soubah. If I "ſhould be ſo happy as to find the Committee with me "in opinion, I would recommend that Mr. *Hollond* be "wrote to on the ſubject. I am ſenſible it is a very de"licate one, and muſt not be abruptly gave into; but "that the opening it to the Soubah (Nizam) will re"quire much management on the part of Mr. *Hollond*, "who muſt, by turns, ſooth and work on his apprehen"ſions as occaſion may require. I have always conſi"dered the Peiſhcuſh as diſgraceful to the Company, "and an acknowledgment which the Soubah had no "right to demand. The giving up the *Guntoor* Circar "during the life of his Brother *Bazalet Jung*, was ſuf"ficient condeſcenſion. The grant from the Mogul "was free and unconditional for the five Circars; and "the receiving them afterwards from the Nizam, on "paying him an annual Peiſhcuſh, was a ſacrifice of the "Company's rights. The time ſeems favourable to "throw off ſo heavy a burden; for the immenſe ex"pences the Company are put to, both to the North"ward and in the *Carnatic*, renders it neceſſary that "we ſhould endeavour to relieve them as much as "poſſible. We may with ſafety make the attempt, and "try to obtain a remiſſion of ſo unneceſſary and ſo im"proper a Tribute, which, by the Mogul's Phirmaund "to the Company, the Soubah has no legal title to; but "in the end, ſhould the withholding of it be impolitic, "or likely to be attended with difficulty, we may then

Appendix, No. 115. Country Cor. 73.

Appendix, No. 116. 9th May 1779. 274—278.

Appendix, No. 117. Select Com. 5th June 1779. 426 to 428.

"make

" make good the payments to him. I am perſuaded he " is not ſufficiently powerful to enforce the demand; " and the ground I go upon is, that he would not have " been entitled to exact ſuch a mark of dependance, if " the original Phirmaund from the Emperor had been " properly attended to." And Your Committee further find, that after ſome other arguments (grounded on the circumſtance of the Peiſhcuſh having been but two lacks for the firſt ſix years, and afterwards raiſed to five by the Treaty) that he propoſed that Mr. *Hollond* ſhould be written to particularly on the ſubject, that he might uſe his utmoſt endeavours to obtain ſo deſirable an object; " nor (continued he) would I have him mention any " compromiſe, or ſtipulate for the payment of any " part of the Peiſhcuſh, till every endeavour has in vain " been uſed to induce the Soubah to relinquiſh the " whole; and Mr. *Hollond* may from his obſervations " learn, if there are any points in which the Soubah " wiſhes a compliance on the part of the Company that " may be acceded to in return for giving up his claim to " the Peiſhcuſh." And it appears, that the Select Committee entirely approved, and ordered the Letter accordingly, which was ſigned on the 11th of June (as Sir *Thomas Rumbold* ſtates in his Minute of the 30th December, Appendix No. 138.) proceeding in the ſame ſtrain of reaſoning with the Preſident's Minute; and concluding in theſe terms: " Although our wiſhes extend to an entire " remiſſion of Peiſhcuſh, which we would have firſt pro- " poſed to the Soubah, and ſupported by your beſt en- " deavours, yet we confeſs, that without ſomething of " importance to tempt him, we can hardly expect he " will at once be brought to ſo great a conceſſion; but " we hope, by making the demand at this time, we ſhall " more eaſily obtain what we think we have a juſt claim " to, which is a conſiderable abatement in the amount " of the Peiſhcuſh. If therefore the Soubah, after all " your endeavours, ſhall appear diſinclined to remit the " whole, you will try to bring the Peiſhcuſh back to the " former ſtandard of two lacks, which is as much as the " countries can afford." Your Committee find, that the terms of the original Treaty are theſe (viz.) That from 1768 to 1774, the Company ſhall pay two lacks a year—from 1774, the ſum of five lacks; and when the *Guntoor* Circar ſhall come into poſſeſſion, ſeven lacks annually.

Appendix, No. 118. Select Conſ. 9th July 1779. 579.

It appears to Your Committee, That Mr. *Hollond*'s Anſwer (26th June) repreſented the Nizam as continuing the ſame language as he had before held, with reſpect to his entertaining Mr. *Lally* and his Troops, and that he ſpeaks of them as vagrants of all nations.—As to the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, that he (Mr. *Hollond*) had repreſented to the Nizam, that, in fact, the Company had a right to the *Guntoor* Circar, by *Bazalet*'s having broken the ſecond article in the Treaty, in harbouring the Enemies of the Engliſh, but that they were ſatisfied with renting it from him, and undertaking, at the ſame time, to defend his territories.—But Your Committee find, That when the ſubject of the Peiſhcuſh was mentioned, Mr. *Hollond* acquaints them, that the Nizam was exceedingly agitated, and ſaid, that he finds that the Preſidency was determined to break the Treaty; that there is no further occaſion for his (Mr. *Hollond*'s) ſtaying there, and that if they were bent on war, he was likewiſe ready; and that if they ſaw any advantage in breaking with him, he ſhould be very well pleaſed, as he was convinced, in caſe of a rupture, the profits of the conteſt would be on his ſide—That the ſurrender of theſe Circars was grounded on the fraud and ignorance of his Manager, and that he had ſubmitted to that heavy loſs from a ſenſe of his engagements, and conſidered himſelf as bound by the Treaty—That he threatened immediately to join *Hyder Ally*, and deſired this might be communicated to the Preſidency, and a ſpeedy Anſwer returned, for if there were any delay, his Troops might poſſibly advance on Colonel *Harpur*.—And Your Committee find, That on the 10th July the Select Committee anſwered this Letter; obſerving, that although the Nizam's reſentment is raiſed, they ſtill flatter themſelves with greater ſucceſs than they could have procured by a different line of conduct; and that they directed Mr. *Hollond* to repreſent, that no threat was meant, but that it was intended the remiſſion ſhould proceed from the Nizam's favour and generoſity—that the claim, however, is built on ſuch foundation of equity, that it cannot be relinquiſhed, and hope he will be convinced of it—that as they cannot flatter themſelves that an entire remiſſion will be granted, Mr. *Hollond* may make propoſitions for abatement of the Tribute; and concluded with inſtructing him, that though they will pay what is due, when in caſh, they ſhall be fully prepared to revenge the leaſt inſult that is offered to them.

Appendix, No. 119. Select Conſ. 5th July 1779.

587—591. 589.

Mr. *Hollond*'s Anſwer to theſe Orders (dated 31ſt Auguſt 1779) appeared to Your Committee to ſtate, That he and the Nizam had gone over the ſubject with the ſame arguments which had been uſed on the former occaſion—that he ſeemed particularly agitated, when it was ſtated to him that he had made the ſame remiſſion in favour of others—that he ſtill ſpoke of the neceſſity of commencing hoſtilities, if the Peiſhcuſh were withheld, ſaying, that he (Mr. *Hollond*) might have his audience of leave in two days; and that he had received a meſſage accordingly, to prepare himſelf for his departure.—Mr. *Hollond* alſo ſtated this as the reaſon why he did not make the propoſitions of paying the arrears, if the Peiſhcuſh in future were remitted, believing the meſſage to be an artifice to drive him to the laſt propoſitions he might have in charge, and that Mr. *Hollond* then repreſented his wiſh, that a nazir (or preſent) might be offered to the Nizam, as he is ſatisfied that the remiſſion having been once propoſed, ought to be carried through, leſt it ſhould appear to be deſerted from weakneſs; and that he conceives that the Nizam's reluctance proceeded from the credit he derives from this Tribute being paid to him by the Engliſh Company.

Appendix, No. 120. 230. 242.

Select Conſ. 817.

Your Committee, finding that the negociation with the Nizam ſtood in this ſituation in September 1779, it was thought neceſſary next to advert to the proceedings at *Bengal* on this ſubject; the Preſident and Select Committee at *Madras* having acquainted the Governor General and Council with Mr. *Hollond*'s deputation, on the 7th February 1779, and having informed them that he was inſtructed to communicate with the Governor General and Council.

Your Committee have ſtated above, That Mr. *Hollond* had written to *Bengal* on the 9th May; but from thenceforward, to the 3d September, no Letter appears to have been written by him to the Government of *Bengal*.—On that day Your Committee find that he wrote very ſhortly, incloſing copies of the ſeveral Letters enumerated below, the ſubſtance of which have been already mentioned; and informing them, " That he ſhould have ſent them " ſeparately at the time they were written, but deferred " doing it, in expectation of being able to give them " more deciſive information with regard to the objects " they relate to." The Soubah (he added) talks of taking the field as ſoon as the rains are over, but his motions muſt depend upon the turn the negociations take with the Miniſters of *Poonah*.

Bengal, Select Conſ. 670—689.

Appendix, No. 121.

The Incloſures are,

His Letter to *Madras*, 9th May.
Letter from *Madras* to him, 23d April.
Letter to *Madras*, 17th May.
Letter to him from *Madras*, 11th June.
His Anſwer, 26th June.
Letter from *Madras*, 29th July.
His Anſwer, 31ſt Auguſt.

Your Committee found, That the Governor General, on the 25th October, entered a Minute on this ſubject, recapitulating the objects of Mr. *Hollond*'s original inſtructions, as ſent to the Governor General on 7th February, which he conſiders as wiſe, and conſiſtent with the power of the Government of *Madras*, independent of the controul

Select Conſ. 670. Appendix, No. 122, 123.

troul of the Governor General, being merely calculated to maintain Peace; but obſerving, by the tenor of the ſubſequent Inſtructions, it appeared they had been imperceptibly led from their firſt deſign, into a train of demands, which are, both in their nature and tendency, oppoſite to it, and have proved ſuch in their effects. The Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, ſays he, is concluded and avowed without the interpoſition of his immediate Sovereign and their Ally;—the arrears and current payment of the Peiſhcuſh withheld, and effectually, though indirectly, refuſed, under pleas highly unreaſonable and irregular; and a demand made for diſmiſſion of the French and other Enemies, and Native Forces, entertained under the command of *Lally*, a French Officer, a demand in itſelf reaſonable and ſuitable to the relation in which they ſtand with the Nabob, but neither politic nor reaſonable, while their other demands indicate War, and are even accompanied with indirect threats of it. And the Governor General obſerved on the light in which the Nizam received theſe propoſitions, as proceeding from a proper ſenſe of inſult. That the demands of State imply conſideration, and a determination to ſupport them; that the ceſſion of the Circars was extorted by neceſſity, and an attempt to deprive the Nizam of his Peiſhcuſh is therefore doubly criminal. The Governor and Council (continued he) have, however, on 10th July, expreſſed their hopes to ſucceed from the generoſity of the Nizam, and have apparently reduced the negociation to a quiet acquieſcence in the Treaty, as it now ſtands, apparently, becauſe they conclude with this expreſſion, That they will diſcharge what is due when they are in caſh, but will defend their juſt rights if they ſhould be attacked; and obſerved, that they will have diſturbed, in any event, the good underſtanding between them and their Ally; that all negociation ſhould originate with the Government of *Bengal*; that they had given their ſanction to Mr. *Hollond*'s appointment, under inducements widely different from the circumſtances which have ſince been made the object of that negociation. And Your Committee find, That he therefore moved, Whether the Board ſhall interfere, or ſhould leave the conduct of the negociation to *Fort Saint George*; and that it was unanimouſly carried for interfering.

Bengal, Sec. Conſ. 1st Nov. 1779. 745. Appendix, No. 124.

Your Committee alſo find, That a Letter was written, on the 1ſt of November 1779, to the Nizam, calculated to throw as little blame as poſſible on the Government of *Madras*, in the eyes of the Nizam, and yet to quiet his apprehenſions; and that the Letter ſtates, that the Government of *Madras* could not have had an idea of the offenſive intentions which his Highneſs imputed to them; for if they had, they muſt have imparted it to the Government of *Bengal*, as ſuch a deſign could not be carried into execution, nor could the Company's name be ever pledged without the ſanction of the Supreme Council; and that they acquaint the Nizam, that they have directed Mr. *Hollond* to ſuſpend his negociation till he ſhall have received further Inſtructions from his immediate Conſtituents, to whom they have written for that purpoſe. And Your Committee find, That on the 1ſt of November, the Supreme Council accordingly wrote to Mr. *Hollond*, ſuſpending his negociation, and incloſing the foregoing Letter. Your Committee further find, That the Governor General, &c. alſo wrote to *Madras* on the 4th November 1779, in the ſame ſtrain of propriety and moderation that was held in their Letter to the Nizam, and incloſed to them Copies of their Letters to *Hyderabad*, requiring their ſtrict conformity to the ſubject of theſe Letters. It appears to Your Committee, That Mr. *Hollond*, on the 18th December 1779, acquainted the Governor General, that he had delivered his Letter above mentioned to the Nizam, who expreſſed great ſatisfaction. And it alſo appears, that the Nizam's anſwer dwelt on the reputation of the Engliſh for good faith, and then adverted to the negociation of Mr. *Hollond*; and ſtates, that the Government of *Madras* had by violence ſeized the Circar, which by Treaty belonged to his brother; and aſks, what was he to conclude from ſuch conduct, but a breach of the Treaty? and declares, that he was on the eve of revenging theſe inſults when their Letter arrived, but that he has now put a ſtop to his meaſures. "If, ſays he, what you write is from your heart, "and the Government of *Madras* will remain ſtrict to "Treaty, and will relinquiſh poſſeſſion of the Circar, it "is well; if not, I have nothing of more conſequence "than defending my Country. It is from this new line "of conduct of the Engliſh Company, that the foundations of enmity have been laid in the whole country of "*Indoſtan*." And he concludes with deſiring their friendſhip may continue ſteady.

Appendix, No. 125. Sec. Conſ. 75. Appendix, No. 126. Ibid. 753. Appendix, No. 127. Appendix, No. 128. 1780. Bengal Select Conſ. 14—22.

Your Committee find, That on the 14th February 1780, the Governor General and Council took into conſideration a Letter from *Madras*, dated 15th January 1780, in anſwer to theirs of 4th November; in which the President and Council of *Madras* expreſs ſurprize that their endeavours, by friendly and perſuaſive means, to get rid of a heavy and diſgraceful burthen, ſhould be deemed a breach of faith; they ſtate their firſt repreſentation to the Nizam, as erring rather on the ſide of forbearance; and that the violent manner in which the Soubah received them, had occaſioned the ſpirited repreſentation made by Mr. *Hollond*, and their ſubſequent orders to addreſs the Nizam in a ſtyle ſuitable to the offence he had given: they expreſs themſelves as greatly concerned at the interpoſition of the Governor General, and the manner of it; aſſerting, that no interference on this occaſion was juſtified by their reſtraining powers: they cite the clauſes above ſtated in the Act 13 *Geo.* III. and obſerve, "that the reſtraining power is confined "to two points, Orders for declaring War, or for mak-"ing Treaties, not a poſitive compelling power extend-"ing to all political affairs; but that the Nizam choſe "to conſtrue this inoffenſive, and even forbearing con-"duct, into a deſign of committing hoſtilities, and to "expreſs himſelf in a ſtyle that betrayed more weakneſs "and folly than any purpoſe from which they might "apprehend danger;" and add, that they had written to the Nizam to ſatisfy him in regard to the Peiſhcuſh.

Sec. Conſ. 129—132. Appendix, No. 129.

Your Committee further find, That this Letter incloſed a Minute of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s, which the Council of *Madras* alluded to as containing their own ſentiments; in which he complains both of the matter and ſtyle of the Letter from *Bengal*, and then proceeds to ſhew, at very great length, that the Nizam's reſentment aroſe from the Maratta War, and the part which the Government of *Bengal* had taken in it: and it appears, that the Preſident very elaborately diſputes the point of juriſdiction, and endeavours to ſhew, that the controuling power is confined to the concluding of a Treaty only, and not to the intermediate negociation; that he inſiſts upon the ſame poſitions which are dwelt upon in the Letter which accompanied it, at much greater length; and obſerves, that the ſtoppage of Peiſhcuſh is juſtified by the ſame practice which obtained in the caſe of *Shuja Allum*; recriminating upon the conduct of the Preſidency of *Bengal* with much warmth, and acquainting them, that in the laſt Committee he had moved for the recal of Mr. *Hollond*, to whom Letters had been ſent for that purpoſe on the 17th December preceding.

Appendix, No. 132. 285.

Your Committee find, That the Governor General entered a Minute upon theſe Letters, hoping at the ſame time that the Board would concur with him in referring theſe extraordinary performances, as he terms them, to the Court of Directors, and that he declined making any particular reply to them.

231. Appendix, No. 134.

In anſwer to the Letter from *Madras*, the Governor General and Council, appear to Your Committee, to ſatisfy themſelves with proteſting againſt the doctrine therein laid down, which endeavours to confine their controlling power merely to the concluding of a Treaty; and not ſeeing how the reſt, in any ſhape, applies to the meaſures of either Board, they make no reply to it.—Your Committee alſo find, That on 16 January Mr.

Appendix, No. 132. Fo. 288.

1780, Sec. Co. Fo. 442. Appendix, No. 133.

Hollond acquainted the Governor General of his recal; and was much ſurprized that the Letter which recalled him, ſhould have deſired the Nizam to ſend down one of his own "confidential ſervants to *Madras*, to confer "with that Preſidency on ſuch matters as he might have "to propoſe;" and that he concluded from his having had no ſeparate Letter or official copy of that to the Nizam, that the Governor was perſonally diſſatisfied with him; and conjectured, that this might ariſe from the Nabob of *Arcot*, or *Fazel Beg*, whoſe intrigues he always ſuſpected, as a free intercourſe with the Nizam was miſchievous to both; or from his having communicated, purſuant to his Inſtructions, with the Governor General and Council.

And Your Committee find, That he thought it abſolutely impoſſible to make the Nizam eaſy on the head of *Bazalet Jung*, whom that Prince conſiders as independant the moment the Company's Troops reach *Adoni*; and that Mr. *Hollond* ſtated his own opinion of the very pernicious tendency of his ſubſequent Inſtructions relating to the Peiſhcuſh, eſpecially at ſo critical a time, when *Hyder* was connecting himſelf with the French, and *Lally* actually gone over to him.

Bengal Select Conſ. 1780. 289. Appendix, No. 134.

And Your Committee further find, That on the 14th of February 1780, the Governor General and Council, in order to obviate the ill effects which might proceed from Mr. *Hollond*'s ſudden recal, took into conſideration the neceſſity of appointing a perſon to reſide as their Miniſter at the Court of the Nizam. The reaſon particularly ſtated, is, that his recal would have too viſible an appearance of diſunion between their Government and that of *Madras*; they therefore reſolved, that an application ſhould be made to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Madras*, for their permiſſion to appoint Mr. *Hollond* to reſide as public Miniſter on the part of the Governor General and Council at the Court of the Nizam, for the purpoſe of negociating ſuch matters as remained to be adjuſted with him. They further reſolved, that Mr. *Hollond* ſhould be furniſhed with credentials for that purpoſe, and directed to remain at the Nizam's Court, until an anſwer ſhould be received from *Fort St. George*: and they ſtate as additional motives for appointing Mr. *Hollond* their Reſident, that advantages would ariſe from his being jointly appointed by both Preſidencies, and his having had the approbation of the Select Committee at *Madras*.

And it appears to your Committee, That Mr. *Hollond* was accordingly written to, his negociations being reſtricted to his original Inſtructions; and that the Governor General alſo acquainted the Nizam with Mr. *Hollond*'s new appointment, and communicated this to *Madras*.

Ibid, 14th Feb. 1780. 290.

Your Committee further find, That whilſt the Governor General and Council were thus employed in reſtoring the Company to the Nizam's friendſhip, the Government of *Madras* were taking meaſures for the recal of Mr. *Hollond* from his embaſſy; for on the 14th December 1779, the recal of that Gentleman was moved by Sir *Thomas Rumbold* the Preſident, adding, that the Nizam ſhould be informed, that they ſhould be glad to receive any perſon from his Court; and it appears, that on the ſame day he entered a Minute upon that ſubject, and wrote to the Nizam, acquainting him with Mr. *Hollond*'s recal, and again, on the 30th December, delivered in another long and elaborate Minute, entering largely into the Maratta War, and proteſting againſt being anſwerable for the conſequence of obedience to the Orders of the Governor General and Council, but yet ſubmitting to them from a ſenſe of the neceſſity of preſerving harmony between the two Boards. From the 31ſt December 1779 to the 1ſt April 1780, the Records of the Preſidency at *Madras*, could not be furniſhed to Your Committee, as they had been loſt on board the *General Barker*, and no duplicates had been ſent by other ſhips; but the following Minute of Mr. *Johnſon*, entered on the 22d May (from which period ſome of the Records are in *England*) is ſufficient to ſhew that Mr. *Hollond* had been

Appendix, No. 135.

Appendix, No. 136, and 137. Appendix, No. 138.

Appendix, No. 139.

ſuſpended from the Company's Service, with ſevere reflections upon his whole conduct, and as far as relates to this particular ſubject, will ſerve in ſome degree to ſupply the defect in the Company's Records.

It appears to Your Committee, That Mr. *Johnſon* declined entering into the diſcuſſion of the powers claimed by the Supreme Council (which he aſſerts to have been the oſtenſible reaſon for the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Hollond*) chooſing to confine himſelf to the arguments contained in a Minute left by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and dated on the firſt of April preceding, recommending the ſuſpenſion of that Gentleman from the Service.

That Mr. *Johnſon* denominates this Minute a political Teſtament, by which Sir *Thomas Rumbold* aſſumed the power of directing the proceedings of the Committee, even after his reſignation.

Your Committee find, That Mr. *Johnſon* endeavours to refute the late Preſident's interpretation of that part of Mr. *Hollond*'s Inſtructions which directed him to communicate with the Supreme Council, viz. "That ſuch "communication was only to be made of matters relat-"ing particularly to *Bengal*;" obſerving, that the words of the Inſtructions ordered him to convey every neceſſary intelligence to them, as well as to us, and to be as early as poſſible in his intelligence to both Preſidencies; and that in other inſtances, where the correſpondence was meant to be limited, it had been ſo expreſſed.

Mr. *Johnſon* appears to Your Committee to have combated another argument, viz. That Mr. *Hollond* had never been particularly directed to communicate with *Bengal* on the ſubject of the Peiſhcuſh, which depended upon ſubſequent Inſtructions, and therefore could not fall within the ſcope of his general Inſtructions to correſpond with the Supreme Council; and alſo animadverted on ſome alluſions of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, to matters which have come to his knowledge, but which he forbears to expreſs. Mr. *Johnſon* takes notice of an expreſſion contained in the late Preſident's Minute, wherein (after objecting to Mr. *Hollond*'s Correſpondence with *Bengal*, and his receiving a freſh appointment from thence, and conſidering it as a great honour) Sir *Thomas Rumbold* is ſtated to have obſerved, that this exceeds all that went before; to which Mr. *Johnſon* oppoſes the prior Letters of great commendation which had been ſent from the Preſident and Committee to Mr. *Hollond*. And it further appears, that Mr. *Johnſon* aſcribes all that had happened reſpecting the Treaty with the Nizam, not to Mr. *Hollond*'s having actually aſſiſted the views of the Nizam (as Sir *Thomas Rumbold* had aſſerted in his Minute) but to their having attempted a negociation with a Country Power without the permiſſion of the Supreme Council, and contrary to the injunction of an Act of Parliament. Mr. *Johnſon* further appears to have compared the reaſons aſſigned by the late Preſident for the recal of Mr. *Hollond*, on the 30th December 1779, namely, a compliance with the wiſhes of the Supreme Council with thoſe which were given on the 1ſt April 1780, viz. an unauthorized communication with *Bengal*, and great breach of truſt on the part of Mr. *Hollond*, in favouring the views of the Nizam; and obſerves, that theſe reaſons, if they exiſted at all, exiſted in December, but were not then ſtated.

Appendix, No. 138.

It alſo appears, that Mr. *Johnſon* vindicates Mr. *Hollond* for having obeyed the Orders of the Supreme Council, in remaining at the Nizam's Court, notwithſtanding he had received previous Letters of recal from *Madras*; and concludes with ſpeaking of Mr. *Hollond* as an able and faithful ſervant, and ſtrongly objecting to his ſuſpenſion from the Service of the Company; which, however, took place; but that Gentleman has ſince been reinſtated by Order of the Court of Directors.

Your Committee have thought it proper to ſtate this Minute at length in the Appendix, as it is the only document from whence the conduct of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and the Council can, in any degree, be aſcertained, ſubſequent to 30th December 1779, reſpecting their oppoſition to the interference of the Supreme Council upon this

Appendix, No. 139.

this occaſion; to which interference the Court of Directors have given their ſanction, by the General Letter, dated 10th January 1781.

Your Committee having traced the courſe of the negociation with the Nizam, from its commencement to its concluſion, and having examined the tranſaction with his brother *Bazalet Jung*, which terminated in a leaſe of the *Guntoor* Circar to the Nabob *Mahomed Ali*, then proceeded to examine the conduct of the Governor and Council of *Madras*, in letting certain other lands called jaghire lands, belonging to the Company, immediately adjoining to *Madras*, and which were alſo let to the Nabob of *Arcot* for three years.

The ſentiments of the Company on the ſubject of theſe lands, appeared to Your Committee to have been fully communicated to their Servants abroad, in their Letter of the 12th April 1775 (the ſame which eſtabliſhed the Committee of Circuit); in which the Directors order, that the jaghire lands ſhould be kept in the Company's immediate poſſeſſion, and that the Nabob ſhould not rent them, unleſs he ſhould agree to ſuch arrangements as they deemed neceſſary for mutual advantage. "You are to "agree with him (ſay they) for renting them for one "year only, and that on condition that our Committee "of Circuit are at liberty to explore the country, and to "aſcertain the real produce and revenue thereof."

Your Committee thought it proper to trace the practice of the Company in letting theſe lands antecedent even to this period of 1775, and found that thoſe lands were granted by the Nabob in jaghire to the Company, at different times in the years 1763, 1764, 1765, and in 1768 and 1769 were ſurveyed by Order of the Preſidency.—That in the year 1769, the Board at *Madras* repreſented to the Court of Directors the impropriety of letting thoſe lands to the Nabob on any terms; and as his then preſent leaſe was to expire in July 1771, deſired to be inſtructed as to their continuing under the Nabob's management, or being let to other renters, or being managed by Amuldars; that the Directors in anſwer to this Letter (on the 10th April 1771) expreſſed themſelves as averſe to leſſening the Nabob's importance, or increaſing his jealouſies by not letting to him the Enaum lands (or certain lands which had been alymoſinary) and that the objections to his renting the jaghire lands might be removed by letting them for one year only; and directed the Board at *Madras* to make out a leaſe for that term, and to repreſent to the Nabob, that, in this inſtance, they have poſtponed their own intereſt to his deſire. And Your Committee find, that before this Letter from the Court of Directors could have arrived at *Madras*, that Preſidency had again written to the Court of Directors, repeating their objections to the Nabob's renting the jaghire lands; and that in the courſe of the year 1772 and 1773, the Preſidency in their ſeveral Letters continued the like repreſentations, but complied with the directions received from home on the 10th April 1771, as above ſtated, and with ſimilar directions of the 25th March 1772; and it appeared that the grounds of theſe ſeveral repreſentations were, that the inhabitants undergo continued oppreſſions, and that the lands, though very capable of cultivation, are not improved; that all the weavers live in the jaghire lands, and that upon the whole, no benefit is derived from them but the mere rent.

Separate Letter, from 27 June 1769, page 13.

Appendix, No. 140.

Appendix, No. 141.

And Your Committee find, That on the 25th of January 1775, the Directors were informed by Letters from *Madras*, that the Enaum lands had been let to the Nabob for one year longer from the 1ſt Auguſt 1773, and that all poſſible meaſures had been taken to prevent injuſtice and oppreſſion; and alſo on the 21ſt September 1776, another Letter informed them, that another annual leaſe had been granted of the jaghire lands, ſuch had been the mode of leaſing, as it appeared to Your Committee antecedent to the 12th of April 1775, when the ſame courſe was directed to be continued by the orders of that date.

And Your Committee find, That their orders were attended to in Mr. *Whitehill*'s firſt Government; for on the 5th February 1778, the Directors are informed, that the jaghire lands had been continued to the Nabob for the then current year, upon the ſame terms as formerly; and were alſo informed, that the conditions required by the Court, and other ſtipulations (conducive to the improvement of the lands) had been attended to; and it appears that the directions of the Court were requeſted, as to the taking the jaghire lands into their own poſſeſſion, the Inſtructions of the 12th of April not being ſufficiently explicit to authorize that meaſure.

Appendix, No. 142.

On the 20th July 1778, Your Committee find, That Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, the Preſident, entered a Minute relative to the Nabob, which Your Committee have thought proper to ſtate at length in the Appendix, in order that the opinion which prevailed in the Council with reſpect to his Highneſs on the 20th July 1778, may be compared with their conduct on the 2d October following; at which time a leaſe of the jaghire lands was propoſed by the Preſident to be given to the Nabob for the term of three years, notwithſtanding the poſitive orders of the Company that they ſhould not be let for more than one year, as appeared to Your Committee from the documents above ſtated; and notwithſtanding the practice of the Company had always correſponded with thoſe orders, and the propriety of letting them to the Nabob on any terms had been queſtioned by the Company's Servants during the courſe of ſeveral years.

Appendix, No. 143.

Your Committee found, That in this Minute Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, the Preſident, repreſents the Nabob as owing very large balances to the Company, which no arguments, or ſenſe of the common danger in caſe of a war, can prevail upon him to pay even in part, though he has large ſums hoarded up at *Chepank*, and has granted tunkahs or ſecurities on very valuable countries, which will not bear inſpection; adding, that this complaint againſt his Highneſs is not the complaint of a day, but that the records are filled with diſtreſſes ariſing from the trifling and dilatory conduct of the Nabob, whenever money has been demanded of him; and that his love of money has increaſed with his advanced years.

And Your Committee further find, That with reſpect to the jaghire lands, the Preſident obſerves, that if his Highneſs would, but conſent to pay his juſt debt to the Company, and what is due from him on account of the jaghire lands, which ought to be a conſtant and never-failing reſource to the Company, the Settlement might ſupport itſelf for ſome time.

That the Nabob muſt be rouſed by determined and ſpirited meaſures; his debt at that time being very heavy, viz.

Balance of old debt, and account of current charges - - -	754. 981. 31. 29	
Balance on account of the Company's jaghire - - -	147. 170. 25. 70	
Pagodas -		900. 052. 25. 70

That beſides this ſum, many other articles might juſtly be charged; that his debt was increaſing at the rate of 40,000 Pagodas a month, beſides a lack of Pagodas which would be due for the jaghire lands in September following; and that tunkahs ought to be obtained from the Nabob to ſecure thoſe debts.

Your Committee alſo find, That on this occaſion the Preſident obſerved, that the jaghire lands, a valuable poſſeſſion of the Company, were moſt ſhamefully neglected and oppreſſed, not by the Nabob, for he might be ignorant of it, but by his Collectors; which Your Committee found to have been much complained of from the year 1769 down to this period.

The Preſident then appears to have propoſed, That advertiſements ſhould be publiſhed for letting theſe lands, but that the Nabob ſhould be made acquainted with that meaſure; and that the ſyſtem of letting from year to year, which the Preſident terms a deſtructive one, ſhould

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by all means be avoided, and propoſals received for three or five years leaſes, which might recover that diſtrict from its preſent ruinous ſituation; and that it was alſo neceſſary to appoint a Receiver of the Rents till an agreement ſhould be concluded: and Your Committee find, that a Letter was ordered to be written to the Nabob accordingly.

Appendix, No. 144. And Your Committee find, That on the 28th Auguſt 1778, five weeks after the date of this Minute, the Preſident reported the Nabob's deſire that the jaghire lands might be continued to him on the uſual terms, and that he offered to enter into any articles that might be judged neceſſary for the improvement of them; and that on the Appendix, No. 145. 4th of September he further reported, that he had endeavoured to converſe with the Nabob upon the ſubject, but had found his converſation unſatisfactory; and that he had reaſon to believe that the Nabob was actually treating with individuals for mortgaging the revenues of the jaghire lands before he is aſſured of renting them: whereupon it was reſolved, that they ſhould be advertiſed Appendix, No. 146. to be let for one, three, five, or ten years; and on the 11th of September, the Nabob requeſted generally that he might have a leaſe of theſe lands for five years, engaging to keep the tanks in repair; but that the conſideration of this propoſition was deferred till the time within which the propoſals were to be received ſhould have expired, the Preſident having propoſed that they ſhould be leaſed to the Nabob for three years.

Appendix, No. 147. And Your Committee find, That on the 23d September, propoſals from three perſons were delivered in, purſuant to the advertiſement, for a ten years leaſe, which were as follow:

Antonio De Souſa 370,000 P', to increaſe in the five laſt years to 390,000.
Kiſtnajee Punda 313,000 to 320,000.
Nawkoia Chattam 320,000 to 390,000.

And that theſe propoſals were ordered to be ſent round for the conſideration of the Members of Council.

Appendix, No. 148. Your Committee further find, That on the 2d day of October 1778, the Preſident entered a Minute upon the Records, repreſenting, that the advertiſements for letting the jaghire lands were meant rather to be a means of aſcertaining the value of thoſe lands, than of letting them to the higheſt bidder, which he informed the Board, was in his opinion an improper mode to be obſerved; that this valuable acquiſition ought only to be let to a tenant who could furniſh indiſputable ſecurity; that the Nabob, who had for ſeveral years rented them, was ſaid to have attended ſufficiently to the neceſſary repairs of the tanks, &c. &c. though the inhabitants were oppreſſed by the Collectors, which he imputed to want of attention in the Government, to ſee thoſe terms obſerved for which they had ſtipulated.

That the Nabob is apprehenſive that his honour would be injured by the advertiſements, of which the Preſident ſtill however approves, as ſhewing that the Select Committee had been actuated by no other views than what their duty required—that the Nabob paid a larger rent than he had collected, and had ſubmitted to this from the credit he derived from his leaſe, and the ſupply which it afforded to his family and attendants; and that without the occupation of the jaghire lands, he would be obliged to remove to *Arcot*, which would be of great prejudice to the Company, though ſome inconveniencies ariſe from his reſidence at *Madras*—that his reſidence at *Madras* ſuits his inclinations, which at his time of life it would be cruel to thwart—that the Company have always ſeemed cautious not to diſtreſs him, and have never given orders to deprive him of the jaghires; and that the mode of letting from year to year is a moſt deſtructive ſyſtem, as it has always kept the Nabob in a ſtate of uncertainty, and made him backward in making repairs, and prevented his being indemnified for the loſs he ſuſtains, by laying more than he receives.

And Your Committee find, That the Preſident, after ſtating that he had taken pains to find out what the country had yielded to the Nabob (which he ſtated at 330,000 Pagodas) propoſed that he ſhould have a leaſe for three years inſtead of five, which he had requeſted; obſerving, that this would give the Company time to obtain the information neceſſary for their future guidance in this matter; and that being engaged in a war with *France*, an annual leaſe would be impolitic, becauſe ſo conſiderable a part of the revenue ought not to be left to the chance of falling into any other hands than the Nabob's, in caſe of troubles ariſing—that the Company in their laſt diſpatches had expreſſed great friendſhip for the Nabob, and had directed them to conciliate his mind by every means; and that in this preſent juncture, it would be highly impolitic to ſour him—that Mr. *De Souza*'s propoſal is the only one made for renting the whole, and being for a ten years leaſe cannot be accepted, and appears to be with a view to ſpeculate.

Your Committee obſerve upon this laſt paſſage of the Preſident's Minute, That three perſons appear to have given in propoſals as above mentioned, and that the objection made to the propoſals as being for ten years, is furniſhed by the advertiſement itſelf, which invited propoſitions for one, three, five, or ten years.

Your Committee further find, That the Preſident concluded his Minute by propoſing that the Nabob ſhould have the leaſe granted him for the term of three years, at the rent of 324,000 Pagodas, ſtipulating for conditions calculated to protect the inferior people, and make the payments regular and certain.

And Your Committee alſo find, That on the 5th October 1778, the Preſident moved that the Minute above Appendix, No. 149. mentioned ſhould be taken into conſideration; which was accordingly done: and it appears to Your Committee, that the Council concurred unanimouſly with their Preſident, chiefly upon the grounds of this being a meaſure which would conciliate the mind of the Nabob, and would beſt accord with the Company's wiſhes reſpecting that Prince expreſſed in their Letters.

Your Committee alſo find, That on the 17th of October, a Letter was written to the Nabob, acquainting Appendix, No. 150. him with the Board's having granted him a leaſe on the conditions above-mentioned; of which he accepted by Letter, dated the 5th of December 1778.

And it appears to Your Committee, That the Court of Directors (having been informed of this tranſaction, by a Revenue Letter from *Madras*, dated the 17th October 1778) in their Anſwer on the 16th of June 1779, Appendix, No. 151. Par. 22, 152, Par. 23. make the following obſervations upon it; they deem the letting the jaghire land to the Nabob for more than one year improper, referring to the Letter of 13th of April 1775, and ſay, "We are very ſorry you have thought "fit to depart from that order, and though the Nabob "was alarmed at the advertiſement, yet we have no doubt "he might have been ſatisfied with a leaſe for one year "as uſual." They then obſerve, that as he had lately ſhewn great zeal and attachment, they acquieſced in the preſent agreement, but that no future leaſe ſhall be given for more than one year.

Your Committee find, That by a General Letter from *Madras* of the 4th of April 1780, the Directors were informed, that the Nabob had addreſſed a Letter to the Preſidency, deſiring permiſſion to rent the Company's jaghire for the term of twenty years; which it was thought neceſſary to refer to the conſideration of the Court; and that on the 31ſt of May 1781 the Directors deſired in their General Letter, that his Highneſs might be informed of their good diſpoſition towards him, and that they would take an early opportunity of expreſſing themſelves to him on that ſubject.

And Your Committee find, That with regard to the ſeveral other matters, which have been herein above-ſtated, namely, the tranſactions with [illegible] during Mr. [illegible]'s laſt Government, and the tranſactions with *Sadhaſeu* and his ſon [illegible] in the Government of Sir [illegible]'s Government, the conſideration of the Committee

Committee of Circuit, the calling down of the Zemindars to *Madras*, the manner of the President's negociating with them in person, the implicit credit given by the Council to his reports, the inadequate rents reserved, the non-payment of balances, the want of stipulations on behalf of the under-tenants, and the acceptance of *Sitteram Rauze* the Father as surety for his Son when adopted by his Uncle the Rajah; the restoring of the fort of *Vizianagrum*, the whole transaction with *Bazalet Jung*, and the ten years lease to the Nabob, which followed upon it, and the negociation with the Nizam of the *Decan*, are highly disapproved of, and severely censured, by the Court of Directors, in their General Letter of the 10th January 1781; and that by this Letter they dismiss from their service, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, President of their Council, and Governor of *Fort St. George*, and *John Whitehill* and *Peter Perring*, Esquires, Members of their Council; and express their strongest displeasure at General *Munro*, for his concurrence in abolishing the Committee of Circuit, and the countenance given by him to measures which they deem very improper, relative to the letting of the districts; but as they cannot suppose that he was influenced by corrupt motives, as his military conduct had been highly meritorious, and as those subjects were foreign to his profession, they proceed no further, than to express their disapprobation.

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APPENDIX.

APPENDIX, No. 1.

Copy of the Instruments by which Sir *Thomas Rumbold* was appointed President, and Mr. *Whitehill* and Mr. *Perring* were appointed Members, of the Council or Select Committee of *Madras*.

Extract of a Letter from the Court of Directors.

To the Right honourable *George* Lord *Pigot*, our President and Governor of *Fort St. George*, dated 11th June 1777.

Thomas Rumbold, Esquire,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnson,
Peter Perring,
Alexander Davidson,
John Hollond,
James Daniel,
} Esquires

Par. 6. AFTER the most mature consideration of those transactions, and in consequence of the several Resolutions of the General Court, we think it of the highest importance to mark our disapprobation, as well to our own Servants as to the Natives of *India*, of the violent act by which the Government of our Settlement of *Fort St. George* at *Madras* was subverted, and our President imprisoned; and have therefore, resolved to restore Lord *Pigot* to the full exercise of the powers vested in him, by the Commission from the Company, as President, and Governor of our said Settlement of *Fort St. George*; and do hereby direct, that on the arrival of this Letter (if his Lordship shall not have been previously released from his confinement) he be immediately released, and put in possession of the full exercise of the said powers as Governor and President of our said Settlement of *Fort St. George*; yet, as his Lordship's proceedings appear to us in several instances to be reprehensible, we have resolved, agreeable to the Resolution of the General Court, and do hereby direct, that his Lordship do, within one week after the dispatch of the first ship from *Madras* for *England*, which shall happen after the receipt of this Letter, and his Lordship's restoration to the possession of the said Government, deliver over to *Thomas Rumbold*, Esquire, appointed by the Commission given you herewith, to succeed his Lordship as Governor and President of our said Settlement, or to the Senior Civil Councillor named in that Commission then at the Presidency, the charge of our said Government of *Fort St. George* at *Madras*; and we do hereby further order and require, that his Lordship do return to *England* by the ship which shall so have been dispatched before his Lordship's delivering up the said Government, or by the next ship which shall sail after that time for *England*.

10. Till enquiry has been made into the conduct of Lord *Pigot* and his late Council, we cannot judge whether any, or which of them ought to be continued in our Service; we have, therefore resolved to appoint a temporary Government for the management of our affairs in our said Settlement of *Fort St. George* at *Madras*, during the said enquiry, and until our further orders; which Government, until the said *George* Lord *Pigot* shall have delivered over the charge thereof as hereinbefore is directed, shall consist of the following persons; viz.

Lord *Pigot*, as President and Governor.
Thomas Rumbold, Esquire, 2d, and to succeed to the Government.
John Whitehill, Esquire, 3d.
Major General *Hector Munro*, 4th, and not at any time to rise to an higher rank than 3d in Council.
Charles Smith, Esquire, 5th.
Samuel Johnson, Esquire, 6th.
Peter Perring, Esquire, 7th.

And we direct, that in case any three or more of the said persons, appointed of Council at *Fort St. George*, shall be of the Presidency when these orders arrive, his Lordship and the said three or more Members of Council do forthwith take upon themselves the Government and Administration of our affairs, at our said Presidency of *Fort St. George*; and that all our Servants at that Settlement, Civil and Military, do yield them due obedience, on pain of dismission from the Service. But as some of the above-named persons of the Council are to go from *England*, and others to be recalled from subordinate factories, it is uncertain what time they may respectively arrive at *Fort St. George*, wherefore, we have named Messrs. *Alexander Davidson*, *John Hollond*, and *James Daniel*, to be Members of the Council, until three or more of the above-named Gentlemen shall arrive, and take upon them their offices, when the appointment of Messrs. *Davidson*, *Hollond*, and *Daniel*, is to cease; and in the mean time, such of them the said first-named six Members of Council as shall be at *Fort St. George* when these orders shall arrive there, and the others, as soon as they shall respectively arrive, are to be sworn, and take upon them their several offices of Members of the said Council.

11. From the time Lord *Pigot* shall have delivered over the Government as hereinbefore is directed, our Council is to consist of six persons only, viz. the said *Thomas Rumbold*, Esquire, President and Governor; the said *John Whitehill*, Esquire, 2d; the said Major General

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Hector Munro, 3d, and not to riſe to a ſuperior rank; the ſaid *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, 4th; the ſaid *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſquire, 5th; the ſaid *Peter Perring*, Eſquire, 6th, and laſt of the ſaid Council; in whom the whole Civil and Military Government of the ſaid Preſidency, and the ordering and managing of all our affairs therein, ſhall be veſted, in like manner, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as the ſame now might legally be, or at any time heretofore might legally have been exerciſed by any Preſident and Council of the ſaid Settlement; ſubject nevertheleſs, to the ſuperintending and controlling power of the Governor General and Supreme Council of the Preſidency of *Fort William*, in *Bengal*, ſo far as the ſaid Governor General and Council have, and are authorized to have, the power of ſuperintending and controlling the Government and Management of the Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, at *Madras*, by an Act paſſed in the 13th year of His preſent Majeſty, intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing certain Regulations for the better Management of the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in *Europe*." And alſo ſubject always to ſuch ſtanding orders and directions as have at any time heretofore been given by any Court of Directors of the ſaid Company, and to ſuch other orders and directions as now are, or hereafter ſhall from time to time be given by us, or by any other Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, or by any thirteen or more of them.

12. Agreeable to theſe Reſolutions, we have cauſed a Commiſſion to be executed, under the Common Seal of the Company, the original of which Commiſſion will be ſent by the ſhip *Beſborough*, a copy thereof atteſted by our Secretary, with a duplicate of this Letter, by *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, and another copy thereof atteſted by our Secretary, with a triplicate of this Letter, by Meſſrs. *William Burk* and *Robert Dean*; and we direct, that as ſoon as the original Commiſſion, or any one of the ſaid atteſted copies ſhall arrive, and be received by our ſaid Preſident and Council, or any of them, at *Fort St. George*, the ſame be forthwith publiſhed and carried into execution, by their taking upon them the Government of the Company's affairs.

13. If Meſſieurs *Charles Smith*, *Samuel Johnſon*, and *Peter Perring*, or either of them, ſhall be abſent from *Fort St. George* at the time of the arrival of this Letter, an expreſs muſt be immediately ſent to each of them, informing them that it is our moſt poſitive order, that upon receiving ſuch expreſs they do ſeverally, without loſs of time, come to the Preſidency, to take upon them there, the important offices to which they are hereby appointed as Members of our Council.

The United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, to all to whom theſe preſents ſhall come, ſend Greeting.

Whereas the ſaid United Company by a certain Commiſſion under the common ſeal of the ſaid United Company, bearing date the 11th day of April, which was in the year of our Lord 1775, appointed the Right honourable *George* Lord *Pigot*, Baron *Pigot* of *Patſhall*, in the kingdom of *Ireland*, to be Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*, at *Madras*, and alſo appointed ſuch perſons as therein are named, to be of the Council of *Fort St. George* aforeſaid, for the governing and managing all the Company's affairs at the places therein ſpecified, with ſuch powers and authorities as in the ſaid Commiſſion are mentioned, as by the ſaid Commiſſion may more at large appear: And whereas the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot* took upon him the ſaid office of Preſident and Governor of the ſaid Preſidency; and afterwards certain perſons of the Council of the ſaid Preſidency, removed him violently from his ſaid office, and cauſed him to be ſeized by a military force, and confined in priſon, and aſſumed and took upon themſelves the Government of the ſaid Preſidency: Now know ye, that ſaid United Company, highly diſapproving of the removal of the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot* from the ſaid office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George* aforeſaid, and of arreſting and confining his perſon, have reſtored, conſtituted, and appointed, and by theſe preſents do reſtore, conſtitute, and appoint the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot*, upon, and from and immediately after, the arrival and publication of this Commiſſion at *Fort St. George* aforeſaid, to the ſaid office or place of Preſident and Governor of and for all our affairs on the coaſt of *Choromandel* and *Orixa*, and of the *Chingee* and *Moratta* countries, and of all the territories thereunto belonging, and of all and ſingular the forts, factories, and ſettlements, territories, countries, and juriſdictions thereof, and to execute all and every the powers and authorities thereunto appertaining, by order and direction of the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, for the time being, in as full and ample manner as he could have executed the ſame by virtue of the ſaid recited Commiſſion, or otherwiſe howſoever, and to continue in the exerciſe of the ſame during our and their pleaſure, and until the contrary thereof ſhall be ſignified under the ſeal of the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, or under the hands of thirteen or more of the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company for the time being: And to the end that the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot* may be better enabled to order and manage all the affairs of us the ſaid Company, we do by theſe preſents conſtitute and ordain *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, to be ſecond of our Council of *Fort Saint George*, to wit, to be next in Council after our ſaid Preſident *George* Lord *Pigot*; Major General *Hector Munro* to be third of our ſaid Council, and not to riſe to a ſuperior rank therein; *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, to be fourth; *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, to be fifth; *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſquire, to be ſixth; *Peter Perring*, Eſquire, to be ſeventh; *Alexander Davidſon*, Eſquire, to be eighth; *John Holland*, Eſquire, to be ninth; and *James Daniel*, Eſquire, to be tenth and laſt of the ſaid Council, for governing and managing all the ſaid Company's affairs upon the coaſt of *Choromandel* and *Orixa*, and the *Chingee* and *Moratta* countries, and for governing the ſaid *Fort St. George* and city of *Madras-Patnam*, and all other our forts, factories, and ſettlements within any of the ſaid territories. Provided always, that when and ſo ſoon as any three of them the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, *John Whitehill*, *Hector Munro*, *Charles Smith*, *Samuel Johnſon*, and *Peter Perring*, ſhall arrive at *Fort St. George* aforeſaid, and take upon them their offices of Members of the ſaid Council, the appointment hereinbefore made of the ſaid *Alexander Davidſon*, *John Holland*, and *James Daniel*, ſhall be abſolutely null and void, and they the ſaid *Alexander Davidſon*, *John Holland*, and *James Daniel*, ſhall from thenceforth ceaſe to be Members of the ſaid Council, in like manner as if they had never been named or appointed thereto, any thing hereinbefore contained to the contrary notwithſtanding: And we do hereby give and grant unto our ſaid Preſident and Governor, *George* Lord *Pigot*, and to our Council aforenamed, or the major part of them (the whole Council reſident at *Madras* aforeſaid being duly ſummoned) full power and authority from time to time to rule and govern all and every our factors and ſervants under the ſaid Preſidency, and all the ſoldiers and inhabitants of our ſaid *Fort St. George* and city of *Madras-Patnam*, and elſewhere within the places aforeſaid, to adminiſter lawful oaths as occaſion ſhall require, and to do and perform all ſuch other acts and things, and to uſe and exerciſe all ſuch other powers and authorities, as the ſaid Preſident and Governor, and his Council, in the ſeveral and reſpective places where the ſaid United Company have or ſhall have factors, or any places of trade, are authorized to do; ſubject nevertheleſs to the ſuperintending and controlling power of the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, in ſuch caſes wherein they are authorized to have a ſuperintending and controlling power in and by an Act of Parliament, paſſed in the 13th year of His preſent Majeſty's reign

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reign, intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing certain Regu- "lations for the better Management of the Affairs of "the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in *Europe*;" and alſo ſubject and according to ſuch inſtructions and directions as he the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot*, our Preſident and Governor, and Council aforeſaid, ſhall from time to time receive under the hands of thirteen or more of the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company for the time being: And we, the ſaid United Company do hereby order and require all our factors, ſervants, officers, and ſoldiers, within the limits of the ſaid Preſidency, and all the people and the inhabitants of our ſaid *Fort St. George* and city of *Madras-Patnam*, or any other our forts, places or colonies within the ſaid Preſidency, to conform, ſubmit, and yield due obedience unto the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot*, our Preſident and Governor, and his Council, accordingly. And foraſmuch as it is altogether neceſſary, that upon the death, reſignation, or removal of the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot*, our Preſidency ſhould be provided for the defence and government thereof; we do therefore by theſe preſents ordain and appoint, that from and immediately after ſuch vacancy ſhall happen of the office of our ſaid Preſident and Governor, the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall immediately be and ſucceed in the place and charge of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, and in caſe of his death, reſignation, or removal, the next civil Servant in degree of Council below the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, ſhall ſucceed to the ſaid Preſidency and Government, in as full and ample manner, and with as large and ample powers, privileges, and authorities, as are hereby granted unto the ſaid *George* Lord *Pigot*, until our further pleaſure be known therein; and upon ſuch ſucceſſion to the ſaid office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George* aforeſaid, the ſeveral other perſons hereinbefore named as Councillors of the ſaid Preſidency, ſhall remain and continue to be Councillors of the ſaid Preſidency in manner aforeſaid, and ſhall reſpectively riſe in rank therein, according to their reſpective ſeniorities, except that the ſaid *Hector Munro* ſhall not at any time take rank therein, higher than third of the ſaid Council. And we do hereby revoke, repeal, and make null and void the ſaid recited Commiſſion, and all and every other Commiſſions and Appointments whatſoever, heretofore granted or made by us in any manner whatſoever, whereby any other perſon or perſons, other than and except the perſons hereinbefore named, have been or are appointed to be Preſident and Governor and Council at *Fort St. George* aforeſaid: In witneſs whereof, we the ſaid United Company have cauſed our common ſeal to be affixed to theſe preſents the tenth day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of His moſt excellent Majeſty *George* the third, by the grace of God of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, defender of the faith and ſo forth, and in the year of our Lord 1777.

(L. S.)

Signed by order of the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, (L. S.)

(Signed) *P. Michell*, Secretary.

Extract of ſeparate General Letter to *Fort Saint George*, dated the 10th April 1778.

Par. 2. Having thought proper to appoint a Select Committee for tranſacting all political, military, and naval affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require ſecrecy, at our Settlement of *Fort St. George*, it is our order, and we hereby direct, That the ſaid Select Committee do conſiſt of *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, our Preſident and Governor, or our Preſident and Governor for the time being; *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, the ſecond Member of our Council, or the ſecond Member for the time being; Major General *Hector Munro*, our Military Commander in Chief, or our Military Commander in Chief for the time being; and *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, the fourth Member of our Council for the time being.

3d. If our Military Commander in Chief at any time be abſent from the Preſidency, then our order is, that our Preſident and the ſecond and fourth Members of our Council, ſhall be a Select Committee for the purpoſes aforeſaid, during the abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency.

Extract of a Letter from the Court of Directors.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*.
John Whitehill, Eſquire,
Major General *Hector Munro*, and
Charles Smith, Eſquire; dated the 10th April 1778.

Par. 2. Having thought proper to appoint a Select Committee for tranſacting all political, military, and naval affairs, and likewiſe all ſuch as may require ſecrecy, at our Settlement of *Fort St. George*, it is our order, and we hereby direct, That the ſaid Select Committee do conſiſt of *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, our Preſident and Governor, or our Preſident and Governor for the time being; *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, the ſecond Member of our Council, or the ſecond Member of our Council for the time being; Major General *Hector Munro*, our Military Commander in Chief, or our Military Commander in Chief for the time being; and *Charles Smith*, Eſquire, the fourth Member of our Council, or the fourth Member of our Council for the time being.

3d. If our Military Commander in Chief ſhall at any time be abſent from the Preſidency, then our order is, that our Preſident, and the ſecond and fourth Members of our Council, ſhall be a Select Committee for the purpoſes aforeſaid, during the abſence of the Commander in Chief from the Preſidency.

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(Copy.) 25th June, 1777.

Covenant of *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, of Council for *Fort Saint George*.

Factors 1770.

THIS Indenture, made the twenty-fifth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, and in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the third, by the grace of God, of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, defender of the faith, and ſo forth, between the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and *Thomas Rumbold*, of *London*, Eſquire, of the other part. Whereas the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, have (upon the ſpecial requeſt and entreaty of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, and upon the conditions and agreements hereinafter contained, on the part of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* to be performed) received and entertained him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* into their ſervice, as their Councillor and Covenant Servant of *Fort Saint George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, to ſerve them in the ſtation aforeſaid, and to be employed in all or any of the traffic or merchandizes, buſineſſes, and affairs, in any place or places whatſoever between the Cape of *Good Hope* and the Streights of *Magellan*, as the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors for the time being, or any thirteen or more of them, or any by them authorized, ſhall appoint, at and for the wages or ſum of forty-thouſand Pagodas by the year, to commence from the time of his embarkation from *England* to go to *Fort St. George* aforeſaid: Now this Indenture witneſſeth, That the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants

of

of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, and their ſucceſſors, in manner and form following; (that is to ſay) That he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, from the time of his arrival at *Fort St. George* aforeſaid, ſhall and will faithfully, honeſtly, diligently, and careſully ſerve the ſaid Company at ſuch place and places, and in all and every ſuch affairs and buſineſs whatſoever of the ſaid Company, as the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall be employed in; and ſhall alſo from time to time, and at all times, obſerve, keep, and fulfil all and every the orders of the ſaid Company, and of the ſaid Court of Directors, made and to be made for the government of their factories and ſettlements, officers, agents, or ſervants abroad; and ſhall and will alſo obſerve, keep, and fulfil all ſuch orders, inſtructions, and directions, which he ſhall herewith or hereafter receive under the ſeal of the ſaid Company, or from the ſaid Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, or any thirteen or more of them, or from their Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall reſide or be employed, or from any perſons authorized thereunto by ſuch Directors; and ſhall and will, to the utmoſt of his power and ſkill, reſiſt and withſtand all and every ſuch perſon or perſons as ſhall break, or endeavour to break, the ſaid orders, inſtructions, or directions, or any of them: And the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he will not do, attempt, or practice, nor ſhall wittingly or willingly permit or ſuffer any other perſon or perſons whatſoever, to do, attempt, or practiſe, any matter or thing whatſoever, to the hindrance, hurt, prejudice, damage, or defrauding of the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or of their ſervants, or any of them, or of the ſaid Company's goods, merchandizes, trade, or traffic, or any of them, or any part thereof; but ſhall, as much as in him lieth, prevent and defeat the ſame. And the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will, from time to time, and at all times from henceforth, give notice and intelligence, with all convenient ſpeed, unto the ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, of all and every the deceits, wrongs, abuſes, breach of orders, inconveniencies, and hindrances, which he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall know, underſtand, hear, or ſuſpect to be done, practiſed, offered, or intended againſt the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or their goods or trade, or any of them, or againſt any perſon or perſons by them, or by the ſaid Court of Directors, employed, or in their ſervice, in any place or places, together with the names of thoſe perſons by whom the ſame ſhall be ſo offered, practiſed, or intended. And the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he will not engage, or employ the ſtock of the ſaid Company, or any part thereof, or make uſe of the credit of the ſaid Company, in any other kind, way, or manner howſoever, than for the affairs of the ſaid Company, and as by the major part of the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, under their hands, or under the common ſeal of the ſaid Company, or by their ſaid Preſident and Council, ſhall be ordered and directed. And that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will at all times keep and conceal the ſaid Company's ſecrets, and every matter and thing committed to him as ſuch by the ſaid Court of Directors, or their agents, factors, officers, and ſervants, or any of them. And alſo, That he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will, from time to time, and at all times from henceforth, during his ſaid employment, keep, or cauſe to be kept, a true and particular journal or day-book of all paſſages and proceedings relating to the affairs of the ſaid Company, and alſo books of accounts; in which journal, day-book, and books of accounts, he ſhall daily, duly, truly, and fully enter, or cauſe to be entered, the accounts of all and every particular buying, ſelling, receipts, payments, barterings, and all other tranſactions and occurrences relating to his truſt, during the time he ſhall continue in the ſaid United Company's ſervice and employment. And the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he will not place, or conſent to the placing to the ſaid Company's account, nor otherwiſe charge the ſaid Company with, any more or greater ſums than he ſhall really and in good faith pay for all or any goods, merchandizes, or effects, which he ſhall buy, or cauſe, procure, or conſent to be bought, for or on account of the ſaid Company. And that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will bring to the account of the ſaid Company, in the books of the ſaid Company, the full rates and prices for which he ſhall ſell, or cauſe to be ſold, any of the ſaid Company's goods, merchandizes, or effects; and further, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* will not, directly or indirectly, take, accept, or receive, or agree to take, accept, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, compenſation, ſum or ſums of money whatſoever, from any perſon or perſons of whom he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall, by himſelf, or any agent for him, buy or barter any goods, merchandizes, treaſure, or effects, for or upon account of the ſaid Company; and further, that he will not take, accept, or receive, or agree to take, accept, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, compenſation, ſum or ſums of money whatſoever, from any perſon or perſons to whom the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall, by himſelf, or any agent for him, ſell or barter any goods, merchandizes, treaſure or effects, of or belonging to, or for or upon account of the ſaid Company; and moreover, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, his executors or adminiſtrators, ſhall produce and deliver the ſaid books, together with all waſte books, pocket-books, diaries, memorials, and other writings and papers whatſoever, wherein he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall make, or cauſe to be made, any entries, or ſet down any matter or thing touching or concerning the ſaid Company's affairs, or any of them, or any way relating thereunto (although the ſame may or ſhall be intermixed with his own, or others concerns) unto the ſaid Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, or to ſuch perſon or perſons as ſhall by letter or order under the hands of thirteen or more of the ſaid Court of Directors, or under the ſeal of the ſaid Company, be authorized and appointed to demand and receive the ſame; and ſhall and will, if required, make oath to the truth of ſuch books, diaries, memorials, writings, and papers, and that the ſame contain the whole of his tranſactions, and that they have not been defaced, obliterated, or altered; and further, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will well and truly deliver and pay unto the ſaid United Company, or their ſucceſſors, all and every ſuch monies, goods, merchandizes, and things whatſoever, as by the foot of his account, or otherwiſe, ſhall be due from him, or remain in his hands and poſſeſſion, and for which he ought to be chargeable or anſwerable in any manner or wiſe; and alſo, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will (before he ſhall leave the ſaid Company's factories or ſettlements) pay and diſcharge all and every ſuch ſum or ſums of money as he ſhall juſtly owe or be indebted to any of the black Merchants or Natives of the country where he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall be, together with ſuch other ſums as he ſhall owe abroad to any other merchants or perſons not being ſubjects of His Majeſty the King of *Great Britain*, or his ſucceſſors; and that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will, from time to time, when and as often as he ſhall be thereunto required by the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or by the Preſident, Agent, or Chief and Council, of the place where the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall be, remove to any

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ſuch other factories as ſuch Preſident, Agent, or Chief and Council ſhall ſo direct and require; and alſo, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall, at all times during the time of his ſervice aforeſaid, faithfully and diligently demean himſelf as a good, honeſt, and faithful ſervant towards the ſaid Company and their ſucceſſors, and thoſe by them authorized. And foraſmuch as complaints have been made to the ſaid United Company, that ſeveral of the ſaid Company's Preſidents and Chiefs of their factories, and ſeveral of ſuch perſons as are of their Councils in their factories abroad, or ſome of them, as alſo their factors, agents, and ſervants, have committed very heinous and grievous offences in ſuch factories of the ſaid Company, and elſewhere in the *Eaſt Indies*, and other places within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, by unjuſtly menacing, impriſoning, aſſaulting, abuſing, and evil-treating the Natives and black Merchants, and others with whom the ſaid Company have had dealings or correſpondence, and by ſuch means, and other violences, abuſes, and injuries, have extorted and forced great ſums of money, and other valuable effects, from ſuch injured perſons, who, by reaſon of the great diſtance from this kingdom, and the wholeſome laws thereof, and by reaſon that the ſaid Company have not been enabled to obtain and render ſatisfaction for ſuch injuries and miſdemeanors, are, and have been remedileſs: Now it is hereby agreed by and between the ſaid parties to theſe preſents, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that in caſe any ſum or ſums of money, goods or chattels whatſoever, ſhall at any time or times hereafter be extorted, forced, or taken by him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* (either ſeparately or jointly with others) from any perſon or perſons whatſoever within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, by the means or uſe of impriſonments, aſſaults, violences, menaces, or other force or compulſion whatſoever, then and as often as any ſuch offence or offences ſhall be committed, it ſhall and may be lawful to and for every perſon or perſons injured thereby, to make and ſend over complaints and atteſtations thereof in writing, to the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being; and that upon the receipt of ſuch complaints and atteſtations, it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, to enquire into the truth of the ſaid complaints, by all ſuch ways and means as they ſhall think juſt and equitable, and thereupon to hear the matter of the ſaid complaint or complaints, and thereupon finally to judge and determine the ſame, and to award ſatisfaction and reparation to be made by the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* to the ſaid Company, for the benefit of ſuch injured perſons; and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, well and truly to pay to the ſaid Company, at ſuch time or times as ſhall be limited by the ſaid Court of Directors (or the major part of them) for that purpoſe, all and every ſuch ſum and ſums of money as ſhall be ſo awarded by the ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, or the major part of them then aſſembled, to be paid as aforeſaid; but in truſt nevertheleſs, and to the intent, that the ſaid Company may and do render and pay over the monies received or recovered by them, to the parties injured or defrauded; which the ſaid Company accordingly hereby agree and covenant to do: And the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth furthermore, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, to pay and ſatisfy to the ſaid Company, for their own uſe and benefit, all ſuch damages as they ſhall have ſuſtained by reaſon or means of any ſuch offence or offences as aforeſaid. And foraſmuch as it frequently happens that the Preſident and Council, Agent and Council, Chief and Council, and ſeveral other ſubordinate Officers of ſeveral of the ſaid Company's factories abroad, have, by mutual influences on each other, ſettled, ſtated, and adjuſted amongſt themſelves, their own accounts with the ſaid Company, in order, as far as they could, to bar and preclude the ſaid Company from reviewing, altering, amending, correcting, or conteſting the ſame: Now it is hereby further declared, That all and every ſuch account and accounts ſo at any time ſtated, balanced, ſigned, or adjuſted, by, between, or amongſt ſuch Preſidents and Councils, or Agents and Councils, or Chiefs and Councils, or other ſubordinate Officers, or any of them, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, are hereby agreed to be, and ſhall at all times hereafter be taken and eſteemed to be open accounts, formed and prepared only for the inſpection, peruſal, and approbation or correction of the ſaid Company, and ſhall not in any ſort or kind, or in any article thereof, bind or conclude the ſaid Company. And the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* will not at any time during his reſidence in the *Eaſt Indies*, or within the ſaid Company's limits, directly or indirectly trade, correſpond, traffic, deal with or for, or be in anywiſe aiding, aſſiſting, or employed as Agent or Factor, by or for any foreign Company trading in or to the *Eaſt Indies*, or any perſon or perſons whatſoever, who do or ſhall during the continuance of theſe preſents, traffic, adventure, or trade to, in, or from the *Eaſt Indies*, or elſewhere within the limits of the ſaid Company's trade, by, or under, or by virtue of any foreign commiſſion, licence, or authority whatſoever, nor ſhall or will, by himſelf, or in conjunction with any perſon or perſons whatſoever, directly or indirectly carry on, or uſe, or be concerned in, any ſort of trade, traffic, or merchandize, either from *Europe* to the *Eaſt Indies*, or to any place within the ſaid Company's limits, between the *Cape of Good Hope* and the *Streights of Magellan*, or from the *Eaſt Indies*, or from any place within the ſaid Company's limits, to *Europe*, or to or from any place whatſoever, although not within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, ſave and except for and on account of the ſaid Company: And in order to a diſcovery of, and a ſatisfaction for, ſuch illicit trade as aforeſaid, it is hereby agreed, that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the ſaid United Company, and their Succeſſors, to file any bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery, in His Majeſty's High Court of Chancery, or Court of Exchequer, againſt him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, his executors and adminiſtrators, whereunto the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby agree, that neither he nor they ſhall or will demur or plead in bar of the diſcovery or relief ſought by ſuch bill or bills, that thereby he or they is, are, may or ſhall become liable to any penalty or forfeiture, by force of any law or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or otherwiſe howſoever, but ſhall make and put in a full and perfect anſwer and anſwers to all the parts thereof, and ſhall not, in ſuch anſwer and anſwers, inſiſt upon any penalty, forfeiture, law, or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or alledge any matter whatſoever, whereby to prevent, bar, or preclude the ſaid Company from the diſcovery or relief ſought or to be ſought by ſuch bill or bills as aforeſaid; but then and in ſuch caſe the ſaid United Company do hereby conſent to wave and diſclaim all and all manner of penalties and forfeitures that ſhall or may, in any kind or degree whatſoever, accrue or incur to them, upon or by reaſon of any diſcovery or diſcloſure ariſing by the ſaid anſwer or anſwers of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, his executors or adminiſtrators; and the ſaid United Company, for themſelves and their ſucceſſors, do agree to accept, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, agree to account for and pay, or cauſe to be paid, to or to the uſe of the ſaid Company or their ſucceſſors, as and for a full, ſtated, and adjuſted compenſation and ſatisfaction for the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid Company upon account of the ſaid illicit trade, the ſum of one hundred

pounds for every one hundred pounds value of all and every the goods and merchandizes traded or trafficked with or for, contrary to the true intent and meaning hereof. Provided always, and it is hereby expreſsly covenanted, declared, and agreed between the parties to theſe preſents, and it is the true intent and meaning thereof, that in caſe the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall make default in any of the covenants hereinbefore contained, or ſhall embezzle any of the ſaid Company's money, goods, or effects, or be guilty of any breach of truſt towards the ſaid Company, or ſhall be concerned in buying, bartering, ſelling, or diſpoſing of any artillery, ordnance, muſquets, fire-arms, ammunition, or warlike ſtores, to or for the uſe of any Prince, Nabob, or Country Power in *India*, or of the Natives there, without the expreſs licence of the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors for the time being, or a majority of them, or of the ſaid Company's Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where ſuch buying, bartering, or ſelling ſhall be; or in caſe the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall at any time during the continuance of theſe preſents, without the like licence and authority as aforeſaid, hold correſpondence with any Prince, Nabob, or Country Power in *India*, or any of their Miniſters; or ſhall ſupply, lend to, or procure for the uſe of any foreign Company trading in or to *India*, or any perſon or perſons trading under the licence or authority of ſuch foreign Company, any money, at reſpondentia, or any other ſecurity, loan, or engagement whatſoever; that then and in each and every of the ſaid caſes, it ſhall be lawful for the ſaid Company and their ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, or the majority of them, or the Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall be reſident or employed, and they are hereby reſpectively declared to have full power and authority for that purpoſe, to ſuſpend or wholly diſmiſs the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* from the ſaid Company's ſervice and employment; the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* having firſt had notice given him of ſuch his offence or default, and a reaſonable time allowed him to make his defence againſt the ſame, and having been convicted thereof. And, for the more effectually carrying the ſaid laſt-mentioned covenant and agreement into execution, it is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that in caſe of ſuch diſmiſſion from, or quitting and reſigning the ſaid Company's ſervice and employment, he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will, within one year after the ſame ſhall happen, or by the firſt paſſage that can be obtained after the expiration of the ſaid one year, tranſport himſelf, together with his Family, to *Great Britain* in ſuch ſhip employed by the ſaid Company as ſhall be appointed for that purpoſe by the ſaid Company or by their Court of Directors, or their Preſident and Council as aforeſaid; and ſhall not nor will, upon any account or pretence whatſoever, ſtay or continue any longer in the *Eaſt Indies*; and moreover, in caſe the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall make default in the ſaid laſt-mentioned covenant, the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby conſent and agree with the ſaid United Company, that from and immediately after ſuch default, it ſhall and may be lawful for the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors, or their Preſident and Council at the ſaid ſettlement where the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall reſide or be, to cauſe the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* to be apprehended and detained, and to put him and his Family on board any ſhip employed by the ſaid Company, for the purpoſe of being tranſported to *Great Britain*, ſo, nevertheleſs, that no unneceſſary delay be ſought, nor any fit occaſion or opportunity loſt in ſo doing; and further, in caſe of ſuch apprehending, putting on board, and tranſporting the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* and his Family, in manner aforeſaid, the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby covenant, promiſe, and agree, to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, his executors or adminiſtrators, ſhall not, nor will commence, ſue, or proſecute the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors, or any of their Preſidents and Council, Commanders or Officers of any ſuch ſhip, or any other perſon employed in any of the matters aforeſaid, in or by any action, ſuit, or other proſecution, civil or criminal, in reſpect of ſuch apprehending and detaining him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, or of putting on board and tranſporting him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* and his Family to *Great Britain*, in manner aforeſaid; and in caſe any ſuch action, ſuit, or proſecution ſhall be commenced, ſued, or proſecuted for any of the matters aforeſaid, the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the ſaid Company, that the general iſſue may be pleaded, and that this preſent indenture, or any other ſpecial matter, may be given in evidence by any of the defendants in any ſuch ſuit, action, or proſecution. In witneſs whereof the ſaid United Company have to one part of theſe indentures ſet their common ſeal, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* hath to the other part of the ſaid indentures ſet his hand and ſeal, the day and year firſt above written.

(Signed) *Thos Rumbold.* (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being ſtamped according to Act of Parliament) in the preſence of us,

(Signed) *P. Michell,*
R^d Hoit.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant before I executed the ſame.

(Signed) *Thos Rumbold.*

Witneſs, *P. Michell.*

Know all men by theſe preſents, That we *John Stables*, of *Park Hill*, near *Croydon*, in *Surrey*, and *Thomas Raikes*, of *New Broad Street*, Eſquires, are held and firmly bound unto the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, in the ſum of four thouſand pounds of lawful money of *Great Britain*, to be paid to the ſaid United Company; or their certain Attorney or Succeſſors, to which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourſelves and each of us, jointly and ſeverally, and our and each of our heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators. Sealed with our ſeals, dated the 25th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, and in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth.

Whereas *Thomas Rumbold*, of *London*, Eſquire, is appointed and choſen a Covenant Servant and Counſellor for *Fort Saint George*, on the Coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, to the above-named United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*. The condition of this obligation is ſuch, That if the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* do and ſhall, from time to time, and at all times hereafter during his continuance in the ſaid office or ſervice, faithfully, honeſtly, diligently, and carefully execute, perform, and diſcharge the ſaid office or ſervice; and further, if the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, his heirs, executors, adminiſtrators, and aſſigns, and every of them, ſhall and do well and truly obſerve, perform, pay, fulfil, and keep all and every the conditions, covenants, payments, articles, and agreements, contained and ſpecified in one pair of indentures, bearing even date with theſe preſents, and made between the above-named United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, of the other part, which on the part and behalf of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, his heirs, executors, adminiſtrators, and aſſigns, or any of them, are or ought to be obſerved,

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ſerved, performed, paid, fulfilled, and kept, and that in all things according to the tenor, effect, and true meaning of the ſaid indentures, then this obligation to be void and of none effect, or elſe to remain in full force and virtue.

(Signed) *J. Stables.* (L. S.)
Thomas Raikes. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt ſtamped according to the Act of Parliament) in the preſence of us,

(Signed) *P. Michell,*
Rd Holt.

(Copy.) 26 June 1777.

Covenant of *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, of Council for *Fort Saint George* (reſpecting Preſents.)

1776. Civil. 1000.

This indenture, made the twenty-ſixth day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, King of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth, and in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, between *Thomas Rumbold*, of *London*, Eſquire, of the one part, and the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the other part: Whereas the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* is employed in the ſervice of the ſaid United Company as one of their Counſellors and Covenant Servants, at their chief ſettlement of *Fort Saint George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*; Now this indenture witneſſeth, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, in compliance with a reſolution of a General Court of the ſaid United Company, and for and in conſideration of what he is or ſhall be entitled to receive from the ſaid Company, in reſpect of his ſaid ſervice, or in reſpect of any other ſtation, capacity, or employment in which the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* may hereafter be retained or employed by the ſaid United Company, or their Court of Directors, doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall not nor will, at any time or times hereafter, during his being employed in the ſaid Company's ſervice, in any ſtation or capacity whatſoever, either by himſelf or by any other perſon or perſons whomſoever, in truſt for him or for his uſe, directly or indirectly, accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive, any gift or grant of lands, or rents or revenues iſſuing out of lands, or any territorial poſſeſſion, juriſdiction, dominion, power, or authority whatſoever, from any of the Indian Princes, Sovereigns, Subahs, or Nabobs, or any of their miniſters, ſervants, or agents, for any ſervice or ſervices, or upon any account or pretence whatſoever; nor ſhall or will, at any time or times hereafter, during his being employed in the ſaid United Company's ſervice in any ſtation or capacity whatſoever, either by himſelf, or any other perſon or perſons whomſoever, in truſt for him or for his uſe, directly or indirectly, accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, donation, or compenſation, in money, effects, jewels, or otherwiſe howſoever, from any of the Indian Princes, Sovereigns, Subahs, or Nabobs, or any of their miniſters, ſervants, or agents, for any ſervice or ſervices performed or to be performed by the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* in *India*, upon any account or pretence whatſoever: And that all and every ſuch gifts or grants of lands, or rents or revenues iſſuing out of lands, or any ſuch territorial poſſeſſion, juriſdiction, dominion, power, or authority whatſoever; and all and every ſuch gifts, rewards, gratuities, allowances, donations, or compenſations whatſoever, which, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, ſhall come to the hands, poſſeſſion, or power of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, or any other perſon or perſons in truſt for him, or for his uſe as aforeſaid, ſhall be deemed and conſtrued to have been received and taken by him or them, for the ſole uſe of the ſaid United Company. In witneſs whereof to one part of theſe indentures the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* hath ſet his hand and ſeal, and to the other part thereof the ſaid United Company have cauſed their common ſeal to be put, the day and year above written.

(Signed) *Tho' Rumbold.* (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt duly ſtamped) in the preſence of

(Signed) *P. Michell.*
Rd Holt.

I acknowledge to have read the within covenant before I executed the ſame.

(Signed) *Tho' Rumbold.*

Witneſs, *P. Michell.*

(Copy.) 27 June 1777.

Covenant of *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. reſpecting Trade and Money Tranſactions.

This indenture, made the twenty-ſeventh day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, &c. and in the year of our Lord ſeventeen hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, between the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and *Thomas Rumbold*, of *London*, Eſquire, of the other part, witneſſeth, That for and in conſideration of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* being appointed Preſident and Governor of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, and for and in conſideration of the ſalary of forty thouſand Pagodas by the year, agreed to be allowed and paid by the ſaid United Company to the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, as Preſident and Governor as aforeſaid, and alſo for and in conſideration of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, as Preſident and Governor as aforeſaid, being allowed to have the advantage of reſiding in the fort-houſe at *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, and to have the uſe of the ſaid United Company's plate and furniture there, and alſo in conſideration of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* being allowed, as Preſident and Governor as aforeſaid, to take ſuch commiſſion on coral as hath uſually been allowed to be taken by the Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid; he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company in manner and form following; that is to ſay, That he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, during the time he ſhall continue to be Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, ſhall not nor will, directly or indirectly, upon any pretence or pretext whatſoever, by himſelf, or by any other perſon or perſons for his or their uſe, or on his or their behalf, carry on or be concerned in, or have any dealings or tranſactions, by way of traffic or commerce, in money or in goods of any kind whatſoever, for his or their uſe, benefit, profit, or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whatſoever ſave and except the trade and commerce of the ſaid United Company, to be carried on by him as Preſident and Governor as aforeſaid, for the uſe and benefit of the ſaid Company; and alſo ſave and except in the diſpoſal of ſuch goods and merchandizes as ſhall be remaining on hand and unſold, belonging to him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, at the time of his taking the ſaid office of Preſident and Governor upon him; and alſo ſave and except the collecting and getting in ſuch debts as ſhall be owing to him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, at that time, in reſpect of the trade and commerce heretofore carried on by him, or wherein he hath been concerned: And alſo, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will, within 30 days next after the time that he ſhall take upon him the ſaid office of Preſident and

Governor

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Governor of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, deliver to the Council of the ſaid Preſidency, at the Council Board, a full and juſt ſpecification, upon oath, of the debts due to him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, in the courſe of the ſaid trade and commerce heretofore carried on by him, or wherein he hath been concerned, and of the goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which he or they ſhall be at that time poſſeſſed, and ſhall and will ſell and diſpoſe of ſuch goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, within the ſpace of nine months next after the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall take upon him the ſaid office or place of Preſident or Governor of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid: And alſo, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* during the time he ſhall continue to be Preſident or Governor as aforeſaid, or in any other ſtation or capacity in the ſervice of or under the protection of the ſaid United Company, ſhall not nor will lend money to any of the Country Powers in *India*, nor to any perſon or perſons holding any commiſſion or commiſſions under or employed by them, directly or indirectly, or any mortgage or mortgages, or on any ſecurity or ſecurities in the nature of a mortgage or mortgages upon lands, or upon the produce of any growing revenues of the country: And alſo, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will, within thirty days next after his taking upon him the ſaid office of Preſident and Governor, and before he ſhall proceed to recover any ſuch money as aforeſaid, deliver, or cauſe to be delivered, to the Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, at the Council Board, upon oath, a ſpecific and particular account of all ſuch loan or loans (if any) as at this time he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* is concerned in, and therein ſhall and will ſpecify and declare how ſuch loan or loans reſpectively is or are ſecured, and deſcribe the whole tranſaction from the beginning of ſuch loan: And alſo, that he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and will accept and take ſuch ſalary and allowances as are hereinbefore mentioned to be agreed to be paid and allowed to him, in lieu and full ſatisfaction of all other fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever; and that he ſhall not nor will, directly or indirectly, on any pretext or pretence whatſoever, by himſelf, or by any other perſon or perſons, for his uſe, accept or take any fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever, other than and except the ſalary and allowances hereinbefore mentioned: And for the true performance of the covenants and agreements herein contained on the part of him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, he the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby bind himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, unto the ſaid United Company in the ſum of fifty thouſand pounds of lawful money of *Great Britain*. And in order to a diſcovery of ſuch trading and trafficking, and of ſuch loan or loans, and ſuch fees, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages, carried on, made, accepted, or taken, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, it is hereby covenanted and agreed, that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the ſaid United Company to file any bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery in His Majeſty's High Court of Chancery or Court of Exchequer in *England*, or in the Mayor's Court of *Madras* aforeſaid, againſt him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, for a diſcovery of any breach or breaches of all or any of the covenants herein contained, and for ſatisfaction of the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid Company on account thereof: Whereunto the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth hereby covenant and agree, that he ſhall not nor will demur or plead in bar of the diſcovery or relief ſought by ſuch bill or bills, that thereby he is, may, or ſhall become liable to any penalty or forfeiture by force of any law or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or otherwiſe howſoever, but ſhall put in a full and perfect anſwer and anſwers to all the parts thereof, and ſhall not in any ſuch anſwer or anſwers, inſiſt upon any penalty, forfeiture, law, or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or alledge any matter whatſoever, whereby to prevent, bar, or preclude the ſaid United Company from the diſcovery or relief ſought or to be ſought by ſuch bill or bills as aforeſaid; but then and in ſuch caſe the ſaid United Company do hereby conſent to wave and diſclaim all and all manner of penalties and forfeitures which ſhall or may, in any kind or degree whatſoever, accrue or incur to them, upon or by reaſon of any diſcovery or diſcloſure ariſing by or from the ſaid anſwer or anſwers of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, other than except the ſum or ſums of money hereinafter agreed to be paid to the ſaid United Company, by way of ſatisfaction for the damages which the ſaid United Company ſhall or may ſuſtain in reſpect of any breach or breaches of the covenants aforeſaid, or any of them. And the ſaid United Company, for themſelves, do agree to accept and take, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, agree to account for and pay, or cauſe to be paid, to or to the uſe of the ſaid United Company, as and for a full, ſtated, and adjuſted compenſation and ſatisfaction for the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid United Company by reaſon or means of any breach or breaches, or any or either of the covenants and agreements hereinbefore contained, or the part of the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, the ſeveral and reſpective ſum or ſums of money hereinafter mentioned; that is to ſay, the ſum of one hundred pounds for every one hundred pounds value, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer value of all and every the goods, merchandizes, and money, traded or trafficked with or for, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſum of one hundred pounds, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer value, in reſpect of every one hundred pounds which ſhall be lent by the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* to any of the Princes in *India*, or their officers, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſum of two hundred pounds in reſpect of every one hundred pounds, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer ſum, which ſhall be accepted, received, or taken by him the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, for any fee, perquiſite of office, emolument, or advantage whatſoever, over and beſides the ſalary hereinbefore mentioned to be agreed to be made to him. Provided always nevertheleſs, that ſuch bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery as aforeſaid, ſhall be filed within three years next after the breach of the covenants aforeſaid ſhall be made known to the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall have quitted the ſaid office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, or ſhall have been removed therefrom; and in default of ſuch bill or bills filed within the ſaid three years from the times aforeſaid, the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* ſhall and may demur or plead thereto in like manner as he might have done if he had not agreed to anſwer the ſame as aforeſaid. In witneſs whereof, the ſaid United Company have, to one part of theſe Indentures ſet their common ſeal, and the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* hath to the other part of the ſaid Indentures ſet his hand and ſeal, the day and year firſt above written.

(Signed)
Tho⁸ Rumbold. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt duly ſtamped) in the preſence of
(Signed) *P. Michell,*
R⁴ Holt.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant before I executed the ſame.
(Signed) *Tho⁸ Rumbold.*

Witneſs,
(Signed) *P. Michell.*

(Copy.) 10th June 1777.

Covenant of *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, of Council for *Fort Saint George*.

Factors 1770.

This Indenture, made the tenth day of June, in the year of our Lord One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-

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ſeventy-ſeven, and in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth, between the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, of the other part. Whereas the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies* have (upon the ſpecial requeſt and entreaty of the ſaid *John Whitehill*, and upon the conditions and agreements hereinafter contained, on the part of the ſaid *John Whitehill* to be performed) received and entertained him the ſaid *John Whitehill* into their ſervice, as their Counſellor and Covenant Servant of *Fort Saint George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, to ſerve them for the term of years, and to be employed in all or any of the traffic or merchandizes, buſineſſes and affairs, in any place or places whatſoever, between the *Cape of Good Hope* and the Streights of *Magellan*, as the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors for the time being, or any thirteen or more of them, or any by them authorized, ſhall appoint, at and for the wages or ſum of ſixteen thouſand Pagodas by the year, to commence from the time of his embarking from *England* to go to *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid: Now this Indenture witneſſeth, That the ſaid *John Whitehill*, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, and their ſucceſſors, in manner and form following; (that is to ſay) That he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will faithfully, honeſtly, diligently, and carefully ſerve the ſaid Company at ſuch place and places, and in all and every ſuch affairs and buſineſs whatſoever of the ſaid Company, as the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall be employed in: And ſhall alſo from time to time, and at all times, obſerve, keep, and fulfil all and every the orders of the ſaid Company, and of the ſaid Court of Directors, made and to be made for the government of their factories and ſettlements, officers, agents, or ſervants abroad; and ſhall and will alſo obſerve, keep, and fulfil all ſuch orders, inſtructions, and directions, which he ſhall herewith or hereafter receive under the ſeal of the ſaid Company, or from the ſaid Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, or any thirteen or more of them, or from their Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall reſide or be employed, or from any perſons authorized thereunto by ſuch Directors; and ſhall and will, to the utmoſt of his power and ſkill, reſiſt and withſtand all and every ſuch perſon or perſons as ſhall break, or endeavour to break, the ſaid orders, inſtructions, or directions, or any of them: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he will not do, attempt, or practiſe, nor ſhall wittingly or willingly permit or ſuffer any other perſon or perſons whatſoever, to do, attempt, or practiſe, any matter or thing whatſoever, to the hindrance, hurt, prejudice, damage, or defrauding of the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or of their ſervants, or any of them, or of the ſaid Company's goods, merchandizes, trade, or traffic, or any of them, or any part thereof; but ſhall, as much as in him lieth, prevent and defeat the ſame: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, from time to time, and at all times from henceforth, give notice and intelligence, with all convenient ſpeed, unto the ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, of all and every the deceits, wrongs, abuſes, breach of orders, inconveniencies, and hindrances, which he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall know, underſtand, hear, or ſuſpect to be done, practiſed, offered, or intended againſt the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or their goods or trade, or any of them, or againſt any perſon or perſons by them, or by the ſaid Court of Directors employed, or in their ſervice, in any place or places, together with the names of thoſe perſons by whom the ſame ſhall be ſo offered, practiſed, or intended: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he will not engage, or employ the ſtock of the ſaid Company, or any part thereof, or make uſe of the credit of the ſaid Company, in any other kind, way, or manner howſoever, than for the affairs of the ſaid Company, and as by the major part of the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, under their hands, or under the common ſeal of the ſaid Company, or by their ſaid Preſident and Council, ſhall be ordered and directed: And that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, at all times, keep and conceal the ſaid Company's ſecrets, and every matter and thing committed to him as ſuch by the ſaid Court of Directors, or their agents, factors, officers, and ſervants, or any of them: And alſo, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, from time to time, and at all times from henceforth during his ſaid employment, keep, or cauſe to be kept, a true and particular journal or day-book, of all paſſages and proceedings relating to the affairs of the ſaid Company, and alſo books of accounts; in which journal, day-book, and books of accounts, he ſhall daily, duly, truly, and fully enter, or cauſe to be entered, the accounts of all and every particular buying, ſelling, receipts, payments, barterings, and all other tranſactions and occurrences relating to his truſt, during the time he ſhall continue in the ſaid United Company's ſervice and employment: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he will not place, or conſent to the placing to the ſaid Company's account, nor otherwiſe charge the ſaid Company with any more or greater ſums than he ſhall really, and in good faith pay for all or any goods, merchandizes, or effects, which he ſhall buy, or cauſe, procure, or conſent to be bought, for or on account of the ſaid Company: And that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will bring to the account of the ſaid Company, in the books of the ſaid Company, the full rates and prices for which he ſhall ſell, or cauſe to be ſold, any of the ſaid Company's goods, merchandizes, or effects: And further, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* will not, directly or indirectly, take, accept, or receive, or agree to take, accept, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, compenſation, ſum or ſums of money whatſoever, from any perſon or perſons, of whom he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall, by himſelf, or any agent for him, buy or barter any goods, merchandizes, treaſure, or effects, for or upon account of the ſaid Company: And further, that he will not take, accept, or receive, or agree to take, accept, or receive any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, compenſation, ſum or ſums of money whatſoever, from any perſon or perſons to whom the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall, by himſelf, or any agent for him, ſell or barter any goods, merchandizes, treaſure, or effects, of or belonging to, or for or upon account of, the ſaid Company: And moreover, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill*, his executors, or adminiſtrators, ſhall produce and deliver the ſaid books, together with all waſte books, pocket-books, diaries, memorials, and other writings and papers whatſoever, wherein he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall make, or cauſe to be made, any entries, or ſet down any matter or thing touching or concerning the ſaid Company's affairs, or any of them, or any way relating thereunto (although the ſame may or ſhall be intermixed with his own, or others concerns) unto the ſaid Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, or to ſuch perſon or perſons as ſhall by letter or order under the hands of thirteen or more of the ſaid Court of Directors, or under the ſeal of the ſaid Company, be authorized and

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and appointed to demand and receive the ſame; and ſhall and will, if required, make oath to the truth of ſuch books, diaries, memorials, writings, and papers, and that the ſame contain the whole of his tranſactions, and that they have not been defaced, obliterated, or altered: And further, That he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, well and truly, deliver and pay unto the ſaid United Company, or their ſucceſſors, all and every ſuch monies, goods, merchandizes and things whatſoever, as by the foot of his account, or otherwiſe, ſhall be due from him, or remain in his hands and poſſeſſion, and for which he ought to be chargeable or anſwerable in any manner or wiſe: And alſo, That he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will (before he ſhall leave the ſaid Company's factories or ſettlements) pay and diſcharge all and every ſuch ſum or ſums of money as he ſhall juſtly owe or be indebted to any of the Black Merchants or Natives of the country, where he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall be, together with ſuch other ſums as he ſhall owe abroad to any other merchants or perſons, not being ſubjects of His Majeſty the King of *Great Britain*, or His ſucceſſors: And that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, from time to time, when and as often as he ſhall be thereunto required by the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or by the Preſident, Agent or Chief, and Council of the place where the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall be, remove to any ſuch other factories as ſuch Preſident, Agent or Chief, and Council, ſhall ſo direct and require: And alſo, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall, at all times during the time of his ſervice aforeſaid, faithfully and diligently demean himſelf as a good, honeſt, and faithful ſervant towards the ſaid Company, and their ſucceſſors, and thoſe by them authorized. And foraſmuch as complaints have been made to the ſaid United Company, that ſeveral of the ſaid Company's Preſidents and Chiefs of their factories, and ſeveral of ſuch perſons as are of their Councils in their factories abroad, or ſome of them, as alſo their factors, agents, and ſervants, have committed very heinous and grievous offences in ſuch factories of the ſaid Company, and elſewhere in the *Eaſt Indies*, and other places within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, by unjuſtly menacing, impriſoning, aſſaulting, abuſing, and evil-treating the Natives and Black Merchants, and others with whom the ſaid Company have had dealings or correſpondence, and by ſuch means, and other violences, abuſes, and injuries, have extorted and forced great ſums of money, and other valuable effects, from ſuch injured perſons, who, by reaſon of the great diſtance from this kingdom, and the wholeſome laws thereof, and by reaſon that the ſaid Company have not been enabled to obtain and render ſatisfaction for ſuch injuries and miſdemeanors, are and have been remedileſs; Now it is hereby agreed by and between the ſaid parties to theſe preſents, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that in caſe any ſum or ſums of money, goods or chattels whatſoever, ſhall at any time or times hereafter be extorted, forced, or taken by him the ſaid *John Whitehill* (either ſeparately or jointly with others) from any perſon or perſons whatſoever, within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, by the means or uſe of impriſonments, aſſaults, violences, menaces, or other force or compulſion whatſoever; then, and as often as any ſuch offence or offences ſhall be committed, it ſhall and may be lawful to and for every perſon or perſons injured thereby, to make and ſend over complaints and atteſtations thereof in writing, to the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being; and that upon the receipt of ſuch complaints and atteſtations it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, to enquire into the truth of the ſaid complaints, by all ſuch ways and means as they ſhall think juſt and equitable, and thereupon to hear the matter of the ſaid complaint or complaints, and thereupon finally to judge and determine the ſame, and to award ſatisfaction and reparation to be made by the ſaid *John Whitehill* to the ſaid Company, for the benefit of ſuch injured perſons: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, well and truly to pay to the ſaid Company, at ſuch time or times as ſhall be limited by the ſaid Court of Directors (or the major part of them) for that purpoſe, all and every ſuch ſum and ſums of money as ſhall be ſo awarded by the ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, or the major part of them then aſſembled, to be paid as aforeſaid; but in truſt nevertheleſs, and to the intent, that the ſaid Company may and do render and pay over the monies received or recovered by them, to the parties injured or defrauded, which the ſaid Company accordingly hereby agree and covenant to do: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth furthermore, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, to pay and ſatisfy to the ſaid Company, for their own uſe and benefit, all ſuch damages as they ſhall have ſuſtained by reaſon or means of any ſuch offence or offences as aforeſaid. And foraſmuch as it frequently happens that the Preſident and Council, Agent and Council, Chief and Council, and ſeveral other ſubordinate officers of ſeveral of the ſaid Company's factories abroad, have, by mutual influences on each other, ſettled, ſtated, and adjuſted amongſt themſelves, their own accounts with the ſaid Company, in order, as far as they could, to bar and preclude the ſaid Company from reviewing, altering, amending, correcting, or conteſting the ſame: Now it is hereby further declared, That all and every ſuch account and accounts ſo at any time ſtated, balanced, ſigned, or adjuſted, by, between, or amongſt ſuch Preſidents and Councils, or Agents and Councils, or Chiefs and Councils, or other ſubordinate officers, or any of them, and the ſaid *John Whitehill*, are hereby agreed to be, and ſhall at all times hereafter be taken and eſteemed to be, open accounts, formed and prepared only for the inſpection, peruſal, and approbation, or correction, of the ſaid Company, and ſhall not, in any ſort or kind, or in any article thereof, bind or conclude the ſaid Company: And the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the United Company, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* will not, at any time during his reſidence in the *Eaſt Indies*, or within the ſaid Company's limits, directly or indirectly trade, correſpond, traffic, deal with, or for, or be in anywiſe aiding, aſſiſting, or employed as Agent or Factor, by or for any foreign Company trading in or to the *Eaſt Indies*, or any perſon or perſons whatſoever, who do or ſhall, during the continuance of theſe preſents, traffic, adventure, or trade to, in, or from the *Eaſt Indies*, or elſewhere, within the limits of the ſaid Company's trade, by, or under, or by virtue of any foreign commiſſion, licence, or authority whatſoever, nor ſhall or will, by himſelf, or in conjunction with any perſon or perſons whatſoever, directly or indirectly carry on or uſe, or be concerned in, any ſort of trade, traffic, or merchandize, either from *Europe* to the *Eaſt Indies*, or to any place within the ſaid Company's limits, between the *Cape of Good Hope* and the Streights of *Magellan*, or from the *Eaſt Indies*, or from any place within the ſaid Company's limits, to *Europe*, or to or from any place whatſoever, although not within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, ſave and except for and on account of the ſaid Company: And, in order to a diſcovery of and a ſatisfaction for ſuch illicit trade as aforeſaid, it is hereby agreed, that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the ſaid United Company, and their ſucceſſors, to file any bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery in His Majeſty's High Court of Chancery, or Court of Exchequer, againſt him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, his executors and adminiſtrators; whereunto the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby agree, that neither he nor they ſhall or will demur or plead in bar of the diſcovery or relief ſought by ſuch bill or bills, that thereby he or they is, are, may, or ſhall become liable to any penalty

or

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or forfeiture, by force of any law or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or otherwiſe howſoever, but ſhall make and put in a full and perfect anſwer and anſwers to all the parts thereof, and ſhall not, in ſuch anſwer and anſwers, inſiſt upon any penalty, forfeiture, law or ſtatute, bond, covenant or agreement, or alledge any matter whatſoever, whereby to prevent, bar, or preclude the ſaid Company from the diſcovery or relief ſought or to be ſought by ſuch bill or bills as aforeſaid; but then and in ſuch caſe the ſaid United Company do hereby conſent to wave and diſclaim all and all manner of penalties and forfeitures that ſhall or may, in any kind or degree whatſoever, accrue or incur to them, upon or by reaſon of any diſcovery or diſcloſure ariſing by the ſaid anſwer or anſwers of the ſaid *John Whitehill*, his executors or adminiſtrators; and the ſaid United Company, for themſelves and their ſucceſſors, do agree to accept, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, agree to account for and pay, or cauſe to be paid to, or to the uſe of the ſaid Company or their ſucceſſors, as and for a full, ſtated, and adjuſted compenſation and ſatisfaction for the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid Company upon account of the ſaid illicit trade, the ſum of One hundred Pounds for every One hundred Pounds value of all and every the goods and merchandizes traded or trafficked with, or for, contrary to the true intent and meaning hereof; and alſo of the produce of the ſaid illicit trade. Provided always, and it is hereby expreſsly covenanted, declared, and agreed between the parties to theſe preſents, and it is the true intent and meaning thereof, that in caſe the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall make default in any of the covenants hereinbefore contained; or ſhall embezzle any of the ſaid Company's money, goods or effects; or be guilty of any breach of truſt towards the ſaid Company; or ſhall be concerned in buying, bartering, ſelling, or diſpoſing of any artillery, ordnance, muſquets, fire-arms, ammunition, or warlike ſtores, to or for the uſe of any Prince, Nabob, or Country Power in *India*, or of the natives there, without the expreſs licence of the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors for the time being, or a majority of them, or of the ſaid Company's Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where ſuch buying, bartering, or ſelling ſhall be; or in caſe the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall at any time during the continuance of theſe preſents, without the like licence and authority as aforeſaid, hold correſpondence with any Prince, Nabob, or Country Power in *India*, or any of their Miniſters, or ſhall ſupply, lend to, or procure, for the uſe of any foreign Company trading in or to *India*, or any perſon or perſons trading under the licence or authority of ſuch foreign Company, any money, at reſpondentia, or any other ſecurity, loan, or engagement whatſoever; that then, and in each and every of the ſaid caſes, it ſhall be lawful for the ſaid Company, and their ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, or the majority of them, or the Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall be reſident or employed, and they are hereby reſpectively declared to have full power and authority for that purpoſe, to ſuſpend, or wholly diſmiſs the ſaid *John Whitehill* from the ſaid Company's ſervice and employment; the ſaid *John Whitehill* having firſt had notice given him of ſuch his offence or default, and a reaſonable time allowed him to make his defence againſt the ſame, and having been convicted thereof. And, for the more effectually carrying the ſaid laſt-mentioned covenant and agreement into execution, it is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that in caſe of ſuch diſmiſſion from, or quitting and reſigning the ſaid Company's ſervice and employment, he the ſaid *John Whitehill*, ſhall and will, within one year after the ſame ſhall happen, or by the firſt paſſage that can be obtained after the expiration of the ſaid one year, tranſport himſelf, together with his family, to *Great Britain*, in ſuch ſhip employed by the ſaid Company as ſhall be appointed for that purpoſe by the ſaid Company, or by their Court of Directors, or their Preſident and Council as aforeſaid; and ſhall not nor will, upon any account or pretence whatſoever, ſtay or continue any longer in the *Eaſt Indies*; and moreover, in caſe the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall make default in the ſaid laſt-mentioned covenant, the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby conſent and agree with the ſaid United Company, that from and immediately after ſuch default, it ſhall and may be lawful for the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors, or their Preſident and Council at the ſaid ſettlement where the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall reſide or be, to cauſe the ſaid *John Whitehill* to be apprehended and detained, and to put him and his family on board any ſhip employed by the ſaid Company, for the purpoſe of being tranſported to *Great Britain*; ſo nevertheleſs that no unneceſſary delay be ſought, nor any fit occaſion or opportunity loſt in ſo doing: And further, in caſe of ſuch apprehending, putting on board, and tranſporting the ſaid *John Whitehill* and his family, in manner aforeſaid, the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby covenant, promiſe, and agree, to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill*, his executors, or adminiſtrators, ſhall not nor will commence, ſue, or proſecute the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors, or any of their Preſidents and Council, commanders or officers of any ſuch ſhip, or any other perſon employed in any of the matters aforeſaid, in or by any action, ſuit, or other proſecution, civil or criminal, in reſpect of ſuch apprehending and detaining him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, or of putting on board and tranſporting him the ſaid *John Whitehill* and his family to *Great Britain*, in manner aforeſaid; and in caſe any ſuch action, ſuit, or proſecution ſhall be commenced, ſued, or proſecuted for any of the matters aforeſaid, the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the ſaid Company, that the general iſſue may be pleaded, and that this preſent Indenture, or any other ſpecial matter, may be given in evidence by any of the defendants in any ſuch ſuit, action, or proſecution. In witneſs whereof the ſaid United Company have to one part of theſe Indentures ſet their common ſeal, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* hath to the other part of the ſaid Indentures ſet his hand and ſeal, the day and year firſt above-written.

John Whitehill. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being ſtamped according to Act of Parliament) in the preſence of us,

P. Mitchell, Secretary.
R^d Holt.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant before I executed the ſame.

John Whitehill.

Witneſs, *R^d Holt.*

(Copy.) 11th June 1777.

Covenant of *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, of Council for *Fort St. George*. (Reſpecting Preſents.)

1776. Civil 1,000.

This Indenture, made the eleventh day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, King of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth, and in the year of our Lord One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, between *John Whitehill*, of *London*, Eſquire, of the one part, and the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the other part: Whereas the ſaid *John Whitehill* is employed in the ſervice of the ſaid United Company, as one of their Counſellors and Covenant Servants at their chief Settlement of *Fort St. George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*: Now this indenture witneſſeth, and the ſaid *John Whitehill*, in compliance with the

the Reſolution of a General Court of the ſaid United Company, and for and in conſideration of what he is or ſhall be entitled to receive from the ſaid Company, in reſpect of his ſaid ſervice, or in reſpect of any other ſtation, capacity, or employment in which the ſaid *John Whitehill* may hereafter be retained or employed by the ſaid United Company, or their Court of Directors, doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall not nor will, at any time or times hereafter, during his being employed in the ſaid Company's ſervice, in any ſtation or capacity whatſoever, either by himſelf or by any other perſon or perſons whomſoever in truſt for him or for his uſe, directly or indirectly, accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive, any gift or grant of lands, or rents or revenues iſſuing out of lands, or any territorial poſſeſſion, juriſdiction, dominion, power or authority whatſoever, from any of the Indian Princes, Sovereigns, Subahs, or Nabobs, or any of their miniſters, ſervants, or agents, for any ſervice or ſervices, or upon any account or pretence whatſoever, nor ſhall or will, at any time or times hereafter during his being employed in the ſaid United Company's ſervice in any ſtation or capacity whatſoever, either by himſelf or any other perſon or perſons whomſoever in truſt for him or for his uſe, directly or indirectly, accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, donation or compenſation, in money, effects, jewels, or otherwiſe howſoever, from any of the Indian Princes, Sovereigns, Subahs, or Nabobs, or any of their miniſters, ſervants, or agents, for any ſervice or ſervices performed or to be performed by the ſaid *John Whitehill* in *India*, upon any account or pretence whatſoever: And that all and every ſuch gifts or grants of lands, or rents or revenues iſſuing out of lands, or any ſuch territorial poſſeſſion, juriſdiction, dominion, power, or authority whatſoever; and all and every ſuch gifts, rewards, gratuities, allowances, donations, or compenſations whatſoever, which, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, ſhall come to the hands, poſſeſſion, or power of the ſaid *John Whitehill*, or any other perſon or perſons in truſt for him, or for his uſe as aforeſaid, ſhall be deemed and conſtrued to have been received and taken by him or them for the ſole uſe of the ſaid United Company. In witneſs whereof to one part of theſe Indentures the ſaid *John Whitehill* hath ſet his hand and ſeal, and to the other part thereof the ſaid United Company have cauſed their common ſeal to be put the day and year above written.

John Whitehill. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt duly ſtamped) in the preſence of
P. Michell, Sec.
R^d. Holt.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant before I executed the ſame.

John Whitehill.

Witneſs,
R^d Holt.

(Copy.) 12th June 1777.

Covenant of *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, of Council for *Fort St. George*. (Reſtrictive of Trade.)

This Indenture, made the twelfth day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, &c. and in the year of our Lord ſeventeen hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, between the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and *John Whitehill*, of *Queen Ann-ſtreet, Cavendiſh Square*, Eſquire, of the other part, witneſſeth, That for and in conſideration of the ſaid *John Whitehill* being appointed one of the Members of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort St. George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, and for and in conſideration of the ſalary of Sixteen thouſand Pagodas by the year, agreed to be allowed and paid by the ſaid United Company to the ſaid *John Whitehill*, as one of the Members of the ſaid Council of the ſaid Preſidency as aforeſaid, he the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, in manner and form following; that is to ſay, that he the ſaid *John Whitehill*, during the time he ſhall continue to be one of the Members of the Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, ſhall not nor will, directly or indirectly, upon any pretence or pretext whatſoever, by himſelf, or by any other perſon or perſons, for his or their uſe, or on his or their behalf, carry on or be concerned in, or have any dealings or tranſactions by way of traffic or commerce, in money or in goods of any kind whatſoever, for his or their uſe, benefit, profit, or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whatſoever; ſave and except the trade and commerce of the ſaid United Company, to be carried on by him as one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid, for the uſe and benefit of the ſaid Company; and alſo ſave and except in the diſpoſal of ſuch goods and merchandizes as ſhall be remaining on hand, and unſold, belonging to him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, at the time of his taking the ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council of *Fort Saint George* upon him; and alſo ſave and except the collecting and getting in ſuch debts as ſhall be owing to him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, at that time, in reſpect of the trade and commerce heretofore carried on by him, or wherein he hath been concerned: And alſo that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, within thirty days next after the time that he ſhall take upon him the ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid, deliver to the Preſident and Governor and Council of the ſaid Preſidency, at the Council Board, a full and juſt ſpecification, upon oath, of the debts due to him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, in the courſe of the ſaid trade and commerce heretofore carried on by him, or wherein he hath been concerned; and of the goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which he or they ſhall be at that time poſſeſſed; and ſhall and will ſell and diſpoſe of ſuch goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, within the ſpace of nine months next after he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall take upon him the ſaid office or place of one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid: And alſo that he the ſaid *John Whitehill*, during the time he ſhall continue to be one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid, or in any other ſtation or capacity in the ſervice of, or under the protection of, the ſaid United Company, ſhall not nor will lend money to any of the Country Powers in *India*, nor to any perſon or perſons holding any commiſſion or commiſſions under or employed by them, directly or indirectly, on any mortgage or mortgages, or on any ſecurity or ſecurities in the nature of a mortgage or mortgages upon lands, or upon the produce of any growing revenue of the country; and alſo that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will, within thirty days next after his taking upon him the ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council, and before he ſhall proceed to recover any ſuch money as aforeſaid, deliver, or cauſe to be delivered, to the Preſident and Governor and Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, at the Council Board, upon oath, a ſpecific and particular account of all ſuch loan and loans (if any) as at this time he the ſaid *John Whitehill* is concerned in; and therein ſhall and will ſpecify and declare how ſuch loan or loans reſpectively is or are ſecured, and deſcribe the whole tranſaction from the beginning of ſuch loan: And alſo that he the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and will accept and take ſuch ſalary and allowances as are hereinbefore mentioned to be agreed to be paid and allowed to him, in lieu and full ſatisfaction of all other fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever; and that he ſhall not nor will, directly or indirectly, on any pretext or pretence whatſoever, by himſelf,

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ſelf, or by any other perſon or perſons for his uſe, accept or take any fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever, other than and except the ſalary and allowances hereinbefore mentioned. And for the true performance of the Covenants and Agreements herein contained, on the part of him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, he the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby bind himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, unto the ſaid United Company, in the ſum of Twenty-five thouſand Pounds of lawful money of *Great Britain*; and in order to a diſcovery of ſuch trading and trafficking, and of ſuch loan or loans, and of ſuch fees, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages, carried on, made, accepted, or taken, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, it is hereby covenanted and agreed, that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the ſaid United Company to file any bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery in His Majeſty's High Court of Chancery, or Court of Exchequer, in *England*, or in the Mayor's Court of *Madras* aforeſaid, againſt him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, for a diſcovery of any breach or breaches of all or any of the covenants herein contained, and for ſatisfaction of the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid Company, on account thereof; whereunto the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth hereby covenant and agree, that he ſhall not nor will demur nor plead in bar of the diſcovery or relief ſought by ſuch bill or bills, that thereby he is, may, or ſhall become liable to any penalty or forfeiture, by force of any law, ſtatute, bond or covenant, or agreement, or otherwiſe howſoever, but ſhall put in a full and perfect anſwer and anſwers to all the parts thereof, and ſhall not in any ſuch anſwer or anſwers, inſiſt upon any penalty, forfeiture, law or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or alledge any matter whatſoever, whereby to prevent, bar, or preclude the ſaid United Company from the diſcovery or relief ſought, or to be ſought, by ſuch bill or bills as aforeſaid; but then and in ſuch caſe, the ſaid United Company do hereby conſent to wave and diſclaim all and all manner of penalties and forfeitures which ſhall or may, in any kind or degree whatſoever, accrue or incur to them, upon or by reaſon of any diſcovery or diſcloſure ariſing by or from the ſaid anſwer or anſwers of the ſaid *John Whitehill* other than except the ſum or ſums of money hereinafter agreed to be paid to the ſaid United Company, by way of ſatisfaction for the damages which the ſaid United Company ſhall or may ſuſtain, in reſpect of any breach or breaches of the covenants aforeſaid, or any of them. And the ſaid United Company for themſelves do agree to accept and take, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, agree to account for and pay, or cauſe to be paid, to or to the uſe of the ſaid United Company, as and for a full, ſtated, and adjuſted compenſation and ſatisfaction for the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid United Company, by reaſon or means of any breach or breaches, or any or either of the covenants and agreements hereinbefore contained, on the part of the ſaid *John Whitehill*, the ſeveral and reſpective ſum and ſums of money hereinafter mentioned; that is to ſay, the ſum of One hundred Pounds for every One hundred Pounds value, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer value, of all and every the goods, merchandizes, and money traded or trafficked with or for, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſum of One hundred Pounds, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer value, in reſpect of Hundred Pounds which ſhall be lent by the ſaid *John Whitehill* to any of the Princes in *India*, or their Officers, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſum of Two hundred Pounds in reſpect of every One hundred Pounds, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer ſum, which ſhall be accepted, received, or taken by him the ſaid *John Whitehill*, for any fee, perquiſite of office, emolument, or advantage whatſoever, over and beſides the ſalary hereinbefore mentioned to be agreed to be made to him. Provided always nevertheleſs, that ſuch bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery as aforeſaid, ſhall be filed within three years next after the breach of the covenants aforeſaid ſhall be made known to the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall have quitted his ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council of *Fort Saint George*, or ſhall have been removed therefrom; and in default of ſuch bill or bills being filed within the ſaid three years from the time aforeſaid, the ſaid *John Whitehill* ſhall and may demur, or plead thereto in like manner as he might have done if he had not agreed to anſwer the ſame as aforeſaid. In witneſs whereof, to one part of theſe Indentures the ſaid *John Whitehill* hath ſet his hand and ſeal, and to the other part thereof the ſaid United Company have cauſed their common ſeal to be put, the day and year above-written.

John Whitehill. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered, being firſt duly ſtamped, in the preſence of us,

P. Michell.
R^d Holt.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant before I executed the ſame.

John Whitehill.

Witneſs,
R^d Holt.

Know all Men by theſe Preſents, That we General *Joſeph Smith*, and *Charles Bourchier* of *London*, Eſquire, are held and firmly bound unto the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, in the ſum of Four thouſand Pounds of lawful money of *Great Britain*, to be paid to the ſaid United Company, or their certain Attorney or ſucceſſors, to which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourſelves, and each of us, jointly and ſeverally, and our and each of our heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, Sealed with our ſeals, dated the tenth day of June, in the year of our Lord One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, and in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth.

Whereas *John Whitehill*, of *London*, Eſquire, is appointed and choſen a Counſellor and Covenant Servant for *Fort Saint George*, on the Coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, to the above-named United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*. The condition of this obligation is ſuch, That if the ſaid *John Whitehill* do and ſhall, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, during his continuance in the ſaid office or ſervice, faithfully, honeſtly, diligently, and carefully execute, perform, and diſcharge the ſaid office or ſervice; and further, if the ſaid *John Whitehill*, his heirs, executors, adminiſtrators, and aſſigns, and every of them, ſhall and do well and truly obſerve, perform, pay, fulfil, and keep all and every the conditions, covenants, payments, articles, and agreements, contained and ſpecified in one pair of Indentures, bearing even date with theſe preſents, and made between the above-named United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and the ſaid *John Whitehill* of the other part; which, on the part and behalf of the ſaid *John Whitehill*, his heirs, executors, adminiſtrators, and aſſigns, or any of them, are or ought to be obſerved, performed, paid, fulfilled, and kept, and that in all things according to the tenor, effect, and true meaning of the ſaid Indentures, then this obligation to be void and of none effect, or elſe to remain in full force and virtue.

Joſeph Smith. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt ſtamped according to the Act of Parliament) in the preſence of us, by the above-bound *Joſeph Smith*,

R^d Holt,
Thos Morton,
Ch. Bourchier. (L. S.)

And by the above-bound *Charles Bourchier*, in the preſence of

W. Ramſay. *R. Owen.*

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(Copy.) 18th June 1777.

Covenant of *Peter Perring*, Eſquire, of Council at *Fort Saint George*.

Factors 1770.

This Indenture, made the eighteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, and in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the Grace of God, of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth, between the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and *Peter Perring*, of *Fort Saint George*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, Eſquire, of the other part: Whereas the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies* have (upon the ſpecial requeſt and entreaty of the ſaid *Peter Perring*, and upon the conditions and agreements hereinafter contained on the part of the ſaid *Peter Perring* to be performed) received and entertained him the ſaid *Peter Perring* into their ſervice, as their Counſellor and Covenant Servant of *Fort Saint George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, to ſerve them in the ſtation aforeſaid, and to be employed in all or any of the traffic or merchandizes, buſineſſes, and affairs, in any place or places whatſoever, between the *Cape of Good Hope* and the *Streights of Magellan*, as the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors for the time being, or any thirteen or more of them, or any by them authorized, ſhall appoint, at and for the wages or ſum of ſixteen thouſand Pagodas by the year, to commence from the time of the ſaid *Peter Perring* taking upon him the execution of the office of a Counſellor at *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid: Now this Indenture witneſſeth, That the ſaid *Peter Perring* for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, and their ſucceſſors, in manner and form following; (that is to ſay) that he the ſaid *Peter Perring*, from the time of his taking upon him the execution of the office of a Counſellor at *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, ſhall and will faithfully, honeſtly, diligently, and carefully ſerve the ſaid Company, at ſuch place and places, and in all and every ſuch affairs and buſineſs whatſoever of the ſaid Company, as the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall be employed in; and ſhall alſo from time to time, and at all times, obſerve, keep, and fulfil all and every the orders of the ſaid Company, and of the ſaid Court of Directors, made and to be made for the government of their factories and ſettlements, officers, agents, or ſervants abroad; and ſhall and will alſo obſerve, keep, and fulfil all ſuch orders, inſtructions, and directions, which he ſhall herewith or hereafter receive under the ſeal of the ſaid Company, or from the ſaid Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, or any thirteen or more of them, or from their Preſident and Council, at the reſpective ſettlement where the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall reſide or be employed, or from any perſons authorized thereunto by ſuch Directors; and ſhall and will, to the utmoſt of his power and ſkill, reſiſt and withſtand all and every ſuch perſon or perſons as ſhall break, or endeavour to break, the ſaid orders, inſtructions, or directions, or any of them: And the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he will not do, attempt, or practiſe, nor ſhall wittingly or willingly permit or ſuffer any other perſon or perſons whatſoever, to do, attempt, or practiſe, any matter or thing whatſoever, to the hindrance, hurt, prejudice, damage, or defrauding of the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or of their ſervants, or any of them, or of the ſaid Company's goods, merchandizes, trade or traffic, or any of them, or any part thereof; but ſhall, as much as in him lieth, prevent and defeat the ſame: And the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby, for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, from time to time, and at all times from henceforth, give notice and intelligence, with all convenient ſpeed, unto the ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, of all and every the deceits, wrongs, abuſes, breach of orders, inconveniencies, and hindrances, which he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall know, underſtand, hear, or ſuſpect to be done, practiſed, offered, or intended againſt the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or their goods or trade, or any of them, or againſt any perſon or perſons by them, or by the ſaid Court of Directors employed, or in their ſervice, in any place or places, together with the names of thoſe perſons by whom the ſame ſhall be ſo offered, practiſed, or intended: And the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, that he will not engage or employ the ſtock of the ſaid Company, or any part thereof, or make uſe of the credit of the ſaid Company, in any other kind, way, or manner howſoever, than for the affairs of the ſaid Company, and as by the major part of the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, under their hands, or under the common ſeal of the ſaid Company, or by their ſaid Preſident and Council, ſhall be ordered and directed: And that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, at all times, keep and conceal the ſaid Company's ſecrets, and every matter and thing committed to him as ſuch by the ſaid Court of Directors, or their agents, factors, officers, and ſervants, or any of them: And alſo, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, from time to time, and at all times from henceforth during his ſaid employment, keep, or cauſe to be kept, a true and particular journal or day-book of all paſſages and proceedings relating to the affairs of the ſaid Company, and alſo books of accounts; in which journal, day-book, and books of accounts, he ſhall daily, duly, truly, and fully enter, or cauſe to be entered, the accounts of all and every particular buying, ſelling, receipts, payments, barterings, and all other tranſactions and occurrences relating to his truſt, during the time he ſhall continue in the ſaid United Company's ſervice and employment: And the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he will not place, or conſent to the placing to the ſaid Company's account, nor otherwiſe charge the ſaid Company with, any more or greater ſums than he ſhall really and in good faith pay for all or any goods, merchandizes, or effects which he ſhall buy, or cauſe, procure, or conſent to be bought, for or on account of the ſaid Company; and that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will bring to the account of the ſaid Company, in the books of the ſaid Company, the full rates and prices for which he ſhall ſell, or cauſe to be ſold, any of the ſaid Company's goods, merchandizes, or effects: And further, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* will not, directly or indirectly, take, accept, or receive, or agree to take, accept, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, compenſation, ſum or ſums of money whatſoever, from any perſon or perſons, of whom he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall, by himſelf, or any agent for him, buy or barter any goods, merchandizes, treaſure, or effects, for or upon account of the ſaid Company: And further, that he will not take, accept, or receive, or agree to take, accept, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, compenſation, ſum or ſums of money whatſoever, from any perſon or perſons to whom the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall, by himſelf, or any agent for him, ſell or barter any goods, merchandizes, treaſure, or effects, of or belonging to, or for or upon account of, the ſaid Company; and moreover, that he the ſaid , his executors or adminiſtrators, ſhall produce and deliver the ſaid books, together with all waſte-books, pocket-books, diaries, memorials, and other writings and papers whatſoever, wherein he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall make, or cauſe to be made, any entries,

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entries, or ſet down any matter or thing touching or concerning the ſaid Company's affairs, or any of them, or any way relating thereunto (although the ſame may or ſhall be intermixed with his own or others concerns) unto the ſaid Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, or to ſuch perſon or perſons as ſhall by letter or order under the hands of thirteen or more of the ſaid Court of Directors, or under the ſeal of the ſaid Company, be authorized and appointed to demand and receive the ſame; and ſhall and will, if required, make oath to the truth of ſuch books, diaries, memorials, writings, and papers, and that the ſame contain the whole of his tranſactions, and that they have not been defaced, obliterated, or altered: And further, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will well and truly deliver and pay unto the ſaid United Company, or their ſucceſſors, all and every ſuch monies, goods, merchandizes, and things whatſoever, as by the foot of his account, or otherwiſe, ſhall be due from him, or remain in his hands and poſſeſſion, and for which he ought to be chargeable or anſwerable in any manner or wiſe: And alſo that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will (before he ſhall leave the ſaid Company's factories or ſettlements) pay and diſcharge all and every ſuch ſum or ſums of money as he ſhall juſtly owe or be indebted to any of the Black Merchants or Natives of the Country where he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall be, together with ſuch other ſums as he ſhall owe abroad to any other merchants or perſons not being ſubjects of His Majeſty the King of *Great Britain*, or his ſucceſſors: And that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, from time to time, when and as often as he ſhall be thereunto required by the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, or by the Preſident, Agent, or Chief and Council of the place where the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall be, remove to any ſuch other factories as ſuch Preſident, Agent, or Chief and Council ſhall ſo direct and require: And alſo, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall, at all times during the time of his ſervice aforeſaid, faithfully and diligently demean himſelf as a good, honeſt, and faithful ſervant towards the ſaid Company, and their ſucceſſors, and thoſe by them authorized. And foraſmuch as complaints have been made to the ſaid United Company, that ſeveral of the ſaid Company's Preſidents and Chiefs of their factories, and ſeveral of ſuch perſons as are of their Councils in their factories abroad, or ſome of them, as alſo their Factors, Agents, and Servants, have committed very heinous and grievous offences in ſuch factories of the ſaid Company and elſewhere in the *Eaſt Indies*, and other places within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, by unjuſtly menacing, impriſoning, aſſaulting, abuſing, and evil treating the Natives and Black Merchants, and others with whom the ſaid Company have had dealings or correſpondence; and by ſuch means, and other violences, abuſes, and injuries, have extorted and forced great ſums of money, and other valuable effects, from ſuch injured perſons; who, by reaſon of the great diſtance from this kingdom, and the wholeſome laws thereof, and by reaſon that the ſaid Company have not been enabled to obtain and render ſatisfaction for ſuch injuries and miſdemeanors, are, and have been remedileſs: Now it is hereby agreed by and between the ſaid parties to theſe preſents, and the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that in caſe any ſum or ſums of money, goods or chattels whatſoever, ſhall at any time or times hereafter be extorted, forced, or taken by him the ſaid *Peter Perring* (either ſeparately or jointly with others) from any perſon or perſons whatſoever, within the ſaid Company's limits of trade, by the means or uſe of impriſonments, aſſaults, violences, menaces, or other force or compulſion whatſoever, then and as often as any ſuch offence or offences ſhall be committed, it ſhall and may be lawful to and for every perſon or perſons injured thereby, to make and ſend over complaints and atteſtations thereof in writing, to the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being; and that upon the receipt of ſuch complaints and atteſtations, it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company for the time being, to enquire into the truth of the ſaid complaints by all ſuch ways and means as they ſhall think juſt and equitable, and thereupon to hear the matter of the ſaid complaint or complaints, and thereupon finally to judge and determine the ſame, and to award ſatisfaction and reparation to be made by the ſaid *Peter Perring* to the ſaid Company, for the benefit of ſuch injured perſons; and the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, well and truly to pay to the ſaid Company, at ſuch time or times as ſhall be limited by the ſaid Court of Directors (or the major part of them) for that purpoſe, all and every ſuch ſum and ſums of money as ſhall be ſo awarded by the ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, or the major part of them then aſſembled, to be paid as aforeſaid; but in truſt nevertheleſs, and to the intent, that the ſaid Company may and do render and pay over the monies received or recovered by them, to the parties injured or defrauded; which the ſaid Company accordingly hereby agree and covenant to do: And the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth furthermore for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, to pay and ſatisfy to the ſaid Company, for their own uſe and benefit, all ſuch damages as they ſhall have ſuſtained by reaſon or means of any ſuch offence or offences as aforeſaid. And foraſmuch as it frequently happens that the Preſident and Council, Agent and Council, Chief and Council, and ſeveral other ſubordinate Officers of ſeveral of the ſaid Company's factories abroad, have, by mutual influences on each other, ſettled, ſtated, and adjuſted amongſt themſelves, their own accounts with the ſaid Company, in order, as far as they could, to bar and preclude the ſaid Company from reviewing, altering, amending, correcting, or conteſting the ſame: Now it is hereby further declared, That all and every ſuch account and accounts, ſo at any time ſtated, balanced, ſigned, or adjuſted, by, between, or amongſt ſuch Preſidents and Councils, or Agents and Councils, or Chiefs and Councils, or other ſubordinate Officers, or any of them, and the ſaid *Peter Perring*, are hereby agreed to be, and ſhall at all times hereafter be taken and eſteemed to be, open accounts, formed and prepared only for the inſpection, peruſal, and approbation or correction of the ſaid Company, and ſhall not in any ſort or kind, or in any article thereof, bind or conclude the ſaid Company: And the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* will not at any time during his reſidence in the *Eaſt Indies*, or within the ſaid Company's limits, directly or indirectly, trade, correſpond, traffic, deal with or for, or be in anywiſe aiding, aſſiſting, or employed as Agent or Factor by or for any foreign Company trading in or to the *Eaſt Indies*, or any perſon or perſons whatſoever who do or ſhall, during the continuance of theſe preſents, traffic, adventure, or trade to, in, or from the *Eaſt Indies*, or elſewhere within the limits of the ſaid Company's trade, by or under, or by virtue of any foreign commiſſion, licence, or authority whatſoever; nor ſhall or will, by himſelf or in conjunction with any perſon or perſons whatſoever, directly or indirectly, carry on, or uſe, or be concerned in any ſort of trade, traffic, or merchandize, either from *Europe* to the *Eaſt Indies*, or to any place within the ſaid Company's limits, between the *Cape of Good Hope* and the *Streights of Magellan*, or from the *Eaſt Indies*, or from any place within the ſaid Company's limits, to *Europe*, or to or from any place whatſoever, although not within the ſaid Company's limits of trade; ſave and except for and on account of the ſaid Company: And, in order to a diſcovery of and a ſatisfaction for ſuch illicit trade as aforeſaid, it is hereby agreed, That it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the

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ſaid United Company, and their ſucceſſors, to file any bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery, in His Majeſty's High Court of Chancery or Court of Exchequer, againſt him the ſaid *Peter Perring*, his executors and adminiſtrators; whereunto the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby agree, that neither he nor they ſhall or will demur or plead in bar of the diſcovery or relief ſought by ſuch bill or bills, that thereby he or they is, are, may, or ſhall become liable to any penalty or forfeiture, by force of any law or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or otherwiſe howſoever, but ſhall make and put in a full and perfect anſwer and anſwers to all the parts thereof, and ſhall not, in ſuch anſwer and anſwers, inſiſt upon any penalty, forfeiture, law or ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or alledge any matter whatſoever, whereby to prevent, bar, or preclude the ſaid Company from the diſcovery or relief ſought or to be ſought by ſuch bill or bills as aforeſaid; but then and in ſuch caſe the ſaid United Company do hereby conſent to wave and diſclaim all and all manner of penalties and forfeitures that ſhall or may, in any kind or degree whatſoever, accrue or incur to them, upon or by reaſon of any diſcovery or diſcloſure ariſing by the ſaid anſwer or anſwers of the ſaid *Peter Perring*, his executors or adminiſtrators: And the ſaid United Company, for themſelves and their ſucceſſors, do agree to accept, and the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, agree to account for and pay, or cauſe to be paid to or to the uſe of the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, as and for a full, ſtated, and adjuſted compenſation and ſatisfaction for the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid Company, upon account of the ſaid illicit trade, the ſum of one hundred pounds for every one hundred pounds value of all and every the goods and merchandizes traded or trafficked with or for, contrary to the true intent and meaning hereof. Provided always, and it is hereby expreſsly covenanted, declared, and agreed, between the parties to theſe preſents, and it is the true intent and meaning thereof, that in caſe the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall make default in any of the covenants hereinbefore contained, or ſhall embezzle any of the ſaid Company's money, goods, or effects, or be guilty of any breach of truſt towards the ſaid Company, or ſhall be concerned in buying, bartering, ſelling, or diſpoſing of any artillery, ordnance, muſquets, fire-arms, ammunition, or warlike ſtores, to or for the uſe of any Prince, Nabob, or Country Power in *India*, or of the Natives there, without the expreſs licence of the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors for the time being, or a majority of them, or of the ſaid Company's Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where ſuch buying, bartering, or ſelling ſhall be; or in caſe the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall at any time during the continuance of theſe preſents, without the like licence and authority as aforeſaid, hold correſpondence with any Prince, Nabob, or Country Power in *India*, or any of their Miniſters; or ſhall ſupply, lend to, or procure, for the uſe of any foreign Company trading in or to *India*, or any perſon or perſons trading under the licence or authority of ſuch foreign Company, any money at reſpondentia, or any other ſecurity, loan, or engagement whatſoever; that then, and in each and every of the ſaid caſes, it ſhall be lawful for the ſaid Company, and their ſaid Court of Directors for the time being, or the majority of them, or the Preſident and Council at the reſpective ſettlement where the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall be reſident or employed, and they are hereby reſpectively declared, to have full power and authority for that purpoſe, to ſuſpend or wholly diſmiſs the ſaid *Peter Perring* from the ſaid Company's ſervice and employment; the ſaid *Peter Perring* having firſt had notice given him of ſuch his offence or default, and a reaſonable time allowed him to make his defence againſt the ſame, and having been convicted thereof. And, for the more effectually carrying the ſaid laſt-mentioned covenant and agreement into execution, it is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that in caſe of ſuch diſmiſſion from, or quitting and reſigning the ſaid Company's ſervice and employment, he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, within one year after the ſame ſhall happen, or by the firſt paſſage that can be obtained after the expiration of the ſaid one year, tranſport himſelf, together with his Family, to *Great Britain*, in ſuch ſhip employed by the ſaid Company as ſhall be appointed for that purpoſe by the ſaid Company, or by their Court of Directors, or their Preſident and Council as aforeſaid; and ſhall not nor will, upon any account or pretence whatſoever, ſtay or continue any longer in the *Eaſt Indies*: And moreover, in caſe the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall make default in the ſaid laſt-mentioned covenant, the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby conſent and agree with the ſaid United Company, that from and immediately after ſuch default, it ſhall and may be lawful for the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors, or their Preſident and Council at the ſaid ſettlement where the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall reſide or be, to cauſe the ſaid *Peter Perring* to be apprehended and detained, and to put him and his Family on board any ſhip employed by the ſaid Company for the purpoſe of being tranſported to *Great Britain*; ſo nevertheleſs that no unneceſſary delay be ſought, nor any fit occaſion or opportunity loſt in ſo doing: And further, in caſe of ſuch apprehending, putting on board, and tranſporting the ſaid *Peter Perring* and his Family, in manner aforeſaid, the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby covenant, promiſe, and agree, to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring*, his executors or adminiſtrators, ſhall not nor will commence, ſue, or proſecute the ſaid Company, or their Court of Directors, or any of their Preſidents and Council, Commanders or Officers of any ſuch ſhip, or any other perſon employed in any of the matters aforeſaid, in or by any action, ſuit, or other proſecution, civil or criminal, in reſpect of ſuch apprehending and detaining him the ſaid *Peter Perring*, or of putting on board and tranſporting him the ſaid *Peter Perring* and his Family to *Great Britain*, in manner aforeſaid; and in caſe any ſuch action, ſuit, or proſecution ſhall be commenced, ſued, or proſecuted, for any of the matters aforeſaid, the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the ſaid Company, that the general iſſue may be pleaded, and that this preſent Indenture, or any other ſpecial matter, may be given in evidence by any of the defendants in any ſuch ſuit, action, or proſecution. In witneſs whereof the ſaid United Company have to one part of theſe Indentures ſet their common ſeal, and the ſaid *Peter Perring* hath to the other part of the ſaid Indentures ſet his hand and ſeal, the day and year firſt above written.

P. Perring. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being ſtamped according to Act of Parliament) in the preſence of us,

John Whitehill.
The' Lewin.

I acknowledge to have read the within covenant before I executed the ſame.

(Signed) *P. Perring.*

Witneſs, (Signed) *Sam' Johnſon.*
John Whitehill.

(Copy.) 2d June 1777.

Covenant of *Peter Perring*, Eſquire, of Council at *Fort Saint George*, reſpecting Trade and Money Tranſactions.

This Indenture, made the ſecond day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, King, Defender of the Faith, and

APPENDIX No. 2.

ſo forth, and in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, Between the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the one part, and *Peter Perring*, of *Fort Saint George*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, Eſquire, of the other part, witneſſeth, That for and in conſideration of the ſaid *Peter Perring* being appointed one of the Members of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*, and for and in conſideration of the ſalary of ſixteen thouſand Pagodas by the year, agreed to be allowed and paid by the ſaid United Company to the ſaid *Peter Perring*, as one of the Members of the ſaid Council of the ſaid Preſidency as aforeſaid, he the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree, to and with the ſaid United Company, in manner and form following; that is to ſay, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring*, during the time he ſhall continue to be one of the Members of the Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, ſhall not nor will, directly or indirectly, on any pretence or pretext whatſoever, by himſelf, or by any other perſon or perſons, of his or their uſe, or on his or their behalf, carry on or be concerned in, or have any dealing or tranſactions by way of traffic or commerce, in money or in goods of any kind whatſoever, for his or their uſe, benefit, profit, or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whatſoever; ſave and except the trade and commerce of the ſaid United Company, to be carried on by him as one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid, for the uſe and benefit of the ſaid Company; and alſo ſave and except the diſpoſal of ſuch goods and merchandize as ſhall be remaining on hand and unſold, belonging to him the ſaid *Peter Perring* at the time of his taking the ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council of *Fort Saint George* upon him; and alſo ſave and except the collecting and getting in ſuch debts as ſhall be owing to him the ſaid *Peter Perring* at that time, in reſpect of the trade and commerce heretofore carried on by him, or wherein he hath been concerned: And alſo that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, within thirty days next after the time that he ſhall take upon him the ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid, deliver to the Preſident and Governor and Council of the ſaid Preſidency, at the Council Board, a full and juſt ſpecification, upon oath, of the debts due to him the ſaid *Peter Perring*, in the courſe of the ſaid trade and commerce heretofore carried on by him, or wherein he hath been concerned, and of the goods, wares, merchandize, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which he or they ſhall be at that time poſſeſſed; and ſhall and will ſell and diſpoſe of ſuch goods, wares, merchandize, effects, and ſtock in trade, within the ſpace of nine months next after he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall take upon him the ſaid office or place of one of the Members of the ſaid Council, as aforeſaid: And alſo that he the ſaid *Peter Perring*, during the time he ſhall continue to be one of the Members of the ſaid Council as aforeſaid, or in any other ſtation or capacity in the ſervice of or under the protection of the ſaid United Company, ſhall not nor will lend money to any of the Country Powers in *India*, nor to any perſon or perſons holding any commiſſion or commiſſions under or employed by them, directly or indirectly, on any mortgage or mortgages, or on any ſecurity or ſecurities in the nature of mortgage or mortgages, upon lands, or upon the produce or any growing revenue of the country: And alſo that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will, within thirty days next after his taking upon him the ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council, and before he ſhall proceed to recover any ſuch monies as aforeſaid, deliver, or cauſe to be delivered, to the Preſident and Governor and Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, at the Council Board, upon oath, a ſpecific and particular account of all ſuch loan and loans (if any) as at this time he the ſaid *Peter Perring* is concerned, and therein ſhall and will ſpecify and declare how ſuch loan or loans reſpectively is or are ſecured, and deſcribe the whole tranſaction from the beginning of ſuch loan: And alſo that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and will accept and take ſuch ſalary and allowance as are hereinbefore mentioned to be agreed to be paid and allowed to him, in hire and full ſatisfaction of all other fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever; that he ſhall not, nor will, directly or indirectly, on any pretext or pretence whatſoever, by himſelf, or by any other perſon or perſons for his uſe, accept or take any fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages, whatſoever, other than and except the ſalary and allowances hereinbefore mentioned: And for the true performance of the covenants and agreements herein contained, on the part of him the ſaid *Peter Perring*, he the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby bind himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, unto the ſaid United Company in the ſum of twenty five thouſand pounds of lawful money of *Great Britain*: And, in order to a diſcovery of ſuch trading and trafficking, and of ſuch loan or loans, and of ſuch fees, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages, carried on, made, accepted, or taken, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, it is hereby covenanted and agreed, that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the ſaid United Company, to file any bill or bills of complaint, or diſcovery, in His Majeſty's High Court of Chancery, or Court of Exchequer in *England*, or in the Mayor's Court of *Madras* aforeſaid, againſt him the ſaid *Peter Perring*, for a diſcovery of any breach or breaches of all or any of the covenants herein contained, and for ſatisfaction of the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid Company on account thereof; whereonto the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth hereby covenant and agree, that he ſhall not nor will demand or plead in bar of the diſcovery or relief ſought by ſuch bill or bills, that thereby he is, may, or ſhall become liable to any penalty or forfeiture by force of any law, ſtatute, bond, covenant, or agreement, or otherwiſe howſoever, but ſhall put in a perfect anſwer and anſwers to all the parts thereof, and ſhall not, in any ſuch anſwer or anſwers, inſiſt upon any penalty, forfeiture, law, or ſtatutes, bond, covenant, or agreement, or alledge any matter whatſoever, whereby to prevent, bar, or preclude the ſaid United Company from the diſcovery or relief ſought, or to be ſought, by ſuch bill or bills as aforeſaid; but then and in ſuch caſe the ſaid United Company do hereby conſent to wave and diſclaim all and all manner of penalties and forfeitures which ſhall or may, in any kind or degree whatſoever, accrue or incur to them, upon or by reaſon of any diſcovery or diſcloſure ariſing by or from the ſaid anſwer or anſwers of the ſaid *Peter Perring*, other than except the ſum or ſums of money hereinafter agreed to be paid to the ſaid United Company, by way of ſatisfaction for the damages which the ſaid United Company ſhall or may ſuſtain, in reſpect of any breach or breaches of the covenants aforeſaid, or any of them: And the ſaid United Company for themſelves, do agree to accept and take, and the ſaid *Peter Perring* doth for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, agree to account for and pay, or cauſe to be paid, to or to the uſe of the ſaid United Company, as and for a full, ſtated, and adjuſted compenſation and ſatisfaction for the damages ſuſtained by the ſaid United Company, by reaſon or means of any breach or breaches, of any or either of the covenants and agreements hereinbefore contained on the part of the ſaid *Peter Perring*, the ſeveral and reſpective ſum or ſums of money hereinafter mentioned; (that is to ſay) the ſum of one hundred pounds for every one hundred pounds value, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer value, of all and every the goods, merchandize, and money, traded or trafficked with or for, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſum of one hundred pounds, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer value, in reſpect of every one hundred

dred pounds which ſhall be lent by the ſaid *Peter Perring* to any of the Princes in *India*, or their officers, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents; and the ſum of two hundred pounds in reſpect of every one hundred pounds, and ſo in proportion for any greater or leſſer ſum, which ſhall be accepted, received, or taken by him the ſaid *Peter Perring*, for any fee, perquiſite of office, emolument, or advantage whatſoever, over and beſides the ſalary and allowances hereinbefore mentioned to be agreed to be made to him. Provided always nevertheleſs, That ſuch bill or bills of complaint or diſcovery as aforeſaid, ſhall be filed within three years next after the breach of the covenants aforeſaid ſhall be made known to the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall have quitted his ſaid office of one of the Members of the ſaid Council of *Fort Saint George*, or ſhall have been removed therefrom; and in default of ſuch bill or bills being filed within the ſaid three years from the time aforeſaid, the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall and may demur or plead thereto, in like manner as he might have done if he had not agreed to anſwer the ſame as aforeſaid. In witneſs whereof, the ſaid United Company have to one part of theſe Indentures ſet their common ſeal, and the ſaid *Peter Perring* hath to the other part of the ſaid Indenture ſet his hand and ſeal, the day and year firſt above written.

(Signed) *P. Perring.* (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt duly ſtamped) in the preſence of
Samuel Johnſon,
John Whitehey.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant, before I executed the ſame.
P. Perring.

Witneſs,
John Whitehey,
Samuel Johnſon.

(Copy.) 19 June 1777.

Covenant of *Peter Perring*, Eſquire, of Council at *Fort St. George*, reſpecting Preſents.

1776. Civil. 1000.

This Indenture, made the nineteenth day of June, in the ſeventeenth year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord *George* the Third, by the grace of God, King of *Great Britain*, *France*, and *Ireland*, Defender of the Faith, and ſo forth, and in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, between *Peter Perring*, of *Fort St. George* in the *Eaſt Indies*, Eſquire, of the one part, and the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, of the other part: Whereas the ſaid *Peter Perring* is employed in the ſervice of the ſaid United Company as one of their Counſellors and Covenant Servants at their chief Settlement of *Fort St. George*, on the coaſt of *Choromandel*, in the *Eaſt Indies*; Now this Indenture witneſſeth, and the ſaid *Peter Perring*, in compliance with a Reſolution of a General Court of the ſaid United Company, and for and in conſideration of what he is or ſhall be entitled to receive from the ſaid Company, in reſpect of his ſaid ſervice, or in reſpect of any other ſtation, capacity, or employment in which the ſaid *Peter Perring* may hereafter be retained or employed by the ſaid United Company, or their Court of Directors, doth hereby for himſelf, his heirs, executors, and adminiſtrators, covenant, promiſe, and agree to and with the ſaid United Company, that he the ſaid *Peter Perring* ſhall not nor will, at any time or times hereafter, during his being employed in the ſaid Company's ſervice, in any ſtation or capacity whatſoever, either by himſelf or by any other perſon or perſons whomſoever in truſt for him or for his uſe, directly or indirectly, accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take or receive, any gift or grant of lands, or rents or revenues iſſuing out of lands, or any territorial poſſeſſion, juriſdiction, dominion, power or authority whatſoever, from any of the Indian Princes, Sovereigns, Subahs, or Nabobs, or any of their miniſters, ſervants, or agents, for any ſervice or ſervices, or upon any account or pretence whatſoever, nor ſhall or will, at any time or times hereafter during his being employed in the ſaid United Company's ſervice, in any ſtation or capacity whatſoever, either by himſelf or any other perſon or perſons whomſoever in truſt for him or for his uſe, directly or indirectly, accept, take, or receive, or agree to accept, take, or receive, any gift, reward, gratuity, allowance, donation, or compenſation, in money, effects, jewels, or otherwiſe howſoever, from any of the Indian Princes, Sovereigns, Subahs, or Nabobs, or any of their miniſters, ſervants, or agents, for any ſervice or ſervices performed or to be performed by the ſaid *Peter Perring* in *India*, upon any account and pretence whatſoever: And that all and every ſuch gifts or grants of lands, or rents or revenues iſſuing out of lands, or any ſuch territorial poſſeſſion, juriſdiction, dominion, power, or authority whatſoever; and all and every ſuch gifts, rewards, gratuities, allowances, donations, or compenſations whatſoever, which, contrary to the true intent and meaning of theſe preſents, ſhall come to the hands, poſſeſſion, or power of the ſaid *Peter Perring*, or any other perſon or perſons in truſt for him, or for his uſe as aforeſaid, ſhall be deemed and conſtrued to have been received and taken by him or them, for the ſole uſe of the ſaid United Company. In witneſs whereof to one part of theſe Indentures the ſaid *Peter Perring* hath ſet his hand and ſeal, and to the other part thereof the ſaid United Company have cauſed their common ſeal to be put the day and year above written.

P. Perring. (L. S.)

Sealed and delivered (being firſt duly ſtamped) in the preſence of
John Whitehill,
Tho. Lewin.

I acknowledge to have read the within Covenant, before I executed the ſame.
P. Perring.

Witneſs,

(Signed) { *Saml Johnſon.* / *John Whitehill.* }

APPENDIX, No. 3.

An Act for eſtabliſhing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in *Europe*. 13 Geo. III. c. 63.

WHEREAS the ſeveral powers and authorities granted by charters to the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, have been found, by experience, not to have ſufficient force and efficacy to prevent various abuſes which have prevailed in the government and adminiſtration of the affairs of the ſaid United Company, as well at home as in *India*, to the manifeſt injury of the public credit, and of the commercial intereſts of the ſaid Company; and it is therefore become highly expedient that certain further regulations, better adapted to their preſent circumſtances and condition, ſhould be provided and eſtabliſhed: And whereas the electing and chuſing of Directors of the ſaid United Company every year, in ſuch manner as at preſent preſcribed by charter, has not anſwered the good purpoſes intended thereby, but, on the contrary, by limiting the duration of their office to ſo ſhort a time, evidently tends to weaken the authority of the Court of Directors, and to produce inſtability in the councils and meaſures of the ſaid Company; May it therefore pleaſe Your Majeſty that it may be Enacted; and Be it Enacted by the King's Moſt Excellent Majeſty, by and with the advice and conſent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this preſent Parliament aſſembled, and by the authority Preamble.

APPENDIX. No. 3.

At the next enſuing General Election, inſtead of 24, there ſhall be choſen 6 Directors for the term of one year, 6 for two years, 6 for three years, 6 for four years; and thenceforward 6 to be choſen yearly.

rity of the ſame, That at the next enſuing General Election of Directors of the ſaid United Company, inſtead of an election of twenty-four Directors to ſerve for the ſpace of one year only, there ſhall be choſen, in ſuch manner and order as the Directors of the ſaid United Company for the time being ſhall appoint, ſix Directors expreſsly for the term of one year, and ſix other Directors for the term of two years, and ſix other Directors for the term of three years, and the remaining ſix Directors for the term of four years, and not otherwiſe; and from thenceforth, yearly, and every year, and at the expiration of each and every of the ſaid terms reſpectively, ſix new Directors, and no more, ſhall be choſen, from time to time, in the place of ſuch Directors whoſe term ſhall have expired, and who are hereby declared incapable of being then re-choſen; and at every ſubſequent election, during the continuance of the charter of the ſaid United Company, ſix new Directors ſhall be choſen, and ſhall continue to be Directors for the term of four years, and no longer, to be accounted from the day on which the election of ſuch Directors was reſpectively made: And in caſe the office and authority of any ſuch Director ſhall become void by death, removal, or otherwiſe, another ſhall be choſen from time to time in his place, to ſerve as a Director during the remainder of ſuch term for which the perſon whoſe office ſhall have become void was choſen, and no longer.

No perſon employed in any office in the Eaſt Indies, ſhall be choſen into the office of Director, until he ſhall return and be reſident in England for two years.

And it is hereby further Enacted, That no perſon or perſons whatſoever, employed in any civil or military ſtation, office, or capacity whatſoever, in the *Eaſt Indies*, or claiming or exerciſing any power, authority, or juriſdiction therein, ſhall be capable of being appointed or choſen into the office of Director, until ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall have returned to and been reſident in *England* for the ſpace of two years; any law or uſage to the contrary notwithſtanding.

All transfers made in a collusive manner to qualify voters at elections,

And whereas it has been found, that the proviſion made by the charter of the tenth year of the reign of King *William* the Third, under which perſons poſſeſſed of five hundred pounds ſtock are entitled to vote in General Courts, has been productive of much inconvenience in the preſent ſituation of the Company, and tends to promote the miſchievous practice of making colluſive tranſfers, which practice hath not been ſufficiently prevented by the proviſion made by an Act of the ſeventh year of His preſent Majeſty's reign, whereby the right of voting is limited to perſons having been ſix calendar months in poſſeſſion of their ſtock; Be it further Enacted, That all tranſfers of ſtocks whatſoever made to any perſon or perſons in any fraudulent or colluſive manner, on purpoſe to qualify him, her, or them, to give his, her, or their vote or votes at any election of Members of the Court of Directors, or in any General Court of the ſaid United Company (ſubject nevertheleſs to conditions or agreements, either verbal or in writing, to defeat or determine ſuch tranſfers, or to re-tranſfer or return the ſame) ſhall be deemed and taken againſt thoſe perſons who tranſferred the ſame, as free and abſolute, and be holden and enjoyed by all and every ſuch perſon or perſons to whom ſuch tranſfer ſhall be made, as aforeſaid, freely and abſolutely acquitted, exonerated and diſcharged, of and from all manner of truſts, conditions, powers of revocation, proviſoes of redemption, or other defeazances between or with the ſaid parties, or any other perſon or perſons in truſt for them; and that all bonds, covenants, notes collateral, or other ſecurities, contracts, or agreements, between or with the ſaid parties, or any other perſon or perſons in truſt for them, or any of them, for the re-tranſferring, redeeming, revoking, or defeating ſuch tranſfer, or for the reſtoring or re-tranſferring thereof, or any part thereof, to any perſon or perſons who made ſuch tranſfer, or to any other perſon or perſons in truſt for them, or any of them, ſhall be null and void, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever: And that every perſon to whom ſuch tranſfer ſhall have been made, and who ſhall have voted by virtue thereof at any election of Members of the Court of Directors, or in any General Court of the ſaid United Company, and who ſhall afterwards re-tranſfer or return the ſame, in conſequence of any truſt, condition, powers of revocation, proviſo of redemption, or other defeazance whatſoever, as aforeſaid, ſhall, for every ſuch offence, forfeit the ſum of one thouſand pounds; one moiety whereof ſhall go and be diſpoſed of, to any perſon who ſhall ſue for the ſame, and the other moiety to His Majeſty, His Heirs and Succeſſors; to be recovered, together with full coſts of ſuit, by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, in any of His Majeſty's Court of Records at *Weſtminſter*, wherein no eſſoin, privilege, protection, wager of law, or more than one imparlance, ſhall be admitted or allowed: And that from and after the firſt day of October one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-three, no Member or Proprietor of the ſaid United Company ſhall be deemed qualified or capable to vote, or be admitted to give any vote or votes, at any election of Directors, or at any General Court of the ſaid United Company, in reſpect of any ſtock amounting to leſs than one thouſand pounds, nor in reſpect of any transferred to him, her, or them; after the ſaid firſt day of October one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-three, until he, ſhe, or they, ſhall have been poſſeſſed of ſuch ſtock twelve calendar months, in his, her, or their own right, and not in truſt for any other perſon or perſons whatſoever, freed and diſcharged of all incumbrances which can or may affect the ſame; unleſs ſuch ſtock ſhall have been acquired, or ſhall have come to ſuch Proprietor by bequeſt, or by marriage, or by ſucceſſion to any inteſtate's eſtates, or by the cuſtom of the city of *London*, or by any deed of ſettlement after the death of any perſon who ſhall have been entitled for life to the dividends of ſuch ſtock; any law, ſtatute, or uſage, to the contrary notwithſtanding.

and all bonds, covenants, &c. with perſons in truſt, ſhall be null and void;

And every perſon to whom ſuch tranſfer ſhall have been made, or who ſhall have voted by virtue thereof, at any election, who ſhall afterwards re-tranſfer the ſame, in conſequence of any truſts, ſhall forfeit, for every offence, 1000l. to be recovered with full coſts, at Weſtminſter;

and after Oct. 1, 1773, no Proprietor ſhall vote at any election of Directors in reſpect of ſtock, amounting to leſs than 1000l. nor until he ſhall have been poſſeſſed of ſuch, 12 calendar months.

Provided always, and be it further Enacted by the authority aforeſaid, That every Member or Proprietor of the ſaid United Company, who ſhall be poſſeſſed, for the time or term aforeſaid, in his or her own right, of three thouſand pounds capital ſtock of the ſaid Company, ſhall be entitled to give two votes at any election of Directors, or at any ballot of the ſaid Company; and every Member or Proprietor who ſhall be poſſeſſed, for the time or term aforeſaid, of ſix thouſand pounds, in his or her own right, ſhall be entitled to give three votes; and every Member or Proprietor who ſhall be poſſeſſed, for the time or term aforeſaid, of ten thouſand pounds, or more, ſhall be entitled to give four votes at ſuch election or ballot; and the oath and affirmation hereinafter reſpectively preſcribed, ſhall, as occaſion ſhall require, be altered in ſuch manner as ſhall be neceſſary to comprize ſuch right of voting.

Every Proprietor poſſeſſed of 3000l. capital ſtock, ſhall be entitled to two votes at any election; if poſſeſſed of 6000l. he ſhall have three votes; and when poſſeſſed of 10,000l. is entitled to four votes.

Provided always, and it is hereby further Enacted, That any Member or Proprietor of the ſaid United Company ſhall be deemed qualified or capable to vote, and ſhall be admitted to give his or her vote or votes, at any election of Directors, or at any General Court of the ſaid United Company, that ſhall be held after the firſt day of October, one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-three, in reſpect of any ſuch ſtock, not amounting to leſs than one thouſand pounds, whereof he or ſhe ſhall have been poſſeſſed from the ſaid firſt day of October, any thing herein contained to the contrary notwithſtanding: And the oath and affirmation hereinafter reſpectively preſcribed ſhall be, as occaſion ſhall require, altered in ſuch manner in reſpect of the continuance of the poſſeſſion of ſuch ſtock as to comprize the time aforeſaid.

Every Member ſhall be deemed qualified to vote at elections of Directors, in reſpect of 1,000l. ſtock, after Oct. 1, 1773.

And be it further Enacted by the authority aforeſaid, That from and after the firſt day of October one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-three, upon every election to be made of any Member or Members of the Court of Directors, and upon every ballot to be taken at any General Court of the ſaid United Company, every Member or Proprietor of the ſaid Company ſhall, before admitted to vote at ſuch election, or in ſuch General Court, firſt take the oath hereafter mentioned, before two or more

Upon election of Directors, every Proprietor ſhall, before admitted to vote, take the following oath.

more of the Directors of the ſaid United Company, who are hereby empowered to adminiſter ſuch oath; (that is to ſay)

"I, *A. B.* do ſwear, [or, being one of the people "called Quakers, do ſolemnly affirm] That the "ſum of one thouſand pounds, or more, of the "capital ſtock of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, "ſtanding in my name, doth at this time belong, "and hath for the ſpace of twelve calendar "months actually belonged to me, in my own "right, and not in truſt for any perſon or perſons whatſoever; and that I have been in the "actual receipt of the dividends and profits "thereof for my own uſe, freed and diſcharged "of all incumbrances which can or may affect "the ſame, for the ſaid ſpace of twelve calendar "months; or, that the ſame came to me within "the time aforeſaid, by bequeſt, or, by marriage, or, by ſucceſſion to an inteſtate's eſtate, "or, by the cuſtom of the city of *London*, or, by "ſettlement; and that ſuch ſtock has not been "transferred or made to me fraudulently or col"luſively on purpoſe to qualify me to give my "vote; and that I have not before given my "vote on this ballot.

"So help me GOD."

Perſons committing wilful perjury, or corruptly ſuborning others ſo to do, ſhall be liable to the penalties in Acts 5 Eliz. and 2 Geo. II.

And in caſe any perſon taking the oath or affirmation hereby appointed, ſhall thereby commit wilful perjury, and be thereof convicted; and if any perſon do unlawfully or corruptly procure or ſuborn any other perſon to take the ſaid oath or affirmation, in order to vote, whereby he or ſhe ſhall commit ſuch wilful perjury, and ſhall be thereof convicted, he, ſhe, and they, for every ſuch offence, ſhall incur ſuch pains and penalties as are in and by two Acts of Parliament, the one made in the fifth year of the late Queen *Elizabeth*, intituled, "An Act "for puniſhing ſuch perſons as ſhall procure or commit "wilful perjury, or ſuborn or procure any perſon to "commit any wilful or corrupt perjury;" the other made in the ſecond year of his Majeſty King *George* the Second, intituled, "An Act for the more effectual pre"venting and further puniſhment of forgery, perjury, "and ſubornation of perjury, and to make it felony to "ſteal bonds, notes, or other ſecurities, for payment of "money," directed to be inflicted for offences committed contrary to the ſaid Acts.

A Governor General and four Counſellors to be appointed, in whom the whole Civil and Military Government of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, ſhall be veſted.

And, for the better management of the ſaid United Company's affairs in *India*, Be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That for the Government of the Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, there ſhall be appointed a Governor General, and four Counſellors; and that the whole Civil and Military Government of the ſaid Preſidency, and alſo the ordering, management, and government, of all the territorial acquiſitions and revenues in the kingdoms of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, ſhall, during ſuch time as the territorial acquiſitions and revenues ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the ſaid United Company, be, and are hereby veſted in the ſaid Governor General and Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, in like manner, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as the ſame now are, or at any time heretofore might have been exerciſed by the Preſident and Council, or Select Committee, in the ſaid kingdoms.

In caſe of difference of opinion, the deciſion of the major part to be concluſive; and in caſe of death, removal, or abſence, the Governor or eldeſt Counſellor to have a caſting vote.

And be it enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That in all caſes whatſoever, wherein any difference of opinion ſhall ariſe upon any queſtion propoſed in any conſultation, the ſaid Governor General and Council ſhall be bound and concluded by the opinion and deciſion of the major part of thoſe preſent: And if it ſhall happen, that by the death or removal, or by the abſence of any of the members of the ſaid Council, ſuch Governor General and Council ſhall happen to be equally divided, then, and in every ſuch caſe, the ſaid Governor General, or, in his abſence, the eldeſt Counſellor preſent, ſhall have a caſting voice, and his opinion ſhall be deciſive and concluſive.

Power of the Governor General and Council.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That the ſaid Governor General and Council, or the major part of them, ſhall have, and they are hereby authorized to have, power of ſuperintending and controlling the government and management of the Preſidencies of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, reſpectively, ſo far and inſomuch as that it ſhall not be lawful for any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making War againſt any Indian Princes or Powers, or for negociating or concluding any Treaty of Peace, or other Treaty, with any ſuch Indian Princes or Powers, without the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Governor General and Council firſt had and obtained, except in ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity as would render it dangerous to poſtpone ſuch hoſtilities or treaties until the orders from the Governor General and Council might arrive; and except in ſuch caſes where the ſaid Preſidents and Councils reſpectively ſhall have received ſpecial orders from the ſaid United Company; and any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, who ſhall offend in any of the caſes aforeſaid, ſhall be liable to be ſuſpended from his or their office, by the order of the ſaid Governor General and Council; and every Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, for the time being, ſhall, and they are hereby reſpectively directed and required to pay due obedience to ſuch orders as they ſhall receive touching the premiſes, from the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being, and conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the ſaid Governor General and Council, advice and intelligence of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the government, revenues, or intereſt, of the ſaid United Company; and the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being, ſhall, and they are hereby directed and required to pay due obedience to all ſuch orders as they ſhall receive from the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and to correſpond, from time to time, and conſtantly and diligently tranſmit to the ſaid Court, an exact particular of all advices or intelligence, and of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the government, commerce, revenues, or intereſt, of the ſaid United Company; and the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, ſhall, and they are hereby directed and required, from time to time, before the expiration of fourteen days after the receiving any ſuch letters or advices, to give in and deliver unto the High Treaſurer, or Commiſſioners of His Majeſty's Treaſury for the time being, a true and exact copy of ſuch parts of the ſaid letters or advices as ſhall any way relate to the management of the revenues of the ſaid Company; and in like manner to give in and deliver to one of His Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State for the time being, a true and exact copy of all ſuch parts of the ſaid letters or advices as ſhall any way relate to the Civil or Military Affairs and Government of the ſaid Company; all which copies ſhall be fairly written, and ſhall be ſigned by two or more of the Directors of the ſaid Company.

Names of the firſt Governor General and Counſellors, who ſhall continue in office five years after their arrival at Fort William in Bengal.

And it is hereby further enacted, That *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, ſhall be the firſt Governor General; and that Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the Honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, Eſquire, and *Philip Francis*, Eſquire, ſhall be the four firſt Counſellors; and they, and each of them, ſhall hold and continue in his and their reſpective offices, for and during the term of five years from the time of their arrival at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and taking upon them the Government of the ſaid Preſidency, and ſhall not be removable, in the mean time, except by His Majeſty, His heirs, and ſucceſſors, upon repreſentation made by the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company for the time being: And in caſe of the avoidance of the office of ſuch Governor General

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General, by death, reſignation, or removal, his place ſhall, during the remainder of the term aforeſaid, as often as the caſe ſhall happen, be ſupplied by the perſon of the Council who ſtands next in rank to ſuch Governor General; and, in caſe of the death, removal, reſignation, or promotion, of any of the ſaid Council, the Directors of the ſaid United Company are hereby empowered, for and during the remainder of the ſaid term of five years, to nominate and appoint, by and with the conſent of His Majeſty, His heirs, and ſucceſſors, to be ſignified under His or their Sign Manual, a perſon to ſucceed to the office ſo become vacant in the ſaid Council; and, until ſuch appointment ſhall be made, all the powers and authorities veſted in the Governor General and Council, ſhall reſt and continue in, and be exerciſed and executed by, the Governor General and Council, remaining and ſurviving; and from and after the expiration of the ſaid term of five years, the power of nominating and removing the ſucceeding Governor General and Council ſhall be veſted in the Directors of the ſaid United Company.

Time when the proviſions relative to the Governor and Council ſhall commence.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That the ſaid ſeveral proviſions, relating to the ſaid Governor General and Council, ſhall commence and take place from and immediately after the time that public proclamation ſhall be made of the arrival of the ſaid Governor General and Counſellors hereinbefore appointed, or any three of them, at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; which proclamation the ſaid Governor General and Council are hereby required to make.

The Company may appoint officers in purſuance of former Acts or Charters.

Provided always, That nothing in this Act ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prevent, controul, or reſtrain, the ſaid United Company from conſtituting and appointing ſuch officers, factors, or agents, as they ſhall think proper and neceſſary, by virtue or in purſuance of any powers, rights, or privileges, granted to them by any former Act or Acts of Parliament, or by any charter or charters, for managing, conducting, and tranſacting the trade and commerce of the ſaid Company, at and within the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*.

His Majeſty may, by Charter, or Letters Patent, eſtabliſh a Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William, &c.

And whereas his late Majeſty King *George* the Second did, by his letters patent, bearing date at *Weſtminſter* the eighth day of January, in the twenty-ſixth year of his reign, grant unto the ſaid United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, his Royal charter, thereby, amongſt other things, conſtituting and eſtabliſhing Courts of Civil, Criminal, and Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, at the ſaid United Company's reſpective Settlements at *Madras*, *Patnam*, *Bombay* on the iſland of *Bombay*, and *Fort William* in *Bengal*; which ſaid charter does not ſufficiently provide for the due adminiſtration of Juſtice in ſuch manner as the ſtate and condition of the Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, ſo long as the ſaid Company ſhall continue in the poſſeſſion of the territorial acquiſitions before-mentioned, do and muſt require; Be it therefore enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That it ſhall and may be lawful for His Majeſty, by charter, or letters patent under the great ſeal of *Great Britain*, to erect and eſtabliſh a Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* aforeſaid, to conſiſt of a Chief Juſtice and three other Judges, being Barriſters in *England* or *Ireland* of not leſs than five years ſtanding, to be named from time to time by His Majeſty, His heirs and ſucceſſors; which ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature ſhall have, and the ſame Court is hereby declared to have, full power and authority to exerciſe and perform all civil, criminal, Admiralty, and Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, and to appoint ſuch Clerks and other miniſterial Officers of the ſaid Court, with ſuch reaſonable ſalaries, as ſhall be approved of by the ſaid Governor General in Council; and to form and eſtabliſh ſuch rules of practice, and ſuch rules for the proceſs of the ſaid Court, and to do all ſuch other things as ſhall be found neceſſary for the adminiſtration of Juſtice, and the due execution of all or any of the powers which, by the ſaid charter, ſhall or may be granted and committed to the ſaid Court; and alſo ſhall be, at all times, a Court of Record, and ſhall be a Court of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery, in and for the ſaid town of *Calcutta*, and factory of *Fort William* in *Bengal* aforeſaid, and the limits thereof, and the factories ſubordinate thereto.

to conſiſt of a Chief Juſtice and three other Judges.

Provided nevertheleſs, and be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That the ſaid new charter, which His Majeſty is hereinbefore empowered to grant, and the juriſdiction, powers, and authorities to be thereby eſtabliſhed, ſhall and may extend to all Britiſh ſubjects who ſhall reſide in the kingdoms or provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, or any of them, under the protection of the ſaid United Company; and the ſame charter ſhall be competent and effectual: And the Supreme Court of Judicature, therein and thereby to be eſtabliſhed, ſhall have full power and authority to hear and determine all complaints againſt any of His Majeſty's ſubjects, for any crimes, miſdemeanors, or oppreſſions committed, or to be committed; and alſo to entertain, hear, and determine any ſuits or actions whatſoever, againſt any of His Majeſty's ſubjects in *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, and any ſuit, action, or complaint, againſt any perſon who ſhall, at the time when ſuch debt or cauſe of action or complaint, ſhall have ariſen, have been employed by, or ſhall then have been, directly or indirectly, in the ſervice of the ſaid United Company, or any of His Majeſty's ſubjects.

Extent of the juriſdiction and powers of His Majeſty's charter;

and of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

The Supreme Court not competent to hear and determine Indictments and Informations againſt the Governor General, &c.

Provided alſo, That the ſaid Court ſhall not be competent to hear, try, or determine, any indictment or information againſt the ſaid Governor General, or any of the ſaid Council for the time being, for any offence (not being treaſon or felony) which ſuch Governor General, or any of the ſaid Council, ſhall or may be charged with having committed in *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*.

Limitation of actions before the ſaid Court.

Provided alſo, and be it enacted, That the ſaid Supreme Court ſhall hear and determine any ſuits or actions whatſoever of any of His Majeſty's ſubjects, againſt any inhabitant of *India* reſiding in any of the ſaid kingdoms or provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, or any of them, upon any contract or agreement in writing, entered into by any of the ſaid inhabitants with any of His Majeſty's ſaid ſubjects, where the cauſe of action ſhall exceed the ſum of Five hundred current Rupees; and where the ſaid inhabitant ſhall have agreed in the ſaid contract, that, in caſe of diſpute, the matter ſhall be heard and determined in the ſaid Supreme Court; and all ſuch ſuits or actions may be brought, in the firſt inſtance, before the ſaid Court, or by appeal from the ſentence of any of the Courts eſtabliſhed in the ſaid Provinces, or any of them.

The Governor General, Council, &c. not ſubject to be arreſted or impriſoned.

And it is hereby further enacted and provided, That nothing in this Act ſhall extend to ſubject the perſon of the Governor General, or of any of the ſaid Council or Chief Juſtice and Judges reſpectively for the time being, to be arreſted or impriſoned upon any action, ſuit, or proceeding, in the ſaid Court.

Appeal may be made to His Majeſty in Council.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That it ſhall and may be directed, in and by the ſaid new charter, which His Majeſty is hereinbefore empowered to grant, that in caſe any perſon or perſons whatſoever ſhall think himſelf, herſelf, or themſelves, aggrieved by any judgment or determination of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, to be eſtabliſhed as aforeſaid, he, ſhe, or they ſhall and may appeal from ſuch judgment or determination to His Majeſty in Council, His heirs or ſucceſſors, within ſuch time, in ſuch manner, and in ſuch caſes, and on ſuch ſecurity, as His Majeſty, in His ſaid charter, ſhall judge proper and reaſonable to be appointed and preſcribed.

So much of the charter granted by Geo. II. (ſhould a new charter be granted) to be repealed;

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That ſo much of the ſaid charter, granted by his ſaid late Majeſty, as reſpects or relates to the eſtabliſhment of the Mayor's Court at *Calcutta* aforeſaid, in *Bengal*, or to the civil, criminal, or eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction thereof, in the ſaid United Company's Settlement there, or the ſubordinates thereunto belonging, in caſe a new charter ſhall be granted by His Majeſty in purſuance of this Act, and ſhall be openly publiſhed at *Fort William* aforeſaid, from and immediately after ſuch publication ſhall ceaſe, determine, and be abſolutely void to all intents and purpoſes:

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otherwiſe to be in full force.

But nevertheleſs, the ſaid charter, ſo granted by his ſaid late Majeſty, ſhall, in all other reſpects, and as for and concerning all or any other of the ſaid Company's principal Preſidencies or Settlements to which the ſame relates, or to any factories or places now or hereafter to be ſubordinate to ſuch principal Settlements, continue, be, and remain in full force and virtue, according to the true intent and meaning thereof, and that as fully and effectually, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as if this Act had never been made, or ſuch new charter, as aforeſaid, ſhould never have been granted.

All records and muniments belonging to the Mayor's Court at Calcutta, &c. to be delivered to, and preſerved by, the new Court.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That all the records, muniments, and proceedings whatſoever, of and belonging to the ſaid Mayor's Court at *Calcutta* aforeſaid, or to the Courts of Over and Terminer and Gaol Delivery at *Fort William* aforeſaid, eſtabliſhed by the ſaid charter of his ſaid late Majeſty, ſhall, from and immediately after ſuch Court of Judicature, which His Majeſty is hereinbefore empowered to erect, ſhall be eſtabliſhed at *Fort William* as aforeſaid, be delivered over, preſerved, and depoſited for ſafe cuſtody, in the ſaid new Court of Judicature; to which all parties concerned ſhall and may reſort and have recourſe, upon application to the ſaid Court.

Salaries eſtabliſhed to the Governor General, Council, Chief Juſtice, and Judges.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That during ſuch time as the territorial acquiſitions ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the ſaid Company, the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company ſhall, and they are hereby required to direct, and cauſe to be paid, certain and eſtabliſhed ſalaries to the Governor General, and to each of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and to the Chief Juſtice, and each of the Judges of ſuch Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William*, as ſhall be by the ſaid new charter eſtabliſhed; (that is to ſay), to the Governor General Twenty-five thouſand Pounds by the year, and to each of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, Ten thouſand Pounds by the year; and to the Chief Juſtice Eight thouſand Pounds by the year; and to each of the Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William*, Six thouſand Pounds by the year: And that ſuch ſalaries ſhall be paid and payable to each and every of them reſpectively for the time being, out of the ſaid territorial acquiſitions in the kingdoms of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*.

When ſuch ſalaries ſhall commence.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That the ſalaries of ſuch Governor General and Council, and of ſuch Chief Juſtice and Judges of ſuch Supreme Court of Judicature as aforeſaid, ſhall take place and commence, in reſpect to all ſuch perſons who ſhall be reſident in *Great Britain* at the time of their appointment, upon and from the day on which ſuch perſon ſhall embark from *Great Britain*; and that the ſalaries of all ſuch perſons who ſhall, at the time of their appointment, be reſident in *India*, ſhall commence and take place from and after their reſpectively taking upon them the execution of their office as aforeſaid; and that all ſuch ſalaries to ſuch Governor General and Council, and of ſuch Chief Juſtice and Judges, ſhall be in lieu of all fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever; and that no fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever, ſhall be accepted, received, or taken, by ſuch Governor General and Council, or by ſuch Chief Juſtice and Judges, as aforeſaid, or any of them, in any manner, or on any account or pretence whatſoever, other than ſuch ſalaries and allowances as are to and by this Act directed to be paid to them reſpectively.

The Governor General or Council ſhall not accept of any preſent;

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That no Governor General, or any of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, or any Chief Juſtice, or any of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* aforeſaid, ſhall, directly or indirectly, by themſelves, or by any other perſon or perſons for his or their uſe, or on his or their behalf, accept, receive, or take, of or from any perſon or perſons, in any manner, or on any account whatſoever, any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwiſe, or any promiſe or engagement for any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward; and that no Governor General, or any of the ſaid Council, or any Chief Juſtice or Judge of the ſaid Court, ſhall carry on, be concerned in, or have any dealing or tranſactions, by way of traffic or commerce of any kind whatſoever, either for his or their uſe or benefit, profit, or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whatſoever (the trade and commerce of the ſaid United Company only excepted); any uſage or cuſtom to the contrary thereof in anywiſe notwithſtanding.

nor be concerned in any tranſaction by way of traffic.

No perſon holding a civil or military office under the the Crown, &c. ſhall accept any donation or gratuity.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That from and after the firſt day of Auguſt one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, no perſon holding or exerciſing any civil or military office under the Crown, or the ſaid United Company, in the *Eaſt Indies*, ſhall accept, receive, or take, directly or indirectly, by himſelf, or any other perſon or perſons on his behalf, or for his uſe or benefit, of and from any of the Indian Princes or Powers, or their Miniſters or Agents, (or any of the natives of *Aſia*) any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwiſe, upon any account or on any pretence whatſoever; or any promiſe or engagement for any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward: And if any perſon, holding or exerciſing any ſuch civil or military office, ſhall be guilty of any ſuch offence, and ſhall be thereof legally convicted in ſuch Supreme Court at *Calcutta*, or in the Mayor's Court in any other of the ſaid United Company's Settlements, where ſuch offence ſhall have been committed; every ſuch perſon, ſo convicted, ſhall forfeit double the value of ſuch preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, ſo taken and received; one moiety of which forfeiture ſhall be to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who ſhall inform or proſecute for the ſame; and alſo ſhall and may be ſent to *England*, by the order of the Governor and Council of the Preſidency or Settlement where the offender ſhall be convicted, unleſs ſuch perſon ſo convicted ſhall give ſufficient ſecurity to remove him or themſelves within twelve months after ſuch conviction.

Counſellors, Phyſicians, Surgeons, and Chaplains, excepted.

Provided always, and be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prohibit or prevent any perſon or perſons who ſhall carry on or exerciſe the profeſſion of a Counſellor at Law, a Phyſician, or a Surgeon, or being a Chaplain, from accepting, taking, or receiving any fees, gratuities, or rewards, in the way of their profeſſion.

The Company may proſecute and recover any gift upon waving forfeitures.

And it is hereby further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That every ſuch preſent, gift, gratuity, donation, or reward, accepted, taken, or received, and all ſuch dealing or tranſaction by way of traffic or commerce, of any kind whatſoever, carried on contrary to the true intent and meaning of this Act, ſhall be deemed and conſtrued to have been received, taken, had, and done, to and for the ſole uſe of the ſaid United Company; and that the ſaid United Company, upon waving all penalties and forfeitures, ſhall and may ſue and proſecute for the recovery of the ſame, or the full value of ſuch preſent or gift, or the profits of ſuch trade reſpectively, together with intereſt at the rate of Five Pounds per centum per annum, from the time of ſuch preſent, gift, gratuity, donation, or reward being received, or of ſuch dealing or tranſaction by way of traffic or commerce, as aforeſaid, by action for money had and received to the uſe of the ſaid Company.

No Collector, Supervifor, &c. to buy goods by way of trade.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That from and after the firſt day of Auguſt one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, it ſhall not be lawful for any Collector, Supervifor, or any other of His Majeſty's ſubjects, employed or concerned in the collection of the Revenues, or the adminiſtration of Juſtice, in the provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, or *Oriſſa*, or their agents or ſervants, or any perſon or perſons in truſt for them, to buy

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buy any goods, wares, merchandize, or other commodities whatsoever, by way of traffic or trade, at any place within the provinces of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, and to ſell the ſame again, or any part thereof, at the place where he or they bought the ſame, or at any other place within the ſaid Provinces reſpectively; and it ſhall not be lawful for any of His Majeſty's ſubjects in the ſaid Provinces, to engage, intermeddle, or be any way concerned, directly or indirectly, in the inland trade, in ſalt, beetle-nut, tobacco, or rice, except on the account of the ſaid United Company, on pain of forfeiting all ſuch goods or commodities which he ſhall ſo buy and ſell again by way of traffic, or in which he ſhall ſo trade, and alſo treble the value thereof; one moiety to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who will ſue for the ſame in the ſaid Supreme Court; and every ſuch perſon, on conviction, ſhall moreover be liable to be ſent to *England*, by ſuch order as aforeſaid, unleſs he or they ſhall give ſufficient ſecurity to remove him or themſelves within twelve months after ſuch conviction.

Not to reſtrain His Majeſty's ſubjects not herein prohibited.

Provided always, That nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prohibit or reſtrain any of His Majeſty's ſubjects, or any perſon or perſons whatſoever (except ſuch perſons as are by this Act prohibited and reſtrained from being concerned in trade) from carrying on or exerciſing any trade or traffic within *Fort William*, and the town of *Calcutta*.

Not to extend to outſtanding debts, nor to ſelling merchandizes poſſeſſed by perſons before ſuch prohibition take place.

Provided nevertheleſs, and be it enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prohibit or prevent any ſuch perſon or perſons, who is, are, or ſhall be hereby reſtrained from carrying on any trade, or being concerned in the buying or ſelling any goods, wares, merchandizes, or other commodities whatſoever, by way of traffic or trade as aforeſaid, or from being any way concerned in the inland trade in ſalt, beetle-nut, tobacco, or rice, from collecting in their outſtanding debts, or from ſelling and diſpoſing of the goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall ſeverally be poſſeſſed, at the time when ſuch prohibition ſhall reſpectively take place; ſo as each ſuch perſon or perſons who, by this Act is, are, or ſhall be ſo reſtrained, ſhall, and each and every of them reſpectively do, deliver in to ſuch Governor General and Council of the provinces of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa* aforeſaid, within thirty days from the time when ſuch reſtriction and prohibition ſhall take place, as aforeſaid, a full, true, and juſt ſpecification, upon oath, of the goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which he or they ſhall be at that time ſo reſpectively poſſeſſed; and ſo as ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall and do ſell and diſpoſe of ſuch goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, within the ſpace of nine months after ſuch reſtriction and prohibition as aforeſaid, ſhall commence and take place; and ſo as no new trade or concern in commerce or merchandize be entered into, contracted for, or carried on, by ſuch perſon or perſons.

No perſon ſhall take on loan or money above the rate of 12 per cent. per annum.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That no ſubject of His Majeſty, His heirs and ſucceſſors, in the *Eaſt Indies*, ſhall, upon any contract which ſhall be made from and after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, take, directly or indirectly, for loan of any monies, wares, merchandize, or other commodities whatſoever, above the value of Twelve Pounds for the forbearance of One hundred Pounds for a year, and ſo after that rate for a greater or leſſer ſum, or for a longer or ſhorter time; and that all bonds, contracts, and aſſurances whatſoever, made after the time aforeſaid, for payment of any principal, or money to be lent or covenanted to be performed upon, or for any uſury, whereupon or whereby there ſhall be reſerved or taken above the rate of Twelve Pounds in the Hundred, as aforeſaid, ſhall be utterly void: And all and every ſuch perſon or perſons whatſoever who ſhall, after the time aforeſaid, upon any contract to be made after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, take, accept, and receive, by way or means of any corrupt bargain, loan, exchange, ſhift, or intereſt, of any wares, merchandizes, or other thing or things whatſoever, or by any deceitful way or mean, or by any covin, engine, or deceitful conveyance, for the forbearing or giving day of payment for one whole year, of and for their money or other thing above the ſum of Twelve Pounds for the forbearing of One hundred Pounds for a year, and ſo after that rate for a greater or leſſer ſum, or for a longer or ſhorter term, ſhall forfeit and loſe, for every ſuch offence, treble the value of the monies, wares, merchandizes, and other things ſo lent, bargained, exchanged, or ſhifted, with coſts of ſuit; one moiety whereof ſhall be to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who will ſue for the ſame in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* in *Calcutta*, or in the Mayor's Court in any other of the ſaid United Company's Settlements where ſuch offence ſhall have been committed, by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, in which no eſſoin, wager of law, or protection, ſhall be allowed; and in caſe no ſuch action, bill, plaint, or information, ſhall have been brought and proſecuted with effect within three years, that then it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the party aggrieved to ſue and proſecute for recovery of all ſums of money paid over and above ſuch rate of intereſt.

Perſons by covin accepting loans, &c. ſhall forfeit, for every offence, treble the value.

One moiety to go to the Company, and the other to the Proſecutor.

Perſons making compoſitions contrary to the meaning of the Act.

And be it further Enacted, That no Informer or Plaintiff ſhall or may compound or agree with any perſon or perſons that ſhall offend, or ſhall be ſurmiſed to offend, againſt this Act, for any offence committed, or pretended to be committed, before anſwer made in the ſaid Supreme Court, unto the information or ſuit in that behalf exhibited or proſecuted, nor after anſwer, but by the order or conſent of the ſaid Court, on pain that if any perſon or perſons ſhall offend in making of any compoſition or agreement, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this Act, or ſhall, by colour or pretence of proceſs, or without proceſs upon colour or pretence of any matter of offence againſt this Act, make any compoſition, or take any money, reward, or promiſe of reward, for himſelf, or to the uſe of any other, without order or conſent of the ſaid Court; that then he or they ſo offending, being thereof lawfully convicted, ſhall, for every ſuch offence, be liable to be fined and impriſoned at the diſcretion of the ſaid Court.

liable to be impriſoned, at the diſcretion of the Court.

Perſons who may be diſmiſſed the ſervice, or reſign, &c.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That from and after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, it ſhall not be lawful for any perſon or perſons whatſoever, who ſhall have been diſmiſſed from, or ſhall have voluntarily reſigned, the ſervice of the ſaid United Company, or for any free merchant, free mariner, or other perſon, whoſe covenants or agreements with the ſaid United Company for reſiding or trading in *India* ſhall be expired, from thenceforth to carry on or be in anywiſe concerned in any trade, traffic, merchandize, or commerce whatſoever, in the *Eaſt Indies*, other than for the diſpoſal of his or their ſtock in hand, without the licence of the ſaid United Company, or the Governor General and Council of the Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, or the Preſident and Council at the place or ſettlement where ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall reſide, for that purpoſe firſt had and obtained.

not to be concerned in any traffic, other than for diſpoſal of ſtock in hand.

Servants of the Company proſecuted for breaches of truſt, on conviction, to be fined or impriſoned, at the diſcretion of the Courts.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That from and after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, if any of His Majeſty's ſubjects in *India*, employed by, or in the actual ſervice of, the ſaid United Company, ſhall be charged with and proſecuted for any breach of public truſt, or for embezzlement of public money or ſtores, or for defrauding the ſaid United Company; every ſuch offender, being convicted thereof in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, or in any Court of Judicature in any other Preſidency or ſettlement in *India*, may be fined and impriſoned, and adjudged to be for ever after incapable of

ſerving

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ſerving the ſaid United Company, at the diſcretion of the Court before which he ſhall be tried; and immediately after the ſentence of ſuch Court ſhall have been executed and inflicted, ſhall and may be ſent over to *England*, by ſuch order, and in ſuch manner, as is hereinbefore mentioned and directed, unleſs he ſhall remove himſelf within twelve months, and, in the mean time, give ſufficient ſecurity ſo to do.

Offences to be tried by a Jury of Britiſh ſubjects.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That all offences and miſdemeanors which ſhall be laid, tried, and enquired of in the ſaid Supreme Court, ſhall be tried by a jury of Britiſh ſubjects reſident in the town of *Calcutta*, and not otherwiſe.

The Company may not compound or diſcharge ſentences of the Supreme Court, &c. without the conſent of 3-4ths of the Proprietors.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That after any judgment of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, or of any Court of Judicature at any of the ſaid United Company's ſettlements, againſt any of the ſaid United Company's Servants, civil or military, for any debt or penalty due or belonging to the ſaid United Company, ſhall be made known to the Court of Directors for the time being of the ſaid United Company, it ſhall not be lawful to releaſe or compound ſuch ſentence or judgment, or to releaſe, diſcharge, or put a ſtop to any proſecution, ſuit, or action, commenced, or to be commenced, for carrying on any illicit trade, or for any debt or penalty due to the ſaid United Company, or to reſtore any Servant or Servants whatever of the ſaid Company, who ſhall have been removed or diſmiſſed from his or their office or employment, for or upon account of any miſbehaviour, without the conſent of three parts in four of the ſaid Court of Directors, to be taken by ballot, and alſo the conſent of three parts of four in number of the Proprietors of the ſaid United Company, who ſhall be preſent, and give their votes by ballot, to be taken at a General Court to be ſpecially called for that purpoſe, and of which fourteen days public notice, at the leaſt, ſhall be given before the holding the ſame, and of the particular occaſion for which ſuch General Court ſhall be called.

Governor General and Council may make ſuch regulations as may appear fit;

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That it ſhall and may be lawful for the Governor General and Council of the ſaid United Company's ſettlement at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, from time to time, to make and iſſue ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, for the good order and civil government of the ſaid United Company's ſettlement at *Fort William* aforeſaid, and other factories and places ſubordinate, or to be ſubordinate thereto, as ſhall be deemed juſt and reaſonable (ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, not being repugnant to the laws of the realm) and to ſet, impoſe, inflict, and levy, reaſonable fines and forfeitures for the breach or non-obſervance of ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations; but nevertheleſs the ſame, or any of them, ſhall not be valid, or of any force or effect, until the ſame ſhall be duly regiſtered and publiſhed in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, which ſhall be, by the ſaid new charter, eſtabliſhed with the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Court; which regiſtry ſhall not be made until the expiration of twenty days after the ſame ſhall be openly publiſhed, and a copy thereof affixed in ſome conſpicuous part of the court-houſe or place where the ſaid Supreme Court ſhall be held; and from and immediately after ſuch regiſtry as aforeſaid, the ſame ſhall be good and valid in law: But, nevertheleſs, it ſhall be lawful for any perſon or perſons in *India* to appeal therefrom to His Majeſty, His Heirs or Succeſſors, in Council, who are hereby empowered, if they think fit, to ſet aſide and repeal any ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations reſpectively, ſo as ſuch appeal, or notice thereof, be lodged in the ſaid new Court of Judicature, within the ſpace of ſixty days after the time of the regiſtering and publiſhing the ſame; and it ſhall be lawful for any perſon or perſons in *England* to appeal therefrom, in like manner, within ſixty days after the publiſhing the ſame in *England*; and it is hereby directed and required, that a copy of all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations,

which ſhall not be valid until duly regiſtered in the Supreme Court,

Appeals may be made to the King in Council, who may repeal ſuch rules;

and a copy of all regulations to be affixed in the India Houſe.

from time to time, as the ſame ſhall be ſo received, ſhall be affixed in ſome conſpicuous and public place in the India Houſe, there to remain and be reſorted to as occaſion ſhall require; yet, nevertheleſs, ſuch appeal ſhall not obſtruct, impede, or hinder the immediate execution of any rule, ordinance, or regulation, ſo made and regiſtered as aforeſaid, until the ſame ſhall appear to have been ſet aſide or repealed, upon the hearing and determination of ſuch appeal.

Governor General and Council to tranſmit copies of their rules to one of the Secretaries of State;

Provided always, and be it enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That the ſaid Governor General and Council ſhall, and they are hereby required, from time to time, to tranſmit copies of all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, as they ſhall make and iſſue, to one of His Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State for the time being; and that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for His Majeſty, His Heirs and Succeſſors, from time to time, as they ſhall think neceſſary, to ſignify to the ſaid United Company, under his or their ſign manual, his or their diſapprobation and diſallowance of all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations; and that from and immediately after the time that ſuch diſapprobation ſhall be duly regiſtered and publiſhed in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, ſhall be null and void; but in caſe His Majeſty, His Heirs and Succeſſors, ſhall not, within the ſpace of two years from the making of ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, ſignify his or their diſapprobation or diſallowance thereof, as aforeſaid, that then and in that caſe all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, ſhall be valid and effectual, and have full force.

which, if His Majeſty does not ſignify His diſallowance of, ſhall have full force.

Governor General and Council to act as Juſtices of the Peace.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That the Governor General and Council for the time being of the ſaid United Company's ſettlement at *Fort William* aforeſaid, and the Chief Juſtice and other Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, ſhall and may, and they are hereby reſpectively declared to be and to have full power and authority to act as Juſtices of the Peace for the ſaid ſettlement, and for the ſeveral ſettlements and factories ſubordinate thereto; and to do and tranſact all matters and things which to the office of a Juſtice or Juſtices of the Peace do belong and appertain; and for that purpoſe the ſaid Governor General and Council are hereby authorized and empowered to hold quarter ſeſſions within the ſaid ſettlement of *Fort William* aforeſaid, four times in every year, and the ſame ſhall be at all times a Court of Record.

If the Governor General, Preſident, &c. commit offences, the ſame may be tried and determined in the Court of King's Bench.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That if any Governor General, Preſident, or Governor or Council of any of the ſaid Company's principal or other ſettlements in *India*, or the Chief Juſtice, or any of the Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, to be by the ſaid new charter eſtabliſhed, or of any other Court in any of the ſaid United Company's ſettlements, or any other perſon or perſons who now are, or heretofore have been employed by or in the ſervice of the ſaid United Company, in any civil or military ſtation, office, or capacity, or who have or claim, or heretofore have had or claimed, any power or authority, or juriſdiction, by or from the ſaid United Company, or any of His Majeſty's ſubjects reſiding in *India*, ſhall commit any offence againſt this act, or ſhall have been, or ſhall be guilty of, any crime, miſdemeanour, or offence, committed againſt any of His Majeſty's ſubjects, or any of the inhabitants of *India*, within their reſpective juriſdictions, all ſuch crimes, offences, and miſdemeanours, may be reſpectively enquired of, heard, tried, and determined, in His Majeſty's Court of King's Bench; and all ſuch perſons ſo offending, and not having been before tried for the ſame offence in *India*, ſhall, on conviction in any ſuch caſe as is not ſpecially provided for by this Act, be liable to ſuch fine or corporal puniſhment as the ſaid Court ſhall think fit; and moreover ſhall be liable, at the diſcretion of the ſaid Court, to be adjudged to be incapable of ſerving the ſaid United Company in any office, civil or military; and all and every ſuch crimes,

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offences, and misdemeanours, as aforesaid, may be alledged to be committed, and may be laid, enquired of, and tried in the county of *Middlesex*.

Manner of procedure in cases of indictments and informations laid in the King's Bench.

And whereas the provisions made by former laws for the hearing and determining, in *England*, offences committed in *India*, have been found ineffectual, by reason of the difficulty of proving in this kingdom matters done there: Be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That in all cases of indictments or informations, laid or exhibited in the said Court of King's Bench, for misdemeanors or offences committed in *India*, it shall and may be lawful for His Majesty's said Court, upon motion to be made on behalf of the prosecutor, or of the defendant or defendants, to award a writ or writs of Mandamus, requiring the Chief Justice and Judges of the said Supreme Court of Judicature for the time being, or the Judges of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, as the case may require, who are hereby respectively authorized and required accordingly to hold a Court, with all convenient speed, for the examination of witnesses, and receiving other proofs concerning the matters charged in such indictments or informations respectively; and, in the mean time, to cause such public notice to be given of the holding the said Court, and to issue such summons or other process, as may be requisite for the attendance of witnesses, and of the agents or counsel, of all or any of the parties respectively, and to adjourn, from time to time, as occasion may require; and such examination as aforesaid shall be then and there openly and publicly taken *viva voce* in the said Court, upon the respective oaths of witnesses, and the oaths of skilful interpreters, administered according to the forms of their several religions; and shall, by some sworn officer of such Court, be reduced into one or more writing or writings on parchment, in case any duplicate or duplicates should be required by or on behalf of any of the parties interested, and shall be sent to His Majesty, in His Court of King's Bench, closed up, and under the seals of two or more of the Judges of the said Court, and one or more of the said Judges shall deliver the same to the agent or agents of the party or parties requiring the same; which said agent or agents (or, in case of his or their death, the person into whose hands the same shall come) shall deliver the same to one of the Clerks in Court of His Majesty's Court of King's Bench in the public office, and make oath that he received the same from the hands of one or more of the Judges of such Court in *India*, (or, if such agent be dead, in what manner the same came into his hands); and that the same has not been opened or altered since he so received it, (which said oath such Clerk in Court is hereby authorized and required to administer): And such depositions being duly taken and returned, according to the true intent and meaning of this Act, shall be allowed and read, and shall be deemed as good and competent evidence as if such witness had been present, and sworn and examined *viva voce*, at any trial for such crimes or misdemeanors, as aforesaid, in His Majesty's said Court of King's Bench, any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding; and all parties concerned shall be entitledto take copies of such depositions at their own costs and charges.

Offences against this Act committed by the Chief Justice or Judges, to be determined by the Court of King's Bench.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That in case the said Chief Justice or Judges of the said Supreme Court of Judicature, or any of them for the time being, shall commit any offence against this act, or be guilty of any corrupt practice, or other crime, offence, or misdemeanor, in the execution of their respective offices, it shall and may be lawful for His Majesty's said Court of King's Bench in *England*, upon an information or indictment laid or exhibited in the said Court for such crime, offence, or misdemeanor, upon motion to be made in the said Court, to award such writ or writs of Mandamus, as aforesaid, requiring the Governor General and Council of the said United Company's settlement at *Fort William* aforesaid, who are hereby respectively authorized and required accordingly to assemble themselves in a reasonable time, and to cause all such proceedings to be had and made as are thereinbefore respectively directed and prescribed concerning the examination of witnesses; and such examination, so taken, shall be returned and proceeded upon in the same manner, in all respects, as if the several directions hereinbefore prescribed and enacted in that behalf were again repeated.

The Chancellor or Speaker of the House of Commons may issue warrants for the examination of witnesses in India, which shall be deemed competent evidence to both Houses of Parliament.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That in all cases of proceedings in Parliament, touching any offences against this Act, or any other offences committed in *India*, it shall and may be lawful for the Lord High Chancellor or Speaker of the House of Lords, and also for the Speaker of the House of Commons for the time being, in like manner to issue his or their warrant or warrants to the Governor General and Council of the said United Company's Presidency of *Fort William*, and to the Chief Justice and Judges of the said Supreme Court of Judicature, or the Judges of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, as the case may require, for the examination of witnesses; and such examination shall be returned to the said Lord High Chancellor or Speaker of the House of Lords, or to the Speaker of the House of Commons respectively, and proceeded upon in the same manner, in all respects, as if the several directions hereinbefore prescribed and enacted in that behalf were again particularly repeated; and every such examination, returned either to the Lord Chancellor or Speaker of the House of Lords, or to the Speaker of the House of Commons, as aforesaid, shall be deemed good and competent evidence, and shall be allowed and read in both Houses of Parliament, or either of them respectively, as occasion may require; any law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.

No proceedings in Parliament, touching offences in India, to be discontinued by any prorogation.

And whereas, by the usage and custom of Parliament, no proceedings by Bill in Parliament have continuance from one session to another: And whereas it would be impracticable that the examination, taken upon such warrant as aforesaid, could ever be returned within the ordinary length of a session of Parliament; Be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That, from and after the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three, no proceedings in Parliament, touching any offence committed, or to be committed, in *India*, wherein such warrant as aforesaid shall have been issued, shall be discontinued by any prorogation or dissolution of the Parliament; but that such proceedings may be resumed and proceeded upon in a subsequent session, or in a subsequent Parliament, in either House of Parliament, in like manner, to all intents and purposes, as they might have been in the course of one and the same session; any law, usage, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Writs of Mandamus may be awarded by the Courts at Westminster, when the Company commence suits in law or equity there.

And whereas His Majesty's subjects are liable to be defeated of their several rights, titles, debts, dues, demands, or suits, for which they have cause arising in *India* against other subjects of His Majesty; Now, for preventing such failure of justice, be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That when and as often as the said United Company, or any person or persons whatsoever, shall commence and prosecute any action or suit, in law or equity, for which cause hath arisen, or shall hereafter arise, in *India*, against any other person or persons whatever, in any of His Majesty's Courts at *Westminster*, it shall and may be lawful for such Court respectively, upon motion there to be made, to provide and award such writ or writs, in the nature of a Mandamus or commission, as aforesaid, to the Chief Justice and Judges of the said Supreme Court of Judicature for the time being, or the Judges of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, as the case may require, for the examination of witnesses, as aforesaid; and such examination being duly returned, shall be allowed and read, and shall be deemed good and competent evidence at any trial or hearing between the parties in such cause or action, in the same manner, in all respects, as if the several directions hereinbefore prescribed and enacted in that behalf were again repeated.

Provided

No depoſitions returned to be allowed as evidence, in cauſes not proceeded againſt in Parliament.

Provided nevertheleſs, and be it enacted, That no ſuch depoſitions, taken and returned as aforeſaid by virtue of this Act, ſhall be allowed or permitted to be given in evidence in any capital caſes, other than ſuch as ſhall be proceeded againſt in Parliament; any thing in this Act contained to the contrary notwithſtanding.

The privileges of the Company, not hereby varied, ſhall remain in force.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That all and every the rights, intereſts, powers, privileges, and authorities, which are now veſted in the ſaid United Company of Merchants trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, and which are not hereby expreſsly taken away, altered, or varied, ſhall remain to, and continue in, the ſaid Company, in as full and ample a manner, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as if this Act had never been made.

Public Act.

And be it further enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, That this Act ſhall be deemed and taken to be a Public Act; of which notice ſhall be judicially taken by all Judges, Juſtices, and other perſons whatſoever, without ſpecially pleading the ſame.

APPENDIX, No. 4.

FIRMAUN from the Mogul for the Northern Circars.

IN theſe happy times, our Firmaun, full of ſplendor and worthy of obedience, is deſcended; purporting, That whereas *Salabat Jung Behauder*, Subahder of the *Decan*, conferred the Circar of *Siccacole*, &c. on the French Company; and that, in conſequence of its not being confirmed by us, either by Firmaun or otherwiſe, the high, mighty, glorious Chiefs of the Khans, choſen of the Omrahs, Sepoy Surdars, truly faithful, worthy of receiving favours and obligations, our invariable and never-failing friends and well-wiſhers, the Engliſh Company (having ſent a large force for that purpoſe) did expel the French therefrom; we therefore, in conſideration of the fidelity and good wiſhes of the above high, mighty, &c. &c. Engliſh Company, have, from our throne, the baſis of the world, given them the aforementioned Circars, by way of iniam or free gift (without the leaſt participation of any perſon whatever in the ſame) from the beginning of the Fuſſul Tuccaucooul, in the year of Phaeſly 1172, equal to the month April 1762; it is incumbent, therefore, on you our Sons, Omrahs, Viziers, Governors, Muttaſeddees, for the affairs of our Dewanſhip, Mootecophils, for thoſe of our kingdom, jaghiredars, and Karorees, both now and hereafter, for ever and ever; to uſe your endeavours in the ſtrengthening and carrying into execution this our moſt high command, and to cede and give up to the above-mentioned Engliſh Company, their heirs and deſcendants, for ever and ever, the aforeſaid Circars; and eſteeming them likewiſe free, exempt, and ſafe from all diſplacing or removal, by no means whatever, either moleſt or trouble them on account of the demands of the Dewan's office, or thoſe of our Imperial Court.

Looking upon this high Firmaun as an abſolute and poſitive order, obey it implicitly.

Dated the 24th of the moon Sophar, in the ſixth year of our reign, equal to the 12th of Auguſt 1765.

Forms made uſe of on the Back of the Firmaun.

From the Secretary, ſetting forth, That his Majeſty had been pleaſed to ſign a Peſhtion (ſuppoſed to be from the Company) of the ſame date as the Firmaun, directing, That whereas *Salabat Jung Behauder*, Subahder of the Decan, conferred the Circar of *Siccacole*, &c. on the French Company; and that, in conſequence of its not being confirmed by his Majeſty, either by Firmaun or otherwiſe, the high, mighty, &c. &c. Engliſh Company (having ſent a large force for that purpoſe) did expel the ſaid French therefrom; His Majeſty therefore, in conſideration of the fidelity of the aforeſaid Engliſh Company, has given them (without the participation of any perſon whatever in the ſame) the above-mentioned Circars, by way of iniam, or free gift.

Then follow two orders from the Mogul, the firſt ſuppoſed to be his own hand, addreſſed to his Son *Mirza Mahomed Akbur Shah Behauder*, telling him to comply with the contents of this Firmaun; the other directing, that the Engliſh Company be under his Son's command, or in his Reſſaula.

The whole atteſted under *Kazzi Inayet Khan*'s ſeal, to be a true copy from the original.

Tranſlation of Saned, under the Seal of *Nizam Ally Cawn*, for the Five Circars.

Be it known to the Deeſmohees, Deeſpondees, Muccuddems, Huſbandmen, and Inhabitants of the Circars of *Rajahmundry*, *Ellour*, *Muſtephanagur*, *Siccacole*, and *Murtezanagur*, belonging to the Subahſhip of *Hydrabad*, That out of our great favour and goodneſs, from the 9th of the moon Gemace-duſſuny, in the year of Phaeſley 1176, equal to the 12th of November 1766, the whole of the ſaid Circars (the jaghire of the *Muſtephanagur*, alias *Condapille Fort*, and the uſual villages appertaining to the diamond mines excepted) are now given to, and conferred upon the European Engliſh Company, by way of iniam, or free gift, for ever and ever, agreeable to their petition ſigned by us: In return for which, they, the Engliſh Company, are to pay the annual ſum of nine lacks of rupees, and to ſtand to all ſebbendy charges, and whatever earthly or heavenly miſchances may happen. You, therefore, our above-mentioned Deeſmohees, &c. are hereby required, with contented minds, to live in obedience to the above Company's Deputies, and to pay the proper revenues at the fixed and ſtated times.

Looking upon this as a poſitive order, obey it accordingly.

Dated the 9th of the moon Gemace-duſſuny, in the year of Hegyra 1180, equal to the 12th November 1766.

APPENDIX, No. 5.

Revenue Conſultations. Committee of Circuit.

Extract of the ſeparate Letter from Court of Directors to the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George*, dated 12th April 1775.

Para. 24. AND being well aſſured that the Jaghire Lands and Northern Circars, and eſpecially the latter, will be found capable of anſwering this deſirable purpoſe, if duly explored and properly regulated, we therefore direct, that when affairs reſpecting *Tanjore* ſhall have been accommodated and finally adjuſted, a Committee of our Council, conſiſting of five Members, be appointed to make the Circuit of the Northern Circars; and that they aſcertain, with all poſſible exactneſs, the produce of the country, the number of inhabitants, the ſtate of the manufactures, the fortified places, the groſs amount of the revenues, the articles from which they ariſe, the mode by which they are collected, the charges of collection, the ſpecific proportion uſually received by the Rajah or Zemindar, and that which cuſtom or uſage has allotted to the cultivator as the reward of his labour.

25. They are alſo particularly to enquire what ſecurity the Native has for his property, what courts there are for the adminiſtration of juſtice, and how far ſimilar regulations to thoſe lately eſtabliſhed at *Bengal* by our Preſident and Council, may with propriety be introduced into the Northern Circars.

26. It is by no means our wiſh to deprive the hereditary Rajahs or Zemindars of their annual income; on the contrary, we mean to ſecure it to them without leaving them under the power of keeping up an armed force to compel the payment thereof; and it is alſo our

APPENDIX. No. 5.

earneſt deſire to deliver the inhabitants, ſo far as may be in our power, from undue exactions and oppreſſions.

27. The impropriety of ſuffering any Zemindar to become formidable to his neighbours, or too powerful, cannot admit of a doubt.—We never approved the policy of our late Governor and Council, in conſenting to accept a ſmall tribute, or ſuch compoſition for lands as *Sitteram Rauze* might think proper to make, without aſcertaining in any degree the value of ſuch lands.—And if it be true, that his power has heretofore rendered it dangerous to riſk his diſpleaſure, by admitting competitors to bid for lands, it is high time to correct our ſyſtem, and to diſallow the keeping of other Troops than our own in the Circars, more eſpecially as ſuch Troops are not ſubject to our orders, but render our tenants leſs dependent than they ought to be upon our authority and controul.

28. In order to enable us to ſtrike at the root of this evil, the Committee of Circuit muſt take the moſt effectual meaſures for aſcertaining the ſtrength of each Rajah, Zemindar, or Landholder in the Circars, the expence of his houſhold and that of his Troops, the means he may have of defraying ſuch expences, and the number of regular Sepoys which it will be neceſſary for us to maintain in the reſpective diſtricts, in order to keep them in due ſubjection.

29. As an addition of military ſtrength within our own poſſeſſions, ſeems to us ſo abſolutely neceſſary, and as we can have no doubt but that, with proper economy, a conſiderable force may be maintained in the Circars, and the annual rent or tribute remitted to our Treaſury at *Fort St. George*, be nevertheleſs conſiderably increaſed; we are therefore reſolved, that every military man reſiding in the Circars, ſhall be abſolutely under our command, obliged to ſerve us whenever he may be wanted, and not left at liberty to take part with our enemies, in caſe troubles ſhould ariſe in the country.

30. After having fully inveſtigated the provincial accounts of the Circars, if any of the Zemindars ſhall prefer receiving their income from the Company, and relinquiſh their hereditary claims, we have no objection to allowing them ſuch ſtipends as ſhall be found reaſonable, in lieu of the benefits ariſing from their Zemindaries: and as it is our intention, on the expiration of the preſent leaſes, that the Committee of Circuit ſhall proceed to let the lands for a term of years, in the ſame manner as hath been practiſed at *Bengal*, it is our order, that the Zemindars have their option of retiring upon ſtipends, or of continuing to rent the lands at a proper valuation; but it is our poſitive command, that the proportion of the produce to be received by farmers of every denomination, be aſcertained, and exactly defined; and that it be an expreſs condition in every leaſe, that all farmers who ſhall exact more than their due proportion from the undertenants, ſhall forfeit their farms; and you are to take eſpecial care that the means of redreſs, in caſe of impoſition or oppreſſion, be rendered as eaſy as poſſible.

31. Theſe are the outlines of the plan which we wiſh to ſee adopted for the Circars. In regard to the jaghire lands, many conſiderations induce us to keep them in our immediate poſſeſſion; and unleſs the Nabob ſhall agree to ſuch arrangements as we deem neceſſary for our mutual advantage, we ſhall no longer conſent to his renting the ſaid jaghire lands, as it almoſt enables him to ſhut us up within the walls of *Madras*, and even to prevent us from obtaining a proper ſupply of proviſions for our ſettlement; we therefore direct, that you conclude no agreement with the Nabob for the ſaid lands for more than one year; and that it be an expreſs condition in ſuch agreement, that our Committee of Circuit ſhall be at full liberty to explore the country, and to aſcertain the real produce and revenues thereof, in the manner deſcribed in our preſent Inſtructions reſpecting the Northern Circars.

32. If any of our ſervants, civil or military, ſhall oppoſe the execution of theſe our Orders and Inſtructions, or refuſe to aſſiſt in carrying them into full effect, we hereby declare, that upon proper repreſentation of the caſe to us, every ſuch perſon ſhall be abſolutely diſmiſſed from the ſervice of the Company.

33. And in order to add the greateſt weight in our power to your proceedings, and to enſure, ſo far as may be, ſucceſs to your meaſures, we have directed our Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to co-operate with you, if you ſhall find it neceſſary, and to yield you all proper aſſiſtance in bringing the important affairs hereby committed to your management to a ſpeedy and happy concluſion.

APPENDIX, No. 6.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 28th June 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right Honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
General Sir *Robert Fletcher*,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſel,
Alexander Dalrymple,
Charles Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
George Mackay.

SIR *Robert Fletcher* deſires to enter the following Minute:

Sir *Robert Fletcher* being of opinion, that the time limited by the Company has been long expired for enforcing their commands reſpecting the Committee of Circuit, he now begs leave to record this his opinion, that he may not in future be in any degree reſponſible, or ſubject to blame, either for diſobedience or neglect of thoſe important Orders.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, Friday, 26th July 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right Honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Sir *Robert Fletcher*,
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſel,
Alex. Dalrymple,
Charles Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
George Mackay.

Mr. *Fourdan* informs the Board, That he has delivered a Minute to the Secretary, in which there is a motion reſpecting the Committee of Circuit.—Mr. *Mackay* deſires to ſecond the motion; the Minute is then read as follows:

The Court of Directors ſay, That when the buſineſs of *Tanjour* ſhall be finally ſettled, the Committee of Circuit ſhall be ordered on that ſervice. When they gave thoſe orders, it is very probable, they expected reſiſtance on the part of the Nabob, for they direct us to apply to the Gentlemen at *Bengal*, if neceſſary, and direct them, if applied to, to co-operate in the carrying of their orders relative to *Tanjour* into execution. This appears alſo from the anxious manner in which they expreſs themſelves on this ſubject, by the *Royal Henry*; and therefore it was conſiſtent and judicious in the Court of Directors, to order, that a buſineſs, from which the moſt important conſequences might reſult, ſhould be conducted by as many Members of the Board as could be ſpared from the other

other departments. But the Nabob, although he has objected to the reſtitution of the country, has not in any inſtance reſiſted; and the Rajah is in poſſeſſion of the whole country, *Hunnimumtagody* excepted. Of this the Board have written to the Nabob; and although he has claimed it as part of the *Maravar* Country, yet, when he conſiders what has been ſaid upon that ſubject, it is to be hoped he will judge proper that it be reſtored. This, however, is not of much importance; for were he to object, as having been illegally taken from the *Maravar*, there can be no doubt but that both parties would willingly ſubmit this to the deciſion of the Company; to which may be added, that the Rajah has entruſted to the Company the defence of his country, and ſtipulated an ample ſum for that purpoſe.

The claims of Mr. *Benfield* have been brought before the Board; the Circar ſhare of the crop has been adjudged to the Nabob, and the mortgages of courſe admitted; nothing remains then, but to aſcertain what the Rajah has received, and to ſettle ſuch terms of payment as may be juſt.

I have been thus particular on theſe ſubjects, as, whenever the ſubject has been mentioned, the *Tanjour* buſineſs has been urged againſt it. I know of no circumſtance in the preſent ſituation of our affairs, that can juſtify longer delay, in carrying theſe orders of the Company for the Circuit, into execution; on the contrary, the rents of ſome of the farms are continued for one year, and the mode tends evidently to the diſtreſs of the inhabitants in thoſe diſtricts. The Zemindaries likewiſe muſt be managed in the ſame manner: the Zemindar will be diſcouraged from improvement, in the apprehention of increaſe of tribute; and this mode, injurious as it may be, cannot be altered, until the Committee obtain full and perfect information of the real value of the lands.—The Circars are capable of great improvement: the ſoil in moſt parts is very rich; two very conſiderable rivers, and ſome ſmall ones, run through them. The inhabitants under *Bajatil Jing*, and *Moſam Ally Cawn*, are greatly oppreſſed, and, with proper encouragement, many might be brought to reſide with us. The foreſts to the Weſtward produce teak, and other valuable woods. They have mines which might furniſh iron for many uſeful purpoſes. Saltpetre is made on the borders of the *Guntoor* Circar. The ſugar cane grows luxuriantly in the *Rajahmundry* Circar, and over the whole country are weavers in great numbers.—To ſecure to the inhabitants their juſt rights from their Lords, and from each other, by eſtabliſhing ſome mode of obtaining juſtice—to cultivate the deſerted and waſte lands—to reſtore a country almoſt depopulated by frequent wars and other calamities—to apply the ſuperfluous waters of the *Godaveery*, *Kiſtna*, and other rivers, to the purpoſes of cultivation, and by the quantity of proviſions, to improve the manufactures, and encourage the workman; theſe are objects worthy of Government, and which, if well attended to, will give conſequence, wealth, and happineſs to the people, and increaſe the revenue to the Government, and theſe are the objects entruſted to the care of the Committee.—For all theſe reaſons, I think the Committee ſhould be ordered upon the Circuit; and I therefore move, That, according to thoſe orders, they be immediately ſent upon it.

Francis Fourdan.

The foregoing Minute concluding with a motion, That the Committee of Circuit do immediately proceed upon their enquiries, Mr. *Mackay* deſires leave to record it.

The Right honourable the Preſident, previous to putting the queſtion, obſerves to the Board, That, in his opinion, there are many points of great conſequence that remain to be ſettled in which he ſhould be glad to have the aſſiſtance of as many of the Members as poſſible.

That the affairs of the Company at Bengal, the Committee of Circuit, and [illegible] reſpecting *Tanjour*, have been [illegible] adjuſted; and there appears [illegible]

by the Company's orders, the Committee ought not yet to proceed, and therefore he cannot recommend the meaſure.

The Preſident then put the Queſtion.

Mr. *Mackay*. For the Motion.

Mr. *Fourdan*. For the Motion.

Mr. *Palmer*. For the Motion, with the following Minute:

As the Committee of Circuit appears to be a buſineſs the Court of Directors ſeem to have very much at heart, from the information they expect from it, relating to points ſo very eſſential to their affairs; and as I am likewiſe apprehenſive that much benefit will ariſe from their proceeding, I am of opinion, that there ſhould be no longer delay in their ſetting out.

Mr. *Stone*. Againſt the Motion; as the Company's orders reſpecting *Tanjour* are not, in his opinion, accompliſhed, there being many very material matters remaining unadjuſted.

Mr. *Floyer* concurs entirely with Mr. *Fourdan* in the ſentiments he has now delivered in his Minute; and he thinks, if the Board were longer to defer the departure of the Committee of Circuit, they would diſobey the poſitive orders of the Court of Directors; for which reaſon, and for thoſe expreſſed in Mr. *Fourdan's* Minute, he is for the Motion.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. Againſt the Motion; as the Preſident has declared it to be his opinion, That the Committee of Circuit cannot at this time proceed to the Northern Circars, conſiſtent with the Company's orders, which require "affairs reſpecting *Tanjour* to be accom-"modated, and finally adjuſted;" but he thinks the Committee may proceed to execute their truſt in the jaghire lands, where the Members can attend any urgent call.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. Againſt the Motion; for the reaſons given by Mr. *Dalrymple*.

Mr. *Brooke*. For the Motion.

Sir *R. Fletcher*. For the Motion; becauſe he thinks the buſineſs of the Committee of the firſt importance to the Company; and he is clearly of opinion, that not any thing remains to be ſettled, reſpecting *Tanjour*, which can, by any conſtruction, come within the letter or meaning of the Company's orders regarding the Committee of Circuit.

Mr. *Stratton*. For the Motion.

Preſident. Againſt it.

Carried for the Queſtion, by a majority of 7 to 4.

Preſident. As Mr. *Fourdan* has paid ſo much attention to the Company's orders, reſpecting the Committee of Circuit, and thinking it of conſequence that it ſhould proceed immediately, the Preſident recommends him to fill up the vacancy occaſioned by the departure of Mr. *Dawſon*.

Mr. *Fourdan* thereupon informs the Board, That ſince he has been in the ſervice he has taken his tour of duty at *Manilba-Cuddalore* and *Maſulipatam*, and he hopes therefore the Board will be pleaſed to permit him to decline the honour intended him by the Right honourable the Preſident.

The Queſtion being then put, "Whether Mr. *Fourdan* "ſhall proceed on the Circuit in the room of Mr. *Daw-"ſon*?" the votes of the Members are taken as follow:

Mr. *Mackay*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Fourdan* obſerves, That ſince it has been reſolved that a Member may vote in his own cauſe, he ſhall, in the preſent caſe, give his voice againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Palmer*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stone*. Againſt the Queſtion; as he himſelf does not wiſh to proceed on the Circuit.

Mr. *Floyer*. Whenever any Member of the Committee of Circuit ſhall [illegible] on that deſire, which [illegible] for it, as he ſees no [illegible] of Directors, he ſhall [illegible]

APPENDIX. No. 6.

the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. *Jourdan* appearing ſo to him, he declares his vote againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. For the Queſtion; becauſe he thinks it the duty of every Member to proceed on ſuch ſervice as the Preſident recommends to be for the intereſt of the Company; and becauſe, in his opinion, the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. *Jourdan* are not ſufficient to excuſe him, as he thinks him a man of buſineſs, and therefore a very proper perſon to be a Member of the Committee of Circuit.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Brooke*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Sir *Robert Fletcher* obſerves, That he ſhould be very glad to have Mr. *Jourdan*'s abilities employed on the Committee of Circuit, but in juſtice to Mr. *Jourdan* he cannot but excuſe him, for the reaſons he has aſſigned; and therefore he is againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stratton*. Againſt the Queſtion; for the ſame reaſons.

Carried againſt the queſtion by a majority of 8 to 3.

Agreed to adjourn until Monday morning.

Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, Monday, the 29th July 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Sir *Rob*t *Fletcher,*
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſell,
*Alex*r *Dalrymple,*
Charles Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Mr. *Mackay* delivers in the following Letter, which is read:

To the Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident, and Council of *Fort Saint George*,

My Lord, and Gentlemen,

As the Court of Directors have done me the honour to include my name in the Committee of Circuit for the Northern Circars, I ſhould think myſelf wanting in duty, if I did not expreſs the grateful ſenſe I have of this mark of their favour: at the ſame time, I eſteem it equally my duty to inform the Board, that in my own ideas I cannot, with propriety, or with hopes of being ſo uſeful to the Company as I could wiſh, undertake a truſt of ſuch importance, when I know it is impoſſible for me to take an active part in the buſineſs. I ſay this, becauſe my time of life, at the age of near ſixty, and after having ſuffered much fatigue with the Army in the field, I hope I ſhall ſtand excuſed in the opinion of our Honourable Maſters and of the Board, if I requeſt to be indulged with remaining at the Preſidency, where, to the utmoſt of my ſtrength and abilities, I ſhall always endeavour to do my duty to the Company. However, after ſaying this much, as the reſult of what I know and feel, I ſhall cheerfully ſubmit myſelf to the determination of the Board, to diſpoſe of me as they may ſee proper; and I remain, moſt reſpectfully,

My Lord and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient, and moſt
humble Servant,
George Mackay.

Fort Saint George,
29th July 1776.

The Right honourable the Preſident obſerves to the Board, that he is himſelf convinced that the Court of Directors never expected a ſervant to undertake a ſervice of fatigue, which he is perſuaded his conſtitution will not enable him to perform; and underſtanding Mr. *Mackay* to be of this opinion with reſpect to himſelf, the Preſident doubts not but the Board will comply with his requeſt.

Mr. *Jourdan*. Conſidering what has been urged by Mr. *Mackay*, particularly his time of life, he thinks his ſervices on the Circuit ought to be diſpenſed with.

Mr. *Palmer*. Agrees in opinion with Mr. *Jourdan*.

Mr. *Stone*. Agrees to Mr. *Mackay*'s requeſt, for the reaſons urged by the Preſident.

Mr. *Floyer*. Is of opinion that Mr. *Mackay* ſhould be excuſed, and enters the following Minute on the ſubject:

The reaſons ſet forth by Mr. *Mackay*, in his Letter to the Board, for requeſting to be excuſed the duties of a Member of the Committee of Circuit, are ſuch as, in my opinion, juſtly merit an indulgence from this Board. I therefore think he ſhould be excuſed; and hope this my opinion will be deemed conformable to the declaration made in my Minute of the 26th inſtant, on a ſimilar occaſion reſpecting Mr. *Jourdan*.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. Aſſents to Mr. *Mackay*'s requeſt, for the reaſons aſſigned by the Preſident.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. Aſſents to Mr. *Mackay*'s requeſt, for the ſame reaſons.

Mr. *Brooke*. Aſſents to Mr. *Mackay*'s requeſt, for the reaſons aſſigned in his Letter, and by the Preſident.

Sir *R. Fletcher*. Agrees to excuſe Mr. *Mackay*, on account of his great age; but he does not admit that Mr. *Mackay* is to be the only judge whether or not he can perform the ſervice.

Mr. *Stratton*. Thinks Mr. *Mackay* ſhould be excuſed, being perſuaded, from his advanced age, that he cannot bear the fatigues attending the duty of a Member of the Committee of Circuit.

Reſolved unanimouſly, That Mr. *Mackay* be excuſed from proceeding on the Circuit.

The Board, taking into conſideration in what manner the two vacancies in the Committee of Circuit ſhall be filled up, and Mr. *Stone* being mentioned by ſome of the Members as a proper perſon for that ſervice, the Right honourable the Preſident expreſſes his hope, that the Board will not think of Mr. *Stone* on this occaſion—That Mr. *Stone*, ever ſince his arrival in the country, has been always employed in the Settlement—That he was ten years in office as Secretary to the Military Department, part of which time was in the Preſident's former Government, when he found Mr. *Stone*'s ſervices very uſeful to him, both in his official and private capacity—That he has experienced the ſame ready and cheerful aſſiſtance from that Gentleman during his preſent Government; and being perſuaded that his long official experience and knowledge of the Company's affairs will make him more uſeful at the Preſidency than if he were employed on the Circuit, he flatters himſelf the Board will diſpenſe with his going upon that ſervice.

Agreed at the requeſt of the Preſident, and for the reaſons urged by him, that Mr. *Stone* be excuſed from going on the Circuit.

Mr. *Dalrymple* reads the following Minute:

The buſineſs for which the Committee of Circuit are appointed, is,

To aſcertain, with all poſſible exactneſs, the produce of the country.

The number of inhabitants.

State of manufactures.

Fortified places.

Groſs account revenues.

Articles from which they ariſe.

Mode by which they are collected.

Specific proportion uſually received by the Rajah or Zemindar,

Zemindar, and what cuſtom or uſage has allotted to the cultivator.

What ſecurity the Native has for his property.

What Courts of Juſtice.

How far ſimilar regulations to thoſe lately eſtabliſhed in *Bengal* may be introduced with propriety in the N^a^ Circars.

Aſcertain the ſtrength of each Rajah or Zemindar, expence of his Troops, &c.

The means of defraying thoſe expences.

The number of regular Sepoys neceſſary to maintain.

The Company expreſs an intention that every military man in the Circars be paid by the Company.

And that the Committee of Circuit are afterwards to proceed to let the lands.

That branch of the Committee's duty, which depends upon enquiry, can ſcarcely be effected by a Committee; at leaſt, it can be much more effectually and expeditiouſly done by a ſingle perſon, with the aſſiſtance of junior ſervants, and when the ſeveral reports are made to the Board, the Committee then proceeding conjointly to let the lands, may on the ſpot examine each Report, to ſee that it is complete and exact.

By this method each perſon of the Committee will naturally be ſtimulated to diſtinguiſh himſelf by the manner in which he executes his truſt; and being left to execute it in the mode he thinks beſt, it will be done more completely as well as more expeditiouſly than if the whole Committee act in conjunction.

Mr. *Floyer*, ſeeing the difficulties which the Board are under in filling up the vacancies in the Committee of Circuit, readily offers his ſervices upon this occaſion, obſerving only, that, for want of local knowledge, he does not think himſelf at preſent competent to do the duties of a Member of the Committee; but if the Board will permit him to remain at *Maſulipatam* (where he has been appointed Chief by the Honourable Court of Directors, and of which Settlement he has not yet taken charge) until he ſhall have acquired that local knowledge ſo neceſſary in a Chief, for the information of the Committee of Circuit, he will, after having obtained ſuch neceſſary information, readily join the Committee, and go on with them in their enquiries.

Agreed unanimouſly, That Mr. *Floyer* be one of the Committee of Circuit, and that he be permitted to remain at *Maſulipatam* ſo long as he ſhall find it convenient for the above purpoſes.—Sir *Robert Fletcher*, Mr. *Jourdan*, and Mr. *Mackay*, having given an opinion heretofore, that Chiefs ought not to be appointed Members of the Committee of Circuit; but the majority determining contrary to that opinion, they think themſelves at liberty to aſſent to Mr. *Floyer*'s being of the Committee of Circuit.

One vacancy in the Committee remaining ſtill to be filled up, and Mr. *Latham*, the Chief of *Cuddalore*, being propoſed as a proper perſon, it is moved, That he be appointed a Member.—The Queſtion being accordingly put by the Right honourable the Preſident,

Mr. *Mackay*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Jourdan*. For it.

Mr. *Palmer*. For it.

Mr. *Stone*. For it, ſuppoſing it will be agreeable to Mr. *Latham*.

Mr. *Floyer*. For it.

Mr. *Dalrymple* and Mr. *Ruſſell*. For it, thinking Mr. *Latham* a proper perſon, and ſuppoſing that it will be agreeable to him.

Mr. *Brooke*. Againſt it, and delivers the following Minute:

I give my negative to the appointing Mr. *Latham* on the Committee of Circuit, becauſe I think it improper to call the Chief of *Cuddalore* to proceed to the Northern Circars, where he has had no opportunity of acquiring any knowledge in the buſineſs on which that Committee is ordered; whereas the Chief of *Vizagapatam*, by his reſidence there, may have acquired ſuch knowledge as might be of material ſervice in inveſtigating the ſeveral matters recommended by the Company: and becauſe the Chiefs of *Vizagapatam* and *Maſulipatam* having been appointed Members of that Committee, he may be called before them (though his juniors in the ſervice) without having a ſeat with them, which I think is an indignity, though this Board never meant that any ſhould be offered him.

Henry Brooke.

Sir *R. Fletcher*. For it.

Mr. *Stratton*. For it.

Preſident. For it.

Reſolved accordingly, That Mr. *Latham* be appointed a Member of the Committee of Circuit, with permiſſion to retain the Chiefſhip of *Cuddalore*;—that he be adviſed of his appointment, and deſired to repair to the Preſidency with all convenient expedition.

Agreed, to meet again on Thurſday next, on the buſineſs of the Committee of Circuit.

Geo. Stratton.
Henry Brooke.
Archdale Palmer.
Francis Jourdan.
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, Thurſday the 1ſt of Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Sir *Robert Fletcher*,
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſell,
Alex. Dalrymple,
Charles Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

The Right honourable the Preſident lays before the Board the following Minute, which is read.

The Preſident obſerving to the Board, that the occaſion of their now aſſembling is in conſequence of the Reſolution of the laſt Council, That they ſhould this day take into conſideration, the departure of the Committee of Circuit—and having upon a former day repreſented, that he thought the affairs of *Tanjour* far from being finally adjuſted, he continues of opinion, that the Committee ought not at this time to proceed on the Circuit.

The Preſident maintains, that there are many very great abuſes at the Preſidency; in the inveſtigation of which, he thinks the extraordinary diligence and application of Mr. *Dalrymple* is eſſentially neceſſary to him, and theſe require to be fully examined into and regulated, before the Members of the Council proceed upon a buſineſs, which will take years to execute. Notwithſtanding this, the Preſident, convinced of the infinite importance of the Jaqueer, has no objection to the Committee of Circuit going upon an enquiry into the ſtate thereof, which is a ſervice he hopes may be performed in a few months with the aſſiſtance of the examination Mr. *Barnard* has already made.

The Preſident further obſerves, that he has a volume of complaints to lay before the Committee; that he had many made to him on his late journey; and the laſt letter from the Nabob, deſiring that orders of Government may be made public, which orders in ſuch caſes [illegible] courage and forbid complaints being [illegible] Preſidency, ſtrengthens him the more in his opinion, that thoſe complaints require their firſt attention.

The Preſident hopes, that the reaſons alleged by Mr. *Mackay*, do not extend to a leaving of the Coaſt during the [illegible] and to keep the Preſidency [illegible] Jaqueer; [illegible] fore, as the Court of Directors [illegible] plied to [illegible] him,

APPENDIX. No. 6.

him, the Preſident recommends, that he be a Member of the Committee on this expedition into the Jaqueer—and more particularly as Mr. *Floyer* will depart ſoon for *Maſulipatam*.

The Preſident moves, That the Committee of Circuit ſhall firſt proceed to the inveſtigation of the Jaqueer—and the queſtion being put,

Mr. *Mackay*. Againſt the Queſtion; as he is clearly of opinion the Court of Directors, in their orders by the *Grenville*, mean, that the Northern Circars ſhould be inveſtigated by the Committee of Circuit before the Jaqueer.

Mr. *Jourdan*. Againſt the Queſtion; for the reaſons contained in the following Minute entered by him:

As the abuſes of which the Right honourable Preſident ſpeaks, are not ſpecified, I can only ſay, that in my opinion the Preſident ought to lay them before the Board, and that the Members who will remain here after the Gentlemen appointed on the Circuit may ſet out, will be competent for the inveſtigation and redreſs of any abuſes that may exiſt. The material parts of the *Tanjour* buſineſs I think are concluded; the Nabob deſires that we order notice to be given, that the Ryots and Inhabitants that receive the ſhares eſtabliſhed in *Saadut Ulla Cawn's* time; that all Chotrums and Enams granted by former Soubahs, ſhall be allowed; and that if any Ryot ſhall demand more than is due to him, he ſhall not receive encouragement and protection from the Engliſh; all which I think may be done, in terms that will not preclude the injured from complaining. The Members of the Committee of Revenue, in the abſence of the Committee of Circuit, may receive and examine the accounts of the *Trepaſſore*, &c. diſtricts, collected by Mr. *Barnard*; and I therefore am againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Palmer*. Againſt the Queſtion; as he thinks the ſpirit of the Company's orders is, that the Northern Circars ſhall be firſt inveſtigated by the Committee of Circuit.

Mr. *Stone* obſerves, That he has already given his opinion, that the departure of the Committee ſhould be delayed for ſome time, as it appeared to him there were many important points reſpecting *Tanjour* remaining to be adjuſted; but it having been determined by the Board, that the Committee ſhall proceed immediately, he thinks they ſhould make the Jaqueer the firſt object of their enquiry, as they may, on any emergency, be called to the Preſidency at a ſhort notice; he is therefore for the Queſtion.

Mr. *Floyer* obſerves, That he has conſidered, with due attention, the ſubject of the Right honourable the Preſident's Minute, and confeſſes he does not ſee reaſons ſufficient to induce him to deviate from what he thinks the poſitive orders of the Court of Directors, That the Committee of Circuit ſhould firſt proceed to the Circars; where, he is of opinion, the duties of the Committee are firſt and moſt eſſentially required: he is therefore againſt the Queſtion, for the above and other reaſons, which he ſhall more fully aſſign in a Minute hereafter.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. For the Queſtion; and gives his reaſons in the following Minute:

The Nabob having not given in any application for continuing to rent the *Trepaſſore*, &c. diſtricts, and the term for his laſt agreement being now expired, I think the Jaqueer is at preſent virtually under the charge of the Committee of Circuit: and although I do not mean to ſay, that in caſe the Nabob ſhould now make application for a continuation of this farm for the enſuing year, that his Highneſs's application ſhould be rejected, becauſe not given in before this time; yet, if a further agreement is made with him, the Company's orders are, that this agreement with the Nabob ſhall be made for one year only; and that it muſt be "an expreſs condition in "ſuch Agreement," that the Committee of Circuit ſhall be at full liberty to explore the country, and to aſcertain the real produce and revenues thereof, in the manner deſcribed in their Inſtructions reſpecting the Northern Circars; which condition would be rendered void, if the Committee were firſt to be ordered to the Northern Circars, as it is impoſſible for them to execute their duty in *one* year. And I am convinced, not only from what I have heard, but from what I have ſeen, that the Jaqueer is capable of very great improvement, and that the inhabitants ſuffer great oppreſſions.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. For the Queſtion; and gives his reaſons in the following Minute:

I am for the queſtion, for the reaſons urged by the Preſident; and, becauſe I think the Jaqueer is of the firſt importance to the Company, on account of its vicinity to the Preſidency, as well as revenue; alſo, becauſe until an inveſtigation is made, the lands cannot be let on long leaſes, which is abſolutely neceſſary to relieve them from the decayed ſtate they are ſaid to have fallen into under the Nabob's management on leaſes from year to year.

Mr. *Brooke*. Obſerves, That he is unhappy in differing in opinion from the Preſident in the preſent caſe; but he thinks the inveſtigation of the Circars an object of much more importance than the Jaqueer, as well as that the Company's orders have ſo particularly and ſtrongly recommended it. For theſe reaſons, and thoſe aſſigned by Mr. *Jourdan*, he is againſt the Queſtion.

Sir *Robert Fletcher*. Subſcribes to the opinion given by Mr. *Jourdan*; and is therefore againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stratton*. Againſt the Queſtion, being clearly of opinion, That, from the ſpirit of the Company's orders, the Committee of Circuit ſhould firſt proceed to inveſtigate the Northern Circars, which appear to him to be the Company's principal object in the appointment of this Committee.

Preſident. For the Queſtion; obſerving, That he is much concerned the arguments made uſe of in his Minute, have not had that weight with the Board which he expected, and which he thinks they deſerve. In reply to Mr. *Jourdan's* Minute, he remarks, that undoubtedly he ought to lay before the Board, the abuſes mentioned; and the ſooner he does ſo, the more he is perſuaded it will be acceptable to his Employers—That he wiſhed to do this at a time when he could have Mr. *Dalrymple's* aſſiſtance.—That he is perſuaded Mr. *Jourdan* is as well acquainted with the circumſtance and ſituation of this Settlement, as any man; but if he ſhould be ſo unfortunate in all his recommendations henceforward, as he has been of late, it is evident he will receive very little ſupport from his Council after the departure of the Committee of Circuit.

Carried againſt the Queſtion by a majority of 7 to 4.

Mr. *Brooke* delivers in the following Motion in writing, which is now read:

It having been determined, that the Committee of Circuit ſhall immediately proceed on that ſervice, and the Court of Directors appearing deſirous of having the affairs of the *Chicacole* Circar firſt ſettled, I move, That Meſſrs. *Ruſſell* and *Dalrymple* do ſet out by the 15th of this month to the *Chicacole* Circar to be there joined by Mr. *Johnſon*, in order to commence upon this buſineſs; that Mr. *Lathom* do repair thither as ſoon as poſſible; and that Mr. *Floyer* ſhall join them when he has acquired that knowledge which is ſo neceſſary for him as Chief of *Maſulipatam*.

The above Motion being read, Mr. *Floyer* deſires leave to ſecond it.

It being late in the day, and the Right honourable the Preſident informing the Board, that he has a great deal to ſay to them on the ſubject of Mr. *Brooke's* Motion, it is agreed to adjourn till to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Geo. Stratton.
Henry Brooke.
Archdale Palmer.
Francis Jourdan.
Geo. Mackay.

Extract

APPENDIX. No. 6.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, Friday, the 2d Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Charles Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
George Mackay.
Sir *Robert Fletcher* indiſpoſed.
Mr. *Ruſſell* and Mr. *Dalrymple* abſent.

The following Letters from Mr. *Ruſſell* and Mr. *Dalrymple* are now read:

My Lord, and Gentlemen,

As I conſider the Motion given in yeſterday by Mr. *Brooke*, and ſeconded by Mr. *Floyer*, to convey a charge of backwardneſs in my duty to the Company, by fixing a particular day for my departure on the Committee of Circuit, I think it incumbent on me, before I can attend your Councils, to requeſt you will call upon thoſe Gentlemen to explain themſelves, and point out in what inſtance I have either been backward or negligent. On this occaſion I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that Mr. *Dalrymple* nor myſelf have not, ſince our arrival, incumbered ourſelves with the charge of any employ of emolument, that we might be the readier for ſetting out on the Circuit, when the *Tanjour* buſineſs ſhould be finally adjuſted.

The Board, when fuller than at preſent, did me the honour of appointing me Reſident at *Tanjour*, to ſettle the buſineſs there, and quiet the alarms in the Rajah's mind, before my ſervices on the Circuit ſhould be called upon; and I ſhould hope they would not now fruſtrate that appointment, as I cannot but think it a highly neceſſary one, it being well known that the Nabob's ſons took great pains, and made large offers to Mr. *Dawſon*, to prevent the appointment taking place; and even now are indefatigable in their nocturnal viſits.

I have the honour to be, very reſpectfully,
My Lord, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
2d Auguſt 1776. *Claude Ruſſell.*

To the Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

My Lord, and Gentlemen,

The Motion made yeſterday by Mr. *Brooke*, and ſeconded by Mr. *Floyer*, *conveying an imputation that Mr. Ruſſell and I have declined our duty to the Company*, I muſt conſider as a charge; and am under the neceſſity, before I attend Council, to call upon Mr. *Brooke* and Mr. *Floyer*, to explain in what inſtance I have ever been backward in performing my duty; the more particularly as I have never expreſſed even a wiſh to be excuſed going on the Committee of Circuit; on the contrary, always did expreſs my readineſs to proceed; and, to qualify myſelf for the execution of this duty, I have, with great pains, abſtracted the proceedings of the Board of Revenue, to know what had been done antecedent to our arrival; and before I was ſent to *Tanjour*, had drawn out a model for abridging Mr. *Barnard*'s Account; which model was approved by the Board, and ordered to be carried into execution, under the direction of the Accountant: and ſince my return I have almoſt completed, from the Company's Records, an Abſtract of all circumſtances I can find concerning the Jagueer. It is true, conſidering the Jagueer to be the matter of the moſt real importance to the Company, I have not entered into any inveſtigation of the Northern Circars, concerning which I have no local knowledge, and am therefore as great an ignoramus as Mr. *Floyer* declared himſelf to be; and for this reaſon his preſent attendance with the Committee was excuſed. If the Committee are to proceed firſt to the Northern Circars, the pains I have taken concerning the Jagueer is labour loſt; and an examination of the Company's Records, to acquire the neceſſary knowledge concerning the Northern Circars, and to have the neceſſary Extracts made, will take more time than the Motion allots for our departure.

So indecent a Motion, as to affix any day for the departure of the Members of this Board, cannot, I preſume, ever be put to the vote by the Preſident; whoſe duty, I conceive, obliges him to maintain the reſpect due to the Members of his Council; ſince, if there was any ground for ſuch an order, the perſon who requires to be put under ſuch command, muſt be unmeriting that confidence indiſpenſably neceſſary to be lodged in the Members of the Committee of Circuit.

But, circumſtanced as I am, the motion is particularly injurious: Upon the eve of the *Grenville*'s diſpatch, when ſuch important matters, wherein I have been ſo much a party concerned, are to be referred to the Company, and the Commander in Chief, having repeatedly intimated to the Board his intention to call upon them to enter into the conſideration of my conduct, which I am conſcious will ſtand the teſt as well as his or any Member of the Board's; it is in a manner preventing me from making my defence to our Honourable Maſters, and precluding me from that juſtice which I have a perfect confidence of ever receiving from them, when all circumſtances are fairly repreſented.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obed^t humble Servant,
Fort Saint George, *A. Dalrymple.*
2^d Augt 1776.

The above Letters being read, Mr. *Floyer* addreſſes himſelf to the Board as follows:

The Letters which have now been read from Meſſrs. *Ruſſell* and *Dalrymple*, ſhould imply, by my ſeconding the Motion of Mr. *Brooke*, read yeſterday at the Board, an indirect charge or accuſation of a neglect of duty on their parts. I have in a former Conſultation very fully expreſſed my wiſhes, that a time, not exceeding the departure of the *Grenville*, ſhould be fixed for the ſetting out of the Committee of Circuit; and did then aſſign as a reaſon for ſuch wiſh, that it was not ſufficient the Court of Directors ſhould know that we had reſolved to enforce their orders relative to the Committee of Circuit, but that they ſhould, by the ſame conveyance, have the additional ſatisfaction of knowing they were actually ſet out on that duty. When I uttered theſe my ſentiments, I did expect the *Grenville* would have been diſpatched from hence to *Europe*, within a month at fartheſt, as we have been told by the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, that the *Grenville* would be diſpatched in a few days after the *Revenge*, which arrived here nine days ago, and as we have nothing to detain her here, to my recollection, after her arrival, but the ſending by her our public diſpatches to the Honourable Court of Directors, and perhaps a few bales of our inveſtment, theſe, together with the lateneſs of the ſeaſon, make me think I am rather beyond than within the time ſhe can with propriety be kept here. I muſt add to the above reaſons, that in my opinion, the buſineſs of the Circuit has been already too long delayed, and that if I did not uſe my endeavours as a Member of this Adminiſtration to expedite the departure of the Committee, I ſhould deſervedly incur the ſevereſt cenſure my Honourable Maſters could impoſe upon me. Theſe are the reaſons which induced me to ſecond Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion, and no other. If in that act I had intended any thing to the prejudice of thoſe two Gentlemen, I ſhould have taken the liberty to have mentioned it at the Board when they were preſent. I am extremely ſorry to have given this trouble to the Board, and [illegible] leave to make one obſervation more upon three words in *Dalrymple*'s Letter, [illegible] to-day, alluding to this

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that made by Mr. *Brooke*). The word *indecent* is, in my opinion, by no means proper to be made uſe of by any Member upon any occaſion, which leads to become a public Act of this Board.

Mr. *Brooke*. When I gave in my Motion yeſterday at the Board, it was upon a general idea that the Company's poſitive commands, regarding the Circuit, had been already too long delayed, and not from any intention to convey to this Board any charge of neglect againſt Mr. *Ruſſell* or Mr. *Dalrymple*. I have, upon all occaſions, during the debates touching the Circuit, given it as my opinion, that the Company's intentions, regarding the buſineſs of *Tanjour*, were fully accompliſhed when the Rajah was put in poſſeſſion of his country, and thought that the Committee of Circuit ſhould have ſet out immediately after that period. Mr. *Stratton* propoſed to move, more than two months ago, That the Committee ſhould then proceed; but poſtponed it, on the Preſident's requeſting it might be deferred until the arrival of the *Greenwich*. Upon the Minute given in by Mr. *Jourdan* the 26th ultimo, it was determined, that the Committee of Circuit ſhould proceed immediately. The exception made to that, was, that the word "immediately" was indefinite; I therefore thought it proper to mention a preciſe time for their departure, that no further debates might ariſe. I am concerned upon this occaſion, that thoſe Gentlemen ſhould miſunderſtand my meaning, as nothing more was intended than to carry the Company's orders into execution, which appears to me already to have been too long delayed.

The Right honourable the Preſident remarks, upon that part of Mr. *Brooke*'s Minute which mentions his having requeſted Mr. *Stratton* to defer his Motion until the arrival of the *Greenwich*, that it never could but have been his intention, that Mr. *Stratton* ſhould poſtpone that Motion until he (the Preſident) ſhould think the proper time was arrived for the departure of the Committee, when it would be unneceſſary for Mr. *Stratton* to make the Motion at all.

The Preſident cannot avoid upon this occaſion expreſſing his concern, that two Members of the Council, of whom he has the higheſt opinion, whom he has known from very young men, and whoſe ability, integrity, and aſſiduity are equal to thoſe of any ſervant of the Company he has ever known, ſhould be placed in a ſituation, which they themſelves think improper and diſagreeable. The Preſident feels the more, as he ſhould think it all growing from his conduct at *Tanjour*, and from his wiſh to keep the Rajah of *Tanjour* in a ſituation, that ſhall henceforward free him from all unjuſt ſufferings from the Nabob, did not the Gentlemen of the majority aſſure him to the contrary. The Preſident will allow great merit to the majority in adhering ſtrictly to what they conceive to be the commands of the Court of Directors; but at the ſame time he is ſorry to obſerve, that even ſince that unfortunate journey, he has not been able to ſatisfy the majority of the Council, that any political queſtion he had to recommend was for the benefit of the Company. Thus ſituated, the Preſident thinks it his indiſpenſable duty to recommend to the Board, to call up, from *Ganjam* and *Vizagapatam*, Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, that he may be aided and aſſiſted with their advice upon this emergent occaſion: He therefore moves the Board, That they will come to that reſolution: And further informs them, he ſhall afterwards propoſe, That the Commander of the Company's ſhip *Revenge* be directed to proceed to the Northward, to bring up Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*.

That if upon enquiry it ſhould appear that the *nocturnal viſits*, mentioned by Mr. *Ruſſell* in his Letter to be made by the Nabob's Sons, be to the Members of this Council, ſuch Members be ſuſpended from the Company's ſervice until their pleaſure be known.

Mr. *Floyer* then requeſts that the Summons ſent laſt night round to the Council may be read, which is accordingly done, as follows:

Gentlemen of the Council,

The Right honourable the Preſident has directed me to acquaint you, That he finds it will require more time to prepare what he has to lay before the Board on the ſubject of Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion; that he deſires, however, the Council will attend at the Fort to-morrow morning at eleven o'clock, to take under conſideration Mr. *Davidſon*'s Letter concerning the *Ingeram* Inveſtment, and other current buſineſs.

I am very reſpectfully,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Thurſday evening, nine o'clock. *Charles Oakeley*, Secr.

Mr. *Floyer* then reads the following Minute, ſubſcribed to by himſelf, Mr. *Stratton*, Sir *Robert Fletcher*, Meſſrs. *Brooke*, *Palmer*, *Jourdan*, and *Mackay*.

After the many inſtances which the Majority of the Board have given of their attention to the Preſident, it was with much concern and aſtoniſhment, that we read the Paper laſt night ſent round to the Council.

A Motion for the ſetting out of the Committee for the Circars, was intended to be made by Mr. *Stratton*, more than two months ago. Mr. *Ruſſell* then objected to ſuch a Motion being made, on account of the land winds; and the Preſident wiſhing that it might be poſtponed until the arrival of the *Greenwich*, the Board yielded thereto. Near two months have elapſed ſince the arrival of the *Greenwich*, and in the intermediate time it has been reſolved by the Governor's caſting vote, that one of the Members appointed and ordered by our Maſters on the Committee of Circuit, ſhall be appointed Reſident at *Tanjour*; but with an intimation from the Preſident, during the debate, that the appointment to *Tanjour* ſhould not interfere in that Member's going on the Circuit. Some days ago the vacancies in the Committee of Circuit were filled up, and it was reſolved, that the Committee ſhould proceed immediately; and as ſome Gentlemen obſerved, that the word "immediately" was indefinite, Mr. *Brooke* moved yeſterday to fix their departure to a day—In this debate the Preſident deſired to have one day's delay, and to adjourn until this morning at ten o'clock—This was complied with, and it was made an Act of the Board that we ſhould meet at that hour to proceed upon Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion—The Preſident, notwithſtanding that adjournment, having taken upon himſelf to order the Secretary to ſend round a paper to ſuperſede that Act, by ſummoning them at a different time, to go upon the buſineſs of the *Ingeram* Inveſtment, (which buſineſs appears ſo immediately connected with that of the enquiry into the conduct of Mr. *Sadlier*, that we think no new ſyſtem can with propriety be adopted until that be finiſhed) we muſt declare this Act of the Preſident to be unconſtitutional, and that it appears to us intended to delay the execution of the poſitive orders of the Company, touching the Circuit: In ſupport therefore of thoſe orders, and of the dignity and honour of this Government, we think ourſelves obliged to object to going on any freſh buſineſs, until the time of the departure and place of enquiry of the Committee of Circuit be ſettled, unleſs ſuch buſineſs ſhall be deemed of more or of equal importance to that which is now before the Board.

Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

The Motions before entered by the Right honourable the Preſident are again read at his deſire.

Mr. *Jourdan*. As the paſſage alluded to by the Right honourable the Preſident, in the Letter from Mr. *Ruſſell*, is too general for me to form any judgment upon, I think Mr. *Ruſſell* ſhould be called upon to explain himſelf; and as I do not ſee the ſituation of the Company's affairs in the manner the Right honourable the Preſident does,

I am

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I am of opinion that the Motion delivered by Mr. *Brooke* to the Board, in point of order and regularity, as well as importance, ought to be firſt taken into conſideration; and I therefore move, That the Preſident's Motion be not now put. This Queſtion being accordingly moved,

Mr. *Mackay*. I think the Motions of the Preſident very irregular, as another Motion made by Mr. *Brooke* is now before the Board, and ought to be firſt diſpoſed of. I am therefore of opinion that the Preſident's Motion be not now put.

Mr. *Palmer*. I conceive that as there is a Motion now before the Board antecedent to the Preſident's Queſtion, and for the determination of which the Board are now aſſembled, I am of opinion that the determination of the Preſident's Motion be ſubſequent to that of the Motion now before the Board.

Mr. *Stone*. I think that the Preſident's Motion ſhould be now put.

Mr. *Floyer*. I am of opinion, that the Preſident's Motions ought not to be now put, for the reaſons given by Mr. *Jourdan*; but I can have no objection to their being put in due order and place.

Mr. *Brooke*. I ſhall always pay the greateſt attention to every thing that is moved by the Preſident; but as the Motion of yeſterday is prior to thoſe made to-day by him, and for the conſideration of which the Board agreed to meet this day, I am of opinion, that the Motion made yeſterday, in point of order and propriety, ſhould be firſt put, and am therefore for the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stratton*. I am for the Queſtion, for the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. *Jourdan*.

Preſident. Againſt the Queſtion.

Carried by a majority of 6 to 2, that the Right honourable the Preſident's Motions be not now put.

Meſſrs. *Brooke* and *Floyer* having declared in their Minutes relative to the Motion made by the former, and ſeconded by the latter, at yeſterday's Conſultation, That they never intended to convey any idea of neglect of duty in Mr. *Ruſſell*, or Mr. *Dalrymple*, by fixing a time for their departure, Reſolved, That they be furniſhed with a Copy of theſe Minutes, and that the Secretary deſire their attendance next Council.

Agreed, That Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion be taken into conſideration on Monday next.

Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 5th Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident.
George Stratton,
Sir *Robert Fletcher,*
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſell,
Alex. Dalrymple,
Chas. Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Minutes of laſt Conſultations read.

The Right honourable the Preſident obſerves to the Board, that the Nabob's agreement for renting the Jagueer, being expired, and the Honourable Company's inveſtments at *Ingeram*, as well as the Preſidency, being at a ſtand, he recommends to the Board to take thoſe important matters into conſideration, before they proceed upon other buſineſs.

Reſolved, That a Letter be written to the Nabob, to remind him that the term for which the *Tupaſſore*, &c. Diſtricts were let to him, expired on the 31ſt ultimo; and to requeſt his Anſwer as ſoon as poſſible to the Letter which was addreſſed to him on that ſubject the 23d ultimo.

With reſpect to the other part of the Preſident's recommendation, relative to the buſineſs of the inveſtment, the ſeveral Members give their opinions as follow:

Mr. *Mackay*. I am opinion that Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion ſhould be taken into conſideration before the buſineſs of the *Ingeram* inveſtment.

Mr. *Jourdan*. I am of opinion, for the reaſons I gave in laſt Conſultation, that Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion ſhould be firſt conſidered.

Mr. *Palmer*. I am of the ſame opinion.

Mr. *Stone*. As a very conſiderable and valuable part of the Company's inveſtment has been provided under *Ingeram*, any ſtop or failure therein muſt be attended with not only immediate but future bad conſequences to the Company; I am therefore of opinion, that the Board cannot too ſoon proceed to take Mr. *Davidſon*'s Letter on that ſubject into conſideration.

Mr. *Floyer*. I think the orders of the Court of Directors are too poſitive with reſpect to the Committee of Circuit, to admit of longer delay; and as the recommendation now before us is not, in my opinion, of equal importance to the ſubject contained in Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion, I am of opinion, that the ſaid Motion of Mr. *Brooke* ſhould firſt be conſidered.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. I am of opinion, that nothing is of more eſſential conſequence to the Company than their inveſtment: As I underſtand the *Ingeram* inveſtment is at a ſtop, I think this requires the firſt attention of the Board; and it is neceſſary for me to obſerve, that I called in vain for Mr. *Davidſon*'s Letter to be read. I alſo underſtand, from the Export Warehouſe-keeper's declaration at the Board, a few day ago, that the weavers of the Southern Pyckets had given to him a written declaration, that they could not conform to the reſolutions of the Board, and that this branch of the inveſtment is alſo at a ſtand.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. I am of opinion, that the *Ingeram* inveſtment ſhould be firſt taken into conſideration, for the reaſons given by Mr. *Stone*.

Mr. *Brooke*. I am of opinion, that the Motion I have delivered in ſhould be firſt conſidered, as well from the importance of the ſubject, as becauſe what I have therein propoſed, is in obedience to the Company's orders.

Sir *Robt Fletcher*. I am of the ſame opinion with Mr. *Floyer*.

Mr. *Stratton*. I am of opinion Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion ſhould be firſt conſidered, for the reaſon given by Mr. *Jourdan*.

Preſident. I am of opinion, that the buſineſs of the inveſtment ſhould be firſt conſidered.

Agreed, by a majority of 7 to 4, That the Motion delivered in by Mr. *Brooke*, be firſt taken into conſideration.

The Right honourable the Preſident then delivers in the following Minute:

Minute of the Preſident.

The Preſident obſerves to the Board, that the Motion before them having been objected to by two Members, as reflecting upon them, he cannot think the Gentlemen from whom it came can ſtill require ſuch a Motion to be put; the more particularly as it is impoſſible for Meſſrs. *Ruſſell* and *Dalrymple*, who have no local knowledge of the Circars, to prepare themſelves in ſo ſhort a time for ſuch a ſervice. He muſt further obſerve, that Mr. *Brooke*, the Gentleman from whom this Motion comes, ſo lately as the 29th of laſt month, gave his negative to Mr. *Lathom*'s appointment, that Gentleman having "had no "opportunity of acquiring any knowledge in the buſineſs "on which that Commiſſion is ordered." The Preſident

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fident conſidering alſo that the Board have given Mr. *Floyer* permiſſion to remain at *Maſulipatam* till he has had time to make himſelf ſomewhat acquainted with the Circars, he, the Preſident, cannot conceive the Motion propoſed by Mr. *Brooke*, and ſeconded by Mr. *Floyer*, can be ſupported on any ground, ſince Mr. *Ruſſel* and Mr. *Dalrymple* are at preſent as little acquainted with the Circars as Mr. *Lathom* or Mr. *Floyer*.

The Preſident further obſerves, That if the Committee of Revenue can be conſidered in any degree ſimilar to the Committee of Circuit, Mr. *Jourdan*, who is one of that Committee, and has been to the Circars, would have been the propereſt perſon to have filled up the vacancy in the Committee of Circuit; and the majority of Council having excuſed him merely for his private convenience, cannot, with any decency, deny ſomething to the convenience of other Members, who are acknowledged to be in no meaſure backward in their duty.

The Court of Directors having been pleaſed to commit the inſpection of the Jagueer to the Committee of Circuit, the Preſident thinks that charge cannot be transferred to the Committee of Revenue, as recommended by Mr. *Jourdan*. The Preſident is very well convinced of the neceſſity of enquiring into the many abuſes and oppreſſions; and at the ſame time he is not ignorant that it would be very pleaſing to the Nabob to have that enquiry poſtponed or made by his friends.

The Preſident makes no reply to the Minute delivered in by Mr. *Stratton*, Sir *Robert Fletcher*, Meſſrs. *Brooke*, *Floyer*, *Palmer*, *Jourdan*, and *Mackay*, leaving the conſideration of that to the Court of Directors; but he cannot avoid taking notice, that thoſe ſeven Members generally go together upon any queſtion, and compoſe the majority: Minutes are prepared and agreed to; Motions are framed and determined on, even before the purport of them is made known to him the Preſident, or the other Members of the Council; ſo that, in fact, the buſineſs of the Company is conducted in private meetings, inſtead of being regularly introduced and properly diſcuſſed by the Council at large. The Preſident is fully perſuaded, that nothing he can urge will put a ſtop to theſe irregular proceedings; but nevertheleſs, he thinks it a duty incumbent on him thus publicly to take notice of them, that the Court of Directors may ſee that their Preſident, inſtead of meeting with ſupport from the Council appointed to aid and aſſiſt him, finds, when they are aſſembled, it is only to give ſanction to meaſures hatched and matured by them in private, and to put a negative upon every meaſure propoſed by him the Preſident.

The Preſident, conſidering his own reſponſibility, as well as that of his office, confirmed by the Company's late diſmiſſion of his Predeceſſor, for the meaſures of the Council, thinks he is warranted, by the neceſſity of circumſtances, to require, "that Mr. *Ruſſell* ſhall forthwith proceed to *Tanjour* to quiet the mind of the "Rajah;" which is the more proper, as the majority of the Council have been pleaſed to refuſe the Rajah ſo ſmall a requeſt as to *continue* Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur* in the command of *Tanjour*; and to declare, that he, the Preſident, will not aſſent to Colonel *Stuart*'s proceeding to *Tanjour*, till Mr. *Ruſſel* goes thither.

The above Minute being read, Mr. *Dalrymple* and Mr. *Ruſſel* enter the following Minutes:

Mr. *Dalrymple*'s Minute.

I ſhall ever be ready, at a minute's warning, to go where the exigency of the ſervice demands; but I cannot be induced to think an undertaking, which will take *ſome years* to execute, can require a day, or even a *month*, to be affixed for its commencement: I truſt, therefore, I ſhall ſtand excuſed to our Honourable Maſters, in ſaying that I cannot be ready by the day propoſed in Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion, to proceed on the circuit of the Northern Circars, in which my reputation is ſo much at ſtake, and on which I muſt be ſo long abſent; and being convinced my Honourable Maſters will not require more of me, as I am acquitted by the Board of every ſuſpicion of backwardneſs to execute that or any other duty, I ſhall without apprehenſion ſtand in the deciſion of our Honourable Maſters; and although I cannot name a day when I ſhall be ready, nobody will ſuſpect me of idling away my time.

Mr. *Ruſſell*'s Minute.

I am in the ſame predicament with Mr. *Dalrymple*; and having, beſides, diſpatched part of my baggage to *Tanjour* in expectation thither, in conſequence of my appointment as Reſident, I muſt beg leave to appriſe the Board, that it will be impoſſible for me to ſet out on the circuit on the day fixed in the Motion.

Mr. *Mackay* then moves an Amendment to the Motion delivered in by Mr. *Brooke* the 1ſt inſtant, by fixing the date of the Committee's departure to the 31ſt inſtead of the 15th of this month.

Mr. *Ruſſell* thereupon deſires it may be minuted, that he cannot poſſibly get ready to proceed before the 1ſt October; and the Preſident expreſſes his hope, that the Board will ſee the neceſſity, where the Company's affairs do not require the immediate departure of the Committee, that a Member ſhould make it convenient to his own affairs.

The Queſtion on the Amendment propoſed in Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion is then put.

Mr. *Mackay*. I am for the Amendment.

Mr. *Jourdan*. For the Amendment.

Mr. *Palmer*. For the Amendment.

Mr. *Stone*. I am againſt the Amendment; and I am very ſorry to ſee any day fixed for the departure of a Member of this Board, as I have not the leaſt reaſon to ſuſpect that he will make any unneceſſary delay, knowing the deſire of the Board that he ſhould proceed with all expedition.

Mr. *Floyer*. I am for the Amendment, and have no other reaſon for giving this as my opinion, than that I deem the time of departure therein mentioned more conſiſtent with the orders of the Court of Directors.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. I am againſt the Amendment propoſed by Mr. *Mackay*, becauſe I think the Board ought to conform to Mr. *Ruſſell*'s convenience, ſo far as to allow him till the 1ſt October; and I doubt not, before that period, the other Members may be enabled to give our Honourable Maſters a general idea of the ſtate of the Jagueer, from their own knowledge and obſervation.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. Againſt the Amendment.

Mr. *Brooke*. For the Amendment.

Sir *Robert Fletcher*. For the Amendment.

Mr. *Stratton*. For the Amendment.

Preſident. Againſt the Amendment, as he is of opinion the Committee ſhould not proceed at all until he thinks proper.

Carried for the Amendment by a majority of 7 to 4.

Mr. *Brooke*'s Motion is then read, with the propoſed Amendment; and the Queſtion being put thereupon,

Mr. *Mackay*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Jourdan*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Palmer*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stone*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Floyer*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Brooke*. For the Queſtion.

Sir *Robert Fletcher*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stratton*. For the Queſtion.

Preſident. Againſt the Queſtion.

Carried for the Queſtion by a majority of 7 to 4.

Reſolved, That the Members of the Committee preſent be furniſhed, as ſoon as poſſible, with a copy of the orders of the Company touching the circuit, for their guidance.

The

The Right honourable the Preſident's Motions entered in laſt Conſultation are then read, as follows:

1. "That the Board will come to the reſolution of "calling up Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* to take their ſeats "at the Board.

2. "That the Commander of the Company's ſhip "*Revenge* be directed to proceed to the Northward to "bring up Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*.

3. "That if, upon enquiry, it ſhall appear that the "*nocturnal viſits* mentioned by Mr. *Ruſſell* in his Letter "to be made by the Nabob's Sons, to the Members "of this Council, ſuch Members be ſuſpended from the "Company's ſervice until their pleaſure be known."

The Queſtion upon the firſt Motion being put,

Mr. *Mackay*. I am againſt the Queſtion, becauſe I think the ſending for the Chiefs of *Ganjam* and *Vizagapatam* will be prejudicial to the Company's affairs, particularly as Mr. *Johnſon* is a "Member of the Com-"mittee of Circuit."

Mr. *Jourdan*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Palmer*. Againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stone*. For the Queſtion.

Mr. *Floyer*. When the Honourable Court of Directors granted a new Commiſſion of Government to the Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, &c. and the other Members of their Council at this Preſidency, as is uſual upon their confirmation or nomination of a new Preſident and Governor, they thought proper to include therein every Member who they were adviſed had ſucceeded to the ſeats vacated by ſome of the Gentlemen who had returned to *Europe*, ſo that by the introduction of Mr. *Ruſſell*, Mr. *Dalrymple*, and myſelf into Council, upon this Eſtabliſhment, the number of the Council at that time amounted to nineteen Members (of which number Mr. *Hay*, Mr. *Straton*, and Mr. *Cotſford*, were in *Europe*) including the Preſident and Commander in Chief; but they were pleaſed particularly to direct, that no future vacancies in the Council ſhould be filled up, until it was reduced to the number of twelve; four of this number are conſtant Reſident Chiefs at the ſubordinate factories. Hence it is evident to me, that the number of the Board ultimately intended to govern the Company's affairs on this coaſt, are eight, including the Commander in Chief, whoſe reſidence at *Fort Saint George* is precarious and uncertain: we have ſtill very lately been twelve Members of the Board, and are now actually eleven in number; notwithſtanding which, the Preſident moves that Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* be called up from the Northern Settlements to take their ſeats at the Board. To this Motion I object for the following reaſons; 1ſt, Becauſe the Board is compoſed of more Members than our Maſters intended it ſhould hereafter be compoſed of, for the Government of their affairs: 2dly, Becauſe, I think, the delay which muſt neceſſarily be occaſioned by the coming up of theſe Chiefs from Settlements ſo very diſtant from the Preſidency, will be attended with prejudice to the affairs of the Company, and be inconſiſtent with their poſitive commands relative to the Adminiſtration of Civil Juſtice; Becauſe Mr. *Johnſon* is one of the Members of the Committee of Circuit, nominated by the Honourable Court of Directors; and 4thly, Becauſe the Board, by this day's conſultation, have appointed a part of the Committee ſhall hold their Circuit this inſtant for the Circar of Ongole, which is under the Adminiſtration of Mr. *Johnſon* and the Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. [illegible] thinking the preſent [illegible] affairs [illegible] abſence of a full Board, [illegible] I give [illegible] Motion, becauſe it [illegible] for our [illegible] opinion [illegible] Preſident on [illegible] Company on [illegible]

Mr. *Ruſſell*. [illegible] reaſons urged by Mr. [illegible]

Mr. *Brooke*. I am [illegible] becauſe I think [illegible] Board [illegible] Company's affairs [illegible]

the intereſt of our Maſters in their reſpective ſtations, than they would be at the Preſidency, where there are already Members ſufficient.

Sir *Rob. Fletcher*. I ſhould be very glad to ſee Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* here at this time; but I am obliged to be againſt the Motion, becauſe I think it is contrary to the Reſolutions of the Board, reſpecting the Committee of Circuit; contrary to the Company's orders reſpecting the eſtabliſhed number of the Council at the Preſidency; and contrary to the expreſs words of the commiſſion of Government, as it reſpects the Chiefs of ſubordinates.

Mr. *Straton*. Againſt the Queſtion, for the reaſons urged by Mr. *Floyer*.

Preſident. For the Queſtion.

The Queſtion being carried againſt the firſt Motion, by a majority of 7 to 4, it becomes unneceſſary to put any Queſtion upon the ſecond Motion.

The third Motion being read, and the Queſtion put upon it,

Mr. *Mackay*. I am againſt the Queſtion; becauſe I think it is contrary to every principle of juſtice, as well as to the eſtabliſhed rules of the ſervice, that we ſhould make an Act of Government to puniſh any ſervants of the Company before an accuſation is brought againſt them, or even before it is known that they have committed any offence. If this Motion is carried in the affirmative, every Member of the Board who may have been viſited by either of the Nabob's Sons after it is dark, is liable to be ſuſpended from the Company's ſervice, though it ſhould appear on examination, that the viſit was not made with the knowledge or conſent of ſuch Member; and notwithſtanding the Reſolution of the Council, not to viſit the Nabob, or his Sons, &c. has been reſcinded by a great majority of the Board.

Mr. *Jourdan*. The majority of the Board having determined, that the Reſolution of Council, prohibiting the Members of Council from viſiting the Nabob, or is legally, if not formally, reſcinded, I know of no offence in viſiting or receiving viſits from the Nabob, or his Sons, and of courſe cannot conſent to the Motion; but I cannot help adding, that to paſs the Motion as it ſtands would be inconſiſtent with my ideas of juſtice, as it would be condemning a man without giving him an opportunity of defending himſelf, nay, even before a charge be laid againſt him.

Francis Jourdan.

Mr. *Palmer*. I am againſt the Queſtion for the reaſons given by Mr. *Mackay*.

Mr. *Stone*. I think the Motion rather premature, and am therefore againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Floyer*. Whenever a charge is given, and particularly in ſo general a manner as this ſeems to have been done by Mr. *Ruſſell*, I conceive the only proper and regular manner of procedure is, to call upon Mr. *Ruſſell* to explain ſuch charge, in order to obtain the neceſſary proofs; and upon the obtaining of proofs of any delinquency, the Board, in my opinion, ſhould then and not before, proceed to paſs ſuch cenſure upon the delinquent as they may deem themſelves legally authorized to inflict. I therefore think this Motion of the Preſident premature, and am againſt its being made, until a charge of delinquency is brought and proved, not only againſt any Members of this Board, but againſt any other perſons reſiding under the Britiſh Government.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. I am for the Queſtion, as I conſider the prohibition againſt viſits from the Nabob or his Sons ſtill in force; if ſuch viſits are conſidered as crimes, they merit ſuſpenſion.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. I look upon the Reſolution, prohibiting viſits as [illegible] of any Lord [illegible] Nabob or his Sons, [illegible] and [illegible] conſidered [illegible] I am [illegible] the Queſtion.

Mr. *Brooke*. I am againſt the [illegible] reaſons given by Mr. *Mackay*.

APPENDIX. No. 6.

Sir *Rob. Fletcher*. I ſubſcribe to the opinion given by Mr. *Jourdan*; and am therefore againſt the Queſtion.

Mr. *Stratton*. Againſt the Queſtion, for the reaſons given by Mr. *Mackay*.

Preſident. For the Queſtion.

Carried againſt the Queſtion, by a majority of 8 to 3.

It being late in the day and ſome of the Members propoſing to adjourn, the Right honourable the Preſident obſerves, That if any Gentlemen are to riſe from the table not ſatisfied that Mr. *Ruſſell* can clearly maintain what he has aſſerted, he objects to the Council's breaking up at this time, and is for going into that enquiry immediately.

Mr. *Floyer* agrees to the Preſident's deſire of having the ſubject of Mr. *Ruſſell*'s Letter diſcuſſed at preſent; and the majority of the Board being of that opinion, Mr. *Ruſſell*'s Letter, dated the 2d inſtant, and entered in the laſt Conſultation, is read.

Mr. *Ruſſell* is then deſired to acquaint the Board where he obtained the information relative to Mr. *Dawſon*'s having had large offers made him for the purpoſe mentioned in that Letter? Mr. *Ruſſell* replies, That what relates to Mr. *Dawſon* he had from himſelf; which he mentions to his credit. Mr. *Dalrymple* likewiſe obſerves, that what relates to Mr. *Dawſon* he heard from him.

Mr. *Floyer* upon this occaſion, ſolemnly declares, that this is the firſt time he ever heard of this matter, except from that paſſage of Mr. *Ruſſell*'s Letter to the Board read the other day.

The Right honourable the Preſident then obſerves, that the other paſſage in Mr. *Ruſſell*'s Letter, reſpecting nocturnal viſits, proceeds from intelligence which that Gentleman received from himſelf; but that having failed in his application to the Board to make the puniſhment certain, he ſhall keep the names of the offenders concealed until another opportunity.

Mr. *Floyer* gives it as his opinion, that the Preſident ſhould be now requeſted to explain to the Board what he means by nocturnal viſits, and further deſired to favour the Board with the names of any of its Members whom he thinks have committed any offence.

With reſpect to nocturnal viſits, the Preſident eſteems all viſits made after ſunſet, to be nocturnal viſits, and when he ſhall ſee an opportunity which ſuits well with the intereſt of the Company, and he is well perſuaded he can bring the puniſhment home, he will produce the offenders, and not till then.

The Board adjourn till Thurſday next, to take into conſideration the buſineſs of the Inveſtment at the Preſidency, and at *Ingeram*.

Geo. Stratton.
Henry Brooke.
Archdale Palmer.
Francis Jourdan.
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 9th Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſell,
Alex. Dalrymple,
Cha. Floyer,
Jn. Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

The Honourable Company's ſhip *Revenge*, being under diſpatch for the Northern Settlements; conformable to what he mentioned in Conſultation the 5th inſtant, the Preſident lays before the Board, the draft of a Letter to *Maſulipatam*, that Mr. *Floyer* may proceed thither, if it be convenient to him.

To *Charles Floyer*, Eſquire, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

The Court of Directors having been pleaſed to nominate Mr. *Floyer* to the Chiefſhip of *Maſulipatam* next after Mr. *Whitehill*, and the ſame being vacant by the reſignation of that Gentleman, Mr. *Floyer* proceeds accordingly to take charge of that ſettlement.

As complaints have ariſen, from the ſervants of the Company becoming ſecurity for the payment of the Kiſts due to the Company, and the influence they have had, and authority exerted, in the country, having been injurious in the greateſt degree to the Natives, who had prior aſſignments on the country, for money ſupplied the different Zemindars for payment of their Kiſts, &c. we direct, that in time to come, no ſervant of the Company ſhall, on any account whatever, directly or indirectly, lend money to the Country Powers, or be in any reſpect whatever concerned in the collection of the revenues.

Lauldoſs, the Soucar, acquaints the Preſident, that he has a demand on the country of *Opparow* Zemindar, for Pagodas 160,000. Aſſignments were properly made to him for the payment of this, by *Opparow* Zemindar; but this Soucar having been interrupted in collecting his debts, we recommend to your attention his particular caſe, and direct that you give him all proper aid and aſſiſtance, as alſo in recovering his debts of the Zemindar *Vaſoriddy*, and the *Pitaporam* Zemindar, although this laſt was during the Mooriſh Government.

The complaints made by the Nabob to our Honourable Maſters, ſhall be removed, by the lands being let out in future, either by the Committee of Circuit, or the Preſident and Council here; and of this you will give public notice, that propoſals will be received until the 1ſt March next, for the renting of that part of the Circars which falls under your management after the preſent time expires. Theſe propoſals muſt be for one year only, for although we are ſatisfied larger offers might be expected, were we to grant a longer leaſe, the Court of Directors would diſapprove our ſo doing, before the Committee of Circuit had made ſome enquiry into that part of their eſtate.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 9th Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſell,
Alex. Dalrymple,
Charles Floyer,
John Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

The following Minute, delivered in by Mr. *Stratton*, Sir *Robert Fletcher*, Meſſrs. *Brooke*, *Floyer*, *Palmer*, *Jourdan*, and *Mackay*, is now read.

Meſſrs. *Brooke* and *Floyer* have declared, That they did not, by their Motion, mean an imputation of neglect on Meſſrs. *Ruſſell* and *Dalrymple*; but after the Letters thoſe Gentlemen have written, after the declaration Mr. *Ruſſell* has made, we think there will appear to the Court of Directors an unwillingneſs on their part to ſet out upon the Circuit.

The firſt duty of every Member of this Government is obedience to the Reſolutions of the Board. Mr. *Ruſſell*, notwithſtanding the Reſolution, "That the Com-"mittee of Circuit" (of which he is at the head) "ſhall "proceed immediately," tells the Board, he hopes to go firſt to *Tanjour*, to quiet the alarms of the Rajah. Of theſe alarms hereafter: in this place we ſhall only note the impropriety of the expreſſion. If he underſtood not,

whether he was first to go to *Tanjour*, he should have asked the question, and have been informed; but from the manner in which he has written, it is by implication a remonstrance, the propriety of which we submit to the Court of Directors. Concerning that part of the Letter relating to Mr. *Dawson*, we say, that we know not of those offers, or any other offers; had they been made, it would have been more to Mr. *Dawson*'s credit to have laid the information before the Board ere his departure, than to have given them to Mr. *Russell*, to be brought forth at a future time. The remark of the indefatigability of the Nabob's sons, in their nocturnal visits, may have been intended to operate in working suspicions on those who have opposed the President; but as the President has taken this information on himself, we shall not here say more upon the subject, than that such general insinuations appear to us very unbecoming.

The whole tendency of Mr. *Dalrymple*'s Letter is finding fault with the late acts of the Board, as well respecting the time of the Committee's departure, as its local prosecution of the important matters committed to its charge. But he has gone farther, he has given it under his hand. He presumes that the Motion regularly made and seconded, cannot, in the case before us, ever be put by the President. This is not the first instance of his unconstitutional and arbitrary principles. It would be descending too much, for us, on this occasion, to enter into a refutation of principles, better calculated for the meridian of a despotic Government, than that of the free one of which we are Members, and which we are determined to preserve and support.

The high encomiums paid by the President, in his Minute of the 2d August, to Messrs. *Russell* and *Dalrymple*, we think might as well have been omitted; but being recorded, we are obliged, in justice to other Members of the Board, to say, that we conceive them to be at least equal in ability, as well as integrity, to those Gentlemen.

After the contents of the Letter of the Secretary, of the 1st August, entered in the proceedings of the 2d, superseding the act of the Board; and after the President had declared himself not ready for the business of the Circuit, it was extraordinary that, from the Letters written by Messrs. *Russell* and *Dalrymple*, he should make three Motions; one of which, if admitted, would operate in direct opposition to a late Resolution, which fixes Messrs. *Russell*, *Dalrymple*, and *Johnson*, to the immediate prosecution of the business upon which they were ordered by the Company; to which we add, that it was irregular in the President to offer, and the Board to receive, any Motions, until the Motion then before the Board had been carried in the affirmative or negative, or been otherwise disposed of. Local knowledge can only be acquired on the spot; the Records of each Subordinacy are to be seen at the principal places of the Subordinacies; and in those Records are to be found every material opinion or order touching the Circars:—We see therefore the impropriety of delay. Mr. *Brooke* moved such a time as he judged sufficient, considering their appointments had been long known to them, and that they had not charge of any employs. Mr. *Floyer* was of the same opinion, but unwilling to differ with the Gentlemen, an amendment of the Motion was proposed and carried, and the main Question then put and carried, fixing the 31st for their departure.

We cannot but observe, That the President hath been pleased to say, that the Nabob wishes to have the enquiry into abuses and oppressions continued, or made by his Friends. We know not what is meant by this Expression, but we refer to the President's own feelings, whether this be liberal. We are not ashamed to call ourselves the Friends of the Nabob, for we are ordered by our Masters so to treat him as such; but that our friendship for the Nabob should make us turn a deaf ear to oppressions committed on the poor people under our Government, is an idea too shocking for us to conceive to have entered into the mind of any man. Were it possible for the President to mean to convey such an idea, it were beneath us to justify ourselves, unless the Company should require it on misapprehension of what hath been said.

Minutes of this kind cannot be written at the Board—if they could, when divisions run as they have done, and when such doctrines have been held forth as we have heard, discussions at the Board would have brought on personalities, which might have involved the Company's affairs in more difficulties than they now are. We cannot but observe, that the President hath given us numberless instances of plans prepared in the Cabinet, and hurried through the Board; such as the Letter, per *Ankerwicke*, which ought to have been the effect of deliberation—the Motions for the President's going to *Tanjour*—his Powers—his Diary—his Motion for sending the Nabob to *Arcot—the Chief and Council for Tanjour, &c.*; and we may also say, every Motion he has opposed has been delayed for consideration from day to day: and since the President hath said, the majority put a negative on every measure he recommends, we take this opportunity of assuring him, that whenever he shall propose measures to the Board which we, in our consciences, can approve, he shall meet with all our support; and whether in our duty to the Public we could or could not support the measures we have opposed, the Court of Directors will be able to determine.

We have so often heard from the President and Mr. *Dalrymple*, of Council being appointed to assist the President, that we are not surprized to hear the President speak of his particular responsibility. We will, to shew the futility of this opinion, insert the following standing Order, although the very constitution of the Company is so clear as to render it quite unnecessary to any one, who does not wilfully refuse conviction. The requisition of the President, that Mr. *Russell* shall proceed to *Tanjour*, and his refusal of assent to Colonel *Stuart*'s going to *Tanjour* until Mr. *Russell* goes thither, are equally extraordinary and equally inadmissible.

Standing Orders from *England*.

3d January 1678, Par. 54.

"Whatever shall be agreed on by the majority, shall "be esteemed the order by which each one is to act; "and accordingly every individual person, even the "Dissenters themselves, are to perform their parts in "the prosecution thereof; and in so doing they do their "duty, and must be blamed for the event."

9th March 1702, Para. 2d.

Of the Instructions to Mr. *Pitt*, &c.

"We do strictly enjoin, that all our affairs be transacted in Council, and ordered and managed as the "majority of the Council shall determine, and not otherwise, upon any pretence whatsoever, &c. &c."

When Lord *Pigot* came to Council, on the [illegible] we understood, that on the evening he summoned the Council on a different business from that on which they had adjourned, he knew not that Messieurs *Russell* and *Dalrymple* intended to write the Letters which are before the Board: on the Consultation of Monday he has recorded, that he gave Mr. *Russell* the information touching the nocturnal visits which Mr. *Russell* has introduced into his Letter, and on which he has founded that extraordinary Motion recorded on Consultation, as the third he intended to make. Let these circumstances speak for themselves.

Before we enter further into the subject of the Motions, it may not be unnecessary to make some observations touching the alarms of which the Rajah's mind ought to be quieted. We have in the Military Department given an opinion that no such alarms exist; but that if the Rajah has alarms, the President ought to [illegible]

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them to the Board, that proper remedy might be applied: we know not of any; but we cannot help saying, that if any could exiſt, they moſt likely have ſprung from the delay of communication of the Reſolution of the Board of 14th June, as ſuch delay may carry with it an air of myſtery, and might raiſe ſuſpicions: but even in this caſe, the blame would fall on the Preſident, who ought, when at *Tanjour*, to have informed the Rajah there were demands of tunckedars, mortgagees, &c. and that he could not of himſelf determine the validity of thoſe claims. But if alarms ariſing from this exiſt, the moſt likely method to remove them will be, without more delay, to tell the Rajah that he ought to have been informed of theſe demands from the Preſident when at *Tanjour*; that we have conſidered the ſubject, and are of opinion, that the demands on the crop are conſiſtent with reaſon, juſtice, and the Company's orders; that in conſequence, he ought to aſcertain what the produce hath been, and fix upon periods for paying the ſame as his finances will beſt admit; that the Company mean to do ſtrict juſtice to the Rajah, as he may clearly ſee by the orders which have taken the country from the Nabob, and reſtored it to him; that the whole of the Board have not agreed in opinion touching the grain on the ground; but that our proceedings go to the Court of Directors, to whom, if he thinks proper, we ſhall be ready faithfully to repreſent every circumſtance he may deſire; that their favourable diſpoſition towards him cannot be doubted; and that if they ſhould judge this Government has erred, may reverſe that judgment: to which we ſhould add, that the Court of Directors thinking the Company guarantees of the Treaty of 1762, we are conſequently as much in duty bound to ſupport his juſt rights againſt the Nabob, as the Nabob againſt *Hyder*, or any other of the Country or European Powers.

When the Company directed us to carry into execution a plan which they were apprehenſive might bring on conſequences of the utmoſt importance, they judged the Board competent to determine upon it: and can we, with propriety, when that buſineſs of importance is finiſhed; when we have on mature conſideration reſolved, that the Committee of Circuit ſhall immediately ſet out; when we know that the buſineſs of the Northern Settlements is of great conſequence to the Company, loſe a moment in a debate, whether we ſhall call up the Chiefs from the Northward or not? We have heard of the alarms of the Rajah, of the oppreſſions of the Nabob, of abuſes exiſting in the Settlement, but with a Council inferior in number, the buſineſs of the Company on emergent occaſions, hath been well conducted. We have denied the exiſtence of juſt alarms; we are convinced of our intention to do the inhabitants of the Jagueer, as well as the Company, ſtrict juſtice; and we think ourſelves competent to redreſs any grievances or alarms which may have occurred at the Preſidency; we therefore could not heſitate a moment in refuſing conſent to his firſt Motion. But what ſhall we ſay of the third? Can any thing more ſtrongly mark the very extraordinary diſpoſition and deſigns of the Preſident, than that Motion? "That if the "nocturnal viſits were made to Members of the Coun-"cil, they ſhould ſtand ſuſpended." The Preſident could not but remember, that the majority had determined the Reſolution of touching the Nabob and his ſons, ſtood legally, if not formally, reſcinded. *But he endeavours* to avail himſelf of the want of form, thereby reproaching thoſe Members who failed in the execution of their duty, and who did not exert their rights, by inſiſting upon the Preſident's putting the Queſtion for reſcinding that Reſolution. Unwilling to proceed to extremities, they adopted a mode they judged likely to anſwer the end without it. But the Preſident ſays, when he ſhall ſee an opportunity which ſuits with the intereſt of the Company, and he is well perſuaded he can bring the puniſhment home, he will produce the offenders, and not till then. This is the return for our moderation, and that delicacy we have ſhewn the Preſident, and which is but one of the many inſtances we might quote; this ſhews the neceſſity of a ſtrict adherence to the principles of our conſtitution; but we hope the Preſident will not put us to ſuch another trial. When the Company ſhall read, that, notwithſtanding their orders to *Bengal*, that a man ſhall have a copy of the charge againſt him, to anſwer and croſs queſtion the witneſs, one of their Preſidents ſhall endeavour to paſs an order to condemn men unknown, unheard, on a ſpecies of offence not admitted as an offence by the majority of the Board, they cannot but be aſtoniſhed. If the Motion had paſſed into a Reſolution, it would have reflected on thoſe who had paſſed it; for it is contrary to humanity and juſtice, the characteriſtics of a free ſtate, and only to be reconciled to the cuſtoms of thoſe arbitrary courts, where men have formerly been tried and condemned unheard.

The Preſident obſerves on the firſt part of the above Minute, which relates to Mr. *Ruſſell*, That that Gentleman was by a former Reſolution of the Board, appointed Reſident at *Tanjour*, although one of the Committee of Circuit; that this Reſolution has never been reſcinded, and therefore he ſhould have thought Mr. *Ruſſell* at liberty to go to *Tanjour*, without infringing any ſubſequent Reſolution, provided he could be back in time to proceed on the Circuit within the period fixed for his departure: that, notwithſtanding, he (the Preſident) was of this opinion, he had before mentioned his wiſh, that Mr. *Ruſſell* might have expreſs permiſſion from the Board, to proceed for a few days to *Tanjour*; but as nothing of that kind is yet recorded, he now repeats his requeſt, and deſires the ſentiments of the Board upon it.

Mr. *Mackay*. I am againſt Mr. *Ruſſell*'s going to *Tanjour*, and will deliver in a Minute on the ſubject.

Mr. *Jourdan*. As I never have conſented to Mr. *Ruſſell*'s going to *Tanjour*, for reaſons before entered in Conſultation, ſo I cannot with propriety give my conſent to it at this time.

Mr. *Palmer*. Againſt it, and will deliver in a Minute.

Mr. *Stone*. For it.

Mr. *Floyer*. I am againſt, for the reaſons I have before aſſigned, as well as that Mr. *Ruſſell* has ſaid, he ſhall not be ready to go on the Circuit before the firſt of October.

Mr. *Dalrymple*. For it.

Mr. *Ruſſell*. For it.

Mr. *Brooke*. Againſt it, for the reaſons aſſigned by Mr. *Jourdan*.

Mr. *Stratton*. Againſt it.

Preſident. For it.

Agreed by a majority of 6 to 4, that Mr. *Ruſſell* be not permitted to go to *Tanjour*.

Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 16th Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right honourable Lord *Pigot*, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Sir *Rob. Fletcher,*
Henry Brooke,
Claude Ruſſell,
Alexr. Dalrymple,
Jas. Maxwell Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Minutes of the laſt Conſultations read:

Mr. *Jourdan* delivers in the following Minute, in reply to that part of the Preſident's Minute of the 5th inſt. which reſpects him.

Mr.

Mr. *Jourdan*'s Minute.

Mr. *Jourdan* thinks it neceſſary to deliver in the following Minute on the ſubject of the Circuit, which he had prepared to have laid before the Board, but the diſputes which occurred prevented him from doing it.

Mr. *Jourdan* begs leave to obſerve, That Lord *Pigot* has miſunderſtood him, if he imagined that he wanted to take from the Committee of Circuit what the Company had entruſted to them. All Mr. *Jourdan* meant was, that while the Gentlemen were acting to the Northward, the Committee of Revenue might collect and arrange the accounts againſt their return. Since Lord *Pigot*'s Minute carries with it an implication of want of zeal in Mr. *Jourdan* for the ſervice, in having declined the vacancy in the Committee of Circuit, Mr. *Jourdan* hopes he may, without being preſumptuous, ſay, that he has ſhewn as much attention and zeal to the ſervice of the Company, as any of the Members of the Board; and the Board have been pleaſed to confer on him, on that account, marks of their favour. He does alſo further declare, that having applied himſelf very particularly to the affairs of the Company at the Preſidency, he thinks he can render more eſſential ſervice by remaining here, than by going upon the Circuit; otherwiſe, that he ſhould not have wiſhed to decline it.

Mr. *Ruſſell* enters the following Minute:

Mr. *Ruſſell*'s Minute.

Mr. *Stratton*, Sir *Robert Fletcher*, and Meſſrs. *Brooke*, *Floyer*, *Palmer*, *Jourdan*, and *Mackay*, in their Minute of the 9th inſtant, found an opinion upon my Letter of the 1ſt, and the declarations made at the Board the That there will appear to the Court of Directors an unwillingneſs in me to ſet out upon the Circuit. I muſt remark in reply, that my Letter was before the Board when I was acquitted of backwardneſs in my duty to the Company; and that thoſe Gentlemen in this very Minute, acknowledge that it would have been diſtreſſing us to fix our departure for fifteen days, and therefore extended it to thirty. On urgent occaſions private conſiderations ought not to have any weight with this Board; and I ſhould hope no Member is capable of making them a plea for declining public ſervice. For my own part, I expreſſed my readineſs to go to the Southward, agreeably to the Preſident's requeſt; in the preſent inſtance, the ſhort time allowed us being meant only to fruſtrate a former Reſolution of the Board, I ſubmit to the Court of Directors, whether more regard ought not to have been paid to the declarations I made, and whether more time might not have been expected after I had made my arrangements for going to *Tanjour*, in conſequence of ſuch Reſolution, and had even ſent part of my baggage thither.

I cheerfully appeal likewiſe to the Court of Directors, whether my declaring, *under ſuch circumſtances*, that, inſtead of the 1ſt September, I could not *poſſibly* be ready before the 1ſt October to go to the Northern extremity of the Company's poſſeſſions, on a ſervice which will require years to execute, or Mr. *Jourdan*'s reaſons (26 July) for declining that ſervice, and Mr. *Mackay*'s Letter of the 29th July, indicate moſt unwillingneſs.

With equal cheerfulneſs I further ſubmit to the Court of Directors, the propriety of what theſe Gentlemen term a *remonſtrance*. Theſe Gentlemen ſurely cannot mean to deny, that a Member of the Board has a right to expreſs his ſentiments; nay, more, to *remonſtrate*, or even *proteſt*, what I had was founded on public grounds: and as the appointment for *Tanjour*, which ſtill exiſted, appears highly expedient, I did hope that it would firſt take place, and the more ſo as it was ſo underſtood at the time the appointment was made.

Theſe Gentlemen do Mr. *Dacres* great injuſtice in ſuppoſing he gave the information mentioned in my Letter to be brought forth at a future time; I declare ſuch was never his intention; and it is a thing ſelf-evident that it could not be, for he did not dream more than myſelf, that the appointment of a Reſident at *Tanjour* would have been overſet after his departure; if he had, probably he would have laid open to the Board the various means taken with him to vote againſt that appointment.

APPENDIX, No. 7.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 29th Auguſt 1776.

PRESENT,

George Stratton, Eſquire, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Sir *Robt Fletcher*,
Charles Floyer,
Archd Palmer,
*Franc*s *Jourdan*,
George Mackay.

Fort Saint George, 29th Auguſt 1776.

THE Board proceeded to take into conſideration the immediate execution of the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, relative to the Committee of Circuit, in order that this matter may undergo the leaſt delay poſſible by the late events, and the ſuſpenſions of Meſſrs. *Ruſſell*, *Dalrymple*, and *Lathom*, who were appointed Members of that Committee.

Minute, 29th Auguſt 1776.

The Board, taking into conſideration the nomination of proper perſons for the Committee of Circuit, refer to the Company's orders on the ſubject, which are as follows:

Separate Letter from *England*, 12 April 1775.

"We therefore direct, that when affairs reſpecting "*Tanjore* ſhall have been accommodated and finally ad-"juſted, a Committee of our Council, conſiſting of five "Members, be appointed to make the Circuit of the "Northern Circars, &c."

When the Court of Directors gave theſe orders, the Council conſiſted of nineteen, ſo that there were more than ſufficient for carrying on the Company's buſineſs at the Preſidency, for the Chiefſhips, and for the Committee of Circuit. The caſe is now altered; for by the late change the Council is reduced to nine Members on the Coaſt: two are gone home with leave, viz. Meſſrs. *Dawſon* and *Whitehill*; and two others, Meſſrs *Cotſford* and *Hay*, are now in *England*, and have the leave of the Court of Directors for remaining there another year. The Honourable the Court of Directors, in their commands of the 12th April 1775, poſitively direct that no new Members ſhall be taken into Council till the number is reduced to twelve.

Letter from *England*, 12th April 1775, paragraph 64.

"Although, from a variety of circumſtances, it has "happened that our Council at *Fort Saint George* have "never been reduced to the number of twelve, alluding "to our directions in the year 1769; nevertheleſs it is "our poſitive order, That no further vacancy therein "be filled up by you, even proviſionally, until the Coun-"cil ſhall be reduced to the ſaid number, twelve, &c."

In this ſituation, we are under the neceſſity of deviating from the orders of our Honourable Maſters, with reſpect to the Committee of Circuit, as in filling up the Council beyond the number preſcribed, which we think ought not to be done but in caſes of neceſſity. After the moſt mature deliberation on theſe ſubjects, we are unanimouſly of opinion, that three vacancies now in the Committee of Circuit, by the ſuſpenſion of Meſſrs. *Ruſſell*, *Dalrymple*,

APPENDIX. No. 8.

Dalrymple, and *Lathom*, be filled up by Meſſrs. *Perring*, *Daniel*, and *Crawfurd*, thoſe Gentlemen being near Council, and in our opinion very capable of ſerving the Company on this important buſineſs. The Committee will then conſiſt of

Meſſrs. *Johnſon*,
Floyer,
Perring,
Daniel,
Crawfurd.

Mr. *Sadlier*, the next ſervant on the liſt to Mr. *Perring*, cannot, we think, be employed until the Board come to a determination on his conduct at *Ingeram*.

Mr. *Davidſon* has the charge of an employ of great truſt, which cannot at this time be transferred to another.

Mr. *Morgan Williams*, the next ſervant on the liſt to Mr. *Davidſon*, having been many years at *Vizagapatam*, and well acquainted with the buſineſs of that Settlement, we think his remaining there will be abſolutely neceſſary, as both the Chief and ſecond are ordered on the Committee of Circuit.

Mr. *John Hollond* is next to Mr. *Williams*, but he is Perſian tranſlator.

Mr. *Williams* to ſucceed Mr. *Perring* as ſecond.

Ordered, That Meſſrs. *Perring*, *Daniel*, and *Crawfurd* be wrote to, adviſing them of their appointments to the Committee of Circuit; that Meſſrs. *Crawfurd* and *Daniel* be directed to proceed to *Vizagapatam*, where they will be joined by Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Perring*.

APPENDIX, No. 8.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 30th September 1776.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſq. Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Charles Floyer,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
George Mackay.

READ the following Letter from Mr. *Hollond*:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

As I underſtand your not naming me on the Committee of Circuit, purſuant to the ground you had adopted of appointing the ſervants next to Council, was on account of my being Perſian tranſlator; I muſt obſerve, with ſubmiſſion, that the buſineſs of that office does not ſeem to render it neceſſary for me to be kept at the Preſidency. I beg leave therefore to offer myſelf for the Committee Service; hoping, that my knowledge of Perſian will not be an impediment to my being appointed to a ſtation ſo much more creditable than that which I now hold.

I am with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
Fort Saint George, 21ſt September 1776. *John Hollond*.

Mr. *James Daniell*, who was, in Conſultation the 29th Auguſt, appointed a Member of the Committee of Circuit, having ſince repreſented, that it would be attended with great inconvenience to him to be removed from his preſent ſtation; it is reſolved, That he be excuſed, and that Mr. *Hollond* be a Member of the Committee of Circuit in his room.

Geo. Stratton,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 1ſt November 1776.

November 1. Diſpatched the following Letter to *Vizagapatam*, incloſing Inſtructions for the Committee of Circuit:

To *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſquire, Chief, &c. Council, at *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

You were adviſed in our Letter of the 11th inſtant, of the appointment of the Committee of Circuit; we now incloſe our Inſtructions to the Committee, and we deſire they may be opened by ſuch of the Gentlemen as may be at *Vizagapatam* on receipt of this Letter.

The Committee being directed to begin their enquiries in the *Chicacole* Circar, we deſire that the Records of your Settlement be immediately open to their inſpection; and in general, that you afford them every information and aſſiſtance in your power.

Such perſons as may be employed in ſurveying the Company's lands, dependant upon *Vizagapatam*, muſt be put under the order of the Committee of Circuit.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,
Fort Saint George, 1ſt Nov. 1776. *Geo. Stratton*, and Council.

To *Samuel Johnſon*, *Charles Floyer*, } Eſquires.
Meſſrs. *Peter Perring*,
John Hollond,
and *Quintin Crauſurd*.

Inſtructions to the Committee of Circuit.

Gentlemen,

1. In conſequence of the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, ſignified to us by their ſeparate Letter of the 12th April 1775, we have appointed you to be a Committee, to make the Circuit of the Northern Circars and Company's Jaqueer; and we incloſe herewith, a copy of ſuch parts of the ſaid Letter as contain their ſentiments and Inſtructions on this ſubject.

2. The Court of Directors have been ſo explicit with regard to the ſeveral points they wiſh to have aſcertained by the Committee of Circuit, that we ſhall have occaſion to add very little at preſent on that ſubject; if in the courſe of your proceedings and enquiries, any thing ſhould occur to us which may improve the deſigns of the Court of Directors, we ſhall communicate it to you, and we are confident you will yourſelves take every opportunity of making their plan as perfect as poſſible.

3. The *Chicacole* Circar being the firſt object of your enquiry, we have reſolved that Mr. *John Hollond* and *Quintin Crauſurd* ſhall proceed thither with all poſſible expedition, to join Mr. *Johnſon* and Mr. *Perring*, who are now at *Vizagapatam*; but we have permitted Mr. *Floyer* to proceed firſt to *Maſulipatam*, where he has been appointed Chief, and to remain there ſo long as he ſhall find it neceſſary to acquire a knowledge of the affairs of that Chiefſhip, after which he is to join the other Members of the Committee of Circuit, and go on with them in their enquiries.

4. As ſoon as either Mr. *Hollond* or Mr. *Crauſurd* is arrived at *Vizagapatam*, we would the Committee proceed on their buſineſs of the Circuit without waiting for the other Members.

5. In reſpect to the mode to be obſerved in carrying the Company's intentions into execution, whether by the Committee's proceedings jointly in that of the buſ[illegible] which relates to the enquiry, or ſeparately taking di[illegible] Diſtricts in the ſame Circar, we leave this matter to [illegible] own judgment and determination, obſerving only, that we wiſh to have the enquiry carried on in the moſt expe[illegible]tious and effectual manner poſſible.

We

We ſhall direct that the Records of the Company at every Settlement ſhall be open to your inſpection, and the Chief and Council reſpectively will be deſired to give you every information and aſſiſtance in their power.

7. There are ſome points not immediately connected with the buſineſs of the Circuit, which we have agreed to refer to your examination.

8. In March laſt the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam* repreſented, that the renters of the Havelly lands have ſuſtained very great loſſes by their farms, and petitioned for an abatement of rent. From the reports that were made to us on the ſubject, the caſe of theſe renters appeared ſo ſingular, that although they were not entitled by their Cowles to any conſideration, we determined to refer the examination of their loſſes to the Committee of Circuit; and upon their report, to act as might appear moſt equitable. In conſequence of this Reſolution, we direct that you make the neceſſary enquiry, and tranſmit the particulars to us, with your opinion.

9. The Preſident informs us, That when he was in the *Chicacole* Circar, *Jugganautrauze*, the preſent renter of the Havelly lands, acquainted him, that if thoſe lands (for which the Company now receive only 170,000 Rupees per annum) were let to him for 10 years, he would give 210,000 Rupees per annum, and after that term 400,000 per annum for 10 years more. From this circumſtance we are led to ſuppoſe the farm capable of the greateſt improvement; and we expect, from your enquiries, to aſcertain its value with ſome degree of preciſion.

10. *Juggabundoo Chowdry*, renter of the Havelly lands in the *Ichapour* diſtrict, has delivered a petition, ſetting forth, the great loſs he has ſuſtained by that farm, which expired the 25th September laſt, and requeſting either that ſome abatement might be made, or that he might have the ſame farm for a further period of three years, at 150,000 Rupees per ann. This laſt requeſt we could not comply with, as we had before reſolved on letting all the Company's farms for one year only; but as *Juggabundoo Chowdry* was repreſented by the Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, as a man very deſerving of our favour, on account of his general good conduct and punctuality in performing his engagements, we reſolved, if it were agreeable to him, that he ſhould be permitted to hold the farm for the preſent year, at 150,000 Rupees, and that if his behaviour ſhould merit the approbation of the Committee of Circuit, it ſhould be recommended to that Committee, to continue him for two years longer at the ſame rent. He has ſince accepted our propoſal, and we deſire, in conſequence, that you attend to the promiſe we have made him.

11. The Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, in a Letter lately addreſſed to us on the affairs of the *Ichapour* diſtrict, recommend the converting ſome of the ſmaller Zemindaries into Havelly lands, and allowing the Zemindars Jaghires out of them for their ſupport. We do not mean, upon any account, to take away from the Zemindars their hereditary rights; and at preſent we are far from ſuppoſing they will voluntarily give them up; nevertheleſs, when you come into the *Ichapour* diſtrict, and have made proper enquiry into the ſtate of it, we deſire you will communicate to us your opinion on the ſubject of the above recommendation.

12. Sometime ago a Letter came before us from the Paymaſter at *Aſſa*, requeſting permiſſion to build a houſe there for his reſidence. We agreed that it ſhould be referred to the Committee of Circuit to report, whether ſuch a building were neceſſary; and we mention it here that you may make enquiry when you arrive at that place, and inform us.

13. It has long been a matter of complaint, and we believe it is very juſtly founded, that the ſalt made in the *Maſulipatam* diſtricts has been ſold by the renters, both for exportation and to the *Lomberdy* People, at too high a rate; upon which account the owners of ſhips have generally preferred taking their ſalts from ports to the Southward; and many of the *Lombardy* People, who would otherwiſe chooſe to purchaſe ſalt in the *Maſulipatam* diſtricts, by reaſon of the protection they meet with, go to other people of the country.

14. Another diſcouragement to theſe people, is the Juncan, collected by the Zemindars in their reſpective diſtricts upon different articles of merchandize paſſing through the country; by which means ſuch merchandize is, we believe, taxed higher than it will bear, and the proprietors are ſubject to great delay and difficulty in paſſing their goods through ſo many different Chokies.

15. The Juncans in the Circars originally belonged to the Government, but the Zemindars in times of trouble uſurped the right of collecting them, and that right was confirmed to them when the Circars came under our Government. They are, as we have ſaid, high in general, and the mode of collection oppreſſive; it would be a great encouragement to trade, if the Juncan and Zemindar's ſees in all merchandize were aboliſhed, and we have no doubt the Zemindars would readily give them up on receiving an equivalent; in this caſe it would be proper that fixed rates be eſtabliſhed upon the ſeveral articles of merchandize, and thoſe rates collected at one particular place only, from whence the merchant ſhould be furniſhed with a certificate to paſs his goods through the country, free of all other tax or duty whatſoever.

16. Theſe objects appear deſerving your attention, and we accordingly recommend them to be conſidered by you in their proper place.

17. In all the diſtricts, whether Zemindaries, Havelly lands, or the ancient poſſeſſions of the Company, we wiſh you to cauſe ſtrict enquiry to be made into all grants of whatever nature. We would have you aſcertain their produce, examine the ſeveral grants, and report by whom they were given, and to what purpoſe the produce is applied: this merits particular attention, as the renters often think themſelves empowered to make ſuch grants without the concurrence of Government.

18. We ſhall direct that the perſons who are now employed in ſurveying the Company's lands be put under your orders.

19. We have appointed the following Gentlemen to proceed with you on the circuit, as Aſſiſtants:

Mr. *Matthew Tuder*,
Mr. *William Jackſon*,
Mr. *Daniel Ruſſell*,
Mr. *Arthur Gregory*.

20. We have agreed, that the Company ſhall defray the expences of ſervants, table, and palanquin hire for yourſelves and Aſſiſtants, excluſive of the ſalary to which you are entitled by your ſeveral ſtations in the ſervice. We deſire you will keep a regular account of theſe expences, and tranſmit the ſame to us monthly.

21. The increaſe of cultivation and of population, the increaſe of wealth to individuals, and of revenue to Government, are ſo connected with each other, that in the inveſtigations entruſted to you, every day will throw new light upon the information of the preceding day. We rely upon the exertion of your endeavours in the execution of this important buſineſs, and we ſhall therefore only add, that much will depend on impreſſing the minds of the people with confidence in our Government, and ſecuring to the induſtrious the produce of their labour.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,
Geo. Stratton, &c. Council.

Fort St. George,
21ſt October 1776.

APPENDIX. No. 9.

APPENDIX, No. 9.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 26th February 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

WE have to acquaint your Honour, &c. that the Chief, with Meſſrs. *Perring* and *Hollond*, proceeded this evening from hence on the circuit.

We remain, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Morgan Williams,
Henry Crawfurd,
Nathaniel Barlow.

Vizagapatam,
4th January 1777.

APPENDIX, No. 10.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 26th February 1777.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

READ the following Letter from the Committee of Circuit:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your Letter of the 11th inſtant.

You were pleaſed to inform us, in your Letter of Inſtructions of the 31ſt of October, that our expences were to be defrayed by the Company; but as they are likely to run high, from a variety of unavoidable cauſes, which, though we are convinced of the neceſſity of them, may appear to be exceptionable, we could have wiſhed you had provided for them in a different mode from the one you have pointed out. If it meets with your approbation to make us a fixed allowance, it would be much more to our ſatisfaction, and may in the end be not more expenſive to the Company. By the neareſt judgment we can form, the pay and batta of a Colonel to each Member of the Committee, will be requiſite, which we flatter ourſelves you will not think more than adequate to the important ſervice we are employed on. We beg leave at the ſame time to recommend the pay and batta of a Captain for each of our Aſſiſtants, as the fears of Dubaſhes and Black Servants at going into the interior part of this country, occaſions their being put to extraordinary expences.

We remain, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring,
John Hollond.

Woddy,
28th Jany 1777.

Reſolved, That the Members now employed on the Committee of Circuit be allowed each Colonel's pay and batta from the time they left *Vizagapatam*; and that the other Members be permitted to draw it from the day on which they may join the Committee. Reſolved alſo, That each of the Aſſiſtants be allowed Captain's pay and batta; but neither they or the Members of the Committee are to be allowed any diet-money, whilſt they are on the circuit.

Such articles of proviſion, &c. as have been already bought for the Company, for the uſe of the Committee of Circuit, muſt be paid for, and the amount brought to the Company's credit.

George Stratton,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 16th March 1777.

To *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſquire, &c. Gentlemen of the Committee of Circuit.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 28th January, and in conſequence of your repreſentation, have reſolved, That each of you be allowed the pay and batta of a Colonel, and that the pay and batta of a Captain be allowed to each of your Aſſiſtants; both to commence from the time of your departure from *Vizagapatam*. As we deem theſe allowances ſufficient to defray all your expences, you muſt bring to the Company's credit the amount of the proviſions and neceſſaries which have been purchaſed for the uſe of the Committee of Circuit, agreeably to the incloſed account.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,
George Stratton, &c. Council.

APPENDIX, No. 11.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 5th December 1777.

At a Conſultation;

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

Mr. *Johnſon* being of opinion that the Board ſhould come to a reſolution upon the ſeveral points mentioned in the laſt Letter from *Vizagapatam*, he moves, That a day be appointed for taking the ſame into conſideration.

The Queſtion being thereupon put to the different Members,

Mr. *Perring*. I think the ſeveral points, excepting that of the *Chicacole* Havelly, ſhould not be determined upon before the arrival of *Viziaramrauze*.

Mr. *Johnſon*. I am for the Motion, and will give my reaſons for it in writing.

Mr. *Smith*. I am for the Motion.

Preſident. As orders have been already diſpatched for *Viziaramrauze* to come up, I am of opinion that all theſe matters, except the Havelly of *Chicacole*, ſhould be deferred till his arrival.

Carried againſt the Motion.

The Honourable the Court of Directors having in their commands of the 12th April 1775, thought proper to appoint a Committee, conſiſting of five Members of the Council, to make the circuit of the Northern Circars, and alſo of the Company's Jaghire, in order to aſcertain the value of thoſe lands, and to anſwer ſuch other good purpoſes as are ſpecified in their ſaid Letters; and a variety of cauſes having ſince combined to impede, in a great

a great meaſure, the execution of thoſe orders, the Board being juſtly ſenſible of the advantages which may be derived to our Honourable Employers from the due diſcharge of this important commiſſion, it is reſolved, That the buſineſs of it be proſecuted without further loſs of time; and that Mr. *Edwd Saunders*, Mr. *Robert Barclay*, and Mr. *John Hudleſton*, be appointed Members of the Committee, to fill the vacancies occaſioned by the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Floyer* from the Company's ſervice, and the appointment of Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Perring*, as mentioned in the laſt Commiſſion of Government.

The Committee will then conſiſt of

Mr. *John Hollond*,
Mr. *Quintin Craufurd*,
Mr. *Edwd Saunders*,
Mr. *Robert Barclay*,
Mr. *John Hudleſton*.

Ordered, That the Secretary do inform theſe Gentlemen reſpectively of the foregoing Reſolution, that they be directed to aſſemble at *Vizagapatam*, then to wait our further inſtructions; and that the three firſt-mentioned, who are now at the Preſidency, be told that the Board expect they will ſet out by the end of this month.

The following Gentlemen are appointed Aſſiſtants to the Committee of Circuit:

Mr. *William Jackſon*,
Mr. *Daniel Ruſſell*.

Agreed, That the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam* be adviſed of theſe appointments.

Agreed alſo, That the allowances to the ſeveral Servants employed on this ſervice, be eſtabliſhed as before.

Farm.	Renter.	Term.	Rent.
Chigutty aſſig^{d} vill^{s}	*Corſugee*	From the 25th Sept. 1777 to the 25th Sept. 1778	R^{s} 36,000
Daracoote, D^{o}	*Corſugee*	D^{o}	25,265
Hautgur reſt^{d} vill^{s}	*Nibbanpoody*, *Dunamauna*	D^{o}	4,185
Vizianagur, D^{o}	*Ramdoſs*	D^{o}	5,500
Meherry and *Hoonmah* reſt^{d} vill^{s}	*Vencata Ramadoo*	D^{o}	5,575
Sea cuſtoms	*Dallapadet*, *Pundet*	D^{o}	12,100

As the Chief and Council at *Ganjam* have rejected the propoſals of the aſſigned villages of *Callicoote*, deeming them wholly inadmiſſible; and as no further propoſals have ſince been received; agreed, that the revenue ariſing from thoſe villages for the preſent year be collected for the Company, under the management of the Chief and Council.

The Board approve of the reaſons given by the Gentlemen at *Ganjam*, together with thoſe of the out-ports: Agreed therefore, that they be directed to iſſue advertiſements accordingly, when the term of the preſent leaſe ſhall have expired.

It appearing extraordinary, that in the propoſals now before the Board no mention is made of the aſſigned villages of *Vizianagur* and *Pretapabgherr*, the term of whoſe leaſe expired with thoſe of the other farms dependant on *Ganjam*: Agreed, that this be taken notice of in our next Letter to the Chief and Council.

Agreed alſo to obſerve to them, that there was an impropriety in their applying to the Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam* for Troops, as well as in their making other preparations againſt the Zemindar of *Gumſoor*, before they knew whether the ſituation of the Company's affairs would admit of our authoriſing them to proceed to the reduction of his country.

APPENDIX, No. 12.

APPENDIX. No. 12.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 5th December 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſq. Governor, Preſident.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board are concerned to obſerve, by the propoſals delivered in at *Ganjam*, that the Company are likely to ſuſtain ſo conſiderable a decreaſe in their revenue, as appears from the ſtatement tranſmitted with the foregoing Letter. We are ſenſible of the good conſequences that might reſult to the Company from letting out their farms on long leaſes; and, indeed, when we conſider how much the value of thoſe in the *Ichapore* Diſtrict has been impaired by the preſent ſyſtem of annual leaſes, there needs no further argument to evince the propriety of ſetting it aſide. But having reſolved to keep in view the objects propoſed by our Honourable Employers, in appointing a Committee to aſſemble at *Vizagapatam*, that they may be in readineſs to proceed upon this important ſervice, we ſhall forbear to paſs our judgment upon the meaſures propoſed by the Gentlemen at *Ganjam*, for augmenting the value of the farms dependant upon that ſettlement, until we can have the aſſiſtance of the Committee's opinion upon the ſubject.

In the mean time, as the advanced ſeaſon of the year renders it neceſſary that the Chief and Council ſhould be furniſhed with our Reſolutions, in conſequence of the propoſals which they have tranſmitted to us, it is reſolved, that the higheſt offers for the term of one year be accepted, and the Cowles be accordingly made out as hereunder mentioned:

Farm.	Renter.	Term.	Rent.
Chigutty aſſig^{d} vill^{s}	*Corſugee*	From the 25th Sept. 1777 to the 25th Sept. 1778	R^{s} 36,000
Daracoote, D^{o}	*Corſugee*	D^{o}	25,265
Hautgur reſt^{d} vill^{s}	*Nibbanpoody*, *Dunamauna*	D^{o}	4,185
Vizianagur, D^{o}	*Ramdoſs*	D^{o}	5,500
Meherry and *Hoonmah* reſt^{d} vill^{s}	*Vencata Ramadoo*	D^{o}	5,575
Sea cuſtoms	*Dallapadet*, *Pundet*	D^{o}	12,100

APPENDIX, No. 13.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 10th December 1777.

Diſpatched by Tappies, the following Letter to *Ganjam*, purſuant to the Reſolutions of laſt Conſultation:

To Mr. *Robert Maunſell*, &c. Council at *Ganjam*.

Gentlemen,

ON peruſing the extracts from your Minutes of the 23d October, we are concerned to obſerve, by the propoſals then delivered in to you, that the Company are likely to ſuſtain ſo conſiderable a decreaſe in their revenue, as appears from the ſtatement you have laid before us. We are ſenſible of the advantage that might accrue to the Company from letting out their farms at long leaſes; and indeed when we conſider how much the value of thoſe in your diſtrict has been impaired by the preſent ſyſtem of annual leaſes, there needs no further arguments to evince the propriety of ſetting it aſide: but as we mean to keep in view the objects propoſed by the Company, in appointing a Committee of Circuit, and have directed the Committee to aſſemble at *Vizagapatam*, that they may be in readineſs to proceed upon this important ſervice, we ſhall reſerve our judgment upon

APPENDIX. No. 14.

upon the measures which you have proposed to us for augmenting the value of the farms dependant upon your settlement, until we can have the assistance of their opinion upon the subject.

In the mean time, the advanced season of the year rendering it necessary that you should be furnished with our Resolutions, in consequence of the proposals which you have transmitted, that the several farms shall be let for one year to the highest bidders, upon the terms expressed in your Minutes of the 23d October, and we have accordingly directed Cowles to be made out as hereunder mentioned:

Farm.	Renter.	Term.	Rent.
Chigutty	*Corsugee*	From the 25th Sept. 1775 to the 25th Sept. 1778	R° 36,000
Daragooto	D°	D°	25,265
Hautgur rest[d] vill[s]	*Nellbanpoody*, *Dunamanau*	D°	4,185
Vizianagur, D°	*Ramdoss*	D°	5,500
Moberry and *Houmah* rest[d] vill[s]	*Vencata Ramador*	D°	5,575
Sea Customs	*Dallapadet*, *Pundit*	D°	12,100

As you have rejected the proposals for the assigned villages of *Callicoote*, deeming them wholly inadmissible, and as we have not received from you any further proposals, we direct that the revenue arising from these villages for the present year be collected for the Company under your own management.

We approve of the reasons set forth in your Minutes, for letting out the sea and river customs of *Ganjam*, together with those of the out-posts; and direct, that when the term of the present leases shall have expired, advertisements be issued accordingly.

We are surprized that we have not heard any thing further from you relative to the assigned villages of *Vizianagur* and *Poctapaghire*, the term of whose lease expired the 25th of September last.

Before we conclude this Letter, we think it necessary to observe to you, that there was an impropriety in your applying to the Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam* for Troops, as well as in your making other preparations against the Zemindar of *Goomsum*, before you knew whether the situation of the Company's affairs would admit of our authorizing you to proceed to the reduction of his country.

We are, Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, 10th December 1777. Your affectionate friends, *J. W.* &c.

APPENDIX, No. 14.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Consultations, the 17th December 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Esquire, Governor, President,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnson,
Peter Perring.

THE President lays before the Board the following Letter from the Nabob:

Translation of a Letter from his Highness the Nabob to Governor *Whitehill*, dated 18 November 1777.

"In my Letter of the 17th instant, I explained to you the causes of the delay in the payment of the money, on account of the jaghire and current expences; notwithstanding which, in the same Letter you see that I have proposed a mode for the payment of it. In consequence of my firm friendship for the Company, I at all times consider it my first duty to afford them assistance in their affairs; and as I am their friend, I hope you will continue to entrust the Company's Jaghire to my security, as formerly."

The President observes on the foregoing Letter from the Nabob, that having inspected the Consultations, he finds the Nabob made application to Mr. *Stratton*, the 9th August, to be continued in the management of the Company's Jaghire for the present year; and that the Council thereupon resolved in their Minutes of the 27th August, that it was necessary some new stipulations should be inserted in the agreement to be made with the Nabob for the ensuing year; and that those stipulations should be proposed to him in a Letter from the President.

The change of Government which took place a few days after, prevented the above resolution from being carried into effect; so that the Jaghire, although the term of the last rent expired the 31st July, has not been formally, though tacitly, continued under the Nabob since that period. This being the cause of the present application from the Nabob, the President is of opinion, that a Letter should be written, to acquaint his Highness, that the Jaghire shall be continued under his direction for the present year, that is to say, till the 31st July next, upon the same terms and conditions that he held it for the last year; which appears to the President the more necessary, as above a third of the term is already elapsed, and he understands that part of the revenue, produced by small grain, has been already collected by his Highness, so that no alteration could take place, without involving the Company in difficulties, and perhaps losses.

The Board concurring in opinion with the President, on the expediency of continuing the Company's Jaghire Lands under the direction of the Nabob for the present year, it is agreed accordingly; and that the following Letter upon the occasion be written to him by the President:

To the Nabob, &c.

May it please your Highness,

I have received your Highness's Letter of the 18th ultimo, proposing that the management of the *Trepassore*, &c. Districts be continued under your Highness's security and direction, upon the same terms as before.

This proposal having been communicated to the Council, I am happy to inform your Highness, that they concur with me in a sincere desire to comply with your Highness's wish in every instance that shall be found consistent with our duty to the Company; and we have, in consequence, resolved, That the *Trepassore*, &c. Districts, together with the *Poonamallee* Country, shall be continued under your Highness's management for another year, on certain conditions hereafter expressed; which I hope will be agreeable to your Highness.

The Company desire it may be an express article in the agreement with your Highness, that "the Com-"mittee of Circuit shall be at full liberty to explore the "country, and to ascertain the real produce and reve-"nues thereof, the number of inhabitants, the state of "the manufactures, the gross amount of the revenues, "the charges of collection, the specific proportion usually "received by Government, and that which custom or "usage has allotted to the cultivator, as a reward for his "labour,

" labour, to enquire what ſecurity the Native has for his " property, to deliver the inhabitants, as far as may be " in their power, from undue exactions and oppreſſions, " that the produce to be received by the Farmer of " every denomination, be aſcertained, and exactly de- " fined; and that all Farmers who ſhall exact more than " their due proportion from their under-tenants, ſhall " forfeit their farms; and that eſpecial care be taken, " that the means of redreſs, in caſe of impoſition or op- " preſſion, be rendered as eaſy as poſſible."

I requeſt your Highneſs will be pleaſed to give ſtrict orders to prevent the Inhabitants being oppreſſed; the property of the Huſbandmen ſhould not be taken on default of their rent, until it be determined by other than the Aumildar or Renter, whether any thing be due to the Circar; and even in this caſe, I hope your Highneſs will give time to the people to diſcharge their debts.

Now I am upon this ſubject, I cannot help obſerving to your Highneſs, that it would be of great benefit to the country and Inhabitants, if ſome regular mode were adopted, to ſettle any diſputes that may ariſe in the reſpective diſtricts; for if the Aumildars be left at liberty to decide upon all matters, how can the poor Inhabitants obtain redreſs? they cannot afford to leave their habitations to come to *Madras* for it. I therefore beg leave to recommend to your Highneſs, to eſtabliſh a country court in each diſtrict, independant of the Aumildar, and to have all their deciſions recorded in a book to be kept for that purpoſe.

As I am informed that many of the tanks in their diſtricts are in want of repair, I earneſtly requeſt your Highneſs will give particular orders that they be properly repaired in future, and that the collections annually made from the Inhabitants, on account of the tanks, be on no pretence applied to other purpoſes; and I ſhall be obliged to your Highneſs, if you will be pleaſed to ſend me, at the end of the year, the annual repairs, ſigned by the principal Inhabitants.

Fort Saint George, the 18 December 1777. I have the honour to be, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 15.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 24th March 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
James Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

When the Honourable the Court of Directors, in their Letter per *Greenwich*, ordered a Committee of Circuit, with extenſive powers, to proceed to the Northern Circars, and enquire into the number of Inhabitants, the ſtate of the Manufactories, the fortified Places, the groſs amount of the Revenues, &c. &c. they appointed five Members of the Board for this important ſervice: The orders, however, were not for ſome time put in execution; and I find by the Records, that at laſt a Committee was formed and ſent. The expence of ſuch Committee has been great; and as, from the reduction of the Members of the Board, it is impoſſible any can now be appointed from it for that ſervice, I recommend, as a much more eligible plan for the preſent, that the Committee do not proceed, but that the Zemindars of the different Diſtricts in the Northern Circars be directed to repair immediately, and without loſs of time, to the Preſidency; which, I am perſuaded, will give us an opportunity of gaining the moſt complete knowledge of the ſtate of the Country, Circars, &c. important to them. I am the more confirmed in this opinion, when I reflect, that hitherto the different Zemindars have, in ſome degree, been taught to conſider the ſubordinate ſettlement under which they were, as the Government itſelf, and a communication between them and the Preſidency has been in a great meaſure cut off. The ſettling the Jammabundy here, will give them a confidence in this Government, teach them to look up to us for protection; they will of courſe be ever ready, in all caſes, where they may ſuppoſe themſelves injured, to make a final appeal to this Board; and I have no doubt but we ſhall, from a thorough inveſtigation, and from the information we receive, obtain a perfect knowledge of thoſe Circars, in a ſhorter time than we can from the enquiries of a Committee of Circuit for that purpoſe, travelling under many diſadvantages, and at a great expence: It will be the means of removing all intrigues and intereſts, which ever operate to the detriment of the Company. As I purpoſe entering more fully into this ſubject in a future Minute, I move, That the Zemindars in all the Northern Circars, dependant on the Company, be immediately ordered to proceed to the Preſidency, to ſettle the Jemmabundy, and that the Company's Dubaſhes at the different Subordinates, who have generally been employed on the buſineſs of the Revenue, be ordered here alſo.

The Board, taking into conſideration the ſubject of the Preſident's Minute, are ſenſible of the propriety and force of the arguments he has made uſe of, in ſupport of the points which are therein recommended; and being perſuaded that they are calculated to promote the intereſt of the Company, they do not heſitate to give their hearty concurrence towards the attainment of that deſirable end. Reſolved, therefore, That the appointment of a Committee of Circuit be for the preſent diſcontinued; and that the ſeveral Gentlemen who compoſe that Committee be informed, that they are no longer to conſider themſelves as Members thereof.

Reſolved, for the reaſons ſet forth in the Preſident's Minute, That the annual rent or Jemmabundy of the ſeveral Diſtricts of the Northern Circars, be in future at the Preſidency; and that the ſeveral ſubordinate Settlements be directed to ſignify to the Zemindars under them, and to the Muſmedars of the reſpective countries, that it is our order they proceed hither for this purpoſe, without loſs of time; and that the Company's Dubaſh, or Interpreter, who has generally been employed in the buſineſs of the Revenue under each Settlement, be alſo directed to repair to the Preſidency.

And the more effectually to enſure a compliance with this order, it is further reſolved, That the Preſident do write a ſeparate Letter upon this occaſion to each of the Zemindars; a copy of which is to be tranſmitted to the Chiefs and Councils of the reſpective Settlements, for their information. They muſt alſo be directed to repreſent in the ſtrongeſt manner to the Zemindars, the neceſſity of an implicit acquieſcence on their part, and the danger of incurring our diſpleaſure, by ſhewing the ſmalleſt reluctance or unwillingneſs to obey our commands; which they are to be told muſt be enforced, in caſe they ſhould not meet with a ready compliance.

The Preſident obſerves to the Board, That having carefully peruſed ſuch parts of the Records for a conſiderable time paſt, as relate to *Vizzeramrauze*, he is of opinion, that, conſidering the particular circumſtances of his ſituation, it will be neceſſary to be more urgent with him than with the other Zemindars, upon this occaſion; and propoſes, therefore, that the Letter to be written to him be varied accordingly, which is unanimouſly agreed to; and alſo that the Chief and Council of *Vizzagapatam* be required, by every means in their power, to impreſs upon his mind the abſolute neceſſity of his paying immediate attention to our orders, and the ill conſequences that muſt inevitably attend his making uſe of any delay. The Preſident further recommends that the ſame be furniſhed with an eſcort of Sepoys, to *Vizzeramrauze*, on his journey to the Preſidency; and accordingly hints on his journey to the Preſidency; and that the ſame do conſiſt of two Companies of Captain *Caſſaki's*

APPENDIX. No. 16.

Lyſaght's Battalion at *Vizianagrum*. Ordered accordingly; and that Captain *Lyſaght* be directed to proceed forthwith to *Vizagapatam*, in order to take upon himſelf the command of that detachment.

In conſideration of the expence which the Members of the Committee of Circuit, as well as their Aſſiſtants, muſt have been put to, in making the neceſſary preparations for entering upon that ſervice, it is agreed, That they be paid half the amount of the allowances which they would have received, agreeably to a Minute of Conſultation, the had they been actually employed thereon, to commence from the 5th December laſt, and to continue until this day. The Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam* muſt be directed to pay the ſame to Meſſrs. *Barclay*, *Hudleſton*, *Jackſon*, and *Ruſſell*; and ſuch of the Members of the Committee as are now here, are to receive it at the Preſidency.

APPENDIX, No. 16.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, dated the 19th September 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Anthony Sadlier,
Quintin Craufurd.

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

WHEN we addreſſed you the 23d inſtant, we promiſed to ſend you the Rajah's (*Viziaram Rauze*) Anſwer to the Preſident's Letter; but the Rajah has thought proper to deviate from the eſtabliſhed mode of conducting buſineſs of this nature, and we believe, by *Sitteram Rauze*'s advice, has ſent it through another channel, with which we are unacquainted. Tranſlation of his Anſwer to us we ſend you herewith. On comparing his late with his preſent conduct, we are perſuaded you will perceive the great alteration which has been made therein, through the influence of *Sitteram Rauze*, who takes every opportunity of impreſſing him with ideas of his own conſequence, and of contempt for the Company's Authority. We are happy to reflect, that by ſtopping *Sitteram Rauze*'s flight, we have fruſtrated, for the preſent, his ſchemes for raiſing diſturbances; and that the effectual ſuccours you have been pleaſed to ſend us, have convinced the Rajah that a prompt obedience to your commands is the only method left for preſerving him from deſtruction. He has delivered up to Colonel *Braithwait* One hundred and ſixty-five ſtand of Arms, and ſet out for *Vizianagrum* laſt night, under an eſcort of our Grenadiers. Colonel *Braithwait* will march with the remainder of them to Camp this evening, and from thence proceed to *Vizianagrum* with ſuch a detachment as he may judge neceſſary to execute your Orders.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Vizieram Rauze* to *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſquire, Chief of *Vizagapatam*, dated 23d Auguſt 1777.

"You ſent a Letter from the Governor to me by the hands of your Chubdar, at eight o'clock this night; I muſt acknowledge the receipt thereof. The purport of that Letter is, that immediately on receipt of it, to ſuffer the Company's Troops to take poſt in the *Fort Vizianagrum*, and for me to proceed to the Preſidency; to apply to the Chief and Council for Sepoys to eſcort me thither, and that they will comply with my requeſt. Should I delay obeying the Orders, I may probably incur *their* cenſure, therefore I requeſt you will, on receipt hereof, give the neceſſary Orders for the Troops to be ſtationed at *Vizianagrum*, and likewiſe to let me have a Company of Sepoys to accompany me on my journey to *Madras*, and to grant me permiſſion this very day to leave this place; upon receipt of which, both me and my Brother will ſet out for *Madras*. To delay my requeſt will be the means of drawing upon me their ſevere diſpleaſure; therefore I repeat my requeſt, that you will pleaſe to comply therewith this very day. This Letter is meant by me, to the Chief and Council. I have replied to the Governor's Letter, and incloſed a Copy hereof. The above I write for your information."

APPENDIX, No. 17.

Eaſt India Houſe, Jovis 24 *Maij* 1781.

Committee of Secrecy met.

LIEUT. Col. *Matthews* attending, was called in, and examined.

I have been in the Service of the Company, under the Preſidency of *Madras*, from 1759—I continued there till 1776, and returned again in 1778, and arrived at *Madras* the 22d of July 1778—then I continued on the Coaſt for nine months, till March 1779—my rank, when laſt there, was that of Major.

I was in *Chicacole* Circar from the latter end of 1773 to 1776, and when there had occaſion to be acquainted with the ſituations and characters of *Viziaram Rauze*, *Sitteram Rauze*, and *Jaggernaut Rauze*—That *Viziaram* was the Rajah, but the Power of the Country was in the hands of *Sitteram Rauze*, whoſe Dewan *Jeggernaut Rauze* was, although underſtood to be attached to *Viziaram Rauze*, with whom he was connected by marriage.

Being aſked the character of *Sitteram Rauze?* he ſaid, He was a very ſenſible man, but would ſtick at nothing to carry his point, and had been guilty of many atrocious crimes.

What character did *Viziaram Rauze* bear?

Rather weak than otherwiſe, but a mild tempered and humane man; and I ſhould think rather improper to manage his affairs, as being addicted to pleaſure, and no ways attentive to buſineſs.

I know *Jaggernaut Rauze*, and think, that, with his aſſiſtance as Dewan, the affairs of the Country could have been managed by *Viziaram Rauze*; but in ſaying ſo, would be underſtood as ſaying, the management would reſt entirely with *Jaggernaut Rauze*.

What was *Jaggernaut Rauze*'s character?

A man of very good ſenſe, and had in general a very good character, and conſidered as one who would manage the affairs of the Country with lenity and juſtice.

Whether do you conceive it more for the intereſt of the Company, and ſecurity of the Revenues, that the Country ſhould be under the management of *Sitteram Rauze* or *Jaggernaut Rauze?*

Under *Jaggernaut Rauze*.

Being aſked, Whether during the time he was laſt in *India* he had ſeen the Troops belonging to that Preſidency?

He ſays, He ſaw only thoſe in Garriſon at *Madras*, which were very few; and thoſe in the diſtrict of *Mazulipatam*, where there were three Battalion of Sepoys—that the Troops at the Preſidency were in very good order, and well appointed—thoſe at *Mazulipatam* in very indifferent order, owing chiefly to their being diſperſed about the country on Revenue buſineſs.—I believe all the Sepoy Corps, though well diſciplined according to the European ſyſtem, are in one reſpect worſe than they were formerly; conſiſting of men of the lower Caſts, inſtead of being of the higher Caſts, or Moors, of which they conſiſted formerly.

Col. *Matthews* ſays, That in 1771 and 1772, he commanded the Nabob of *Arcot*'s Cavalry—At that time his Regiment was in very good order—the ſecond Regiment was then forming—and thoſe were all the regular Cavalry the Nabob had at that time; and about that time he had about 3,000 irregular Cavalry—he had at that

time 16 battalions of Sepoys, amounting to about 16,000—which may have ſaid to have been in good order, and diſciplined in the European way, commanded by European Officers, but not ſo well diſciplined as ours, though conſiſting in general of better men—there were beſides two Rajahs under his influence, who had about 10,000 men, irregulars, without any kind of diſcipline.

Being aſked what number of Troops the Nabob had, and what was their condition in 1776?—he delivered in a ſtate of them:

The 16 battalions of Sepoys were then in good order, though not ſo well diſciplined as the Company's—his Cavalry were in very bad order, exceedingly ill appointed, owing to his want of paying them; and that whole regiments frequently mutinied and confined their Officers, and deſerted by 50 at a time to *Hyder Ally*—the Artillery was in general compoſed of Mahomedans—that he can't ſay any thing of the condition of the Artillery at that time, as it was in the Southern part of the *Carnatic*, but that detachments of them had behaved exceedingly well at the ſieges of *Tanjore* and *Pondicherry*.

Colonel *Matthews* has been at *Arcot* ſeveral times—that from his knowledge of the fortification of that place, he thought it might have held out a conſiderable time, even with the Troops that were in it when it was taken—that they defended the petta, flanked with round towers, with a very narrow rampart where cannon could hardly be drawn, for a conſiderable time, and he ſhould have thought the ſame number of men might have defended the fort of *Arcot*, which is in all reſpects infinitely ſtronger, a conſiderable time longer than they did—though he underſtands *Hyder Ally*'s Troops are much improved in the art of attacking places to what they were formerly.

Being aſked, Whether, after the Circars came into our poſſeſſion, it was better policy to permit the Rajahs to continue to have Troops of their own, or that the whole military force ſhould be ours?

He anſwered, That in his opinion, the Rajahs ſhould not have any military men, but only Sebendy Peons for collecting the revenues, who are more for ſhew than office—that he thinks the fortified places and paſſes which form the entrance from the Circars into the Maratta Country, ſhould be alſo in our poſſeſſion, which they are not at preſent.

In 1778, when he returned to *Madras*, an account was received, that *Lally* was in the *Guntoor* Circar, and threatened to invade our *Mazulipatam* diſtrict; and in conſequence thereof, he was ſent down to collect the Troops to oppoſe him—*Lally* was then in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, but it was ſuppoſed he was directed to make the attack by orders from the French Commander of *Pondicherry*.

Colonel *Matthews* having informed the Committee, That the reaſon of the Company's Sepoys being worſe men than they uſed to be formerly, was, that moſt of the good men were enticed into and liſted in the Nabob's ſervice, where they had more liberty, and from which they frequently deſerted; he was aſked, Whether it would not have been more for the intereſt of the Company, that the Nabob ſhould have had no Troops at all, and that the whole military force neceſſary for the defence of the *Carnatic*, ſhould belong to the Company?—anſwered, That he is clearly of that opinion; and that if it had been ſo, he thinks *Hyder* could never have invaded the *Carnatic*; and if he had, he would not have taken a ſingle fort.

From your knowledge of *Mahomed Ally*, do you think that it would have been eaſy to have induced him to have given up his military eſtabliſhments and fortifications, and depended on the Company for the defence of his poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*, and the ſecurity of the ſucceſſion of the Nabobſhip in his family?

I believe it was frequently attempted to perſuade him to conſent to this, but he conſtantly refuſed; but if he was not under the influence of his ſecond ſon, I think he might be induced to conſent to reſign all the military force of the country.

Could *Mahomed Ally*, in any reſpect, defend his country, if it was not for the force of the Company?

It would be impoſſible.

Are there any Officers in the Nabob's ſervice, who at the ſame time hold commiſſions in the Company's ſervice?

There are a few.

Being aſked, Whether, in the War with *Hyder* in 1769, he had any opportunity of knowing the condition of his Troops?

He anſwered, He ſerved through the whole War at that time againſt him; and in one action he obſerved his Artillery was well ſerved, and had gained an evident advantage, and obliged us for a time to retreat—we had then a ſmaller quantity of Artillery than he had—that his Artillery were ſerved by Frenchmen and Moors—that his Cavalry were very numerous, and the beſt of the country—that his Infantry was very indifferent—I believe ſince then, he has formed his Infantry into battalions with European Officers of different nations, ſome Engliſh deſerters, and that they are now diſciplined in the European way—amongſt the deſerters, I have heard of one Engliſhman who had been in the Company's civil ſervice, and one Officer who had been broke by a Court-martial.

In the campaign you ſerved againſt *Hyder*, were you well or ill ſupplied with carriage and draft bullocks?

Very ill ſupplied both as to number and quality.

How were you ſupplied with proviſions?

I don't recollect any want, but was unacquainted with the magazines.

Were the whole operations of that Army directed by the Commanding Officer?

I believe when we were in *Hyder*'s country, there were two Members of the Council joined with the Commanding Officer.

Do you know who were the Contractors for ſupplying the Army with draft and carriage bullocks, and proviſions, for that campaign?

I don't know—Mr. *Call* and Mr. *Mackay* were the Field Deputies.

Did you ever know a Sepoy battalion as good as European?

No, they are not ſo good—I have known them ſtand cannonading, and advance in good order againſt Cavalry.

When you arrived at *Madras*, in July 1778, did you find any of the Rajahs and Circar Zemindars there?

I did, ſeveral others refuſed to come—it was in general eſteemed by the people of the country to be an unjuſt and unneceſſary meaſure, and the general opinion was, that the lands might have been as well let without their coming to *Madras*.

Do you think the meaſure of the Committee of Circuit, or the meaſure of bringing down the Rajahs and Zemindars to *Madras*, was the beſt calculated to aſcertain the value of the lands, and the ſituation of the occupier?

Undoubtedly, by the Committee of Circuit, who, being upon the ſpot, would have judged of the value, and not received diſtant reports from others.

Whether, from your knowledge of the ſituation and diſpoſition of the Zemindars, and other the inhabitants of the Circars, the bringing them to *Madras* was not a very offenſive meaſure?

It certainly was.

The diſtance from *Vizagapatam* to *Fort George* is 550 miles, and from *Ganjam*, about 720 miles.

Withdrew.

And Colonel *Matthews* attending again on the next day, delivered into Your Committee, an Account of the Revenues of the diſtrict under *Vizagapatam* in 1775; and he informed Your Committee, he drew it up from information he got in the country—that he ſent his ſervants to the villages, and they got it from the Records.

APPENDIX No. 17.

An Account of the Revenue of the diſtrict under *Vizagapatam* in the year 1775.

Four Pergunnahs, being the Jaghire of *Viziaram Rauze*, Rajah of *Vizianagrum*.

	Rupees.
Putnire, including *Vizianagrum*, 88 villages -	200,000
Bogaporam - - - 44 D° -	80,000
Dawapella - - - 44 D° -	100,000
Gurcadu - - - 44 D° -	80,000
Rupees -	460,000

The country of *Wodady*, about fifty years ago, was a part of the *Chicacole* Havelly; the Rajah rented it at 30,000 Rupees, and it has been withheld from the Company.—There are two Forts in this Pergunnah; the annual income is reckoned at Rupees 325,000.

The Rajah of *Vizianagrum* has at different times taken the countries from 13 other Rajahs, which were valued at per annum, R° 1,278,000; viz.

From *Deſamuntiro*, the fort of *Chepporapilla*, and 4 Pergunnahs, taken about 30 years ago by old *Viziaram Rauze*, valued at R° 60,000.

From *Baallapellindo*, the fort of *Goperapilla*, and two Pergunnahs, valued at Rupees 40,000.

From the Rajah of *Cattapollam*, one Pergunnah, taken by *Sitteram Rauze*, R° 25,000.

Curingum, a Pergunnah, which belongs to *Chicacole* Havelly, R° 12,000.

Ancapilla and *Milpanen*, two forts and four Pergunnahs, valued at 10,000 R°—They belonged to *Pikerow*, who was killed by order of *Sitteram Rauze*.—The Pergunnah of *Sittiavaram* belonged to one of the ſame family, and was taken at the ſame time.—The ſum of 30,000 Rupees is paid to the Rajah, but it is worth more.

Four Forts, and four Pergunnahs, that did belong to *Vellibaury Tim Rauze*.

Uratta, valued at Rupees - - -	75,000
Collacotah - - - - - -	25,000
Millygapauca - - - - -	60,000
Upallum Pakenadur - - - -	47,000

From *Mackeycauzey Pettarauze*, were taken four Pergunnahs, valued at R° 200,000.

The forts of *Nerrywa* and *Peddagaddy*, and the two Pergunnahs, belonging to *Narſingram*, were taken by old *Viziaram Rauze*, valued at Rupees 20,000.

The diſtrict of *Mandagoil* which belonged to *Lingabeepatty*, valued at - - R°	200,000
Peondymalatallaga Saltpans, formerly belonged to *Coſſimcotah* Havelly, valued at - R°	30,000
Laeverrum Pergunnah - - - R°	40,000
Bobilly Pergunnah - - - - R°	300,000
The Pergunnah of *Eremundalum*, formerly belonged to *Khimedy* - - - - R°	14,000

Of the lands to the Eaſtward of the hills, which old *Viziaram Rauze* took from *Vikramdor*, Rajah of *Nardaperam*, and of which ſome were under his own management, and others tributary, valued at Rupees 475,000; viz.

1. Four Pergunnahs, that formerly belonged to *Maripilla Pikerow*, valued at - R°	100,000
2. *Taadab* Pergunnah, D° - - -	70,000
3. *Salure*, lately taken from *Senarba Rauze*, D°	40,000
4. *Rumpetty* Pergunnah, D° - - -	25,000
5. *Singa Vellara* Pergunnah, D° - -	10,000
6. *Bellegarum* and *Narſingperam*, D° - -	40,000
7. The country lately taken from *Severam Rauze*, Rajah of *Curipam*, D° - -	100,000
8. *Polycondah Ramboda Rauze*'s country;—it is valued at 150,000 R°, and *Sitteram Rauze* receives from it annually, - - R°	90,000
R° -	475,000

A Tax gathered from every Jaghiredar, and from ſome Bramin villages, amounts to yearly Rupees 150,000.

Cuſtoms, collected by order of *Sitteram Rauze*, Rupees 25,000.

Houſe tax, D°, D° 30,000.

Total of the Revenue of the country under the management of *Sitteram Rauze*, Rupees	2,743,000
The *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah* Havelly -	200,000
The *Teckley* Rajah receives - - - -	100,000
Khimedy D° D° - - - - -	200,000
Total Revenue of the diſtrict, R° -	3,243,000

APPENDIX, No. 18.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 1ſt Auguſt 1777.

PRESENT,

George Stratton, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Henry Brooke,
Brigadier General *James Stuart*,
Charles Floyer,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

READ the following Letter from the Committee of Circuit:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We doubt not you have been duly informed, by the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, of the impriſonment of *Jagonautrauze*.

Having maturely conſidered *Jagonautrauze*'s ſituation, with regard to his dependence on the Company, that having under his charge their Havelly lands and diſtrict *Sittenvarum*, he is entitled to their protection, and that it is notorious he has, through the intrigues of *Sitteramrauze*, been lately deprived of his employ of Dewan to *Viziaramrauze*, and has not acted in any public capacity at *Vizianagrum* theſe three months. We were of opinion, that *Viziaramrauze*'s ſeizing his perſon and effects, when thus in a manner unemployed by him, and charged with important truſts under the Company, without previouſly aſking the conſent of their Government, was a manifeſt breach of that reſpect and ſubmiſſion it is his duty, on all occaſions, to ſhew to the authority of the Company; which appeared to us, by this violent meaſure, to be treated with a degree of contempt highly injurious to their intereſt.

Concluding from public reports, that *Viziaramrauze* had been drawn into his extraordinary conduct from the artful inſinuations of *Sitteramrauze*, who it is generally thought, has more than *Jagonautrauze*'s diſgrace in view, and knowing *Viziaramrauze* to be naturally of a mild, humane diſpoſition, and that he is principally indebted to the abilities of *Jagonautrauze* for the power he now, happily for the Company, has in his Zemindary; we judged it beſt, firſt to try what friendly admonitions, and a full repreſentation of the impropriety of his, *Viziaramrauze*'s conduct, would do towards the releaſe of *Jagonautrauze*; theſe proving ineffectual, and it being the general prevailing opinion among the Country People, from *Sitteramrauze*'s known inveterate hatred to *Jagonautrauze*, that his life was in danger if he was not protected by the Company; we thought it proper, both from motives of duty and humanity, to take the matter up on public grounds, and in conſequence thereof, addreſſed the Rajah a Letter, of which we encloſe a copy, requiring *Jagonautrauze*'s enlargement. We deferred this ad-

dreſs till now, in daily expectation of an anſwer, but have not yet received any.

As the Committee buſineſs has been much impeded of late, by the village Conecoplies being kept from us in an unuſual manner; we are to requeſt your Honours, &c. will pleaſe to ſend an order to the Rajah, to prevent in future any obſtacles being thrown in our way.

We are,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
with utmoſt reſpect,
Your moſt obedient Servants,

Chicacole, 5th July 1777.

Sam[l] *Johnſon*,
P. Perring,
John Hollond.

Copy of a Letter from the Committee of Circuit to *Viziaramrauze*.

We are informed you have taken upon you to impriſon the perſon, and ſeize on the houſe and effects, of *Jagonautrauze*, the renter of the Honourable Company's Havelly lands, and manager of their diſtrict of *Setteaverum*.

The Company having put under this man's charge, countries to the amount of three lacks of Rupees per annum, he is their ſervant and ſubject, and entitled to their protection.

We therefore require of you his immediate enlargement; acquainting you at the ſame time, that we conſider your conduct as an inſult to the Company, of a very ſerious nature, and warn you to be cautious how you perſevere in a meaſure ſo contrary to your duty to the Company; to whom we deem you anſwerable for *Jagonautrauze*'s perſon and effects.

If you have any complaints to make againſt him for miſconduct in the affairs he has had to tranſact under you, the Company will, no doubt, give you redreſs.

Chicacole, 28 June 1777.

Agreed, that the Preſident do write to *Viziaramrauze*, requiring him to remove the obſtacles complained of by the Committee of Circuit, and to pay regard to their orders in future.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, 2d Auguſt 1777.

Sent the following Letter to the Committee of Circuit:

To *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſq. &c. Members of the Committee of Circuit.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 24th June and 5th ult.

The Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam* having intimated to us, that the term of the late Cowles for the *Chicacole* and *Ceſſimcotah* Havelly lands is nearly expired, and having requeſted orders for our reletting the ſame, we deſire you will communicate to us ſuch obſervations as you may have made in the courſe of your enquiries reſpecting this farm in particular, which may ſerve as a guide to us in forming our opinion upon the ſubject.

Being alſo deſirous of knowing what progreſs you have hitherto made in the buſineſs of the Circuit, we deſire you will tranſmit to us ſuch parts of your proceedings as may moſt effectually afford us the information we require; you will alſo continue from time to time, to adviſe us of every material occurrence.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,
G. S. &c. Council.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 27th Auguſt 1777.

PRESENT,

Brig[r] Gen[l] *James Stuart*,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
George Mackay.

Mr. *Brooke* and Mr. *Floyer* indiſpoſed.

Read the following Letter from the Committee of Circuit:

To the Honourable *George Stratton*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

1. We have received your commands of the 2d inſt. and ſhall forward Auots of the Havelly lands in a few days, together with an offer we have received from *Jagonautrauze* in behalf of his brother *Padnaubrauze*, of 230,000 Rupees a year, for the term of five years; 222,000 thereof for ſuch of the Havelly lands as have been under the late renters, and 8,000 Rupees on account of Muſmedars collections; which we ſhall ſubmit to your conſideration; and further, to give an adequate rent for ſuch other villages as may be put under him, the Rajah having received, as we have found in the courſe of our enquiries, the rents of ſeveral of the Havelly villages ever ſince the Circars have been in our poſſeſſion; all which circumſtances we ſhall enlarge on when we tranſmit the accounts.

2. We ſhall, conformable to your orders, continue to adviſe you of all material occurrences, and ſhall lay before you an account of the progreſs we have made in our enquiries, as ſoon as an abſtract can be formed. For your immediate information, we beg leave to acquaint you, that we have examined accounts, for the laſt five years, of lands to the amount of fourteen lacks of Rupees nett revenue, ten of which are on account of countries dependant on the Rajah; we could have ſent you part of theſe accounts ſooner, but as they were broken and unfiniſhed, we thought it probable you might not wiſh to ſee them till completed.

3. We did ourſelves the honour to addreſs you on the 5th ultimo, concerning the obſtructions we had lately met with in the proſecution of our enquiries into the Circar Revenues, and hoped that a Letter from you to the Rajah might have produced a good effect; but as the delays we then complained of ſtill continue, and are probably contrived to gain time, in order to enable him the more effectually to elude or oppoſe the Company's intentions; and as we are not inveſted with any powers for enforcing a prompt obedience to our orders, we think it our duty to addreſs you again upon this important ſubject.

4. By the enquiries we have made, and the informations we have obtained, we have every reaſon to be aſſured that the ſeveral countries now under *Viziaramrauze* yield at leaſt a revenue of twenty lacks of Rupees, out of which we underſtand he maintains a military force at a monthly expence of 50,000 or 60,000 Rupees; and as he is probably apprized of the Company's intentions to reduce his Troops, and raiſe his Jemmabundy, we may reaſonably conclude that the great importance of theſe objects will animate his endeavours to preſerve them, and incline him to a conteſt; and if ſuch ſhould be his intentions, he will hope, by delaying the new ſettlement, not only to gain time to prepare for reſiſtance, but alſo that he will thereby be enabled to obtain an increaſe of treaſure by the new crops, and a more favourable ſeaſon for obtaining the aid of the Marattas or other allies; and we therefore conceive, that your Honour, &c. may not judge it prudent to depend wholly upon his acting with good faith.

5. The carrying that part of the Company's Inſtruc-

tions

APPENDIX. No. 18.

tions into execution, which relates to the reducing the military ſtrength of the Zemindars, is, we think, more likely to be attended with difficulty in this Circar than any of the reſt; the *Vizianagrum* family have long been conſidered as the moſt powerful in wealth and military force, and the moſt capable of making reſiſtance to the Company's authority, of any in the Circar; and we find hey have, in different parts of the Company's Records, een accordingly repreſented to be ſo formidable, that hey have been allowed, on this account, to hold their Zemindary at a low tribute, rather than that any attempts ſhould be made to raiſe it at the riſk of the peace of the Circars, and the ruin that might enſue to the country from the reſiſtance that might be expected to the execution of ſuch a plan.

6. From a very particular enquiry we have lately made with regard to the Rajah's military ſtrength, we are informed that it conſiſts of the following Troops now in his pay:

2,300 Seyoys, with ſlinted firelocks, of which 1,100 are cloathed, and 1,700 receive the ſame pay as the Company's.
4,000 Matchlockmen.
2,700 Pikemen.
1,000 *Poleconda* Pike and Matchlockmen.
100 *Vikeramdoos* Pikemen.
200 Ditto Matchlockmen.
300 Pikemen belonging to *Byrabooby* of *Golgunda*.
300 Flinted Firelock Sepoys, belonging to *Sitteram Rauze*, now ſtationed at *Ankapille*.
200 Pikemen.

11,100

Of the above, about 8,000 are at *Vizianagrum*, the remainder in the diſtricts, and can be called at the ſhorteſt notice.

7. Excluſive of theſe, we are of opinion the Rajah could collect from the *Nundaporam*, *Peluonata*, *Madagola*, *Gutgunda*, &c. Diſtricts, five or ſix thouſand Pike and Matchlockmen.

8. As his collecting the large body of Troops above enumerated, ſhews but too manifeſtly that he entertains ideas of the relative ſituation in which he ſtands with reſpect to the Company, very different from thoſe expreſſed in their inſtructions to the Committee of Circuit, that inſtead of depending on their juſtice, he is inclined to truſt to his own ſtrength; and if not to aim at a ſtate of independence, at leaſt to deter us from proceeding againſt him, by impreſſing us with an idea of his being armed with ſufficient power to make effectual reſiſtance to the Company's orders; we are of opinion, that no time ſhould be loſt in bringing him to a due ſenſe of the obedience he owes to their authority. His late extraordinary conduct, in ſeizing the Company's Renter of the Havelly Lands, having been the occaſion of drawing into this diſtrict a very conſiderable force, we think it may appear to you highly expedient to avail yourſelves of the opportunity it affords of eſtabliſhing the Company's authority upon the footing that has been marked out in their inſtructions to their Committee above referred to. It hath been lately our opinion, from the conduct the Rajah has been purſuing for ſome time paſt, in obſtructing our enquiries, as well as from the important objects of our appointment, and the very conſiderable change intended to be introduced in the tenure of theſe Zemindaries, that the application of force would probably in the end become neceſſary for effecting the Company's intentions; but as extremities of this nature are ever, if poſſible, to be avoided, and the Company's inſtructions ſeemed to point out, that the reduction of the Rajah's military force, as a meaſure that was intended to take place after the accounts of the country had been examined into, we were unwilling to ſuggeſt a meaſure that might appear in any degree precipitate, or which might be deemed to vary from the plan the Court of Directors ſeemed to have laid down; yet, when it is conſidered that their orders for the reduction of the military force of the Zemindars are poſitive, and that it is their declared opinion that ſuch military force, particularly and expreſsly that of the *Vizianagrum* Rajah, is dangerous, we think, that the longer he is allowed to continue in poſſeſſion of ſuch force, after being appriſed of the Company's intentions to reduce it, the more dangerous it becomes in his hands. Admitting that the new ſyſtem intended to be eſtabliſhed will excite reſiſtance, which appears, by the *Vizagapatam* records, to have been the opinion formerly entertained upon this ſubject, we conceive that the reduction of the Rajah's force ſhould be the work firſt entered upon; for if his intentions are bad, which we have ſome reaſon to ſuſpect from his late conduct, any delay on this important point might be attended with ill conſequences, as it would give him an opportunity of ſtrengthening himſelf, by applying the produce of his country to the purpoſe of increaſing his Troops, of forming alliances with other Zemindars, and exciting inſurrections.

9. The points which we think it will appear proper to inſiſt on as a baſis for a ſettlement with *Viziaramrauze*, are, the immediate diſbanding of his Troops, the ſurrendering of his Forts, and the delivering up the expelled Zemindars, whom he holds in confinement. The two former articles are virtually included in the Company's inſtructions; and the latter, we think, is likewiſe eſſentially neceſſary, in order, as much as poſſible, to guard againſt any deſigns the Rajah may have of temporiſing, till a more favourable opportunity offers for his declaring himſelf openly. The Forts in this country being ſmall, and not very ſtrong, the Rajah could not truſt to them were he attacked; and with reſpect to his Troops, as they are not kept in a body, nor diſciplined like ours (except about 1,700 Sepoys) he might privately retain; the reſt to be aſſembled when wanted. The delivering up the confined Zemindars will therefore, we think, be no leſs neceſſary to be inſiſted on than the other two conditions, as we ſhall thereby have an opportunity of engaging them in our intereſt, and of drawing material ſervices from them, ſhould the Rajah attempt hereafter to oppoſe us.

10. Having thus ſtated, as fully as we have been able, the reaſons which induce us to think, that immediately entering upon the meaſures of reducing the power of *Viziramrauze* is founded in policy and expedience, and juſtified by his late conduct; and having alſo ſubmitted to your conſideration the objects which appeared to us neceſſary to be inſiſted on, previous to our coming to a final ſettlement with this Rajah, we now proceed to offer you our ſentiments with regard to what we conceive to be the advantages of the preſent juncture.

11. The appointment of the Committee of Circuit being a meaſure of an extraordinary nature, it may naturally be ſuppoſed to have created very great alarms among the Zemindars in general of theſe Circars; and the full extent and purpoſe of their commiſſion being probably not known to all of them, the few who may have found means to inform themſelves of the Company's intentions, and who have diſcovered that their military power is to be reduced, will, no doubt, repreſent ſuch intentions to ſtrike deeper, and be of wider extent than they are, and will endeavour by ſuch means to engage the other Zemindars in a combination to oppoſe their being carried into execution.

12. *Sitteramrauze* is well known to be a man of great intrigue, abilities, and perſeverance. We have been informed that he keeps up a conſtant correſpondence with all the Zemindars under the Company's Government, who are capable of being wrought upon, to embrace his views, or to yield him an addition of ſtrength in time of trouble; and as his intereſt, and the great ſtake he has depending, will incline him to employ every means in his

power to ſhield himſelf from the blow that is now aiming at him, we cannot doubt but he will leave no art unpractiſed to inflame the minds of the Zemindars in general, by impreſſing them with an idea that they are to be deprived of their lands as well as of their forces, and that the latter is but a prelude of the former; an opinion, which, from the treacherous character of the people in this country, where *might* alone is right, will, we think, be very readily received among them. This conſideration opens, we think, a very wide field. The appointment of the Committee of Circuit, as we have already obſerved; has given the alarm, and having probably been magnified by the arts, and for the private views of one or more of the moſt powerful of the Zemindars, to the extent of ſtriking at the exiſtence of all of them, theſe arts may in ſome meaſure have ſhaken that confidence and dependance the Zemindars before had on our Government, inſpired by a ſeries of many years of peace and tranquillity. Such being the preſent ſituation of affairs here, we think that the continuation of peace in *Europe*, as it affords a favourable opportunity for carrying the Company's new ſyſtem into execution, is too important a circumſtance to be overlooked in your deliberations upon this extenſive ſubject. If it ſhould appear by the *Suez* advices, that there is likelihood of war with *France*, for the preſent year there will, we imagine, be ſufficient time on your hands for accompliſhing this important work, which, if it is effected previous to the breaking out of ſuch a war, will evidently be attended with the moſt beneficial conſequences to the future ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions: but if it ſhould be urged, that the preſent unſettled condition of affairs in *Europe* makes it neceſſary for you to be cautious of taking any ſteps that might alienate the minds of the Zemindars, and that on this account it would be ſafer for us, at this juncture, to be at peace with our Tributaries, it might, on the other hand, be conſidered, that much of the work, by a vigorous application of our force, may, in all probability, be ſoon completed, that there will then be little to apprehend from the ſhattered condition to which their power will have been reduced; that if the *Vizianagrum* Family are inclined to oppoſe us now, they will be equally well inclined, and better able to do it, in January; and that if it ſhould even then be thought neceſſary, from political conſiderations, to ſuſpend the execution of ſuch part of the Company's inſtructions as might lead to hoſtilities, ſuch temporizing might be to little purpoſe, ſince no more dependance can hereafter be placed on their attachment to our intereſt, now the alarm has been given, than if hoſtilities had actually commenced againſt them.

13. The preſent peaceable ſtate of the Company's poſſeſſions in general, the ſeaſon of the year favouring the tranſporting of reinforcements and ſtores from *Madras*, the improbability, on account of the rains, of the Marattas venturing into the country before December, and for the ſame reaſon of the Rajah's receiving any aſſiſtance from *Ibrahim Beg*, the preſent ſituation of the grain on the ground, which is not of a growth high enough to ſhelter an enemy, nor capable of being eaſily deſtroyed, are further reaſons for recommending the preſent juncture as favourable; and as they cannot fail to occur to the Rajah, they may conduce to deter him from thoſe ideas of oppoſition which he might at other times be led to entertain.

14. *Ibrahim Beg*, the Nizam's General, being an old ſervant of the Rajah, is thought to be attached to him, and it is ſaid the Rajah has applied to him for aſſiſtance; as he is in the ſervice of the Nizam, who receives an annual ſtipend from the Company on condition of the Circars being in peace, there is good reaſon to expect he will remain neutral.

15. The Rajah is ſaid to be on a good footing with the *Buſtaver* Zemindar, whoſe poſſeſſions are ſituated to the weſtward, on the other ſide the Paſſes, between the *Chicacole* Circar and the Maratta Countries, dependant on *Calahandre*.—This Zemindar has, we underſtand, 7 or 8,000 Pike and Matchlockmen; but, on account of his vicinity to the Marattas, with whom he is obliged to be conſtantly on his guard, and his want of Troops to defend himſelf againſt a Brother who has lately headed a party, with an intention to diſpoſſeſs him, he is not likely to be ſoon in a condition to aſſiſt *Vizianamrauze*. There does not appear to us any likelihood of this Family being able to procure any foreign aid.

16. The reſources of the Rajah for paying the Troops he has already aſſembled, or which he may hereafter aſſemble, are *Sitteramrauze*'s treaſury, the ſums lately extorted from *Jagonautrauze* and *Pabnaubrauze*, the collection from the country, and loans from the Soucars.—*Sitteramrauze*, it is ſaid, keeps his money moſtly in the hands of a Soucar at *Peddapore*, from whence he may find it difficult to convey it to *Vizianagrum*. The collections from the country, at this ſeaſon of the year, are inconſiderable. The Soucars may, we think, by proper management, be drawn away from *Vizianagrum*, or deterred from making the Rajah any loans; and with reſpect to *Jagonautrauze*'s effects, if your order for them to be delivered up ſhould be complied with, the Rajah muſt, we think, be reduced to great embarraſſments; particularly if you ſhould likewiſe think proper to order reſtitution of the effects of *Pabnaubrauze*, which, we think, there is ground for in the Company's inſtructions, intimating it to be their intention, that the property of all the inhabitants of the Circars ſhall be ſecured to them.

17. The Rajah, we think, is expoſed to be gradually weakened by negociations; and we are not without hope, that with circumſpection and ſecrecy, ſo neceſſary to be obſerved in undertakings of this nature, there is a poſſibility of carrying the Company's intentions into execution without bloodſhed.

18. The having in our poſſeſſions the expelled Zemindars of the *Nundaporum*, &c. Diſtricts, would contribute greatly to intimidate and check him; as they might, with very little aſſiſtance from the Company, ſoon regain their former poſſeſſions; the fear of which would make the Rajah very cautious how he proceeded to lengths that might render him obnoxious to the Company's reſentment.

19. We think that the money extorted from *Jagonautrauze* and *Pabnaubrauze* might be obtained, and perhaps the confined Zemindars be delivered up, by your poſitive orders to the Rajah for this purpoſe, previous to the arrival of any additional force in the diſtrict; but we are of opinion, that at leaſt two more battalions of Sepoys, and, if poſſible, 200 Europeans, will be neceſſary before any thing further ſhould be attempted. When theſe reinforcements arrive, the firſt ſteps we would recommend to be taken, are to draw away the Soucars from *Vizenagerumda*, and privately to ſecure to our intereſt the *Polycondar* Zemindar, by freeing him from his dependance on the Rajah, and putting him on a footing with other Zemindars, who hold their lands immediately of the Company, a meaſure which we think will of courſe be neceſſary hereafter, as we underſtand that his paying tribute to the Rajah is an impoſition upon our Government. The Rajah has great reliance on this Zemindar, receiving from him a ſmaller tribute than he would probably otherwiſe demand, on condition of being ſupplied with his Troops whenever they are wanted, the Rajah allowing him batta while on ſervice; they conſiſt of about 2,000 Matchlock and Pikemen, and being more uſed to ſervice than others, by being called out on all occaſions, are eſteemed the beſt Troops of the kind the Rajah has; with the *Polycondaman* gained over, which may be done eaſily by a Letter to him from yourſelves, and the aſſiſtance of the *Kimeedy* Rajah, whoſe fidelity to the Company may, we think, be relied on, there will be a ſhew of Country Troops on our ſide, which will be a further help to prepare the Rajah for the reception of ſuch arrangements as your Honour, &c. may be pleaſed to determine on. Whatever theſe may be, we are of opinion,

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that in order to your demands operating with the fulleſt effect, they ſhould be declared in a Letter from you to the Rajah, to be held ready to be preſented to him, at a time the moſt favourable for enſuring obedience, to which we think he may be diſpoſed when he finds it to be your determination, in caſe of refuſal, to deprive him of his Zemindary, and ſees on the ſpot a force ſufficient to reduce him.

20. We have propoſed in para. 9th, that the Rajah ſhould be required to diſband his Troops, and ſurrender his Forts to be garriſoned by the Company's Sepoys. It has in a former part of our Letter been mentioned, that his Troops coſt him 50 or 60,000 Rupees per month; and we underſtand that a military Force has been kept up by himſelf and family for many years paſt:—Sometimes even at a much greater expence expence than that above-mentioned.—As the *Vizianagrum* family therefore have been long uſed to great ſtate, and as the preſent Rajah is a vain man, and has been bred up in ſhew and parade, he will naturally be very averſe to any conditions that may deprive him of theſe external marks of greatneſs. We would therefore recommend, that ſome ſhadow of power ſhould be held out to flatter his pride, and thereby engage him to ſubmit the more readily to the Company's Orders. His acquieſcence will probably be followed by that of all the other Zemindars, and the object is ſo important, that the effecting it without bloodſhed, will be cheaply purchaſed at the expence of a few indulgences and diſtinctions granted to the *Vizianagrum* family; who, having rendered eſſential ſervice in aſſiſting Colonel *Ford* to expel the French from the Circars, and in delivering up *Vizagapatam* to the Company, after having taken it from the French, may, we think, be juſtly deemed entitled from theſe conſiderations, to ſuch marks of the Company's favour as can prudently be ſhewn them. The high authority this family has been poſſeſſed of in this Circar, by having had the entire management of it, with the title of Nabob, under the Mooriſh Government, for a conſiderable time, may very juſtly be ſuppoſed to have given *Viziaramrauze* lofty notions of his perſonal conſequence; and although he has been miſled to the late acts of violence againſt *Jagonautrauze* and *Padnaubrauze*, he has the character of being a well-meaning, humane man, and is favourably ſpoken of by the people in general of this Circar. He has hitherto generally appeared in public with a retinue of 50 Horſe and 500 or ſometimes a thouſand Sepoys and Pikemen. We think if he were allowed to retain the 50 Horſe and 500 Sepoys as a guard, it would tend greatly to reconcile him to the change.

21. With reſpect to the Forts, we are of opinion that it may be very difficult to bring the Rajah to deliver up that of *Vizianagrum*; not that we ſuppoſe he depends upon it as a place of defence, but we believe that he is greatly attached to it on account of the length of time his family has reſided there; that he will probably be afraid, on account of his women, of continuing there when it is garriſoned by our Troops, and will dread the mortification and diſgrace of being obliged to remove. It is a ſmall Fort of about 200 yards ſquare, with a dry unfiniſhed ditch, and has four round baſtions at the angles; the body of the Fort is at preſent in pretty good repair, and is partly of brick and partly of ſtone, cemented on the outſide with Chunam. By the conſtruction of it, which is wholly in the country ſtile of fortifying, without any outworks, we conceive that it cannot be deemed ſtrong; there are but few buildings in it, conſiſting of the Rajah's dwelling-houſe, with the outhouſes, a ſmall bomb proof, and ſome ſheds for the Rajah's people. We do not imagine it to be a place of any conſequence conſidered as a Fortification, but the leaving it in the Rajah's hands might make other Zemindars expect the ſame indulgences. We ſhould think it more adviſable to allow the Rajah an addition to his guard than the poſſeſſion of his Fort, and rather the poſſeſſion of his Fort, than that the inſiſting on this article alone ſhould be the occaſion of a total breach with him: His holding the Fort cannot put it in his power ever hereafter to do us miſchief; and in order to effect quietly a great change, all immaterial or unimportant matters ſhould, we think, be ſacrificed.

22. We think, after diſbanding the Rajah's Troops, that four Battalions of Sepoys ſhould be kept up by the Company for ſome time in this Diſtrict, allowing for the Rajah's Body Guard, to be taken from his Sepoys. Such of the remainder as chooſe it, might be enliſted in the Company's Service, and divided amongſt the different Battalions; his Pike and Matchlockmen will employ themſelves in the cultivation of the Country.

23. It would have been a very great ſatisfaction to us, to have been able to offer you our ſentiments upon this occaſion, with regard to the tribute that might reaſonably be demanded from this Rajah—as his being at a certainty with regard to the proviſion that might be intended to be made for his maintenance, and the ſupport of his family, his guard, &c. might the more incline him to accede peaceably to the terms to which he is to be reduced. We have already enlarged upon the cauſes which, we conceived, had led the Rajah to obſtruct the enquiry; and his miſconduct in this particular, renders us unable at preſent to aſcertain the tribute that might be deemed adequate to the Revenues of the Country he holds; he muſt in this reſpect depend ultimately upon the juſtice and generoſity of the Company, and he will accordingly ſee the neceſſity and propriety of ſubmitting to whatever they may determine on.

24. If it ſhould appear to you inexpedient at preſent to compel the *Vizianagrum* Rajah to obedience, we think it our duty to repreſent to you, that the enquiry, in ſuch caſe, is liable to be lengthened out to what extent he pleaſes: It is neceſſary, in order to our proceeding with diſpatch in this ſervice, that we ſhould have the prompt attendance of the village Conecoplies, and others, whom we may have occaſion to examine: When we write to the Rajah for them, he promiſes to order them to attend us, but they come to us very ſlowly; and when our Hircarrahs and Sepoys are ſent for them to the villages, not above half the number we want are to be found. We wiſhed, previous to entering on any other work, to have firſt finiſhed the Accounts of the *Vizianagrum* Zemindary, in order that a more adequate Jemmabundy might be ſettled with the Rajah; and if the Conecoplies are hereafter ſent to us without delay, we ſhall be able in three months to go through the whole of the Accounts of that Country. We have been obliged lately, on account of their not attending, to take in hand the *Kemedy* Zemindary, and are now proceeding upon that of *Tibaly*. *Jagonautrauze* and his brother *Padnaubrauze*, having, on account of the ill uſage they have received from the *Vizianagrum* family, determined to quit their ſervice, and implore the protection of the Company, we think it will be adviſable to give them all poſſible encouragement; and are the more induced to recommend ſuch a meaſure, on account of their being eſteemed the moſt capable and truſt-worthy managers in this Circar, a ſet of people much wanted; particularly if it ſhould appear, as there is ſome reaſon to think, that part of the country now held by the Rajah as Zemindary lands, was formerly Havelly, and that his claim to them may not ſtand the teſt. Theſe two men having a thorough knowledge of every part of the Countries dependant on the Rajah, they are capable of rendering the Company great ſervice: *Jagonautrauze*, the moſt able of them, we propoſe recommending to your Honour, &c. for the office of Meeraſſydar to the Diſtrict; but it being neceſſary before we do ſo, in order to judge of the degree of reliance to be placed on him, to queſtion him particularly relative to the produce of the different Countries, and receive from him other important informations, to keep by us as a check to refer to in the courſe of our enquiries, we ſhall defer entering further on this ſubject till our next Addreſs.

26. In your Letter of Inſtructions to us, you mention the

the repreſentations that had been made to you of the loſſes that were declared by the Renters of the *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah* Havelly lands, to have been ſuſtained by them in thoſe farms. We have found, in our enquiries into theſe Havelly lands, that the collections for the year in which the repreſentation of loſſes was made to you, fell ſhort of the collections for the two years preceding; but as they amounted to 59,000 Rupees above the ſum for which the lands were rented from the Company, and as the average collections for that and the two years preceding included in the ſame Cowle, amounted to 76,000 Rupees a year above that ſum, we cannot think the Renters entitled to any abatement in their rents. It is true, the crops in general fell ſhort; and ſome parts of the country, by ſuffering more ſeverely than the reſt, muſt have appeared in a ruined ſtate; but the high prices of grain made up to the Renter for the differences in the produce.

We are, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient, and
moſt humble Servants,

Chicacole,
16 Auguſt 1777.

John Hollond,
P. Perring,
Saml Johnſon.

To *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſquire, Chief of *Vizagapatam*, and Senior Member of the Committee of Circuit.

Sir,

When we were lately at *Vizagapatam*, we agreed with you, on the 8th inſtant, that it would be proper to addreſs the Board upon the ſubject of reducing the Rajah's force. The rough drafts of a Letter, which you moſtly approved, was read to you; but we were obliged, upon the receipt of the Board's Letter of the 2d Auguſt, to come away to *Chicacole*, in order to put in hand Tranſlates of ſuch Accounts as were neceſſary to enable us to comply with their Orders. We have not been able, till now, to finiſh our Addreſs to the Board upon the ſubject firſt above-mentioned: In proportion to its importance, it was neceſſary for us to conſider it very maturely; if you ſhould approve of it, you will pleaſe to ſign and forward it; but if you ſhould diſapprove of any part of it, we beg nevertheleſs that you will forward it immediately, as the diſtance we are at renders it impoſſible to debate on any difference of opinion, and the ſubject of the Letter, and time of the year, does not admit of any delay.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
(Signed) *P. Perring*,
John Hollond.

Chicacole,
16 Auguſt 1777.

APPENDIX, No. 19.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 25th November 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board having met, according to adjournment, to take into conſideration the Letter from the Committee of Circuit, dated the 10th September, as entered in laſt Conſultation, the Preſident lays before them a Letter, which has been addreſſed to him from the family of the deceaſed *Uppala Poyakarew*, late Zemindar of *Ancapillee*; alſo one from *Jumpana Jaggernautrauze*, and one from *Vizziaramrauze*, which are read as follows:

(Tranſlation.)

APPENDIX. No. 19.

To the Honourable Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*.

The Urgee or Petition of *Vancataputty Rauz*, *Pada Rauz*, and *Vancataputty Rauz*, Son of *Vancataram Rauz*, &c. Couſins of *Appola Poick Roy*, and the Vakeel *Sacarmunter Nurſunna*.

That your Honour is the Fountain of Juſtice arrived from *England*, and that we hope and confide in your Honour, and &c. Gentlemen, will look into the merits of our cauſe, and render on us our rights, of which we have already repreſented to your Honour, and &c. Gentlemen, bearing date 18th September laſt, which we doubt not by this time may have arrived with you, to which we expect a juſt Anſwer, and we hope it may not prove ineffectual. Now *Seetaram Rauz* is gone to *Madras*; he, in our *Rauze*'s life-time, lent him a ſmall ſum of money, and for which he had a Tunca on the Diſtrict of *Ancapully*; he did calculate intereſt on intereſt, until it amounted to a great ſum; and he alſo made up other accounts, and increaſed them to an enormous ſum, thinking that he is powerful and rich, and we are poor, and that what can be in our power, let him be who it will, provided he ſpends money, it will turn out to his advantage, even ſuppoſing it was contrary to juſtice; and he endeavoured alſo to encroach upon our Country: Since the deceaſe of our Rajah, he has wrote to the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, and alſo to the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George*, which muſt be in the Company's books, as well as their Anſwer. He has alſo offered them preſents of large ſums of money, which practice he even now makes uſe of after the deceaſe of our Rajah *Appola Poick Roy Jumpana Jagunnada Rauz*; what he has wrote, and his verbal meſſages, in order to bring our Diſtrict, called *Ancapully*, under their Jamindarſhip, this Honourable Board will find if you will but make enquiry. The Company is full of juſtice: We rely on you, Gentlemen, that you will do us juſtice, as by uſual cuſtom, according to the People that have been in power before in this quarter, have done with regard to our Jamindarſhip; as a proof of which, that in theſe our Circars, when there was no iſſue at the death of the different Rajahs, viz. *Pooſaputty Raovoo*, *Appan Row Culdindy*, &c. the names of families, their wives did addreſs themſelves to the then Government; they did always permit them to adopt any lad they pleaſed out of their couſins; this was the uſual cuſtom of the Jamindarſhips from ancient times: And beſides, a year ago, at the deceaſe of *Bungar Yaſum Naick*, his wives did requeſt Lord *Pigot*, Bahadar, to permit them to adopt a lad they choſe of their couſins, as heir, which was accordingly granted to them, who is now in the Government of the Country: Our requeſt is not unprecedented: Our Rajah's wives reſt aſſured that this Honourable Board will favour them, by permitting them to adopt a lad they like on the deceaſe of our Rajah *Appola Poick Roy*. The Governor of *Madras* did write to the Gentlemen at *Maſulipatam*, and deſired them to make an enquiry of who was the heir to that Jamindarſhip, and of what was cuſtomary in other Circars; and alſo deſired them to get certificates thereof from them, and ſend them to *Madras*, which they have accordingly complied with, which we doubt not muſt remain in the Company's books, which will convince this Honourable Board of our aſſertions. When the Houſe of *Pooſaputty* lent money to us, they did alſo lend to the Houſe of *Kimmedy*, and increaſed it to an exorbitant ſum, as their Country is woody: They thought proper to ſettle matters amicably; the balance they have agreed to pay, yearly a certain ſum. The Houſe of *Vutchavoy* have lent money to the Houſe of *Raovoo*; and they were at variance, and made their complaint to the Council of *Maſulipatam*, on which their Accounts were juſtly ſettled, and they have determined the balance to be paid at the rate of Five thouſand Pagodas per annum. We beg this Honourable Board will be ſo good as to ſettle our Accounts juſtly and equitably, and determine us to pay either according to the terms of the Houſes of *Kimmedy* or *Raovoo*,

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Rawvoo, to which we will readily agree. If the lenders ſhould incline to encroach upon the borrowers Country, it is a thing quite unprecedented: The inclination of *Viziaram Rauze* is only to recover the money juſtly due to him, and he has no intention to encroach on our Country: The inclination of *Sittaram Rauze* is from a long time to encroach on our Country, and he thinks of nothing elſe. Our Vakeel *Sacermuntry Nurraſumma* is coming for to repreſent our cauſe. We humbly beg this Honourable Board will take our caſe into their conſideration, and ſupport our Jamindarſhip, and for which we ſhall pray, &c. &c.

We beg this Honourable Board will excuſe any fault in this Urgee.

October 17th 1777.

A Duplicate of it is ſent.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze* to the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir,

Since your arrival at *Madras*, I have had the honour to addreſs you with two Letters, and my Vakeel, *Narſimloo*, has communicated to you what I wrote to him. I ſuppoſe you have to this juncture conſtantly many other affairs to tranſact, and therefore I have not received your favourable Letter.

The late *Uppala Poyakarow*, who died about thirteen months ago, was my neareſt couſin.

On the application I made about *Poyakarow*'s country, and the repreſentation made by the family of the deceaſed *Poyakarow*, as alſo on the Rajah's interceſſion, the Chief and Council of *Vizigapatam* thought proper to give me their intereſt. All the Papers in my favour, the Chief and Council incloſed in their Letter about this buſineſs to the Preſidency of *Madras*; if you will be pleaſed to refer to what has been wrote on this ſubject, after the death of *Poyakarow*, you will fully underſtand this buſineſs.

If the Honourable Company be pleaſed to grant me the ſucceſſion of *Ankapilly* Zemindary, I am to diſcharge a large debt due to the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*; and I agree that the Company ſhall order the family of *Poyakarow* to adopt a Son, and they to ſettle a Jamabundy to *Sallawaram*, and the remainder of the collection of ſaid *Sallawaram* money, to go towards the maintenance of them; and I further conſent to pay the tribute, if the Company are pleaſed to increaſe it. To all which the Rajah *Vizitram Rauze* agreed, and alſo the family of *Poyakarow*. The Chief and Council here have promiſed me to endeavour to procure a Cowle for me for this Zemindary; until this was procured, they thought proper to make me their Manager for this Country, and they gave me their Duſtock in order to collect the Revenue from that Diſtrict, and to pay it into the Company's Treaſury; they alſo ordered me to pay a ſmall ſum monthly to *Poyakarow*'s family. I am acting conformable to the Company's Orders; I have alſo improved the lands to the ſatisfaction of all the Inhabitants.

Sitteram Rauze has made application to the Board at *Vizagapatam*, for the ſucceſſion of *Ankapilly* Zemindary, to join with his brother's Zemindary; the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* having adopted his ſon to ſucceed him, which *Sitteram Rauze* knows perfectly well, his next ſtep is to get *Ankapilly*, and then to rent the *Chicacole* Havelly at any rate, that he may thereby engroſs all the political buſineſs; if he can accompliſh this, then he knows very well how to make himſelf great, as there will be no other perſon but himſelf in this Circar: Theſe are his inward ſentiments; but he pretends that he wants to have nothing to do with his Brother's Country, and that he has got nothing for his own maintenance. He thinks, if he can perſuade your Honour and the Council into this, the Company will doubtleſs grant him a Cowle for *Poyakarow*'s Country: when he gets it, he intends to turn *Poyakarow*'s family out of the country; at the time he made his repreſentation to the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* about this, they thought proper to refuſe him, becauſe he was not a relation to *Poyakarow*, nor had he any claim or mortgage on that country, therefore the Chief and Council reſolved to recommend me to the Board of *Madras*, as they deemed me a proper perſon, being manager for the Company and a couſin of *Poyakarow*'s; I have conſented to give *Sittavaram* to the family to make them contented, and to pay off the debt to Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, and alſo to content all the inhabitants, beſides paying more Jamabundy. The Company will be pleaſed to conſider how far I deſerve their favours, and I hope to get the Cowle. I have ſome little private affairs to be ſettled here, then will ſet out to *Madras*, and will pay my reſpects to you perſonally by the 1ſt of December.

Incloſed I ſend my Sarmed to you, on account of the Cowle, for the *Ankapillee* Zemindary, which I hope you'll receive ſafe. What can I ſay more?

(Signed)

Vizagapatam, 1ſt Nov. 1777. *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze.*

(Tranſlation.)

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

I *Mirja Rauza Vizia Ram Rauz*, Bohadar, Monſub Sultan, write this Letter.

An intimate friendſhip between the Honourable the Engliſh Company and us ſubſiſted before, and even after they had the Circars; we doubt not, Gentlemen, but that you are acquainted with it. Lately, by ſome reaſons, and unfortunately for us, the Company placed their garriſon in all the forts of our country, and even in the fort of *Vizianagrum*, the place of our habitation. We, for ſome reaſons, had received a ſum of money from *Janagada Rauz*; even that ſum we returned to him; as the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* informed us, that the Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*, have deſired us to do ſo, we thought proper to comply with their pleaſure. *Vizianagarum* fort is not large enough for their Company's Troops, but juſt fit for the habitation of our family. There being there diſtreſſed the place much, which has produced many inconveniencies to us, on which we removed with our family to *Summa Chellem*, a place devoted to our religion, ſituated at the diſtance of five coſs from *Vizagapatam*. All theſe circumſtances we doubt not but Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Perring* have informed you, Gentlemen, of. There was a ſum of money due to the Company from us, on account of the Kiſtees; although our country is in different circumſtances, we thought proper to diſcharge the above due, which we have accordingly done by a teep or draft given by the Soucars for one hundred and fifty thouſand Rupees, of which Mr. *Williams*, &c. Council, wrote to you, Gentlemen. We did formerly, and ſhall henceforth, entirely rely upon the Company, of which you, Gentlemen, are ſenſible of. We beg you will pleaſe to order the Troops at *Vizianagarum* to leave the place, for which we ſhall thank you, and return to that place again with our family; it is our duty to pay obedience to the Company's orders, and their duty is to protect us. We expect your anſwer, which we hope you will favour us with ſoon. Formerly the management of our country was taken care of by our Brother; now, ſince two years, we have managed it ourſelves, as we thought proper ſo to do, and paid the Company's money according to the payments. When our Brother delivered the management of it to us, there was an allowance of five thouſand Rupees per month ſettled on himſelf, which he received for one year, and after he made known to us, by people of character, that five thouſand Rupees was not enough, and that he would be glad if we allowed him at the rate of ten thouſand Rupees per month, at which rate we have allowed him, and told him to reſide in any place he pleaſed; he ſaid, that he was deſirous to ſee Mr. *Stratton*; and ſet off for *Madras*; and alſo he ſaid, that he would have nothing to do with our Rauzſhip; and that I may write to my Vakeel on that purpoſe: by this time he

may have arrived with you. As our brother has not any buſineſs with our Rauzſhip, we have wrote to our Vakeel, *Gondala Sectaram*, with regard to every thing, of which we dare ſay he has informed you, Gentlemen, of our brother; that the farm of the diſtricts of *Havelly*, *Sriceeolim*, *Cuſmy*, *Cottah*, &c, for three years, when we told him that he ſhould not take any farm on which he ſuſtained a loſs of ſixty thouſand Rupees; when the Company demanded it of him, he requeſted us to pay it: merely to oblige him we have agreed to it. The farm of the Havelly diſtrict, the Gentlemen of the Committee lately much increaſed the rate; of courſe our brother will not think of it: in caſe he does take it, I take the liberty to obſerve to you, Gentlemen, that our Rauzſhip ſhall have no manner of buſineſs with it. We have lent a large ſum of money to *Poick Roy*, on the mortgage Annacapully diſtrict, the Governor and Council, their papers, and alſo the papers of *Poick Roy*, I have with me, and alſo the copies thereof we doubt not muſt remain in the Board after the deceaſe of *Appola Poick Roy*; what we wrote to the Board concerning the diſtricts of *Annacapully* and *Sullyaverem* muſt remain in the Company's books; by your peruſing them every thing will occur to your knowledge. Lately, for a little time, the Company appointed *Jagunnad Rauz*, manager of the diſtricts of *Annacapully* and *Sullyverem*, and the revenues produced therefrom the Company have received entirely. The Company's Troops remaining in *Annacapully* fort. We are indebted a large ſum of money to the Gentlemen and the Soucars at *Vizagapatam*. We beg this Honourable Board will pleaſe to write to *Jagunnada Rauz*, and order him to pay us the money due to us from the diſtricts of *Annacapully* and *Suttyaverem*, which will enable us to diſcharge our debts. As it is your duty, and incumbent on you, Gentlemen, to do us juſtice, we wrote to you. In our return from *Rajamahandrem* to our country, we did call at *Suttyaverem*, to enquire after the late *Poick Roy*'s wives; they grievouſly complained to us, ſaying, that ſome perſon of wealth is endeavouring to encroach upon our country, by diſburſing ſome of his riches, and obtain an order for it from the Company: and alſo they ſaid, that their Rauzſhip is very ancient; and that they have repreſented their deplorable caſe to the Board; and that I might write in their favour to you, Gentlemen, and beg you to permit them to adopt a lad as their heir; that they, their children, and aged, will retain a great ſenſe of the favour; and that it will be to the repute and fame of the Company. For which we aſſured them, that the Company is our ſuperior, and they will do no other than juſtice; and that they may reſt aſſured of it. We are only deſirous of recovering our money due from them, but we had not any intention on their Rauzſhip; if we illegally ſhould attempt any thing againſt it, we ſhould be deemed by the Company and others as uſurpers; but the Company never will agree to ſuch meaſures. We hope you, Gentlemen, will do them juſtice.

Vizia Ram Rauze.

30th October 1777.

The Letter of the 6th inſtant, from *Vizagapatam*, as entered in laſt Conſultation, being alſo read again, the Board are of opinion, That previous to the determining upon the ſubjects contained therein, it will be neceſſary that *Viziaramrauze* ſhould come to *Madras*; and the Preſident is accordingly requeſted to write him the following Letter, to be ſent to him through the Chief and Council, at *Vizagapatam*.

To *Mirza Rauze Viziaramrauze*, Behauder, Monſul Sultan.

Sir,

From the Letters you have written to me, ſince your return to *Vizagapatam*, which have been laid before the Board, and the repreſentations made through the Council of that Settlement, which have been tranſmitted hither, I obſerve you are under great uneaſineſs of mind on account of the late proceedings regarding you. I write you at this time, that you make yourſelf eaſy on the ſubject of your affairs. The Company are full of juſtice, and their friendſhip is never wanting to thoſe who are under their protection. The faults you have committed will not be remembered, whilſt you continue ſubmiſſive and obedient to their orders, and ſhew yourſelf diligent in the management of your country, and in the payment of your Jimmabundy to the Company. Be not careful that any of your juſt rights will be infringed; the Company have a regard for your family, and will not only protect you in what you have a claim to, but extend their indulgence to you whenever it can be done conſiſtently with the ſafety and welfare of their own affairs.

As the ſeveral requeſts communicated in your Letters will require much conſideration, and the ſituation in which your affairs ſtand at preſent, making it proper and neceſſary that you ſhould come to *Madras*, I deſire you will accordingly proceed hither without delay, leaving careful and truſty ſervants to manage the buſineſs of your Zemindary during your abſence.

In compliment to you I have directed the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* to order a company of Sepoys to eſcort you to *Madras*.

As it has been a rule long eſtabliſhed by the orders of the Company, that all correſpondence with the Prince, and the Natives of *India*, ſhould be carried on through the channel of their Governor, you will apprehend that your Letters ſhould in future be addreſſed to me alone.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt obedient,

Fort St. George, humble Servant,

17th November 1777. *John Whitehill.*

Mr. *Johnſon* deſires it may be minuted, that he cannot give his aſſent to this meaſure, for the reaſons he ſubſcribed to as Chief of *Vizagapatam*, in the Letter from that Settlement, dated the 30th Auguſt laſt, in the Military Department.

Agreed, That the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam* be directed to furniſh *Viziaramrauze* with the eſcort mentioned in the Preſident's Letter to him.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sami Johnſon,
P. Perring.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 18th November 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith.
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have the honour to acquaint you with the return of *Viziaramrauze* to his country, ſeemingly full of contrition for his paſt miſconduct, which had ſo juſtly drawn upon him the diſpleaſure and reſentment of the late adminiſtration. The Rajah ſince his return has paid us a viſit, and acknowledged his error, in liſtening too readily to the advice of evil Counſellors, whereby he has brought himſelf nothing but ſhame and diſgrace. He is extremely apprehenſive the Company will never ſhew the ſame regard and friendſhip they had formerly for him

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and his family; on which account, has requeſted our interceſſion with the Honourable Board for pardon, and to explain to your Honour, &c. his great concern for his late miſbehaviour, which has been expreſſed in a very pathetic manner, in his addreſs to Mr. *Williams*, on the ſubject of his affairs, as will be perceived in the incloſed copy of it, ſent herewith for your peruſal by his deſire.

As the reſtoration of the fort of *Vizianagrum* ſeems to be the principal object the Rajah has in view, we beg leave to recommend that part of his Letter to your ſerious conſideration; and to obſerve at the ſame time to your Honour, &c. that we are fully convinced within ourſelves, the Rajah, from his weakneſs and ſuperſtition, can never be happy whilſt he continues abſent from the ancient reſidence of his family; nor have we reaſon to believe he will ever be faithfully attached to the Company's intereſt, unleſs their Troops are withdrawn from *Vizianagrum*; for ſhould the Rajah not be indulged in his requeſt to be reſtored to his family, fort, and reſidence, his averſion to the Company's Government will certainly ſhew itſelf whenever he can be encouraged and ſupported by an European Power. It is true indeed the fort is ſmall, and in the defenceleſs condition deſcribed in the Rajah's Letter; but as it is the poſitive orders of the Company, that all the Rajahs or Zemindars who hold their lands of them, ſhall truſt to the Company's Troops for defence and protection, we cannot, in duty to our Honourable Employers, recommend the fort of *Vizianagrum* to be reſtored to the Rajah, without firſt having from him ſome ſecurity for his fidelity and attachment to the Company, as well as for the peace and tranquillity of this Circar: for although the Rajah has expreſſed the utmoſt concern for his late diſobedience, and has promiſed future amendment, in hopes of obtaining again his fort; yet we are ſomewhat doubtful of the ſincerity of his profeſſions, from his too well known fluctuating diſpoſition; and we are not a little ſurpriſed at his expecting the Company's indulgence to his ſuperſtition, without making the leaſt offer of increaſing his tribute (which is at preſent too ſmall for the large poſſeſſions he holds of the Company); nor, what appears to us very extraordinary, has he propoſed to reimburſe the Company for the great expence they have been at in ſending Troops and Stores from the Preſidency, *Maſulipatam*, and *Ganjam*, in order to reduce him to a proper obedience to their Authority and Government.

The reſtoring the fort of *Vizianagrum* to the Rajah, the raiſing of his tributes, and the reimburſement of the Troops ordered to be employed to reduce him to a due ſenſe of his duty, are ſubjects of the utmoſt importance, highly meriting the attention of the Honourable Board; therefore, as we have no authority from you to enter into any negociation with the Rajah upon theſe matters, of which he ſeems to be truly ſenſible, if we might judge by his averſion to his having any diſcourſe about them, we ſhall wait your orders and inſtructions regarding the propriety of his requeſt, and the ſettling a reaſonable Jemmabundy with him for the enſuing year, as his Cowle for the preceding one expired the 25th September laſt, as well as thoſe of the other Zemindars in this Circar; about which alſo we ſhould be glad to have ſpeedily your directions.

It affords us much ſatisfaction, to have it in our power to inform your Honour, &c. that the Rajah has at length ordered the money which he forcibly took from *Jumpana Jagernautrauze*, to be reſtored to him. In our Letter to the Preſidency, dated 31ſt July laſt, we mentioned, that it was our intention, after the recovery of *Jagernaut Rauze*'s effects, to ſubmit to the determination of the Board, how far it may be proper to inſiſt alſo on reſtitution being made to *Pudda Naib Rauze*, for the large ſum of money taken from him by the Rajah, merely becauſe he was a brother to the aforeſaid *Jagernaut Rauze*. As this is an inſtance of oppreſſion that loudly calls forth the juſtice of the Company, who, we are perſuaded will not ſuffer any of their Zemindars to act oppreſſively by the people under them, we hope your Honour, &c. will cauſe the Rajah to ſatisfy the injured man: for, upon the ſtricteſt enquiry, *Viziaramrauze*, we find, cannot have any claim upon *Pudda Naib Rauze* for the money he has unjuſtly taken away from him, after having once given him an acquittal upon ſettling accounts to the Rajah's entire ſatisfaction. *Pudda Naib Rauze* is in ſome meaſure deſerving of your protection, as he will moſt probably be an uſeful ſervant to the Company; being determined, as he aſſures us, to devote the remainder of his life to their ſervice.

As the Cowle for Havelly land is expired, and this is the time for repairing the tanks and watercourſes, we beg permiſſion to remind your Honours, &c. of a propoſal lately made by *Pudda Naib Rauze*, delivered to the Committee of Circuit, for renting the Caſſimcolah and Chicacole Havelly lands, for 10 years, at 2,30,000 Rupees per annum, eſpecially as he has requeſted we would apply to you for a Cowle on the above terms, and to aſſure you that he will be punctual in the payment of his kiſts, and that he will do all in his power to improve thoſe lands, and to make the people happy under him, during the time he is Renter.

We obſerve in the Rajah's Letter, a ſtrong diſlike to *Sitteramrauze* renting the Havelly lands, from an apprehenſion, in caſe of failure in his payments, that he will want him to be reſponſible for his balance; therefore, as it is his determination not to pay any ſuch balance, he requeſts your Honour, &c. will not liſten to any propoſals *Sitteramrauze* might make for renting thoſe lands. If the Rajah is ſo averſe to his brother becoming a Renter, for the reaſons already ſet forth, it is beyond a doubt his objection to his being appointed Zemindar of *Ancapillee* muſt be inſuperable, as there is no leſs than ſeven lacks of Rupees due to him from the mortgaged lands: indeed, *Viziaramrauze* has already explained his ſentiments on this head, in his Letter to the Chief and Council (which was tranſmitted to the Board in our Letter of the 12th December 1776) that it appears to us there is no neceſſity for enlarging on the ſubject further than it is our opinion, that ſhould this Zemindary be granted to *Sitteramrauze*, there will be eternal diſputes between the two brothers, and our time, of courſe, will always be taken up with hearing of their complaints, frivolous on one ſide, but conſequential to the other; which might be avoided, if your Honour, &c. ſhould think proper to confer the Zemindary on *Jaggernaut Rauze*, who is a man of abilities and ſubſtance, and worthy of truſt and favour, and to whom the Rajah has no objection with regard to the ſucceſſion, and hath frequently expreſſed his wiſh he might obtain the Zemindary, as he is convinced the heavy debt due to him from the late Zemindar, would be ſoon diſcharged; beſides, the Company, in the courſe of a few years, would have a conſiderable increaſe in the Jemmabundy, which cannot be expected at preſent, while the Rajah is allowed to collect the revenues, and to charge annually the country intereſt of 24 per cent. beſides Soucar of Tepawany batta, of exchange, and other charges attending the collections. Notwithſtanding the heavy debt due to the Rajah, *Jagernautrauze* is willing to increaſe the tribute from 65,000, to a lack of Rupees per annum, which is 35,000 more than ever was before given for the *Ankapillee* Zemindary. But leſt your Honours, &c. ſhould be impreſſed with an unfavourable opinion of *Jagernautrauze*, on account of the accuſation made laſt February againſt him by *Sitteramrauze*, for traiterous proceedings againſt the Company, we think, in honour to ourſelves, and in vindication of an injured character, we ought to do juſtice to *Jaggernautrauze*, for too eaſily giving credit to the cruel aſperſions caſt upon him by his vindictive, ill-deſigning enemy, *Sitteramrauze*; who, for endeavouring to impoſe upon the Council, by his infamous, falſe informations, has rendered himſelf deſerving your high diſpleaſure: conſcious, therefore, of *Sitteramrauze*'s deception of us, and of *Jaggernautrauze*'s innocence, the Chief and Council had, laſt

Auguſt,

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Auguſt, delivered the latter a paper, with their ſign manual and the Company's ſeal affixed thereto, in order to produce occaſionally to the Honourable Board for his juſtification; but as his preſent bad ſtate of health prevents him from going up immediately to the Preſidency for redreſs, he has requeſted we would lay the ſaid paper before you, in the full perſuaſion your Honours will juſtify his character to the Company; otherwiſe this man, who has it in his power to render them ſervices, muſt retire from the world, and of courſe be buried in oblivion. Before we conclude, we muſt make another remark on the Rajah's Letter, wherein he gives us to underſtand, that *Sitteram Rauze*'s going up to the Preſidency, was only on a viſit to his friend, Mr. *Stratton*, and that he did not entertain any ſuſpicions of his wanting to intermeddle with his affairs. Although this appears doubtful to us, yet we are pleaſed he has guarded againſt this interference, by deſiring it may be repreſented to your Honours that his brother has no authority to act or do any thing for him in his affairs. We repeat, we are well pleaſed with the Rajah's aſſurance, as it will be the means of guarding you againſt the machinations of *Sitteramrauze*, whoſe ambition knows no bounds, and whoſe character bears the mark of infamy upon our Records for ſome months paſt, which we have faithfully repreſented in its true light, in our correſpondence with the late adminiſtration.

We have the honour to ſubſcribe ourſelves, with the utmoſt reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt dutiful,
humble Servants,
M. Williams,
Hy Crawford,
Nath. Barlow.

Vizagapatam,
6th November 1777.

Tranſlation of a Letter from Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* to Mr. *Morgan Williams*, Provincial Chief of *Vizagapatam*.

Sir,

Since the happy era in which the Honourable Company were put in poſſeſſion of the Northern Circars, until this juncture, my family have experienced their friendſhip; and I humbly hope they have all proved themſelves deſerving of the favours conferred on them.

My late miſbehaviour, for which I am truly concerned, drew upon me the Company's diſpleaſure, and they thought proper to order all my inſignificant forts to be garriſoned by their Troops, not even excepting *Vizianagrum*, the ancient reſidence of my family: being conſcious I brought this misfortune upon myſelf, I paid the ſtricteſt obedience to their orders, and not only gave up my forts, but being further informed by Mr. *Johnſon*, in the name of himſelf and the Council of *Vizagapatam*, that it was expected that I ſhould reſtore the money which I had forcibly taken from *Jampane Jaggernaut Rauze*, I have returned it accordingly, and hope this will alſo be conſidered as a proof of my ſincere intentions implicitly to obey in future the Company's orders on all occaſions.

I yeſterday delivered you a teepe for Rupees, 150,000 on account of the kiſts due from me to the Honourable Company, although I have found the greateſt difficulty, in the preſent poſture of affairs, to raiſe that ſum, my credit being materially affected by the late meaſures taken againſt me.

I have no doubt but the Honourable Preſident and Council have been fully informed of the preſent defenceleſs condition of *Vizianagrum*; that lately a great part of the walls has tumbled down, and the remainder is tottering; that it is but barely capable of containing my family, and it is not of the leaſt conſequence as a fort, but is very dear to me as the ancient reſidence of my family; and by my being diſpoſſeſſed thereof, am rendered unhappy. It is true, the Company moſt conſiderately granted me permiſſion to remain therein; but this is impracticable whilſt a battalion of Sepoys remain there, and in the adjoining village. Want of room, continual complaints about proviſions, and the little ſquabbles (to which my people were ſubjected) with the Sepoys, made the place ſo diſagreeable, that I have been neceſſitated to forſake it, and take up my reſidence at *Sumatchallum*, within five coſs of *Vizagapatam*. Two Members of the Council (*Samuel Johnſon* and *Peter Perring*, Eſquires) can give the Honourable Board a more affecting deſcription of my diſtreſſed condition (thus obliged to forſake my ancient habitation) than I am capable of inditing.

When the Honourable Board take my preſent ſituation into conſideration, I have the moſt ſanguine hopes, that their humanity and juſtice will influence them to give orders for my fort of *Vizianagrum* being evacuated, that I may joyfully return thereto, and by future dutiful and peaceable demeanour, evince that I am deſerving of the favour. I faithfully promiſe that it ſhall never be put into any poſture of defence; and that the Honourable Company's Troops ſhall again have immediate poſſeſſion whenever they think proper. I am now perfectly convinced that the Company's protection is my beſt ſecurity, and on it I ſhall ever place (next to God) my chief dependance.

My brother, *Silteram Rauze*, managed my affairs for many years, and of his own accord delivered them over to me about two years paſt, encumbered with an enormous debt; yet ever ſince I have had the good fortune to conduct them ſo well myſelf, that I have punctually paid the Company's kiſts, and given entire ſatisfaction to all the people under me. My brother then agreed to receive from me for his ſubſiſtence 5,000 Rupees per month, and received at that rate for one year; but afterwards he ſent people to repreſent to me, that this allowance was inadequate to his expences, and therefore hoped I would double it: as my brother, I thought it incumbent on me to comply with his requeſt; and told him he might reſide in any part of my country that was moſt agreeable to him; but he replied, that he would proceed to *Madras*, on a viſit to his friend Mr. *Stratton*, and I muſt not entertain any ſuſpicions of his wanting to intermeddle with my affairs, leſt he may act otherwiſe. I beg that it may be repreſented to the Honourable Board, that he has no authority from me to do any thing in my affairs, and that whatever I wiſh to be tranſacted, will be communicated to my proper Vakeel, *Gundal Sbittanah*, who reſides in that capacity at *Madras*.

Contrary to my inclination and advice, my brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, rented the Chicacole Havelly for three years; and beſides other loſſes, leſt a balance due to the Company of ſixty thouſand Rupees. As this debt was contracted whilſt he was my Manager, and he declared he was incapable of diſcharging it, I took upon me to be reſponſible for it to the Honourable Company. I have now a worſe opinion of ſuch an undertaking than before, as the Committee of Circuit have thought proper to increaſe the rent conſiderably; and yet, I ſuſpect my brother wiſhes to become again Renter, flattering himſelf, that ſhould the loſs be ever ſo great, I will be induced to pay it; and therefore he will have the temporary gratification of his own wiſh, without riſque: for theſe reaſons I think it incumbent on me, to timely advertiſe you of my firm reſolution not to be again reſponſible for any ſuch balance.

I have already tranſmitted to the Honourable Board, copies of the original mortgage bonds granted to me by the deceaſed *Poyatarow*, on the Zemindary of *Ancapilly*; which were allowed to be taken by the ſaid Board, and duly authenticated by the Chiefs of this place. My debt is large, and accumulates daily. If you will be pleaſed to refer to what I wrote on this ſubject after the death of *Poyatarow*, you will fully underſtand my ſentiments of that matter. Lately the relations of *Poyatarow*, although they are very diſtant, have requeſted that I will intercede

for

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for permiſſion being given to the wife of the deceaſed *Poyakarow*, to adopt a ſon who may poſſeſs that Zemindary, as they are greatly alarmed by a report that it is to be given to my family, and they be left in indigence. I anſwered, that I never had applied for this Zemindary, or claimed any pretenſions to it, but ſo far as my mortgage gave me a right, nor did I ever wiſh to poſſeſs it; that they muſt reſt ſatisfied the Company would take care of their maintenance; but as to the country, I ſuppoſe, it would only be given to a perſon who could ſatisfy me for my great debt, which is nearly the worth of the Zemindary. *Joggernaut Rauze* being appointed Manager on behalf of the Company, now receives all the revenues of this country, which is contrary to the tenor of my mortgages, and keeps me in great diſtreſs. I hope the Honourable Board will be pleaſed to take care of my intereſt, in the diſpoſition of this Zemindary, and not grant it to any perſon who will not undertake fully to pay off my mortgage; by this I ſhall be enabled to diſcharge my balance to the Company, and part of the heavy debt I owe to individuals. I further hope they will be pleaſed to take into conſideration the diſtreſſed ſituation of the deceaſed *Poyakarow*'s family and relations.

I cannot conclude this long addreſs without aſking your pardon for having been ſo prolix; but the neceſſity of my affairs required it. I hope you will not only lay this Letter before the Council here, but ſend a copy thereof to the Honourable Preſident and Council; when I hope you will aſſure them, my future behaviour ſhall convince them I am deſerving of all favours they may hereafter be pleaſed to conſer on me. What can I ſay more?

(A true copy.)

Vizigapatam, 30th October 1777. *Nath*l *Barlow*. Secr*y*.

Whereas *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze* has repreſented to us the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, that from the repeated attempts made on his life and property by the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, through the evil Council of *Sitteram Rauze*, he can have no dependance on either; and therefore has this day paſſed us an obligation, wherein he binds himſelf never to ſerve them in any capacity whatſoever, without our expreſs permiſſion firſt had and obtained.

Now be it known unto all men, That we, taking into conſideration the preſent ſituation of *Jaggernaut Rauze*, and the ſervices which he may be able to render our Honourable Employers, by his great knowledge of all the Chicacole Circar, do hereby, at his earneſt requeſt, acknowledge him to be Renter of Chicacole Havelly, and Manager of Ankapillee, Dodegulloo, &c. Zemindary; that we conſider him as immediately under the Company's protection, and ſhall endeavour on all occaſions to ſee juſtice done to him and all his family: we alſo hereby declare, that we think he merits further encouragement, and ſhall embrace every opportunity which may offer, for giving him reaſon to be grateful for the protection and favour ſhewn him by this writing. In juſtice to his character, which we apprehend may have been injured by the Letter we wrote the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, under date the 26th of February laſt, an account of the repreſentation made againſt him by *Sitteram Rauze*, we think it neceſſary to certify, that many circumſtances have ſince come to our knowledge, to induce us to believe that *Sitteram Rauze* is capable of inventing any ſtory, however wicked, which will ſerve his purpoſe, and that the complaints he urged againſt *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze* were groundleſs, though it is probable they have been the means of preventing him from being nominated Zemindar of *Ankapillee*, *Dodegulloo*, &c. we therefore being willing to repair the injury done him, as far as in our power, do hereby promiſe to uſe our beſt endeavours for his procuring that Zemindary; and in caſe this ſervice cannot be effected for him, we hereby promiſe to uſe every means in our power to make the Rajah *Vizieram Rauze* fulfil a Sanned granted by him to *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze*, bearing date the October 1776 (Gentoo Stile) wherein he promiſes to grant to him the following places, viz.

	R*y*.
Narva and *Peddagady* for -	9,000 per annum.
Canathee and *Caravoſa* - -	10,000 D°
Leva Cheema - - - - -	5,000 D°
Rupees -	24,000

In caſe the Zemindary of *Ankapillee*, *Dodegulloo*, &c. ſhall not be granted to *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze* within one year after the date of the ſaid Sanud, we further, being willing to bind the ſaid *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze* by all poſſible ties of gratitude to our Honourable Employers, do hereby promiſe to aſſiſt and ſupport him on all occaſions where it can be done conſiſtent with our own honour and the intereſt of the Honourable Eaſt India Company, whoſe ſeal is affixed to this writing, to which we have ſubſcribed our names in *Vizagapatam*, this 20th day of Auguſt 1777.

(Signed) *Samuel Johnſon*,
Morgan Williams,
Henry Crawfurd,
Nathaniel Barlow.

(A true copy.)
*Nath*l *Barlow*,
Secr*y*.

Agreed, That this Letter do lay upon the table, until the Letter of the 10th September, from the Committee of Circuit, ſhall be taken into conſideration.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
*Sam*l *Johnſon*,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 21.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 27th of November 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Gov*r*, Pres*t*.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

PURSUANT to the Reſolution of laſt Conſultation, the following Letter was this day diſpatched by Tappies to *Vizagapatam*, incloſing the Preſident's to *Viziram Rauze*:

To Mr. *Morgan Williams*, &c. Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your ſeveral Letters in this department, the laſt bearing date the 15th inſtant. As we are of opinion, that before we come to a concluſive determination upon the ſubjects contained in your Letter of the 6th inſtant, it is neceſſary that *Viziaram Rauze* ſhould come to *Madras*, in order to give us ſuch particular information regarding them as we may have occaſion to require him. —Our Preſident has been deſired to write him a Letter to this effect, which we incloſed herewith, to be immediately forwarded by you, and of which a copy is alſo ſent for your peruſal.

We deſire you will prepare and ſend up to us as ſoon as poſſible, a ſtatement of your nett territorial revenues, from the 25th March to the 25th September laſt.

Fort St. George, 27th November 1777. We are, Gentlemen, Your affectionate Friends.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 15th May 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident.
John Whitehill,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Peter Perring.

Read the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your Honour, &c. Council's Letter of the 3d of April.

Incloſed we tranſmit a duplicate of our Letter of the 16th December. In our Letter of the 3d March, we ſent you an account of our territorial revenues, from the 25th March to the 25th September 1777.

Immediately on the receipt of the Honourable Board's Letter, we ſignified to all the Zemindars dependant on this Settlement, your order to them to proceed to the Preſidency without loſs of time. We repreſented to them reſpectively, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the neceſſity of an implicit acquieſcence on their part, and the danger of incurring your diſpleaſure, by ſhewing any reluctance to obey your commands; which we informed them, agreeably to your deſire, would be enforced in caſe your orders ſhould not meet with a ready compliance.

We have not yet received replies from *Tugganaut Deo*, nor from his Dewan *Arzebeg*, neither have we heard from *Tugga Deo*; but we have no reaſon to apprehend any delay on their part.

Viziaram Rauze, in a Letter to Mr. *Davidſon* of the 17th inſtant, acquaints him, that he ſhould leave *Boney* the 24th inſtant; and we are informed that he intends ſetting out from *Vizagapatam* for the Preſidency the 28th inſtant. The Rajah has not ſhewn any reluctance to act conformably to the Orders received from the Government.

Juggarauze, the Company's Dubaſh, will leave this in a few days, and will probably arrive at *Madras* ſome time before *Viziaram Rauze*.

Captain *Lyſaght* has received orders to hold himſelf in readineſs with two Companies of his Battalion to eſcort *Viziaram Rauze* to *Madras*.

Advertiſements were, on the receipt of your Letter, ſent to *Chicacole*, and publiſhed at this place, for letting out the Honourable Company's farms for a period of five, eight, or ten years, commencing from the firſt inſtant. Whatever propoſals we may receive, ſhall be tranſmitted to you for your information; we ſhall likewiſe ſend you an account of the character and circumſtances of each perſon who may bid for the Company's farms.

Conformably to your orders, we have ſignified to the Company's Servants, and other Europeans in this Diſtrict, your having been pleaſed to revoke the permiſſion formerly granted to them, of bidding for the Company's farms.

We are, reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble Servants,
Alex' Davidſon,
Hy Crawford,
Nath' Barlow,
Chas Maxtone.

Vizagapatam,
22d April 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 22.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 9th September 1777.

Extract of a Letter from the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*, to the Governor and Council at *Fort Saint George*.

WHEN the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* came here on the 17th inſtant, exclaimed againſt *Sitteram Rauze*'s intrigues, and imputed to them all his misfortunes. As a proof of his contrition, and of his abhorrence of this wicked man's projects, he gave, under his hand, an account of the ſchemes which he, *Sitteram Rauze*, had projected, to carry him amongſt the hills, and raiſe diſturbances; he requeſted that *Sitteram Rauze*, and the evil-diſpoſed people which were with him, might be ſeized, as he had information they had fled from *Viziaram Rauze*, and were carrying off his money and effects; he fully exculpated *Jaggernaut Rauze*, and acknowledged he had given him an acquittal of all demands, (Tranſlation of which is N° 16); and therefore would directly make full reſtitution of all he had taken from him. He alſo acknowledged he had granted *Boney* and its dependencies to the ſon of *Jaggernaut Rauze* (*Jumpana Vencata Veziaram*) for ever, in the manner engraved on a copper-plate, (of which we ſend an exact Tranſlation, N° 17;) and we hope it will appear to you, as it does to us, an irrevocable grant, conceived in the ſtrongeſt terms which could be made uſe of for this purpoſe. The Rajah further acknowledged his having bound himſelf by an Inſtrument (of which we incloſe a Tranſlation, N° 18) to grant ſundry villages, on the conditions therein recited, to *Jaggernaut Rauze*. The Rajah alſo allowed, that he had given *Jumpana Padnat Rauze* an acquittal of all demands, previous to his having confined him; and in ſame writing made to him a grant of three villages, as particulariſed in his Sanad, a Tranſlation of which comes herewith, N° 19. We repreſented to the Rajah, that, to regain the Company's favour and protection, it was neceſſary not only to make reſtitution to thoſe he had unjuſtly deſpoiled of their property, but alſo to diſband his Forces, and admit a garriſon of the Company's Troops into *Vizianagrum*, without any ſtipulation of not being ſtationed in all parts of it. We further remonſtrated, that he ſhould ſpeedily diſcharge the large balance of 3 lacks and 11,000 Rupees he owes to the Company, and pay the amount of all charges incurred by the Company, for the preparations made by them to enforce obedience to their commands. To all theſe conditions he aſſented; and had not other proſpects opened, would, we are convinced, have ſpeedily fulfilled. But no ſooner did he receive the Preſident's Letter by the *Coventry*, than he began to adopt new meaſures, and to evade the performance of all he had before promiſed to us: He no longer conſidered us as capable of rendering him any ſervices, but paid all poſſible attention to Colonel *Braithwaite*. The morning after the *Coventry*'s arrival, the Chief ſent for the Rajah, and endeavoured to perſuade him to fulfil his engagements, which were founded on equity, conſiſtent with the Company's honour and dignity, and greatly to their intereſt; but to all theſe demands he gave evaſive anſwers, without concluding on any thing, although the Chief urged him to give an explicit reply. The next morning he thought proper to wait on the Colonel before he viſited the Chief; and when he came, it was ſo late, there was a neceſſity for ſeeing him again in the evening, to ſpeak to him relative to the impediments which had juſt been given to the Committee of Circuit, as recited in a Letter from Meſſrs. *Perring* and *Holland* to the Chief, copy of which comes herewith, N° 20. We were alſo deſirous of receiving from him ſome information relative to the plan he muſt have laid, for the management of his Country during his abſence; who were to be his managers and receivers;

APPENDIX No. 22.

how he propoſed to prevent the Hill People from availing themſelves of his abſence, by making incurſions, and laying waſte the Country; when and how the Company's large balance was to be paid; and whether he had prevailed on the Soucars to make the neceſſary advances for cultivation, and other contingent expences, during his abſence. But on his return to the Chief, at ſix o'clock the ſame evening, he again evaded ſatisfactory anſwers to any one of theſe important queſtions. The Chief plainly perceived he relied on the permiſſion he had received to proceed to *Madras*, and the ſupport he flattered himſelf he ſhould receive from Colonel *Braithwaite*, in complying with no other requiſition than that of diſbanding his Troops, and permitting our Forces to take poſſeſſion of the gates of *Vizianagrum*; he told him, he might proceed to *Vizianagrum* whenever he thought proper; and the Rajah ſet out that night.

We have thus minutely recited all that has paſſed ſince the arrival of your Orders of the 15th inſtant, that we may ſtand exculpated for any delay in their execution, as we hope it will appear to you we detained the Rajah no longer than was abſolutely neceſſary to obtain the requiſite information on ſubjects of the higheſt importance; and thus, as our endeavours have proved fruitleſs, we ſhall not be conſidered in a ſhape reſponſible for the conſequences. We entertain not the ſmalleſt doubt, but you have good and ſufficient reaſons for giving Colonel *Braithwaite* authority to act without controul on this occaſion; and if we feel the leſs concern, from our conſciouſneſs of having fully executed our duty during this diſpute with the Rajah, yet we cannot but lament that thereby the Civil Authority has been greatly weakened, and we apprehend it will be attended with worſe conſequences than we can at preſent foreſee. If what Colonel *Braithwaite* advances in his Letter of the 25th inſt. N° 10, be true, That a Civil Chief reſiding in one of the Honourable Company's Forts, cannot with propriety iſſue any military orders, or exerciſe any military authority whatſoever, the conſequence of a Chief muſt be thereby leſſened conſiderably; and it appears to us inconſiſtent that he ſhould keep the keys of the Garriſon, give out the parole, and order ſalutes. The Chief's anſwer to Colonel *Braithwaite* will evince how deſirous he is to avoid diſputes, and the actual neceſſity there was for requiring his Orders to be iſſued. In conſequence of the powers granted to Colonel *Braithwaite*, the majority of the People have imbibed a notion, that his authority is much greater than his rank entitles him to; and we are convinced, that both the Rajah and *Sitteram Rauze* entertain this opinion.

When you granted the Rajah and *Sitteram Rauze* permiſſion to proceed to the Preſidency, we apprehend you did not advert to the conſequences, which it is probable will reſult from their leaving this Diſtrict, eſpecially as *Jaggernaut Rauze* has declared he never will again undertake the management of the Rajah's affairs: We therefore beg leave to enumerate ſome of thoſe evils, which may be apprehended from this meaſure.

The ſeaſon for reaping will ſoon approach, when it is probable the Hill People will take this favourable opportunity for ruſhing down, carrying away the grain, and deſtroying all before them; the Marattas may alſo make an incurſion in November, as they have received ſuch frequent invitations from *Sitteram Rauze*, and it is probable will not be diſpleaſed to find his brother and him abſent. During the Rajah's abſence, the Soucars will not advance any money; the Company's Kiſts will become due, and his debts be ſo increaſed, that it is probable he will not be able to diſcharge it for many years. The large ſum he owes to individuals will remain undiſcharged, and the greateſt diſtreſs be brought on many families. The continual diſturbances occaſioned by his abſence, will deter the weavers from ſettling to their work; and therefore our Inveſtment muſt be greatly impeded, if not totally ſtopped, as our Merchants will not advance the money without having ſome proſpect of receiving the cloth; and even on the report of the Rajah's intentions, they begin to expreſs their apprehenſions.

Bima Beopity (late Zemindar of *Golconda*) has got poſſeſſion of his Country, although the Rajah has not thought proper to acquaint us with this circumſtance; and it is very probable Rajah *Donah* (late Zemindar of *Totapilly*) notwithſtanding the protection and friendſhip the Rajah has ſo recently ſhewn him, may ſeek for a ſettlement near the hills, or plunder the country contiguous to them. The oppreſſions and exactions of *Sitteram Rauze* have created him many enemies, who now ſeeing him ſo cloſely connected with the Rajah, may conſider them as one, and revenge their cauſe at ſo favourable an opportunity.

We conceive that the buſineſs of the Committe of Circuit is an object, which both our Honourable Employers and you, Gentlemen, deem of the greateſt conſequence; and therefore we ſubmit to your conſideration, if the Committee have met with ſo many obſtructions and ſtudied delays in the execution of their buſineſs, even whilſt the Rajah is preſent, how many more may they reaſonably ſuppoſe may be created, when he ſhall be abſent. We will not venture to aſſert, that the buſineſs of the Committee in this Diſtrict muſt be ſuſpended until his return; whereas, if he remains, the Chief is of opinion the inveſtigation of his Zemindary may be accompliſhed in three months from hence, and a Report made by the Committee, which will aſcertain his tribute in future; by which it is probable the Company will gain above two lacks in the two firſt Kiſts, and this they muſt unavoidably loſe for next Kiſts, if the enquiry is impeded or ſuſpended. We ſhould too far tranſgreſs on your time, were we to write more diffuſely on this ſubject; and we flatter ourſelves, we have ſaid ſufficient to convince you there is an apparent neceſſity for your giving immediate orders, that the Rajah ſhall remain in this Diſtrict, and even if he be ſet out before your commands can reach him, that he be poſitively directed to ſpeedily return. As to *Sitteram Rauze*, his abſence will be highly pleaſing to all degrees of people; and we cannot help expreſſing our ſincere wiſh, that he may never be permitted to return, as we are fully perſuaded this is the only means of keeping this Circar in perfect tranquillity.

We ſhould not conſider ourſelves fully juſtified, if we did not thus explicitly repreſent what may, and probably will, reſult from the Rajah's being permitted to go ſo very far from his Zemindary; at the ſame time we beg leave to aſſure you, nothing ſhall be wanting on our parts to avert the conſequences we apprehend, and that we ſhall keep you conſtantly adviſed of every occurrence which happens.

The Chief requeſts we will expreſs his concern at a paragraph in your Letter of the 16th inſtant, which ſeems to ſuggeſt that a private antipathy ſubſiſts between the Rajah and him. He aſſerts, that he never had any difference with the Rajah, except when he ſaw that he was deficient in reſpect for his public character; and that he thought it incumbent on him to aſſert the dignity and honour of his employers, whoſe Repreſentative he is, by reminding the Rajah of his duty, and the relation in which he ſtands to the Company, to whom he is tributary. This was doctrine, he believes, the Rajah was little accuſtomed to, and therefore, perhaps, ſometimes liſtened to it with diſguſt; but he declares there never was any difference of a private nature, and appeals to the public Records for the favourable manner in which the Rajah is mentioned, even on occaſions where an opening was given for cenſure, had he been ſo inclined. He is ſorry to obſerve the Rajah's late behaviour towards him, though he ſtill will do him the juſtice to declare he thinks he has a good heart, and might manage his Zemindary with reputation, were he freed from the pernicious Councils of *Sitteram Rauze*, who acts on his fears, and renders him entirely ſubſervient to his inſidious ſchemes.

We earneſtly requeſt you will immediately anſwer this Addreſs, and determine relative to the Rajah's departure

for

for *Madras*, as we flatter ourſelves you will ſee the conſequence in the light we have repreſented, and order him to remain in this Diſtrict.

We are, reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
Samuel Johnſon,
M. Williams,
Henry Crawford,
Nath. Barlow.

Vizagapatam,
30th Auguſt 1777.

APPENDIX, No. 23.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 13th January 1778.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

WE have been honoured with your Letter of the 27th ultimo, incloſing one from the Honourable Preſident to the Rajah *Viziaramrauze*, which was immediately forwarded to him, conformably to your directions.

As your Honour, &c. are of opinion nothing concluſive can be determined upon the ſubjects contained in our Letter of the 6th ulto. unleſs the Rajah waited on you perſonally, to give ſuch information as may be required regarding them; we have been very urgent with him in this particular, and pointed out to him the inconvenience which might attend his affairs, ſhould he on any account evade your orders; in ſhort, nothing has been wanting on our part, to induce the Rajah to undertake this journey: But we are ſorry to inform your Honour, &c. of his determination to the contrary, concerning which, we ſuppoſe, he has been very particular in his Anſwer to the Honourable Preſident's Letter, which comes herewith incloſed. He has likewiſe repreſented to us his reaſons for not going up to the Preſidency; which are theſe: That the Hill People from *Madagloo* and *Gulgunda*, in the intereſt of *Kiſtna* and *Bira Boopely*, have lately made diſturbances in thoſe Countries, with an intention to burn the villages, and deſtroy or carry off the grain. His great debt to individuals, which he is incapable of paying off, or any part thereof, from his loſs of credit with the Soucars, who have in general entertained a notion that the Honourable Board will never reſtore him to his ancient reſidence, and of courſe are apprehenſive his affairs are in ſuch a predicament, as will involve him in difficulties that he cannot extricate himſelf from. He is full of fears and apprehenſions, that during his abſence, all the Hill People will deſtroy his Country, which he at preſent keeps in ſome order, by negociation with ſome of their Head Men or Chiefs. He is, wherewithal, ſo ſuperſtitious, which is the characteriſtic of the Gentoos, that he is led to think it will be impoſſible to recover his ancient family habitation, without he is continually employed in ſupplication to his Deity, for the Company's favour and protection, for which purpoſe he is encamped near the Pagoda, on the Hill of *Sumachilum*, and means not, as it is reported, to quit it before your Honour, &c. reſtore to him his Fort of *Vizianagrum*; which circumſtance, although founded in ignorance and ſuperſtition, we hope will merit ſome degree of attention from the Honourable Board; particularly as the Rajah aſſures us, he will ſettle with us any reaſonable tribute on account of the Company, ſhould you think it proper to order him to negociate with us about this buſineſs, which is of ſo much importance to the Honourable Company's intereſt.

As *Jagernautrauze*, the manager of the *Sallaveram* Zemindary, will, in the courſe of the preſent month, pay in the balance due on the Cowle granted to the late Rajah *Pyakerow*, his brother-in-law, we wait for your directions about the diſpoſal of the balance of the collections, ſhould there be any from the *Ancapillee* country, which had been mortgaged for ſome years paſt to the Rajah of *Vizinagrum*, and guaranteed to him by the Honourable Board in Mr. *Du Pre's* Government. From a full perſuaſion it was never the intention of the late adminiſtration that *Jagernautrauze* ſhould take to himſelf, for his own uſe, or that of the Company, the balance due on the collections made by him from the mortgaged lands, the Rajah claimed the balance remaining after the Company's tribute and charges of collections are paid; we have informed him, that juſtice in this and every other reſpect will be done him, although we could not take upon ourſelves to direct *Jagernautrauze* to pay him any money from the *Ancapillee* collections without your orders. Now we are on the ſubject of the *Ancapillee* country, we beg leave, at the earneſt deſire of *Jagernautrauze*, to requeſt your Honour, &c. will come to a deciſive determination about his claim to this Zemindary; and in conſequence of his offer of increaſing the tribute from ſixty-five to one hundred thouſand Rupees per annum, which we humbly think is for the preſent a *conſiderable* increaſe to the Company's revenue; and after the *Ankapillee* mortgage is paid off, it could then be further increaſed, for *Jagernautrauze* will engage, in a certain period of time, to diſcharge the debt due to the Rajah from the mortgaged country; out of which, nothing can ever be collected for the Company, if the Rajah is allowed to be the manager and collector. This appears to us to be plainly the caſe, for the debt, inſtead of being decreaſed, is increaſed from three to ſeven lacks of Rupees in a few years, which is ſtill accumulating, from the heavy intereſt paid thereon, and never can be leſſened in any other manner than by *Jagernautrauze's* liquidating the debt with the Rajah; becauſe it appears the annual intereſt on the principal, is nearly, if not more than the whole produce of the revenues of *Ankapilly* amounts to, after all charges of the collections are deducted. The harveſt time is approaching faſt, when it is expected there will be freſh diſputes between the Rajah and the Company's manager, about the produce of the mortgaged lands, which, we preſume, might be prevented, ſhould your Honour, &c. come to a ſpeedy determination, whether *Jagernautrauze*, or the Rajah, ſhall have *Ankapillee*, or whether this Zemindary ſhall be converted into Havelly lands, and the Company made anſwerable for the heavy debt due to *Viziaramrauze*. Your Honour, &c. are the beſt judges what is proper for the Company's intereſt, we ſhall therefore only beg permiſſion to obſerve, that the Rajah has expreſſed his wiſh, that *Jagernautrauze* might have the Zemindary, as he has not only promiſed, in caſe of ſucceeding thereto, to be reſponſible for the large debt due to him from the late *Pyakerow*, but will engage to allow a decent maintenance for the deceaſed's relations. We do not doubt but your Honour, &c. will be well pleaſed to find that *Viziaramrauze* has no thought of increaſing his territories, by putting in a claim for *Ankapilly*, on account of his large mortgage on it; indeed, we are glad for this reaſon, as we were informed by the late adminiſtration, that it was the Company's poſitive orders, the aſſumed power of this Rajah's family ſhould be leſſened, and not by any means increaſed.

We are with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servants,
M. Williams,
Hr Crawford,
Nath' Barlow.

Vizagapatam,
24th December 1777.

The Preſident alſo lays before the Board the following tranſlation of a Letter, which he has received from *Viziaram Rauze.*

Tranſlation

APPENDIX. No. 23.

(Tranſlation.)

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

The Chief and Council have ſent to me your favour, and I obſerve the contents thereof. You ſay you have mentioned the purport of the Letter I lately wrote to you, in the Board, and that you have received a Letter from the Council of this place, in which you ſay they have mentioned my requeſts; and alſo you ſay, that the Company is full of juſtice, and the people that are under their protection will not want aſſiſtance, and that I might be eaſy about it, of which I am very glad. I expected your anſwer to my Letter of congratulation ſince your arrival at *Madras*. Your favour which I now received, I eſteem it as if I had ſeen you in perſon, my joy for which is inexpreſſible. *Jaggernaut Rauze* intends to come to you in a few days, when I ſhall alſo ſend my Vakeel, *Keſtnagee*, to accompany him with *my preſents* to you: they will ſoon arrive with you, and addreſs concerning all my applications. As the Honourable Company were our protectors from the time of our anceſtors, we have always with reverence obeyed their commands. *In September laſt* George Stratton, *Eſq. then Governor, wrote Letters, deſiring me to come to* Madras *at any rate*; in conſequence of which I did ſet out, and arrived at *Rajamohandrem*, though it was againſt my will, thinking my abſence would be attended with bad conſequences to my Zemindaries. When I was informed that Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Perring*, in their way to *Madras*, would call there, I waited for them to take their advice: I informed them of all my affairs; on which they adviſed me to return to my country. After my arrival here, I have paid to the Company one lack and fifty thouſand Rupees, by a draft on the Soucar; I am yet to make payments to the Company; and alſo *it is now the time of harveſt, my whole attention is on theſe buſineſſes, as the Company* obliged me to diſmiſs my own Troops, and put their Troops into the fort of *Vizianagaram*, and no regard was ſhewn to me. *Kiſtnah Booputty* of *Modugul*, *Colacona*, *Boyerawa*, *Booputty*, and ſome others with them, have taken poſſeſſion of ſome part of my mountain places, and thoſe places that they could not take they have ſet on fire, of which I have informed the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*, who have been ſo good as to ſend a battalion of Sepoys to *Modugul*. I have again made my application to them for another battalion of Sepoys, as the firſt was not ſufficient; I doubt not but that they already informed you of it. Lately I have wrote to you concerning my preſent circumſtances, on which you deſired me to come to *Madras* myſelf; I had not any objection againſt it, *but I beg leave to inform you, that I muſt unavoidably diſcharge my debt to the Soucar, in procuring a draft in favour of the Company, and I have yet to pay the Company's payments entirely; and the diſturbances in my country have not as yet ſubſided; which, againſt my will, prevents me from coming to you.* *Jagannaut Rawze* is the Company's ſervant, and always ſtudies the Company's intereſt; he is perfectly acquainted with the nature of our Zemindary and the rules thereof, and there is not a better man than him; I have requeſted him to go to you on my buſineſs, and promiſed him that I ſhall approve of what he agrees to about my buſineſs; and alſo I intend to ſend in company with him my Vakeel *Kiſtnagee*, and my Muſnoondar or accountant; he will anſwer you every queſtion for me. I am ſorry to obſerve to you of my being much diſtreſſed for want of money, and the fort of *Vezianagarum* is not in my poſſeſſion, and my country is diſturbed. *Jaggannaut Rauze* is not in my ſervice; my brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, is very ſenſible of the troubles and difficulties I labour under; and his not pleading my cauſes convinces me that he wiſhes for my fall. I have a brotherly affection for him! When he did deliver the management of my country into my poſſeſſion, he requeſted me to allow him five thouſand Rupees per month, but I allowed him at the rate of ten thouſand Rupees per month, and always endeavoured to pleaſe him; but he wiſhes my ruin. As I am not in poſſeſſion of *Vizianagarum*, the Soucars and my other ſubjects do not eſteem me as if I had any Zemindary. I dare ſay your reaſon for not letting me have my fort is, you think that I would not agree to increaſe the Jemmabundy; I ſhall allow the ſame as others Circars do. As you are a Gentleman of great knowledge, I will not dwell long on the ſubject; I beg you will favour me with my fort. In that caſe the Soucars will put their confidence in me. Although I allow ten thouſand Rupees per month to my brother *Sitteram Rauze*, he is not contented with it, but is forming various contrivances; whatever ſum I may allow him is out of the Company's money. I hope you and the Members of your Council will take it into your conſideration; I will comply with your pleaſure about it. The troubles I have here, and the loſs I ſuſtained, you will underſtand more fully by the Letter from the Chief and Council. I hope you will ſhew me great favour, and write me often of your welfare; I ſhall in two or three days anſwer the private Letter. I write this that you may have knowledge of it.

23d December 1777.

As *Viziaramrauze* has in this Letter declined coming to *Madras*, and informs us of his having deputed *Jaggernautrauze* to act concluſiveiy on his behalf; Agreed, That his ſeveral requeſts, as well as the matters contained in the Letter from *Vizagapatam* which relate thereto, be deferred until the arrival of *Jaggernautrauze*; and that in the mean time theſe Letters do lie upon the table for further conſideration.

APPENDIX, No. 24.

THE Preſident acquaints the Board, That *Sitteramrauze*, who arrived here ſome time ago from *Vizagapatam*, has lately applied to him for permiſſion to deliver in propoſals for rendering the Havelly lands dependant upon that Settlement; and as the Committee of Circuit have alſo acquainted us, in their Letter of the 10th September, of their having received ſome propoſals for that farm; it is agreed, That Friday be appointed for taking the whole into conſideration.

APPENDIX, No. 25.

THE Preſident acquaints the Board, That having, ſince the ſhort time he has been here, found his time and attention wholly taken up with the buſineſs of the Civil and Military Departments; and underſtanding that ſome important matters in the Revenue branch had engaged the Board at the time of his arrival, which he has not yet had an opportunity of underſtanding ſufficiently to enable him to paſs an opinion upon them, particularly ſuch as relate to the appointment of a Committee of Circuit, and the affairs of the Chicacole Circar; he requeſts the Board will defer entering upon theſe ſubjects until after the diſpatch of the *Duke of Kingston*, by which time he hopes to be able to inform himſelf fully concerning them, and will be ready to join with the other Members of Council in bringing them to a final deciſion. General *Munro* alſo takes this occaſion of expreſſing the ſame doubts as are entertained by the Preſident; and therefore wiſhes thoſe matters may be deferred for the reaſons he has juſt given.—Agreed accordingly, and that this be taken notice of, in our Letter by the *Duke of Kingston* from this Department, to account for the inattention

which would otherwiſe appear to have been ſhewn to this branch of the Company's affairs.

(Signed) *Tho' Rumbold,*
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam' Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 26.

Extract *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 15th April 1778.

SENT by Tappies the following Letters to *Ganjam* and *Maſulipatam:*

To Mr. *Morgan Williams*, Chief, &c. Council at *Ganjam.*

Gentlemen,

Having judged it expedient for the preſent to diſcontinue the appointment of a Committee of Circuit, and having reſolved that the annual rent or Jemmabundy of the ſeveral diſtricts of the Northern Circars ſhall in future be ſettled at the Preſidency, we direct that you do ſignify to all the Zemindars dependant upon your Settlement, and to the Muſmedars of the reſpective countries under them, That it is our order they proceed hither for this purpoſe, without loſs of time; and alſo, that *Bali Kiſtnah*, the Company's Dubaſh or Interpreter, who has generally been employed on the buſineſs of the revenue under *Ganjam*, be directed to repair to the Preſidency.

And, in order more effectually to enſure a compliance with this Reſolution, our Preſident has been deſired to write ſeparate Letters upon this occaſion to each of the Zemindars; a copy of which is herewith tranſmitted for your information. You will alſo repreſent to them reſpectively, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the neceſſity of an implicit acquieſcence on their part, and the danger of incurring our diſpleaſure, by ſhewing the ſmalleſt reluctance or unwillingneſs to obey our commands, which muſt be enforced in caſe they ſhould not meet with a ready compliance.

As we are ſenſible of the many advantages to be expected from letting out the Company's lands on long leaſes, we have reſolved to extend the term of thoſe under your Settlement, as the preſent leaſes may occaſionally expire; we have therefore thought proper to reject the ſeveral propoſals for renting the aſſigned villages of *Callicoute*, which we deſire you will ſignify to the perſons who made them to you; and we direct, that advertiſements be iſſued for receiving ſeparate propoſals for renting theſe lands, for a period of five, eight, or ten years, commencing from the 1ſt ulto.

We doubt not, that in conſequence of our augmenting the term, the value of this farm will be conſiderably increaſed; and we deſire, that whatever propoſals you receive, may be ſent to us for our conſideration.

Having thought proper to revoke the permiſſion granted to the Company's ſervants, and other Europeans living under the Company's licence, to bid for their farms, as expreſſed in our Letter of the 15th June 1775, we deſire that this Reſolution may be made public at the ſame time that you iſſue the advertiſements before-mentioned.

As the Company's farms will thus by degrees fall again into the hands of the Natives of *India*, it will become neceſſary for you to be more attentive to the ſecurities required of ſuch perſons as may be hereafter put in poſſeſſion of them, and ſtill more ſo from the conſideration of the leaſes being extended, which renders it an article of ſo much the more importance; we deſire, therefore, that you will be very careful in this particular, and that you will alſo make it a rule in future to ſend us an account of the character and circumſtances of each perſon who may bid for any of the Company's farms, and whether ſuch perſon is any way connected, either directly or indirectly, with any ſervant of the Company, or other European reſiding under their licence or protection, that we may not be in danger of giving the preference to propoſals in any reſpect exceptionable.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,

Fort St. George, 15 April 1778.

Tho' Rumbold,
&c. Council.

APPENDIX, No. 27.

Extract *Fort Saint George* Conſultations, the 15th April 1778.

To Mr. *Anthony Sadlier*, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam.*

Gentlemen,

HAVING judged it expedient, for the preſent, to diſcontinue the appointment of a Committee of Circuit; and having reſolved, that the annual rent or Jemmabundy of the ſeveral diſtricts of the Northern Circars, ſhall in future be ſettled at the Preſidency; we direct, that you do ſignify to all the Zemindars dependant upon your ſettlement, and the Muſmedars of the reſpective countries under them, that it is our order they proceed hither for this purpoſe, without loſs of time; and alſo, that *Vencataroyaloo*, the Company's Dubaſh or Interpreter, who has generally been employed on the buſineſs of the revenue under *Maſulipatam*, be directed to repair to the Preſidency.

And, in order more effectually to enſure a compliance with this Reſolution, our Preſident has been deſired to write ſeparate Letters upon this occaſion to each of the Zemindars, a copy of which is herewith tranſmitted for your information. You will alſo repreſent to them reſpectively, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the neceſſity of an implicit acquieſcence on their part, and the danger of incurring our diſpleaſure, by ſhewing the ſmalleſt reluctance or unwillingneſs to obey our commands, which muſt be enforced in caſe they ſhould not meet with a ready compliance.

Having thought proper to revoke the permiſſion granted to the Company's ſervants, and other Europeans living under our licence, to bid for their farms, as expreſſed in our Letter of the 15th June 1775; we deſire that this Reſolution may be made public throughout your ſettlement, and the diſtricts dependant thereon.

As the Company's farms will thus by degrees fall again into the hands of the Natives of *India*, it will become neceſſary for you to be more attentive to the ſecurities required of ſuch perſons as may hereafter be put in poſſeſſion of them, and ſtill more ſo, from the conſideration of the leaſes being extended, as they probably will be, which renders it an article of ſo much the more importance; we deſire, therefore, that you will be very careful in this particular; and that you will alſo make it a rule in future to ſend us an account of the character and circumſtances of each perſon who may bid for the Company's farms, and whether ſuch perſon is any way connected, either directly or indirectly, with any ſervant of the Company, or other European reſiding under their licence or protection, that we may not at any time be in danger of giving the preference to propoſals in any reſpect exceptionable.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,

Fort Saint George, 15 April 1778.

Tho' Rumbold,
&c.

APPENDIX. No. 28.

APPENDIX, No. 28.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 27th March 1778.

THE Preſident lays before the Board the following draft of a Letter, which he propoſes may be ſent to each of the Circar Zemindars, purſuant to a Reſolution of laſt Conſultation; as alſo a draft of one to *Viziaramrauze*.

Copy of the Governor's Letter to the Circar Zemindars, dated the 4th April 1778.

As the affairs of the Company require that the Jemmabundy, and the adjuſting of other matters, ſhould be ſettled at the Preſidency, you are directed to proceed to *Madras* with all poſſible expedition. You will not require many attendants, or to put yourſelf to much expence on this occaſion; the Company's protection will be ſufficient: and you may reſt aſſured, that the meaſure of ſettling your affairs immediately with the Government, is intended to remove all difficulties from you, and to enſure ſtability and happineſs to your country. As you regard your own ſituation with the Company, you will make no delay, but proceed immediately to ſettle your buſineſs here, and receive the Company's favour and protection.

Copy of the Governor's Letter to *Viziaramrauze*, dated April 1778.

I have had the pleaſure to receive the ſeveral Letters you have wrote me ſince I have taken charge of this Government; and as I am very deſirous to reſtore peace and order to your country, which has ſo lately been full of diſturbances and trouble, the Government here have thought proper to direct you immediately, and without loſs of time, to proceed to *Madras*, where, upon your ready compliance with this order, you will meet with all favour and protection. If you had come when you was before wrote to, all your buſineſs would by this time have been ſettled, and you would now have been in the quiet poſſeſſion of your country. Be careful not to evade a ſecond time the orders you receive. I recommend to you by no means to put yourſelf to any great expence, or to come up with too many attendants; they are unneceſſary here. This is the ſeat of juſtice, and the Company's protection is ſufficient. Two companies of Sepoys are ordered to attend you, under the command of Captain *Lyſaght*, who has directions to ſhew you all proper attention. As you value your own welfare, ſhew an immediate readineſs to comply with this requeſt of the Company. A proper houſe will be ready for your reception here. Eſteem me as your Friend. What can I ſay more?

Approved, and ordered to be ſent accordingly.

APPENDIX, No. 29.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 15 May 1778.

AS the departure of the Zemindars, &c. to the Preſidency at this time, leaves us little room to hope that they will be able to negociate bills with their Soucars, ſo that we may receive any conſiderable part of the heavy Kiſts now due from them during their abſence, which otherwiſe we were in expectation they would have accounted for in full, they having been ordered, and many of them having actually repaired hither for that purpoſe, we judge it expedient that your Honour, &c. ſhould be made acquainted with the preſent ſituation of the Settlement; and for that end, now tranſmit you our proceedings relative thereto, together with a ſtatement of our probable receipts and monthly diſburſements; that being thus furniſhed with full information relative to our probable exigencies and reſources, you may be enabled to determine on ſuch meaſures as will be moſt effectual in relieving our diſtreſs, and promoting the ends you have in view.

We are, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Anth. Sadlier,
James Hodges,
John Peter Boileau,
Tho. Barnard,
Alex. Pringle.

APPENDIX, No. 30.

THE Preſident then delivers in the following Minute:

Having attentively peruſed the Letter from *Maſulipatam*, with the Conſultations, and account of probable receipts and diſburſements, I ſhall now proceed to offer a few remarks on them. The conduct of the Chief, Mr. *Sadlier*, on his firſt arrival there, in enquiring into the ſtate of the factory, the ſeveral balances due from the Zemindars, Soucars, and Renters, the cauſes for non-payment, and the forming an eſtimate of the probable receipts and diſburſements, with the view to every reſource for ſupplying the demands of the factory during the abſence of the Zemindars at the Preſidency, was certainly a meaſure very proper and neceſſary.

Having gone thus far, nothing more was wanting than to direct the Zemindars, in conſequence of the orders received, to repair to the Preſidency with all poſſible diſpatch, and to have endeavoured to prevail on them to pay in ſome part of their balances before their departure. The Letter wrote by the Chief to accompany the one wrote by me to the Zemindars, ſeems to enter more into the buſineſs than there was any occaſion for: he ſays, "In future you will know, that it is the intention of the "Governor and Council to ſettle the annual rent or "Jemmabundy of your ſeveral diſtricts at the Pre-"ſidency." This in ſome degree implies, that they were annually to repair here; which might be a great diſcouragement to them, and I believe is not the intention of any Member of this Board, but to ſettle the Jemmabundy for a length of time, and on ſuch a footing as may prevent ſuch heavy balances in future, as now appear due from them, from every oppreſſion and undue influence. It is with concern I find balances to ſo large an amount remain due from the Zemindars, the payment of which ought to have been enforced as they became due. There is one part of the extracts of the Conſultations of the 20th of April, that demand our particular notice. They agree to apprize the Zemindars of what will be expected from them on their arrival at *Madras*, without our ever having made known to them our expectations, or the plan we intend to purſue, as they particularly make uſe of the following expreſſions: "to find means during "their abſence to pay in to the Treaſury here, on account "of the heavy Kiſts now due from them, ſuch money *as* "*would otherwiſe have been received, had not the buſineſs* "*of the Jemmabundy been transferred to the Preſidency.*" It therefore remains for us to ſhew, that the mode we intend to adopt has not, as yet, by any means impeded the payment of the balances due; for our Letters ordering the Zemindars up here, had but juſt been received, and no ſteps taken in conſequence; but if we look to the adjuſtment of accounts in former years, I apprehend we ſhall find that the ſtated Kiſts have ſeldom been regularly complied with, and that large balances have been allowed to remain in the hands of the Zemindars, though ſuch Zemindars have been immediately under the eye and influence of the Northern Subordinate Councils. The

Letter from the Chief to the Zemindars, in conſequence of the Reſolution the Chief and Council came to, "to "apprize them of what would be expected from them," &c. &c. is certainly ill conſidered, for having made uſe of the following expreſſions in it; "ſuch money as would "otherwiſe *have been received, had not the buſineſs of this* "*Settlement been transferred to* Madras," gives the Zemindars an opportunity of making uſe of the ſame fineſſe in excuſe for not paying what is due from them; and accordingly Rajah *Trippetty Rauze*, in his anſwer to the Chief's Letter, dwells upon that part, and adds to it, on mentioning his balance, "*the Company would have re-* "*ceived that money to this time.*" On the whole, though the Gentlemen at *Maſulipatam* have iſſued our orders for the Zemindars to repair to the Preſidency, they have rather ſtarted difficulties than held forth encouragement for their coming; and at the concluſion of their Conſultations of the 2d of May, they give up all hopes of receiving any part of the balance due, previous to the departure of the Zemindars for *Madras*, merely in conſequence of the ſeveral Letters the Chief has received in anſwer to his, without any one good reaſon offered; for whoever is acquainted with the nature and conduct of the Zemindars throughout *Indoſtan*, muſt know it is their cuſtom to complain, and retard the payment of their Kiſts, though their countries are in ever ſo flouriſhing a condition; and I am perſuaded, from the great balances due, the Zemindars might, by management, be induced amongſt them to pay in ſuch a ſum, though not the whole of their debts, as would ſupply the exigencies of the factory during their abſence, which at moſt will not be above two months. The amount due from them is upwards of three lacks ſixty-eight thouſand Pagodas, and the diſburſements of the factory do not exceed thirty-three thouſand Pagodas monthly; and with what muſt be coming in from the Soucars and other reſources, the ſum of fifty thouſand Pagodas would amply ſupply every want and remove every difficulty; and as I ſee no way to ſettle the Circars, and provide againſt the riſk of ſuch balances being incurred in future, as well as to ſecure what is now due, but by hearing the Zemindars themſelves, letting the lands for a term of years, and by giving them redreſs in their grievances, I am of opinion the order ſhould be repeated to the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, to haſten the coming up of the Zemindars here, and that we ſhould take upon ourſelves to ſee the factory properly ſupplied with money for the purpoſes of the Inveſtment and current expences.

The Board, having attentively conſidered this Letter, together with the accompanying extracts from the Proceedings at *Maſulipatam*, and being perſuaded of the juſtneſs and propriety of the Preſident's remarks upon the occaſion, as ſet forth in his Minute hereinbefore entered, we cannot, without ſurpriſe, obſerve the delay which the Zemindars have ſhewn, in complying with our orders, by remaining at *Maſulipatam* ſo long after the receipt of our Letter of the 15th ultimo, notwithſtanding the earneſt and peremptory manner in which thoſe orders were conceived. Reſolved, That the Chief and Council be told to repeat to them our directions to ſet out immediately for the Preſidency.

The Board, recurring to that part of the extracts which relates to the balance due from *Narſiah Naik*, are concerned to obſerve the backwardneſs of that Soucar in performing the engagements he has entered into with the Gentlemen at *Maſulipatam*, on behalf of Zemindars, &c. dependant on that Settlement; and as it appears from their proceedings, as well as from their own repreſentation upon the ſubject, that this failure has ariſen, in a great meaſure, from the want of proper aſſiſtance from the principal Houſe of *Govindoſs*, at *Hydrabad*, it is reſolved, That the Preſident do call upon the Agent for that Houſe, now reſiding here, to exert himſelf upon the occaſion, towards ſupporting the credit of *Govindoſs*; and that a Letter be written to the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*, directing them to make a ſimilar application to the Gomaſtah at *Chicacole*.

As it does not appear from the extracts hereinbefore entered, that *Venkatareyaloo*, the Company's Dubaſh at *Maſulipatam*, has given the Gentlemen there any aſſurances of his ready obedience to our commands, nor that he has even been properly informed of them; it is reſolved, That the Chief and Council be directed not to delay any longer acquainting him therewith, repreſenting to him the neceſſity of his immediate departure for the Preſidency.

APPENDIX. No. 31.

APPENDIX, No. 31.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 20th July 1778.

READ the following Letter from *Maſulipatam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council at *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The multiplicity of buſineſs in which your late advices have engaged us engroſſing all our attention, we have not had time for ſome days paſt, for the conſideration of what remained to communicate, reſpecting the conduct of thoſe Zemindars and Tributaries, who, having received your orders to proceed to the Preſidency, have not hitherto ſhewn any actual obedience thereto; we embrace the opportunity of the firſt leiſure from attentions at this juncture more immediately neceſſary, to give you this communication.

The accompanying Paper (No. 1.) contains a liſt of all the Zemindars and Tributaries now remaining in theſe Circars, with every material circumſtance, ſtated under general heads, of their tribute or rents; and we now proceed to give you, in detail, ſuch other circumſtances relative to theſe perſons as could not be exhibited to you under a general view, but which we, at the ſame time, conſider as neceſſary for your complete information. In beginning this detail, it may not be altogether uſeleſs to premiſe, that the correſpondence of all theſe people, without exception, however contradicted by their conduct, offers nothing but repeated profeſſions of ſubmiſſion; it is, however, on a conſideration of their conduct, combined with that of their circumſtances, that the opinions we may in the courſe of this addreſs ſubmit to your Honour, &c. will be founded.

The firſt perſon whoſe name appears on the above liſt is the Zemindar of *Chintalapoondy*, *Toopallee Vencatarow*; he replied to our Chief's ſummons to repair to the Preſidency, by a requeſt, that on account of his diſtreſſed circumſtances, he might be permitted to remain. When he found, by a ſecond Letter addreſſed to him, that this could not be granted, he then promiſed compliance; but intimated at the ſame time, that this could not be very ſpeedy, for that *he ſhould find the greateſt difficulty in raiſing a ſum to defray the expences of his journey*, of which he could not better convince us, than by repreſenting, that even in his own country, and at his own home, he with difficulty provided for the current expences of his Family. We offer no remarks with reſpect to this perſon, the circumſtances related, in our judgment, requiring no comment.

It would be perfect waſte of time, to detain your Honour, &c. on the ſubject of the next perſon in the above liſt, the Zemindar of *Taluachartah*; it will be ſufficient to obſerve, that, like the others, he ſtill promiſes, and without delay, to repair to the Preſidency.

We proceed to thoſe of the joint Zemindars of *Zummalvoy* and *Madoore Guttoo*, for whom *Trippelly Rauze* of *Muglatore*, is ſecurity; namely, *Vallankey Gopautrow* and *Vencatarow*. They plead very ſtrongly the neceſſity they are under of continuing in their country, to provide for

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for the payment of what they owe to *Trippelly Rauze*, as well as the future cultivation of their country: This, and what we eſteem feigned promiſes of obedience, are the only reply our Chief has been able to get from them.

Vaſſereddy Ramanah, Zemindar of *Nandigamah:* This man is a conſiderable Tributary under *Bazalet Jung*, as Poſſeſſor of the *Guntoor* Circar; his Zemindary of *Nandigamah* being very much inferior to what he holds under *Bazalet Jung*, has been conſidered at all times ſince we have had the adminiſtration of theſe countries, with reſpect to intereſts, as a ſecondary object, and on that account, as well as that we have always found great punctuality in his payments, and that occaſionally he has even been a reſource to us, in becoming ſecurity for the tribute of countries from which, without his aid, we had little proſpect of obtaining it, he has hitherto been excuſed giving perſonal attendance at the time the other Zemindars have been aſſembled to ſettle their Jemmabundy; influenced, as we ſuppoſe, by theſe circumſtances, although he promiſes obedience to your orders, we judge, that unleſs he be compelled to alter his conduct, nothing more is to be expected from him than a repetition of theſe profeſſions. We ſhall have occaſion to make further mention of him in the next article.

The joint Zemindars of *Mylavaram*, *Sooranany*, *Narſirvarow*, and *Venkataramarow*. The country of theſe people is wild, woody, and uncultivated. The tribute of it has not only never been regularly paid, but has been ſeldom paid at all. In the month of March, laſt year, the above Zemindars fled their country, and took ſhelter with *Vaſſereddy Ramanah*. The protection thus given by him to ſubjects of this Government, who had abſconded only to avoid the payment of its juſt demands, and his perſiſting to hold this conduct, in contempt of all public authority, were conſidered as ſuch flagrant miſdemeanors, that upon a repreſentation thereof to the Preſidency, orders were received in laſt July to puniſh his delinquency by the ſequeſtration of his Zemindary of *Nandigamah*. A Tanadar was accordingly appointed, and put in charge of the revenues of the country; and it remained in that ſituation until the month of March in the preſent year. At this time the Vakeel of *Vaſſereddy Ramanah* was brought, by the means of *Venkatroyaloo*, our Interpreter, to make ſome overtures to the Chief, Mr. *Davidſon*; namely, that if his diſtrict ſhould be reſtored to him, he would not only become ſecurity for the arrears of the *Mylavaram* Zemindars, but if their country were likewiſe put into his poſſeſſion, and ſo continued for a term of years, and the Zemindars themſelves allowed to come to *Maſulipatam* with protection from their Creditors, that he would then bind himſelf for the payment of its future Jemmabundy ſo long as the country remained under his charge. The Council here conſidered theſe propoſals as ſo advantageous to the revenue, the Tanadars appointed in both the *Nandigamah* and *Mylaveram* Countries, although they had been in charge ſeveral months, not having been able to make any conſiderable collections, that, ſo far as their powers enabled them to act, they cloſed with them immediately. The ſudden death of the Vakeel of *Vaſſereddy Ramanah*, as he was on the point of departure to get the buſineſs completed by his Maſter, interrupted for a time the train of it; but the Son of the Vakeel engaging to proſecute it on the ſame plan, the Council perſevered in the meaſure, and the Tanadars and Sepoys, who had been almoſt an uſeleſs expence, were recalled from both countries. *Vaſſereddy Ramanah* has been at *Mylaveram*, and taken the neceſſary ſteps for ſecuring the collection of the revenues; and we ſhortly expect a Vakeel from him finally to adjuſt the above tranſaction. The uncertainty into which it fell, by the untoward circumſtance of the Vakeel's death at the moment every thing was concluded with him, was the reaſon no mention of it was made to your Honour, &c. at the time it happened; and we do not now ſtate the particulars of the agreement at length, conceiving it to be not improbable they may be altered when the matter comes to be diſcuſſed with the new Vakeel; they may be ſeen, however, by your Honour, &c. in our Conſultations of March, where they are recorded. The detail into which we have entered on the ſubject of the *Mylaveram* Country, will ſufficiently explain to you the conduct the Zemindars of it will probably hold, in conſequence of your orders for their proceeding to the Preſidency; to wit, That they will continue in their country, attending, in conjunction with *Vaſſereddy Ramanah*, to the buſineſs of it, if left unmoleſted, otherwiſe that they will again have recourſe to flight.

One of the *Bezoara* Zemindars has proceeded to the Preſidency, and the other, by name *Collavacollue Timmanarow*, is gone off. The Chief has received no Anſwer to any of his Letters to him, nor are we informed with certainty where he has taken ſhelter.

We have already made mention of two Zemindars of *Zumalvoy* and *Madoore Guttoo*, for whom *Tripetty Rauze*, of *Muglatore*, is ſecurity; there are two others, namely, *Vellunkey Mullarow* and *Sunjevarow*; theſe aſſured our Chief, in anſwer to his firſt ſummons, that as ſoon as they could raiſe money to defray their expences, they would ſet out for the Preſidency; but on the approach of ſome Sepoys we had required from *Condopillee* to quicken their departure, they have, within theſe few days, quitted their country, ſo that we have not any expectation of bringing them to comply with your orders. Their Tribute is inconſiderable, and themſelves poor.

Canjee Mahamed Ruffy, *Saddacally Cawn*, *Domadar Doſs*, and *Buchana Pundat*, paying only the ſmall ſums annexed to their names in the above liſt; it appeared we ſhould not conform to the ſpirit and true intent of your orders with reſpect to theſe people, in rigorouſly exacting a compliance with them; and therefore they have only been communicated without any attempt to enforce them. We ought not, perhaps, to omit obſerving, with reſpect to *Buchana Pundat*, that beſides being aged and infirm, he is our Perſian Interpreter, and that his place could not eaſily be ſupplied.

Having thus gone through the liſt of all the Zemindars and Tributaries remaining in theſe Circars, as contained in the Paper, No. 1, we have only to obſerve to your Honour, &c. that if our account of them ſhould not convey all the information you could wiſh, we muſt refer you for further particulars to our Interpreter, *Vincalaroyaloo*, at this time at the Preſidency: and having now taken every ſtep, which from the nature of your orders, commanding the attendance of the Zemindars at the Preſidency, we conceived to be proper, we conclude the ſubject by acquainting your Honour, &c. that we ſhall not proceed to further extremities in compelling the refractory Zemindars to obedience, without your expreſs orders.

The departure of the principal Zemindars from theſe countries leaving us deſtitute of pecuniary reſources, whilſt our demands of money not only continue, but are likely to increaſe, we find it neceſſary to make a particular repreſentation thereof; and we flatter ourſelves, that the ſupplies, which from the ſtatement that will now be laid before you, may appear to be neceſſary, will be granted as ſpeedily as the nature of ſuch buſineſs will admit. In the Paper, No. 2, we have exhibited to your Honour, &c. a view of all the balances now due to us, as in charge of this factory, and its dependencies. We have ſtated them under two general heads, that of balances we can depend upon, as immediately forthcoming, and that of balances on which no ſuch dependance can be placed; the greater part of the latter indeed are deſperate, and have for ſome time paſt been entered as ſuch on our books, where at any time hereafter circumſtances change with reſpect to any of theſe balances, care ſhall be taken duly to adviſe your Honour, &c. thereof, that your remittances may by that means be

proportioned

proportioned to our actual wants. The amount of balances now at command, or the payment of which we may depend upon when due, is, Rupees 16,750, *Madras* Pagodas 6,536. There is to add to this, the amount of Mint, Sea, and Land Cuſtoms, and the payments to be made by the different Managers of Farms, immediately under charge of the Chief and Council; the amount of the above Cuſtoms, eſtimated at what they produced monthly at the ſame period laſt year, will be, during the three ſucceeding months, Rupees 3,420 per month; and with reſpect to theſe Farms we are ſorry to obſerve, that the expected payments, of which we made mention to your Honour, &c. in the Extracts accompanying our Letter under date the 3d May, have, on account of the low price grain has borne in all parts of theſe diſtricts, failed in almoſt every inſtance; we find the utmoſt difficulty in procuring purchaſers for it at any price for which it can be offered. Having in the preceding paragraph given your Honour, &c. a ſketch of ſuch reſources as remain to us, we ſhall briefly mention the amounts of our ſeveral monthly demands, as nearly as they can at preſent be eſtimated: The civil and military diſburſements of the Paymaſters here, and in our Circars, 5,000 Rupees, and 10,000 Pagodas; the inveſtment at *Ingeram*, 16,000 Pagodas; penſion to the Family of *Huſſam Ally*, 8,500 Rupees nearly; we were the 25th of laſt month already in arrears 25,000 Rupees to them: And to the amount of theſe certain demands, ſome addition ought perhaps to be made, as a proviſion for any ſudden emergency.

We ſhall not preſume to propoſe to your Honour, &c. any ſpecific ſum as neceſſary for the ſupply of theſe our probable exigencies. We think we have diſcharged our duty in placing all the immediate, and, as far as we can judge, future circumſtances of our ſituation under your view; it will remain with you, after combining theſe with ſuch particulars as come within your knowledge, through your greater inſight and more extenſive information concerning the affairs of our Honourable Employers, to determine in what degree it may be expedient to ſupply our wants. We find it neceſſary, however, to intreat, that you will grant us ſome immediate aſſiſtance, without which, our Chief reports to us, all buſineſs muſt be ſoon at a ſtand; the balance now in his hands amounting to, in Pagodas, only 8,366 : 17 : 69.; in Rupees 79,574, and in Fannams 3,598 Pagodas. In this extremity we hope we ſhall ſtand excuſed to your Honour, &c. if we embrace the opportunity, ſhould ſuch an one preſent itſelf, of drawing bills on you, as far as may be neceſſary to anſwer our inſtant demands.

We are, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Anth. Sadlier,
James Hodges,
Tho' Barnard.

Maſulipatam,
11th July 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 32.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 12th June 1778.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Preſident,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.
Mr. *Rumbold* indiſpoſed.

MINUTES of laſt Conſultation read.

Read the following Letter from *Maſulipatam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your commands of the 15th inſtant.

It gives us concern to find, that your Honour, &c. ſhould have had occaſion to expreſs ſurpriſe at the delay the Zemindars have ſhewn in their departure to the Preſidency; and we beg leave to aſſure you, that it certainly has been our wiſh and endeavour to obtain the earlieſt compliance with the orders entruſted to us, and to prevent unneceſſary delay. If any has happened, it has not been by impediments cauſed by us; on the contrary, their departure has been required in the ſtrongeſt terms, and the moſt effectual means have been taken that we could deviſe, not only to inſure their obedience, but to promote the ſucceſs of the meaſures of Government; your orders have been again repeated, and as ſeveral of the Zemindars have already taken leave of us, we hope no further plea of delay will be urged by them. APPENDIX. No. 33.

With regard to the latter paragraphs of your commands, reſpecting *Vencataroyaloo*, we are ſorry to find, that the ſmall and undeſigned omiſſion in our Extracts, of mentioning him expreſsly by name, has been the cauſe of miſleading your Honour, &c. into an opinion, that your orders have not been properly communicated to him. Our Chief, in a Minute of the 6th ultimo, acquainted us, that he had delivered a Letter from the Governor to *Vencataroyaloo*, ordering him to *Madras*, and afterwards at another meeting that he had received *Vencataroyaloo*'s Anſwer, and tranſmitting the ſame to the Honourable the Preſident: but to remove all doubt, we yeſterday called *Vencataroyaloo* before us, who acknowledged to have received your orders, as we have already ſaid, and in conſequence, that he had been from that time preparing for his journey; that he had already ſent away part of his baggage, and propoſed to depart himſelf in two or three days; ſo that we hope he will arrive in time to prevent any diſappointment.

The following Zemindars and Tributaries have taken leave of this Government, in order to proceed to *Madras*, purſuant to your orders:

10th inſtant. { *Jaggerputty Rauze*, of *Peddapore*. / *Ramchunderauze*, of *Ramchundaporum*.

18th inſtant. { *Culdendee Trippetty Rauze*, of *Muglatore*. / *Mundapetty Trippetty Rauze*, of *Corcondah*. / *Opporow*, of *Noozeed*.

18th inſtant. { *Angra Bramajee*, *Kiſtna Deſmook*, and *Ramajee Banow*, Muſmedar of the Rajahamundry Circar, and *Veraſha Singum*, Deſpondah of Ellore Circar.

Opparow left this place this morning; but the others not yet having ſet out, although they have taken leave, we have thought it neceſſary to inform you particularly of it. As the others depart, your Honour, &c. ſhall be regularly adviſed.

We are, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Anthony Sadlier,
John Peter Beileau,
Tho' Barnard,
Alex' Pringle.

Maſulipatam,
21ſt May 1778.

APPENDIX, No. 33.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 12th June 1778.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

IN conſequence of your orders of the 15th ultimo, directing us to ſignify to the ſeveral Zemindars dependant on this Settlement, to proceed immediately to the Preſidency, in order to ſettle their Jemmabundys, we deſire the Chief to make known to them your Reſolution.

We have now the pleaſure to tranſmit to your Ho-

APPENDIX. No. 33.

nour, &c. copies of Letters (No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) from the Zemindars of *Callicoote*, *Chigutty*, *Vizianagur*, *Moberry*, and *Hautgur*, to the Chief, on the ſubject of your orders, together with Letters from thoſe Zemindars to the Preſident. We have not as yet received any Letter from *Jugganauldoo*, Rajah of *Pretapagherry*; when it comes to hand we ſhall not fail to diſpatch it immediately.

From the tenor of the Zemindars Letters to the Chief, as well as from our own knowledge, we are well aſſured of their inability, were they ever ſo well inclined, to proceed to the Preſidency at this juncture: And we ſhould hold ourſelves wanting in the duty we owe to your Honour, &c. did we not point out, to the beſt of our knowledge, the difficulties that would ariſe from ſuch a procedure. In the firſt place, we beg leave to make a ſtatement of the balances due to the Company from the Zemindars you have been pleaſed to order up to the Preſidency.

	Balance. P.	F.	C.		Annual Tribute. P.	F.	C.
From the Zemindar of *Callicoote*	45,997.	17.	22.	-	9,714.	20.	46.
D° - - D° - - - *Chigutty*	17,543.	25.	65.	-	10,000.	10.	23.
D° - - D° - - - *Viziangur*	19,242.	25.	57.	-	7,143.	5.	11.
D° - - D° - - - *Moberry*	20,000.	20.	45.	-	12,857.	15.	34.
D° - - D° - - - *Hautgur*	7,714.	20.	46.	-	10,571.	25.	57.
D° - - D° - - - *Pretapaghery*	11,406.	31.	36.	-	6,285.	25.	57.

As the Zemindars of *Callicoote*, *Chigutty*, *Viziangur*, and *Pretapaghery*, have already aſſigned over lands for the payment of their debts, no very material loſs to the Company would enſue from their going to the Preſidency; and we are convinced that theſe Zemindars would with cheerfulneſs proceed thither, were they in a capacity to defray the expences of ſo long a journey. But we can, with a degree of certainty, inform your Honour, &c. that theſe Zemindars, ſo far from being in a capacity to travel, are ſcarcely enabled to maintain their families with common decency at home.

The Zemindar of *Moberry*, in point of circumſtances, is altogether in the ſame predicament with the four abovementioned Zemindars, with the additional misfortune of his being afflicted with a diſorder which has totally deprived him of the uſe of his reaſon; on which account, the management of that Zemindary has devolved on the Rajah's mother. The balances due from this Zemindary are very conſiderable; yet, in juſtice, we muſt obſerve, that theſe balances have in a great meaſure ariſen from an over-rated Jemmabundy, it being one half of the whole revenue, under which hardſhip the country has laboured for theſe laſt ten years.

We have called the *Moberry* Pauter to *Ganjam*, and are now preſſing him for the payment of ſome part of his balance, which we hope to effect either by aſſignments or ſecurity; though we would much rather prefer the latter mode, having already experienced the pernicious conſequences of taking aſſignments; which, if taken in the preſent caſe, would be attended with no material advantage until the month of February or March next.

In regard to the Zemindar of *Hautgur*, we have to acquaint your Honour, &c. that he is, without a doubt, in a capacity to defray the expences of a journey to the Preſidency; and have only to obſerve, that if you are not pleaſed to admit of the reaſons ſet forth in his Letter, we are apprehenſive force muſt be uſed to compel him into a compliance with your orders. This Zemindar, from motives of prudence, and a dread of your arms, has ever been regular in his payments; though, from the nature of his country, and the ſtrength of his fort, it is in his power to give us as much trouble as any Zemindar in the diſtrict. This much we thought ourſelves obliged to mention in his favour, and we entirely ſubmit to your Honour, &c. the expediency of enforcing your orders with reſpect to this Zemindar.

We have the honour to be, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
M. Williams,
R^t Maunſell,
Robt Hughes,
George Forſter.

Ganjam,
25 May 1778.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 15th June 1778.

Diſpatched by Tappies the following Letter to *Maſulipatam*:

To Mr. *Anthony Sadlier*, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 21ſt and 26th ultimo.

We deſire that advertiſements may be iſſued at your Settlement and its dependencies, for receiving propoſals for renting, for a period of five, eight, or ten years, the ſeveral farms under *Maſulipatam*, which have been for a conſiderable time paſt entruſted to the immediate management of the Chief and Council. You will tranſmit to us ſuch propoſals as may be tendered to you in conſequence, obſerving, at the ſame time, the particular directions contained in our Letter of the 15th April.

As the ſeveral Zemindars of your diſtrict are ſhortly expected here, in purſuance of our repeated orders for their coming to the Preſidency, we ſhall defer, until their arrival, taking into conſideration thoſe parts of your Letter of the 26th ultimo, which relate to the ſucceſſion of the Zemindary of *Cotah*.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,
Thos Rumbold, &c. Council.

Fort St. George,
15 June 1778.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 12th June 1778.

Zemindars, &c. Tributaries, who have taken their leave of this Government, and proceeded on their journey for the Preſidency, as follows; viz.

On the 23d May 1778,
Culdindee Trippelly Rauze, Zemindar of *Muglatore*.
Candraigula Vencatoroyaloo, Company's Interpreter, and Surſuſtadar of the *Rajah Mundry* Circar.

On the 24th May 1778,
Jaggapully Rauze, Zemindar of *Peddapore*.
Ramchundrarauze, Zemindar of *Ramchundraporam*.
Coneety Narſimvoloo, of the diſtrict of *Cottapillee*.

On the 21ſt May took leave, but has not yet ſet out on his journey, *Row Vencatarow*, Zemindar of *Pettaporam*.

APPENDIX, No. 34.

Read the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your Honour, &c. Council's commands of the 6th ultimo, relative to *Narſiah Naick*, Soucar. We immediately addreſſed the Gomaſtah of *Govindoſs*, *Conareo Naick*, Soucar, reſiding at *Vezianagrum*, deſiring he would make ſuch payments in favour of the houſe of *Govindoſs*, as might ſupport *Govindoſs*'s credit, and that of his Agent at *Maſulipatam*, *Narſiah Naick*.

In reply, *Conarco Naick* informs us, that the Manager of each particular Bank (or Cottee) ſhould be anſwerable for the engagements he may enter into; in failure of which, recourſe ought to be had to the Principal at *Hydrabad*, who ſhould be anſwerable for his ſervants; that each Gomaſtah muſt take care of his own buſineſs, and pay the balance that may be due by him. *Conarco Naick* further informs us, that he has no directions from his Superiors to act in ſuch a caſe as *Nurſiah Naick*'s, nor is it in his power to advance a ſingle Rupee.

In our Letter to the Revenue Department of the 16th ultimo, we explained fully the ſtate of our finances. We beg to take this occaſion to obſerve to you, that unleſs we receive your aſſiſtance or orders in our favour, in the courſe of this month, we ſhall be in great diſtreſs for means to make the uſual monthly payments. *Our inveſtment is already nearly at a ſtand.* Your Honour, &c. Council have been pleaſed, in your Letter of the 6th June, to acquaint us, that *Sitteram Rauze*, now at the Preſidency, had aſſured you, that the Kiſts ariſing on the Chicacole Havelly ſhould be punctually diſcharged at *Vizagapatam*. A Kiſt from him became due on that farm the 25th April laſt, for Rupees 58,750; another Kiſt for the ſame amount will be due the 25th of next month: a remittance from *Sitteram Rauze* on this account would ſupply our preſent exigencies.

For the large ſums due by the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, and from *Jaggernaut Rauze*, now at the Preſidency, we continue to preſs their Conſtituents here, but without ſucceſs; they informing us, that they wait for the inſtructions of their Superiors. We are thus urgent in ſoliciting your aſſiſtance, and in ſtating our diſtreſs, becauſe we have no money to advance our Merchants on account of the inveſtment, nor any proſpect of a reſource within ourſelves, for our military payments the enſuing month of Auguſt.

Mr. *Morgan Williams*, in a Letter dated the 19th ultimo, in reply to a Letter from Mr. *Davidſon*, requeſting to know, on a ſuppoſition that the Chief and Council ſupplying us with treaſure, might be agreeable to the Government of *Madras*, what ſums might be expected from *Ganjam* for the uſe of the inveſtment at *Vizagapatam*, from the 1ſt June to the 31ſt December 1778? Mr. *Williams* acquaints Mr. *Davidſon*, that they are extremely low in caſh at *Ganjam*, having been obliged to ſend up to *Madras*, on board the *Seahorſe* man of war, half a lack of Rupees; but that nevertheleſs, by the time that orders can be procured from the Preſidency, for us to apply for money to *Ganjam* in favour of *Vizagapatam*, he hoped the Chief and Council of *Ganjam* would be able to furniſh us with fifty thouſand Rupees. We beg your orders in our favour, on the ſubject of ſupplies, may be communicated to *Ganjam* and to *Maſulipatam*.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Alex. Davidſon.
Hy Crawford,
Nath. Barlow,
Cha. Maxtone.

Vizagapatam,
3d July 1778.

Ordered, That the paſſage in this Letter relating to the neceſſity of ſupplies for the expences of *Vizagapatam* Factory, be delivered to the Secretary of the Civil Department.

The Preſident informs the Board, that with reſpect to the balances mentioned in this Letter to be due from *Viziaram Rauze* and *Jaggernaut Rauze*, they had aſſured him, that before their departure from the Chicacole Diſtrict, they left orders for the diſcharging of their reſpective arrears to the Company, at the ſame time that they provided for the management of their affairs in that diſtrict, during their abſence.

Agreed, That the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* be directed to acquaint us what ſums they have received on account of the balances due from *Viziaram Rauze* and *Jaggernaut Rauze*, ſince their departure from that Settlement.

APPENDIX. No. 35.

The Preſident alſo repeats to the Board, That *Sitteram Rauze* has aſſured him, that the firſt Kiſt for the Havelly Lands of *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah*, which became due the 25th February laſt, has been paid at *Vizagapatam*, and that he (*Sitteram Rauze*) has given orders for diſcharging the ſucceeding ones as they became due.

APPENDIX, No. 35.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 20th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Major General *Hector Munro,*
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

The Preſident lays before the Board a Letter from the Chief at *Ganjam*, incloſing one from the Zemindar of *Goomſur*, both which are ordered to be entered on theſe Proceedings as follows:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir,

Herewith I have the pleaſure of tranſmitting to your Honour, copy of a Letter I have juſt received from *Vickeram Bunge*, the unhappy Rajah of *Goomſur*; who I underſtand will ſhortly make his ſubmiſſion to Government, and I flatter myſelf many good conſequences will ariſe therefrom; ſuch as an increaſe in the Goomſur Tribute, and the inſuring to us in future a perfect tranquillity in this diſtrict, as well as leſſening the heavy expences the Company have been at for ſome months paſt, in keeping this country in ſubjection, without any other advantage than convincing the deluded Rajah of the ſuperiority of our arms; for no revenue can be collected from the preſent ſtate of the country, as it is lying waſte for want of cultivation. When the Rajah arrives, I ſhall not fail making him ſenſible of his diſreſpectful ſilence to your Letter, which I attribute more to his ſavage ignorance than to any other motive; for the Zemindars in this diſtrict are in general more like ſavages than reaſonable beings, as they are to all appearance void of common underſtanding, and extremely timorous and miſtruſtful; ſo that your Honour may eaſily conclude how difficult an undertaking it will be to perſuade *Vickeram Bunge*, or indeed any of our Rajahs, to comply with the orders of the Honourable Board, with regard to their proceeding to the Preſidency; *poverty, and their large balances to the Company, and their inability to diſcharge them*, are the only excuſes that ought to be admitted, otherwiſe a military force ſhould, I think, be uſed to enforce a compliance, although it might be attended with a great deal of trouble and expence. Notwithſtanding the weak prejudices of theſe people, I ſhall endeavour all in my power to prevail on *Vickeram Bunge* to ſeek for your favour at the Preſidency; but ſhould I unfortunately be diſappoined in my attempts, I can only aſſure your Honour, that any inſtructions you might be pleaſed to favour me with, either public or private, ſhall be implicitly followed by me, as I have nothing to hope or wiſh for but your countenance and favour; on which I beg leave to rely.

I am, with due deference and reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt devoted and
obedient humble Servant,
M. Williams.

Ganjam,
13th June 1778.

Tranſlate

APPENDIX, No. 36.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Vickeram Bunge* to Mr. *Williams*, Chief of *Ganjam*.

I am much honoured with your kind Perwannah, and have obſerved the contents; conformably to my deſire, you have ſent to me *Ball Kiſtnah* and *Hatmaram*, in order to encourage. I entirely depend on your kind Letter, and by the perſuaſion of *Ball Kiſtnah* and *Hatmaram*, I am determined to come to *Ganjam* to make my ſubmiſſion, and after my arrival at that place, I hope you will do me all the good in your power.

With regard to immediately ſetting off for *Ganjam*, it is impoſſible, as all my family and things are at different places, which obliges me to go back again; therefore you will be ſo good as to excuſe me for a few days, till I can ſettle my family in one place. I ſhall get ready myſelf for ſetting out by the 20th of this month from hence, and ſhall be with you as ſoon as poſſible. What can I ſay more?

The Anſwers of the Zemindars dependant on *Ganjam* to the orders for their coming up to the Preſidency, together with the Letter of the 25th May from the Chief and Council, coming next under conſideration:—The Board are ſenſible of the heavy expence which the Zemindars would be liable to incur in performing ſo long a journey, and are, upon that account, induced to diſpenſe with their perſonal attendance; but as it is, however, highly expedient for us to be well informed of the particulars relative to each Zemindary, in order that we may be enabled to ſettle a permanent Jemmabundy, which can only be done by forming a juſt valuation of theſe lands, it is

Reſolved, That the Pauters and Muſmedars of the ſix principal Zemindaries be ordered forthwith to proceed hither, bringing with them ſuch accounts as may be neceſſary for the before-mentioned purpoſe.

The Board cannot help obſerving, that notwithſtanding our orders for the coming up of *Ball Kiſtnah*, the Company's Dubaſh or Interpreter at *Ganjam*, were moſt pointedly ſignified in our Letter of the 15th April to that Settlement, it does not appear that thoſe orders have been in the leaſt attended to, nor has any excuſe been offered to us in extenuation of his diſobedience.

Reſolved therefore, That the ſame directions be repeated in our next Letter to the Chief and Council; and that they be inſtructed to require him, on pain of incurring our further diſpleaſure, to depart from *Ganjam* for the Preſidency as ſoon after the receipt of it as the nature of circumſtances will permit.

APPENDIX, No. 36.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 20th July 1778.

READ the following Letter from *Maſulipatam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have been favoured with your commands of the 15th June, in the Revenue Department.

Advertiſements have in conſequence been iſſued at this Settlement, and through the Circars dependant thereon, ſignifying that propoſals will be received until the 15th inſtant, for renting the ſeveral farms under *Maſulipatam*, which for ſome time paſt have been under the immediate management of the Chief and Council, for a term of five, eight, or ten years.

No propoſals having hitherto been tranſmitted to us, we beg to be honoured with your commands, whether you would have the time, above fixed for receiving theſe propoſals, prolonged or not.

Anthony Sadlier, &c.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, 24th July 1778.

Sent by *Tappies* the following Letter to *Maſulipatam*.

To Mr. *Anthony Sadlier*, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 3d, 6th, and 11th inſtant.

We deſire you will give notice throughout the Diſtrict dependant on your Settlement, that the term for receiving Propoſals for renting the farms which have lately been under the management of the Chief and Council, will be extended to the 20th of next month; and as you inform us that no offers had been made to you for them ſo late as the 3d inſtant, we have ordered advertiſements to be publiſhed at the Preſidency for receiving propoſals within the before-mentioned term.

Obſerving by your Letter of the 11th inſtant that you were likely to be much in want of caſh, we recommend to you to uſe every poſſible exertion with the Soucars that are indebted to the Company, in order to prevail upon them to diſcharge their reſpective balances; particularly the Agent for the Houſe of *Govindoſs*, whoſe debt is the moſt conſiderable, and who being a Soucar of principal note, appears to be the moſt capable of fulfilling his engagements. Should this prove inſufficient to anſwer your demands, you may ſupply the reſt by monthly draſts upon the Preſidency, taking care, however, not to exceed the amount of your neceſſary expences.

We are, Gentlemen,

Your affectionate Friends,

Fort St. George, 24th July 1778. *Thomas Rumbold*, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 37.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 21ſt July 1778.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Chief and Council at *Ganjam*.

HAVING taken into conſideration the Anſwers of the ſeveral Zemindars, addreſſed to your Chief on the occaſion of their being ordered to repair to the Preſidency, together with thoſe addreſſed to the Preſident, and your own repreſentation upon the ſubject; we are induced, on account of the heavy expence which they would be likely to incur in performing ſo long a journey, to diſpenſe with their perſonal attendance here; but it being however highly expedient for us to be well informed of the particulars relative to each Zemindary, in order that we may be enabled to ſettle a permanent Jemmabundy, which can only be done by forming a juſt valation of thoſe lands, we direct that the Pauters and Muſmedars of the ſix principal Zemindaries be ordered forthwith to proceed hither, bringing with them ſuch accounts as may be requiſite for the before-mentioned purpoſe.

We muſt here take notice, That notwithſtanding our orders for the coming up of *Ball Kiſtnah*, the Company's Dubaſh, or Interpreter, were moſt pointedly conveyed to you, in our Letter of the 15th April, we do not find that they have been in the leaſt attended to; nor has any excuſe been offered to us, in extenuation of his diſobedience: You will therefore, upon receipt hereof, repeat to him our directions, contained in that Letter, and require him, on pain of incurring our further diſpleaſure, to depart from *Ganjam* as ſoon as the nature of circumſtances will permit, and proceed, without loſs of time, to the Preſidency.

APPENDIX, No. 38.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 20th July 1778.

THE Preſident acquaints the Board, That ſeveral of the *Maſulipatam* Zemindars having arrived at the Preſidency, he has for ſome time paſt been employed in endeavouring to recover the balances due from them, as well as in collecting particular information relative to the Revenue of their different Countries; and that he purpoſes ſhortly to lay a full account of the ſame before the Board.

APPENDIX, No. 39.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 19th December 1777.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board having met, according to adjournment, to conſider how the farm of the *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah* Havelly lands, dependant on *Vizagapatam*, may be let out moſt for the advantage of the Company; ſuch parts of the Committee of Circuit's Letter of the 10th September, as related to this ſubject, and the Propoſals of *Padnabrauze* for renting thoſe lands for the term of ten years, being recommended by the Committee, they are read, as follows:

Padnabrauze's terms of Propoſals for renting the Havellys of *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah*, and the four Pergunnahs, viz. *Bomally*, *Nagarycattuum*, *Jelmore*, and *Caricawalſa*, and *Naupada* Salt Pans, for ten years; the firſt five years at the rate of 230,000 Rupees per annum, and the five laſt years as follows:

For the 6th year,	-	-	236,000
7th D°	-	-	244,000
8th D°	-	-	252,000
9th D°	-	-	260,000
10th D°	-	-	268,000

On condition, that at the expiration of my Cowle, I am to be credited, and have a receipt for the good outſtanding balances then due to me from the Country; and I engage the ſaid balances ſhall not exceed 10 per Cent. or 268,000 Rupees; and that I alſo have the privilege for ſelling what ſalt may be on the ground at the expiration of my Cowle, before any of the new Renter's ſalt is ſold; and I engage the amount of the ſalt on hand ſhall not exceed 15,000 Rupee's; 5,000 Rupees worth of which I engage to ſell off for ſhipping, and the other 10,000 Rupees I am to have credit and a receipt for, at the end of my term.

The Jagindars, Inaumdars, Agraharom and Maniam, Holders, ſhall pay to me the ſums which it has been cuſtomary for them to pay to former Renters.

The Preſident then lays before the Board the Propoſals delivered to him by *Sitteram Rauze*, which are alſo read, as follows:

(Tranſlation.)

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, &c. &c.

I, *Mirja Rauze Sitteram Rauze*, Behader, Munna Sultan, do write theſe Propoſals:—When I was at *Vizianagrum*, the Gentlemen of the Committee came there, and propoſed to me, that I ſhould rent *Shecacolam* Havelly; to which I anſwered, that I would go myſelf to *Madras*, and ſpeak to the Preſident and Council there concerning it. When I paid my viſit to you, after my arrival here, I applied to you concerning Shecacolam and Coſſimcotah, &c. diſtricts; to which you have been pleaſed to tell me to make my Propoſals in writing, and give it you, and that when an opportunity offers, that you will think of it; in conſequence of which, I now write, as the villages of our Zemindary, and the villages belonging to the diſtricts of *Shecacolam* and *Coſſimcotah*, &c. are ſituated among my Diſtricts, if the Company ſhould let the farm of thoſe Diſtricts to others, diſputes and quarrels will always ariſe between that Renter and us, concerning water; and the Inhabitants requeſt the Company will be ſo good as to favour me with farm of the ſaid Diſtrict. I would be glad to have them for ten years, if not, for five.

The number of thoſe Diſtricts, viz.

Shecacolam Diſtricts,
Coſſimcotah,
Zulmoor,
Bommaully,
Negary Cutcum,
Curca Valaſa,
Nowpadda, &c. Salt Pans,
The Cuſtoms of *Muzendar*, &c.

If the Renter of the ſeven Diſtricts and Office were given to me, for the firſt five years I ſhall pay to the Company at the rate of two lacks and thirty-five thouſand Rupees per year, which, from the year 1777 to the year 1781, amounts to eleven lacks and ſeventy-five thouſand Rupees, which I promiſe to pay, according to the Kiſts of each year. If the Company will be kind enough to let me have rent for ten years, from the ſixth year to the tenth year both included, I ſhall pay the Jemmabundy to the Company; viz.

		R°.
For the year 1782	—	241,000
83	—	249,000
84	—	257,000
85	—	265,000
86	—	273,000

For theſe five years amounts to twelve lacks and eighty-five thouſand Rupees, which I promiſe to pay according to their reſpective Kiſts of each year. Of theſe two Propoſals, whichſoever the Company thinks moſt convenient to let me have, I ſhall accept it; if you let me have it for ten years, it will be for the Company's advantage, as it would be of ſervice to the Diſtricts: as the Company before had given the Cowle for one year and three years, the Diſtricts were much ruined. If you think of doing ſo now, it will be detrimental both to the Company and the Diſtricts; as the rent was granted for a few years only, the Renters had not an opportunity of improving the Country, by repairing the Lakes and Channels: And beſides, we have ſome years a good monſoon, and in others none, for which reaſon I propoſe to take it for ten years, or for five years. The balance that may become due from the Inhabitants, and which was acknowledged by them in the laſt year, the Company muſt examine and give me credit for the ſame. Alſo, I requeſt that the Company will be ſo good as to mention in the Cowle, that after the remaining ſalt of my farm is ſold, the ſalt of the new Renter may be ſold, and not till then. I ſhall allow the ſhare to the Inhabitants, as in other Diſtricts. The owners of the gift lands, Jaggurs, and the Oggrahareems, or the villages granted to the Brahmins, they muſt allow me the ſame they allowed to the former Renters.

(Signed) *Mirja Rauze Sitteram Rauze*,
Behader, Munna Sultan.

The Preſident obſerving that the Propoſals of *Sitteram Rauze* are higher than thoſe of *Padnabrauze*, and conſequently more for the intereſt of the Company, he moves, That the *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah* Havelly lands be let to him for ten years, agreeable to the terms therein mentioned.

APPENDIX. No. 40.

tioned.—And after ſome debate, the Queſtion being put,

Mr. *Perring*.—As *Sitteram Rauze* has made the higheſt offer, I think he ought to have the rent.

Mr. *Johnſon*.—I have already given many reaſons, in the courſe of the debate, why *Sitteram Rauze* ſhould not have the Havelly; but, as the Board ſeems inclined to favour his Propoſal, I ſhall for the preſent content myſelf with expreſſing my diſapprobation of the meaſure, and with explaining myſelf more fully upon it, in a Minute which I ſhall deliver in at a ſubſequent Conſultation.

Mr. *Smith*.—I am againſt *Sitteram Rauze* having it, and will deliver my reaſons for it at a ſubſequent Conſultation.

Preſident.—I am for giving it to *Sitteram Rauze*, and will enter a Minute upon the occaſion.

Carried in favour of the Preſident's Motion by his caſting vote.

Reſolved, That the *Chicacole* and *Ceſſamcotah* Havelly lands be let to *Sitteram Rauze* for ten years, agreeable to the terms of his Propoſal; and that the Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam* be adviſed thereof, and a Cowle tranſmitted accordingly, commencing from the 25th September 1777, and ending the 25th September 1787.—A Clauſe muſt however be inſerted in the Cowle, ſtipulating, that the amount of ſalt on hand at the expiration of the Cowle, as well as the outſtanding balances which may be then due from the Inhabitants, ſhall be provided for agreeably to the recommendation of the Committee of Circuit, in the paragraph of their Letter of the 10th September.

APPENDIX, No. 40.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 2d February 1778.

PRESENT,

John Whitehill, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your commands of the 24th ultimo, incloſing therein a Copy of the Cowle, your Honour, &c. have been pleaſed to grant to *Sitteram Rauze*, as Renter of the Havelly lands.

As it has been an invariable eſtabliſhed cuſtom, ſince the Honourable Company were put in poſſeſſion of the Circars, for the Chief and Council of the different Settlements under which they have been reſpectively arranged, to adverti ſe and receive Propoſals for the renting of Countries that have been entruſted to their care and management, and afterwards to tranſmit to the Preſidency an account of ſuch as were offered, with their opinion of the characters, capacity, and ſubſtance of the men who had made Propoſals for the Honourable Board's determination; we are not a little concerned to find you have deemed it neceſſary to deviate from this rule, as it has conveyed to us a different idea, that your Honour, &c. have unfavourable ſentiments of our capacity or integrity, although we flatter ourſelves that is not the caſe. Your Honour, &c. are undoubtedly the beſt judges of what is moſt advantageous for the intereſt of our Honourable Employers; nevertheleſs, whenever an inconvenience ſhould ariſe, from a new arrangement of their affairs in this Diſtrict, we think it our duty to point out ſuch to our ſuperiors as might occaſionally happen, eſpecially as an inſtance of the kind now preſents itſelf before us, in your accepting the Propoſals of *Sitteram Rauze*, for the renting the Havelly lands in preference to thoſe made by *Padnabrauze*; who, being at a very great diſtance from the Preſidency, had not the leaſt idea that he would have been outbid by another, or he would have authorized ſome proper perſon to make more advantageous offers to the Honourable Board for thoſe Diſtricts; therefore, as he moſt ardently wiſhes for a continuance of the Honourable Company's favour and protection, he has requeſted we would lay before you this his laſt Propoſal, which is, that he will give as a rent for the Havelly lands for the term of ten years, twenty five lacks of Rupees, at the rate of two hundred and fifty thouſand Rupees per annum, which is forty thouſand more than what has been offered by *Sitteram Rauze*, during that period of time, and fifteen thouſand Rupees per annum more than his offer for the firſt five years, which we eſteem worthy your conſideration, as it is ſo advantageous to the Company's intereſt.—If this Propoſal of *Padnab Rauze* ſhould arrive too late for your Honour's, &c. approbation, he has only to lament his abſence from the Preſidency, and to regret that both the parties did not make their Propoſals at this Settlement.

We hope the above propoſal will not arrive too late for the Honourable Board's determination, becauſe it is very conſiderable, and what was before never offered by any individual ſince the Company's poſſeſſion of the Havelly lands; but this, we preſume, is not the only conſideration with your Honour, &c. the character and capacity of the man is undoubtedly the firſt. *Padnabrauze*, although he has lately ſeverely felt the iron rod of oppreſſion, is ſtill a man of ſubſtance, and univerſally known to be an improver of a country, and an enemy to fraud and violence; his great love of juſtice has won the hearts of all the poor inhabitants, both in the Rajah's country and in the Havelly lands, during the time of his being manager on account of the Company. With regard to *Sitteram Rauze*, although much might be ſaid againſt his conduct during his late management of the Havelly lands, yet, without animadverting on his character ourſelves, we will only beg leave to refer your Honour, &c. to the account which we underſtand was given of him by the late Committee of Circuit to your Board, and to ſubmit it to your judgment, whether, of the two candidates, the preference ought not to be given to *Padnab Rauze*, eſpecially when backed by an higher offer.

We are, with great reſpect,
Your moſt devoted, and
obedient humble Servants,
M. Williams,
Hy Crawford,
*Nath*l *Barlow*.

Vizagapatam,
17th January 1778.

Agreed, That the conſideration of this Letter be deferred till after the diſpatch of the *Houghton*.

Read the following Letters from *Vizagapatam* and *Cuddalore*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received Mr. Secretary *Lewin*'s Letter of the 27th ultimo, directing us to deliver over the management of the Havelly lands (during the abſence of *Sitteram Rauze*) unto *Annapindee Veſſannah*; which we have complied with.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
M. Williams,
Hy Crawford,
*Nath*l *Barlow*.

APPENDIX, No. 41.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 10th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Hon. Sir *Tho' Rumbold*, Preſident and Governor.
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Pe' Perring. } Eſq^rs

READ the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *Tho' Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

On an application to *Annapindee Viſſenah*, *Sitteram Rauze*'s manager of the Havelly lands, for payment of fifty-eight thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty Rupees, the amount of the firſt Kiſt, due on his Cowle the 25th laſt month, we are concerned to inform your Honour, &c. that to our great aſtoniſhment, he acquaints us, as he is only a ſervant of *Sitteram Rauze*'s, we muſt apply to his maſter at *Madras*, not only for the payment of his Kiſt, but any matter relative to his management, having no authority from him to ſatisfy us in this reſpect. This aſſertion of his we have reaſon to think is well founded, for we have undeniable proof that the ſaid *Viſſenah* has remitted to *Sitteram Rauze*, in grain and bills, no leſs a ſum than one hundred and thirty one thouſand Rupees; beſides, it is currently reported that he is now negociating bills with the Soucars on *Sitteram Rauze*'s account, for the further ſum of ſeventy thouſand Rupees, which likewiſe we are informed were raiſed from the produce of the Havelly lands. As theſe two ſums nearly equal the amount of the annual rent *Sitteram Rauze* has agreed to pay the Company for thoſe lands, we think it is our duty thus early to communicate this intelligence to your Honour, &c. that meaſures may be taken to ſecure the payment of his Kiſts at the Preſidency, ſince the manager has refuſed to pay them here. We muſt not here omit to notice, the great diſreſpect ſhewn to the authority of your Chief and Council, by the contemptuous ſilence of *Viſſanah*, to two Letters wrote to him about fifteen days ago, on the ſubject of the above information, and the conſequent order, that no part of the Company's Revenues ſhould be remitted to *Sitteramrauze*, unleſs his firſt Kiſt was diſcharged. If *Sitteram Rauze*'s manager, *Viſſenah*, ſhould be allowed to diſregard our authority by a wilful diſobedience of our orders, we ſhall no longer be able to conduct the affairs of this diſtrict with the ſame regularity as formerly; but on the contrary, have reaſon to expect we ſhall frequently be under the neceſſity of preferring complaints againſt him to your Honour, &c. diſagreeable to ourſelves, and troubleſome to the Honourable Board when too often repeated. We therefore requeſt your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to order *Sitteram Rauze* to direct his Manager to diſcharge his Kiſts regularly at this Settlement, and to pay due deference to any orders we may think fit to iſſue for the intereſt of our Employers.

We are, very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
M. Williams,
H^y Crawford,
Vizagapatam, *Nath' Barlow*,
11 Mar. 1778. *Cha' Maxtone*.

Reſolution thereon.

Agreed, That the Preſident do call upon *Sitteram Rauze* for the Kiſt due from him on account of the *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah* Havelly lands.

APPENDIX, No. 42.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, 10th April 1778.

READ the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *Tho' Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since we addreſſed your Honour, &c. on the 12th inſtant, on the ſubject of *Viſſenah*'s having remitted to *Sitteram Rauze* nearly the amount of a year's rent out of the produce of the Havelly lands, it affords us the utmoſt concern to obſerve further to you, that we have the ſtrongeſt reaſon to believe, in order to raiſe the large ſums mentioned in that addreſs, the poor farmers have been ſeverely oppreſſed, for we are credibly informed that ſome of them are fled out of the country, and thoſe remaining, groaning under the oppreſſions of *Viſſenah*, who, ſo far from protecting the inhabitants in their rights, by allowing them their proper ſhares, as have been heretofore uſual and cuſtomary, has taken conſiderably from their proportions by force and threats, giving them at the ſame time to underſtand, that we had no power over him, and conſequently to ſeek redreſs from us would be needleſs, his maſter *Sitteram Rauze*, having received his Cowle at the Preſidency, and that he was, from that circumſtance, only anſwerable for his conduct immediately to your Honour, &c. without our interference. This conduct of *Viſſenah*'s, we beg leave to obſerve to your Honour, &c. is unuſual, and highly improper, tending to hurt the Company's Government, and diſreſpectful and inſulting to us, their immediate Repreſentatives here; for were we not allowed to take cognizance of any oppreſſion committed by him, the poor farmers and inhabitants muſt ſuffer greatly, as they cannot conveniently demand redreſs ſo far diſtant as the Preſidency, and will therefore ſeek ſhelter elſewhere. To avoid this growing evil, the dangerous conſequence of this being eaſy to be conceived, we flatter ourſelves you will immediately take ſuch meaſures as will effectually prevent it.

We are very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt humble and obedient Servants,
M. Williams,
H^y Crawford,
Vizagapatam, *Nath' Barlow*,
21ſt March 1778. *Cha. Maxtone*.

Agreed, That the Preſident be deſired to communicate this purport of the Letter to *Sitteram Rauze*, who muſt be required to take ſuch meaſures concerning it as may effectually obviate all future complaints of this nature.

Tho' Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam' Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 43.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 24th April 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Preſident acquaints the Board, that in purſuance of the Reſolution at the laſt Conſultation, he has communicated

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nicated to *Sitteram Rauze* the purport of the Letters lately received from *Vizagapatam*, relative to the *Chicacole* and *Coſſimcotah* Havelly lands, and that *Sitteram Rauze* has, in anſwer, aſſured him that the firſt Kiſt of the annual rent of that farm, due the 25th of February, ſhall be forthwith diſcharged at *Vizagapatam*, and that he will alſo ſend poſitive orders to his Agent there, to take ſuch meaſures as may effectually prevent all further cauſe of complaint from the inhabitants of that country.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam. Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 44.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, 20th July 1778.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

Having given my utmoſt attention to the ſeveral Letters and Tranſactions which appear on the Records regarding the *Chicacole* Circar, and having made it my buſineſs to obtain the beſt information with reſpect to the ſtate and conſequence of thoſe lands; and alſo the ſituation of the family of *Viziaram Rauze*, the Rajah of *Vizianagrum*, and his brother *Sitteram Rauze*, &c. I ſhall trouble the Board with a few obſervations, but not go particularly into the ſubject, unleſs any circumſtances ſhould render it neceſſary for me to be more full and explicit in my remarks, but content myſelf with offering my ſentiments on the proper mode to be obſerved, in reſtoring order and management to that country, ſo that the Company's Intereſt and Revenues may be fixed upon a firm and advantageous footing.

The great power of the brothers, *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*, which has been held forth as an object of jealouſy to the Company, and which alarmed our Honourable Employers for the ſecurity of their Revenues in thoſe diſtricts, is now no longer a queſtion relative to this buſineſs, as the conduct of *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze* on the march of our Troops to reduce them, muſt evidently eraſe from our minds any hoſtile ideas which might hitherto have been entertained of them; for inſtead of reſiſting our arms in that formidable manner it was expected, they laid down their own, opened the gates of their forts, and their dreaded power, which has been ſo particularly repreſented to the Court of Directors, vaniſhing at once, they wiſely looked up to the Company for favour, protection, and forgiveneſs of any miſbehaviour towards them, either intentional or by miſtake, thus laying themſelves at the mercy of this Government, imploring its ſupport and aſſiſtance to reinſtate them in their poſſeſſions, and former favour with the Company, that every diſagreeable impreſſion might be removed which occaſioned the ſending a force againſt them. We cannot, in my opinion, be too early in adopting a plan, and carrying it into execution with firmneſs, tending to reſtore the two brothers, *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*, to that friendſhip and harmony which ought ever to ſubſiſt between them, and to place them in the quiet poſſeſſion and management of their countries; the Jemmabundy of the diſtricts dependant on *Vizianagrum*, has been long thought very inadequate, and far ſhort of what other Zemindars have paid.

The Government here, ever ſince the Circars have been under the Company, have made repeated repreſentations of this kind home; alledging, in excuſe for not raiſing the Jemmabundy, that endeavours, by negociations through the Chiefs and Councils, failed; and that the great influence and power of the *Vizianagrum* family, which were greatly exaggerated, rendered the uſe of force to effect it, hazardous to the peace of the Circars. Their repreſentations were credited at home till 1774, by which time the Circars had been well explored, and a pretty juſt idea of their ſituation and value communicated to the Direction; who, on ſuch authority, ventured, in 1775, to ſend out poſitive orders by Lord *Pigot*, that the military force of the Zemindars ſhould be reduced, *and that a reaſonable Jemmabundy ſhould be ſettled, after the Revenues of the ſeveral diſtricts had been enquired into by the Committee of Circuit.* The Directors were ſo particular, and ſo pointed in their orders with regard to the *Chicacole* diſtrict, as evidently ſhews that they have higher expectations from that quarter than any other; that theſe may be anſwered as much as poſſible, the oſtenſible grounds of theſe expectations, by which the public will judge of the reaſonableneſs of any ſettlement that may now take place, ſhould be fully conſidered.

The reduction of the Vizianagrum Troops, leaves the defence of that Circar to the Company; of courſe the Company will expect, for this purpoſe, a ſum equal to the expence the Zemindar is eaſed of by the diſbanding his Troops. *This may be deemed only an additional ſtrength to the Company's military force on the Coaſt, and not an increaſe of Revenue.* And though the Company have forbid the Zemindars keeping regular Troops, yet they muſt have a Sibendy for collecting the revenues. The charge attending theſe and other revenue ſervants, and diſburſements, ſhould be fully ſtated, as well as the Rajah's houſehold expences; and for the laſt, ſhould be allowed as amply as they have ever enjoyed. Theſe articles of expence, deducted from the revenue uſually collected, good and bad years together, will ſhew the increaſe of Jemmabundy the country is capable of, and will naturally be the ſtandard for the people at home to judge: till theſe are aſcertained, no judgment can be formed with any degree of preciſion, and the aſcertaining them requires no great length of time.

The Committee of Circuit reported, in September laſt, their examination of a conſiderable part of the *Vizianagrum* Zemindary; the remainder can be ſpeedily collected from the Rajah's Muſnedars; the reports and opinions of many individuals here, can be collected to compare or check the accounts given by the Rajah's ſervants, which, without ſuch precaution, cannot be relied on.

Till of late years the country under *Vizianagrum* was divided into many petty Zemindaries; the Zemindars of theſe proving troubleſome, were reduced by *Sitteram Rauze*, ſome before the Circars were ours, and ſome ſince, and are now priſoners; the only Zemindar at preſent remaining tributary to *Vizianagrum*, is the *Polliudah* man. Mr. *Cotsford*, in his Letter to the Court of Directors, recommends the reſtoration of all theſe Zemindars. Should a plan take place, the proviſion for this expence in office will conſiderably leſſen the Jemmabundy, and, by cauſing a diviſion of intereſt, may be otherwiſe a ſource of inconvenience. If the reſtoring be thought ineligible, the dignity of the Company's Government requires their enlargement, and that a comfortable allowance be ſettled for their ſupport.

Whether *Polliundah* ſhould be tributary to the Company or the Rajah, requires conſideration; that part of the *Vizianagrum* diſtrict called *Warulla*, is claimed by *Jogapetty Rauze* of *Peddapore*; his claim to it has been ſeveral times referred to this Government, but *Sitteram Rauze* has always found means to prevent a deciſion being obtained. The merits of each of the claimant's pretenſions ſhould be enquired into, before a final ſettlement take place with either; and as our reſources for ſupporting the expected War with *France*, depend principally upon the good management, and upon the regular collection of our revenues, no time ſhould be loſt in putting them on the moſt ſtable footing they will admit of.

Our Zemindars, without exception, ſeem to have made it a rule to be in arrears, and ſome of them where there

is

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is no ground or pretence for being ſo; in particular, the principal of them, *Viziaram Rauze*, whoſe management appears to me to be glaringly exceptional; though he diſbanded his Troops in Auguſt laſt, and was of courſe, by that meaſure, eaſed of a conſiderable expence, and pays the Company only three lacks of Rupees out of the amount he collects, he is ſtill in arrears to them, and greatly in debt to individuals. I have been very particular in my enquiries relative to *Viziaram Rauze*, and am ſorry to ſay, that there is too much reaſon to conclude, that his preſent circumſtances are owing to his want of capacity and firmneſs to guard againſt the artifice and intrigues of the rapacious ſervants he has had about him. *Viziaram Rauze*'s character appears to me to be marked with a degree of fickleneſs and inſufficiency, that renders him unfit to be depended on for the preſent Jemmabundy in quiet times, much leſs ſo in the times of trouble, which we are now to expect, and when the Jemmabundy is to be conſiderably increaſed. I am clearly of opinion, that it is indiſpenſably incumbent on us, without delay, to place with *Viziaram Rauze*, as Duwan, a man of known abilities to aſſiſt him in eſtabliſhing that order and economy in the management of the collections, ſo eſſentially neceſſary to ſecure to the Company the punctual receipt of this ſo conſiderable a part of their revenue. The people he has lately had about him, I do not heſitate to ſay, are improper for this high truſt. His brother *Sitteram Rauze*'s abilities in the revenue branch, cannot be doubted; and their intereſt being united, by the line of ſucceſſion to the Zemindary, point him out at the fitteſt man. There is not that room to apprehend ſelfiſhneſs in him, or profuſion to others, that may be looked for from aliens. Any diſgrace that may fall on the management of the Zemindary, will affect *Sitteram Rauze*'s future hopes equally with *Viziaram*'s, he has therefore the ſpur of intereſt to excite him to avert it; whereas a common ſervant, unconcerned in the future welfare of the family, may, on its own ruins, raiſe his own fortune. A man ſo diſpoſed, could not wiſh a better opportunity than the confidence of *Viziaram Rauze* would afford him; and the ſituation of the *Chicacole* Circar is ſo much altered ſince the movement of our Troops, the diſbanding of the Rajah's, and our getting poſſeſſion of *Vizianagrum*, that we muſt ever have a check on either of the Rajahs, who attempt to go beyond the bounds we preſcribe to them. In *Sitteram Rauze* we ſhall have for the management of the country, a man of firmneſs and abilities, whoſe intereſt it is to prove faithful and ſteady to the Company. For the inability of the other brother, let us only look to the Records, and we ſhall find too many proofs of the weakneſs and inconſiſtency of his character. Mr. *Cotsford*, who is ſaid to be well acquainted with the Northern Circars, in his Letter to the Court of Directors, points out *Viziaram Rauze* as a man of a very limited capacity; and in another part of his Letter, doubts *Viziaram Rauze*'s real and juſt title to the Zemindary, and upon ſuch grounds as would juſtify the Company in putting the management and revenues of it on a different footing, ſhould his obſtinacy, inſufficiency, or intrigues of thoſe who have obtained an aſcendancy over him, make it neceſſary for the ſecurity and intereſt of the Company to effect a change.

There is no doubt but his preſent ſervants have all that influence with him, that a weak mind will generally give way to, when a love of indolence, and a fondneſs for trifles, are gratified by the ſacrifice; they at the ſame time flatter his vanity, and feed the ridiculous haughtineſs of his character, by continual endeavours to make him believe himſelf of more conſequence than he really is, whilſt they are ready to laviſh his treaſures in ſupport of the aſcendancy they have gained: but theſe are not times to trifle either with the revenues, inveſtment, or reſources of the Northern Circars, and I am perſuaded, in the *Chicacole* diſtrict, as well as in every other part of thoſe poſſeſſions of the Company, and not in thoſe poſſeſſions alone, but in all where they have an intereſt in the *Carnatic*, the moſt ſpirited and vigorous meaſures are neceſſary to be purſued, ſhould a war break out with the French, which we daily apprehend; I am convinced we cannot render a more eſſential piece of ſervice to that vigilant and intriguing enemy (ſhould their views be turned to the Circars) than by leaving the brothers, *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*, at variance; the utmoſt hopes of the French, even from the neighbourhood of thoſe Troops under Mr. *Lally*, with every artifice (which I have no doubt they would make uſe of in caſe of troubles) would not afford ſuch a proſpect of ſucceſs to their wiſhes, as the continuance of the diſſentions in the *Pooſpully* family, and the management of the country under a man of ſuch ſlender abilities as *Viziaram Rauze*: but if any Gentleman at the Board ſhould differ with me in opinion upon a point of this conſequence, let him refer to the Records, to the Letters from the *Vizagapatam* factory, and inveſtigate the whole tranſactions in the *Chicacole* Circar for the laſt two or three years. I think they muſt then conclude with me on the neceſſity of ſettling it on a permanent and ſecure footing, with the aſſiſtance of ſuch a man as *Sitteram Rauze*, who ſhould be under thoſe reſtrictions, that the brother, *Viziaram Rauze*, may enjoy all he is capable of enjoying (and which till lately he has been contented with) ſecurity, eaſe, affluence, and the neceſſary ſtate and reſpect due to the rank and ſtation he holds.

To what I have already offered as neceſſary to be done before we can finally conclude for the Jemmabundy or tribute of the *Chicacole* diſtrict; I ſhall add the following circumſtances, neceſſary to be attended to.—That a juſt and true ſtatement of the expences of the expedition under the command of Colonel *Braithwaite*, be made out, and that *Viziaram Rauze* make good the ſame to the Company. That the Zemindary of *Ancapilly* be given to *Viziaram Rauze*, on his increaſing the tribute to the Company, which before was ſixty-five thouſand Rupees per annum, to one lack:—It appears upon the Records, that the Zemindary of *Ancapilly* is mortgaged to *Viziaram Rauze*, and that the amount of the mortgage is (agreeable to bonds, yearly executed in the preſence of the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*) between ſeven and eight lacks of Rupees, though upon a ſtrict ſcrutiny into the amount of intereſt, &c. ſome deduction might be made, yet as this mortgage has been incurred to pay the tribute due to the Company, and being conducted under the ſanction of their ſervants, it appears but reaſonable that he, *Viziaram Rauze*, ſhould have the Zemindary given up to him. I did intend to propoſe that it ſhould be converted into Havelly lands for the Company; but when I conſidered the heavy mortgage under the guarantee of the Preſident and Council, the value of the Zemindary, the increaſed tribute propoſed to be received from it; I am perſuaded it will be more for the intereſt of the Company to give the grant of it, on the terms I have before-mentioned, to *Viziaram Rauze*; ſome allowance ſhould however be made by him to the widow and remaining family of the former poſſeſſor, the deceaſed *Poyakerow*, or ſome proviſion be made for them from the Zemindaries of *Salevaram*.

It appears, That *Viziaram Rauze*, after having adopted the ſon of *Sitteram Rauze*, his elder brother, as ſucceſſor to the Zemindary, and after having gone through all the ceremonies uſual on ſuch an occaſion, writes a moſt extraordinary Letter, full of equivocation, reſpecting this adoption; which plainly ſhews the intrigues at his Court, the weakneſs and fears of the man, and indicates *the abſolute neceſſity that* Sitteram Rauze *ſhould again reſume the management of affairs in the Circar*, as all the evils ſeem to have ariſen from the intrigues and miſmanagement ſince his removal; and as the ſon of *Sitteram Rauze* is the undoubted preſumptive heir to the Zemindary, the adoption ſhould be confirmed by Cowle of this Board. After *Viziaram Rauze* is rendered ſenſible that he ought not to have taken ſuch a ſtep without the advice and conſent of the Preſident and Council, as repreſentatives of the Com-

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pany, and a proper *Nazer*, *as uſual, been given to the Company on the occaſion; for we muſt all be ſenſible, that no ſimilar circumſtance could take place under the Government of the Moors, without the conſent of the feudal Lord, and that a proper acknowledgement for ſuch conſent is always exacted.* In the preſent caſe, notwithſtanding the Letter I have before mentioned from *Viziaram Rauze*, the ſon of *Sitteram Rauze*, *Naraſummah Gazepetty Rauze*, in conſequence of the adoption, is acknowledged in the Diſtricts, and, conformable to eſtabliſhed cuſtom, all acts of Government are executed in his name.

That no Troops be levied or entertained by *Viziaram Rauze*, except ſuch a number as may be thought requiſite to collect the revenues; but that this Board take into conſideration the mode of eſtabliſhing an additional force for the protection of his country.

With reſpect to the Havelly Lands of the *Chicacole* Circar, *they were let to* Sitteram Rauze, *before my arrival, on too long a leaſe*; but as I am of opinion true policy ſhould induce us to ſupport the brothers, to reconcile them to each other, and attach them to the Company, ſo I do not ſee that the lands can be in better hands, being thoroughly convinced from the late tranſactions, the Company have nothing to apprehend from their power and ambition; and I have never ſeen that too frequent a change of men or meaſures have ever proved beneficial to the Company in farming out their revenues.

Such are my ſentiments upon this buſineſs, which I beg leave to ſubmit to the conſideration of the Board; they are dictated by a firm conviction, that the plan I have propoſed is calculated for the ſecurity and benefit of our Honourable Employers in their poſſeſſions in the Northern Diſtricts, and free from every private view or prejudice; and as the Rajah obſtinately perſiſts (from the advice of thoſe about him) to keep at variance with his brother, I ſhall propoſe to the Board to appoint *Sitteram Rauze* Dewan of the Circar, that we may without delay have the Jemmabundy, and every neceſſary article ſettled, and that the balances due may be immediately collected.

The Board approve in general of the ſentiments expreſſed by the Preſident, and of the arguments he has made uſe of in the foregoing Minute, relative to an arrangement of the Company's lands in the *Chicacole* Diſtrict.

Mr. *Johnſon* then delivers in the following Minute:

I readily conſent and agree to adopt the ſentiments of the Preſident, contained in his Minute delivered in this day, ſo far as appears to be conſiſtent, and no further, with the opinions I have already given while Chief of *Vizagapatam*, on the various ſubjects the above Paper contains.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 29th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill, Eſq.
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Peter Perring.

THE Board having aſſembled at the Company's Garden Houſe, agreeably to the adjournment of yeſterday, for the purpoſe of coming to a concluſive determination upon the affairs of the *Chicacole* Diſtrict; the Preſident expreſſes himſelf concerned to inform them, that his utmoſt endeavours to promote a reconciliation between the two brothers, *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*, have proved ineffectual. He further obſerves, that, in the preſent critical ſituation of affairs, it is neceſſary that harmony ſhould ſubſiſt in the Government of the Northern Circars, not only for the ſake of ſecuring the revenues of that country, but that we may have ſome dependance for military ſupport, in caſe of any invaſion from a foreign Enemy; that for theſe and other reaſons, which are recited at large in his Minute of the 20th inſtant, he continues to be of the ſame opinion he has therein expreſſed; that an accommodation between the two brothers is indiſpenſably requiſite, and he hopes, upon an occaſion of ſo much importance, to ſee unanimity prevail in the Reſolutions of the Board, as nothing conduces ſo eſſentially towards carrying them into effect.

The Preſident alſo adds, That having, purſuant to the Reſolution of yeſterday, required the attendance of *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*, they are now waiting in readineſs to be called before the Board. Previous, however, to their being admitted, he requeſts, that as the circumſtances of the preſent occaſion are of a particular nature, the Members of the Board will give their ſeparate opinions upon it.

The following Minutes are delivered in.

Mr. *Perring* delivers in the following Minute:

I have fully conſidered the Preſident's Minute, and am clearly of opinion, that it is for the intereſt of the Company that an immediate reconciliation ſhould take place between the two brothers, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*; that on the known abilities of the latter only, the Company can depend for the punctual payment of that part of their revenues dependant on this family; of courſe that it is indiſpenſably neceſſary to give him ſuch a ſhare in the management of the *Vizianagrum* buſineſs as will enable him to act with effect.

Minute of Mr. *Smith*.

I wiſh, as much as any Member at this Board, to ſee a hearty reconciliation take place between the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* and his brother *Sitteram Rauze*; but as they have both of them now been before the Board, and the Rajah has expreſſed his utter averſion to the meaſure in ſtrong and pointed terms, I am of opinion that he ſhould not be compelled thereto.

Minute of General *Munro*.

The Preſident's Minute is ſo full, and correſponds ſo much with my ideas reſpecting *Viziaram Rauze* and his brother *Sitteram Rauze*, that there is nothing left for me to ſay upon the ſubject, only to give my moſt hearty aſſent to the ſettling of the collection of the revenues of *Viziaram* upon *Sitteram Rauze*, as the only effectual method of ſatisfying the Company's demands, and keeping peace and harmony in that country.

Viziaram Rauze and *Sitteram Rauze* are then deſired to come in, and being ſeated, the Preſident informs *Viziaram Rauze* of the ſentiments of the Board with reſpect to the lands dependant on *Vizianagrum*; and concludes with recommending to him, in the ſtrongeſt terms, to ſhew a ready and entire acquieſcence to the wiſhes of the Board, which he aſſures him are dictated, not more by an attention to the intereſts of the Company, than by a regard to juſtice, and to the real and permanent advantage of the *Poofputty* Family.

Viziaram Rauze returns for Anſwer by an Interpreter, That in all things he is ready to obey the commands of this Government, but that he cannot conſent to an accommodation with his brother *Sitteram Rauze*.

He is then told, That if the fear of endangering his life, by being reconciled to *Sitteram Rauze*, which he has repeatedly urged as a principal objection againſt it, be the only one he has to offer, it ought not to have any influence over him, as the Company are a ſufficient guarantee to him.

A Letter from him to Mr. *Whitehill* being produced (as entered hereafter) he is aſked, how he could write ſo ſtrongly in favour of his brother *Sitteram Rauze*, unleſs he entertained a favourable diſpoſition towards him?

He replies, That the outward form of an accommo-

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dation had paſſed between them, about the time that Letter was written, and alſo upon ſome other occaſions, but that he never felt himſelf cordially reconciled to *Sitteram Rauze*.

Here *Sitteram Rauze* requeſted the permiſſion of the Board to repreſent ſome circumſtances relative to his own ſituation, which being granted, he proceeds as follows:

" For a conſiderable length of time I tranſacted entirely the affairs of my brother's Government, and ſo much were we all at that time upon a footing of equality and brotherly affection, that it never was a queſtion with me whether I acted upon his account or my own. I took all the care I poſſibly could in the management of his country, and omitted no opportunity of improving the revenues of it, or of contributing in every reſpect to his happineſs and welfare, according to the beſt of my ability. I deſire to be informed in what light I was to be conſidered; whether as the brother or as the ſervant of the Rajah?"

Preſident. The Board look upon you as his brother acting for him.

Sitteram Rauze. I deſire that the ſame queſtion may be put to my brother, in preſence of the Board.

Whereupon the queſtion being put;

Viziaram Rauze. It is true he is my brother; but he only held the management of my affairs during my pleaſure.

Queſtion from the Board to *Viziaram Rauze*. Has *Sitteram Rauze* ever done any act injurious or offenſive to you?

Viziaram Rauze. He has taken away the Braminies Maniams.

Sitteram Rauze. Who beſtowed them upon the Braminies?

Viziaram Rauze. The Rajahs have uſually done it; but the gifts of individuals have ſometimes been allowed.

Sitteram. If I have taken away the Maniams, who has enjoyed the benefit ariſing from them?

Viziaram. It was received into my treaſury; but ſince that time my ill fortune has been ſuch, that the affairs of my country have never proſpered.

Board to *Viziaram*. Who has had the diſtributing of that part of the revenue, ſince the Company's tribute has not been paid?

Viziaram Rauze. The perſons who have managed the country.

Some debate ariſing with regard to the authority from which the *Pooſputty* Family derive their right to the Zemindary of the countries dependant on *Vizianagrum*, *Viziaram Rauze* affirms, That he holds it by virtue of a grant from *Nizam Ally Cawn*, the Soubah of the Decan.

Sitteram Rauze to *Viziaram Rauze*. Where is the Saned for it?

Viziaram Rauze. There was no Saned; the thing was done in too open and public a manner to render that neceſſary. The whole country were witneſſes to it.

Board to *Viziaram Rauze*. Have you any thing more to alledge againſt your brother?

Here *Sitteram Rauze* interpoſing, ſaid, I am ſenſible that *Jaggernaut Rauze* has contrived and worked up many falſehoods, with intent to prejudice me, by ſetting me at variance with my brother; but I deſire only that *Viziaram Rauze* may relate before this Board what I have ever done to injure him. For myſelf, I can ſafely ſay, that when I left him I took nothing with me but my own wearing apparel.

Viziaram Rauze. I always conſidered my poſſeſſions as my own; but I am concerned to perceive that the Board do not ſeem to admit it.

Sitteram Rauze to *Viziaram Rauze*. What was the ſtate of your affairs at the time I undertook the management of them? Your annual revenues amounted then to about ſeven lacks of Rupees, and when I gave up the management I left you poſſeſſed of a revenue amounting to upwards of twenty-two lacks.—It generally happens that perſons acting in ſo high a truſt, reſerve ſome benefit to themſelves, but I never reſerved any ſuch advantage to myſelf.

Viziaram Rauze making no reply, the Board addreſs him, through the Preſident, to the following effect:

Board. You are to know, that this is the laſt opportunity you will have of declaring yourſelf to the ſatisfaction of the Board, and you cannot but be ſenſible that it is an occaſion of the utmoſt importance to your future happineſs and well-doing.—We recommend it to you, in the moſt earneſt manner, to become reconciled to your brother *Sitteram Rauze*, as we are convinced that it is a meaſure which your own welfare and the intereſt of the Company render indiſpenſably neceſſary.—But ſhould you continue obſtinately to withſtand the preſſing inſtances that have been repeatedly made to you by the Board, conjunctively as well as ſeparately, we ſhall be under the neceſſity of taking ſuch Reſolutions as will, in all probability, be extremely painful to you, but which being once paſſed, can never be recalled.

Viziaram Rauze. I ſhall conſider myſelf henceforward as diveſted of all power and conſequence whatever, ſeeing that the Board urge me to do that which is contrary to my fixed determination, and that the reſult of it is to be the loſing of my country.

The above Anſwer precluding every hope of effecting, by means of perſuaſion and mildneſs, an accommodation between the two brothers, the Preſident, on account of the obſtinacy of *Viziaram Rauze*, deſires that the following queſtions may be put:

1. That *Sitteram Rauze* be appointed Dewan of the countries dependant on *Vizianagrum*, for the management of the collections, but not to the prejudice of *Viziaram Rauze*'s right to the Zemindary.

Mr. *Perring*. For the Queſtion.
Mr. *Smith*. Againſt it.
General *Munro*. For it.
Mr. *Whitehill*. For it.
Preſident. For it.
Carried in the affirmative, Mr. *Smith* only diſſenting.

2. That it be recommended to *Sitteram Rauze*, by every means in his power, to cultivate a friendſhip, and endeavour to bring about a reconciliation with his brother *Viziaram Rauze*.

Carried unanimouſly.

3. That *Sitteram Rauze* be directed to look into the accounts of the province committed to his charge, and to acquaint the Board with the reaſons for the preſent balance due from it to the Company. In the mean time, as the ſaid balance has been moſtly incurred during the management of the Rajah and his Servants *Trippetty Rauze*, *Jaggernaut Rauze*, and others, that they be called upon to account for, or make good the ſame.

Mr. *Perring*. I am for the Queſtion.
Mr. *Smith*. As the Board have thought proper to appoint *Sitteram Rauze* Dewan of the country, I can have no objection to the preſent Queſtion.
General *Munro*. I am for the Queſtion.
Mr *Whitehill*. I am for it.
Preſident. I am for it.
Carried in the affirmative.

4. That *Sitteram Rauze* do immediately take into conſideration the ſettling of the Tribute or Jemmabundy to be paid to the Company in future, alſo the neceſſary Sibbendy to be kept up, which it muſt be recommended to him to make as ſmall as poſſible.

Carried in the affirmative, Mr. *Smith* expreſſing himſelf the ſame as to the preceding Queſtion.

The ſeveral queſtions propoſed by the Preſident having been thus reſolved in the affirmative, he declares to *Sitteram Rauze* the ſenſe of the Board as follows:

Preſident to *Sitteram Rauze*. We have appointed you Dewan to the Diſtricts dependant on *Vizianagrum*, in the *Chicacole* Circar. You will therefore proceed to take charge

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charge thereof, and uſe your utmoſt endeavours to recover the balances due from thoſe lands to the Company; the Accounts will be ordered to be delivered into your poſſeſſion, and you are to take the moſt expeditious and effectual means of ſettling a Jemmabundy for the ſaid Diſtricts. As ſoon as you are ready to ſet out for *Vizianagrum*, an eſcort of Troops ſhall be ordered to attend you thither. Your Brother is, however, ſtill to be conſidered as Rajah of the Country, and you are to conduct yourſelf in ſuch a manner as may be the moſt likely to produce a reconciliation with him.

Ordered, That a Saned be prepared for *Sitteram Rauze*, conformably to the purport of the foregoing Reſolution.

The Preſident then addreſſes himſelf to *Viziaram Rauze* in the following manner:

Preſident to *Viziaram Rauze*. Having done all that lay in our power to effect what appeared to us the ſureſt means of promoting your real advantage, whatever uneaſineſs you may experience from the meaſures which this Government hath judged neceſſary to be adopted, you ought to impute entirely to the pernicious Councils of your principal Servants, and thoſe in whom you have imprudently placed your confidence.

Viziaram Rauze and *Sitteram Rauze* withdrawing, the Board adjourn unto Friday next the 31ſt, for taking into conſideration the ſubject of the *Ancapilly* Zemindary, and other matters relative to the *Chicacole* Diſtrict.

Letter from *Viziaram Rauze* to Mr. *Whitehill*.

I, *Meerjah Rauze Viziaram Rauze*, Behader, Munna Sultan, write this Letter: As there is a large ſum of money due to me from the Diſtricts of *Sutleavaram* and *Ancapilly*, all the Papers concerning them to my Brother, and have ſent him to you. I requeſt the favour of you, Gentlemen, to favour him with whatever applications he may make concerning them, and grant him thoſe Diſtricts, and which will be to my ſatisfaction; and there will be no diſpute concerning the money due to me with the Company. You may keep this Letter in the Company as a voucher; and I hope you will make him Proprietor of thoſe Diſtricts. With regard to this buſineſs, what I have already wrote, and what I ſhall henceforth write, you need not regard them; but I hope you, Gentlemen, will regard and take notice of this Letter.

(Signed) *Viziaram Rauze Meerjah Rauze.*

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
P. Perring.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 3d Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident.
John Whitehill,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Peter Perring.

The Preſident obſerves to the Board, That notwithſtanding *Sitteram Rauze* was, at laſt Conſultation, appointed Dewan or Manager for the Diſtricts dependant on *Vizianagrum*, and that the ſame was then declared to his Brother *Viziaram Rauze*, the former has not yet been able to obtain the accounts of thoſe lands, owing to the obſtructions which the latter has created, with the view of ſetting aſide the Reſolutions of the Board in favour of *Sitteram Rauze*. The Preſident therefore recommends, that *Viziaram Rauze* be poſitively ordered to ſend the Muſnedars and other Officers of the Revenue, to *Sitteram Rauze*; and that he be directed to proceed with him to *Vizianagrum*, as ſoon as the neceſſary ſtipulations for paying off his balance, and ſettling a new Jemmabundy, ſhall be concluded.

Approved; and ordered accordingly.

The Preſident requeſts, That ſome perſons who are attending without may be called before the Board, as he wiſhes to put a few queſtions to them relative to the affairs of the *Chicacole* Circar; and the ſame being agreed to, *Jaggernaut Rauze* is called in, and interrogated as follows:

Queſ. Why have you not paid off the balances you owe the Company?—Anſ. I will pay them off if you will deliver up *Meir Saib* to me.

Queſ. What is become of the Collections from the *Ancapilly* Zemindary, during the time it was under your management?—Anſ. I paid them to the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Queſ. What proof of this can you ſhew?—Anſ. I have their receipts.

Queſ. Whoſe Servant do you reckon yourſelf?—Anſ. I am in *Viziaram Rauze*'s pay, but under the Company's protection.

Queſ. Did you not give an obligation not to ſerve the *Vizianagrum* family without the Company's leave?—Anſ. The Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam* have given me leave under their hands.

Queſ. What are the names of thoſe Gentlemen?—Anſ. Meſſrs. *Johnſon*, *Williams*, *Crawford*, and *Barlow*.

Queſ. When is it dated?—Anſ. I do not know.

Being further queſtioned, he prevaricates, and contradicts his aſſertion of the written permiſſion.

Queſ. In whoſe name is the buſineſs of *Vizianagrum* tranſacted?—Anſ. In the name of *Guzziputty Rauze*.

Queſ. Is he *Sitteram Rauze*'s Son?—He was ſo formerly, but now he is *Viziaram Rauze*'s.

Queſ. Are not all Acts of Government made out in his name?—Anſ. Yes.

Queſ. Is he conſidered as the Zemindar of the Country?—Anſ. He is.

Queſ. Have not bonds that were formerly due to European Gentlemen from *Viziaram Rauze*, been lately made out in the name of *Guzziputty Rauze*?—Anſ. Some bonds have, and others have not.

Queſ. Is the public ſeal of the Zemindary or Government *Guzziputty Rauze*'s ſeal?—Anſ. Sometimes the ſeal of *Viziaram Rauze* is made uſe of, and ſometimes that of *Guzziputty Rauze*.

Queſ. Under whoſe ſeal are Acts of Government enforced and validated?—Anſ. Under *Guzziputty*'s.

Queſ. Did not *Viziaram Rauze* write a Letter to the Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam*, importing, that the circumſtance of the adoption of *Guzziputty Rauze* was untrue?—Anſ. He wrote it with the concurrence of *Sitteram Rauze*, as they were apprehenſive that the Company might be diſpleaſed at ſuch an act being done without their ſanction.

Preſ. You muſt go and ſettle all the Accounts of the Country with *Sitteram Rauze*, and pay off your balances.

Jaggernaut. As *Sitteram Rauze* and I are in a ſtate of enmity with one another, how can I go to him upon the Company's buſineſs?

Preſ. It is the Government that commands you to it. *Sitteram Rauze* will lay before the Board whatever Accounts you deliver to him.

Jag. I ſhall be glad of it. I deſire, however, that *Meer Saib* may be compelled to pay what he owes me.

Preſ. That is not the matter in queſtion, your balances muſt be paid off unconditionally.

Jaggernaut Rauze informs the Board, that Mr. *Morgan Williams*, as acting Chief of *Vizagapatam*, ſome time ſince received from him, on account of the Honourable Company's Kiſts, a Bond of *Meir Saib*'s, to the amount of fifty thouſand Rupees.

As *Meir Saib* is a man who has long been looked upon as in a ſtate of inſolvency, the Board cannot ſuffer themſelves to believe that this circumſtance can have happened as *Jaggernaut Rauze* repreſents. Agreed, however, that a Letter

a Letter be written to the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*, directing them to enquire and inform us particularly on the ſubject.

Jaggernaut Rauze being ordered to withdraw, *Juggah Row* is called in, and interrogated as follows:

Queſ. You have long acted in the capacity of the Company's Dubaſh, or Interpreter, at *Vizagapatam*. In what ſtate do you look upon the Diſtricts of *Vizianagrum* to be at preſent?—Anſ. They have been much injured by the diſputes long ſubſiſting between the two brothers, *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*.

Queſ. Do you think *Viziaram Rauze* capable of managing the affairs of his Country?—Anſ. I cannot take upon me to ſay. Your Honour, &c. are the moſt capable of judging, from the manner in which he has performed his engagements to the Company.

Queſ. Are all acts of Government done in the name of *Guzziputty Rauze*, or in whoſe name are they done?—Anſ. In *Guzziputty Rauze*'s.

Queſ. Do you not think that a diviſion between the two brothers muſt prove detrimental to the Country?—Anſ. Every body muſt be ſenſible of it, if the reconciliation be ſincere.

Preſ. Relate what further particulars you are acquainted with, regarding the Countries dependant on *Vizianagrum*.

Jug. The Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* has given away part of the *Medigut* Country, yielding an annual Revenue of ſeventeen thouſand Rupees, in order to preſerve tranquillity to his own Diſtricts. He has alſo reſtored the Curaupaum Diſtrict, amounting to about fifty thouſand Rupees a year, to the ancient poſſeſſors of it, and he has loſt a tract of land worth fifty thouſand Rupees a year, which was forcibly taken from him by the people of *Golconda*.

Juggah Row being ordered to withdraw, the Board adjourned to Wedneſday next at ten o'clock in the forenoon.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Peter Perring.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 27th February 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Major Genl *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letters from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your Letter of the 22d ultimo, and in obedience to your Honour, &c. commands, now forward to you a copy of the Tranſlation of a Paper delivered to our Chief by *Viziaram Rauze*, which indeed contains a lively deſcription of the ſentiments he entertained of *Sitteram Rauze*.

With regard to the Letter wrote by *Viziaram Rauze* in anſwer to one of the Chiefs reſpecting the adoption of *Sitteram Rauze*'s ſon as his preſumptive heir, we are ſorry to ſay, that it has either been miſlaid or loſt, as it cannot at preſent be found; however, ſo ſoon as we receive a copy of the ſaid Letter from the Rajah (to whom we have applied for one) it ſhall be ſent to you.

(Signed) *M. Williams,*
Hy Crawford,
Nathl Barlow,
Chas Maxtone.

Vizagapatam,
5th February 1778.

Tranſlation of a Repreſentation to *Samuel Johnſon*, Eſq. Chief, by *Viziaram Rauze*.

As you inform me it would afford much pleaſure to the Governor, Mr. *Stratton*, to hear of my reconciliation with my brother, and that it would alſo contribute greatly to your own ſatisfaction, I have thought it neceſſary to inform you of my real ſentiments on this ſubject.

For fourteen years paſt my brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, confined me, as if a priſoner, in my own Fort, and took upon him the ſole management of all my affairs; moreover, the injuries and inſults he rendered me, during this interval, were greater than I can recapitulate. Knowing his temper, I was induced to diſſemble, and make him believe I was an inſignificant perſon, and incapable of managing my Country, otherwiſe my life would have been in danger; but now having an inclination to take the whole management of my Country upon myſelf, and to convince the world, that I ever was capable of managing my own affairs, I have excluded him from interfering, and by the Almighty's favour, I manage all my buſineſs myſelf, and find from experience, that it is not a weight upon me. When I reflect on the hardſhips I have ſuffered from my brother, it can never enter my thoughts to reconcile myſelf with him during his life, or to be under his management as I was before. If you and the Company wiſh to ſee my life prolonged, you muſt drop all thoughts of our union; on the contrary, if you and the Company are averſe to my exiſtence, then you may do as you think proper.

Theſe are my undiſguiſed ſentiments of this matter, to authenticate which I have written them with my own hands.

(A true copy.) *Nathl Barlow*, Sec^y.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In obedience to your commands of the 22d ultimo, we have now the honour of tranſmitting you a copy of the Rajah's Letter to the Chief, regarding the adoption of his brother *Sitteram Rauze*'s ſon.

We are with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
Chas Maxtone,
N. Barlow,
Hy Crawford,
M. Williams.

Vipagapatam,
16th February 1778.

Tranſlation of a Letter from *Viziaram Rauze* to the Chief, dated 10th July 1777.

I have received your Letter, wherein you ſay, that you are informed that I had an entertainment made for my brother's ſon, on account of adopting him as my preſumptive heir, which all the people believe; and that you are very much ſurpriſed at my not communicating ſo material a circumſtance to you. In caſe this was a fact, the Governor lately wrote both me and my brother, that he ſhould be glad to effect a reconciliation between us, on which ſubject he alſo wrote to you. I thought it would be for our intereſt to pleaſe the Preſident, and therefore reſolved to reconcile myſelf to my brother; although my prejudices were very ſtrongly againſt him, for which purpoſe I ſent for him and his ſon *Guzziputty*, and made an entertainment to pleaſe them both. Be aſſured there was nothing ſerious in the adoption, and that our meeting together was merely convivial, for I never

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never gave my Cowle in *Guddiputty*'s name, which I could not do without the Governor and Council's permiſſion, or repreſenting it to you. I am very much ſurpriſed at your writing to me, that you know nothing from me concerning the affair, becauſe I think at our laſt meeting, there was a long converſation between us about it, but I may be miſtaken. What can I ſay more? (A true copy.)

*Nath*l *Barlow*, Secr.

APPENDIX, No. 47.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, 18th of Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

General *Munro* abſent on ſervice.
Mr. *Smith* indiſpoſed.

READ the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

Revenue Department.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In our Letter of the 16th June and 3d ultimo, we expreſſed ſo fully our diſtreſs for caſh, that we had ſanguine hopes of teips or bills from *Madras*, by the influence of your Honour, &c. Council; we are informed, the repreſentatives of *Viziaram Rauze*, and the Havelly Renter *Sitteram Rauze* are in advance, but not having received inſtructions from their Conſtituents, they withhold the kiſts due.

In our Letter of the 3d ult°. we obſerve, "that we are urgent in ſoliciting your aſſiſtance, and in ſtating our diſtreſs, becauſe we have no money to advance our merchants on account of the inveſtments, nor any proſpect of a reſource within ourſelves, for our military payments the enſuing month of Auguſt." It is with concern we inform you, notwithſtanding repeated and preſſing ſolicitations, we have received no money from any of the repreſentatives of the Zemindars now at the Preſidency, ſince we laſt had the honour of addreſſing you, except five thouſand Rupees from *Padnab Rauze*, the repreſentative of *Jaggernaut Rauze*, who is in charge of the *Ancapilly* country. Our inveſtment is at a ſtand for want of money; the pay due to our military muſt have remained in arrears, but that Mr. *Davidſon* has prevailed with thoſe acting for the eſtate of the late Captain *Murphy*, to depoſit into the Company's caſh, for the Chief and Council, notes payable on demand for fourteen thouſand Rupees without intereſt, which, with the five thouſand above-mentioned, will enable us to pay our current expences for the preſent month of Auguſt.

Having been directed, in caſe of urgency to apply to *Gangam* for aſſiſtance, we addreſſed that Board the 14th ultimo; but you will perceive from their reply, incloſed No. 1. that they were not able to comply with our requiſition: ſince the receipt of your Letter of the 24th July, we have again written to them on the ſubject, but we have little reaſon to rely on them for a ſupply, as they informed us their expences are increaſed.

Before we ventured to apply to *Gangam*, the Chief, the 22d June, addreſſed the principal Soucars, deſiring to know of them, whether they could aſſiſt the Government with money on bond, or for their bills on the Preſidency. The replies of the Soucars are unfavourable; and it would appear by the incloſed copies of Letters, No. 2 and 3, from the principal Soucar of the Diſtrict, *Conarra Naick*, that the Rajah, *Viziaram Rauze*, is much involved with him.

In caſe of diſtreſs for treaſure, we requeſt to know, whether we may be permitted to draw on the Preſidency if occaſion offer, or whether we may be allowed to take up money on bond, if we ſhould be able to procure any; we think it neceſſary to apply for leave in ſuch caſe; but in this remote place, even if your permiſſion ſhould be obtained, we have little proſpect of receiving any conſiderable ſum, either for our bills or on bond; our principal reliance is from your influence with the Zemindars at *Madras*, in order to their remitting to us Soucar bills, for the heavy arrears due from the Zemindars. The following is an abſtract of their preſent debts to the end July, viz.

	Rupees.
From *Viziaram Rauze* - - - - -	321,196 5 4
Sitteram Rauze - - - - -	58,750 — —
Jaggernaut Rauze - - - - -	103,030 — —
Jagganaut Dee - - - - -	103,333 5 4
Juggardeo - - - - -	20,742 — —
Ancapilly Zemindary, under the charge of *Jagganaut Rauze* -	42,000 — —
Rupees -	649,051 10 8

We are reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servants,
*Alex*r *Davidſon*,
Hy Crawford,
*Nath*l *Barlow*,
Cha. Maxtone.

Vizagapatam,
Auguſt 5, 1778.

From *Conaroo Naick*, Soucar, to the Chief of *Vizagapatam*, dated *Vizianagrum*, 22d of May 1778.—Received 23d of May 1778.

I have received your Letter, deſiring me to come to you. I have lately received two Letters from my maſter at *Hydrabad*, deſiring me to go to him. In theſe parts, *Viziaram Rauze* is indebted to me, principal without intereſt, three lack and twenty thouſand Rupees to this time; *Jumpana Jaggernaut Rauze*, and *Padnab Rauze*, are alſo indebted to me large ſums; beſides, at *Paleonda*, *Zeekalie*, &c. large balances are due. Such heavy debts being due in this Diſtrict, my maſter is quite tired out and has deſired me to go to him. I intend, after I go to *Paleonda*, &c. to ſettle ſome balances, to come to you to aſk my leave of you, but not being well at preſent, I am unable to proceed there. Such being our ſituation, how can we lend money to thoſe who want it? As you have ſent for me, as ſoon as I am better I will proceed to *Vizagapatam*. I had no occaſion to write ſo much, but you being the Chief, I take the liberty to mention to you my ſituation.

(A true copy.)
Charles Maxtone, Secr.

From *Conaroo Naick*, Soucar, to the Chief of *Vizagapatam*, dated *Vizianagrum*, the 24th of June 1778.—Received 5th of June 1778.

You were pleaſed to write to me, to let you know if I could ſupply you with 50,000 Rupees, either for the Chief and Council's bond, or for their bills on the Governor and Council; in conſequence of which, I acquaint you, the Pooſapally Rajahs are indebted to me the amount of 325,000 Rupees; the Teekaly man and Zemindars, and the Renters of thoſe parts, are indebted to me 125,000 Rupees, and none of theſe balances can be collected. My maſter has drawn on me in favour of certain merchants, which bills I find it out of my power to diſcharge.

If it were in my power to ſerve the Company, I would do ſo with pleaſure, but it being out of my power, I am ſorry I cannot comply with your requeſt.

I wrote to you, that I would come to you; for theſe ſeveral days paſt I have been very ill, and am ſtill much indiſpoſed; have not been able to go to *Palaconda* or *Teckaly*, on account of my ill health.

(A true copy.)
Charles Maxtone, Secr.

To Mr. *Alexander Davidſon*, Chief of the Council at *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 14th inſtant, and are much concerned it is not in our power to aſſiſt you with the ſum of money you have applied to us for, ſince the date of Mr. *Williams*'s Letter to Mr. *Davidſon*, giving him reaſon to expect we might be able to furniſh you with Rupees 50,000. A ſhip has called here, by order of the Honourable Board, for all our ſurplus caſh, and our expences being of late much increaſed, we fear our inability to aſſiſt you for ſome time to come.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Morgan Williams,
Robt Maunſell,
Robt Hughes,
George Foſter.

(A true copy.)
Chas Maxtone, Secr^y.

The Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* having, by Letter of yeſterday's date from the Civil Department, been permitted to draw upon the Preſidency for ſuch ſupplies of caſh as may be neceſſary for their immediate exigencies, it is needleſs to take notice of their preſent application.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

I am happy to acquaint the Board, that a reconciliation has taken place between the two Northern Rajahs, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, which I believe to be ſincere, and hope it will be attended with all the ſalutary conſequences I expect, from the endeavours you have uſed to bring them together. If I wanted any circumſtance to confirm me in my opinion I had formed of the neceſſity of making up the quarrel between the two brothers, and of ſending *Jaggernaut Rauze* to *Vizagapatam* to ſettle the heavy balances due from him with the Chief and Council there, the laſt Letters received from that factory, with an account of the balances and debts due from the *Vizianagrum* family, and *Jaggernaut Rauze* to the Company; the Soucars and individuals will ſufficiently evince the propriety of the meaſures I propoſed to purſue.

The Preſident further informs the Board, that having preſſed *Viziaram Rauze* upon the ſubject of diſcharging his balances to the Company: he, *Viziaram Rauze*, had promiſed to give him an order for that purpoſe upon his agent in the Chicacole Diſtrict; and the Preſident expects to receive it from him in the courſe of a few days.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that he has for ſome time paſt applied himſelf with much attention towards making the neceſſary enquiry into the circumſtances of the ſeveral principal Zemindars dependant on *Maſulipatam*, who are now at the Preſidency, as well with a view of ſtipulating with them for an increaſe of the Company's Jemmabundy, as for the diſcharging their reſpective outſtanding balances: that having nearly completed theſe enquiries, and inveſtigated the claims which ſome of the Zemindars reciprocally make upon one another; he takes this opportunity of acquainting the Board, that he means ſhortly to lay before them a particular account of each Country, with his opinion of the moſt eligible meaſures to be taken regarding it; as he wiſhes that the intention of calling up the Zemindars to the Preſidency ſhould be accompliſhed without loſs of time, that they may be ordered back to their reſpective Diſtricts.

The Board receive with ſatisfaction, this intimation of the Preſident's intentions, and will chearfully co-operate with him upon every occaſion, in meaſures ſo conducive to the advancement of the Company's intereſts, as thoſe which he appears to be deſirous of adopting, with reſpect to the Zemindars dependant on *Maſulipatam*.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 48.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 28th Auguſt 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Preſident reports to the Board, that *Viziaram Rauze* has informed him of his having ſent an order to his ſervants at *Vizagapatam*, for paying immediately a Lack of Rupees into the hands of the Chief and Council there, on account of his balances to the Company.

He alſo acquaints them, that from the diſpoſition which he has of late obſerved in the ſeveral Zemindars dependant on *Maſulipatam*, he entertains the moſt confident hopes of bringing them to acquieſce in an augmentation of the Company's Jemmabundy.

The Board perceive with ſatisfaction, the ſucceſs that has thus far attended the Preſident's negociations with the Zemindars and other Northern tributaries dependant on the Company; and as it is probable that his time may ſhortly be taken up by buſineſs of another nature, they recommended to him to conclude as ſpeedily as poſſible, what he is at preſent engaged in, that the Company's Revenue may be firmly eſtabliſhed upon an advantageous footing, and he be left at liberty to purſue their intereſts in the Military Department.

APPENDIX, No. 49.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 11th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board now reſuming the conſideration of the unlet farms dependant on *Maſulipatam*;—as it is neceſſary, that we ſhould be furniſhed with every information concerning them, to enable us to determine upon the mode of collecting thoſe Revenues in future, it is reſolved, that the Chief and Council be directed to prepare and forward to us without delay, a ſtatement of them for the two laſt years that they have been under their management; ſhewing, what ſums have been due from them each year, with the amount paid for the ſaid time into the Company's caſh, and the balances outſtanding reſpectively at the expiration thereof, diſtinguiſhing in what manner ſuch balances have ariſen, and how ſoon they are likely to be recovered.

Diſpatched

APPENDIX. No. 49.

Diſpatched by Tappies, the following Letter to *Maſulipatam:*

To Mr. *Anthony Sadlier*, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam.*

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 22d July, and 5th and 24th ultimo.

The unlet farms dependant on your Settlement being at preſent under conſideration, and as it is neceſſary that we ſhould be furniſhed with every information concerning them, to enable us to determine upon the mode of collecting theſe Revenues in future, we deſire you will prepare and forward without delay, a ſtatement of them for the laſt two years that they have been under your management, ſhewing what ſums have been due from them each year, with the amount paid for the ſame into the Company's caſh, and the balances outſtanding reſpectively at the expiration thereof, diſtinguiſhing in what manner they have ariſen, and how they are likely to be received. We are,

Gentlemen, &c.

Fort Saint George, 12th Septr 1778. Your affectionate Friends.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 2d October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

Read the following Letter from *Maſulipatam:*

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, *Fort St. George.*

We have been favoured with your commands in your Revenue Department, under date the 12th inſtant.

We incloſe to you the ſtatements of the different farmers, under the form you were pleaſed to ſend us, with however, an additional head, which we judged would throw ſome uſeful lights on this ſubject.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servants,
Anth^{y}. Sadlier,
James Hodges,
Thos Barnard.

Maſulipatam, Sep^{t} 24th 1778.

Mr. *Hodges* delivers in to the Board, the accounts of Nizampatam Diſtrict for the firſt and ſecond years management, after the form reſolved upon; in regard to the third year's buſineſs, the Jemmabundy was not yet ſettled; to do this in a proper manner, it is neceſſary for the Manager to be on the ſpot: we did not proceed to this for ſome time, on account of the preſſing buſineſs of the Settlement, and the Board being left with only three of its Members; he begs to remark, that this is no advantage to the Company. The heavy part of the grain having been ordered here as a garriſon ſtore, which will much aſſiſt the buſineſs of the year, which is indeed a fortunate circumſtance, as the Troops paſſing through this Diſtrict have entirely depopulated it; theſe detachments, inſtead of carrying with them the Coolies they were ſupplied with at their firſt outſet, took from *Nizampatam* one thouſand men, moſt of whom were the cultivators; the plough ſtill remains nearly at a ſtand, eight hundred of theſe not being returned which were carried away by the Troops under the command of Captain *Colliers*; to attempt ſettling the Jemmabundy until the return of its inhabitants would be vain. Mr. *Hodges* would wiſh to give the Board ſome ſatisfaction reſpecting the buſineſs of laſt year, but the preſent military preparations, added to the deſertion of the people, will, doubtleſs, retard the collection; and the withdrawing of all the Revenue's Sepoys muſt ſeverely affect the ſale of our ſalt, which, with ſuch aſſiſtance, was at leaſt one-third of the amount of the profit of this farm. To ſhew by what means this can affect the Revenue on the above article for the year in queſtion, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the ſale of ſalt for that year commenced as uſual 1ſt April, and does not therefore terminate till 31ſt March next. The want of Sepoys, without which this Diſtrict has never been left (or at leaſt for many years back) muſt alſo conſiderably injure the Revenue, by impeding the collections. It is not therefore at the preſent inſtant, from the above circumſtances, in his power to give the Board any ſatisfactory idea of the Company's clear receipts this year from *Nizampatam.*

James Hodges.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, 2d October 1778.

NIZAMPATAM FARM, 1ſt Year of Management, taken Charge of 1ſt September 1775; Jemmabundy ſettled.

Jemmabundy ſettled, or ſums due each Year.	Advances made (or Loans) to begin the Cultivation, and for making of Salt.	Old Rent, or Rent previous to the Farm coming under Management.	Amount paid into Caſh.	Balance due.	Reaſons why due, and when they will be paid, and how theſe Balances aroſe.
Mrd^{s} Pag^{s} 28,109	5,900	19,600			

E. E.
P^{r}
James Hodges, Man^{r}.

APPENDIX. No. 49.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, 2d October 1778.

NIZAMPATAM FARM, 2d Year's Management; Jemmabundy ſettled 14th of July 1777.

Jemmabundy ſettled, or Sums due.	Old Rent.	Advances made (or Loans) to begin the Cultivation, and for making of Salt.	Amount paid into Cash.	Balance due.	Reaſons why due, and when they will be paid; and how theſe Balances aroſe.
21,038	19,600	5,900	2,37,200	3,238	Grain having been at ſo low a price, the inhabitants were deſirous of waiting, with a hope of its riſing; this retarded the ſale of the grain, and of courſe kept back the payments. But here the Manager obſerves, that Renters are not uſed to collect ſo expeditiouſly in this Farm as the Company appear to have done. Theſe balances aroſe from the mode invariably purſued in all our Farms—the inhabitants receive the grain at the market price, and give bonds to the Renter or Manager. This balance will (if no diſturbances ariſe) with much more, be paid into caſh within two months. The rains which poured down like an inundation on this diſtrict laſt September, rolled almoſt the whole of the crop of grain, which is the reaſon the Revenue fell ſhort laſt year.

E. E. *James Hodges*, Man^r.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, 2d October 1778.

GUNDOOR and ACCLAMANAR FARM, 1ſt Year of Management, taken Charge of 1ſt September 1775; Jemmabundy ſettled in the Month of June 1776.

Jemmabundy ſettled, or Sums due each Year.	Advances made (or Sums) to begin the Cultivation.	Old Rent, or Rents previous to the Farms coming under Management.	Amount paid into Cash.	Balance due.	Shewing the Manner in which theſe Balances have ariſen, and how ſoon they are likely to be recovered.
17,213 7 51	1,000 — —	11,200 — —	18,213 7 51		
	2d Year of Management.				
11,955 11 2	3,500 — —	— —	11,440 19 32	4,014 37 50	Part of this balance, nearly the whole, conſiſt in grain; the low price thereof, in all the Circars, for ſome time paſt, has prevented the earlier ſale of it; the whole of it will ſtill be realized, in all probability, in the courſe of three months.
	3d Years Management.				
9,269 27 71	3,500 — —	— —	2,000 — —	10,455 25 63	The Jemmabundy of this year is but recently ſettled; the payments are never made at ſo early a period after it; but there is every reaſon to expect the amount of this balance will be collected within ſix months from the preſent date.

T. Barnard,
per
J. P. Boileau.

APPENDIX.
No. 49.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, 2d October 1778.

BANDARMALANKE, &c. Towns, Farms, 1ſt Year of Management, taken Charge of 1ſt Sepr 1775; Jemmabundy ſettled in the Month of June 1776.

Jemmabundy ſettled, or Sums due each Year.	Advances made, or Sums to begin the Cultivation.	Old Rent, or Rent previous to the Farms coming under Management.	Amount paid into Caſh.	Balance due.	Shewing the Manner in which theſe Balances have ariſen, and how ſoon they are likely to be recovered.
6,164 25 39	700 — —	6,000 — —	6,864 25 39		
	2d Year of Management.				
4,913 26 6	600 — —	— —	5,513 26 6		
	3d Year of Management.				
3,561 28 78	— —	— —	835 11 55	2,726 17 23	The payments are never made immediately upon the ſettling of the Jemmabundy; this happened in the month of July for this Farm, therefore, ſo large a balance will take ſix months to call it in.

Thos Barnard, Man^{r}.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, 2d October 1778.

ENEGODROO FARM, 1ſt Year of Management, taken Charge of 1ſt Septr 1775; Jemmabundy ſettled in the Month of June 1776.

Jemmabundy ſettled, or Sums due each Year.	Advances made, or Sums to begin the Cultivation.	Old Rent, or Rent previous to the Farms coming under Management.	Amount paid into Caſh.	Balance due.	Shewing the Manner in which theſe Balances have ariſen, and how ſoon they are likely to be recovered.
4,356 5 9	500 — —	2,590 — —	4,856 5 9		
	2d Year of Management.				
2,781 33 8	1,500 — —	— —	2,781 33 8	1,500 — —	This balance is the advance to the Farmer for laſt year's cultivation; it is promiſed to be repaid in the courſe of three months.
	3d Year of Management.				
2,260 3 47	— —	— —	218 12 72	2,041 36 55	The Jemmabundy has but lately been ſettled, whence ſo large a balance; the whole will probably be cleared in ſix months time.

Thos Barnard, Pr *A. Pringle.*

Agreed, That the further conſideration of this buſineſs be deferred till Mr. *Cotsford* takes upon him the Chief-ſhip of *Maſulipatam*.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute relative to, and Statement of, the Revenues of the *Maſulipatam* Diſtrict, with the propoſed Jemmabundy for the next 5 years:

The many complaints received on my arrival from the Northern Settlements, the large balances that appeared due from the Zemindars, induced me to propoſe, that the beſt method to ſettle all differences, to ſecure the balances, and to fall on ſome plan for eſtabliſhing a fixed revenue to the Company, would be, to order the Zemindars to the Preſidency.

The Board were pleaſed to agree with me in opinion, and ſeveral of them are accordingly come up. But it appears from enquiry they are ſo loaded with debt, as well to the Company as to individuals, that I obſerve, with great concern, the little proſpect there is of any great increaſe of revenue from their lands, or the ſpeedy payment of what remains due from them; it ſeems abſolutely neceſſary that they ſhould be at ſome certainty, and that for a length of time, what Tribute they are to pay; that their Jemmabundy ſhould be ſettled accordingly, that they may not be liable to frequent calls for making a freſh ſettlement, which is ever attended with inconveniencies and trouble. The ſituation of their ſeveral countries is at preſent in ſuch a ſtate as to require indulgence and time to recover them. I will not determine where miſmanagement has firſt ariſen; but we find in April one payment of the laſt and ſix of the preſent year were due, and not the leaſt part of ſo heavy a debt likely to be received. Since that, another payment has become due, the 31ſt of Auguſt, which greatly increaſes their arrears to the Company. I ſpeak of the Zemindars in the *Maſulipatam* Diſtrict alone, and have been at ſome pains to enquire into their ſeveral circumſtances.

Jagapulle Rauze, of *Peddepore*, is ſaid to be able to

ſettle

ſettle his affairs if time is allowed him, and there is no doubt but the balances due from him will be received; part he is ready now to pay in, and he has agreed to an increaſe of his Jemmabundy, which ſeveral others have followed, as will appear by the account annexed.

Row Venceta Row's country, by good management, is recovering, and he promiſes to make good his balance, and abſolutely objects to an increaſe of Jemmabundy, which he declares his country cannot bear; and this is confirmed by the teſtimony of others acquainted with his ſituation.

Coldinda Trippetty Rauze, was formerly punctual in his payments to the Company, is ſaid to be a good and able Manager of his country, and well verſed in buſineſs, and at little expence for Sibbendy; has been extremely uſeful to the Company's revenues, in aiding the different Chiefs to ſettle the Jemmabundy, by ſubſtituting himſelf ſecurity for Zemindars, who otherwiſe could not have found it; and has hitherto preſerved great influence among the Zemindars; he is ſaid to have loſt conſiderably by the countries under his management, for which he became ſecurity, and has paid on that account what money he may have ſaved by his former good management. At preſent he is much in arrears, both to the Company and his Soucars, and is greatly embarraſſed to make good his payments. He aſſures me, if time is allowed, and he is not much preſſed at preſent, the whole of his debt ſhall be ſoon diſcharged.

Opparow's country has been in the management of other hands, on account of the conſiderable debts due from him; great part of his Zemindary is under the management of *Coldinda Trippetty Rauze*, and the remainder mortgaged to and ſuperintended by different people. His country is ſaid to be a very fine one, capable of great improvement, and of diſcharging its Tribute to the Company when properly taken care of. *Opparow* has not been thought equal to the taſk; he is given up to indolence and expence, and fond of the name of having a large Sibbendy. There ſeems no proſpect of proſperity to his country, or certainty of recovering the Company's balances, but by ſequeſtration under the management of proper perſons, making him an allowance for his maintenance till the country is in ſome meaſure eaſed of the load of debt with which it is now burthened, when he may be again put in poſſeſſion, with proper regulations for ſecuring the Company's rents. And I am of opinion, it ſhould in the ſtrongeſt manner be recommended to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, to take *Opparow*'s ſituation into conſideration, and endeavour to fall on ſuch a plan, either by ſequeſtration or the appointing a proper Manager to ſee the Company's Tribute ſecured, and the private Creditors ſatisfied by an equitable diviſion of the ſurplus revenue, after making a proviſion for *Opparow*'s expences. I am informed the Land Cuſtoms would be ſufficient for that purpoſe, and with which he would be contented till his affairs are retrieved and brought into ſuch order as may allow of his being reſtored to the full poſſeſſion of his Zemindary.

Ramachunder Rauze complains of having had his Jemmabundy raiſed more on former occaſions, in proportion, than the other Zemindars. He, however, gives way to the preſent increaſe, and ſays, he is ready here or at *Maſulipatam* to diſcharge the balance due from him, but is deſirous of having his claim ſettled to the *Cotah* Country, which has been in diſpute between him and another branch of his family.

Codant Ram and *Vaſſereddy Ramanah* have always been punctual in the performance of their engagements to the Company, and may be expected to continue ſo.

I have now mentioned the principal of the Zemindars of the *Maſulipatam* Diſtrict; ſome few of the leſs conſiderable ones are not come up, but I am aſſured they will have no objection to an increaſe of Jemmabundy, in proportion to what the others pay; and it ſhould be recommended to the Chief and Council to ſettle with them accordingly for the ſame term, that Cowles may be granted accordingly.

The heavy balances due from the Zemindars ſeem owing, in ſome meaſure, to their not keeping ſtrictly to their engagements with the Soucars, to whom they are greatly indebted for former payments, and the Soucars, on that account, are not inclined to grant them further Teeps; it will therefore be neceſſary, ſhould the whole of the balance not be ſoon paid after the return of the Zemindars to *Maſulipatam*, that Tajeldars be ſent by the Chief and Council into the ſeveral diſtricts from whence any conſiderable ſums remain due, as well to ſecure the crops for the enſuing year's revenue, as to provide for the payment of what is owing; it being a certain eſtabliſhed rule, that the rents to Government have always a prior claim, and ought to be accounted for before any proviſion is made for other demands.

It is to be wiſhed, and I think ſhould in the ſtrongeſt manner be recommended to Mr. *Cotsford*, at a proper time, to endeavour to ſecure the Company's revenue without the aſſiſtance or interference of the Soucars; who, from the high intereſt and other advantages they receive, acquire a very conſiderable profit on the revenues of the country, oppreſſive to the Zemindar and Landholder, who by this mode is conſtantly burthened with debt, which, from a failure of crop or bad ſeaſon, he can hardly ever relieve himſelf from, and is left at the mercy of the Soucars to ſatisfy the Government. If ſome plan could be formed to ſecure the crop on the Government's account, till by the ſale of the produce the revenue might be provided for, nothing could contribute more to the relief of the Zemindars and the country in general; and I ſhould ſuppoſe it no difficult matter to appoint people on account of the Company for that purpoſe, under proper checks. It would be the intereſt of the Zemindar to prevent all colluſive management; for as ſoon as Government have received their ſhare, which it is his buſineſs to ſee diſpoſed of to the beſt advantage, the greater the ſurplus the more for his benefit, and it becomes entirely his own property: but in his agreements with the Soucars, he is under the neceſſity of ſubmitting to many impoſitions to ſecure their future aſſiſtance whenever Government calls on them for arrears: nor are the Company better ſecured by receiving Teeps from the Soucars; the payment of them is generally for a length of time, and depends upon the ſale of the produce of the lands, which the Soucars have in their hands as ſecurity, and which might as well be taken for the Company.

Some inconveniencies might ariſe at firſt, from the year's revenue being not ſo ſoon brought to account, and ſome difficulty would occur in bringing the Zemindars to conſent to it, after a mode they have long practiſed, but the advantage to them muſt ſoon evidently appear; and from the abilities and knowledge of Mr. *Cotsford*, of the revenue buſineſs in the Northern Circars, I ſhould hope ſo deſirable a change from the preſent mode of receiving the revenue by Soucars Teeps, might be effected. But ſhould this ſcheme be found impracticable, it is abſolutely neceſſary that the Soucars ſhould meet with proper ſupport from Government, which I am afraid has not hitherto been the caſe, and is the reaſon of the failure in payment of *Ramanah Naick*, of the houſe of *Govindoſs*, who now ſtands indebted upwards of eighty thouſand Pagodas to the Company. The Zemindars ſhould be obliged to fulfil their engagements to them, or a total ſtop to their payments and loſs of revenue muſt enſue.

The annexed Statement of Revenue, if it meets with the approbation of the Board, I propoſe to be fixed for five years, that Cowles be granted accordingly, and the Zemindars be directed to proceed to their ſeveral Zemindaries with all expedition, that the cultivation and manufactories for the enſuing year may not ſuffer by a longer abſence. I alſo propoſe, that the ſeveral petitions they have delivered in, relative to the diſputes amongſt themſelves, be taken into conſideration, that we may determine on the merits of them, or refer the deciſion of them to arbitration.

October 1ſt 1778. *Thos Rumbold.*

APPENDIX. No. 49.

FORT SAINT GEORGE,

Propoſed STATEMENT of the JEMMABUNDY in

Rajahmundry Circar.	Mamool or Jemmabundy in the Moor Government.	French and Hyder Jung's Jemmabundy.	Haſnully Cawn's Jemmabundy.
Rajah Jagaputty Rauze, - - - Zemindar of Peddapore - - - -	93493	167098 — —	139740 22 40
Row Vencatarow, - - - - - D° - of Pettapour - - - -	51832	77186 18 —	76249 6 60
Caucurlamoody Atchudaram Rauze D° - of Cotah - - - - -	9646	20316 — —	15626 — —
Caucurlamoody Ramachundra Rauze, D° - of Ramahchundraporam	7657	15954 — —	13525 15 60
Mandapautty Trippetty Rauze, - D° - of Corcondah - - -	4904	9277 9 —	7706 — —
Culdinda Trippetty Rauze, - - D° - of Paroor - - - - -	11403	16500 — —	16500 — —
Reddy Mungaputty D° - - - D° - of Polaram - - - -	6160	10955 18 —	9279 22 40
Reddy Lutchemenarrain D° - - - D° - of Goolalah - - - -	6160	10955 18 —	9279 22 40
Condraigula Vencatarow, - - - Muzumdar and Sircirſhdar of Rajahmundry, for Caſancuroo Village	4352	- - - - -	5112 — —
Angura Brummajey, - - - - Muzumdar and Deſmook of D°, for Villiampollan D° - - - - -	2000	4000 — —	2575 — —
Jellalah Ramiah, - - - - - - Muzumdar of D°, for Salemoody -	120	308 — —	130 — —
Joganah, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - for Balacondah -	- -	- - - - -	- - - - -
Vaudar Somapah - - - - - - Diſpondah of D°, for Vaygayam Pilla Village - - - - - -	870	1610 — —	1001 — —
Sublenevefs Naganah - - - - for Paunnungapilla Village - - -	100	150 — —	131 9 —
Cauzey Mahamed Raffy - - - for Vellah - - - D° - - -	444	150 — —	150 — —
Sadecally Cawn, - - - - - - for Vencataypollam D° - - -	200	300 — —	200 — —
Daumodara Doſs, Soucar, - - - for Maccamala - - D° - - -	35	35 — —	35 — —
Gaumojee Vencataurſoo, - - - for Vondataſaraporam D° - - -	150	300 — —	150 — —
Conaty Nurſewaloo, - - - - for the Diſtrict of Collapilly - -	1250	2817 — —	1452 18 —
Chief and Council of Jaggernautporam - - - - - - - - - -	143	143 — —	143 — —
Ellore and Muſtaphanagur Circars.			
Macca Nurſina Opparow, - - - Zemindar of Noozud - - - -	49000	- - - - -	109650 — —
Culdinda Trippetty Rauze, - - - D° of Muglatoor - - - - -	57300	- - - - -	96400 — —
Cundama Subiah, - - - - - D° of Chaar Mahall - - - - -	- -	- - - - -	29500 — —
Erlagudda Codant Ram - - - D° of Davaracotah - - - - -	12000	- - - - -	17500 — —
Vaſſereddy Ramanah, - - - - D° of Nundegamah - - - - -	- -	- - - - -	19000 — —
Collaracollau Timmarow and Ramahrow - - - - - - - - D° of Bazoura - - - - - -	- -	- - - - -	8450 — —
Soorany Nurſinaarow and Vincatarow, D° of Mylaveram - - - - -	- -	- - - - -	5700 — —
Joopilly Mullarow and Nurſinvarow, D° of Chintalapoody - - - -	2950	- - - - -	4850 — —
Vullunky Sunjeivarow and Mullarow, D° of Varigondah - - - - -	- -	- - - - -	7500 — —
Uppalapaully Vencaputty Rauze, - D° of Telicaiharla - - - - -	300	- - - - -	600 — —
Codant Ram and Nurhurry, - - Diſpondah for Lingagery - - -	- -	- - - - -	250 — —
Kiſſara Vincahamrow, - - - - Deſmook for Moonagalo - - -	- -	- - - - -	1650 — —
Chief and Council of Palicole - - - - - - - - - - - - -	- -	- - - - -	217 — —

N. B. Thoſe Zemindars who are not come to the Preſidency, their Jemmabundy to be ſettled at *Maſulipatam* agreeable to the propoſed Increaſe.

2d October 1778.

the MASULIPATAM DISTRICT for Five Years.

Last Year's Jemmabundy.	Raised 12½ per Cent. or Mamool Jemmabundy.	Present Jemmabundy.	REMARKS.
127969 22 40	11686 27 —	139656 31 40	Agreed.
62720 4 40	- - - - -	62720 4 40	Objects to an Increase of Revenue.
13443 24 60	1202 — —	14645 24 60	Agreed.
11743 6 60	957 4 40	12700 11 20	
6862 13 40	613 — —	7475 13 40	
15235 27 —	1425 13 40	16661 4 40	
8260 — —	770 — —	9030 — —	
8500 — —	770 — —	9270 — —	
5180 — —	544 — —	5724 — —	Agreed.
2550 — —	250 — —	2800 — —	
75 — —	15 — —	90 — —	
- - - - -	- - - - -	200 — —	
1363 — —	100 22 40	1426 4 40	
131 9 —	12 18 —	143 27 —	
150 — —	18 27 —	168 27 —	
200 — —	25 — —	225 — —	Not come to the Presidency.
35 — —	4 13 10	39 13 40	
150 — —	37 18 —	117 18 —	Agreed.
2940 — —	156 9 —	3096 9 —	Agreed.
143 — —	- - - - -	143 — —	Dutch Factory.
92564 18 —	- - - - -	92564 18 —	Country not capable of Increase.
90800 — —	7162 18 —	97962 18 —	Agreed.
24724 18 —	3090 20 20	27815 2 20	Not come to the Presidency.
16130 — —	1500 — —	17630 — —	Agreed.
15125 — —	1890 22 40	17015 22 40	
4343 9 —	542 32 50	4886 6 60	
5175 — —	646 31 40	5765 22 40	
4735 — —	368 27 —	5103 27 —	
5651 — —	706 13 40	6357 13 40	Not come to the Presidency.
450 — —	37 18 —	487 18 —	
496 9 —	24 19 10	220 28 10	
1505 27 —	188 7 70	1693 34 70	
217 — —	- - - - -	217 — —	Dutch Factory.
		564249 11 20	

APPENDIX. No. 50.

APPENDIX, No. 50.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 5th of October 1778.

THE Preſident propoſes, that his Minute relative to, and Statement of, the *Maſulipatam* Diſtrict, be now taken into conſideration.

Read accordingly.

The Preſident informs the Board, he has uſed his utmoſt endeavours to obtain from the Zemindars a larger increaſe of Jemmabundy, and that it is with difficulty he has brought them to agree to 12½ per cent. being added to the Mamool or Jemmabundy under the Mooriſh Government, as expreſſed in the Statement he has delivered in, which he believes is the utmoſt the Country will at preſent bear, when the debt of the Zemindars are conſidered, both to the Company and Individuals; *and he does not think that the preſſing them further at this time would anſwer any other purpoſe than adding to their diſtreſs.*

Agreed, That the Preſident's Minute, together with the Statement of a Revenue accompanying it, and delivered in laſt Conſultation, be now taken into conſideration, that a Jemmabundy may be ſettled, and the ſeveral Zemindars return to their reſpective Diſtricts without delay.

As the exacting terms from the Zemindars, which there is no likelihood of their fulfilling, will render any ſettlement with them that may be determined on, more nominal than real, and be the ſource of endleſs diſappointment to the Government here, and the Company at home, as well as productive of diſtreſs and diſcontent to the Zemindars; all which ought, even in times of Peace, to be guarded againſt, but more eſpecially in the preſent critical ſituation of War, when the unavoidable expences of military operations alone have almoſt exhauſted the Company's Treaſury;—on mature conſideration, the Board are clearly of opinion, that it is not in the power of the *Maſulipatam* Zemindars to make any great increaſe to their Jemmabundy at preſent; and that the endeavouring to draw from them more than they have with ſo much difficulty been prevailed on to pay, would be treating them with a degree of ſeverity that is inconſiſtent with that juſtice and lenity which it has ever been the Company's inclination to ſhew them. It cannot be denied, that in their preſent unfavourable circumſtances they are entitled to our compaſſion, and that every reaſonable indulgence ſhould be exerciſed towards them; but nevertheleſs, particular care ſhould be taken to recover the ſums they ſtand indebted to the Company, in preference to every other demand:

Reſolved, therefore, That the Jemmabundy, agreeable to the Statement of the Preſident, be agreed to, and that Cowles for five years be made out accordingly; and that a Letter, in conſequence, be written to the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*.

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Saml Johnſon,
2d October 1778. *P. Perring.*

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute relative to, and Statement of, the *Chicacole* Circar:

Having already given my ſentiments on the Revenues of the *Maſulipatam* Circar, and the new ſettlement of the Jemmabundy, I ſhall beg leave to offer my opinion with reſpect to the *Chicacole* Circar; and particularly on the *Vizianagrum* Country.

The Havelly lands were granted before my arrival, to *Sitteram Rauze*, on a large increaſe of the Revenue, for a term of ten years. I hope the agreement with him will be punctually fulfilled; but from all accounts I have received, I am led to believe, the deſire of different people to have the Country under their management, have induced them to offer more than the real value will admit of. This method of letting lands to the higheſt bidder often proves deſtructive to the Country, and ends at laſt in a failure of Revenue, and an accumulation of heavy balances from year to year.

The Accounts given in by the Committee of Circuit, lead us to imagine the value of thoſe Countries to be much greater than in reality they are ſaid to be. It is not from accounts collected from different people, ſome of them intereſted, others diſcontented, and wiſhing for a change of Government, that the true value of a country can be eſtimated; the collections alone ought to determine the Jemmabundy to be received. I have found it extremely difficult to bring the two Brothers, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, to conſent to an increaſe of their tribute: They plead their inability on account of their load of debt to Soucars and others, of which they produce proofs, and aſſert their Country is not ſo valuable, nor does not produce ſo conſiderable a revenue as has been repreſented. They will, however, only conſent, after much altercation, to increaſe their preſent tribute of three lacks five thouſand Rupees, which they have hitherto paid, to four lacks five thouſand Rupees.

I was in hopes we ſhould have been able to ſettle a larger amount of revenue for the Company from the *Vizianagrum* Country, but do not believe it poſſible to obtain a further increaſe at preſent. But as the Company may have been led to expect more from the Countries, I wiſh to obtain the ſentiments fully of the Members of the Board on the occaſion; and if any certain mode can be adopted, that may do juſtice to the Rajahs, and at the ſame time add to the Revenue of the Company, I ſhall be happy to join in promoting it; but in our preſent ſituation, of an actual War and exhauſted Treaſury, I am clearly of opinion, that a certain eſtabliſhed Revenue is preferable to any ſpeculative ſchemes, even if they ſhould in the end be productive of a larger tribute; and which probably might be attempted with greater proſpect of ſucceſs, when we have a certainty of tranquillity in the Country, and nothing to apprehend from the views of the French; which, in caſe of the fall of *Pondicherry*, can only be aſſiſted either on the *Malabar* Coaſt or our Northern Settlements, that open immediately to thoſe Powers who are able to afford them aſſiſtance.

The Revenue of the *Kimmedy* Country is well known to have been conſiderably increaſed of late years. I have, however, prevailed on the Dewan of the Rajah, who has been ſent up here, to admit of a further increaſe of Rupees, 6000 per annum; which, I am informed from many accounts, is full as much as the Country is able to bear.

The Dewan is very deſirous of having a Cowle made out, that he may return to his Country, which he repreſents as ſuffering much by his abſence.

Raganaud Jaga Doo, of the *Teekaly* Country, is not yet come up. Should he not arrive, the Jemmabundy muſt be left to be ſettled by the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*.

I have annexed a Statement of the preſent propoſed Revenue of the *Chicacole* Circar, excluſive of the Havelly lands, for the approbation of the Board.

Thomas Rumbold.

October 1ſt 1778.

APPENDIX. No. 51.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, 2d October 1778.

Propoſed STATEMENT of the Jemmabundy in the Vizagapatam Diſtricts, for Five Years.

Chicacole Circar.	Laſt Year's Jemmabundy.	Raiſed.	Preſent Jemmabundy.	Remarks.
Rajah Viziaram Rauze, Rem^{r} of: Vezianacaram Bogapoor, &c. Diſtricts; Madagole Singaram Cohah, &c. D°; Nundaporam Curupaum, &c. D°; Bobbilly Rajaum, &c. D°; Palacondah Veeracotam, &c. D°; Worllah, &c. D°; Golgundah, &c. D°; Ancapilly, &c. D°	250,000 — —	100,000 — —	405,000 — —	Agreed.
	50,000 — —			
	5,000 — —			
	65,000 — —	25,000 — —	90,000 — —	D°
Jaganaud Doo, Rem^{r} of Kemedy D°	80,000 — —	6,000 — —	86,000 — —	
Raganaud Jago Doo D° of Tecklay D°	20,000 — —	— — — —	20,000 — —	
		Total R^{s}	601,000 — —	

Ten thouſand Rupees annually to be paid from the Ancapilly and Saleaveram Diſtricts to the Family Pyakarow, to be received into the Company's Treaſury from Viziaram Rauze, and paid to the Family in quarterly payments.

APPENDIX, No. 51.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 6th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.
General *Munro* on ſervice.

MINUTES of laſt Conſultation read.

The Preſident propoſes that his Minute relative to, and Statement of, the *Chicacole* Circar, be now taken into conſideration.

Read accordingly.

Read the following Petition from *Viziaram Rauze:*

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

The humble Addreſs of Murjah Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, Bahadar, Manna Sultan.

During the recent prevalency of my bad luck, and through the ill fortune which attended me, I was induced to rely upon my ſervant *Jaggernaut Rauze*, and employed him confidentially in the management of all my affairs; who availing himſelf hereof, with ſiniſter views, and attentive to his own intereſt, did breed and foment the diſſonancy which lately took place between me and my brother; and the world is too firmly convinced of the truth of this circumſtance to need any comment.

From the time of our anceſtors to this period, we have preſerved and acquired freſh inſtances of the Honourable Company's friendſhip and protection, and with a view to diſtinguiſh our ſteady attachment and dependance on them, the Company did likewiſe graciouſly condeſcend to ſhew us every manner of countenance and favour; but *Jaggernaut Rauze*, in hopes of prejudicing the Company againſt me and my brother, and deſirous that we might forget their favours and good-will, did ſpuriouſly and maliciouſly inſinuate many and divers ill-grounded ſuggeſtions to the Gentlemen at *Vizagapatam*, who giving implicit faith to ſuch his miſrepreſentations, were led thereby to magnify matters in their repreſentations to the Preſidency; and the Board truſting, was pleaſed to iſſue orders for my ſurrendering up my fort, guns, ſmall arms, ammunition, ſtores, &c. to the Honourable Company. In purſuance thereto, from a ſenſe of my dependance on them, to exhibit a proof of my cheerfulneſs to ſubmit both my life and fortune to their pleaſure, and to ſhew a ready compliance with their injunctions, I obeyed their orders to me without heſitation, flattering myſelf to prove my innocency in courſe of time.

To witneſs our ſteady attachment to the Company, and to evince our dependance on them, I beg leave to refer your Honour, &c. to our conduct and behaviour during *Colonel* Torde's *campaign* in the Northern Circars, and at the time Captain *Cajemere* quelled ſome diſturbances in the *Chicacole* Circar; of all which your Honour, &c. will be fully convinced on conſulting impartial perſons, and referring to the Company's Records.

I am neither alarmed, nor in any ſhape anxious on account of my fort being garriſoned by the Company's Troops, any farther than by reaſon of the Soucars, who are inhabitants of my country, and the Pooligars, who occupy the hills, being led to put unfavourable conſtructions thereon, and drawing preſumptive concluſions, implying the Company's having withdrawn their favour and protection from me, and therefore refuſe their wonted ſubjection; by which my dignity and rank is materially decreaſed: therefore, to convince the world of the Company's retaining their accuſtomed favour and confidence towards me, it will be an eſſential ſtep to reſtore back my fort, and to ſupport my rank and degree.

The late *Rambudra Poyakerow*, of *Ancapillee* and *Satevaram* Diſtricts, proving backward in the payment of his Jemmabundy, and being actually indebted to the Company in the amount of two years Tribute, Mr. *John Andrews*, then Chief of *Vizagapatam*, ſummoned him thither, and demanded the payment of this heavy balance; but *Rambudra Poyakerow* replied, "that he had "no money, the Soucars would give him no credit, and "that it was beyond his power to procure the money;" adding,

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adding, " that he had his country and poſſeſſions, which, " excepting Mr. *Andrews* prevailed on ſome perſon to " hold in mortgage to guarantee the ſame to them, and " through that means to recover the ſum due from him, " that he ſaw no other expedient left for being paid the " money." Hereupon Mr. *Andrews* ſent for us, and communicated the purport of *Poyakerow*'s declaration; adding, that the Company's money ſhould be recovered at all events; therefore, that as we were firmly attached to the Company's intereſt, we ought to accept theſe diſtricts in mortgage, and thereon to make good the amount due to the Company; and ſupported his arguments in very ſtrong terms. To which we replied, that *Rambudra Poyakerow* was always ſlow in ſatisfying thoſe who had ever contributed to the ſupport of his poſſeſſions, therefore begged he would not involve us in ſo intricate an affair as the nature hereof was; but that in hopes of augmenting the Company's favour, and in deference to his recommendation, we would willingly make *Rambudra Poyakerow* a preſent of five thouſand Rupees, and leave him to procure and pay the reſidue. Mr. *Andrews* reiterated hereto, that *Rambudra Poyakerow* could not procure the money; therefore, that if we accepted the mortgage of theſe diſtricts, and paid the Company the ſum due to them, we would in that caſe ſhare the Company's favour in a higher degree; that we need not be under any apprehenſions of *Poyakerow* uſing deception in this tranſaction, for that he (Mr. *Andrews*) would procure it to be guaranteed to us by the Governor and Council; that no perſon or perſons whatever ſhould be permitted to interfere with the management of the country revenues, until the full and total diſcharge of our debt, principal and intereſt included; and added many other arguments to the ſame effect; which in the end induced us to acquieſce therewith, in hopes of inſuring to us the Company's favour and protection. Accordingly we accepted the mortgage of theſe diſtricts, and paid the Company the whole of *Poyakerow*'s balance to that period; from which time hitherto I punctually pay to the Company the fixed Tribute for *Ancapillee* and *Sattevaram*, at the ſtated periods with the payment made for my own country; have always obtained the Company's receipts for the ſums thus paid by me, and likewiſe uſually received the Cowles for thoſe diſtricts. Agreeable to Mr. *Andrews*'s engagement, he procured for us a guarantee of the mortgage from the Preſident and Council, during the government of Mr. *Dupré*.

To this period of time there is a balance of about ten lacks of Rupees due to me from theſe mortgaged diſtricts; therefore, as both *Rambudra Poyakerow* and his ſon *Uppala Poyakerow* are dead, and as no iſſue of their body are ſurviving, and moreover, as none of their kin or relations are able to pay off my debt, or to manage the country; I therefore beg leave to obſerve, that it will be equally agreeable to me, that either the Company retain theſe diſtricts in their own poſſeſſion and pay me my heavy debt, or that they will be pleaſed to annex *Ancapillee* and *Sattevaram* to my own country, and give them up to me as a part of my Zemindary, and inſert them in the Grant or Cowles given me for my country. Of either of the modes, that which your Honour, &c. think proper to adopt, ſhall be agreeable and acceptable to me. If your Honour, &c. determine on the latter, I agree to increaſe the former Jemmabundy from 65,000 to 80,000 Rupees per annum, and for the ſupport of the relations of the late *Poyakerow*, I will engage to pay them yearly in four Kiſts, the ſum of ten thouſand Rupees.

I lately gave *Jaggernaut Rauze* ſome writing under my hand, relating to the foregoing buſineſs, for ſome particular reaſons; which papers, and likewiſe thoſe I had given my brother regarding the ſame affair, *I beg may be returned to me as void, and this alone to continue in full force and virtue.* Your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to take the foregoing ſubject into your ſerious conſideration, and determine therein.

It having been cuſtomary in my family, for the Rajahs, during their lives, to inveſt their heirs with full power and title to their Zemindaries and Rajahſhips, making all grants, deeds, and writings, and tranſactions of buſineſs of all kinds, in the name and with the ſeal of the new-appointed Rajah, from the day of his appointment; thereby preventing ill-deſigning ſervants or people from altering by intrigues the ſucceſſion after the deceaſe of the Rajah, contrary to his intention—Having no children of my own, I have made my brother's ſon my heir, and your Honour, &c. are already appriſed of my having, conformable to this cuſtom, in April laſt year, appointed my ſaid brother's ſon, *Nurſemah Guzziputty Rauze*, the Rajah and ſole Proprietor of my Zemindary; alſo, that I nominated and augurated him in the Rajahſhip, cauſed the ſeals and ſignatures, Cowles and Cuthpaws, bonds for monies borrowed and lent, and all other paper and papers whatever, to be executed in his name ſolely, and which your Honour, &c. are ſenſible, is now the practice and method I make uſe of in tranſacting every buſineſs. Nevertheleſs, it is indiſpenſably neceſſary, that *Nurſemah Guzziputty Rauze* be veſted with the right and title to the government of my Zemindary, formally by your Honour, &c. and that you grant him a Commiſſion of Rajahſhip, and alſo that you give all future Cowles in his name, for any ſtipulated Tribute [illegible] may be hereafter agreed on, in the ſame manner as Cowles were granted to me during my minority, and to Rajahs of my family appointed during the life-time of their fathers, in the time of the Mooriſh Government, viz. to *Vizi'aram Rauze*, appointed by *Anunda Rauze*, both whom were appointed in the life-time of their fathers, in the ſame ample manner as I have appointed *Nurſemah Guzziputty Rauze*. The procuring the Board's confirmation has been hitherto procraſtinated on account of the diſſonancy excited by *Jaggernaut Rauze* between me and my brother; but as all manner of difficulties and diſagreements are effectually and entirely removed between us, and we are become firm friends, I repeat my requeſt, that your *Honour, &c. will be graciouſly* pleaſed to confirm and guarantee my ſaid appointment of *Nurſemah Guzziputty Rauze*, and grant a Senud, or Commiſſion of Rajahſhip, in favour and in the name of *Nurſemah Guzziputty Rauze*. As I am ignorant of your rules in drawing and preparing the ſaid Senud or Commiſſion of Rajahſhip, I leave that important and weighty matter to you, and deſire you will cauſe the ſaid Senud to be written in very ſtrong terms, leaving no clauſe that will admit of diſpute in after times, but to render it of force and virtue to himſelf and heirs for ever, only reſerving to me the management of the affairs of the Zemindary, on condition that I and my brother *Sitteram Rauze* become ſecurity for the punctual payment of Rajah *Nurſemah Guzziputty*'s Tribute to the Honourable Company.

By reaſon of my brother and I remaining here, the affairs of my country cannot be conducted with propriety and efficacy; therefore, after taking theſe points into your ſerious conſideration, I beg your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to permit me to return thither.

As my brother will remain here, I beſeech your Honour, &c. will be pleaſed to give your attention to ſuch repreſentations as he may find neceſſary to make regarding all my affairs, he being fully authorized and empowered to act for me in all matters whatſoever: And alſo I beg you will comply with his requeſt, and permit him to follow me ſpeedily. During the time I and my brother differed in ſentiments, *Jaggernaut Rauze* came thither, and preſented divers papers; ſince my arrival, I alſo preſented others; but as I hold them all unſerviceable and too puerile, I beg they may be returned back to me, and this paper alone held in force and conſequence.

The foregoing I humbly ſubmit to your Honour, &c. and beſeech your compliance with all and every part thereof. What can I ſay more?

The Board taking into conſideration the Petition of

Viziaram Rauze, delivered in Conſultation, have come to the following Reſolution on the points therein contained:

That the fort of *Vizianagrum*, being a very inconſiderable fortification, be delivered up by the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, to the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, upon conditions that the baſtions and walls remain in their preſent ſituation.

The Preſident obſerves, That ſince the delivering in of the Petition of *Viziaram Rauze*, he has obtained from them a verbal agreement, that they will pay to the Company 90,000 Rupees per annum for the *Ancapilly* Zemindary, and 10,000 Rupees per annum at ſtated payments, to the family of *Poyakerow*; which, he is of opinion, ſhould be ſo ſecured to them as to prevent any failure of payment in future.

Reſolved, That the *Ancapilly* and *Sittevaram* Zemindary be granted to the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, agreeable to the prayer of his Petition, on the conditions abovementioned, and for the ſecurity of the ſtipend to the family of *Poyakerow*.

Reſolved, That the ſame be received into the Company's Treaſury at *Vizagapatam*, and be paid by the Chief and Council there to the family, in quarterly payments.

Reſolved, That all ſuch Letters and Petitions as have been given into the Preſident and Council, cannot, on any account, be returned.

Reſolved, That *Viziaram Rauze*'s appointment of *Venkemah Guzziputty Rauze* to the Zemindary of *Vizianagrum*, be confirmed, ſo far as is conſiſtent with the rights, privileges, and cuſtoms of their own lands; and that all Cowles in future be made out in the name of *Venkemah Rauze*; and that *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze* be required to ſecurity in the manner they have propoſed for the Tribute of the Company; and that *Viziaram Rauze* continue in the management of the Zemindary.

Agreed, That the Rajahs *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze* be called before the Board, and that every endeavour be uſed to prevail on them, if poſſible, to conſent to a larger increaſe of Jemmabundy.

The Rajahs, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, called before the Board.

The Board repreſents, in the ſtrongeſt terms, to the Rajahs, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, the neceſſity there is for a larger increaſe of Jemmabundy; that they are willing to ſhew them every attention and friendſhip that can be conſiſtently ſhewn, but ſtill they expect their compliance in a matter which they cannot by any means conſider oppreſſive, but, on the contrary, no more than an act of juſtice to the Company.

But the Rajahs, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, objecting to a larger increaſe of Jemmabundy,—that great part of their country is hilly and woody, and its ſeveral paſſes into the Marattas and other countries, require more than double the Sibendy of the *Maſulipatam* Diſtricts, which are all plain countries; that their hill countries are all ſo very unwholeſome, that no truſt-worthy Sibendy or Servants will remain there, but at an extraordinary allowance; that by engaging for more than they were able to pay, it would involve them in unſurmountable difficulties, and ſubject both their own affairs and the Company's to uncertainty and confuſion; and depending, further, from a former experience of the Company's protection and friendſhip, that they will not in the preſent inſtance diſcredit the repreſentations they have faithfully made; the Board are reduced to the diſagreeable neceſſity of declaring, That their beſt endeavours have been uſed to raiſe the Jemmabundy, and are ſorry that they have proved ineffectual, and that there ſeems to be little (if any) proſpect of a larger increaſe of Jemmabundy. Agreed, however, that the Preſident do once more endeavour to prevail on them to raiſe it.

Reſolved, therefore, That *Viziaram Rauze* be directed to repair with all poſſible expedition to his own country, ſo ſoon as the Cowles ſhall be made out; and that it be particularly recommended to the Rajahs, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, to diſcharge their heavy balance that remain due to the Company.

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The Board taking into conſideration the neceſſity of *Viziaram Rauze*'s defraying the expences of the expedition under Colonel *Braithwaite*, agreed, That the Accountant be ordered to make out an eſtimate of the extra expences of the ſaid expedition for the inſpection of the Board.

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Saml Johnſon,
P. Perring.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, Friday, November 13, 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill, Eſq.
Major Gen. *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

SENT by Tappies the following Letter to *Vizagapatam*, dated Nov. 13th:

Mr. *Alexander Davidſon*, Chief, &c. Council of *Vizagapatam*.

Gentlemen,

You will order the fort of *Vizianagrum* to be delivered up to the charge of any perſon Meerjah Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* ſhall appoint to receive it; and you will likewiſe order the *Ancapilly* and *Sattevaram* Diſtricts to be given up to any perſon *Viziaram Rauze* ſhall think proper to be intruſted with them till his arrival at *Vizagapatam*.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 8th October 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Governor. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.
General *Munro* on ſervice.

MINUTES of laſt Conſultation read.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that ſince the laſt Conſultation he has exerted his utmoſt endeavours, and renewed his former arguments with additional force, to prevail upon the Rajahs, *Viziaram Rauze* and *Sitteram Rauze*, to conſent, if poſſible, to a larger increaſe of Jemmabundy; but finding, notwithſtanding his moſt preſſing ſolicitation upon this ſubject, that they ſtill continue inflexible, he entirely deſpairs of ſucceſs upon any further endeavours at preſent.

The Board, in conſequence of the repreſentations of the Preſident, ſeeing no probability of prevailing upon the Rajahs, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, to increaſe the Jemmabundy higher than four lack and five thouſand Rupees; Reſolved, That the ſame be accepted for the countries at preſent under *Viziaram Rauze* in the *Chicacole*

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Circar, for the term of five years, and that Cowles be made out accordingly.

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 53.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*, 13th October 1780.

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

WE addreſſed you yeſterday from on board the *Sartine*; this morning we came on ſhore. We find ourſelves in a predicament which we conceive dangerous: the revolt of the Grenadiers, of which we adviſed you, is in all reſpects an event that may lead to dangerous conſequences: it has annihilated our power and influence in a great meaſure; at any rate, it has received ſuch a ſhock, that we feel ourſelves degraded as a Government. The conduct of the mutineers was adopted by five Companies of the 1ſt Circar battalion, that happened to be in garriſon here; they are all gone off with them, except about 40 men, and even thoſe joined the inſurgents; and as this revolt took place when we had not the leaſt idea that ſuch a diſpoſition prevailed in the Troops, it is not improbable but that the remains of the 1ſt battalion and 5th battalion, now at *Chicacole*, have adopted ſimilar opinions. On a review of the general ſtate of affairs on the Coaſt, the War with the Marattas and *Hyder*, and the probability of a French force landing, it is not drawing an improbable concluſion, to ſuppoſe, that the Zemindars may avail themſelves of this criſis of events, and throw off their allegiance. We are here without any reſources either of men or money; the former we ſuſpect, and for the latter we depend alone on the Zemindars. We have now ſtated to you, our ſituation; and we add, that all we have to truſt to is, the attachment of 300 Sibbendy Sepoys, and half of them are now detached. In this repreſentation we have not, in our opinion, either exaggerated in points of real ſtate or conjecture: we therefore requeſt of you, Gentlemen, that you will determine on ſome plan of operations for us to purſue. The revolt has ſo effectually deranged this Government, and ſo reduced our conſequence, that we imagine ſome meaſures ought to be adopted that will give us the importance we have loſt; and we can think of no other ſtep ourſelves, than procuring us ſome Sepoys, and about 50 Europeans from *Calcutta*, or ſending Southern people here, and ordering all the Sepoys in theſe diſtricts to the Southward. Sitteram Rauze *is not yet arrived at* Vizagapatam; *he keeps away in a manner that has the appearance of premeditated delay*; *all theſe matters ſerve to create in us, anxiety about the fate of this Settlement.* And *Shaik Mahomed*, the man who heads the revolted Sepoys, is gone off with a great deal of money; is capable, daring, and full of enterprize, and what are his intentions, is not at preſent to be conjectured. By this day's intelligence, *he has taken the road to Ankapile*, and it is very probable that he has written to the Sepoys at *Chicacole* of his ſucceſs; at any rate, common report favours that ſuſpicion. Could the *Sartine* ſtay here until this Government was again re-eſtabliſhed, it would be of much aſſiſtance to the Settlement, in caſe of an unfortunate event; but the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced, that Captain *Mackay* cannot venture to ſtay here longer than to-morrow, without violating his inſtructions; in juſtice to him, however, we muſt obſerve, that he has been ready in his offers of aſſiſtance, and the preſence of the *Sartine* contributed to render the revolt leſs permanent. We have nothing further to add on the ſtate of the Settlement, but that we wait your orders and reſolutions with ſome degree of anxiety; and the ſcene that was exhibited here for 24 hours, warrants us in our apprehenſions of every kind.

By the maſſacre of Mr. *Rutherford*, there is a vacancy of the paymaſterſhip of *Chicacole*. Mr. *Gregory* has been a long time an aſſiſtant at this place, and has ſuffered in his property, as well as every individual here; we therefore take upon ourſelves to mention him as a proper ſucceſſor to this vacant office.

We have the honour to tranſmit you a duplicate of our addreſs, dated yeſterday.

Captain *Brule*, of whom we wrote yeſterday, is deſirous of proceeding to *Madras*, to vindicate his conduct; and we believe, that had he offered his ſervices on the day of the revolt, he would have been attended to. We recommend him for forgiveneſs, and to have ſome allowance as a ſubſiſtence. He takes his paſſage on the *Sartine*.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
J. H. Caſamajor,
Henry Crawford,
Charles Maxtone.

Vizagapatam,
5th October 1780.

The Committee are much concerned at the mutiny which has happened among the Grenadier Sepoys at *Vizagapatam*.

Reſolved, That the *Nancy*, ketch, be immediately ſent down there, with 50 European Invalids for that garriſon, and that the Reſident at *Ganjam* be directed to ſend 25 or 30 Coffrees from that place.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. *Caſamajor*, Chief of *Vizagapatam*, to Mr. *Whitehill*, Governor of *Fort Saint George*, dated 9th October 1780.

Sel. Conſ. 18th October 1780.

You have been addreſſed by the Chief and Council here, under date the 4th and 5th inſtant, relative to the unfortunate and unexpected revolt of the four companies of Grenadiers. All ſeems quiet here at preſent; but this event has raiſed ſuch a general ſuſpicion of all the Sepoys, that we know not where to place any confidence. Thoſe at *Chicacole* are moſt of them related and connected with the mutineers; and when you conſider, that out of four companies of Grenadiers, and five battalion companies of the firſt battalion, there were but a few who did not join the mutineers; I am ſure it warrants every apprehenſion of the remaining eleven companies of the two battalions at *Chicacole* and *Maringy*. There was an univerſal and complete plunder of all the property belonging to the Company and European inhabitants. All the Company's caſh in the treaſury, amounting to Rupees 21,922. 11. 9. and the money of ſome of the Employers fell into the hands of the inſurgents; and in the wreck of all property, all the Company's broad cloth, and a large proportion of the Civil and Military ſtores, fell into the poſſeſſion of the plunderers. The inhabitants of the place were as active in this ſcene as the inſurgents; and quantities of broad cloth, firelocks, &c. are hourly brought in. My own loſs amounts to 5,000 Pagodas; and the other Gentlemen have alſo ſuffered conſiderably.

As ſoon as poſſible, a complete account of the public loſs ſhall be tranſmitted, and the orders and regulations we have iſſued ſince the revolt. Among other expedients, we have raiſed for the preſent 100 Gun Peons, who have families in the town, and with the aſſiſtance of the Sibendy they at preſent ſerve to garriſon this place, as our confidence in the regular Sepoys is for a time loſt; nor can any detachment be well ſpared from *Chicacole*, as the two battalions are now reduced to eleven companies, and two of them detached to *Maringy*. The mutinous party, under *Shaik Mahomed*, were by the laſt accounts entering into the *Yotapilly* country. The Rajah, *Viziaram Rauze*, has written to all the little Zemindars to ſtop them;

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ther - but they yet compoſe a ſtrong body, and it is not a trifling force that can oppoſe them. I have written to Colonel *Stoddard* and Captain *Bridges*; and as they will probably paſs near *Samul Cotah*, I am in hopes ſome of them may be picked up and puniſhed. They evidently are going to the Nizam's country, or through the Guntoor Circar to *Cuddapah*.

Captain *Lane* is directed to recruit up the battalion to the eſtabliſhment, and to conſider the mutinous companies as annihilated; and to receive only ſuch of them as preſerved their fidelity into the ſervice again, who are alſo to be rewarded with one month's pay.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 6th November 1778.

READ the following Letter from *Vizagapatam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In your Honour and Council's Letter of the 6th Auguſt, you direct us to acquaint you what ſums have been received from the Agents of the Zemindars, ſince their departure from the Vizagapatam Diſtrict to the Preſidency: alſo to inform you what ſums have been received on account of the Chicacole Havelly from *Sitteram Rauze*. By the incloſed account, N° 1, we have ſtated the ſums received from the Zemindars ſince their departure. N° 2. contains a Sketch of the ſeveral accounts with the Zemindars, calculated according to the tenor of their laſt Cowles, ſerving to ſhew, that their arrears amounted at leaſt to the balances ſpecified in the accounts current.

We are in daily expectation of a Teep from *Vencatty Rauze*, the repreſentative of the Rajah, for ſixty thouſand Rupees, on account of *Sitteram Rauze*.

Callagarah Veneatuchellum has been made acquainted with your having accepted of his propoſals for renting the farms of *Wattarah Wallaire* and the *Vizagapatam* Salt Pans, and his Cowles have been received.

Agreeably to your commands we again iſſued advertiſements for letting the farms of *Upparah*, the Beetle and Tobacco, and Arrack farms, for the term of five years; we have accepted the propoſal of *Anoopindee Vincaiah* for *Upparah*, that of *Baddaty Comiah* and *Bollipillee Boochinnah*, for the Arrack, and that of *Mulla Mudagala Oſſanah* for the Beetle and Tobacco, &c.; judging their propoſals the moſt eligible and advantageous for the Honourable Company: we requeſt their Cowles may be ſent to us. Copies of the propoſals of the above-mentioned perſons make a number of this packet, N° 3.

The late Dewan of the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze*, *Jagganaut Rauze*, whom you mention in your Letter of the 9th Auguſt, to have intended to ſend to *Vizagapatam*, not having arrived here, we have been prevented from demanding of him a ſettlement of his accounts. We furniſhed Mr. *Williams* with the ſubſtance of your commands, relative to a tranſaction ſaid by *Jagganaut Rauze* to have paſſed between him and Mr. *Williams*, while acting Chief of *Vizagapatam*: we incloſe a copy of that Gentleman's reply, N° 4, to a Letter addreſſed to him by our Secretary.

From the ſmall ſums for which we have drawn upon you, the money you have remitted by bills, and from the large payments we have reaſon to expect at this ſeaſon, we are glad to inform you, that we have not now any immediate apprehenſions of being in diſtreſs for means to pay our military, or for advances on account of the inveſtment.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Alex^r. Davidſon,
Hy. Crawford,
Chas. Maxtone.

P. S. Since writing the above we are glad to inform you, that the expected Teep on account of *Sitteram Rauze* has been received.

An ACCOUNT of the Sums received from the following Zemindars and Renters of the Chicacole Circar ſince their Departure from the Diſtrict.

	Viziaram Rauze, Rajah of Vizeanagrum, &c.		
1778.			
Sept. 7th.	Rupees	15,000 — —	
17th.	Soucar Bills for Rupees	47,864 — —	
			62,864 — —
	Sitteram Rauze, Renter of the Havelly Lands.		
May 1ſt.	Soucar Bills for Rupees	59,000 — —	
Oct. 7th.	Rupees	5,000 — —	
			64,000 — —
	Jagganaut Rauze, Manager of the Ancapillee Zemindary, on Account of the Collections from that Zemindary.		
May 21.	Rupees	353 — —	
July 7.	Ditto	4,952 — —	
Aug. 31.	Ditto	9,960 — —	
Sept. 30.	Ditto	2,822 — —	
Oct. 14.	Ditto	4,200 — —	
			22,287 — —
		Rupees	149,151 — —

Errors excepted.
H^y. Crawford, Accomp^t.

Vizagapatam,
15th Oct. 1778.

N. B. Rupees 4,647, received the 21ſt May on Account of the Collections, and carried it to the Credit of Pyakerow, being the Remainder in full of the Balance due on his Cowle, ending 25 Sept. 1777.

Since cloſing the above Account, received a Teep on Ramaſhuſhu Naick, from the Agent of Sitteram Rauze, for Rupees 55,000 the 19th inſtant, on Account of the Chicacole Havelly.

APPENDIX. No. 54.

Dr. Viziaram Rauze, Rajah of Vizeanagrum, &c. in Account Current with the Honourable Company. Cr.

1777. Sept. 25.	To Arrears due from him on his laſt Cowle, which expired the 25th September 1777			1778. Sept. 7.	By Caſh received in further Part of the 3d and laſt Kiſt, due the 25th Auguſt 1777		
1778.	To his Tribute, calculated according to his laſt Cowle		53,333 5 4				15,000 — —
				17.	By Bills receivable in full of the 3d and laſt Kiſt		38,333 5 4
					By D°, D° on Account		9,530 10 8
Feb. 25.	1 Kiſt, due 25 Feb.	101,666 10 8					62,864 — —
May 25.	2 Ditto, 25 May	101,666 10 8					
Aug. 25.	3 Ditto 25 Auguſt	101,666 10 8	305,000 — —	Oct. 15.	By Balance due to the Hon. Company		295,469 5 4
	Rupees		358,333 5 4		Rupees		358,333 5 4

Dr. Jagganaut Deo, Zemindar of Kimmedy, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. Cr.

1777. Sept. 25.	To Balance of his laſt Cowle, ending 25 September 1777		52,267 — —	1778. May 6th.	By Caſh received in further Part of 3d Kiſt, due 31ſt March 1777		7,000 — —
	To his Tribute, calculated according to his laſt Cowle			Oct. 15.	By Balance due to the Honourable Company		125,267 — —
Nov. 30th.	1ſt Kiſt, due 30th November 1777	14,000 — —					
1778. Jan. 31ſt.	2d Kiſt, due 31 January 1778	13,000 — —					
Mar. 31ſt.	3d D°, 31 March	13,000 — —					
May 31.	4th D°, 31 May	13,000 — —					
July 31ſt.	5 D°, 31 July	13,000 — —					
Sept. 25.	6 D°, 25 September	14,000 — —					
			80,000 — —				
	Rupees		132,267 — —		Rupees		132,267 — —

Dr. Juggadeo, Zemindar of Teckaly, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. Cr.

1776. Sept. 25.	To Balance of his former Cowle, ending 25 September 1776		742 — —	1778. Oct. 15.	By Balance due to the Honourable Company		40,742 — —
1777. Sept. 25.	To Amount of laſt Cowle for One Year, ending 25th September 1777, no part of which has yet been paid		20,000 — —				
1778. Sept. 25.	To his Tribute, calculated according to his laſt Cowle		20,000 — —				
	Rupees		40,742 — —		Rupees		40,742 — —

Dr. Sitteram Rauze, late Renter of Chicacole, Julmore, &c. Diſtricts, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. Cr.

1776. Sept. 25.	To Balance due from him on this Account		R' 64,530 — —	1778. Oct. 15.	By Balance due to the Honourable Company		R' 64,530 — —

The above Sum Viziaram Rauze has promiſed to diſcharge.

Dr. Jagganaut Rauze, late Renter of the Havelly Lands, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. Cr.

1777. Sept. 25.	To Balances due from him on this Account		103,030 — —	1777. Oct. 15.	By Balance due to the Honourable Company		103,030 — —

Of this Sum Viziaram Rauze has promiſed, by a Letter, to pay Rupees 40,000.

APPENDIX. No. 54.

Dr. - - Sitteram Rauze, the preſent Renter of the Havelly Lands, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. - - Cr.

1778.			1778.		
Feb. 25th.	To the Amount of 1ſt Kiſt. which became due the 25 February - -	58,750 — —	May 1ſt.	By a Bill received on Canaroo Naick, Soucar - - - - - - - - -	59,000 — —
April 25.	To Ditto, 2d Ditto, due 25th April -	58,750 — —	Oct. 7th.	By Caſh received - - - - - -	5,000 — —
Aug. 25.	To Ditto, 3d Ditto, due 25th Auguſt	58,750 — —			64,000 — —
			15th.	By Balance due to the Honourable Company - - - - - - - -	112,250 — —
	Rupees -	176,250 — —		Rupees -	176,250 — —

N. B. Since cloſing the above Account, received a Teep on Ramaſhaſha Naick, from the Agent of Sitteram Rauze, for Rupees 55,000, the 19th Inſtant, on Account of the Chicacole Havelly.

Dr. - - Ancapille Zemindary, at preſent under the Charge and Management of Jugganaut Rauze, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. - - Cr.

1778.			1778.		
	To the Tribute, calculated according to the Terms of laſt Cowle to the laſt Pyakerow.		May 1ſt.	By Caſh received of Jagganaut Rauze, on Account Collections made by him from that Zemindary - - -	353 — —
Feb. 25.	Due the 25 February - - - - -	21,000 — —	July 7.	By Caſh received of Jagganaut Rauze, on Account Dº - - - - - -	4,952 — —
May 25.	Due the 25 May - - - - - -	21,000 — —	Aug. 2.	By Caſh received of Jagganaut Rauze, on Account Dº - - - - - -	5,000 — —
Aug. 25.	Due the 25 Auguſt - - - - -	23,000 — —	15.	By Caſh received of Jagganaut Rauze, on Account Dº - - - - - -	4,960 — —
			Sept. 11.	By Caſh received of Chintataputty Ram Rauze, on Account - - -	493 — —
			23.	By Caſh received - - - - - -	4,335 — —
			28.	By Caſh received - - - - - -	994 — —
			Oct. 14.	By Caſh received - - - - - -	4,200 — —
					22,287 — —
			15.	By Balance due to the Honourable Company - - - - - - -	42,713 — —
	Rupees -	65,000 — —		Rupees -	65,000 — —

Dr. - - - - Pyakerow, late Zemindar of Ancapilly, in Account Current with the Honourable Company. - - - - Cr.

1778.			1778.		
Sept. 25.	To Balance of his laſt Cowle, ending 25th September 1777 - - - -	4,647 — —	May 21ſt.	By Caſh received of Jugganaut Rauze, in full - - - - - - - - -	4,647 — —
	Abſtract of Balances due from Rajah Viziaram Rauze, and from the following Zemindars, &c.				
	Viziaram Rauze - - - - -	295,469 5 4			
	Jugganaut Deo - - - - -	125,267 — —			
	Juggadeo - - - - - - -	40,742 — —			
	Sitteram Rauze, late Renter - -	64,530 — —			
	Jagganaut Rauze - - - - -	103,030 — —			
	Sitteram Rauze, the preſent Renter	112,250 — —			
	Ancapillee Zemindary, under the Charge of Jagganaut Rauze - - - - -	42,713 — —			
	Rupees -	784,001 5 4			

Vizagapatam, 15 October 1778.

Hº Crawford, Accountt.

APPENDIX. No. 55.

APPENDIX, No. 55.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 10th Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Governor, Preſident.
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board having taken into conſideration the ſeveral propoſals tranſmitted by the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, for renting the Havelly Lands and Farms dependant on *Maſulipatam*, together with the propoſals delivered in at the Preſidency; the Preſident puts the following queſtion to the Board, Whether the propoſal of *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo*, for renting the whole at the rate of one lack and twenty-five thouſand *Madras* Pagodas per annum, be accepted? Whereupon the opinions of the ſeveral Members of Council are taken, and are as follow:

Mr. *Perring* is of opinion, as the propoſal of *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo* is higher than any other, it ſhould be accepted, provided he is a man of fair character, and can find ſuch ſecurity as will ſatisfy the Board.

Mr. *Johnſon* is of opinion the higheſt offer ought to be accepted; and as he underſtands the ſecurity of *Sunca Rama*, offered by *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo*, is good, is for the propoſal of *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo*.

Mr. *Smith* is of opinion the propoſal of *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo* ſhould be accepted, as he underſtands the ſecurity of *Sunca Rama*, which he has offered, is good.

Sir *Hector Munro* is of opinion, that the higheſt offer ſhould be received, provided the bidder is a man of fair character, and reſident on the ſpot, and gives undoubted ſecurity; but as he is not reſident at *Maſulipatam*, objects to his propoſal being accepted.

Mr. *Whitehill* is of opinion the propoſal of *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo* ſhould not be accepted.

The Preſident is ſtrongly againſt the propoſal in queſtion being accepted, and delivers in the following Minute on the occaſion:

As the Board have now under conſideration the renting of the *Maſulipatam* Farms for the term of five years, I deem it incumbent on me to be particular in ſtating my reaſons for the opinion I ſhall give on the occaſion.

There is ſcarcely one of the Farms that have been now adverti[ſ]ed, that is not in debt to the Company for balances from the old Renters, who are moſt of them become bankrupts, and the number of reſponſible black people ſo few, that it encourages every needy adventurer to ſtand forth as a bidder, truſting to accidents whether he ſhall be a gainer or loſer by the Farm he bids for; if the latter, he is not in a much worſe ſituation than when he firſt ſet out, and the Government have nothing left but to inflict puniſhments that afford no recompence for the loſs of revenue, which can never be recovered; nor is it ſufficient, that in the ſeveral propoſals, mention is made of Soucar ſecurity, without particularizing the Soucars; for ſuch is the ſtate of public credit at preſent in the *Carnatic* and the Circars, that there are very few who are to be depended on, or whoſe ſecurity is worth accepting.

Upon examination of the ſeveral propoſals for renting the Farms, I find, that taking the higheſt bidder ſeparately, to whom with any propriety the Farms could be granted, and adding up the ſeveral ſums they offer for the different Farms, the amount does not exceed what is offered by *Lechema Narſamaloo* above one thouſand Pagodas annually. This appears from the ſtatement of the ſeveral bidders taken on a view of the groſs calculate of the higheſt offers, without conſidering the character, abilities, or ſecurity of the ſeveral competitors, and amongſt ſo many, without going into particulars, we may fairly conclude there are objections. I ſpeak from the enquiries I have made, when I inform the Board that there are ſeveral who offer, to whom the Farms ſhould on no account be entruſted. I ſhall mention three in particular, whoſe propoſals are very high. *Achulerauze Lechemenerandoo*, is no more than a rice-broker, has no property, and lives entirely from hand to mouth, on his brokerage per centage. This man offers M[r] Pagodas 12,600 for the Farms of *Condoor* and *Acc[h]m[a]nor*. *Sooramy Moraloo* and *Coramaloo Gungarauze* (the former makes propoſals for the Nizampatam Farm, and the other for the Ellore Havelly) are men not known, unacquainted with the management of the country buſineſs, and though they talk of ſecurity, I do not find, on enquiry, that they can inform me where it is to come from, but truſt, that in caſe they procure a grant of the Farms, they ſhall afterwards find ſecurity for them.

Letchema Narſinvaloo is a reſident in the Circars, has conſtantly been employed in the revenue buſineſs, is a man of repute, and offers *Loll Doſs*, one of the moſt reſponſible Soucars, as his ſecurity. The offer he makes of one lack of Pagodas, is five thouſand Pagodas more than the ſame Farms for which he now offers, were before rented.

It appears to me, there can be no heſitation in giving him the preference, when the ſecurity of the revenue is conſidered; for having the Farms in the hands of one reſponſible man, muſt be attended, not only with favourable conſequences to the inhabitants, but in caſe of failure in any one particular Farm, his having poſſeſſion of the others where the crops or produce ſucceed better, muſt enable him with greater certainty to fulfil his engagements to the Company; and the effects to the natives, and the conſequences to Government, of putting a needy man into a high-rented country, are too obvious to be further noticed.

The only offer that ſtands in competition with *Letchema Narſinvaloo* is *Veneataragava Pantooloo*, who offers a larger amount for the whole of the Farms, including the Farm of the *Maſulipatam* and *Ponracca* Salt. This man, from the enquiries I have made, proceeds entirely on ſpeculation; was a Gomaſtah of one of the Soucars, is unacquainted with the country buſineſs, and does not offer Soucar ſecurity; but the ſecurity of *Sunkakiſſnama Chitty*, the ſon of the late *Sunkarama*; the property of that family, I underſtand, is much divided, and notwithſtanding what he has mentioned relative to their being anſwerable for his payments, I have been aſſured they did not entirely agree to his propoſals, which were only to be conditional.

I am therefore of opinion thoſe Farms ſhould be granted to *Letchema Narſinvaloo*, for which he has made propoſals, and that the Farm of the *Maſulipatam* and *Ponracca* Salt ſhould be granted to *Swamy Pillah*, on condition that he takes off the Company's remaining Salt, on a fair valuation and meaſurement. I am informed from *Maſulipatam*, that he is a man to be depended on, and will tender proper ſecurity.

Carried by the Preſident's caſting voice againſt the propoſal.

The Preſident puts the following Queſtion to the Board, "Whether the propoſal of *Letchema Narſinvaloo*, "for renting the whole, excluſive of the *Maſulipatam* "and *Ponracca* Salt Farm, for the term of five years, "at the rate of one lack *Madras* Pagodas per annum, "ſhould be accepted on his finding Soucar ſecurity?"

Mr. *Perring* is of opinion, as the propoſals received from *Maſulipatam* were higher than *Letchema Narſinvaloo*'s, and as many of them are recommended by the Chief and Council as proper perſons to manage the Diſtricts, they ſhould be accepted in preference to *Letchema Narſinvaloo*'s.

Mr.

Mr. *Johnſon* is of the ſame opinion with Mr. *Perring*.

Mr. *Smith* is of the ſame opinion with Mr. *Perring*

Sir *Hector Munro* is of opinion, that the propoſal of *Letchema Narſinvaloo* ſhould be accepted, as the perſons recommended by the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, do not appear to be themſelves the labourers of the ground.

Mr. *Whitehill* is of opinion, that the propoſal of *Letchema Narſinvaloo* ſhould be accepted.

The Preſident is of opinion, that *Letchema Narſinvaloo*'s propoſal ſhould be accepted, for the reaſons already ſet forth in his Minute upon the ſubject.

Carried in favour of *Letchema Narſinvaloo*'s propoſal.

Ordered, That a Cowle be made out accordingly.

General Letter from *Fort Saint George*, in the Revenue Department, to the Court of Directors, dated 14 October 1779.

Pa. 6. After paying every degree of attention to the ſeveral propoſals which we received, and making the neceſſary enquiries as to the bidders themſelves, whether they were men of character, could be reſponſible to the Company, and were reſident on the ſpot, and how far the ſecurities were admiſſible which they offered; we have thought it, on a due conſideration of matters, moſt adviſable to rent the whole (excluſive of the *Maſulipatam* and *Ponracca* Salt Farms) to *Letchema Narſinvaloo*, for the term of five years, at the rate of one lack *Madras* Pagodas per annum, which is an advance on the former rent of this farm, as a perſon more to be depended upon than the others, from his character, the circumſtance of his being reſident in the Circars, and the unqueſtionable ſecurity he has produced.

7th. The *Maſulipatam* and *Ponracca* Salt Farms we have let to *Swamy Pillah*, for the term of five years, at the rate of forty-two thouſand five hundred *Arcot* Rupees per annum, his propoſal being 500 Rupees higher than any other, and his character, on enquiry, free from objection.

APPENDIX, No. 56.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 26th February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident, Governor,
John Whitehill, Eſquire,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from *Ganjam*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident, and Governor, &c. Council, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We now beg leave to lay before you, the information we have at length obtained, reſpecting the value of the Government lands, ſince the year 1773, when the rent was entruſted to *Juggoobundoo Choudery*.

From a variety of cauſes, the inveſtigation has been attended with much difficulty, and it was found impracticable to obtain any accounts for the year 1776, in the leaſt to be depended on, until the cloſe of enſuing year, ending laſt September.

We have reaſon to believe, that the account of collections is aſcertained with exactneſs; but the greateſt difficulty throughout the enquiry has been, to determine the amount of the charges in the ſeveral Pergunnahs; and we are of opinion they muſt have been more conſiderable than they appear to be by the incloſed abſtracts; but as we were unable to ſay preciſely how much they may have amounted to, we have inſerted thoſe ſums only which we find were actually diſburſed; and we premiſe thus much in regard to the charges, in order that your Honour, &c. may be better able to determine on an equitable reduction, on account of the heavy loſſes which the late Renter declares he has ſuſtained.

APPENDIX. No. 56.

On reference to *Juggoobundoo Choudery*'s petition, it appears, he has ſtated his loſſes in the years 1773, 1774, and 1775, at Rupees 61,724; whereas by the abſtract now before you, they amount only to Rupees 35,149. 3. 3.; but when the additional charges for the three years are conſidered, we are inclined to believe his loſſes have not been exaggerated.

With reſpect to the debts, amounting to Rupees 20,942. 10. 8. which he has repreſented as dubious, we are of opinion it will not be in his power to recover any conſiderable part of them; and we think it would in the end be for the advantage of the Company, rather to allow a deduction of the whole ſum, than to ſuffer the inhabitants to be rigorouſly preſſed for the payment of debts which were contracted in a time of great ſcarcity, and which they could not fully diſcharge, even were they driven to the laſt extremity, and obliged to diſpoſe of their cattle to ſatisfy his demands.

The balance due from *Juggoobundoo Chowdery* amounts to Rupees 182,666. 10. 8. ſo that ſhould your Honour, &c. be pleaſed to ſhew him the indulgence he has prayed for in his petition, and further think proper, for the reaſons we have ſet forth, to allow for his outſtanding balances, there will ſtill remain due to the Company one lack of Rupees, which in the ſaid petition he promiſed to pay in the months of September and October 1777.

The Chief has frequently called upon *Jaggoobundoo Chowdery* for this ſum, and although he has from time to time promiſed to pay it, ſtill no part has yet been received; ſeeing, therefore, how little dependance was to be placed on his promiſes, and all the accounts of the Havelly being now completed, we determined to ſummon him before us, and to inform him, that if he delayed any longer to pay the Company Rupees 100,000, which we well knew he had received from the rent, and which he had ſo long promiſed to diſcharge, that we ſhould repreſent his conduct to your Honour; &c. in the ſame unwarrantable light in which we beheld it. *Juggoobundoo Cowdery* was accordingly ſummoned, and the foregoing being explained to him, he appeared much alarmed, and after ſome heſitation informed us, that he had nothing to do with the Havelly lands; that at the particular requeſt of *Ball Kiſtna*, he had indeed lent his name to him, but that he (*Ball Kiſtna*) was actually the Renter. We could not but be much aſtoniſhed at ſo extraordinary a declaration; and proceeding to queſtion him further concerning it, he informed us, that fearful of offending *Ball Kiſtna*, he had to this time ſubmitted to be looked upon as the Renter, but now that the Company peremptorily demanded the balance due from the Havelly lands, that he could no longer avoid diſcovering the real truth; that what he had advanced was perfectly well known in the different Pergunnahs, and might be proved by all the people employed in making the collections. He then produced a petition, which he ſaid he had prepared for the occaſion, whenever it might happen; its contents are unknown to us, but when tranſlated, it ſhall be laid before you; in the mean time we ſhall endeavour to arrive at a certainty as to the truth of what he has aſſerted, and ſhall inform you, as ſoon as poſſible, of the reſult of our enquiries.

We have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
M. Williams,
R. Maunſell,
T. Oakes.

Ganjam,
14th January 1778.

The Board taking into conſideration the above Letter, agreed, That the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam* be acquainted

APPENDIX. No. 56.

acquainted, that as the Board underſtand *Ball Kiſtna* has been ſome time from *Ganjam* in his way to the Preſidency; that he has been long, and is ſtill at *Maſulipatam*; and as they have particular information from the Gentlemen of *Ganjam*, that renders his preſence here indiſpenſably neceſſary, it is their order, that he be ſent under a guard of Sepoys.

Sent the following Letter to *Maſulipatam:*

Mr. *Edward Cotsford*, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam.*

Gentlemen,

As we underſtand *Ball Kiſtna* has left *Ganjam* for ſome time, in his way to the Preſidency; that he has been long and is ſtill at *Maſulipatam*; and as we have received very particular information from the Gentlemen at *Ganjam*, which renders his preſence here indiſpenſably neceſſary, you will pleaſe to order him to ſet out immediately, and upon his refuſing, you will ſend him under a guard of Sepoys.

We are,

Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Fort Saint George, 28th February 1779.

Tho Rumbold, &c. Council.

ACCOUNT of the Paubacunda Pergunnah.

1773.	Jemmabundy of the whole Pergannah as let out	49000 — —		
	Addition	5907 13 —		
			54907 13 —	
	Deduct the following.			
	Inaums Durroburt	143 2 —		
	Charges of Coolies for Paſſengers	100 — —		
	Balances	12585 1 —		
			12828 3 —	
				42079 10 —
1774.	Jemmabundy as let out	47800 4 —		
	Addition	1048 4 —		
	Nurram	500 — —		
			49348 8 —	
	Deduct the following.			
	Inaums Durroburt	294 — —		
	Cuſtoms not collected	302 — —		
	Balances	7282 8 —		
			7878 8 —	
				41470 — —
1775.	Jemmabundy as let out	66908 12 —		
	Addition	6832 3 —		
	Nurgar	1884 8 —		
			75625 7 —	
	Deduct the following.			
	Inaums Durroburt	1607 5 —		
	Cuſtoms not collected	553 10 —		
	Coolies for Paſſengers	294 — —		
	Balances	1999 1 —		
			4454 — —	
				71171 7 —
	Jemmabundy as let out	5576 4 —		
	Addition	100 — —		
	Nurgar	1621 4 —		
			7297 8 —	
	Deduct the following.			
	Inaums Durroburt	517 13 —		
	Cuſtoms not collected	643 9 —		
	Coolies for Paſſengers	132 — —		
	Balances	5585 4 —		
			6878 10 —	
				50606 10 —
			Rupees	205327 11 —

Tho. Oakes.

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ACCOUNT of the Itchapour Pergunnah.

1773.	Villages as let out		37202 — —		
	Addition for Charges		2755 — —		
				39957 — —	
	Deduct the following				
	Inaums		10000 — —		
	Balances		520 — —		
				10520 — —	
				29437 — —	
	Land Cuſtoms collected		1894 — —		
	Charges		237 — —		
				1657 8 —	
	Arrack Shop, &c. Farmer lets for		3186 4 —		
	Charges	185 6 —			
	Balances	94 2 —			
			279 8 —		
				2906 12 —	
	Ibrahumbadda Pettah and Puckeer Pettah			330 12 —	
	Salt ſold		7699 4 3		
	Charges of making	608 4 —			
	D° attending the Sale	499 — —			
			1107 4 —		
				6592 — 3	
					40924 2
1774.	Villages as let out		38500 — —		
	Addition for Charges		3725 12 —		
			42225 12 —		
	Inaums	11000 — —			
	Balances	520 — —			
			11520 — —		
				30705 12 —	
	Land Cuſtoms clear			2390 9 —	
	Arrack Shop, &c. Farmer lets for		3662 5 —		
	Charges	206 4 —			
	Balances	231 10 —			
			437 14 —		
				3224 7 —	
	Pettahs			297 4 —	
	Salt ſold		3031 5 —		
	Charges of making	514 8 —			
	Ditto of Sales	179 — 6			
			693 8 6		
				2337 12 6	
					38955 12 6
1775.	Villages as let out		36601 10 —		
	Addition for Charges		3475 — —		
			40076 10 —		
	Inaums	10140 — —			
	Charges	3475 — —			
	Balances	2209 8 —			
			15824 8 —		
				24252 2 —	
	Land Cuſtoms collected		2795 8 —		
	Charges		213 — —		
				582 8 —	
	Arrack, &c. Farms let for		3352 10 —		
	Charges	196 — —			
	Balances	91 7 —			
			287 7 —		
				3065 3 —	
			Carried forward - Rupees		79879 14 9

			Brought forward - Rupees		79879 14 9
	Ibrahimbadda and Packeer Pettah - - -			242 4 —	
	Salt fold - - - - -		572 14 3		
	Charges making - 426 2 —				
	Sundry Charges - 15 — —				
			441 2 —		
				131 12 3	
					30273 13 3
1776.	Villages let out - - - -		54182 — —		
	Addition for Charges - - -		2840 — —		
			57022 — —		
	Inaums - - 12800 — —				
	Balance and Charges 8791 — —				
			21591 — —		
				35431 — —	
	Land Cuſtoms collected - - -		2083 8 —		
	Charges - - - - -		542 — —		
				1741 8 —	
	Arrack, &c. Farms let out for - -		3048 11 —		
	Charges - - 192 — —				
	Balances - - 206 — —				
			398 15 —		
				2649 12 —	
	Ibrahimbadda Pettah only - - - - -			189 12 —	
	Salt Works, the Charges equal to, or greater than the Sales.				40012 — —
				Rupees - -	150165 10 —

ACCOUNT of the Terriſtaun Pergunnah, Years 1773, 1774, 1775 and 1776.

1773.	Villages let out for - - -	5480 4 —		
	Balances unpaid - - - -	2228 1 —		
			3252 3 —	
	Farms of Tobacco, &c. - - -	3086 — —		
	Balances unpaid - - -	343 11 —		
			2742 5 —	
	Land Cuſtoms - - - -	306 9 9		
	Balances unpaid - - -	27 — —		
			3042 — 9	
				9036 8 9
1774.	Villages let out for - - -	14001 3 —		
	Balances unpaid - - -	1844 5 —		
			2 156 14 —	
	Farms of Tobacco, &c. - - -	2300 15 9		
	Balances unpaid - - -	404 7 —		
			1896 8 9	
	Land Cuſtoms - - - -	4850 9 9		
	Balances unpaid - - -	1220 15 9		
			3629 10 —	
				17683 — 9
1775.	Villages let out for - - -	18155 8 9		
	Balances unpaid - - -	2468 3 —		
			15687 5 9	
	Farms of Tobacco, &c. - - -	2772 2 6		
	Balances unpaid - - -	994 — 6		
			1778 2 —	
	Land Cuſtoms - - - -	3912 9 —		
	Balances unpaid - - -	276 11 3		
			3635 13 9	
				21101 5 6
1776.	Villages let out for - - -	20529 15 —		
	Balances unpaid - - -	2024 8 —		
			18505 7 —	
	Farms of Tobacco, &c. - - -	2194 9 —		
	Balances unpaid - - -	516 11 —		
			1677 14 —	
	Land Cuſtoms - - - -	2819 1 9		
	Balances unpaid - - -	464 7 6		
			2354 10 3	
				22537 15 3
			Rupees - -	70358 14 3

(A true copy)
T. Oakes.

ACCOUNT of the Montready Pergunnah.

1773.	Jemmabundy	9915 — —		
	Addition to D° for Charges	2000 — —		
			11915 — —	
	Inaums	- 250 — —		
	Charges	1750 — —		
	Balances	1187 7 —		
			3187 7 —	
				8727 9 —
1774.	Jemmabundy	14851 — —		
	Addition for Charges	2200 — —		
			17051 — —	
	Inaums	- 890 — —		
	Charges	1450 — —		
	Balances	2773 11 —		
			5113 11 —	
				11937 5 —
1775.	Jemmabundy	7851 — —		
	Addition for Charges	1258 6 —		
			9109 6 —	
	Inaums	- 100 — —		
	Charges	1160 — —		
	Balances	- 383 5 —		
			1643 5 —	
				7466 1 —
1776.	Jemmabundy of Biaulu	- 900 — —		
	of Soorlah	- 800 — —		
	of the Remainder	13500 — —		
	Addition for Charges	2930 — —		
			18130 — —	
	Inaums	- 500 — —		
	Charges	2430 — —		
			2930 — —	
				15200 — —
	(A true Copy) *Thoˢ Oakes*, Secʸ.		Rupees	43330 15 —

ACCOUNT of the Courlah Pergunnah.

1773.	Jemmabundy		6700 — —	
	Balances		707 4 —	
				5992 12 —
1774.	Jemmabundy		7250 — —	
	Inaums Durroburt	- 64 — —		
	Balances	- 439 10 9	503 10 9	
				6746 5 3
1775.	Jemmabundy, the whole collected			5800 — —
1776.	Jemmabundy		5500 — —	
	Inaums Durrobert	- 44 14 3		
	Balances	- 500 7 6	545 5 9	
				4954 10 3
	(A true Copy) *Thomas Oakes*, Secʸ.		Rupees	23493 11 6

ACCOUNT of the Aſka Pergunnah.

1773.	Collected		9000 — —	
	Deduct Inaums		1500 — —	
				7500 — —
		Carried forward	Rupees	7500 — —

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		Brought forward - -	Rupees	7500 — —
1774.	Collected - - - - - - - -		7900 — —	
	Deduct Inaums - - - - - - - -		1200 — —	
				6700 — —
1775.	Collected - - - - - - - -		8100 — —	
	Deduct Inaums - - - - - - - -		1400 — —	
				6700 — —
1776.	Collected - - - - - - - -		11800 — —	
	Deduct Inaums - - - - - - - -		2183 — —	
				9617 — —
	(A true Copy) *Thos Oakes*, Sec^{y}.		Rupees -	30517 — —

ACCOUNT of the Baroua Pergunnah.

1773.	Jemmabundy - - - - - - - - -		8422 — —	
	Charges - - - - - - 927 7 9			
	Lofs - - - - - - - 194 8 3			
	Inaums - - - - - - 450 5 —			
	Balances - - - - - - 64 2 —			
			1636 7 —	
				6785 9 —
1774.	Jemmabundy - - - - - - - - -		7214 2 —	
	Charges - - - - - - 391 — —			
	Inaums - - - - - - 501 10 6			
	Balances - - - - - - 380 12 —			
			1273 6 6	
				5940 11 6
1775.	Jemmabundy - - - - - - - - -		7278 2 —	
	Charges - - - - - - 444 15 —			
	Inaums - - - - - - 234 15 —			
	Balances - - - - - - 567 7 6			
			1247 5 6	
				6030 12 6
1776.	Jemmabundy late Crop, &c. - -	7949 7 —		
	Parmaus - - - - - - 885 5 4			
			8834 12 4	
	Charges - - - - - - 350 — —			
	Inaums - - - - - - 590 8 7			
	Balances - - - - - - 367 1 4			
			1207 9 11	
				7627 2 5
	(A true Copy) *T. Oakes*, Sec^{y}.		Rupees -	26384 3 5

ACCOUNT of the Monſurcotah Pergunnah.

1773.	Jemmabundy of the Villages, &c. -	5745 — —		
	Inaums, valued at - - -	250 — —		
	Addition for Charges - - -	650 — —		
			6645 — —	
	Deduct Inaums - - - -	250 — —		
	Charges - - - - -	650 — —		
	Balances - - - - -	943 6 6		
			1843 6 6	
				4801 9 6
		Carried forward - -	Rupees	4801 9 6

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	Brought forward - - Rupees			4801 9 6
1774.	Jemmabundy of the Villages, &c. including two Pannauſes - - - - -	6251 — —		
	Deduct Charges - - - - -	- 750 — —		
			— — —	5501 — —
1775.	Jemmabundy of the Villages, &c. - - - -		6401 — —	
	Deduct Charges - - - -	- 750 — —		
	D° Balances - - - - -	- 125 8 —		
			875 8 —	
				5525 8 —
1776.	Jemmabundy of the Villages, &c. - - - -		8009 — —	
	Deduct Charges - - - -	1000 — —		
	Jhaums - - - - -	500 — —		
	Balances - - - - - -	1110 15 —		
			2610 15 —	
				5389 1 —
		Rupees -		21217 2 6

(A true Copy)
Thos Oakes, Secr.

APPENDIX, No. 57.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, dated 21ſt May 1779.

SENT by Tappies the following Letter to *Ganjam:*

To Mr. *Morgan Williams*, Chief, &c. Council, at *Ganjam*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of 5th March, relative to the ſtate of the Goomſoor Country, of which we are ſorry to find you give ſo unfavourable accounts.

We are willing to try every expedient that may poſſibly affect a reconciliation between the brothers: as we are ſtill apprehenſive that *Vickeram Bungee* may be the cauſe of more trouble at the particular periods when the harveſt is ready for reaping, and by that means occaſion a diminiſhing of the Company's revenues, or at leaſt give pretext for delay or excuſes for non-payment, we deſire that you will propoſe to him, that the ſon of *Latchema Bungee* ſhall be nominated to ſucceed to the Zemindary, upon the death of *Vickeram Bungee*; and if this is agreed to by him, that he ſhall, during his life-time, make ſuch proviſion for *Latchema Bungee* and his ſon as ſhall be thought adequate for their ſupport: on theſe conditions, he may return immediately to his Zemindary; and we deſire you will obtain from *Vickeram Bungee* his Anſwer, in writing, within a reaſonable time. But if this propoſition ſhould be rejected, we then empower you, in our name, to put *Latchema Bungee* into immediate poſſeſſion of the whole Zemindary, for which we will forward you, by the earlieſt opportunity, a Commiſſion of Rajahſhip; and it will be neceſſary that you inform us, after particular enquiry, whether by any meaſures we may take with the Zemindars bordering on the Ganjam Diſtricts where *Vickeram Bungee* now takes ſhelter, we may prevent his making any further inroads to the diſturbance of the inhabitants of the diſtricts, or that may give us ſome chance of getting him into our power.

We have received likewiſe your Letter of the 29th April, and peruſed the Papers incloſed, relative to the Havelly Lands, rented to *Jaggabundoo Chowdrey*, though it would appear that the real Renter is *Ball Kiſtna*.

As *Ball Kiſtna* is ſo ſoon to return to *Ganjam*, it will then be proper that you enter upon a thorough inveſtigation of this matter; and if it proves he is the real Renter, you will be careful that he makes good his balances to the Company.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient Servant,
Thos Rumbold, &c.
Council.

Fort St. George,
May 21ſt, 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 58.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 26th April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thos Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Major General *Hector Munro*,
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board reſuming the conſideration of a Letter from *Ganjam*, as entered in Conſultation the 3d inſtant; ordered, That *Ball Kiſtna*, the Company's Dubaſh, be immediately ſummoned before the Board.

Ball Kiſtna being ſummoned in conſequence, and attending the Board, the following Queſtions are put to him by the Preſident:

Queſ. Does he think *Letchema Bungee* a proper perſon to be appointed Rajah of the Goomſoor Country?—Anſ. He thinks *Letchema Bungee* a very proper perſon, and that *Vickeram Bungee* has been the cauſe of all the troubles that have happened in the country.

Queſ. Suppoſe *Letchema Bungee* was appointed Rajah, does he then think *Vickeram Bungee* would occaſion any trouble?—Anſ. Yes, unleſs matters are accommodated between the two brothers.

Queſ. Does he think that the Ryots are attached to *Vickeram Bungee?*—Anſ. A quarter part for *Vickeram Bungee*, and three parts for *Letchema Bungee*.

Queſ. Does he think that if the Goomſoor Country was once ſettled, that there would be an end put to the troubles?—Anſ. He thinks there would be no troubles in any other part of the country.

Queſ. What is the time for ſowing the crops?—Anſ. This is the time.

Queſ. How did *Vickeram Bungee*, being the younger brother, come to be appointed to the Zemindary?—Anſ.

APPENDIX. No. 58.

Anſ. He was adopted by his father, and acted under him during his adminiſtration; and upon the death of his father, the Board confirmed him in the Zemindary agreeable to his father's adoption.

Two Petitions having been delivered in to the Board by *Ball Kiſtna*, with ſome accompanying papers, relative to the ſubject of the above Letter, they are now read, and ordered to lie upon the table for further conſideration.

To the Honourable *Tho. Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

The humble Petition of *Ball Kiſtna*, ſheweth,

That your Petitioner begs leave to lay before your Honours, a demand for a balance due from the Havelly Renter, *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*, at *Ganjam*: In his defence, he pretends that he only lent his name as renter, and that your Petitioner was to be accountable for the whole rent to the Company, which your Petitioner denies, as being entirely falſe, the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey* having acted with full power in the whole management, with the aſſiſtance of your Petitioner whenever it was required.

Your Petitioner moſt humbly requeſts leave to lay before your Honours, vouchers in teſtimony of *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*'s having the ſole management of the Havelly, as follows:

In 1769, whilſt Mr. *Cotsford* was Chief, the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*, brother to *Sham Sunder Chowdrey*, received the rent of the Havelly, and deſired your Petitioner to aſſiſt him in the management; accordingly your Petitioner did ſo, and drew up an agreement, dated 21ſt July 1772, to ſecure himſelf in the property for the profit and loſs of the rent, of which your Honours will receive the tranſlation here joined.

On the 21ſt May 1773, the ſaid *Sham Sunder Chowdrey* died, and *Jagabundoo Chowdrey* became the heir of his eſtate, and undertook the whole management of the Havelly, in which he was aſſiſted by your Petitioner for a conſiderable time, in the ſame manner as he had acted for his deceaſed brother. Several months after, a diſpute aroſe between your Petitioner and *Jugabundoo Chowdrey*, concerning different dealings; at the time of ſettling, all the accounts of each party were examined by an arbitration of reputation; *Jagabundoo Chowdrey* appeared himſelf indebted to your Petitioner for the ſum of R^{s} 63,019, to the end of the 8th of January 1775, for which he gave two obligations, and which your Petitioner is ready to produce whenever your Honours may require it, together with another diſcharge which has been determined under the ſame date, of which alſo your Honours have a tranſlation.

Some time after, the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey* made uſe of many perſuaſions to induce your Petitioner to aſſiſt him, as he had done before, without which he was not capable to carry on the management; and gave an agreement to your Petitioner, dated 20th July 1776, by which he was to receive and diſburſe to the beſt advantage; of which likewiſe your Honours have a tranſlation.

When the term of theſe obligations expired, and upon ſettling the accounts between your Petitioner, and the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*, the account current, with every particular, was made up, commencing in December 1774, and ending in July 1778, with the monthly collections, and what has been paid by your Petitioner to the Company, &c. in the hand writing of the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*'s Conicoply, *Tormundra Sheveram Pundit*, which your Petitioner is ready to produce.

Your Petitioner, at the time of his proceeding to *Madras*, on the 6th September 1778, appeared before the Chief, Mr. *Williams*, and offered to atteſt the truth of what he now declares, relative to the matter between him and *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*, whether or no your Petitioner had any concerns or connections with the rent, or if he owed him any money; to which *Jagabundoo Chowdrey* replied, that he had no concern or connection whatever with the rent, and that he himſelf was the only perſon accountable to the Company for the rent, and ſtood indebted in the ſum Rup^{s} 63,019, which is balance due to your Petitioner: All this has been declared before the Chief of *Ganjam*.

It was agreed, between your Petitioner and the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*, that the whole management of the country ſhould be tranſacted under the particular hand and ſeal of the ſaid *Jagabundoo Chowdrey*.

Your Petitioner, therefore, humbly hopes that your Honours will perceive the injuſtice done him by falſe information during his abſence from *Ganjam*, and that you will be pleaſed to enter into a full examination of the affair.

Your Petitioner, as in duty bound, ſhall ever pray.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, dated 26th April 1779.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

The Propoſal of *Ball Kiſtna*.

Who humbly begs leave to lay before your Honour, &c. That if the Honourable Company grant the rent of the whole Itchapour Diſtrict (that is to ſay, Havelly or Government Lands, with the Sea and River Cuſtoms of *Monſoor Cotah*, *Sonepoor*, and *Baroa*, and likewiſe the ſeveral Zemindary Diſtricts) for ten years, commencing from 1ſt June 1779, the value of the rent for every year as follows:

1ſt Year	Rupees	350000
2d D°	-	350000
3d D°	-	350000
4th D°	-	425000
5th D°	-	425000
6th D°	-	430000
7th D°	-	430000
8th D°	-	430000
9th D°	-	430000
10th D°	-	430000
	Rupees	4050000

The yearly payments of which ſums ſhould be granted, the ſame as the rent of the Chicacole Havelly.

The following articles to be granted in order to ſettle the diſtrict, and to encourage the ſame to the Inhabitants, &c. viz.

The Garriſon conſiſting of a battalion of Sepoys, may conſtantly remain in the Ganjam Diſtrict, out of which one or two companies of Sepoys may attend the Renter, in order to collect the Revenues, and to place the Guards at the different places when it is required: The Renter will allow the Batta to them, according to the regulation of the Company's books, except in the Ganjam Town.

When the Troops are marching up the country on account of any troubles ariſing from the Zemindars, &c. the field charges ſhould be placed to the Honourable Company's account, but not to that of the Renter.

From the beginning of this rent, the Jemmabundies ought to be ſettled upon the value of the crops, or what they may produce; and in caſe any Rajah or Zemindar ſhould make complaints about the increaſing of them, he hopes they will be obliged to comply to the ſatisfaction of the Renter.

The Goomſoor Zemindar, *Vickeram Bungee*, has left the place for theſe ſeveral months, on account of his not being able to make up the Company's Tribute; by which means that country is now in great confuſion and trouble, and likewiſe the inhabitants gone away from the place, which ought to be ſettled ſoon. *Vickeram Bungee* and *Latchema Bungee* are brothers; the firſt is the Rajah, and the latter is now under the Company's protection; he therefore hopes, that whichever of them is found moſt capable to manage the country, and who pays the Company's rent the beſt, may be confirmed Rajah, and as ſoon

as the Renter has ſettled every thing, that the Troops now in that diſtrict may be removed, on his application to the gentlemen there.

Lately the Honourable Company have let out ſeveral farms in that diſtrict, which he deſires they may enjoy, agreeable to the Company's Cowle, under the Renter, on paying him the Kiſts regularly; otherwiſe he hopes they will grant a permiſſion to take away thoſe rents from them, that he may receive the revenues himſelf.

As ſeveral perſons may interfere privately with the Zemindars, and may perſuade them to put off or cauſe difficulties in paying the Company's revenue, he hopes there will be a poſitive order given, not to protect or give them any bad counſel.

Permiſſion ſhould be allowed to all the European merchants to purchaſe grain, &c. and pay the ſame value as the natives, and likewiſe to pay the cuſtoms and duties for the ſea and lands as uſual.

As the ſeveral duties at the Ganjam Buzar, and the rents of the Bannians, were formerly paid to the Renter, but now, ſince the Havelly have been taken under the Company's management, theſe articles have been received by the gentlemen, he hopes that all the articles at the Ganjam Town may be received by the Renter.

The Nizeanagur Rajah, *Munny Doo* and the Calli-coote Rajah, *Murda Rauze*, are both now at *Ganjam*; he hopes theſe two Rajahs may be delivered up to the Renter's diſpoſal, otherwiſe troubles will ariſe in their Countries, and the inhabitants will leave the place, which will conſequently injure the revenues.

As the hire of coolies, carts, bullocks, &c. has been lately fixed by the Chief and Council at *Ganjam*, he requeſts that it may be confirmed accordingly.

He hopes permiſſion will be granted to enjoy the ſeveral Inaum lands and villages in the Itchapour Diſtrict as uſual, under the management of Mr. *Maunſell*.

APPENDIX, No. 59.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, dated the 2d July, 1779.

At a Conſultation;

PRESENT,

The Right Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

MINUTES of laſt Conſultation read:

The Board reſuming the conſideration of the buſineſs relative to the Ganjam Revenues, upon which the Preſident in a former Conſultation had requeſted the favour of the Members of Council to give their opinions fully, to aſſiſt his own judgment as much as poſſible, the opinion of the following Members of Council are now read.

Read the following Minute of Mr. *Perring*.

Mr. *Perring* is of opinion with regard to the Revenues of the Ganjam Diſtrict, that on account of their having fallen ſo much in arrear, it is incumbent on Government to fall, if poſſible, on ſome mode of collecting them, that can be more depended on, than the preſent one.

Ball Kiſtna is beyond doubt thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the inhabitants, and their ability to perform their engagements; and is, Mr. *Perring* believes, the fitteſt man the Board could appoint to the collection of the revenues; but the offer he makes, Mr. *Perring* is of opinion is inſufficient, being much leſs than what was collected by the Chief and Council for ſome years before the late troubles in the Goomſoor Country.

Read the following Minute of Mr. *Johnſon*.

The Preſident having requeſted the Members of the Board to give their ſentiments on the mode which appear to them beſt calculated for ſecuring the Company's Revenues in the Ganjam Diſtrict, and for preventing any failure of them in future; I am of opinion, that all the Zemindars ſhould be obliged to ſettle all their accounts until the 30th of April laſt, and to give bonds for the payment of them in ſuch Kiſts, and at ſuch ſtated periods, as the Chief and Council may think reaſonable; that orders be given to the Chief and Council to make the Rajahs adhere ſtrictly to the ſpirit of their agreements, and on no pretence whatſoever to poſtpone the punctual payment of the Kiſts for their Jemmabundy.

The management of the Havelly Lands to be continued under Mr. *Maunſell*, who, in my opinion, has given proofs of his attachment to the intereſt of his employers, and I am perſuaded will not ſuffer the revenue ariſing from theſe lands to decreaſe.

As the Board have agreed to reſtore *Vickeram Bungee* to the Rajaſhip of Goomſoor, I hope he will be punctual in the payment of his Tribute in future; although I muſt own I entertain great doubts of his prudent conduct; but by tranquillity being reſtored to the Itchapoor Diſtrict, there is no doubt of the other Rajahs being made ſenſible that the Company's orders muſt be obeyed.

The inſuperable objections to a Renter for this whole diſtrict, and the numerous examples I have ſeen of their inſufficiency, convinces me that the moſt eligible plan is what I have ſuggeſted; but, ſhould any more ſecure or feaſible mode be propoſed, I ſhall be happy to ſee it adopted.

Read the following Minute of Sir *Hector Munro*.

As different ſentiments are entertained reſpecting *Ball Kiſtnah's* propoſals, and as the Preſident has deſired the gentlemen of Council to give in their opinions ſeparately on that ſubject, I now, in compliance with his requeſt, ſhall deliver mine.

The little experience I have had in the buſineſs of the Revenue Department, and the want of practical knowledge, will not allow me to enter minutely into the ſubject: I mean therefore to expreſs what I have to ſay in a very few words, confining my attention ſolely to the preſent ſtate of the Revenues in the Ganjam Diſtrict, and to the means of ſecuring regular payments of them in future.

The Military Eſtabliſhment in the Diſtrict of *Ganjam*, coſts the Company no leſs than 80,000 Pagodas per annum; it is placed immediately under the Chief and Council; and this very conſiderable expence is incurred for the ſole uſe of ſupporting their authority in the collection of the revenue; nevertheleſs, in the courſe of a few years we find that the balance from the Zemindars have been gradually increaſing, until now that they amount to 400,000 Pagodas: From this plain and ſimple ſtate of the caſe, would not any one imagine that the military force was inſufficient; that our Troops had been defeated, and that the contumacy of the Zemindars had withſtood all our efforts to reduce them? this, I ſay, is the concluſion that any one would naturally draw: But the fact is widely different; our Troops have on every occaſion routed the enemy, and we have, in a very late inſtance, ſeen a principal Zemindar driven from his country; for preſuming to diſpute the orders of a Chief and Council.

When I reflect on the facility with which oppoſition was ſuppreſſed, I am at a loſs to conceive the cauſe of failure in the collection of the Tributes, or what plauſible reaſons can be aſſigned for it.

As the internal management of the diſtrict is entruſted ſolely to the Chief and Council, they have every thing in their power: Yet, inveſted as they are with authority of Government, and armed with the power of directing a military force, the Zemindars fall into arrear, and the amount of their balances increaſe; the revenues of the Company are not to be depended on, and the reſources of Government fail.

I have

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I have here, I think, in a few words drawn a juſt picture of the ſtate of the revenues in the Ganjam Diſtrict, a ſtate that in my opinion calls loudly for reformation; and I am well pleaſed to ſee the attention of Government fixed upon means of effecting it: But I muſt confeſs, that from any mode which we may at preſent adopt, I entertain hopes of little more than a temporary advantage. There is, I apprehend, a grand defect in the ſyſtem of the ſervice; the reſponſibility in which the Company hold their ſervants, is, I fear, not ſufficient encouragement to ſacrifice their intereſt to their duty; and while things continue ſo, I ſhall be free enough to declare, that with reſpect to the complexion of the party, it makes, I doubt, but little difference to the Company, by whom their Revenues are collected: There is however in the inſtance now before us, ſomething very ſingular.

After the revenues of *Ganjam* have fallen into arrear, and large balances remain due under the management of the Chief and Council, that a black man ſhould offer to uſe his endeavours for the recovery of thoſe payments which they could not obtain, and actually engage for the punctual diſcharge of the revenues in future, appears on firſt ſight ſo extraordinary, that if the offer was made by one who was a ſtranger to the diſtricts, I ſhould conſider him merely as an adventurer, and far from expecting that he would keep his word; I ſhould accept almoſt any ſecurity he might give for the performance of his engagements: This, however, at preſent, is far from being the caſe; no one is better acquainted with the Ganjam Diſtrict, than the man who makes theſe offers; he has, I underſtand, been employed there on public buſineſs for many years, particularly under Mr. *Cotsford*, who firſt ſettled that country, and is now ſtrongly recommended by him as a man of integrity and capacity. There is another circumſtance which in my opinion, leads to a concluſion favourable to his propoſals; ſince they have become public, ſome of the gentlemen at *Ganjam* have, I underſtand, offered to increaſe the revenue, and to enſure the payments of it, at leaſt for a time, although for years paſt there has been almoſt a conſtant annual decreaſe, and no plan, at leaſt to my knowledge, has ever been ſuggeſted for preventing it.

Conſidering therefore theſe circumſtances as a kind of expence, on which I may preſume to form a judgment, I declare the Propoſals of *Ball Kiſtnah* appear to me ſo much for the Company's advantage, that I ſee no ground on which they can be rejected: I do not, however, wiſh to determine finally, until we know what the gentlemen will undertake to perform. One of them has ſaid, that the country can bear a Tribute of five lacks of Rupees; will they inſure the payment of it? and in what time will they undertake to ſecure the outſtanding balances now due to the Company? Let them reply to theſe Queſtions; and as our concluding an engagement with *Ball Kiſtnah* might be conſtrued into a reflection on them, I hope their anſwer will be to the ſatisfaction of the Board, otherwiſe I am clearly of opinion that his Propoſals ſhould be accepted.

Having thus delivered my ſentiments on the ſubject under debate, I beg leave only to add, that although I expreſs myſelf on this occaſion without reſerve, nothing is more foreign to my intention than to paſs reflections on any man or ſet of men; but, as I have an opinion to ſupport, I cannot in juſtice to myſelf, avoid mentioning thoſe facts on which it is founded.

Fort St. George, *Hector Munro.*
26th June 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 60.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations,
Thurſday July 29th 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith,
Saml Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Report of *Ball Kiſtna*, for renting the Itchapour Diſtrict.

To the Honourable Sir *Thos Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

The Propoſal of *Ball Kiſtnah*, humbly begs leave to lay before your Honour, &c. that if the Honourable Company grant the rent of the whole Itchapoor Diſtrict, excluſive of the Ganjam Sea and River Cuſtoms (that is to ſay Havelly or Government Lands, with the Sea and River Cuſtoms of *Monſor Cota*, *Senacour*, and *Baroo*, and likewiſe ſeveral Zemindar Diſtricts) for ten years, commencing from the 25 September 1779, at the rate of four lacks and fifteen thouſand Rupees per annum, the yearly payment of which ſums ſhould be made the ſame as the rent of the Chicacole Havelly. I beg leave to acquaint your Honour, &c. I ſhall conſider to let for the good of the Company, and alſo to ſhew my zeal for their ſervice by ſecuring the rent; in order to obtain their favour and protection, I am ready to engage to pay the ſum of forty thouſand Rupees annually to the Company's Treaſury, on account of the old balance due to the Company in that diſtrict, to the 25th September 1779, during the time of my receiving the rent for ten years, provided, if the Honourable Company ſhould approve and grant a Saned to *Vickeram Bunjee* for the Rajaſhip of *Goojar*; and I will give the particular account of the ſaid 40 000 Rupees collection to the Chief and Council there, to be credited from ſuch diſtrict.

I beg leave to inform your Honour, &c. the following articles to be granted, in order to ſettle the diſtrict, and to encourage the ſame to the inhabitants, &c

The Garriſon, conſiſting of a battalion of Sepoys, may remain in the Ganjam Diſtrict, out of which one or two Companies of Sepoys may attend the renter, in order to collect the revenues, and to place the Guards at the different places when it is required. The renter will allow the Batta to them according to the regulation of the Company's books, except in the Ganjam Town.

When the Troops are marching up the country, on account of any troubles ariſing from the Zemindars, &c. the Field charges ſhould be placed to the Honourable Company's account, but not to that of a renter.

Lately the Honourable Company have let out ſeveral Farms in that Diſtrict; which he deſires they may enjoy agreeable to the Company's Cowle under the renter, on paying him the Kiſts regularly, otherwiſe he hopes they will grant a permiſſion to take away thoſe rents from them, that he may receive the revenues himſelf.

Permiſſion ſhould be allowed to all European merchants to purchaſe grain, &c. paying the ſame value as the natives, and likewiſe to pay the cuſtoms and duties for the ſea and lands as uſual. The Maſoola boats in the ſea ports of *Moonſoor Cota*, *Sonapour*, and *Barou*, the permiſſion ſhould be granted to be under the renter, in order to encourage the merchants and traders for their export and import.

As the ſeveral duties at the Ganjam Buzar and the rent of the Banians were formerly paid to the renter, but now, ſince the Havelly has been taken under the Company's management, thoſe articles have been received by the gentlemen, he hopes that all ſuch articles at the Ganjam Town may be received by the renter. As the hire of coolies, carts, bullocks, &c has been lately fixed by the Chief and Council at *Ganjam*, he requeſts that it may be confirmed accordingly.

Read the following Repreſentation of *Ball Kiſtna*.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

The Repreſentation of *Ball Kiſtna*.

I humbly beg leave to lay before your Honour, &c. Aſſurances that my offer for renting the Itchapoor Diſtrict for the ſum of four lacks and fifteen thouſand Rupees per annum, *is full as large a Sum as the Company can expect*; the revenues of that diſtrict will never bear to make a collection any thing near 500,000 Rupees, with-

out oppreſſing the inhabitants, and whatever attempt may be made to ſhew a more conſiderable collection this year, will be ſeverely felt hereafter. What I now offer, conſidering the trouble I ſhall undergo, will afford very little advantages to myſelf, and my whole ſcheme is to put the revenues, in courſe of time, on a proper footing without oppreſſing any body, and to obtain the Company's favour and protection; and I am convinced that greater encouragement muſt be given to the inhabitants, and advances of conſiderable ſums of money be made them for manuring the lands, to bring the country into good order, otherwiſe the revenues of that diſtrict will certainly fall ſhort from year to year.

I beg leave to inform your Honour, &c. that there are ſeveral Diſtricts of the Zemindars, that turn out worſe and worſe from year to year, on account of the Rajah not *managing* properly, nor giving any encouragement to the inhabitants, but are conſtantly oppreſſing them, without allowing them their proper ſhare of the crops. Great numbers of inhabitants have been obliged to quit their habitations, which is a cauſe of great neglect in the cultivation. Therefore the Company's Jemmabundy, which was ſettled formerly for every year, has ſcarcely ever been collected, which occaſions the heavy balance due on them; and the Company's Troops have been obliged to take the field againſt them at great expence, and at laſt, what the Company have got from the country, has been moſtly expended by the charges of the diſtrict, which will be proved by the Ganjam accounts to this Honourable Board.

If the Honourable Company grant the Rent agreeable to my propoſals, I muſt take proper meaſures to ſettle thoſe diſtricts on advancing the money, and to eſtabliſh the inhabitants in their habitations again, otherwiſe the country will be ruined from one year to another without doubt. I have therefore, for my own credit, conſidering all that has paſt in the Ganjam Diſtrict, with regard to the falling off of revenues from year to year, undertaken to put the diſtrict into proper order, by encouraging the Zemindars and the Country People for my future reputation, with hopes of ſome ſmall advantage for my trouble upon an examination of the laſt ſeveral years, and have offered the ſum of 415,000 Rupees per annum, contained in my Propoſal, and likewiſe 40,000 Rupees for every year on account of the old balance due to the Company on the diſtrict; both ſums amount to Rupees 455,000 per annum, which I will engage to pay to the Honourable Company without admitting any trouble or expences in collecting the revenues, as there is very often great expences on this occaſion, and excluſive, as I have ſaid in my Propoſal, of the Ganjam Sea and River Cuſtoms. If the Honourable Company grant me the rent agreeable to my Propoſal, I muſt be at the expences of about a lack of Rupees for repairing the tanks, watercourſes, &c. and to aſſiſt the inhabitants of the Havelly and Zemindary, as this has been neglected hitherto, otherwiſe I ſhall not be able to make good the Company's rent and the balance, according to my promiſe.

If your Honour, &c. think that they can collect 500,000 Rupees every year, if the country is not let out, I humbly beg that your Honour, &c. will pleaſe to peruſe the former collections of every year what has been collected. There are two or three years collections will appear high, but the gentlemen of *Ganjam* were obliged to ſend Troops againſt the Rajahs, and got part of the balance with great difficulty, after leaving the Company's Troops ſeveral months there; but they did not forcibly collect it, the Rajahs were obliged to diſpoſe of their jewels, and I to make good the demands of the Company, and they are turned poor and are not able to make up the Company's balance, if the Company even ſend the Troops againſt them; to prove which, how has the Goomſoor Diſtrict ſtood for theſe ſeveral years in trouble and confuſion, and no inhabitants ſettled properly in their habitations. I am informed that *Latchema Bunjee* has been confirmed in the Rajaſhip of Goomſoor. If it is ſo, it will continually occaſion troubles in that diſtrict, and difficulty to collect the revenues, and the Company's Troops muſt remain there to prevent diſturbances. If it ſhould be the Company's pleaſure to grant the Zemindary again to *Vickeram Bunjee*, the country will be ſettled in peace and quiet without requiring the Company's Troops, and the revenues may eaſily be collected with the old balance due on that diſtrict, and I think it is the better way for the Company, if the Honourable Board may approve.

As for my paying the 40,000 R^{s} yearly on account of the old balance, it is *a great offer for me* to go through, and I muſt get every diſtrict properly ſettled to recover the yearly Tribute, together with a part of the Company's balance out of ſome diſtricts; others are entirely ruined, and will not afford the recovery of any part; and even the Tribute will fall ſhort, becauſe there are ſome family diſputes amongſt themſelves, and while they remain they will not let the inhabitants ſettle in the villages, in order to diſtreſs each party.

It is ſaid ſeveral of the inhabitants of the Havelly and Zemindary have abſconded from their villages, on account of not receiving their proper ſhare of their huſbandry, and a large part of the lands are uncultivated in the Government and the Zemindary Lands, which muſt occaſion a deduction in the Revenues.

Hoping therefore your Honour's favour and protection, I truſt you will conſider the above particulars, and determine as you judge beneficial for the Company's intereſt, and the juſtneſs of the repreſentation.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute, relative to farming the Ganjam Diſtricts.

Having fully conſidered the ſtate of the Ganjam Diſtrict, its diſtance from the Preſidency, and the difficulty of bringing it under proper controul, but by letting it out to a Renter for a certain fixed rent to the Company, on whom the Chief and Council, or a reſident, may by a proper check, to ſee that the Renter's engagements are fully complied with, that he keeps within the terms of the Cowle granted to him, and in no reſpect exerciſes any degree of oppreſſion towards the Zemindars and inhabitants, but affords them all encouragement, in order to bring the country, in the courſe of a few years, into a more flouriſhing ſtate, than by accounts it is in at preſent: I am therefore of opinion, the terms of *Ball Kiſtnah* ſhould be accepted, and a Cowle be immediately granted to him, that he may repair, without loſs of time, to *Ganjam*, as the ſeaſon requires his immediate preſence there.

I ſhall beg leave to ſubmit to the Board the principal reaſons that have induced me to offer the opinion I have now done.

The Itchapore Diſtrict is valued in the Company's account, Revenues in their Northern Circars, at a Jemmabundy of R^{s} 516,419, which, at 350 R^{s} per 100 P^{s}, is, P^{s} 147,548. 10. 23. but on a calculate of one year with another, it will be found the revenue has not yielded any thing near to that amount, which has occaſioned an accumulated account of balances that are ſtill going on, *and are yearly entered in the account of Quick Stock, only tended to deceive the Company with a Statement of what it's impoſſible for them ever to receive*; but it is not the amount collected that is alone to be attended to, in conſidering the utility of farming out the diſtrict; but the immenſe expences attending theſe collections, leave but a trifling profit to the Company; and the accompanying Statement will ſhew the total amount collected from the time the Company took poſſeſſion till the 30th of April laſt, amounting to Pagodas 1,298,404. 13. 27. The Civil and Military charges (excluſive of the fortifications, which amount to near Pagodas 50,000) are Pagodas 856,450. 4. 70. beſides the Aſſiſtance of the *Bengal* Troops, whoſe expences were paid from Bengal; and it will here be neceſſary to add ſome remarks on the collections of thoſe years that appear conſiderable.

From May 1772 to April 1773, the collections amounted to Pagodas 144,578. 12. 47. that year there were

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were two battalions of Sepoys ſent into the diſtricts, and the amount collected not on the exact Statement of the Jemmabundy, but a great part in conſequence of the Reduction of ſeveral places belonging to *Bumadoo*, one of the principal Rajahs, and likewiſe part of the balances due from the ſeveral Zemindars.

From May 1774 to the 30th of April 1775, the Collections amounted to Pagodas 138,098. 7. 9. From 1ſt May 1775 to the 30th of April 1776, 173,076. 23. 24.

In the above two years alſo, the collections are greatly aſſiſted by Troops employed in the diſtricts, and do not depend on the Jemmabundy alone, but a great part is the recovery of balances of former years, particularly from the Goomſoor Rajah, who paid what was due from him.

I come now to the laſt year's collections; *From the 1ſt May* 1778 *to the 30th of April* 1779 *during which period the Collections are ſaid to amount to* P^{s} 143,445. 15. 47. And it may here be neceſſary to remark, that obſerving from the year 1776 the collections decreaſed, and that in the laſt year, from the 1ſt May 1778 to the 28th of February 1779, there was to no greater amount collected than P^{s} 71,831. 26. 40. and for the full year preceding that, only P^{s} 97,907. 12. 57. I determined to conſider on ſome regulations that might ſecure a certain revenue to the Company in thoſe diſtricts at leſs expence; for, by referring to the Statement I now deliver in with this Minute, it will appear, that if a very unexpected collection had not been made in the months of March and April, the Company would have ſuffered a loſs from their being in poſſeſſion of the diſtricts; for the amount of the Civil and Military charges for the two years, to the 30th of April 1779, are eſtimated at Pagodas 189,587. 41. 30. the collections to the end of February 1779, for the two years, amount to no more than Pagodas 169,739. 7. 7. and even with the addition brought ſo unexpectedly to account in the months of March and April, the Company gain in the two years, only Pagod 24,585. 28. 74. I ſay unexpectedly; for during the twelve years that the Company have had poſſeſſion of the diſtricts, no ſuch collection was ever made in the months of March and April; the preceding year the amount received was trifling in compariſon of what has been brought to account in thoſe months of the preſent ſeaſon; whether a report of a deſign to rent the country, or to make ſome alterations in the mode of collections and reduction of expence operated to produce ſo conſiderable a receipt of revenue, in order for the preſent to ward off an alteration, by ſhewing a more conſiderable collection than was expected, I will not pretend to ſay: no reaſon was aſſigned at the end of February, for the receipts being ſo backward, and it cannot be urged that the low price, or little demand for grain, was the cauſe, as it is well known the grain from the Ganjam Diſtricts is chiefly exported to the Southward, and that the exportation is generally made in the months of January and February, or the middle of March at the lateſt, with ſafety.

I ſhall not, therefore, proceed further into an examination how ſuch a conſiderable part of the revenue came to be brought to account ſo late in the ſeaſon; but ſince we have been ſo fortunate as to receive the money, and we are much diſtreſſed at the Preſidency, by the lowneſs of the treaſury, I ſhall recommend to the Board, that an order be iſſued to the Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, to ſend up two lacks of Rupees with all poſſible diſpatch and ſafety.

Ball Kiſtna, in his propoſal, offers 415,000 R^{s} annually, excluſive of the Ganjam ſea and river cuſtoms, which may be computed at 10,000 R^{s}. and alſo to pay annually 40,000 R^{s} on account of the balances; theſe ſums make a certain revenue to the Company of 465,000 R^{s}. which is more, Communibus Annis, than ever they received; but whatever may be the collections, the Company can look but for little advantage, if ſome reductions are not made in the expences, for nearly the whole amount of the revenue is abſorbed in the Civil and Military charges; at preſent two battalions of Sepoys are kept there; by *Ball Kiſtnah*'s account, one will be ſufficient. He offers to pay the propoſed rent, free from all charges of collections, and even to pay the batta to the Sepoys employed with him upon that ſervice. I would recommend to the Board to go into an inveſtigation of the Civil and Military charges, and to ſee how they can be reduced; and it is worthy their conſideration, whether the eſtabliſhment of a Chief and Council, or a Reſident, is moſt for the Company's intereſt; the former muſt unavoidably occaſion a greater expence, and it ſeems to be entirely unneceſſary to have a Chief and Council where the whole inveſtments of the Company do not amount to twelve thouſand Rupees in a year; the ſea and river cuſtoms of *Ganjam*, &c. ſea ports, formerly, when under the adminiſtration of the Moors, produced eighty thouſand Rupees per annum; they do not now amount to more than 12,000 R^{s}, no great proof that the trade and advantages of the Settlement have benefited by an European Government.

Having fully offered the reaſons on which I have formed my opinion for farming the diſtrict, I have nothing more to add, and ſubmit the whole to the determination of the Board.

Thos Rumbold.

The Preſident's Minute being now read, Mr. *Johnſon* begs leave to obſerve, that not being prepared to give an opinion upon it at preſent, he wiſhes to have the conſideration of the Preſident's Minute, together with *Ball Kiſtnah*'s propoſal and repreſentation, deferred for a few days, when Mr. *Johnſon* will enter a Minute on the occaſion.

Mr. *Smith* being of opinion with Mr. *Johnſon*, requeſts further time to conſider the Preſident's Minute, and will likewiſe deliver in a Minute on the ſubject of *Ball Kiſtnah*'s propoſal.

Agreed, That the further conſideration of the Preſident's Minute be poſtponed to next Tueſday.

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Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 26th Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Board reſuming the conſideration of the Preſident's Minute, relative to farming the Ganjam Diſtricts, together with the repreſentations and propoſals of *Ball Kiſtna*, as entered in Conſultation the 29th July; the Preſident delivers in the following Minute, with the accompanying papers, marked N° 1, 2, 3, in addition to his former Minute of the 29th July, for farming the Ganjam Diſtrict.

In addition to the Minute I delivered in to the Board the 29th July, on the ſubject of renting the Ganjam Diſtricts, I ſhall offer a few more obſervations, that have confirmed me in the opinion, that it will be for the credit and intereſt of the Company to accept the propoſals made by *Ball Kiſtna*. In matters of Revenue, aſſertions and declamations do not prove any thing, unleſs ſupported by facts. Accounts are the only guides by which a true judgment can be formed. I have thoroughly examined the laſt two years collections; and the papers I now deliver in, N° 1, 2, 3, will ſhew the particulars of the collections brought to account, from the 1ſt May 1777 to the

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the 30th April 1778; and from 1ſt May 1778 to the 30th April 1779. It muſt be obſerved, that the year for the collections end in September; but as the accounts are always adjuſted in the general books to the 30th April each year, it makes no difference with reſpect to the yearly collections; but has this diſadvantage, that the Zemindars are always in arrears. Had I examined the particulars of other former years, it would have ſtill gone further in ſupport of my ſentiments; but the two laſt will ſufficiently explain the nature of the Revenue, and ſhew the Company how fallacious an account is held out to them, when the Jemmabundy of the Ganjam Diſtricts is rated in their books at upwards of five lacks of Rupees. The accounts I now deliver in will ſhew, that

From the 1ſt of May 1777, to the 30th April 1778, there was collected, on account of Balances due from the Year 1770, to the end of the Year 1775	20,855	29	9
For the Year 1776	32,935	19	25
And of the Jemmabundy for the Year 1777, only	44,116	6	23
Total Collection	97,907	12	57

From the 1ſt of May 1778 to the 30th April 1779, on account of Balances from the Year 1770 to the end of the Year 1776	31,469	1	4
On account of the Year 1777	19,256	33	34
And for the Jemmabundy of the Year 1778	92,719	22	49
Total Collection	143,445	15	47

It muſt be obſerved, that the greateſt part of the collections for 1778, is brought to account in the months of March and April 1779; and being entered in the caſh as ſo much received, the Chief and Council become anſwerable for the amount, whatever is received either from the Havelly or Zemindary lands: from that period the ſeveral Renters will be entitled to a further credit; for, in the Letter from the Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, dated the 17th June, they do not ſpeak with any certainty of the recovery of the balances; ſome they mention are likely to be paid in a courſe of years; but I do not ſee of what benefit to the Company ſuch recovery can prove, if it is to be at the expence of each enſuing year's revenue. That ſuch will be the caſe, not only the accounts I now deliver in to the Board will demonſtrate, but alſo the ſtatement of the balances before referred to, which will prove the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing another Jemmabundy through the country, whether the collections are kept under the management of a Chief and Council, or let to a Renter; and where ſuch Renter takes the lands for a term of years, there can be no fear of oppreſſions; for his intereſt muſt lead him to give all due encouragement to the inhabitants. This ſeems to be the opinion of the Company in all they have ſaid on the ſubject of farming their lands; and it appears extraordinary, that the ſervants of the Company, in the Northern Circars, ſhould have been allowed to take to themſelves ſo much the management of the country, in contradiction to the expreſs orders of the Company, who, in their Letter of the 25th March 1768, direct as follows: "Should the "Circars continue in our poſſeſſion, it muſt be obſerved "as a general rule, that no European is to interfere in "the collection of the Revenues, further than receive "the rents from *Huſſain Ally*, or the Rajahs who hold "the Diſtricts, and are to account to the Chiefs of "*Maſulipatam* or *Vizagapatam*, as you ſhall direct; "neither are they to interfere in the management or the "Government of the country, further than to check the "Renter, if guilty of any grievous oppreſſions."

I before gave in a ſtatement of the collections and diſburſements, Civil and Military, for the time the Company have had poſſeſſion of the Ichapore Diſtrict; to the latter muſt be added, what has been expended in fortifications and buildings, amounting to Pagodas 119,711 5 50. as appears by the account dead ſtock; and if to this is added the expence of ſtores, the Company will not be found to have benefited much by the poſſeſſion of that country. An abſtract of the expences, Civil and Military, which I now deliver in, will, I am perſuaded, convince the Board of the neceſſity of reducing them: I have carefully looked into the military accounts: the eſtabliſhment of a Caffree Company appears to me very expenſive; their pay and allowances amount to near four hundred Pagodas monthly, beſides the expences they occaſion in the hoſpital, which is from twelve to fifteen hundred Pagodas per annum. I am not, however, ſufficiently acquainted with their uſe and ſervices, to decide haſtily on their diſmiſſion; but if, as I am informed, they are compoſed chiefly of old and decrepid Topaſſes, thoſe who can plead length of ſervice, had better be put on a penſion liſt, than be kept on a full eſtabliſhment, at a great expence, when they are not likely to prove of any ſervice; and it will be neceſſary to conſider, whether a leſs number of Sepoys than are now kept at *Ganjam*, may not be ſufficient to anſwer every purpoſe: by which means, and ſome regulations in the other Circars, we may be able to keep a greater force together, for the protection of the whole, as they are at preſent very much divided. The yearly field charges in the Ganjam accounts, appear enormous. I ſubmit further to the conſideration of the Board, whether the affairs of that diſtrict may not be as well managed, and at leſs expence, by a Reſident and one or two aſſiſtants, as by a Chief and Council. The reaſons given for appointing a Chief and Council, are as follows: "When Mr. *Cotsford* went down to *Ganjam*, 1768, the "ſituation of affairs in the Itchapore Diſtrict was exceedingly unfavourable; the Company reaped but little "advantage from the country, and even that little was "rendered very precarious by the revolt of *Narrindoo*, "and by that ſpirit of rebellion which prevailed amongſt "the Zemindars of the Itchapore Diſtrict, from the "deſire, and with a view, of freeing themſelves entirely "from the Company's Authority and Government. "The natural ſtrength of this country, from the number "of hills and woods, the unhealthineſs of the climate, "and the ſtrong holds poſſeſſed by the Zemindars, "favoured their ſcheme for independence; and at the "ſame time preſented us with many difficulties in the "execution of the plan we propoſed, of reducing them "to obedience, and receiving from them a reaſonable "Tribute, in proportion to the value of their ſeveral "Zemindaries. Mr. *Cotsford*, who has been employed "in this ſervice, hath conducted himſelf much to the "ſatisfaction of the Board, and to his own credit; the "peace of the country is now fully ſettled, the Zemindars are all brought under due ſubjection, and the "Company's Revenue, from this diſtrict only, is increaſed to ſo conſiderable a ſum, as upwards of five "lacks of Rupees per annum. Mr. *Cotsford* has aſſured "us alſo, that a conſiderable inveſtment may be provided at *Ganjam*, when the buſineſs is brought into a "proper

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" proper channel; and as the management of this Inveſtment, together with the collection of the revenues, " will require more ſervants than we have hitherto employed, it is agreed, that from henceforth the whole be " put under the direction of a Chief and Council, with " a proper number of aſſiſtants, who are to be on the " ſame footing, and to have the ſame allowances, as the " ſervants at *Vizagapatam*."

From the above extract of the Conſultations, it appears, that it was the Reſident that brought the revenue to five lacks of Rupees; which however has never been collected, one year with another, by the Chief and Council; and the principal reaſon aſſigned for the appointment of a Chief and Council, was the management of a ſuppoſed large increaſe of Inveſtment. The Inveſtment now, after five years appointment of a Chief and Council, is between three and four thouſand Pagodas annually; which certainly would not prove too great a labour for a Reſident to look after. I have endeavoured, from facts drawn from the Records, to ſtate to you my reaſons for being of opinion, that the renting the diſtricts will be the moſt eligible method we can purſue, for ſecuring a certain revenue to the Company, and for bringing the diſtrict into a more flouriſhing ſtate than it is in at preſent: either a Chief and Council, or a Reſident, whichever the Board may determine on, will be a proper check on the Renter. This is the idea of the Company, in their Letter of the 25th March 1768, which I have before quoted, and which I think ſhould be followed.

I will not take up the time of the Board, further than to remark on the laſt Letter from *Ganjam*, relative to the proceedings of the Chief and Council, with reſpect to the two brothers, *Vickeram Bungee* and *Lechema Bungee*. The idea of the cruelty of expelling a man entirely from his lands and patrimony, induced the Board not to come to deciſive meaſures againſt the former, till abſolute neceſſity ſhould oblige them. Our ſentiments were fully, and in ſtrong terms, expreſſed to the Chief and Council. They have ſent us the Copy of the Chief's Letters to *Vickeram Bungee*; and we have a Tranſlate of his anſwer, wherein *Vickeram Bungee* agrees to two of the propoſitions made to him, and does not abſolutely object to the third; he only reaſons on the ſubject, and expreſſes a wiſh to have a Cowle from the Preſidency, that he may come in: He expreſsly ſays, he has taken refuge with one of the Company's Zemindars, which is the ſame as if he was in his own diſtricts; and there is ſuch a myſtery runs through his Letter, and a declaration of having paid his Tribute, that I think the Gentlemen ſhould, for their own credit, have paid that attention to what they know to be our wiſhes, as to have taken a little time to conſider what was proper to be done; but ſuch was their hurry to carry this favourite point, they have not made any ſtipulation for the Company's balances, though they inveſted *Lechema Bungee* in a formal manner, with the Rajahſhip; and then ſay, they " do not doubt but he will do what we deſire." I hope I ſhall be excuſed from giving my aſſent to confirming this Act, till I am convinced *Vickeram Bungee* had no cauſe for complaint when he quitted his Zemindary, and that he has forfeited all claim to the Company's protection; which is by no means clear to me at preſent.

Ganjam Collections from 1ſt May 1777 to the 30th April 1778.

Auguſt.	Narrainder, Rajah of Moherry, in Part of his Tribute for 1775, -	1714	10	23
	Ditto - Ditto. Ditto - - - -	4000	—	—
Novem.	Bemadoo, Rajah of Vizianagur, in Part of his Tribute for 1774, -	2857	5	11
	Rajonaud Soor, Rajah of Turtah, in Part of his Tribute for 1771, -	285	25	57
	Santarow, Rajah of Hownnah, in Part of his Tribute, for 1774, -	57	5	11
	Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Souranghee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771,	285	25	57
	Mahurta, Rajah of Berandi, in Part of his Tribute for 1775, - -	285	25	57
	Guzender, Rajah of Polar, in Part of his Tribute for 1773, - -	85	25	57
December.	Ragonaud Soor, Rajah of Turlagh, in Part of his Tribute for 1771,	142	30	09
	Santarow, Rajah of Howmah, in full for his Tribute for 1775, -	57	5	11
	Hurry Chundon, Rajah of Souringhee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771,	285	25	57
	Mahurtah, Rajah of Berondi, in Part of his Tribute for 1775, -	285	25	57
	Gazendar, Rajah of Paloor, in full for his Tribute of 1773, and in Part for 1774, - - - - - - - - - -	114	10	23
	Narrainder, Rajah of Moherry, in Part of his Tribute for 1775, -	2857	5	11
February.	Rajah Sing, Rajah of Sourerah, in full of his Tribute for 1772, and in Part of 1773, - - - - - - - - - -	428	20	46
	Ragonaud Soor, Rajah of Turlah, in Part of his Tribute for 1771, -	1142	30	69
	Neſhunk, Rajah of Bouraur Singhee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771,	114	10	23
	Santarow, Rajah of Howmah, in Part of his Tribute for 1775, -	285	25	57
	Mahurtah, Rajah of Berondi, in Part of his Tribute for 1775, -	571	15	34
	Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Sourang, in Part of his Tribute for 1771,	571	15	34
	Hurry Kiſſen Sing, Rajah of Surgur, in Part of his Tribute for 1774, -	657	5	11
	Gazender, Rajah of Palloor, in Part of his Tribute for 1774, -	200	—	—
	Narrinder, Rajah of Moherry, in full of his Tribute for 1775, -	3571	15	34
		20,855	29	9

Ganjam Collections, from 1ſt May 1778 to the 30th April 1779.

Beemadoo, Rajah of Vizeanagur, in Part of his Tribute for 1774 - -	2857	5	11
Jagganaudoo, Rajah of Prelapahgery, in Part of his Tribute for 1775 - -	2000	—	—
Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Sourenghee, received in Part of his Tribute for 1775	571	15	34
Hurry Kiſſen Sing, Rajah of Surgur, received in Full for his Tribute for 1774, and in Part 1775 - - - - - - - - - -	285	25	57
Permaud Sing, Rajah of Burragur, received in Part of his Tribute for 1774 -	171	15	34
Santarow, Rajah of Howmah, in Part of his Tribute for 1775 - - -	285	25	57
Royah Sing, Rajah of Sourchah, in Part of his Tribute for 1775 - - -	285	25	57
Ragonaud Soor, Rajah of Turlah, in Part of his Tribute for 1771 - -	285	25	57

Carried forward

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Gazender, Raiah of Paloor, in Part of his Tribute for 1774	142	30	69
Narrainder, Rajah of Moherry, in Part of his Tribute for 1776	1428	20	46
Chotra, Rajah of Tellentra, in Part of his Tribute for 1770	157	5	11
Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Sourenghee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	157	5	11
Santerow, Rajah of Howmah, received of him in full of his Tribute for 1775 and in Part 1776	285	25	57
Gazendar, Rajah of Paloor, received of him in Part of his Tribute for 1774	285	25	57
Mahurtah, Rajah of Berondi, received of him in Part of his Tribute for 1776	285	25	57
Bunny Chitty Joguey, in Part of his Balance	350	—	—
Permanund Sing, Rajah of Burragur, in Part of his Tribute for 1774	265	25	57
Hurry Kiſſen Sing, Rajah of Surgur, received in Part of his Tribute for 1775	208	20	46
Ragonaud Soor, Rajah of Turlah, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	222	30	69
Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Souringhee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	62	30	69
Neſhunk, Rajah of Bourar Singhee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	28	20	46
Santarow, Rajah of Howmah, in Part of his Tribute for 1776	285	25	57
Gazendar, Rajah of Paloor, in Part of his Tribute for 1774	285	25	57
Mahurtah, Rajah of Berondi, in Part of his Tribute for 1776	485	25	57
Narrander, Rajah of Moherry, in Part of his Tribute for 1776	1,428	20	46
Roya Sing, Zemindar of Souretah, in Part of his Tribute for 1773	285	25	57
Choterow, Rajah of Tellantra, in Part of his Tribute for 1770	278	—	—
Narrander, Rajah of Moherry, in Part of his Tribute for 1776	2,857	5	11
Roya Sing, Rajah of Sourerah, in Part of his Tribute for 1773	285	25	57
Hurry Kiſſen Sing, Rajah of Surgur, in Part of his Tribute for 1775	285	25	57
Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Souringhee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	285	25	57
Ragonaud Soor, Rajah of Turlah, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	142	30	69
Permanaund Sing, Rajah of Barragur, in Part of his Tribute for 1774	228	20	46
Choterow, Rajah of Tellertra, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	579	5	11
Roya Sing, Rajah of Sourerah, in further Part of his Tribute for 1773	571	25	57
Beemadoo, Rajah of Viziangur, in full for his Tribute for 1774, and in Part for 1775, and 1777	4,285	25	57
Gazender Raiah of Paloor, in Part of his Tribute for 1774 and 1775	142	30	69
Ragonaud Soor, Rajah of Turlah, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	1,062	30	69
Hurry Chunden, Rajah of Souringhee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771 and 1772	937	5	11
Hurry Kiſſen Sing, Rajah of Surgur, in further Part of his Tribute for 1775	1,505	25	57
Neſhunk, Rajah of Bourour Singee, in Part of his Tribute for 1771	114	20	46
Narrander, Rajah of Moherry, in full for his Tribute for 1776	4,285	25	57
Mahurtah, Rajah of Berondi, in Part of his Tribute for 1776	285	25	57
	31,469	1	44

ACCOUNT of Particulars of the Collections at Ganjam, from the 1ſt May 1777 to the 30th April 1778.

Account of old Balances from the Year 1770 to the End of April 1775, as per Account N° 1	20,855	29	9
Account of Collections for the Balance of 1776	32,935	19	25
Account of Collections for the Year 1777	44,116	6	23
Total collected	97,907	12	57

ACCOUNT of Particulars of the Collections at Ganjam, from the 1ſt May 1778 to the 30th April 1779.

Account of old Balances, from the Year 1770 to the End of April 1776, as per annexed Account N° 2.	31,469	1	44
Account of Collections for the Balances of the Year 1777	19,256	33	34
Account of Collections for the Year 1778, chiefly brought to Account in the Months of February, March, and April, 1779	92,719	22	49
Total Collections	1,43,445	15	47

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 9th Auguſt 1779.

Read the following Minute of Mr. *Smith*:

Having attentively peruſed and conſidered the Petition and Repreſentation of *Ball Kiſtna*, together with the Preſident's Minute thereon, I beg leave to ſubmit to the Board my reaſons for diſapproving of the propoſed meaſure of giving *Ball Kiſtna*, or any other perſon, the rent of the Itchapore Diſtrict.

The collections and management of the Company's Revenues in the Itchapore Diſtrict have hitherto been in the hands of their Servants, whoſe conduct has from time to time received the moſt honourable teſtimonies of the approbation of this Government. The country was found in a ſtate of anarchy, to which it had been long accuſtomed. The Zemindars looked upon themſelves as independent, and many of them were poſſeſſed of ſtrong holds, which, with the ſmalleſt degree of reſolution, would have made them ſo; theſe have all been ſucceſſively reduced, and the Company's authority eſtabliſhed

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bliſhed throughout the diſtrict. In accompliſhing which important works, and bringing the Company's affairs in the Itchapore Diſtrict into their preſent ſecure ſtate, much expence has been incurred; yet the Treaſury here has ſeveral times received ſupplies from *Ganjam* in money and drafts; and the Inveſtment at *Vizagapatam* has been conſiderably aſſiſted from thence. It is a circumſtance well known, and has been often ſtated in the Records, that ſo long as the Goomſoor Rajah's force remained unbroken, the tranquillity of the diſtrict would be inſecure, and the Revenue uncertain. Equity and policy equally dictated, that he ſhould be brought to a level with the reſt. The undertaking was long deferred, from an idea of his ſtrength, and an apprehenſion of involving the Company in diſputes with the Maratta Government, to which he had been formerly tributary; at length the refractory conduct of the Rajah made it abſolutely neceſſary to proceed againſt him, and it fell to the lot of the preſent Chief and Council to aſſume the management of the Company's affairs at *Ganjam*, preciſely at the commencement of the troubles in the Goomſoor Country. Can it then be juſtly matter of reproach to the Chief and Council, if, during theſe troubles, the Revenues have fallen ſhort of their uſual amount? But the following fact will ſhew that little can be urged againſt them on this ſcore.

The balances outſtanding at *Ganjam* on my arrival, or rather on the 30th September 1774, amounted to Pagodas 301,437. The 30th April laſt they amounted to Pagodas 378,467, ſo that in the ſpace of five years, during which the Goomſoor Country has been reduced, the balances have increaſed only 77,000 Pagodas. It cannot here eſcape the obſervation of the Board, how conſiderable a part of the arrears now due was incurred during the adminiſtration of a man, to whoſe ſpirited and judicious conduct the Company are indebted for the advantages they have received, or may hereafter receive, from that diſtrict. After my arrival at *Ganjam* with Mr. *Hollond*, in February 1774, one of the firſt objects to which we directed our attention, was the recovery of theſe balances. The then Preſident and Council, in their Letter of the 13th July 1774, deſired our opinion on that ſubject, and with great candour obſerved, "that when Mr. *Cotsford* was ſent to *Ganjam*, the natural ſituation of the country, and the ſtrong holds poſſeſſed by the principal Zemindars, ſo favoured their idea of independence, that they frequently with-held the ſums they had agreed to pay, and reduced him to the neceſſity of collecting what he was able by marching a force againſt them." In this ſtate of affairs it is not at all ſurpriſing that conſiderable balances ſhould have ariſen, particularly as Mr. *Cotsford* debited the Zemindars for a twelvemonth's arrears on his arrival at *Ganjam*.

It would render this Minute too voluminous were I to inſert even the ſubſtances of what we wrote in anſwer to the foregoing, under date the 28th Auguſt 1774; but as that Letter was very explicit on the ſubject of the balances, and ſhewed in what manner they had ariſen and accumulated to the ſtate they then were in, I wiſh to have it read on this occaſion. I beg leave to refer to the General Letter from *Ganjam*, of the 10th July 1776, in which is fully inveſtigated and explained one very conſiderable cauſe of the increaſe of the balances, namely, the ſituation of the ſix Zemindaries, collectively known by the appellation of the Mahindra Mullees, which had been conſtantly debited for a Tribute of Rupees 55,000, while the medium of the collections for nine years, from the time of Mr. *Cotsford*'s arrival at *Ganjam*, amounted to only Rupees 19,082.

Upon the whole, with regard to the large balances due at *Ganjam*, let it be conſidered, firſt, That the Tribute exacted from many of the Zemindars (or at leaſt from thoſe of the Mahindra Mullees) was higher than their countries would bear. Secondly, That Mr. *Cotsford* debited the Rajahs for a whole twelvemonth's arrears on his arrival at *Ganjam*. Thirdly, That during the whole time of the troubles for two years afterwards, when moſt of the principal Zemindars were ſtruggling for independance, the full Tribute was carried to their debit in the ſame manner as if the diſtrict had been in perfect tranquillity. To theſe circumſtances add two years of ſcarcity after my arrival (for which not the leaſt deduction was allowed from the Tribute), and the late troubles in the Goomſoor Country, and when theſe conſiderations have had their full weight, let the arrears due at *Ganjam* be compared with thoſe due at the other ſubordinate Settlements, where no obſtacles have exiſted, and I am perſuaded it will appear that no argument can be drawn in favour of the meaſure now under conſideration, from the amount of the balances at *Ganjam*, which would not operate in a greater degree for letting the diſtricts of *Maſulipatam* and *Vizagapatam*.

I grant that the collections in the Ganjam Accounts for the month of April, are to an uncommon amount, and that the Chief and Council ſeem to have exerted themſelves in a particular manner, to bring as much as poſſible to account in that month, in order to make the collections for the year (which expires the 30 April) appear in the moſt advantageous light.

I grant alſo that the arrears are in conſequence conſiderably reduced from what they would otherwiſe have been; on the other hand, it ſhould be conſidered that the balance from the late Renter of the Havelly Lands forms a great part of the arrears; from which balances the Chief and Council ſome time ſince recommended a deduction of 60,000 Rupees, on account of the Renter's loſſes, which, if it is to be allowed, will of courſe leſſen the arrears by that ſum.

I now proceed to examine *Ball Kiſtna*'s Propoſal and Repreſentation; in which he has indirectly endeavoured to convey an unfavourable idea of the conduct and management of the Company's Servants at *Ganjam*; yet I ſhall draw from theſe very Papers an ample vindication of them; for, if the Company's Servants have been unfaithful to their truſt, or through inability have miſmanaged it, we may reaſonably expect from *Ball Kiſtna* ſome at leaſt of the advantages which muſt hitherto have been loſt to the Company, particularly, as, if his Propoſal be accepted, he will have poſſeſſion of the lands for a length of time, amply ſufficient to accompliſh every plan that he can form for their improvement. We ſhall ſee whether his Propoſal correſponds with ſuch an expectation. The annual Jemmabundy at *Ganjam*, ever ſince the reſtoration of the villages that were detained from the Government Lands, and the addition of 20,000 R^{s} to the Goomſoor Rajah's Tribute, has amounted to Rupees 555,000.

The Board have already ſeen how much the arrears have accumulated in the laſt five years. *Ball Kiſtna* offers R^{s} 415,000 for the rent, and to pay off 40,000 Rupees per annum of the *preſent* balance; ſo that in the courſe of ten years, the preſent balance will be decreaſed 400,000 Rupees, and a new one incurred of 1,400,000 Rupees; or, in other words, if *Ball Kiſtna* fulfils his engagements, by paying 455,000 R^{s} per annum, the arrears, inſtead of being reduced by his renting the diſtrict, will accumulate ten lacks of Rupees beyond their preſent amount; but there appears to me an inconſiſtency in his offering to pay off 40,000 R^{s} per annum of the arrears, when his whole Propoſal, including that ſum, falls ſhort 100,000 R^{s} of the current Tribute. If we are to underſtand by that offer, that the payment of 40,000 R^{s} per annum is to be a full compenſation to the Company for whatever part of the arrears he may be able to collect by the expiration of his Cowle: in that caſe, I beg leave to remind the Board, that the Zemindars of *Vizianagur*, *Pretapaghery*, *Callicoote*, *Chigutty*, and *Daracoote*, have given aſſignments of lands for the diſcharge of their balances, which aſſignments, before I left *Ganjam*, produced nearly 50,000 R^{s} more than the current Tribute.—*Ball Kiſtna* himſelf now rents the *Vizianagur* aſſigned lands for eight years, engaging to

clear off the Rajah's arrears by that period, ſo that one of the balances at leaſt he thinks recoverable.

I arrived at *Ganjam* the 21ſt February 1774, and left it the beginning of October 1777;

The collections for that period amount to - - - R' 16,42,653
On a medium - - - - - 4,69,328 per annum.

It is true that this includes the Goomſoor Rajah's balances, which he paid off in 1775; on the other hand, he paid nothing the laſt year, and the Havelly Collections fell ſhort upwards of a year's rent.

The great impediment to the collections is now removed, and the Company's authority eſtabliſhed by the reduction of the Goomſoor Country; yet *Ball Kiſtna*'s offer, including the 40,000 R' for the balances, does not equal the collections that have been made for theſe ſix years paſt. What then is the object, or what the end propoſed, by transferring the charge and collection of the Company's Revenues from their Servants to *Ball Kiſtna*? It is not the recovery of the arrears, for they will increaſe ten lacks, even if he punctually fulfils his engagements; nor the collecting more of the current Tribute, for he offers leſs than has been collected theſe ſix years paſt: if it be the improvement of the lands, *Ball Kiſtna* will enjoy the benefit, for he offers no more for the laſt year than the firſt. It is true he propoſes to withdraw one of the battalions ſtationed in that diſtrict, well knowing that the Company's authority is now ſo firmly eſtabliſhed by the reduction of the only Zemindar who was in the leaſt formidable, that probably one battalion may henceforward be ſufficient; but to what does this amount, unleſs he were to engage to defray the expences in caſe another battalion ſhould be found neceſſary? If he, as Renter, can keep the Zemindars in due obedience with one battalion, will the Company's Servants require more? or can it be ſuppoſed that the Zemindars will more readily ſubmit to the controul of a Black Renter, than to the Company's immediate Government?—By the vigorous meaſures adopted at *Ganjam*, moſt of which were ordered, and all approved, from hence, the Zemindars are become ſenſible of the Company's power, and the ſtability of their Government; the diſtrict is at length in a ſtate of perfect tranquillity: Was it poſſible to accompliſh this work without expence? or, can the expences by which it has been effected, be urged as matter of reproach to the Company's Servants? The charges of collection, in caſe it ſhould be found neceſſary to ſend Troops to compel the Zemindars to make good their engagements, except the batta to two companies of Sepoys, are ſtill to be carried to the Company's account, as *Ball Kiſtna* expreſsly ſtipulates, "that when the Troops are marching "up the country on account of troubles ariſing from the "Zemindars, &c. the field charges ſhall be placed to "the Company's account."

Having now ſaid what has occurred to me on this important ſubject, I ſubmit the whole, with deference, to the opinion and judgment of the Board; only hoping they will conſider, that the depriving the Company's Servants of their truſt, and beſtowing it on a Black Man, will imply the ſevereſt reflection on their integrity, and operate as a puniſhment before they are charged with any crime.

Charles Smith.

Read the following Minute of Mr. *Johnſon*:

I diſſent from renting the Itchapore Diſtrict; for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe I conceive the Company's dignity, honour, and intereſts, are much better ſupported by a Chief and Council, than any other mode which can be adopted.

2d'y. Becauſe, although Mr. *Cotsford* had been a Reſident there for many years, this Board, of which I was then a Member, found it expedient to appoint a Chief and Council on his reſignation in 1773.

3dly. Becauſe I am convinced the balance now due in that diſtrict, chiefly accumulated during the Reſidentſhip of Mr. *Cotsford*; and that, when thoſe balances, which are unqueſtionably ſecure, are deducted, it will be found there has not been any great decreaſe ſince his time, although the diſtrict has greatly ſuffered by the rebellious diſpoſition of *Vickeram Bungee*, late Zemindar of *Goomſoor*.

And laſtly, becauſe I am convinced that the decreaſe of Revenue has ariſen from untoward circumſtances, which no longer exiſt, and from no inattention of the Chief and Council; that I think it too dangerous a ſcheme to truſt ſo extenſive a diſtrict to the management of any one man, and am of opinion we ſhould have had the ſentiments of the Chief and Council of *Ganjam* on this ſubject, before we agreed on the conditions of the Cowle to be granted to *Ball Kiſtna*.

Samuel Johnſon.

The Preſident then puts the following Queſtion to the Board, Whether the Itchapore Diſtrict be rented to *Ball Kiſtna* for the term of ten years, at the rate of four lacks and fifteen thouſand Rupees per annum, agreeable to the terms of his Petition?

Mr. *Perring* is of opinion that *Ball Kiſtna* ſhould have the rent, for the reaſons ſet forth in a former Minute.

Mr. *Johnſon* is opinion the Itchapore Diſtrict ſhould not be rented, for the reaſons alledged in his Minute.

Mr. *Smith* is of opinion the Propoſals of *Ball Kiſtna* ſhould not be accepted, for the reaſons contained in his Minute.

Sir *Hector Munro* is of opinion, the Propoſal of *Ball Kiſtna* ſhould be accepted, for the reaſons given in his former Minute upon this ſubject.

Mr. *Whitehill* is of opinion, that *Ball Kiſtna*'s Propoſal ſhould be accepted.

The Preſident is of opinion, the Propoſal of *Ball Kiſtna* ſhould be accepted.

Carried in favour of *Ball Kiſtna*'s Propoſal.

Reſolved therefore, that the whole Itchapore Diſtrict, excluſive of the Ganjam Sea and River Cuſtoms, be rented to *Ball Kiſtna* for the term of ten years, commencing the 25th September 1779, and ending the 25th September 1789, on condition that he pays into the Company's Treaſury, the ſum of four lacks and fifteen thouſand Rupees annually, at ſtated payments, as will be expreſſed in his Cowle; and forty thouſand Rupees annually, on account of the balances due from the Zemindars; as alſo twenty thouſand Rupees yearly, on account of the balance due from *Jaggabundoo Chowdrey* for the Havelly Lands, provided all accounts of the collections and payments are given up to him, unleſs *Jaggabundoo Chowdrey* immediately makes good the balances himſelf; that is, after deducting the ſixty thouſand Rupees recommended by the Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, on the enquiry made, "Account of Loſſes ſuſtained."

Agreed, That a Letter be written to the Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, to the above purport; and that they be directed, upon receipt of the ſaid Letter, to give the country in charge to whoever *Ball Kiſtna* may appoint for the purpoſe of acting for him till his arrival in the diſtrict, ſo far as may be neceſſary for his encouraging and ſecuring the cultivation for the enſuing year, for the Revenue of which he is to be anſwerable; and that they make known the Reſolutions of the Board accordingly, that there may be no delay, miſunderſtanding, or impediment to the mode they have thought proper to adopt, for the greater certainty of ſecuring the Revenue to the Company, and afford the Renter all neceſſary aſſiſtance to enable him to fulfil his engagements to the Company.

Extract

APPENDIX. No. 61.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, dated 13th Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Governor, Preſident.
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.
Mr. *Smith* indiſpoſed.

Read the following Petition of *Ball Kiſtna:*

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have to requeſt your Honours, &c. Council, will pleaſe to inſert in the Cowle for the Itchapore Diſtrict, the Jemmabundy to be collected by me from each of the Zemindars. I am far from wiſhing that the Jemmabundy of any Zemindar ſhould be raiſed; on the contrary, that many of them ſhould have their Jemmabundy conſiderably lowered, for at preſent it is fixed at ſo high a rate as never has been and never can be collected. It might be for my benefit to have it ſtand as it is, had I my own intereſt in view only; but as I am convinced theſe Zemindars are greatly diſſatisfied, by having large balances ſtanding againſt them, which they have not the leaſt proſpect of ever being able to pay, and which they are in continual apprehenſions may ſome time or other be their ruin, it would greatly quiet their minds to have their Jemmabundy fixed at what their countries will afford to pay, which is nearly about the ſum collected from them by the Chief and Council; under mentioned ſhews the Jemmabundy, as it ſtands on the Company's books, and the Jemmabundy I would beg leave to recommend to be fixed for the ſmall Zemindars.

	Jemmabundy as it ſtands on the Ganjam Books.		Jemmabundy as propoſed by Ball Kiſtna.	
Pretepaghery	22,000	—	22,000	ſame as before.
Vizianagur	25,000	—	25,000	D° D°
Checkaly	35,000	—	35,000	D° D°
Darolotah	25,000	—	25,000	D° D°
Callicote	34,000	—	34,000	D° D°
Goomſoor	50,000	—	50,000	D° D°
Ratazur	37,000	—	37,000	D° D°
Sourdah	5,000	—	3,000	
Homah	3,000	—	2,000	
Beredy	5,700	—	4,000	
Surgur	11,000	—	6,000	
Paloor	3,500	—	2,000	
Borgur	10,000	—	4,000	
Moherry	45,000	—	30,000	
Turlah	15,000	—	3,000	
Bonaſſey	3,000	—	700	
Sourahie	13,000	—	4,000	
Jellentra	16,000	—	5,000	
Jerdah	8,000	—	2,000	
Munveſaw	20,000	—	15,000	
Rupees	3,86,200		3,08,700	

The Jemmabundy I have recommended, is leſs by 80,000 Rupees than what it was fixed at. The diſtreſſes and inability of theſe petty Zemindars, to pay their high Jemmabundy, has been conſtantly repreſented to the Chief and Council of *Ganjam*, and by them, I believe, to the Honourable Board; that by looking at the Letters, your Honours, &c. Council, will perceive how reaſonable what I have recommended. And your Petitioner will be ever bound to pray.

The Preſident deſires to remark, that the Petition given in by *Ball Kiſtna*, appears to him a further proof of the propriety of the meaſure lately adopted by the Board, in renting to him the Itchapore Diſtrict; and as it ſhews his deſire of relieving the ſeveral Zemindars, who have been diſtreſſed, by having too heavy a Jemmabundy fixed upon them, and at the ſame time does not diſcover an inclination to increaſe the revenues from any of the others, he has not a doubt but the good effects of his conduct, in managing the diſtrict, will very ſoon be experienced in the country, as well by the Zemindars as the inhabitants.

The Preſident then puts the following Queſtion to the Board: Whether the Jemmabundy ſhall be altered agreeable to the propoſal of *Ball Kiſtna?* whereupon the opinions of the ſeveral Members of Council are taken, and are as follows:

Mr. *Perring* is of opinion the Jemmabundy ſhall be altered.

Mr. *Johnſon* begs leave to remark, that as he ſees this matter in a very different light from the Preſident, he will take an opportunity of delivering his ſentiments upon the ſubject at a future day.

Sir *Hector Munro* is of opinion, that the Jemmabundy ſhould be altered.

Mr. *Whitehill* is of the ſame opinion.

The Preſident is of opinion the Jemmabundy ſhould be altered.

Carried in the affirmative.

Ordered, therefore, That the Jemmabundy be altered, in ſuch proportion as the Board may hereafter determine upon, and will be particularly expreſſed in the Cowle to *Ball Kiſtna*.

APPENDIX, No. 62.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, the 15th September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thos Rumbold*, Bart.
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from *Ganjam*:

To the Honourable Sir *Thos Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have received your Letter of the 10th inſtant, informing us of your having let out the whole Itchapore Diſtrict, excluſive of Ganjam Sea and River Cuſtoms, to *Ball Kiſtna*, for the term of ten years.

As nothing could exceed the happineſs we have experienced in reflecting, that no act of this Board hath been diſapproved of, ſince the affairs of the diſtrict have been entruſted to our management, and always conſidering your approbation of our conduct an ample recompence for our zealous endeavours for the advancement of the Company's intereſt; ſo nothing can equal the concern we feel in beholding ourſelves thus diveſted of truſt and influence, at *a time too when by the reduction of* the Goomſoor Zemindary, the diſtrict in general is brought to a ſtate of tranquillity, and its revenues ſecured on a more permanent footing than at any former period from the firſt eſtabliſhment of the Company's authority.

We had flattered ourſelves, that our repreſentation of the affairs of the diſtrict, under date the 16th June, which informed your Honour, &c. of the very conſiderable collections which had been made in the laſt year, and that we had every reaſon to believe they would increaſe in future, would have overſet a Propoſal which, even admitting the terms fully complied with, is inadequate to what would have been collected had the ſervants of the Company continued in the charge of affairs: permit us, however, to aſſure you, it is as far from our intentions as it would be inconſiſtent with reſpect, to arraign the plan you have thought proper to adopt; on the contrary, we are not to doubt the validity of the reaſons, though unknown to us, which have induced you to alter the ſyſtem of conducting the affairs of the diſtrict; yet as the meaſures apparently operate to the prejudice of our characters and conduct, and being inconſcious of having ever failed in a faithful diſcharge of our duty, we have too great a reliance on your juſtice not to hope, that when you addreſs the Honourable Court of Directors on the ſubject, you will not ſuffer them to ſuppoſe you have been actuated to it from motives which can in any degree reflect on us as ſervants to the Company.

On receipt of your commands of the 10th inſtant, we ſummoned *Juggabundoo Chowdrey* before us, and having made known to him your orders on the ſubject of the Havelly balance, he again declared to us, in the moſt ſolemn manner, that ſo far from having been the Renter, he had never the leaſt concern in the Government lands until the year 1776, when he rented the *Poupacunda Courlah* and *Terriſtain* Pergunnahs from *Ball Kiſtnah*, who appointed *Langum Jurgiah Taſſalder* of the eight Perſanahs, directing him to ſend the money to him at *Ganjam*, and to give the accounts to him (*Juggabundoo Chowdrey*) which was accordingly done; that by this means he is in poſſeſſion of the accounts of collections and payments for that year, and is ready to give them up when called upon; but that he has no other papers or accounts whatever concerning the Havelly lands. Much as *Ball Kiſtna* may be ſcreened by an artful conduct, and impoſſible as it may be to eſtabliſh the fact on poſitive proof, ſuch circumſtantial evidence appears againſt him, as leaves us without the ſmalleſt doubt of his having, to all intents and purpoſes, been the Renter of the Havelly lands; his having ſtipulated, therefore, as the expreſs condition of paying the balance, that all accounts of collections and payments be delivered to him, hath much the appearance of an intention to withhold it altogether; for which a pretext cannot be wanting, if, to ſay hereafter that all the accounts have not been given up, be deemed a ſufficient excuſe; and what corroborates this opinion, is, that having confirmed himſelf to have been the Manager, it is not to be believed he can be ſo uninformed on the ſubject, or ſo deſtitute of accounts, as that the receiving every individual paper from *Juggabundoo Chowdrey* can really make the difference to him of a lack of Rupees. But it were a waſte of time to argue on probabilities, when it is a fact not to be denied, that this lack of Rupees hath already been received, as mentioned in our Letter of the 29th of April laſt. We have thought it our duty to lay theſe circumſtances before you, as points neceſſary for your information.

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The brother of *Ball Kiſtna* having informed us of his being empowered to act in his brother's abſence, we deſired he would point out to us what ſteps he wiſhed us to take towards aſſiſting him in encouraging and ſecuring the cultivation for the enſuing year: and agreeably to his deſire, we have cauſed the appointment by *Ball Kiſtna* to be made public throughout the different Zemindaries and Havelly lands, as the only meaſure which appeared to him neceſſary to be taken for the preſent.

In our Letter of the 11th inſtant we informed your Honour, &c. of our having remitted to *Vizagapatam*, the ſum of fifty thouſand Rupees, in addition to twenty thouſand Rupees we diſpatched thither in April laſt; and having within theſe few days received a Letter from the Chief and Council, informing us of their being ſtill in want of money to advance for their Inveſtment, we ſhall now ſend to them a further ſupply of fifty thouſand Rupees.

We have the Honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Ganjam, 31ſt Auguſt 1779.

Mr Williams,
Rt Maunſell,
T. Oakes.

The above Letter from *Ganjam*, relative to the appointment of *Ball Kiſtna* to be Renter of the whole Itchapore Diſtrict for the term of ten years, being now read, the Preſident begs leave to remark, that he differs ſo much in ſentiment from the tenor and aſſertions of the above Letter, that, inſtead of ſpeaking in favourable terms to the Court of Directors of the conduct of the Gentlemen at *Ganjam*, he propoſes, before the diſpatch of the next ſhip, to give his opinion fully on the ſubject of the Letter, and to accompany his opinion with ſeveral papers in his poſſeſſion in ſupport of it.

APPENDIX, No. 63.

Martis, 22° Maii 1781.

COMMITTEE of Secrecy met.

Captain *Foxall* called in. In the ſervice of the *India* Company. A Captain in 1777. Was at *Madras* in 1778. Commanded the *Royal George*. Went from thence, in my way home, to *China*. Sailed from *Fort Saint George* early in Auguſt 1778.

Did you know at the time you left *Madras*, that there was any treaſure put on board your ſhip?—Yes, I did.

How did you know it?—By application being made to put ſome treaſure on board.

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By whom was the application made?—I cannot charge my memory with perfect accuracy, but think it was either by Governor *Rumbold*, or his Dubash.

By whom did they say the treasure was to be brought on board?—The Purser went, and had it counted or weighed.

Do you know how many boxes there were?—I knew then; and at present believe there were about eight. The Purser's name was *George Perry*.

Where is he now?—I believe he is in *London*; and I will endeavour to find him out, and inform the Committee.

Did you know at that time to whom the treasure belonged?—To Sir *Thomas Rumbold*; at least I received it as such.

Was this treasure at that time entered on your Boatswain's book?—I found, on enquiry afterwards made, that it was not.

What was the enquiry which led you to the discovery?—In the morning at day-light, getting the ship under sail in the river *Canton*, finding the tiller of the ship foul, the Gunner was sent down to clear it. He then discovered that the ship had been robbed; the rudder-coat and break-water were cut so as to admit a man to come through into the gun-room. They had forced open the larboard gun-room port, through which they had conveyed part of the treasure, which was in the gun-room the day before. The Gunner came up and gave this information. He was sent down with some of the officers to examine strictly into the circumstances of the robbery. They brought me an account of what was left; upon which I sent for the Boatswain's book, in order to see what had been first put on board; and not finding any treasure entered, I sent for the Purser for the account taken at *Fort Saint George*; which account proved the quantity first put on board, and of course the quantity lost.

Do you recollect the number of boxes which remained?—I do not; but it will appear by the Boatswain's book, in which I then caused an entry to be made of the parts remaining.

By whom is the Boatswain's book kept?—By the Commanding Officer on board at the time.

Who was the Commanding Officer at the time the treasure was put on board?—I was not on board; but it must have been either *James Elkington* the first Mate, or *Charles Chambers* the second Mate.

Where is *James Elkington* now?—He commands one of the Company's ships now going to the Downs.

Where is *Chambers* at present?—I heard he is in *Devonshire*. I know where a brother of his resides in town, and where he frequently is, when in town.

Did you enquire why this treasure was not entered in the Boatswain's book?—I did not, such omissions being very frequent.

To whom was this treasure consigned at *China*?—To the best of my knowledge to some of the Company's Supercargoes. I am not certain whether Mr. *Raper*, the Chief, was concerned in the commission; but I am certain Mr. *Bradshaw* and Mr. *Pigou* were.

Do not the consignments appear in the Purser's book?—No.

Did you sign a bill of lading for this treasure?—I did, but know nothing of it from the time I signed it; but delivered the treasure to the Consignees at *China*, in consequence of an order from the Board there.

Was any demand ever made on you for this treasure by any other person than the Consignees?—Yes.

By whom?—Mr. *Coore*, the Solicitor for Sir *Thomas Rumbold*.

When, and where?—Some time in March, April, or May, 1780, after my arrival in *England*.

What answer did you make when that demand was made upon you?—I did not think myself responsible to Sir *Thomas Rumbold* for it, having been lost by no fault of mine. And that was the answer I made to Mr. *Coore*, and to the other agents of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*.

What are the names of those Agents?—Mr. *Thomas* and *William Raikes*.

Did Sir *Thomas* himself ever speak to you upon the subject?—He has.

When?—I waited on him about a fortnight ago, not in consequence of any message, but on my own accord.

What were the particulars of the conversation relative to this subject?—I told him I had waited upon him in consequence of the robbery which had happened on board my ship in the river *Canton*; and informed him, that his Solicitor had made a demand for such loss. That it was not in my power to pay such loss, particularly as I had been lately captured myself, where I had lost near £.3,000, exclusive of the loss I had sustained at the time of the robbery.

Was this the first conversation you had with Sir *Thomas Rumbold*?—It was. I had called twice at Sir *Thomas*'s without seeing him; and Sir *Thomas* had called once on me, and saw me, but no conversation passed on this subject.

When you made this representation to him, what answer did he make you?—He said he was very sorry; it was a great deal of money to lose, and that it was not all his; the whole did not belong to him.

Did he mention the amount of the loss?—No, he did not.

Did he say to whom the treasure belonged as well as himself?—To Sir *Hector Munro*.

Did he mention any one else?—No.

Did he mention how much belonged to himself?—No, I don't remember any thing more passed about the treasure but what I have mentioned.

Do you understand that any proceeding will be had against you for this money?—I don't understand that any proceedings are now commenced, but I don't know that none will.

Has ever any thing led you to judge what was the amount of the treasure lost?—I think the whole was 12 or £.13,000, and more than half was lost. I arrived at *Plymouth* from *Spain* the 1st of January. I called at Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s a few days after his arrival, which was in February.

What ships sailed from *Madras* to *China* in 1778 besides your own?—The *Latham*, Captain *Prince*; the *Hillsborough*, Captain *Collett*; the *Lord Holland*, Captain *Lawson*; the *Glatton*, Captain *Dovetun*, sailed after us: the *Lord North*, Captain *Hamley*, sailed some months before, and touched at *Bencoolen*.

Had you any conversation with any of the Captains of those ships, concerning the treasure on board them?—I had with Captain *Prince*, now abroad, and think with Captain *Collett*, now dead, but I can't be certain. Captain *Prince* told me he had a little; I understood it belonged to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. I had no conversation with any one else about their having treasure on board.

What reason had you to understand that the treasure on board Captain *Prince*, was Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s?—I heard it in conversation with Captain *Prince*.

The Boatswain's book being shewn to Captain *Foxall*, and he being desired to explain the date of the entry of the treasure, as standing on the 4th of August,—Says, I made the entry of the date on which the treasure was received, at *Madras*.

Do you know of any other omission of the goods taken on board at *Madras* at that time, but of the treasure above-mentioned?—No, I do not.

Was Captain *Elkington* generally esteemed a careful man in making his entries?—Yes, he was; but the treasure came on board late in the evening.

Is it usual to send any valuable effects on board late in the evening, and just before the ship sails?—When treasure is sent on board, it is usually the last thing sent on board.

If this treasure had never been entered, either in the Boatswain's book or Captain's journal, would it, from

any

any other document on board the ſhip, appear to the Company to whom ſuch treaſure had been ſent from *Madras* to *China*?—No, it would not; but perhaps it might appear on the Company's books at *China*.

If the accident of the robbery had not happened, would any entry have been made of this treaſure in the Boatſwain's book?—It would not have occurred to me to look into that book.

Has any one elſe, in their own names, or in the name of any one elſe, made any demand on you for money loſt?—No.

Can you ſay whether that part of the treaſure taken on board at *Madras*, which was landed at *Canton*, was entered in the Boatſwain's book?—I did not know it was, but I am certain it was landed.

Captain *Foxall* being ſhewn the Boatſwain's book, and aſked whether he can find any ſuch entry?—Upon looking, he finds it is not entered. The treaſure was delivered two or three days after my arrival.

If the entry, at the time of the delivery, had been made in the Boatſwain's book, would the entry ſhew the delivery to have been made to the Conſignees?—It would. Withdrew.

Comes in again, and ſays, that one of the cheſts put on board his ſhip, belonged to Mr. *Ferguſon*, and was conſigned to Mr. *Raper*.

APPENDIX, No. 64.

Jovis, 24° die Maii 1781.

COMMITTEE of Secrecy met.

Mr. *Pigou* attending according to order, was aſked,

When did you go to *India*?—In March 1767.

To what part?—To *China*. I went firſt to *China*. Went as a Writer in the Company's ſervice. In four years after my arrival I became a Supercargo, and remained ſo till I returned to this country in laſt February. I was in *China* when Sir *Thomas Rumbold* came to the Preſidency of *Madras*.

Was you the Conſignee of any treaſure ſent by the Preſidency of *Madras* to *China*?—I was.

Was you likewiſe Conſignee of any treaſure for individuals?—I was.

As Conſignee did you keep regular accounts of what was ſent you on account of the Preſidency, and what by individuals?—What was ſent by the Company will appear by their books; and what was ſent to me on account of individuals, I kept a regular account of, and have left it in *China*. I have no copy of it here. I left the book with Mr. *Bradſhaw*, who was my partner in moſt of the conſignments.

Did you receive any conſignments, either on account of the Company or individuals, by the ſhips which ſailed from *Madras* for *China* in 1778?—I did on account of individuals, but am not certain with reſpect to the Company.

Do you remember the names of the ſhips, or their Commanders, who brought money ſo conſigned by individuals?—I remember the *Latham*, Captain *Prince*; *Hillsborough*, Captain *Collet*; the *Royal George*, Captain *Foxall*; don't recollect any others.

Nor by the country ſhips?—I received money by the ſhip *Lord North*, that came immediately from *Bencoolen*.

Have you any letters now in your poſſeſſion relative to theſe conſignments?—I don't believe I have, but will enquire.

Do you recollect the ſums conſigned on board each of the ſhips?—I cannot without my papers: by the *Latham* I received 50,000 Pagodas, value at eight ſhillings each, £. 20,000.

On whoſe account was that conſignment?—On account of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*.

How much did you receive by the *Hillſborough*?—56,000 Pagodas, by two conſignments; 50,000 from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and 6,000 from Mr. *Plummer*, a Company's factor.

APPENDIX. No. 64.

What did you receive by the *Royal George*, Captain *Foxall*?—I cannot recollect, but I imagine it was about 39,000 Pagodas; that was the whole invoice before the robbery was committed: it was all Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s.

What did you receive of it?—Fourteen thouſand Pagodas were ſtolen out of the ſhip, and 6,000 Dollars, part of the 39,000.

In what manner did you diſpoſe of the treaſure ſo conſigned to you?—We were directed to pay 25,000 Pagodas to the Agents of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and Sir *Hector Munro*, *Raper* and *Crommelin*, who were then at *China*: the remainder we diſpoſed of thus; 150,000 Dollars I paid to *Hutton* and *Gordon* on account of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*.

Do you underſtand from any information, that this money was to be remitted to *Great Britain*?—As to the 25,000 Pagodas I don't know, but believe the 150,000 Dollars were intended for *England*, but don't know in what manner. I don't recollect any money being ſent to *China*, and ſent back to *Madras*.

Do you remember any remittance from individuals to *China* by any of His Majeſty's ſhips in 1778?—There were none of His Majeſty's ſhips in *China* that year.

Was there any in country ſhips in 1778?—None to me.

Were any jewels conſigned to you in 1778, to *China*, by any conveyance?—From *Madras* none, nor from any other Preſidencies.

Is it uſual to ſend property in any other ſhape than in money to *China*, in order to be remitted to *Europe*?—In merchandize and pearls.

Did you receive any in that ſhape in 1778?—None from the Preſidencies.

Did you receive any conſignments from *Madras* in 1779, by any of His Majeſty's ſhips, the Company's ſhips, or country ſhips, in ſpecie, pearl, or merchandize?—I received ſeveral conſignments in money by all the ſhips mentioned.

To what amount by each ſhip?—They were rather inſignificant conſignments, and I can't recollect them as to the preciſe ſhips. I think there were about 20,000 Dollars by the *Sea Horſe* for Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. Mr. *Whittle*'s money did not come to me, nor Sir *Hector Munro*'s. I can't recollect whether I received any thing elſe by the *Sea Horſe*, either in money or pearls, not having my papers.

By ſhips from *Madras* in 1779, by the *Morſe* Indiaman I received about 3,000 Pagodas, about £. 1,200 ſterling, on account of Mr. *Palk*. I believe I had no other conſignment by that ſhip in money, pearls, or goods.

By the *Succeſs* galley I received about 3,000 Pagodas for the ſame perſon.

By the *Sea Horſe* there was money conſigned to Mr. *Creighton*, but I don't know on whoſe account, but it was to a large amount; the greateſt part of it was the property of perſons in *Bengal*, though ſhipped at *Madras*, and ſent to me at *China* for remittance.

Did the *Sea Horſe* import to a large amount in ſpecie to *China*, in 1779?—Yes. No other country ſhips but the *Succeſs* galley brought money to me from *Madras*.

Is not the channel of remittance by the way of *China* greatly increaſed of late years?—It is very much increaſed, owing to the increaſe of the value of gold.

Did you receive, in 1778 or 1779, any remittances of money from *Bengal*?—Yes, I did.

Was any of it belonging to people on the coaſt of *Coromandel*?—I am pretty ſure not.

Did you receive any from *Bombay* in that year?—Yes; and all belonging to the Gentlemen of *Bombay*.

Whether in 1778 or 1779 did you receive any remittances which you knew to be the property of Gentlemen reſiding on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, beſides what you before mentioned?—To the beſt of my recollection I

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did not; but cannot give a positive answer, not having my papers.

Did you know any other Gentlemen in your way, who had consignments of money from *Madras* in 1778 and 1779?—I think several had; Messrs. *Raper* and *Crommelin*. I don't know from whom this came, or to what amount. Mr. *Raper* and *Crommelin*, and many other Gentlemen, had consignments of treasure from their friends.

Were there very large sums of money laying in *China* for remittances?—Some, not much.

Are there large sums in the hands of the Chinese merchants belonging to British subjects?—Very large sums.

What interest is usually given in *China* by the Chinese merchants to Europeans for the loan of money?—Eighteen per cent. is usual, and some give more.

Do you know the reason of His Majesty's ship *Sea Horse* coming to *China* in 1779?—It was understood that Captain *Panton* came there to recover sums due to British subjects in *China*.

Did the Captain make any application to the Governor of *China* for that debt?—He delivered a letter to the second of the Province from Sir *Edward Vernon*.

Did you ever hear what amount the private property belonging to British subjects was in the hands of Chinese merchants?—Upwards of a million.

What success had Captain *Panton*'s application?—None, whilst I remained in *China*.

Did you know how that application was received by the Chinese Government?—It appeared to me they did not chuse to take any notice of it whilst our ships remained in the river. No other Gentleman who was in the Company's service as Supercargo in *China*, in 1778 and 1779, is in *England* except Mr. *Lane*.

Have you received any bonds or bills of exchange payable out of the produce of cargoes sold from country ships in China?—I have from *Bombay* and *Bengal*, but not from *Madras*.

Do not the Dutch, French, Danes, Swedes, and Imperialists, take up money in *China* for bills payable in *Europe*?—The Danes, Swedes, and French do, to a large amount.

Do not British subjects often remit their property through those channels?—I suppose they do.

When you came to *England*, did you bring with you any property in money, or otherwise belonging to any of the Gentlemen on the Coast of *Coromandel*?—I did not.

Withdrew.

APPENDIX, No. 65.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Mayor's Court, at *Fort St. George*, the 24th Nov. 1778.

PRESENT,

James Call, Esquire, Mayor.
George Proctor, and *Edward John Hollond*, } Aldermen.

James Henry Casamayor, *William Petre*, and *Alexander Brodie*, } Executors of *John Redhead*, deceased,

Vers.

Stre. *Sitteram Rauze, Maha Rauze, Loongar.*

BILL, with translate of an Agreement annexed, filed between the days of adjournment. Summons issued thereupon; returned; served. The defendant appears by his attorney, Mr. *Henry Dupuy*. The attorney for the complainants prays, That the defendant may give bail. Mr. *Charles Bromley*, attorney for *James Henry Casamayor*, one of the complainants named in this cause, objects to any process being had thereon, until the name of his client be severed from the names of the other executors, and struck out of the bill, he having renounced all right of executorship to the last will and testament of *John Redhead*, deceased.

Ordered accordingly; and ordered by the counsel of the complainants attorney, That the defendant do put in bail by 6 o'clock to-morrow evening, or in default thereof, that warrant of arrest do issue.—The attorney for the defendant objects to give bail for more than the sum of 22,018 Rupees and 8 Anas, because it appears on the face of the bill of complaint, that it is the only sum which ought now to be forthcoming, the other sum, of 50,000 Rupees, being mentioned in the Agreement to be paid at a future day, upon the defendant's return to his own country, in Soucar bills of exchange. The Court having taken the same into consideration, Ordered That the defendant do put in bail for the sum of 22,018 Rupees and 8 Anas only.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Mayor's Court at *Fort Saint George*, the 1st of December.

PRESENT,

James Call, Esquire, Mayor,
John Turing, *George Proctor*, *Edward John Hollond*, *Benjamin Roebuck*, *George Taswell*, *Edward Garrow*, *Edmund Saunders*, and *William Webb*, } Aldermen.

James Henry Casamayor, *William Petre*, and *Alexander Brodie*, } Executors of *John Redhead*, deceased,

Vers.

Stre *Sitteram Rauze, Maha Rauze, Loongar.*

The Register acquaints the Court, that *Moodee Kistnah Naidoo* and *Ramah Punto*, became bail for the personal appearance of the defendant, or to answer all costs and damages, taken and acknowledged before Mr. Alderman *Webb*. The attorney for the defendant prays leave to deliver in a demurrer; which is granted. Demurrer filed the 30th November last. The attorney for the complainant prays leave to file an affidavit of *Ramiah* and *Sashia*, to prove the insufficiency of *Moodee Kistnah Naidoo* and *Rama Punto*, the bail taken in this cause. Affidavit sworn to, having been first explained to them by the Interpreter. Read and filed. The Court having taken the same into consideration,

Ordered, That the defendant do put in better bail immediately, or in default thereof that a warrant of arrest do issue.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Mayor's Court at *Fort St. George*, the 8th December 1778.

PRESENT,

James Call, Esquire, Mayor,
Edward Saunders, and *William Webb*, } Aldermen.

Alexander Brodie, and *William Petre*, } Executors of *John Redhead*, deceased,

Vers.

Stre. *Sitteram Rauze, Maha Rauze, Loongar.*

The Register acquaints the Court, that *Vencata Narnassah Chitty*, and *Subaroyaloo Chitty*, became bail for the personal appearance of the defendant, or to answer all costs and damages, taken and acknowledged before the Mayor between the days of adjournment.

The attorney for the complainant prays, That he may be permitted to amend his bill of complaint by next court day, upon payment of cost.

Ordered accordingly.

Extract

Extract of the Proceedings of the Mayor's Court at *Fort St. George*, the 8th December 1778.

PRESENT,

James Call, Eſquire, Mayor,
Edwd Saunders, and *Willm Webb*, } Aldermen.

James Henry Caſamayor, *Willm Petre*, and *Alexr Brodie*, } Executors of *John Redhead*, deceaſed.

Vers.

Stre. *Viziaram Rauze.*

Bill, with copy of a receipt annexed, filed between the days of adjournment. A further time of one week, for the return of the ſummons. Returnable immediately, and warrant of arreſt iſſued againſt the Defendant's body, prayed for, and granted.

Mr. *Charles Bromley*, Attorney for *James Henry Caſamayor*, one of the Complainants named in this cauſe, objects to any proceſs being had thereon, until the name of his Client be ſevered from the names of the other Executors, and ſtruck out of the bill, he having renounced all right of Executorſhip to the laſt will and teſtament of *John Redhead*, deceaſed.

Ordered accordingly.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Mayor's Court at *Fort St. George*, the 15th December 1778.

PRESENT,

James Call, Eſquire, Mayor,
John Turing, and *Edwd Garrow*, } Aldermen.

Willm Petre, and *Alexr Brodie*, } Executors of *John Redhead*, deceaſed.

Vers.

Stre. *Viziaram Rauze.*

A further time, till the 12 January, for the return of the ſummons, returnable immediately, and warrant of arreſt iſſued againſt the Defendant's body, prayed for, and granted.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Mayor's Court at *Fort St. George*, the 15th December 1778.

PRESENT,

James Call, Eſquire, Mayor,
John Turing, and *Edwd Garrow*, } Aldermen,

Alexander Brodie, and *Willm Petre*, } Executors of *John Redhead*, deceaſed.

Vers.

Stre. *Sitteram Rauze*, *Maha Rauze*, *Loongar.*

The Attorney for the Complainant prays leave to file an amended bill in this cauſe, on payment of coſts. Mr. *Charles Bromley*, the Attorney for Mr. *James Henry Caſamayor*, one of the Complainants named in this cauſe, objects to the amended bill being received, until the name of his Client be ſevered from the names of the other Executors, and ſtruck out of the amended bill, he having renounced all rights of Executorſhip to the laſt will and teſtament of *John Redhead*, deceaſed. The Court having taken the ſame into conſideration, ordered, That the name of *James Henry Caſamayor* be ſevered and ſtruck out of the bill of complaint, and that the future proceedings in this cauſe do ſtand in the names of *Willm Petre* and *Alexr Brodie* only. Amended bill filed.

APPENDIX, No. 66.

(No. 1.)

Sir,

HAVING been to my houſe at *Southampton*, I have fortunately found amongſt ſome papers I left behind me when I embarked for *India*, a duplicate ſet of books, containing an account of my fortune in *Bengal*, cloſed in the year 1772. The balance in my favour amounts to about one hundred and eleven thouſand pounds. I take the liberty of ſending my books for the inſpection of the Committee; and requeſt they will do me the favour to obſerve, by the laſt article in the balance ſheet, that the above ſum even at that time was excluſive of intereſt on many accounts then not adjuſted (which intereſt was accumulating moſtly at 8 and ſome at 10 per cent. for ſeveral years): This, added to the amount of a bond of Mr. *Droz*'s, which was to have been paid in *England*, but was afterwards paid in *Bengal*, amounting to upwards of nine thouſand pounds, will ſhew that I was poſſeſſed of very conſiderable property there. The not being able to get it remitted home was one reaſon for my returning to *India*. Some part of it was paid into the Dutch Factory at *Chinſurah* for certificates, as will appear in one of the accounts current with my Attornies (delivered in to the Committee by Mr. *Stables*) to the amount of about one hundred and ſixteen thouſand Rupees. In having taken the liberty of ſending my books to the Committee, I hope I ſhall not be thought to have acted officiouſly; or if it ſhould in any reſpect carry that appearance, I flatter myſelf they will not impute it to any other cauſe, than the anxiety I feel from thoſe aſperſions that have been thrown on me ſince my return from abroad. I had ſome doubt of the propriety of making my accounts public, whilſt I continued under a proſecution from the Company, and mentioned the ſame to Mr. *Stables*; but whatever may be the event, I wiſh to give every poſſible ſatisfaction to the Committee, and therefore leave it to them to make what uſe they think proper of the books and papers delivered in to them. I beg pardon for giving you this trouble, and have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
Thos Rumbold.

New Cavendiſh Street,
18th June 1781.

APPENDIX No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER ON THE BUSINESS OF THOMAS

[1]

Dr. - - STOCK.

1770. January 1.	To ſundry Accounts, as per Journal	2,27,197 10 4
1772. January 31.	To David Killican, who paid the Amount of a Bill of Exchange for £. 500 at ⅔ in favour of C. Sympſon	4,615 6 —
	To Charles Ingram and M'Tagard, Reſpondentia Bond, the Account having been ſent Mr. Rumbold to recover the Inſurance in England	18,900 — —
	To Randolph Marriott, Reſpondentia Bond, the Account having been ſent Mr. Rumbold, to recover the Inſurance in England	32,400 — —
	To Ophium Account, never charged to Stock before	45,154 7 6
	To Honourable Company Treaſury, remitted Mr. Rumbold home in 5 Sets of Bills	1,72,506 12 —
	To Balance, being Mr. Rumbold's neat Eſtate, as appears by theſe Books	9,92,201 4 11
	C. R'	14,92,975 8 9

Dr. - EDWARD GOLDING.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per his Bond, 10 Auguſt 1769, payable in 2 Years	50,000 — —
	To Stock per his Bond, 26 November 1769, D° in 9 Years	9,874 14 6
	C. R'	59,874 14 6

Dr. - - EWAN LAW.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per his Bond, 30 September 1769, payable in 12 Months	13,307 3 6
1771. March 19.	To Intereſt from Date to this Day, Y. 1 M. 5 D. 9, at 9 per Cent.	1,759 14 —
	C. R'	15,067 1 6

[2]

Dr. - - MANUEL D'CRUZ.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 18 October 1769, payable in 6 Months	20,150 — —
	C. R'	20,150 — —

Dr. - - JOHN CARTIER.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 7 March 1769, payable in 12 Months	37,670 6 —
1771. February 9.	To Intereſt from Date Y. 1 M. 11 D. 2, at 9 per Cent.	6,516 15 —
	C. R'	44,187 6 —

Dr. - DR. JOHN ROUTLEDGE.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 1 December 1769, payable in 9 Months	34,346 —
October 20.	To Intereſt from Date to this Date	3,043 15
	C. R'	37,390 —

RUMBOLD, Esquire;—commencing the 31st December 1769, ending the 28th February 1772.

	Per Contra - - - - - - - - -	Cr.	[1]
1770. January 1.	By sundry Accounts, as per Journal - - - - - - -	13,86,710 13 —	
	By Charles Freake, Mr. Rumbold having paid him in England, £. 598. 16. at ¾ - - - - - - - - -	5,322 10 9	
	By Profit and Loss, Balance of that Account, being a Gain, as appears by these Books, since Mr. Rumbold left India - -	1,00,942 1 —	
	C. R°	14,92,975 8 9	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1772. January 31.	By Edward Golding, Ophium Account, transferred the opposite Bond to that Account - - - - - - - -	9,874 14 6	
	By David Killican, Account Curr. who received per Part Payment his Bond - - - - - - - - - -	23,427 5 9	
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - -	26,572 10 3	
	C. R°	59,874 14 6	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1771. March 31.	By David Killican, Account Curr. of this Date, who received in full Principal and Interest - - - - - - - -	15,067 1 6	
	C. R°	15,067 1 6	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		[2]
1771. March 31.	By David Killican, his Account Curr. this Date, who received in Part - - - - - - - - - -	625 5 6	
August 31.	By David Killican, D° D° D° - - - -	14,847 13 6	
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - -	4,676 13 —	
	C. R°	20,150 — —	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1771. February 28.	By David Killican, Account Curr. this Date, who received in full Principal and Interest - - - - - - - -	44,187 6 —	
	C. R°	44,187 6 —	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. Nov. 30.	By Joseph Price, Account Current this Date, who received in Two Payments, being in full Principal and Interest - - - -	37,390 — 6	
	C. R°	37,390 — 6	

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

Dr. — Capt. JOSEPH PRICE.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 30 November 1769, payable in 10 Months	1,23,000 — —
1771. February 20.	To Joſeph Price, Account Curr. this Date, having granted a Bond this Date, for the Balance Account Curr.	25,118 12 7
	C. R^{t}	1,48,118 12 7

[3]

Dr. — EWAN LAW.

To Rajah Setraboy, who received of him in two Payments	34,174 2 —
To Profit and Loſs, a Gain on the Batty of the Dutch Bill	269 14 9
C. R^{t}	34,443 — 9

Dr. — EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond 25 November 1769, payable in 10 Months	52,916 6 6
	To Stock per Bond, which Mr. Rumbold values at 30,442. 1. —	
	To Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, Account Current, for the Balance that Account, which is added to the above on the Bond — 517 15 1	30,960 — 1
	To Intereſt on the Accounts and Bonds, as per their ſeparate Accounts, tranſmitted to Mr. Rumbold	10,153 11 8
	C. R^{t}	74,030 2 3

Dr. — EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond 1 October 1769, payable in 12 months	80,255 13 6
	To Intereſt from Date to 8 February 1771, Y. 1 M. 4 D. 8, at 5 per Cent.	5,439 9 —
	To Profit and Loſs, Diſcount on the Two oppoſite Bonds, 2 per D^{o}	1,078 7 —
1771. February 21.	To David Killican, who paid them this Balance of this Date	12,867 8 —
	C. R^{t}	99,641 5 6

[4]

Dr. — CHARLES INGRAM.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount his Bond, 12 January 1769, payable 6 Months	4,320 — —
1772. February 14.	To Intereſt on his Bond to this Date	1,376 1 1
	C. R^{t}	5,696 1 1

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - -		1,45,118 12 7
	C. R[t]		1,45,118 12 7
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		[3]
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, Account Curr. Amount of a Dutch Bill - - - - - -	12,466 1 3	
Nov. 30.	By Joſeph Price, Account Curr. Amount of a Bill on Bamaſſa Ghoſs - - - - - -	268 15 6	
			12,735 — 9
	By Ewan Law, Ophium Account transferred to this Head - - - - - -	10,854 — —	
	By Jeffrey Wilkins, Ophium Account transferred to this Head - - - - - - -	10,854 — —	
			21,708 — —
	C. R[t]		34,443 — 9
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
1771. February 21.	By David Killican, Account Curr. this Date, received 8 January 1771 - - -	12,867 8 —	
March 31.	By Ditto, D[o], 21 March - - -	10,000 — —	
			22,867 8 —
Auguſt 31.	By Ditto, D[o], 19 June, of Mr. Law -	14,046 3 6	
	28 D[o], of Mr. Law - -	3,000 — —	
	5 July, of Mr. Law - -	2,432 2 9	
			19,478 6 3
	24 D[o], of J. Wilkins -	18,923 9 1½	
	of D[o] - - -	6,076 6 10½	
			25,000 — —
1772. January 31.	By David Killican, D[o], 9 Nov. of D[o] in full - - - -		4,994 14 1
	By Intereſt on the Accounts, as per their ſeparate Accounts, tranſmitted to Mr. Rumbold - - - - - - - -		1,689 . 5 11
	C. R[t]		74,030 2 3
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
1771. February 8.	By Ophium Account, Balance of Meſſrs. Law and Jeffrey Wilkins Account, dated 8 February 1771, and carried to Account Current of that Date - - - - - - - - -		45,154 7 6
	By Honourable Company Bonds, one Principal, 29 December 1770 - - - - - -	33,704 10 3	
	One D[o], 26 D[o] - -	20,217 8 9	
			53,922 3 —
	By Intereſt on the above Two Bonds to this Day - - -		564 11 —
	C. R[t]		99,641 5 6
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		[4]
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, Account Current, who received in Part - - - - - - -	3,092 — —	
1771. February 20.	By Ditto D[o] - D[o] - -	631 15 —	
			3,723 15 —
	By Joſeph Price, who received in full for Goods remaining in his Hands - - - - - - - - - -		768 12 6
	By ſundry Accounts - - - - - - - -		1,203 5 7
	C. R[t]		5,696 1 1

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

Dr. - CHAS. FLOYER, ROB. ALEXANDER, and H. INGLIS.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount of their Bond, 30 April 1769, payable 12 Months	1,16,356 3 —
1771. July 14.	Y. M. D. To Intereſt from the Date 2 2 14, at 10 per Cent.	25,664 — —
	C. R^{t}	1,42,020 3 —

Dr. - JOHN ROBINSON and ROB. CRAUFORD.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount their Bond, 26 November 1769, payable in 10 Months	25,360 — —

Dr. - EDWARD STEVENSON.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount his Bond, 3 November 1769, payable 8 Months	10,800 — —
1771. February 20.	Y. M. D. To Intereſt from Date 1 3 17	1,401 — —
	C. R^{t}	12,201 — —

Dr. - GILES HOLLOWAY, Account Richd Wyatt.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount Bond, 26 March 1769, payable 10 Months	18,900 — —	
	Deduct received by Mr. Rumbold	14,115 — —	
1771. January 1.	To Intereſt Account		4,975 — — 732 8 —
	C. R^{t}		5,707 8 —

[5]

Dr. - WALTER WILKINS.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, dated 1 December 1769, payable in 9 months	82,165 11 10	
	To Stock per Bond, dated 19 December 1769, D^{o} in 6 D^{o}	25,240 5 1	1,07,406 — 11
1771. April.	Y. M. D. To Intereſt Account on 82,165 11 10. is 1 4 16 at 10 per Cent.	11,320 9 8	
	on 25,230 5 1. — 1 3 28	3,351 5 8	14,671 15 4
	C. R^{t}		1,22,078 — 3

Dr. - GOCUL GOSAUL and MODEN DUTT.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 30th April 1779, payable 6 Months	65,880 — —	
	Deduct, received by Mr. Rumbold	45,000 — —	20,880 — —
	To Owners Ship Rumbold's Account, for Account their Shares in the Rumbold, they being to account with Mr. Rumbold privately		32,859 9 9
	C. R^{t}		53,739 9 9

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
1771. August 31.	By David Killican, who received in full Principal and Intereſt -		1,42,020 3 —
	C. R^{s}		1,42,020 3 —
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - -		25,360 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
1771. February 20.	By David Killican, Account Current, who received Principal and Intereſt - - - - - - - - - -		12,201 — —
	C. R^{s}		12,201 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
1771. February 20.	By David Killican, Account Curr. who received in full - -		5,707 8 —
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
	By Honourable Company Bond, dated 31 December 1770 - - - - -	25,000 — —	
	By Honourable Company Treaſury paid in by Mr. Miller - - - - - - -	7,016 — —	
			32,016 — —
February 28.	By David Killican, Account Curr. who received, December 31 - - - - -	4,997 6 —	
	By Ditto D° February 12 - -	32,400 — —	
	By Ditto D° D° 21 - - -	8,042 4 9	
			45,439 10 9
August 31.	By Ditto D° Balance Account to 17 April 1771 - -		42,604 11 6
	By Intereſt Account 25,000 - - - -	750 — —	
	7,016 — — - -	282 9 3	
	4,997 6 — - -	161 — 3	
	32,400 — — - -	585 — —	
	8,042 4 9 - -	239 — 6	
			2,017 10 —
	C. R^{s}		1,22,078 — 3
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		
1770. April 14.	By David Killican Account this Date, who received 6 February 1770 - - - - -	3,000 — —	
	17 D° 1770 - - - - -	1,000 — —	
	1 from Modun Dutt, 16 March 1770 - -	1,000 — —	
			5,000 — —
	By Owners Ship Rumbold Account, for the Amount of Half the Ophium, he having become anſwerable to Meſſrs. Law and Wilkins - - - - - - - -		41,426 1 7
	By David Killican Account this Date, who received of Mr. Wilkins a Dividend on Ship Rumbold - - -		3,390 11 10
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -		3,922 12 4
	C. R^{s}		53,739 9 9

[5]

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

Dr. - DR. ROBERT HUNTER.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 1 October 1769, payable in 12 Months -	22,566 13 10
March 16.	To David Killican, who lent him on Bond, payable 1 November 1770 - - - - - - - - - -	15,000 — —
	C. R[1]	37,566 13 10

[6]

Dr. - FRANCIS HARE.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, dated 28th May 1769, payable in 12 Months	11,100 — —
	C. R[1]	11,100 — —

Dr. - ALEX[R] HANNAY.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, dated 20 Auguſt 1769, payable in 12 Months - - - - - -	10,000 — —	
	To Intereſt for one Year, at 9 per Cent. -	900 — —	
1771. February 21.			10,900 — —
	To David Killican, who lent him on Bond, dated 20, 1770 -		10,000 — —
	C. R[2]		20,900 — —

Dr. - ESOP GABLE, at Judda.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 20 December 1769, payable on Demand -	17,526 8 7

Dr. - JOHN KNOTT,

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Bond, 20 December 1769, payable on Demand -	20,511 14 —
April 13.	To Intereſt from the Date - - - - - - - -	466 5 6
	C. R[3]	20,978 3 6

[7]

Dr. - HONOURABLE COMPANY BONDS.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per one Company's Bond, 1 September 1769 - -		7,849 11 5
1771. February 22.	To David Killican, Account this Date, who purchaſed 16 Bonds, viz.		
	1 Company's Bond, 31 Dec. 1770, Prin[l]	6,607 8 —	
	1 Ditto - - - 9 D° - - - - -	5,000 — —	
	1 Ditto - - - 31 D° - - - - -	23,438 1 —	
	5 Ditto, 2,000 each, 1 Jan. 1771 - -	10,000 — —	
	1 Ditto - - - 17 D° - - - - -	1,763 12 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 17 D° - - - - -	5,000 — —	
	1 Ditto - - - 12 D° - - - - -	3,000 — —	
	1 Ditto - - - 12 D° - - - - -	1,707 3 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 9 Dec. 1770 - -	5,000 — —	
	1 Ditto - - - 9 D° - - - - -	1,009 3 3	
	1 Ditto - - - 9 D° - - - - -	3,000 — —	
	1 Ditto - - - 26 D° - - - - -	6,978 2 —	
			72,903 14 3

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			
1771.				
Auguſt 31.	By David Killican, who received 9 April -	7,000	— —	
	1 May -	3,000	— —	
1772.				10,000 — —
February 4.	By Ditto, who received - - - - - - - -			6,000 — —
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - - -			21,566 13 10
	C. R'			37,566 13 10
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			[6]
1771.				
Aug. 31.	By David Killican, who received a Dividend of 4 Annoes - - - - - - -	3,370	1 4	
Oct. 31.	By Ditto, - - who received a Dividend of 4 D° - - - - - - - -	3,370	1 3	
				6,740 2 7
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - - -			4,359 13 5
	C. R'			11,100 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			
1771.				
Feb. 22.	By David Killican, who received in full, Principal and Intereſt, 1ſt Bond - - - - - - - - - - -			10,900 — —
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - - -			10,000 — —
	C. R'			20,900 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			
1772.				
Feb. 29.	By Profit and Loſs, this Debt being irrecoverable, and ſo Mr. Rumbold mentions in his Inſtructions - - - - - -			17,526 8 7
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			
1770.				
April 14.	By David Killican, who received in full, Principal and Intereſt -			20,978 3 6
	C. R'			20,978 3 6
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.			[7]
1771.				
February 20.	By David Killican, Account this Date, having ſold 4 Bonds, viz.			
	1 Company Bond, 31 Dec. 1770, Princ'	6,607	8 —	
	1 Ditto - - - 31 D° - - - -	25,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 9 D° - - - -	5,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - May - - -	4,052	7 9	
				40,659 15 9
Auguſt 31.	By David Killican, Account this Date, ſold 1 Bond, 1 Sept. 1769			4,709 7 3
October 31.	By Ditto - D° - - 1 D°, 12 July 1771			12,000 — —
1772.				
January 31.	By Ditto - D°, who ſold the following Bonds:			
	1 Bond - 19 Jan. 1771 -	5,400	— —	
	1 Ditto - 28 Feb. - -	2,937	9 —	
	1 Ditto - 22 Nov. 1770 -	1,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - 23 Feb. 1771 -	1,567	8 —	
	1 Ditto - 28 D° - -	1,222	— —	
	1 Ditto - 5 Dec. 1770 -	1,854	12 6	
				13,981 13 6
	Carried over -			71,351 4 6

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Books of

1771. March 30.	To David Killican, Account this Date, who purchased 7 Bonds, viz.			
	1 Bond - - - - - - - - - Princ[l]	4,709	7 3	
	1 Ditto - - - 26 Feb. 1771 - -	9,140	— 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 26 D[o] - - - - -	5,553	2 —	
	2 Ditto - - - 21 D[o] - - - - -	10,144	10 9	
	1 Ditto - - - 29 Nov. 1770 - -	3,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 13 Dec. - - - -	11,151	11 —	
				43,798 15 6
August 31.	To David Killican, Account this Date, who purchased 33 Bonds, viz.			
	1 Bond - - - 18 Apr. 1771, Princ[l]	2,264	6 —	
	1 Ditto - - - 18 D[o] - - - - -	17,658	3 3	
	1 Ditto - - - 18 D[o] - - - - -	9,006	14 3	
	1 Ditto - - - 18 D[o] - - - - -	4,814	9 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 18 D[o] - - - - -	5,359	12 9	
	1 Ditto - - - 29 D[o] - - - - -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 29 D[o] - - - - -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 30 D[o] - - - - -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 17 Jan. - - - - -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 20 June - - - - -	20,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 25 D[o] - - - - -	37,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 12 July - - - -	12,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 22 D[o] - - - - -	15,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 29 D[o] - - - - -	10,000	— —	
	8 Ditto 10,000 each, 22 D[o] - - - - -	80,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 22 D[o] - - - - -	14,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 5 Dec 1770 - -	1,854	12 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 28 Feb. 1771 - -	1,222	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 23 D[o] - - - - -	1,567	8 —	
	1 Ditto - - - 28 D[o] - - - - -	2,937	9 —	
	1 Ditto - - - 22 Nov[r] 1770, Princ[l]	1,000	— —	
[8]	1 Ditto - - - 26 Dec. - - - -	3,991	1 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 12 Jan. - - - -	2,684	— —	
	1 To - - - 24 July 1771 - -	15,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 24 D[o] - - - - -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - 25 D[o] - - - - -	8,000	— —	
				3,15,620 12 9
	To Cloth, &c. our Company's Bonds - - - - -			1,24,685 15 9
	To Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, viz.			
	1 Bond - - - - - -	33,704	10 3	
	1 Ditto - - - - - -	20,217	8 9	
				53,922 3 —
1772. January 31.	To David Killican Account, this Date, viz.			
	1 Bond - - - 15 June 1771 -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 14 December -	3,766	14 —	
	1 Ditto - - - 14 D[o] - - -	5,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 14 D[o] - - -	5,000	— —	
	5 Ditto 200 each, 21 D[o] - - - -	10,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 21 July - -	5,270	6 —	
				39,037 4 —
February 28.	To Ditto, 1 Ditto - - - 12 Febr[y] 1772	13,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 28 D[o] - - -	5,000	— —	
				18,000 — —
29.	To Joseph Price, 2 Ditto, 10,000 each, 30 November 1771 - - - - - - -	20,000	— —	
	1 Ditto - - - 30 D[o] - - -	13,928	4 6	
	1 Ditto - - - 11 Jan[y] 1772 -	6,471	11 3	
				40,399 15 9
	To Walter Wilkins, 1 Ditto, - - - 31 Dec[r] 1770 -			25,000 — —
	To Honourable Company Revenue, 1 Bond, - May - -			4,352 7 9
			C. R[s]	7,45,270 10 2

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

[8]

Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
Brought over - -	71,351	4 6
By Balance Account remaining, 70 Company's Bonds - -	6,73,919	5 8
C. R.	7,45,270	10 2

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Business of

[9]

Dr. - - Capt. H. JAMES SHAW.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Half of Bond 16,514 7 8.—27 December 1769, payable in 12 Months	8,257 3 10
	To Interest	144 11 2
	C. R^{t}	8,402 15 —
	To Interest Account	1,789 1 —

Dr. - - EDW^{D} WAPLE and GEO. DOBINSON.

1770. January 1.	To Stock, Respondentia Bond, Lord Anson, 15 February 1763	1,620 — —

Dr. - - CHA^{S} INGRAM, P. M^{c}TAGART, and M^{c}TAGART.

1770. January 1.	To Stock Respondentia Bond, Greenwich Ketch, 10 April 1768	18,900 — —

Dr. - - - JOHN TOOL.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Respondentia Bond, Nelly Snow, 13 January 1769		6,480 — —
	To Profit and Loss, Premium on his Bond	1,620 — —	
	To Interest on his Bond	1,937 6 9	
			3,557 6 9
	C. R^{t}		10,037 6 9

[10]

Dr. - ROBERT DOBINSON.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Respondentia Bond, Snow Industry, A. R^{t} 37,500	40,500 — —	
	To Profit and Loss per Premium, to 22d February 1770	10,125 — —	
			50,625 — —
	To Interest, being Interest on the Balance of this Account; after deducting the Mortgage 30,000, the Balance is 20,625. Int. from that Date to 30 April 1771, 1 3 15. 9 per Cent.		2,092 12 12
	C. R^{t}		52,717 12 —

Dr. - RANDOLPH MARRIOTT.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Mortgage, Respondentia Bond, Snow Speedwell, 4 February 1769	32,400 — —

Dr. - HENRY WEDDERBURN.

1770. January 1.	To Stock Respondentia Bond and Premium	18,900 — —	
	Deduct received by Mr. Rumbold	15,050 — —	
			3,850 — —
	To Interest Account		3,990 — —
	C. R^{t}		7,840 — —

[11]

Dr. - - LEWIS D'COSTA.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Respondentia Bond and Premium	18,900 — —	
	Deduct received by Mr. Rumbold	13,359 — —	
			5,541 — —
	To Interest Account		4,147 8 —
	C. R^{t}		9,688 8 —

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

[9]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1771. August 31.	By David Killican, Account Current, this Date received - -	8,402 15 —
	C. R[s]	8,402 15 —
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -	1,789 1 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -	1,620 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1772. February 29.	By Stock, having ſent Mr. Rumbold the Account to recover the Inſurance in England - - - - - - - -	18,900 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, Account this Date, received in Part - -	6,716 4 5
1771. February 20.	By Ditto D[o] D[o] - - - - - - -	954 14 6
	By Ditto D[o] D[o], who received Balance of Goods -	768 12 6
	By ſundry Accounts - - - - - - - - -	1,597 7 4
	C. R[s]	10,037 6 9

[10]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1771. March 31.	By David Killican, Account this Date, who received for Sale of Tin, deducting Charges Merchandize - - - - -	18,273 7 6
August 31.	By Ditto, - D[o], who received Balance this Account -	3,572 9 9
	By Ditto, - D[o], who received in further Part for Sale Tin -	625 15 6
	By Hare's Aſſignment 30,000, being a Mortgage Bond on his Houſe, dated 14 March 1770, in Mr. Rumbold's Favour -	30,000 — —
	Intereſt on Tin - - - - - - -	245 11 3
	C. R[s]	52,717 12 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Stock, having ſent Mr. Rumbold the Account to recover the Inſurance in England - - - - - - - -	32,400 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who received in Part - - - - -	2,618 12 10
1772. January 31.	By Ditto - D[o] in full - - - - - - -	1,554 15 5
	By Intereſt Account - - - - - - - -	3,666 3 9
	C. R[s]	7,840 — —

[11]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who received in Part - - - - -	4,000 — —
1772. February 29.	By Ditto - D[o] D[o] in full - - - - - -	1,985 — 6
	By Intereſt Account - - - - - - - - -	3,703 7 6
	C. R[s]	9,688 8 —

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

Dr. - THOMAS M'BRIDE and PETER MOREAU.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Reſpondentia Bond and Premium	38,800 — —	
	Deduct received by Mr. Rumbold -	27,591 — —	
			10,209 — —
	To Intereſt Account - - - - - - - -		296 14 3
	C. R'		10,505 14 3

Dr. - RAJAH SETABROY.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per Half of a large Houſe ſold him, 69,600, my Half - - - - - - - - - - - -	34,800 — —
	C. R'	34,800 — —

[12]

Dr. - - Capt. JOSEPH PRICE.

1770. January 1.	To Stock, being the Balance of Account Current, cloſed 30 November 1769 - - - - - - - - - - - -		13,466 15 —
July 23.	To Caſh Account received of your Banian Balance Caſh Account		27,342 10 —
	To Card Debts received of Middleton and Kelſall - - -		909 12 3
	To Honourable Company's Salary received of 1 Year's Salary -		403 3 3
	To Card Debts received of Floyer and Watſon -	548 10 —	
	To Henry Wedderburn, received in Part of his Bond - - - - - - - - -	2,618 12 10	
	To Thomas M'Bridge, &c. D° D° - -	7,332 14 9	
	To Lewis D'Coſta, - - D° D° - -	4,000 — —	
	To Salt Petre, neat Proceeds now rendered -	65,239 2 6	
	To John Tool in Part Reſpondentia Bond -	6,716 4 5	
	To Charles Ingram D° D° - - - -	3 092 — —	
	To Dead Stock, received in Part Sale of Effects -	9,701 15 —	
	To David Killican Balance Account, 14 April 1770	9,781 3 9	
			1,09,030 15 3
	To Thomas M'Bridge, &c. Balance Reſpondentia Bond - - - - - - - - -	3,172 15 6	
	To Honourable Company's Revenues, your Salary	39 3 —	
	To Ewan Law, Amount of one Dutch Bill received - - - - - - - - -	12,466 1 3	
			15,678 3 9
	C. R'		1,66,831 11 6
1770. July 23.	To Balance brought down from Account Current this Date -		23,480 15 1
Nov. 30.	To Ewan Law, Amount a Bill on Banaraſs Ghoſs - - -		268 15 6
	To Dr. Routledge, received in full Principal and Intereſt Bond -		37,390 — 6
	To Intereſt on this Account - - - - - - - -		1,240 13 6
	C. R'		62,380 12 7
1770. Nov. 30.	To Balance Account Current this Date - - - - - -		22,595 2 10
1771. February 20.	To Dead Stock - - received in further Part Sales of Effects -		616 9 6
	To Cloths - - - - received per Sales of Sundries - -		2,314 2 6
	To Charles Ingram - received in further Part Bond - - -		631 15 —
	To John Tool - - received in further Part Bond - -		954 14 6
	C. R'		27,112 12 4
1771. March 1.	To Cloths, &c. remaining for Amount Salt Petre to Ship Catharine - - - - - - - - - - -		3,780 — —
1771. May 1.	To Balance Account brought down - - - - - -		3,190 1 6

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1771. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who received in Part - - - - - -	7,332	14 9
	By Ditto - - D° in full - - - - - -	3,172	15 6
	C. R^{s}	10,505	14 3
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
	By Ewan Law, Account Curr. who received of him in Two Payments - - - - - - - - -	34,174	2 —
	By Profit and Loſs, ſuppoſed to be in Intereſt Account - -	625	14 —
	C. R^{s}	34,800	— —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		[12]
1770. July 23.	By Salt Petre having paid Mr. Rumbold - - - - -	56,840	— —
	By Charges general Sundries paid of this Date - - - -	4,920	4 4
	By Card Debts, paid Marriott and Capt. Sampſon - - -	4,462	9 —
	By Card Debts, paid Lawrel, Barker, Price, and Kelſall - -	4,869	2 6
	By Charges general, paid Sundries of this Date - - -	6,696	— —
	By William Hoſea, paid him Balance Ophium Account - -	5,820	— —
	By Charges general, Sundries of this Date - - - -	1,367	3 6
	By Subſcription Mrs. Majendie, paid her - - - - -	5,400	— —
	By Card Debts, paid Mr. Cobham - - - - -	1,015	3 3
	By Charges general, February, March, and April - - -	5,041	5 1
	By Charges general, Taylor and Logun - - - - -	2,357	5 9
	By Edward Golding, Balance Account - - - - -	979	1 6
	By Dr. John Taylor, paid into the Treaſury - - - -	15,000	— —
	By Ditto, paid Balance Account - - - - - -	7,738	12 —
	By Commiſſion Account, my Commiſſion on Cloths - - -	6,224	3 9
	By Charges general, Sundries - - - - - -	479	9 9
	By Manual D'Cruz, paid his Child - - - - -	2,160	— —
	By Honourable Company Treaſury, paid into the Treaſury - -	12,000	— —
	By Balance to new Account - - - - - - -	23,480	15 1
	C. R^{s}	1,66,831	11 6
Nov. 30.	By Jeffrey Wilkins, paid him Balance private Account - -	1,636	9 6
	By Honourable Company Treaſury, paid into the Treaſury -	37,399	— 6
	By Charges general, Sundries - - - - - -	328	12 3
	By Intereſt on this Account - - - - - -	421	3 6
	By Balance carried to new Account - - - - -	22,595	2 10
	C. R^{s}	62,380	12 7
1771. February 20.	By General Charges, paid Sundries - - - - -	1,993	15 9
	By Captain Joſeph Price Account Bond, for the Amount of his Bond for the Balance of this Account of this Date - - -	25,118	12 7
	C. R^{s}	27,112	12 4
March 30.	By Charges general per Sundries - - - - -	589	14 6
April 30.	By Balance to new Account - - - - - -	3,190	1 6
	C. R^{s}	3,780	— —
	By Balance carried to new Account - - - - -	3,190	— —

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Business of

[13]

Dr. - - - ACCOUNT in Company with WALTER WILKINS.

1770. January 1.	To Stock, being a Balance of a private Account, due me - -	5,701 8 3
	To Calcutta Houses, Half Rent of 1,533 9 8.—received of Major Polier - - - - - - - - - -	766 12 10
	And 3 Glass Lanthorns of the Honourable Company -	160 8 —
	To Charges general, he having received of a Gomastah - -	141 9 9
	C. R°	6,770 6 10

Dr. - DULLAB DASS, Gomastah at Gazypore.

1771. January 1.	To Stock, Balance Account Current to be received by Law and Wilkins - - - - - - - - - - - -	157 2 6

Dr. - - - CALCUTTA HOUSES.

1770. January 1.	To Stock, my Half, one House with Walter Wilkins 11,000 -	5,500 — —
	C. R°	5,500 — —

Dr. - - ADVENTURE to ROTASGUR.

1770. January 1.	To Stock Balance Chunam 25,000 - - - - - -		5,843 5 —
	To Stock Balance Cash in Gomastahs Hands -	3,643 10 —	
	Deduct received per Mr. Rumbold -	1,110 — —	
			2,533 10 —
	C. R°		8,376 15 —

Dr. - - ADVANCES for CHUNAM.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per sundry Advances - - - - - - -	3,953 9 3

[14]

Dr. - - CLOTHS with Mr. JOSEPH PRICE.

1770. January 1.	To Stock per sundry Cloths, which Mr. Rumbold values as follows; viz.				
	1 Invoice of Musters	20 - - -	84 14 3		
	29 Oct. 1 Ditto of Cloths -	4,922 - - -	22,537 2 —		
	26 Aug. 1 Ditto D° - -	10,313 - - -	42,300 — —		
	15 Oct. 1 Ditto D° - -	10,325 - - -	48,875 5 9		
	22 D° 1 Ditto D° - -	5,610 - - -	15,120 — —		
	Pieces -	31,190 - -	1,28,915 6 6		
	Deduct 3 2 per Cent.		3,906 8 6		
			1,25,008 14 —		
	Batta 11 per Cent.		13,750 15 8		
			1,38,759 13 8		
	Amount Charges upon Invoice		2,308 6 —		
					1,41,068 3 9
1771. August 31.	To David Killican, who paid Company's Duties - - -				5,508 11 —
1772. February 29.	To Joseph Price, Charges Merchandize on Sales to Honourable Company - - - - - - - -				2,179 1 —
	To Salt Petre, re-transferring the opposite Sum - - -				3,780 — —
	To Charges General, Commission on Cloths - - - -				6,224 3 9
	To Profit and Loss, Gain upon this Account - - - -				31,388 15 9
	C. R°				1,90,149 3 3

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

[13]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1771. August 31.	By David Killican, who received in full - - - - -	5,667 11 9
	By Charges general, having paid Mr. Kelſall per ſundry Plate -	987 — 11
	By Profit and Loſs, Mr. Rumbold having over-valued the Balance of this Account in his Inſtructions - - - - - -	115 10 2
	C. R^{s}	6,770 6 10
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Law and Wilkins Account Current made over to them - -	157 2 6
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Walter Wilkins, Houſe Rent of Major Polier 1,533 9 8 -	766 12 10
	And 3 Glaſs Lanthorns ſold to the Honourable Company -	160 8 —
	By Walter Wilkins, he having ſold our ſmall Houſe for 5,000 A. R^{s} my Half - - - - - - - - - -	2,700 — —
	By Profit and Loſs, Mr. Wilkins having ſold our ſmall Houſe -	1,872 11 2
	C. R^{s}	5,500 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Law and Wilkins Account Current made over to them - -	8,376 15 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Wilkins and Law Account Current made over to them - -	3,953 9 3

[14]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1771. February 20.	By Joſeph Price, who received for ſundry Cloths - - -	2,314 2 6
	By Honourable Company Bond, for the Amount Sales of 18,082 Pieces of Cloths ſold them, and for which they gave Bonds -	1,24,685 15 9
	By Joſeph Price, who received for Sundries, Account of this Date - - - - - - - - - - -	3,780 — —
	By Joſeph Price, who received for Cloths and Chints - - -	140 10 9
	By Owners Ship Alexander, 47 Bales Cloth ſold them - -	16,653 14 6
	By Joſeph Price, ſold the Honourable Company, 30 November 1771 - - - - - - - - 33,928 4 6	
	By Ditto - - D^{o} 11 January 1772 - 6,471 11 3	
		40,399 15 9
	By Balance remaining unſold with Mr. Price, as per Liſt now ſent Mr. Rumbold, P^{ces} 21,471½, and they being damaged and bad, are only valued at - - - - - - - -	2,174 8 —
	C. R^{s}	1,90,149 3 3

		Brought forward C. R	1,90,149 3 3
		To Balance brought down 2,174½ valued at	2,174 8 —
		To Stationary, having charged the Sales of Mr. Hurſt to this Head, 7 January 1771	636 1 9
		C. R[s]	2,810 9½ 9
		To Balance of Cloths 2,174½ Pieces	2,174 8 —
[15]		Dr. - - SALT PETRE.	
	1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount of 9,188 17 8. as valued by Mr. Rumbold	45,942 2 —
	July 23.	To Joſeph Price, who paid per Account this Date	56,840 — —
		To Profit and Loſs, gained on this Head	19,297 — 6
		C. R	1,22,079 2 6
		To Profit and Loſs, being a further Gain on this Head	3,780 — —
		Dr. - - STATIONARY.	
	1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount Invoice left with Mr. Price	1,259 4 6
		To Cloths, having carried the Amount Sales of that Head, 7 January 1771, and ſent Mr. Rumbold	636 1 9
		Dr. - - OWNERS Ship RUMBOLD.	
	1770. January 1.	To Stock per Amount Balance Account, due to me	55,137 7 2
		To Gocul Goſall and Moden Dutt, to the Amount of Half the Ophium, he having become anſwerable to Meſſrs. Law and Wilkins	41,426 1 7
		To Intereſt on the Sum Mr. Wilkins paid, being Balance 19,891 2 Intereſt on that Sum	2,817 14 6
		C. R[s]	99,381 7 3
[16]		Dr. - VOYAGE in the Ship RUMBOLD.	
	1770. January 1.	To Stock, my ⅓ of ⅔ Concern in the Voyage, Stock and Block 43,812 13 — Deduct Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, their Concern under me 6,000 — —	37,812 13 —
		C. R[s]	37,812 13 —
		Dr. - EWAN LAW *and* JEFFREY WILKINS.	
	1770. January 1.	To Stock, Amount their Concern under me in the Voyage Ship Rumbold	6,000 — —
		Dr. - CASH.	
	1770. January 1.	To Stock, Balance of my Caſh Account	26,668 3 4
		To Profit and Loſs, more received than charged to Stock	674 6 8
		C. R[s]	27,342 10 —

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Brought forward - C. R^{s}	1,90,149 3 3
	By Stationary, Mr. Rumbold having had Credit for this Amount in Account Sales ſent him, 7 January 1771 - - - - -	636 1 9
	By Balance to new Account - - - - - - - -	2,174 8 —
	C. R^{s}	2,810 9 9
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - -	2,174 8 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	[15]
1770. January 1.	By Stock, Mr. Rumbold having received from Mr. Price the oppoſite Sum, and ſtill charges the whole Salt Petre to Stock	56,840 — —
July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who now renders neat Amount Sales of the Salt Petre - - - - - - - - - - -	65,239 2 6
	C. R^{s}	1,22,079 2 6
	By Cloths, having re-transferred the Amount, being ſold - - -	3,780 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Price and Loſs, the white Ants having entirely ſpoiled it -	1,259 4 6
	By Cloth, Mr. Rumbold had Credit for the oppoſite Sums - - -	636 1 9
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1771. Auguſt 31.	By David Killican, who received of Mr. Wilkins his Proportion	22,709 — 6
	By Harry Verelſt, the Amount of his Share, as per Account, 30 December 1769 - - - - - - - - -	43,812 13 —
	By Gocul Goſaul and Moden Dutt, Account Half their Shares in the Ship Rumbold, they being to account privately with him -	32,859 9 9
	C. R^{s}	99,381 7 3
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	[16]
1771. Auguſt 31.	By David Killican, who received of Mr. Wilkins - - -	4,420 15 11
1772. January 31.	By Ditto - D^{o} - D^{o} - - -	100 — —
February 27.	By Ditto - D^{o} - D^{o} - - -	13,452 2 —
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -	19,839 11 1
	C. R^{s}	37,812 13 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -	6,000 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who received from his Banian - - -	27,342 10 —

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

	Dr. - DEAD STOCK.	
1770. January 1.	To Stock as valued	10,000 — —
	To Profit and Loſs, more received than charged to Stock	5,283 — 5
	C. R'	15,283 — 5
[17]	Dr. - HONOURABLE COMPANY REVENUES.	
1770. January 1.	To Stock per Months September, October, November, and December	4,494 14 —
	Dr. - JEFFREY WILKINS.	
1770. Nov. 30.	To Joſeph Price, who paid him in full	1,636 9 6
	Dr. - CHARLES FEAKE.	
1770. October 31.	To David Killican, who paid him	32,274 8 —
1772. January 31.	To Ditto, D° in Two Payments	16,551 14 3
	To Profit and Loſs, transferring the oppoſite Sum	1,111 13 6
	To ſundry Accounts	5,834 11 3
	C. R'	35,772 15 —
	Dr. - DR. JOHN TAYLOR.	
1770. July 23.	To Joſeph Price, who paid into the Treaſury on his Account	15,000 — —
	To Ditto D° Balance Account	7,738 12 —
	C. R'	22,738 12 —
	Dr. - WILLIAM FISHER.	
	To Balance Account	26,000 — —
[18]	Dr. - EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS.	
	To Adventure to Rotargur Gomaſtah, made over to them	8,376 15 —
	To Advances for Chunam, made over to them	3,953 9 3
	To Dullab Doſs Balance Account D°	157 2 6
	To Charles Feake, Caſh received on his Account of Mr. Craig	1,111 13 6
	C. R'	13,599 8 3
	Dr. - EWAN LAW.	
	To Ewan Law private Account, having transferred it to that Head	10,854 — —

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who received in Part Sales of Effects - -		9,701 15 —
1771. February 20.	By Ditto D° in further Part - - -		616 9 6
1772. January 14.	By Walter Wilkins, Account this Date, for Plate ſold him -		4,964 7 11
	C. R¹		15,283 — 5
	Per Contra - - - - - -		[17]
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, who received 1 Year's Salary - - -		403 3 3
	By Ditto D° - 1 Month D° - - - -		39 3 —
	By Honourable Company Bond, dated 1 May - - -		4,052 7 9
	C. R²		4,494 14 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. January 1.	By Stock Balance Account, due him 30 November 1769 - - - - - - 718 6 5		
	Caſh received from the Warehouſe Keeper 823 4 —		
			1,541 10 5
	By Intereſt - - - - - - - - - - -		84 15 1
	C. R³		1,636 9 6
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. January 1.	By Stock Balance Account, due him 20 December 1769 -		29,086 7 5
	By Law and Wilkins, who received of Mr. Craig - - -		1,111 13 6
	By Intereſt on this Account - - - - - -		5,574 10 1
	C. R⁴		35,772 15 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. January 1.	By Stock Balance Account, due him 30 November 1769 - -		21,993 15 7
	By Intereſt to this Account - - - - - -		744 12 5
	C. R⁵		22,738 12 —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. January 1.	By Stock Balance Account, due him 31 December 1769 - -		26,000 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - Cr.		[18]
1770. January 1.	By Stock, Balance Account Current, due to them from Concern in Chunam - - - - - - - - -		13,081 9 2
	By Bond, Account for this Balance, being added to the Bond on this Account, was ſettled after Mr. Rumbold left India; Mr. Rumbold eſtimated their Bond - - 30,442 1 —		
	But they ſend a Bond, dated 20 December 1769, for - - - - 30,960 1 —		
			517 15 1
	C. R⁶		13,599 8 3
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per Purchaſe of 30 Cheſts Ophium - - -		10,854 — —

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Business of

Dr. - JEFFREY WILKINS.

	To Ewan Law private Account, having transferred it to that Head	10,854 — —

Dr. - EDWARD GOLDING.

	To Edward Golding Bond Account, having transferred the Amount of his Bond 26 November to this Account - -	9,874 14 6
1770. July 23.	To Joseph Price, who paid him in full this Account - -	974 1 6
	C. R[s]	10,854 — —

Dr. - WILLIAM HOSEA.

1770. July 23.	To Joseph Price, who paid him in full - - - -	5,820 — —
	To Profit and Loss to balance this Account - - - -	34 — —
	C. R[s]	5,854 — —

[19]

Dr. - SUBSCRIPTION, *Mrs. Majendie.*

1770. July 23.	To Joseph Price, who paid her in full - - - -	5,400 — —

Dr. SALT and BETTLENUT, with Middleton and Ellis.

	To Balance Account - - - - - - - -	30,518 1 9

Dr. - MANUEL D'CRUZ.

1770. July 23.	To Joseph Price, who paid him - - - - -	2,160 — —

Dr. - DROZ'S CHILD.

	To Balance Account - - - - - - - -	2,160 — —

Dr. - CARD DEBTS.

1770. July 23.	To Joseph Price - paid Marriott and Sampson - -	4,462 9 —
	To Ditto D° - D° Lawrell, Barber, Price and Killican -	4,869 2 6
	To Ditto D° - Mr. Cobham - - - - -	1,015 3 3
	C. R[s]	10,346 14 9

[20]

Dr. - CHARGES GENERAL.

1770. July 23.	To Joseph Price, Account Current this Date -	4,920	4 4
	To Ditto - D° -	6,696	— —
	To Ditto - D° -	1,367	3 6
	Carried forward -		

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per Purchaſe of 30 Cheſts Ophium - - -	10,854 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per Purchaſe of 30 Cheſts Ophium - - -	10,854 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per Purchaſe of 30 Cheſts Ophium - - -	10,854 — —
	Deduct received by Mr. Rumbold - - -	5,000 — —
	C. R^{t}	5,854 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	[19]
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per my promiſe of a Preſent to her - - -	5,400 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per Balance Account due to them, Middleton and Ellis	30,518 1 9
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per my preſent to his Child, and Capt. Autchmutty	2,160 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. January 1.	By Stock, per my Preſent to be given his Child - - -	2,160 — —
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	
1770. July 23.	By Joſeph Price, received of Middleton and Kelſall - -	909 12 3
	By Ditto - D^{o} Floyer and Watſon - - - - -	548 10 —
1772. January 31.	By David Killican, Account this Date, who received of Walter Wilkins - - - - - - - - - -	4,218 7 8
	By Profit and Loſs, to balance this Account - - -	4,670 — 10
	C. R^{t}	10,346 14 9
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.	[20]
	By Walter Wilkins, who received Sundries, which is put to this Head for not having any Account - - - - - -	141 — —
	By Cloths, re-transferring the oppoſite Sum - - - -	6,224 3 9
	Carried forward -	

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

1770.		Brought forward -						
July 23.	To Joſeph Price, Account Current, this Date				5,041	5	1	
	To Ditto - D° - -				2,357	5	9	
	To Ditto - D° - -				479	9	9	
								27,861 12 5
	To Ditto, Commiſſion on Cloths - - -							6,224 3 9
	To David Killican, who paid Sundries - -							1,351 4 —
Nov. 30.	To Joſeph Price - - - - - -				328	12	3	
1771.								
February 20.	To Ditto - - - - - - -				1,993	15	9	
								2,322 12 —
21.	To David Killican, Fees on Company Bonds -				15	10	—	
March 30.	To Ditto Sundries - - - -				1,125	5	6	
Auguſt 31.	To Ditto D° - - - - -				16	12	3	
								1,157 11 9
31.	To Ditto Mr. Law Bill - - -				104	6	—	
October 31.	To Ditto D° - - - - -				1,458	3	—	
								1,562 9 —
April 30.	To Joſeph Price D° - - - - -				589	14	6	
1772.								
January 1.	To Ditto D° - - - - -				211	6	9	
								801 5 3
	To Walter Wilkins, who paid Mr. Kelſall - - - -							987 — 11
31.	To David Killican, Account Current this Day, who paid -							1,001 2 6
	To Joſeph Price, Godown Rent on his Goods - - -							2,575 7 —
		Y. M.						
	To Ditto Office Charges	2	2	- - - -				4,212 — —
	To Ditto Coachman's Wages, January and February -							21 9 9
				C. R¹				43,078 14 4

[21]

Dr. - DAVID KILLICAN.

1770.								
April 14.	To Moden Dutt, received in Three Payments - - -							5,000 — —
	To John Knott, received in Four Payments - - - -							20,978 3 6
	To Intereſt Account - - - - - - - -							154 4 3
				C. R¹				26,132 7 9
1771.								
February 21.	To Alexander Hannay, received in full Principal and Intereſt of Bond - - - - - - - - - -							10,900 — —
	To Walter Wilkins, received in Three Payments - - -							45,439 10 9
	To Giles Holloway, received Balance his Reſpondentia Bond -							5,707 8 —
	To Law and Wilkins, received in part of their joint Bonds -							12,867 8 —
	To John Cartier, received in full his Bond - - - -							44,187 6 —
	To Edwd Stevenſon, received in full his Bond - - -							12,201 — —
	To Profit and Loſs, Diſcount on 16 Company Bonds - -							1,411 5 3
	To Honourable Company Bonds, received for 4 Bonds - -							40,659 15 9
	To Intereſt, received for the Intereſt on the Company Bonds -							830 6 9
				C. R¹				1,74,204 12 6
February 21.	To Balance Account of this Date brought down - - -							14,809 11 9
March 31.	To Manuel Cruz, received in Part of his Bond - - -							625 5 6
	To Robert Dobinſon, received in Part Sale Tin - - -							18,273 7 6
	To Ewan Law, received in full Intereſt, &c. Bond - -							15,067 1 6
	To Law and Wilkins, received in Part joint Bonds - -							10,000 — —
	To Profit and Loſs, Diſcount on 7 Company Bonds - -							1,408 11 9
				C R¹				60,184 6 —

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Brought forward -	
	By Profit and Loſs, to balance this Head - - - -	36,713 — 10
	C. R$	43,078 14 4

[21]

	Per Contra - - - - Cr.	
1770.		
April 14.	By Robert Hunter, lent him on Bond - - - - -	15,000 — —
	By Charges general, paid Sundries - - - - -	1,351 4 —
	By Joſeph Price, having paid him the Balance - - -	9,781 3 9
	C. R$	26,132 7 9
1771.		
February 22.	By Honourable Company Bonds, for the Purchaſe of 16 Bonds -	72,903 14 3
	By Intereſt Account, for Intereſt on the 16 D° - - -	1,849 7 3
	By Alexander Hannay, lent him on Bond - - - -	10,000 — —
	By Law and Wilkins, paid them Balance Account - - -	12,867 8 —
	By Honourable Company's Treaſury, for Bills on Europe -	61,758 9 3
	By Charges general, Fees on Company Bonds - - -	15 10 —
	By Balance carried to new Account - - - - -	14,809 11 9
	C. R$	1,74,204 12 6
March 31.	By Honourable Company's Bonds, for the Purchaſe of 7 Bonds	43,798 15 6
	By Intereſt Account, for Intereſt on the 7 D° - - -	1,001 6 —
	By Charges general, ſundries paid - - - - -	1,125 5 6
	By Balance carried to new Account - - - - -	14,258 11 —
	C. R$	60,184 6 —

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

Dr. - WALTER WILKINS.

1771. September.	To Calcutta Houſes, he having ſold our ſmall Houſe to Mrs. Parkinſon, for A. R^{s} 5,000, Mr. Rumbold's Share - -	2,700 — —
1772. January 1.	To dead Stock, per Amount ſundry Plate he bought of Mr. Rumbold - - - - - - - - - -	4,964 7 11
	C. R^{s}	7,664 7 11
January 14.	To Balance, brought down from his Account Current this Date - - - - - - - - - - -	5,393 9 5

[22]

Dr. - - DAVID KILLICAN.

1771. March 31.	To Balance Account of this Date - - - - - - -	14,258 11 —
	To Robert Dobinſon, received Balance Tin Account - -	625 15 6
	To Robert Hunter, received in Part Payment Bond - - -	10,000 — —
	To Honourable Company Bonds, received Amount 1 Bond, 1 September 1769 - - - - - - - - -	4,709 7 3
	To Intereſt, received Intereſt on above Bond - - - -	607 0 9
	To Walter Wilkins, received Balance his Bond Account - -	42,604 11 6
	To Manuel Cruz, received in Part his Bond - - - -	14,847 13 6
	To Robert Dobinſon, received Balance Reſpondentia Bond -	3,572 9 9
	To Owners Ship Rumbold, received of Mr. Wilkins his Proportion - - - - - - - - - - -	22,709 — 6
	To Account Co^{y} Walter Wilkins, received of Mr. Wilkins private Account - - - - - - - - - -	5,667 11 9
	To Walter Wilkins private Account, received of Mr. Wilkins -	2,270 14 6
	To Voyage in Ship Rumbold, received of W. Wilkins - -	4,420 15 11
	To Law and Wilkins, received their joint Bond Account - -	44,478 6 3
	To Capt. Shaw, received in full - - - - - - -	8,402 15 —
	To Alexander, Floyer, and Inglis, received in full - - -	1,42,020 3 —
	To Francis Hare Hare, received a Dividend of 4 Annoes - -	3,370 1 4
	To Profit and Loſs, Diſcount on Company Bonds - - -	966 11 3
	To Intereſt, for 1 Year's Intereſt on 2 Company Bonds - -	5,135 5 —
	C. R^{s}	3,30,668 9 10
March 31.	To Balance of an Account of this Date - - - - -	8,326 14 10
October 31.	To Francis Hare, received a further Dividend - - - -	3,370 1 3
	To Honourable Company Bonds Caſh for one Bond ſold 12 July 1771 - - - - - - - - - -	12,000 — —
	To Intereſt Account, Intereſt on this Bond - - - -	274 8 —
	C. R^{s}	23,971 8 1
October 31.	To Balance of an Account of this Date - - - - - -	10,238 13 1
1772. January 31.	To Gocul Goſaul and Modun Dutt of Mr. Wilkins Dividend Ship Rumbold - - - - - - - - - -	3,390 11 11
	To Voyage Ship Rumbold, received of Mr. Wilkins Balance due on Dividend - - - - - - - - - -	100 — —
	To Card Debts, received of Mr. Wilkins Amount his Card Debt -	4,218 7 8
	To Honourable Company Bonds, for Sale of 6 Bonds - -	13,981 13 6
	To Intereſt Account, for Intereſt on 6 D^{o} - - - - -	1,032 7 6
	To Law and Wilkins, received in full J. Wilkins Balance Share Joint Bond - - - - - - - - - -	4,994 14 1
	To Edward Golding, received in Part his Bond - - -	23,427 5 9
	To Balance to new Account - - - - - - -	405 14 10
	C. R^{s}	61,790 8 3

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			
1771.				
Auguſt 31.	By David Killican, who received from him June 1771 - -		2,270	14 6
1772.				
January 1.	By Balance to new Account, as from his Account Curr. - -		5,393	9 5
		C. R^{s}	7,664	7 11
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - - -		5,393	9 5

[22]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.			
1771.				
Auguſt 31.	By Honourable Company Bonds, for the Purchaſe of 33 Bonds -		3,15,620	12 9
	By Intereſt - - - Intereſt on D^{o} - - -		1,091	1 —
	By Charges general - - Sundries paid - - -		16	12 3
	By Cloths in Calcutta - - Company's Duty - - -		5,508	11 —
	By Charges general - - Amount of his Bill - - -		104	6 —
	By Balance to new Account - - - - - - -		8,326	14 10
		C. R^{s}	3,30,668	9 10
October 31.	By Charges general, Sundries paid - - - - - -		1,458	3 —
	By Charles Feake, paid him - - - - - - -		12,274	8 —
	By Balance to new Account - - - - - - -		10,238	13 1
		C. R^{s}	23,971	8 1
1772.				
January 31.	By Stock Amount of a Bill of Exchange from London £. 500, at ½, in favour C. Sympſon - - - - - - -		4,615	6 —
	By Charles Feake, paid him in full in Two Payments - - -		16,551	14 3
	By Honourable Company Bonds, for Purchaſe 10 Bonds - -		39,037	4 —
	By Intereſt on the above Bonds - - - - - -		584	13 6
	By Charges general, Sundries paid - - - - - -		1,001	2 6
		C. R^{s}	61,790	8 3

APPEND. DIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Business of

[23]

Dr. - HONOURABLE COMPANY TREASURY.

1770. January 1.	To Stock which was paid in by Mr. Rumbold - - - -				50,000 — —
July 23.	To Joseph Price who paid in 20 June - - - - -				12,000 — —
Nov. 30.	To Ditto - - - - D° 26 October - - - - -				37,399 — 6
1771. February 21.	To David Killican Account this Date, paid in				
	20 January - - - - - - -		6,636	13 9	
	20 Ditto - - - - - - -		25,111	1 9	
					31,747 15 6
	13 February - - - - - -		21,983	15 —	
	21 Ditto - - - - - - -		8,026	15 9	
					30,010 9 9
	To Walter Wilkins, paid in by Mr. Miller - - - -				7,016 — —
	To Interest on Sums before the Bills were granted - - -				4,333 12 —
		C. R°			1,72,506 12 —

Dr. - - INTEREST ACCOUNT.

1770. Nov. 0.	To Joseph Price, Interest on Account this Date - - -				421 3 6
1771. February 21.	To David Killican, D° on the Purchase of 16 Bonds - - -				1,849 7 3
March 30.	To Ditto - - - D° - - - - - 7 D° - - -				1,001 6 —
August 31,	To Ditto - - - D° - - - - - 33 D° - - -				1,091 1 —
	To Ewan Law - D° - - - - - 2 D° - - -				564 11 —
	To Walter Wilkins Account Bonds Interest on Sums received -				2,017 10 —
	To Robert Dobinson - - D° on his Tin Account - -				245 11 3
	To Jeffrey Wilkins - - D° on his private D° - -				84 15 1
	To David Killican - - D° on purchased Bonds -				584 13 6
	To Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins D° on Sums received Account Bonds - - - - - - - - - -				1,689 5 11
	To Charles Ingram, Interest on his Bond -		671	2 6	
	To John Tool - - - D° - -		1,539	3 8	
	To Henry Wedderburn - D° - -		3,666	3 9	
[24]	To Lewis D'Costa - - D° - -		3,703	7 6	
	To Dr. John Taylor - - D° - -		744	14 5	
	To Charles Feake - - D° - -		5,574	10 1	
					15,899 9 11
	To Profit and Loss, Gain upon this Head - - - - -				85,721 5 1
		C. R°			1,11,171 3 6

Dr. - - PROFIT and LOSS.

To Walter Wilkins Account in Co. Difference of Estimation -	115 10 2
To Charles Ingram Account for his Bond to Balance - - -	532 3 1
To John Tool - D° - - - D° - - -	58 3 8
To Esop Gable, now wrote off, being irrecoverable - - -	17,526 8 7
To Calcutta Houses, Mr. Wilkins having sold the House - -	1,872 11 2
To Stationary, Amount a Chest spoiled by white Ants - -	1,259 4 6
To Card Debts, Balance of that Account - - - -	4,673 — 10
To Rajah Settabroy, D° - - D° - - - - -	625 14 —

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

[23]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.				
	By Stock, having remitted Mr. Rumbold Home, viz.				
	1 Set of Bills, Original per Houghton, and Duplicate per Kingſton			1,03,748	2 9
	1 Ditto - - - - - - - D°			7,000	— —
	1 Ditto D° per Worceſter, and D° - - per Vereſt			31,747	15 6
	1 Ditto - - - - - - - D°			21,983	15 —
	1 Ditto - - - - - - - D°			8,026	10 9
	C. R°			1,72,506	12 —

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.				
1770.					
April 14.	By David Killican, Intereſt on Account Current this Date - -			154	4 3
Nov. 30.	By Joſeph Price - D° - - - - D° - -			1,240	13 6
1771.					
February 21.	By David Killican - D° on Company Bonds -	4	- -	830	6 9
Auguſt 31.	By Ditto - - D° - - - -	1	- -	607	— 9
	By Ditto - - D° - - - -	2 for 1 Year		5,135	5 —
Sept. 30.	By Ditto - - D° - - - - D° - -			274	8 —
	Y. M. D.				
	By Ewan Law - D° on his Bond for 1 5 9 - - -			1,759	14 —
	By John Cartier - D° on D° - - - - - -			6,516	15 9
	By Dr. John Routledge, D° D° - - - - - -			3,943	15 9
	By Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, D° on Bond 80,255 13 6			5,439	9 —
	By C. Floyer, R. Alexander, and H. Inglis, Intereſt on their Bond			25,664	— —
	By Edward Stevenſon - - - - - - D°			1,401	— —
	By Giles Holloway - - - - - - - D°			732	8 —
	By Walter Wilkins Account of 2 Bonds, Intereſt on them - -			14,671	15 4
	By John Knott, Amount Intereſt on his Bond - - - -			466	5 6
	By Capt. Harry James Shaw, D° - D° - - - -			144	11 2
	By Robert Dobinſon, Intereſt on that Account - - -			2,092	12 —
	By Thomas M'Bride and Peter Moreau, Intereſt on their - -			296	14 3
	By Joſeph Price, who received One Year's Intereſt on Two Bonds			5,467	7 9
	By Owners Ship Rumbold, Intereſt on the Sum paid by Mr. Wilkins - - - - - - - - - - -			2,817	14 6
	By David Killican, Intereſt on Company's Bonds ſold - -			1,032	7 6
	By Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, Intereſt on Joint Bond - -			10,153	11 8
	By Charles Ingram, Intereſt on his Bond - -	1,376	1 1		
	By John Tool - - D° - - - -	1,937	6 9		
	By Henry Wedderburn D° - - - -	3,990	— —		
	By Lewis De Coſta - D° - - - -	4,147	8 —		
	By Honourable Company Treaſury, D° on Sums	4,333	2 3		
	By Charles Feake - - D° - - -	512	— 6		
	By Owners Ship Alexander D° on Account -	2,230	11 —		
	By Capt. Shaw - - D° on Rumbold Half	1,789	1 —		
				20,315	14 7
	C. R°			1,11,171	3 6

[24]

	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.				
1771.					
February 21.	By David Killican, Diſcount on Company Bonds - - -			1,411	5 3
March 31.	By Ditto - - - D° - - D° - - - -			1,408	11 9
Auguſt 31.	By Ditto - - - D° - - D° - - - -			966	11 3
	By Ewan Law, Batty gained on the Dutch Bill - - - -			268	14 9
	By Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, Diſcount on 2 Company Bonds			1,078	7 —
	By Robert Dobinſon, Premium on Reſpondentia Bond - -			10,125	— —
	By Salt Petre Account, gained upon this Head - - - -			19,297	— 6
	By John Tool, Premium on his Bond - - - - -			1,620	— —

APPENDIX, No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

		Brought forward -	
	To Charges general - - - - - - - - -		36,713 — 10
	To Stock, being neat Gain ſince Mr. Rumbold left India - -		1,00,942 1 —
		C. R[s]	1,64,315 9 10
	Dr. - - OPHIUM ACCOUNT.		
	To Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, Account of one Bond for the Amount of the Balance Ophium Account, which they charge 8 February 1771 to that Account - - - - - -		45,154 7 6
[25]	Dr. - HARE'S ASSIGNMENT.		
	To Robert Dobinſon, Account Reſpondentia, for a Mortgage Bond, dated 14 March 1770 - - - - - - -		30,000 — —
	Dr. - Capt. JOSEPH PRICE.		
1771. May 1.	To Balance an account this Date - - - - - - -		3,190 1 6
October 4.	To Intereſt Account for One Year, on 4 Company Bonds -		5,467 7 9
	To Cloths, for Sundries ſold - - - - - - -		140 10 9
	To John Tool, received in full Balance Goods Outcry - - - - - - - -	768 12 6	
	To Charles Ingram, D° D° -	768 12 6	
	To Henry Wedderburn, D°, in full Balance -	1,554 15 5	
	To Lewis D'Coſta, D° D° -	1,985 — 6	
			5,077 8 11
	To Cloths, for Sales to the Honourable Company, 30 November 1771 - - -	33,928 4 6	
	To Cloths, D° 11 January 1772 - -	6,471 11 3	
			40,399 15 9
		C. R[s]	54,275 12 8
	To Balance - - - - - - - - - -		4,676 4 5
	Dr. - HARRY VERELST.		
	To Owners Ship Rumbold, Account for the Amount his Share, as per Account, December 1769 - - - - -		43,812 13 —
[26]	Dr. - OWNERS Ship ALEXANDER.		
	To Cloths, having ſold them 47 Bales Cloths, as per Account Sales ſent Mr. Rumbold - - - - - - - -		16,653 14 6
	To Profit and Loſs, for a ſhort Charge - - - - -		146 4 —
	To Intereſt to 9 March 1772, and gave Bond of that Date -		2,230 11 —
		C. R[s]	19,030 13 6

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Esquire—*continued.*

	Brought forward -		
	By Cash Account, received more than charged - - - -	674 6 8	
	By Dead Stock, D° - - - D° - - - -	5,283 — 5	
	By William Hosea, paid less than charged - - - -	34 — —	
	By Salt Petre, a further Gain - - - - - - - -	3,780 — —	
	By Cloths, gained upon this Head - - - - - -	31,388 15 9	
	By Charles Feake, re-transferring as per J. 22 - - - -	1,111 13 6	
	By Owners Ships Alexander, Charge omitted - - - -	146 4 —	
	By Interest Account Balance that Head - - - - -	85,721 5 1	
	C. R°	1,64,315 9 10	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
	By Stock to close this Head, as Mr. Rumbold never charged it to Stock, and Messf. Law and Wilkins charges this Sum in their Account Current - - - - - - - - -	45,154 7 6	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		[25]
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - - -	30,000 — —	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1772. January 1.	By general Charges, Sundries paid of this Date - - -	211 6 9	
	By Honourable Company's Bonds, received per Sales November 30 1771,		
	1 Bond - - 10,000 — —		
	1 D° - - - 10,000 — —		
	1 D° - - - 13,928 4 6		
	33,928 4 6		
	By Honourable Company Bond, received per Sales 11 January 1772 - - - - - - 6,471 11 3		
		40,399 15 9	
	By Cloths, per Charges Merchandize, 30 Nov. 1771 1,884 3 —		
	11 Jan. 1772 294 14 —		
		2,179 1 —	
	By Charges general, Godown Rent - - - - - -	2,575 7 —	
	Y. M.		
	By Office Charges 2 2 - - - - - - -	4,212 — —	
	By Charges General, Coachman's Wages - - - -	21 9 9	
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -	4,676 4 5	
	C. R°	54,275 12 8	
	By Balance - - - - - - - - - -	4,676 4 5	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - -	43,812 13 —	
	Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		[26]
	By Balance Account - - - - - - - - -	19,030 13 6	

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 2.)—LEDGER on the Buſineſs of

		Dr. - DAVID KILLICAN.	
1772. February 28.		To Robert Hunter, received in further Part his Bond -	6,000 — —
		To Voyage in the Ship Rumbold, received in Part her Cargo -	13,452 2 —
		C. R[s]	19,452 2 —
February 29.		To Balance brought down from above Account - - -	1,046 3 2

[27]

		Dr. - BALANCE ACCOUNT.	
1772. Feb. 29.	1	To Edward Golding - - Balance his Bond Account	26,572 10 3
	2	To Manuel D'Cruz - - Balance his Account -	4,676 13 —
	2	To Capt. Joſeph Price - - Amount of his Two Bonds -	1,45,118 12 7
	4	To John Robinſon and R. Crauford, Amount their Bond - -	25,360 — —
	5	To Gocul Goſaul and Moden Dutt, Balance their Account -	3,922 12 4
	5	To Robert Hunter - - Balance his Bond Account	21,566 13 10
	6	To Francis Hare - - - Balance his Bond - -	4,359 13 5
	6	To Alexander Hannay - - Bond - - - -	10,000 — —
	26	To Honourable Company Bonds - 70 Bonds, value - -	6,73,919 5 8
	8	To George Waple and Geo. Davidſon, Reſponderitia Bond - -	1,620 — —
	13	To Cloths - - - - Balance remaining on Hand	2,174 8 —
	15	To Voyage in the Ship Rumbold - Balance Account - -	19,839 11 1
	15	To Law and Wilkins - - their Concern in the Rumbold	6,000 — —
	20	To Walter Wilkins - - Balance of private Account -	5,393 9 5
	24	To Mortgage Bond - - - Mr. Dobinſon's Houſe -	30,000 — —
	24	To Harry Verelſt - - - Proportion Ship Rumbold -	43,812 3 —
	26	To David Killican - - - Balance Account Current -	1,046 3 2
	24	To Owners Ship Alexander - Cloths and Intereſt - -	19,030 13 6
	8	To Capt. Harry James Shaw - Balance Intereſt Account -	1,789 1 —
	25	To Joſeph Price - - - Balance his Account Current	4,676 4 5
		C. R[s]	10,50,879 6 8

THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire—*continued.*

		Per Contra - - - - - - Cr.		
1772. January 31.		By Balance of Account of this Date - - - - -		405 14 10
February 28.		By Honble Company Bond, 1 Bond, 12 Feb. 1772	13,000 — —	
		28 D° -	5,000 — —	
				18,000 — —
		By Balance to new Account - - - - - -		1,046 3 2
			C. R°	19,452 2 —
		By Balance Account - - - - - - - - - -		1,046 3 2

[27]

		Per Contra - - - - - Cr.	
1772. Feb. 29.	16	By William Taylor, Balance due him - - - - -	26,000 — —
	18	By Salt and Beetlenut, in C° with Middleton and Ellis - -	30,518 1 9
	18	By Droz Child, Preſent to be given - - - - -	2,160 — —
			58,678 1 9
		By Stock, being the neat Eſtate of Mr. Rumbold, as appears from theſe Books, excluſive of Intereſt on many Accounts -	9,92,201 4 11
		C. R°	10,50,879 6 8

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL on the Buſineſs of THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire; Commencing the 31ſt of December 1769, ending the 28th of February 1772.

[1] 1. SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to STOCK.

1.	Edward Golding, this Bond, dated 10 Auguſt 1769, for C. R^{s} 50,000, free of Intereſt for Two Years, and then remitted Home with the very beſt Methods				50,000	—	—
	Ditto, his Bond, dated November 26, 1769, payable 9 Months				9,874	14	6
							59,874 14 6
1.	Ewan Law, this Bond, dated 30 September, payable in 12 Months						13,307 3 6
2.	Manuel D'Cruz, this Bond, dated 18 October 1769, payable 6 Months						20,150 — —
2.	John Cartier, this Bond, dated 7 March 1769, payable in 12 Months						37,670 6 3
2.	Captain Joſeph Price, this Bond, dated 30 November 1769, payable 9 Months						1,20,000 — —
2	John Rowtledge, this Bond, dated 1 December 1769, payable 9 Months						34,346 — 9
3.	Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins,						
	1ſt. 1 Bond, dated 1 October 1769, payable in 12 Months				80,255	13	6
	2d. 1 Bond, dated 25 November 1769, ditto, ditto				32,916	6	6
	3d. 1 Bond, dated ditto, ditto,				30,442	1	—
							1,43,614 5 —
4.	Charles Ingram, this Bond, dated 12th January 1769, payable 6 Months						4,320 — —
4.	Charles Floyer, Robt Alexander, and Hugh Inglis, Their Bond, dated 30 April 1769, payable in 12 Months						1,16,356 3 —
4.	John Robinſon and Robert Craufurd, Their Bond, dated 26 November 1769, payable in 10 Months						25,360 — —
5.	Walter Wilkins,						
	1ſt. One Bond, dated 1 December 1769, payable in 9 Months				82,165	11	10
	2d. One ditto, 19 D^{o} D^{o} 6 D^{o}				25,240	5	1
							1,07,406 — 11
4.	Edward Stevenſon, his Bond, dated 3d November 1769; 8 M^{o} 10,000 A. R^{s}						10,800 — —
5.	Gocul Goſaul and Modun Dutt, Their Bond, dated 30 April 1769, payable in 6 Months		61,000	— —			
	Batta 8 per Cent.		4,880	— —			
					65,880	—	—
	Received in Account Modun Dutt		30,000	— —			
	Gocul Goſaul		15,000	— —			
					45,000	—	—
							20,880 — —
4.	Giles Holloway, Account Richard Wyatt and Company, This Bond, 26 May 1769, payable in 10 Months				18,090	—	—
	Received in part Payment from Thos Bagnell, and Alex^{r} Murray his Attorney				14,115	—	—
							4,975 — —
5.	Robert Hunter, Surgeon at Patna, This Bond, dated 1 October 1769, payable in 12 Months						22,566 13 10
6.	Francis Hare, this Bond, dated 28 May 1769, payable on Demand						11,100 — —
6.	Alex^{r} Hanway, this Bond, dated 26 Auguſt 1769, payable in 12 Months						10,000 — —
[2] 6.	Eſop Gable, at Judda, For my Proportion of a Bond, for Goods ſold him by Captain Harry James Shaw, when he carried the William Snow, belonging to Walter Wilkins and me, Cruz 50,000, my $\frac{9}{16}$ Proportion						17,526 8 7
6.	John Knott, his Bond, dated 20th December 1769, payable on Demand						20,511 14 —
7.	Honourable Company, their Intereſt, Receipts dated the 18 December 1769, for Bills on Europe by the firſt Ship following Year				50,000	—	—
	One ditto, 20 November 1769, to bear Intereſt from 1 September 1769, payable in 12 Months				7,849	1	5
							57,849 1 5
8.	Captain Harry James Shaw, This Bond, dated 27 December 1769, payable 12 Months, Walter Wilkins and Self, for 16,514 7 8. my $\frac{1}{2}$ is						8,257 3 10
8.	Edward Waple and George Davidſon, Their Reſpondentia Bond, Ship Lord Anſon, 15 February 1768, A. R^{s} 1,500						1,620 — —
8.	Charles Ingram, Pal McTaggart, and P. McTaggart, Their Reſpondentia Bond on the Greenwich Ketch, dated 10th April 1768						18,900 — —
8.	John Tool, his Reſpondentia Bond on the Nelly Snow, dated 13 January 1769 A. R^{s} 6,000						6,480 — —

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

9.	Rober Dobinſon, this Reſpondentia Bond on the Induſtry Snow			40,500 — —
9.	Randoph Marriott, this Mortgage Reſpondentia Bond on the Snow Speedwell, ated 4 February 1769, for 30,000			32,400 — —
9.	Henry Wedderburn, the Amount his Reſpondentia Bond, March	15,120 — —		
	Premium 25 per Cent.	3,780 — —		
		18,900 — —		
	Received from him December 12th	7,772 15 5		
	Ditto D° 26th	7,277 — 7		
		15,050 — —		3,850 — —
10.	Lewis Da Coſta, the Amount of his Reſpondentia Bond, dated 1 March 1769 — Principal	15,180 — —		
	Premium 25 per Cent.	3,780 — —		
		18,900 — —		
	Received from him December 12	7,772 15 5		
	Ditto D° 26	5,586 — 7		
		13,359 — —		5,541 — —
10.	Thomas Mc Bryde and Peter Moreau, Their Bond, dated 1 March	30,240 — —		
	Premium, 25 per Cent.	7,560 — —		
		38,800 — —		
	Received in part 12 December	15,545 14 10		
	D° D°	12,045 1 2		
		27,591 — —		10,209 — —
10.	Raja Setabroy, for the large Houſe bought of Meſſrs. Wilkins and me, from the Eſtate of Lieutenant Vollam, and ſold by us to Rajah Setabroy, for S. R^s	60,000 — —		
	Batta 16 per Cent.	9,600 — —		
		69,600 — —		
	Payable, One Half in Two Months, the other in Four D° My $\frac{1}{2}$ is			34,800 — —
11.	Capt. Joſeph Price, Balance 30th November 1769			13,466 15 — [31
12.	Account in Co. with Walter Wilkins, Balance of an Account due me, my $\frac{1}{16}$ Proportion			5,701 8 3
12.	Dullub Doſs, Gomaſtah at Gazypore, Balance of Account due from him			157 2 6
12.	Calcutta Houſes, for a ſmall Houſe adjoining to the one ſold Setrabroy, Purchaſed by Walter Wilkins and me, from the Eſtate of Lieut. Vollam, C. R^s 11,000, my Half			5,500 — —
12.	Adventure to Rotaſgur, Balance Chunam remaining 25,000 M^ds at 20. 14. 3. per Maunds	5,264 4 —		
	Batta 11 per Cent.	579 1 —		
		5,843 5 —		
	Balance of Caſh in the Gomaſtah's Hands, 30 October	3,643 10 —		
	Deduct ſince received	1,110 — —		
		2,533 10 —		8,376 15 —
12.	Advances for Chunam to Chopſah 31 October			3,953 9 3
13.	Cloths with Mr. Joſeph Price, 1 Invoice Muſter — 20 Pieces	84 14 3		
	1 Ditto of Cloth, Oct. 29. 4,922	22,537 2 —		
	1 Ditto D° Aug. 26. 10,313	42,300 — —		
	1 Ditto D° Oct. 15. 10,325	48,873 5 9		
	1 Ditto D° D° 22. 5,610	15,120 — —		
		1,28,915 6 6		
	Batta 32 per Cent.	3,906 8 6		
		1,25,008 14 —		
	Batta 11 per Cent.	13,750 15 8		
		1,38,759 13 8		
	Amount Charges on the Invoice as appears by my Books	2,308 6 1		
				1,41,068 3 9

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

		Mds		
14.	Salt Petre ſent to Calcutta, 9,188 17 8: at 5 per Maund			45,942 2 —
	Received in Part Payment, 56,840.			
14.	Stationary, Amount Invoice left with Mr. Price, A. Rs 1,096			1,259 4 6
14.	Owners Ship Rumbold,			
	Amount Sundries paid by me, the Particulars given Mr. Wilkins		1,25,847 8 —	
	Deduct as follows:			
	Received from Mynheer Doulah	8,640 — —		
	Ditto from Walter Wilkins	10,000 — —		
	My ½ Joint Bond to me of Walter Wilkins from Capt. Harry James Shaw	8,257 3 10		
	My ⅓ of ⅔ Concern in the Voyage	43,812 13 —		
			70,710 — 10	
				55,137 7 8
15.	Voyage in the Rumbold,			
	My ⅓ of ⅔ Concern in the Voyage, Stock and Block		43,812 13 —	
	Deduct Meſſ. Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins Concern under me 3,000		6,000 — —	
				37,812 13 —
[4] 15.	Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins,			
	Amount of their Concern under me in the Voyage Ship Rumbold			6,000 — —
15.	Caſh,			
	Balance of my Caſh Account paid to Mr. Price and Killican			26,668 3 4
15.	Dead Stock valued at			10,000 — —
16.	Honourable Company's Commiſſion on Revenues			4,494 14 —
			C. Rs	13,86,710 13 —

Calcutta, 29 February 1772.

(Errors excepted.)

[5] 5.	STOCK, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.			
16.	Jeffrey Wilkins, Balance of an Account Current, dated 30 November 1769, due him		G. Rs 718 6 5	
	Received from Mr. Hare, Warehouſe-keeper, an Overcharge in the Sepoys Cloathing		823 4 —	
				1,541 10 5
16.	Charles Feake, Balance of Account due him, 20 December 1769			29,086 7 5
16.	John Taylor, Balance of Account due him, 30 November 1769			21,993 15 7
16.	Wm Fiſher, Balance of Account due him, 21 December 1769			26,000 — —
17.	Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins, Balance of an Account Current due to them for a joint Concern in Rotaſgur in Chunam			13,081 9 2
17.	Ewan Law, purchaſed from him 30 Cheſts Ophium			10,854 — —
17.	Jeffrey Wilkins, purchaſed from him 30 Cheſts Ophium			10,854 — —
17.	Edward Golding, purchaſed from him 30 Cheſts Ophium			10,854 — —
17.	Wm Hoſea, purchaſed from him 30 Cheſts Ophium		10,854 — —	
	Deduct paid in Calcutta		5,000 — —	
				5,854 — —
18.	Subſcription for Mrs. Majendie			5,400 — —
18.	Salt and Bettlenutt, in Co. with Middleton and Ellis, Due from me on that Account			30,518 1 9
18.	Manuel D'Cruz, for his Daughter Mary D'Cruz		1,000 — —	
	for the Daughter of Captain A.		1,000 — —	
		A. Rs	2,000 — —	2,160 — —
18.	Droz Child, to ſettle on her		2,000 — —	2,160 — —
14.	Salt Petre, Mr. Rumbold having charged the whole Amount of Salt Petre, and never given Credit for this Sum received			56,840 — —
			C. Rs	2,27,197 10 4

Calcutta, 29 February 1772.

(Errors excepted.)

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

[6]

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE,
From Account Current, dated 23 July 1770.

14	Salt Petre, Caſh paid Mr. Rumbold, 30 November 1769				39,440 — —	
	Caſh paid his Banyan on this Account				17,400 — —	
					56,840 — —	
19	Charges general Caſh, per 1 Caſk Brandy		226 1 3			
	1 Set Stone China		432 — —			
	Amount 3 Pipes Madeira and China		1,198 — —			
	Amount 2 Leagures Arrack		237 9 7			
	Preſent to the Muſicians		151 3 3			
	Mr. Smith at Chinſurah		118 12 9			
	Mr. Porter, per Sea Stock		1,648 9 3			
	Your Proportion of European Wages		21 9 6			
	Petty Diſburſements this Month		885 10 —			
					4,920 4 4	
18	Card Debts, paid Mr. Marriott		4,289 12 3			
	To Caſh paid Brook Sampſon		172 12 9			
					4,462 9 —	
						66,222 13 4

Ditto

JOSEPH PRICE Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS,
From Account Current, dated 23d July 1770.

15	Caſh, received from his Banyan				27,342 10 —	
18	Card Debts, of Mr. Middleton		77 12 3			
	of Mr. Killican		832 — —			
					909 12 3	
16	Honourable Company's Salary, 29 Sept. 1769 to 1769				403 3 3	
						28,655 9 6

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE,
From Account Current, dated 23d July 1770.

18	Card Debts, Caſh paid James Laurel his Debt				3,251 5 9	
—	Sir Robert Barker				583 3 3	
	Mr. Price, Ring and Card Debt				689 — —	
	Thomas Kelſal, Card Debt				345 9 6	
					4,869 2 6	
19	Charges general, Caſh paid Ramkiſon		540 — —			
	Caſh paid Rammander per Fireworks		159 11 9			
	D° for 3 Tarcern Bills		2,535 10 —			
	Preſent to Thomas Andrews		162 — —			
	Caſh paid Charles Pigot per Rent		15 14 3			
	To Conſumer, per Mr. Fiſher's Orders		10 8 —			
	Rammandart, per Draft		2,160 — —			
	Ramdie Tackoor, per Order		216 — —			
	Capt. Garden		324 — —			
	Manuel D'Cruz, your Account Linen		515 — 3			
	Barramſue, 2 Bills, per Order Mr. Fiſher		57 3 9			
					6,696 — —	
					11,565 2 6	
17	W^m Hoſea, paid him Balance per Receipt				5,820 — —	
						17,385 2 6 [7]

11	SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE, From Account Current, dated 24 July 1770.				
19	Charges general,				
	1770.				
	January 31. Mr. Porter, Account Balance			335 6 3	
	Sundry Charges omitted in December			101 14 6	
	10 Cheſts and 3 Boxes for Neceſſaries			64 — —	
	2 French Horn Men, per Order			108 — —	
	2 China Bills in December laſt			89 10 3	
	2 Cheſts Wine per Duke of Grafton			584 13 —	
	Your Proportion of European Wages			21 9 6	
	Petty Diſburſements this Month			61 14 —	
				1,367 3 6	
18	Subſcription, Mrs. Majendie, paid the Amount for the Widow			5,400 — —	
18	Card Debts, paid Mr. Coleham his Bill			1,015 3 3	7,782 6 9
	Ditto				
19 11	CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE, From Account Current, dated 24 July 1770.				
	28 Feb. To Caſh paid Daniel Hoizard			1,231 3 1	
	Company's Writer, per 2 Bonds			2 5 —	
	Paid Thomas Roxburgh per 9 Pair Shoes			48 9 6	
	Thomas Andrews, 2 Dozen Lime Juice			51 13 6	
	Thomas Ewers, per Mr. Fiſher's Orders			216 — —	
	Doctor Hunter, per Receipt			540 — —	
	William Hoſea, per a Ring			540 — —	
	Colonel Goddard, per a Ring			540 — —	
	Your Proportion of European Wages			21 9 6	
	Petty Diſburſements this Month			43 13 3	
	31 March. To Caſh paid Diaram, a Gift per Order Mr. Feake			432 — —	
	Your Subſcription per Mr. Stone and Family			324 — —	
	Thomas Pizzy, as per Order			216 — —	
	Meſſrs. Hearn and Taylor's Bill			35 10 3	
	Proportion European Wages			21 9 6	
	30 April. Petty Diſburſements			4 10 3	
	Mr. Lealy 3 Bills againſt Buxy			103 15 —	
	Petty Diſburſements			662 2 3	5,041 5 1
	Ditto				
[8] 11	JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.				
	Card Debts, Caſh received of Major Watſon			276 7 6	
18	Caſh received of Mr. Floyer			272 2 6	
9	Henry Wedderburn, received in Part of his Bond			2,618 12 10	
10	Thomas M°Bride and Mureau, in part his Bond			7,332 14 9	
10	Lewis Da Coſta, received in part his Bond			4,000 — —	
4	Salt Petre, neat Proceed now rendered			65,239 2 6	
8	John Tool, in Part his Reſpondentia Bond			6,716 4 5	
4	Charles Ingram and C°, ditto ditto			3,092 — —	
20	David Killican, Balance of his Account Current this Date			9,781 3 9	
15	Dead Stock, received in Part Sales his Effects			9,701 15 —	
					1,09,030 15 3

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

"	SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.				
11					
19	Charges General, paid Dr. John Taylor		1,221 9 9		
	paid Dr. Logun		1,135 12 —		
				2,357 5 9	
17	Edward Golding, paid him			979 1 6	
					3,336 7 3
	Ditto				
21	JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.				
"					
10	Thomas M'Bride, Balance his Reſpondentia			3,172 15 6	
16	Honourable Company's Salary, your Salary			39 3 —	
3	Ewan Law, received Amount Dutch Bills			12,466 1 3	
					15,678 3 9
	Ditto				
—	SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.				
—	Dr. John Taylor, paid into the Company's Caſh			15,000 — —	
	D°, Balance due to him			7,738 12 —	
				22,738 12 —	
	Charges General, Commiſſion on 202 Bales Cloth ſold Company		5,677 13 —		
	Commiſſion on Effects ſold		546 6 9		
				6,224 3 9	
	Mr. Purling, per Bandanah		62 10 3		
	Dr. Taylor, per Sundries		414 10 6		
	Paid Company's Writer		2 5 —		
				479 9 9	
—	Manuel D'Cruz, for his Child Autchinutty			2,160 — —	
—	Honourable Company Treaſury, paid into their Caſh			12,000 — —	
					43,602 9 6
	Ditto				
1 —	DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, From Account Current, dated 14 April 1770.				
—	Modun Dutt, received in Three Payments			5,000 — —	
	John Knott, received in for Payments			20,978 3 6	
	Intereſt, for Intereſt on the above Sums			154 4 3	
					26,132 7 9
	Ditto				
	SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN, from Account Current, dated 14 April 1770.				
	Robert Hunter, lent him on Bond			15,000 — —	
	Charges general, paid Mr. May per a Bond and Intereſt			811 4 —	
	Ditto, a Ring to Mr. Killican			540 — —	
					16,351 4 —
	Ditto				
	SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE, as per Account, dated 30 November 1770.				
	Jeffrey Wilkins, paid him Balance Account cloſed 31 Auguſt			1,636 9 6	
	Honourable Company Treaſury, paid into the Treaſury			37,399 — 6	
	Intereſt, for Intereſt this Account Current			421 3 6	
	Charges general, paid Nixon's Bill per Cooper's Work		154 14 6		
	Mr. May per Marriott's Declaration		101 8 —		
	Pool's Bill burying a Child		72 5 9		
				328 12 3	
					39,785 9 9

[9]

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Esquire—*continued.*

JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS,
as per Account, dated 30 November 1770.

Ewan Law, received Amount of a Bill on Baranaſſy Ghoſs	268 15 6	
Dr. Routledge, received in Two Payments	37,390 — 6	
Intereſt, for Intereſt on this Account	1,240 13 6	
		38,899 13 6

Ditto

CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE,
as per Account, dated 20 February 1771.

Mr. Lepape per making Shirts	55 1 3	
George and Thomas Brown per Claret	585 12 —	
Mr. Darrell per Fees	13 5 —	
Sundry Cloths to Dr. Taylor	167 6 6	
Making Clothes for your Child	17 8 9	
Commiſſion on Piece Goods, Salt Petre, &c.	640 14 6	
Dr. Taylor's Bill	513 15 9	
		1,993 15 9

Ditto

[10] JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS,
as per Account, dated 20 February 1771.

Dead Stock, received in further Part Sales Outcry	616 9 6	
Cloths, received per Sales delivered	2,314 2 6	
Charles Ingram, in further Part, his Bond	631 15 —	
John Tool, in further Part, his Bond	954 14 6	
		4,517 9 6

Ditto

Capt. Joſeph PRICE, his Account Bond, Dr. to his ACCOUNT.

To the Amount of his Bond of Date 20 February, being the Balance Account Current cloſed this Day	25,118 12 7

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN,
as per his Account Current, dated 22d February 1771.

Honourable Company Bonds, 1 Bond, dated 31 Dec. 1770	6,607 8 —	
1 Ditto 9 D°	5,400 — —	
1 Ditto — 31 D°	23,438 1 —	
5 Ditto, 2,000 ea. 1 Jan. 1771	10,000 — —	
1 Ditto — 13 D°	5,000 — —	
1 Ditto — 17 D°	1,763 12 6	
1 Ditto — 12 D°	3,000 — —	
1 Ditto — 12 D°	1,707 3 6	
1 Ditto — 9 Dec. 1770	5,000 — —	
1 Ditto — 9 D°	1,009 3 3	
1 Ditto — 9 D°	3,000 — —	
1 Ditto — 26 D°	6,978 2 —	
		72,903 14 3
Intereſt on the above Bonds; viz.		
On Bond 23,438 1 — to 10 February	203 2 —	
10,000 — — / 5,000 — — / 1,762 12 6 } to 10 February 1771	119 3 3	
3,000 — — / 1,707 3 6 } to 10 February 1771	28 4 —	
5,000 — — to 9 February 1771	477 12 6	
1,009 3 3 / 3,000 — — } to 21 February 1771	382 3 3	
6,978 2 — to 21 D°	638 14 3	
		1,849 7 3
Alex' Hannah, lent him on Bond		10,000 — —
Law and Wilkins, paid Balance their Account		12,867 8 —
Honourable Company Treaſury, January 20, paid into Caſh	6,636 13 9	
21, D°	25,111 1 9	
February 13, D°	21,983 15 —	
21, D°	8,026 10 2	
		61,758 9 3
Charges General, for Fees		15 10 —
		1,59,395 — 9

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DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, from Account Current, dated 22d February 1771.

Major Alex^{r} Hannah, received in full of him, per his Bond				10,900 — —
Walter Wilkins, received in Part of his Bond		4,997 6 —		
received D° D°		8,042 4 9		
received D° D°		32,400 — —		
				45,439 10 9
Giles Holloway, received Balance of his Account				5,707 8 —
Law and Wilkins, in Part of their Bond				12,867 8 —
Honourable Company Bonds, received per one Bond, 31 December 1770				6,607 8 —
Intereſt, for Intereſt on this Bond to 20 January				29 5 9
Honourable Company Bonds, one dated 31 December 1770				25,000 — —
Intereſt, for Intereſt on this Bond to 20 January				111 1 9
Honourable Company Bonds, one dated 9 December 1770				5,000 — —
Intereſt, for Intereſt on this Bond to 20 January				400 — —
Honourable Company's Bonds, one dated May 1770				4,052 7 9
Intereſt, for Intereſt on this Bond to 20 February 1771				289 15 3
John Cartier, the Amount of his Bond and Intereſt				44,187 6 —
Mr. Stevenſon, Ditto D°				12,201 — —
Profit and Loſs, Diſcount on Bond				1,411 5 3
				1,74,204 12 6

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN, from Account Current, dated 30 March.

Honourable Company Bonds, 1 Bond Principal		4,709 7 3	
1 Ditto, 26 February 1771		9,140 — 6	
1 Ditto		5,553 2 —	
2 Ditto, 21 February		10,244 10 9	
1 Ditto, 29 November		3,000 — —	
1 Ditto, 15 December		11,151 11 —	
			43,798 15 6
Intereſt,			
4,709 7 3		556 — —	
9,140 — 6 / 5,553 2 —		65 5 —	
10,244 10 9		45 8 3	
3,000 — —		74 10 9	
11,151 11 —		260 3 —	
			1,001 6 —
Charges General, paid Manuel D'Cruz, per Bill of Exchange from St. Helena		625 5 6	
Paid Col. Chapman		500 — —	
			1,125 5 6
			45,925 11 —

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DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, from Account Current, dated 30 March,

Manuel D'Cruz, received in Part		625 5 6	
Robert Dobinſon, received for Tin ſold Mr. Ruſſell		18,273 7 6	
Ewan Law, Intereſt on Bond	13,307 3 6		
Intereſt	1,759 14 —		
		15,067 1 6	
Law and Wilkins, in Part joint Bond		10,000 — —	
Profit and Loſs, for Diſcount on the Bond		1,408 11 9	
			45,374 10 3

Ditto

DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, as per Account Current, dated 31 Auguſt 1771.

Robert Dobinſon, Balance of his Tin Account received			625 15 6
Robert Hunter, received in Part his Bond		7,000 — —	
Ditto D°		3,000 — —	
			10,000 — —
Honourable Company Bonds, one dated 1ſt September 1769		4,709 7 3	
Intereſt, for Intereſt on the above Bond		607 — 9	
Walter Wilkins, 2 Bonds, 1,22,078 - 3, Balance now received		42,604 11 6	
Manuel D'Cruz, in Part of his Bond to you,		14,847 13 6	
Robert Dobinſon, received in further Part Balance		3,572 9 9	
			66,341 10 9

DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS,
as from Account Current, dated 31 August 1771, *continued.*

Interest, One Year's Interest, 1 Bond, 15 Dec. 1769, 46,342 5 6	4,507 6 3		
1 Ditto, 1 Sept. 1769, 7,849 1 3	627 14 9		
		5,135 5 —	
Owners Ship Rumbold, received of Mr. Wilkins his Proportion of the Debt due me by the Owners, with Interest		22,709 — 6	
Account in Co. Walter Wilkins, received of Mr. Wilkins the Balance of an Account between us	5,667 11 9		
Walter Wilkins, private Account received	2,270 14 6		
Voyage in the Ship Rumbold, received of Mr. Wilkins, being Proportion of Money received on Account his Voyage homeward bound	4,420 15 11		
		12,359 10 2	
Law and Wilkins, received of Mr. Law, Share of his joint Bond	14,046 3 6		
received of Mr. Law, Share of Two joint Bonds	3,000 — —		
received in full of D° - - D° -	2,432 2 9		
		19,478 6 3	
received of Jeffrey Wilkins, half joint Bond	18,923 9 1½		
Ditto - - - - D° -	6076 6 10½		
		25,000 — —	
Capt. Shaw, received in Two Payments - - - -		8,402 15 —	
Alex[r] Floyer and Inglis, received in full - - - -		1,42,020 3 —	
Francis Hare, a Dividend ¼ - - - - - -		3,370 1 4	
Profit and Loss, Discount on Bond - - - - -	787 — 9		
Ditto - - - - - - -	179 10 6		
		966 11 3	

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN,
as from Account Current, dated 31 August 1771.

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Honourable Company Bonds, 1 Bond, dated 18 April 1771,	2264 6 —		
1 D° - - - - -	17,658 3 3		
1 D° - - - - -	9,266 14 3		
1 D° - - - - -	4,814 9 6		
1 D° - - - - -	5,359 12 9		
		39,363 13 9	
1 D° - 29 April 1771	10,000 — —		
1 D° - 29 D° - -	10,000 — —		
		20,000 — —	
1 D° — 30 D° - - -		10,000 — —	
1 D° — 12 January 1771		10,000 — —	
1 D° - 20 June 1771		20,000 — —	
1 D° - 25 D° - -		37,000 — —	
1 D° - 12 July 1771 -		12,000 — —	
1 D° - 20 July 1771 -	15,000 — —		
1 D° - 20 D° - -	10,000 — —		
		25,000 — —	
8 D° 1,000 each, 22 D° -	80,000 — —		
1 D° - 22 D° -	14,000 — —		
		94,000 — —	
1 D° - 5 December 1770	1,854 12 6		
1 D° - 28 February 1771	1,222 — —		
1 D° - 23 D° - -	1,567 8 —		
1 D° - 28 D° - -	2,937 9 —		
1 D° - 22 November 1770	1,000 — —		
1 D° - 26 December 1770	3,991 1 6		
1 D° - 12 January 1770	2,684 — —		
		15,256 15 —	
1 D° - 24 July 1771	15,000 — —		
1 D° - 24 D° -	10,000 — —		
		25,000 — —	
1 D° - 25 D° - -		8,000 — —	
		3,15,620 12 9	

Interest - - - - on 10,000 — —	266 10 9		
1,854 12 6	90 4 —		
1,567 8 —	49 1 9		
1,222 — —	36 14 9		
2,937 9 —	88 12 6		
1,000 — —	51 9 —		
3,991 1 6	184 7 6		
2,684 — —	323 4 9		
		1,091 1 —	

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLIGAN,
as from Account Current, dated 31 Auguſt 1771, *continued.*

Charges general, Caſh for cancelled Bonds	2	5	3
Caſh for Fees on Bonds	5	12	9
Cooley Hire, bringing	8	10	3
		16	12 3
Cloths in Calcutta, Company's Duty on Goods		5,508	11 —
Charges general, paid Mr. Ewan Law		104	6 —
		3,22,341	11 —

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN, [14]
from Account Current, dated 31 October 1771.

Charges general, paid for Fees on Company's Bonds	17	6	6
paid Mr. Dobinſon per Wine	1,440	12	6
		1,458	3 —
Charles Eeake, paid him in one Company's Bond		12,274	8 —

Ditto

DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS,
from Account Current, dated 31 October 1771.

Fran' Hare, received One Four Annoes Dividend	3,370	1	3
Honourable Company's Bonds, One 12 July 1771, Principal	12,000	—	—
Intereſt, to October 26, 1771	274	8	—
		15,644	9 —3

Ditto

EDW. GOLDING and OPHIUM ACCOUNTS, Dr. to EDW. GOLDING

To Amount of his Bond, 26 November 1769, transferred to this Account 9,874 14 6

Ditto

EWAN LAW, Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNTS.

	Y. M. D.	
Intereſt on his Bond 13,307 3 6,	1 5 9	1,759 14 —

Ditto

JOHN CARTIER, Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNTS.

	Y. M. D.	
To Intereſt on his Bond 37,670 6 3,	1 11 2	6,516 15 9

Ditto

JOHN ROUTLEDGE, Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

Intereſt on his Bond, 34,346 — 9, to 20 October 1770 3,043 15 9

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to EWAN LAW.

Ewan Law, Ophium Account transferred to this Head	10,854	— —
Jeffrey Wilkins, D° transferred to this Head	10,854	— —
	21,708	— —

Ditto

EWAN LAW, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Rajah Settabroy, he having received of him in Two Payments	34,174	2 —
Profit and Loſs, Batty gained on the Dutch Bill	268	14 9
	34,443	— 9

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Esquire—*continued.*

EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS, Two Bonds Account, Dr. to their private Account Current.

To the Amount of the Balance of their Account, which was not settled when Mr. Rumbold left India, and is now added to this Bond, dated 20 December 1769 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 517 15 1

Ditto

[15] EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS, one Bond Account, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

	C. R^{s}	Y. M. D.		
Interest on their joint Bond,	80,255 13 6	— 1 4 8—$\frac{5}{6}$	—	5,439 9 —
Profit and Loss, Discounts on Two Company's Bonds, which they made over to Mr. Rumbold - - - - -				1,078 7 —
				6,518 — —

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS Dr. to EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS, One Bond Account.

Ophium, Account for the Amount of a Balance of an Account, dated 8 Feb. 1771, and carried to this Account of that Date -		45,154 7 6	
Honourable Company Bonds, One Bond, Principal	33,704 10 3		
One D° D° -	20,217 8 9		
		53,922 3 —	
Interest, for Interest on the above Bonds - - - -		564 11 —	
			99,641 5 6

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

E. Floyer, R. Alexander, and H. Inglis, Interest on Bond -	25,664 — —	
Edward Stevenson, Interest on his Bond - - - -	1,401 — —	
Giles Holloway, D° D° - - - - -	732 8 —	
		27,797 8 —

Ditto

WALTER WILKINS Bond Account Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

	C. R^{s}. A. P.	Y. M. D.		
Interest on 1 Bond	82,165 11 10	— 1 4 16	- -	11,320 9 8
1 Ditto	25,240 5 1	— 1 3 28	- -	3,351 5 8
				14,671 15 4

Ditto

INTEREST ACCOUNT Dr. to WALTER WILKINS, Bond Account.

Interest on 5 Sums received from him, viz.

25,000 — —	- - - - -	750 — —
7,016 — —	- - - - -	282 9 6
4,997 6 —	- - - - -	161 — 3
32,400 — —	- - - - -	585 — —
8,042 4 9	- - - - -	239 — 6
		2,017 10 —

Ditto

JOHN KNOTT Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

To Interest on his Bond - - - - - - - - - - - - 466 5 6

Ditto

CAPTAIN HARRY JAMES SHAW Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

To Interest on his Bond - - - - - - - - - - - 144 11 8

Ditto

ROBERT DOBINSON Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.

To Amount Premium on his Respondentia Bond, to 22d February 1771 - - 10,125 — —

ROBERT DOBINSON, Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

To Intereſt, being Intereſt on the Balance of his Account, March 14 1770 to 30 April 1771, 1 3 15 - - - - - - - - - - - 2,092 12 —

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to ROBERT DOBINSON. [*15]

Hare's Aſſignments, being a Mortgage Bond on his Houſe, dated 14 March 1770, in favour of Mr. Rumbold - - - - -	30,000 — —	
Intereſt Account, for Intereſt on the Sale of Tin - - -	245 11 3	
		30,245 11 3

Ditto

THO^{s} M^{c}BRIDE and PETER MOREAU, Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

To Intereſt on the Balance of their Reſpondentia Bond - - - - - 296 14 3

Ditto

EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS Private Account, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Dullab Daſs, Gomaſtah at Gazypore, made over to them -	157 2 6	
Adventure to Rotaſgur, the Amount this Account made over to them - - - - - - - - - -	8,376 15 —	
Advances for Chunam, the Amount made over to them - -	3,953 9 3	
		12,487 10 9

Ditto

EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS Private Account, Dr. to CHA^{s} FEAKE.

They having received of Mr. Craig, on his Account - - - - - - 1,111 13 6

Ditto

SALTPETRE, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.

To Profit gained on this Head - - - - - - - - - - 19,297 — 6

Ditto

INTEREST ACCOUNT, Dr. to JEFFREY WILKINS Private Account.

To Intereſt on his Private Account - - - - - - - - - 84 15 1

Ditto

HONOURABLE COMPANY's BONDS, Dr. to CLOTHS, &c. remaining.

To Amount of 5 Bonds for the Amount Sale of 18,082 Pieces of Cloth ſold to the Honourable Company, as per Account Sales ſent Mr. Rumbold - 1,24,685 15 9

Ditto

JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to CLOTHS, &c. remaining.

To Amount Sale Saltpetre ſold the Owners of the Ship Catherine - - - 3,780 — —

Ditto

CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.

Caſh paid his Coachman - - - - - -	15 1 9	
Sundry Mats ſent on Board the Worceſter - - -	108 — —	
Coachman per March and April - - - - -	2 11 3	
Sundry Charges on Merchandize - - - - -	445 1 6	
		589 14 6

Ditto

JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to INTEREST ACCOUNT.

To Intereſt on 4 Company's Bonds - - - - - - - - - 5,467 7 9

[**15] CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.

To the Allowance his Coachman	86 6 —	
Paid the Treaſury for endorſing Company Bonds	4 10 3	
Paid your Draft to Geo. Lethews	100 — —	
Paid Proportion Morris's Bill for Decrees	20 6 6	
		211 6 9

Ditto

JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to CLOTHS, &c. remaining.

To Amount 12 Pces Chints ſold Mr. Harris	42 2 —	
To Amount 28 Pces Cloths and Wrappers	98 8 9	
		140 10 9

Ditto

CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to WALTER WILKINS, Account in Co.

To the Amount of ſundry Fillegree Work, bought by Thomas Kelſal, on Mr. Rumbold's Account, as per Mr. Wilkins Account	987 — 11

Ditto

WALTER WILKINS, Account in Co. Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Charges General, to Caſh received nurſing his ſettel Gomaſtah		141 9 9
Houſes in Calcutta, received of Major Polier, his Half of Houſe Rent, C. R^{s} 1,533 9 8	766 12 10	
3 Glaſs Lanthorns received from our Houſe by the Company	160 8 —	
		927 4 10

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to OWNERS Ship RUMBOLD, as from Mr. Wilkins Account.

Harry Vereliſt, the Amount of his Share, as per Account 31 December 1769	43,812 13 —	
Gocul Goſaul and Moden Dutt, for Account Half their Shares in the Rumbold, they being to account with him	32,859 9 9	
		76,672 6 9

Ditto

OWNERS Ship RUMBOLD, Dr. to GOCUL GOSAUL and MODEN DUTT.

To Amount of Half the Ophium, he having become anſwerable to Meſſrs. Law and Wilkins	41,426 1 7

Ditto

OWNERS Ship RUMBOLD, Dr. to INTEREST.

To Intereſt on the Balance of Walter Wilkins Account, being C. R^{s} 1,989 1 2 and Intereſt	2,817 14 6

Ditto

WALTER WILKINS, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Calcutta Houſes, having ſold the ſmall Dwelling Houſe to Mr. Parkinſon, for A. R^{s} 5,000, Mr. Rumbold's Half is	C. R^{s} 2,700 — —	
Dead Stock, per Amount of the Bill of ſundry Plate, bought by Mr. Wilkins of Mr. Rumbold	4,964 7 11	
		7,664 7 11

Ditto

PROFIT and LOSS Dr. to WALTER WILKINS, Account in Co.

To the Difference of Mr. Rumbold's Eſtimation of the Balance of Account in Co. Mr. Wilkins having ſince ſettled this Account	115 10 2

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN,
Account Current, 31 January 1772.

Stock, for the Amount of Caſh paid for a Bill of Exchange, drawn by you from London, for £. 500, at ⅔ C. R^{s} in Favour of C. Sympſon				4,615	6	—
Charles Feake, 9 Nov. paid in further Part		7,725	8 —			
21 Ditto paid in full		8,826	6 3			
				16,551	14	3
Honourable Company Bonds, 1 dated 15 June 1771		10,000	— —			
1 D° 14 Dec. 1771		3,766	14 —			
1 D° 14 D°		5,000	— —			
1 D° 14 D°		5,000	— —			
5 D° 21 D° 2000 ea.		10,000	— —			
1 D° 21 July 1771		5,270	6 —			
				39,037	4	—
Intereſt on the above Bonds,						
10,000 — —		402	3 6			
5,270 6 —		138	3 —			
Intereſt on a Bond of 5,447		44	7 —			
				584	13	6
Charges General, Sub-treaſury for Fees		1	2 6			
12 Dec. Mr. Caulfield	116 — —					
28 Jan. D°	884 — —					
	1,000 — —					
				1,001	2	6
						61,790 8 3

Ditto

DAVID KILLICAN Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS,
Account Current, 31 January 1772.

Gocul Goſaul and Moden Dutt, received of Mr. Wilkins on Account a Dividend of the Sales of Part the Rumbold's Cargo				3,390	11	11
Voyage in the Ship Rumbold, received of Mr. Wilkins, being the Amount of a Miſtake, his Share being 4,520 15 10 when he only remitted before 4,420 15 10				100	—	—
Card Debts, received of Mr. Wilkins, Amount his Card Debt				4,218	7	8
Honourable Company Bonds, 1 dated 19 Jan. 1771		5,400	— —			
1 - 28 Feb. 1771		2,937	9 —			
1 - 22 Nov. 1770		1,000	— —			
1 - 23 Feb. 1771		1,567	8 —			
1 - 28 D° 1771		1,222	— —			
1 - 5 Dec. 1770		1,854	12 6			
				14,026	4	6
				21,735	8	1
Intereſt on 5,444 7 —		44	7 —			
Ditto — —		339	13 6			
2,937 9 —		186	11 —			
1,000 — —		85	5 3			
1,567 8 —		101	6 6			
1,222 — —		77	6 9			
1,854 12 6		152	14 6			
				988	—	6
Law and Wilkins, received of Jeffrey Wilkins the Balance of his Share, Joint Bonds				4,994	14	1
Edward Golding, received in Part of his Bond				23,427	5	9
						51,145 12 5

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Ditto

EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS, Dr. to INTEREST.

Intereſt on their Two Joint Bonds, as per Account tranſmitted to Mr. Rumbold	10,153 11 8

Ditto

INTEREST, Dr. to EWAN LAW and JEFFREY WILKINS.

Intereſt on Sums received of their Joint Bonds, as per Account tranſmitted Mr. Rumbold	1,689 5 11

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

STOCK, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Charles Ingram, P. M'Tagart, and M'Tagart. The Account being ſent Mr. Rumbold to recover the Inſurance in England, we now write it off	18,900 — —	
Randolph Marriott, the Account being ſent Mr. Rumbold to recover the Inſurance in England, we now write it off,	32,400 — —	
		51,300 — —

Ditto

CHARLES INGRAM, Dr. to INTEREST.

To Intereſt from 12 July 1769, on 4,514 6 3. from 14 February 1772	1,181 10 10	
And Intereſt on his Bond for 9 Months, from 12 January to 12 July	194 6 3	
		1,376 1 1

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to CHARLES INGRAM.

Intereſt, for Intereſt on ſeveral Sums received	671 2 6	
Profit and Loſs, for the Balance due, Mr. Price having no more Goods remaining	532 3 1	
		1,203 5 7

Ditto

JOHN TOOL, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Profit and Loſs, for Premium on his Bond	1,620 — —	
Intereſt to 14 February 1772	1,937 6 9	
		3,557 6 9

Ditto

[*17] SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to JOHN TOOL.

Intereſt, on ſeveral Sums received	1,539 3 8	
Profit and Loſs, for the Balance due, Mr. Price having no more Goods remaining	58 10 3	
		1,597 7 4

Ditto

JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

John Tool, received the Balance their Account Goods in my Cuſtody, his Half	768 12 6	
Charles Ingram, Ditto, D°	768 12 6	
Henry Wedderburn, received in full his Balance	1,554 15 5	
Lewis D'Coſta, received in full D° - D°	1,985 — 6	
		5,077 8 11

Ditto

HENRY WEDDERBURN, Dr. to INTEREST.

To Intereſt on his Bond 18,900	3,990 — —

Ditto

INTEREST, Dr. to HENRY WEDDERBURN.

To Intereſt on Sums received	3,666 3 9

Ditto

LEWIS D'COSTA, Dr. to INTEREST.

To Intereſt on his Bond 18,900	4,147 8 —

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL, of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

INTEREST, Dr. to LEWIS D'COSTA.		
To Intereſt on Sums received - - - - - - - - - -		3,703 7 6
Ditto		
HONOURABLE COMPANY's BONDS, Dr. to DAVID KILLICAN, as per Account Current, dated 28 February 1772.		
February 12, One Bond of this Date - - -	13,000 — —	
28, Ditto - - D° - - -	5,000 — —	
		18,000 — —
Ditto		
DAVID KILLICAN, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.		
Robert Hunter, February 4, received in further Part - -	6,000 — —	
Voyage in the Ship Rumbold.		
Received in Part of her Cargo - - - - -	13,452 2 —	
		19,452 2 —
Ditto		
PROFIT and LOSS, Dr. to ESOP GABLE.		
To the Amount of his Debt, we now write it off being irrecoverable, and Mr. Rumbold, in his Inſtructions thinks the ſame - - - -		17,526 8 7
Ditto		
PROFIT and LOSS, Dr. to CALCUTTA HOUSES.		
To the Amount of my Share of the Loſs, Mr. Wilkins having ſold the Houſes - - - - - - - - - - - -		1,872 11 2
Ditto		
PROFIT and LOSS Dr. to STATIONARY.		[**17]
To the Amount of the Cheſt Stationary, it being entirely ſpoilt by the white Ants, as Mr. Price informed Mr. Rumbold - - - - - - - -		1,259 4 6
Ditto		
CASH, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.		
To the Amount of Caſh received from his Banyan, then Mr. Rumbold charges in his Stock Head - - - - - - - - - - -		674 6 8
Ditto		
DEAD STOCK, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.		
To the Amount of Caſh received more for the Sales than valued at in this Stock -		5,283 — 5
Ditto		
INTEREST, Dr. to JOHN TAYLOR.		
To Intereſt on his Account, ſettled by Mr. Price - - - - - -		744 14 5
Ditto		
WM. HOSEA, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.		
To Difference in the Sum paid Mr. Hoſea, and the Value eſtimated in the Stock		34 — —
Ditto		
PROFIT and LOSS, Dr. to CARD DEBTS.		
To Balance this Account - - - - - - - -		4,670 — 10

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

STOCK, Dr. to OPHIUM ACCOUNT.

To the Amount of this Head, Mr. Rumbold having never mentioned it in his Inſtructions, and Ewan Law and Jeffrey Wilkins charges Mr. Rumbold with this Debt, we now write it off to Stock - - - - - - - 45,154 7 6

Ditto

OWNERS, SHIP ALEXANDER Dr. to CLOTHS.

To the Amount of 47 Bales Cloth ſold them, 31 January 1771 - - - 16,653 14 6

Ditto

JOSEPH PRICE, Dr. to CLOTHS.

To the Amount Sales ſundry Cloths to the Honourable Company, as per Account Sales ſent Mr. Rumbold - - - - - - - - - - - 40,399 15 9

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.

Honourable Company Bonds received of the Company for Sale of Cloths, viz.

November 1771, 1 Bond this Date,	Principal	10,000 — —		
1 D° - -	D°	10,000 — —		
1 D° - -	D°	13,928 4 6		
			33,928 4 6	
January 1772, 1 D° - -	D° - - - -		6,471 11 3	
				40,399 15 9

Cloths for the Charges Merchandize on the above.

Sales to the Honourable Company, 30 November 1771	1,884 3 —	
11 January 1772 -	294 14 —	
		2,179 1 —
		2,579 — 9

Ditto

[18] PROFIT and LOSS, Dr. to RAJAH SETTABROY.

For the Difference ſuppoſed to be in Intereſt - - - - - - 625 14 —

Ditto

CLOTHS in CALCUTTA, Dr. to SALTPETRE.

For the Amount this Head now re-tranſferred - - - - - - 3,780 — —

Ditto

SALTPETRE, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.

For this Amount being neat Profit as the Account is cloſed - - - - 3,780 — —

Ditto

CLOTHS in CALCUTTA, Dr. to CHARGES GENERAL.

For my Commiſſion, &c. on Cloths ſold - - - - - - - 6,224 3 9

Ditto

CLOTH in CALCUTTA, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.

Gain upon this Head - - - - - - - - - - - - 31,388 15 9

Ditto

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to WALTER WILKINS.

Honourable Company Bonds, One Bond, Principal - - -	25,000 — —	
Honourable Company Treaſury, paid in by Mr. John Miller, N° 22, 1770, for a Set of Bills - - - - -	7,016 — —	
		32,016 — —

HONOURABLE COMPANY TREASURY, Dr. to INTEREST.

50,000 — —	3,714	1	9
12,000 — —	405	5	3
37,399 — 6	216	11	3
			4,333 2 3

Ditto

STOCK, Dr. to HONOURABLE COMPANY's TREASURY.

Bills remitted Home.

22 November 1770, 1 Set Original per Houghton, Duplicate per Kingſton				1,03,748	2	9
January 20 1771	1 D°	D°	D°	7,000	—	—
D°	1 D°	per Worceſter,	D°			
per Vereſt				31,747	15	6
D°	1 D°	D°	D°	21,983	15	—
D°	1 D°	D°	D°	8,026	10	9
						1,72,506 12 —

Ditto

CHARLES FEAKE, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.

Re-transferring the Sum Meſſr' Law and Wilkins received of Mr. Craig on that Gentleman's Account — 1,111 13 6

Ditto

INTEREST, Dr. to CHARLES FEAKE.

	Y.	M.	
Intereſt to the 20th November,	1	11	5,574 10 1

Ditto

CHARLES FEAKE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Stock, ſo much Mr. Rumbold paid him in England 598 6 a $\frac{2}{7}$	5,322	10 9
Intereſt on Sums paid him	512	— 6
		5,834 11 3

Ditto

OWNERS SHIP ALEXANDER, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS. [19]

Being a ſhort Charge, and as the Cloth Account was cloſed, this Sum is carried to Profit and Loſs — 146 4 —

Ditto

OWNERS SHIP ALEXANDER, Dr. to INTEREST.

Intereſt on 16,800 2 6. to 9 March, the Day they granted a Bond; Principal 19,030 13 6. — 2,230 11 —

Ditto

HONOURABLE COMPANY BONDS, Dr. to HONOURABLE COMPANY REVENUE.

Amount of One Bond received on that Account — 4,052 7 9

Ditto

CAPTAIN HARRY JAMES SHAW, Dr. to INTEREST.

Intereſt on the Half of Mr. Rumbold's Bond. N. B. No Notice is taken of Mr. Wilkins Half — 1,789 8 —

Ditto

CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.

Being the Amount of the Account of Godown Rent on his Goods, as per Account ſent Mr. R. — 2,575 7 —

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

CLOTHS, Dr. to STATIONARY.

For ſo much Stationary being ſold to Mr. Hurſt, which was carried to Cloth Account, is now transferred - - - - - - - - - - 636 1 9

Ditto

STATIONARY, Dr. to CLOTHS.

Having given Mr. Rumbold Credit for this Amount, in Account Sales 7 January 1771, this Entry is only to ſhew the whole of the Stationary was not loſt - 639 1 9

Ditto

CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.

Being the Amount of a Writer's Wages, and Office Charges - 3,900 — —
312 — —
4,212 — —

Ditto

PROFIT and LOSS, Dr. to CHARGES GENERAL.

To Balance this Account by Profit and Loſs - - - - - - - 36,713 — 10

Ditto

INTEREST ACCOUNT, Dr. to PROFIT and LOSS.

To Balance this Account, being a neat Gain on this Head - - - - 85,721 15 1

Ditto

CHARGES GENERAL, Dr. to JOSEPH PRICE.

Coachman's Wages January and February - - - - - - - 21 9 9

Ditto

[20] BALANCE, Dr. to SUNDRY ACCOUNTS.

Edward Golding - - - - -	Balance Bond Account - -	26,572	10 3
Manuel D'Cruz - - - - -	D° - - D° - - -	4,676	13 —
Captain Joſeph Price - - - -	2 Bonds - - - - -	1,45,118	12 7
John Robinſon and Robert Craufurd -	Bond - - - - -	25,360	— —
Gocul Goſaul and Moden Dutt - -	Balance - - - - -	3,922	12 4
Dr. Robert Hunter - - - -	D° - - - - - -	21,566	13 10
Francis Hare - - - - - -	D° - - - - - -	4,359	13 5
Alexander Hannay - - - - -	Bond - - - - - -	1,0000	— —
Honourable Company's Bonds - -	70 valued - - - - -	6,73,919	5 8
George Waple and George Davidſon	Bond - - - - - -	1,620	— —
Cloths remaining in Calcutta on Hand	- - - - - - -	2,174	8 —
Voyage in the ſhip Rumbold - -	Balance - - - - -	19,839	11 1
Law and Wilkins - - - - -	Voyage in the Rumbold - -	6,000	— —
Walter Wilkins - - - - -	Private Account - - -	5,393	9 5
Mortgage Bond - - - - -	Dobinſon Houſe - - -	30,000	— —
Harry Verelſt - - - - -	Proportion Rumbold - - -	43,812	3 —
David Killican - - - - -	Balance Private Account - -	1,046	3 2
Owners of the Ship Alexander - -	Cloth and Intereſt - - -	19,030	13 6
Captain Harry James Shaw - -	Intereſt Account - - -	1,789	1 —
Joſeph Price - - - - - -	Balance Account - - -	4,676	4 5
	C. R'	10,50,879	6 8

SUNDRY ACCOUNTS, Dr. to BALANCE.

William Fiſher - - - - -	Balance Account - - - -	26,000	— —
Salt and Beetlenutt, in C°. with Middleton and Ellis - - - - -		30,518	1 9
Droz Child, Preſent to her - - - - - - - - - -		2,160	— —
	C. R'	58,678	1 9

APPENDIX No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

PROFIT and LOSS, Dr. to STOCK.	
To Balance this Account, being neat Gain ſince Mr. Rumbold left India - -	1,00,942 1 —
STOCK, Dr. to BALANCE.	
To the Amount of Mr. Rumbold's neat Eſtate in India, as appears by theſe, excluſive of Intereſt, on many Accounts not adjuſted - - - - - -	9,92,201 4 11

Calcutta, 29 February 1772.

(Errors excepted.)

Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s Obſervations added to the Account of Remittances, as Part Inſtructions for his Anſwer delivered to his Solicitor, which refers to his Accounts with his Attornies, Meſſrs. *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou*, in China, M. *Droz*, and his Attornies in England; whoſe ſeveral Accounts are alſo delivered, to be referred to.

To Meſſrs. Stables, Macreath, and Raikes, through different Channels - - - -	150,837 19 4
To Meſſrs. Goſlings, D° - - - - - - - - - - - - -	16,250 — —
	167,087 19 4
From the above Sum muſt be deducted ſeveral Sums included in the above Account, which were remitted on Account of other People, and at the time of this Defendant's Arrival at Fort St. George, in February 1778, this Defendant had Property due to him in Bengal, to the Amount of above £. 100,000, carrying an Intereſt at 8 and 10 per Cent. - -	38,091 13 —
	128,996 6 4

N. B. Of the above Remittances to Meſſ. Stables, Macreath, and Raikes, the following were remitted by way of China, through the Hands of Meſſrs. Bradſhaw and Pigou, the Defendant's Attornies there.

1779.		
June 10th.	Bill on the India Company, due June 19th 1780 - - - - -	3,123 16 5
	Bill on the Swediſh Company, due 13th March 1780 - - - -	4,775 15 6
July 9th.	Bill on India Company, due 17th July 1780 - - - - -	9,268 1 9
23d.	Bill on Swediſh Company, due 13th March 1780 - - - - -	31,042 10 6
Sept. 7th.	Bill on the India Company, due 11th September 1780 - - - -	10,769 12 11
1780.		
June 22d.	Bill on the Swediſh Company, due 9th January 1781 - - - -	5,000 — —
Sept. 26th.	Bill on the Court of Directors, due 30th September 1781 - - - -	5,554 3 4

The above Sums were remitted from Madras to China for the purpoſe of being remitted from thence to England, for which end the Defendant borrowed a conſiderable Sum at Madras, and for the Remainder drew Bills on Bengal. Annexed (N° 3 and 4) are my Accounts Current with Meſſrs. Bradſhaw and Pigou; which will not only ſhew how and when the ſeveral above-mentioned Sums have been remitted, but will contradict another Charge againſt me, of having ſent conſiderable Sums out of the Carnatic, to the Detriment of the Circulation of Specie. The only current Money in the Carnatic are Pagodas, of which it will be ſeen, that on Account of myſelf and others, during the whole courſe of my Government, I ſent only 93,000 Pagodas, excluſive of ſome plundered in the River of Canton from the Royal George Eaſt Indiaman, about 15,000 Pagodas and 6,000 Dollars.

Having mentioned the Remittances made, it will be neceſſary to obſerve, that when I left England, I had remaining in Bengal, and due to me, upwards of £. 100,000. To this Sum muſt be added, the Amount of a Bond from Mr. Simeon Droz, which was payable in England; but it not being convenient for him to pay it here, the Amount was received in Bengal after my Arrival at Madras. The Principal and Intereſt was about R° 83,858, which, at 2*s*. 3*d*. per Rupee, is Sterling £. 9,517. 7*s*. 2*d*. It muſt be obſerved here, that the principal Sum due to me was ſecured by ſundry Bonds and Mortgages, on Intereſt which had been and was ſtill accumulating, after the Rate of 8 and ſome of 10 per Cent. ſo that the accumulated Amount muſt have been conſiderable; but having loſt all my Books and moſt of my Papers, except ſuch as are of very late Date, I cannot ſpeak with Certainty and Exactneſs of the ſeveral Sums. If the Company require any further Information, I can write to Bengal, for Copies of all Books and Accounts in my Attornies Hands.

It will appear by my Account Current with Meſſrs Bradſhaw and Pigou, that in a few Months after my Arrival at Madras, I remitted a conſiderable Sum to China; and this has probably given Riſe to many diſadvantageous Inſinuations from People not acquainted with my Affairs and Circumſtances: I ſhall therefore take Notice, that I was under the Neceſſity, at all Events, of ſending a large Sum there, to anſwer Bills in Favour of the Swediſh Eaſt India Company, which Money was to be paid at a certain Period, or I was liable to a Forfeiture of 5 per Cent. as will appear by the annexed Account (N° 5.) To raiſe this Sum, I borrowed Money at Madras from ſeveral People; my Books being loſt, I cannot with Preciſion mention from whom, further than my Recollection goes, but I particularly remember I borrowed from Mr. Caſmajor about 14,000 Pagodas, from Chickapoore, Chitty, and other Black Merchants, about 30,000 Pag[s]; and I drew Bills on Bengal, as the annexed Accounts from my Attornies

APPENDIX. No. 66.

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.*

there, (N° 6, 7, and 8) will ſhew. I do not know that I am obliged to go into this Detail, but I do it for the Company's Satisfaction; at the ſame Time I deſire no more of the Accounts with my Attornies may be made public, than ſuch Entries as relate to the Drafts made by me on them, or Remittances made by them to me. I muſt further obſerve, that the whole of the Money ſent to China was not my own, 30,000 Pagodas were on Account of Sir Hector Munro, who, to my Knowledge, borrowed Money for the Occaſion, and in particular 10,000 Pagodas from Alex[r] Brodie, Eſq.

When I arrived at Madras, as my Salary from the Company commenced on my leaving England, I had about Seven Months due, which was upwards of 20,000 Pagodas, or near £.9,000, and before any Remittances were made, about 6 Months more Salary was due, near £. 8,000. And I muſt further obſerve, that ſome of the Sums mentioned to be remitted in the annexed Account of Meſſrs. Stables, Mackreath, and Raikes, were not remitted immediately from Madras, but from Bengal, and in particular the Two following Sums:

Auguſt 7th. Bills on the India Company, due the 16th Auguſt 1779, for - - -	£. 5,000.
November 4. D° and D° due 7th November 1779 - - - - - - - - -	1,000.

Theſe Remittances alſo through the Daniſh Company, were by Transfers from Bengal, with Francis Jourdan, Eſq. The annexed Accounts (N° 9 and 10) are my Accounts Current with Mr. Simeon Droz, for the Amount of his Bond to me, which ſhould have been paid in England, but was paid in Bengal.

REMITTANCES received by Meſſrs. J. Stables, R. Mackreth, and T. Raikes, on Account of Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart.

		£.	s.	d.
1778.				
Auguſt 7.	From David Killican of Calcutta, the Preſidency at Fort William on the Eaſt India Company, due 16th Auguſt 1779 - - - - - - - - -	5,000	—	—
Oct. 28.	From Sir Thomas Rumbold, Alex[r] Grant's Bill on Hugh Grant, Eſq. drawn from Fort St. George, and due 18th January 1779 - - - - - -	70	—	—
Nov. 4.	From David Killican at Calcutta, the Preſidency at Fort William, on the Eaſt India Company, due 7th November 1779 - - - - - - - - -	1,000	—	—
1779.				
Mar. 31.	From Sir Thomas Rumbold, Tho[s] Powell's Bill on Jn° Eames, dated Madras 4th July, and due 23d April 1779 - - - - - - - - -	70	—	—
	From D° R. Doveton's Bill on R[d] Neave, Eſq. dated Madras, due 4th July 1779	2,000	—	—
	From D° J. Shaw on Peter Shaw, drawn from Fort St. George, due 21ſt April 1779 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	100	—	—
	From D° the Preſidency of Fort St. George on the India Company, due 4th April 1780 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	2,125	10	10
	From Ditto, a Bond of John Whitehill's, due 9th April 1781 - - - - -	8,000	—	—
June 10.	From Meſſrs. Bradſhaw and Pigou of Canton, the Preſidency on the Eaſt India Company, 19th June 1780 - - - - - - - - -	3,123	16	5
	From Ditto, Swediſh Supra Cargoes at Canton on the Swediſh Eaſt India Company, 13th March 1780 - - - - - - - - - - - - -	4,775	15	6
July 9.	From Ditto, Supra Cargoes at Canton on the Eaſt India Company, 17th July 1780	9,268	1	9
July 23.	From Meſſrs. Bradſhaw and Pigou of Canton, Swediſh Supra Cargoes there, on their Eaſt India Company, due 13th March 1780 - - - - - - -	31,042	10	6
Aug. 19.	From Sir Thomas Rumbold, J. Utterſon's Bill on the Commiſſioners of the Victualling Office, drawn from Fort St. George, due 6th November 1779 - -	5,000	—	—
Sept. 7.	From Mat. Raper, Jun[r], Supra Cargoe at Canton on the Eaſt India Company, due 11th September 1780 - - - - - - - - -	10,769	12	11
Dec. 27.	From Edw[d] Golding, Eſq. Preſidency at Fort St. George on the Eaſt India Company, due 3d January 1781 - - - - - - - - -	958	6	8
	From Sir Thomas Rumbold, Daniſh Preſidency at Tranquebar on their Eaſt India Company, due 18th July 1780 - - - - - - - - -	1,916	13	4
	From George Baldwin of Cairo, his Remiſe through Treves of Venice, on N. and H. Modegliani, due 23d February 1780 - - - - - - -	699	—	—
1780.				
June 22.	From W[m] Henry Pigou of Canton, the Swediſh Preſidency there on their Eaſt India Company, due 9th January 1781 - - - - - - - - -	5,000	—	—
Aug. 30.	From Sir Thomas Rumbold, Jn° Utterſon's Two Drafts from Fort St. George, on the Commiſſioners of the Navy, for £. 3,000 and £. 4,000, due 17th October 1780 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	7,000	—	—
	From Ditto, Daniſh Preſidency at Tranquebar on their Eaſt India Company, due 19th March 1781 - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,823	7	6
	From Ditto, George Taſwell of Fort St. George, his Bill on W. and T. Raikes and A. Greenland, due 5th October 1781 - - - - - - - -	1,450	—	—
	From Ditto, a Bond of Quintin Crawfurd's, due 23d July 1781 - - -	5,750	—	—
Sept. 26.	From Bradſhaw and Pigou, Supra Cargoes there, on the Eaſt India Company, due 30th September 1781 - - - - - - - - - - - -	5,554	3	4
	Carried forward - £.	112,496	18	9

(No. 3.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Esquire—*continued.*

	Brought forward -	£.	112,496	18 9
1781.				
Jan. 22.	From Sir Thomas Rumbold, a Bond of Jn° Huddleston's, due 19th March 1783 -		4,600	— —
Jan. 22.	From Ditto, a Bond of Quintin Crawfurd's, due 1st October 1781 - - -		5,750	— —
	From Ditto, A. Cuthbert's Bill on the Board of Ordnance, dated in Fort St. George, due 30th March 1781 - - - - - - - - -		5,000	— —
	From Ditto, Thomas Moore's Bill on the Commissioners of the Victualling Office, dated Fort St. George, due 25th February 1781 - - - - - -		9,375	— —
	From Ditto, a Bond of Jn° Whitehill's, due the 4th of April 1782 - - -		13,616	— 7
	From Ditto, Francis Welden's Receipt for 100 Pagodas, never repaid by Mr. Welden		—	— —
		£.	150,837	19 4

Messrs. Gosling's Letter to Sir Thomas Rumbold.

London, 30th May 1781.

Sir,

We have your Favour of the 28th Instant, desiring an Account of the Remittances you made us from the 8th February 1778 to 29 January 1781, and Copies of your Letters to us in that Period.

Inclosed are Copies of Two Letters which were all we received, and they take Notice of the Remittances you made us; which were,

Bill on the Danish East India Company, per £. 5,750 paid 2 October 1779.
Ditto, East India Company - - 10,500 paid 8 January 1781.

£. 16,250

We are,
Sir,
Your most humble Servants,
Robt & Fra^s Gosling.

Sir Thos Rumbold, Baronet.

Dates of Sir THOMAS RUMBOLD's following Remittances.

£. 5,000 — —	Bill - - - - - -	dated	17th December 1777	-	at 12 Months Sight.
70 — —	D° - - - - - - -		20th February 1778	-	at 60 Days Sight.
1,000 — —	D° - - - - - - -		27th January - 1778	-	at 12 Months Sight.
70 — —	D° - - - - - - -		4th July - - 1778	-	at Sight.
2,000 — —	D° - - - - - - -		7th August - 1778	-	at 90 Days Sight.
100 — —	D° - - - - - - -		12th October - 1778	-	at 10 Days Sight.
2,125 10 10	D° - - - - - - -		30th June - - 1778	-	at 12 Months Sight.
8,000 — —	Bond, Madras - - - - -		9th April - 1778	-	at 3 Years.
3,123 16 5	Bill - - - - - - -		10th January - 1779	-	at 12 Months Sight.
4,775 15 6	D° - - - - - - -		28th December 1778	-	at 4 Months Sight.
9,268 1 9	D° - - - - - - -		10th January - 1779	-	at 12 Months Sight.
31,042 10 6	D° - - - - - - -		21st December 1778	-	at 4 Months Sight.
5,000 — —	D° - - - - - - -		7th November 1778	-	at 30 Days Sight.
10,769 12 11	D° - - - - - - -		10th January - 1779	-	at 12 Months Sight.
958 6 8	D° - - - - - - -		1st January - 1779	-	at 12 Months Sight.
1,916 13 4	D° - - - - - - -		10th March - 1779	-	at 6 Months Sight.
699 — —	D° - - - - - - -		20th November 1779	-	at 3 Months.
5,000 — —	D° - - - - - - -		16th December 1779	-	at 6 Months Sight.
3,000 — — } 4,000 — — }	Bills - - - - - -	dated	30th September 1779	-	at 30 Days Sight.
1,823 7 6	a Bill - - - - -	dated	21st June - - 1779	-	at 6 Months Sight.
1,450 — —	D° - - - - - - -		2d October - 1779	-	at 24 Months Date.
5,750 — —	Bond, Madras, Fort Saint George, - -		23d July - - 1779	-	payable in 2 Years.
5,554 3 4	Bill - - - - - - -		31st December 1779	-	at a Month's Sight.
4,600 — —	Bond, Fort Saint George - - -		19th March - 1780	-	payable in 3 Years.
5,750 — —	Bond, Fort Saint George. - - -		1st October - 1779	-	payable in 2 Years.
5,000 — —	Bill - - - - - - -		4th February 1780	-	at 30 Days Sight.
9,375 — —	Bill - - - - - - -		4th February 1780	-	at 30 Days Sight.
13,616 — 7	Bond - - - - - - -		4th April - - 1780	-	payable in 2 Years.

Pagodas 100 Rec^t dated 9th August 1778.

APPENDIX. No. 66.

Dr. (No. 3.)—THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſq. in Account

	Pillar Dollars.
To Caſh paid into the Swediſh Company's Treaſury by the Hands of Mr. Hutton, for Bills on their Directors, to the Amonnt of 162,000 Rix Dollars, Holland's Current, payable to the Order of Meſſrs. Robert Mackreth, John Stables, and Thomas Raikes, at the Houſe of Meſſrs. Pye, Rich, and Wilkinſon's, in Amſterdam - - - - - - - - - - -	150,000
To D° paid into the Engliſh Company's Treaſury for Bills in Favour of the beforementioned Gentlemen, at the Exchange of 5 *s.* 3 *d.* per Dollar, and 12 Months Sight - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	35,307
To D° paid for ſundry Articles, ſent per Ships Concordia and St. Carmoe e S[t] Anna - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	372 458
To D° paid Mr. Pigou for Tea and Sugar Candy ſent laſt Year - - -	82 336
To our Commiſſion of 2 per Cent. on 189,552. 851 Dollars received - -	3,791 057
	189,552 851

with Messrs. BRADSHAW and PIGOU—*continued.* Cr.

			Pillar Dollars.
By Stock, received per Ship Latham, Goldstar Pagodas - - -		50,000	
Hillsborough - - - - -		29,000	
Royal George - - - - -		14,000	
		93,000	
Deduct the Amount of Messrs. Raper and Crommelin's Bill -		25,000	
		68,000	
Exchange 168 Head Dollars per 100 Pagodas, Head Dollars		114,240.	
By Stock, received per Ship Hillsborough - - D° -		9,524 250	
Royal George - - D° -		8,163	
D° from Mr. Benedict, in Part of our Bill in his Favour -		3,144 444	
		135,071 694	
Deduct 2 per Cent. thereon, as inferior to Pillar Dollars, by dividing by 102 - - - - - - - - -		2,648 464	
			132,423 230
By Stock, received per Hillsborough, Fr. Crown. 7,000 weighed Ta^s. 5,429 Mce. 050			
Deduct 2 per Cent. worse than Pillar Dollars 106 452			
	Tales	5,322 598	
By Stock, received per Hillsborough, Ger. Crown. 4,500 weighed Ta^s. 3,355 Mce. 640			
Deduct 9 per Cent. worse than Pillar Dollars 277 072			
		3,078 568	
By Stock, received per Hillsborough - - - - Arcot Rup^s 23,083 Pond^y Rup 2,100 weighed Ta^s. 7,643 Mce. 730			
Add 3 per Cent. better than Pillar Dollars - 229 311			
		7,873 041	
	Tales	16,274 207	
at Mce. 72 per Dollar - - - -			22,603 065
By Stock, received per Ship Hillsborough - - - - - - - -			2,784
Royal George - - - - - - - -			7,337
D° from Mr. Raphael, for our Bill on you in his Favour - - - -			14,500
Mr. Catchick, for our Bill in Favour of Mr. Michael Joannes - -			1,450
Mr. Benedict, in full of our Bill in his Favour - - - - -			8,455 556
			189,552 857

Canton, 10th January 1779.

(Errors excepted.)

Ja^s Bradshaw,
Wm Henry Pigou.

APPENDIX. No. 66.

Dr. (No. 4.)—Sir THOMAS RUMBOLD, Baronet, in

1780.	New Spa. Dollars.
To Caſh paid into the Company's Treaſury, for Bills in Favour of Meſſrs. Robert Mackreth, John Stables, and Thomas Raikes, amounting to Dollars 21,500	21,930
To Caſh paid into the Swediſh Treaſury, for Bills in Favour of the ſaid Gentlemen, amounting to Dollars 20,000	20,400
To Caſh for amount of Sundries ſent to England	1,421
To Caſh for our Commiſſion of Two per Cent. on Dollars, 43,751	875
To Balance remaining, which we have depoſited in the Company's Treaſury for Bills next Seaſon	7,374
New Spa. Dollars	52,000

(No. 5.)

We received by the Ships from China this ſummer, a Letter from your Partner, Mr. John Ferguſon, dated Canton 16 December 1776; wherein he gives us Orders to contract with the Engliſh, Daniſh, or Swediſh Eaſt India Companies, for the delivery, at Canton, of One hundred and fifty or Two hundred thouſand weighty Spaniſh Dollars, on your account, at 5^{s} or 5^{s} 3^{d}. The Engliſh Eaſt India Company, we underſtood, would not engage in any ſuch affairs; and therefore, preferring the Swediſh to any other Eaſt India Company, we have contracted with them on your Account for One hundred and fifty thouſand Spaniſh Dollars, to be delivered to their Supra Cargoes at Canton; viz.

50,000 Dollars in October
50,000 D° - in November } 1778.
50,000 D° - in December

150,000 Dollars in all:

For which the Swediſh Supra Cargoes are to grant you Bills on their Directors in Sweden, payable in four months time in Amſterdam, at the Exchange of 54 S^{s} per H^{r} Current Money per Dollar; and we are bound in a Penalty of 5 per Cent. for a failure in the delivery of any part of the ſum. The Swediſh Company did not chuſe to make their Bills payable in London, and the Exchange of 54 S^{s} per H^{r} C^{y} is, as the courſe now ſtands between Amſterdam and London, rather better than 5 per 1 St^{g} per Dollar. Should the War with America be continued on, or a difference break out between us and the French, there is a likelihood of this Exchange being much in your favour.

The ſmallneſs of the Penalty being fixed at only 5 per Cent. whereas the Dutch always require 12 per Cent. was an additional inducement to us to agree with this Company. We incloſe you a Copy of a Set of Bills, or Letters of Credit, which we have given in this engagement to the Swediſh Company on Mr. Ferguſon, or any other perſon Agent for you at Canton.

London, 28th October 1777. { John Ferguſon, Eſquire, or to any other Perſon who may be Agent for the Houſe of Meſſrs. Robinſon, Crofts, Killican, Grant, and Ferguſon of Calcutta in Bengal at Canton.

Sir,

APPENDIX. No. 66.

Account with Meſſrs. BRADSHAW and PIGOU. Cr.

1780.	New Spa. Dollars.
By Caſh received by His Majeſty's Ship Sea Horſe	20,000
By Caſh received from Meſſrs. Johannes and Catchick, for Value of a Bill on them	20,000
By Caſh received from Mr. Manoel De Souza, from Manilha	12,000
New Spaniſh Dollars	52,000

Canton, January the 18th 1780.

(Errors excepted.)

Ja^s Bradſhaw.
Wm Henry Pigou.

Sir,

In conſequence of the Orders which you gave us in your Letter, dated Canton, 16 December 1776, we have contracted with the Honourable the Directors of the Swediſh Eaſt India Company, for the payment of One hundred and fifty thouſand of old weighty Spaniſh Dollars, to be paid to their Council at Canton; viz.

50,000 Dollars in the Month of October
50,000 Dollars D° - - November } 1778.
50,000 Dollars D° - - December

150,000 Old Spaniſh Dollars in all:

For which the Council of the Swediſh Eaſt India Company are to give you Bills on their Directors, payable at the Houſe of Meſſrs. Pye, Rich, and Wilkinſon, in Amſterdam, at four months ſight, at the Exchange of fifty-four Stivers, Holland's Current Money, per Dollars.

You will therefore pleaſe to pay the ſaid ſum of One hundred and fifty thouſand Spaniſh Dollars to the Council of the Swediſh Eaſt India Company, according to the terms of the Contract which we have made for you; obſerving, that we are bound in a Penalty of 5 per Cent. on any part of the ſum which is not paid conformably to the Agreement.

We are, with much truth,

Sir, your moſt obedient Servants,

(Copy.) (Signed) *Rumbold, Charlton*, and *Raikes.*

This Agreement was made over by John Ferguſon, Eſquire, to Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire.

APPENDIX. No. 66.

Dr. (No. 6.)—THOMAS RUMBOLD,

1778. Mar 19.	To Caſh paid to Joſeph Barretti, for a Set of Bills of Exchange drawn by him on Augavilly Suttur, at Madras, in your Favour, for Star Pagodas 2,615. 25		10,000 — —
Apr. 30.	To Caſh paid Poſtage to the End of April 1778 - - - - - 6 15 3		
	Ditto Cooleyhire on Treaſure - - - - - - 4 8 —		
			11 7 3
June 23.	To Caſh paid to Charles Weſton for One Set of Bills of Exchange, drawn by him, dated the 24th Inſtant, in your Favour, for Pagodas 5,000; Exchange at 360 Ar[t] Pagodas is - - - - - - - A. R[s] 18,000 — —		
	Batta, 8 per Cent. - - - - - - - 1,440 — —		
			19,440 — —
Aug. 26.	To Caſh paid the Amount of a Bill of Exchange, dated the 24th July 1788, drawn by you on your Attornies at Calcutta, in Favour of Showmier Sultan, for - - - - - - - - - - - -		44,712 — —
Oct. 14.	To Caſh paid to John Fergusſon, in full, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange, dated the drawn by you in Favour of George Moore, for Venetians 953 Exchange at A. R[s] 4. 9. 6 per each, is - A. R[s] 4,377 13 6		
	Batta 8 per Cent. - - - - - - - 350 3 6		
			4,728 1 —
31.	To Caſh paid by George Moore, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange drawn by you, dated the 25th Auguſt 1778, on your Attornies, in his Favour, for Venetians 9,924 $\frac{2}{4}$; Exchange at R[s] 4 A. 9 P. 6 Arcot Rupees each, is - - - - - - - - - A. R[s] 45,603 5 6		
	Batta 8 per Cent. - - - - - - - 3,648 4 3		
			49,251 9 9
Dec. 31.	To Caſh paid for 23 Pieces of flowered and plain Muſlin, and 6 Aprons, for Mrs. Rumbold, ſent in the Mountſtewart, as per Account, amounting to - -		2,047 11 6
			1,30,190 13 6
1779. Jan. 15.	To Balance - - - - - - - - - - - -		1,35,306 7 3
		Current Rupees	2,65,497 4 9

Esquire, in Account with his Attornies. Cr.

1778.					
Mar. 10.	By Balance of an Account Current of this Date				1,12,546 2 3
31	By Cash received from William Larkins, in Part of his Mortgage Bond				6, 00 — —
Apr. 23.	By Ditto — — D° — — D°				2,500 — —
30.	By Cash received from P. M. Dacres, for One Year's Interest on Current Rupees 35,000, dated the 1st May 1776, at 5 per Cent.				1,750 — —
May 11.	By Cash received from Mr. Larkins, the Amount of his Bond for Principal			25,000 — —	
	Interest from 23d December 1775 to 10th May 1778, is 28 Months and 18 Days, at 5 per Cent	2,979 2 8			
	Deduct One Year's Interest, received the 27th December 1776	1,250 — —			
				1,729 2 8	
				26,729 2 8	
	Deduct received the 27th Dec' 1776	5,000 — —			
	28th July 1777	5,000 — —			
	27th August	2,500 — —			
	29th D°	2,500 — —			
	31st Mar. 1778	6,000 — —			
	23d April	2,500 — —			
	Interest on D° to 10th May 1778	756 6 3			
				24,256 6 3	
					2,472 12 5
June 17.	By Cash received from Mr. Dacres, in full the Amount of his Mortgage Bond, dated 10th October 1776, for Principal			70,000 — —	
	Interest thereon to 4th September 1777, is 10 M°s and 24 Days at 8 per Cent.			5,040 — —	
	Interest on Current Rupees 60,000, from the 4th September to 10th October 1777, is 1 Month and 6 Days at 8 per Cent. per Ann.			480 — —	
				75,520 — —	
	Deduct received in Part of Principal the 4th September 1777, Current Rupees	10,000 — —			
	Ditto received in Part of Interest, the 31st October 1777	5,520 — —			
				15,520 — —	
				60,000 — —	
	Interest from the 10th October 1777 to the 10th June 1778 is 8 Months, at 8 per Cent			3,200 — —	
					63,200 — —
July 22.	By Cash received from Simeon Droz, in Part of his Debt				10,000 — —
28.	By D° — — D° — — D°				3,827 2 3
Sept. 9.	By Cash received in Part of Mr. Droz's Debt				2,174 4 7
25.	By Ditto — — D° — — D°				12,143 5 3
Oct. 8.	By Cash received from Benjamin Laccum, in Part of his Mortgage Bond				5,000 — —
30.	By Cash received from Joseph Price, the 29th July 1777, Two Annas Dividend on his following Bonds to you, made up with Interest to the 1st May 1776:				
	On Bond, for Current Rupees 25,118 12 7. dated the 25th February 1771			3,477 6 —	
	On Bond, for Current Rupees 70,000, dated the 30th July 1774			9,406 4 —	
					12,883 10 —
Dec. 31.	By Cash received from Mr. Laccum, the 10th February 1778, in Part of his Mortgage Bond omitted				1,000 — —
1779.					
Jan. 12.	By Cash received from Mr. Droz, in Part of the Balance of his Account Current with you, dated the 10th Instant				30,000 — —
				Current Rupees	2,65,497 4 9

Calcutta, 15th January 1779.

(Errors excepted.)

per *David Killican.*

APPENDIX. No. 66.

Dr. (No. 7.)—Sir THOMAS RUMBOLD,

1779.			
Jan. 15.	To Caſh paid for 70 Sheep, 17 Md. Potatoes, 3 Caſks of Pickles, and 2 Bullocks, ſent you to Madras, as per Account, Particulars ſent, amounting, with Charges, to		695 13 —
	To Caſh paid Mr. Auriol, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange, dated the 5th December 1778, drawn by you in Favour of Henry Richardſon, for		686 7 6
April 9.	To Caſh paid to Colonel Owen, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange, drawn by you, dated the 12th March 1779, in his Favour, for Arcot Rupees 89,640 — —		
	Batta 8 per Cent.	7,171 3 3	
			96,811 3 3
30.	To Caſh paid Cooley Hire on Treaſure, ſundry Times		7 8 —
June 15.	To Caſh paid Thomas Law, as per Bill for certain Silver and Gold Filagree Things ſent you		2,278 12 9
July 31.	To Caſh paid Cooley Hire on Treaſure this Month		— 15 —
Sept. 20.	To Caſh paid into the Dutch Company at Chinſurah, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange drawn by your Attornies in London, dated the 15th October 1778, for Sicca Rupees 100,000, is	C. R. 116,000 — —	
	Hundian and Extra Batta, to remit the Money to Chinſurah	118 14 6	
			116,118 14 6
20.	To Caſh paid Thomas Law, as per Bill, for Muſlins, &c. provided by Mr. Cleveland for Lady Rumbold		864 7 9
Oct 1.	To the Amount received by you from Francis Jourdan, 5,000 Pagodas, Exchange at 365 Arcot Rupees per Pag. is	A. R. 18,250 — —	
	Batta 8 per Cent.	1,460 — —	
			19,710 — —
	To Caſh paid Fees on Three Sets of Dutch Certificates tranſmitted you—Sicca R. 15, is		17 6 6
	To Commiſſion on Current Rupees 4,21,339 5 6, being the Amount of ſundry Bills, for Money remitted you from November 1777 to 30th September 1779, particulars as per Accounts Current, dated the 10th March 1778, the 15th January 1779, and 1ſt October 1779, at One per Cent.		4,213 6 6
			2,41,404 14 9
	To Balance		32,470 11 —
		Current Rupees	2,73,875 9 9

Baronet, in Account Current with his Attornies—*continued.* Cr.

1779.			
Jan. 15.	By Balance of an Account Current of this Date		1,35,306 7 3
	By Caſh received for Batta on Sicca Rupees 590, being Part of the Amount of Charges working Muſlins for Lady Rumbold, erroneouſly overcharged in the Account tranſmitted to you		53 11 3
Feb. 16.	By Caſh received from P. M. Dacres in full the Amount of his Mortgage Bond, dated the 1ſt May 1778, for Principal	35,000 — —	
	Intereſt thereon, from the 1ſt May 1778 to the 15th February 1779, is Nine Months and 15 Days, at Five per Cent. per Ann.	1,385 6 6	
			36,385 6 6
March 22.	By Caſh received from Charles Grant, Two Years Intereſt on his Bond to you, for C. R^{s} 50,000, a. 8 per Cent.		8,000 — —
26.	By Caſh received from Joſeph Price, a Dividend of 9 Pice in the Rupee, on his Bond for C. R^{s} 25,118. 12. 7. to you	1,394 — 3	
	Received D^{o} D^{o}, for D^{o} 70,000 D^{o}	3,437 5 6	
			4,831 5 9
31.	By Caſh received from the Commercial Society, in full the Amount of their Intereſt Bond, dated the 19th February 1776, Principal	50,000 — —	
	Intereſt thereon, from the 19th February 1777 to the 28th February 1779, is 2 Years 11 Days, at 8 per Cent.	8,122 3 6	
			58,122 3 6
April 9.	By Caſh received from Simeon Droz, in Part of the Balance of his Account Current		8,000 — —
July 28.	By Caſh received from Simeon Droz, in full the Balance of his Account Current		17,176 7 6
Oct. 1.	By Caſh received from Richard Barwell, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange, dated the 30th Auguſt 1779, drawn by you for		6,000 — —
		Current Rupees	2,73,875 9 9

Calcutta, the 1ſt October 1779.

(Errors excepted.)

per *David Killican.*

APPENDIX, No. 66.

Dr. (No. 8.)—Sir THOMAS RUMBOLD, Baronet, in Account with his Attornies. Cr.

1779.			1779.		
Oct. 31.	To Cash paid Cooley Hire on Treasure this Month	— 9 9	Oct. 1.	By Balance of an Account Current of this Date	32,470 11 —
Nov 22.	To Cash paid, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange drawn by you in Favour of John Ferguſſon	39,400 — —	25.	By Cash received for a Bill of Exchange, dated the 23d Inſtant, drawn by me on you, at 21 Days Sight, in Favour of Wm Duff, for Pagodas 1500, Exchange at 365 A. Rs per Pa. is 5,475	
		39,400 9 9		Batta, 8 per Cent. 438	
30.	To Balance	2,979 1 3			5,913 — —
			29.	By Cash received from the Company's Treaſury, the Amount of a Bill of Exchange drawn by the Governor and Council of Madras	3,996 9 9
	Current Rupees	42,379 11 —		Current Rupees	42,379 11 —

Calcutta, the 30th November 1779.

(Errors excepted.)

per *David Killican*,
Acts Attorney.

Dr. (No. 9.)—THOMAS RUMBOLD, Eſquire. Cr.

To paid Mr. David Killican on 11th January, in Part Payment of my Bond		30,000 — —	By Balance of an Account Current, dated 10th January 1779, tranſmitted to Mr. David Killican	54,644 1 1
To paid Mr. David Killican on 7th April, as in Part Payment of my Bond		8,000 — —		
Intereſt on the above Sums calculated from their reſpective Dates, paid on as follows; viz.			Intereſt on the above Sum from 11th January to 20th July 1779, being 6 Months 9 Days, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.	1,434 5 7
On 30,000, from 11th January to 20th July 1779, being 6 Months 9 Days, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.	787 8 —			
On 8,000, from 7th April to 20th July 1779, being 3 Months 13 Days, at 5 per Cent.	114 7 2			
		901 15 2		
		38,901 15 2		
To Balance paid to Mr. Rumbold this Day		17,176 7 6		
	Current Rupees	56,078 6 8	Current Rupees	56,078 6 8

Calcutta, 20th July 1779.

(Copy.)

(Errors excepted.)

per *Simeon Droz*.

Dr. (No. 10.)—JOURNAL of Thomas Rumbold, Eſquire—*continued.* Cr.

To paid Mr. Killican, by Roy Motichund, on 22d July		10,000 — —	By the Amount of my Bond to him, dated 10th January 1769		55,550 — —
To paid Mr. Killican, by Mr. William Alderſey, on 28th July		3,827 — —	Intereſt on the above Sum from 10th January 1769 to 10th January 1779, being 10 Years, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.		27,775 — —
To paid Mr. Killican, by Mr. William Alderſey, on 9th September		2,174 4 7			
To paid Mr. Killican, by Mr. William Alderſey, on 25th September		12,143 5 4			
Intereſt on the above Sums, calculated from their reſpective Dates, paid on as follows, viz.					
On 10,000 — — from 22d July 1778 to 10th January 1779, being 5 Months 19 Days, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.	234 7 9				
On 3,827 — — from 28th July 1778 to 10th Jany 1779, being 5 M^{s} 13 D^{s}, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.	86 12 3				
On 2,174 4 7 from 9th Sept. 1778 to 10th January 1779, being 4 Mo 1 Day, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.	36 4 9				
On 12,143 5 4 from 25th Sept. to 10th Jan$_{y}$ 1779, being 3 Mo^{s} 16 D^{s}, at 5 per Cent. per Ann.	17 12 3				
		536 5 —			
		28,680 14 11			
To Balance due to him this Day		54,644 1 1			
Current Rupees		83,325 — —	Current Rupees		83,325 — —

(Copy.)

Calcutta, 10th January 1779.

(Errors excepted.)

per *Simeon Droz.*

Extract of a Letter from Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart. to Meſſrs. Robert Mackreath, John Stables, and Thomas Raikes, dated Fort St. George, 13th October 1778.

Meſſrs. Ferguſon, Killican, &c. having offered to me the Remittance procured for them by the houſe of Rumbold, Charlton, and Raikes, through the Swediſh Company, I have accepted the ſame, and tranſmitted the neceſſary Papers to Meſſrs. Bradſhaw and Pigou, who are my Attornies at Canton, and are deſired to correſpond with you. They will acquaint you of ſuch meaſures as they take for the Remittance of the ſums now ſent to them, or of any that I may conſign to them in future. Meſſrs. Raper and Crommelin have Bills on Meſſrs. Bradſhaw and Pigou for twenty-five thouſand Pagodas, which they are to remit to you on account of General Munro and myſelf; the particulars you will be informed of, by thoſe Gentlemen. I am afraid theſe Remittances will turn out but indifferently, as I have been obliged, in order to procure the money here, to draw on Bengal at a very diſadvantageous exchange.

APPENDIX, No. 67.

Extract of Proceedings of the Preſident and Council at *Fort George*, in their Military Department, the 4th April 1775.

CAME in the following Letter from *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Chief of *Maſulipatam.*

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George.*

Honourable Sir,

Having had intelligence ſome time ago, that *Bazalet Jung* was coming down to the Guntoor Circar with a conſiderable Army, I thought it neceſſary to ſend Hircarrahs to take notice of the number of his Troops; and have this day received the information in the accompanying Paper from them.

The Renter of *Nizampatam* has juſt received a Letter from his manager in that diſtrict, acquainting him, that Monſ. *Lally*, with 120 Horſemen, 96 Soldiers, 300 Sepoys, 600 Coolies, ſome camels, and 400 bullocks, arrived on the 27th at *Mootapillee.* That the bullocks and Coolies were diſpatched the ſame night for *Bazalet*

APPENDIX. No. 67.

Jung's camp, with ſome pieces of large and ſmall cannon, ſeveral cheſts of ſmall arms, and a quantity of ammunition and other ſtores, all which had been laying ſome time at *Nicotapillee*; that beſides theſe, had been landed there from a veſſel that arrived from *Pondicherry* on the 26th inſtant, four pieces of large cannon, eight of ſmall cannon, ſix thouſand firelocks, and thirteen cheſts of gunpowder; and that it is reported two more ſhips are expected from *Pondicherry*, with a further ſupply of ſtores and 600 Europeans. But to this report I give little credit, it being uſual with the French at *Mootapillee*, upon every occaſion, to cauſe news of this kind to be circulated through the country.

I have written to Mr. *Scott*, who is at preſent ſurveying the Nizampatam Diſtrict, to inform himſelf particularly of what may be going forward at *Mootapillee*, and have ſent him intelligent Hircarrahs to aſſiſt him in his enquiries.

I am, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
John Whitehill.

Maſulipatam, 30th March 1775.

The Company's Hircarrahs brought the following news from *Bazalet Jung*'s camp.

That *Bazalet Jung* is now halted on the Banks of Teaglais River, within eighteen coſs to *Vinicondah*, and has the under-mentioned Troops and Stores with him:

10 Pieces of Cannon,
5 Cheſts of Gunpowder,
1 Carriage of Gunpowder in Duppees,
18 Camels,
1 Load of Rockets,
8,000 Cavalry,
2,600 Sepoys.

That *Manavar Cawn* of *Condanole* is with him, with
2 Pieces of Cannon,
2 Gunpowder Cheſts,
1 Carriage loaded with Rockets,
200 Foot Men.

That *Yellabreddy*, Duan of Gadwale Zemindar, is with 300 Foot Men, and 50 or 60 Cavalry with him.

That Monſieur *Lally* is with him, with
150 Troopers,
200 Soldiers,
300 Topaſſes,
1,200 Sepoys,
5 Pieces of Cannon,
4 Cheſts of Gunpowder,
1 Carriage loaded with Duppies of Gunpowder,
3 Elephants,
4 Colours.

That *Davy Chund*, the Duan of *Bazalet Jung*, is halted within a coſs and half of *Vinicondah*, on the Banks of Gondlacomma River. That he has met with him *Ameen Saib Surdar*, with 500 Cavalry and 500 Foot Men.

That Rajah *Burjanaud*, the manager of the Guntoor Country, and *Mahomed Huſſein*, having paid their viſit to *Davy Chund*, went down to Chilkaloor Pundoo, and carried *Maunaer Vencatakaſinahmah*, one of the Zemindars of Guntoor to the ſaid *Davy Chund*, to pay viſit on the 25th March.

Monſieur *Haurnout* with 300 Sepoys, 2 guns, 2 ſmall cheſts of gunpowder, 2 tranſport carriages, 10 ſoldiers, and 10 topaſſes, from Monſieur *Lally*'s Army, were come and halted near *Potavenam*, on their way to *Mootapillee*, to which place they are going to take the firelocks, cannon, ſhot, and gunpowder, which are lying there.

Extract of a Letter from Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George*, to *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, and Council, at *Maſulipatam*, dated 18th April 1775.

Our Preſident has laid before us ſeveral Letters and papers of intelligence, which he has received from Mr. *Whitehill*, relative to the late tranſactions in the Guntoor Circar; and as it is highly incumbent on us to keep a watchful eye on both *Bazalet Jung* and the French, who appear to us to be daily increaſing in ſtrength in that Circar, and as it is neceſſary for us to be furniſhed with every information relative thereto, we direct, that you keep the moſt conſtant attention to both *Bazalet Jung* and the French, and other Troops that are in his ſervice; and that you gain the cleareſt account poſſible of the nature and quality of ſtores that may arrive at *Mootapilly*, or other ports upon the coaſts, and of the places they may afterwards be ſent to: You will likewiſe endeavour to find out if *Bazalet Jung* had any other motives than thoſe of ſettling with the Guntoor Zemindars, for his leaving *Adoni* and coming to the ſea coaſt.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your affectionate Friends,
A. Wynch, &c. Council.

Fort St. George, 18th April 1775.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 17th April 1775.

To the Honourable *Alex^r Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir,

Since I had the honour to write you laſt, nothing very material concerning *Bazalet Jung*'s motions has come to my knowledge; he ſtill continues encamped near *Toccapilly* in the Duopar Country, which is dependant on *Cudapa*. The Inhabitants of this Country about *Adinge*, which lies that way, being a good deal alarmed at his neighbourhood, I have, upon the repreſentation of the Renter, ſent a company of Sepoys there, in order to quiet their apprehenſions; but I have not heard of any of his people committing the ſmalleſt irregularities on the borders of this country.

A detachment from his Army under the command of Monſ. *Lally*, has arrived at *Nairpilly* and *Mootapilly*, which lies on the ſea coaſt; they have come at different times, and now amount to at leaſt ſeven or eight hundred men, horſe and foot, and amongſt the former is a good many Europeans. They have had ſixty or ſeventy camels with them, and a number of bullocks, and have already ſent off one convoy of military ſtores from thence, which has not taken the rout to his (*Bazalet Jung*'s) Camp, but is gone to *Guntoor* or *Cundur*. Their ſtores have been juſt landed from ſome veſſels lately arrived there, (and two of which are ſtill lying there) and conſiſt of guns, muſquets, ſhot, powder, lead, and iron in bars. I have a particular information of eight guns of a middling ſize, and from 1,000 to 1,500 ſtand of arms, which it is ſuppoſed are immediately to follow what is already ſent off. There are ſome French People ſettled at *Nairpilly* in a commercial way, who I am told have had a few of theſe ſtores ſome time by them, but the greateſt part have come in their veſſels; I have not been able to learn from whence, but they are navigated moſtly by Europeans, of whom about twenty are landed. Monſ. *Lally* has his camp and people in good order, and under ſtrict diſcipline, fires his morning and evening gun, and ſeems very jealous of any people ſpying into his tranſactions. It is reported (with what certainty I know not) he, with a conſiderable party, are to remain in the Guntoor Circar.—*Bazalet Jung* has not yet ſettled with his Zemindars, but it is ſuppoſed will ſoon, and then return home. You may be aſſured of my always communicating

cating whatever intelligence I ſhall think worthy of your notice; and that I have the honour to be with the greateſt reſpect,

Honourable Sir,

Ongole, 6th April 1775. Your very devoted and moſt obedient Servant, *Alex. Duncan.*

If the aforegoing intelligence of the arrival of the military ſtores at *Mootapilly*, is ſuch as can be depended on, it becomes highly neceſſary for this Government to keep a watchful eye on the motions of *Bazalet Jung*, who ſeems, by the encouragement he gives the French, and by collecting of ſo large a quantity of ſtores, to have ſomething in agitation which we are ignorant of:—Agreed, That Letters in conſequence, be wrote to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, and to Captain *Duncan* at *Ongole*, directing them to be attentive to every movement of *Bazalet Jung*'s, and to make us acquainted with every material circumſtance that comes to their knowledge.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 6th May 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex^r Wynch, Eſq. Governor, Preſident, &c.

Came in this day the following Letter from the Chief and Council at Maſulipatam Military department:

To the Honourable *Alex^r Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Colonel *Flint* having repreſented to us, that the greater part of the Europeans of the 2d battalion of the 2d brigade, now at *Ellore*, will have ſerved out their reſpective times by the months of June and July, and that moſt of them are willing to re-inliſt, provided the bounty money is paid them in advance; and having further repreſented, that if they ſhould not be taken in their preſent diſpoſition, it may be apprehended, when the time comes, they will inſiſt on their diſcharge; and that as this will happen at a time when no ſea conveyances can be procured to tranſport them to the Southward, many inconveniencies may attend their being then diſcharged—we think it neceſſary to give you immediate information thereof, and to requeſt your orders upon the occaſion. The ſituation of the French party in the Guntoor Circar, giving us reaſon to apprehend that emiſſaries from thence will be employed to ſeduce our men; and tho' they may not ſucceed at preſent, yet we think it is to be feared the great number of our Soldiers, when diſcharged may be induced to engage themſelves in the ſervice of that party, the ſtrength of which having been lately increaſed from the veſſels which have arrived at *Mootapilly*, may be made formidable by ſuch an augmentation of trained Soldiers.

We are very reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
Charles Devoeux,
James Hodges,
John Sulivan.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 8th May 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex^r Wynch, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident.
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
J. M. Stone,
Archd Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

The Preſident acquaints the Board of his having received a Letter from Mr. *Whitehill*, informing him of intelligence which he had received of a further importation of military ſtores at *Mootapilly*.

Extract of Proceedings of the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George*, in their Military Department, the 25th April 1775.

The Preſident lays before the Board a Letter which he has received from Mr. *Whitehill*, incloſing one from Mr. *Scott*, on the ſubject of military ſtores, imported at *Mootapilly*.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Governor of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir,

Herewith I have the honour to ſend you, copy of a Letter from Mr. *Scott* to me, giving an account of a further importation of military ſtores at *Mootapillee*; which intelligence is confirmed by a Letter from *Mootapillee* to the Company's Interpreter here, tranſlation of which I alſo forward for your information.

I am with reſpect,
Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
John Whitehill.

Maſulipatam, 9th April 1775.

To *John Whitehill*, Eſquire.

Sir,

I find I have been rather too haſty in propoſing to ſend back the Hircarrahs. I have juſt been informed, That three days ago, two boats went out to ſea from *Mootapillee* in the morning, and returned in the evening loaded; they did the ſame the next day, and have landed in that manner, two hundred cheſts of arms, and fifty large caſks; likewiſe, four Soldiers came on ſhore with them; there is no veſſel within ſight of land, from which they could bring theſe things, nor could the Hircarrah hear that any had been ſeen off *Mootapillee*, only ſaw the above-mentioned ſtores when landed. Fifty Coffries and twenty Troopers (who were left by Monſieur *Lally*) took charge of them, and ſent them away immediately; to what place he does not know.

The Hircarrah I ſent to camp is alſo returned with account that *Bazalet Jung* is encamped, with eight thouſand Horſe and about three hundred Sepoys, at *Doolah*, which is thirteen coſs from *Inacondah*. *Manuar Cawn*, Nabob of *Condanoor*, is encamped with him, with three hundred Horſe; they have with them ten guns and ten tumbrils. *Divechundah*, whom he calls *Bazalet Jung*'s Secretary, has been for ſome time encamped at *Tuacondah*, with five hundred and fifty Sepoys, and had with him one gun and a tumbril. Monſieur *Lally* is arrived at the ſame place, with two thouſand Sepoys, three hundred Coffries, and fifty Europeans; he brought with him two braſs guns and ſeven tumbrils. The Hircarrah did not hear that they have any other camp; but as it appears probable to me, from the ſmall number of Europeans that he mentions, that they have one ſomewhere, I intend ſending off Two Hircarrahs immediately, to try if they can find it. He likewiſe mentions, that they are buying up all the bullocks they can get; and that it is reported, that they only ſtay till the village people pay ſome arrears that are due to *Bazalet Jung*.

I am very reſpectfully,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient, humble Servant,
(Signed) *Aud^w Scott.*

Allapaure, 18th April 1775.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 16th May 1775.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir,

I juſt now had accounts brought me, that *Bazalet Jung*

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Jung had broke up his camp, where he has been for ſome time paſt, and is ſuppoſed to be on his return to his own capital; as he directs his rout towards the Cuddapah and Cummum Countries, by the ſame road which he came.

I have the honour to be; with the greateſt regard,
Honourable Sir,
Your very devoted, and moſt obedient Servant,
Alexander Duncan.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, 29th May 1775.

Preſent, *Alexander Wynch*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
J. M. Stone,
Arch^d Palmer,
Francis Fourdan.
Mr. *Mackay* indiſpoſed.

Read a Letter from the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam* as hereafter:

Military Department.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having in conſequence of your orders of the 18th ultimo, cauſed particular enquiry to be made as to the quantity of military ſtores, and the number of Troops, lately landed at *Mootapilly*; and having alſo procured an account of the Stores and Troops under the command of Monſ. *Lally* in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, before this reinforcement; we find that he now has with him,

European Troopers.	Ditto Infantry.	Topaſſes.	Sepoys.	Cheſts of Powder.	Ditto of Flints.	Ditto of Firelocks.	Bags of - - -	Shot.	Large Cannon.	Small Ditto.
150	200	300	1,200	4	—	—	—	—	5	—
—	56	—	—	66	62	91	50	—	4	10
—	13	—	—	125	65	280	—	3,000	5	4
150	269	300	1,200	195	127	371	50	3,000	14	14

And we have received certain information that he is recruiting Seapoys, and has already enliſted 150 of a new battalion, which it is ſaid he propoſes to train.

Upon the above information we make no doubt your Honour, &c. will think the ſituation and ſtrength of this party deſerving your particular notice, and that you will excuſe us the liberty of offering our ſentiments upon a ſubject, which may particularly concern that part of the Company's affairs which you have been pleaſed to entruſt to our management. For, however ſecure the preſent ſtate of *India* may make us in our poſſeſſions here, and however little we may have to apprehend from a country Enemy; yet, ſeparated by the Kiſtna from the *Carnatic*, and having ſuch a party as that now under Monſ. *Lally* to diſpute our communication, we cannot help thinking, that upon the firſt miſunderſtanding with the French Nation, we may be made to feel in its full extent, the inconveniencies of the ſtation which this party now holds. For as their preſent numbers are nearly equal to our eſtabliſhment, and as ſmall reinforcements may be eaſily ſent them by the Port of *Mootapilly*, they may in a ſhort time be put in a condition to diſturb us; and having it in their power at any time to poſſeſs themſelves of the Nizampatam Circar, and having the Zemindars of *Nandigamah*, *Bezwara*, part of *Nozeed Devra Cotah*, and the iſland of *Devy*, open to their depredations, we think it cannot be doubted but that our revenue would be materially and immediately affected by their firſt meaſures, and we be prevented thereby from ſending thoſe ſupplies of money to your Honour, &c. which theſe Circars now afford, and which in time of war may be of eſſential conſequence to the public ſervice. And our apprehenſions upon this occaſion are increaſed by the number of Europeans which have been this year landed at *Mootapilly*, 55 private and one officer having come up with one *Ruſſell*; a circumſtance which we think too ſtrongly proves, that the countenance of the French Government is given to this party, and of courſe makes it more particularly neceſſary that we ſhould take meaſures in time to counteract them; for if they ſhould be ſuffered to remain, and to ſtrengthen themſelves in the Guntoor Circar, we are of opinion they will thereby obtain an eſtabliſhment the moſt advantageous on the coaſt, not only for affecting the Revenue of theſe Circars, but for uniting with the Country Powers, for fitting out their artillery and for laying up granaries, beſides the opportunity of levying contributions from the Guntoor Country, from *Nizampatam*, *Ongole* and the *Palnaud*, and for receiving ſuch aſſiſtance as *Hyder Ally*, *Bazalet Jung*, or any other Country Power may be diſpoſed to give them.

Having expreſſed the grounds of our apprehenſion, we think it our duty to add, that nothing leſs than the abſolute poſſeſſion of that part of the Guntoor Circar, in which *Mootapilly* and the villages now held by the French, are ſituated, can give us ſufficient ſecurity againſt the intentions of the French. And we therefore beg leave to ſubmit to your Honour, &c. if, for reaſons which we cannot be acquainted with, you ſhould not think it proper to inſiſt upon the diſmiſſion of theſe French Troops, or the immediate ceſſion, for an adequate conſideration of a Circar, which is in reverſion to the Company, it would not be expedient to require, that *Mootapilly* and the other villages held by the French, be now given to the Company at a reſerved rent by *Bazalet Jung* during his life.

If *Bazalet Jung* ſhould refuſe to comply with ſuch a deſire, we think no ſtronger preſumption need be required, either of the deſigns of the French and the influence of their councils over him, or of his intention. And we ſubmit to your Honour, &c. better judgment, whether in ſuch a caſe it would not be better to deprive them of the means of giving us diſturbances, while we are in a general peace, than to defer it, till their increaſed ſtrength and other circumſtances may endanger the Company's right to ſo valuable a country as the Guntoor Circar, and now compel us to act upon the defenſive for the protection of thoſe now in our poſſeſſion.

We, are, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
John Whitehill,
Charles Defoeux,
John Sulivan.

Maſulipatam,
20th May 1775.

Reſolved,

Reſolved, That the conſideration of the above Letter be deferred till a ſubſequent Conſultation.

A. Wynch,
Geo. Dawſon,
Hy. Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan.

Extract of ſeparate Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George* to the Court of Directors, dated the 4th July 1775.

Par. 8. Having lately received information from the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, of the particulars of the ſuccours of men and ſtores imported at *Mootapilly* for the uſe of *Bazalet Jung*, Brother to *Nizam ul Mulck*, within the courſe of a few months, we deemed it adviſable to communicate the ſame to the Governor General and Council, and at the ſame time to make known to them our apprehenſions, in caſe of a rupture with *France*; and that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould not be prevented from collecting ſuch vaſt quantities of military ſtores, and ſuch formidable numbers of French, and other Foreigners, as he is daily enliſting into his Service.

Par. 9. In the 2d Article of the Treaty afore-mentioned, entered into in 1768 with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, your Honours will be pleaſed to obſerve, that the Circar of *Murtazanagur* or *Guntoor*, is guaranteed to *Bazalet Jung*, on certain conditions, during his life-time, and at his deceaſe, or infraction of the terms agreed upon, that the property of it reverts to the Company.

Par. 10. Were we convinced that *Bazalet Jung* had in the leaſt manner infringed the terms on which he holds poſſeſſion of the Circar, we could, with the greateſt propriety, not only call him to a ſevere account for the ſame, but, according to the tenor of the agreement, diſpoſſeſs him of a Country, which he is no longer maſter of than while he adheres to the points ſtipulated in the Treaty aforeſaid. But, while no ſuch matter has come to our knowledge, and his conduct is, as far as we are acquainted with, conformable to the line laid down for his actions, we ſee not how we can, with any degree of propriety, prevent the great and increaſing evil of the French ſettling in his dominions. On this ſubject we have written particularly to the Governor General and Council, and have at the ſame time given it as our opinion, that the only modes which are left for obviating the danger to be apprehended, are, to endeavour, if poſſible, to prevail upon *Bazalet Jung* to give up the Port of *Mootapilly*, at which place all his ſuccours are imported, for an adequate acknowledgment; or, if practicable, the whole Circar on the like terms; or that he will admit of its being protected for him by the Company, he being at the expence of the force employed on that ſervice.

Extract of ſeparate Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort St. George*, to the Court of Directors, dated 14th October 1775.

Par. 2. In conſequence of the alarm which the eſtabliſhment of the French in the Murtanazagur Circar had given us, and of the real neceſſity there was to diſpoſſeſs them of that Eſtabliſhment, we wrote to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*; directing them, if the opportunity was favourable, and they were of opinion they ſhould ſucceed, to endeavour to obtain from *Bazalet Jung*, *Mootapillee*, and the other villages granted to the foreign party in his ſervice, or, if practicable, the whole Guntoor Circar, at a certain reſerved rent to him, which ſhould be mutually agreed upon for that purpoſe.

Par. 3. In reply to which, we were given to underſtand by the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, that they did not think any endeavours they could make uſe of would be ſufficient to induce *Bazalet Jung* to give to the Company the whole, or any part, of the Guntoor Circar, at rent, even though their offers ſhould be as much more conſiderable as their credit would be preferable to that of any other propoſer; for that *Bazalet Jung* had acquired a degree of confidence from the conſiderable ſupplies of men and ſtores he had received; and that thoſe ſupplies would, no doubt, be uſed to oppoſe a meaſure ſo much calculated to deprive him of the advantages of their ſupport.

Par. 4. On receipt of this Letter, therefore, from the Chief and the Council at *Maſulipatam*, and ſeeing that the conjunction of affairs was unfavourable, we came to the reſolution not to perſevere in the attempt to get poſſeſſion of *Mootapillee*, and the other villages, or of the whole of the Circar, until time and circumſtances ſhould ſecure to us a probability of ſucceſs.

Par. 5. Not many days after our having come to the above Reſolution, we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, in anſwer to one we had written them on the ſubject, wherein they inform us of their having come to the reſolution, that no time was to be loſt in endeavouring to remove the French from the Guntoor Circar; authoriſing us immediately to take ſuch ſteps as might be neceſſary for that purpoſe; and recommending to us to form a body of Troops, if poſſible, in conjunction with the Nabob, and march them to the frontiers of the territory of *Bazalet Jung*. At which time they deſire we would acquaint him, that ſeeing he had applied for the aſſiſtance of foreign Troops, thoſe of the Company were come to him for that purpoſe, as well as to ſecure the reverſion of the Circar to them; that we therefore inſiſted upon the immediate diſcharge of all Foreigners from his ſervice; in failure of which, that our Troops ſhould take poſſeſſion of his country, and that we would endeavour, by a negociation with the Nizam, either by the offer of the whole Revenues, or otherwiſe, to obtain the immediate ceſſion of it to the Company.

Par. 6. Authorized in this manner to take vigorous meaſures for the expulſion of the French, we could not but deem it expedient to have matters in a proper train of preparation, ſhould it be at length found neceſſary to uſe forcible means; and we accordingly directed General *Smith* to prepare and lay before us an account of the Troops and Stores which would be required for that purpoſe.

Par. 7. We found it, however, impoſſible immediately to come to a determinate reſolution on the meaſures which the Governor General and Council had given us their ſanction to purſue, as they, not only in their immediate, but in their conſequential effects, were likely to be of the moſt ſerious nature, both to the intereſts of the Company, and the future tranquillity of their poſſeſſions and the *Carnatic*.

Par. 8. From the general poſture of affairs, both in the *Decan* and in the *Carnatic*, we could not but be of opinion, that the applying immediately to *Bazalet Jung* to diſmiſs the foreign party his ſervice, and to truſt to the Company for the protection of his country, or to rent to them the whole, or a part of the Guntoor Circar, would be the moſt effectual methods to render him ſtill more deſirous of the aſſiſtance of his European Troops, and probably to call to his aid, by raiſing his fears, the further ſuccour of a body of mercenaries, poſſibly of the Marattas, or of *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

Par. 9. Moreover, we could not conceive ourſelves, agreeably to the ſpirit and tenor of the Treaty of 1768, authorized to negociate with *Bazalet Jung* as principal, while in reality he could be conſidered in no other light than that of a dependant upon the Soubah, poſſeſſing a country at his pleaſure, or at the will of this Government, who, on the infraction of certain conditions ſpecified in the Treaty on his part, have an abſolute right to take poſſeſſion of it immediately.

Par. 10. *Bazalet Jung*, it could not be conceived, would part with a country which yields him ſuch ample Revenues, and which is ſo commodiouſly ſituated as not only to render him of conſequence on the Sea Coaſt, but like-

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wiſe of conſideration in his interior Dominions of *Adoni*; which, unleſs ſupplied with military ſuocours by the Port of *Mootapillee*, would not be in that defenſive ſtate in which it is now repreſented.

Par. 11. Negociation, could it be carried on with propriety, which we do not think it could, would never effectuate the neceſſary purpoſes with *Bazalet Jung*; and therefore it was evident to us, as well from the foregoing reaſons, as from the jealouſy ſubſiſting between him and his brother, *Nizam Ally Cawn*, that nothing leſs than forcible meaſures would induce him to part with the Guntoor Circar, which, in his eſtimation, muſt be deemed a poſſeſſion of too material conſequence to admit of its being wreſted from him tamely.

Par. 12. And further, on adverting to the Treaty of 1768, we could not but be of opinion, that if we were directly to apply to *Bazalet Jung*, we ſhould, by ſuch a ſtep, give the Soubah the moſt alarming jealouſy; which, for every political conſideration, we ſhould avoid.

Par. 13. The Soubah muſt certainly conſider himſelf as having very material intereſt in the Guntoor Circar; for it is pointedly ſtipulated in the Treaty of 1768, that whenever it ſhall be his pleaſure ſo to do, he may diſpoſe of it from his brother to the Company. And for us to take meaſures for the getting poſſeſſion of that Circar without his acquieſcence, or without the terms of the Treaty being infringed by *Bazalet Jung*, which could alone authorize ſuch a ſtep, would be the moſt effectual means of ſtriking at the root of that friendſhip and connection which it is ſo much the intereſt of the Company to preſerve inviolate.

Par. 14. For us likewiſe to offer to protect the Guntoor Circar for *Bazalet Jung*, in ſo ſhort a time after we had poſitively refuſed the Soubah the aid which by Treaty we were bound to furniſh him, would be to convince him to a certainty that he never was to rely upon the faith of the Engliſh, while an adherence to their engagements could in the leaſt affect their own convenience, or the general ſyſtem of their affairs. Whereas, in a negociation with the Soubah, as principal, we might eaſily convince him of the propriety of the one and the impropriety of the other; the difference between detaching a ſmall body of Troops, at an unfavourable ſeaſon of the year, into diſtant provinces, and that of raiſing and placing a body of Troops in a country, which in ſo ſhort a time is to revert to the Company for ever.

Par. 15. In ſhort, after the moſt mature deliberation on the neceſſity of preventing the eſtabliſhment of Europeans in the Guntoor Circar, as well as on the meaſures which we had the ſatisfaction of the Governor General and Council to adopt, we could not but be of opinion, that the writing to *Bazalet Jung*, or the entering upon any kind of negociation with him, without the concurrence of the Soubah, would be to raiſe up more difficulties towards the accompliſhment of our ends than would be found an eaſy matter for us to overcome; and we therefore reſolve to commence a negociation, by Letter, with the Soubah.

Par. 16. Accordingly a Letter was prepared to the Soubah, ſtating to him our reaſons for wiſhing to diſpoſſeſs the French of their eſtabliſhment in the Guntoor Circar, and deſiring his acquieſcence in our inſiſting upon the compliance of *Bazalet Jung*; to the one or the other of the hereafter-mentioned propoſitions, viz.

Firſt, Either to let to the Company, at an annual rent, previouſly to be agreed upon, the whole of the Guntoor Circar; or,

Secondly, To diſmiſs the Europeans his ſervice, and truſt to the Engliſh for the protection of a country which in reality is their own, though conditionally veſted in him. And in the mean time, we have directed the Troops ſtationed in the Circars dependent upon *Maſulipatam* to be held in readineſs to march.

Par. 17. Having in this manner, and for the reaſons we have given, determined to apply immediately to the Soubah, we deemed it of conſequence that the Nabob ſhould be previouſly acquainted of the line we meant to take, and that he ſhould be requeſted to give us freely his ſentiments thereon, in order that nothing of moment, which, in its moſt diſtant conſequences, could affect the tranquillity of the *Carnatic*, ſhould be undertaken without his knowledge and opinion.

Par. 18. Accordingly, we received a Letter from the Nabob, wherein he ſtates to us at large his ſentiments with reſpect to the meaſure, and the objections which he has to a Letter being ſent to the Soubah, whom he declares expreſsly to be no well-wiſher to the Engliſh: but as thoſe objections, and the arguments which are adduced in ſupport of them, did not appear to us in the alarming light in which they are repreſented, we adhered to our firſt determination, and in conſequence diſpatched the Letter to the Soubah at *Aurengabad*.

Par. 19. As it was however more than probable that *Bazalet Jung* would in the mean time endeavour to ſtrengthen himſelf by his European connections, unleſs ſome effectual ſtop was put to it, we came to the reſolution of ordering two companies of Sepoys to *Vantepollum*, a village belonging to the Company, and adjoining to *Mootapillee*; at which place they have ſince been ſtationed, with directions to the officer commanding, to prevent the paſſing of any ſuccours of men and military ſtores that may be landed at *Mootapillee* for the reinforcement of *Bazalet Jung*; at the ſame time that he is to inform them, they have permiſſion to embark again themſelves, or re-ſhip the ſtores, ſhould they be ſo inclined, after being made acquainted with his orders.

Par. 20. Since the writing of the Letter to the Soubah, and the iſſuing of directions to the Troops in the Circars, in the manner aforegoing, our Preſident has received a Letter from Mr. *Whitehill*, Chief of *Maſulipatam*, wherein he informs him, that ſince the forwarding of the Letter to the Soubah about the Guntoor Circar, he has received ſuch aſſurances of the diſpoſition of the Soubah's Court to improve its connection with the Company, that he is fully convinced a deputation would be well received by that Prince, and that more good conſequences would reſult from a perſonal negociation, than from any other that could be ſet on foot.

Par. 21. Knowing the general principle of Aſiatics, and that unleſs from neceſſity, or to carry ſome private point, the truth is ſeldom ever communicated by Letter, we readily concur with the Chief of *Maſulipatam*, in the opinion, that the Soubah's reply to the propoſitions lately put to him about the Guntoor Circar, may be indefinite and unſatisfactory; but, as we have reaſon ſhortly to expect anſwers both from him and from the Governor General and Council, on the ſame ſubject, we have thought it expedient to defer coming to any new reſolution till we receive them; at which time, if it ſhall appear that the Soubah writes in vague or general terms on a matter which has been ſo ſeriouſly recommended to his conſideration, or that he ſhould expreſs an inclination, that a perſonal negociation ſhould be ſet on foot, and that the ſame ſhould meet with the approbation of the Gentlemen at *Bengal*, and that we ſhould think it for the benefit of your affairs, we mean to depute ſome perſon to him properly authorized, to treat on thoſe points already ſubmitted to his attention.

Par. 22. The Soubah's dominions are a natural barrier to the Company's Northern territories; and there is no doubt, but if ſupported by the countenance and protection of the Engliſh, he would be in a great degree enabled, under their ſanction, to ſecure the tranquillity of thoſe parts.

APPENDIX, No. 68.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 5th June 1775.

GENERAL Letter from *Maſulipatam*, of the 20th ultimo, which was ordered to lie on the table, being now taken into conſideration;

It is agreed, that though a great deal of trouble may be apprehended from the French in caſe of a rupture with that nation, and that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould ſtill perſevere in augmenting of his forces with them; yet, as he has not in any reſpect, that the Board are acquainted with, infringed the terms on which he holds poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, they cannot, with any degree of propriety, either inſiſt on the diſmiſſion of the French, or on the ceſſion of *Mootapillee*, and the other villages poſſeſſed by them. Reſolved therefore, That the Chief and Council be made acquainted with the aforegoing, and that they be directed, if the opportunity ſhould be favourable, and they are of opinion they may ſucceed, to endeavour at obtaining from *Bazalet Jung*, *Mootapillee*, and the other villages, or, if practicable, the whole Circar, at a certain reſerved rent to him, which ſhall be mutually agreed upon for that purpoſe. Reſolved likewiſe, That Copies of the Letters from and to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, be ſent to the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, together with the ſentiments of the Board in full on that ſubject.

A. Wynch,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke.
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 13th June 1775.

Conformable to the Minutes of Conſultation, the following Letter was diſpatched to the Governor General and Council:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council, at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have had the honour to receive your Letter of the 1ſt ultimo, and ſhall ſhortly conform to what you recommend.

Accompanying this, we have the honour to tranſmit you copies of a Letter from the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, and of our Letter in reply thereto; both of which we requeſt your particular attention to. On reference to the ſecond article of the Treaty of Alliance entered into between this Government and *Nizam Ul Mulk*, in 1768, your Honour, &c. will pleaſed to be obſerve, that the Circar of *Murtazanagur* was to be held by *Bazalet Jung*, brother to the Soubah, on certain conditions during his life-time, and at his deceaſe, or infraction of the terms agreed upon, that the property of it reverts to the Company. For many years paſt *Bazalet Jung*, by reaſon of the jealouſy and ill-will ſubſiſting between him and his brother, as well as from the ſituation of his country, greatly expoſed to the incurſions and depredations of the neighbouring Powers, has conſtantly kept up a kind of regular military force, conſiſting of Natives, and a few Foreigners, moſt of them French. The encouragement he hath openly given to Foreigners has been frequently under the conſideration of this Government; but we did not ſee how we could, conſiſtently with the articles of the Treaty, take any meaſures to put a ſtop to ſuch practice, ſo long as he obſerved the conditions of the ſaid Treaty.—The conſiderable ſupply of men and military ſtores which *Bazalet Jung* has of late received from the French, has induced us to pay more particular attention to his motions, and was the cauſe of the above-mentioned Letter from *Maſulipatam*; and it therefore becomes not only a matter of good policy, but, conſidering our reverſionary right to the Muſtazanagur Circar, of evident neceſſity, to prevent, if in our power, ſuch a practice from being continued. *Bazalet Jung* not having infringed the terms agreed upon in the Treaty of Alliance afore-mentioned, it does not ſeem conſiſtent with the Articles of Agreement to diſpoſſeſs him of his country, or to inſiſt upon the diſmiſſion of thoſe European Troops, whom, he will ſay, he is under the neceſſity of employing for the protection of himſelf and dominions. The only mode, therefore, which occurs to us, for obviating the danger to be apprehended, is, to endeavour, if poſſible, to prevail upon *Bazalet Jung* to give up the Port of *Mootapilly*, at which place all his ſuccours are imported, for an adequate acknowledgement; or, if practicable, the whole Circar upon the ſame terms; or that he will admit of its being protected for him by the Company, he being at the expence of the force employed on that ſervice. We much doubt whether he will be brought to conſent to any of the above propoſitions; but, as the evil conſequences to be apprehended, ſhould he, as heretofore, continue increaſing his force, and ſhould he by ſuch means give the French a permanent footing in the Circar, are too evident to be pointed out; we have thought it expedient to recommend the conſideration of this ſubject to your Honour, &c.

(Signed) *A. Wynch*, &c. Council.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 13th June 1775.

Diſpatched the following Letter to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*:

To *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Chief, &c. Council at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letter of the 20th ultimo, and have particularly attended to the reaſon which you advance in ſupport of the meaſures propoſed by you, of either inſiſting upon the diſmiſſion of the French from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, or the immediate ceſſion of *Mootapilly*, and the other villages held by the French, to the Company, at a reſerved rent to *Bazalet Jung* himſelf, during his life-time. There is, no doubt, a great degree of trouble to be apprehended from the French, in caſe of a rupture with that nation, and that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould ſtill perſevere in augmenting his force with them; yet, as he has not, in any reſpect that we are acquainted with, infringed the terms on which he holds poſſeſſion of the Circar, we cannot, with any degree of propriety, either inſiſt on the diſmiſſion of the French, or on the ceſſion of *Mootapilly*, and the other villages poſſeſſed by them; and therefore, at preſent, have only to deſire that you will, if the opportunity ſhould be favourable, and you are of opinion you may ſucceed, endeavour to obtain from *Bazalet Jung*, *Mootapilly*, and the other villages; or, if practicable, the whole Guntoor Circar, at a certain reſerved rent to him, which ſhall be mutually agreed upon for that purpoſe; previouſly adviſing us of what you may propoſe to do, and what proſpect you may have of ſucceeding.

A. Wynch, &c. Council.

APPENDIX, No. 69.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 31ſt July 1775.

PRESENT,

Alexander Wynch, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
John M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Geo. Mackay.
Mr. *Jourdan* indiſpoſed.

READ Letter from the Governor and Council at *Fort William*:

To

APPENDIX. No. 71.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Esq. President, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Gentlemen,

We are favoured with your Letter of the 13th ultimo, transmitting us inclosed a copy of a Letter to you from the Chief and Council at *Masulipatam*, with your sentiments at large on the intelligence which that contains, and your Answer, in consequence, to the Chief and Council at *Masulipatam*.

After weighing maturely the subject of the advices, we have come to a resolution, that no time is to be lost in endeavouring to remove the French from the Guntoor Circar. It is manifest to us, that the number of Foreigners entertained there by *Bazalet Jung*, and the considerable supply of Troops, Cannon, and Ammunition lately sent there, are in consequence of a concerted scheme with the French to secure to them the possession of that province, and to put them in a condition to attack our possessions in those parts with advantage on the first favourable opportunity: at all events, we deem it highly impolitic to leave the French in possession of the port of *Mootapilly*, which affords them so free and easy a communication with those Country Powers who may be supposed to entertain the greatest jealousy of the growing influence of the British Nation; we mean *Nizam Ul Mulk*, *Hyder Ally*, and the Marattas. For these reasons, and seeing that we have the sanction of a reversionary right for interfering to secure the independency of that district, we authorize you immediately to take such steps as may be necessary for that effect; and recommend, that you form a body of Troops, if possible, in conjunction with the Nabob of *Arcot*, and march them immediately to the frontiers of the territory of *Bazalet Jung*. You will then acquaint him, that seeing he has applied for the assistance of Foreign Troops, those of the Company are come to him for that purpose, as well as to secure the reversion of that Circar to them; that you insist upon the immediate discharge of all Foreigners from his service, in failure of which, you will signify to him, that your Troops will take possession of his country, and that you will endeavour, by a negociation with the Nizam, either by the offer of the whole Revenues, or otherwise, to obtain the immediate cession of it to the Company.

This is the measure which suggests to us at present as the most expedient in this affair; we do not mean expressly to direct it, but only to give a sanction to your undertaking it, supposing you should think it advisable, considering the general posture of affairs in the *Carnatic*.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble Servants,

Warren Hastings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monson,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Fort William,
5th July 1775.

As the measures authorized by the Governor General and Council to be pursued relative to the Guntoor Circar, are not only in their immediate, but in their consequential effects, likely to be of the most serious nature to both the interests of the Company, and the future tranquillity of their possessions, and the *Carnatic*; it is resolved, That they be taken into the most mature deliberation at a subsequent Consultation, when the Board will have more fully considered the subject.

Alexr Wynch,
Geo. Dawson,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

APPENDIX, No. 70.

Extract *Fort Saint George* Military Consultations, the 7th August 1775.

PRESENT,

Alexander Wynch, Esq. Governor, President,
Joseph Smith,
George Dawson,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnson,
John M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Franc's Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

ALTHOUGH the Board have not had sufficient time to consider, in the necessary manner, the late measures recommended to be adopted with respect to the Guntoor Circar, by the Governor General and Council, yet cannot but deem it expedient, that matters should be in a proper train of preparation, in case their resolution should be to take possession of it, if *Bazalet Jung* should not acquiesce in the terms that shall be proposed to him; and they accordingly direct, that General *Smith* do prepare, and lay before them at the next Consultation, an account of the number of men and quantities of stores that may appear to him requisite for that purpose.

A. Wynch,
Geo. Dawson,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archd Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

APPENDIX, No. 71.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Consultations, the 14th August 1775.

Alexander Wynch, Esquire, Governor, President,
Joseph Smith,
George Dawson,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnson,
John M. Stone,
Archd Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

IN consequence of the directions of the Board, that General *Smith* should prepare an account of the Troops necessary to take possession of the Guntoor Circar by force, should such a measure be at length determined on; he now lays before them an account of such as he deems absolutely necessary for that purpose.

List of the Troops:

Artillery Men, 60.
2d Battalion of the 2d Brigade, 290.
5 Circar Battalion of Sepoys.
3 Companies of Sepoys from the Battalion stationed at *Masulipatam*, two of whom to be Grenadiers:
And 2 Companies of Grenadiers of the 6th Circar Battalion of Sepoys.

J. Smith, B. G.

The Board being now informed by General *Smith* of the force which will be required, should it be at length determined on to take possession of the Guntoor Circar; and the same being such as can be collected with the greatest ease and expedition, it is agreed, That the measures

meaſures recommended by the Governor General and Council, relative to the Guntoor Circar, be at once ſeriouſly taken into conſideration. From the general poſture of affairs, both in the *Decan* and in the *Carnatic*, the Board cannot but be of opinion, that the applying immediately to *Bazalet Jung* to diſmiſs the Foreigners whom he has employed in his ſervice, and to truſt to the Company for the protection of his country, or to rent to him the whole or a part of the Circar, would be the moſt effectual methods to render him ſtill more deſirous of the aſſiſtance of his European Troops, and probably to call in to his aid the further aſſiſtance of a body of mercenaries, poſſibly of the Marattas or of *Hyder Ally Cawn:* And moreover, the Board cannot conceive themſelves, agreeably to the ſpirit and tenor of the Treaty of 1768, authorized to negociate with *Bazalet Jung* as principal, while in reality he can be conſidered in no other light than that of a dependant upon the Soubah, poſſeſſing a country at his pleaſure or at the will of this Government, who, on the infraction of certain conditions, ſpecified in the Treaty on his part, have an abſolute right to take poſſeſſion of it immediately. *Bazalet Jung*, it cannot be ſuppoſed, would part with a country which yields him ſuch ample Revenues, and which is ſo commodiouſly ſituated, as not only to render him of conſequence on the ſea-coaſt, but likewiſe of conſideration in his interior dominions of *Adoni*; which, unleſs ſupplied with military ſuccours by the port of *Mootapilly*, would be in a much leſs defenſive ſtate than it really is. Negociation, could it be carried on with propriety, would never effectuate the neceſſary purpoſes with *Bazalet Jung*; and therefore it is evident to the Board, that as well from the aforegoing reaſons, as from the jealouſy ſubſiſting between him and his brother, that nothing leſs than forcible meaſures would ever induce him to part with the Guntoor Circar, which he muſt look upon as a poſſeſſion of too material conſequence to let it be wreſted from him tamely. And further, the Board, adverting to the Treaty of 1768, cannot but be of opinion, that if they were directly to apply to *Bazalet Jung*, they ſhould, by ſuch a ſtep, give the Soubah the moſt alarming jealouſy, which for every political conſideration they ſhould avoid. The Soubah muſt certainly conſider himſelf as having very material intereſt in the Guntoor Circar; for it is even ſtipulated in the Treaty of 1768, that when it ſhall be his pleaſure ſo to do, he may diſpoſe of it from his brother to the Company: and for this Government to take meaſures for the getting poſſeſſion of it without his acquieſcence, which they have no juſt right to do, while the terms are not infringed, and until the time of which infringement, the power of diſpoſal is abſolutely veſted in him, would be the moſt effectual means of ſtriking at the root of the friendſhip and connection which it is ſo much the intereſt of the Company to preſerve inviolable. The Board likewiſe offering to protect the Guntoor Circar for *Bazalet Jung* in ſo ſhort a time after they had ſo poſitively refuſed the aid which by Treaty they were bound to furniſh the Soubah with, would be to convince him to a certainty, that he never was to rely upon the faith of the Engliſh, while an adherence to their engagements could in the leaſt affect their own convenience, or the general ſyſtem of their affairs. Whereas, in a negociation with him as a principal, they might eaſily convince him of the propriety of one and of the impropriety of the other; the difference between detaching a ſmall body of Troops at an unfavourable ſeaſon of the year into diſtant provinces, and that of raiſing and placing a body of Troops in a country, which in a ſhort time is to revert to them for ever. In ſhort, the Board, after the moſt mature deliberation on the neceſſity of preventing the eſtabliſhment of Europeans in the Guntoor Circars, as well as on the meaſures which they have the ſanction of the Governor General and Council to adopt, cannot but be of opinion that the writing to *Bazalet Jung*, or the entering upon any kind of negociation with him without the concurrence of the Soubah, would be to raiſe up more difficulties towards the accompliſhment of their ends, than would be found an eaſy matter to overcome; and therefore the Preſident puts the following queſtion:

Queſt. Whether a negociation ſhall be carried on with the Soubah, to endeavour to obtain his conſent to oblige *Bazalet Jung* to accede to one of the hereafter-mentioned propoſitions? viz.

Firſt, Either to diſmiſs the Europeans his ſervice, and truſt to the Engliſh for the protection of a country, which in reality is their own, though conditionally veſted in him; or

Secondly, To let to them, at an annual rent, previouſly to be agreed upon, the whole of the Guntoor Circar.

Agreed to unanimouſly: and

Reſolved in conſequence, that a Letter be prepared to the Soubah to the aforegoing effect; and another to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, directing them to order Colonel *Flint* to hold himſelf in readineſs to march at a moment's warning, with the Troops which are to be collected in the Circars dependant on *Maſulipatam*. As it is, however, of conſequence, that the Nabob ſhould be made acquainted with theſe matters, previous to their being carried into execution, it is reſolved, That the Preſident do inform him fully of them, and requeſt his ſentiments thereon, in order that nothing of moment, which can in its moſt diſtant conſequences affect the tranquillity of the *Carnatic*, be undertaken without his knowledge and opinion with reſpect to its propriety.

The Preſident lays before the Board, Extract of a Letter from Mr. *Whitehill*, Chief of *Maſulipatam*, as entered hereafter:

Nizam Ally is ſaid to be jealous of the correſpondence which *Bazalet Jung* ſeems to be engaging in with *Hyder* and the French; and, I am informed, ſeriouſly reſents his having received ſo many Troops and Stores from the latter; which I credit, from a paragraph in one of *Fazel Beg*'s Letters, in which he ſays, if the Company will ſend a party of Troops to the Soubah, I will engage to put them in poſſeſſion of *Guntoor* in one year after the arrival of their Troops at the Soubah's camp.

Reſolved likewiſe, That a Letter be wrote to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, directing them to order two companies of Sepoys to *Vantepolliam*, under the command of a prudent European Officer, and there to ſtation them till further orders. *Vantepollam* being ſo nearly ſituated to *Mootapilly*, the ſtationing of two companies of Sepoys at that place will be the moſt immediate hindrance that can be given to the importation of military ſuccours to *Bazalet Jung*; and the Gentlemen at *Maſulipatam* are therefore to direct the Officer whom they may nominate to command the party, to ſtop any military ſtores or Europeans that may be landed at *Mootapilly*, and there to detain them until he ſhall receive the neceſſary directions for their diſpoſal. Eſpecial caution muſt, however, be given to him, that he, upon no account whatever, make known to any one the nature of the ſervice he is ſo ſent upon, unleſs neceſſity ſhall render it expedient for him to divulge it.

A' Wynch,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Arch' Palmer,
Fran' Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

APPENDIX. No. 72.

APPENDIX, No. 72.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 21ſt Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex^r Wynch, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Saml Johnſon,
John M. Stone,
Arch^d Palmer,
Fran^s Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

READ Letter which was diſpatched the 19th inſtant to the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam:*

To *John Whitehill*, Eſq. Chief, &c. Council, at *Maſulipatam*.

Gentlemen,

On receipt hereof you will be pleaſed to order two companies of the battalion of Sepoys, at preſent garriſoning *Maſulipatam*, to *Vantepollam*, under the command of a prudent European Officer:—And you are to direct him to ſtop any military ſtores or Europeans that may be landed at the port of *Mootapilly*, and to detain them there until he ſhall have received further orders, taking eſpecial care at the ſame time, that the nature of the ſervice he is ſo ſent upon be not known to any one, unleſs neceſſity ſhall render it neceſſary for him to divulge it: and further, you are to acquaint him, that he is immediately to adviſe both you and us of the number and quantity of Men and Stores he ſhall ſo detain, in order that the neceſſary directions may be given for the diſpoſal of them.

We are, Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, 19th Auguſt 1775. Your affectionate Friends, *A. Wynch*, &c. Council.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that in conſequence of the conference which he had with the Nabob, on the meaſures propoſed to be purſued with reſpect to the Guntoor Circar, and wherein the Nabob promiſed to give him his ſentiments candidly and ſincerely, and that he this morning waited on him (Monday 21ſt Auguſt 1775) and found him far from well, though on the recovery.

He aſked him for his opinion on what he ſpoke to him laſt week, our reſolution of writing to the Soubah. He pointed to his head, and ſaid he was not in a condition to ſpeak to it now. The Preſident replied, that at preſent nothing more was intended than to ſend a Letter to him; and aſked if he thought the *Carnatic* could be affected by it? He anſwered as before; and added, The pen being once made uſe of, there was no retracting.—He appearing ill, the Preſident took his leave of him.

A^r Wynch,
Geo. Dawſon,
Hen^y Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Arch^d Palmer,
Fran^s Jourdan.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 28th Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

Alexander Wynch, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
Geo. Dawſon,
H^y Brooke,
Saml Johnſon,
J^n M. Stone,
Arch^d Palmer,
Fran^s Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Read Letter from the Nabob, as entered in Co. Cor. No. 98, containing his ſentiments in full on the meaſures propoſed with reſpect to *Bazalet Jung*, and the Guntoor Circar.—Does not approve of the ſending a Letter immediately to the Soubah; declares him to be no Friend to the Engliſh, whoſe growing influence he is jealous of; and offers it as his advice, that application ſhould be firſt made to *Bazalet Jung*, unto whom, with the concurrence of the Board, he will ſend a Vakeel for that purpoſe.

Although the Nabob has in the aforegoing Letter uſed many arguments in ſupport of his advice of negociating through his means with *Bazalet Jung*, and, in conſequence, many objections to the meaſures propoſed to be adopted by the Board; yet, as they cannot conceive matters in the ſame alarming light in which they are repreſented; it is reſolved, to adhere to the firſt determination, and to make direct application to the Soubah by Letter.—That the Nabob ſhould not, however, have the leaſt colour of pretence for complaint, in acting thus oppoſite to his opinion; it is ordered, That the Tranſlator do wait upon him with copy of the Letter to the Soubah, and that he do, in the moſt particular manner, explain to him the contents, in order that he may point out to the Board any material objections which may occur to him on the ſubject. Reſolved, in conſequence, that the Letter to the Soubah be not diſpatched till Wedneſday next; when it is agreed to meet, and finally conclude this ſubject.

A^r Wynch,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

From the Nabob, - Dated - 27 / Received 28 } Auguſt 1775.

No. 98. The Paper I here, in a public manner, incloſe to you, contains my opinion for the preſent, on the affair of *Bazalet Jung*, that is, ſo far as you have explained it to me.—I requeſt, as a favour, that whatſoever you ſhall think fit to do in the preſent circumſtances, you will pleaſe to acquaint me with it particularly. What ſhall I ſay more?

From the commencement of my eſtabliſhed friendſhip with the King and Company, and Engliſh Nation, I have always been deſirous of their aggrandizement and advantage, and have always exerted myſelf, as far as my power would go, for the increaſe of the Company's authority in *India*.—In moſt of the conqueſts the Engliſh have made, a body of my Troops have acted in conjunction with them; and in future alſo it is my heart's deſire, that all the Enemies of the Engliſh may become contemptible, and be extirpated, particularly the French, the ruin of whoſe power muſt contribute greatly to the intereſts of myſelf, the Company, and the Engliſh Nation;—on them I have my eye more than any of the reſt, and if any ſcheme or aſſiſtance of mine can contribute to this end, it will impart to me the greateſt ſatisfaction.

Having lately underſtood from the Governor, Mr. *Wynch*, by the interpretation of Mr. *Chambers*, that the Governor General of *Bengal* has written to the Governor and Council of *Madras*, on the ſubject of procuring the diſmiſſion of the French Troops who are in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, and putting the Company in poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar;—notwithſtanding that I am not fully and particularly acquainted with the contents of that Letter, as I am yet convinced, from the proceedings of the Supreme Council, that they have a ſtrict regard for juſtice, that they are diſtinguiſhed for wiſdom and prudence, and that the meaſures they purſue in general are agreeable to the orders of the Court of Directors, and conformable to the intentions of His Majeſty, who

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are my beſt Friends, I have not the leaſt doubt that the directions they may have given on this ſubject have been well weighed and digeſted, and are entirely ſuited to the occaſion.

On the ſuppoſition that the Treaty concluded between the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah*, myſelf, and the Company, in the year 1768, need not be attended to, there is no doubt but the Guntoor Circar may be taken poſſeſſion of with a very ſmall body of Troops; however, the ſeparation of the French who have been in his ſervice before the writing of that Treaty, if done by authority and violence, is attended with difficulties; the ſword muſt be drawn, and war muſt enſue, and this will be a breach of the Treaty ſo concluded, ſigned, and ſealed, by the four Powers, I mean the Nizam, myſelf, the Company, and the Marattas. The Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah*, the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, and the Marattas, will not be perſuaded that this Government have entered upon hoſtilities merely from an enmity to the French, but will conclude that they have made this a pretence for breaking through all the engagements that ſubſiſt between them, with a deſign to make themſelves maſters of their territories. Now that there is war between the Maratta Government and the Engliſh at *Bombay*, and that Preſidency have taken the part of *Ragonaut Row*, this meaſure will afford an excellent pretext for the Nizam to ſide openly with the people at *Poonah*.

Hyder Ally Cawn has alſo got together an extraordinary force of Horſe, Sepoys, Peons, and Artillery, and is ſtill raiſing more; he has a deſign upon the diſtrict of *Cudapah*, which is a dependency of mine, as alſo upon *Caumool*, *Cadwall*, &c. that is, he either means to make the Chiefs of thoſe places join him, or to take poſſeſſion of their territories; nay, he is ſo puffed up by the number of his Troops, that in defiance of the Engliſh, he thinks of laying hands on the diſtrict of *Morari Row*, who is included in the Treaty between the Governor and Council and himſelf, and propoſes commencing hoſtilities againſt *Bazalet Jung*; in ſhort, he ſummonſes them all to join him, and if they refuſe, he immediately employs his thoughts about ſeizing their poſſeſſions. By what he has given *Morari Row* to underſtand verbally by his Vakeel, and the meſſage he has alſo ſeparately ſent him, one may clearly ſee the high deſigns and the ambitious deſire of an increaſe of power he is poſſeſſed with: Theſe circumſtances you will learn by the two Letters from *Morari Row*, one to myſelf, and the other to his Vakeel, who is here, of which I ſend you Perſian tranſlations incloſed; a matter which cannot but prove highly injurious to the honour of the Company and the intereſt of their affairs. Now the increaſe of *Hyder*'s power is in fact an eſſential addition to that of the French, for he has certainly the ſtrongeſt attachment to them; and they, when occaſion offers, place their hopes in his aſſiſtance and alliance; and though, for want of treaſure, and from other inauſpicious circumſtances, the French ſhould be even deſirous of deferring all hoſtile deſigns to a later period, yet *Hyder*, we may be ſure, will not be deficient in offers of ſuccour with his whole force, of paying all the expences of their Troops in treaſure and revenue, of protection in his forts, and of every neceſſary ſupply of grain, bullocks for the Artillery, proviſion, &c. that they can deſire, in order to ſpur them on; in a word, it may be deemed certain, that the Army of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, which is drawn up and ready in *Manore*, is entirely at the devotion of the French.

Whenever the Nabob *Bazalet Jung* ſhall experience ill uſage from the Engliſh, he will of neceſſity join himſelf to *Hyder Ally Cawn*; the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah* will be induced to take the ſame meaſure, and the Fouzdars of *Cannoul* and *Cudapah*, with *Morari Row*, and the other Chiefs of the country, will unavoidably follow the reſt; the tranquillity of the *Carnatic* as well as the Circars will be diſturbed, and *Hyder*, who has his eye upon the diſtrict of *Balbaunee Chetteldery*, and of the other Zemindars dependant on *Adoni*, will eaſily become maſter of thoſe places, and will by that means be enabled to raiſe more Troops.

As I am attached to the Company, it is my deſire that their intereſts be promoted ſo as that their honour and reputation be preſerved, and that without trouble and difficulty; ſo I mean as that the tranquillity of my country and the Company's may be ſecured, and war and diſturbance be averted in future. Thus, formerly, without any requeſt on the part of the Company, the Nabob *Salabut Jung* ſent his Vakeel, through my mediation, with Sunnuds for the Circar, upon condition of friendſhip and aſſiſtance, which my Friends refuſed; after that, the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah* ſent the ſame, which were in like manner rejected. At length they took poſſeſſion of them by way of open hoſtility and violence; and the Nizam being offended at this proceeding, Gen. *Calliaud* and Mr. *Stracy* were ſent with preſents to *Hydrabaud*, and took the Circars at rent, entering at the ſame time into engagements of alliance with him. As it was then the ſeaſon of the rains, the Nizam's Troops were not in readineſs for action; and on the other hand, thoſe of the Engliſh were quite prepared in the fort of *Cundapilly* and in the *Carnatic*; the Nizam therefore, inwardly diſſatisfied, patched up an imperfect peace; and I mentioned at the time, that it was not ſincerely and properly concluded. When he approached the *Carnatic*, and joined *Hyder Ally Cawn*, General *Joſeph Smith* was ordered to leave him with the Engliſh Forces under his command, and they then entered my country; the war and diſturbance that enſued upon this, the devaſtation of my country, the plundering of the inhabitants, and the load of military expences that fell upon me, need no long explanation here, as my Friends are already acquainted with them. What I would ſay is this, that all this I have done, from the regard I have to the Company, and the intereſt I take in the proſperity of their affairs, and that at the ſame time I wiſhed ſincerely well to the Engliſh Nation, and to them.—I am perfectly well acquainted with the diſpoſition of the Country Powers, and the ſyſtem of their politics; what I wiſh therefore is to promote the Company's intereſt with ſolidity and credit, and without diſturbance on either ſide. In the preſent inſtance, if the Governor and Council, who are the Deputies of my beſt Friends, will inform me of their real ſentiments, will let me know the full purport of the Letter from the Governor General of *Bengal*, and acquaint me, with openneſs and preciſion, of what they think adviſable, I might ſend a perſon in friendly manner to *Bazalet Jung*, with Letters from myſelf and the Governor and Council, propoſing the diſmiſſion of the French; and might empower him, in caſe *Bazalet Jung* ſhould remonſtrate concerning the injury his affairs might ſuſtain from ſuch a proceeding, and the advantage his Enemies would have over him, to aſſure him with confidence, that he might depend on receiving all the benefits he could propoſe to himſelf from the ſervice of the French, from the aſſiſtance of a body of Engliſh Troops, whom he might pay by a Tankoah on the Guntoor Circar.—If *Bazalet Jung* ſhould agree to this propoſal, and the Governor and Council ſhould ſend a body of Troops to be maintained at his expence out of the Revenues of the Guntoor Circar, the ſeparation of the French would not be the only benefit ariſing therefrom, a variety of advantages would accrue: for a Force being maintained out of the Revenue of that Circar, and one half being always ſtationed there, and the other with *Bazalet Jung* at *Adoni*, would be always ready for ſervice. The Commander of thoſe Troops would always have him and his country in his power in the way of friendſhip; and *Bazalet Jung* would be doubly ſecured from negociating or forming connections with any individual of the Company's Enemies; on the one hand, by the Treaty ſo often mentioned, on the other, by the awe thoſe Troops would keep him in: as a conſequence of this too, the Zemindars dependant on *Adoni*, the Fouzdar of *Cannoul*, with *Morari Row*, with all their Forces of Horſe, Sepoys,

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poys, and Foot, that make all together a formidable body, would join us in caſe of an invaſion from *Hyder*, or any other Enemy. The Fouzdar of *Cuddapah*, who is a Dependant of mine, would either act in allegiance, as his Maſters have done, or otherwiſe by the favour of Heaven, the diſtrict of *Cudapah* might eaſily be put upon the ſame footing as my other poſſeſſions; and all this would keep *Hyder Ally* in awe. But one principal advantage from keeping *Bazalet Jung* in your hand in the way of amity, would be this, that he would be a ſecurity againſt any ill deſign of the Nizam.

Thus, as a ſincere friend and well-wiſher to the proſperity and intereſt of the Company, I have written, without the leaſt reſerve, whatever occurred to me as adviſable in this affair.

There is, however, one very important conſideration, which gives me a good deal of anxiety; which is this, that in the eye of ſound judgment it ſeems utterly unadviſed to ſeparate a body of French Europeans and Sepoys, well diſciplined and ſupplied with military ſtores, from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, who is weak and impotent in war, without treaſure, and ſecured by a Treaty with the Engliſh, and to ſuffer them to join *Hyder Ally*, the Enemy of the Engliſh Nation, who is already puffed up with the extent of country he poſſeſſes, his abundance of treaſure, and the number of his Troops; by this means, bringing two powerful Enemies together.—Surely ſome means muſt be adopted to prevent the junction of this Force with any of the Powers of *India*, eſpecially the Enemies of the Company.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Morari Row Goporah*; received at Durbah, 25th Auguſt 1775.

It is long ſince I had the pleaſing ſatisfaction of receiving a Letter from your Highneſs—among friends and brothers there is no need of a perpetual ſeries of buſineſs or important undertakings to keep up their correſpondence; and the receipt of Letters from your Highneſs cannot but be at all times to me a ſource of joy.—*Gopaut Row* and *Sreeput Row*, Vakeels, have repeatedly at your Highneſs's deſire written to me on the ſubject of an interview and mutual friendſhip, which has given me great pleaſure; the deſire I have of waiting upon your Highneſs is unbounded, and it is a meaſure your Highneſs's intereſts require, which it is needleſs to write upon.

The Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*, Behr, has got together an Army and a train of Artillery, and has ſome expedition in view.—Thus much I learn from intelligence, but it is not clear what quarter he has deſigns upon; common report ſays, he means to fall upon *Cudapah*, which belongs to your Highneſs, and alſo upon *Adoni*, *Carnool*, *Cadwall Balharee*, and my diſtricts. Now, though the ſaid Nabob and I are upon friendly terms as yet, and has given me no grounds to doubt his ſincerity; your Highneſs nevertheleſs knows the politics of the preſent time, and if by the inſtigation of ſhort-ſighted people he ſhould think of picking a quarrel, and invade my territory, I have no doubt that your Highneſs, who is our Brother and our Chief, and the Governor and Council, who are our Friends, will afford me ſuccour and aſſiſtance, eſpecially as I and my country are included in the Treaty of Peace. I conceive I have no room to be anxious, and I hope that your Highneſs and the Governor Behauder will be pleaſed to write to the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn*, to prevail upon him not to make a breach in the amity ſubſiſting between us.

I have written explicitly on this ſubject to *Abdul Rachbed Cawn*, Behauder, and *Seid Auſin Cawn*, Behauder, as alſo *Sueput Row*, who will give your Highneſs a full account of particulars. Your Highneſs's knowledge and diſcernment, I dare ſay, will incline you, on their repreſentation, to be favourable to my requeſt. *Nackul Row Conair*, the Intelligencer, who is with me, has no doubt written you fully, and your Highneſs will learn more from what he now ſends you. I have to beg you will favour me with a ſpeedy Reply to this Letter.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Morari Row* to *Sueput Row*, his Vakeel; received at Durbar, 25th Aug. 1775.

My Vakeel, who is reſident with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, at *Seringapatam*, writes me the following particulars: That *Hyder* has lately been raiſing conſiderable Forces, and ſtill continues to raiſe more, inſomuch that he is ſending advance-money to all quarters for that purpoſe; that his Stable Horſe and others together amount to the number of 15,000—his Sepoys 30,000—and his *Carnatic* Peons, his Artillery, and warlike ſtores are abundantly formidable in his camp.—That there is a ſcantineſs in nothing, and his people are regularly paid; and that his firm intention is to march with his Army againſt the Polygars *Cheeldurg*, *Raydurg*, *Ballauze*, and *Harpanpally*; the Fouzdars of *Sannoor* and *Cannoul*, and the dominions of the Peiſhwa as far as the river *Kiſtnah*, to collect from the ſeveral Sedars, Soubahdars, and Polygars, as much money as he choſes; and to chaſtiſe thoſe that are refractory, or oblige them to join them. He ſent for my Vakeel into his preſence, and ſpoke to him thus, "*Morari Row* is an independant Chief, and I have not been "deficient in friendſhip and confidence towards him: I "am now deſirous of moving upon ſome expedition or "other.—Laſt year I ſent my ſon *Tippoo* with a Force "againſt *Adoni* and *Cannoul*, but as *Morari Row* wrote "to requeſt that I would, out of regard to his inclination, defer the ſaid deſign for that year, I attended to "his interceſſion—put a ſtop to the expedition, and recalled *Tippoo* with his Troops: now, however, I have "enliſted a great number of Troops, Horſe and Foot, "and they muſt have ſomething to do."

Bazalet Jung and *Ramnaut Cawn* have been writing to me for this twelvemonth paſt, that they will come and have an interview with me, when ſome ſchemes may be concerted; but from a principle of foreſight, I have, as yet, declined their propoſal: now, however, they are both particularly preſſing on that head, in order that a Treaty may be concluded between us; and *Ramnaut Cawn* is inceſſantly ſending me Letters that he will come poſt haſte to ſee me. In this caſe, how can I forbid his coming? and yet *Hyder Ally Cawn*, who has hoſtile deſigns, and puffed up as he is at preſent, cares for no one, will conceive ſome other ſuſpicions if I ſhould receive a viſit from *Ramnaut Cawn*, and what ſhall I do then? As to myſelf, I ſhall never be deficient in friendſhip; but, if notwithſtanding this, *Hyder Ally Cawn* will commence hoſtilities, I have no remedy; my dependance, however, is upon the ſincerity of the Nabob and the Engliſh Company, and my name is included in the Treaty of Peace.

Explain theſe matters to the Nabob, and he will repreſent them to the Governor and Council; they may then both write on this ſubject to *Hyder Ally Cawn*, that he form no deſign againſt me.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 30th Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex^r Wynch, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
John M. Stone,
Fran^s Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Mr. *Dawſon* and Mr. *Palmer* indiſpoſed.

The Preſident lays before the Board, the following Report of the Perſian Tranſlator.

29th Auguſt 1775. Agreeable to directions I received yeſterday from the Governor I went this morning to the Nabob, and offered to interpret to him the contents of the Letter from Bengal of the 5th ult. and

of the Letter intended to be ſent from this Government to the Nizam. The Nabob ſaid it would anſwer no end to hear them only read to him in that manner, as he was not able to retain in his memory immediately ſuch a length of argument, ſo as to form a competent judgment of the ſcope of it; he would be glad therefore, if either Tranſlations of them were ſent him, or copies in Engliſh; when he would peruſe them, and give his opinion. I told the Nabob from the Governor, that as *Bazalet Jung* was not a principal in the Treaty, the Board thought it improper to addreſs him on the ſubject; and therefore propoſed writing to the Nizam. The Nabob ſaid, that he himſelf being a principal in the Treaty, it was neceſſary he ſhould give his opinion, and that he ſhould be connected in the affair;—that his opinion was, that writing to the Nizam on this occaſion was exceedingly improper—that the Nizam himſelf was no friend of the Engliſh, and would never ſecond any friendly connection between them and *Bazalet Jung*—that *Bazalet Jung*, on the other hand, would pay no regard to the injunctions of the Nizam, and therefore he was convinced would by no means conſent to either of the propoſitions intended to be made to him:—In ſhort, that it was impoſſible to proceed in this manner without producing a rupture;—that he had offered his advice, which, if the Board would attend to, it would be well; if not, they would act as they thought proper.

Wm Chambers.

As the Board have now heard what further objections the Nabob had to urge againſt diſpatching the Letter to the Soubah, which was ordered to be prepared at a former Conſultation, the Preſident puts the following queſtion:

Queſt. Is it adviſable, conſidering what has been urged by the Nabob, to diſpatch the Letter to the Soubah immediately, or not?

Mr. *Mackay*. For the immediate diſpatch of the Letter.

Mr. *Jourdan*. For the ſame.

Mr. *Palmer*. For the ſame.

Mr. *Stone*. For the Letter being detained, until the Nabob ſhall be furniſhed with the ſubſtance of the Letter from the Governor General and Council, on the ſubject of *Guntoor*, as well as of that propoſed to be ſent to the Soubah, and that he ſhall have given the Board his ſentiments thereon more particularly, as he does not apprehend any inconvenience can reſult from ſuch delay.

Mr. *Johnſon*. For the Letter not being diſpatched—will give his reaſons at a future Conſultation.

Mr. *Brooke*. For deferring ſending the Letter until the Board ſhall have the ſentiments of the Nabob on the ſubſtance of the Letter from the Governor General and Council, and of that propoſed to be ſent to the Soubah, which he is to be furniſhed with, and more eſpecially as it is eſſential to the proſperity of the Company's affairs that they and he ſhould, if poſſible, go hand in hand together, or at leaſt that nothing definitive ſhould be undertaken, whereby the tranquillity of the *Carnatic* may be diſturbed, without his being previouſly, particularly, and candidly adviſed with.

General *Smith*. For detaining the Letter until the Nabob ſhall have given his ſentiments on the Letter from the Governor General and Council on the ſubject of *Guntoor*.

The Preſident. As the Preſident does not ſee any material inconvenience which can reſult from deferring the diſpatch of the Letter a few days longer, he is againſt its being ſent until the Board ſhall have heard further from the Nabob, on the contents of the Letter from the Governor General and Council.

The majority of the Board being againſt the immediate diſpatch of the Letter to the Soubah; It is reſolved, That it be detained until the Nabob ſhall have given them his further ſentiments;—which he promiſes to do on being furniſhed with the ſubſtance of the Letter from the Governor General and Council, in writing, as well as that to be ſent to the Soubah; both of which it is agreed to ſend him, with a Letter, which is now read and approved, as entered in Co. Corr. N° 99.

APPENDIX. No. 73.

Alex. Wynch,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Fourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

To the Nabob.

N° 99. In conſequence of the report which I have juſt had the honour to receive from Mr. *Chambers*, the tranſlator, of the converſation which he had yeſterday with your Highneſs, I am to acquaint you, that this Government will always have a real ſatisfaction in communicating every thing to your Highneſs which may be material; and I therefore now have the honour of ſending you incloſed, agreeably to your deſire, the ſubſtance of the Letter which we have lately received from the Governor General and Council, relative to the Guntoor Circar, as well as of that which is propoſed to be diſpatched to the Nizam.—But as delay in all caſes of conſequence is detrimental to the public ſervice, I am to requeſt that your Highneſs will favour me with your ſentiments on thoſe Letters as ſoon as poſſible.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 4th September 1775.

Came in Letter from the Nabob, dated 31ſt Auguſt, as entered in Co. Corr. N° 100, in further ſupport of his former opinion, of the propriety of negociating firſt with *Bazalet Jung*, before any ſteps are taken with the Soubah.

APPENDIX, No. 73.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 18th Auguſt 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex^r Wynch, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
George Dawſon,
Hy Brooke,
Saml Johnſon,
J. M. Stone,
Arch. Palmer,
Fran^s Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.
General *Smith* indiſpoſed.

THE Preſident delivers in the Perſian Tranſlator's Report of Conferences with the Nabob, relative to the meaſures propoſed, with reſpect to the Guntoor Circar, as entered hereafter.

Tueſday 15th Auguſt 1775, went to the Nabob with the Governor; the Nabob was indiſpoſed, and wrapt up in a ſhawl. The Governor told the Nabob, that ſome time ago, on the arrival of warlike ſtores and a military force from the French to the country of *Bazalet Jung*, by the way of the Guntoor Circar, he had written the Governor General and Council of *Calcutta* on the ſubject.—That their anſwer was now come, to this purport: "That it was neceſſary to prevent this meaſure, either "by having the ſaid Circar in our poſſeſſion, or inducing "*Bazalet Jung* to diſmiſs thoſe forces."—That yeſterday the Council had taken it into conſideration, and did propoſe to write the Nizam a Letter, acquainting him, that they did not perceive the inconvenience that might ariſe

APPENDIX No. 73.

from *Bazalet Jung* having the Guntoor Circar, at the time they firſt conſented to that meaſure; but it now appeared, that from his collecting a body of French in his country, the reverſion of the Guntoor Circar might not only be rendered uncertain to the Company, but their other Circars might alſo be injured by it—that therefore it was neceſſary either to let us have the Guntoor Circar at an annual rent, or that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould conſent to diſmiſs thoſe Europeans from his ſervice. The Governor then proceeded to tell the Nabob, that the Board intended, in the interim, to order the Sepoys at *Ellore* to be in readineſs, and ſome Sepoys to *Vantepollam*, which is cloſe to *Mootapilly*, where theſe ſtores are landed, and to prevent any more from being admitted there; and that the Ongole battalion was to be in readineſs, in caſe it ſhould become neceſſary to uſe any forces in that quarter: The Governor ſaid, he informed the Nabob of this, as it was thought proper he ſhould be previouſly acquainted, when ſuch meaſures were about to be purſued. The Nabob anſwered dryly, That it ſeemed needleſs to acquaint him, but he was, however, obliged for that favour. The Governor aſked his opinion; to which he replied, it was out of place to aſk his opinion, when a matter was abſolutely reſolved upon. The Governor ſaid it was an affair propoſed, and they ſhould be glad of his opinion about it. The Nabob ſaid, if they wanted his opinion, merely as ſuch, it was one thing; and if by way of attending to his advice, another; that in this caſe, if they would write him a Letter on the ſubject, he would anſwer it; he could not give his opinion on ſuch a matter, without ſome previous reflection. The Governor ſaid, it was not public as yet, it was only known to the Gentlemen of Council. The Nabob anſwered, that it could not be private; if a Letter was wrote to the Nizam, the whole *Decan* muſt then know it, and that he himſelf was as one of their Council. The Governor replied, that he had acquainted the Nabob with this matter, becauſe he conſidered the intereſt of the Nabob and the Company as connected, and becauſe meaſures ſo taken might alſo affect the *Carnatic*. The Nabob ſaid, by this it was plain, that the Governor's ſentiments ſo far correſponded with his own. The Governor then repeated the unity of intereſts; ſaid nothing would be undertaken to injure the *Carnatic*, and if the Nabob would think of it, and give his opinion, he would wait on him in a couple of days for that purpoſe. The Nabob ſaid, he would give it him with the utmoſt ſincerity, but if his health would permit him, he would come to him.

This was the ſubſtance of the diſcourſe; I do not recollect any thing elſe of conſequence.

Wm Chambers.

As it appears, from the conference which the Preſident has had with the Nabob, that we may expect his ſentiments fully on the meaſures propoſed, it is Reſolved, That nothing be done before the next Conſultation; when we hope to be furniſhed with his opinion at large.

Read draft of a Letter to the Soubah, as entered in Co. Corr. 94. conformably to the Minutes of Conſultation on the 14th inſtant. Approved—but as it is poſſible that the Nabob may be able to throw ſome new light on the ſubject, it is reſolved, That the Letter be not diſpatched until the Board are furniſhed with his ſentiments thereon.

A. Wynch,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultation, the 15th September 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex. Wynch, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
John M. Stone,
Arch. Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Mr. *Johnſon* deſires that the following Minute may be entered, which contains his ſentiments on the Reſolution of the Board, relative to the meaſures propoſed to be taken with reſpect to the Guntoor Circar.

On conſidering the Guntoor buſineſs with the moſt deliberate attention, I cannot approve of the meaſure of our intended addreſs to the Soubah; I am afraid it is neither well-timed, well-concerted, or ſuch as is moſt likely to produce the intended good.—The principal object with the Supreme Council appears to me to be not ſo much the ſecuring the reverſion of the Circar, as the expulſion of the French Troops, and the immediate poſſeſſion of the ſea port of *Mootapilly*, by which they might hereafter introduce ſuch military ſuccours to the adjacent Country Powers, as might endanger our other Circars. The quere in this caſe then becomes, what ſeems the moſt effectual means to this end?—Why, I ſhould imagine, our Letter to the Soubah will only give the alarm, without inducing him to favour our views, or acknowledge our conduct to be an infraction of the Treaty. It is my opinion that before we write to either the Soubah or *Bazalet Jung*, we ſhould conſider well, and not only take our reſolution, but have every thing prepared for their non-compliance with our views—I have ſaid the meaſure is ill-timed, becauſe I think we ſhould wait the hourly expected arrival of the laſt orders of the Seaſon, and of a new Governor, and I conſider it ill-concerted, as it appears to me very impolitical, that the Nabob is not made a party in it: In any matter that has a relation to the French, it would, I think, be good policy to make him a principal; and in an affair that may end in war with the neighbouring Country Powers, would it not be equally ſo to have his Highneſs a party, both to defray the greateſt part of the expence, and ſupport us with his Cavalry? When the ſuperior Government recommend ſo ſtrongly employing his Troops, if *poſſible*, on this ſervice, I imagine theſe were their objects.

The arguments uſed againſt conſidering *Bazalet Jung* but as a dependant of the Soubah, and the reaſons offered againſt negociating with him directly, are, I ſuſpect, more ſpeculative than ſolid in politics with the Country Powers—*Bazalet Jung* poſſeſſes the diſtrict, and has the French in his ſervice. The danger of applying to the Soubah, before we act with his brother, is, that the latter will get intelligence and take the alarm; and either by negociating with neighbouring Powers, or other arrangements of ſecurity, endeavour to defeat our purpoſe. *Hyder Ally* is near him, and by his encroachment upon *Cuddapa*, and the very great preparations he is making near that quarter, he ſeems bent on extending his poſſeſſions to the Orixa Shore. If *Bazalet Jung* throws himſelf under *Hyder*'s protection, our negociations with the Soubah will, I fear, be of little end.

In a word, I conſider this buſineſs as very intereſting, and I am afraid an addreſs to the Soubah will appear to the Supreme Council rather a ſort of compliance with their intentions on the terms of their Letter, than any effectual ſtep to the attainment of the grand object.

(Signed) *A. Wynch,*
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 4th September 1773.

PRESENT,

Alexander Wynch, Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Joſeph Smith,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Samuel Johnſon,
John M. Stone,
Arch. Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
George Mackay.

Read Letter from the Nabob, as mentioned in the Diary dated 31ſt ult°; wherein he ſtill continues to urge the propriety of negociating immediately with *Bazalet Jung*, and for that purpoſe propoſes that an Envoy ſhall be ſent to *Bazalet Jung* with Letters, both from the Preſident and from himſelf. As the Board have now waited till they were furniſhed with every argument which the Nabob could ſuggeſt in oppoſition to the meaſures propoſed by them to be carried into execution; as they do not ſee any political or juſt grounds for altering their firſt ſentiments, the Preſident moves to know, if the Letter already prepared to the Soubah ſhall be immediately diſpatched, or not.—Agreed to, and ordered accordingly, by all but Mr. *Johnſon*, who will give his reaſons at a future Conſultation.

Ordered, That the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam* be adviſed of the determination of the Board to negociate immediately with the Soubah; and that they be directed to cauſe Colonel *Flint* to hold himſelf in readineſs to march with the Troops mentioned by General *Smith*, in Conſultation the 14th ult°, to be the number which it may be found neceſſary to employ in getting poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, ſhould ſuch a meaſure be at length determined on: Captain *Duncan* likewiſe, commanding at *Ongole*, to be directed to hold himſelf in readineſs to march with his battalion. Ordered likewiſe, That a Letter be prepared to the Governor General and Council, ſtating to them at large the reaſons which have induced the Board to begin by negociating with the Soubah, inſtead of purſuing thoſe meaſures to which they have given their ſanction in their Letter of the 5th of July.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Military Conſultations, the 13th September 1775.

CONFORMABLY to the Minutes of Conſultation, the following Letter was this day diſpatched to the Governor General and Council.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

We have had the honour of receiving your Letter of the 5th July, conveying to us your ſentiments reſpecting the French Troops in the Guntoor Circar, and of the meaſures which appear to you moſt expedient for diſpoſſeſſing them of that footing which they have acquired, and for rendering the reverſionary right of the country to the Company as unclogged with difficulties as poſſible; and to the whole, we have paid the moſt particular attention. As your Honour, &c. however, has not expreſsly required us to adopt thoſe meaſures which you recommend, but only give us your ſanction for undertaking them, ſuppoſing we ſhould think them adviſable, conſidering the general poſture of affairs in the *Carnatic*; ſo we have maturely weighed every argument which could be advanced in ſupport of them; and we hope that the reſult of our deliberations will meet with your concurrence: And we could not conceive ourſelves, agreeably to the ſpirit and tenor of the Treaty of 1768, authorized to negociate with *Bazalet Jung* as principal, when in reality he can be conſidered in no other light than that of a dependant upon the Soubah, poſſeſſing a country at his pleaſure, or at the will of the Engliſh, who, on the infractions of certain conditions ſpecified in the Treaty, on his part, have an abſolute right to take poſſeſſion of it immediately. *Bazalet Jung*, it cannot be ſuppoſed, would part with a country which yields ſuch ample revenues, and which is ſo commodiouſly ſituated as not only to render him of conſequence on the ſea coaſt, but likewiſe of conſideration in his interior Dominions of *Adoni*; which, unleſs ſupplied with military ſuccours by the port of *Mootapillee*, would be in a much leſs defenſive ſtate than it really is. Negociation, could it be carried on with propriety, which we do not think it can, would never effectuate the neceſſary purpoſes with *Bazalet Jung*, and therefore we are convinced, as well from the reaſons which we have advanced, as from the jealouſy ſubſiſting between him and his brother, that nothing leſs than forcible meaſures would ever induce him to part with the Guntoor Circar, which he muſt look upon as a poſſeſſion of too material conſequence to let it be wreſted from him tamely: And further, by adverting to the Treaty of 1768, we could not but be of opinion, that if we were to apply directly to *Bazalet Jung*, we ſhould by ſuch a ſtep give the Soubah the moſt alarming jealouſy, which, by every political conſideration, we ſhould avoid. For us likewiſe to offer to protect the Guntoor Circar for *Bazalet Jung*, in ſo ſhort a time after we declined ſending the Soubah the aid which he had applied for, would be to convince him to a certainty, that he never was to rely upon the faith of the Engliſh while an adherence to their engagements could in the leaſt affect their own convenience, or the general ſyſtem of their affairs: Whereas, in a negociation with him as a principal, we might eaſily convince him of the propriety of the one, and of the impropriety of the other; the difference between detaching a ſmall body of Troops at an unfavourable ſeaſon of the year, into diſtant Provinces, and that of raiſing and placing a body of Troops in a country which in ſo ſhort a time is to revert to us for ever. In ſhort, after the moſt mature deliberation on the neceſſity of preventing the French from gaining an eſtabliſhment in the Guntoor Circar, as well as on the meaſures which we have the ſanction of your Honour, &c. to adopt, we could not but be of opinion, that the writing to *Bazalet Jung*, or the entering upon any kind of negociation with him without the concurrence of the Soubah, would be to raiſe up more difficulties towards the accompliſhment of our ends than would be found an eaſy matter for us to overcome. And we therefore reſolved to commence a negociation with the Soubah by Letter, copy of which comes incloſed, for your information; and in the mean time have directed that the Troops in the Circars dependant upon *Maſulipatam*, be held in readineſs to march, in caſe we ſhould find it expedient to carry our meaſures into execution by a military force. Having in this manner, and for the reaſons we have given, determined to apply immediately to the Soubah, we deemed it of conſequence that the Nabob ſhould be previouſly acquainted of the line which we meant to take, and that he ſhould be requeſted to give us freely his ſentiments thereon, in order that nothing of moment, which in its moſt diſtant conſequences could affect the tranquillity of the *Carnatic*, ſhould be undertaken without his knowledge and opinion. Accordingly, we received a Letter from the Nabob, copy whereof is incloſed; wherein he ſtates to us freely the objections which he has to a Letter being ſent to the Soubah, whom he declares to be no well-wiſher to the Engliſh;—but as thoſe objections, and the argument which he brings in ſupport of them, do not appear to us in the alarming light in which they are repreſented, we have adhered to our firſt determination, and in conſequence, we have diſpatched the Letter to the Soubah:

Previous

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Previous however to the diſpatch of the Letter, the Nabob was made acquainted with the ſubſtance of your Honour, &c.'s Letter of the 5th of July, and of that which we had prepared for the Soubah; and he accordingly addreſſed us another Letter on the ſubject, copy whereof is incloſed.

APPENDIX, No. 75.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 13th November 1775.

PRESENT,

Alex^r Wynch, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Geo. Stratton,
R. Fletcher,
Geo. Dawſon,
H. Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Fran^s Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

SIR *Robert Fletcher* acquaints the Board, that as he has a motion to propoſe upon the ſubject matter of the laſt Conſultation; he deſires that a Letter may be read from Mr. *Brooke*, 14th March 1773, when he was Chief of *Maſulipatam*.

Letter from Mr. *Brooke*, 14th March 1774, read accordingly.

General *Fletcher* then addreſſes the Board as followeth:

Since our laſt Meeting, I have read with attention the ſeveral Papers relative to the Guntoor Circar, and I have maturely conſidered what the conduct of *Bazalet Jung* has been ſince our Treaties of 1766 and 1768, with his brother the Soubah. By the 5th Article of the Treaty of 1766, *Bazalet Jung*, his agents, and dependants are bound, under forfeiture of his right of poſſeſſion, not to cauſe any diſturbances to the prejudice of the Company.—*Bazalet Jung* may ſay he has not broken the 5th Article, becauſe he has not yet cauſed any actual diſturbances, but it is my opinion, that he has for years paſt been acting in direct contradiction to the ſpirit of the 5th article, by receiving numbers of our Europeans into his ſervice and by the encouragement he has conſtantly given them to deſert, either to himſelf, or his French party.

By the ſecond article of the Treaty of 1768, it is expreſsly the opinion of the contracting parties, that *Bazalet Jung* had previous to that early period, broken the 5th article of the Treaty of 1766. The parties declare therefore, that the Company had then had a juſt claim to take poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar; but in conſideration of our friendſhip for the Soubah, and our deſire not to diſtreſs his affairs, by obliging him to provide *Bazalet Jung* with another Jaghire, we overlook his bad conduct, and conſent to continue him in poſſeſſion of the Circar, upon the terms of the Treaty of 1766; with the additional clauſe inſerted in the ſecond article of the Treaty of 1768, that he ſhall live in harmony with the Engliſh, and that he ſhall give no protection or aſſiſtance to any of our enemies—Such are the terms of both Treaties; and ſuch has been the notorious and repeated conduct of *Bazalet Jung*, both ſubſequent and previous to the Treaty of 1768, that I think he has acted in open violation of both, and in a manner, though ſlow and progreſſive, yet, in his ſituation, the moſt direct and the moſt probable in the end, to do a real prejudice to the Company.

I know that Mr. *Du Pre*, and perhaps Mr. *Wynch*, received frequent information (although they may not be entered on the records) from the Chiefs of *Maſulipatam*, and Officers commanding to the Northward of the great prejudice we have repeatedly ſuſtained, in conſequence of the encouragement given by *Bazalet Jung*, his agents, and dependants, to the deſertion of our Europeans. Such then has been the conduct of *Bazalet Jung*; and I take this public opportunity of declaring it to be the moſt effectual way of violating the ſpirit of both Treaties to our prejudice; nay, the very words of the Treaty of 1768 are groſsly infringed; for I believe that it will be admitted that own deſerters are enemies, but enemies of the worſt ſort. If *Bazalet Jung*'s conduct therefore can be reconciled to the clear and obvious terms of the Treaty of 1768, it muſt be done by thoſe who have better logical abilities than I can pretend to; and, unleſs ſome Member of the Board can prove to me, that I do not underſtand the meaning of the Treaty, or that I am miſinformed with reſpect to *Bazalet Jung*'s conduct, I ſhall enter my proteſt againſt delaying any longer to take meaſures for our own ſecurity.

The Governor General and Council, although they do not appear to know any thing of the circumſtances I have mentioned, as an infringement of the Treaty, yet they are clearly of opinion that no time is to be loſt in removing the French from the Guntoor Circar; becauſe it is manifeſt to them, and it is ſo to me, that the number of French and the quantity of ſtores now in the Guntoor Circar, are concerted in conſequence of a ſcheme, to ſecure to them the poſſeſſion of that province, and to put them in a condition to attack our Circars on the firſt favourable opportunity, as well as to enable them to carry on their intrigues with thoſe Country Powers who already entertain the greateſt jealouſy of the Engliſh. Upon this opinion alone, they recommend to you to form a body of Troops, if poſſible, in conjunction with the Nabob, and march them immediately to the frontiers of the territory of *Bazalet Jung*, and then inſiſt on the immediate diſcharge of the French party.—But had they known the frequent cauſes which I think *Bazalet Jung* has given us to complain of a breach of Treaty, it is my opinion they would have recommended to you to diſpoſſeſs him immediately of the Circar. It is not to be ſuppoſed that the Governor General and Council did not advert to the Treaty, when they wrote their Letter to this Preſidency of the 5th July, becauſe in your Letter of the 13th June, wherein you apply to them, you clearly explain the terms of the 2d article of the Treaty of 1768; and they in their anſwer expreſsly tell you, that, after weighing maturely the ſubject of your Letter, they came to the reſolution they have recommended.—Inſtead of following their recommendation, you wrote to the Soubah on the 18th of Auguſt, to deſire his interpoſition with his brother.—The Soubah has not anſwered your Letter; and if he had anſwered it, it is more than probable that the anſwer would have been vague and inconcluſive; for the Soubah cannot, without wounding his own honour in the eyes of all the Princes of *India*, openly ſacrifice the intereſts of his elder brother to thoſe of the Engliſh, however much his diſlike to his brother may lead him to wiſh that we ſhould purſue the very meaſure we recommend, without making him a principal: And in a political light likewiſe I think the Soubah will take no part, from an apprehenſion, that ſuch a conduct in him might induce his brother to throw himſelf into the arms of *Hyder Ally*; who, for the kingdom of *Adoni*, and the aſſiſtance he would receive in annexing *Canoul* and *Cudapah* to his dominions, as well as from his enmity to the Soubah, would be glad to aſſert an elder brother's right to the Muſnud; on which he might place him without much difficulty, leaving us to take quiet poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, and exonerating us, perhaps, from our Piſhcuſh burden. We have information, that the Zemindars of the Guntoor Circar are ordered to aſſemble immediately at *Condavir*; of a part of *Bazalet Jung*'s army being actually arrived at that Fort; of an advance of the new year's Jemmabundy being required; of *Bazalet Jung*'s great preparations for war, and of a foundry being erected by the French for caſting cannon and ſhot. For all theſe reaſons, then,

joined

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joined to the conſideration that the Governor General and Council came to their reſolution without ſeeing thoſe inſtances of *Bazalet Jung*'s conduct, which I deem a violation of the Treaty, I now move the Board, "That the recommendation of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, given in their Letter to us of the 5th July, be immediately put in execution."

Robert Fletcher.

Whereupon, Letter from the Governor General and Council, as entered hereafter, is read.

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George.*

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 13th and 30th ultimo. As we obſerve that you have addreſſed *Nizam Ally Cawn*, through your Preſident, in the terms we had ſuggeſted for obtaining the removal of the Europeans out of the Guntoor Circar, and ſecuring the reverſion of that diſtrict to the Company, we ſhall wait to hear the reſult of that Letter, before we ſend you any further inſtructions on this head.

We have conſidered the terms of the Treaty propoſed to be entered into between the Nabob and *Hyder Ally Cawn*; and as no progreſs ſeems yet to have been made in the negociation, we muſt obſerve, that we are not aware of any advantages that could be derived from ſuch a Treaty, either to the Nabob or the Company: Indeed, ſo far as we can judge of the conſequences, we conceive that they would be inconvenient, and contrary to the inſtructions of the Court of Directors; for, although the direct object of the Treaty is Peace, it would ultimately draw us into hoſtilities and diſtant operations, in ſupporting *Hyder Ally Cawn.*

It ſhall always be our ſtudy, as far as can depend on us, to promote a mutual confidence between your Preſidency and the Nabob, whoſe intereſt we regard as inſeparably united with the Company's in the *Carnatic.* For this reaſon we were much concerned at the mode through which he thought proper to make his application to us, to be included in the definitive Treaty of Peace with the Marattas. Conformably to theſe ſentiments, we requeſted him to convey any further propoſals which he might have to make to us, through the channel of your Board, that we might be furniſhed with your ſentiments at the ſame time, reſpecting the advantages alſo to be obtained for the Company on that ſide of *India*; and you may reſt aſſured that we ſhall obſerve this conduct towards the Nabob on all ſimilar occaſions.—We cannot help lamenting that ſuch an apparent want of cordiality has lately taken place between him and you, to which alone we can attribute the mode of communication which he has made uſe of; and we recommend to you, in the ſtrongeſt terms, to endeavour, as much as poſſible, to conciliate his friendſhip and confidence, and to remove every obſtacle in your power to the reſtoration of them.

Sir *Robert Fletcher*'s Motion put to the vote; viz. "That the recommendation of the Governor General "and Council of *Bengal*, given in their Letter to the "Board, the 5th July, be immediately put in exe-"cution."

Mr. Mackay's Minute.

Since I have ſeen the Letter, juſt now received from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, of the 23d of laſt month, wherein they tell us, "that they will give us further inſtructions when they know the reſult of the Letter wrote to the Soubah, of the 18th of Auguſt," I think we cannot commence hoſtilities againſt *Bazalet Jung*, till we receive thoſe further inſtructions; and therefore, on that account only, I put my Negative on General Sir *Robert Fletcher*'s Motion. I came here, fully determined to vote in favour of it; and as my reaſons for that opinion are contained in the following Minute, I beg leave to enter it on the *Records*:

Becauſe, on the moſt mature deliberation on what has already paſſed, with regard to the Guntoor Circar and to *Bazalet Jung*, I think the honour and intereſt of the Company materially concerned, that we ſhould bring the buſineſs to as ſpeedy a concluſion as poſſible. The preparations now making by *Bazalet Jung*, for oppoſing our deſigns; the large ſums of money which he has demanded in advance from the Zemindars in the Guntoor Circar; the time of cutting the crop in that Circar being ſo near at hand; and our not having received yet any anſwer from the Soubah, though he has been wrote to ſo long ago as the 18th of Auguſt—are likewiſe weighty reaſons with me, why we ſhould not loſe any more time: And I confeſs that I now wiſh I had not conſented to defer taking poſſeſſion of the Circar, after we had received the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 5th July. Though theſe Gentlemen have not given us poſitive directions, but left it to our own diſcretion, as they might not know whether the general poſture of affairs in the *Carnatic* would admit of our undertaking ſuch an expedition, yet an opinion ſo clearly expreſſed by them, on a matter of ſo much conſequence to the intereſts of the Company, and after they had every information on the ſubject which we could give them, ought to be equally binding on us as if they had ſent us the moſt poſitive orders, and will, in my opinion, render us equally reſponſible for the conſequences; unleſs we can make it appear, and I think we cannot, that the ſituation of the Company's affairs under this Preſidency will render the undertaking impoſſible, or highly imprudent.

We have told the Court of Directors and the Governor General and Council, that *Bazalet Jung* had not infringed the terms of the Treaty of 1768. I will ſay for myſelf, that I concurred in that opinion without having ſufficiently weighed all the circumſtances; for, conſidering the Company's reverſionary right to the Guntoor Circar, and the conditions on which they have ſuffered him to enjoy it during his life, viz. that he would do nothing to their prejudice, &c. it naturally follows, that *Bazalet Jung* ought to have regarded the Company as his firſt Friends, and have deſired their aſſiſtance only for the protection of his country, whenever he apprehended any danger. Inſtead of obſerving ſo wiſe a conduct, and which appears to me to have the true ſpirit and meaning of the Treaty, he has formed connections with their Rivals, the French, by giving Monſieur *Lally*, and others, jaghires in that very diſtrict which belongs to the Company, and by receiving continual ſupplies of men and military ſtores from *Pondicherry.* Beſides, I believe it will appear from our Records, that *Bazalet Jung* has often, ſince the year 1768, entertained ſeveral of our deſerters in that party commanded by Monſieur *Lally*, which has been the cauſe of all our apprehenſions.

I am very ſenſible that we ought to be extremely cautious how we engage the Company, without ſufficient cauſe, in military operations that may involve them in troubles with any of the Country Powers. If the information we have juſt received from the Chief of *Maſulipatam* is to be depended on (and I think it may) we have reaſon to believe that the Soubah would be well pleaſed if we took poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, as it would be an advantage to him hereafter, though it may not be convenient for him at preſent to give his public ſanction for our acting againſt his Brother; and his not having yet returned an Anſwer to the Preſident's Letter, to tell him that he approved or diſapproved of the meaſures we intended to take, as to myſelf, is a confirmation of this. *Hyder Ally* has always ſhewn a diſpoſition to be on terms of friendſhip with the Company, ſo that there is very little probability of his eſpouſing *Bazalet Jung*'s cauſe againſt them. I am therefore of opinion, as I think we cannot well fail of ſucceſs, and as we have the ſanction of the Governor General and Council, that we ſhould give immediate orders for carrying their intentions into execution.

Geo. Mackay.

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Mr. *Jourdan*'s Minute.

The poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar is of the utmoſt importance to the Company, as it reſpects the ſecurity of their Northern countries by the excluſion of the French and all other Foreigners from territorial connections with the Country Powers on this coaſt.—The Nabob is poſſeſſed of the whole country from Cape *Comorin* to the *Kiſtnah*, and the Company of all the Northern coaſt between the Cuttack Country and the *Kiſtnah*, excepting the villages of *Mootapilly*, &c. belonging to the Guntoor Circar—the French then can have no chance of interrupting our tranquillity, than by connections with *Bazalet Jung*; and this they ſeem attentive to;—for although it does not ſuit them to act openly, they have endeavoured to form an intereſt at *Adoni*, and ſeem to have ſucceeded; for *Bazalet Jung* has for a long time been encouraging the French, and has now collected a conſiderable number of them.—The French certainly do not appear in this; yet there can be no doubt but that the party at *Guntoor* is ſecretly encouraged from *Pondicherry*, and that they mean to ſeize the firſt convenient opportunity of interfering with us in *India*; and whilſt they can, without danger, convey ſtores and men to that party, they will continue it, until it may perhaps become dangerous to the tranquillity and ſecurity of the Company's ſettlements in the *Decan*.—The averſion *Bazalet* has ſhewn to the renting of the Guntoor Country to the Engliſh, although they offered him its full value for it—the continual encouragement given to the Britiſh Troops to deſert, and their reception into his ſervice; convey no favourable ideas of the friendſhip of *Bazalet Jung* towards the Engliſh; nor, conſidering his ſentiments of our connection with his Brother, of whom he is extremely jealous, is it likely he ſhould alter them. Of courſe, being joined to the French by his jealouſy of the Engliſh, we are to apprehend that he will be induced, by any favourable appearance, to join in acting againſt us, when, perhaps, ſuch a junction may be dangerous.—Self-preſervation is the firſt law of nature, and ſeems to point out the poſſeſſing ourſelves of *Guntoor* as a further ſecurity for our other poſſeſſions. The circar appertains to the Company, has been conditionally left with *Bazalet Jung*, and, if it cannot be proved that the conditions have already been broken, yet it is evident that Foreigners and Natives in his ſervice have ſeduced our Soldiers from us; that he has collected his Foreign and Native Troops; that he has ordered all his Zemindars to attend with their Sibbendy; that he is fortifying *Condavir*, evidently with a view to diſpute the circar with us; and having once ſhewn this doubt and ſuſpicion of us, we ſhall be juſtified for endeavouring to prevent this Prince from injuring us, when his attempts againſt us may be important—for he has it in his power to enter from *Guntoor* into our circars at pleaſure, and he may at one ſeaſon of the year overturn the country, and deſtroy the crops of a great part of *Ellore*. If we delay to ſeize the circar, alarmed as he is, he may put himſelf under the protection of the French, and as the Treaty of *Paris* does not prohibit ſuch protection and connection, if we delay, we may perhaps never gain poſſeſſion of it.

The Soubah has received our Letter on the ſubject; and has, after having detained the Letter, returned no Anſwer.—The Chief of *Maſulipatam* writes us word, that he has information that the Soubah will not be diſpleaſed at our taking the circar.—This is an encouragement, ſo far as the intelligence is to be depended on, and the Soubah's ſilence ſeems to confirm it.

The meaſures taken indicate our intention to enforce the demand—to delay, may convey ideas to the diſadvantage of the Nation.—In many caſes it is better to act at any rate, than not to act at all.

The advantages to be reaped from the acquiſition are ſelf evident; but it has alſo its dangers; for *Bazalet Jung*, diſtreſſed by our meaſures, may be urged to enter into the circars with his Cavalry, and he may deſtroy and lay waſte the greater part of the Ellore Circar, notwithſtanding all we can do; and the loſs the Company may ſuſtain by ſuch depredation, and the expences which may be incurred, may be more than equal to the value of the country, if acquired.

But it appears reaſonable to think, that if the Government are determined to have the circar, yet willing to make *Bazalet Jung* compenſation; as he cannot expect to cope with the Company, he will be ſatisfied with an annual rent.

It may be ſaid, that as we wrote to *Bengal*, we ſhould take no further ſteps until we ſhould hear from them—but the appearance has ſince changed, and ſuch delay might be productive of danger.

For all theſe reaſons I ſhould have voted for the Motion, but for the Letter which has come in from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and which render a further delay proper and neceſſary.

Francis Jourdan.

Mr. *Palmer*'s Minute.

I am againſt the Motion; becauſe we have already, upon mature deliberation, adopted meaſures, from which no new occurrence has rendered any deviation neceſſary; namely, that the Soubah has been told our apprehenſions from *Bazalet Jung*'s late conduct, which ſeems to be very wide from that quiet and peaceable manner he, by Treaty, was to have the tenure of the Guntoor Circar, to which the Company have a reverſionary right; becauſe the Supreme Council have been wrote to on the ſubject. Therefore, both their Anſwers would be neceſſary before any ſtep is taken; and becauſe the Court of Directors have been adviſed of our Reſolution to purſue no further meaſure until we ſhould know the reſult of our propoſitions to the Soubah.

A. Palmer.

Mr. *Stone*'s Minute.

I am againſt the Motion:—But before I aſſign my reaſons, I beg leave to premiſe, that in my Minute, entered in Conſultation the 22d September, I propoſed that the Troops which had been ſtationed for the purpoſe of intercepting Men and Military Stores landed at *Mootapilly*, in the Guntoor Circar, and intended for the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, ſhould be withdrawn. In this I was actuated by my aprehenſions of the dangerous conſequence to be expected from a perſeverance in the meaſure which had been adopted, and from a perſuaſion of the unjuſtifiableneſs thereof. By the advices now received from the Chief at *Maſulipatam*, and Captain *Duncan*, it appears that *Bazalet Jung* has, in conſequence of that meaſure, taken the alarm; and, as I foretold, is endeavouring, by every means in his power, to provide for the ſecurity of the Guntoor Circar, and to repel force by force. At the time I delivered in my above-mentioned Minute, I was convinced that the Court of Directors, in ſome part of their advices to this Government, had been explicit on the ſubject of ſeizing military ſtores intended for the ſervice of the Country Powers; but I could not immediately refer to the particular paſſages: I however made it my buſineſs to ſearch for the orders, and which I found under date the 25th March 1768, Par. 15, 16, 17, and 18. They appeared to me quite applicable to the preſent caſe, and thought it my duty to lay them before the Board at the ſucceeding Conſultation. The Court of Directors appear to me to expreſs themſelves therein very clearly and fully, of the unjuſtifiableneſs in ſeizing arms and military ſtores intended for the ſervice of any of the Country Powers, unleſs ſuch Powers are actually at war with us, or our Allies.

However, to ſave the trouble of a reference, and that the Company's orders may here appear in their own words, I beg leave to quote them as follows:

Extract from the Company's General Letter, dated 25th March 1768.

Par. 15. Having peruſed your Proceedings in the ſeveral Conſultations referred to in the margin, relating to the

the practices of ſome Europeans, in ſupplying the Country Powers in enmity with the Company's Allies with warlike ſtores; and having taken advice thereon, we are of opinion, that it may be of very dangerous conſequences if we ſhould ſend orders for ſtopping and confiſcating warlike ſtores anſwering this deſcription, and the veſſels carrying them; for if they are fairly bought of Europeans, we think the aid which the Company can, conſiſtently with the terms of amity this Nation is bound to hold with other European Powers, afford to their Indian Allies, will not juſtify ſuch ſeizure and confiſcation.

16. The charters granted to the *Eaſt India* Company have no tendency to enable the Company to enter into offenſive wars; and, great circumſpection is neceſſary in the Alliances they enter into with the Indian Powers, leſt the aſſiſtance they afford under ſuch Treaties ſhould give juſt cauſe of umbrage and reſentment to European Powers, and kindle the ſparks of a new war in *Europe*. We never thought that an offenſive and defenſive Alliance with an Indian Prince, againſt all the world, was warranted by the Company's charters, or the laws of Nations; in caſe of an attack, the Company have a right not only to repel Invaders, but to obtain ſatisfaction for injuries they may have aſcertained; and in ſuch inſtances we muſt ſuppoſe that actual war exiſts, with or without a formal declaration of it; and then the ſupplying the Enemy with ſtores, or other things neceſſary towards the carrying on ſuch war, is a breach of good faith and amity; and we think the Company would be well warranted in ſeizing ſtores thus intended to be ſupplied. So likewiſe in wars commenced againſt the Company by Indian Powers, we have no doubt that the like means would be juſtifiable; but, where the Company can conſider themſelves only as Allies, we cannot think that attacking and ſeizing the property of Europeans is either legal or prudent.

17. We have taken occaſion from your ſaid Proceedings (which we obſerve you finiſhed with proper caution) to give you our ſentiments thus fully, for your information and future guidance on a ſubject of ſo intereſting a nature.

18. Moſt undoubtedly the practice of Europeans furniſhing the Country Powers with men and warlike ſtores is greatly prejudicial to the Nabob, and the other Indian Powers in amity with us; and may, in its conſequences, prove ſo to the Company: it is therefore incumbent on our ſaid Allies, ſo far as regards themſelves only, to take ſuch meaſures as they ſhall think juſtifiable, preferring pacific ones to any other; in which latter you are to interpoſe your good offices with the ſeveral Chiefs of the European Nation, to obtain redreſs for any injuries of this kind, and to prevent the repetition of them in future.

The reaſons which induce me to oppoſe the Motion are,

1ſt. Becauſe I conceive that any hoſtile meaſures to compel *Bazalet Jung* to accede to the terms propoſed, without the conſent of the Soubah, would juſtly expoſe this Government to the imputation of a breach of public faith.

2d. Becauſe I cannot think that any act of *Bazalet Jung* can warrant ſuch a proceeding; as it does not appear to me that he has, in any ſhape, violated the terms on which he hold the circar of *Guntoor*. The Board, on their Records, and in their Letters to *Europe*, to *Bengal*, and *Maſulipatam*, have declared as much. His entertaining and keeping of Foreigners in his ſervice, and receiving ſupplies of military ſtores, whenever he can get them, cannot, I conceive, be conſtrued a breach of the Treaty, eſpecially when it is certain, that excluſive of the Guntoor Circar, he has a much more conſiderable country dependant on *Adoni*, to defend, on which the Company cannot pretend to any claim, and for the protection of which he is certainly at liberty to entertain what Troops he pleaſes, provided they are not actually Enemies to the Company or the *Carnatic*; and I think it is evident that the Europeans maintained by him are principally for that ſervice: ſince, while he obſerves the terms of the Treaty on which he holds the circar of *Guntoor*, he can have nothing to apprehend for the ſafety thereof, it being bounded on the North by the Company's circars, on the South by the Nabob's country, and on the Weſt by his own; whereas his country of *Adoni* is open to the attacks and depredations of the Marattas, *Hyder Ally*, his brother *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and other Country Powers; and to the ſafety of which, it therefore certainly behoves him to be the more attentive.

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3d. Becauſe it was well known at the time the Treaty was concluded with the Soubah in 1768, that *Bazalet Jung* had many French and other Foreigners in his ſervice; that he had been long before, and was then, entertaining all he could get; and that he received ſupplies of military ſtores whenever he could procure them. If ſuch a conduct was deemed improper or contrary to the intereſt and meaning of the Treaty, a clauſe ought to have been inſerted therein to prevent the ſame, and to compel him to rely on the Company alone for protection.

4th. Becauſe I cannot conceive that the Commanding Officer of the Europeans in his ſervice having entertained ſome of our deſerters can be deemed or conſtrued a breach of the Treaty of 1768. It did appear to the Board in that light at the time it happened, now upwards of two years ago; and it is well known, that on application to *Bazalet Jung* on the ſubject, he ordered them to be diſmiſſed his ſervice. The trifling diſputes which have happened between his people and thoſe of the Company, on the confines of our reſpective diſtricts, regarding watercourſes, and the liberty of cutting wood, &c. and on which it has not been thought neceſſary to come to an eclairciſſement with him, cannot ſurely be deemed a violation of the Treaty, or a ſufficient ground to warrant our proceeding to hoſtilities, to deprive him of the circar of *Guntoor*.

5th. Becauſe, excluſive of the imputation of a breach of Treaty (which, as I have ſaid before, I conceive this Government would incur, by proceeding to hoſtilities, to compel *Bazalet Jung* to a compliance with the requiſitions propoſed, without the concurrence of the Soubah) I apprehend that, notwithſtanding what is alledged of the Soubah's jealouſy and diſlike towards his Brother, that his inclination towards the Company is by no means more favourable; that he would rejoice at their being diſpoſſeſſed of the circars; and that it is not improbable that he might be induced to ſupport his Brother, which the preſent diſtracted ſtate of the Maratta Government ſeems to leave him at liberty of doing. And although I do not think that *Hyder Ally* will wantonly or haſtily enter into a quarrel with us, yet it is impoſſible to ſay what he may not attempt on ſeeing us engaged in trouble, or what a tempting offer of country from *Bazalet Jung* may not induce him to undertake; and to what lengths we may be led, having once drawn the ſword, no one can tell:—we cannot ſay, we will go thus far, and no farther. To carry on a long and expenſive war, I am afraid our finances are by no means equal; eſpecially when it is conſidered, that the collection of our Northern Revenues, our principal reſources, would probably be ſtopped in the beginning, our inveſtment muſt immediately ceaſe, and the Company of courſe be diſappointed of returning cargoes to aſſiſt them in fulfilling their engagements in *Europe*. Moreover, as this war would be wholly on the Company's account, we could not expect that any part of the expence would be borne by the Nabob—nay, ſhould the *Carnatic*, in conſequence of the meaſures propoſed, be invaded, which I by no means think improbable, might we not juſtly be accuſed of bringing miſery on the Nabob's country, and of involving him in difficulties and diſtreſs?——The ſeaſon of the year, as the crops will ſoon be cut, has been urged as an argument for our taking immediate poſſeſſion of

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APPENDIX. No. 75.

the Guntoor Circar. May it not be expected that the ſame argument may be an inducement with any of the Country Powers, to enter and lay waſte the *Carnatic* and circars? And may we not, in that caſe, ſuſtain far greater loſs than any advantages to be obtained by the meaſures now propoſed, can repay?

6th. Becauſe, from the accounts lately received from Captain *Duncan*, I conſider the Foreigners in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice as a mere banditti, without diſcipline, ſubordination, or controul, and that while they are in that ſtate, which I think will be ſo long as they continue in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, leſs danger is to be apprehended from them than if they were removed from him; ſince, if he were to diſmiſs them, they would probably go off to *Hyder Ally*, when, by being kept in proper order and ſubjection, they might become very uſeful to him, and in time very dangerous to us. At any rate I am of opinion, that their removal is not an object of ſuch importance as to juſtify our undertaking it without the Soubah's concurrence; as the advantages to be expected therefrom are by no means to be put in competition with the difficulties and dangers to which we may expoſe ourſelves by ſuch a meaſure.

J. M. Stone.

Mr. *Brooke*'s Minute.

The more I reflect on the conſequence which muſt attend the intercourſe between the French and *Bazalet Jung*, the more I am convinced of the neceſſity of putting a ſtop to that intercourſe; for, though the French have not openly appeared in it, I have not a doubt but they are ſecretly and intimately connected with him, and if ever *Bazalet Jung* ſhould aſpire to the Muſnud of *Hydraḥad*, in right of being the elder Brother, it is through the aſſiſtance of the French by which he means to obtain it. *Bazalet Jung* has ever been deemed a favourer of the French intereſt, and I believe it would not be eaſy to point out a ſingle inſtance wherein he has ſhewn a friendly diſpoſition to the Engliſh; and did not his natural attachment to the French preponderate againſt the real benefits which he has received from the Engliſh, in giving him a Revenue of £. 80,000 a year, it ſhould ſeem that gratitude alone ſhould have attached him to the latter. If ever the French mean to figure again on this coaſt, they muſt form an Alliance with ſome Country Power; that with *Hyder Ally*, though he is the moſt able to aſſiſt, yet is attended with many difficulties, becauſe of the *Carnatic* lying between, through which the ſupplies of men and ſtores may be intercepted; this is not the caſe with *Bazelet Jung*; their intercourſe with him is immediate and direct through the ſea-port of *Mootapilly*; and, in caſe of a war with the French, it ſeems more than probable their firſt ſtroke would be in the Northern Circars, to cut off, by his aſſiſtance, our Revenues there, which amount to near ten lacks of Pagodas per annum; and as the Nabob has told us, in caſe of troubles in the *Carnatic*, he will not be able to ſupply us, our finances then would be reduced indeed.—It ſeems therefore of the greateſt conſequence, that our Revenues from our circars ſhould be permanent and ſecure; and I think they cannot be deemed ſo, while men and ſtores are ſupplied *Bazalet Jung* by the French. But as they have not openly appeared in this intercourſe, they cannot openly take umbrage at our intercepting it. This then ſeems the moſt favourable juncture to take vigorous meaſures; for, ſhould we wait until they publicly declare their intentions, we could not then take any ſtep in this buſineſs without endangering a rupture between the two Nations. With reſpect to the Queſtion,—whether *Bazalet Jung* has broke the Treaty or not,—I muſt acknowledge, that when it was entered on our Minutes, that he had not, I gave my aſſent thereto with great reluctance; and I may with truth ſay, that I did not object to it, rather than that I concurred in that opinion. And if we at this time take a review of the whole tenor of *Bazalet Jung*'s conduct, his attachment to the French in preference to the Engliſh, his encouraging our people to deſert us, his granting a jaghire in the Guntoor Circar to a French Officer when the Company have a reverſionary right to it; his employing another Officer in the management of his affairs at *Mootapilly*, who had taken upon him to alter the ancient watercourſes, land-marks, and uſages of the country, and puniſhed corporally the people of the Company's villages; I cannot think that *Bazalet Jung*, who enjoys the Guntoor Circar by Treaty on ſufferance and good behaviour, can be ſaid to merit much regard from the Engliſh; on the contrary, I think this Government had a right to call him to an account by the ſpirit of that Treaty, in the very firſt inſtance of his receiving our deſerters, and that his conduct ever ſince has been an aggravation of that fault. I am therefore of opinion, it would be right in this Government to take an active part in this buſineſs, having firſt obtained the concurrence of the Governor General and Council thereto; and in caſe ſatisfaction is not obtained, then to take poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, and thereby break off his direct intercourſe with the French, even though we ſhould, after poſſeſſion, give him the whole of the Revenues; which are, in my opinion, but a ſecondary conſideration in compariſon of the conſequences which may attend the connections between *Bazalet Jung* and the French.

The Nizam, it may be imagined, would not chuſe to give his public concurrence to this meaſure, to ſave appearances to the world, though ſecretly he may wiſh it ſhould take place; for it is well known that jealouſies have for a long time ſubſiſted between the two Brothers: and as ſelf-preſervation is the great law of nature, the more the Nizam can reduce the offenſive power of the other, the leſs will be his own apprehenſions; and nothing can contribute more to this end, than cutting off the means of aſſiſtance which the French may afford. What then can reſt with the Nizam, but the fear that his Brother may become burthenſome to him?—But if this can be provided for by paying *Bazalet Jung* the Revenues of the circar, the Nizam will not probably object, but on the contrary, will think himſelf benefited by the meaſure; and this may lead to further occaſions of mutual benefits between the Company and him; for as his country is the natural barrier to the Northern Circars, the Marattas cannot eaſily diſturb our poſſeſſions there while he continues to favour us. The relinquiſhing alſo of the Piſhcuſh of five lacks of Rupees might probably be obtained, if aſſiſtance was ſent him in caſe his country was invaded.

Henry Brooke.

Mr. *Dawſon*'s Minute.

So far from conſidering the French, as they are termed in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice, an eſtabliſhment from the French Government, I have always underſtood them to be principally the Natives of every European ſettlement in *India*; and on the whole, an undiſciplined rabble, who, like many others in the ſervice of the Country Powers, cannot find ſubſiſtence elſewhere. They may be regarded merely as adventurers not of ſufficient conſequence to be employed to promote any views of Government, and in fact, objects almoſt unworthy our conſideration. It is well known that foreign ſhips import military ſtores from *Europe* on account of individuals, and theſe ſtores are diſpoſed of to the ſeveral Country Powers. What military ſuccours have been imported at *Mootapilly*, I have reaſon to believe, from the intelligence received from Captain *Duncan*, were not intended for the defence of the Guntoor Circar, but conveyed, as uſual, through it, and for the defence of *Bazalet Jung*'s poſſeſſions in the Adoni Country, which are extenſive, and ſurrounded with powerful Chiefs, among whom it is good policy in him to appear as reſpectable as poſſible. The Troops *Bazalet Jung* lately marched into the Guntoor Circar were from *Adoni*, and in conſequence of the alarm he has received from a detachment of ours being ſtationed on the borders of his country, and with no other deſign than to defend that country from any hoſtilities he may commit. It is from experience ſufficiently proved, that

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in the preſent ſyſtem of the Company's affairs, their firſt and grand object ſhould be the defence of that very great extent of territories they are now in poſſeſſion of, and not the acquiſition of new ones. Nay, I profeſs myſelf of opinion, that the Company do not even wiſh for an increaſe of territory at the hazard of interrupting the preſent tranquillity of the Country, and incurring an expenſive war. I, on no account, would ſubmit to any thing which would carry with it the leaſt appearance of inſult and indignity offered to the Company; but that not being now the caſe, I am convinced that moderate meaſures will ever prove moſt ſalutary to their intereſt; nor can I admit of the expediency of proceeding to more violent ones till thoſe have failed; and if we were to commence hoſtilities precipitately, it might involve us in a diſpute with both the Soubah and his Brother, injure the Company's inveſtment, and endanger our Revenues in the Northern Circars. For theſe reaſons, added to our having addreſſed the Soubah on this ſubject, and the Governor General and Council at *Bengal* deferred giving their final inſtructions until the reſult of that Letter is made known to them, I therefore give my vote againſt the Queſtion.

Geo. Dawſon.

Mr. *Stratton*'s Minute.

I cannot agree to any hoſtile meaſures being taken againſt *Bazalet Jung*, for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe it does not appear to me that *Bazalet Jung* has infringed the 2d article of the Treaty entered into with the Soubah, in 1768, wherein it is ſtipulated, that the Company ſhall not take poſſeſſion of the circar he holds till after his death, or till he breaks the friendſhip of the ſaid Company, by raiſing diſturbances in the country, *Nizampatam*, or the *Carnatic*.

2d. Becauſe I think that *Bazalet Jung*'s entertaining Foreigners in his ſervice, and receiving military ſtores, is conſiſtent with the plan he obſerved when the Soubah entered into the Treaty with the Company, and cannot therefore be looked upon as a breach of this Treaty; for he has not employed them againſt any of the Company's poſſeſſions, (though it has been apprehended for ſome years paſt that he would do ſo) and I conclude he keeps them for the protection of the country he holds dependant on *Adoni*, which the Company cannot have a claim to.

3d. Becauſe I am of opinion, that we ſhould firſt know the Soubah's ſentiments with reſpect to the propoſitions made to him in the Preſident's Letter, dated the 18th Auguſt 1775, wherein he is aſſured, "That nothing ſhall induce this Government to infringe any part of the Treaty entered into with him in 1768;" and if we were therefore to commence hoſtilities before we have an Anſwer to this Letter, the Soubah might juſtly look upon us as the aggreſſors, and might probably be induced, by promiſes from his Brother, of acting a part againſt us, and thereby bring on a war, which would be the loſs, for a time, of the Revenues in the circars, and deprive the Company of their inveſtments to the Northward.

4th. Becauſe I do not think there is any bad conſequence to be apprehended from the Europeans in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice, as they are allowed (by the intelligence we have received) to be undiſciplined, and in want of pay; and I well remember, at the time that Captain *Thomas Fletcher* commanded at *Angole*, this party was ſo diſſatisfied with their ſituation, that he gave it as his opinion, that if he was allowed to march with his battalion into the Guntoor Circar, every man (then commanded by *Bons Enfans*) would come over to him.—About that time the Board determined on ſeizing a quantity of military ſtores landed at *Mootapilly* for *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice; but on mature deliberation, they reſolved to deliver them up.—The Company approved of the meaſures, as appears by their General Letter, dated 25th March 1768. Par. 15, 16, 17, and 18, to which I refer.

Having been for theſe three years abſent from *Madras*, it took me up ſome time to refer to the Records reſpecting what had paſſed relating to the Guntoor Circar; and while I was writing the foregoing, Mr. *Stone*'s Minute on the ſubject was ſent for my peruſal, which makes it unneceſſary for me to add further, for I approve of the reaſons aſſigned by him in the ſupport of my opinion.

Geo. Stratton.

The Preſident's Minute.

The Company being adviſed that we ſhould wait the Anſwer to the Letter wrote the Soubah, before we took any further ſteps regarding the Guntoor Circar; alſo the Governor General and Council, who, by their Letter of the 23d ult. ſo far approve of what we have done, as to tell us that they ſhall not give us any further inſtructions until they know his Anſwer; and as nothing has occurred ſince to induce us to alter our former Reſolution, for I conſider *Bazalet Jung*'s ſending the French into the Guntoor Circar, and calling upon the Zemindars for aſſiſtance, and an advance of their Jemmabundies, as things that we have to expect—I therefore give my vote againſt the Queſtion; and have no doubt within myſelf, that if at any future time it ſhould be judged by the Board adviſable to take poſſeſſion of that circar from the aſſurances that were given me, as I paſſed through it, that the Zemindars would be ready enough to put themſelves under the Company's Government.

Carried in the Negative by all preſent, excepting Sir *Robert Fletcher*; who will ſend in his reaſons to the Secretary, and requeſt they may be entered on this day's Conſultation.

Sir *Rob*^{t} *Fletcher*'s Minute.

The Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, under date the 23d ult. which was received and read at the Board yeſterday, ought not, in my opinion, to have prevented our adopting immediately the meaſure recommended in their Letter of the 5th of July.

Firſt. Becauſe the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 23d ult. appears to me to be nothing more than an unavoidable acquieſcence in the Letter this Board has written to the Soubah on the 18th of Auguſt, without containing any thing that can be conſtrued as an approbation of the Board's having declined to follow the idea recommended by the Governor General and Council, could not, I think, conſiſtently with the dignity of this Preſidency, and the regard that is due to the Soubah, inforce in their Letter of the 23d ult. what they recommended in their Letter of the 5th of July; becauſe, in doing ſo, they would have ſuperſeded the act of this Board, and endangered the preſent harmony which ſubſiſts between us and the Soubah.

Secondly. Becauſe *Bazalet Jung*'s preſent preparations for war, and his correſpondence with the French, give us apprehenſions, that, if much more time be allowed him, he will form connections with that Nation dangerous to our circars: every delay may add to the evil, till our future poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar ſhall daily become more and more precarious; circumſtances being ſo altered ſince that date of the Governor General and Council's firſt Letter, as to render what appeared to be expedient then, abſolutely neceſſary now.

Rob. Fletcher.

Mr. *Jourdan* moves, That a Letter be wrote to the Governor General and Council, ſetting forth the neceſſity of obliging *Bazalet Jung* immediately to comply with what they have recommended in their Letter of the 5th July, whether the propoſitions put to the Soubah meet with his concurrence, or not?

Mr. *Mackay*. For the Motion.
Mr. *Jourdan*. For the Motion.
Mr. *Palmer*. Againſt the Motion.
Mr. *Stone*. Againſt the Motion.
Mr. *Brooke*. For the Motion.
Mr. *Dawſon*. Againſt the Motion.
Sir *Robt. Fletcher*. For the Motion.

APPENDIX. No. 76.

Mr. *Stratton*. Againſt the Motion.
The Preſident, Againſt the Motion.
The Majority againſt the Motion.

The Majority of the Board deeming it difficult to frame a Letter to the Governor General and Council, agreeably to the different opinions which have appeared in the courſe of this debate; it is agreed, That a copy of this day's Proceedings, as far as relates to the ſubject in queſtion, be tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council, for their opinion.

Reſolved, That a Letter be wrote to the Nabob, with the ſubſtance of the Letter from the Governor General and Council of the 23d ult. as far as relates to the Treaty propoſed by him to be entered into with *Hyder Ally Cawn*.

A. Wynch,
Geo. Stratton,
Robt Fletcher,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Arch^d Palmer,
Fran^s Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

APPENDIX, N° 76.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, 20th November 1775.

READ Letter from *Nizam Ally Cawn*, as entered in Co. Corr. N° 135, acquainting the Preſident of his having ſent directions to *Bazalet Jung*, to withdraw the Foreign Party from the Guntoor Circar, and ſtation them in the country dependant on *Adoni*; and to make them relinquiſh *Mootapilly* and the other villages, and draw their pay from the Adoni Country.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

From the Nizam; received 16th Nov. 1775.

No. 135. I received at a moſt fortunate time your very agreeable Letter, every word of which may be compared to the bud of a flower out of the garden of ſincerity and friendſhip; the contents of it, like flowers of various hues, gave brightneſs to my countenance.

You ſay that in the beginning of 1769, the Chriſtian æra, a Treaty took place between the Governor and Council and me, by the means of the late *Ruannud Dawlah*, Bahadar, and the knowledge of *Wallan Jau*, which, by the bleſſing of God, has not been infringed till the preſent time; that the Engliſh have nothing more at heart than the obſervance of their Treaties, and that they will never deviate from the preſent one.—You mention ſome circumſtances relating to the Murtazanagur Circar, and it being held by *Bazalet Jung* (*Erun ul Ourah*) upon certain conditions.—You ſay that you have received certain intelligence, that he has a number of Europeans in his ſervice; that he has received a large quantity of ammunition and ſtores, which were landed at *Mootapilly*—You ſay that theſe Europeans have plundered, and committed violence in the diſtricts of the Company; and to remedy this you propoſe two things—That I will either allow the Engliſh to hold the Guntoor Circar at a ſtipulated rent; or that I will get theſe Europeans diſmiſſed, and truſt the defence of that circar to the Engliſh.—All the particulars of the above Letter are clearly underſtood.

I never formed the leaſt doubt concerning the faith and good wiſhes of the Engliſh to my Government; the Treaty made by *Ruannud Dowlah* with the Governor and Council, I conſidered as ſtable and firm as if engraven on ſtone never to be effaced; and I am certain there will not be the difference of an hair's breadth in their obſervance of it.—The particulars relating to the Europeans in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice, are theſe: when Monſieur *Buſſy* obtained leave to go to the *Carnatic*, after the taking of *Pondicherry*, his men deſerted and wandered in ſeveral parts of the country, ſome of them were retained in the ſervice of this Government; and being afterwards diſmiſſed, went to the circars at *Ellore Muſtaphanagur*, where *Huſſein Ally Cawn* took them into pay, after this they went into *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice; they are not compoſed of French only, but all nations, ſuch as Germans, Dutch, Engliſh, Portugueze, who have deſerted from other places; their Commander may be a Frenchman.—*Bazalet Jung* took them into his ſervice for this reaſon: In the province of *Viziapore* there are ſeveral Zemindars, who have each from 10 to 15,000 Peons, and 2,000 Horſe, ſuch as thoſe of *Chellapem*, *Walla*, *Coittal Durg*, *Ray Durg*, and *Ballary*; thoſe often prove refractory, and without a force, it is impoſſible to collect the Peiſhcuſh due by them.—*Hyder Ally Cawn*'s country alſo borders on this province, and *his* power is well known.—*Bazalet Jung* has therefore taken theſe Europeans into his ſervice, to render himſelf ſome way formidable; he has appropriated the Revenue of 10 or 12 villages towards their pay, and this is not always ſufficient; they receive from the Revenues of *Adoni*—I have no certain accounts of this, but write from gueſs. As theſe Europeans, being ſtationed in the diſtrict of *Guntoor*, ſeem to give you uneaſineſs; in order to remove all cauſe for it, a perſon of diſtinction has been ſent to *Bazalet Jung*, to get theſe men removed, and ſent to the diſtrict of *Adoni* and *Raychoor*, and to ſtop their receiving the Revenues of the villages granted to them for their pay, which they may receive from *Adoni*. This, I hope, by the aſſiſtance of the Almighty, will be brought about. Every article and condition of the Treaty between us ſhall remain fixed and unaltered even in an hair's breadth. Beſides this, a perſon has been ſent from the Preſence to *Murtazanagur*; that if *Bazalet Jung* has granted theſe twelve villages to the Europeans above-mentioned, their Agent ſhall be removed, and one appointed there from the circar of *Murtazanagur*; of which he is to acquaint me.

You will pleaſe to give orders to the Agents of the Company to obſerve the ſame boundaries, fixed and eſtabliſhed for theſe twelve years paſt.—What ſhall I ſay more?

Mr. *Stone*'s Minute.

The Letter from the Soubah appears to me to be expreſſed in terms exceedingly proper, and highly becoming his ſituation, as it reſpects his Brother and this Government. He therein ſhows his good will towards the Company, and his deſire of maintaining the Treaty eſtabliſhed with them; and at the ſame time he manifeſts an earneſt inclination to live in harmony with his Brother, and to prevent, if poſſible, a rupture between him and the Company.—It affords us, in my opinion, the moſt favourable opportunity that could be, of relinquiſhing him with honour; a meaſure which I ſhall always think too precipitately undertaken, and which if purſued, will, I am afraid, probably endanger the peace and ſecurity of the Company's and the Nabob's poſſeſſions, and be productive of conſequences highly detrimental to the intereſts of our Employers—I therefore move, that the extraordinary number of Sepoys ſtationed at *Vantepollam* be immediately withdrawn, and that the Europeans ſent to *Ongole* be ordered to *Ellore*, as ſuch a meaſure will be a proof to the Soubah of our confidence in, and of our friendly diſpoſition towards him, and will convince him, that we mean not to injure his Brother *Bazalet Jung*; who, I think, would thereby be induced to comply the more readily with the Soubah's requiſition of removing the Europeans from the Guntoor Circar; and it might alſo be a means of preventing him from making any further preparations for its defence, which the collection of our Troops had obliged him to ſet about. This may be done with the more propriety, as it will be a conſiderable time before any ſtores can be imported at *Mootapilly*

from the Southward.—I alſo move, That a Letter be wrote to the Soubah, informing him of the meaſures we have taken, and aſſuring him, that we are induced thereto by the firm reliance we have on his friendly interpoſition, and endeavours to prevent his Brother from giving us any juſt cauſe of complaint.

J. M. Stone.

Whereupon Mr. *Stone*'s firſt Motion being put to the vote, it is carried in the Negative by a majority of the Board—Becauſe they have written to *Bengal*, and they think it improper to make any alteration in the preſent arrangement, until they ſhall have received the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council—Becauſe there are no more than two companies of Sepoys at *Vantepollam*, which is a Company's Village, and the Europeans ſent from hence are ſtationed at *Ongole*, in the Nabob's country.—And Mr. *Mackay* further adds,

Becauſe, while the party of Europeans commanded by Monſieur *Lally* remains in any part of *Bazalet Jung*'s dominions, and while the port of *Mootapilly* is open to him for receiving men and military ſtores from *Pondicherry*, the evil which we complained of, and which occaſioned our writing to *Bengal*, will ſtill exiſt the ſame as before.

Sir *Robert Fletcher* obſerves to the Board, that the Soubah's Letter appears to him exactly ſuch as he ſaid in his former Minute he expected, *vague* and *inconcluſive*; he further thinks that the Soubah will take no active part unleſs he ſhall receive aſſurances of our complying with the articles of the Treaty of 1768, particularly the article wherein we agree to aſſiſt him with Troops.

Mr. *Stone*'s firſt Motion being thus carried in the Negative, it is thought unneceſſary to put the ſecond, it being founded on the withdrawing of the Troops.

Ordered, That a copy of the Soubah's Letter be tranſmitted to *Bengal*, with an Extract of this day's Proceedings, as far as relates to the ſubject in queſtion, and a Letter prepared in conſequence to the Governor General and Council.

A. Wynch,
Geo. Stratton,
Robt Fletcher,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Thomas Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, November 22d 1775.

Came in the following Letter from *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Chief at *Maſulipatam*:

To the Honourable *Alex^r Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*.

Honourable Sir,

The incloſed Letter from the Soubah was brought me this morning by the Hircarrahs who carried your Letter of the 8th September to him, and came accompanied by one addreſſed to me as uſual.

The extraordinary diſpatch which was uſed in ſending me the duplicate of this Letter, would of itſelf have been ſufficient evidence of the ſolicitude with which your Anſwer is expected; but if it needed any further demonſtration, the care which has been uſed to ſend a copy of it here, to be explained to me, carries the ſtrongeſt confirmation of the Soubah's anxiety, and makes it incumbent on us to be cautious and determined in our meaſures.

I am informed by very good authority, that the oppoſing intereſts of *Bazalet Jung* and *Fazel Beg* have particularly occaſioned this anxiety in the Soubah's mind upon this occaſion; and that while the aſpiring views of *Bazalet Jung* are ſet forth by one party, as a motive for the Soubah's improving his connexion with the Company; the power of *Fazel Beg* and the deſigns of the Nabob are urged by the other, to ſhew the danger of admitting the Company to any further footing in the country: If this ſhould really be the ſtate of the Durbar, and *Bazalet Jung*'s conduct, on the one ſide, gives us as much reaſon to credit, as that of *Fazel Beg*, in ſending his family to this place at ſo critical a time, does on the other: if this ſhould be really the caſe, we cannot, I think, more effectually aſſiſt the party which favours our views, than by taking immediate poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, and then offering to pay a reaſonable rent for it, as was at firſt propoſed; for, by this means, not only the jealouſy which is now entertained of our intentions would be removed, but a degree of credit be acquired which might give an entire aſcendancy to the party we wiſh to favour; whereas by delaying to act, and truſting to further negociations for getting the circar, we muſt neceſſarily weaken *Fazel Beg*'s intereſt, and add real ſtrength to the party of *Bazalet Jung*, by the money which in the interim he will draw from the Guntoor Country.

I ſhall anxiouſly expect the Board's orders upon this ſubject, that I may be enabled to remove the ſuſpenſe under which the Zemindars of that circar are now held, and to relieve the one, who has particularly made advances to me, from the preſſing demands of near two hundred people, who have been ſent in conſequence of the ſuſpicions entertained of him, to exact his proportion of the money required by *Bazalet Jung*. The Vackeel of this Zemindar has been ſome time here, and as I thought it might be of conſequence to have one on the part of *Vaſſereddy Ramanah*, I ordered him, as a Zemindar of the Muſtaphanagur Circar, to ſend a perſon to me; which he has accordingly done; and I hope my having taken this ſtep will be approved of by you. The other Zemindars I make no doubt of being able to ſecure in our intereſt, as ſoon as the appearance of our Troops in the circar can give them a confidence in our protection. I am, with great reſpect,

Honourable Sir,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
John Whitehill.

Maſulipatam,
November 15, 1775.

In conſequence of which the following Anſwer was immediately diſpatched to Mr. *Whitehill*:

To *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Chief at *Maſulipatam*.

Sir,

Your Letters to the Preſident, of the 12th and 15th inſtant, have been laid before us.

As we have already come to the determination of not taking any further meaſures until we hear from the Governor General and Council, we ſhall for the preſent only direct, that you give ſuch Anſwer to the Vackeels from the Guntoor Circar, as may appear to you moſt conſiſtent with this our Reſolution. In the mean time you will keep us regularly adviſed, and be particularly attentive that no freſh alarms are given to *Bazalet Jung* or his party.

We are, Sir,
Your affectionate Friends,
A. Wynch, &c. Council.

Fort Saint George,
22d November, 1775.

Diſpatched Letter to the Governor General and Council, as entered hereafter:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

We have been honoured with your Letter of 23d ultimo; previous to the receipt of which, we had advice from the Chief at *Maſulipatam*, and the Commanding Officer at *Ongole*, (copy of which comes incloſed) whereupon we have reaſon to ſuppoſe *Bazalet Jung* is making preparations for reſiſtance. This, together with the meaſures

APPENDIX. No. 77.

meaſures to be purſued in conſequence, we had under deliberation; but as you have deemed it expedient to wait the reſult of our Letter to the Soubah, we ſhall not take any further ſteps till his Anſwer arrives.

In the courſe of our deliberations on the ſubject matter of the advice before-mentioned, and of the meaſure propoſed by the Chief of *Maſulipatam*, of taking poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar immediately, a difference of opinion appeared at our Board. But as this is a matter of moment to the Company, and cannot be too attentively weighed and conſidered, we ſhall, accompanying, furniſh you with our ſeparate opinions on the ſubject.

Since writing the aforegoing, we have received a Letter from the Soubah, copy of which comes incloſed; you will obſerve it is not a direct Anſwer to the propoſals that were made to him. We alſo ſend incloſed our further deliberations on this ſubject, for your information; and we requeſt you will favour us with your ſentiments with all convenient expedition.

We have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servants,
A. Wynch, &c. Council.

Fort Saint George,
22d November 1775.

APPENDIX, No. 77.

Received the following Letter from *Bengal*:

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſq. Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

WE have received the Letter which you wrote to us on the

If *Nizam Ally Cawn* ſhall not agree to the terms propoſed to him in the Letter from your Preſident, reſpecting the country of *Bazalet Jung*, or if he ſhall give an evaſive Anſwer to that Letter, we then ſhall approve of your deputing a perſon to his Court; but we deſire that his commiſſion may be confined merely to the affairs of the Guntoor Circar, agreeably to the inſtructions we have already given you; the principal object of which is, to deprive the French of any footing which they may have obtained in that diſtrict. And in caſe you find it neceſſary to depute a perſon on this ſervice, we requeſt to be furniſhed with a copy of the inſtructions which you may give him.

Minute thereon:

The Board having acquainted the Governor General and Council, in their Letter of the 22d ultimo, they had reſolved to wait their ſentiments upon the Soubah's Letter to the Preſident, before any further meaſures were taken for the removal of the French from the Guntoor Circar, they are of opinion, that it will not be proper to ſend a perſon to the Soubah's Court, or to purſue any other ſteps in the way of negociation, until they receive an Anſwer to that Letter.

Agreed, That a Letter to the foregoing effect be written to the Governor General and Council; and that we incloſe, for their information, copies of the laſt Letters received from Captain *Duncan* and Enſign *Halcott*, relative to the defeat of *Bazalet Jung*'s Troops, before the fort of *Bellari*.

A. Wynch,
Geo. Stratton,
Robt Fletcher,
Geo. Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
J. M. Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Thomas Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

APPENDIX, No. 78.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 2d January 1776.

PRESENT,

The Right Honourable Lord *Pigot*, Governor, Preſident,
George Stratton,
Robert Fletcher,
George Dawſon,
Henry Brooke,
Claud Ruſſel,
Alex^r Dalrymple,
John Maxw Stone,
Archdale Palmer,
Francis Jourdan,
Geo. Mackay.

READ the following Letter from the Governor General and Coucil at *Fort William*:

To the Honourable *Alexander Wynch*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort St. George*.

Gentlemen,

We have this day received and taken into conſideration your Letter of the 22d ult. and your Proceedings relative to the Foreigners in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, in the Guntoor Circar.—As you have reſolved to ſuſpend taking any meaſures for their removal until you receive further inſtructions from us, we take the earlieſt opportunity of conveying to you our ſentiments, to enable you to proceed, without loſs of time, on this neceſſary buſineſs.

In our Letter of the 5th July laſt, we left it open to you to take poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, unleſs *Bazalet Jung* ſhould immediately conſent to diſmiſs all the Foreigners in his ſervice; without poſitively directing the meaſure, we authorized you to carry it into execution, *if you ſhould think it adviſable, conſidering the general poſture of affairs in the* Carnatic.

By the Anſwer of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* to the Letter which your Preſident wrote to him on that occaſion, we perceive he engages his Brothe ſhall remove his Foreign Troops from the ſea coaſt t *Adoni*, and to ſtop the Revenue of the villages allotted for their pay. If this engagement be fulfilled, and if we are put in poſſeſſion of *Mootapillee*, the object of our firſt inſtructions will be obtained; if not, we ſtill continue to allow you the ſame latitude to take poſſeſſion of the circar which we gave you in our Letter of the 5th July. In the firſt place, we think it proper to aſſign the Revenues of *Mootapillee* to *Bazalet Jung*, after defraying the extraordinary expences which may be incurred by that ſervice; and in the ſecond place, to grant the Revenues of the circar to the Soubah, with the like reſerve for defraying the expences; but in either, our yielding up our Revenues is founded on the ſuppoſition that *Bazalet Jung*, or *Nizam Ally Cawn*, reſpectively, do not oppoſe you in theſe operations.

Our ſole object in all the directions we have given on the ſubject of the Guntoor Circar, has been to exclude Europeans from an entrance, by ſea, into the diſtricts of *Bazalet Jung*, through the port of *Mootapillee*. This point, therefore, we recommend to your ſerious attention; and ſhall be ſatisfied with any juſt means by which you may be able to attain the end propoſed. You will obſerve, by the conceſſions we offer, how much it is our wiſh to ſettle the affair amicably, and to avoid proceeding to open hoſtilities.

We deſire you will acquaint the Nabob of the *Carnatic* with your intentions on this head, and that they proceed from the approbation and inſtructions of this Government. You will alſo explain to him our motives for recommending the above meaſures, and endeavour, if poſſible,

ſible, to attain his acquieſcence and aſſiſtance in the execution of them. We are, Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
Richd Barwell,
P. Francis.

Fort William,
the 11th Dec. 1775.

Ordered to lie on the table, until the Right Honourable the Preſident, and the other new Members of the Board, ſhall have read over what has already paſſed on this ſubject.

APPENDIX, No. 79.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Military Conſultations, the 10th July 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold,* Eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Major General *Munro,*
Charles Smith,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

THE Preſident lays before the Board the following Minute for their conſideration:

On referring back to the Records of 1775, I find the attention of the Board at that time very much employed in endeavouring to remove an evil which has for ſome years paſt threatened no ſmall danger to the intereſts of the Company in the circars. The Board will be at no loſs to underſtand, that I mean the growing power and influence acquired by the French in the Guntoor Circar; an object of ſo much importance at this juncture, when we expect a war with *France,* that I cannot too ſtrongly recommend it to their attention; and I ſhall beg leave, after ſtating briefly what has paſſed on the ſubject, to propoſe to them ſuch meaſures as appear to me immediately neceſſary to be purſued on this occaſion.

The Guntoor Circar was by the Mogul's Phirmaund, granted with the other Northern Circars to the Company in 1765; but by the Treaties concluded between them and *Nizam Ally Cawn* in 1766 and 1768, they conſented that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould hold the Guntoor Circar during his life, on certain conditions, by which he was reſtrained from diſturbing their affairs; at his death this circar reverts to the Company.

Bazalet Jung holding on the above tenure, a country in which the Company have an immediate and powerful intereſt, ſhould certainly have been at ſome pains to cultivate their friendſhip, or at leaſt have been cautious of diſobliging them. Inſtead of obſerving a conduct ſo prudent and neceſſary in his ſituation, he has ventured to provoke their diſpleaſure, and even to inſult them, by converting this ſame country, which in fact belongs to them, into a nurſery for French and other Foreign Troops, who have been paid with its Revenues, ſupplied with all ſorts of military ſtores through the only ſea-port that opens to it, and who, to crown all, are to every appearance ſupported by the Government of *Pondicherry,* evidently with the view of ſecuring that Province to themſelves, or of attacking the Company in that quarter, in caſe of a rupture with *France:* for this purpoſe, it muſt be confeſſed, they are conveniently ſituated, and might give much diſturbance to our Northern poſſeſſions, which are the only ſure ſource of Revenue to the Company on this coaſt.

Theſe circumſtances were repreſented to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal,* in a Letter dated the 1775; the danger appeared to them in the ſame light that it did to this Government, and they came to a Reſolution, that no time was to be loſt in endeavouring to remove the French from the Guntoor Circar; the mode they recommended was to aſſemble a body of Troops near the Guntoor Circar, and to inſiſt on all Foreigners being immediately diſcharged from *Bazalet Jung's* ſervice, otherwiſe to take poſſeſſion of the country, and to negociate with Nizam for the immediate ceſſion of it to the Company.

APPENDIX No. 79.

The Board at that time, imagining this mode of application directly to *Bazalet Jung* would be improper, and not agreeable to the Treaty with *Nizam Ally Cawn,* complained of his Brother's conduct, and deſired redreſs from him; and a Letter being received from him in Anſwer, it was reſolved to ſend a copy of it to *Bengal,* and to wait the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council before any further ſteps were taken.

The Letter from *Nizam Ally* was conceived in very friendly terms. He promiſes therein to uſe his influence with *Bazalet Jung* to remove every cauſe of jealouſy from the Engliſh; and ſays, he had then ſent a perſon to him expreſsly for that purpoſe. The Governor General and Council of *Bengal,* very juſtly looking upon this as a ſlight ſecurity, continued the latitude before given to this Government to employ ſuch further meaſures as might be effectual. Their Letter on the ſubject is dated the 11th December 1775, and was received ſoon after Lord *Pigot* arrived in the country. The Government being then changed, the Letter was ordered to lie on the table for conſideration; and the ſubſequent diſputes at the Board left the matter in that ſtate in which it has ſince remained. The inſtances uſed by *Nizam Ally Cawn* with his brother have had very little, if any effect; it is well known that a conſiderable party of Troops, commanded by Mr. *Lally,* were lately in the Guntoor Circar, and approached very near to our poſſeſſions; and even ſince my arrival here, ſome Europeans, with paſſports from the Governor of *Pondicherry,* have been taken up by the Commanding Officer at *Ongole,* on their way to the Guntoor Circar, which clearly ſhews that the Foreign Troops with *Bazalet Jung* are not compoſed of mere adventurers, but are recruited by the authority of the French Government, and kept up for the purpoſes before explained. For theſe reaſons I am of opinion, and accordingly recommend to the Board, that preparations be made as ſoon as poſſible, for executing the former deſign of this Government relative to the Foreign Troops with *Bazalet Jung.* We have the fulleſt latitude from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to effect it in any manner we may think proper; and that as little delay as poſſible may happen, I think a Letter ſhould be written to *Nizam Ally Cawn,* acquainting him, that our deſire of continuing on the beſt terms with him induced us to repreſent the behaviour of his brother, *Bazalet Jung,* in the firſt inſtance, to his Highneſs, expecting the evils complained of, would, by his authority, be redreſſed; but finding no good effect from the endeavours he had employed with his brother on this occaſion, we propoſe applying to *Bazalet Jung* himſelf, in ſuch a manner as we hope will be more effectual;—that our views are not to acquire territory for the Company, but to take care of their intereſts, and ſecure their reverſionary right to the Guntoor Circar, neither of which can be done without checking at leaſt, if not entirely eradicating, the power obtained by the influence of the French with *Bazalet Jung,* and ſupported through the channel of that circar; that for this purpoſe we are deſirous of poſſeſſing the port of *Mootapillee,* by which they are ſupplied with warlike ſtores; but if that port be not immediately put into our hands, and ſufficient aſſurances given us that the Foreign Troops ſhall not be permitted, on any pretence, to enter the Guntoor Circar, the Company may in that caſe, for their own ſecurity, find themſelves under the neceſſity of taking the whole circar into their own hands.

The Board concurring entirely in opinion with the Preſident, relative to the ſtate of the French Force in the Guntoor, and the neceſſity of taking meaſures for ſecuring the Company's intereſts from danger, reſolved, That a Letter be written to *Nizam Ally Cawn* on this ſubject, as entered in Country Correſpondence, No. 104. Reſolved alſo,

APPENDIX. No. 80.

alſo, That Captain *Barclay*, the Commandant at *Ongole*, be directed to ſtop all Europeans going into the Guntoor Circar, and ſend them to the Preſidency.

Tho' Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam' Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 80.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 30th November 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

THE Preſident acquaints the Committee, that *Bazalet Jung*'s Vackeel, who is now here, hath been frequently to viſit him, and hath expreſſed his Maſter's ſtrong deſire to obtain marks of the Company's friendſhip and good-will, which, he is willing to purchaſe by giving to them the Guntoor Circar, at rent on the terms of the following Treaty or Agreement, which he propoſes to be entered into by the Company's Repreſentatives and himſelf.

Treaty propoſed to be ſettled between the Honourable *Tho' Rumbold*, Eſquire, Governor, and the Council of *Fort Saint George*, on the part of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and the Nabob *Suja Ul Mulk Bazalet Jung*, Bahauder.

We *Tho' Rumbold*, Preſident and Governor, and Members of the Council of *Fort Saint George*, do engage, on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, to take on rent from the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, the circar of *Murtazanagur*, alias *Guntoor*, for a term of years, commencing the and ending The charity allowances and enams to Zemindars, amounting to Pag' 5,000 per ann. ſhall be paid by *Bazalet Jung*, and the villages depending on the fort of *Condavir*, amounting to 5,000 Pag', ſhall continue in their preſent ſtate without our interfering therein. We agree to pay for the reſt of the diſtrict, the annual rent of 1,92,000 Madras Pag'.

We ſhall, in conſideration of one lack of Madras Pag', remitted out of the above rent, maintain a body of Europeans and battalions of Sepoys, beſides guns and military ſtores, as ſhall be hereafter ſpecified; which Force ſhall be ſtationed with the ſaid Nabob, and employed at his diſcretion, or of any other perſon whom he ſhall appoint.

The remaining 92,000 Pag' ſhall be yearly remitted in Soucar Bills, or ready money, to *Bazalet Jung*.

The Officer whom we ſhall appoint to take command of the Force above-mentioned, ſhall have ſtrict orders to obey *Bazalet Jung* in every thing; and we promiſe to remove, and appoint another Officer, whenever application is made to us by *Bazalet Jung*.

If a powerful Enemy comes into *Bazalet Jung*'s country with hoſtile intentions, we promiſe to aſſiſt *Bazalet Jung* with a Force ſufficient, beſides the ordinary one ſtationed with him, to repel the Enemy; and he ſhall pay the extraordinary charges attending ſuch aſſiſtance given him.

If any diſputes happen between *Bazalet Jung*'s Servants or Ryots and our Soldiers and Sepoys, it ſhall be referred for deciſion to *Bazalet Jung*; and we promiſe to acquieſce to ſuch deciſions as he ſhall make.

Whatever changes may take place in the Council of *Fort Saint George*, we promiſe, that as long as the Engliſh are eſtabliſhed in the *Decan*, they ſhall never depart from the Alliance now entered into by us with *Bazalet Jung*, or his deſcendants and poſterity; and we promiſe to obſerve ſtrictly every part of this Treaty; and we ſwear, in the preſence of the Almighty God and Jeſus Chriſt, upon his holy Goſpels, that we ſhall abide and never deviate from it.

The Preſident then delivers in the following Paper; which he propoſes to the Committee as the foundation of ſuch Agreement as he thinks the Company may with propriety conclude with *Bazalet Jung*:

Articles for a Treaty of Agreement to be concluded between the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and the reſt of the Members of the Select Committee, and the Nabob *Sujah Ul Mulk Bazalet Jung*, Bahauder.

The Company agree to rent the Guntoor Circar from the Nabob during his life, for the amount he now actually receives from it, reſerving the Company's reverſionary right to it.

We will keep a ſufficient body of Troops, with artillery and military ſtores, with him, provided he diſcharge and diſarm all the French Troops now in his ſervice, and oblige them to quit the country.—But our Troops with him muſt only be employed within his own diſtricts, or againſt Zemindars dependant on him, and for the defence of his country, in caſe of an attack from a Foreign Power; but they are on no account to be carried beyond the line of his country. The expence of theſe Troops and Stores to be defrayed out of the rent for the Guntoor Circar; the reſt ſhall be paid to *Bazalet Jung*'s order regularly as it becomes due.

In caſe of any improper behaviour in the Commanding Officer, or any other Officer of our Troops, upon a proper repreſentation to us, we ſhall remove ſuch Officer, and appoint another in his room.

If *Bazalet Jung*'s territories be attacked, we will, beſides the Troops which may be with him, give ſuch further aſſiſtance as we can ſpare, without danger to our poſſeſſions; the ordinary and extraordinary expences of ſuch aſſiſtance to be paid by *Bazalet Jung*.—If any diſputes ariſe between our Soldiers or Sepoys and the Ryots or Servants of *Bazalet Jung*, the ſame, as far as our own Soldiers or Sepoys are concerned, muſt be determined by our own laws and cuſtoms, and puniſhment inflicted accordingly by our own Officers; but our Officers ſhall have no power over the Servants or People of *Bazalet Jung*, or protect them in any ſhape whatever againſt his authority; and in caſe of any diſputes where his People appear to be in the wrong, they ſhall be delivered up to him for puniſhment.

The charity allowances and enams to the Zemindars, amounting to 5,000 Pag' per ann. ſhall continue as before. The fort of *Condavir* ſhall be garriſoned by the Engliſh Troops; but the jaghire villages depending, amounting to 5,000 Pag' per ann. ſhall remain under the management of *Bazalet Jung*'s people, as formerly.

In caſe the Company ſhould require a body of Horſe for the defence of their poſſeſſions, *Bazalet Jung* ſhall engage to let them have any number they may want, as he may be able to ſpare, upon the Company's paying the expence thereof; the ſaid Cavalry to be returned to *Bazalet Jung* as ſoon as the ſervice for which they ſhall be required is finiſhed.

This Agreement ſhall be executed with all due form, under our hands and the ſeal of the Company, and ſhall be binding on the Company for ever, ſo long as the terms are faithfully executed on the part of *Bazalet Jung*.

The Committee are of opinion, That the above Articles contain very proper Amendments to thoſe propoſed by *Bazalet Jung*; and the Preſident is deſired to communicate them to the Vakeel, and ſound him upon them.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 35. From the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, Behauder; received 23d February 1779.

I received with great pleaſure your Letter, accompanying the draft of a Treaty to be ſealed with my ſeal,

APPENDIX. No. 81.

ſeal, and relating to the diſmiſſion of the French in my ſervice, which you repreſented would be the means of eſtabliſhing a friendſhip between the Company and me. The deſire I have of being allied with the Engliſh, is from a conſideration of their ſtrict adherence to Treaties, and firmneſs of their friendſhip, in which they ſurpaſs all other Nations; for all thoſe with whom they have made friendſhip, have enjoyed the continuation of it, and tranſmitted it to their poſterity. It has therefore long been my earneſt wiſh to be friendly connected with them; and I thank the Almighty that I have now, by your prudent and wiſe management, been able to obtain what I ſo much wiſhed for. May God, out of his infinite Providence, day by day increaſe and ſtrengthen the foundation of the friendſhip between us, and make it a ſource of mutual advantage to us! The draft of the Treaty ſent by you, has now been altered in a few places. This was done out of pure neceſſity; for, conſidering it as the firſt Treaty of friendſhip between us, it was proper to inſert in it ſuch expreſſions as only portend omens of good fortune, and without this my mind would never have been ſatisfied. In ſo doing, it can be no loſs to the Company; for the expreſſions made uſe of only tend to manifeſt our friendſhip. It has now been ſealed and ſigned by me, and goes with this. After I have received the collections for this year from the Guntoor Circar, and the Treaty is ſent to me under the ſeals and ſignatures of the Governor and Council of *Madras*, and the Troops deſigned to be ſtationed here are ſent to me, I will ſend you the Sunnud for the rent of the Guntoor Circar. The French Soldiers have been diſmiſſed my ſervice, as you deſire. For further particulars I refer you to the noble and illuſtrious *Amer Ul Hind Wallaja*, Bahauder.—What ſhall I ſay more?

Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance between the Nabob *Amer Ul Omra*, *Sujah Ul Mulk*, Behauder, and Mr. *Rumbold*, Governor, and the Council of *Madras*, for themſelves and all the future Governors and Councils, as Repreſentatives of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, for ever and ever.

Suja Ul Mulk, Amer Ul Omra.

Article 1ſt. The Engliſh Company agree to rent from the Nabob *Suja Ul Mulk*, Bahauder, the Circar of *Murtazanagur*, commonly called *Guntoor*, clear of Sibbendy; for whatever he now annually receives from it, will appear by the accounts of collections of the Aumil now reſiding there. (Signed by the Nabob.)

Article 2d. We (the Engliſh Company) ſhall always have at heart the good and proſperity of the Nabob *Suja Ul Mulk*, who ſhall diſmiſs from his ſervice the French Soldiers now with him; we will ſend him what Troops he may want, who will remain with him conſtantly, and obey his inſtructions. They are, however, only to be employed within the diſtricts belonging to him, or againſt Zemindars dependant on him, or for the defence of his country, in caſe of an attack from a Foreign Enemy; but theſe Troops are on no account to be carried out of his country, or thoſe of the Zemindars dependant upon him. If his affairs ſhould at any time require his going to viſit his brother, the Nabob *Nizam Ul Dowla*, Bahauder, theſe Troops ſhall attend him and be always with him.

Article 3d. The expences of theſe Troops ſhall be regulated by the Company's cuſtom; and the Accounts having been ſigned by the Nabob, ſhall be paid monthly from the rent of the Guntoor Circar; the remainder of the rent ſhall be regularly remitted in Soucar Bills to the Nabob. In caſe of any improper behaviour or diſreſpect ſhewn by the Commanding Officer, or any other European Officer of our Troops, upon repreſentation being made to us by the Nabob, we ſhall remove ſuch Officer, and appoint another in his room. (Signed by the Nabob.)

Article 4th. If the Nabob *Suja Ul Mulk*'s territories be invaded by an Enemy, we ſhall, beſides the Troops that are ſtationed with him, ſend ſuch a ſufficient Force as we can ſpare to his aſſiſtance. The extraordinary expences of ſuch Troops, whatever they may amount to, ſhall be paid, agreeable to the Company's eſtabliſhed cuſtoms, by the Nabob, who will ſign the Accounts. If any diſputes ariſe between our Soldiers and Sepoys and the Ryots and Servants of the Nabob, puniſhment ſhall be inflicted by our Officers on our Men, agreeable to the Engliſh laws and cuſtoms. The Engliſh Officers, and their People, ſhall not interfere with the Servants and Ryots of the Nabob, and ſhall not protect them or countenance them in any ſhape. In caſe of any diſpute where the Nabob's People appear to be in the wrong, they ſhall be delivered up to him for puniſhment. (Signed by the Nabob.)

Article 5th. The cuſtomary allowances of the Zemindars of the Guntoor Circar, amounting annually to five thouſand Pagodas, ſhall continue as before. The fort and jaghire villages of *Condavir* ſhall remain under the management of the Servants of the Nabob; but ſuch a garriſon of Engliſh Troops as may be deemed neceſſary for the defence of the fort, ſhall be ſtationed with the Killidar. (Signed by the Nabob.)

Article 6th. If the Company ſhall demand a body of Horſe from the Nabob, he ſhall let them have a number according to his abilities; and the ſaid Cavalry ſhall be returned to him, and their expences paid, as ſoon as the ſervice for which they were required is finiſhed. (Signed by the Nabob.)

This Treaty has been executed in due form, under the ſignatures and ſeals of the Governor and Council, and the Company's ſeal.

We the Governor and Council, who are the Repreſentatives of the Company, do promiſe, that as long as the above terms are faithfully executed by the Nabob *Suja Ul Mulk*, we ſhall, on our part, never demand from him more than is mentioned in the above Articles; and we engage, on our part, to adhere to them in the ſtricteſt manner. We have accordingly given this as a Treaty. Dated 19th of Mohum, in the 1193 of the Hygera, or 7th February 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 81.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 22d December 1778.

THE Vakeel of *Bazalet Jung* being deſirous of returning to his Maſter, it is agreed to write a Letter by him, incloſing the Articles on which we are willing to accept his offer of the Guntoor Circar, and requeſting his ſpeedy determination upon them.

Agreed to write to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, adviſing them of *Bazalet Jung*'s Propoſals for a Treaty with the Company, and of the Anſwer we have ſent to him, and deſiring their opinion on the ſubject.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 194. To *Bazalet Jung*; dated the 23d December 1778.

I received your friendly Letter of congratulation upon my acceſſion to the Government; and your Vakeel has communicated to me the terms on which you are inclined to form a connection with the Company; all which I underſtand. In anſwer to the Propoſals made to me by your Vakeel, I have delivered him a Paper containing the Articles delivered by your Vakeel, altered and amended by me; and I hope you will approve the alterations, and ſignify your determination upon it as ſoon as poſſible. With reſpect to the diſmiſſion of the French Troops from your ſervice, as that is a circumſtance very eſſential to the cementing a proper Alliance between you and the Company, I hope it will be ſoon effected. And if any aſſiſtance from me be requiſite, I beg you will point out in what manner I can afford it, and I ſhall do it with great pleaſure. May your health and proſperity always increaſe! What can I ſay more?

Extract

APPENDIX. No. 82.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 31ſt December 1778.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*; dated the 31ſt December 1778.

We have written particularly to the Honourable Court of Directors on the ſubject of their engagements with the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*, and have requeſted that they will fall on ſome means of relieving us from the embarraſſments we are expoſed to in defending ſuch extenſive territories, without having the leaſt command over any one reſource belonging to them. In the meantime, we flatter ourſelves that you will, from a due conſideration of theſe circumſtances, be induced to yield us every aid in your power, and particularly at this period, when we are obliged to make exertions ſo much beyond our natural ſtrength, and when we have nothing to truſt to for ſupporting them, but engagements to be performed, and revenues to be collected.

On referring to our Records, we obſerve, that in the year 1775, ſeveral Letters were written to you from this Preſidency, on the ſubject of the French Troops in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, maintained in the Guntoor Circar, and ſupplied with warlike ſtores through the port of *Mcotapaly*; we obſerve too with ſatisfaction, the warmth with which you approved and ſupported the meaſures that were propoſed for effecting the diſmiſſion of thoſe Troops from the neighbourhood of our Northern poſſeſſions. It appears, however, that this neceſſary buſineſs was not at that time proſecuted by this Government, further than by a correſpondence with the Soubah, *Nizam Ally Caun*, which concluded in nothing.

As we are thoroughly convinced of the neceſſity of removing theſe Troops from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, we have lately taken up the ſubject again; and having received certain Propoſals from *Bazalet Jung*, relative to the Guntoor Circar, we returned ſuch an Anſwer to them as we thought proper and neceſſary for the occaſion. We now incloſe copies of thoſe Papers for your information. By Letters from your Preſidency, dated the 5th July and 11th December 1775, we find ample authority from you to the then Government, to proceed in effecting the diſmiſſion of the French Troops, by Treaty, or in any other manner they might think proper. As ſo much time has been elapſed ſince, we have thought it neceſſary to apply to you again on this ſubject, and requeſt you will be pleaſed to favour us with your ſentiments upon the Articles we have propoſed to *Bazalet Jung*, and ſanction, if you approve them, to enter into a Treaty or Agreement with him.

APPENDIX, No. 82.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*, to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*; dated the 25th of January: in Conſultations the 22d of February 1779.

IN regard to the Alliance propoſed to be formed with *Bazalet Jung*, we highly approve of the meaſures in general, and leave it to you to negociate and finally conclude a Treaty with him. That you may be acquainted with our ſentiments, as far as the materials you have ſupplied will enable us to form them, we ſhall make ſuch remarks upon the different Articles which you have propoſed to *Bazalet Jung*, as occur to us on the peruſal of them.

1ſt. The quota of Troops of every denomination, to be maintained by the Company for the ſervice of the Chief ſhould be mentioned; and theſe we recommend to be reſtricted as much as poſſible to Natives, that your European Force may not be weakened by this Alliance.

2dly. The ſubſidy for them ſhould be fixed at the utmoſt expence that will probably be incurred, and the ſurplus or deficiency ought to be on account of the Company.

3dly. That the Troops ſhould be confined to *Bazalet Jung*'s country, is proper.

4thly. A net ſum ſhould be paid annually to *Bazalet Jung*, for the farm of his circars or country, to be fixed on a view of the preſent rent roll.

5thly. The removal of Officers on complaints of unbecoming behaviour, is proper.

6thly. The expence of extra Troops, furniſhed by the Company, ſhould be fixed on the ſame principle as thoſe which are to be ſtationary.

7thly. Mode of puniſhing offenders, proper.

8thly. The Propoſal reſpecting the fort of *Condavir* and the jaghire, proper.

9thly The charge of the Horſe which may be required of *Bazalet Jung*, ſhould be aſcertained; and whilſt they are employed by the Company, they ought to be paid from your own funds, at a fixed rate for each rank.

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith.

APPENDIX, No. 83.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 22d April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident.

THE Committee having at their laſt meeting reſolved to ſend three battalions of Sepoys and a Company of Artillery, for the protection of *Bazalet Jung*'s country, it is now ordered, That this Force, together with ſix field-pieces, and a proportionable quantity of ſtores, be got ready to proceed with all poſſible expedition; and that the command be given to Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*.

APPENDIX, No. 84.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*; dated 23d April 1779.

SINCE writing the foregoing, we have intelligence from the Nabob, that *Hyder* has made a conqueſt of the Cuddapah Country, and taken the Phouſdar priſoner; that he is proceeding to ſubdue the Phouſdar of *Cannoul*, and that he means alſo to make a conqueſt of the territories of *Bazalet Jung*; of which laſt meaſure, the Vakeel of *Bazalet Jung* has, in the name of his Maſter, expreſſed the ſtrongeſt apprehenſions; that he has alſo written threatening Letters to the Zemindars of *Vencatagbery* and *Calaſtry*, who are tributary to the Nabob.

In conſequence of late negociations with *Bazalet Jung*, we have reſolved to ſend immediately, for the protection of his country, 3 battalions of Sepoys, a company of Artillery, and 6 field-pieces.

Hyder's proceedings in that quarter have added greatly to his power, and given him a much more eaſy acceſs to the *Carnatic* than he had before; conſidering all theſe circumſtances, we are of opinion, that immediate meaſures ſhould be taken to compel *Hyder* to retreat back within his former limits, or, if neceſſary, to reduce him totally; for we have every reaſon to conclude, from the language he holds, and from the nature of his proceedings, that he will very ſhortly draw us into hoſtilities; in which caſe it will be highly expedient that we ſhould be prepared to act deciſively; and we requeſt you will favour us with your ſentiments and determination upon this Letter as ſoon as poſſible. We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble Servants,

Thomas Rumbold. &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 85.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 22d February 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident,
General Sir *Eyre Coote*,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
General *Munro* abſent upon ſervice.

THE following inſtructions to Mr. *John Hollond*, who was appointed the 27th ultimo to proceed to the Soubah's Court, are now read, and approved:

To Mr. *John Hollond*.

Sir,

It appearing to us expedient at this juncture, to ſend a perſon to the Court of *Nizam Ally Cawn*, in quality of Reſident on the behalf of the Company; we have ſelected you for this ſervice, and deſire accordingly, that you will proceed by the way of *Maſulipatam*, to join *Nizam Ally* with all expedition. We have written to him, as you will perceive by the enclоſed copy of our Letter, to forward the neceſſary paſſports for this purpoſe, and we hope they will meet you on the road.

The intention of our appointment is in part explained in that Letter: we are anxious to know how the Nizam is diſpoſed towards the Company—what his deſigns are; and in particular whether he means to take any, and what, part in the preſent war with the French; or, in conſequence of the meaſures lately adopted by the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; or by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in detaching a conſiderable Force into the heart of the peninſula, to favour our Alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*.

The motions of our Troops from *Bengal* and *Bombay*, will naturally have excited a great degree of jealouſy and diſtruſt in the Nizam, becauſe they have been directed in oppoſition to his profeſſed views and intereſt; he has openly remonſtrated both to the Governor General and Council at *Bengal*, and to us, againſt the ſupport given to *Raganaut Row*, whom he conſidered as his declared enemy; and there is reaſon to believe, that he is no leſs adverſe to the meaſures which have been purſued with reſpect to the Rajah of *Berar*.

To remove theſe impreſſions from the mind of the Nizam, and to ſubſtitute others more favourable to the preſent ſituation of the Company's affairs, will be a work of difficulty, and we fear of time; relying much, however, on the ſincerity of our own intentions, and the ſeaſonable exertion of your abilities, we do not deſpair of accompliſhing the end we have in view; at leaſt ſo far as to preventing the Nizam from entertaining any diſhonourable deſigns againſt the Company, while they are engaged in a war with a National Enemy, which is likely to employ all their ſtrength.

We encloſe herewith copies of the Treaties concluded with the Nizam in 1766 and 1768, which will be of uſe to you in framing ſuch repreſentations as you may find it neceſſary to make to him, or in obviating any objections that he may raiſe againſt our conduct, on the grounds of thoſe Treaties. We deſire you to aſſure him of our firm intentions to abide ſtrictly by the terms of our engagements in all reſpects; and that we have nothing ſo much at heart as the preſervation of the peace and friendſhip eſtabliſhed between him and the Company, by the Treaty of 1776. But as ſome circumſtances have happened in relation to the Guntoor Circar, which may be thought to affect the terms of that Treaty, we ſhall here explain them to you, that you may be prepared to act as occaſion ſhall require.

The Guntoor Circar was, by the Mogul's Phirmaund, granted to the Company, with the other Northern Circars, in 1765; but at the ſolicitation of the Nizam, was allowed to remain with his brother *Bazalet Jung* during his life, on certain conditions expreſſed in the Treaty of 1768. *Bazalet Jung*, unmindful of theſe conditions, and diſregarding the intereſts of the Company, has for ſeveral years entertained a body of Frenchmen in his ſervice, appropriating the Revenue of the Guntoor Circar for their maintenance, and uſing the port of *Mootapillee*, in that circar, as an inlet for, and furniſhing them with, warlike ſtores. Theſe Frenchmen are ſtill with *Bazalet Jung*; and as we deem it not only an infringement of the Treaty of 1768 to entertain them at this juncture, when we are at war with their Nation; but conſider alſo that their vicinity to the other circars, and the means they poſſeſs of acquiring additional ſtrength, through the port of *Mootapillee*, may render them formidable, and even dangerous to our Northern poſſeſſions, we are determined to ſpare no pains in effecting their entire diſmiſſion and removal from the country. We formerly tranſmitted repeated repreſentations to *Nizam Ally Cawn* on this head, and ſince the commencement of the hoſtilities, we have opened a negociation immediately with *Bazalet Jung*, which we hope will conclude to our mutual ſatisfaction. For your information in this particular, we encloſe herewith copy of ſundry Propoſals made to us by *Bazalet Jung*, and of our Anſwer to them. The Anſwer has been ſome time forwarded to *Bazalet Jung*, and we ſhortly expect his final determination upon it.

We leave it to your judgment to preſs our views in this reſpect upon the Nizam, ſo far as may be neceſſary to obtain his concurrence and good offices towards their completion. The Treaty of 1768 being concluded with the Nizam only, we have hitherto made all our applications relative to the Guntoor Circar immediately to him, and conſidered him as reſponſible for the due execution of that part which concerns his brother: upon this ground, viewing the conduct of *Bazalet Jung*, in regard to the French Troops, as an infringement on the Treaty, we judged it proper to delay the payment of the yearly Peſcuſh to the Nizam until we could obtain ſome ſatisfaction on that head. It may be neceſſary that you explain theſe circumſtances in ſuch a manner as to remove any diſtruſt which may have been occaſioned by this delay, aſſuring him that we have no intention of withholding the Peſcuſh from him; and that, in firm confidence that his friendſhip for the Company will continue inviolate, and that he will afford them all reaſonable ſatisfaction with reſpect to the Guntoor Circar, and the Troops in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice, we ſhall give the neceſſary orders for diſcharging the arrears, and paying the Peſcuſh regularly in future, according to the kiſts which have been ſettled for that purpoſe.

We deſire you will, during your reſidence at the Nizam's Court, convey every neceſſary intelligence to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, as well as to us; and that you will be as early as poſſible in all your communications to both Preſidencies.

APPENDIX, No. 86.

Letter to the Governor General.

APPENDIX. No. 86.

Honourable Sir,

I HAVE the honour to tranſmit to you a copy of a Letter which I this day addreſſed to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Madras*. The moſt important information I have been able to obtain, ſince my arrival here, is, that the Soubah begins to grow jealous of *Hyder Ally*'s increaſing power; and in effect, not only the Soubah's ſecurity, but our own, ſeems to render it neceſſary that a check ſhould be given to the encroachments of that reſtleſs uſurper. By the reduction of the Fort of *Chittuldungum*, I have been informed that he acquired an acceſſion of country to the amount of 30 lacks of Rupees; he has ſince been employed in the countries bordering

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on the Soubah's. He has entirely ſubdued the Cudapah Country, and poſſeſſed himſelf of a very large ſum in plunder, and has exacted ſums of money from the *Cannoul* Nabob, and from *Bazalet Jung*, the Soubah's brother. How far it may be our intereſt to purſue peace at preſent, you are the beſt judge; but *Hyder*'s power, if it is ſuffered to increaſe, will certainly become formidable. The Soubah would be glad, I believe, to ſtrengthen himſelf with our alliance; and although he has not yet ſaid a word to me upon this ſubject, I am clear that the buſineſs he deſired me to mention to the Governor of *Madras*, relates to this object.

Fazel Beg Cawn, who was formerly in our ſervice, during the war with *Myſore*, and who was afterwards introduced and ſupported by——— *ul Dowla*, at this Court, is become ſo powerful, that he is no longer controllable by the Soubah. This man, who looks for ſupport to our Nabob, and who has a faction in his favour at this Durbar, and our Nabob, who is jealous of the Soubah, and who conſiders a free communication of ſentiments with this Court, without his intervention, as dangerous to his influence; will both of them exert themſelves to prevent my reſiding here: the Soubah and his ſervants ſeem, at preſent, from prejudice, to be diſinclined to it; and himſelf, as well as thoſe of his ſervants who are his friends and wiſh him well, are full of ſuſpicions. I think it, therefore, very probable, as ſoon as the negociations relative to the views he has againſt *Hyder*, are brought to a concluſion, that he will give me my audience of leave. If you ſhould be of opinion, that my reſiding here can be attended with any advantage to the Company, ſome ſteps that may be conducive towards procuring the Soubah's aſſent, will, no doubt, ſuggeſt themſelves to you. The Soubah conducts his buſineſs in his own perſon; and as I am allowed free conference with him, without the intervention of an interpreter, I can pledge myſelf for a faithful communication of any repreſentations you may have to make him, on the public intereſts.

Hydrabad, 9th May 1779. I am, &c. (Signed) *John Hollond.*

Mr. *Hollond* to the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived at this place on the 6th inſtant, and on the 8th, in the morning, waited on the Soubah. I was received with all the honours that have uſually been ſhewn to Gentlemen appointed in public ſtations to this Court; *Cawn Dowrar*, an Omrah of the firſt rank at the Durbar, having been ſent by the Soubah to my tent, to receive me, and to conduct me to Court, with a retinue of elephants, &c. and a large party of the Soubah's Troops. Upon my delivering the Governor's Letter, and the Company's Preſents, the Soubah expreſſed himſelf much pleaſed.

Nothing paſſed relative to buſineſs on my firſt viſit, but in conſequence of an appointment laſt night, I waited upon his Highneſs this morning. Conformably to my inſtructions, I aſſured him, that it was your firm intention to adhere ſtrictly to the terms of the Treaty of 1768; that with reſpect to the Peſcuſh for the Circars, in full confidence of his giving all reaſonable ſatisfaction with regard to the Circar of Guntoor, and the Troops in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice, it was your intention to give orders for diſcharging the arrears, and paying the Peſcuſh regularly in future, according to the kiſts which have been ſettled for that purpoſe; that you had inſtructed me to make this declaration to him; and that, with a view to a more eaſy communication of ſentiments upon affairs of importance, you were deſirous I ſhould reſide conſtantly at his Court. In anſwer to what I have above ſtated, his Highneſs made the ſtrongeſt and moſt earneſt declarations of his great deſire to be upon terms of the ſtricteſt friendſhip with the Company; that he had not deviated in any inſtance from the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and him; that he had been ſtrongly ſolicited to join in ſupporting the French, but had deciſively, from the beginning, rejected every overture, as inconſiſtent with his engagements with the Company; that with reſpect to *Lally*'s party, he has cauſed his brother to diſmiſs them from the Guntoor Circar, and that he had done this in compliance with the Governor's Letter, at a time when they might have been uſeful, on account of *Hyder Ally*'s near approach towards that quarter. With reſpect to my reſiding at this Court, he expreſſed himſelf doubtfully, but he appeared on the whole diſinclined to it. He ſaid a great deal about our taking part with *Raganaut Row*, which he conceived to be a deviation from the terms of the Treaty of 1768; but he ſpoke with great moderation and reſpect towards the Company. He then proceeded to tell me, that he wiſhed I would ſtate the purport of his declarations to the Governor; and that upon receiving his anſwer, he ſhould have ſomething further to ſay upon ſome matters of importance, in which the Company's intereſts and his own were jointly concerned. I told him, that as there had been already a declaration of friendſhip on both ſides, there was no neceſſity for writing to the Governor, and waiting for his anſwer upon the ſubject of what had paſſed; and that I wiſhed he would immediately inform me of the buſineſs he had to propoſe, that I might communicate it without loſs of time, and receive early inſtructions regarding it. In reply to this, he again requeſted me to communicate what had paſſed; and hoped, from the whole of his conduct, and the earneſt and ſincere declarations he now made of his unſhaken attachment to the Company, that the Governor would expreſs himſelf ſatisfied with reſpect to his Highneſs's firm intention, of being ſteady to his engagements, and of his being heartily diſpoſed to adopt every means in his power, to preſerve and cultivate the Company's friendſhip. He gave me no intimation of the nature of the buſineſs he had to propoſe; but I have every reaſon to believe, that he wiſhes to form an alliance for the reduction of *Hyder Ally*, who has lately taken *Cudapah* and *Sidoutam*, and exacted money from *Bazalet Jung* and the Nabob of *Cannoul*.

The Soubah informed me, in the courſe of the conference, of his having engaged *Lally* in his ſervice; which he had told me he had done, merely to prevent that party joining the Marattas or *Hyder Ally*; who was, he ſaid, already too ſtrong. Attention to his own ſecurity againſt ſo powerful an enemy, who has invaded and ſubdued Countries ſituated ſo contiguous to his, and conſequently makes ſuch near approaches towards his own poſſeſſions and capital, was moſt probably the cauſe of the Soubah's taking this ſtep.

I have not been able to learn any thing preciſely with regard to the ſtrength of *Lally*'s party, with reſpect to intelligence in general, you may depend upon my employing my beſt endeavours to obtain authentic accounts of all important occurrences, but you muſt be ſenſible that under a Mooriſh Government, good information cannot be procured but in the way of intrigue, and that precipitate enquiries muſt tend to create ſuſpicions, and give alarms; it will therefore be neceſſary to tread cautiouſly upon this ground.

The Soubah's ſon is at preſent with a part of his army at *Kulbwig*, a place near the Maratta Country, having been lately ſent there to cover it from an attack threatened by a party of Marattas.

With reſpect to the renting of the Guntoor Circar from *Bazalet Jung*, as you did not lay any ſtreſs upon it in your inſtructions, and as I was informed that my mentioning it would be totally uſeleſs, I thought it beſt for the preſent to paſs it over in ſilence.

Hydrabad, 9th May, 1779. I remain with reſpect, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 87.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 1ſt of May 1779.

WROTE the following Letter to Colonel *Harpur*:

To Lieut. Col. *Harpur*.

Sir,

We have appointed you to the command of three battalions of Sepoys, a company of Artillery, and ſix field pieces, intended for the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*.

This detachment is to be employed in the defence and protection of *Bazalet Jung*'s territories, and for the ſupport of his Government. You are on no account to carry any of the Troops beyond the frontiers of his country, without our expreſs orders; but you are to employ them, at his requiſition, in enforcing due obedience and ſubmiſſion from any of the Zemindars, or others his dependants, who ſhall diſpute his authority, or withhold from him his juſt rights.

You are to pay the utmoſt attention to *Bazalet Jung*, and to be careful, by preſerving the ſtricteſt order and diſcipline among your Troops, that no juſt cauſe of complaint be given to him. If any violences or irregularities ſhould happen to be committed by our people, the offenders muſt be puniſhed agreeable to our laws and uſages; but if any diſputes ariſe between our people and the Ryots or Servants of *Bazalet Jung*, theſe laſt, ſhould they appear in fault, muſt be delivered over to *Bazalet Jung*, or his Officers, to be puniſhed.

You are not in any reſpect to interfere with the affairs of *Bazalet Jung*'s Government, or to have any dealings or tranſactions in money concerns with him, or any of his people; and you are to take eſpecial care that this injunction be obſerved by every perſon under your command.

In the courſe of your march through the territories of *Bazalet Jung*, you will preſerve the ſtricteſt order, and ſee that the inhabitants be duly paid for every thing you require from them.

The Troops are directed to aſſemble at *Mootapillee* in the Guntoor Circar, from whence they are to be marched, by the ſhorteſt and moſt expeditious route, to *Adoni* or *Raychour*, as *Bazalet Jung* may appoint.

You are to keep up a regular correſpondence with us, and adviſe us of every occurrence that may happen.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient Servants,

Tho' Rumbold, &c. Select Committee.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, dated the 14th June 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
General *Munro*,
Charles Smith.

READ the following Letters from Lieu' Colonel *Harpur*:

To the Honourable Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to tranſmit you monthly returns for the month of May, of the detachment under my command.

Captain *George Nixon* having obtained leave from the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam* to join this detachment, I have taken the liberty to appoint him to do duty with it till your pleaſure may be known.

Laſt night I received a Letter from *Bazalet Jung*, expreſſing the joy on my arrival in his country, and deſiring my march to *Adoni* may be as expeditious as poſſible, leaving behind me with Rajah *Bahauder* a battalion of Sepoys to enforce his orders with ſeveral Zemindars, reſpecting the payments of the Revenues for which they are in arrears. He has pointed out the route he wiſhes me to take by the way of *Atcour*; aſſuring me at the ſame time, that not the leaſt danger is to be feared from the enemy's Army having left that part of the country and gone to *Bangalore*, except a ſmall party under the command of *Meer Ali Raza*, which garriſons a Fort called *Sidotte*. He has ſent his inſtructions to Rajah *Bahauder* to furniſh me with every thing I may want, which leaves me in hopes of receiving draft bullocks in a few days; the want of them has for ſome time paſt been the only obſtacle to my leaving this place. He alſo informs me, that *Titula Khaun*, his Vakeel from *Madras*, will accompany me, to ſee every thing provided during the march; as yet he is not arrived.

I am, with every reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and moſt obedient Servant,

Camp near *Mootapilly*, 2d June 1779. *H' Harpur.*

APPENDIX. No. 87.

The Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Since I did myſelf the honour of addreſſing you the 2d inſtant, I find, by taking the route *Bazalet Jung* deſires, I ſhall have a march of three days through the Cuddapa Country, part of the dominions of *Hyder*, and where, in a fort near *Cuddapa*, the capital, he has a ſmall detachment of about three thouſand horſe under the command of *Meer Ali Raza*. There is another which leads through part of the *Nizam Ally Khan*'s territories, who, as I learn from a Letter from Mr. *Cotsford* "is exceeding angry that our Troops are to march "to ſupport his brother *Bazalet Jung*, and talks of op-"poſing their march." Theſe circumſtances I thought proper to be communicated to you, and as there will be a ſufficient time before I can have gone any great diſtance from hence, beg the honour of your inſtructions reſpecting the route which I am to take.

From theſe circumſtances, I conceive the battalion which *Bazalet Jung* mentions to be left with Rajah *Bahauder*, is not meant from my detachment, but ſome other which he may perhaps expect. In this opinion I am ſtrengthened by *Titula Khan* (his Vakeel from *Madras*, and who arrived in camp yeſterday); he declares it was never intended a battalion ſhould be left by me with Rajah *Bahauder*, but that the whole of the Troops under my command ſhould proceed to *Adoni*.

In my Letter of the 10th ult. I mentioned having two three-pounders tumbrils more than the complement ordered for the detachment, and as no Artillery-men have joined ſince my arrival, and not ſufficient with me to man the ſix ſix-pounders, they are a real incumbrance.

I am, with the greateſt Reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and moſt obedient
humble Servant,

Camp, near *Mootapilly*, 4th June 1779. *H' Harpur.*

To the Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 2d inſtant, informing me that you had been pleaſed to approve of my appointment of an Aid de Camp; that Enſign *Moncrief* is appointed Quarter-maſter to the detachment; and that the Artillery belonging to Captain *Jones*'s company at *Ellore* and *Maſulipatam*, were ordered to join. In order to be better ſituated, I intend to march in two or three days with the greateſt part of the detachment near to *Porteram* (the reſidence of Rajah Bahauder) at which place I hope to be provided with every thing neceſſary to proceed to *Adoni*, and alſo to ſend back draft-bullocks for the part of the Artillery, &c. which will remain behind till then for want of them.

Great

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Great part of the tents brought from *Madras* for the uſe of the detachment, being very old, and having been a long time in ſervice, were, by a violent ſtorm of wind, hail, and rain, that came on yeſterday afternoon, torn to pieces. This morning I held a ſurvey on them, and beg leave to encloſe you an indent for others inſtead of thoſe deſtroyed; earneſtly intreating it may be complied with as ſoon as poſſible, as in the interim we muſt be greatly diſtreſſed.

Captain *George Nixon*, whom I mentioned in my laſt, I have taken the liberty to appoint Major of Brigade, until your pleaſure may be known (as there is no corps in camp to which he can be attached) I hope it will meet with your approbation.

I am, moſt reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and
Camp near *Mootapilly*, moſt obedient humble Servant,
7th June 1779. *Hy Harpur.*

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, that ſuch parts of Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*'s Letters as ſeemed to require an immediate Anſwer before the Committee met, were replied to by himſelf; and he now delivers in the following draft of the Letter which he wrote to Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur* on this occaſion; which is approved and entered accordingly,

To Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur.*

Sir,

Your Letter to the Committee of the 2d I have received; and as Mr. *Whitehill* and General *Munro* are gone to *Pondicherry*, and there will not be a Committee for ſome days, I ſhall mention to you what I find neceſſary in reply to your Letter. I am pleaſed to find you have heard from *Bazalet Jung*, and hope every thing will now go on well. It is intended that your detachment ſhall be kept as complete as poſſible, and that four or five companies of Sepoys, under the command of Lieutenant *Douglas*, ſhall be immediately ordered to *Guntoor* to aſſiſt the Manager in the collections; this may be repreſented to the Vakeel when he arrives with you: and would have you at any rate march with two complete battalions and the Artillery to *Adoni*; and if the Vakeel ſeems very anxious to have ſome Troops left in the Guntoor Circar to aſſiſt the collections, I would have you on no account leave more than four or ſix companies, and thoſe muſt have orders to join you as ſoon as the Sepoys under Lieutenant *Douglas*, deſtined for that ſervice, arrive in the circar; as it is the wiſh of the Committee to have your detachment to appear as formidable as poſſible; I hope you will ſoon be on your march. We are anxious to hear you are proceeding towards *Adoni*. You will pleaſe to take the route *Bazalet Jung* points out. I wiſh you health and ſucceſs; and am,

Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble Servant,
Fort St. George. (Signed) *Tho' Rumbold.*

P. S. I would wiſh you to have frequent muſters, that you may be always ſure your detachment is complete, as it is of the utmoſt conſequence to keep them ſo.

Tho' Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

APPENDIX, No. 88.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 3d Auguſt 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith.

READ the following Letter from Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur:*

The Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am ſtill detained at *Innacunda* for want of proviſions, not having collected above enough for ſix days, nor bullocks near ſufficient to carry even that; yet, ſecured in the expectation of a peaceable march through the dominions of *Hyder*, I ſhould have proceeded with this; but as I learn by Letter from his Managers, this moment received (and which I take the liberty to encloſe you) that he ſeems inclined to oppoſe me, it is become neceſſary to complete to ten days at leaſt, for ſhould his Troops poſſeſs themſelves of the paſs, I may be ſome time in diſlodging them; during which, as well as from my firſt entering his territories, my reſources muſt be entirely within myſelf. I beg leave to obſerve, that this paſs is ſo very narrow and difficult, the guns, tumbrils, and their carriages, muſt be carried by coolies, eight cannon, and the latter, for that purpoſe, taken to pieces.

I beg the honour of your commands, as I imagine getting the ſupply juſt mentioned will leave me ſufficient time to receive them before I quit this neighbourhood.

I am, moſt reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
Camp, *Innacunda*, moſt obedient humble Servant,
30th July 1779. *Hy Harpur.*

From *Meer Reza Aly Cawn*, Bahauder, to Colonel *Harpur.*

I have received your Letter, in which you acquaint me, that as a ſincere friendſhip ſubſiſts between the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* and the Company, you propoſe marching the Troops under your command to *Adoni*, through *Durnall* and *Atcour*, which I underſtand. It is as manifeſt as the ſun, that a ſincere friendſhip ſubſiſts between his Excellency and the Company, and that they have no ſeparate intereſt; it is therefore my duty to pay a regard to the friendſhip they have for him; yet you will march your Troops by another road, that his friendſhip may be preſerved, for there are Sepoys ſtationed in that country, and ſome diſputes and quarrels may take place between your Men and theſe Sepoys, who are of a very quarrelſome diſpoſition. I have ſo much regard for our friendſhip, that I would not wiſh this to happen. Continue write me of your welfare. What ſhall I ſay more?

From *Meer Mhadi Huſſein Cawn*, the Phouzdar of *Cummum*, and *Sri Nowaſs Vincagee*, the Aumil of that place, to Colonel *Harpur.*

We heard that you was arrived at *Innacunda*, and intended marching with the Troops under your command to *Adoni*, by the ghaut of *Burnachel*, and the road of *Cummum*, which belongs to the Circar: we therefore acquainted his Excellency of it; and he has wrote us in anſwer, that your Troops are not to have leave to march through the country of *Cummum*. Theſe are our orders, and we therefore deſire that you will not march that way.

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AGREED to acquaint Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*, that as the Guntoor Circar belongs to the Company, he muſt threaten Rajah *Bahauder* with our ſevereſt diſpleaſure, for his neglect in not procuring ſufficient ſupplies for the detachment; and if he (Colonel *Harpur*) meets with any further difficulty in this reſpect, he muſt take meaſures for ſupplying himſelf. In regard to the two Letters from *Hyder*'s Managers, we cannot think they ſeriouſly intend to obſtruct the march of our Troops; but Colonel *Harpur* muſt be well on his guard againſt

any deſign of this nature; and the Preſident is deſired to write himſelf to *Hyder*'s Managers on the ſubject.

Wrote the following Letter to Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*, commanding the Troops marching to *Adoni*:

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters, and are ſorry that any impediments ſhould have happened to delay your march. We hope you have exerted yourſelf in ſuch a manner as to procure every thing you were in want of; and that we ſhall hear of your proceeding with more expedition, as we are very anxious for the arrival of your detachment at *Adoni*. We have ordered a quantity of ammunition to be ſent you from *Maſulipatam*, and we have forwarded ſome from hence to *Mootapillee*.

APPENDIX, No. 90.

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

AGREEABLE to what I wrote to your Honour, &c. laſt night, the two companies of my battalion (except a Zemindar's guard, which I thought beſt to leave) marched this morning at two o'clock, will be at *Ardinay* this night, and I hope I ſhall be at *Innacunda* by ten o'clock to-morrow morning, where I will conſult with the Rajah *Bahauder* on the intelligence he has received from Colonel *Harpur*, and ſee if ſuch a force can be got together as the Colonel may think ſufficient to puſh through the paſs with. If I find that I cannot be of immediate ſervice to the Army, I ſhall inſtantly return to this Garriſon.

I am this moment told by a bullock-man who has been in ſix days from the camp, that it is reported that *Hyder* has a very large body of Horſe on the other ſide of the paſs, that thoſe in the rear of the Army, and who ſtop the communication, are principally the people of the country collected together for the ſake of plunder.

When I wrote to your Honour, &c. laſt night, from the manner the Rajah *Bahauder*'s Letter was interpreted, I did imagine that Colonel *Harpur*'s Army was in danger of being cut off; that the Enemy were powerful both in front and rear, and that he was not able either to advance or retreat: it was on this idea that I have marched the Troops of this Garriſon, in hopes, with *Bazalet Jung*'s Horſe and Zemindars people, to have by ſome means or other relieved Colonel *Harpur*. But as the two companies are marched, and cannot be attended with any great expence, nor can I depend on any intelligence I have received; I think it beſt that they proceed to *Innacunda*, from whence, if I find my aſſiſtance not wanted, I ſhall immediately return.

I am, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
P. Barclay, Capt.

Ongole,
17 Auguſt 1779,
6 o'clock, morning.

The Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I beg leave to inform you, that after leaving *Innacunda* till my arrival at this place, which is about a courſe North of *Daupad*, not the leaſt interruption had been met with; on the contrary, we have been readily ſupplied. To-day we came here, and have had three Sepoys and a Nague plundered of their arms, &c. by a party of ſtraggling Horſe; the Nague is taken priſoner: theſe poor creatures were ſick, unable to keep up with the detachment. As they were incapable of defending themſelves, ſeveral of the camp-followers have ſuffered in the ſame manner. Half a dozen Horſemen appeared this afternoon near to our camp, and drove off ſome head of cattle belonging to it. The Manager of this country has collected his Troops together, and I hear taken every method to impede my march through the paſſes, by cutting down trees, and laying them acroſs the road; ſo that I ſhall find the greateſt difficulty in forcing it, if it is to be accompliſhed at all. Two courſe from hence, I apprehend from intelligence, a ſtand will be made againſt me: it is a ſmall paſs, and eaſily defended; I ſhall march through to-morrow. I ſhould have obſerved, barriers are formed at the paſſes, within which are a number of people plentifully ſtored with proviſions; and all intelligence agrees, that their Force without is far ſuperior to ours. I thought it neceſſary you ſhould be acquainted with theſe circumſtances, and therefore take the liberty to mention them. As I conſider myſelf in an Enemy's country, ſurrounded by his Troops, it will be impoſſible to fix Tappies without the greateſt riſk; Hircarrahs, by one of whom this is forwarded. I am reſpectfully,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
moſt obedient Servant,
H. Harpur.

Camp near *Yenavelly*,
12th Auguſt 1779.

APPENDIX No. 91.

APPENDIX, No. 91.

The Honourable the Preſident and Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I DID myſelf the honour to addreſs you from *Yenavelly*, mentioning the behaviour of *Hyder*'s Horſe, and my reſolution of proceeding the next morning for *Atcour*; but after diſpatching the Hircarrah, I received from different people, intelligence, founded on good authority, that meaſures had been taken to ſurround the detachment; that the paſs was defended by a ſtrong barrier, and a large body of men both within and on the outſide of it, plentifully ſupplied with proviſions; and to render the paſſing more difficult, if poſſible, trees had been laid acroſs, and one breaſt-work thrown up in the rear of the other, to a conſiderable diſtance. *Fitata Chawn* and myſelf have alſo received accounts of a number of Horſe and Foot having left *Seringapatam* for *Coman*, and another from *Sedout* with five guns, the more effectually to diſtreſs us. In this ſituation I thought it neceſſary to hold a Council of the five oldeſt Officers; who, weighing every circumſtance, gave it as their opinion, that with our ſtrength, to force the paſs would be impracticable, and the attempt highly ridiculous; and that they ſaw no other way of ſaving the detachment than by returning to the Guntoor Circar: in conſequence of which, I decamped yeſterday morning for *Innacunda*. After marching about three miles, we ſaw a ſmall party of Horſe, one of which came up with us, and declared the whole Friends, Servants of *Hyder*, and intruſted with Letters for me and *Fetula Chawn*. The Letters were produced, one for each, from *Meer Madee*, the Commanding Officer of *Comam*, and *Iſaac Beg*, who commands the Troops near *Dorual*. Their contents ſignified, that the preceding evening orders had been received from *Hyder* through *Meer Saib*, to permit our march throughout his diſtricts, and to take off the guards at the barrier, and in the paſs. I ſaw through the treachery, but concealed my ſentiments, the better to get through the Wanampilly Paſs, where they might have given us a little trouble: and this ſucceeded; for inſtead of poſſeſſing it, and ſecured in believing I was ſatisfied with their ſincerity, they marched towards the Guntoopilly Paſs. I marched this morning at day-break, without any appearance of Horſe for ſome miles; at length they came out in ſmall parties of ten or fifteen, riding cloſe up to our rear, and endeavouring to cut off the baggage; but I had uſed ſuch precautions as to make that impoſſible: they frequently fired at us, but at too great a diſtance to do any execution. In this manner they ha-

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raſſed us for ſome hours; when we perceived a body of about one thouſand Horſe, and two or three hundred Foot, making their approach on our right flank; they moved rapidly, and came ſo near to the rear-guard, that the Officer commanding it was obliged to fire two ſhots at them, which being exceedingly well aimed, threw the whole into the greateſt confuſion; three were alſo given to thoſe who had advanced near to our front, with the ſame effect. They had with them three ſtands of colours.

In the ſteps taken, I have had no other view than preſerving the Troops intruſted to my command. The laws of honour, and the dictates of humanity, would not ſuffer me to lead on men to deſtruction without one ſingle advantage deriving to the Community. I hope, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, to have met with your approbation: the ſimple facts are here related; from thoſe your better judgment will perceive the juſtneſs or impropriety of my conduct.

I am, moſt reſpectfully,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your faithful and
obedient humble Servant,
H. Harpur.

Camp, *Wanampilly*,
14th Aug. 1779.

To the Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I wrote your Honour, &c. yeſterday morning, acquainting you, that I had marched the two companies, except a Zemindar's guard. I had this morning at eight o'clock got within four courſe of *Innacunda*, when I received a Letter from Lieutenant *Fleming*, belonging to the detachment from my battalion with Colonel *Harpur*. He acquaints me, that they are returned to *Innacunda*; I have halted the detachment to refreſh ſome hours, as they are much fatigued, having marched ſince yeſterday morning, in very bad weather, ſeventeen coſs. I ſhall be back to the Garriſon of *Ongole* ſome time to-morrow night. I am, with great reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble Servant,
P. Barclay, Capt.

Jamulmurka,
18th Auguſt 1779.

The Committee having attentively conſidered the foregoing Letters, it is reſolved to write Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur* immediately as follows:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*, commanding the Detachment in the Guntoor Circar.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 12th and 14th inſtant.

We cannot at preſent judge of the ſufficiency of the reaſons which induced you to return with the detachment to the Guntoor Circar, after having advanced ſo near to the paſſes through which we wiſhed you to march. It is doubtleſs commendable to withdraw Troops from any certain and imminent danger to which they might be expoſed by encountering too great a ſuperiority of numbers; and if there be good foundation to believe the paſſes were guarded in the manner you mention, and that there were ſo many people to oppoſe you on both ſides, it was a prudent meaſure to retreat from the danger; but in order to decide clearly upon this point, it is neceſſary we ſhould be informed how the circumſtances you repreſent in your Letter were authorized, from whom you received the intelligence, and what reaſons you had to think the particulars true. We deſire alſo that you will communicate to us the Minutes of the Council which you judged it neceſſary to call of the principal Officers of the detachment.

We are concerned, after ſo long a delay in the Guntoor Circar, that you were not better ſupplied with proviſions: we ſhall enquire into the reaſons of ſuch neglect on the part of thoſe who were directed to furniſh them; and we hope to find there has been nothing omitted on your part that could haſten the ſupplies.

We would have you remain for the preſent at *Innacunda*, and we ſhall take meaſures immediately for ſending a proper reinforcement to your Troops, and for having the detachment ſo amply ſupplied with every thing, that when it is ordered to march, there may be no delay whatever.

You inform us, that when you had retreated about three miles, you received by a Horſeman Letters from *Hyder*'s Officers commanding at *Comam* and *Dourval*, acquainting you that *Hyder* had ſent orders to permit you to march through his diſtricts, and to take off the guard at the paſſes. It is impoſſible to ſay whether this meaſure was intended to deceive you or not, but you ſhould have detained the man in your camp, and made particular enquiry into the circumſtances; you ſhould have alſo encloſed to us the Letters which you received by him. We now deſire they may be ſent to us.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Thomas Rumbold, &c.
Committee.

Fort St. George,
23d Auguſt 1779.

Agreed alſo, That a Letter be written to *Hyder Ally Cawn*, to know the reaſons of his fortifying the paſſes againſt the march of our Troops; and that another Letter be written on the ſubject to his Manager in the Cuddapa Country.

Reſolved, That two companies of Europeans, half a company of Artillery, together with the firſt battalion of Sepoys, be ordered to hold themſelves in readineſs to reinforce the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*; and that the Admiral be requeſted to ſpare us the *Coventry* frigate, to aſſiſt in conveying thoſe Troops to *Mootapilly*.

The Committee approve of Captain *Barclay*'s conduct, and for the reaſons he has given, conſent to his retaining the Collery Company for this month only, after which they muſt be diſcharged.

APPENDIX, No. 92.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 117. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 24th Auguſt 1779: received 29 D.

I HEREWITH ſend you a copy of a Letter which I have received from the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, Bahauder, expreſſing his anxiety of mind, at the delay of Colonel *Harpur*, and the declared enmity of his Brother the Nizam, and *Hyder Ally Cawn*, occaſioned by his having entered into an Alliance with the Engliſh. You will alſo receive copies of the Letters wrote by the Nizam and *Hyder* to him upon this ſubject, and their contents will plainly ſhew you the hoſtile intentions of thoſe two Powers againſt you and *Bazalet Jung*. The Nizam has called upon *Runamuſt Cawn*, the Fouzdar of *Kinnoul*, to come to him; but his intention in this is to ſeize the fort of *Payckel* and the jaghire annexed to it, which belongs to this Fouzdar; who having it not in his power to reſiſt *Hyder*, has agreed to comply with the orders of the Nizam; he has accordingly ſent all his family to *Hydrabad*; but I have intelligence that he was ſtill at *Kinnoul* on the 26th Rejub, though I cannot ſay whether he be there at preſent or not. The Nizam is determined to ſend ſix thouſand Sepoys and ſix hundred Europeans, and a thouſand Horſe, to *Kinnoul*, under the command of Monſieur *Lally*, a Frenchman; and to give up the country of *Kinnoul*, as a jaghire, to thoſe Frenchmen, whoſe power will be greatly increaſed.

This Monſieur *Lally* has no other intention of taking *Kinnoul*, *Adoni*, and *Kunbaur*, but to manifeſt his enmity

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to the Engliſh; and *Bazalet Jung* is full of cares and anxiety on that account: beſides, it is *Hyder*'s intention to ſend Troops immediately againſt *Adoni*, before the Engliſh arrive there. A variety of difficulties preſent themſelves, but I make no doubt that my Friends will conſider what plan is beſt to purſue. What ſhall I ſay more?

P. S. I need not recommend it to you, to keep this Letter from *Bazalet Jung* a profound ſecret.

From the Nabob *Bazalet Jung* to the Nabob *Walla Jau*.

I ſend you encloſed, for your information, the copy of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn* to *Mahomed Iſhaar Cawn*; the contents diſcover his diſpleaſure and reſentment. My alliance and friendſhip with the Company has raiſed the jealouſy of my Enemies; and it is their intention to give me trouble before the arrival of the Engliſh Troops. At ſuch an important criſis, a delay muſt be attended with danger; thoſe Troops ought to be ſent with all expedition; I muſt, therefore, recommend it to you, to uſe all your endeavours to that purpoſe.

Letter from *Hyder Ally* to *Iſhaar Cawn Bazalet Jung*.

It has reached my ears, that the Nabob *Suja Ul Mulk*, Bahauder, has given up the circar of *Guntoor* to the Engliſh, with an intention of making an Alliance with them, and having a body of their Troops ſtationed with him. Such a ſtep could never be dictated by prudence or foreſight. In every part throughout *Hindoſtan*, where the Engliſh have eſtabliſhed their influence, and got a footing under the cover of giving their protection and aſſiſtance, experience has ſhewn what treatment thoſe have met with who have had any connection with that Nation. It may be ſeen by their conduct towards the Nazims of *Bengal*, and other places, whom they have ſtripped of every thing, and reduced under their own authority. His Excellency, no doubt, did not attend to all theſe conſiderations, when he thought of entering into a Treaty with them; for if he had, it is probable he would not have conſented to it. It is my opinion, that the Engliſh ſhould not be allowed to have a footing in this part of the country; time will ſhew, whether any benefit accrues from it or not. His Excellency might ſettle things in ſuch a manner, that he would keep poſſeſſion of the circar of *Guntoor*. This might be done, by allowing the Killedars of my country to rent that circar from him, which would be paid to him in three kiſts, by the means of the houſe of *Wolluſs Sunder*, the Soucar; nobody would then dare to attack that country. Thanks to Heaven, my Troops are not few, and his Excellency would find it more for his advantage to apply to me for ſuccour, than to another. When once a Treaty takes place between us, no one will dare to think of diſturbing that circar. It is in no ſhape whatever prudent or conſiderate to call the Engliſh into that country. When *Hurry Pundit Purkich* came ſome time ago, and diſturbed his Excellency's territories, I expended lacks for the good of his Excellency, and drove away *Hurry Pundit*. If I had not done it at that time, his Excellency would have been obliged to comply with the exorbitant demands which he made. It is not in my power to conſent to his Excellency's giving up the Guntoor Circar to my old and bitter Enemies, for it joins to my country. If the Engliſh are put in poſſeſſion, his Excellency and I cannot agree. You, Sir, will explain all this in a proper manner to his Excellency, and get his leave to come to me, in order to ſettle this affair.

What are the Engliſh whoſe name gives ſo much alarm to the people of this country? How did I encounter them when I was at war with them? How often were they not defeated by my victorious Troops? This is well known to every body: why ſhould they be ſo much feared that their protection ſhould be ſolicited?

If his Excellency and I are joined, we ſhall ſtand in fear of no one.

Letter from the Nizam to *Bazalet Jung*.

It has reached my ear, that the people about you have thought it adviſable to let the Engliſh Company have the renting of the Guntoor Circar from you, and to have a body of Engliſh Troops placed with you. You well know the diſpoſitions of thoſe Europeans, who, when once they get any thing in their poſſeſſion, never part with it; as may be ſeen from what they have done in *Bengal* and *Oude*. *Suja Dowla* poſſeſſed ſome power while living, but now the Engliſh authority prevails throughout his country, the ſituation his Sons are in is known to all the world: it is not in their power to recover their loſt dominions. *Hyder Ally Cawn* can ſcarce be conſidered in any other light but a Zemindar; he is not ſecure in his poſſeſſions; for we ſhall be able to recover when our power increaſes, any countries which he now takes; but it is highly improper to throw ſo much power into the hands of Europeans. You have done wrong in following this ſtep; for if you ſhould ever find it neceſſary to call for my ſupport, it will not be granted you. I now therefore write to you, to let me know what your intentions are: if you perſiſt in doing this, you will feel the bad conſequences of it.—Give me your Anſwer immediately.

APPENDIX, No. 93.

To Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*, commanding the Detachment at *Innacunda*.

Sir,

WE have received your ſeveral Letters.

As we ſuppoſe by the time you receive this Diſpatch you will have collected ſufficient proviſions to proceed on your march, we deſire you will, without loſs of time, purſue ſuch a route to *Adoni* as ſhall be recommended to you by *Bazalet Jung*, or his Vakeel, unleſs it ſhall appear to you to be attended with great or inſurmountable difficulties; in which caſe you will ſtate your opinion to us, and wait our orders. We are, Sir,

Fort St. George, 29th September 1779. Your moſt obedient Servants *Tho*s *Rumbold*, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 94.

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence

No. 72. To *Bazalet Jung*; dated 12th May 1779.

IN order to aſcertain the yearly Revenue of the Guntoor Circar, your Excellency has ſent me the accounts of collections for four years back, viz. from the beginning of the Phazely year 1183 to the end of 1186. It is our intention to take immediate poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar; but as the preſent year of Phazely 1188 is near expiring, we ſhall not commence the rent from this time, but ſhall give your Naib and Managers in that country every aſſiſtance they may require, in order to collect the balance of Revenue due to your Excellency. We ſhall be able, before the expiration of the year, to aſcertain the ſtate of collections from the above accounts ſent by your Excellency, and the informations we may receive from the Zemindars and other people in the country, and we ſhall afterwards ſend to your Excellency an agreement under the Company's ſeal, and the ſignatures of the Governor and Council, to rent the circar from the beginning of the year Phazely 1189. As money will be wanted immediately for the payment of the Troops ſent to your Excellency, you will be pleaſed to give orders to your Managers at *Guntoor* to advance twenty-five or thirty thouſand Pagodas to the Paymaſter; for which he ſhall give receipts, and the amount ſhall be paſſed to your Excellency's credit. I herewith ſend you a copy of the orders given to Colonel *Harpur*, for your Excellency'

APPENDIX. 94.

Excellency's information. I have received from *Tatta Ulla Cawn* your Sunnud for giving up the Guntoor Circar to the Company, and I have delivered to him the Treaty and a Letter for you: I have at the ſame time ſent your Excellency a Sulpuh, &c. of which I beg your acceptance. What ſhall I ſay more?

Extract from *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

Sunnud from *Bazalet Jung*.

Ummeen ul Urmah,
Sujah ul Mulk,
Amud ud Dowlah,
Meer Mahomed Sherif Cawn,
Bahauder, *Bazalet Jung*,
the devoted Servant of
His glorious Majeſty
Shaw Allum,
Bahauder.

To all Deſmooks, Zemindars, Deſpondahs, and Tenets of the Circar of *Murtazanagur*, commonly called *Gentoor*, be it written,

The aforeſaid circar has at this time been given to the glory of Merchants, the Engliſh Company, at a certain rent, commencing from the beginning of the year Phazeley 1188. You are therefore to give your attendance on the Naibs of the aforeſaid Company, and punctually pay to them the juſt Revenue due to the Circar (Government). After this, a freſh Sunnud, ſetting forth the rent which is fixed upon, ſhall be granted, and you are to act agreeable thereto. Let this be punctually obſerved.—Dated 12 Mohrem, in the 1193d year of the Hygera.

No. 127.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 127. From the Nabob to the Governor; dated the 19th September 1779: received 21 D°.

The circar of *Guntoor* being ſituated next to my country, and many differences intervening on account of its neighbourhood, it was always my wiſh, that whenever that diſtrict fell into my Friends hands, they would allow me to rent it from them. I have wrote this to former Governors, and mentioned it to the Company; and I have heard, that leave has been given for this to the Repreſentatives of my Friends. Now that, by the bleſſing of God, this diſtrict is in the poſſeſſion of my Friends the Company, I have to requeſt of you to give me the renting of it for the term of ten years, commencing from the 1ſt September 1779, to the 31ſt Auguſt 1789; during which I engage to pay twenty lacks ſeventy-five thouſand Madras Pagodas, as ſtated in the accompanying Paper Agreement. I have engaged, out of my deſire for the intereſt of my Friends, to pay them more than ever was annually collected in the circar of *Guntoor* during all the time it was in the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*'s hands: but with their aſſiſtance, and expecting to ſee the country flouriſh, and diſtributing juſtice to the Ryots agreeable to my own form, I hope to ſerve myſelf; and I doubt not you will grant me that aſſiſtance, and keep always a ſufficient number of men in that country. You will give ſtrict orders to the Commanding Officer not to interfere in any ſhape in the affairs of the diſtrict, or lend money to the Zemindars or Ryots, or give them protection, and not to meddle with any thing, but aſſiſt my Aumil, and defend the country. You will alſo give orders, that when any Europeans and Sepoys paſs through that country to and from the circars, they moleſt not the inhabitants. In caſe any trouble happen, and loſs ariſes in the Revenue, I make no doubt but my Friends will make it good, for the ſake of the welfare of the inhabitants. What ſhall I ſay more?

KISTBUNDY ſtipulated to be paid for the Circar of *Guntoor*, excluſive of the Sunt Noonguy, and the Jaghire of *Sunta Rawoor*, and the Jaghire of the Fort of *Condavir*, for ten Years, commencing from the 1ſt of September 1779, to 31ſt of Auguſt 1789.

N. B. If any troubles happen, the Company ſhall make good the loſs which ſhall ariſe during that year. They will keep a ſufficient body of Troops to bring to order the Zemindars, when neceſſary; and ſhall always have a body of men in that diſtrict, to ſettle and defend it. No one ſhall in any ſhape interfere in the affairs of the diſtrict.

In the year 1780 ſhall be paid,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	70,000	
30th November - -	60,000	
		200,000
In the year 1781,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	70,000	
30th November - -	60,000	
		200,000
In the year 1782,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	70,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		205,000
In the year 1783,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	70,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		205,000
In the year 1784,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	70,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		205,000
In the year 1785,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	75,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		210,000
In the year 1786,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	75,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		210,000
In the year 1787,		
On the 31ſt January - -	70,000	
30th June - -	75,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		210,000
In the year 1788,		
On the 31ſt January - -	75,000	
30th June - -	75,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		215,000
In the year 1789,		
On the 31ſt January - -	75,000	
30th June - -	75,000	
30th November - -	65,000	
		215,000
For ten years, Madras Pagodas		20,75,000

Extract

APPENDIX. No. 94.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 4th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, a Letter from the Nabob, as entered in C.C. No. 127, requeſting to have the management of the Guntoor Circar, at the following rent, for 10 years, from 1ſt September 1779 to 31ſt Auguſt 1789:

Firſt two years - -	2,00,000	Madras Pagodas.	
Next three years - -	2,05,000	D°	D°.
Next three years - -	2,10,000	D°	D°
Next two years - -	2,15,000	D°	D°
In all -	20,75,000, for 10 years.		

The foregoing Letter and Propoſals from the Nabob being read, Mr. *Smith* requeſts to know from the Preſident, whether he propoſes that the ſubject of the Letter ſhall be conſidered and determined in the Committee, or in the Council? The Preſident replies, That, in his opinion, it ſhould be ſettled in the Committee. Mr. *Smith* thereupon enters the following Minute:

I am of opinion, That the ſettling of the Guntoor Circar is a buſineſs of Revenue; and that it ſhould be conſidered and determined on by the Council within the Revenue Department.

Charles Smith.

The Preſident informs the Committee, That if he hereafter finds it neceſſary, he ſhall enter his reaſons at large for thinking the Nabob's Propoſals ſhould be determined in the Committee.

Mr. *Smith* obſerves, That if he finds it neceſſary, he ſhall reply to them.

Sir *H. Munro* and Mr. *Whitehill* are of opinion, That the Nabob's Letter ſhould be taken into conſideration in the Committee.

In order to enable the Committee to form a judgment on the Nabob's Propoſals, the Preſident lays before them the following Accounts of the produce of the Guntoor Circar for four years paſt, as ſent him by *Bazalet Jung*.

APPENDIX. No. 94.

Dr. ACCOUNT Revenues of the Circar at

			Pag. F. C.	Pag. F. C.
Phasely 1183, or Anno 1775.	To Balance remaining on the following Districts on Account of last Year, viz.			
	Taulooka of Vencata Kistna Row, Muzumdar, as per Account delivered by Cojam Mahomed Johm Cawn, Bahauder	6,190 23 50		
	Do	210 — —	6,400 23 50	
	Purgunnah Vellacunda and Vellum Conda, under the Management of Madarauze Goomda Row, as per Account of Mahomed Baholool Cawn	3,000 — —		
	Do Balance due	3,003 13 10	6,053 13 10	
	Taulooka of Maurch Row, Jaggena Row, and Trippetty Row, as per Account delivered by Golam Rusool	9,793 — —		
	Do Balance due	834 26 20	10,627 26 20	
				2[illegible],081 21 —
	To Rents and Revenues of this Year, viz.			
	The estimated Jemmabundy, or total Produce amounting to		202,000 — —	
	Deducting the following, viz.			
	The Jagueir of the Fort	5,000 — —		
	The Jagueir of Ally Mahomed Cawn, Bahauder	9,200 — —		
	The Enam Villages of Venata Kistnama, Muzumdar	1,150 — —		
	The Village called Santraver	3,000 — —		
	A Village called Akloor, of Mahomed Fatula Cawn	400 — —		
	The Enam of Sachmana Josy	150 — —		
	A Village called Acklatore	125 — —	19,025 — —	
	The Remainder		1,82,975 — —	
	The Village called Audulpaud		125 — —	1,83,100 — —
		Pagodas	- - -	2,06,181 21 —

Dr. ACCOUNT Revenues of the Circar of

Phasely 1184. or Anno 1776.	To Balance brought from last Year		- - -	8,963 11 12½
	To Rents and Revenues of this Year, viz.			
	The Jemmabundy		20,201 — —	
	Deducting the following, viz.			
	The Jagheer of the Fort	5,000 — —		
	Ditto of Ally Mahomed Cawn, Bahauder	9,200 — —		
	Santaroves, &c.	3,000 — —		
	Vencata Kistna, Mazumdar	1,150 — —		
	A Village called Ratnapury	400 — —		
	Ditto Malicapor	125 — —		
	Ditto Satchma Joss	150 — —	19,025 — —	
		The remaining	182,976 — —	
	A Village called Andelpaud		125 — —	183,101 — —
		Pagodas	— — —	1,92,064 11 12½

Murtazanegar, belonging to the Soubah of Hyderabad. Cr.

APPENDIX. No. 94.

		Pags	F.	C.	Pags	F.	C.
Phaſely 1183, or Anno 1775.	By Caſh paid Rajah Balavent Row, Bahauder, as per Receipts	-	-	-	994	38	56
	By Caſh remitted to Muzóor in the Preſence, viz.						
	For the Treaſury	80,563	—	—			
	For the Chaut or Tribute of the Mahrattas	49,571	18	39			
					130,134	18	39
	By Caſh paid Tankas and Tawejee to the different Perſons, as per Purwannahs	-	-	-	54,295	39	57½
	By ſundry Charges, as per Saneds	-	-	-	754	16	75
	By ſundry Charges Sibbendy paid the following Zemindars, viz.						
	Vaſſareddy Ranſana	1,800	—	—			
	Venkatakiſtnama Row, Muzumdar	1,200	—	—			
	Mameknow Jagana Row, and Trippetty Row	1,000	—	—			
	Mulrauz Goondarow	1,038	22	—			
					5,038	22	—
	By Ditto in the Country	-	-	-	6,000	—	—
					197,218	9	67½
	By Balance carried forward	-	-	-	8,963	11	12½
	Pagodas	-	-	-	2,06,181	21	—

Murtazanegar under the Soubah of Hyderabad. Cr.

Phaſely 1184, or Anno 1776.	By Caſh remitted to Huzoor by Means of Phatalla Cawn, viz.							
	Ready Money	8,000	—	—				
	Bills of Exchange	15,000	—	—				
		23,000	—	—				
	Deducting on Account of the Year 1183 Phaſaly or 1775	13,000	—	—				
					10,000	—	—	
	By Camel Man	12,000	—	—				
	Deduct on Account of the Phaſaly 1183 or 1775	2,563	—	—				
					9,437	—	—	
	In the Month of Zechaja 1188 Higery				3,700	—	—	
	In Moharum Higery 1189				3,500	—	—	
	In Saffer				1,500	—	—	
	By Caſh paid Tankas, &c. as per Purwannahs.							
	Monſr Dulally Bahauder Ruſtum Jung				1,05,226	—	—	
	Mahomed Maroof Cawn				28,273	39	30	
	Johyar Cawn, Merchr				1,519	10	40	
	Huſſen Mahomed, Do				98	—	—	
	Seid Badarudeen Cawn, Bahauder Humayoon Jung				5,901	—	—	
	Mahomed Ameer Cawn				3,068	18	30	
	Rajah Balavent Bahauder				1,027	—	—	
	Mahomed Phatalla Cawn				549	23	50	
	Roy Cavercaundoſs				64	39	30	
	The Wife of Jaher Cawn				909	9	17½	
	Ahamed Cawn				117	21	—	
								1,46,653 36 7½
	By Caſh paid in Part of the Arrears to the following Perſons, viz.							
	Abdul Iſlam Cawn				281	18	30	
	Mahomed Iftear Cawn				287	10	40	
	Mahomed Jamaul Cawn				53	10	40	
	Coja Mahomed Ally Cawn, Bahauder				801	—	—	
	Backtamal				82	2	50	
	Harcara				52	31	40	
								1,557 31 40
	By Oxen Hire				-	-	-	86 — —
	By Allowance to the following Zemindars, viz.							
	Vaſreddy Ramanah				1,800	—	—	
	Vancata Kiſtnah Marow, Mazumdar				1,200	—	—	
	Mulrauz Gundarow				1,038	21	—	
	Maunick Row				1,000	—	—	
								5,038 21 —
	By Charges Sibbendy in the Country,							
	Sibbendy				4,000	—	—	
	The Allowance of Berjevandoſs				2,000	—	—	
								6,000 — —
	By ſundry Charges				-	-	-	1,089 11 65
								1,88,562 16 32½
	By Balance carried to next Year				-	-	-	3,501 36 30
	Pagodas				-	-	-	1,92,064 11 12½

APPENDIX. No. 94.

Dr. ACCOUNT Revenues of the Circar of

Phaſaly, 1185, or Anno 1777.	To Balance brought from laſt Year			3,501 36 00
	To Rents and Revenues of this Year, viz. Jamabundy		202,001 — —	
	Deducting the Amount of the Jagheers as follow:			
	The Jagheer of the Fort	5,000 — —		
	Aly Mohamed Cawn, Bahauder	9,200 — —		
	Venkatakiſtnama, Muzundar	1,150 — —		
	Santarover, &c.	4,500 — —		
	The Village called Ratanpury	400 — —		
	Ditto Akſaloore	125 — —		
	Satchman Joſſey	150 — —		
			20,525 — —	
	The remaining Pag^{a}		1,81,476 — —	
	To Sundries.			
	An Account of the Jagheerdars	704 — —		
	The Stoppages of Tankas, and the Preſents	6,422 30 67½		
	The Fees of the Devan	1,000 — —		
			8,126 30 67½	
				1,89,602 30 67½
	Pagodas			1,93,104 25 47½

ACCOUNT Revenues of the Circar of

				Pag^{a} F. C.
Phaſaly, 1186, or Anno 1778.	To Balance brought from laſt Year			3,645 15 60
	To Rents and Revenues of this Year, viz. Jamabundy		202,001 — —	
	Deducting the Amount of the following Jagheers, viz.			
	Jagheer of the Fort	Pag^{a} 5,000 — —		
	D^{o} of Alimahomed Cawn	9,200 — —		
	D^{o} of Nerſanna Muzemdar	1,150 — —		
	Santeveraven, &c.	4,500 — —		
	A Village called Ratnapury	400 — —		
	D^{o} Aklatore	125 — —		
	Satcheman Joſy	150 — —		
			20,525 — —	
	The remaining Pag^{a}		181,476 — —	
	To Sundries, viz.			
	Nazer Putty, or Preſents received	Pag^{a} 25,000 — —		
	Fees of the Devan	1,000 — —		
	For the under-mentioned four Jagheers, viz.			
	Narſana Muzumdar	Pag^{a} 287 21 —		
	Satchemana Joſey	38 21 —		
	Mahomed Careem	27 — —		
	A Village called Udulpaud	124 — —		
		477 — —		
			26,477 — —	
				207,953 — —
	Pagodas			2,11,598 15 60

APPENDIX. No. 94.

Murtazanegar, under the Soubah of Hyderabad.

			Cr.
Phasaly, 1185, or Anno 1777.	By Cash transmitted to Huzoor, or the Presence, as per Perwannah to the Treasury, viz.	3,700 — —	
	Ditto - D° - to the Jagheerdar	701 — —	
			4,401 — —
	By Cash paid Sad Siah		9,336 26 20
	By Said Badaree deen Cawn, Bahauder		4,508 23 50
	By Kittnama Naick		1,000 — —
	By Roath Cawn and Coreem Cawn		4,137 36 60
	By Mohabut Cawn, Merchant		3,512 21 —
	By Hareem Cawn, D°		750 — —
	By Phasalt Shaw		7 21 —
	By Rajah Balavent, Bahauder		1,129 31 40
	By Cash paid the Creditors, by means of Abdel Islam Cawn, as per Perwannah		2,500 — —
	By Abdel Islam Cawn		280 15 60
	By Mahomed Iflacar Cawn		287 10 40
	By Jamaul		82 5 20
	By Mahomed Jamaul Cawn		82 7 70
	By Roy Chendrabaun		120 35 32½
	By Raunojey, &c. Hircars		54 — —
	By Charges, Elephants, and Camels		72 8 45
	By Charges in the Country Sibbendy, 4,000, and Allowance of Berjevendoss, in all		6,000 — —
	By Yacoot Cawn		52 — —
	By Sunjevery, &c.		96 7 70
	By Allowance to the Zemindars		5,238 21 —
	By Charges extraordinary, as per Receipts		2,000 — —
	By Mahomed Aftarcan Cawn, &c.		90 — —
	By Cash paid Sagoly Vasantanaick Swear, by means of Golum Hussain Cawn, on account of a Debt		7,620 28 70
	By Rusteem Jung, Bahauder, viz.		
	On account of the monthly Allowance	109,306 — —	
	Ditto of the Debt, as per Perwannah	13,793 2 50	
			1,23,099 2 50
	By Cojam Cawn, paid him for the Cavalry under him		10,000 — —
	By Manever Cawn		3,000 — —
			1,89,459 19 67½
	By Balance carried to next Year		3,645 15 60
	Pagodas		1,93,104 25 47½

Murtazanegar, belonging to the Soubah of Hyderabad.

			Cr.
Phasaly, 1186, or Anno 1778.	By Cash paid Rustum Jung, Bahauder		147,088 — —
	By Cash paid to sundry Persons, viz.		
	Mahomed Caul Cawn, &c.		26,250 — —
	Neveesandas, or Writers		1,362 — —
	Jamaul Cawn		82 7 70
	Mahomed Iftacar Cawn		376 36 60
	Rajah Balavent Bahauder, &c.		1,129 31 40
	Mahomed Cauly, and Mahomed Cawn, Mer[t]		5,951 28 70
	Ahamud Cawn, on account of the Price of Cloth		548 21 —
	Abdul Islam Cawn		281 15 60
	Mahomed ul Cawn		1,641 2 50
	Seid Imaumably Cawn, &c. Cavalry		553 21 —
	Munver Cawn		2,672 2 50
	Coaja Mahomud Gaulib Cawn, Bahauder		1,000 — —
	Hussain Ally Cawn		225 28 70
	Allowance to the Zemindars		5,238 21 —
	Mubauzezdil Cawn, Bahauder		416 7 —
	Kandabiah		113 21 —
	Carpenters and Smiths		53 17 5
	Sundry Charges, as per Receipts		1,978 7 70
	By Sibbendy in the Country, viz.		
	Charges Sibbendy	4,000 — —	
	Allowance to Rajah Balavent Doss	2,000 — —	
	Nazurputty, as per Perwannahs	350 — —	
			6,350 — —
	By sundry Charges, viz.		
	On account of the religious Ceremony		25 — —
	Harcaras, &c.		80 — —
	Nacud Ahamud Cawn		10 — —
	Sepoys in the Company of Abdul Islam, as per Perwannahs		109 24 22½
	Seid Nooralla Cawn, his Allowance, as per Receipt		54 31 40
	Sajmul		82 5 20
	Transmitted to Huzoor		141 — —
	Siedy Saroor		11 — —
	Mohan, &c.		30 — —
	Oxen Hire for sending Ammunition		40 21 70
			2,04,496 17 57½
	By Balance due to the Circar		7,101 40 2½
	Pagodas		2,11,598 15 60

APPEND IX
No. 95.

APPENDIX, No. 95.

THE Preſident alſo lays before the Committee, the following Extract from the Company's Letter, dated 4th March 1767.

Extract from the Company's General Letter; dated London, the 4th March 1767.

"You inform us, that as ſoon as our authority ſhall be perfectly eſtabliſhed in the Circars, you think it will be for our intereſt to give the management of the Circar of *Condaver* to the Nabob of *Arcot*, at a reaſonable rent. The reaſons you offer in ſupport of this opinion, are very ſatisfactory: ſuch a boundary as the river *Kiſtna*, muſt certainly prevent all colour of diſpute touching the limits; and the Troops employed in the protection of the *Arcot* Province, may hold that alſo in obedience; and you will take care to obtain from the Nabob as high a Revenue as could be procured in any other way."

The Preſident then deſires the opinion of the Committee, Whether, or not, the propoſals made by the Nabob ſhall be accepted, ſubject to the Company's approval, and under ſuch further limitations as the Committee ſhall think proper, for the ſecurity of the Revenue, and the welfare of the Inhabitants?

Mr. *Smith* thinks the letting of the Guntoor Circar a very important matter; and not having ſeen the Letter from the Nabob propoſing to rent it, or the other Papers now delivered in by the Preſident, until this day, he is not prepared to give an opinion upon them; and requeſts therefore the conſideration of the affair may be deferred till the next Committee.

Sir *Hector Munro* and Mr. *Whitehill* are of opinion, that the Circar ſhould be let to the Nabob on the terms of his propoſals, ſubject to the approbation of the Company, and to the other limitations propoſed by the Preſident.

As it ſeems to be the wiſh of the Company, that the Nabob ſhould have the Guntoor Circar at rent, whenever it came into our hands, he does not ſee how, with that paragraph of the Company's Letter before them, the Committee would be juſtified in rejecting the Nabob's propoſals; that he is againſt delay in this buſineſs, as the ſeaſon is very far advanced, and the Revenue will ſuffer, if ſome meaſures are not ſpeedily adopted—that he would have propoſed the ſubject before, but was deſirous of obtaining every neceſſary information of the value of the country, which he has accordingly done—that as he looks on the poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar to be of very material conſequence to the Company, and has propoſed every meaſure to the Committee that he thought likely to obtain, he is deſirous the Company ſhould know by the ſhips now under diſpatch, all the ſteps that have been taken in the negociation and ſettlement of the country, which he flatters himſelf cannot fail of meeting with their approval, and do credit to this Government, whether conſidered in a political light, or as eaſing the Company of ſome part of the burthen of their military expences. Though he thinks, for the reaſons abovementioned, that the Guntoor Circar ſhould be let to the Nabob for the ſums he has offered, yet he is of opinion that the following ſtipulations, with ſuch others as may appear neceſſary to the Committee, ſhould be made to the Nabob, viz.

The Zemindars and Inhabitants to be preſerved in their rights and privileges—the amount of the Revenue, according to the ſeveral Kiſts, as they become due, not in any reſpect to be blended with the Nabob's other Accounts or Payments to the Company, but to be received from the Aumildar, or whoever is appointed to the charge and management of the diſtrict, immediately into the Company's treaſury, or by ſuch perſon as ſhall be directed to receive the ſame; and in caſe of failure in any one payment beyond the ſpace of one month, a Reſident to be appointed on the part of the Company, to ſee the engagements the Nabob enters into more punctually fulfilled in future—the Grant of the Guntoor Circar to be made out to the Nabob, agreeably to his requeſt, but conditionally, that it meets with the approbation of the Company, which muſt be expreſſed in our reply to his Letter. As the Revenue from the Guntoor Circar is received, to be kept as a fund for the payment of ſuch of the Company's Troops as are employed with *Bazalet Jung*, and all charges incurred thereby, and for the protection of the Guntoor Circar, and the ſurplus to be remitted to *Bazalet Jung*, which muſt be ſtipulated in our final treaty with him.

APPENDIX, No. 96.

Extract from *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

N° 133. To the Nabob; dated 8th October 1779.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Letter of the 19th September, acquainting me with your deſire of renting the Guntoor Circar from the Company for ten years, on certain terms and conditions expreſſed in your ſaid Letter, and in a Paper of propoſals which accompanied it.

It will always give me pleaſure to comply with ſuch of your Highneſs's requeſts as ſhall appear conſiſtent with the orders of my honourable Employers; and upon this ground I am willing to grant you the Circar at rent, but as I do not approve of binding the Company in a matter of ſuch importance, without their own expreſs conſent, what I now do muſt be entirely ſubject to their pleaſure.

Having, however, conſented to let your Highneſs have the Circar until that pleaſure be ſignified to us, I muſt ſtipulate the following Conditions to be obſerved by your Highneſs.

1ſt. That the Zemindars and Inhabitants be preſerved in all their juſt rights and privileges.

2d. That the amount of the ſeveral agreed to be paid by your Highneſs, ſhall not in any ſhape be blended with other accounts, but received immediately from the Aumildar, or ſuch other perſon as may be appointed to the management of the diſtrict.

3dly. That the Kiſts ſhall be paid regularly as they become due; and if they are at any time in arrear beyond the ſpace of one month, the Company will appoint one of the Company's ſervants to reſide upon the ſpot, and to ſee that the Revenues be duly collected and applied to the punctual diſcharge of your Highneſs's engagements.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

APPENDIX, No. 97.

Fort Saint George Country Correſpondence.

N° 91. To *Bazalet Jung*; dated 23d September 1780.

YOUR Excellency having ſome time ago expreſſed your deſire of having the Guntoor Circar reſtored into your hands, in conſequence of the diſappointments which prevented our Troops marching for the protection of your country; and your brother *Nizim Ally Cawn* having alſo intereſted himſelf with the Governor General of *Bengal* upon the ſame account, we have come to the reſolution of complying with your's and the Nizim's wiſhes in this reſpect, and have diſpatched the neceſſary orders to our officer commanding in that country, to put your agent into immediate and entire poſſeſſion of it, and to withdraw the Troops entirely from the diſtrict. I hope this will prove acceptable to you, and tend to ſtrengthen

ſtrengthen the friendly diſpoſitions which have hitherto ſubſiſted between us. May your happineſs and proſperity daily increaſe! What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, No. 98.

Fort St. George Select Conſultations, 17th July 1780.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

READ the following Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*:

To the Honourable *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

We are to acknowledge the favour of your Letter of the 19th May, in which you inform us that you had reſolved to ſuſpend Mr. *John Hollond* from the Company's ſervice. As this act cannot be reverſed, nor the conſequences of it averted by any power but that of the Company, we ſhall only ſay, that it has given us the deepeſt concern, and that we hope that Mr. *Hollond*'s conduct will not appear to our Superiors to have merited the ſeverity with which you have proceeded againſt him.

The actual ſtate of the negociation in which he is employed, makes it neceſſary for us to communicate to you the incloſed copy of the laſt Letter we have received from him, and to expreſs to you our expectation, that you will readily concur with us in yielding to ſuch a final arrangement of the only point now in diſpute with the Nizam, as we find indiſpenſably neceſſary for ſecuring his neutrality, if not his friendſhip, at a period full of difficulty and hazard to the general intereſts of the Company, and of the Nation in *India*. We do not mean, however, that any ſacrifices ſhould be made to the Nizam, inconſiſtent with the Company's honour, or with that of your Preſidency. The conceſſion he expects, and which we propoſe ſhould be granted him, is in our opinion founded in ſtrict juſtice, and in effect will only replace all parties concerned in the poſſeſſion or reverſion of the Guntoor Circar, preciſely on the ground on which they ſtood a year ago, and on which the moſt ſolemn Treaties between the Company and the Nizam had placed them. You will be pleaſed to recollect, that the meaſures authorized and recommended in our Letter to you of the 5th July 1775, had for their firſt and direct object, to diſpoſſeſs the French of the port of *Mootapillee*, to ſecure to the Company the reverſion of the Circar, and to accompliſh the diſmiſſion of the French from *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice; but that (on his failing to comply with theſe terms) the immediate ceſſion of the Circar to the Company was to be obtained by a negociation with the Nizam. We did not mean to depart from this fundamental principle, in the general approbation which we gave to your intended Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, in our Letter of the 25th January 1779; nor do we ſuppoſe that you yourſelves had it in contemplation to infringe the Treaties already ſubſiſting with the Nizam by a new agreement with his brother; who, as it appears to us, could not enter into any engagement whatſoever for the immediate ceſſion of the Circar, without the conſent of the Nizam, to whom he ſtands in the relation of tributary or jaghiredar. Whether this opinion be well founded, or not, or whether our general approbation of the terms in which you propoſed to treat with *Bazalet Jung*, be liable to a different conſtruction, are queſtions on which we deem it uſeleſs and inexpedient to enlarge at preſent, ſince our conduct muſt finally be determined by conſiderations of infinitely greater weight and importance.

Independent of the juſtice of the Nizam's pretenſions, the difference between the reverſion of the Guntoor Circar, on the death or forfeiture of *Bazalet Jung*, and the immediate poſſeſſion of it on the terms of your Treaty with him, is not an object of any eſſential moment to the Company's intereſts, provided a ſufficient ſecurity can be obtained againſt the introduction of the French, which the Nizam has agreed to give us; much leſs is it to be compared to the advantage of recovering his friendſhip in the preſent ſituation of our affairs, or at leaſt, of not being obliged to act againſt him.

On theſe principles we have determined to reinſtate *Bazalet Jung* in the poſſeſſions of the Circar, and to replace every thing in the ſtate in which it ſtood before you entered into a negociation with him. We have formerly notified to the Nizam, our reſolution reſpecting this arrangement, and we require and expect your immediate compliance with it, by withdrawing your forces, collectors, and other agents, of whatever character, from the Circar of Guntoor, and reſtoring it to the poſſeſſion of *Bazalet Jung*. There will be no breach of faith to him, ſince he, on his part, has been unable to perform the conditions to which he ſtood engaged, and wiſhes to be relieved from thence; nor do we foreſee any difficulty whatſoever in the execution of the accommodation we now have in view, and of courſe in preventing a rupture with the Nizam at this unfavourable juncture, except ſuch as may unfortunately ariſe from the preſent temper and diſpoſition of your Preſidency towards this Government. We are ſorry that ſuch a diſpoſition ſhould at any time prevail between us, but eſpecially in circumſtances in which the moſt perfect harmony and co-operation are eſſentially neceſſary to the common good and general ſervice of the Company, through all their poſſeſſions. We wiſh on our part, to put an end to every ſubject of diſagreement; and we flatter ourſelves, that in the preſent inſtance, our requiſition will not want any further motive or argument to ſupport it, and to inſure your willing and ready compliance.

We are,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
P Francis.
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William, 12th June 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 99.

Fort Saint George Select Conſultations, the 6th September 1780.

THE Preſident lays before the Committee a draft of a Letter, which he propoſes to be ſent to *Bengal*, on the ſubject of the requiſition made by the Governor General and Council to them, for delivering up the Guntoor Circar to *Bazalet Jung*.

The ſaid Letter is now read as follows:

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire; Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 12th June. The important requiſition contained in that Letter, added to the troubles which ſo ſoon followed the receipt of it, will, we flatter ourſelves, be conſidered by you as a ſufficient apology for not ſending an earlier anſwer. The ſubject has indeed engaged much of our attention, and we have turned it over and over again in our minds, with the view of meeting, as far as we poſſibly could, the objects which you propoſed for our compliance with your deſire.

It were needleſs to recapitulate what has paſſed relative to the Guntoor Circar, ſince the year 1775, when the French fleet ſtationed there, firſt became a ſource of jealouſy to us. Suffice it to obſerve, that the meaſures which were taken to obtain the diſmiſſion of theſe Troops, were ſuch as muſt have convinced the Nizam of the ſtrict regard we paid to our Treaties; yet the repeated

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peated applications we preferred to him on this ſubject, availed nothing: the French were permitted to continue in the Guntoor Circar, and when the war with that Nation broke out, we found it neceſſary to appoint a conſiderable force to counteract their deſigns. At this time we alſo made a pointed requiſition to the Nizam, with no better ſucceſs than the former one; and ſeeing there was little probability of obtaining the end we ſought, by direct applications in this channel, we liſtened to the propoſals made to us by *Bazalet Jung*, and with your ſanction entered into a Treaty with him, which freed us entirely from the inconvenience we had been ſo long endeavouring to remove.

From this review of things, we confeſs it does not appear to us that the Nizam has any juſt cauſe for complaint. When our rupture with the French took place, it certainly became a violation of Treaty in the Nizam, to permit our enemies to remain in *Bazalet Jung*'s diſtricts, after we had formally demanded their diſmiſſion: nor could he, by the moſt rigid conſtruction of the Treaty of 1768, accuſe us of any breach of our engagements in the mode we purſued, in conſequence of his neglecting to do us juſtice. But what, more than all we have ſaid, convinces us that we were right, is, that our proceedings, and the Treaty in conſequence, had the ſanction of your conſent and approbation.

You now require of us to deliver back to *Bazalet Jung* the Guntoor Circar, which we obtained on certain terms by virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty with him. Your motives ſeem principally to reſt upon the neceſſity of preſerving the Nizam's friendſhip; and this indeed is now become ſo urgent, that we are willing to make the ſacrifice you propoſe for effecting it. As to the mode of requiring us to give up the Circar, we do not wiſh in the preſent juncture to enter into the ſmalleſt diſpute about it.

The difficulty which occurs to us in complying with your deſire, is of another kind: nevertheleſs we are heartily diſpoſed to remove it, and ſhall uſe our beſt endeavours for that purpoſe.

When we obtained the Sunnuds for the five Northern Circars, including that of Guntoor; the Nabob requeſted of the Company that he might have the Guntoor Circar at rent, whenever it came into their hands; which they aſſented to; and accordingly, after the delivery of that diſtrict to us, upon the concluſion of the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, we farmed it to the Nabob for a certain term, ſubject to the pleaſure of the Company; and the Nabob now holds it upon this footing. We have written a Letter to his Highneſs, repreſenting what you have urged, as to the expediency of giving up the Guntoor Circar in compliance with the Nizam's deſire, and expreſſing our hope that he will relinquiſh his claim upon it as Renter. So ſoon as we receive his anſwer, we ſhall acquaint you with it, and do every thing in our power to expedite this buſineſs agreeably to your wiſhes.

Before we conclude, however, we muſt expreſs the apprehenſion we feel, leſt *Hyder Ally Cawn* ſhould, upon its reſtoration, have influence enough to acquire the poſſeſſion of this diſtrict to himſelf. We know that he has already, both by temptation and threats, endeavoured to obtain it; and ſhould he at any time hereafter ſucceed in his deſign, we ſhall find him a moſt troubleſome neighbour; as, by the ſituation of the country, he would have it in his power to ſtop our communication by land with the Northern Circars; and in caſe of *Bazalet Jung*'s demiſe, it might coſt us a war to take poſſeſſion of our reverſionary rights to the diſtrict.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
Fort St. George, and humble Servants,
Sept. 2d, 1780. *John Whitehill*, &c. Select Committee.

Mr. *Smith* and Mr. *Johnſon* diſapprove of the foregoing Letter, as inconſiſtent with the ſentiments they have already expreſſed on the ſubject of it.

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Fort St. George Conſultations, 7th and 8th November 1780.

Tueſday 7th Nov^r.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, eſq. Governor, Preſident.
Charles Smith,
Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon,
Alexander Davidſon.

MINUTES of laſt Conſultation read.

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B. Commander in Chief in *India*, having arrived here the 5th inſtant, in the ſhip *Duke of Kingſton*, now takes his ſeat at the Board as ſecond in Council.

The Preſident delivers in General Letter from *Bengal* Preſidency, under date the 10th ultimo, and a Minute from himſelf of this day's date.

Read the abovementioned Letter as follows:

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

Having for good and ſufficient reaſons, ſtated in a Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of this date, a copy of which we ſend to you encloſed, Reſolved to ſuſpend *John Whitehill*, Eſq. from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*: We do hereby order and declare *John Whitehill*, Eſq. ſuſpended from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort St. George*; agreeable to powers delegated to us for that purpoſe, by the Act of the 13th of His preſent Majeſty: and to this order and declaration we direct you pay implicit obedience and attention.

We are, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obliged
humble Servants,
(Signed) *Warren Haſtings*,
P. Francis,
Fort William, *Edwd Wheler*,
the 10th Oct. 1780. *Eyre Coote*.

To the Honourable the Preſident, &c. Select Committee of *Fort St. George*.

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Letter of the 3d ult. in anſwer to the one which we addreſſed to you on the 12th June.

You plead the importance of the requiſition contained in our Letter, added to the troubles which ſoon followed the receipt of it, as an apology for not ſending an earlier anſwer. You juſtify the Treaty concluded with *Bazalet Jung* without the participation of his ſuperior, the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, againſt the charge of having infringed the Treaty 1768; adding, that it had the ſanction of our conſent and approbation: that you are willing to deliver back to *Bazalet Jung* the Circar of *Guntoor*, obtained by the Treaty; but that a difficulty had occurred, which you were heartily diſpoſed to remove, and would uſe your utmoſt endeavours for the purpoſe; namely, that you had farmed the Circar of *Guntoor* to the Nabob *Waulajah*, and that you had written a Letter to him, repreſenting what we had urged as to the expediency of giving up the Circar of *Guntoor*, in compliance with the deſire of the Nizam; and expreſſing your hope, that he would relinquiſh his claim upon it as a Renter; and that ſo ſoon as you received his anſwer, you would acquaint us with it, and do every thing in your power to expedite this buſineſs agreeably to our wiſhes. To theſe points we ſhall ſeparately reply: the importance of our requiſition demanded your attention

and unconditional obedience; nor could the troubles which intervened, afford any real impediment to ſo ſimple an act, or prevent your returning an earlier anſwer to our Letter, had you choſen to carry our orders into execution; ſince all that was neceſſary for your reply, obviouſly amounted to this: that you had received our Letter—that you had communicated its contents to the Nabob *Waulajah*—that you had withdrawn your Troops from the Circar of *Guntoor*, and required the Nabob to remove from it all Agents and Collectors belonging to him. Inſtead of this, it is evident that our Letter muſt have remained in your poſſeſſion for above the ſpace of two months, before you thought it worthy of the ſmalleſt regard; becauſe, when your anſwer was written (which was not till the 3d September) you confeſs you had only then made the Nabob acquainted with our determination.

Whether the Treaty concluded with *Bazalet Jung* were, or were not, an infringement of the Treaty 1768, exiſting with the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, ceaſed to be a queſtion from the very moment that we had refuſed our aſſent to it, and agreed to yield up the conditions obtained by it.

It is true, that in our reply to your Letter of the 31ſt December 1778, wherein you firſt mentioned the Treaty negociated with *Bazalet Jung*, we gave our aſſent to it generally; which by no means implied that extent of latitude which you have taken, but required to be uſed with reference to the condition in which it had our original ſanction, and which without any declaration on your part, or any authority expreſſed on ours, ought always to be underſtood as the ſuperior, indiſpenſable, and permanent condition, in all negociations, and in all acts of Government, the *Faith of Treaties actually exiſting*.

The following Extract of a Letter from this Preſidency, dated the 23d October 1775, is introduced here, as a proof of what our ſentiments then were on this ſubject, and is a part of the correſpondence quoted by you, as conveying "ample authority from us to the then Go-"vernment, to proceed in effecting the diſmiſſion of the "French Troops from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, by "Treaty, or in any other manner they might think "proper"

"As we obſerve, you have addreſſed the Nabob *Ni-"zam Ally Cawn*, through your Preſident, in the terms "we had ſuggeſted, for the removal of the Europeans "out of the Guntoor Circar, and for the purpoſe of ob-"taining his conſent for the reverſion of that diſtrict to "the Company; we ſhall wait to hear the reſult of that "Letter before we ſend you any further inſtructions on "that head."

When, therefore, we give our aſſent generally to the terms of the Treaty marked out in your Letter of the 31ſt December 1778, we had no more of your proceedings before us, than what you had choſen to make known to us in that Letter; and theſe formed of courſe the limits of our approbation.

We knew not that you had wholly omitted the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* in the negociation; we could not therefore authorize what you had concealed from our knowledge, much leſs ought our ſanction to have been ſuppoſed by conſtruction to an act which pledged the faith of the Company in one inſtance, by the ſacrifice of it in another, and bore in its formation the principles of its own diſſolution.

But as ſoon as we were acquainted with it, and were enabled to give it our attention, we declared our diſapprobation of it, and then firſt interpoſed our authority, to prevent it from taking effect, by requiring the inſtant ſurrender of the Circar of *Guntoor*.

We cannot paſs over this period of the tranſaction, without obſerving, that although the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung* was concluded in the month of April 1779, it was not till the 18th of February 1780 that you thought proper to adviſe us of it, and apparently for the only purpoſe of informing us at the ſame time, after the difficulties which you had ſubſequently met with, from the proteſt of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, the menaces of *Hyder Ally*, and the retraction of his concurrence by the Nabob *Bazalet Jung* himſelf, on the plea of his inability to maintain it.

Whatever obligations our ſanction, given in the manner which has been explained, to the draft of the Treaty propoſed to *Bazalet Jung*, in December 1778, may be ſuppoſed to have conveyed on you to maintain it when made; yet, when the party with which it was made, declared it invalid on his part, and ſolicited to be abſolved from it, its obligation certainly became void upon yours, and the plea, that our ſanction had been previouſly obtained, will not avail againſt our orders for reſtoring the Circar of *Guntoor*; ſince, even in the exiſting ſtate of the Treaty, it would have been no infringement of it, to yield up any right obtained by it, much leſs would it have been liable to ſuch a conſtruction, when the reciprocal condition of it had been annihilated.

But your oppoſition to our orders in this inſtance was not only not incumbent upon you, from the engagement of the Treaty, but was, in effect, a violation of it, ſince the Revenue of the Circar of *Guntoor* had been aſſigned to you by it, only as a ſubſidy for the military force which you had ſtipulated to furniſh him, at your own ſolicitation, in the room of the French party under Mr. *Lally*, which he had long retained, and which at your ſolicitation alſo he had conſented to diſmiſs, and had actually diſmiſſed; when, therefore, he declined the acceptance of that aid, and you had already profited by his good faith in the diſmiſſion of Mr. *Lally*, we know not upon what right you could retain poſſeſſion of the land which had been aſſigned as an equivalent for that aid, or how an act of ſuch apparent violence could be reconciled to the Treaty, from which, by his rejection of the only condition intended for his benefit, your Government derived every advantage oſtenſibly propoſed to be obtained by it, and his none.

The plea which you alledge, of difficulties ariſing from your engagements with the Nabob *Waulajah*, comes laſt under conſideration; and is, indeed, too ſerious not to be dwelt upon more particularly. The more we reflect upon it, the more we are at a loſs to conceive how you could ſo far forget that reſpect which was due to our authority, and the faith which we informed you we had pledged to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, as to admit of a moment's heſitation in the performance of our orders; but when we read your looſe, indefinite, vague promiſes, of your *aſſiſtance* in promoting *our wiſhes*, of an inſtant *conformity to our injunctions*, we have too much reaſon to ſuſpect ſuch a conduct as an intended cover to a fixed reſolution not to obey us, under the idea of the Nabob's claims being of ſufficient weight to poſtpone the execution of a peremptory requiſition from us, and to make it optional in the Nabob, whether he will give up the Circar of *Guntoor* or not, as his own convenience, or perhaps, even his caprice ſhall determine.

And this appears the more ſtriking, when we recollect, in your Letter of the 3d September, you inform us, that you actually had made repreſentations to the Nabob; when we have received Letters from you, dated the 17th September; when, even from your own account, the Letter which you had written to the Nabob muſt have been in his poſſeſſion above a fortnight; and when, from the 3d September to the 17th, you delayed procuring any Anſwer, although a conſtant, we might add a daily communication ſubſiſts between the Nabob and the Governor, and his reſidence is within your own walls; and when it is evident, that the ſubject of the Letter from you to the Nabob could not have comprized in it a number of ſpecific articles, which would have taken a length of time to reply to: there could be no references to accounts, no voluminous matter to wade through; nothing, in ſhort, to which a tedious or minute examination was neceſſary: and when we combine all theſe circumſtances together, and reflect, that the

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Letter could have contained ſimply one plain propoſition, whether or not the Nabob would give up the Guntoor Circar? which required not a day, no not an hour, to determine; we maintain that it was your duty to have exacted a poſitive Anſwer from the Nabob, without admitting any pretence for delay; and that the difficulties which you have alledged in extenuation of your miſconduct, were beneath you to offer, and unworthy of us to receive. Your conduct has expoſed us to the reproaches and deriſion of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, who has openly taxed us with having attempted to amuſe him with promiſes, which, though ſolemnly made, we have not the ability to perform; nor has he ſcrupled to avow himſelf the adviſer of the confederacy, the effects of which you yourſelves have recently and too fatally experienced, juſtifying it by the aggravated injuries which he had ſuſtained in this particular inſtance, and in the offenſive demands made on him, through your late Miniſter, Mr. *Hollond*. To what lengths of reſentment he may proceed, we cannot foreſee; he has indeed given us aſſurances of his pacific intentions, whenever he ſhall obtain the effects of our promiſes, and a reparation for the violation of his rights, and of the Treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company.

Whatever may be the ſincerity of theſe profeſſions, we are morally certain, that but for our intervention, he would have become the declared Enemy of the Company; and if he ſhall yet prove ſuch, in conſequence of any actual, but latent impreſſion, we ſhall impute it totally to you, as the aggreſſors.

Nor is it in on his part that we have to dread the conſequence of your contempt of our authority—we have found it neceſſary to make abrupt advances for peace to the Maratta State, and to ſeek other Alliances, as the means of obtaining and confirming it. But what Prince or State, without much heſitation, involve themſelves in engagements with a Power which cannot protect them againſt its own dependants? or who will truſt to the faith of our Treaties, which they had ſeen hitherto violated by you with impunity? Such is the ſituation to which you have reduced us, and we ſubmit to the neceſſity which it impoſes on us, becauſe we feel ourſelves impelled by a ſenſe of duty, which renders us ſuperior to every other conſideration.

We now proceed to ſum up all that has been already ſtated, and to form the ſeveral facts into diſtinct charges.

You have attempted to make a Treaty with the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, in direct violation of the former Treaty then ſubſiſting between the Company and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*.

You have preſumed to hold the Circar of *Guntoor* or *Murtazanagur* at all events, in defiance of a requiſition from the Governor General and Council, peremptorily made to reſtore it; and you have refuſed to withdraw your Troops, and to remove your Agents and Collectors from it, knowing, as you did, that we had formerly pledged the faith of the Company to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* for both theſe points; thereby degrading the authority, weakening the energy, and preventing the efficacy of the powers of this Government.

You have ſhewn a contemptuous indifference to the Governor General and Council, and a want of even common reſpect, in ſuffering a dangerous length of time to elapſe before you replied to orders of ſuch importance, or allowed them any conſideration; and when you did, you eluded the effects of theſe orders.

You have offered an inſult to the high commiſſion which we bear, in permitting other claims to ſtand in competition with the deliberative Reſolves of this Government.

In a word, you have made orders for commencing Hoſtilities, and you have negociated and concluded a Treaty of Peace, without the conſent and approbation of the Governor General and Council firſt obtained.

Under circumſtances of ſuch aggravation, ſo unpardonable in their very nature, and ſo dangerous in their conſequences, that nothing ſhort of inſtant example can preſerve the ſupremacy of the reſponſible Government, and give credit to its acts—we have reſolved, That *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, be ſuſpended from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and we declare him to be ſuſpended, in virtue of the power granted to us, the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, for that purpoſe, by the Regulating Act of Parliament of the thirteenth of His preſent Majeſty.

It is neither our deſire to extend an Act of this nature beyond the line preſcribed for the aſſertion of the public rights entruſted to our charge, nor ſhould we be juſtified in ſuch an indiſcriminating rigour, which, by involving every perſon in the effects of a conduct oſtenſibly common to all, might fall, as we believe it would, on ſome whoſe opinions, had they prevailed, would have prevented the grievances of which we complain.

On you, Gentlemen, to whom the charge of affairs will eventally be committed, we place the moſt implicit reliance for the redreſs of paſt evils, for a zealous and united exertion of every means which may tend to retrieve the misfortunes to which, from whatſoever cauſes, your affairs have lately been ſubjected, and for a liberal co-operation with us for the ſame great ends.

Fort William, 10th October 1780. We are, &c. (Signed) Governor General and Council.

Sir *Eyre Coote* obſerves, that he ſhould object to the reading Mr. *Whitehill*'s Minute, had not Mr. *Whitehill* given it in at the ſame time he delivered in the Letter from the Supreme Council, notifying his ſuſpenſion from the ſtation of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and before that Reſolution of the Supreme Council was publicly known to this Board.

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THE Minute of Mr. *Whitehill* is then read as follows:

I have now heard read the extraordinary and intemperate animadverſions of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, on the meaſures of this Government, and the unauthorized privileges which they claim, of iſſuing orders, which in their conſequences muſt affect the character, honour, and welfare of every Servant of the Company, on this and the other Eſtabliſhment of *India*.

The blow in the preſent inſtance ſeems levelled at me; for what reaſon I know not; they are to anſwer for it who have attempted it; and, with or without ſupport, they ſhall feel that a ſubject of *England*, whatever may be his ſtation, is guarded and protected by the wiſe and wholeſome regulations of his country.

As a Servant of the Company, I have, and always will, implicitly obey the juſt and proper orders of my Superiors.

But I ſhould be treacherous to my Employers, and wanting in a proper attention to my own character and ſtation as Preſident of this Government, if I tacitly ſubmitted to the graſping hand of unconſtitutional power.

The other Gentlemen of the Council may reconcile an illegal innovation of their rights, as their own views may lead them; I aſſert the independency of this Government under the reſtrictive Act of Parliament, in the preſent inſtance, where the Governor General and Council have arrogated to themſelves a power of ſuſpenſion, and whatever may be the iſſue of it, I both call and rely upon the ſupport of thoſe Members of Adminiſtration, who in their high offices are bound to ſupport the acts of Government entruſted to their management, under the ſanction of their King and Country.—Wherefore I proteſt againſt the power aſſumed by the Supreme Council, of ſuſpending me, in their Letter of the 10th October 1780:

1ſt. Becauſe

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1ſt. Becauſe the grounds for their attempt to ſuſpend me, are mentioned by themſelves as acts of the whole Board, for which I ſingly and ſeparately cannot be held reſponſible.

2d. Becauſe there was no infraction of the powers granted to the Governor General and Council, when this Preſidency proceeded upon the meaſure of acquiring the Guntoor Circar; the Governor General and Council having themſelves concurred in the propriety of that meaſure.

3d. Becauſe the ſecond charge of the Governor General and Council, viz. That we have preſumed to hold the Guntoor Circar at all events, in defiance of their authority, and have refuſed to withdraw our Troops and Agents from it; has no foundation in truth or fact: that Circar having long ſince, and as ſoon as the local ſituation of affairs rendered it proper, been reſtored to *Bazalet Jung*, and the Troops, Agents, and Collectors withdrawn from it, agreeably to the deſire of the Governor General and Council.

4th. Becauſe with regard to the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, I was no more culpable than the other Members of the Board, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* having at that time been in charge of this Government.

5th. Becauſe their controlling power being confined to offences which cannot be committed otherwiſe than by the whole Board, extends to the Preſident and Council as a collective body only, and cannot affect individuals.

6th. Becauſe though the Act gives the Governor General and Council, in certain inſtances, a power of ſuſpending Preſidents and Councils, it gives them no power of ſuſpending Governors from the exerciſe of their military charge.

7th. Becauſe, as Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and Commander in Chief of the Forces in the Garriſon, I cannot be removed but by the orders of the Company, under their common ſeal, or under the hands of thirteen or more of the Court of Directors, as is fully ſpecified in the commiſſions and orders on that head.

8th. Becauſe the Governor General and Council, in their ſaid Letter of the 10th October, declare me ſuſpended in virtue of the power granted to them for that purpoſe, by the Regulating Act of Parliament of the 13th of His preſent Majeſty; a power which no longer exiſts, that Act having expired in the year 1779, and the Act of the 19th of His Majeſty, the laſt Act that has been communicated to us, chap. 61. for continuing it, having alſo expired on the 5th day of April laſt—a circumſtance which, even ſuppoſing culpability, entirely annihilates their ſuperintending and controlling power.

For all which reaſons I do, in the name of my Conſtituents, the *Eaſt India* Company, and in defence of thoſe rights I am inveſted with by the ſaid Company, moſt ſolemnly proteſt againſt the illegal aſſumption of authority in the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, of impoſing partial ſuſpenſions; declaring it at the ſame time to be my firm intention not to acquieſce in the Reſolutions of the ſaid Governor General and Council ſo paſſed, the ſame being illegal, and evidently contrary to the ſpirit, meaning, and letter of the Act of the 13th of His preſent Majeſty, called the Eaſt India Regulating Act; but to conſider myſelf, in every reſpect, as Preſident of the Council of *Madras*, and Commander in Chief in the Fort and Garriſon of *Fort Saint George*, hereby exonerating myſelf, in theſe reſpective capacities, from any evil conſequences which may attend an uſurpation of authority in the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and an eventual ſubmiſſion and obedience to their illegal orders, by any of the Members of this Adminiſtration; againſt whom, as integral part of this Government, without whoſe preſence no Council can exiſt, no meaſure can be taken, no buſineſs carried on, I do, in the event of ſuch ſubmiſſion and obedience, alſo moſt ſolemnly proteſt, ſeparately and collectively, and hold them, and every of them, anſwerable, as well to the Honourable *Eaſt India* Company, for the ſubverſion of this Government, and uſurpation of the authority thereof, as to myſelf for any loſs or injury I may ſuſtain in my perſon, property, or liberty, or in the due enjoyment and exerciſe of thoſe rights and powers of which I am legally poſſeſſed and inveſted.

Wherefore—as I hold this Government to be compoſed of a Preſident and Council, as particularly provided for in the commiſſion of Government, and not in a Preſident and Select Committee, who have only general powers in certain inſtances—I move, That the opinion of the Board be taken, whether this unjuſtifiable ſtretch of uſurped authority in the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, to ſuſpend not only the Preſident and Council collectively, but every Member of it ſeparately and individually, as their ambition, prejudice, or caprice may lead them, be acquieſced in; and whether their orders ſhall be obeyed.

Fort Saint George, 7th November 1780. (Signed) *John Whitehill.*

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following Minute:

As the Letter from the Supreme Council, now read, contains my ſentiments at large on the ſubject of the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Whitehill* from his office of Governor of this Preſidency, and as my opinion thereon has already been recorded in the Proceedings of that Board, it is unneceſſary I ſhould, on this occaſion, enter into any further diſcuſſion, but ſimply declare my firm reſolution to ſupport an authority which I think the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, by the Regulating Act of the 13th of George the Third, have, in the preſent inſtance, a clear, legal, and unqueſtionable right to exerciſe; and muſt therefore add, on my own part, as Commander in Chief of the Company's Forces in *India*, that whilſt that Act of the Supreme Council of *Bengal* remains in force, which it muſt do until reverſed by an authority even ſuperior to themſelves, I cannot, nor will not, act with Mr. *Whitehill* as Preſident of *Fort Saint George*, deeming him, under ſuch ſuſpenſion, diveſted of all authority, and conſequently incompetent to any acts of Government whatever.

In delivering this opinion, I wiſh to be underſtood, that I mean nothing derogatory towards Mr. *Whitehill* and that, whenever the bar ſhall be properly removed, and his reinſtatement in this Government takes place, I will cheerfully co-operate with him in any meaſure that may promiſe a remedy for, or aſſiſt to extricate the affairs of the Company, and, I may add, the Public in general, from their preſent difficulties and diſtreſſes.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Mr. *Johnſon* delivers in the following Minute:

I am of opinion, That the Letter now read of the 10th October, from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* to this Board, has ſuſpended *John Whitehill*, Eſq. our late Preſident, from his office of Governor, &c. of this Fort and Settlement; and that he does accordingly ſtand ſuſpended, and conſequently cannot ſit at this Board, as a Member of this Government, or vote upon any Queſtion, or do any act of Government whatever.

7th Nov. 1780. (Signed) *Samuel Johnſon.*

Mr. *Smith* delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. *Whitehill* being ſuſpended from his office as Preſident of the Council and Governor of the Fort and Garriſon of *Fort Saint George*, by orders from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, contained in their Letter dated 10th October 1780, I am of opinion, that he ſtands ſuſpended accordingly, and that he cannot deliver in any Minute, make any Motion, give his voice on any Queſtion, or do any act of Government whatever.

7th Nov. 1780. (Signed) *Charles Smith.*

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Mr. *Whitehill* desires, that the Motion contained in his Minute be now put.

Sir *Eyre Coote* objects to it, as he is of opinion Mr. *Whitehill*, at this time, actually stands suspended from the station of President and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, in virtue of the authority vested in the Governor General and Supreme Council, by the Regulating Act of the 13th year of His present Majesty; and that therefore Mr. *Whitehill* has no longer a right to move a Question at this Board.—Sir *Eyre Coote* further desires, that the following Motion be put, That Mr *Charles Smith*, agreeably to the rules of succession at this Presidency, he being next to the chair in this Government, do from henceforth take upon him all the power and authority which have hitherto been legally and constitutionally vested in the President and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Mr. *Davidson* particularly requests, he may have some time allowed him to deliberate on this subject, before he gives his opinion; and it is in consequence agreed, that the meeting of Council be adjourned until to-morrow at ten o'clock.

Wednesday, 8th November. At a Consultation;

PRESENT,

The Honourable *John Whitehill*, Esq. Governor, President,
Lieut. Gen. Sir *Eyre Coote*, K.B.
Charles Smith,
Major Gen. Sir *Hector Munro*, K.B.
Samuel Johnson,
Alex^r Davidson.

The Board met agreeably to their adjournment of yesterday.

Minutes of the proceedings of yesterday read.

The opinions of the several Members of Council are taken upon the Motion made yesterday by Sir *Eyre Coote*, viz.

That Mr. *Charles Smith*, agreeably to the rules of succession at this Presidency, he being next to the chair in this Government, do from henceforth take upon him all the power and authority which have hitherto been legally and constitutionally vested in the President and Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Mr. *Davidson* for the Motion, and delivers in the following Minute:

For the reasons so amply set forth in the President's Minute, and particularly because I understand from that Minute, and from Sir *Hector Munro*, a Member of the Select Committee, that the cause of Mr. *Whitehill*'s suspension no longer exists, the Guntoor Circar having some time since, pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Council, been ceded to *Bazalet Jung*; I do not approve of Mr. *Whitehill*'s suspension, though I acknowledge the power of the Supreme Council; I therefore support General Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Motion, that Mr. *Charles Smith*, the next senior Servant to Mr. *Whitehill*, be the acting President.

Mr. *Johnson* for the Motion.

Sir *Hector Munro* against the Motion being put in effect for the present; and delivers in the following Minute:

As the President never meant to dispute the authority of the Governor General and Supreme Council, in executing their orders to deliver up the Guntoor Circar:

As the delay was occasioned by a particular circumstance blended with some difficulties which occurred:

As the act for which the President has been suspended by the Supreme Council of *Bengal* did not exist at the time they carried their Resolution into execution:

And, as I imagine, upon a representation of facts as they stand, that the Supreme Council would rescind their act of suspension, if they have that power:

For these reasons I am not for carrying the orders of the Supreme Council, respecting the President's suspension, into execution, until we hear again from them on this subject.

Fort St. George, 8th Nov. 1778. (Signed) *Hector Munro.*

Sir *Eyre Coote* for the Motion.

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Mr. *Whitehill* delivers in the following Minute:

In Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute of yesterday, he declares, that considering me suspended by a legal and unquestionable authority, he cannot and will not sit or act with me as President of this Council.

If Sir *Eyre Coote* was as firmly persuaded of the justice, nay of the existence of the grounds on which the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* resolved my suspension, as he seems to be of their power, I should not be at all surprized at his declaration. The Governor General and Council, Sir *Eyre Coote* himself being one of them, came to the Resolution of suspending me, upon an idea of our refusal and determination not to give up the Guntoor Circar. He sees at present, that the idea was without foundation; he finds we have not only *not* refused to give it up, but that we have actually done it, and done it in obedience to their order. It therefore needs no great force of argument to convince him, that the Resolution in which he bore a part was founded in error; nor will it, I hope, be difficult to prove, that condemning a man without any specific charge against him, in which he also concurred, is an act of the highest injustice and precipitation. Thus, though Sir *Eyre Coote* must in his own breast be convinced that the order of the Supreme Council was precipitate and unjust, he is determined to support it. Do the principles of honour he so eminently possesses, approve such a conduct? Do they not rather call upon him, when he has done an injury, to endeavour to repair it? Perhaps he will say he is obliged to pay implicit obedience to the orders of the Governor General and Council. That he is, to all their lawful orders, I admit. But, right or wrong, to carry them into execution, I say he is under no obligation; nay, knowing them to be founded in error or injustice, he would be highly criminal in doing it. Has Sir *Eyre Coote* considered the consequence of his Resolution, not to act with me as President of this Council? Should I not, as he wishes to comply with this partial and oppressive order, should I not hand over the keys of the Garrison to Mr. *Smith*, and withdraw myself from the deliberations of Council? Should I not, by such a step, acknowledge a culpability that does not exist?—And should he employ force to drive me from the honourable station in which I am placed, he would be guilty of a subversion of this Government; and it would depend on my prudence and attention to the public interest, if he would not give birth to the horrors of a civil war in a moment when unanimity and co-operation are essential to the preservation of the *Carnatic* and the safety of *Madras*—And, should neither a resignation on my part, nor force on his, take place; should he sit down contented with his Resolution not to obey the orders of this Presidency, as it is at present formed; should he withhold the supply of money he has brought with him, and refuse to order the Bengal Troops to march, or to co-operate with those of this Government;—to what a desperate situation would be reduced the Company's interest on the coast! The remains of our own Army being insufficient to repel the Enemy in so critical a situation as the present; when I am determined not to acquiesce in an act of injustice, I see no measure left for Sir *Eyre Coote* to take, but either to employ a force which I must submit to, to carry into execution an illegal order, though he knows it to be such; or to repair an injury he has erroneously

erroneouſly and haſtily committed. He is to determine which to adopt.

Fort Saint George, 8th Nov. 1780. (Signed) *John Whitehill.*

Carried in favour of the Motion, That Mr. *Whitehill* is ſuſpended from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*; and that Mr. *Charles Smith* ſucceeds thereto.

Sir *Eyre Coote* delivers in the following Minute:

From a Paper juſt now given in by Mr. *Whitehill*, I obſerve that I am pointed out as the chief inſtrument in the buſineſs of his ſuſpenſion; and why he ſhould conceive himſelf vindicated in placing me in ſo diſtinguiſhed a light, I am at a loſs to find out. Surely my being charged with diſpatches from the Supreme Council at *Bengal*, addreſſed to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Madras*, can in no ſhape conſtitute me more a party in the affair than I originally poſſeſſed as a Member of that Board, and what I muſt now ſhare as holding a ſeat at this Council. Mr. *Whitehill* carries the idea of my power ſtill further; by imputing to me the ability of ſuſpending the execution of orders from an authority which I am myſelf obliged to obey in all caſes, where my own commiſſion, as Commander in Chief of the Company's Forces in *India*, does not enable me to act independently of them. It is impoſſible upon this occaſion that Mr. *Whitehill* can ſuppoſe me poſſeſſed of any inſtructions from the Supreme Council as Commander in Chief of the Army, to enforce obedience to an order proceeding from them in their civil capacity, ſanctified by a conſtitutional Act of Parliament, and addreſſed to a Civil Government, ſubject to their controul. In the firſt place, allowing it poſſible I could have had any, I ſhould certainly have brought them forward on this occaſion; and in the ſecond place, could the Supreme Council have entertained a thought of the kind, they muſt have betrayed a ſuſpicion of imbecility in their civil power, and an implied doubt of the legality by which they exerciſed it.

Theſe circumſtances conſidered, I am perſuaded the burthen which Mr. *Whitehill*'s arguments tend to impoſe upon me in particular, will appear as unjuſt as they muſt in the end be ineffectual.

(Signed) *E. C.*

Wedneſday, 8th Nov.—At a Conſultation;

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Charles Smith*, Eſq. Governor, Preſident,
Lieutenant Gen. Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.
Samuel Johnſon,
Major Gen. Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Alexander Davidſon.

The Secretary reads the following Paper, together with the Commiſſion of Government, from the Honourable Court of Directors; the Company's civil and military Servants, and the Inhabitants, attending:

" The Honourable the Governor General and Su-
" preme Council, by their Letter to this Preſidency of
" the 10th ult. in conſequence of powers delegated to
" them by the Act of the 13th of His preſent Majeſty,
" having been pleaſed to ſuſpend *John Whitehill*, Eſquire,
" from his office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort*
" *Saint George*; the Honourable the Preſident and
" Council of *Fort Saint George* do hereby give notice,
" That the ſaid *John Whitehill*, Eſquire, ſtands ſuſpended
" from the office of Preſident and Governor of *Fort*
" *Saint George*, accordingly; and that *Charles Smith*,
" Eſquire, late ſecond of Council, ſucceeds thereto."

Charles Smith, Eſquire, then takes the chair as Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George* and its Dependencies; and the oaths of allegiance and office are adminiſtered to him.

John Whitehill, Eſquire, having applied for a copy of the Proceedings relative to his ſuſpenſion; it is unanimouſly agreed, that he be furniſhed with an official copy thereof.

(A true copy.)
Ch. Freeman, Sub-Secretary.

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APPENDIX, No. 103.

Extract of the ſeparate Letter from *Fort Saint George*; dated the 4th July 1775.

Par. 8. HAVING lately received information from the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, of the particulars of the ſuccours of men and ſtores imported at *Mootapillee*, for the uſe of *Bazalet Jung*, brother to *Nizam ul Mulck*, within the courſe of a few months, we deemed it adviſable to communicate the ſame to the Governor General and Council; and at the ſame time to make known to them our apprehenſions, in caſe of a rupture with *France*, and that *Bazalet Jung* ſhould not be prevented from collecting ſuch vaſt quantities of military ſtores, and ſuch formidable numbers of French and other Foreigners as he is daily enliſting into his ſervice.

9. In the ſecond article of the Treaty afore-mentioned entered into in 1768, with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, your Honours will be pleaſed to obſerve, that the circar of *Murtazanagur*, or *Guntoor*, is guaranteed to *Bazalet Jung* on certain conditions during his life-time, and at the deceaſe, or infraction of the terms agreed upon, that the property of it reverts to the Company.

10. Were we convinced that *Bazalet Jung* had in the leaſt manner infringed the terms on which he holds poſſeſſion of the circar, we could, with the greateſt propriety, not only call him to a ſevere account for the ſame, but, according to the tenor of the agreement, diſpoſſeſs him of a country which he is no longer maſter of than while he adheres to the points ſtipulated in the Treaty aforeſaid: but, while no ſuch matter has come to our knowledge, and his conduct is, as far as we are acquainted with it, conformable to the line laid down for his actions, we ſee not how we can, with any degree of propriety, prevent the great and increaſing evil of the French ſettling in his dominions. On this ſubject we have written particularly to the Governor General and Council, and have at the ſame time given it as our opinion, that the only modes which are left for obviating the danger to be apprehended, are, to endeavour, if poſſible, to prevail upon *Bazalet Jung* to give up the port at *Mootapillee*, at which place all his ſuccours are imported, for an adequate acknowledgment; or, if practicable, the whole circar on the like terms: or that he will admit of its being protected for him by the Company, he being at the expence of the force employed on that ſervice.

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Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated the 17th October 1778.

Par. 28. YOU have been adviſed in former Letters from this Preſidency, of the growing influence and power acquired by the French in the dominions of *Bazalet Jung*, where a conſiderable party of their Troops has for many years been maintained upon the ſame footing nearly as the Troops formerly with the Soubah of the *Decan*, under Mr. *Buſſey*. The Guntoor Circar, which at preſent belongs to *Bazalet Jung*, but reverts to the Company at his death, opens a paſſage for ſupporting and recruiting this party from the ſea; but though the danger to be apprehended from a body of Europeans kept up in a ſituation ſo near to your Northern poſſeſſions, has been often obſerved, no effectual meaſures were ever taken

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to remove it. In the Conſultations of 10th July, our Preſident entered a Minute on the ſubject of this party, and propoſed his idea of the method to be purſued for effecting its diſmiſſion from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*; which was approved, and in part adopted, when we received your authority to begin hoſtilities in *India*. We have ſince formed a body of Troops in the Maſulipatam Diſtrict, to act againſt the French party; and as *Bazalet Jung* has expreſſed himſelf uneaſy at the conſequence it has aſſumed, which is even become dangerous to himſelf, we hope and expect, from his aſſurances, that he will unite with us as far as he can in ſubduing it.

APPENDIX, No. 105.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated the 13th March 1779.

Par. 12. YOU were acquainted, in our Letter of the 17th October, that we had ſome hopes of prevailing on *Bazalet Jung* to diſmiſs the French Troops, whom he had long entertained in his ſervice, and whom he had placed in a ſituation which rendered them formidable to your poſſeſſions in the circars. We lately opened a negociation with *Bazalet Jung* on this ſubject, and having received certain propoſals from him, containing an offer of the Guntoor Circar at rent, on condition of our keeping an Engliſh force conſtantly with him, for the defence of his country; we embraced that opportunity of acquainting him, in general terms, with our wiſhes in reſpect to the French Troops, and to make the condition of our renting the circar, and ſupplying him with a force, that he ſhould abſolutely diſcharge and ſend out of his country every Frenchman in his ſervice. By a Letter we received from him a few days ago, we have the pleaſure to learn, that he has, in conſequence of our deſire, diſmiſſed the French Troops; and that he is impatient to conclude a Treaty of Friendſhip and Alliance with the Company on the terms of his firſt propoſals to us.

Par. 13. The poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, and the diſmiſſion of the French Troops from the dominions of *Bazalet Jung*, are certainly objects of great importance to the ſecurity of your Northern Provinces; and we ſhall loſe no time, after the diſpatch of this ſhip, in bringing the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung* to a concluſion, on the moſt favourable terms we can obtain. The Governor General and Council of *Bengal* have been informed of our deſign, which they much approve.

APPENDIX, No. 106.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*, to the Court of Directors; dated the 14th October 1779.

Par 12. WE acquainted your Honours, in our addreſs of the 13th March laſt, with the progreſs we had then made in our negociation with *Bazalet Jung*, for obtaining the poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar. We have ſince exchanged with him a written agreement to the following effect: viz. In conſideration of his diſmiſſing the French Troops under Mr. *Lally* entirely from his ſervice, we engage to furniſh him with ſuch a military force as he may require for the protection of his country (the quota to be ſettled hereafter.) This force is only to be employed in defending him againſt foreign attacks, but on no account to be carried beyond the line of his own territory. We have further agreed to ſpare him additional Troops to protect him, in caſe of an attack, if our ſituation will admit of it. In return for theſe ſervices, *Bazalet Jung* conſents to our taking poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, at rent, paying ſuch a ſum for it as has been uſually received ſince he has been maſter of that country; and from the amount of this rent we are firſt to provide for the pay and expence of the Troops ſtationed with him, and then remit to him whatever balance ſhall remain. He has further engaged to ſupply the Company with a body of Horſe, in caſe it ſhall be required of him. Theſe are briefly the terms of our agreement, and *Bazalet Jung* has in conſequence given us a Sunnud, by which we have taken poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar.

Par. 13. Although the Company derive not, at preſent, any pecuniary benefit from theſe engagements, yet the advantages of having preſent hold of the Guntoor Circar; of excluding the French influence entirely from that quarter; and of entering into a defenſive alliance with *Bazalet Jung*, are, in our opinion, ſuch as cannot fail of operating greatly to your intereſt. By retaining poſſeſſion of the circar, you effectually ſecure your reverſionary right to that diſtrict, and you ſhut up the only port on the Coaſt by which the French have hitherto been accuſtomed to introduce men and ſtores into the heart of the country, and through which they have ſo long maintained an intercourſe and connection with *Bazalet Jung*. By the protection now held forth to this Prince, we hope, beſides putting an end to the views of the French, a ſtill more material purpoſe will be anſwered, and that is, to check the views of *Hyder Ally*, which are much more to be feared. *Hyder*, in the month of February laſt, conquered the Cuddapa Country; he was advancing with the ſame intention towards *Cannoul*, and the dominions of *Bazalet Jung*, when his affairs called him back to his Capital at *Seringapatam*. Had he puſhed his conqueſts further at that time, which he might eaſily have done, your circars, and the Nabob's poſſeſſions to the Northward, would have been laid entirely open to his invaſions, and with his Cavalry he might have ravaged them at pleaſure. Seeing the feeble barrier that remains between *Hyder* and our Territories to the Northward, it is apparently for your intereſt and ſecurity to ſupport *Bazalet Jung*, who is the only Prince that has the ſmalleſt chance of ſtanding, with our aſſiſtance, againſt the arms of *Hyder*: our force with him will likewiſe be ſo ſituated, that we ſhall be able to make uſe of it, if neceſſary, for the protection of the circars; and as we do not mean, by any addition to your eſtabliſhment, to replace the Troops ſtationed with *Bazalet Jung*, the maintaining thoſe Troops out of the Revenues of the Guntoor Circar, muſt be conſidered as a ſaving of ſo much expence, ſince you will occaſionally be able to employ them in the protection of your own diſtricts.

Par. 14. The detachment firſt propoſed to be ſtationed with *Bazalet Jung*, was three battalions of Sepoys, and one company of European Artillery, with ſix field pieces. We appointed Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur* to command it, and directed him to proceed by the neareſt route to *Adoni*, the Capital of *Bazalet Jung*; and as that route led through the Paſs of *Atcour*, in the Cuddapa Country, lately ſubdued by *Hyder Ally*, our Preſident wrote a Letter to *Hyder*'s Manager, to requeſt the Troops might march by the ſaid Paſs unmoleſted. Colonel *Harpur* in the meantime proceeded with the detachment; but on his arrival at the Paſs, he found it ſo ſtrongly guarded to oppoſe him, that he did not think it prudent to force it, and therefore returned to the Guntoor Circar, from whence he had marched. We have ſince reinforced his detachment with two companies of European Infantry, half a company of Artillery, and another battalion of Sepoys, and have directed him to march to *Adoni*, by whatever route he ſhall, upon enquiry, find moſt practicable,

Par. 15. The Guntoor Circar having been delivered into our hands, in conſequence of the agreement before recited, our Preſident employed himſelf in aſcertaining its annual produce, while in the poſſeſſion of *Bazalet Jung*, and having obtained particular accounts of the receipts from this diſtrict for the four laſt years, with the charges of collection, he laid them before us, and we

then deliberated in what manner to diſpoſe of the circar, ſo as to realize the ſum for which we are to account with *Bazalet Jung*, agreeably to the tenor of our agreement. The Nabob, who, by your Letter of the 4th March 1767, Par. 13, had been promiſed the Guntoor Circar at rent, whenever it came into your hands, addreſſed us a Letter on this occaſion, putting us in mind of that promiſe, and offering Propoſals to rent the circar for ten years. The terms of theſe Propoſals are higher than the ſums obtained from the circar by *Bazalet Jung*, (at leaſt for the laſt four years, of which we had the particulars before us) and of courſe would enable us to account with *Bazalet Jung*, for rather more than he could have expected from us by our engagement.

Par. 16. It was evident to us, that there were only two ways of realizing, with any certainty, the produce of this diſtrict; the one by collecting the Revenues immediately for your account, and the other by letting it to the Nabob; for there appeared to us no other perſon of ſufficient reſponſibility to be entruſted with ſo large a rent. If, by collecting the produce ourſelves, it were, from any miſmanagement or bad ſeaſons, to fall ſhort of the rent to be accounted with *Bazalet Jung*, the difference could only be made up out of your treaſury, which might be inconvenient; but when it is let to a reſponſible perſon, ſuch deficiencies are not to be apprehended. For theſe reaſons, but more particularly becauſe your orders of 1767 ſeemed to favour the Nabob's application, we have reſolved to grant him the Circar at rent; ſubject, however, entirely to your pleaſure, and to ſuch reſtrictions as may appear neceſſary for ſecuring the rights of the Zemindars and Inhabitants.

Par. 17. Your Honours will obſerve on our Minutes, that Mr. *Smith* differed from the reſt of us in reſpect to the propriety of diſpoſing of the Guntoor Circar in the Committee, giving it as his opinion, that it ſhould have been ſettled in the Council as a matter of Revenue. We thought otherwiſe, becauſe all the previous ſteps being of a political or military nature, had been adjuſted in the Committee; and becauſe, in our ideas, this laſt meaſure, which was connected with the reſt, could not with propriety be ſeparated, and ſubmitted to the opinion of Gentlemen, who were unacquainted with every thing that preceded it. Mr. *Smith* likewiſe objected to giving his vote upon the queſtion, for granting the Guntoor Circar at rent to the Nabob, for the reaſons which appear in the Minutes.

APPENDIX, No. 107.

Extract of a Letter from *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. to the Chairman of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 31ſt October 1778.

OUR Diſpatches from the Select Committee and other Departments, are ſo full as to leave me little further to add. The reduction of *Pondicherry* being accompliſhed, our next object will be to inſiſt on the force under Mr. *Lally*, conſiſting of a body of French in the pay of *Bazalet Jung*, to be delivered up. This I am in hopes we ſhall find but little difficulty to ſucceed in; and that we may be able to obtain the Guntoor Circar to be put in the Company's poſſeſſion, and to remain under their management, paying a ſtipulated ſum to *Bazalet Jung* during his life; this meaſure will effectually ſecure the Northern Circars, and diſappoint every view the French may have in that quarter.

I expect to hear every day from the Nizam and *Hyder*, who, I now think, we ſhall find very ready to court the friendſhip of the Engliſh, however they might have been inclined to be troubleſome before the reduction of the French power: it is certain they looked to the event of our operations againſt *Pondicherry* to determine their political conduct. The heavy balances that were due and accumulating from the Northern Zemindars, I have no doubt will now be recovered; and that your Revenue there will be on a more ſecure footing than ever. The uncontrolled power of the Chiefs of the Northern Settlements, and the mutual intereſt that ſubſiſted between them and this Government, I am perſuaded was very oppreſſive to the Zemindars, and detrimental both to your Revenue and Commerce. The alteration that has taken place by fixing their Jemabundy here, will be productive of the beſt conſequences to the Company, though it will require time for the Zemindars to recover from the load of debt with which they are burthened; and the utmoſt attention and indulgence muſt be given to promote the cultivation of their lands. The determination of calling the Zemindars to the Preſidency, has ſtruck at the root of thoſe evils which they complained of; and it is the ſubordinate Chiefs alone that will probably wiſh the meaſures we have taken had been diſpenſed with. It is the intention of your Select Committee, immediately after this diſpatch, to ſet about the reduction of your expences in every department, both civil and military; and I flatter myſelf our next advices will acquaint you with our ſucceſs in the accompliſhment of ſo material an object. In all regulations of ſuch nature, the intereſt of individuals muſt be affected; it will therefore be indiſpenſably neceſſary, that whilſt we are endeavouring to put the Company's affairs on a proper footing, we receive their utmoſt ſupport; my only wiſh is to obtain their approval of my conduct.

APPENDIX, No. 108.

Extract of a Letter from the Court of Directors, to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*; dated 4th March 1767.

Par. 12. IT was rather precipitate to offer, as you did, the management of the Circars to the Nabob, before you had weighed all the conſequences; for after having done ſo, the retraction could not fail to mortify and diſguſt him: however, your ſecond judgment appears to us the beſt, not only for the reaſons you aſſign, but becauſe we apprehend, that if any thing can give us the interior, peaceable, and quiet poſſeſſion of the Circars, it will be ſuch a kind of Government as ſhall make the ſeveral Rajahs and Zemindars feel and acknowledge its juſtice, mildneſs, and equity, above all others that they have been accuſtomed to, ſo long as they live in obedience, and fulfil the engagements they are bound to; effects which we much doubt whether they would ever have derived from the Company's Government, had the Nabob, or any other Native of *Indoſtan*, been entruſted with the particular management. What we have ſaid, implies a confidence in you, that the Rajahs, Zemindars, and every other Inhabitant, will be protected in the poſſeſſion of their juſt and hereditary rights; we mean not only as relative to oppreſſion, from the Members or Miniſters of our own Government, but alſo from the encroachments and attempts of each other. And to that end it will be neceſſary to aſcertain the boundaries and rights of the ſeveral diſtricts. This may be a work of time and difficulty, but it is nevertheleſs highly expedient; for as you muſt now become the ſole arbiters of thoſe rights, it is impoſſible you ſhould decide equitably without ſuch a knowledge; and we ſhall expect that you will, from time to time, tranſmit us a very particular account of your proceedings herein.

APPENDIX, No. 109.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated 1ſt April 1766.

WE had ſome reaſon to apprehend the Nabob would be very jealous, and not well pleaſed, if he was not made acquainted

APPENDIX. No. 110.

acquainted with our designs, and that he might endeavour to prevent our keeping a proper force in the circars, by giving us constant alarms of invasions from the Marattas, or others. To obviate this, we at first proposed to make him a party, by offering him the management of the Circars, on paying a certain annual rent for them—We were indeed the more inclined to this measure, as the Nabob had advanced large sums, and it was well known that *Hussein Ally* could never have obtained the Phouzdarry from *Nizam Ally*, without the assistance of the Nabob, who, encouraged with the hope of some time or other possessing them himself, had, without our knowledge, lent *Hussein Ally* five Lacks of Rupees, which we were in some measure under the necessity of seeing repaid. Proposals were accordingly made to the Nabob, and which he seemed very ready to accept: but upon more mature deliberation, we judged, that till your authority was entirely established, it would be more for your interest to keep the management in your own hands, not only as it would be less complicated, but give less umbrage to *Nizam Ally*, already jealous of the Nabob's designs on the *Decan*, and would therefore judge that the existence of his Government depended on opposing the the Phirmaund, which gives us possession of a country adjoining almost *Hydrabad*, especially as there is no Fort of any consequence to interrupt our march to that capital, or even to *Arungabad:* he therefore concluded little harmony could be expected from the neighbourhood of two such rivals. For these reasons, and to prevent the Nabob's being embarrassed with more than he can manage to advantage, we have declined entering into that measure. But as the Circar of *Guntoor* or *Condavir*, which lies on this side the Kistna, is intermixed with the Nabob's country to the Northward, and the Troops he is obliged to keep there to guard that frontier, will at the same time preserve tranquillity in *Condavir*, it may be for your interest to give him the management of it at a reasonable rent, as soon as your authority is perfectly established.

APPENDIX, No. 110.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Consultations, the 27th January 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Esq. President,
Sir *Eyre Coote*,
John Whitehill.
General *Munro*, on service.
Mr. *Smith*, indisposed.

THE President delivered in the following Minute:

The accompanying intelligence, which I have received from the Camp of *Fazel Beg Cawn*, through *Sitteram Rauze*, by means of his Vakeel, I think it necessary to lay before the Committee, as it contains many points for their information relative to the views of the Soubah, and to the situation of his General, *Fazel Beg Cawn*; and if transmitted to *Bengal*, may be of some service to the Governor General and Council, in forming their political plan, particularly when the present situation of affairs, the detachment from *Bengal*, is considered. In a former Minute, I gave my opinion of the necessity of having some person to reside at the Soubah's Court, during the unsettled state of affairs, if no other consequence was to arise from it than our being at a certainty of the views and intention of the Nizam, and to obtain such intelligence as we now only imperfectly receive by chance. The settlement of the Guntoor Circar, the payment of the Nizam's tribute, the being at some certainty with respect to any intrigues the French may be carrying on, are all objects of importance; and the sending some person immediately to *Hydrabad*, as well as to *Hyder Ally*, appear to me to be absolutely necessary for our security, and what cannot fail of meeting with the approbation of the Governor General and Council, as no matter will be concluded without their knowledge and approbation. I shall therefore propose to the Committee that Mr. *Hollond* be appointed to proceed to the Nizam with all expedition, and that instructions be drawn out accordingly for his conduct.

When *Rumundud Dowlah* was acting under the Soubah in full authority, he protected *Fazel Beg Cawn*, and promoted him to an high rank, and they were to one another close friends. But some of the Aumeens (or principal persons) that are with the Soubah, often accused *Rumundud Dowlah* to the Soubah; and by every persuasion, brought at last *Rumundud Dowlah* into danger of his life; and *Fazel Beg Cawn* becoming suspicious with regard to himself, has for these two years since determined going to the Soubah's Court. But although three or four of the principal persons that are with the Soubah always endeavour to blame *Fazel Beg Cawn*, they are not able to overturn him, nor to manage the affairs themselves; the Soubah, being a sensible man, knows very well that those people are not able to act in his affairs, and never gives ear to them, but employs the said *Beg Cawn* in every matter of consequence, not minding whether he come to visit him or not; and the Soubah writes to *Fazel Beg Cawn* the contents of Letters which he receives from different places, in order to receive his advice, and employs him without any suspicion, though people who do not know the matter, talk in public as if the Soubah does not agree with *Fazel Beg Cawn*, because he does not go to the Soubah, but they are mistaken. Colonel *Goddard*, with some English Troops, set out from *Bengal*, and in their march they crossed the *Nanbaden* River, and are now three Cos on this side the said river; the distance from *Bombay* to *Bonah* is 40 Cos; 3 or 4 battalions of Sepoys, with some soldiers and officers, having set out from *Bombay* with *Chinto Vital*, the Dewan of *Rogobah*, and have, after four or five days march, halted at a place where they themselves safe near a tell, and continuing in that place, and taking charge of the district situated round about them, and also possession of the garrison. Upon hearing this, the people at *Poonah* constantly wrote to the Soubah, desiring him to come to their assistance, and the Soubah is daily sending those Letters to *Fazel Beg Cawn*, ordering him to give him his opinion. The people at *Poonah* place a confidence in *Fazel Beg Cawn*, and write to him for assistance; this man must either assist the Poonah people, or join *Ragobah* and the English against the Poonah people, and to beat *Ragobah* and the English against the Poonah people, and to beat *Ragobah*, because the Souhah has, from the beginning, protected the Poonah people against *Ragobah*, being his enemy.—Secondly, the Soubah thinks that if he protects the Chief at *Poonah*, being a child, his advice will be followed, but if instead, *Ragobah* should be successful, who is a man that can manage for himself, he will not be quiet, but always endeavouring to give trouble, by remembering the late displeasure and enmity that was between them. Thirdly, as the said *Ragobah* is coming to the assistance of the English, and as the English make themselves already master of all the countries, with a full authority, the Soubah thinks that they will never submit to his orders, and that therefore if *Ragobah* be put in power at *Banal*, and the English should enter into those parts, they will cause great trouble to him; he does not therefore chuse to be a friend to *Ragobah* and the English; and the Soubah is of opinion, that if he and the Poonah people join together, the English will not be able to stand against them; but *Fazel Bag Cawn* thinks, that the Soubah is only carrying on the business relying on his assistance, and the Ameens that are with the Soubah cannot bear to see *Fazel Beg Cawn* in favour, which are the reasons why he keeps himself so retired, without shewing his authority. Besides this, as he has been some time in the service of the English, and been obliged to them, he always wishes for their success; being, by the protection of the English Company, in high rank under the Soubah.

And

And as the Engliſh protect *Ragobah*, he is of opinion, they will certainly one time or other, put *Ragobah* into power; and afterwards they may be able to cauſe trouble to the Soubah, and to him too, though now the Soubah's intentions lead him another way; by not conſidering the power of the Engliſh, he will at laſt repent of it. Therefore *Fazel Beg Cawn*, in condemning what will follow, is ready to bring the Soubah to a firm friendſhip with the Engliſh, by perſuading him privately to it, from day to day; and after this is performed, to act under the Soubah in every thing, according to the plan and opinion of the Engliſh; this the real intention of *Fazel Beg Cawn*.

Governor *Rumbold*, on the 8th of Iſtand Maer, ſent a Letter to the Soubah, which he has communicated to *Fazel Beg Cawn*; in which the Governor mentions, that an order was arrived from *Europe* to turn out all the French that are in thoſe parts of *Indoſtan*; and gave notice, that on ſuch a date the Engliſh Troops took poſſeſſion of *Pondicherry*; and that the whole number of French who were there, being come under their power, would be diſpatched to *Europe*; and that alſo he had ordered all their different places and forts to be taken poſſeſſion of. The ſaid Governor mentioned alſo, that with regard to thoſe French Troops which are now in *Condavir*, or the Guntoor Circar, he has written to him the Soubah; but that the Soubah never ſent a proper Anſwer, which diſpleaſed him very much. A copy of the Governor's Letter has been ſent to *Fazel Beg Cawn*, ordering him to let him know his opinion and advice about it.

Before I came to this place, Governor *Rumbold* arrived at *Madras*; after that, you acquainted me that the Governor had wrote a Letter to the Soubah; and on my arrival here, I told it to *Fazel Beg Cawn*; but he knew nothing of it, though the Soubah did uſually ſend a copy to him of any Letter which he had received; lately the Soubah has ſent a Letter to the Soubah, which he ſent immediately, and copies of thoſe Letters and Anſwers all come to *Fazel Beg Cawn*.

Beſides, *Fazel Beg Cawn* deſired me to write to you under hand, that the Engliſh will well know that *Bazalet Jung* has employed ſome French Troops in the Guntoor Circar, to the diſpleaſure of the Engliſh; and he ſaid he would tell me in a few days, what the Soubah's intentions may be concerning it; and he deſired me to beg you to enquire, whether the intention of the Engliſh is to take the Guntoor Circar as a conqueſt from the French, or to turn only the French Soldiers out of the ſaid Guntoor Circar; or whether they are to take that circar by way of peace and friendſhip from the Soubah, or by force.

Colonel *Goddard* having with his Troops from *Bengal* croſſed *Narbundat*, and halted by a place called *Huſſemgat Bendar*, the Boapaut Country within three coſs of the ſaid river, which place belongs to the Pettaum Court *Monuvdam*, under the Mogul; on that place the ſaid Colonel *Goddard* poſted himſelf by the canal of the ſaid *Recuttams*, that country being ſituated Weſt and Southward of *Rupenjah Band*, and belonging to the province of *Poonah*; but the country ſituated Eaſt and Northward to *Mundayer Boomſlah*, and the borders join each other's country. The ſaid Colonel *Goddard* has got as far as *Muſſengat Band*, without any hindrance on the road; and as there is forty or fifty leagues diſtant from that place to *Bombay*, he muſt paſs near *Bombay*, by a way near *Poonah*; on this account he thinks it will be difficult for him to get proviſion, &c. &c. on his march, becauſe the borders of the Bengal Country are left very far behind. Moveover, he conſidered that in caſe the Troops belonging to *Poonah* ſhould come and ſurround him on the march, he will meet with danger, therefore he is daily writing to *Muddagee Bounſelah*.

Three of the Engliſh Gentlemen have ſeparately ſet out from *Calcutta*, and being arrived at *Negapor*, requeſt *Muddagee Bounſelah* to join them, and to aſſiſt them in getting to *Bombay*, by which means, they ſaid they ſhould be ſupplied with proviſion by his aſſiſtance from behind; and that he might follow him with his Troops a few days march: but *Muddagee Bounſelah* concluded, that if he ſhould do ſo, and join the Engliſh, having firſt protected *Rajahbah*, and afterwards diſappointed him; that if he ſhould do ſo, he would not be able to ſecure himſelf; he did not therefore think proper to agree with Colonel *Goddard*'s propoſals, though he cannot even refuſe the deſire of the Engliſh, as he ſuppoſes they will make themſelves maſters of all the countries. Colonel *Goddard*, for to give proper ſatisfaction to *Muddagee Bounſelah*, ordered one of the Gentlemen to go to him to *Negap*, who I believe is gone by this time: ſuch is the ſituation of that buſineſs, and the Colonel finds himſelf in difficulties.

What *Fazel Beg Cawn* deſired me to write to you at large is as follows: If the Engliſh certainly intend ſupporting *Ragobah*, and to put him into power, *Fazel Beg Cawn* ſays he can effect it eaſily; he ſays it will be impoſſible for Colonel *Goddard* to go to *Bombay*, becauſe *Maddagee Baunſelah* cannot ſafely join the Engliſh as long as matters remain in the preſent ſituation; but if the Governor will take his advice, he ſays he will promote a friendſhip between the Soubah and Engliſh, and then cauſe *Maddagee Baunſelah* to join them, and will likewiſe get the buſineſs of Poonah Country effected. The manner and way of doing it, he ſays, muſt be as follows: if the Government will diſpatch a detachment of four or five battalions of Sepoys, and three or four hundred Soldiers, with proper Officers, under the name of going to *Poonah*—then he will come to *Comametto* by the time the ſaid detachment will arrive at the Pernaud Country; upon hearing them marching, the Soubah will aſk *Fazel Beg Cawn*'s opinion and advice about it; then he will by good words, argument, and perſuaſion, bring him to embrace the friendſhip of the Engliſh, and perſuade alſo *Muddagee Baunſelah* to join them; after that he will accompany the Engliſh Troops, and they will enter *Poonah* without any further trouble.

In doing and performing ſo great a buſineſs, the Company muſt then agree to the propoſal when it ſhall be made by the Soubah and *Muddagee Baunſelah*; and if their intention is to finiſh this buſineſs, it muſt be done without any longer delay of time, and the promiſe muſt be made to him by the Company in great ſecrecy, and without letting it become public. If the buſineſs which could not be effected by the Gentlemen of *Fengal* and *Bombay* is done early by the Governor of *Madras*, his name will be greatly eſteemed; and if the Company deſire to get the Guntoor Circar, he ſays he will by all means for them in a friendly way.

On receipt of this Letter be ſo good as to ſpeak every thing freely, and let me know, whether it can be done or not; if the Governor of *Madras* undertake this, and diſpatch the Troops, it will be ſo much the better; but if he won't conſent to it, and ſay it muſt be done by the Gentlemen of *Bengal*, you will let me know accordingly.

By the favour of the Soubah his Maſter, *Fazel Beg Cawn* ſays he is in high rank, but on account of ſome Ameens who are at the Soubah's Court, and not their friends, he does not go to pay his viſit to the Soubah; yet the Soubah has a great regard for him.

He cannot attempt to perſuade the Soubah to be in friendſhip with the Engliſh, until he knows their true intention; but if the Soubah even paſſes his word to the Poonah people, he cannot afterwards retreat.

Therefore, on the arrival of this Letter, you will let me know, whether the Engliſh Company conſent to their propoſal or not.

You may be ſure, that if the Engliſh Troops can be ſent, *Fazel Beg Cawn* will be able to do any thing eaſily, and without Soubah; and that whatever advices he gives in ſecret, if that can be brought about, every thing will come into good order. I have got the copy of the Letter which the Governor General wrote to the Soubah, and likewiſe the Soubah's Anſwer in Perſian, and ſend them to you.

Agreeably to the Preſident's recommendation at the concluſion of his Minute, reſolved, that Mr. *John Holland*

APPENDIX. No. III.

lond be appointed to proceed to the Soubah's Court, and that inſtructions be prepared for him accordingly.

Thomas Rumbold,
Eyre Coote,
John Whitehill.

APPENDIX, No. III.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 7th February 1779.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*; dated 7th February 1779.

ENCLOSED we have the honour of tranſmitting to you a Paper of intelligence, received by the Nabob from his Agent at *Poonah*. Its authority is too ſtrongly marked to leave any doubt on our minds concerning the particulars; and we have now only to hope, that the effects of ſo conſiderable a check in the progreſs of the Company's arms, may not create ſome attempts to diſturb our poſſeſſions on this ſide of *India*, or to fruſtrate the expectations we had formed of putting a final and ſpeedy period to the power of the French.

The ſubject indeed is of ſuch a nature as to awaken all our reflections; and we ſhall beg leave here to ſtate to you briefly what occurs to us from a review of our ſituation with reſpect to the Powers around us, and a conſideration of the probable effects that may have been cauſed by the unfortunate enterprize in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*.

It will admit of no doubt that *Hyder Ally* at preſent bears no favourable inclination towards the Company, and that he is very ſtrongly in the intereſt of the French. Had we not commenced the War in this country with ſo great a ſuperiority, *Hyder* would moſt likely have appeared and taken an active part againſt us in the beginning. The ſucceſs of our arms againſt *Pondicherry*, probably determined him to perſevere in the line of neutrality he had adopted, and we had every reaſon to think we might have purſued our operations to the point at which we aimed, without any moleſtation whatever from him, had not the misfortune of the Bombay Troops cauſed ſo material a change in the face of affairs. *Hyder* now perceiving ſo glaring an inſtance of weakneſs and diſgrace, may be encouraged openly to reſiſt our propoſed attempt on *Mahé*, which he conſiders in ſome ſort as under his protection.

With reſpect to the Nizam, his avowed attachment to the Poonah Miniſters, and the warmth with which he remonſtrated to your Board and to this Government, againſt the deſigns which he underſtood had been formed in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, ſufficiently ſhew how he muſt have received the news of our diſaſter, and how materially this misfortune will contribute to ſtrengthen the inclinations he will naturally have conceived to our prejudice.

The diſpoſitions of the Peſhwa and the Miniſters at *Poonah* upon this event may be eaſily conceived. The effects of their reſentment may be ſuſpended for a time, but we can never ſuppoſe they will reſt ſatisfied with the advantages they have acquired; much leſs can we expect they will unite in friendſhip or in meaſures with thoſe who have attempted ſuch dangerous deſigns againſt them.

Thus, by one ill-timed and unfortunate enterprize, the reputation of our arms is ſullied, and the friendſhip of the principal Indian States hazarded, or loſt for ever; and that too at a period when we are engaged in a War which calls for the execution of all our force, and the good will of any State in alliance with us.

In the midſt of theſe unpleaſing reflections, we feel no ſmall degree of ſatisfaction at the ſucceſsful meaſures that have been purſued againſt the French. By removing them from our neighbourhood, we are at liberty to act with much greater ſpirit and ſecurity, and we yet flatter ourſelves that it is within the power of the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Madras*, by prudent and vigorous meaſures, to repair the miſchiefs that have been occaſioned by the miſcarriage of the Bombay Troops, to wipe away the diſcredit that has fallen on the Company's arms, and to keep in awe the Powers that may be diſpoſed to take advantage of our ill ſucceſs on that ſide of *India*.

On the receipt of the intelligence from *Poonah*, it became a queſtion with us, whether it would be ſafe or prudent to purſue the expedition we had ſet on foot againſt *Mahé*. We ſaw the additional riſk to which it was expoſed, and the inconvenience of ſending ſuch a body of Troops at this time out of the *Carnatic*; but we perceived alſo the particular advantages that would reſult from the ſucceſsful execution of our meaſures: we ſaw that this was the only opportunity that might offer for removing the diſadvantageous impreſſions which have been occaſioned every where by our late defeat; that the appearance of diffidence or timidity on this occaſion, would ſtrengthen and confirm thoſe impreſſions, and probably operate more to our prejudice than any failure that could happen from the proſecution of the enterprize: and laſtly, that the withdrawing our Troops would be inevitably followed by the capture of our ſettlement at *Tellicherry*, which, though perhaps not important in itſelf, would, in the eyes of the Country Powers, be conſidered as a victory of no ſmall conſequence to the French, and perhaps induce thoſe who are now waivering, to declare openly in their favour. Upon the whole, our concluſion was, that the expedition ſhould be proſecuted; and we came to that reſolution accordingly.

We have ſome hopes that *Hyder Ally*, who ſecretly favoured and wiſhed well to the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, ſeeing the danger to which he may be expoſed from the reſentment of the Maratta State, will be glad to avail himſelf of our ſupport; and in that caſe we may be able to detach him entirely from the intereſts of the French, and render him a moſt uſeful Ally to us. Indeed we are ſo convinced of the good policy of uniting cloſely with *Hyder* in a defenſive Alliance, that we ſhall embrace every occaſion to effect it. We have lately appointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to his Durbar, and have written to him for the neceſſary ſupports, which we expect daily.

As our Northern Circars lie ſo open to invaſion from the dominions of *Nizam Ally*, and as there is but too much reaſon to doubt the ſincerity of his friendſhip for the Company, we think it highly expedient at this juncture to have the beſt intelligence of his deſigns, and to be timely informed of any motions he may make towards thoſe provinces for this purpoſe, as well as to ſettle every thing that may be neceſſary for obtaining the Guntoor Circar for the Company, and procuring the diſmiſſion of the French Troops from the ſervice of *Bazulet Jung*. We have appointed one of the Company's Servants to proceed to the Court of *Nizam Ally*, in quality of Reſident; he will have inſtructions to correſpond with your Board, and to communicate every information you may require from that quarter. The Northern Circars being too extenſive to be properly defended by the ordinary force maintained there, and the protection of the *Carnatic* and *Tanjore* requiring all the Troops that are ſtationed for their ſecurity, we are apprehenſive, that if any ſudden attack be made on our poſſeſſions to the Northward at this juncture, while we have ſo large a detachment employed on the expedition to *Mahé*, we might not be able to collect a ſufficient force in time to repel it. Conſidering the value and influence of thoſe poſſeſſions to the Company, we think it our duty to attend particularly to their ſafety; and with that view we beg leave to communicate a thought which has occurred to us, and which may poſſibly be improved by you to ſome uſeful purpoſe.

APPENDIX, No. 112.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 19th April 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident.

THE Preſident, in conſequence of the negociation that has been carried on with *Bazalet Jung*, and the repreſentations which have been made through his Vakeel, of the neceſſity of ſending immediately a force to protect him againſt the attempts of *Hyder Ally*, who threatens an invaſion of his country, propoſes, that three battalions of Sepoys, a company of Artillery, and ſix field-pieces, be ſent, with all poſſible expedition, for the protection of his country; which is approved and ordered accordingly.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following draft of a Letter, propoſed by the Nabob to be ſent to the Soubah.

To the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah*.

The fidelity and attachment which I bear to your Highneſs are ſuch, that I am at all times deſirous of your welfare, and the proſperity of your Highneſs's illuſtrious Houſe, which I hope you are well convinced of. The diviſions which have of late prevailed in the Maratta State, and your Highneſs being engaged in other affairs, have given an opportunity to the Myſore Chief *(Hyder)* to collect a large force together, with which he has been able to diſpoſſeſs *Murrarow*, and the Zemindars of *Chitteldurg Bulhar*, and many others, of their territories; by which he has amaſſed great treaſures, and has greatly increaſed his power. He has now attacked *Abdul Hulim Cawn*, the Fouzedar of *Cuadapa*, taken his country and the fort of *Sudhout*, and at laſt impriſoned the Fouzedar and all his family. He intends next to go againſt *Cannoul*, *Adoni*, and *Raichoor*, and even to march againſt your Highneſs, and your Brother *Bazalet Jung*. If *Hyder* ſhould croſs the *Kiſtna*, and march into theſe countries, and your Highneſs does not immediately take proper revenge of it, it will be extremely difficult to accompliſh it next year, conſidering that his power is daily increaſing. The preſent inability of his Highneſs's Brother to effect this, is well known.

When I conſider my preſent ſituation, and the great number of Engliſh Troops which are every where, and that a force of five thouſand Europeans are daily expected from *Europe*; beſides, that the Troops under the command of Colonel *Goddard*, may be ordered to aſſiſt, if it ſhould be found neceſſary; and when I conſider alſo, that the Engliſh, by taking the forts of *Pondicherry* and *Mahé*, have driven the French entirely from this country; I am under no ſort of anxiety or uneaſineſs that my country will be invaded; yet, out of the exceſs of my fidelity and attachment, I was greatly concerned when I heard that *Hyder*'s intentions were to go againſt *Adoni* and *Rachour*, becauſe I know that your Highneſs's Brother has it not in his power to oppoſe him, and I have often ſpoken of this to Governor *Rumbold*. I now underſtand that Governor *Rumbold* and the Council of *Madras*, who are well diſpoſed towards your Highneſs, as are all the Engliſh, who are famous for the ſincerity of their friendſhips, have determined to ſend a detachment with ſtores to *Raichoor* and *Adoni*, by way of *Delour Conda*, to join your Highneſs's Brother *Bazalet Jung*, and to be ready to protect his country. It appears that your Highneſs will find it adviſable to order immediately part of your Forces, under the command of an able Officer, to croſs the *Kiſtna* at *Raichoor*, and join the Engliſh and *Bazalet Jung*, in order to ſave his country from the attack of the Enemy. This will be the ſure means of protecting *Bazalet Jung*, and in many reſpects tend to the welfare of your Highneſs's affairs; on the contrary, if it is neglected, the conſequences will be bad. I make no doubt but your Highneſs will look upon what I have now repreſented to you, as proceeding from my well-known attachment and fidelity to your Highneſs, and I hope you will diſpatch orders to your Talookdars, &c. in *Delour*, *Conda*, and *Segver*, to get proviſions, and every thing elſe which may be wanted for the Engliſh Troops, and furniſh them with Guides and Hircarrahs, to ſhew them the roads through which they are to paſs. I alſo hope that your Highneſs will be pleaſed to honour me with an Anſwer to this as ſoon as poſſible.

The Committee approve of the foregoing Letter, and the Preſident then recommends, that a Letter be written to Mr. *Hollond*, the Reſident at the Soubah's Court, acquainting him with the ſteps we have reſolved to purſue in favour of *Bazalet Jung*, and deſiring him to avail himſelf of them; to promote our views with the Soubah, and to engage him to take ſuch a part in his Brother's defence as may effectually check the dangerous deſigns of *Hyder* in that quarter; which is approved.

APPENDIX, No. 113.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, 25th October 1779.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I RECEIVED your Letter of the 22d ultimo, on Thurſday laſt the 13th inſtant, and immediately ſent to the Soubah, to deſire leave to wait on him the day following; but on account of ſome ceremonies on Friday, and the death of a Grandoon on Saturday, I was prevented ſeeing him till yeſterday. The Governor's Letter, which I then delivered to his Highneſs, leaving me little to ſay for myſelf, I had only to obſerve to him, that the meaſures you intended purſuing in ſupport of his Brother, had been adopted in full confidence of their being perfectly agreeable to his Highneſs's wiſhes, and that I hoped he would ſee the expediency of uniting with us, to give a check to *Hyder*'s encroachments, and give orders for a part of his Army to join ours, and for our Troops being ſupplied with proviſions, &c. agreeably to the requeſt contained in the Governor's Letter. I remarked, from the change in his Highneſs's countenance, that he was much diſtreſſed at the information the Letter gave him; but he ſo far commanded himſelf as to ſhew nothing of it in his converſation; and when I requeſted to know what he would have me to ſay in reply to the Governor, he anſwered, that affairs of this nature were attended with ſerious conſequences, and required mature deliberation: that the approach of the rains, and the difficulty of getting proviſions, rendered it impoſſible for him to ſend any part of his Army; that the people (Bungueras he called them) who made a trade of ſupplying his camp with proviſions, not being in expectation of his moving, were ſcattered about, and not to be prevailed upon to croſs the rivers to attend our camp; that there were no ſtores of proviſions in the countries where our Troops were coming;—with more to the ſame effect. I then took my leave of his Highneſs, and very ſhortly after my return home, received a meſſage from him, ſignifying, that as the Governor's Letter required conſideration, he had not ſpoken fully to the contents of it, and deſired to ſee me again at the Durbar the day following. I waited upon him accordingly; and after being ſeated, his Highneſs began with declaring, that he thought it extraordinary when you had ſent a Gentleman for the declared purpoſe of ſtrengthening the mutual friendſhip between him and the Company, you ſhould, at the ſame time, engage in meaſures ſo little conformable to theſe profeſſions, and ſo little likely to produce this effect. He read over to me the 4th and 7th articles of the Treaty of 1768; and ſaid, that your holding a correſpondence, and forming engagements, with his Brother, *Bazalet Jung*, conſtituted a direct vio-

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lation of theſe articles; that you had no right to interfere with the concerns of his family or country; that with reſpect to your ſuppoſing the part you had taken would be agreeable to him, the articles did not allow any latitude for making ſuppoſitions that might eventually be ſo deſtructive to the peace of the contracting parties; that if you had any thing to propoſe for his benefit, he ought to have been conſulted upon it; and laſtly, that he did not apprehend any invaſion of his Brother's country on the part of *Hyder Ally*. I told him, in reply to the above, that you had good information of *Hyder*'s being determined on attacking *Adoni* and *Raychoor*; and that you were even apprehenſive the force you were ſending would ſcarcely arrive with his Brother in time to protect his country; that the ſuddenneſs of the emergency, and the near approach of the danger, had made it neceſſary for you to be quick in embracing this meaſure, in which the defence of our reverſionary circar of *Guntoor* was likewiſe concerned; and that if it had not been for your being preſſed in point of time, you would no doubt have conſulted with his Highneſs previous to your adopting the meaſure. His Highneſs was not at all ſatisfied with this declaration; and in anſwer to every thing I ſaid, reverted to the two articles of the Treaty; obſerving, that nothing I could urge was capable of vindicating the ſtep you had taken; that the infraction of the Treaty was clear; that if it was your intention to adhere to it, he had a right to hope, that you would immediately forbid the Sepoys from advancing into his country; but that if you no longer regarded it, and perſiſted in ſending them, he ſhould be under the neceſſity of ordering his Troops in that quarter to oppoſe their march with force. His Highneſs concluded with deſiring me to repreſent theſe matters to you without loſs of time, that in caſe of ſerious conſequence, he might not be liable to blame. What the Soubah's real intentions may be, it is impoſſible for me to know; his Highneſs *Waulau Jau*, by means of ſecret correſpondence, may know them better than I can. With reſpect to *Bazalet Jung*, I have been informed, that it was the Soubah's wiſh to ſee him reduced, and ſince matters were not ripe for his Highneſs taking an open part in oppoſition to *Hyder*, he was not ſecretly diſpleaſed at *Hyder*'s demands of money having fallen upon his Brother, whoſe country at the ſame time he conſidered as in no immediate danger of being attacked.—The Soubah informed me to-day, that he hears *Hyder* propoſes next to take *Little Commonet*, the only place left belonging to *Cuddapah*; and that being thus in poſſeſſion of all the paſſes, his intention is afterwards to fall upon the *Carnatic*. I cannot underſtand, from any thing I have heard the Soubah ſay, that he apprehends his own country to be in any danger of an immediate attack from *Hyder*. He has been very open to me on the ſubject of his preſent ſyſtem of politics, and ſeems to conſider himſelf as pretty well ſecured at this period by means of his Alliance with the Marattas. *Hyder*, he ſays, has often made him offers of large ſums in payment of arrears of Peiſhcuſh, due for *Myſore*, upon condition of his Highneſs's ſtanding neuter, and not ſupporting the Marattas; but that being connected by Treaty with them, he has conſtantly rejected *Hyder*'s overtures. He does not affect to ſpeak ſlightingly of *Hyder*'s power, but conſiders him as formidable, and growing more ſo every day: I have no doubt that he wiſhes to form an Alliance with us againſt him. Although he conſiders himſelf and the Marattas united as capable of making a ſtand againſt him in their own defence; he is not forward to enter offenſively into a conteſt with him, but entertains hopes that the intereſt of the Company will engage them to be a party for reducing his overgrown power. He ſays, that *Hyder*'s Army conſiſts of 40,000 Horſes, 25,000 Sepoys, and 100,000 Carnatic Peons. He thinks *Hyder* will not riſk a pitched battle with us; but if he invades the *Carnatic*, will purſue the plan he adopted before with ſo much ſucceſs, of burning, deſtroying, and laying waſte the country.—I have delivered the Nabob's Letter agreeably to your orders.

Hydrabad, 17th May 1779.

I am, with great reſpect, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 114.

Copy of a Letter from Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Baronet, to Mr. *John Hollond*; dated *Fort Saint George*, 10th June 1779.

Dear Sir,

I HAVE duly received your favours of the 17th May and 24th. The former accompanied one to the Select Committee; but General *Munro* and Mr. *Whitehill* being gone to *Pondicherry*, a Committee will not be held for ſome days; and that there may be no delay, I ſit down to write you fully. Before General *Munro* and Mr. *Whitehill* went to *Pondicherry*, a Letter was agreed on to be wrote to you, in anſwer to your's, giving an account of your reception at the Nizam's Court, and it is now forwarded to you; as alſo a Letter for the Nizam, with a copy to you for your information. There is no other view, but to give you all poſſible conſequence at his Court; and no more is wrote to him than is abſolutely neceſſary, in anſwer to the Letters he writes to me. As you will obſerve, we refer him to you for all particulars with reſpect to the Nabob's Letters. When the laſt packet was diſpatched, which you have acknowledged the receipt of, the Nabob's Letter was forwarded by me; he ſent a copy to the Select Committee, which was ordered to be tranſmitted to you; and if you did not receive it, there muſt have been ſome neglect of the perſon who cloſed the Letter. With reſpect to the Nabob's firſt Letter, I applied for a copy, but it was late at night, and I muſt have detained my packet till the next day; I therefore deſired Mr. *Haliburton*, who had read the Nabob's Letter to the Nizam, to give you the contents of it, which he tells me he did do. I agree with you, that copies of all Letters ſhould be ſent you, which the Nabob wiſhes to have delivered to the Nizam, that, acting in a public character, you may be fully informed of what paſſes; and I would have you, as much as poſſible, inculcate in the Nizam that idea, that you are acting for the Company, independent of every other Power; at the ſame time it will be proper to ſhew him, there is no jealouſy between the Nabob and the Company, but that the latter are not to be guided or influenced by any other Power whatever. You will ſee by my Letter to the Nizam, that it is the wiſh of the Committee to keep you reſident with him: I thought it would have more force, mentioning it in a Letter from me, than coming as a repreſentation from yourſelf.

I was ſurprized, on the peruſal of your firſt Letter of the 17th, that you did not acknowledge the receipt of mine of the 24th April, and was apprehenſive that either mine to you, or your Anſwer, had been intercepted; and was happy to find, by your laſt Letter of the 24th, that my Letter before mentioned had come ſafe to hand; though you take no notice of a very material part, relative to the Peiſhcuſh, on which the Committee now write you, and which is a point we wiſh much to carry, if not entirely, in part; though I am ſtrongly of opinion, an exemption from the whole ſhould be inſiſted on.

I will now freely offer you my ſentiments on every thing that has paſſed between the Soubah and you; and I hope to be able to give you ſuch ground and reaſons as may allow you to ſpeak with firmneſs on ſuch points as are ſubmitted to you to negociate.

The agreement with *Bazalet Jung* will, no doubt, raiſe the jealouſy of the Soubah, but at the ſame time be a very great check on him; nor have we in any reſpect infringed the Treaty with him, by entering into the agreement with his Brother.

The 4th and 7th articles he referred you to, are in a Treaty not valid, as a ſubſequent one was made, full and explicit. The Treaty the Soubah quoted was concluded with General *Calliaud*, dated 12th November 1766. This is the Treaty I complain of, as ſacrificing the rights of the Company; for no mention is made of the Phirmaund from the Emperor granting the circars unconditionally to them; *but they are received as a free gift from the Nizam.* A War afterwards broke out, and a ſecond Treaty was concluded between the Nizam and the Preſident and Council of *Madras*, dated the 23d February 1768: the very firſt article claims the circars as an iniam, or free gift, from the Emperor, for ever; and the ſecond article admits of the circar of *Murtazanagur* remaining in the poſſeſſion of *Bazalet Jung* during his life; but it is expreſsly provided, that if he affords protection or aſſiſtance to the Enemies of the Company, he was to forfeit his right to the circar, which the Company were to be at liberty to take poſſeſſion of. Notwithſtanding this ſtipulation, a body of French were conſtantly kept up and recruited in his ſervice. There is no doubt but Mr. *Lally* maintained a correſpondence with the Government of *Pondicherry*, and was from thence occaſionally ſupplied with arms, ſtores, &c. and men were allowed, in ſmall parties, to proceed from the French ſettlements to join him. Such a conduct in *Bazalet Jung* would have authorized the Company, agreeable to the ſecond article of the Treaty of February 1768 (which is the only Treaty to be attended to) to have ſeized by force on the circar of *Murtazanagur*; but, out of friendſhip to the Soubah, they deſiſted from ſo hoſtile a meaſure againſt his Brother, and took the milder method of remonſtrating to his Highneſs, and to *Bazalet Jung* himſelf, againſt ſo direct a violation of the ſecond article of the Treaty; but all our repreſentations were in vain. Still we took no ſteps till the breaking out of the preſent diſputes with the French Court. Our own ſafety then obliged us to adopt meaſures to remove a force ſo capable of aſſiſting any armament the French might have attempted to have ſent towards our Northern Settlements: no time was to be loſt in long negociations, that might have admitted of fatal delays: we muſt either have proceeded to have made uſe of force to expel the French, or have inſiſted on knowing from *Bazalet Jung* his real intentions and views in keeping with him ſuch a body of the avowed Enemies of the Engliſh Nation. We choſe the latter, as ſuppoſing it muſt be more agreeable to the Soubah; and on *Bazalet Jung* informing us, that he only kept the French Troops in pay for the defence of his own territories, we agreed, provided he would diſcharge them, to furniſh him with a detachment from the Engliſh Army for that purpoſe, to be paid from the Revenues of *Guntoor*, which the Company have only rented from *Bazalet Jung*, and have not poſſeſſed themſelves of, as their right; and in doing this, the Company have not, in any ſhape, infringed the Treaty, but provided only for their own ſecurity. The Officer commanding our Troops has poſitive orders to confine himſelf to the defence of *Bazalet Jung*'s diſtricts; to reduce the refractory Zemindars, and on no account to go beyond the bounds preſcribed to him; and this is alſo a particular article in the agreement with *Bazalet Jung*, which will not be broke through. You will fully repreſent theſe circumſtances to the Soubah; and as he has deſired to know the Company's real intentions, you will pleaſe to inform him, we have no views but thoſe of ſtrict alliance and friendſhip; that he may ſet his mind at eaſe; that we have not the moſt diſtant idea of ſupporting any Power againſt his authority; and that whatever points we wiſh to obtain, it is our intention to endeavour at ſucceſs by negociation and treaty, and not by the ſword. With this diſpoſition on the part of the Company, I cannot help expreſſing the utmoſt concern to find he ſhould ſo haſtily expreſs an intention of ordering his Troops to oppoſe the march of our's towards his Brother's country: I can only deſire you will, on this occaſion, make uſe of the ſame words to the Soubah, that he did to you on the receipt of my Letter, that affairs of this nature are attended with ſerious conſequences; and you may further add, that no one ever oppoſed the Engliſh Troops with impunity: but that on reflection, and being aſſured the Company have no hoſtile intentions againſt his power or government, I have no doubt but he will be convinced we have done nothing with reſpect to the removal of the Troops from *Bazalet Jung* but what our own ſafety required, having poſitive orders from hence to remove from his country all the French, as the natural Enemies of the Britiſh Nation; and, I took the method I ſuppoſed muſt prove the more agreeable to his Highneſs than ſending an Army for the purpoſe; but the ſeveral repreſentations that had been made to him did not produce the deſired effect. It will be very neceſſary that you expreſs great diſſatisfaction at Mr. *Lally* and his Troops being entertained by his Highneſs; the reaſon he gives, for fear they ſhould enter into the ſervice of the Marattas or *Hyder*, is futile. If the Soubah is ſufficiently powerful to think of oppoſing the Engliſh Troops, thoſe under Mr. *Lally* being in his country are at his mercy, and knowing that they are the Enemies of the Engliſh, and that this Government has frequently repreſented to his Highneſs their wiſhes about them, they might very eaſily have been ſeized and ſent to the ſea-coaſt to be embarked for *Europe:* this would have effectually prevented any intrigues to diſturb the peace of the country. You deſired me, when you went away, to write you fully my ſentiments, which I ſhall continue to do; and allow me to obſerve, from the experience I have had in dealing with the Country Powers in different parts of *Indoſtan*, a too ſubmiſſive language will ſeldom gain upon them; it is neceſſary ſometimes to treat them with reſerve and hauteur. Such is the Company's preſent ſituation with reſpect to power, that they are rather to be conſidered as giving laws than ſoliciting favours; and ſhould the Soubah pretend an indifference to the friendſhip of the Engliſh it may not be amiſs to hint, that though they are always inclined to peace, they are ever prepared for events that may oblige them unwillingly to obſerve a different conduct. It would ſeem from your Letters, that he ſuppoſes we are apprehenſive of *Hyder*'s entering the *Carnatic*, and would on that account wiſh to ſtrengthen our Alliance with him: that is not the caſe; *Hyder* has moved off, and I have great reaſon to ſuppoſe will ſoon wiſh to connect himſelf more cloſely with us: my grand object is, if poſſible, to relieve the Company from the heavy Peſhcuſh paid to the Soubah from the circars; indeed, at preſent, we are unable to make good the balance due to him; our expences are ſo great, our treaſury ſo low, our reſources ſo confined, and our Northern Revenue ſo much in arrears, that I know not how to obtain the money to remit to the Soubah, ſhould we find ourſelves under the neceſſity of doing it; and at any rate we could only give him teeps payable in a certain time; but it is worth while to make the attempt to get rid of it altogether. No point of this kind was ever carried without ſome difficulty; and many points that might have been obtained, have never, from want of reſolution, or other cauſes, been attempted. The Soubah (if I am not miſtaken), with all his bluſtering, would dread very much a rupture with the Engliſh; he is afraid of *Phazel Beg*, and our Troops with *Bazalet Jung* muſt be a check upon him; he will be very well ſatisfied we mean not any thing hoſtile againſt him, and do not deſign any ſteps that can interfere with the peace of his poſſeſſions, and the honour of his government; our great expences in the preſent War, our failure of Revenue, and having balances in the circars, muſt all be mentioned to him in ſtrong terms, as reaſon for the application we make relative to the Peſhcuſh. It may not be improper to mention, that we expect a Treaty will very ſoon be concluded with the Marattas; for he builds, I believe, much on the probability of our being at variance with them. You ſee I mention every

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circumſtance to you that occurs to me; it proceeds from my zeal for the intereſt of the Company, and my deſire to obtain every beneficial point for them that I poſſibly can accompliſh during my Government. Excuſe me, if I recommend to you to be very ſecret in your negotiations. I was ſurpriſed on receiving a Letter yeſterday from Colonel *Harpur* to the Select Committee mentioning, that he had been informed, in a Letter from Mr. *Cotesford*, that the Soubah was very angry at our detachment's marching to join his Brother, and threatened to oppoſe their march: theſe reports getting wind may be of great detriment. For fear you ſhould not have copies of the Treaties with the Soubah, I ſend you a copy of each, which will give you all neceſſary information. I repeat to you again what I mentioned in a former Letter, that if we can but obtain a remiſſion of this burthenſome Peſhcuſh, we ſhall render an eſſential ſervice to the Company. No news yet from *Europe*; the moment a packet arrives I will inform you, as alſo of every material occurrence. The Nabob's Brother, *Murphuis Cawn*, is dead, and the Durbar either are, or affect to be, in great tribulation. You may notify this event to the Soubah; and you may aſſure yourſelf, that at the ſame time I think all proper reſpect and attention ſhould be paid to the Nabob, as the Company's old Friend and Ally, I will not ſuffer any interference that can claſh with or obſtruct the intereſt of the Company. I expect Sir *Edward Vernon*, with the ſquadron, here about the end of the month. We have had no accounts of any French ſhips or veſſels being ſeen in any part of the Eaſtern ocean. If any thing further occurs, you may depend on my writing to you.

I am, &c.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Country Correſpondence.

No. 73. From the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah* to the Governor, received the 15th May 1779.

I HAVE had the pleaſure to receive your Letter, in which you expreſs a wiſh of aſcertaining my inclination to preſerve the friendſhip between us; and you at the ſame time acquaint me of your intension to ſend Mr. *Hollond*, a gentleman of rank and abilities, to negociate ſome particular matters with me. You wrote to me ſome time ago upon the ſame ſubject, to which I gave you an anſwer, and I now again acquaint you, that it is my ſincereſt deſire to adhere ſtedfaſtly to the Treaty which ſubſiſts between us; you may reſt perfectly ſatisfied of this, I have no objection to your ſending a perſon of truſt to negociate any matters here; it is right that one ſhould be ſent, who may return when he has tranſacted the buſineſs he is ſent upon. If it is your intention to keep him conſtantly here, I muſt acquaint you, that this was never done before, and innovations of any kind are improper: ſending a perſon to me, may be attended with great advantage in ſeveral reſpects, becauſe I can communicate ſome matters to him, and he may explain to me your intentions, by which our friendſhip may be put on a more ſolid foundation; there is, therefore, no impropriety in ſending from time to time a perſon to confer on ſome matters, when neceſſity requires it, after adviſing me of it. Be kind enough to conſider of this in a favourable manner, and favour me with your anſwer immediately, as I wait for it, to ſend the proper paſſports for Mr. *Hollond*. Regard me ever friendly diſpoſed to you, and continue to give me accounts of your welfare. What ſhall I ſay more?

APPENDIX, No. 116.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, 28th May 1779.

READ the following Letter from Mr. *Hollond*:

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I arrived at this place on the 6th inſtant, and on the 8th in the morning waited on the Soubah. I was received with all the honours that have uſually been ſhewn to gentlemen appointed in public ſtations to this Court; *Cazen Deverah*, an Omrah of the firſt rank at the Durbar, having been ſent by the Soubah to my tent to receive me, and conduct me to Court with a retinue of elephants, &c, and a large party of the Soubah's Troops. Upon my delivering the Governor's Letter, and the Company's preſents, the Soubah expreſſed himſelf much pleaſed.

Nothing paſſed relative to buſineſs on my firſt viſit; but, in conſequence of an appointment laſt night, I waited on his Highneſs again this morning. Conformably to my inſtructions, I aſſured him that it was your firm intention to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaty of 1768; that with reſpect to the Peſhcuſh for the circars, in full confidence of his giving all reaſonable ſatisfaction with regard to the Circar of *Guntoor*, and the Troops in *Bazalet Jung*'s ſervice, it was your intention to give orders for diſcharging the arrears, and paying the Peſhcuſh regularly in future, according to the Kiſts which have been ſettled for that purpoſe; that you had inſtructed me to make this declaration to him; and that, with a view to a more eaſy communication of ſentiments upon affairs of importance, you were deſirous that I ſhould reſide conſtantly at his court. In anſwer to what I have above ſtated, his Highneſs made the ſtrongeſt and moſt earneſt declarations of his great deſire to be upon terms of the ſtricteſt friendſhip with the Company; that he had not deviated in any inſtance from the Treaty ſubſiſting between the Company and him; that he had been ſtrongly ſolicited to join in ſupporting the French, but had deciſively, from the beginning, rejected every overture, as inconſiſtent with his engagements with the Company. That with reſpect to *Lally*'s party, he had cauſed his Brother to diſmiſs them from the Guntoor Circar, and that he had done this in compliance with the Governor's Letter, at a time when they might have been uſeful, on account of *Hyder Ally*'s near approach towards that quarter. With reſpect to my reſiding at his Court, he expreſſed himſelf doubtfully, but he appeared on the whole to be diſinclined to it. He ſaid a great deal about our taking part with *Raganaut Row*, which he conceived to be a deviation from the terms of the Treaty of 1768; but he ſpoke with great reſpect and moderation towards the Company. He then proceeded to tell me, that he wiſhed I would ſtate the purport of his declarations to the Governor; and that upon receiving his anſwer, he ſhould have ſomething further to ſay upon ſome matters of importance, in which the Company's intereſts and his own were jointly concerned, I told him, that as there had been a declaration of friendſhip on both ſides, there was no neceſſity for writing to the Governor and waiting for his anſwer, upon the ſubject of what had paſſed; and that I wiſhed he would immediately inform me of the buſineſs he had to propoſe, that I might communicate it without loſs of time, and receive early inſtructions regarding it. In reply to this, he again requeſted me to communicate to you what had paſſed; and hoped, from the whole of his conduct, and the earneſt and ſincere declarations he now made of his unſhaken attachment to the Company, that the Governor would expreſs himſelf ſatisfied with reſpect to his Highneſs's firm intentions of being ſteady to his engagements, and of his being heartily diſpoſed to

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adopt every means in his power to preſerve and cultivate the Company's friendſhip. He gave me no intimation of the nature of the buſineſs he had to propoſe; but I have every reaſon to believe, that he wiſhes to form an alliance for the reduction of *Hyder Ally*, who has lately taken *Cuddapah* and *Sidoutam*, and exacted money from *Bazalet Jung* and the Nabob of *Cannoul*.

The Soubah informed me, in the courſe of the conference, of his having engaged *Lally* in his ſervice, which he told me he had done merely to prevent that party joining with the Marattas, or *Hyder Ally*, who was, he ſaid, already too ſtrong. An attention to his own ſecurity, againſt ſo powerful an enemy, who has invaded and ſubdued countries ſituated ſo contiguous with his, and conſequently makes ſuch near approaches towards his own Poſſeſſions and Capital, was moſt probably the cauſe of the Soubah's taking this ſtep.

I have not been able to learn any thing preciſely with regard to the ſtrength of *Lally*'s detachment. With reſpect to intelligence in general, you may depend upon my employing my beſt endeavours to obtain authentic accounts of all important occurrences, but you muſt be ſenſible, that under a Mooriſh Government, good information cannot be procured but in the way of intrigue, and that precipitate enquiries muſt tend to create ſuſpicions and give alarms; it will therefore be neceſſary to tread cautiouſly upon this ground.

The Soubah's ſon is at preſent with a part of his Army at *Kulburg*, a place near the Maratta Country, having been lately ſent there to cover it from an attack threatened by a party of Marattas.

With reſpect to the renting the Guntoor Circar from *Bazalet Jung*, as you did not lay any ſtreſs upon it in your inſtructions, and as I was informed, that my mentioning it would be totally uſeleſs, I thought it beſt for the preſent to paſs it over in ſilence.

I remain, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
John Hollond.

Ordered to lie on the table.

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Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations; dated 5th June 1778.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

As the Letter from Mr. *Hollond* of the 9th ultimo, giving the Committee an account of his reception at the Court of *Nizam*, and what paſſed between the Soubah and him, requires to be replied to as ſoon as poſſible, as alſo a Letter from the Soubah to me, as Governor, I ſhall beg leave to offer my ſentiments on their contents, and to propoſe for the conſideration of the Committee, ſuch anſwers to them as I think the preſent ſituation of affairs require.

In reply to the Soubah's Letter, it will be neceſſary to acquaint him, that we are pleaſed to find, the ſending Mr. *Hollond* to confer with his Highneſs, has met with his approbation; that ſince the receipt of his Letter, we have received one from Mr. *Hollond*, informing us of the friendly reception he has met with from his Highneſs; conformable to thoſe ſentiments of regard and amity he has been pleaſed on all occaſions to expreſs towards the Company, and which cannot fail to cement the friendſhip ſo happily eſtabliſhed between them. That the invariable cuſtom of all States in alliance, is to keep a reſident at each other's Court, which has been found the moſt certain way for removing every cauſe of jealouſy and miſunderſtanding, and of preſerving ſuch alliances, by a proper attention to the intereſts of each other, which generally diſappoints the views of thoſe who might be inclined to ſow the ſeeds of diſſention, and diſturb the public tranquillity; that we have no doubt but this repreſentation will have due weight with his Highneſs, and that having wrote fully to Mr. *Hollond*, he will explain every thing material for his Highneſs's conſideration.

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Mr. *Hollond* to be wrote to: that we approve his conduct in the interview he had with the Soubah, and are pleaſed to find he met with ſo friendly a reception from his Highneſs: that we deſire he will expreſs to the Soubah our thanks, for the endeavours he informed Mr. *Hollond* he had uſed, to remove from the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, his Brother, the French Troops under M. *Lally*; but as the French are the avowed enemies of the Britiſh Nation, we wiſh they had been directed to proceed to the ſea-coaſt, that we might have ſent them, with all others of the ſame nation, now our priſoners, to their native country, that they might no longer have wandered about to diſturb the peace of any of the different States in *Indoſtan*; and we cannot but lament, that they ſhould have found protection in the ſervice of his Highneſs: that we requeſt he will freely communicate to Mr. *Hollond* whatever he may have to mention for our information, and that we ſhall be ready to pay all proper regard to what he may recommend for our mutual intereſts.

I muſt now requeſt the Committee's permiſſion to lay before them my ſentiments on a particular point, if poſſible to be negociated with the Soubah; and if I ſhould be ſo happy as to find the Committee with me in opinion, I would recommend that Mr. *Hollond* be wrote to on the ſubject. I am ſenſible it is a very delicate one, and muſt not be abruptly gave into; but that the opening it to the Soubah will require much management on the part of Mr. *Hollond*, who muſt, by turns, ſooth and work upon his apprehenſions, as occaſions may require. I have always conſidered the Peſhcuſh paid by the Company to the Soubah, for the Northern Circars, as diſgraceful to them, and an acknowledgment which the Soubah had no right to demand. The giving up the Guntoor Circar, during the life of his brother *Bazalet Jung*, was a ſufficient condeſcenſion. The grant from the Mogul was free and unconditional for the five circars, and the receiving them afterwards as a grant from the Soubah *Nizam Ally Cawn*, on paying him an annual Peſhcuſh, was a ſacrifice of the Company's rights. The time ſeems favourable to throw off ſo heavy a burthen: for the immenſe expences the Company are put to, both to the Northward and in the *Carnatic*, renders it neceſſary that we ſhould endeavour to relieve them as much as poſſible: we may with ſafety make the attempt, and try to obtain a remiſſion of ſo unneceſſary and improper a tribute, which, by the Mogul's Phirmaunds to the Company, the Soubah has no legal title to. But in the end, ſhould the witholding it be impolitic, or likely to be attended with difficulty, we may then make good the payments to him. I am perſuaded he is not ſufficiently powerful to enforce the demand; and the ground I go on is, that he would not have been entitled to exact ſuch a mark of dependance, if the original Phirmaund from the Emperor had been properly attended to.

The heavy expences of the war with the French, the large bodies of Troops we are obliged to keep up for the defence of the circars, the conſiderable balance due from thence, and the failure of a great part of the Revenue, may be urged to him, to induce him to give up this point; which, he may be aſſured, cannot fail of producing from the Company a ſuitable return in the continuance of their friendſhip and alliance. If we cannot bring him to relinquiſh the whole, the balance now due may be paid, on his giving up any future claim; and ſhould we not even ſucceed ſo far, we may refer to the Treaty concluded between the Soubah, and the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, dated the 23d February 1768, Article 5th, wherein it is ſtipulated to pay the Soubah annually, for the ſpace of ſix years, from the 1ſt January 1768, the ſum of two lacks of Arcot Rupees,

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at *Madras* or *Maſulipatam*, that is to ſay, one lack on the 31ſt March, and alſo one lack on the 31ſt October, or two lacks every year, and one lack more at each of the periods, whenever the circar of *Condavir* is put into the Company's poſſeſſion. This was to continue till the 1ſt of January 1774, when the ſum to be paid to the Soubah was to be increaſed to five lacks in two equal payments, and in caſe of obtaining the circar of *Condavir*, to ſeven lacks. It may be here neceſſary to remark, that the circar of *Condavir* is the one now poſſeſſed by *Bazalet Jung*, known to us commonly by the name Guntoor. It appears that it is only from the year 1774 that the Soubah has been entitled to the annual Peſhcuſh of five lacks, near two years of which are now due to him. If then, upon the repreſentation of the burthen we feel by ſo conſiderable an annual payment, we can even bring him back to the receipt of two lacks of Rupees, which was ſtipulated for the firſt ſix years, it will be eaſing the Company in part from a very heavy burthen, and every attempt to reduce their yearly charges, appears to me very neceſſary; that the affairs on the Coaſt may be ſupported without any foreign aid, and they may reap at home the clear amount of the inveſtments provided from hence. I therefore propoſe that Mr. *Hollond* be wrote to particularly on the ſubject, that he may uſe his utmoſt endeavours to obtain ſo deſirable an object; nor would I have him mention any compromiſe, or ſtipulate for the payment of any part of the Peſhcuſh, till every endeavour has in vain been uſed to induce the Soubah to relinquiſh the whole; and Mr. *Hollond* may from his obſervations learn, if there are any points in which the Soubah wiſhes a compliance on the part of the Company that may be acceded to, in return for his giving up his claim to the Peſhcuſh.

Thos Rumbold.

The Committee entirely approve of what the Preſident has propoſed in the foregoing Minute; and it is reſolved that Letters be prepared accordingly, for the Soubah and Mr. *Hollond*.

Thos Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations; dated the 11th June 1779.

Sent the following Letter to Mr. *John Hollond*:

To Mr. *John Hollond*.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 9th May, and are pleaſed to find you met with ſo favourable a reception from the Soubah. By the encloſed copy of the Letter to his Highneſs, which we now ſend, you will ſee what we have ſaid on the ſubject of your remaining at his Court, and we flatter ourſelves he may be induced by it to give his aſſent to a meaſure ſo well calculated to preſerve the intercourſe we wiſh to eſtabliſh with his Highneſs.

We ſhall now enter with you upon a ſubject which we have much at heart, and which by its importance will merit every attention we can give to it. The Peſhcuſh ſettled by the Treaty of 1768, to be paid annually to the Soubah for the Northern Circars, has always appeared to us not only a very expenſive, but in ſome meaſure a diſgraceful charge upon the Company, conſidering the free and unconditional grant by which the Mogul conveyed thoſe Provinces to them. When we reflect on the power of the Company at that time, and the inability of the Soubah to make any effectual oppoſition againſt it, we cannot but conſider the ſurrender of their right to hold the circars, free of all demands whatſoever, by virtue of the Mogul's Phirmaund; the acceptance of a Saned for them from the Soubah, on condition of paying him a tribute nearly equal to what they yielded him, and the giving up to *Bazalet Jung* during his life, one of the moſt valuable of thoſe circars, as very great conceſſions, any one of which ſhould have been eſteemed ſufficient to purchaſe what the whole only obtained; we mean the peaceable poſſeſſion of the lands granted by the Phirmaund.

If it were abſolutely neceſſary to pay any Tribute to the Soubah, the ſum of two lacks of Rupees annually for the four circars that we retained, ſeems to have been the moſt reaſonable valuation; and it appears extraordinary, that this ſum, which was agreed to be paid for the firſt ſix years, ſhould by the ſame Treaty have been raiſed to five lacks of Rupees per annum, without the Company's reaping any additional advantage to warrant ſo great an increaſe. This laſt ſum is indeed highly exorbitant, and were we even to lay no ſtreſs upon the Mogul's Phirmaund, but attend merely to the expence and riſk of maintaining poſſeſſion of the circars, under the Company's authority, we ſhould deem it unreaſonable. Seeing then that the Company have, under all circumſtances, made but a diſadvantageous bargain with the Soubah for the circars; we think it incumbent upon us to embrace the firſt opportunity of relieving them wholly, or in part, from the burthen they ſuſtain in the payment of the Peſhcuſh; and though we are ſenſible it muſt be attended with many difficulties, we do not entirely deſpair of ſucceſs, and we think the preſent juncture the moſt favourable that can happen for the trial.

We would have you therefore, by degrees, break the ſubject to the Soubah; and when you think him ſufficiently prepared, we wiſh you to repreſent to his Highneſs, that although by the Mogul's Phirmaund we were entitled to the full and undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the five circars therein granted, free of all demands whatſoever, yet, in conſideration of the great reſpect which the Company had for his Highneſs, and their earneſt deſire to preſerve his friendſhip and good-will, they relinquiſhed, in a great degree, their right under the Phirmaund, and conſented to receive the circars as a grant from himſelf, ſubject to ſuch ſtipulations as have almoſt annihilated their value; that the very large conceſſions made by the Company on that occaſion, for the ſake of his friendſhip, muſt have doubtleſs produced in his Highneſs the moſt favourable diſpoſition towards them; and upon that preſumption they are led to hope, he will reconſider the affair of the Peſhcuſh, and act therein agreeable to the principles of reaſon and equity: that the ſum of five lacks of Rupees for the circars of *Ellore*, Rajah *Mundry*, *Muſtaphanagur* and *Chicacole*, is much more than thoſe provinces can afford, after paying all the charges attending the collections, allowing for unfavourable ſeaſons, the failures of Renters and Zemindars, the expence of Troops, and the general riſk of maintaining thoſe extenſive countries againſt foreign and domeſtic troubles; that till within theſe laſt two years we have, by the means of long uninterrupted peace and tranquillity, been able to pay his Highneſs the amount of the Peſhcuſh regularly; but ſince it was increaſed from two lacks of Rupees to five, many circumſtances have contributed to render it too burthenſome for the Company to bear, and have occaſioned their falling into arrears: among theſe the great expence of the war with the French, the conſequent proviſion neceſſary for the ſecurity of the circars, and the great failures which have lately accrued in the Revenues, may be mentioned as the moſt conſiderable: that the Peſhcuſh was originally ſettled on the idea of our remaining in the full and peaceable enjoyment of the Revenues; and we truſt his Highneſs is too reaſonable to expect from us, in this time of failure and trouble, what we could ill afford to pay when the circars were in profound tranquillity, and the Company in the full receipt of every advantage belonging to them.

If by theſe, and ſuch other arguments as ſhall occur to you, the Soubah can be brought to a favourable diſpoſition in regard to the Peſhcuſh, we wiſh you to repreſent to him, how very acceptable a thing it would be to the Company, to be relieved of this great burthen; how thankful they would be for it; and how ready they would

would be, upon all occaſions, to come into the views of his Highneſs, and to give him the ſtrongeſt marks of their friendſhip and attachment.

Although our wiſhes extend to the entire remiſſion of the Tribute, which we would have firſt propoſed to the Soubah, and ſupported by your beſt endeavours; yet we confeſs, that without ſomething of importance to tempt him, we can hardly expect he will at once be brought to ſo great a conceſſion; but we hope, by making the demand at this time, that we ſhall the more eaſily obtain what we think we have a juſt claim to, which is a conſiderable abatement in the amount of the Peſhcuſh: if therefore the Soubah, after all your endeavours, ſhall appear diſinclined to remit the whole, we would have you try to bring the Peſhcuſh back to the former ſtandard of two lacks of Rupees, which is as large a ſum as the countries can afford, after the failures, loſſes, and charges, they have lately ſuſtained, and are ſtill likely to ſuſtain during the preſent War: if it be poſſible alſo to obtain a proportionate remiſſion of the arrears on this account, we ſhould be well pleaſed.

We have written to the Soubah, as you will ſee in the encloſed Copy of our Letter, on the ſubject of the French party under *Lally*; expreſſing our ſurprize at his entertaining them in his ſervice, and requeſting him to ſend them out of his dominions: we deſire you will uſe your endeavours to effect their removal, ſince we cannot but conſider them now in the ſame point of view nearly as when they were employed in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient Servants,
Thomas Rumbold,
&c. Select Committee.

Fort Saint George,
11th June 1779.

APPENDIX, No. 118.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations, the 9th July 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable Sir *Tho. Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Charles Smith.

READ the following Letter from Mr. *Hollond*, Preſident at *Hydrabad*.

To the Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, Eſq. Preſident and Governor, and Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the night before laſt the honour of your commands of the inſtant, and waited this morning upon the Soubah, to deliver to him the purport of your inſtructions regarding the Peſhcuſh for the Northern Circars. As the Governor's Letter related to the diſmiſſion of *Lally*'s party from the Soubah's ſervice, we were firſt led into that ſubject. His Highneſs repeated to me what he had ſaid before, as repreſented in my Letter of the 9th May, that the party would aſſuredly have been entertained either by *Hyder Ally* or the Marattas; that the ſtrengthening either of theſe powers muſt have been a great diſadvantage to us, the former of them being to his certain knowledge ill-diſpoſed towards us, and the latter engaged in actual hoſtilities againſt us; that he conſidered the party of Europeans as vagrants, and aliens to their natural country; that they were not French, but the refuſe of various nations; that they could never have it in their power to join the French, ſhould they be diſpoſed to attach themſelves to the fortunes of that Nation, and that they had not attempted to do it at the ſiege of *Pondicherry*. I repeated in reply, what had been ſaid in the Governor's Letter; I urged, that their not attempting to aſſiſt their Nation at *Pondicherry*, was owing not to the want of inclination in them to diſtreſs us, but to the want of opportunity and power; that their leader and commander would ever look forward to his own country; and would endeavour, by every poſſible means, to recommend himſelf to his own Prince and Nation; that the keeping them together in a body in his ſervice, was a meaſure hurtful to our intereſts, and inconſiſtent with the terms of the Treaty. On taking leave of this ſubject, he gave me no poſitive aſſurances of his intention of diſmiſſing them, but in the courſe of the converſation, ſeeming deſirous of excuſing himſelf, and of ſoftening matters, by ſaying, that the party was entertained by one of his Aumils, and not by himſelf; and that they were not engaged for any ſpecific time, but optionally, and were to be diſmiſſed at will. The Soubah now proceeded to enquire of me, what your anſwer was relative to the repreſentations he had made on the ſubject of our engagements with *Bazalet Jung*, and what your inſtructions were regarding the payment of the Peſhcuſh. I told him, with reſpect to the former, that you did not deem thoſe engagements in the light of an infringement of the Treaty, as he had repreſented them; that you had long ago frequently and preſſingly written to him to diſmiſs that party of Frenchmen from his brother's ſervice; that you had been for ſome time paſt ſenſible of the probability of a War with France, and had foreſeen the danger of their being kept together in a body, in a ſituation contiguous to our poſſeſſions; that you had nevertheleſs, from an attention to the friendſhip ſubſiſting between his Highneſs and the Company, forborne taking any hoſtile meaſures for their removal; that at length, by the breaking out of a French War, it became more immediately neceſſary for you to take ſome ſteps for expelling them from that part of the country; that as *Bazalet Jung*, by their removal, would have been left without defence, you had engaged, on condition of his diſmiſſing them, to furniſh him with ſome Troops for his protection, to be paid out of the Revenue of the Guntoor Circar; and on this condition had rented it from him; that by the 2d Article of Treaty, the circar was juſtly forfeited to the Company; but that they had been induced to wave this claim, from an unwillingneſs to embrace any meaſure, however equitable, that might be the cauſe of miſunderſtanding with his Highneſs. The foregoing circumſtances having been before ſubjects of diſcuſſion, we advanced ſo far without any apparent ſymptoms of uneaſineſs or reſentment on the part of the Soubah; but upon my proceeding to declare to him, what you had given me in charge relative to your deſire of obtaining a remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, he was exceedingly agitated, and expreſſed himſelf with great warmth and force, but at the ſame time with decency. I had before told his Highneſs, upon his applying to me for the diſcharge of his arrears of the Peſhcuſh, that on account of the great expences of the French War, and the Zemindars having been deficient in their payments, it would be impoſſible for you to comply with his requeſt. I believe he has been for ſome time jealous of this delay. I now repeated to him the above arguments, and added, that the heavy charges of the Army; and the collections, the large balances due from the Zemindars, and the failures of renters from unfavourable ſeaſons, and other cauſes, were altogether ſo large a draft upon the Revenue, as greatly to exhauſt it, and rendered the payment of the Peſhcuſh a very heavy burden; that the Company in *England* were uneaſy at the payment of ſo large a ſum from a Revenue that could not bear it, which there was the more occaſion for them to give attention to, from the burden falling in part upon their other Revenues; that by the Mogul's Phirmaund of 1765, the ceſſion of the circars was declared to be free and unconditional; and that it was ſo acknowledged on the part of his Highneſs, by the Treaty with the Company of 1768; that nevertheleſs, through regard to his honour and dignity, the Company had been contented to receive them, by the firſt Treaty 1766,

APPENDIX. No. 118.

as a grant from his Highneſs; that the Sum itſelf was not ſo conſiderable as to affect his Highneſs's Revenue, or give him any uneaſineſs; that as he had, through favour and munificence, excuſed others the payment of Tribute, he would, no doubt, be inclined to ſhew an equal degree of liberality to the Company, who had given him no moleſtation in his Government, and had hitherto, during times of peace and tranquillity, been punctual in complying with the terms of their engagement; that for theſe reaſons, you entertained a well-grounded hope, that through his friendſhip to the Company, he would be induced to excuſe them the payment of the Peſhcuſh; that it would be doing the Company a pleaſure and a favour; that they would be ever ready to acknowledge it, by ſhewing him at all times all poſſible marks of their attachment and friendſhip. His Highneſs was too much agitated to permit me to go through the whole of the above repreſentation without interruption: upon my firſt opening the ſubject, he ſaid, he found that we were determined to break the Treaty, that he looked upon it as already violated; that there could not be any further occaſion for my ſtaying at his Court; that if we were bent on War, he was likewiſe ready. He afterwards replied more in detail to the points I had dwelt upon; he ſaid, that with reſpect to deficiencies of Revenues, from whatever cauſe, he had nothing to do with them; that the Treaty was clear and explicit; that no exception whatever had been made, nor proviſion ſtipulated, for failure of any kind; that he had himſelf ſuffered great loſſes upon various occaſions; but ſhould think it very unreaſonable to call upon the Company for a year's Revenue of the circars towards his indemnification; that with reſpect of its being put upon the footing of favour, it might, have been a reaſonable ground, if we had done him any favours on our part; that whatever might be the profits of the circars, they were our own, and it was not right that the loſſes ſhould be his; that his ſituation, at the time of our taking poſſeſſion of the circars, would have enabled him to prevent it; that he has ever conſidered the ceſſion of them to us, as proceeding from the fraud and ignorance of his managers, but that he has ſince been induced to ſubmit to the heavy loſs he ſuſtained on that occaſion, from a ſenſe of the regard he owed to his engagements; that as he conſidered himſelf pledged by the Treaty to maintain Peace with the Company, he had harboured no intentions of taking any ſteps to diſturb the public tranquillity; but that, if we ſaw any advantage in breaking with him, he ſhould be very well pleaſed, as he was convinced, in caſe of a rupture, that the profits of the conteſt would be on his ſide, and that he ſhould be able to make a better bargain for himſelf than had been made for him by his ſervants: that with reſpect to our forbearance, in not having taken poſſeſſion of the circars upon the ground of the Mogul's Phirmaund, we ſeemed at preſent to have loſt view of that principle; that both himſelf and the Company might now revert to that ground, and after a trial of ſtrength, make a freſh Treaty upon new terms ſuited to the events of War; that if we thought him in ſo weak a condition, as to be under a neceſſity of ſubmitting to this new claim, we were greatly deceived. His Highneſs, in the courſe of his converſation, ſpoke as if he conſidered *Hyder Ally* as waiting only to be called on to join him, and as if he and his people upon ſuch an occaſion, would be ready to fly to his banners, and to act under his orders; and purſuant to this idea, he ſaid, he ſhould give orders to *Meer Ally Rizam*, *Hyder's* Governor of *Cuddapah*, to join his ſon, and proceed againſt Colonel *Harpur*. I told him that with reſpect to War, it ought to be a matter of ſerious conſideration with him; that the power of the Company in *Bengal*, and on the Coaſt, was very great; and that, by means of our ſhips, and the command of the ſea, we could eaſily tranſport our Army from the North or South to any place where they might be wanted; that from the equitable principle of our Government, we were not forward to invade our neighbours, but that we feared no power whatever; that we expelled the French not only from *Pondicherry*, but likewiſe from *Mahé*, which was in *Hyder Ally's* dominions; that with reſpect to the Peſhcuſh, it was really a heavy charge on the Circar Revenue; that I had been ſent, through reſpect for his Highneſs's great ſtation and dignity, to requeſt the remiſſion; that the requeſt ſtood on good grounds; and I concluded with hoping, that he would be pleaſed to conſider it maturely. His Highneſs ſtill continued to hold the language of reſentment and War, but in terms of decency, and not of outrage: He propoſed to me either to proceed to *Madras*, or to communicate the above particulars to you, with a preſſing requeſt for a ſpeedy anſwer. He ſaid, he ſhould immediately prepare for hoſtilities, and deſired me to inform you ſo; intimating, that if there were any delay in your anſwer, his Troops might poſſibly, in the meantime, advance upon Colonel *Harpur*; and that in ſuch caſe the blame would be yours.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
John Hollond.

Hydrabad,
June 26th 1779.

The above Letter being taken into conſideration, the following Draft of an Anſwer is read and approved, and ordered immediately to be diſpatched.

APPENDIX, No. 119.

To Mr. *John Hollond.*

Sir,

WE have received your Letter of the 26th ult. this morning, and we loſe no time in replying to it, that you may be prepared to preſs forward the affair of the Peſhcuſh, which we have much at heart.

The line you have taken, and the firmneſs which appears to accompany your repreſentations to the Soubah, are very commendable; and though they ſeem for the preſent to have made a ſtrong impreſſion on his mind, and to have raiſed a great degree of reſentment againſt us, we ſtill flatter ourſelves that in the end they will prove ſucceſsful, and obtain for the Company more than we could have procured by a different mode of conduct.

The effect occaſioned by our firſt demand reſpecting the Peſhcuſh, is no other than what might have been expected. We would have you, however, repreſent to his Highneſs, that we cannot forbear expreſſing our concern at the unfavourable interpretation which he has put upon our deſigns; that the manner in which we have applied to him for the remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, is full of reſpect; and ſo far from denouncing the ſmalleſt threat againſt him, we wiſhed to owe this great favour entirely to his generoſity and good-will; and had not the leaſt intention of proſecuting the claim upon any other ground: that we appeal to himſelf, whether the ſtyle of his anſwer to our demand be ſuch as the Company ought in reaſon to have expected from a friend and an Ally, or whether he has not given us too much cauſe to charge him with thoſe hoſtile intentions, which he would fix upon us? That our claim in the article of the Peſhcuſh, has ſuch foundation in equity, that we cannot relinquiſh it; and we ſtill hope his Highneſs, upon mature reflection, will be ſo well convinced of it, as to give the Company a proof of his friendſhip and good-will, by complying with their requeſt. If it be neceſſary, from the diſpoſition of his Highneſs, or from any new circumſtances which we cannot foreſee, to vary this repreſentation, you will act accordingly as ſhall ſeem to you moſt likely to anſwer our views, in which we ſhall now fully and finally intruſt you.

As we cannot flatter ourſelves that the Soubah will be brought to remit the Peſhcuſh entirely, including the arrears

arrears that are due, we would have you make trial of the following propoſitions, in ſuch order and manner as you may deem expedient to obtain for the Company on this occaſion, the greateſt relief that can be procured.

1ſt. To offer the whole of the balance, payable in three or four months, on condition that the entire Tribute be remitted in future.

2d. To offer him half of the balance by bills, either on *Maſulipatam* or the Preſidency, on condition that the other half be remitted, and the Peſhcuſh in future be fixed at the ſum eſtabliſhed by Treaty to be paid for the firſt ſix years, which is the moſt that the Company can afford to pay by way of Tribute, even in time of peace.

3d. To offer him the whole of the balance now due, at two ſtated payments, allowing a reaſonable time, on condition that the Tribute in future ſhall only be two lacks.

4th. To remit the whole of the balance now due, in conſideration of our late expences and failure of Revenue, and on condition of our paying the Peſhcuſh regularly in future.

We empower you to ſettle with the Soubah on any of the foregoing propoſitions, confiding in your zeal and attention to the intereſts of the Company, from which we expect to derive every advantage that can be obtained under the preſent circumſtances; but ſhould the Soubah reject all the propoſitions we have laid down, you muſt in that event acquaint him, that the Company will pay the balance with current Tribute, as ſoon as they are in caſh: that they have no deſigns to commit hoſtilities upon him, or to infringe any of his rights; but that they will always be prepared fully and effectually to revenge the leaſt inſult that ſhall be offered to them.

We wiſh you to continue your remonſtrances, as you ſhall ſee occaſion, againſt the conduct of the Soubah, in entertaining *Lally*'s party contrary to his engagements. We encloſe you a Copy of an intercepted Letter from an Officer belonging to that party, which you will employ according to your directions.

Tho' Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Hector Munro,
Charles Smith.

APPENDIX, No. 120.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Select Conſultations, the 13th September 1779.

PRESENT,

The Hon. Sir *Tho' Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Sir *Hector Munro*, Knt.
Charles Smith.

READ the following Letter from Mr. *Hollond*, Reſident at *Hydrabad*, dated 31ſt Auguſt.

To the Honourable Sir *Tho' Rumbold*, Baronet, Preſident, Governor, and Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was on the 22d of laſt month honoured with your Letter of the 10th, and in conſequence waited on the Soubah. I informed him of the great deſire you ſtill expreſſed to obtain a remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh; that you were greatly concerned to find, inſtead of giving a favourable attention to your requeſt, his Highneſs had been ſo forward in making declarations inconſiſtent with the friendſhip that had ſo long ſubſiſted between him and the Company; that in the mode of proceeding which you had obſerved upon this occaſion, it had been the object of your particular attention to ſhew all poſſible reſpect to his Highneſs's great ſtation and dignity; that although you wiſhed, upon good grounds, to be relieved from the heavy burthen of the Peſhcuſh, it could not fail of giving you uneaſineſs, if the requeſt you had made ſhould be the occaſion of your being upon terms of miſunderſtanding with his Highneſs; that you hoped he would conſider maturely the reaſonableneſs of your repreſentation, and manifeſt his friendſhip to the Company, by giving his ready aſſent to a requeſt ſo juſtly founded. We were naturally led, from this preface, into a diſcuſſion of the queſtion at large, nearly as I have ſtated it to you in my Addreſs of the 26th June: all the arguments made uſe of on both ſides at the former occaſion were now again repeated. I obſerved that his Highneſs appeared to be particularly agitated, when I mentioned his having excuſed others, as a ground for the Company to expect an equal ſhare of his regard. I made uſe of this argument, entirely with a view of ſhewing the Soubah that I was not unacquainted with the preſent weak ſtate of his Government, and it ſeemed to operate accordingly: he replied immediately to this part of my repreſentation with ſome warmth, that it was not conformable to cuſtom to repeat words after a deciſive anſwer had been given. The Soubah, in the courſe of the converſation, dwelt much upon his having a larger Army than ours, ſaid, he could eaſily ſend parties of horſe, of which we had none, to lay waſte the *Carnatic* and Circars; that if we would not pay the ſtipulated Peſhcuſh, and the balance due, he ſhould be under the neceſſity of committing hoſtilities, in order, by that means, to recover thoſe ſums. I replied, firſt, that with reſpect to what his Highneſs had ſaid to have heard of the ſtrength of our Army, it would be found, even in point of numbers (ſuppoſing numbers the important conſideration) to be truly reſpectable, and was amply ſufficient to oppoſe to the power of any of our enemies; that by the ſea being open to us, our *Bengal* Army could always be tranſported with the utmoſt diſpatch into the circars; that the real ſtrength of an Army conſiſted in diſcipline; and the art of managing them; that ours, which had been often tried, were well known to be powerful; that our ſyſtem of War did not require a numerous body of horſe; but that of theſe we had a ſufficient force trained, according to the rules of European diſcipline; that the Company had no intention of becoming his enemies, and would not be the firſt to diſturb the peace of the country; but in caſe of hoſtilities being committed, from whatever quarter, we were always prepared, and were full of confidence, that if a ſtroke of a ſword were ſtruck, there would be afterwards no poſſibility of repairing the miſchief, which might extend no one knows how far; that with reſpect to the advantages he had declared he promiſed to himſelf from a War with the Company, he would do wrong to be ſanguine, as the event might poſſibly be different from what he might expect; that it was natural for him to ſuppoſe, that what I ſaid proceeded from my zeal for the intereſt of the Company, but that if I were his own ſervant, and the real and faithful well-wiſher of his Highneſs and his family, which I wiſhed him to conſider me, I ſhould not fail to uſe my utmoſt endeavours to diſſuade him from his being precipitate in engaging in hoſtilities againſt our Government; that what I had repreſented upon this occaſion with reſpect to the ſtrength of our Army, did by no means proceed from any intention of exaggerating the Company's power, but from the ſincere deſire I had of giving him a true and perfect view of the real ſtate of affairs, in order that he might thereby be enabled to conſider the queſtion before him maturely on true grounds, previous to his taking any ſteps that might diſturb the public tranquillity, and involve the country in diſtreſs. His Highneſs ſtill continued firm in refuſing his compliance with the requeſt for the remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, and informed me, that he ſhould give me audience of leave in two days. He ſent for my Dubaſh the ſame evening, and deſired him, through *Sbemſe Ud Dowla*, his principal ſervant, to tell me to prepare for my departure on the day he had preſcribed as above-mentioned. In the viſit I had paid his Highneſs, I had not made known to him your firſt propoſition,

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poſition, which was the diſcharging the balance due, on condition of his remitting the Peſhcuſh in future; I thought it better to keep up this conceſſion in order to give a check, as much as poſſible, to his Highneſs's expectation, wiſhing much that the deſired accommodation might be eſtabliſhed on this ground; neither did I think it neceſſary to yield, after receiving his Highneſs's meſſage above ſtated, believing it to be an artifice employed by his Highneſs to drive me to make ſuch further propoſitions as I might have in charge. The day following my Dubaſh was again ſent for to the Durbar, and was given to underſtand through *Sbennſe Ud Dowlah*, that the Soubah had appointed *Sabit Jung*, Brother of *Fazel Beg Cawn*, to ſpeak to me on any buſineſs I might have to propoſe. I accordingly paid a viſit to *Sabit Jung*, agreeably to the Soubah's deſire; but nothing was ſaid on either ſide on buſineſs; and after an interval of two or three days, he returned my viſit. As I underſtood that he had been appointed to ſay ſomething to me from the Soubah, I waited, after the uſual compliments, in expectation of his opening the buſineſs he might have to ſpeak of: he told me that he was not authorized to ſay any thing to me on the part of the Soubah, but that his Highneſs had deſired him to hear, and report, any propoſitions that I might have to offer on the part of the Company. We then went through a diſcuſſion of the ſeveral arguments ſtated in my former Letters; in the courſe of which I did not fail to ſet before him in the ſtrongeſt terms, the great danger the Soubah his maſter would inevitably be expoſed to, if he ſhould imprudently precipitate himſelf into hoſtilities with the Company: I added, that as the Soubah, on the day I viſited him, did not appear to be in a diſpoſition to give a favourable attention to any propoſition which I had to offer, I had not thought that occaſion a proper meeting for introducing any further matter. I told him, that I had often given his Highneſs the ſtrongeſt and moſt unequivocal aſſurances of the Company's firm intention to maintain that friendſhip which ſubſiſted between them, and of the great inclination which I knew you had to ſhew his Highneſs every poſſible attention that could manifeſt your high eſteem and reſpect to his perſon and Government. I then added, that if his Highneſs was inclined to receive a Nazur, as a mark of reſpect from the Company, and as an acknowledgment on their part of the great favour ſhewn them by the remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh and balance, I was perſuaded that in ſuch caſe you would willingly do every thing in your power to conform to his wiſhes, and that it would be the occaſion of great ſatisfaction to you, if the difference was accommodated on this ground. Although *Sabit Jung* pretended not to have been authorized to ſay any thing on the part of the Soubah, he replied, with reſpect to the remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, that it could not be on any terms whatever; and he aſked me pointedly, Whether, after having heard the Soubah's reſolution, it was our intention, *bonâ fide*, to pay the ſtipulated Tribute? This was ſo explicit and direct a queſtion, that I found myſelf under the neceſſity of making ſome kind of reply to it, by deſiring him to conſider how the caſe ſtood, and to draw his own concluſions regarding the event. I was induced to propoſe the payment of a Nazur, rather than to offer the balance of Peſhcuſh, not only becauſe I perceived it would be agreeable to the Soubah under that denomination, but becauſe it enabled me the more eaſily to conceal the amount of the ſum you propoſed paying him; and further, if I had mentioned your intention of paying the amount due under the name of balance, I apprehended, conformable to the modes of Eaſtern Courts, there would have been a further claim made on the Company under the title of Nazur.

I am led, upon this occaſion, to expreſs my wiſhes that I might be authorized to offer a ſuitable Nazur, in caſe of neceſſity, beyond the payment of the balance due, rather than be driven to an accommodation, on the ground of either of the other three propoſitions contained in your Letter of the 10th July. As the payment of Tribute is a matter by which the independency of Government is effected, and as we have negotiated the remiſſion of it at this Court, I am ſtrongly of opinion, that the point ought, if poſſible, to be carried through. We have repreſented, that it will be unreaſonable on the part of the Soubah, to claim this Tribute in future, and he has refuſed his compliance with our requeſt, in terms not warranted by his ſituation. When we conſider that he is ſupported more by the reputation of his late father's name and government, than by any real power of his own, it muſt neceſſarily be ſuppoſed the opinions of the Indian powers, to reſent both the refuſal and the manner, the latter of which will, no doubt, if we ſhould yield, be greatly exaggerated. If under theſe ſuppoſed emotions of reſentment on our part, and after the public declaration we have made, of the unreaſonableneſs of the demand, we ſhould ſtill continue to pay the Peſhcuſh, it will be univerſally believed through this country, that our compliance has proceeded from apprehenſions of the Soubah's ſuperior power; I propoſe therefore to continue ſteady to the ground I have aſſumed, and ſhall not make any further propoſitions, unleſs, purſuant to your inſtructions, it ſhall be abſolutely neceſſary.

It may be proper, on the preſent occaſion, to inform you of the reports I have had of the ſtrength of the Army. The number of his horſe, and that of all his Jaqueedars and Munſubdars collected together, are, according to various accounts, from 30 to 50,000; the Soubah's Sepoys exerciſed in the European manner, are ſaid to be 8,000, and thoſe of *Fazel Beg* 10,000. I have ſeen thoſe belonging to the former, and have had accounts of *Fazel Beg*'s, and I am fully of opinion that they will be found, in caſe of action, to be leſs ſerviceable than common Pike Peons, of whom there are many conſidered as fighting men in the Soubah's Army, but it is of little conſequence to aſcertain their numbers. If we may form a judgment of the whole of his Cavalry from a ſample of ſome thouſands lately arrived at this place, under the command of his ſon, they are ſmall, poor, and ill equipped. There is not a ſingle gun mounted on the walls of *Hydrabad*, and the place is wholly defenceleſs. The power of the Soubah does not extend to the ability of controlling even his Jaquierdars, of whom *Fazel Beg Cawn* is one, and holds himſelf independent of this Court; *Bazalet Jung*, and the *Cuddapah* and *Cawnoul* Nabobs have for a long time held themſelves alſo entirely independent of him: there cannot, under all theſe appearances of a weak Government, be any thing to apprehend from the Soubah's reſentment. I think it neceſſary to adviſe you of all theſe circumſtances, as I conceive that my yielding a ſtep of the firſt ground I have aſſumed, will defeat my beſt endeavours to maintain myſelf in either of the three propoſitions following, mentioned in your Letter of the 10th July, the laſt of which will I think moſt certainly be rejected. The many conferences I have had with the Soubah have given me an opportunity of forming an opinion of his character; and I conſider him to have ſo much experience of affairs, and ſo juſt a knowledge both of his own ſtrength and the Company's Government, that I cannot think it in any degree probable he will be diſpoſed to carry his threats into execution, and plunge into the danger of War with ſo formidable a power as our's is well known to be: I am therefore the more inclined to keep my firſt ground, and to diſregard his menaces. I have already remarked his not carrying thoſe into execution, that related to my diſmiſſion from his Court. I believe that the credit he derives from receiving the Tribute from the Company, is by far a greater object with him than the amount of the ſum ſtipulated; and from this conſideration I think it highly probable that he may perſiſt throughout, in refuſing his compliance with the requeſt that has been made to him for an entire remiſſion of it; I do not imagine, however, that he will on this account be ſo imprudent as

to commit hoſtilities upon any part of our poſſeſſions. If other circumſtances were favourable, it is very probable he may rather ſend me away than give his aſſent to the propoſition I have made to him. The balance due is ſo ſmall a ſum when ſet in compariſon with the preſent flouriſhing condition of his treaſury, that I am doubtful whether the offer of paying will be accepted, as he may probably think it more for his intereſt to riſk the loſs of it, than to make a conceſſion which has a tendency to diſcredit him, by impreſſing the minds of other powers with an opinion of the weakneſs of his Government. I am not encouraged to draw any concluſions deciſively favourable to my wiſhes, from the circumſtance merely of his not having given me audience of leave, conformably to the declaration he had made of his intention ſo to do; the ſituation of our affairs with reſpect to the Marattas, gives me a great alarm. There has been, for a long time paſt, a determined perſonal enmity between his Highneſs and *Ragonaut Row*, and his Highneſs is apprehenſive that our eſtabliſhing *Ragonaut Row* in the poſſeſſion of the Poonah Government, will be but a prelude to our attacking his own poſſeſſions. He conceives, that our connection with the Maratta Chief extends to the engaging in hoſtilities againſt him; and being very apprehenſive of our Government, he has, as I underſtand, ſent a Vakeel to *Surat*, with inſtructions, in caſe of our uniting again with *Ragonaut Row*, either to get himſelf included in the Treaty, or to make a ſeparate Treaty in his own name with that Chief; in caſe he cannot ſucceed in either of theſe objects, he has determined, as I have been informed, to join heartily with the preſent Poonah Adminiſtration againſt *Ragonaut Row*, and conſequently againſt us. I am not acquainted with the final reſolution of the Bengal Government relative to the Poonah affairs; conformably, however, to what the Preſident wrote me in a former Letter, I told the Soubah, that I believed our Government was diſpoſed towards the reigning Adminiſtration at *Poonah*, if any thing could be ſettled with them upon a reaſonable footing; that even in caſe of any obſtructions to a renewal of the former Treaty of friendſhip with them, and of our being obliged, in conſequence, to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, I nevertheleſs was very well aſſured, that there was not any intention on our part, of aiding *Ragonaut Row* in any views againſt the Peace of his Highneſs's country. I am doubtful whether he will truſt to the event. If Peace be eſtabliſhed with the Poonah Miniſters, it is poſſible that his Highneſs, ſeeing that he can have no hopes of aſſiſtance from that quarter, may be diſpoſed to make the moſt of the Peſcuſh, by accepting the balance due, or the ſame amount under the denomination of Nazur, as a conſideration for yielding up what I believe he conceives to be already loſt. In the caſe of his joining the Poonah Miniſters againſt *Ragonaut Row* and our Army, his pretenſions drop of courſe. He will probably keep me here until he ſees the end of the negotiations ſet on foot on the Malabar Coaſt, and perhaps beyond that period, until he can form ſome judgment of *Hyder Aly*'s intention. He appears to be under great apprehenſions from that quarter, and will have it in his power, by my reſiding at his Court, to impreſs *Hyder* with an idea of there being an alliance formed with the Company to oppoſe his further encroachments.

Read two Letters from the Nabob, dated 19th and 20th ultimo; the former containing intelligence relative to the deſigns of *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam, in conſequence of our having entered into an alliance with *Bazalet Jung*; the latter, on the ſubject of *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas, and recommending that the diſputes with the latter be made up as ſoon as poſſible; for which purpoſe, if we approve, he can ſend for an able and truſty perſon from *Poonah* to negotiate a Treaty with us.

Agreed to acknowledge the receipt of the foregoing Letters, and to acquaint the Nabob, that if any perſon came hither on the part of the Marattas, we ſhall give him a favourable reception, and contribute, as far as lies in our power, to promote a good underſtanding with that State. APPENDIX, No. 121.

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Honourable Sir,

I DO myſelf the honour herewith to enclоſe you copy of my laſt Addreſs to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Madras*; I likewiſe tranſmit to you copies of Letters of prior date, together with copies of three Letters from the Committee to me. I ſhould have ſent the former to you ſeparately at the time I wrote them, but deferred doing it in expectation of being able to give you ſome more deciſive information with regard to the object they relate to.

The Soubah talks of taking the field as ſoon as the rains are over, but his movements muſt depend, I think, upon the turn the negotiations may take, that are now on foot with the Poonah Miniſtry.

I am, &c. &c.

(Signed) *John Hollond.*

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Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, the 25th October 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Philip Francis,
Edward Wheler,
Mr. *Barwell*, indiſpoſed,
Sir *Eyre Coote*, gone to viſit the different ſtations of the Army.

THE Governor General lays before the Board a Letter which he has lately received from Mr. *Hollond*, deputed by the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* to the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally*, at *Hydrabad*. This contains an account of his proceedings, and the ſtate of his negotiations, to the time in which it was written.

The Board received the original intimation of this commiſſion in a Letter from the Select Committee, dated the 7th February, but hath never received from them any further advice of the particular objects deſigned to be accompliſhed by it, nor of the progreſs made towards the execution of them, which muſt be aſcribed to ſome official inattention. In this perſuaſion he is confirmed, by the aſſurances of the Commander in Chief, who left that Preſidency about the time of Mr. *Hollond*'s appointment, and by a Letter received ſince from Mr. *Hollond*, ſoon after his arrival at *Hydrabad*, containing a report of the reception which he met with from the Nizam, and a copy of his inſtructions. By ſome accident this Letter has been miſlaid, which the Governor General regrets, becauſe it obliges him to have recourſe to his memory for the ſubſtance of it, which, though of little importance when it was received, is become of very material conſequence at this time; from the great variation which has been made, as well in the principle and deſign as in the progreſs of Mr. *Hollond*'s commiſſion.

In the Letter from the Select Committee, dated the 7th February laſt, they aſſign as their motives for this deputation, their apprehenſions leſt the jealouſy of *Nizam Ally* ſhould be excited by their connection with his Brother, the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*, and by the long arrears withheld of his Peſhcuſh, and induce him to take a hoſtile part againſt them; and the profeſſed object was therefore to ſatisfy him on both theſe ſubjects; and ſuch, in his recollection of them, was the ſubſtance

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of Mr. *Hollond*'s inſtructions, though more explicitly detailed. Theſe were to explain to the Nabob the nature and urgency of the impending negotiation with *Bazalet Jung*, and to engage his concurrence in it, and his ſanction to ſuch engagements as might be concluded with the Nabob *Bazalet Jung*; to apologize for their want of punctuality in the payments of his Peſcuſh, to ſettle the mode of diſcharging the arrears, to require from him the previous aſſurance of a pacific diſpoſition towards their Government, and to give him ſimilar aſſurances of theirs, and of their firm determination to abide by every article of the Treaty of 1768. Theſe inſtructions ſeemed equally wiſe and well adapted to the ſeaſon and occaſion which gave birth to them, and were ſuch as perhaps in the ſtrict conſtruction of the dependance of that Preſidency on the controul of this Government, they were authorized to give, by their own ſeparate power, ſince the profeſſed and only object was the preſervation of Peace, grounded on a Treaty already exiſting.

But by the tenor of the ſubſequent inſtructions tranſmitted to Mr. *Hollond*, it appears that they have been imperceptibly led from their firſt deſign into a train of demands, which were both in their natural tendency oppoſite to it, and have proved ſuch in their effect. The Treaty with *Bazalet Jung* is concluded and avowed without the participation of his immediate Sovereign and their Ally; the arrears and current payment of the Peſhcuſh withheld, and effectually, though indirectly, refuſed, under pleas highly unreaſonable and irregular; and a demand for diſmiſſion of the French, and other enemies, and native forces, entertained under the command of Mr. *Lally*, a French Officer; a demand in itſelf reaſonable, and ſuitable to the relation in which they ſtand with the Nabob, but neither politic nor reaſonable while their other demands indicate an intention of War, and are even accompanied with indirect threats of it.

The Nabob has given to theſe requiſitions their obvious conſtruction; and unleſs his arguments have received ſome aſſiſtance in the relation of them from Mr. *Hollond*, who appears to poſſeſs all the requiſites for the truſt to which he has been ſelected, they are ſuch as manifeſt the cleareſt conviction of their unreaſonableneſs, as well as a proper ſenſe of the inſult conveyed by them; as nothing but an extreme contempt for his power could apparently have dictated the propoſal of relinquiſhing ſuch valuable and acknowledged rights, without one conceſſion offered in return, that might ſerve as a ſpecious cover to his credit in yielding them.

To demand the abſolute ceſſion of a right acquired by Treaty, or even the variation of it, without ſomething propoſed as an equivalent or alternative, will, though not a direct breach of Treaty, be always conſidered as ſuch; as the demands of ſtates are ſuppoſed to be deliberate acts, of which every conſequence has been duly weighed before they were paſſed, with a reſolution to ſupport them; and becauſe they cannot be ſupported but by violence, either immediate or eventually implied, or by the principle of right, which is entirely excluded from the preſent queſtion. But the right of *Nizam Ally* to the Peſhcuſh ſtands yet upon ſtronger ground, ſince it ought to be remembered that it was the effect of ſolicitations and importunity on our part, his conſiſting in a ſimple acquieſcence, extorted from him by the neceſſity of his affairs; this conſideration would render the attempt doubly criminal to wreſt it from him.

It is but juſtice to acquit the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* of ſuch an intention or reſolution, already decided within their own breaſts; the contrary is evinced by the final inſtructions contained in their Letter to Mr. *Hollond*, dated the 10th July. In this they diſclaim all thoughts of violence, expreſſing their hope to receive the remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh from his generoſity, and propoſe various and ſucceſſive qualifications of their demand, till they have reduced it apparently to a quiet acquieſcence in the Treaty, as it now ſtands; apparently, for a very different reſolution may be ſuſpected in the concluding declaration, that if all their propoſitions are rejected, they will diſcharge what is due when they are in caſh, but will defend their rights, if they ſhould be attacked; a mode of expreſſion, which, without much violence on the literal conſtruction, may be taken as an implied, an indirect refuſal to diſcharge it, and a threat of reſiſtance, if it ſhould be reclaimed by force; ſo that the negotiation, when it ſhall have run its round to the point at which it ſet off, will have made an impreſſion in its courſe, which muſt either diſturb the good underſtanding between the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* and their Ally, or to efface it, they muſt ſubmit to ſacrifices, which, however juſt in themſelves, would reflect a public diſcredit on their Government.

In this ſtate of the negotiation, the interpoſition of a ſuperior authority appears to be equally ſeaſonable and neceſſary, both to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, from the difficulty in which it ſeems to have involved them, and to prevent the conſequence which a breach with their Ally would entail on the credit of their faith, and on the general intereſts of the Company.

While the political ſyſtem of the Company's affairs in *India* is eſpecially and excluſively entruſted to the charge of this Government, it ſeems to follow as a neceſſary rule, that all political negotiations ſhould originate with this Government, and all commiſſions and deputations to foreign States iſſue immediately from it. But the Court of Directors have, in one inſtance, determined otherwiſe. And this Board has already given its conſent to Mr. *Hollond*'s appointment, though under inducements widely different from the circumſtances which have been ſince made the objects of it. It would be therefore improper to withdraw it; and in other reſpects he appears to be well qualified for it.

The deſign of this Minute is ſolely to bring forth a queſtion before the Board, with all the introductory facts which appear neceſſary for the determination of it; namely, "Whether this Board ſhall interfere in the preſent negotiation, or ſtill leave it to the conduct of the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George?*" The Governor General forbears to offer any opinion on the mode of interference, if any ſhall be judged proper, wiſhing rather to leave this ſubject at large to their deciſion.

Mr. *Francis*. I think this Board ought to interpoſe its authority to prevent, if poſſible, any further operation of the meaſures taken by the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, without our conſent and knowledge, and which evidently tend to a rupture with the Nizam at a very unfavourable point of time, and on the ſlighteſt and moſt unwarrantable pretences.

Mr. *Wheler*. I am of the ſame opinion.

(Signed) *Edwd Wheler.*

Mr. *Barwell*. As this negotiation cannot be effected or concluſive, without the interpoſition of the Governor General and Council, I am of opinion it muſt interfere.

(Signed) *Richd Barwell,*
Warren Haſtings.

APPENDIX, No. 123.

Extract of *Fort William* Appendix to Conſultations; dated the 25th October 1779.

Honourable Sir,

I HAVE the honour herewith to tranſmit to you copy of a Letter which I this day addreſſed to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Madras*. The moſt important information I have been able to obtain ſince my arrival here, is, that the Soubah begins to grow jealous

of *Hyder Ally*'s increaſing power; and, in effect, not only the Soubah's ſecurity, but our own, ſeems to render it neceſſary, that a check ſhould be given to the incroachments of that reſtleſs uſurper By the reduction of the Fort of *Chittuldungum*, I have been informed, that he acquired an acquiſition of Country to the amount of thirty lacks of rupees. He has ſince been employed in the Countries bordering on the Soubah's. He has entirely ſubdued the Cuddapah Country, and poſſeſſed himſelf of a very large ſum in plunder; and has exacted ſums of money from the Cannoul Nabob, and from *Bazalet Jung*, the Soubah's Brother. How far it may be our intereſt to preſerve Peace at preſent, you are the beſt judge; but *Hyder*'s power, if it is ſuffered to increaſe will certainly become formidable. The Soubah would be glad, I believe, to ſtrengthen himſelf with our alliance; and although he has not yet ſaid a word to me upon this ſubject, I am clear that the buſineſs he deſired me to mention to the Governor of *Madras*, relates to this object.

Fazel Beg Cawn, who was formerly in our ſervice, during the War with *Myſours*, and who was afterwards introduced and ſupported by *Rukunul Dowla* at this Court, is become ſo powerful, that he is no longer controllable by the Soubah. This man, who looks for ſupport to our Nabob, and who has a faction in his favour at this Durbar; and our Nabob, who is jealous of the Soubah, and who conſiders a free communication of ſentiments with this Court, without his intervention, as dangerous to his influence; will both of them exert themſelves to prevent my reſiding here. The Soubah and his ſervants ſeem at preſent, from prejudice, to be diſinclined to it; and himſelf, as well as thoſe of his ſervants who are his friends, and wiſh him well, are full of ſuſpicions; I think it therefore very probable, as ſoon as the negotiations relative to the views he has againſt *Hyder*, are brought to a concluſion, that he will give me my audience of leave. If you ſhould be of opinion, that my reſiding here can be attended with any advantage to the Company, ſome ſteps that may be conducive towards procuring the Soubah's aſſent, will, no doubt, ſuggeſt themſelves to you. The Soubah conducts his buſineſs in his own perſon; and as I am allowed free conference with him, without the intervention of an interpreter, I can pledge myſelf for a faithful communication of any repreſentations you may have to make to him on the public intereſts.

I am, &c.
John Hollond.

APPENDIX, No. 124.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations; dated the 1ſt November 1779.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,

Richard Barwell, *Philip Francis*, *Edward Wheler*, } Eſquires.

Sir *Eyre Coote* gone to viſit the different ſtations of the Army.

THE following Letter to *Nizam Ally Cawn* having been prepared by the Governor General, conformable to his Minute of the 25th October, is now laid before the Board, and read:

In the month of February laſt, a Letter was received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, who had been appointed by the Company to manage and tranſact the political affairs of the Preſidency, under the general controul and direction of this Government, informing us of their intention to depute a public Miniſter to your Court, for the purpoſe of explaining and accommodating ſome ſubjects of diſſatisfaction with your Highneſs, and of confirming the ancient faith and alliance between your Highneſs and the Company; and Mr. *Hollond* was ſoon after deputed on this ſervice, with inſtructions conformable to thoſe intentions, namely, to give you the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their deſire to cultivate and preſerve the good underſtanding which had ſo long ſubſiſted between you; to repeat their intention of ſupporting the Treaty of Alliance concluded in 1768; and at the ſame time to expreſs their concern at the arrears of the Peſcuſh, which had been ſuffered to accumulate, and to explain the unavoidable cauſes which had prevented the punctual diſcharge of it.

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He was alſo to make you acquainted with the ſituation of that Preſidency, in regard to the French, which made it expedient for them to enter into a negotiation with *Bazalet Jung*, on particular points, to which Mr. *Hollond* was directed to ſolicit your aſſent and concurrence.

Objects of the nature here deſcribed, were ſo deſirable in themſelves, and ſo conformable to our wiſhes, that they could not but meet with our approbation; and we were pleaſed to ſee them undertaken upon principles, which had no other profeſſion, or apparent tendency, than to ſtrengthen and confirm the obligation of a Treaty already concluded, and, of courſe, not requiring any ſpecial authority from this Government.

Mr. *Hollond* has ſince informed me of his arrival at *Hydrabad*, of the gracious reception which he had met with from you, and of the particular conferences which he had been admitted to, as late as the end of Auguſt.

From theſe I underſtand, the negotiation had been imperceptibly carried beyond the limits originally preſcribed to it; and that ſome propoſitions had been made to your Highneſs, which you had received as demands, and miſconſtrued them into an intention to depart from the Treaty ſubſiſting between you and the Company, although this Government has received no communication of theſe ſubjects, from that of *Fort St. George*; yet, as the ſlighteſt cauſes, if ſuffered to operate, often produce the moſt important events; and as it is my wiſh, and equally that of the other Members of this Government, to remove firſt the impreſſion of a miſunderſtanding with your Highneſs, eſpecially on an occaſion which might reflect upon the Engliſh faith, if it were attended with other conſequences; we have therefore judged it incumbent upon us, to interpoſe our authority and mediation, to recall the negotiation, on the part of the Government of *Fort Saint George*, to the terms of their original inſtructions; and to remove the doubts to which the paſt may have given birth in your breaſt, by informing you, that the Government of *Fort Saint George* hath never entertained an idea of the intention which ſeems to have been imputed to them; if they had, they would certainly have informed us of it, as ſuch a deſign could not be carried into execution, nor the Company's name pledged to any new engagements, without the knowledge and ſanction of this Government, by the controlling powers which it poſſeſſes over the other eſtabliſhments, of which you were early and formally adviſed, on their firſt inſtitution. And, for the ſame reaſons, we have written to Mr. *Hollond*, and required him to ſuſpend the buſineſs of his commiſſion, until he ſhall have received further inſtructions from his immediate conſtituents; in conſequence of which, a Letter has been written to them from hence.

After ſuch demonſtrations of the ſincerity of my friendſhip and attachment to your Highneſs, and of the zealous reſpect which this Government maintains to the faith of its Treaties, I ſhall hope to receive as ample and ſatisfactory proofs of your reſolution to maintain the ſame inviolable on your part.

For the reſt, I refer you to Mr. *Hollond.*

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APPENDIX, No. 125.

APPROVED the foregoing Draft, and ordered, that it be ſent to the Perſian Tranſlator.

The following Letters are accordingly written to Mr. *Hollond*, and to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*.

Sir,

The Governor General having laid before us your Letter of the 3d of September, with the ſeveral Papers encloſed in it, we obſerve, that a line had been preſcribed for your negotiations in the laſt orders which you received to that date, differing very eſſentially from your original inſtructions, and in its conſequence tending to create a rupture with *Nizam Ally Cawn:* we have therefore deemed it incumbent upon us to endeavour, by a timely interpoſition, to prevent any ſuch miſunderſtanding, for which purpoſe we encloſe a Letter to him from the Governor General, which we deſire you will immediately deliver.

A Tranſlation of it is likewiſe encloſed for your information, and we direct that you ſuſpend your negotiations, until you ſhall receive further orders from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort St. George*, to whom we have written more fully on the ſubject.

We are, &c.

Fort William,
the 1ſt November 1779.

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Gentlemen,

THE Governor General has laid before us a Letter which he has lately received from Mr. *Hollond*, your Miniſter at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam ul Muck*, dated the 3d September; which contains matters of ſo great importance to the general intereſts of the Company, as, in our judgment of them, to require our immediate interference.

We impute it to an official omiſſion, that we have never yet received the regular information of Mr. *Hollond*'s appointment, of which the firſt notice was conveyed to us by an early Letter, addreſſed by him to the Governor General, with a copy of his inſtructions. We were indeed adviſed in your Letter to us, of the 7th February laſt, that you had appointed a Miniſter to this Court, for the ſpecial purpoſes of facilitating the acquiſition of the Guntoor Circar, and generally to confirm the Nabob in the intereſt of your Government. Such alſo we underſtand to have been the ſubſtance of your inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, from the Governor General's recollection of them, theſe having been by ſome accident unfortunately miſlaid, with an explanation in addition to them, of the cauſes which had compelled you to withhold the regular payment of the Peſcuſh due to the Nabob by Treaty for the Northern Circars, and a promiſe of diſcharging the arrears, and greater punctuality in the future payment of it.

Such were the original objects of this deputation, and they appeared to us to have been moſt wiſely and ſeaſonably adapted, both to the relation in which we ſtood to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and to the general exigencies of our affairs, at a period when, as you very juſtly obſerve, we were engaged in a War, which acquired ſpecial ſanction from the controlling powers which are veſted in this Government; and we patiently waited the iſſue of it, in the perſuaſion that the ſame prudence which planned, would direct the execution of it to the moſt happy termination. We are not ſufficiently acquainted with the progreſs of this buſineſs to diſcover the intermediate cauſes which ſeem imperceptibly to have led the negotiation into a very different channel; but we perceive, by the copies of Mr. *Hollond*'s lateſt correſpondence with you, to the beginning of September, that the firſt objects of it have been totally dropped, and new points introduced, which have given great offence to the Nabob, and have even been conſtrued by him as a reſolution on your part to violate the Treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company. We allude chiefly to your demand for a remiſſion of the Peſcuſh, which, from the urgent and pointed terms in which it was conveyed, accompanied with a denial of the right on which it was originally founded antecedently to the Treaty, and the affirmation of utter inability to diſcharge either the arrears or current payments of it, and without any compoſition or condition offered to engage his compliance with it, did too ſtrongly warrant the conſtruction which the Nabob appears to have given to it, not as an implied, but decided reſolution, from which you could not afterwards depart without hazarding the imputation of inability to ſupport it. What impreſſion your laſt propoſal may have made upon the mind of the Nabob, we are yet unacquainted with; but if they are communicated to him with the declaration and defiance with which you conclude your inſtructions upon them to Mr. *Hollond*, we fear they may yet fail of their effect, and the candour which dictated them be miſunderſtood.

Excluſively of any other conſiderations, we ſhould be exceedingly concerned at a rupture grounded on ſuch a plea, as it would ſeverely reflect upon our national faith, and require a long tale, to which the world in ſuch circumſtances never attends, to convince it, that the charge was without foundation.

Neither do we think it prudent in the preſent ſtate of our affairs, to expoſe them to the hazard of a rupture with a power which at any other time we ſhould have held in much lighter eſtimation than we now do, with ſo many weighty concerns upon our hands, which will ill bear this addition to them. In this delicate criſis, we have judged it expedient and incumbent upon us, to interpoſe our mediation and authority, to prevent the conſequences, which appeared to us inevitable to one ſide or other without ſuch an intervention, and we have choſen ſuch means for this purpoſe, as appear to us moſt likely to produce their effect, and at the ſame time to retrieve the credit of your Government without occaſioning any diminution of its influence. We have written a ſhort Letter to Mr. *Hollond*, in which we have deſired him to ſuſpend this negotiation until he ſhall receive further inſtructions from you; and to the Nabob we have written, though more at large, to the ſame effect: for your information, we tranſmit you an Engliſh copy of this laſt Letter, which will ſufficiently point out the line, which we wiſh to have obſerved in your future inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, and we require your ſtrict conformity to it.

We are, &c.

APPENDIX, No. 127.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, 17th January 1780.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident,
Richard Barwell,
Philip Francis,
Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on a viſit to the different ſtations of the Army.

READ the following Letters and Encloſure, from Mr. *Hollond*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I received your Letter of the 1ſt November, on the 29th of the ſame month; and not having been able to ſee his Highneſs the Soubah on the day following, I delivered it to him on the 1ſt inſtant. His Highneſs expreſſed

preſſed very great ſatisfaction on reading it; and I have ſince been waiting his anſwer, which I applied to him for on the 6th inſtant; his Highneſs *promiſed* to ſend it to me immediately, but not having yet received it, I think it neceſſary to inform you, without further delay, of my having complied with your orders.

Hydrabad, I remain, &c. &c.
December 8, 1779. *John Hollond.*

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Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I Herewith tranſmit you his Highneſs the Soubah's Anſwer to the Letter which I had the honour to deliver to him, encloſed to me in yours of the 1ſt November.

Hydrabad, I am, &c. &c.
December 18, 1779. *John Hollond.*

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan.*

Your gracious Letter under date 25 Shawaul, 6 November, to this purport, that the Governor and Council of *Madras* had deputed Mr. *John Hollond* to *Hydrabad*, to explain to me thoſe points which might tend to ſtrengthening our friendſhip, after having informed you of it, and that whatever that Gentleman has mentioned further than what they may tend to this end, is contrary to the intentions and permiſſion of the Council, that you have therefore directed the Governor and Council of *Madras* to attend particularly to this matter; and that you have written to Mr. *Hollond* to put a ſtop to his negotiations till he ſhall receive explicit Letters from *Madras*, was delivered me by that Gentleman; and from the contents of it, I received great ſatisfaction.

Friendſhip and faith to their Treaties in the Engliſh Company, have been, from the beginning, the admiration of all the rulers, and I, after the concluſion of the Treaty in 1182, from my own experience, found this maxim of the whole world to be true. At the time of your coming to the Government in that quarter, and the ſuperintendence of the affairs of all the Engliſh Settlements, and of your writing to me, that you had learnt from all quarters, and by the actual ſituation of affairs, the firmneſs of our friendſhip: you were made particularly acquainted with the negotiations, which, with the approbation of the Governor and Council of *Madras*, had been entered upon between the Company and this quarter. I alſo gained information of the ſituation of all matters from Colonel *Upton*, when on the breaking out of *Ragonaut Row*'s quarrel, with the circar, he came here in his way to *Poonah*, to ſettle the negotiations between *Row Pundit Purdhan Mahdo Row Narrain*. But that of late, many evident infringements of the Treaty ſhould have ariſen, is matter of the greateſt aſtoniſhment to any one who reflects on the former alliance and eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the Company.

Whatever I diſcovered on the ſubject of *Ragonaut Row*, I formerly wrote to you, and now encloſe a copy of it, and you wrote to me in anſwer, that the negotiations and tranſactions of the Engliſh Company were the ſame, and that no alteration or infringement ſhould be ever made in the Treaties entered into by the Governor and Council of *Madras*; but whatever has happened contrary to this declaration, is of no conſequence to be repeated, ſince *Ragonaut Row* is now in the ſame ſituation in which he was formerly.

Mr. *Hollond*, upon his arrival here, requeſted me, contrary to all right, to annul the ſmall Tribute for *Rajemundery*, and the other circars, for which, formerly, I received from that quarter, lacks of Rupees, the particulars of which I before informed the Company of, in an encloſed paper; and for which, ſince, I have not received altogether, a tenth part of what I formerly did; and the Governor and Council of *Madras* have, by violence, ſeized the Circar *Murtazanagur*, which, by the Treaty, belonged to my Brother *Ameer ul Omrah, Sujah ul Mulk Bahader, Bazalet Jung.* Reflect now, what can be concluded from ſuch conduct, except a breach of the Treaty. I accordingly wrote to you the 2d Rejib, and the 2d Ramzaun, all the particulars, by two Hircarrahs, together with a copy of my former Letter. As your anſwer late arriving, and in the meanwhile the violences of the Governor and Council of *Madras* increaſed, I was on the eve of revenging them, as was proper: When your Letter arrived, and on the peruſal of the explicit contents of it, I put a ſtop to my preparations. If what you write is from your *Heart*, and the Governor and Council of *Madras* will remain ſtrict to the Treaty and Alliance, and give over all further demands to have the Tribute to the circar annulled, and will relinquiſh poſſeſſion of the Circar of *Murtazanagur*, it is well; if they will not, I have nothing of more conſequence, than the preſerving and defending my Country; and the ſpark of diſpute and enmity will be raiſed to a flame. That I have overlooked and connived at the provocations which have been given me, and which I before informed you of, was owing to my deſire to preſerve the Treaty, not to my inabilities to revenge myſelf. By the bleſſing of God I am prepared, and am in no want of aſſiſtance. The Rulers of *Poonah*, whoſe dignity and exalted ſtate of power is owing to my protection and aſſiſtance, are attached to me, and would ſupport me to the utmoſt, and *Modajee Booſla* is my Ally, and is as one with the Rulers of *Poonah*; and *Hyder Naige*, who entertains enmity againſt the Engliſh Company, having lately entered into a Treaty with the Poonah Miniſters, agrees with us in all matters.

Do you, who are prudent and foreſeeing, and able to determine on the *right Plan*, reflect maturely upon theſe circumſtances, and conſider attentively in your mind, that it is from this new line of conduct of the Engliſh Company, that the foundations of enmity have been laid in the whole Country of *Indoſtan*; and ſhould your views be hoſtile, which appearances ſeem to point out as immediately impending, let not the time be loſt in fruitleſs pretences, but whatever is proper to be written, do you write to the Governor and Council of *Madras* without delay. Further particulars will be made known to you, by the Letters of Mr. *Hollond*, who, agreeable to your's, remaining ſilent till the arrival of the explicit directions from *Madras*.

My views and ſole deſire, which you requeſt of me to write to you, are, that no infringement be made in the Treaties between me and the Company, and that our friendſhip and alliance may remain firm and ſtedfaſt. Knowing my anxiety, write without delay, anſwers to my former and preſent Letters.

A true Copy.
Edward Colebrooke,
Pr Tranſlator.

Read another Letter from Mr. *Hollond*, as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

His Highneſs, the Soubah, at the time of delivering me the Letter which I had the honour to tranſmit to you on the day I received it, expreſſed himſelf in terms of the greateſt reſpect, and with the higheſt encomiums on the conduct you had obſerved towards him on the preſent occaſion; and added, that from the equity of your proceedings, and the friendly terms of your Letter, he was ſtrongly induced to wiſh you ſucceſs in the meaſures you might determine on, with regard to the Poonah Government, although they ſhould not be entirely conformable to his own wiſhes; he deſired, however, that through me he might, as a friend intereſted in your proſperity, communicate his ſentiments upon the ſubject of the ſyſtem of politics with regard to the Marattas, in which he conſiders you engaged. He began by declaring, if you continued determined to ſupport *Ragonaut Row*, he ſhould not interfere, nor deem himſelf intereſted in the quarrel; but he ſaid he wiſhed you to conſider how troubleſome an undertaking you would have on your

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hands; that the Marattas would never venture to face us in a pitched battle, but would employ their numerous bodies of horſe, in ravaging and laying waſte our Country and in cutting off proviſions; and might, by this mode of War, diſtreſs us as much as by obtaining a victory. *Moodajee Booſla* was now cloſely united with the Poonah Miniſtry, and would take an active part in the War againſt us; that the charge of the War would fall very heavy on the Company, and would neceſſarily be at a great riſk, as our exertions are in favour of a perſon who has neither money or credit to enable him powerfully to co-operate with us: finally, that this very hazardous enterprize was in behalf of one, whoſe treachery and inconſtancy of character was ſuch, as might hereafter bring into danger the advantages we now might hope to reap from our alliance with him. He ſaid, that he was well acquainted with the principle eſtabliſhed among the Engliſh, of granting indefeaſible protection to thoſe who ſought it under their flag; that we therefore never ſhould, in any extremity, be brought to conſent to the delivering *Ragonaut Row* into the hands of the Poonah Miniſters; that poſſibly there might not be the ſame objection in putting *Ragonaut Row* under his protection; that by doing ſo, there would be a termination of the preſent troubles; and that *Ragonaut Row* ſhould have an annual allowance from him, of two or three lacks of Rupees, for his maintenance and ſupport.

I did not think it neceſſary to give the Soubah my opinion of this propoſition; neither in communicating it, do I wiſh to be underſtood to have entered into his Highneſs's views; but I have deemed it my duty to tranſmit you theſe particulars, as matters of information, from which, poſſibly, ſome hints might be derived.

His Highneſs the Soubah informed me, he had underſtood from the tenor of your Letter, that the negotiation that regarded the Peſcuſh had originated with me, and that I had not been duly authorized by Government to ſpeak to him upon that ſubject. He ſaid, that as you had ſtated the matter in that light, he had neceſſarily taken it upon the ſame ground; that he ſuppoſed, and was fully confident, your reaſon for charging me with acting an unauthorized part, were founded in ſuch conſiderations, regarding the reputation of our Government, as had made it moſt adviſable that this imputation ſhould be thrown on me: and he was pleaſed to add, that not only the knowledge he had of the ſtrict diſcipline obſerved in our Government, but likewiſe the good opinion he had perſonally of me, would not admit of his ſeeing the affair in any other light. It is conformable to his Highneſs's deſire I have ſtated this circumſtance to you.

I remain, &c. &c.

Hydrabad, *John Hollond.*

December 20, 1779.

Ordered, That the ſubject of the above Letters do lie for conſideration.

Warren Haſtings,
P. Francis,
Edward Wheler.

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Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations the 14th February 1780.

RECEIVED the following Letter and Encloſures from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*:

Gentlemen,

In your Letter, dated the 4th November (the receipt whereof hath already been acknowledged) you are pleaſed to animadvert on our late proceedings for obtaining a remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh due to our Treaty with *Nizam Ally* of 1768, for the Northern Circars; and after expreſſing your apprehenſion of their effects at this juncture, when you have ſo many weightier concerns on your hands, you obſerve as follow: "In this delicate criſis, "we have judged it expedient and incumbent upon us "to interpoſe our mediation and authority, and to pre- "vent the conſequences which have appeared to us ine- "vitable on one ſide or other; and we have choſen ſuch "means for this purpoſe, as appear to us moſt likely to "produce their effects: and at the ſame time to re- "trieve the credit of your Government, without occa- "ſioning any diminution of its influence, we have written "a ſhort Letter to Mr. *Hollond*, in which we have de- "ſired him to ſuſpend his negotiation until he ſhall re- "ceive further inſtructions from you; and to the Nabob "*(Nizam Ally)* we have written, though more at large, "to the ſame effect. For your information we tranſmit "you an Engliſh copy of this laſt Letter, which will "ſufficiently point out the line which we wiſh to have "obſerved in your future inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, "and we require your ſtrict conformity to it."

Before we proceed in our reply to this Letter, it may be proper to mention, that our Preſident has thought it expedient to enter on the Conſultations a very full and explanatory Minute, compriſing not only the whole tranſactions on which your Letter is grounded, but alſo an extenſive view of the preſent ſituation of affairs. A copy of this Paper we now encloſe, by his deſire, and as the manner in which he has handled the ſubject of the Peſcuſh will leave us but little to ſay in this place, we beg leave to refer to his Minute for a particular and circumſtantial account of our proceedings in that affair.

We confeſs to you, Gentlemen, we felt no ſmall degree of ſurprize to find that our endeavours to eaſe the Company, by friendly and perſuaſive means, of a heavy and diſgraceful burthen, ſhould have fallen in your opinion under the imputation of a breach of faith: we cannot conceive how an application to the Nizam, to ſhew the like favour to the Company on this occaſion that he had done to other tributaries in ſimilar caſes, with an expreſs declaration on our part, that we meant to proſecute our claim upon no other footing than that of a requeſt, which he might grant or refuſe as he thought proper, ſhould have been liable to ſo harſh a conſtruction. But you ſay, that "the urgent and ſpirited terms in which "our demands were conveyed, accompanied by our de- "nial of the right on which it was originally founded, "and the affirmation of utter inability to diſcharge "either the arrears or current payments of the Peſhcuſh, "and without any compoſition or condition offered, to "engage his compliance with it, did too ſtrongly war- "rant the conſtruction which the Nabob appears to have "given it," &c. You will be pleaſed to remember, that in our firſt inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, whereon to ground his application, there was nothing at which the Soubah might reaſonably take offence; on the contrary, when we had ſuch good cauſe of complaint as that which he afforded, by receiving the French Troops under Mr. *Lally*, into his ſervice, contrary to the Treaty of 1768, we think the ſtyle of our firſt repreſentation erred rather on the ſide of forbearance than of ſpirit. It was the violent manner in which the Soubah thought proper to receive a requeſt, that occaſioned the ſpirited repreſentations made by Mr. *Hollond*, and our ſubſequent orders to him to addreſs the Nizam in a ſtyle ſuitable to the juſt offence he had given us. When we ſaid, in a former Letter to you, that "we were engaged in a War which "required the exertion of all our force, and the good- "will of every ſtate in alliance with us," we did not mean that the friendſhip of the Indian States ſhould be purchaſed by improper condeſcenſions and ſubmiſſion upon points wherein we had reaſon on our ſide; but that we ſhould not raſhly or unjuſtly provoke their reſentment.

We are extremely concerned that you ſhould have thought it neceſſary to interfere in an affair of this kind; but our feelings are ſtill more affected by the manner in which it has been done. If the credit of this Government were in any ſhape hazarded by an application to the Soubah, which we can by no means believe, the proper way of retrieving it, would have been to have allowed us

to

to withdraw the application; and not by the mode you chuſe to follow, which could poſſibly anſwer no other purpoſe than to degrade our conſequence, and bring us into contempt, where the intereſt of the Company required that we ſhould appear in a reſpectable light.

But ſhould it ſeem to the Company, as we are in no doubt it will, that any interference at all, upon this occaſion, was not juſtified by the controlling powers lodged in your Government, then the manner of doing it will appear ſtill more extraordinary and improper. We have heard, and indeed ſeen upon our own records, during the adminiſtration of Mr. *Whynch* and Lord *Pigot*, ſome inſtances of claims and even acts of power, exerciſed by your Government, which we could never reconcile to the ideas we entertain of your authority; nevertheleſs, our earneſt deſire to preſerve all poſſible harmony between the two Preſidencies, would have kept us in profound ſilence, had we not been pointedly called upon by an overt act of power, ſo nearly affecting us, to declare our ſentiments on this ſubject.

The clauſe in the Act of Parliament, which forms the ſole groundſ of the controlling powers, is in theſe words: "And be it further Enacted by the authority aforeſaid, "that the Governor General and Council, or the major "part of them, ſhall have, and they are hereby autho- "rized to have, the power of ſuperintending and con- "trolling the governments of, and management of, the "Preſidencies of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, ſo "far and in ſo much as that it ſhall not be lawful for any "Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, "for the time being, to make any orders for com- "mencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making War againſt "any of the Indian Princes or Powers, or for nego- "tiating or concluding any Treaty of Peace or other "Treaty, without the conſent and approbation of the "ſaid Governor General and Council firſt had and ob- "tained, except in ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity," &c.

This power, as we conceive, is only a negative reſtraining power, confined to two points, orders for declaring War, or for making Treaties, not a poſitive compelling power, extending to all the political affairs of the other Preſidencies; yet you are pleaſed to tell the Nizam, that we had been appointed by the Company to tranſact the political affairs of this Preſidency, under the "general controul and direction of your Government." We know not what effect ſuch a declaration may have produced upon his Excellency; but this is a power, we ourſelves can only admit to be in the Court of Directors, unleſs it ſhall be proved to us by an Act we have not yet ſeen, that it legally appertains to your Government; and in ſuch caſe you may reſt aſſured, even though we have no regular notice of it, that we ſhall be as prompt in our obedience as we are and ſhall be to the powers which are known to us.

The clauſe of the Act was wiſely intended by the Legiſlature to eſtabliſh among all the Preſidencies an uniform ſyſtem with reſpect to their Wars and Treaties; for before that Act paſſed, it had ſometimes happened that one Preſidency was at war againſt a power with whom another Preſidency was under engagements of peace and friendſhip. This abſurdity is remedied by the controlling authority veſted in your Government, which reſtrains the other Preſidencies, under a ſevere penalty, from making War or Treaties without your previous conſent; but in reſpect to all other matters connected with theſe two points, however nearly they may lead to or affect them, the ſeveral Preſidencies are, as we conceive, left preciſely with the ſame powers that they poſſeſſed before the Act took place, that is to ſay, the powers of governing, directing, and managing, according to their own judgment and direction, under the ſole authority of their conſtituents.

The Act of Parliament itſelf; the Commiſſion of Government under which we act; the Orders of the Company; an expreſs Reſolution made by your own Board in 1775 (which our Preſident has quoted in his Minute) and the reaſon of the thing, all combine to ſatisfy us of this truth.

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We come now to enquire how far the actual controlling power lodged in your Government, authorized your interference in our late proceedings regarding the Peſhcuſh. Finding ourſelves embarraſſed by this burthen, and unable to make the regular payments to the Nizam, we applied at a juncture that we thought favourable, for a remiſſion of the whole, or any part which he might be inclined to give up; and though we had ſo good a cauſe for delaying, or even withholding altogether, the payment of this Tribute, yet we aſked the remiſſion as a favour; and mentioning with extreme caution and delicacy the juſt ground of complaint which he had given us, by publicly retaining in his ſervice the French Troops under Mr. *Lally*, contrary to an expreſs article of the Treaty of 1768; but becauſe the Nizam choſe to conſtrue this inoffenſive, and even forbearing conduct on our part, into a deſign of committing hoſtilities, and to expreſs himſelf in a ſtyle which betrayed more weakneſs and folly, than of any purpoſe from which we might apprehend danger, you are pleaſed, without even requiring the leaſt information or explanation from us, to interpoſe your authority (as you term it) by writing at once to the Nizam, and telling him, that we had acted in this caſe without your knowledge or ſanction; and that he was not to regard any thing we had done: this was indeed giving to the Nizam a complete triumph over us: but how was it effected? it was effected, we fear, at the expence of the Company's preſent and future intereſts; it was effected at the expence of that firmneſs, which ought to have been ſhewn in a caſe where the Nizam had infringed an article of a public Treaty; it was effected at the expence of the credit of this Government, becauſe, as we conceive, the point did not come within the extent of your controlling power.

There was no order made or given by us for declaring War againſt the Nizam; we neither made nor gave any order for negotiating or concluding a new Treaty with him; all that we did was, to take advantage of Mr. *Hollond*'s reſidence at the Nizam's Court, to requeſt a favour for the benefit of the Company. The Nizam's compliance would have led to no new Treaty, becauſe we offered nothing to engage it but general expreſſions of friendſhip; but if it had led to a Treaty, there is no reaſon to imagine but that we ſhould have required your conſent in due time, and concluded it in all proper form.

Notwithſtanding the mortification and diſappointment we have ſuffered on this occaſion, ſuch was the reſpect we had for your conſequence, ſo deſirous were we of avoiding, at this time, even an appearance of diſagreement between the two Preſidencies, that upon the receipt of your Letter of the 4th of November, we heſitated not to acquieſce in the part you had taken, ſo far as to write a Letter ourſelves to the Nizam, containing aſſurances of friendſhip and eſteem, and acquainting him we ſhould do all in our power to ſatisfy him in regard to the Peſhcuſh. We have reaſon to believe that the Nizam's reſentment, if he really felt any upon this ſcore, is now at an end; and having ſucceeded ſo well in his firſt appeal from the Acts of this Government, we entertain no doubt that he will riſe in his demands, until every ſource of uneaſineſs and diſcontent, proceeding from your conduct or from ours, be wholly removed.

We are,

Fort St. George, 5th January 1780. Gentlemen, Your moſt obedient humble Servants.

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Minute of the Preſident, delivered in on the 30th December 1779.

THE Letter from the Governor General and Council of

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of *Bengal*, dated the 4th November 1779, gives me no leſs ſurprize than concern; ſurprize, I ſay, becauſe, at a time when we were uſing our utmoſt endeavours to manage the affairs of this Preſidency, and to promote the honourable Company's intereſt committed to our charge, to the beſt advantage, I flattered myſelf, that our conduct had ſome claim to approbation rather than cenſure; and I feel concern, that from the neceſſity of ſelf-defence, I ſhould be forced into an unſeaſonable controverſy with thoſe whom I do not wiſh to have the ſmalleſt appearance of variance with.

The Governor General and Council of *Bengal* have thought proper, in the moſt public manner, to manifeſt a diſapprobation of our conduct: they tax us with an omiſſion towards them, in not having given them regular intimation of Mr. *Hollond*'s appointment to the Nizam's Court; they cenſure the application we directed Mr. *Hollond* to make to the Nizam, for a remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, as a meaſure which tended to produce a rupture with the Nizam; and finally, they have iſſued their orders to this Preſidency, through the channel of a Letter to the Nizam; a copy of which they have ſent us, and require our ſtrict conformity to.

It is my intention to examine minutely, and to anſwer the charges contained in this Letter; but I muſt firſt premiſe, that I think the manner and ſtyle in which it is written, no leſs exceptionable than the matter it contains. The reprehenſion it conveys, I cannot but think an indignity offered to this Preſidency. In caſes where we were ſo unfortunate as to differ in ſentiments from the Governor General and Council, we ſhould receive their opinion and candid advice with pleaſure and due attention, but ſuch dictatorial reprehenſion I think degrading to a Board, veſted with ſo great a ſhare of the adminiſtration of the Company's affairs in *India*, and cannot fail to leſſen in the opinion of the States we are connected with, and of the world in general, the reſpect they ought to maintain.

In the firſt paragraph of this Letter, the ſubject of their animadverſions is introduced by the mention of a Letter which the Governor General has laid before the Council, received from Mr. *Hollond*, our Miniſter at the Court of the Nizam, dated the 3d of September; but as the Nizam himſelf wrote to the Governor General, it appears extraordinary that the Nizam's Letter was not alſo ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Council. This Letter would have expreſſed the Nizam's ſentiments more clearly; but it did not anſwer the preſent purpoſe, as it would have ſhewn that his Excellency was exceedingly diſpleaſed with meaſures purſued by the *Bengal* Government, as ſhall be pointed out hereafter.

As to their complaint of not having received regular information of Mr. *Hollond*'s appointment to the Nizam's Court, I do not comprehend how the Governor General and Council can impute to us an official omiſſion, or indeed an omiſſion at all, when they acknowledge, that in our Letter of the 7th of February laſt, we adviſed them of our having appointed a Miniſter to the Court of the Nizam on ſpecial purpoſes; and in our inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, of the 22d of February, he is particularly directed to convey every neceſſary intelligence to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* as well as to us, and to be as early as poſſible in all his communications to both Preſidencies. Mr. *Hollond* was not deficient in complying, in the moſt ample manner, with this deſire; though the Governor General had unfortunately miſlaid our inſtructions to him. As from thoſe circumſtances it is evident, that in our application to the Nizam, we neither meant to neglect the Council General, nor to take advantage of their want of information of the ſteps we took, I conſider the charge of omiſſion as frivolous, and unworthy of further notice.

But the great object of the Council General's reprehenſion, is the application for remiſſion of the Peſhcuſh, which they alledge as a principal ſource of offence to the Nizam, and tending to bring on a rupture with him. How far he was affected by that application, or irritated by other conſiderations, will appear by the Letter received from Mr. *Hollond*, and by the following Letter from the Nizam to the Governor General.

Copy of a Letter from his Highneſs the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowla*, to the Governor General.

" At the time *Ragonaut Row* ſought for refuge at " *Bombay*, and the Government there gave him pro- " tection, in conſideration of the Treaty ſubſiſting be- " tween the Company and myſelf, by the means of the " Governor and Council of *Madras*, I wrote to you, " that beſides many other things, it was mentioned in " that Treaty, that the enemies of the Circar ſhould be " conſidered as the enemies of the Engliſh; that it was " therefore highly improper in the Government of *Bom-* " *bay*, to grant protection and aſſiſtance to *Ragonaut* " *Row*, whom, conſidering the friendſhip which ſubſiſted " between me and the *Row Pundit Pirdhawn Mahadeo* " *Rownarrain*, I could n t but regard as an enemy.

" You, Sir, write me in anſwer to this, that the " actions of the Company were uniform; that there " ſhould be no deviation from any quarter, in the Treaty " between me and the Governor and Council of *Madras*; " that in the ſame manner as you entertained a friendſhip " for me, you conſidered the *Pundit Perdhawn* as your " friend; and that it was not your intention to break the " union between you and him, for the ſake of *Ragonaut* " *Row*. I conſidered your declarations free from all double- " dealing, and waited to ſee you put your profeſſions into " execution; but every thing that has happened ſince " has been in contradiction to them. To what degree " has not the Government of *Bombay* given aſſiſtance to " *Ragonaut Row?* what have they not done for him? " what happened afterwards, is well known. I regarded " the faith of Treaties, and, truſting to your profeſſions, " I declined giving aſſiſtance to the *Pundit Perdhawn*, " notwithſtanding his ſolicitations, and the friendſhip " which ſubſiſted between us; and before the com- " mencement of hoſtilities, I gave my advice to the " Poonah Miniſters, and prevailed on them to diſmiſs " the French Ambaſſadors, who had come to *Poonah* " with a deſire of ſettling a Treaty of friendſhip with " the *Pundit Perdhawn* and the Circar. I paid no re- " gard to the propoſals made to me by them here; yet, " notwithſtanding all this, I underſtand that the Govern- " ment of *Bombay* have newly taken up the cauſe of " *Ragonaut Row*, whom they mean again to aſſiſt; and " that he is now at *Surat*, with the hopes of being pro- " tected by them; and that Colonel *Goddard* has been " ſent from *Calcutta* to join the Bombay People, for " this end.

" Beſides this, Mr. *Hollond*, who has been ſent to me " by the Governor of *Madras*, amongſt many other " things tending to bring on a rupture betwe n us, has " acquainted me of his being deſirous that I ſhould re- " mit the Peſhcuſh for the Circars; and I find alſo, that " the Governor has intentions of poſſeſſing himſelf of the " Circar of *Guntoor*, which, by Treaty, is ſettled on my " Brother, *Sujah ul Mulk Bahauder Ally*. Theſe things " are unprecedented, and contrary to the Treaty, and " muſt be conſtrued into evil deſigns. I have therefore " told Mr. *Hollond*, that it was plain that ſuch Treat- " ment was founded on hoſtile views. If you are de- " termined, I ſaid to him, to break Treaties, it is well; " you may ſet about it when you pleaſe, and we will go " to war if you think proper: I am ready on my part, " thanks to the Almighty: you have been the firſt to " break the Treaty. Mr. *Hollond* has informed the Go- " vernor of all this; we ſhall ſee what he writes in an- " ſwer.

" By the bleſſing of God, you are a wiſe and conſi- " derate man, and you ſuperintend all the Settlements of " the Engliſh in this country; I have therefore thought " it neceſſary, above all things, to inform you of theſe " particulars. I will acquaint you what happens next,

" Be

" Pe kind enough to anſwer this Letter ſoon, as I am " anxious to hear from you."

The Nizam, in the foregoing, alludes to a Letter from the Governor General to him, a Copy of which he forwarded to me, and is as follows:

Copy of a Letter from Mr. *Haſtings*, the Governor General of *Bengal*, to the Nabob *Nizam ud Dowlah*.

" I have been honoured with your Excellency's " Letter, and underſtand the contents; which have " given me great pleaſure. You therein acquaint me, " that the merchant who went with ſome curioſities " from this, has arrived at your Court; and that you " had given him a full account of the affairs of the " Maratta State, in what manner *Ragonaut Row* had " entered into engagements with your Excellency, and " afterwards treacherouſly murdered *Narrain Row*, to poſ- " ſeſs himſelf of the Government; how he entertained " hoſtile intentions againſt your Excellency, but received " a total defeat; that your Excellency had afterwards " entered into new engagements with the *Pundit Perd-* " *hawn*. Your Excellency is pleaſed to tell me, in " the ſame Letter, that when Colonel *Upton* was at " your Court, in his return from *Porebendar*, after he " had made the Treaty with the Marattas, your Ex- " cellency related to the Colonel the evil deſigns of " *Ragonaut Row*, and in what manner you ſtood en- " gaged with the Maratta Miniſtry; and ſhewed to the " Colonel the Treaties you had made with the Gover- " nor of *Madras*. You ſay, that it is mentioned in " that Treaty, that the enemies of the Circar ſhall be " deemed thoſe of the Company, and that thoſe of the " Company ſhall be deemed thoſe of the Circar; that " notwithſtanding this, we had given aſſiſtance to *Rago-* " *naut Row*, your enemy; which your Excellency was " at a loſs to account for. Your Excellency ſays, in " the ſame Letter, that if we have any diſagreement " with the Maratta Miniſtry, without the participation " of *Ragonaut Row*, it matters nothing to your Ex- " cellency; but if it is on his account that we have " quarrelled with the Maratta Miniſtry, your Excel- " lency will be obliged to give them aſſiſtance, as you " have entered into engagements with them, which " you regard as binding; and that you muſt conſider " us as having infringed the Treaty which ſubſiſted be- " tween us. You add, that you have thought it neceſ- " ſary to acquaint me with all the above particulars; " and alſo, that after Colonel *Upton* left *Poonah*, a re- " port was ſpread, that *Ragonaut Row* was preparing to " return to that place; and the Maratta Miniſtry " thought it adviſable to retain the French Vakeel, " who had come to them; for if the Treaty made with " Colonel *Upton* was adhered to, it was well; but if " there was any infringement on the part of the Engliſh, " an opportunity might offer, in which the retaining " the French Vakeel might be of ſervice to their affairs. " Your Excellency likewiſe mentions, that, notwith- " ſtanding the intentions of the Maratta Miniſtry, as " ſoon as you heard of their keeping a French Vakeel " with them, your Excellency wrote to them, that it " was not proper to keep him, and that accordingly he " was ſhortly ſent away from *Poonah*. Illuſtrious Sir, " the caſe is this: ſomething more than a twelvemonth " ago, a perſon was ſent, in the quality of Ambaſſador " from the French King to the Maratta Miniſtry at " *Poonah*, and a friendly connection between them and " the French. About that very time, we received au- " thentic accounts from *Europe*, that the French King " was ſeeking every means to hurt the Engliſh Nation, " and for this purpoſe has demanded the aſſiſtance of " the Marattas. This was afterwards confirmed, by " our hearing that a Treaty had taken place between " them, by which it was ſtipulated by the French Am- " baſſador, that he would aſſiſt them with a body of " Europeans, and a large quantity of Military Stores.

" After a public Treaty had been made between the " Maratta Government and the Plenipotentiary of the " Engliſh Nation, and every thing had been ſettled " with the conſent of the principal men of the Miniſtry " of *Poonah*; that the Marattas made a Treaty with the " French, I can give your Excellency the moſt clear " and undoubted proofs. It was not long after, that " we received accounts from *Europe*, of our Nation " being at War with the French; I then thought it ne- " ceſſary, from the ſituation of affairs, to ſend a force " to *Bombay*, but not to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*, with " whom this Government has entered into no Treaty. " It was not intended that this force ſhould diſturb or " moleſt the Poonah Miniſters, with whom we were " friends; but it was ſent merely to the aſſiſtance and " protection of *Bombay*, becauſe we conſider it as the " duty of this Government, to protect all the other Settle- " ments of the Engliſh Nation in *Indoſtan*; and there " was reaſon to fear, that the French, who are our " public enemies, or the Marattas, would go againſt " that place.

" If it is true, as the report prevails, that it is their " intentions to do ſo, we ſhall, without doubt, exert " our power to take vengeance of them; and the Poo- " nah Miniſters, by declaring themſelves our enemies, " muſt make themſelves the enemies of your Excellency; " and it will be the duty of your Excellency, in conſi- " deration of your Treaty with us, inſtead of joining " with them, to endeavour, as much as in your power, " to diſſuade them from their evil intentions. If, on " the contrary, it is found this report is falſe, and that " the Marattas entertain no bad deſigns, or that they " have relinquiſhed them if ever they had any, we ſhall " never act in any ſhape which may prove detrimental " to their affairs, but even employ our Army to render " them friendly ſervices. In a word, we are the friends, " of the Paſhwa and Miniſters of *Poonah*, and ſhall ne- " ver deviate from that friendſhip, as long as they ſhall " continue to be our friends. If they declare themſelves " our enemies, we ſhall be under the neceſſity to act as " enemies towards them; your Excellency alſo, in com- " pliance with the Treaty which you quote in your own " Letter, and the conduct you wiſh to hold, will find it " neceſſary to be their friends or enemies, as their " actions deſerve.

" As it is my moſt ſincere wiſh to maintain the friend- " ſhip between us, and adhere firmly to the Treaties " between your Excellency and the Company, I thought " it neceſſary to give your Excellency a full and cir- " cumſtantial account of our reaſons for acting as we " have done; and I entertain not the leaſt doubt, but " your Excellency will, in the ſame manner, act towards " us, in preſerving the friendſhip between us, which " will tend to our mutual advantage. Be pleaſed to " ſend me accounts of your welfare, which at all times " gives me great ſatisfaction. What ſhall I ſay more?"

From the Nizam's Letter, I believe it will appear evident, that the principal cauſe of his diſpleaſure, was the meaſure purſued by the Bengal Government; and that it was not on account only of our application to him, for a remiſſion of the Peſcuſh, that he thought proper to take offence, and to declare intentions ſo hoſtile: it is the ſupport given to *Ragonaut Row*, and the meaſure purſued with the Marattas, that are the principal objects of his attention; for he writes more at large, and expoſtulates more fully on them. But ſince the Nizam has alſo mentioned, as a cauſe of uneaſineſs, our deſign of poſſeſſing ourſelves of the Guntoor Circar, and our application for the remiſſion of the Peſcuſh, I ſhall enter into a full diſcuſſion of theſe ſubjects. As to many other things which he alludes to, as coming from Mr. *Hollond*, and tending to bring on a rupture, ſince he has not ſpecified them, and this Government has not the moſt diſtant idea of what he can mean, I ſhall paſs them over, as the mere ſuggeſtions of a mind diſpleaſed, and prone to complain.

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The Guntoor Circar had long been an object which both the Government of *Bengal* and *Madras* thought extremely proper to get poſſeſſion of, even by force of arms, if other methods failed*. But when the preſent War with France broke out, it became abſolutely neceſſary to ſecure it; for ſuch is the ſituation of that Country, that if poſſeſſed by an enemy, it cuts off all communication by land with our other Circars; and at the very time our Troops were before *Pondicherry*, a French force under *M. Lally*, in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*, continued for ſome time actually in the Guntoor Circar, uſing every endeavour to form an intereſt, and to cauſe a diverſion of our Troops from before *Pondicherry*, for the protection of our Northern Settlements. The Port of *Mootapillee*, in the Guntoor Diſtrict, gave the French an opening into the very heart of the *Decan*, and would have enabled them not only to diſturb the tranquillity of our poſſeſſion in the Circars, but to renew their old connections, and form ſuch alliances, as gave them heretofore great weight in that part of the Country, and would not fail to do ſo again; for I believe it has been generally allowed, that the withdrawing the French force under *Buſſy* from the *Decan*, was one of the moſt impolitic meaſures of General *Lally*'s Government; and that it gave a more fatal ſtab to the intereſt of the French in *Indoſtan*, than even the reduction of *Pondicherry* at that time †. Many repreſentations were made by this Government to the Nizam, for the removal of the French Troops from that part of the country, but in vain; no ſatisfaction could be obtained either from the Nizam, or his brother *Bazalet Jung*; and, ſtrictly ſpeaking, the territory was, by the conduct of the Brothers, forfeited to the Company; for it is expreſsly ſtipulated, that *Shuja ul Mulk* (*Bazalet Jung*) was only to enjoy the Circar as a Jagheer during his life, under certain reſtrictions ſpecified in the Treaty with the Nizam, and in caſe of failure in any of thoſe reſtrictions (which has actually happened) the Company were authorized to poſſeſs themſelves of it: but as we found an opening for a negotiation with *Bazalet Jung*, we embraced this opportunity, and obtained the Circar at rent during his life, on terms advantageous to the Company, and infinitely ſo in point of ſecurity, not only from any attempts from the French, but from the ambitious views, or from the reſtleſs diſpoſition of the neighbouring powers. The policy and utility of this meaſure are ſo evident, that it does not require any further explanation; and as it met, very early, the approval of the Council General, they will not, I ſuppoſe, conſider it as a ſtep that ought in juſtice to have given the Nizam offence, ſeeing the Circar was obtained with the free-will and conſent of *Bazalet Jung* himſelf, who even firſt made the propoſal of renting it to the Company.

I come now to explain the affair of the Peſcuſh, and our motives for wiſhing to procure its remiſſion, and the ſteps we have taken for that purpoſe in the ſeveral inſtructions given to Mr. *Hollond*; and, I truſt, it will appear, that we have not endeavoured, by any means, to involve the Company in a War, as the Council General would ſeem to inſinuate.

It has, on the contrary, been the conſtant object of this Government, to preſerve Peace with all but our national enemies. I have ſincerely lamented every ſtep that has been taken to diſturb the tranquillity of any of the Indian States, when ſo fair a proſpect preſented itſelf to the Company, of almoſt unbounded affluence abroad, and of an undiſturbed commerce, to realize at home, for the national benefit, thoſe riches, which a long ſeries of good fortune and ſucceſs had put them in poſſeſſion of.

I hope I ſhall be pardoned for a momentary digreſſion, when I expreſs how much I am grieved on reflecting that the ſcene is changed, and that the Company's well-founded expectations will be turned to diſappointment: and I ſhall take occaſion to obſerve, that although I am not veſted with any ſhare of the ſuperintending and controuling power, delegated by the act of parliament, yet, as a ſervant of the Company, placed by them in a very conſiderable and reſponſible ſtation, I claim the privilege of offering my ſentiments on the preſent poſture of their affairs. It is a duty I owe to them, to employ whatever knowledge or experience I have acquired, either formerly, or ſince my laſt arrival in *India*, for their information: I ſhall at leaſt derive from my endeavours, the ſatisfaction of ſhewing my zeal for their ſervice, even ſhould I be unfortunately miſtaken in my opinions.

In returning to my ſubject, it will be previouſly neceſſary to take a ſhort view of the ſtate of our finances.

The Northern Circars did not yield the amount of Revenue expected from them. We had flattered ourſelves with an increaſe from that quarter, inſtead of diminution; but the Country had ſuffered from two unfavourable ſeaſons. The Zemindars, from diſputes amongſt themſelves, and miſmanagement, were impoveriſhed; and upon a thorough inveſtigation, were found unable to make good their balances, without the indulgence of time. Upwards of a year's Peſcuſh was due to the Soubah when *Pondicherry* ſurrendered; and this heavy burthen was accumulated without a proſpect of diſcharging it. Our treaſury was entirely exhauſted with the heavy expences of the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, the expedition to *Mahé*, the maintenance of French priſoners, and their neceſſary conveyance from this part of the world, and the great expence of completing the fortifications, which was abſolutely neceſſary to be done without loſs of time, and are now nearly finiſhed. We know not where to look for ſupplies. From *Bengal* we were told not to expect aſſiſtance. The Nabob, from the decreaſe of his Revenues, his diſtreſſed ſituation on account of debts, and the maintenance of a large family, and other cauſes, unable to furniſh us with more than the ſtipulated ſhare of current charges, and a proportion of his balances. The Raja of *Tanjore* pleading poverty, and not keeping up the payment of his ſubſidy, but with the utmoſt difficulty, and conſtantly in arrears, either from his own inability to look into his affairs, or from the miſmanagement of his Dewan. This Government, in ſome meaſure, reſtrained from taking a line which might remedy the evil in the Tanjore Country; or at leaſt if they took ſuch a ſtep, they ſubjected themſelves to the uncertainty of having their meaſures approved of at home; add to theſe conſiderations, that the Revenues of this Preſidency, even on a Peace eſtabliſhment, with the preſent increaſed Force, allowing for the civil ſervice and proviſion for inveſtment, will do little more than anſwer our current diſburſements, and leave this Government without a fund for the events of War.

Thus circumſtanced, although on the reduction of *Pondicherry* the tranquillity of the *Carnatic* was ſecured for the preſent, by the expulſion of our national enemy; yet as there was a proſpect of the continuance of the War in *Europe*, the events and conſequences of which were uncertain, it ſtill became neceſſary to provide for future exigencies. The only means we had to effect which, as we could expect no increaſe of income, were not only to endeavour the eſtabliſhing, as much as poſſible, a plan of internal œconomy, but alſo the preventing our Treaſury from being exhauſted by any demand or diſburſements we could avoid. The heavy Tribute of the Peſcuſh came immediately under the latter predicament; and the obtaining its remiſſion from the Nizam, ſeemed the moſt practicable relief that could, in the preſent conjuncture, be applied to our embarraſſed Treaſury. We were accordingly induced to make the trial of effecting it; and we inſtructed Mr. *Hollond* to uſe his endeavours for that purpoſe, by argument ſupported by the circumſtances of the times, which ſeem to afford a fair opportunity for ſucceſs.

* Vide Letter from Bengal, under date.

† Vide Orme's Hiſtory of Indoſtan, 3d vol.

Indeed

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Indeed it muſt be apparent that we were unable to pay the Peſcuſh; but in our inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, communicated by him to the Governor General, there is another very forcible reaſon aſſigned, beſides our inability, for withholding it from the Nizam, which I ſhall here mention.

The Treaty of 1768 being concluded with the Nizam only, we have hitherto made all our applications, relative to the Guntoor Circar immediately to him, and conſidered him as reſponſible for the due execution of that part which concerns his Brother. Upon this ground, viewing the conduct of *Bazalet Jung* in regard to the French Troops, as an infringement of the Treaty, we judged it proper to delay the pavment of the yearly Peſcuſh to the Nizam, until we could obtain ſome ſatisfaction on that head.

The cauſe of the complaint has never been removed; for when by negotiation we had prevailed with *Bazalet Jung* to diſmiſs the French Troops under Monſieur *Lally*, they marched immediately towards *Hydrabad*, and have been continued in the Nizam's ſervice ever ſince, notwithſtanding our remonſtrances; ſo that the Nizam, inſtead of entering into our views of diſmiſſing the French Troops, has encouraged and protected them. Mr. *Bellecombe* furniſhed Mr. *Lally*, and many of his officers, with commiſſions in the ſervice of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and ſome Letters have been intercepted, which are addreſſed to him as Colonel in the French ſervice, and Commander in Chief of all their Forces in the *Decan*; and under the Nizam's protection, there is no doubt but that they are at this moment conſidered as maintaining the intereſt of the French in *India*.

It will be found upon examination, that the Nizam's conduct has been unfavourable to the Engliſh, from the commencement of the meaſures adopted in favour of *Ragonaut Row*, for he has always been connected with the Poonah Miniſtry, and has generally acted under their influence, but ſtill has ſo far wavered from that connection, through jealouſy of the Engliſh, as to encourage, in ſome degree, the views of *Hyder*, the moſt formidable rival to both. This is the moſt impolitic meaſure he could follow, for it is plain that *Hyder* has views of conqueſt Northwards, and would ſoon poſſeſs himſelf of the *Decan*, were he not to be checked either by the Marattas or Engliſh; the Nizam ſingly being unable to reſiſt him. The following Letters will ſhew the diſpoſition of the Nizam.

Copy of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn*, to *Iſlecher Cawn*.

" It has reached my ears that the Nabob *Shuja ul* " *Mulk Bahauder*, has given up the Circar of *Guntoor* " to the Engliſh, with an intention of making an alli" ance with them, and having a body of their Troops " ſtationed with him; ſuch a ſtep could never be dic" tated by prudence or foreſight. In every part through" out *Indoſtan*, where the Engliſh have eſtabliſhed their " influence, and got a footing under the cover of giv" ing protection and aſſiſtance, experience has ſhewn " what treatment thoſe have met with, who have had " any connection with that Nation. It may be ſeen by " their conduct towards the Nizams of *Bengal* and " other places, whom they have ſtripped of every thing, " and reduced under their authority. His Excellency, " no doubt, did not attend to all theſe conſiderations, " when he thought of entering into a Treaty with them; " for if he had, it is probable he would not have con" ſented to it. It is my opinion, that the Engliſh ſhould " not be allowed to have a footing in this part of the " Country. Time will ſhew whether any benefit ac" crues from it or not. His Excellency might ſettle " things in ſuch a manner, that he would keep poſſeſſion " of the Circar of *Guntoor*: this muſt be done by allow" ing the Killedars of my Country to rent that Circar " from him, which would be paid to him in three Kiſts, " by the means of the houſe of *Wellap Sundes*, the " Soucar; nobody would then dare to attack that " Country. Thanks to heaven my Troops are not few, " and his Excellency would find it more for his advan" tage to apply to me for ſuccour than another. When " once a Treaty takes place between us, no one will " dare to think of diſturbing that Circar. It is in no " ſhape whatever prudent or conſiderate to call the Eng" liſh into that Country. When *Hurry Pundit Purkik* " came ſome time ago, and diſturbed his Excellency's " territories, I expended lacks for the good of his Ex" cellency, and drove away *Hurry Pundit*. If I had " not done it at that time, his Excellency would have " been obliged to comply with the exorbitant demands " which he made.

" It is not in my power to conſent to his Excellency's " giving up the Circar of *Guntoor* to my old and bitter " enemies, for it joins to my country. If the Engliſh " are put in poſſeſſion, his Excellency and I cannot " agree. You, ſir, will explain all this in a proper manner " to his Excellency, and get his leave to come to me, in " order to ſettle this affair.

" What are the Engliſh whoſe name gives ſo much " alarm to the people of this country? How did I en" counter them when I was at War with them! how " often were they defeated by my victorious Troops! " this is well known to every body. Why ſhould they " be ſo much feared, that their protection ſhould be " ſolicited!

" If his Excellency and I are joined we ſhall ſtand in " fear of no one."

Copy of a Letter from the Nizam to *Bazalet Jung*.

" It has reached my ears, that the people about you " have thought it adviſable to let the Engliſh Com" pany have the renting of the Guntoor Circar from " you, and to have a body of Engliſh Troops placed " with you; this I conſider as no proof of your pru" dence or foreſight. You well know the diſpoſition " of thoſe Europeans, who when they once get any " thing in their poſſeſſion, never part with it, as may " be ſeen from what they have done in *Bengal*; and " *Owde Suja ud Owla*, poſſeſſed ſome power while living, " but now the Engliſh authority prevails throughout his " Country, the ſituation his ſons are in is known to all " the world; it is not in their power to recover their " loſt Dominions. *Hyder Ally Khan* can ſcarce be " conſidered in any light but a Zemindar; he " is not ſecure in his poſſeſſions, for we ſhall be able " to recover when our power increaſes, any Countries " which he now takes; but it is highly improper to " throw ſo much power into the hands of the Europeans: " you have done wrong in following this ſtep, for if " ever you ſhould find it neceſſary to call for my ſup" port, it will not be granted you. I now therefore " write to you to let me know what your intentions " are; if you perſiſt in doing this, you will find the " bad conſequences of it. Give me your anſwer im" mediately."

This recommendation of *Hyder* by the Nizam, is in expreſs contradiction to the 2d Article of the Treaty of 1768, which ſtipulates that Bazalet Jung *ſhall neither keep up nor receive from* Hyder Naigue, *any Vakeel or Correſpondents, but live in peace and harmony with the Engliſh Company and the Nabob* Waulau Jau, *and give no protection or aſſiſtance whatever to the ſaid* Naigue, *or any of his people, nor any other enemies of the Company, or the Nabob* Waulau Jau; *but if this Article ſhall at any time be infringed, the Company ſhall be at liberty, by virtue of the Treaty, to take poſſeſſion of and keep the Circar of* Murtazanagur, *in the ſame manner as the other four, and the Nabob* Auſuph Jaw *engages to aſſiſt them therein with his Troops if neceſſary.*

Such is the man we had to deal with; but prompted by the embarraſſment of our finances, and a ſalutary policy to get rid of the burthen of the Peſcuſh, we thought the

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nature, and I may say unreasonableness, (as I shall now endeavour to shew) of the Pescush itself, afforded us a very just plea to expostulate, and endeavour with the Nizam for a remission, if not of the whole, at least of a part of that burthen.

When the Treaty was settled with the Nizam in 1776, an army had been formed to the Northward under General *Caillaud*, to take possession of these Circars, ceded to the Company by the Phirmaund of *Shaw Allum*: a negotiation took place, in which General *Caillaud* was employed on the part of the Company, and a Treaty concluded, in which no mention is made of the Mogul's Phirmaund, but the Circars are received as a grant solely from the Nizam, with a Pescush annexed to them. A quit rent, agreeable to the terms of that Treaty might then perhaps be very proper, when we did not think ourselves sufficiently powerful, or from other reasons did not deem it expedient, to claim them, in consequence of the Phirmaund we had received. But when the 2d Treaty of 1768 was entered into, after the War with the Nizam, in consequence of his having joined *Hyder*, and the former was in no situation to dispute our title to the circars, (as will appear from the first Article of the Treaty, where they are claimed in consequence of the Phirmaund) a Pescush to the Nizam was more than ought to have been granted, for the same Phirmaund that gave the Circars to the Company, gave the *Carnatic* to the Nabob, free from all Tribute or demands whatever, either for arrears or otherwise. In the Treaty with the Nizam of 1768, the Nabob receives the *Carnatic* exactly conformable to the tenor of the Phirmaund, but the Company are burthened with an increasing Tribute, and one of the Circars is allowed to remain as a Jaghire with the Nizam's Brother *Bazalet Jung*. It is very well known, that the Nizam, at the time he made them over to the Company by the first Treaty, received no great benefit from the Circars; the troubles raised by the Zemindars, who all endeavoured to maintain an independency, and the Troops the Nizam was obliged to have on foot, in order to keep these Zemindars in subjection, did not admit of any great surplus Revenue coming into his treasury. Whilst the Tribute or Pescush remained at only two lacks of Rupees per annum, which by the 5th Article of the Treaty of 1768, it did, for the first six years, the burthen was not greatly felt by the Company; but when that Tribute from the year 1774 came to be raised to five lacks of Rupees per annum, and when the Troops, which are necessary to be kept up by the Company, the charges of collections, losses arising from unfavourable seasons, and the failure of many Zemindars, are taken into consideration, the Pescush must evidently appear too great, and its disproportion to the Revenues naturally occasioned the arrears due to the Nizam.

The remission or diminution of those arrears, and of the Tax which caused them, was the object we wished to arrive at, not for the want or desire of bringing on a rupture, but to ease the distresses we labour under; and we endeavoured to attain that end, not by violence or threats, but by representation, and candid rational expostulation, as our several instructions to Mr. *Hollond* will shew.

Extracts from the Instructions to Mr. *Hollond*, under date the 11th June 1779.

" We shall now enter with you, upon a subject which " we have much at heart, and which, by its importance, " well merits every attention we can give to it. The " Pescush settled by the Treaty of 1768, to be paid an- " nually to the Soubah, for the Northern Circars, has " always appeared to us, not only a very expensive, but " in some measure a disgraceful charge upon the Com- " pany, considering the free and unconditional grant by " which the Mogul conveyed those provinces to them. " When we reflect on the power of the Company at " that time, and the inability of the Soubah to make " any effectual opposition against it, we cannot but " consider the surrender of their right to hold the Circars " free of all demands whatsoever, by virtue of the Mo- " gul's Phirmaund; the acceptance of Saned for them, " from the Soubah, on condition of paying him a Tri- " bute, nearly equal to what they yielded him; and the " giving up to *Bazalet Jung*, during his life, one of the " most valuable of those Circars, as very great conces- " sions; any one of which should have been esteemed " sufficient to purchase what the whole only obtained; " we mean the peaceable possessions of the Lands granted " by the Phirmaund.

" If it were thought absolutely necessary to pay any " Tribute to the Soubah, the sum of two lacks of Ru- " pees annually, for the four Circars that we retained, " seems to have been the most reasonable valuation; " and it appears extraordinary to us, that this sum, " which was agreed to be paid for the first six years, " should, by the same Treaty, have been raised, after " that period, to five lacks of Rupees per annum, with- " out the Company's reaping any additional advantage, " to warrant so great an increase. This last sum is, in- " deed, highly exorbitant; and were we even to lay no " stress upon the Mogul's Phirmaund, but attend merely " to the expence and risk of maintaining possession of " the Circars under the Company's authority, we should " deem it unreasonable.

" Seeing then that the Company have, under all " circumstances, made but a disadvantageous bargain " with the Soubah for the Circars: we think it incum- " bent upon us, to embrace the first occasion of re- " lieving them wholly, or in part, from the burthen " they sustain in the payment of the Pescush; and " though we are sensible it must be attended with many " difficulties, we do not entirely despair of success; and " we think the present conjuncture the most favourable " that can happen for the trial.

" We would have you, by degrees, break the sub- " ject to the Soubah; and when you think him suffi- " ciently prepared, we wish you to represent to his " Highness, that although by the Mogul's Phirmaund, " we are entitled to the full and undisturbed possession " of the five Circars therein granted, free of all demands " whatsoever; yet, in consideration of the great respect " which the Company had for his Highness, and their " earnest desire to preserve his friendship and goodwill, " they relinquished, in a great degree, their right under " the Phirmaund, and consented to receive the Circars " as a grant from himself, subject to such stipulations as " have almost annihilated their value: that the very " large concessions made by the Company on that occa- " casion, for the sake of his friendship, must have doubt- " less produced in his Highness the most favourable dis- " position towards them; and upon that presumption " they are led to hope he will re-consider the affair of " the Pescush, and act therein agreeable to the prin- " ciples of reason and equity: that the sum of five lacks of " Rupees, for the circars of *Ellore, Rajahmundry, Musta- " phanagur*, and *Chicacole*, is much more than those " provinces can afford, after paying all the charges at- " tending the collections, allowing for the unfavourable " seasons, the failures of Renters and Zemindars, the " expence of Troops, and the general risk of main- " taining those extensive countries against foreign and " domestic troubles; that till within these last two years " we have, by the means of a long uninterrupted peace " and tranquillity, been able to pay his Highness the " amount of the Pescush regularly; but since it was in- " creased from two lacks of Rupees to five, many cir- " cumstances have contributed to render it too burthen- " some for the Company to bear, and have occasioned " their falling into arrears; among these the great ex- " pences of the War with the French, the consequent pro- " vision necessary for the security of the Circars, and the " failures that have lately accrued in the Revenues, may " be mentioned as the most considerable: that the Pes-

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" cuſh was originally ſettled on the idea of our re-
" maining in the full and peaceable enjoyment of the
" Revenues; and we truſt his Highneſs is too reaſon-
" able to expect from us, at this time of failure and
" trouble, what we could ill afford to pay when the
" Circars were in profound tranquillity, and the Com-
" pany in full receipt of every advantage belonging to
" them.

" If by theſe, and ſuch other arguments as ſhall
" occur to you, the Soubah can be brought to a favour-
" able diſpoſition, in regard to the Peſcuſh, we wiſh you
" to repreſent to him, how very acceptable a thing it
" would be to the Company, to be relieved of this great
" burthen, how thankful they would be for it, and how
" ready, upon all occaſions, to come into the views of
" his Highneſs, and to give him the ſtrongeſt marks of
" their friendſhip and attachment.

" Although our wiſhes extend to the entire remiſſion
" of the Tribute, which we would have firſt propoſed
" to the Soubah, and ſupported by your beſt endea-
" vours; yet, we confeſs, that without ſomething of
" importance to tempt him, we can hardly expect he
" will, at once, be brought to ſo great a conceſſion;
" but we hope, by making the demand at this time,
" that we ſhall the more eaſily obtain what we think we
" have a juſt claim to, which is, a conſiderable abate-
" ment in the amount of the Peſcuſh.

" If therefore the Soubah, after all your endeavours,
" ſhould be diſinclined to remit the whole, we would
" have you try to bring the Peſcuſh back to the former
" ſtandard of two lacks of Rupees, which is as large a
" ſum as the Countries can afford, after the failures,
" loſſes, and charges, they have ſuſtained, and are ſtill
" likely to ſuſtain, during the preſent War; if it be
" poſſible alſo to obtain a proportional remiſſion of the
" arrears on this account, we ſhould be well pleaſed.

" We have written to the Soubah, as you will ſee in
" the encloſed copy of our Letter, on the ſubject of
" the French party under *Lally*; expreſſing our ſur-
" prize at his entertaining them in his ſervice, and re-
" queſting him to ſend them out of his Dominions; we
" deſire you will uſe your endeavours alſo to effect their
" removal, ſince we cannot but conſider them now in
" the ſame point of view nearly as when they were em-
" ployed in the ſervice of *Bazalet Jung*."

Extract from the Inſtructions to Mr. *Holland*, of the 10th July 1779.

" The line you have taken, and the firmneſs which
" appears to accompany your repreſentations to the
" Soubah, are very commendable; and though they
" ſeem for the preſent to have made a ſtrong impreſſion
" on his mind, and to have raiſed a great degree of re-
" ſentment againſt us, we ſtill flatter ourſelves, that in
" the end they will prove ſucceſsful, and obtain for the
" Company more than we could have procured by a dif-
" ferent mode of conduct.

" The effect occaſioned by our firſt demand reſpecting
" the Peſcuſh, is no other than might have been ex-
" pected. We would have you, however, repreſent to
" his Highneſs, that we cannot forbear expreſſing our
" concern at the unfavourable interpretation which he
" has put on our deſigns: that the manner in which we
" have applied to him for a remiſſion of the Peſcuſh,
" is full of reſpect; and ſo far from denouncing the
" ſmalleſt threat againſt him, we wiſh to owe this great
" favour entirely to his generoſity and goodwill, and
" had not the leaſt intention of proſecuting our claim
" upon any other ground; that we appeal to himſelf,
" whether the ſtyle of his anſwer to our demand be ſuch
" as the Company ought in reaſon to have expected
" from a friend and an ally; or whether he has not
" given us too much cauſe to charge him with thoſe
" hoſtile intentions which he would fix upon us? That
" our claim on the article of the Peſcuſh, has ſuch
" foundation in equity, that we cannot relinquiſh it; and
" we ſtill hope his Highneſs, upon mature reflection,
" will be ſo well convinced of it, as to give the Com-
" pany a proof of his friendſhip and goodwill, by com-
" plying with their requeſt.

" If it be neceſſary, from the diſpoſition of his Highneſs,
" or from any new circumſtances which we cannot
" foreſee, to vary this repreſentation, you will act ac-
" cordingly as ſhall ſeem to you moſt likely to anſwer
" our views, in which we ſhall now fully and finally
" inſtruct you.

" As we cannot flatter ourſelves that the Soubah will
" be brought to remit the Peſcuſh entirely, including
" the arrears that are due, we would have you make
" trial of the following Propoſitions, in ſuch order and
" manner as you may deem expedient to obtain for the
" Company, on this occaſion, the greateſt relief that
" can be procured.

" 1ſt. To offer the whole of the balance payable in
" three or four months, on condition that the entire
" Tribute be remitted in future.

" 2d. To offer him half of the balance by bills,
" either on *Maſulipâtam* or the Preſidency, on condition
" that the other half be remitted, and the Peſcuſh in
" future fixed at the ſum eſtabliſhed by the Treaty to
" be paid for the firſt ſix years, which is the moſt that
" the Company can poſſibly afford to pay by way of
" Tribute, even in time of Peace.

" 3d. To offer him the whole of the balance now due
" at two ſtated payments, allowing a reaſonable time,
" on condition that the Tribute in future ſhall be only
" two lacks.

" 4th. To remit the whole of the balance now due,
" on conſideration of our late expences and failure of
" Revenue, and on condition of our paying the Peſcuſh
" regularly in future.

" We empower you to ſettle with the Soubah on any
" of the foregoing Propoſitions, confiding in your zeal
" and attention to the intereſts of the Company, from
" which we expect to derive every advantage that can
" be obtained under the preſent circumſtances; but
" ſhould the Soubah reject all the Propoſitions we have
" laid down, you muſt in that event acquaint him, *that*
" *the Company will pay the balance with the current Tri-*
" *bute, as ſoon as they are in caſh; that they have no de-*
" *ſign to commit hoſtilities upon him, or infringe any of his*
" *rights*; but that they always will be prepared fully
" and effectually to revenge the leaſt inſult that ſhall be
" offered to them.

" We wiſh you to continue your remonſtrances, as
" you ſhall ſee occaſion, againſt the conduct of the Sou-
" bah, in entertaining *Lally*'s party contrary to his
" engagements. We encloſe you a copy of an inter-
" cepted Letter from an Officer belonging to that party,
" which you will employ according to your diſcretion."

The above Extracts contain fully the ſentiments and intentions of the Committee, and I flatter myſelf will vindicate them from the imputation of any deſign to violate treaties, or bring on a rupture with the Nizam. I cannot diveſt myſelf of the conviction, that our claim for the remiſſion of the Peſcuſh is both reaſonable and expedient in itſelf. The annals of *Bengal* ſhew, that the entire ſtoppage of a Peſcuſh, though unconditionally to be paid by Treaty *, is not a novel meaſure. *Shaw Allum* indeed, had no other gaurantee to enſure the regular payment of the Peſcuſh, in return for all the grants he made the Company, but the national faith, which proved then but a ſlender tie.

But the principal objection to the meaſure of the Peſcuſh ſeems to be, that it was undertaken at an improper time; for the Council General do not think it

* Vide agreement between Shaw Allum and the Company, relative to the Tribute to be paid him, dated 16th Auguſt 1765.

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prudent, in the preſent ſtate of our affairs, to expoſe them to the hazard of a rupture with a power, " which " at any other time we ſhould have held in much lighter " eſtimation than we now do, with ſo many weightier " concerns upon our hands, which will ill bear this ad- " dition to them." But who could conceive, that after the credit our arms had obtained in a national War both on this and the Malabar Coaſt, we ſhould be brought to ſo critical a ſituation as to dread the reſentment of the Nizam, whoſe power but a few months ſince was held in ſo light eſtimation: for on an apprehenſion expreſſed by myſelf to the Governor General, that the Nizam might take advantage of the troubles to raiſe diſturbances in the Circars; which was not improbable, when we conſider that Mr. *Lally*, who commanded the French party, would be ready and deſirous of promoting ſuch a plan) the Governor General expreſſed himſelf in anſwer to my Letter in the following terms: " I am not ſufficiently " apprized of the neceſſity of providing an extraor- " dinary defence for the Circars, having no great opinion " of the power of *Nizam Ally*, nor apprehenſive of his " making any formidable attempt to wreſt them from " us." I take occaſion to repeat here, that we had ſufficient grounds to withold the Peſcuſh, from the views and conduct of the Nizam, and that it would have been highly impolitic to have furniſhed, if not a declared enemy, at leaſt a very doubtful friend, with money to be employed againſt ourſelves, and that too when we could ſo ill ſpare it. Nothing can point out more ſtrongly the light in which the Nizam ſtood with the Governor General and Council, than the inſtructions given to Mr. *Elliot* for his negotiations with *Moodajee Booſla*, wherein it is ſaid, " The Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* has " always been connected with the French, and is now " in cloſe union with the Miniſters at *Poonah*;" and at the time theſe inſtructions were drawn up, ſo little delicacy was obſerved on the point of national faith, or of furniſhing tales to the world, that one of the conditions on which we were to purchaſe the friendſhip of *Moodajee Booſla, was the recovery of the conqueſts which have been made from his Country by* Nizam Ally; this was qualified indeed, by directing a reference on the point, if demanded, to the Governor General and Council, *unleſs he* (Moodajee Booſla) *ſhall require it, as an indiſpenſable condition of his forwarding our views in the weſtern part of* India.

The powers veſted in Mr. *Elliot* were diſcretionary and abſolute; and how, in point of national faith, do theſe inſtitutions agree with the firſt article of the Treaty with Nizam in 1766, and confirmed by the Treaty of 1768?

The two contracting parties do, by virtue of this Treaty of honour, alliance, and friendſhip, ſolemnly engage a mutual aſſiſtance, to eſteem the enemies of one the enemies of both, and contrarywiſe, the friends of one the friends of the other. If the former declaration, that the Nizam had always been connected with the French, and was at the time in cloſe union with the Miniſters of *Poonah*, gave ſufficient authority for the beforementioned article in the inſtructions, in that caſe the withholding the Peſcuſh, even forcibly, would have been full as wiſe, as juſt, and as politic a meaſure, as the attempt to wreſt from the Nizam his former conqueſts.

It is now time to finiſh this ſubject, which I ſhall do by obſerving, that ſince, however, the Governor General and Council thought expedient to interpoſe their authority, and to prevent the ſucceſs we might have reaſonably expected from our endeavours to obtain remiſſion of the Tribute, it would have been proper, in caſe the Soubah ſhould peremptorily inſiſt on immediate payment of the arrears due to him, to have pointed out to us in what manner, or from what funds, we were to ſatisfy him; for they acquaint us, the Treaſury in *Bengal* is ſo exhauſted, that they cannot afford us the leaſt aſſiſtance: and I cannot help remarking how miſerably injudicious and unfortunate thoſe meaſures muſt have been, which, by exhauſting our Treaſury, alarming every ſeparate State in *India*, and giving conſequence to the inſignificant, have reduced us, even after important ſucceſſes, to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to a man, whom the Council General themſelves have proved to be ſo much our enemy, and at the ſame time of ſo light eſtimation.

After what has been ſaid, I hope none will think our conduct can rationally be charged with having the ſmalleſt tendency to involve the Company in War, or that there was occaſion for conveying inſtructions to us in trite remarks or ſplendid declamation. I will, however, confeſs the force of what is contained in a paragraph of the Council General's Letter: " the world, on occaſions " of a ſuppoſed breach of national faith, or ruptures " grounded on plans that require a long tale to convince " and vindicate, ſeldom attend to ſuch circumſtances as " may be offered in defence." Nor can this obſervation be more fully verified than it was in the caſe of the Rohilla War, when neither repreſentations, nor the efforts of party, could prevail to wipe off the odium with which it was attended; and perhaps the Maratta War may afford another inſtance for application; but whether it is applicable to our meaſures, the world will judge.

I come now to ſpeak of the laſt paragraph of the Governor General and Council's Letter, and to conſider, whether, in the delicate criſis to which they acknowledge the Company's affairs are brought, they have actually choſen the means that are likely to promote the end they profeſs, which is, to retrieve (as they are pleaſed to expreſs themſelves) the credit of our Government, without occaſioning any diminution of its influence. That the credit this Government have obtained has engaged the attention of that of *Bengal*, evidently appears. If, as they profeſs, they were anxious to ſupport its influence, when the Governor General laid before the Council the advices received from Mr. *Hollond*, why, inſtead of immediately addreſſing the Nizam (without having acknowledged the receipt of any Letter from him) did not they adviſe us where they thought we were wrong, or on what points the neceſſity of the times made it prudent for us to alter our meaſures? do not the laſt propoſals contained in our inſtructions of the 10th July, which Mr. *Hollond* had to offer to the Nizam, leave ſufficient opening for ſuch a conduct on the part of the Governor General and Council, who, by ſo doing, would have continued in our hands the finiſhing the buſineſs which we had begun, and rendered unneceſſary that Letter to the Nizam, which, inſtead of ſupporting the credit and influence of this Government, ſeems only calculated to deſtroy both? Such a mode of proceeding on the part of the Governor General and Council, I muſt obſerve, would have been conſonant to the orders of the Company in their General Letter to *Bengal*, under date the 5th February 1777, Paragraphs the 20th and 24th.—Par. 20th. " But as you muſt have known that it was not poſſible, at the time of concluding the Treaty with *Ragobah*, for the country powers to have been apprized of your authority to controul other Preſidencies, in concluding Treaties, or in making Peace and War; or that our Governors and Councils reſpectively were reſtrained from acting independently in thoſe caſes; and as that Treaty had been formerly entered into by an agent from *Bengal*, and ſolemnly ratified by the Governor and Council, under the ſeal of the Company, we cannot but diſapprove of your mode of interference, by ſending an Ambaſſador directly to *Poonah*, without firſt conſulting the Governor and Council of *Bombay*, and of your determination to diſavow and invalidate the Treaty concluded by them, and alſo of your taking ſuch further ſteps as muſt degrade them in the eyes of the Natives, and perhaps make it impoſſible for them hereafter to conduct our affairs on the Malabar Coaſt with honour to themſelves, or advantage to the Company."—Paragraph,

graph 24th. "This would have been the preciſe line we wiſh to have drawn; and if on any future occaſion you ſhall think it neceſſary to exerciſe the powers veſted in you by Parliament relative to Peace and War, we direct that you purſue the method adopted, when you thought Colonel *Tipton*'s negotiations at an end; and that you contribute all in your power to preſerve to our reſpective Governors and Councils that conſequence which may enable them, on all occaſions, to promote the intereſts of the Company." Inſtead of following the line here pointed out, the Letter to the Nizam breathes a ſpirit of the controlling powers beyond what is lodged in the Bengal Government: the Act of Parliament plainly points out how far that controlling power exiſts; and this Government, ſo far from diſputing or raiſing doubts on it, are deſirous it ſhould take place in its full force; and they have ever, not only wiſhed to co-operate with the Council General in every point relative to the Company's political intereſts, but to receive their opinions upon ſubjects that do not immediately come under the controlling power, a power they have expreſſed a very juſt idea of themſelves in their Conſultations of the 8th November 1775: "Theſe opinions the Board only offer as mediators voluntarily choſen by the parties themſelves; by the Act of Parliament, the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* are enjoined to tranſmit to the Governor General and Council advice and intelligence of all tranſactions and matters whatever that ſhall come to their knowledge relating to the Government, Revenues, or Intereſts of the Company; but no power is given to the Governor General and Council to exerciſe any controul or authority over the other Preſidencies in theſe matters, their power being ſolely confined by the Act to Hoſtilities and Treaties, yet this Board are of opinion, that they have a right to expect an implicit deference to be paid to their judgments on the preſent occaſion, not ſought by them, but brought before them in a ſolemn and deliberate Appeal from the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and the Nabob of the *Carnatic*."

The remark in the latter part of this Reſolution is certainly juſt; for after a ſolemn and deliberate Appeal to their judgment on any ſubject, though not within their controlling power, they undoubtedly had a right to expect that a deference ſhould be paid to that judgment.

The buſineſs entruſted to Mr. *Hollond* was entirely a matter of Revenue; had our endeavour ſucceeded by the application he made, the Nizam might have beſtowed the favour on the Company by a Grant, without a formal Treaty; but if it became neceſſary to form a Treaty, and to pledge the Company's name to any new engagement, we ſhould, in due time, have given the Council general notice of every circumſtance neceſſary for their knowledge, and yielded up to them the honour of putting the finiſhing hand to the Treaty.

In this tranſaction we looked only to the credit ariſing from a due conſideration of the Company's intereſts; and in ſo large a field as the Bengal Government have for acquiring reputation by a proper economy, a frugal management of the immenſe treaſures of *Bengal*, the extenſive line of negotiations entruſted to their care, and a deſire to procure Peace to the Company, and by their weight and influence to preſerve it amongſt the Country Powers: I ſay the ſmall ſhare of honour this Government have within their reach (now that our natural enemies are ſubdued) ought not to have excited either the jealouſy of the Governor General and Council, or their haſty interference in ſo peremptory and impolitic a manner as they have done. We ſhould not have heſitated to follow the meaſures they recommended to us, and had they done it in a manner leſs derogatory to the rank and powers of this Preſidency, it would have carried no leſs weight. But whoever peruſes the Letter to the Nizam, which is pointed out as the guide for our conduct, and the concluding Paragraph of their Letter to us, muſt allow, that the Governor General and Council have choſen an unuſual mode of conveying a Mandate to one of the Company's Preſidencies; and that the Mandate itſelf is a ſtretch of their prerogative. APPENDIX. No. 130

Having now fully replied to every matter on which the Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* called upon us for vindication, I ſhall proceed to conſider a ſubject that requires little introduction, as it relates to what has been diſcuſſed in the former part of this Minute; I mean the War with the Marattas; which, although it originated elſewhere, yet, as it is connected with and affects this Preſidency, as well as every other part of *India*, falls properly within the province of its conſideration. I will venture to ſay, that it is as important and intereſting a War as the Company have ever been engaged in; for it ſeems to ſuſpend every other operation, and has manifeſted to the Country Powers our weakneſs and inability to engage in ſuch extenſive plans of conqueſt. I will view it under the heads of Juſtice, of general Policy, and of temporary Expediency.

In regard to its Juſtice, after the Treaty between Colonel *Upton* and the Miniſters and Chiefs of *Poonah*, in 1766, had been notified, there could be no juſt grounds to quarrel with thoſe Miniſters, unleſs they had committed ſome infraction of that Treaty, or had ſhewn decided marks of an inimical diſpoſition towards us, by the actual commitment of hoſtilities, or by a proved combination with our declared enemies. Neither an infringement of their Treaty, nor the commitment of hoſtilities, is imputed to them; but it is alledged that they gave reception to the Chevalier *De St. Lubin*, who is ſuppoſed to be ſent on the part of the King of *France* to form a Treaty with the Marattas. In the firſt place, I have no proof that Mr. *St. Lubin* was an actual Miniſter from the Court of *France*; at leaſt M. *Bellecombe* was not acquainted with his having any ſuch commiſſion, for in an intercepted Letter from him, in anſwer to one he had received from the Chevalier, recommending the ſending a Vakeel to *Poonah* (which would have been unneceſſary if there had been a Miniſter there) he ſays "that in the preſent ſituation of the French affairs, they were not in a condition to conſider of any great enterprize; that the beſt way was to remain quiet; that the ſteps the Engliſh were following would ſufficiently diſguſt the different States in *Indoſtan*; and that the French might then, at a more convenient juncture, ſtand forth to advantage. We have nothing to do at preſent (ſays he) but to ſtart the game for the Engliſh to purſue." This Letter is in poſſeſſion of Sir *Edward Vernon*; by ſome miſtake a copy of it was not kept in the Secretary's Office.

It ſeems to me moſt probable that *St. Lubin*, who is known to be an adventurer, might, from his own ſpeculation, wiſh to take advantages of the ſituation of affairs, and try to promote the intereſt of *France* by the project of an alliance with the Marattas, which would recommend him to the favour of his Sovereign if he ſucceeded. But on whatever footing he made his propoſals at *Poonah*, it does not appear that they were accepted, or that any ſteps to our diſadvantage were taken in conſequence of them. Although the Governor General, in his Letter to the Nizam, writes, "That the Marattas made a Treaty "with the French, I can give *your* Excellency the moſt "clear and undoubted proofs;" yet in the following part of his Letter he departs from this certitude, and expreſſes himſelf in leſs poſitive terms: "If (ſays he) on the con- "trary, it is found that this report is falſe, and the Ma- "rattas entertain no bad deſigns, or that they have relin- "quiſhed them if they ever had any, we ſhall never act "in any ſhape which may prove detrimental to their "affairs, &c." And this uncertainty is alſo expreſſed in the Council General's inſtructions to Mr. *Elliot*, where it is ſaid, "Or if you are convinced from other circum- "ſtances of the non-exiſtence of the engagements which "we ſuppoſed to have been formed between him (the "Chevalier *St. Lubin*) and the Miniſters, &c." On the other, the Nizam tells the Governor General, "Before "the commencement of hoſtilities, I gave my advice to "the Poonah Miniſters, and prevailed on them to diſ-

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" miſs the French Ambaſſadors, who had come to *Poonah* " with a deſire of ſettling a Treaty of Friendſhip with the " *Pundit Perdhaun* and the Circars." And it is well known that Monſieur *St. Lubin* was obliged to leave *Poonah*, and retire to a Settlement belonging to the Portugueze. This proceſs conveys no preſumption of the ſuppoſed French Treaty. Indeed it is moſt probable, that the ſucceſs of our Arms againſt the French muſt have have rendered the Poonah Miniſtry very cautious of connecting themſelves with a nation whoſe influence and power ſeemed entirely annihilated in *Aſia*. The part the Poonah Miniſtry acted confirms this, for they took no ſteps to impede the march of General *Goddard*. Had they entertained hoſtile intentions towards us, or been diſpoſed to favour the French intereſt, they would have exerted themſelves to prevent the junction of the Bengal detachment with the Forces of the Bombay Preſidency, and in that caſe I do not believe that the detachment, though commanded by a gallant and excellent Officer, could ever have reached *Surat*, nor would the pretence, or maſk, have availed, that the Bengal Troops were ſent " not to aſſiſt *Ragonaut Row*, with whom this Govern " ment have entered into no Treaty," not to diſturb or moleſt the Poonah Miniſters with whom we were friends, (as the Governor General writes to the Nizam) " but " merely to the aſſiſtance and protection of *Bombay*." Had the Poonah Miniſtry been conſcious of deſerving the reſentment of the Engliſh, ſeeing ſuch a military manœuvre, they would have been on their guard, and expected it, and have tried to counteract it; on the contrary, the Marattas ſhewed an extraordinary degree of moderation, to be accounted for only by their deſire of continuing on peaceable terms with the Engliſh: had they entertained views of ſupporting the intereſts of the French, or of leſſening our power and conſequence, they would never have ſuffered the Bombay Army to march back in the manner they did. The Treaty of *Tulicanoor* will ſhew how humiliating a ſituation the Troops were reduced to: the Marattas dictated their own terms, and though they required the ſurrender of *Salſet*, and other Diſtricts before granted to the Company, we do not find, by the accounts from *Poonah*, that they now vigorouſly demand the full execution of the terms of that Treaty, nor would the Governor General and Council be juſtified in ſurrendering up the Countries the Company poſſeſs. But if, as the Marattas give way, we riſe in our demand, and inſiſt on other advantages, and the reimburſement of thoſe expences incurred by a War which they never ſought, and ſeemed inclined to avoid; there is no ſaying to what further lengths the diſpute may extend, nor when we may look for the much to be deſired object, Peace; for as they muſt conſider ſuch a demand as unjuſt to comply with, it will require more than a common degree of reſignation, and a very earneſt deſire on their part to put an end to the troubles which their family diſputes firſt occaſioned, and with which, juſtly ſpeaking, the Engliſh had no reaſon to interfere. There can be no doubt that the Marattas muſt already have ſeverely ſuffered themſelves, from the diſturbances we have raiſed; their Armies have been kept in the field at a conſiderable expence, and they have been obliged to ſuſpend all other operations, and to form alliances, on ſacrificing points they have deemed themſelves entitled to, in order to be guarded againſt our attempts; and it is almoſt certain that they have entered into a Treaty with *Hyder Ally*, their long avowed and inveterate enemy. Nothing could have brought them to ſuch a meaſure, but the deſpair of being able to effect a perfect reconciliation with the Engliſh.

Thus far the ground of a juſt cauſe of quarrel with the Poonah Miniſtry ſeems untenable: the Company themſelves, however, approve of the meaſure, of ſupporting *Ragonaut Row*'s pretenſions to the Peſhwah of the Maratta States. Although it is recommended, yet it is not poſitively ordered, but left to the diſcretion of the Governor General and Council; in their Letter to *Bengal* of the 5th of Februrry 1777, they write as follows:

" You cannot but obſerve that we have hitherto ſuppoſed the affairs of *Ragobah* are rendered deſperate, and that the Miniſters at *Poonah* maintain their ground, and conſtitute at preſent the Maratta Government; we are nevertheleſs of opinion, that an alliance originally with *Ragobah* would have been more to the honour and advantage of the Company, and more likely to be laſting, than that concluded at *Poonah*; his pretenſions to the Supreme Authority, either in his own right, or as Guardian to the infant Peſhwah, appears to us better founded than thoſe of his competitors; and therefore, if the conditions of the Treaty of *Poonah* have not been ſtrictly fulfilled on the part of the Marattas, and if, from any circumſtances, you ſhall deem it expedient, we ſhall have no objection to an alliance with *Ragobah* on the terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council at *Bombay*."

If *Ragonaut Row*'s pretenſions to the Supreme Authority are better grounded by conſanguinity than thoſe of his competitors, it is well known he paved the way to theſe pretenſions by the murder of his nephew *Narrain Row*, which, according to the Chriſtian ideas of juſtice, muſt have greatly weakened, if not altogether cancelled them: if, however, they are ſtill admitted, upon what grounds is the Treaty propoſed with *Moodajee Booſla* of *Berar* to be formed, of [illegible] it is ſaid in Mr. *Elliot*'s inſtructions, "that he h[illegible]g pretenſions, if not a legal right, to " Rauje, [illegible]overeign Authority of the Maratta State?"

To conſider the Maratta War in the light of Policy, it is evident that the reſolution of ſupporting *Ragobah* was founded by the Company to procure an intereſt through him in the Maratta State, that would prevent the eſtabliſhment and encroachment of the French; but if he has no intereſt himſelf there, how can he procure it for us? The Company muſt have believed that ſome part of the Adminiſtration of the Maratta State had made application for our interference, and of courſe that he had a ſtrong party on his ſide. But it ſoon afterwards appeared that no application could have been made by the Miniſtry at *Poonah*; that our Reſidents there had been egregiouſly deceived; that the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay* had been originally miſinformed, and through them the Company had been miſled in this matter. For on the march of the Bombay Troops, not one of the Miniſters ſtood forth in the ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*, not the ſhadow of a party ſeemed formed in his favour; on the contrary, contending intereſt united to oppoſe him as a common enemy. Indeed this appeared plain enough to the Governor General and Council, before the fatal retreat of the Bombay Troops in January laſt; for in the inſtructions to Mr. *Elliot*, dated the 18th July 1778, it is ſaid, " theſe Miniſters appear to us to have all been united in the reſolution of oppoſing the pretenſions of *Ragonaut Row*; he has now no party left amongſt the Marattas, with whoſe aid he could venture to aſſert them." And even *Moodajee Booſla*, who had expreſſed an uncommon eagerneſs for our alliance, although tempted with every offer that could excite either his ambition or revenge, declared, that he could not truſt *Ragonaut Row*, nor involve himſelf in any deſign to which he was a party. In this ſituation the eſtabliſhing *Ragobah* at the head of affairs at *Poonah* by compulſion would require an exertion and force not leſs than ſufficient to ſubject the Maratta Dominions. But this would be a direct deviation from the ſalutary and wiſe plan of policy adopted by the Court of Directors, expreſſed by them in repeated orders, to confine ourſelves to the defence and protection of their preſent poſſeſſions, and not to employ their Forces on diſtant Expeditions, and never to engage the Company in any diſputes between the Country Powers, but to leave theſe Powers to be a check upon one another without our interference. The Court of Directors, therefore, could never mean to involve themſelves in an undertaking of ſuch magnitude, in ſupport of *Ragobah*.

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The Maratta, when united under one head, has long been the dread of every State in *India*; what could be more deſirable than to ſee that Power divided, and ſo waſting its ſtrength in internal quarrels, as to become leſs formidable and dangerous to ourſelves? When they ſhewed no inclination to break with us, and entered into no engagements with our Enemies, I cannot think it conſiſtent with ſound policy in us to follow meaſures that cauſe them to lay their private diſputes aſide, to reunite, and to direct their reſentment againſt us.

If the meaſures we have purſued with the Marattas were, at any other time, leſs improper than in my opinion they are, there are reaſons ſubſiſting that render them at this conjuncture inexpedient, and even inexcuſable. When the Britiſh Nation was involved in a diſtreſsful War, not only with the American Colonies, but with the Powers of *Europe*, the immovable object of our attention ſhould have been the ſecurity of our Settlements and Poſſeſſions; and the great advantage we had to derive from the expulſion of our national Enemies, was eſtabliſhing Peace with the States of *Indoſtan*. We ſhould have uſed all our endeavours to convince them that we were ſatisfied with our preſent dominions, and had no idea of increaſing them, nor of extending influence over our neighbours. That ſo far from harbouring deſigns of invading their territories, we wiſhed to ſupport and protect them; and this line of conduct was the more eligible, as, while it ſtrengthened our intereſt, it not only coſt us nothing, but gave us an opportunity of huſbanding our finances, and of providing a Fund for any poſſible exigence; and then if our national Enemies thought proper to invade us, we had reaſon to believe that the neighbouring Powers would be more diſpoſed to ſupport us, than to give them a favourable reception. On the contrary, by intruding ourſelves in the quarrels of the Powers of *Indoſtan*, we muſt be thought unfriendly, ambitious, and turbulent; and inſtead of making them our Friends, we have rendered them our Enemies. But at this period, the eve of the expiration of the Company's Charter, there was not time for plans, the concluſion and fruits of which muſt be diſtant, and the expence immediate. It was of the utmoſt conſequence to the Company to have a full Treaſury in *Bengal*, as we cannot tell what their occaſions for Money may be: no Wars ſhould have been engaged in, except what immediate ſelf-defence required; no Expeditions ſet on foot to diminiſh that Fund which had been beforehand collected, and on which it is probable a great dependance had been placed. The Proprietors at home have been reſtricted from increaſing their Dividends, that a Fund might accumulate there for particular purpoſes. A Fund was known to be accumulated in *India*; perhaps the latter may have been intended for ſome important uſe: what will our Conſtituents think, when they hear that a very conſiderable amount of that Fund has been beforehand diſpoſed of in a fruitleſs Expedition of the Bengal Troops through *Indoſtan*.

To conclude, I think our meaſures reſpecting the Marattas have been very unjuſt, impolitic, inexpedient, and ruinous: I think an end ſhould be put to the War as ſoon as poſſible. From their backwardneſs to quarrel with us, I hope a reconciliation may yet be effected, and they are the Nation from whoſe alliance we have the moſt advantage to expect, and who are the moſt likely to be a check on thoſe who are hoſtile to us; I ſhall then rejoice to ſee that ſyſtem purſued which will be the moſt conducive to the intereſts of the Company and Nation.

After having thus fully given my ſentiments on the ſeveral points mentioned in a former part of my Minute, whatever may be the opinion of the Committee, however we may feel ourſelves hurt by the proceedings of the Council General relative to our Inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, or whatever proſpects of advantage to the Company we may ſuppoſe are fruſtrated, I ſtrongly recommend that we do not ſuffer any circumſtance to interrupt the harmony that might ſubſiſt between the two Preſidencies. It was with this view that, in conformity to the wiſhes of the Council General, I immediately adopted their ſentiments, and moved in the laſt Committee for the recal of Mr. *Hollond*, and that a Letter ſhould be wrote to the Nizam, to aſſure him of our firm intentions to preſerve the Friendſhip ſubſiſting between his Highneſs and the Company; that we never entertained any other deſign; and that his ſuppoſing to the contrary muſt have ariſen from ſome miſtake: for whatever our particular ſentiments may be, it is a duty incumbent on us to make the co-operating with the Council General our firſt conſideration, and to adopt every idea of theirs that may lead to Peace, in order to remove, as far as depends on us, every embarraſſment which the late meaſures may have brought on the affairs of the Company. But at the ſame time that I recommend this to the Committee, and mean heartily to join with them in it, it is nevertheleſs my wiſh, that the ſentiments I have expreſſed in this Minute may be known to the Council General and to the Company, by being tranſmitted in our diſpatches to both. To the Company it is no leſs my duty than my inclination to offer my opinion on their affairs in every department of the Service; and by the controlling Power veſted in the Governor General and Council, I am bound to obey their Inſtructions on certain points, and ſhall always, readily and with pleaſure, comply, as far as that Power goes, even to an extreme idea of it: ſtill I claim a right, at the time I receive and put their directions into execution, to ſtate my ſentiments on them to this Committee, and to themſelves, if neceſſary, and to proteſt againſt the conſequences where I apprehend they may be attended with danger or detriment to the true intereſts of the Company. The diſpute with the Marattas is likely ſo materially to affect this Preſidency, as well as other parts of the Company's poſſeſſions, that I ſhould be in ſome degree culpable not to expreſs my ſentiments on it, when drawing to ſuch ſerious lengths.

Since writing the foregoing part of this Minute, I have received a Copy of the Nizam's Letter to the Governor General, in Anſwer to one the Nizam received from him on the ſubject of the Peſhcuſh.—*Letter from the Nabob* Nizam ul Dowlah *to the Governor General*, Mr. Haſtings:——This Letter is entered in Conſultation the 17th January.

I am apprehenſive from this Letter, that as we give up points, the Nizam will riſe in his demands, and at any rate come to an open rupture with us, in caſe affairs are not accommodated with the Marattas. On that depends the line he will follow, being, notwithſtanding the pompous language he makes uſe of, no further to be conſidered than as an auxiliary, whoſe conſequence will increaſe from our contention with much more powerful States; and ſhould we comply with his requiſition to give up the Guntoor Circar, which we have in the moſt unexceptionable manner obtained on *Bazalet Jung*'s own offer to us, it may be attended with very diſagreeable conſequences. The Governor General and Council ſhould be fully acquainted with the neceſſity there is for our obtaining it; for from its ſituation were that Circar in poſſeſſion of an Enemy, our communication by land will be entirely cut off with the others, and even a part be open to the French, ſhould they make any attempt in that quarter. The Nizam takes no notice of the French Troops in his Service; but it is to be hoped that the Governor General and Council will ſtrengthen our remonſtrance relative to them.

The Nizam in his Letter mentions the Treaty formed between the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*, which plainly ſhews the combination that has been entered into; and I am apprehenſive, that unleſs Peace takes place with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, that neither the payment of the Peſhcuſh, nor any other conceſſion on our part, will prevent him from joining to diſtreſs us as much as poſſible.

A true Copy.

(Signed) *D. Braine*, Sec^r.

APPENDIX. No. 131.

APPENDIX, No. 131.

The Governor General.

I HOPE it will not be thought neceſſary for the Members of this Government, or for myſelf particularly, to engage in a controverſy with the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* in the juſtification of our meaſures, which they have thought proper to arraign. I hope that the Board will, on this occaſion, alſo join with me in referring theſe extraordinary performances to the conſideration of the Court of Directors, that they may take ſuch meaſures as they in their wiſdom may think neceſſary for preſerving the dignity of this Government from ſuch inſults in future, as can only tend to involve the two Preſidencies in an altercation as dangerous as unbecoming.

The Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* detains our Recruits under the pretence of ſickneſs; and before the departure of the Ships that brought them to *Madras*, incorporates them with their own Troops. When we remonſtrate on this proceeding, point out to them the inſufficiency of our European Force for the defence of *Bengal*, and deſire the Recruits may be ſent to us, they elude our demands; tell us, in very groſs language, that they are entirely on terms of equality with us, and oſtentatiouſly remind us of the honours they have received from the capture of *Pondicherry*.

When we are obliged, from neceſſity, to interfere in their negotiations with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, in conſequence of information tranſmitted to us, at their own deſire, by a Miniſter they had deputed to *Hydrabad*, their Preſident ſends us a long ſtricture of the juſtice and expediency of the Maratta War, with alluſions to the conduct of this Government on points which unhappily were the ſubjects of long contentions between the Members of this Board, obviouſly for the purpoſe of engaging a party in this Board to the attack upon its Authority.

I will not depreciate the ability of the oppoſition which thoſe meaſures have formally received, nor their merits, after ſo long a diſcuſſion as they have already undergone, by making any reply to the objections of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. Let them have the full weight they may be thought to deſerve, by thoſe for whoſe peruſal they may be intended.

I propoſe, That the Secretary be ordered to prepare, to be tranſmitted to the Court of Directors, Copies of our Letters to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, and of theirs to us; the Governor General's correſpondence with *Nizam Ally Cawn* and Mr. *Hollond*; and our Minutes upon the ſubject of his Negotiation, with a Narrative connecting the different parts of it.

APPENDIX, No. 132.

RESOLVED, That the following Letter be written to *Fort Saint George:*

Gentlemen,

We have received your Letters of the 31ſt December and 15th ultimo.

We return you thanks for the great readineſs which you have ſhewn to co-operate with us in the proſecution of our meaſures on the other ſide of *India*, by detaching a reinforcement of your Troops to join General *Goddard's* Army at *Surat*, in lieu of thoſe under the command of Colonel *Brathwaite*, which had been unexpectedly diverted from this Service. We have no doubt that the number you informed us you propoſed to ſend will be fully ſufficient.

We come now to reply to your Letter of the 15th of January. We ſhall not diſpute with you the right of this Government to interfere in ſuch of your political matters as tend to diſturb the peace of *India*, or Treaties ſubſiſting with other Powers, while you think proper to yield to the exerciſe of it; and hope that we ſhall not be compelled to the diſagreeable neceſſity of enforcing it. One general obſervation, however, we ſhall ſtate in this place on the ſubject of Negotiations, whether of a hoſtile or pacific nature, undertaken by the ſubordinate Preſidencies with any of the Country Powers, without the previous knowledge and conſent of this Government; and we ſtate it, not ſo much with a view to its being applied, as it might be, to the caſe now before us, as to meet the general and dangerous doctrine which we conceive is implied in that paragraph in your Letter, which ends with the following words: "But if it had led to a Treaty, "there is no reaſon to imagine that we ſhould not have "required your conſent in due time, and concluded it in "all proper form."

When all the previous ſteps are once taken, which neceſſarily lead to the concluſion of a Treaty, and which, if not productive of ſuch a concluſion, muſt be deemed nugatory in themſelves, and offenſive to the other contracting Party; the requiſition of our conſent to the Treaty becomes a mere formality, and in effect leaves us no option. If this obſervation be true of negotiations of a pacific nature, it holds much more ſtrongly, and becomes of infinitely greater importance to the common intereſt of the Britiſh Empire in *India*, when applied to acts done, or declarations made, by the ſubordinate Preſidencies, which, without literally denouncing War, tend directly to provoke it, or to render it inevitable: under the Letter of the Act of Parliament, they are then to defend themſelves againſt hoſtilities which they have themſelves excited, or which they may profeſs to expect. But defence in many caſes ſuppoſes the neceſſity and includes the authority of acting offenſively; and a War may be actually begun before this Government has time to interpoſe. By means ſuch as theſe the Governor General and Council may, in every inſtance, be deprived of the powers veſted in them by Parliament; or, which amounts to the ſame in effect, their advice and conſent may never be deſired, until it muſt arrive too late to prevent the operation of ſteps already taken.

Reſpecting the other ſubjects of your Letter, and the voluminous Minute of your Preſident, as we cannot apply them to any advantage, either of our own meaſures or yours, and as we do not know for what purpoſes they were addreſſed to us, unleſs for that of gratifying a reſentment excited by the part which we have lately taken in your negotiations with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, a part to which our duty and ſtrong neceſſity impelled us; we ſhall make no reply to them; but if you are ſincere in your profeſſion, of a deſire to avoid every circumſtance which may interrupt the harmony which might ſubſiſt between the two Preſidencies, we hope that you will confine your correſpondence with us to ſuch points only as relate to your own concerns; and reflect, that your cenſures on our acts, as they are irregular and highly unbecoming the relation of your Government to ours, and muſt be in every inſtance liable to erroneous concluſions, whether derived from falſe or defective materials, or from both, as in the inſtance now before us, and cannot fail to recoil upon yourſelves.

We are willing to allow you all the credit which is your due for the proſperous ſtate of your Preſidency; but you muſt leave to us the choice of the meaſures which depend ſolely and excluſively on our Government, and to a higher and competent authority to judge, and to decide on the propriety of thoſe which have a relation to *Shaw Allum*, the Rohillas, and the Marattas; or any other ſubjects which do not appertain to your authority, and of which you do not poſſeſs any authentic information.

We are, &c.

Read a Letter from the Nabob *Nizam Ally*, received and entered in the book of Perſian Correſpondence, the 7th inſtant.

From

APPENDIX No. 132.

From the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan.*—Received 7th February 1780.

In anſwer to the Letter dated the 25th of Shawaul, 6th November, which was delivered to me on the 22d Zepaida, 2d December, by Mr. *Hollond*, I wrote on the laſt of the ſame month all the particulars of our friendſhip and alliance, and all circumſtances both good and bad, and made Mr. *Hollond* acquainted with them, who will alſo have written them to you. Accordingly that Gentleman, in obedience to your commands, put a ſtop to his former negotiation, and remained ſilent in expectation of Letters from *Madras*; and I, conſidering that you have the ſupreme power over all the Engliſh Settlements, and that your Orders would never be diſobeyed, was certain that the Governor and Council of *Madras*, from dread of diſobeying your directions, would remain ſtedfaſt in the former conditions. On the 2d Mohirram, 10th January, Mr. *Hollond* waited upon me, and informed me of his having received Letters of Recal, and preſented me a Karitah, a Copy of which is encloſed, and the Contents of which you will underſtand. I have alſo learned from other quarters, that the Governor and Council of *Madras* have not aſſented to what you have written, and that they are diſpleaſed with Mr. *Hollond* for having informed you of the ſituation of affairs after his arrival here. What difficulties did not the Governor and Council of *Madras* make about ſending Mr. *Hollond* hither? and at laſt, without my conſent, and even contrary to my intentions, ſent him to remain continually with me: and now that negotiations on many points are depending, they, without giving me information of it, and without any reaſon, recal him. From hence I am certain, that whatever I have heard is true; and if it is true, it is matter of great aſtoniſhment to me; ſince how will theſe negotiations or affairs of ſuch moment be carried on? I was before employed in negotiations on Peace and War with the Governor and Council of *Madras*, and from the former and preſent Letters in which you frequently wrote to me on the ſituation of the quarter, on your keeping ſtedfaſt to the Treaties and Engagements of the Company, and your having the ſuperintendance of all the Engliſh Settlements, I diſcover that you have really that authority; what power then can the Governor and Council of *Madras* have to diſſent from what you direct in your Letters, and to be diſpleaſed with Mr. *Hollond* for having written you the particulars of this quarter? and how can I be ſatisfied in the affair of the Money from the Circars, and in many other matters of which they write? Nor can I know to whom the power of conducting theſe matters is given by the Company; if it depends upon you, and you ſhould be willing to proſecute the negotiations, you ſhould ſend a perſon from your quarter. Whatever way it ſhall appear beſt to you, you muſt reflect on it; ſince it is neceſſary I, after having diſcovered the infringements of the Governor and Council of *Madras*, which have been particularly explained to you, merely on account of your Letters, delayed the revenging and puniſhing them; for the deſire of my heart is to ſtrengthen the Treaties and to increaſe the intimacy of our connection; but lately many things have happened; and beſides, I cannot be negligent and overlooking in my affairs. It is neceſſary that you write an Anſwer to this before the departure of Mr. *Hollond*, who is preparing to ſet off for *Madras*.

I encloſe you my Anſwer to the Letter of the Governor of *Madras*, the contents of which you will underſtand.

Encloſures in the foregoing.

No. 1.—Copy of a Letter from the Governor of *Madras* to the Nabob.

What you have ſaid to Mr. *Hollond* about the Peſhcuſh, has been made known to me by his Letters; and from finding your want of favour towards me, and that your thoughts are directly oppoſite to my intentions, I received great concern; notwithſtanding this, I am ſtill confident that you have no other wiſh but my ſucceſs and proſperity. I have repeatedly informed you, that when I requeſted to have the Peſcuſh remitted, it was for this reaſon, becauſe a firm connection ſubſiſts between you and the Company; and thinking that whenever any difficulties ſhould be made known to you, to have ariſen in ſending the Money, you might, from your favour towards me, attend to my repreſentations. This matter, however, depended entirely upon yourſelf, ſince there is no inſtance in which I have deviated from my reſpect and attention to you, how can it be imagined that I ſhall ſeek for War?

Sir, that you ſhould conceive ſuſpicions of an intention in us, which never entered into our hearts; of us who, till the preſent time, have always remained ſtedfaſt to our treaties and engagements with you, is bringing a great diſgrace upon us. Since you have not approved of the negotiations of Mr. *Hollond* on the ſubject before written about, it is improper that he remain any longer at your preſence: I have therefore written to Mr. *Hollond* to come to *Madras* immediately; and am hopeful that you will give him his diſmiſſion, and favour him with a Raydarry Daſtuck. At preſent there is a ſcarcity of Money in the Company's Treaſury. By the bleſſing of God, I will apply myſelf to the paying of the arrears of the Peſcuſh. My wiſh is, that an intimate connection and ſtrict alliance may be kept up for ever between you and the Company; and I hope that your intentions will tend the ſame way, that ſo neither ſide may receive any injury. Should it be agreeable to you, ſend a perſon in your Service from your preſence to *Madras*, that whatever he will repreſent from you may give me pleaſure, and remove all miſunderſtandings; and that the friendſhip between you and the Company may daily increaſe. What can I ſay more?

No. 2.—Copy of a Letter from the Nabob to the Governor of *Madras*.

Mr. *Hollond* has delivered me your Letter, and I perfectly underſtand the contents; namely, that you have learnt, from the Letters of that Gentleman, that the negotiations about remitting the Peſcuſh of the Circars, which had been undertaken ſolely with a view to increaſe the friendſhip and alliance between me and the Company, had not met with my approbation; and that it gave you great concern; that you are reſolved to maintain, in their full vigour, the Treaties and Engagements, and have no other intention; that as Mr. *Hollond* can have no further buſineſs here, I ſhould give him his diſmiſſion; that there is a ſcarcity of Money in the Company's Treaſury; but that, by the bleſſing of God, the Money for the Circars ſhall be paid; and that, if it be adviſable, a perſon be ſent from here to *Madras*, from whom you may learn my ſentiments, and who may remove all miſunderſtandings.

The maintaining and ſupporting the Treaties and Engagements of the Engliſh Company is your deſire; and my attention to Treaties is alſo known to the whole world; and my wiſh is, that both ſides may apply themſelves to ſtrengthen our connection and friendſhip: the fact is, that of the ſmall tribute due from the Engliſh Company for the Circars, the tenth part is not received. If this is alſo wanted to be put off or remitted, the Country cannot be ſupported. Many things which, when requeſted by a Friend, carry the greater obligation with them, in many inſtances, on account of divers reaſons, admit of denials. If it is your deſire that a perſon ſhould be ſent from hence to *Madras* to ſtrengthen the Treaties and obligations already ſubſiſting, I have no objection; he can be ſent, together with Mr. *Hollond*; if not, the ſending back that Gentleman will be enough. Knowing me to be firm in my attention to my Treaties, and favourably inclined towards you, by writing me continually the ſtate of your quarter, keep up our connection entire. I have kept Mr. *Hollond* till I ſhall receive your Anſwer; when it ſhall arrive he will take his leave of me.

APPENDIX, No. 133.

APPENDIX, No. 133.

READ the following Letters and Enclosures from Mr. *Hollond:*

Honourable Sir,

I had, on the 2d inſtant, the honour of your Letter of the 30th November, and conformably to your requeſt, have enclosed you copies of my Letter on the 23d March and May 9th, together with the Enclosures. My Letter of the 9th May was the firſt I addreſſed to you from *Hydrabad*, but as that of the 23d March, contained my inſtructions, which you mention to have been miſlaid, I now ſend them both.

I herewith likewiſe encloſe you a copy of a Letter of the 17th December, received from the Governor and Council of *Madras*, together with the copy of my anſwer to it.

After the declaration contained in the Letter I delivered on my arrival, reſpecting the intentions of the Board, with the Nabob's concurrence, to appoint a perſon to reſide conſtantly at his Court, I was greatly ſurprized at the order I had now received to return to the Preſidency; but I was much more ſo, when I was informed by his Highneſs, that in the Board's Letter to him, they had deſired him to ſend one of his own confidential ſervants to *Madras*, to confer with them on ſuch matters as he might have to propoſe.

Whether the meaſure which has now been adopted by the Board of *Madras* has proceeded from want of confidence in my honour or in my abilities, or from diſapprobation of my paſt conduct, or from perſonal reſentment, or, finally, from an opinion, that the affairs they have to treat of are ſuch as ſhould be negotiated by themſelves, I am left uninformed; but as I have not, for good public reaſons, taken a ſingle ſtep in the negotiations ſince the date of thoſe Letters from the Governor ſeparately, and the Governor and Council jointly, in which they expreſſed their cordial approbation of my conduct; and further, as I have not been favoured on this occaſion, as uſual, with a ſeparate Letter from the Governor, nor even with an official copy of the Letter to the Nabob; I am led to conclude that the Governor is perſonally diſſatisfied with me; for what reaſon I cannot tell, unleſs it be your interpoſition in the affair lately under negotiation, ſtrengthened, probably, by the endeavours of the Nabob *Mahummud Ally* and *Fazel Beg*. With reſpect to theſe two perſons, I mentioned in the beginning my ſuſpicion of the oppoſition the propoſed reſidence would meet from both of them; and I muſt be very much miſtaken, if they have left any means unemployed to effect my removal from a ſituation which they muſt neceſſarily have apprehended to be ſo pregnant with miſchiefs to themſelves; to the former, as it would leſſen his importance by opening an independent channel of intelligence, and would ruin his intrigues, and annihilate his wild ambitious views, by giving us the opportunity of eſtabliſhing a cordial intercourſe with the Soubah, and of obtaining a more complete inſight into the politics of the country; to the latter, as it would appear to endanger his uſurped independence, fortune, and life.

Whether or not it be in the courſe of events, that the reſtleſs activity of politics and war muſt neceſſarily be directed next againſt the Nabob's country; or whether it be moſt adviſable, on a general view of affairs, to draw cloſe, and enter into a firm, cordial, and permanent union with him, I do not pretend to underſtand; but with reſpect to the Nabob's diſpoſitions, I believe I can anſwer for it, that he is heartily inclined to meet us.

Upon my delivering to the Nabob, on the 10th, the Governor's Letter, he obſerved to me, That upon the ground of what he had thrown out in the firſt conference, he had expected that the Company's intereſt would have led the Board to take the preſent ſituation of affairs into their ſerious conſideration; and that I ſhould have been authorized to treat with him upon the ſubject of an alliance againſt the alarming growth of power in *Hyder Ally*; but that inſtead of this, a great deal of time had been taken up in diſputes regarding the fulfilling the terms of an eſtabliſhed Treaty; that his mind had been held in ſuſpence during the interval, and although he had felt great ſatisfaction from the receipt of your Letter, he was ſtill at a loſs to know what were the intentions of the *Madras* Board: that there was now poſſibly but a ſhort time left for deliberation, and a little ſpace might produce great events: that *Hyder Ally* was a pupil of ours in the art of war, and had made great progreſs in the European forms of diſcipline: that he had a large treaſury and army: that the Marattas, between whom and us hoſtilities had already commenced, had been very buſy lately in negotiating with him: that they have agreed to make a formal ceſſion of certain countries in diſpute, which he had ſeized during the family quarrels; and further, to leſſen the amount of their claim of Chout, on condition of his invading the *Carnatic* and Circars; that a plan of operations had accordingly been formed: that *Hyder*'s ſon, *Teepoo*, had charge of over-running and ravaging the *Carnatic:* that *Meer Hyder*'s brother in-law and Governor of *Cuddapah*, had the ſame buſineſs in charge with reſpect to the Circars: that *Hyder* himſelf, with the main of his army, intended to enter the *Carnatic* to ſupport his ſon: that the internal family diſputes which had for a long time prevailed among the Marattas, were in part made up, and in part cruſhed by the ſeizure and impriſonment of ſome of the diſcontented Chiefs: that 25,000 horſe had already been ſent towards *Surat*, to engage or haraſs Colonel *Goddard*'s army; that 15,000 more were ſoon to follow: that *Moodajee Booſla*'s army, under the command of his ſon, was on the point of ſetting out, to go by the way of *Mahoor* towards the *Bengal* provinces, to ravage and lay waſte thoſe countries; and that the Poonah Chiefs were likewiſe ſending an army to *Bengal* for the ſame purpoſe. He concluded with ſaying, he had himſelf been reſtrained from taking any decided part in thoſe general commotions, from a ſteady regard to the obligations of the Treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company, and from the hope that their mutual friendſhip would continue firm and unſhaken. As he is not clearly acquainted with the nature of our complicated Government, he does not appear to be at a certainty with reſpect to our intentions, regarding the payment of the peſhcuſh; and the calling me away ſo ſuddenly on the preſent occaſion, has, I believe, contributed to increaſe his perplexity. He has informed me, that he ſhall immediately write to *Madras*, and if the Board continue to deſire it, he ſhall ſend a perſon to them conformably to their deſire, but that he has no buſineſs to give him in charge other than he has declared to me, and that previous to his departure he ſhall require ſome explicit and ſatisfactory declaration regarding the payment of the peſhcuſh. He ſaid, he thought that an alliance againſt *Hyder* would be advantageous to both parties: that he was well acquainted both with our ſtrength and our weakneſs: that without horſe, ſupplies of grain, treaſury, bullocks, &c. we might be ruined without having the opportunity of bringing our enemy to an engagement: that, independent of his own force, his influence over the Marattas was conſiderable, particularly over the *Berar* Rajah, who would not, contrary to his declared inclinations, venture to go upon any expedition that carried him far from home. This was, he ſaid, the ſum of what he had to communicate to me, and had alluded to in our conference at the firſt meeting; that none of his ſervants were now preſent, and that he had choſen to be alone with me, purpoſely to have the opportunity of talking to me in private, and of hearing from me what were the real intentions of our Government, in regard to an alliance ſo beneficial, as he conceived, to both parties.

How far the above declarations may merit belief or conſideration, is ſubmitted, with deference, to your ſuperior judgment and great experience; they came from an intereſted, and conſequently from a ſuſpected quarter. The communication of them however may at leaſt be uſeful, adding new materials to a body of other more important informations, and as ſuch, they may poſſibly aſſiſt you in forming general concluſions regarding the extenſive and important intereſts that are now embraced in the Company's ſyſtem, and poſſibly at this juncture of ſuſpence. The watchful jealouſy of a deſpotic Government renders it exceeding difficult to diſcover, and far more to have any intercourſe, with perſons capable of giving true intelligence; and I cannot but lament, in this reſpect, the reſtraint I have been under.

I was informed on the 8th inſtant, that *Lally* had gone off with the whole of his party to join *Hyder*, who had previouſly ſent him, as is reported, a ſum of money to engage him in his ſervice.

If my removal from *Hydrabad* hath, as I have reaſon to ſuppoſe, been occaſioned by your interpoſition, founded on information received from me regarding the affairs that were in agitation at this Court, it will nevertheleſs at the ſame time appear, that in the communications I have made to you, I have acted only in purſuance of the public orders received from the Governor and Council of *Madras*. My ſituation has been ſingular: no leſs ſingular is the ſituation of the Nabob *Subahdar Nizam*, who has affairs of conſequence to negotiate, and does not know which way to turn, or to whom the Company have delegated their authority.

Previous to my taking leave of the Nabob, I ſhall not fail to execute the orders contained in your Letter of the 30th November, in regard to the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*. Although it was abſolutely neceſſary to take ſome immediate ſteps for the removal of the party under M. *Lally*, yet it will be difficult if not impoſſible to make the Nabob eaſy upon this head. He perceives, and perhaps upon juſt grounds, that his brother will become abſolutely independent of him from the inſtant our troops reach *Adoni*, from whence he thinks they never will be recalled. He even apprehends, from the alliance we have formed with his brother, miſchief much more alarming. The brothers in the deſpotic Government of *India* are all pretenders to Mumud, deſpotiſm being only ſupported by the attachment of a few of the great military ſervants of the Prince, and by their envy and mutual ſuſpicions of each other, there is foundation for jealouſy; and *Bazalet Jung* being a Prince of the governing family, the Nabob will never be eaſy whilſt our troops remain with him. A proper proviſion or jaghire and perſonal ſecurity may be guaranteed to him, but as long as a party continue with him it will be difficult either to ſatisfy the Nabob's pride or remove his ſuſpicions. *Hyder* is no leſs jealous of our getting footing in *Adoni*, having marked that country as a quarry for the firſt favourable opportunity, and being ſenſible that *Bazalet Jung* cannot be attacked through us without manifeſt diſgrace to the Engliſh name, and conſequently not without a certain rupture with us. The Nabob conſiders his brother as a rebellious vaſſal, whoſe country he could eaſily take poſſeſſion of if it were not for the certain conſequence, which he clearly foreſees, of his brother taking refuge with *Hyder*, who by having a ſon of *Nizam ul Mulk*, a pretender to the Government, under his protection, would thereby acquire ſo great an additional weight of credit and conſequence, as might lead him, under pretext of ſupporting *Bazalet Jung*, to invade the Nabob's own country: ſuch an event might be the conſequence, if *Bazalet Jung* were driven by the Nabob into *Hyder's* hands. *Hyder* has already given out his having ſolicited from the king a Phirmaund for the *Decan*. He is ſuppoſed to have accumulated a very large treaſury from the countries of the Zemindars, under the Myſore dependency, and from other petty and unconnected and unprotected Rajahs. I need not mention to you who are ſo well acquainted with his hiſtory, that he is thought to be a very able ſoldier, and a man of a reſtleſs, aſpiring, and vigorous character. The Marattas are certainly afraid of him, and he is perhaps pretty nearly a match for them and the Nabob united. His Highneſs aſſures me, that before an anſwer to his Letter can come from *Bengal*, I ſhall hear of *Hyder's* having attacked ſome one of the countries dependent on the *Carnatic*. Of the probability of this you may be able to judge by the advices you may have received from *Madras*.

As I conſider my character to be in danger of ſuffering by the meaſure adopted by the Madras Board, I hope I ſhall be juſtified in recommending to your particular attention, my having kept up the negotiation in a tone beyond the extent of my orders, by having adhered rigidly to my firſt propoſition, although I was fully authorized to offer others more favourable. The deſire of obtaining the beſt terms poſſible for the Company, would have been a ſufficient inducement to me to have done this, had there been no other motive, but I had others alſo for wiſhing to avoid making any further propoſitions.

On reading over my Inſtructions, you will not fail to obſerve, how evidently the declarations which I was therein directed to make to the Nabob, differ from the requeſts that followed ſo ſhortly after. I muſt ſay that I wholly diſapproved of them, not only as being contrary to the obligations of the Treaty, but as coming forth at a wrong period; declarations ſo directly contrary to them having ſo recently been made. The juncture likewiſe was critical, there being other important buſineſs already on our hands, and no certainty of our being ſecure from another conteſt with the French, in alliance with *Hyder*. Requeſts of this kind proceeding from a power jealous of the dignity and independence of Government, are in reality demands, and muſt ever be conſidered as ſuch. The Company could not receive a refuſal, and exhibit afterwards to this country the ſpectacle of a forced compliance: the Governor and Council poſſibly may not have adverted to this conſequence; and I, perhaps upon falſe principles, implicitly obeyed my orders, fearing, if I had made any repreſentations on the occaſion, that I might have been thought wanting in zeal, and diſinclined to undertake a difficult negotiation. I ſhould have been exceedingly unwilling however, without poſitive orders, to have proceeded beyond the firſt propoſition, not only for the reaſons I gave to the Madras Board, but becauſe I thought the object was not, if obtained, of ſo important a nature as to compenſate in a political view (if any conſiderations excepting thoſe of ſelf-preſervation may be allowed to compenſate) the ill conſequences reſulting from the violation of a Treaty; and becauſe further, I thought it probable the Nabob would have immediately rejected the other propoſitions, as conſidering that he would have been poſſeſſed of no better ſecurity for the performance of the ſecond engagement, than of the former one.

The approbation of my conduct, which you have been pleaſed to expreſs in your Letter of the 30th November, I ſhall always conſider as a very particular honour.

I am, &c.

Hydrabad, January 16, 1780. (Signed) *John Hollond.*

P. S. I obſerve that in the body of the above Letter, I have only alluded to the reaſons that induced me to ſuſpend the negotiation, without reciting them: they will appear by a peruſal of the following extracts, from a Letter I wrote to the Governor, dated November 14th.

"As the negotiations at *Poonah* hold the Soubah ſor the preſent in ſuſpence, I judge it wholly unneceſſary to apply to him again upon the ſubject of the Peſcuſh, until they ſhall have been brought to a determination; for this reaſon I have not ſpoken to his Highneſs relative to that point ſince I had the honour to addreſs the Board, under date the 31ſt Auguſt."

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Again in the ſame Letter:

" I am waiting in impatient expectation of the arrival of the Europe ſhips, which, I ſhould imagine, would have a good effect upon the negotiations at *Poonah*; and by bringing them to a ſpeedy concluſion, enable me to make another trial in regard to the affair of the Peſcuſh."

I am juſt informed from *Madras*, that the *Nymph* frigate arrived there on the 1ſt inſtant; that a month before ſhe had left Sir *Edward Hughes*, and the Indiamen, off *St. Paul's*; that Sir *Edward* had not ſent back any of his ſhips, and that they were all expected to arrive in a few days.

I am alſo informed from *Madras*, that the Nayers, at *Hyder Ally's* inſtigation, had inveſted *Tellicherry*; that the Madras detachment, after having been embarked to join General *Goddard*, have been relanded for the defence of that place: that the Nayers had attacked an advanced battery, and had ſtood the fire of our Sepoys with great firmneſs, but had at length been compelled to retire.

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THE Board, conſidering the neceſſity of appointing a perſon to reſide as their public Miniſter at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, and that Mr. *Hollond's* ſudden recall from *Hydrabad* would have too viſible an appearance of a diſunion between this Government and that of *Fort Saint George*;

Reſolved, That an application be made to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*, for their permiſſion, to appoint Mr. *Hollond* to reſide as public Miniſter on the part of this Government at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, for the purpoſe of negotiating ſuch matters as remain to be adjuſted with him.

Reſolved, That Mr. *Hollond* be furniſhed with credentials for that purpoſe, and directed to remain there in conſequence, until a reply from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George* be received to the preſent application.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George:*

Gentlemen,

The Governor General has received a Letter from *Nizam Ally Cawn*, with a copy of your Preſident's Letter to him, notifying the recall of Mr. *Hollond*. We are ſorry to perceive that the ſuddenneſs of the reſolution, and the abrupt manner in which it has been conveyed to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, have contributed to excite inſtead of allaying his ſuſpicions. For this reaſon, and becauſe he has deſired that we will ſupply the place of Mr. *Hollond* by a ſimilar appointment from this Government; which, inſtantly following his recall, would have too viſible an appearance of a diſunion between your Government and ours; we requeſt that you will permit that Gentleman to remain in the quality of our Miniſter at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, for the purpoſe of negotiating ſuch points as remain to be adjuſted between us. For this end we have granted him our credentials, and deſired him to continue in that ſtation, until we ſhall have been informed of your ſentiments and reſolution reſpecting the preſent propoſal.

We are, &c.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written to Mr. *Hollond:*

Sir,

The Governor General has laid before us your Letter to him, dated the 16th ultimo, with the different Enclo-ſures which accompanied it; he has likewiſe received a Letter from the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, tranſmitting a copy of one addreſſed to him by the Preſident at *Fort St. George*, and of the reply which he ſent to it.

We are concerned to find that the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* have ſo ſuddenly reſolved upon your recall from *Hydrabad*, and that they have notified this intention in ſuch an abrupt manner to *Nizam Ally Cawn*, as to ſtrengthen the belief which he had previouſly adopted of their unfriendly diſpoſition towards him. In his Letter to the Governor General, he expreſſes his diſſatisfaction with their conduct, and requeſts that a perſon may be ſent from this quarter to ſupply your place, and to proſecute the negotiations which you had commenced. We find ourſelves inclined, for many reaſons, to comply with this application; but as an appointment from hence inſtantly following your recall, would carry too ſtrong an appearance of diſunion between the two Preſidencies, we are induced to ſend a commiſſion in your name, and to write to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*, for their permiſſion to appoint you to reſide as our public Miniſter at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn:* in the meantime, we deſire you to remain there in that capacity.

Although you are a ſervant of the Company belonging to another Preſidency, and therefore not dependent on our authority, yet we deem it ſo eſſential to the general intereſts of the Britiſh Empire in *India*, that an Engliſh Reſident ſhould be ſtationed at this juncture with *Nizam Ally*, that we enjoin you to remain at *Hydrabad* in that quality, as you ſhall anſwer for the conſequences of your departure to the Court of Directors. We are thus pointed in our injunctions, becauſe the order for your recall may be repeated before the Preſident and Select Committee are in poſſeſſion of our Letter to them, requeſting that you may be allowed to continue; and becauſe, in caſe of their refuſing their conſent to this requeſt, it may be proper for us to depute a perſon from hence to ſucceed you, before you can relinquiſh your ſtation with ſafety to the Company's intereſt, with which you are thus entruſted.

Several additional motives weigh with us in conferring this appointment upon you.

1ſt. Our deſire to manifeſt to *Nizam Ally Cawn* and to the other powers of the country, that a ſtrict unity of principles and meaſures ſubſiſts between the Company's Preſidencies, which we think will be apparent from the mutual ſelection of the ſame agent, to negotiate the affairs of *Bengal* and *Madras*.

2dly. Becauſe the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* having made choice of you, and furniſhed you with particular inſtructions, ſuited to their own ſituation and circumſtances, you will be better acquainted with the relation in which they ſtand to the Nabob, and of courſe more likely to attend to the general and combined intereſts of both Preſidencies, ſince theirs is the moſt immediately concerned, than a perſon deputed immediately from *Bengal*.

3dly. Becauſe we obſerve, that ſuch negotiations as have been already intruſted to your management, have been conducted with temper and ability; and your experience of the Nabob's character, added to the confidence which he appears to place in you, will be more likely to enable you to ſecure his attachment, and to carry many points, than a mere ſtranger.

Encloſed you will receive proper credentials from us, which you may produce to the Nabob.

We think it ſufficient for the preſent, to refer you to the original inſtructions which you received from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, and to confine your negotiations to the different objects therein recited. We alſo deſire that you will repreſent to the Nabob, the ſole end for which we have appointed you, in compliance with his requeſt, to be the earneſt deſire which we have to give him every proof of our amity and inclination to cement the good underſtanding which ſubſiſts between us. You will endeavour to

ſatisfy

ſatisfy him, with the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that nothing adverſe or hoſtile is intended towards him, by either of the Company's Preſidencies; but that, on the contrary, if he has any thing to propoſe, which ſhall tend to make our alliance more cloſe, confidential, and permanent, and to render the terms of the preſent Treaty reciprocally more binding and effectual, we ſhall readily liſten to them; and we hereby empower you to receive his overtures for that purpoſe.

The Governor General has written an anſwer to his Letter, which, together with the Engliſh draft, we herewith encloſe.

We are, &c.

P. S. Encloſed is a Letter to the Nabob *Nizam Ally*, which you will be pleaſed to forward to him in the moſt expeditious manner.

To Mr. *John Hollond.*

Whereas it has been judged proper to appoint a Miniſter, on the part of this Government, to the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, to treat with his Highneſs: We the Governor General and Council, in virtue of the powers veſted in us by the King and Parliament of *Great Britain*, and by the *Eaſt India* Company, to direct and controul the political affairs of all the Company's ſettlements in *India*, relying on your fidelity, prudence, and integrity, have appointed you our public Miniſter, to remain at *Hydrabad*, or ſuch other place where the Nabob may reſide, and to treat with him upon all ſuch matters as are or ſhall be given you in charge by us. And we hereby give you full powers to that effect, declaring, that we will ratify and confirm whatever engagements you ſhall accept or conclude with the Nabob in our names, and on our behalf, according to the inſtructions with which we have or ſhall furniſh you for that purpoſe.

Given under our hands, and the ſeal of the Company, in *Fort William*, this 17th day of February 1780, or 11th Suffer 1194 Hegira.

Agreed, That the Governor General be requeſted to write a Letter to the Nabob *Nizam Ally*, in reply to that which he has received from him, and acquainting him with the credentials given to Mr. *Hollond.*

To the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, acknowledging the receipt of his Letter.

It is with great concern I obſerve that you attribute the recall of Mr. *Hollond*, by the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, to an unfriendly diſpoſition towards you, when I really believe that the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* are ſincere in their promiſe to abide by the terms of their Treaty, and have no intentions or wiſhes adverſe to your ſtate. For my own part, and on behalf of this Government, I can aſſure you, that we are reſolved to preſerve inviolate the faith of this Treaty, and promiſe to guard it from any infringement of the other Preſidencies, being heartily deſirous of cultivating your friendſhip, and maintaining a ſtrict and firm alliance with you on the moſt confidential terms. In proof of my deſire, and of the wiſh of this Government to afford you the ſtrongeſt teſtimony of our goodwill, we have reſolved, in compliance with your requeſt, to appoint a public Miniſter to reſide with you, on the part of this Government; but as Mr. *Hollond* is a perſon with whom you are already acquainted, and whoſe manners might therefore be more agreeable to you than thoſe of any other whom we could immediately depute from hence, we applied to his Superiors at *Fort Saint George*, to allow him to continue at *Hydrabad* in quality of our Miniſter. In the meantime we have thought proper to furniſh him with credentials, authorizing him to act for us as ſuch; and I deſire that you will give faith to any repreſentations or propoſals which he may make to you, in confirmation or ſupport of our friendſhip and alliance, and for improving the mutual intereſts of your Highneſs and the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*
Warren Haſtings.
P. Francis.
Edw. Wheler.

APPENDIX, No. 135.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort St. George*, the 14th December 1779.

THE Preſident acquaints the Committee, that he means to give his ſentiments fully on the above Letter, at their next meeting. In the meantime, as it appears to him that no further benefit can be expected from Mr. *Hollond*'s longer continuance at *Hydrabad*, he recommends that he be recalled; and that a Letter be written to the Soubah, explaining to him again our motives for requeſting a remiſſion of the Peſcuſh; that we are concerned at the ill ſucceſs of our application, but not having the ſmalleſt intention to break the friendſhip between him and the Company, on this account, we mean to take into conſideration the arrears of Peſcuſh, as ſoon as the Company are in caſh; that for the preſent, we have thought it proper to recall Mr. *Hollond*, and requeſt he will give him the neceſſary paſſports; and that, if he wiſhes to repreſent any matters to this Government, either now or at any other time, we ſhall be glad to receive any perſons he may depute for that purpoſe.

APPENDIX, No. 136.

From Governor *Rumbold* to *Nizam Ally Khan*; dated 17th December 1779.

MR. *Hollond* has fully adviſed me of every circumſtance that has paſſed relative to the Peſcuſh, and I aſſure your Highneſs it is with equal concern and ſurprize that I obſerve the unfavourable manner in which you have been pleaſed to conſtrue my intentions upon this ſubject. I think too well of your Highneſs to ſuppoſe you can really have miſtaken the part I have acted; however, leſt this ſhould be the caſe, I ſhall once more repeat; the requeſt I made for a remiſſion of the Peſcuſh, ſolely took its riſe from the long friendſhip ſubſiſting between your Highneſs and the Company, and the idea I had formed, that upon a fair repreſentation of the difficulties we experience, in regard to the payment of this money, your Highneſs would be induced to conſider our claim in a proper light. The matter being thus left to your own free will, and being accompanied by aſſurances the moſt friendly, and expreſſions full of reſpect, there could be no poſſible ground to imagine, that our conduct proceeded from any hoſtile intentions; and your Highneſs will permit me to obſerve, that it was injurious to our honour to ſuſpect us of deſigns which had not a colour of probability, and which were ſo inconſiſtent with that attention we have always paid to our engagements with your Highneſs.

As Mr. *Hollond* has not been able to prevail with your Highneſs to comply with our wiſhes, and as we ſee no further occaſion at preſent for his remaining at your Highneſs's Court, I have directed him immediately to return to *Madras*; and I am to requeſt you will furniſh him with the neceſſary paſſports and ſafeguard.—In regard to the Peſcuſh, ſo ſoon as the Company's treaſury will permit, I ſhall take into conſideration the arrears due to your Highneſs, and as my intentions are to preſerve the friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, I expect to find the ſame diſpoſition on your part, and that nothing will happen to interrupt it. Should your Highneſs have an

intention

APPENDIX. No. 137.

intention to ſend any one of your people to *Madras*, I ſhall receive him with pleaſure, and attend to any repreſentations he may make in your Highneſs's name, that may at any time tend to clear up miſtakes between us, and to preſerve inviolate that harmony that I hope will always ſubſiſt between your Highneſs and the Company. May your Highneſs's proſperity and happineſs daily increaſe. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX, No. 137.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, 17th December 1779.

DISPATCHED the following Letter to Mr. *John Hollond*:

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 31ſt Auguſt.

As we do not perceive any inclination in the Soubah to comply with our deſires relative to the Peſcuſh, and circumſtances having rendered your remaining longer at his Court unneceſſary, we have written to his Highneſs a Letter, which we deſire you will immediately deliver, and we direct that you return to the Preſidency as ſoon as poſſible. On your taking leave of the Soubah, you will aſſure him, agreeable to the inſtructions before ſent you, that it never was the intention of this Government to act in any manner offenſively againſt him, but that we cannot view the ſupport and encouragement given to Mr. *Lally* and the French troops under him, than a deviation from the terms of the Treaty ſubſiſting between his Highneſs and the Company, and that we flatter ourſelves, after the frequent repreſentations we have made to him, he will comply with our wiſhes in obliging them to quit his territories.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient ſervants,

Fort Saint George, 17th Decr 1779.

Thos Rumbold, &c.
Select Committee.

APPENDIX, No. 138.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, 30th December 1779.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

Having fully conſidered our preſent ſituation with reſpect to the Country Powers, and having too much reaſon to ſuppoſe, from the declaration of the Governor General and Council, that a war with the Marattas is inevitable, as alſo from the intelligence we have received, that nothing yet has been ſettled by General *Goddard*; I ſubmit to the Committee's conſideration, whether our laſt Letter to Mr. *Hollond* and the Nizam are ſufficient to quiet the mind of the latter with reſpect to the Peſcuſh, or of any deſigns on our part to diſturb the tranquillity of his Government: for as his attachment to the Maratta Miniſtry has been declared by himſelf, and it is probable, in caſe of a war with them, will lead him to take an active part againſt us, eſpecially if what is ſo confidently aſſerted prove true, that *Hyder Ally* has entered into the combination, and concluded a Treaty with the Miniſtry at *Poonah*, it is incumbent on us not to afford the leaſt pretence, either for the Nizam, or the Governor General and Council, to impute to this Government any ſhare in the meaſures that have already involved the Company's affairs in difficulties, and are likely to be attended with a ruinous and deſtructive war. I have ſtill, from circumſtances, ſome faint hope, that peace may take place; but ſhould the contrary happen, and the Nizam inſiſt on the immediate payment of the Peſcuſh, as a condition of his remaining neuter, whether it might not be proper, as our treaſury is unable to ſupply ſuch a ſum, either to take meaſures for drawing bills on *Bengal*, or of giving Soucar ſecurity for the payment of the whole, or part of the Peſcuſh in a limited time. I have alſo to recommend to the Committee, that an account of the conduct of *Bazalet Jung*, and what paſſed in conſequence of his ſeveral Letters with reſpect to our troops, be tranſmitted to the Governor General and Council.

Colonel *Baillie* writes, that there is at preſent not the leaſt appearance of troubles in the quarters where the troops under his command are now ſtationed; but as the times are ſo unſettled, and we are not certain what movements may be made either by the Nizam or *Hyder Ally*, it may be neceſſary to caution Colonel *Baillie* to be on his guard; and in caſe of any attempts being made againſt the Guntoor Circar, or any other of the Circars, the troops aſſembled at *Ellore*, after leaving a ſufficient garriſon there, may have directions to join him, in order to ſtrengthen his detachment, and move, as occaſion may require, for the ſecurity of the Northern diſtricts; the Sepoys alſo, under Lieutenant *Douglas*, may be held in readineſs. The orders to Colonel *Baillie* ſhould be only to protect our preſent poſſeſſions, and not to act offenſively againſt any Power without our poſitive orders.

The Committee approve of the Preſident's ſentiments, and deſire him to conſider of the proper mode of having ſecurity ready to tender to the Nizam, in caſe we ſhould be called upon for the ſpeedy payment of the Peſcuſh.

Agreed alſo, That Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* be empowered, in caſe of any movement towards the Guntoor Circar, either from the Nizam or *Hyder Ally*, to call for the Sepoys under Lieutenant *Douglas*, and for as many Sepoys as can be ſpared from the Maſulipatam diſtrict; and that the neceſſary Letters be written conformably to the Preſident's recommendation.

Agreed, That the Gentlemen at *Bengal* be informed of our proceedings in regard to the Guntoor Circar.

Letter from the Nabob *Nizam Ul Dowlah*, to the Governor General, Mr. *Haſtings*.

"On the 22d of Zecuyed, I received, through Mr. *Hollond*, your Letter, dated 25th of Shamal; in which you tell me, That the Governor and Council of *Madras* deputed Mr. *Hollond* to *Hydrabad*, with your knowledge, ſimply for the purpoſe of explaining ſome things, which would tend to confirm the friendſhip between us; that whatever he might have ſaid, beyond what has been agreed upon in former Treaties, has been done without the orders of the Council; but that you had wrote to the Governor and Council of *Madras*, to abide by the terms of the Treaty, and at the ſame time had deſired Mr. *Hollond* to ſuſpend the buſineſs until he ſhould receive freſh orders from *Madras*.

"The contents of the above Letter, replete with ſincerity, have given me great pleaſure and ſatisfaction. The Company, for their ſincerity and adherence to their Treaties, have been for a long time examples to the world, particularly what I experienced after the concluſion of the Treaty in 1768, has made a deep impreſſion in my heart, and is publicly known to all the world. When you wrote me at firſt, acquainting me of your acceſſion to the Government of *Bengal*, and the ſuperintendency of all the Engliſh ſettlements, and inquiring into the Treaties made with the different Powers, I gave you a particular account of the Treaty I had entered into with the Company, by means of the Governor and Council of *Madras*; and I alſo explained every part of it to Colonel *Upton*, who was here in his way from *Poonah*, after having made peace with the Pundit Perdhaun, in conſequence of the troubles raiſed by *Ragonaut Row*, the enemy to my Government, in order that Colonel *Upton* might report it to you. However, ſome untoward circumſtances which have happened of late, have ſcarce left

me room what to imagine, when I at the ſame time conſidered the former conduct, and ſtrict regulations of the Engliſh Company: for inſtance, what has happened with regard to *Ragonaut Row*, which I wrote to you about in a former Letter, of which I now ſend you a copy. You, Sir, in anſwer to that Letter, told me, that the actions of the Company were uniform, and that there ſhould be no deviation whatever from the Treaty I had made with the Governor and Council of *Madras*; but every thing that has happened ſince, has been in contradiction to it, ſetting aſide what is now done towards *Ragonaut Row*, which is juſt what was done before. Mr. *Hollond*, without any reaſon whatever, now inſiſts upon a remiſſion of the ſmall Peſcuſh from the Circars of *Rajalmandry*, &c. which countries formerly yielded lacks to me, and were given up to the Company for the reaſons ſpecified in the encloſed Letter, and from which they reap ſuch advantages, that which is paid to me does not amount to a hundredth part of them. The Governor and Council of *Madras* alſo, by force and ſome pretext, have ſeized upon the Circar of *Guntoor*, which by Treaty is ſettled upon my beloved brother *Bazalet Jung Bahauder*. Conſider then, whether ſuch proceedings can be thought any thing but breaches of the Treaties between us. It was on this account that I wrote you on the 2d of Rejub and 2d of Ramzam, ſetting forth all this to you in general terms, and I afterwards ſent duplicate to you by Hircarrahs. Your anſwer not arriving, and the Governor and Council of *Madras*'s proceedings ſtill going further, I had no remedy left, and entertained ſome thoughts of revenge, when I received your Letter, the ſincerity of the profeſſions of which made me delay the execution of my intentions. If your Letter produce any effect, and the Governor and Council of *Madras*, adhering faſt by the terms of the Treaty, give up the requeſt they have made for the Peſcuſh from the Circars, and relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, it is well; otherwiſe it is not poſſible for me, in juſtice to my Government, to forbear any longer; and the fire of war muſt ſhortly blaze into a flame.

" The forbearance I have hitherto held after the commencement of the breaches of the Treaty above-mentioned, has been owing entirely to my regard and faith to Treaty, and not to my inability. By the bleſſing of God, I have every thing in readineſs, and have no occaſion for the aſſiſtance of any other. The Poonah Miniſters, whoſe propriety, and the continuance of their Government, are, as it is well known, entirely owing to my ſupport, devoted to me, and ready to join me: *Moodajee Booſla* is alſo attached to me. *Hyder Naigue*, who is an enemy from his heart to the Company, has now made an alliance with the Poonah Miniſters, and only waits for directions from both. You, Sir, who are a prudent and wiſe man, will take all this into your conſideration, as well as the unprecedented conduct of the Company, which has made them enemies with all the Powers in the *Decan*. Should any thing happen, which, conſidering the ſituation and appearance of things cannot be far off, do not reproach me for having given you warning, but write again every thing that is neceſſary to the Governor and Council of *Madras*. You will know the reſt from Mr. *Hollond*, who, agreeable to your orders, waits quietly till he receives freſh orders from *Madras*. As you have wrote me to know what are my intentions, you will then know that my wiſhes are, to preſerve unſhaken the Treaty between me and the Company, and that the garden of our mutual friendſhip may daily flouriſh. Be kind enough to return me a ſpeedy anſwer to this Letter and the former ones."

I am apprehenſive from this Letter, that as we give up points the Nizam will riſe in his demands, and at any rate come to an open rupture with us, in caſe affairs are not accommodated with the Marattas: on that depends the line he will follow, being, notwithſtanding the pompous language he makes uſe of, no further to be conſidered than as an auxiliary, whoſe conſequence will increaſe from our contention with much more powerful States; and ſhould we comply with his requiſition, to give up the Guntoor Circar, which we have in the moſt unexceptionable manner obtained on *Bazalet Jung*'s own offer to us, it may be attended with every diſagreeable conſequence. The Governor General and Council ſhould be fully acquainted with the neceſſity there is for our retaining it; for from its ſituation, were that Circar in poſſeſſion of an enemy, our communication by land will be entirely cut off with the others, and a port be opened to the French, ſhould they make any attempts in that quarter. The Nizam takes no notice of the French troops in his ſervice; but it is to be hoped the Governor General and Council will ſtrengthen our remonſtrance relative to them.

The Nizam, in his Letter, mentions the Treaty formed between the Marattas and *Hyder Aly*, which plainly ſhews the combination that has been entered into; and I am apprehenſive, unleſs peace takes place with the Miniſters at *Poonah*, that neither the payment of the Peſcuſh, nor any other conceſſion on our part, will prevent him from joining to diſtreſs us as much as poſſible.

Mr. *Whitehill*, and Sir *Hector Munro*, requeſt leave to enter their opinions on the foregoing Minute of the Preſident.

Mr. *Whitehill*, deſires to expreſs his warm approbation of the ſentiments contained in the Preſident's Minute, and to obſerve, that the Preſident has, in his opinion, fully juſtified the proceedings of this Committee with regard to the Peſcuſh for the Northern Circars, and given a moſt juſt and ſatisfactory account of the preſent ſituation of affairs throughout *India*.

Sir *Hector Munro*.—However deſirous I might have been to have offered my ideas in writing, on the preſent impending troubles with the Country Powers in *India*, the Preſident has treated the whole buſineſs ſo much at large, and has handled it ſo ably, that he has only left it neceſſary for me to ſay, that I moſt heartily join with him in thinking a war at preſent muſt be detrimental to the Company's intereſts, and perhaps embarraſſing to the Nation; and to approve entirely of his idea on this important ſubject.

Ordered, That a copy of the Preſident's Minutes be ſent to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and that an anſwer be propoſed to their Letter of the 4th November.

Copy of Letter from the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

We have received two Letters from you, both dated the 14th February.

We are obliged to you for the acknowledgment in expreſs of the readineſs with which we detached a body of our troops to join General *Goddard*, but we apprehend, you have been pleaſed to give an object to this reinforcement, which we did not altogether intend by it. We did not ſay in our Letter to you on this occaſion, that we ſent theſe troops " to co-operate in the proſecu- " tion of your meaſures on the other ſide of *India*," becauſe we knew not what meaſures you might really have in contemplation, or what turn might be given to the ſtate of affairs on that ſide. In order therefore to prevent any miſtake with reſpect to our intention in detaching troops from this Preſidency, we declared expreſsly, that the object was to enable General *Goddard* to conclude an honourable and immediate peace. You had, in a Letter dated the 5th April laſt, communicated the terms of your intended negotiation with the Marattas, and thoſe terms which were to reſtore things to the footing of the Treaty made by Colonel *Upton* at *Poonah*, appeared

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to us, after the diſaſter ſuffered by the Bombay troops, both ſafe and honourable; here then is fully explained the intention of our reinforcement. So far we ſee our way clearly, and are conſcious that we are acting for the true intereſt of our Employers; but if any other meaſures differing materially either in form or complexion from the object we have mentioned, be purſued without our knowledge and concurrence, we do not mean, by ſending the reinforcement, to join our aſſent to ſuch meaſures, or to be anſwerable in any ſhape for their conſequences.

When we wrote our Letter to you of the 5th January, on the ſubject of your late interference in our proceedings at the Nizam's Court, we did it under the impreſſion that you had exceeded, in a very eſſential point, the controlling powers lodged in your Government; and the juſt alarm occaſioned by this conduct, and by the right you had ſet up of "general controul and direction in "the political affairs of this Preſidency," put us upon a careful peruſal of the authorities from whence theſe claims might be ſuppoſed to proceed. We were indeed before ſatisfied in our own minds, that they had not the ſmalleſt foundation, but by the manner in which they were now advanced and exerciſed, we were led to think it poſſible that our judgment might have erred, for we could hardly conceive that Gentlemen, placed in high truſt, and acting under the ſacred appointment of the Legiſlature, would aſſume any powers not warranted by their commiſſions, becauſe it is evident, that the leaſt oppoſition to ſuch powers muſt create inconveniences of an embarraſſing nature, and becauſe real authority is always much more reſpected when it acts within its juſt and proper ſphere, than when it is mingled with powers of an ill founded or doubtful nature.

Such were our reflections at the time we examined into the claims that had been advanced; and as our credit much depended upon the manner in which we were able to ſupport the poſitions we might eſtabliſh, we determined to go to the bottom of the ſubject, and to treat it in our Letter to you with cloſeneſs, that we might have the benefit of a particular reply, and our errors, if we had formed any, removed by new lights. We referred to the Act of Parliament, and quoted the clauſe which forms the only true and proper teſt of the controlling powers: we ſhewed, that it expreſſed nothing like the power you had claimed and exerciſed; but that it reſtrained the other Preſidencies only from "making orders "for declaring war, or for negotiating or concluding any "Treaty of peace, or other Treaty, without your pre-"vious conſent." We ſhewed alſo, that this was the ſenſe in which the Court of Directors underſtood it, and in which you yourſelves formerly underſtood it. The clauſe is indeed expreſſed with perſpicuity, and the limitation is ſo clearly and preciſely marked, that we do not ſee how it can be miſtaken. We expected, however, when you were ſo pointedly called upon to defend the powers you had claimed and exerciſed, you would have endeavoured to prove them by the ſame teſt that we had employed to diſprove them. Inſtead of this, you tell us only in general terms, "that you ſhall not diſpute with "us the right of your Government to interfere in ſuch "of our political meaſures as tend to diſturb the peace "of *India*, or Treaties ſubſiſting with other Powers, "while we think proper to yield to the exerciſe of it; "and hope, that you ſhall not be compelled to the diſ-"agreeable neceſſity of enforcing it."

The firſt obſervation that occurs to us upon this paſſage, is, that you were not called upon to diſpute with us, but only to ſhew the authority on which your powers reſted. No man can expect obedience to powers which he is unable or unwilling to produce; and it would be unjuſt to the laſt degree, to think of *enforcing* ſuch powers before they have been produced. The ſecond obſervation is, that we have never yielded, as you ſuppoſe, to the exerciſe of the rights you claim. If you allude to our withdrawing the application to the Nizam for the remiſſion of the Peſcuſh; we reply, that we did not withdraw it, becauſe you diſapproved or interfered in the meaſure, but becauſe the application could not be properly ſupported after you had encouraged the Nizam to reject it, and becauſe we were unwilling to conteſt a point of right with you in a place where no diſagreement between us ſhould even have appeared, much leſs have been continued by our perſevering under theſe circumſtances in a fruitleſs demand.

In order, however, to remove all further miſapprehenſions upon this ſubject, we now declare, in expreſs terms, that we have not yielded, and that we cannot yield, to the power you have aſſerted, of "general controul and "direction over our political affairs," until you ſhew us your authority for it; and this favour we think you ſhould and may eaſily grant upon our application, if your claim be of the nature you would wiſh us to believe. In the meantime, the only power we can acknowledge with reſpect to this Preſidency, is the power of controlling our right of "making war, or for negotiating Treaties," and we can never admit the the leaſt extenſion of this power, while it ſtands ſo clearly defined, and anſwers, as we are ſure it does, all the purpoſes intended by it.

But in your Letter now before us, though you have treated the points we had conteſted, in ſuch a manner as if they were totally indefenſible, upon any ground of authority, yet you ſeem extremely unwilling to yield them to us; and with the view, as we ſuppoſe, of maintaining the appearance of your new powers as long as poſſible, a new phraſe is introduced, and repeated in more than one place; we mean that by which we are called a "Subordinate Preſidency." Theſe words we do not remember to have crept into your correſpondence at any time before, even when your claims were not diſputed, and we little expected to ſee them in your preſent Letter, ſtanding without a ſhadow of ſupport. "Subordinate" is a word of extenſive ſignification, and as it is here uſed, may be conſtrued into a general inferiority. So *Patna* is ſubordinate to *Fort William*, and *Mulipatam* to this Preſidency; but for our part, we totally diſclaim any ſuch ſubordination, and declare, that any idea drawn from ſuch a word, is inapplicable to the relative ſituation in which we are placed. As well might we ſay, *Fort William* is ſubordinate to this Preſidency, as this Preſidency to *Fort William*.

You are pleaſed alſo in your Letter, after expreſſing the intention of not entering into a diſpute with us, concerning the powers we conteſted, to make one general obſervation on the ſubject of negotiations undertaken by the other Preſidencies; which you ſay, is ſtated not ſo much with a view of its being applied, "as it might be," to the caſe now before you, but to meet the general and dangerous doctrine which you conceive is implied in that paragraph of our Letter which ends with the following words: "but if it had led to a Treaty, there is no rea-"ſon to imagine that we ſhould not have required your "conſent in due time, and concluded it in all proper "form."

Permit us to remark, in this place, that when you were taking from our Letter a quotation which you thought implied a general and dangerous doctrine, it would have had the appearance of candour, if you had been pleaſed to inſert the whole paragraph; becauſe it ſometimes happens, as in this caſe, that a partial quotation may convey a very different ſenſe from that of the whole paſſage, taken together. This omiſſion which you have made, we ſhall now ſupply. Speaking of your interference in our proceedings with the Nizam, and trying it by the powers of the Act of Parliament, we ſaid, "there was no order made or given by us, for declaring war againſt the Nizam; we neither made nor gave any order for negotiating a new Treaty with him. All that we did was to take advantage of Mr. *Holland*'s reſidence at the Nizam's Court, to requeſt a favour for the benefit of the Company. The Nizam's compliance would have led to no new Treaty, becauſe we offered nothing to engage

engage it, but general expreſſions of friendſhip. But if it had led to a Treaty, (that is, if any circumſtance had ariſen, which might have made it requiſite to offer *ſpecific terms*, to engage the Nizam's compliance) there is no reaſon to imagine we ſhould not have required your conſent in due time (that is, when thoſe terms had been communicated to you) and concluded it in all proper form."

Here then is the plain, genuine ſenſe of the whole paragraph; and we appeal to the judgment of any one, whether there be any expreſſion which can convey the leaſt idea of a general and dangerous doctrine, or any doctrine inconſiſtent with the juſt powers of your Government? Yet you have been pleaſed, upon an imperfect quotation of our words, to draw concluſions directly oppoſite to thoſe which were meant or warranted by the ſenſe of the whole paſſage; and from theſe erroneous concluſions, you have ſuppoſed that we intended generally, in our negotiations, to take all the previous ſteps which neceſſarily lead to the concluſion of Treaties, ſo as to make your conſent a mere formality. This we have never done in any caſe, nor do we mean it, for the reaſon you have yourſelves given. But there is nothing in the Act of Parliament which reſtrains our endeavours to ſerve the Company, by applications to any of the Country Powers, to do juſtice, or to ſhew favour to them in any thing which comes under our immediate cognizance; nor are we prevented by that Act from making any declarations (except that of war) which we think neceſſary, in ſupport of the rights and honour of the Company, as far as they are committed to our charge. If ſuch requeſts and declarations, from the miſconſtruction of the perſons to whom they may be addreſſed, or from their weakneſs, or from their propenſity to quarrel with us, or from any other cauſe, ſhould at any time bring on a war, there is no help for it that we know of; and all we have to do in ſuch a caſe, is to avoid declaring or committing hoſtilities without your previous conſent, unleſs the neceſſity be ſo imminent as would render it dangerous to wait for it. All this is perfectly clear, and the line is moſt diſtinctly traced by the Act of Parliament. But by your interpretation, after making erroneous concluſions, and ſuppoſing caſes upon them which do not ſeem to affect the queſtion between us, and which in ſome parts are not very intelligible, you ſay, "by means ſuch as theſe, the Governor General and Council may, in every inſtance, be deprived of the powers veſted in them by Parliament; or, which amounts to the ſame in effect, their *advice and conſent* may never be deſired, *until it muſt arrive* too late to *prevent* the operations of ſteps already taken." But your conſent, let it arrive ever ſo early, cannot in any caſe *prevent* the operation of our meaſures; nor do we ſuppoſe you wiſh to prevent any operations at all by your conſent to them.

With all due reſpect however to your judgment, we conceive, that beſides deviating from the powers granted by Parliament, and extending them to undefined lengths, you ſeem to have miſapprehended the nature of the power which is actually granted to you, and the inconveniences propoſed to be remedied by it. You will, we truſt, excuſe a ſuggeſtion of this kind from us, who are by your conduct become particularly concerned, that every thing which appears doubtful upon this intereſting point, ſhould be cleared up. We ſaid in a former Letter, and we now repeat, that the controlling powers with reſpect to War and Treaties, was, in our humble opinion, intended to remedy a moſt glaring abſurdity in the former ſyſtem, which was, that three Preſidencies being totally independent of each other, though all under one common maſter, made political and other Treaties with the Country Powers of the moſt contradictory nature; and thus it happened that the Company were ſometimes expoſed to imputations of breach of faith, and to other inconveniences ariſing from the oppoſite and claſhing engagements of their different Preſidencies: to remove this abſurdity, as we conceive, a reſtraining power was lodged in your Government, ſufficient to prevent this, or any other Preſidency, from negotiating any Treaty, or making war, without your previous conſent; by which means, and by proper attention on your part, it is impoſſible for the Company to fall into the inconveniences above pointed out. But there is nothing of a poſitive nature in this right; it cannot direct us to make or alter any Treaty, to declare any war, or to purſue any intereſt that we deem incompatible with the welfare of our Employers. In ſhort, it has no one power of compulſion; it has only the power of a ſimple aſſent or negative upon a queſtion, neceſſary to be propoſed by us, before we can begin any negotiation for a Treaty, or make any order for declaring war; and yet it is ſufficient for all the purpoſes intended by it.

We have now urged every thing that appears neceſſary to us, upon this important ſubject; we have done it with deliberation and candour, and we hope with all due reſpect; for we are not conſcious of the leaſt degree of warmth, reſentment, or any other feeling which is inconſiſtent either with our public or private characters. If you really poſſeſs the right you have claimed, exerciſed, and promulgated, of "directing and controlling the political affairs of this Preſidency," or any other right except that which the Act of Parliament has ſo expreſsly defined, we are ready to yield it the moſt implicit acquieſcence, and we make it our particular requeſt, only that you will produce the authority for it; or if you think it is contained in the Act of Parliament, that you will ſhew us how or where it is expreſſed, that we may aſſent to it if we poſſibly can: but until this be done, we hope and expect that you will refrain from the exerciſe of ſuch rights, as we cannot in duty to our truſt acknowledge; and from uſing language and expreſſions in your Letters, denoting them, becauſe neither can anſwer any other purpoſe than to provoke differences; and we aſſure you it is not our wiſh to diſagree, but to act with you in perfect harmony and good underſtanding; to pay you every reſpect and attention which are juſtly due to you, and to co operate with you moſt heartily in all meaſures that ſhall appear to be calculated for the honour and intereſt of our common Employers.

You are pleaſed in the latter part of your Letter, after ſpeaking of the Minute we ſent you from our Preſident, to expreſs your hope, "that we will confine our correſpondence with you to our own concerns; and reflect, "that our cenſures on your acts are unbecoming the "relation of our Government to yours," &c. You will be pleaſed to remember, Gentlemen, that we have never written to you upon any thing which did not immediately concern us; that we have not cenſured any of your acts, and have only remonſtrated againſt ſuch as directly tended to deprive us of our authority, or weaken the reſpect due to it. If you mean "by confining our correſpondence to our own concerns," that we are not to offer an opinion upon any public meaſure which may affect the peace of *India*, and in which we may be conſequently called upon to act, we hope you will pardon us, if we declare, that in ſuch caſes, we conſider it as an indiſpenſable duty we owe to the Company to declare our ſentiments, and that by ſo doing, we act perfectly conſiſtent with the relation in which we ſtand to your Government.

You have been pleaſed likewiſe to inſinuate, that what we have urged in ſupport of our remonſtrances, is derived from falſe or defective materials; we beg leave to aſſure you, that we have uſed no materials, but ſuch as are perfectly authentic, being your own Letters, and ſuch other Letters and Papers as have come to us officially, or from undoubted authority.

We are,

Gentlemen,

Fort St. George, March 13, 1780.

Your moſt obedient, humble Servants.

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APPENDIX, No. 139.

Mr. *Johnſon*'s Minute on Mr. *Hollond*'s Suſpenſion.

MR. *Johnſon* now delivers in the following Minute, at the ſame time apologizing for not entering it ſooner, on account of the number of Letters and Papers he had to refer to.

Having given my negative againſt the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Hollond*, I think it neceſſary, in juſtice to that Gentleman, to aſſign my reaſons for not concurring in ſo ſevere a meaſure with the Preſident and General. In doing this, it would not be improper to enter into a thorough inveſtigation of the powers granted by Parliament to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, it having been oſtenſibly their claim to a ſuperintending and controlling power over this and the other Preſidencies, that has given riſe to the reprehenſion of Mr. *Hollond*'s conduct; but I ſhall touch no farther on this ſubject, than may be requiſite to juſtify the vote I have given. I ſhall enter more fully into the examination of the Minute left us by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, recommending this ſuſpenſion; as that Gentleman ſeems, from ſeveral concurrent circumſtances, which I ſhall take occaſion to mention, to have been actuated by a ſpirit of perſonal reſentment againſt Mr. *Hollond*.

In this Minute, which I conſider as a political teſtament, as he there arrogates to himſelf a power of directing the proceedings of the Committee, even after his reſignation of the chair, we are told that "every thing which may have contributed to the interference of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, in the late demand from this Preſidency for the remiſſion of the Peſcuſh, and eſpecially ſuch as originated with Mr. *Hollond*, ſhould be fully explained and underſtood." "Mr. *Hollond*'s inſtructions from us (ſays Sir *Thomas*) directed him in general, only to communicate to the Governor General and Council of Bengal *every neceſſary intelligence*, by which (ſays he) I conceive nothing more would be underſtood, than that Mr. *Hollond*, who, by reſiding at a public Court, muſt be acquainted with many particulars relating to the affairs of the ſeveral Preſidencies, ſhould communicate directly to *Bengal* (for the ſake of expedition) ſuch intelligence concerning the affairs of that Preſidency, as might be neceſſary for their early information." If this was the *true* ſenſe of the inſtructions Mr. *Hollond* received from the Committee, it is very extraordinary that they ſhould be worded in ſuch a manner, as evidently to convey a different meaning. Had the conveyance of ſuch intelligence *only*, been the intention of the Committee, it is more than probable they would have expreſſed it in terms as explicit, as they did in their inſtructions to *Maſulipatam*. "The Gentlemen (ſays one of the Letters to Mr. *Hollond*) of *Maſulipatam*, having requeſted that you might be ordered to correſpond with them, upon ſuch buſineſs as may relate to their factory, we direct, that if any ſubject of this nature ſhould occur, you would write to them accordingly." Here no doubt could ariſe in his mind, what portion of intelligence he was to convey to *Maſulipatam*; it was evidently ſuch as only related to their factory: neither was there any room for doubt in his inſtructions relative to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*. "We deſire (ſay the inſtructions) that you will, during your reſidence at the Nizam's Court, convey every neceſſary intelligence to the Governor General and Council of Bengal, *as well as to us*, and that you will be as early as poſſible in all your communications to both Preſidencies." If words have a meaning, it implies clearly, that Mr. *Hollond* ſhould convey every neceſſary intelligence to the Governor General and Council, as fully, as amply, and as particularly as to us; there is here no diſtinction made between the two Preſidencies: and Sir *Thomas Rumbold* perverts the meaning, and attempts to miſlead the underſtanding of the Committee, where he ſays, "the intelligence to be conveyed to *Bengal*, was only ſuch as related to that Preſidency." That this miſrepreſentation too was wilful on the part of Sir *Thomas*, and calculated to anſwer ſome preſent purpoſe, is evident from his own Minute of the 30th December; where, after quoting verbatim the inſtructions on this head, and leaving them their true meaning, he adds, "Mr. *Hollond* was not deficient in complying in the moſt ample manner with this deſire;" and thus, affords the cleareſt teſtimony of his want of candour in the explanation he impoſes on the Committee; yet on this explanation he founds his argument, to induce us to form an ungenerous and illiberal opinion of Mr. *Hollond*'s conduct.

"Mr. *Hollond* (he tells us) had particular inſtructions relative to the Peſcuſh, which did not direct him to communicate the progreſs of his negotiation to *Bengal*; nor do I (ſays he) conceive he was in any ſhape authorized by our general inſtructions to him a Reſident, to communicate to the Governor General of *Bengal*, the particulars of a negotiation he had in charge from us, his Superiors, and which related ſolely to the intereſts of this Preſidency." As he has explained the general inſtructions, no doubt Mr. *Hollond* was wrong in communicating to *Bengal* what Sir *Thomas* ſays related ſolely to this Preſidency; but when we take a fair and impartial view of theſe inſtructions, we find that Sir *Thomas*'s explanation of them has perverted their evident meaning, and that Mr. *Hollond* acted with the ſtricteſt propriety; for as their particular inſtructions, relative to the Peſcuſh, did not direct him not to communicate the progreſs of his negotiation to *Bengal*, he was bound to do it by the orders expreſſed in our general inſtructions, being directed to convey to the Gentlemen there, all neceſſary intelligence as well as to us. "If this Government (he tells us) had thought it proper or neceſſary, that he ſhould communicate his inſtructions and correſpondence to *Bengal*, it would have directed him ſo to do." But was not Mr. *Hollond* inſtructed to convey all neceſſary intelligence to them as well as to us? that is, as fully as to us; and was it not therefore neceſſary to acquaint the Government of *Bengal*, not only with the inſtructions he received from this Preſidency, immediately on his being ſent to the Nizam's Court, but alſo to communicate to them every ſubſequent Letter he received from the Committee, in order that the Gentlemen there ſhould have a juſt idea of the cauſe of his deputation, and of the ſtrict attention he paid to the orders he received?

"When I compare this unauthorized communication (ſays Sir *Thomas*) of all our Inſtructions and Letters to *Bengal*, with other circumſtances which have come to my knowledge, I cannot poſſibly force myſelf to think that Mr. *Hollond* has, as he aſſerts, uſed his endeavours to accompliſh our views, or that they have been throughout uniformly ſincere and zealous." But this communication which Sir *Thomas* is pleaſed to term unauthorized, was in fact authorized by the general orders, to correſpond equally with the two Preſidencies, and give them all neceſſary intelligence: for how could the Government of *Bengal* form a judgment of Mr. *Hollond*'s adherence to the inſtructions he received, if they were unacquainted with the inſtructions themſelves? *As to the circumſtances which Sir Thomas ſays have come to his knowledge, and which, for reaſons beſt known to himſelf, he does not think proper to mention in his Minute*, I am at a loſs to conceive what they are.

As to facts; to prove that Mr. *Hollond* was not ſincere and zealous in his endeavours to accompliſh the views of the Committee, Sir *Thomas* ſays, "that in the ſeveral Letters to Mr. *Hollond*, he was deſired to continue *unremittingly the negotiation concerning the Peſcuſh*, and to preſs it to a concluſion as ſpeedily as poſſible; yet (ſays he) by a Letter from him to me, it appears, that he took upon himſelf to ſuſpend it, alledging as a reaſon, that he thought it may be taken up again with greater proſpect of ſucceſs on the arrival of His Majeſty's ſhips and troops, which were then expected." In reading over the Letters of the Committee to Mr. *Hollond*, I do not recollect

recollect to have met the word *unremittingly*; and if it was uſed, I think it was improper; for, literal obedience to orders of this nature, may fruſtrate their intention. A Miniſter keeping his main point in view, ſhould be left entirely to the Government of his own prudence and diſcretion. Mr. *Hollond*'s ſuſpending this negotiation at a time when he ſaw the Nizam full of his own conſequence and ſuperior power, in order to take it up again when he muſt have been ſenſible of his inferiority, was ſuch an act of true policy and ſound judgment as ought rather to redound to his honour, and entitle him to the thanks of the Committee, than be brought againſt him as an article of accuſation. As a further proof that Mr. *Hollond* was not ſincere and zealous in his beſt endeavours to accompliſh the views of the Committee, Sir *Thomas* tells us, "that Mr. *Hollond* received a Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, directing him to ſtay at the Nizam's Court as their public Miniſter; which appointment (ſays he) Mr. *Hollond* regards as a further valuable mark of diſtinction, to the honour conferred on him by us by his former negotiation, and receives it with ſuitable ſatisfaction. This (adds Sir *Thomas*) *exceeds all that went before.*" This it ſeems is the greateſt crime that Sir *Thomas* thought proper to accuſe him of at the Committee; as if the approbation of the ſuperintending power in *India* were ſo little flattering, that a Gentleman in a public and conſpicuous ſtation ſhould not feel an honeſt pride in it. "Upon the whole (ſays Sir *Thomas*) Mr. *Hollond*'s conduct in this negotiation, whether intentionally or not, ſeems to have been more calculated to aſſiſt the views of the Nizam, and to promote the unſeaſonable interference which took place from *Bengal*, than to anſwer the purpoſe for which he was employed." Sir *Thomas*, however, appears here to have forgot the commendation paſſed on the conduct of Mr. *Hollond* by the Committee; for in one of their Letters they tell him "the line you have taken, and the firmneſs which appears to accompany your repreſentation to the Soubah, are very commendable." His conduct therefore could not have been calculated to aſſiſt the views of the Nizam, nor to promote the interference of the Government of *Bengal*, which was entirely brought about by the Committee themſelves, in attempting a negotiation with a Country Power *without* their permiſſion, contrary to the injunction of the Act of Parliament.

The firſt Letter for the recall of Mr. *Hollond*, we are told by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, in his Minute of the 30th December, was moved in Committee by him; not for any of the cauſes of complaint brought againſt Mr. *Hollond* in his laſt Minute of the 1ſt April, but *purely in adoption of the ſentiments of the Governor General and Council.* The paſſage I have in view is expreſſed in theſe terms: "however we may feel ourſelves hurt by the proceedings of the Council General, relative to our inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, I ſtrongly recommend that we do not ſuffer any circumſtance to interrupt the harmony which ought to ſubſiſt between the two Preſidencies. It was with this view (ſays he) that in conformity to the wiſhes of the Council General, I immediately adopted their ſentiments, and moved in Committee of the 14th inſtant the recall of Mr. *Hollond*." Here is here no occaſion of betraying a confidential negotiation, no accuſation of having ſent copies of the Inſtructions and Letters to the Council General, neither is there any want of zeal or ſincerity; and yet Sir *Thomas* then knew that Mr. *Hollond* had acquainted the Government of *Bengal* with the whole progreſs of his negotiation; had ſent them copies of the Inſtructions and Letters of this Preſidency, and had ſuſpended his application for the remiſſion of the Peſcuſh, until what he conceived would be a more favourable opportunity. If theſe cauſes of accuſation really ever exiſted, they exiſted then, and why was he not then ſuſpended? Sir *Thomas* cannot be charged with lenity towards Mr. *Hollond*, and if theſe acts of delinquency are founded in truth, it is more than probable, that inſtead of moving for his recall, in adoption of the ſentiments of the Council General, he would have moved for his immediate ſuſpenſion from the ſervice.

To the firſt Letter of recall, Mr. *Hollond* endeavoured to pay a ready and dutiful obedience. He acquaints the Nizam of the orders he received to return to the Preſidency; and that as ſoon as he ſhould be in readineſs to ſet off, he ſhould wait on him for leave: but a few days after, the Nizam informed him he ſhould have a Letter for him to forward to the Governor, at the ſame time deſiring him to remain at *Hydrabad* until he could receive an anſwer; and as this was a requeſt he could not refuſe without offence, his excuſe on that occaſion has been admitted.

Notwithſtanding the requeſt contained in the Nizam's Letter, it was not thought proper to permit Mr. *Hollond* to remain longer at his Court; and he was accordingly, by Letter of the 1ſt February, directed to return to *Madras* with all convenient expedition. Nearly, however, about the ſame time that he could have received this Letter, he receives one from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; in which they tell him, "that although he is a ſervant of the Company belonging to another Preſidency, and therefore not dependent on their authority, yet they deem it ſo eſſential to the general intereſt of the Britiſh Empire in *India*, that an Engliſh Reſident ſhould be ſtationed at that juncture with *Nizam Ally*, that they enjoin him to remain at *Hydrabad* in that quality, as he ſhould anſwer for the conſequence of his departure to the Court of Directors." Thus was Mr. *Hollond* thrown into a very diſagreeable dilemma; ordered by one Preſidency to leave *Hydrabad*, and by the other to remain there; he was laid under the neceſſity of diſobeying one of them. In this ſituation he took that part which appeared to him moſt conſonant with the Company's intereſt, and accordingly remained at the Nizam's Court; informing, however, this Preſidency of the cauſe, and expreſſing his confidence of their approbation.

At the ſame time that the Governor General and Council diſpatched theſe orders to Mr. *Hollond*, they wrote to the Committee, expreſſing their concern to perceive that the ſuddenneſs of Mr. *Hollond*'s recall, and the abrupt manner in which it had been conveyed to the Nizam, had contributed to excite, inſtead of allaying, his ſuſpicion: "for this reaſon (ſay they) and becauſe he has deſired that we will ſupply the place of Mr. *Hollond* by a ſimilar appointment from this Government, which inſtantly following his recall, would have been too viſible an appearance of a diſunion between your Government and ours, we requeſt that you will permit that Gentleman to remain in quality of *our* Miniſter at the Court of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn.*"

Though I ſhould have agreed with the Committee, in not allowing Mr. *Hollond* to remain at *Hydrabad* as the public Miniſter of the Government of *Bengal only*, after he had been appointed to act in that capacity by this Preſidency, yet, in order to keep up an appearance of unanimity, I ſhould have urged the propriety of permitting him to remain under the orders he had received from us, as well as theirs, until ſuch time as they had appointed one of their own ſervants Reſident there. This propoſal I ſhould have thought would have met with the approbation of the Committee, in conſequence of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s recommendation, in his Minute of the 30th December, "that we ſhould not ſuffer any circumſtance to interrupt the harmony which ought to ſubſiſt between the two Preſidencies." To which he adds, that "it is a duty incumbent on us to make the co-operating with the Council General our firſt conſideration."

But Sir *Thomas* was then too much hurt, I imagine, at Mr. *Hollond*'s conduct, to attend to any conſideration of harmony or co-operation with the Government of *Bengal*; and therefore a third Letter was diſpatched to Mr. *Hollond*, ordering him directly from *Hydrabad*, and threatening him with putting in execution the powers veſted in the Committee in caſe of delay.

To this Letter Mr. *Hollond* returned a very reſpectful, and

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and in my opinion a very ſatisfactory anſwer. The indiſpoſition of the Nizam had prevented his ſeeing him, and conſequently his taking leave; not having orders to depart without taking leave, he could not of himſelf attempt ſo offenſive a meaſure, and therefore, had no other cauſes intervened, he found it impoſſible to pay an inſtant obedience to the orders he received. He did not conceive he could incur our diſpleaſure by obeying the peremptory injunction of a Government conſtituted by Parliament the guardians of the public peace of *India*, more particularly when that Government declared theſe injunctions to be founded on the preſent critical ſituation of public affairs. He thought the conſideration of general and public objects ought to ſuperſede the regard due to particular and partial ſyſtems; and therefore, though covenanted to act under this Preſidency, that he could not diveſt himſelf of the ſuperior duty he owed to the Company, taken collectively, or of that zealous attention due from a faithful ſervant to their general intereſts; for theſe reaſons, regardleſs of his perſonal intereſt, he was under an abſolute neceſſity of complying with the orders of the Governor General and Council, until they ſhould relieve him from the public truſt they deemed it neceſſary to commit to his charge, and this he made no doubt they would do, on being made acquainted with our determination.

This is the ſubſtance of his Letter; and to us, who certainly ought to be more attentive to the peace of *India*, and the general intereſts of the Company, than jealous of our particular authority; I think it ſufficiently full and ſatisfactory. The powers of ſuſpenſion with which we are armed, ſhould be exerciſed with caution, and never on thoſe who ſacrifice their private intereſts to the public welfare. We ſee Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, for ſome private pique, miſrepreſent the general inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*; we ſee him bring againſt him, as proofs of his miſconduct, thoſe acts which it was his duty to perform; and we ſee him act in direct oppoſition to what he recommended to the Committee before this reſentment was excited. In his Minute of the 30th December, we find him warmly recommending harmony and co-operation with the Council General, notwithſtanding their interference: we afterwards find him refuſing a requeſt of theirs, though it was founded in the general intereſts of the Company, and the propriety of keeping up, at leaſt the appearance, of concord and unanimity; I ſay we find him refuſing it, for though this was oſtenſibly the act of the Committee, I have myſelf no doubt that the refuſal originated in him, and that more from a principle of implacability to Mr. *Hollond*, than jealouſy of the Council General: and finally, we find him purſuing Mr. *Hollond*, to the moment of his departure for *Europe*, leaving us the executors of his laſt will, to ſuſpend that Gentlemen the ſervice, ſhould he attempt to delay obedience to this laſt order, without ever recommending it to us to weigh well the arguments he may offer in his defence, before we determined on exerciſing ſo ſevere an act of authority. The welfare of the Company requiring the concurrence of the ſeveral Preſidencies in every meaſure that may tend to promote them, I conceive that the requeſt of the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* ought to have been ſo far granted, as to have ſuffered Mr. *Hollond* to remain at the Nizam's Court, under the double appointment; which certainly would have been no derogation to the dignity of this Government: and therefore I think the refuſal of that requeſt, and the recall of Mr. *Hollond*, were haſty and undigeſted ſteps, incompatible with the true intereſts of the Company, or the general good of the Nation; and that Mr. *Hollond* has proved himſelf a zealous and faithful ſervant, in remaining at *Hydrabad*, at the riſque of our diſpleaſure, until another Reſident be appointed from *Bengal*: for this reaſon, and becauſe Sir *Thomas Rumbold* ſeems to have been more influenced in his recommendation to ſuſpend him, from perſonal reſentment, than by any public conſideration; and further, as Mr. *Hollond* appears to me to have acted throughout with the prudence, attention, and judgment, that has ever diſtinguiſhed him, I have given my hearty negative to his ſuſpenſion, and being fully perſuaded that his conduct merits the approbation of the Company, I do not perceive, with what degree of propriety it deſerves to be reprobated and puniſhed by their ſervants.

John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
May 29th 1780. *Hector Munro,*
Saml Johnſon.

APPENDIX, No. 140.

Extract of the ſeparate Letter from *Fort Saint George*; dated the 27th June 1769.

Par. 13. MR. *Bernard* is ſtill employed in ſurveying the jaghire lands, and hath made conſiderable progreſs; but much remains ſtill to be done, and the work advances but ſlowly. He hath often repreſented the delays and impediments he meets with, from the backwardneſs of the Managers and Chief of the diſtricts, in giving him the neceſſary aſſiſtance. The Nabob has been frequently requeſted to iſſue his orders, that Mr. *Bernard* may have all proper helps; and he hath promiſed ſo to do, but without much effect. When this ſurvey ſhall be completed, we hope to acquire a more accurate knowledge of the value of theſe lands, than hath hitherto been practicable. Upon ſuch informations as we have been able to obtain, we have no cauſe to differ from the repreſentations that have been made to you, at various times, in the general advices from hence, touching the value of theſe diſtricts: and we are of opinion, that if the Nabob continues to pay the full rents at which he hath farmed them, he muſt either oppreſs the inhabitants, or make good the deficiency out of his other Revenues; indeed we are ſorry to ſay, that the apprehenſions your Honours expreſſed in your commands of the 26th April 1765, Par. 30, have but too much foundation; and we deſpair of ſeeing this valuable part of your poſſeſſions, in a more flouriſhing condition than any other part of the *Carnatic*, whilſt it remains under the Nabob's management. It is not in reaſon to ſuppoſe that he would encourage the inhabitants of your lands, to the prejudice of thoſe which he conſiders as his own; but it is certain, that if no other encouragement were given, than merely not to exact more than the juſt proportion due to the Circar, *that* alone would put the inhabitants in a far better condition than thoſe of any other part of the *Carnatic*. Common policy, therefore, would oppoſe ſuch a preference, eſpecially when immediate intereſt ſo plainly concurs. The experience we have lately had of the intractable diſpoſition of the Nabob's Amuldars, gave us great cauſe to wiſh we had not parted with their power over theſe diſtricts. When the enemy lately entered the *Carnatic*, we foreſaw that the jaghire, as well as other parts, might be expoſed to the ravages, and that *Madras* might be diſtreſſed for proviſion; we therefore requeſted the Nabob, in the moſt preſſing manner, to iſſue poſitive orders to the Amuldars, to lay in as much as poſſible of the grain, proviſions, and production of the country, of every kind, into the forts of *Chingleput* and *Poonamalee*, and to uſe all poſſible means of conveying a good ſtore to *Madras*. We muſt do the Nabob the juſtice to ſay, he did repeatedly iſſue his orders, and we believe with a deſire of having them obeyed; yet the effects were far ſhort of our expectation; of which it would be endleſs to relate the particulars. The term granted to the Nabob, in the name of Vencatachellum, for the farm of the jaghire and *Poonamallee*, will expire in July 1771. It reſts with your Honours to determine, whether they ſhall again be put under the Nabob's management, if he ſhould chooſe it, or be let to other renters, or be managed by Amuldars. There

is no doubt but that the Nabob will offer a much higher rent than any other perſon; the reaſons and the conſequences have been explained. And as your Honours are now furniſhed with all the lights we can at preſent give on the ſubject, it only remains, that *we* requeſt you will be pleaſed, before the expiration of the term, to ſignify to us your pleaſure on this ſubject.

APPENDIX, No. 141.

Extract of the General Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated 10th April 1771.

Par. 55. HAVING expreſſed to our Select Committee the earneſtneſs of our deſire, that every conciliatory meaſure ſhould be employed to remove from the Nabob's mind, any jealouſies, and eradicate any ſuſpicions he may have unjuſtly conceived, reſpecting the ſincerity of our attachment to him; we ſhall here confine ourſelves to your inquiry concerning the diſpoſal of the jaghire lands, at the expiration of the preſent Cowle.

56. Impreſſed as we are with the moſt friendly diſpoſition towards the Nabob, we can by no means think of increaſing his jealouſy, or depriving him of the leaſt degree of importance, by not admitting him as a renter of the Enaum lands. And though theſe reaſons prevent us from reaping every benefit which might be expected from their being in other hands, many of the objections againſt his having them under his management would, in a great degree, be removed by his holding them only from year to year, ſince the apprehenſions he will be under of their being withdrawn from him at ſuch a period, ſhould there be any cauſe of complaint againſt his conduct, may diſpoſe him to comply with every reaſonable requiſition in behalf of the inhabitants, or for the providing of grain for the uſe of your ſettlement upon any preſſing occaſion.

57. If the Nabob, therefore, ſhould deſire you to continue him the renter of theſe diſtricts, you will revert to your former method of letting your farms, and grant him a yearly Cowle. And we truſt you will profit by this occaſion, and repreſent to the Nabob, that from our unwillingneſs to take any ſtep which may be diſpleaſing to him, we comply with his deſire in this reſpect, although we thereby obſtruct our own intereſts, ſince we cannot doubt but thoſe lands let to perſons, who might be more ready to cultivate and improve them, would in time yield us much greater advantages than we can expect from their being under the care of the Nabob.

Extract of the General Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated 25th March 1772.

Par. 24. By our General Letter of the 10th April 1771, we apprized you ſo fully of our ſentiments in reſpect to diſpoſal of the Enaum lands, that it is unneceſſary for us to enter here on this ſubject, further than to inform you, that the motives which induced us to continue the Nabob the renter of thoſe lands, are too powerful to admit of your deviation from the orders we have given in this reſpect; for though we are ſenſible of the benefit which would accrue to the Company, were thoſe lands in other hands than thoſe of the Nabob, we had rather wait for a conjuncture more favourable than the preſent, before we attempt to reap all poſſible advantages from them, leſt that jealouſy, which the Nabob appears to have conceived, of our diſpoſition towards him, might terminate in diſguſt, were we to leſſen his conſequence in the *Carnatic*, by not permitting him to hold any authority in thoſe lands which he had *granted* to the *Company*.

APPENDIX, No. 142.

APPENDIX, No. 142.

Extract of the Revenue Letter from *Fort Saint George*; dated 5th February 1778.

Par. 31. ON the 17th December our Preſident laid before us a Letter from the Nabob, requeſting to have the rent of your jaghire lands continued under his management, for the preſent year, upon the ſame terms as he had formerly held it; and we found alſo, upon referring to the Records, that an application of the ſame kind had been made to Mr. *Stratton* and his Council, and that they had paſſed a reſolution to comply with his requeſt.

32. This happening, however, but a very few days before the receipt of your orders by the *Swallow*, the Letter which was intended by thoſe Gentlemen to have been addreſſed to the Nabob upon the occaſion, had not been diſpatched to him when our Preſident arrived, and took charge of the Government.

33. The unremitted attention which we were obliged to give to the more immediate objects of concern, upon our firſt coming to the management of your affairs, prevented us from entering upon this ſubject, until the receipt of the Nabob's ſecond application before referred to, and conſidering that theſe lands had been tacitly, though not formally, continued under the Nabob, from the time the laſt rent expired, and that above a third of the term already elapſed, during which the Nabob had begun to collect a part of the Revenue produced by ſmall grain, we were of opinion, that no alteration could take place, without involving you in difficulties, and perhaps loſſes; and we judged it therefore moſt adviſable to continue it to him.

34. A Letter was accordingly wrote to his Highneſs, ſignifying our acquieſcence to his requeſt, and inſerting at the ſame time, the condition your Honours have inſtructed us to require of him, relative to the operations of your Committee of Circuit, as well as a few others, which, if obſerved, we hoped might conduce to the improvement of theſe lands.

35. As the expediency of taking your jaghire into your own immediate poſſeſſion has, upon former occaſions, been very clearly and ſtrongly pointed out to you, and as your orders of the 12th April 1775, although manifeſtly favouring the meaſure, do not abſolutely authoriſe us to adopt it, we cannot but be anxious, under this ſtate of uncertainty, as to your real intentions, and we therefore requeſt your Honours will furniſh us with your preciſe directions upon this ſubject, that we may not be in doubt with reſpect to the part we ſhould take, when the matter may again come under our conſideration.

APPENDIX, No. 143.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 20th July 1778.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute:

It is with concern I find myſelf under the neceſſity of repreſenting to the Board the difficulty I have to obtain the leaſt aſſiſtance from the Nabob to ſupply our treaſury, now entirely exhauſted, not having ſufficient to pay the current charges of the month. Our preſent critical ſituation demands the moſt ſpirited exertion on our parts, to obtain from him the very large balances remaining due, as well as to induce him to provide ſome certain reſources for the very heavy expences attending our preſent neceſſary preparations. No arguments or ſenſe of the common danger, in caſe of a war, can prevail on him to furniſh the Company with what is abſolutely neceſſary to aſſemble our army, though it is beyond a doubt that money,

APPENDIX. No. 143.

money, to a large amount, is now hoarded up in his coffers at *Chippauch*, and tunkaws are granted to individuals upon ſome of his moſt valuable countries, for payment of part of thoſe debts which he has contracted, and which certainly will not bear inſpection, as neither the debtor or creditors have ever had the confidence to ſubmit their Accounts to our examination, though they expreſſed a wiſh to conſolidate the debts, under the auſpices of this Government, agreeable to a plan they had formed. This backwardneſs to aſſiſt the public ſervice is not the complaint of a day; the Records are filled with the diſtreſs which the Company's affairs have been expoſed to, occaſioned by the trifling and dilatory conduct of the Nabob, whenever money has been demanded from him; and I ſhall beg leave to refer the Board to a Letter written by one of the ableſt men that ever filled the chair of this Government, under date It affords a ſtriking picture of the difficulties he had then to ſtruggle with, in bringing the Nabob to a ſenſe of what ought to have been his conduct. The Letter is nearly applicable to the preſent times; but I will venture to ſay, the difficulties are heightened by him, for his love of money has increaſed with his advance of years. Threatened with the danger of a war, and dependent alone on our own forces, without one ally except himſelf to aſſiſt us, and he almoſt without troops, and unwilling to furniſh the means for the payment of ours, I look forward with more than common concern at the riſk we may be expoſed to. If he would but conſent to pay his juſt debt to the Company, contracted ſolely for the public ſervice, and what is due from him on account of the jaghire, which ought to be a conſtant and never-failing reſource to the Company, we might ſupport ourſelves for ſome time, and wait the event of further aſſiſtance: but I muſt be plain to tell the Board, entreaties and arguments are in vain. The Nabob muſt be rouſed from the ſtate he has fallen into, by ſome determined and ſpirited meaſures: on our part it is abſolutely neceſſary to purſue ſuch a line, for the ſafety of the *Carnatic*, and the preſervation of our poſſeſſions, which the neceſſity of affairs at preſent ſo indiſpenſably demands. I muſt here remark, that it was cuſtomary formerly to deliver in to the Nabob his Accounts with the Company regularly every three months; but the unhappy diſſentions that prevailed at the Board during the two former Governments, put a ſtop to that regularity ſo neceſſary to be obſerved, and the Nabob has had no Accounts ſent to him for two years, from the 31ſt July 1776, till they were adjuſted and delivered by me to him the other day. His debt to the Company, the end of laſt month, amounted to as follows, viz.

Balance of the old debt, and account current charges - - - -	754,981	31	29
Balance on account of the Company's jaghire - - - - -	145,070	30	41
Pags	900,052	25	70

Excluſive of the above, without reckoning one pagoda extraordinary for the expences we are certain of being put to for our preparations, and which cannot in prudence be put a ſtop to, the debt is increaſing at the rate of 40,000 pagodas a month, beſides one lack of pagodas, which will be due in September on account of the jaghire. This Account, and our threatened danger, obliges me to urge, in the ſtrongeſt manner, that we may conſider of proper means to extricate us from our preſent difficulties, and the embarraſſments we are likely to be thrown into; I muſt confeſs, I ſee no other certain proſpect than inſiſting that the Nabob do grant the Company tunkaws on ſuch countries as we ſhall point out for the payment of his preſent debt, and as ſecurity for his ſhare of the current charges; and that Taſſeldars be appointed by us to act in conjunction with his, and to ſee that the collections are properly brought to account; and thoſe Taſſeldars, if it ſhould be found neceſſary, be aſſiſted with a ſufficient force.

It is with concern that I propoſe a plan that may be the cauſe of uneaſineſs to the Nabob; I wiſh to do every thing that may render his age eaſy and happy; but we are driven either to the ſacrifice of the public good, or to take ſuch meaſures as may prove a certain ſecurity to his, as well as our own Government; and before I put the plan into execution, I would wiſh, by Letter, to make one more repreſentation in the ſtrongeſt manner, to induce him to grant of himſelf the neceſſary ſupplies.

Having now offered my ſentiments with regard to the neceſſary meaſures to be taken for the ſupply of our treaſury, and which, if not immediately adopted, and troubles ſhould break out, it may then be too late to attempt; I ſhall now beg leave to call the attention of the Board to another material object for their conſideration; I mean the Company's jaghire, and the farming of the diſtricts of *Poonamalee*. This valuable poſſeſſion of the Company's is moſt ſhamefully neglected and oppreſſed; I will not ſay by the Nabob, for I believe he is in a great degree ignorant of it, but by thoſe he truſts in the collections. The year for which it is let is now expiring, and it becomes neceſſary that we determine how the Jemmabundy may be ſettled in future; for this purpoſe I would propoſe that an advertiſement be put up for the re-letting of the jaghire, and the diſtricts of *Poonamalee*, but firſt to acquaint the Nabob with our intentions; and that we by all means avoid that deſtructive ſyſtem of farming it from year to year, but receive propoſals for a longer term, from three to five years, and on ſuch conditions as may be effectual to recover the country from its preſent ruinous ſituation; and as the Nabob's leaſe expires the laſt of this month, I am of opinion it is abſolutely neceſſary to have ſome proper perſon ſent as a Taſſeldar to receive charge of the jaghire, till the new ſettlement is made.

I ſhall beg leave alſo to ſubmit another circumſtance to the conſideration of the Board, reſpecting the Vakeels, who come in from the different Powers to the Nabob, without paying any attention to this Government, in time of profound peace: it is, according to my ſentiments, highly improper, and tends exceedingly to leſſen the Company's conſequence in the eyes of the Natives, but in times of trouble, and on the proſpect of war, it is not only dangerous, but may be attended with many inconveniencies. The Nabob, at preſent, reſides immediately under our flag, and under the protection of our guns; and that Vakeels ſhall come in without any ſort of communication with this Government, or without even making a complimentary viſit to the Governor, appears to me highly improper.

I ſhall therefore move, That all Vakeels from the different Powers, who come within the Company's limits and protection, do immediately on their arrival wait on the Governor; and that all Vakeels now here be acquainted with this regulation, that thoſe who have not already done it may conform thereto.

I cannot but with concern reflect on the preſent backwardneſs of the Rajah of *Tanjore*, in the payment of his kiſts; which, by the beſt informations I have been able to obtain, proceeds from his weakneſs and inſufficiency to direct the buſineſs of the Revenue; theſe throw him at the mercy of his ſervants, who have not honeſty or ability to manage that valuable country to that advantage it is capable of: had it been in proper hands, there is not a doubt but the kiſts might have been all paid, and a large treaſury left to aſſiſt us, in caſe our occaſions ſhould have required it. A continuance of the preſent prevailing miſmanagement, cannot be prevented by a correſpondence; ſome other method muſt therefore be adopted, and that ſoon; on which I ſhall give my ſentiments at a future meeting.

The Board are ſenſibly concerned to find by this repreſentation from the Preſident, that the Nabob ſhould purſue a conduct ſo inconſiſtent with the friendſhip that

has

has for many years ſubſiſted between his Highneſs and the Company, and eſpecially at a time when the precarious ſituation of public affairs renders every exertion on his part indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſupport of their common intereſts: being however anxious to avoid any meaſure that may be in the leaſt diſagreeable or derogatory to him, and wiſhing to defer it until we are compelled to give up this important conſideration, for the ſtill more important one of the ſafety of the Company's poſſeſſions, in which the national welfare is deeply concerned, reſolved, That a Letter, conformable to the ſentiments expreſſed by the Preſident in the foregoing Minute, be addreſſed to his Highneſs upon the occaſion, and that our determination upon the ſeveral points which he has therein ſubmitted to us, be ſuſpended until the Nabob's anſwer be received.

The Board approve of what the Preſident recommends, relative to the complimentary attention which is due to this Government, from the Vakeels of neighbouring Country Powers upon their arrival at this place; and it is accordingly reſolved, That the ſame be in future ſtrictly obſerved.

APPENDIX, No. 144.

28th Auguſt 1778.

THE Preſident informs the Board, That having communicated to the Nabob the ſenſe of the Board, as recited in Conſultation the 10th inſtant, relative to the future diſpoſition of the Company's jaghire; his Highneſs expreſſed an earneſt deſire to have the rent continued to him for the enſuing year, upon the ſame terms as before; and offered to enter into any articles that might be judged neceſſary for the improvement and benefit of thoſe diſtricts.

Some debate ariſing concerning the meaſures to be taken in conſequence of the Preſident's Report of the Nabob's inclinations: as it is a ſubject that from its importance requires to be conſidered with a deliberate attention, and eſpecially in the preſent uncertain ſtate of affairs, it is reſolved, that a further time be allowed for each Member of Council to deliver his ſentiments upon it; and the Board accordingly adjourn until Friday next the 4th of September, for taking the ſame under final conſideration.

Tho' Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
Charles Smith,
Peter Perring.

APPENDIX, No. 145.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 4th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.
General *Munro* abſent on ſervice.
Mr. *Smith* indiſpoſed.

THE Preſident acquaints the Board, That having, ſince laſt Conſultation, uſed frequent endeavours to converſe with the Nabob on the ſubject of the Company's jaghire, in the hopes of leading him to a deciſive and explicit declaration of his ſentiments concerning it; his Highneſs has repeatedly evaded this deſign: and as the Preſident has ſufficient reaſon to believe that he is actually in treaty with certain individuals, for mortgaging the revenue of thoſe lands, before he is aſſured that they will be continued under his management, he is of opinion, that the iſſuing of advertiſements for renting them, may be attended with advantage, as it will be a means of coming at the knowledge of their eſtimated value; and by indicating to the Nabob, that we intend to let them out to the greateſt advantage, without regard to any perſon in particular, his Highneſs may be induced to enter upon the ſubject in a more ſatisfactory manner than he has hitherto been inclined to do. Reſolved therefore, that advertiſements for renting them for one, three, five, or ten years, be publiſhed throughout the ſettlement; and that the term for receiving propoſals be limited to Sunday the 20th inſtant.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

APPENDIX No. 146.

APPENDIX, No. 146.

Extract of *Fort St. George* Revenue Conſultations, 11th September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Samuel Johnſon,
Peter Perring.

READ the following Letter from the Nabob.

From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 9th September 1778—Received D°.

" It is unneceſſary to tell you in what manner I have at all times paid up the rents of the jaghire, ever ſince I firſt have had the management of it, notwithſtanding the troubles that have happened of late years, and the many dry and ſcarce ſeaſons which we have had; becauſe I ever am the ſteady friend of the Company and Engliſh Nation, and ever wiſh the proſperity of their affairs. Notwithſtanding I have large arrears of revenue due to me in theſe diſtricts, yet I have had conſideration for the Ryots, and not dealt hard with them in collecting what was due. The year of Phazely 1188, having already commenced, I have to requeſt of the repreſentatives of my beſt friends, the Governor and Council, that they will do me the favour to let me rent the abovementioned diſtricts of the jaghire for the five enſuing years; that the Aumils may with eaſe and ſatisfaction to themſelves, attend to the cultivation of the lands in theſe diſtricts, and make the proper and neceſſary repairs of tanks and watercourſes. Conſidering the preſent poſture of affairs, there is a proſpect of a loſs in the revenues by troubles which may happen hereafter; and ſhould this be the caſe, which God forbid! I hope you will be kind enough to take the loſs which may ariſe to me, into your conſideration. What ſhall I ſay more?"

Advertiſements having been already publiſhed for letting out the Company's jaghire;

Agreed, That the conſideration of the Nabob's requeſt be deferred till the expiration of the term limited for receiving propoſals.

APPENDIX, No. 147.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 23d September 1778.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, eſquire, Governor, Preſident,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Sam' Johnſon,
Peter Perring.
General *Munro* on ſervice.

SEVERAL propoſals having been delivered in, relative to the re-letting the Company's jaghire;

Reſolved, That an Abſtract be made of the ſeveral propoſals, and that it be ſent round for the examination of Council.

APPENDIX.
No. 147.

PROPOSALS for renting the Company's Jaghire.

PROPOSALS.	Pondamaley.	Chingleput.	Conjerams.	Caroongoly.	Poonary Pergunnah.	Muncrungiam and Covelong.	Covelong.	Whotramoor and Sawlevauk.	Sevaccanche and Veerinoocaincke.	Perreyapoliam.	Saut Maginan.	Trepassoor, Pedd polliam, Pounary, Steery Cottah.
Chetrputt Ponapah								30,000	43,000	the 1st	5 Years	
Abraham Moodliar									50,000	the last	5 D°	
Sooreah Moothly								31,000				
Purivakum Gangadura Pilly		56,200		56,500	19,500	25,100						
Dafe Reddy						24,000						
Currhee Coonum Soobramaniah Mooderlier	43,000	the 1st	3 Years.									
	44,000	the 2d	4 D°									
	43,000	the last	3 D°									
Vadamalay Pilly												
Sawmy Moodaly					20,500					17,500		
Lutchaman Rauroo		52,000										
											20,500	
Veeraparmaull			37,000	the 1st	3 Years							
			40,000	next	4 D°							
			45,000	last	3 D°							
Cootrumbourom Nurfawyah											21,085	the 1st 5 Years.
											23,055	the last 5 d° with Security.
Mango Putty							8,500	3 Years				
							9,000	5 D°				
							9,250	10 D°				

	5 Years.	10 Years.
Tombeyapah Moderlear, his Gomaſtah Vencataroy and Moſtaliah	310,000	620,000
If the Fawkiers Allowances are deducted, will give	318,000	634,000
If the Charges of repairing the Tanks, &c. are allowed, will give	326,000	651,000
If the Free Gift Villages and Conicoples Fees are added	344,000	690,000
If the Villages taken by the Nabob in the Year 1765 and 1777, are added	373 000	740,000
If the Villages called Teckſiam, now in the Nabob's Poſſeſſion, can be added	383,000	760,000

PROPOSALS for renting the Company's Jaghire.

PROPOSALS.	The Whole of the Jaghire.	Chingleput.	Tripaſſoor, Perrea-pollam Poonary, Che Caracaudy, the new Diſtrict of Mungeeve.	Caroongoly.	Conjeveram.	Covanandum tetum.	Whotramatoor and Sawlevauk.	Pondamaley.
Govinda Row		56,500		57,250	53,000			
Antonio de Souza	370,000 the 1st 5 Y's.							
	390,000 the last 5 d°							
Kiſtnajee Punda	313,000 for the 1st Y'r							
Venkata Chelum	320,000 2d D°							
	330,000 3d D°							
	340,000 4th D°							
	340,000 5th D°							
	350 000 6th D°							
	350 000 7th D°							
	360,000 8th D°							
	370,000 9th D°							
	380,000 10th D°							
Moonor Putchapah Moddelly and Veera Pooram Keſtna Pillee		43,000 1 Year.	67,000 —	55,000				
		43,000 2 D°	67,000 —	55,000				
		45,000 3 D°	70,000 —	55,000				
		45,000 4 D°	70,000 —	57,000				
		47,000 5 D°	73,000 —	57,000				
		47,000 6 D°	73,000 —	57,000				
		47,000 7 D°	75,000 —					
		53,000 8 D°	75,000 —	60,000				
		53,000 9 D°	75,000 —	60,000				
		53,000 10 D°	75,000 —	60,000				
Anunda Vizia Ninar								39,100
		52,000 —		53,500	42,500	13,500	26,500	39,500
		52,000 —		53,500	43,100	13,500	26,500	40 000
		53,000 —		53,500	43,100	14,000	27,500	41,000
		53,000 —		54,000	43,500	14,000	27,500	42,000
Appajee Royer		54,000 —		54,000	43,500	14,500	28,000	43,000
		54,000 —		54,000	43,500	14,500	28,000	44,500
		55,000 —		54,500	44,000	15,000	28 500	44,500
		55,000 —		54,500	44,000	15,000	28,500	44,500
		55,000 —		54,500	44,500	16,000	28,500	44,500
		55,000 —		54,500	44,500	16,000	28,500	44,500

APPENDIX, No. 148.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 2d October 1778.

THE Preſident delivers in the following Minute, relative to re-letting the Company's jaghire.

Having adverti ſed for letting the Company's jaghire, more with a view to aſcertain the real value and preſent ſtate of it, than with any determined reſolution to grant it to the higheſt bidder, which, in my opinion, would be an improper mode to be obſerved; it now becomes neceſſary to conſider the ſeveral points that depend on the re-letting of this valuable acquiſition of the Company's.

The granting ſo extenſive a territory, and ſo large an amount of revenue, to any individual, without the moſt certain ſecurity, and the moſt aſſured confidence that the perſon renting it, is in every reſpect equal to the talk of taking care of the cultivation and improvement of the lands, would, in my opinion, prove of dangerous conſequence, and probably a failure of revenue would enſue. The Nabob, who has for ſeveral years rented it, is ſaid not to have attended ſufficiently to the neceſſary repairs of the tanks, &c. &c that the inhabitants have had too much cauſe for complaint of the oppreſſion of his Aumildars; which I impute to our not having properly inſiſted upon ſeeing the terms fulfilled, on which the holding the jaghire has been granted to him; for had they been ſtrictly obſerved, the lands muſt at this time have been in a proſperous ſtate of cultivation.

The Nabob has wrote us a Letter on the ſubject, and ſeems exceedingly anxious that the jaghire ſhould be continued to him. He is apprehenſive that his honour will be hurt in taking it from him; and is extremely uneaſy at our having made a publication regarding it, which he deems a reflection on him; though ſtill I approve the meaſure, as it will ſerve clearly to ſhew the Company the preſent value of thoſe lands, and that we have not been actuated by any other views than what our duty has prompted us to for their intereſt. It ſeems to be allowed by every one, that the Nabob has paid *us* a larger revenue for the jaghire, than what he really collects from the country. Two principal reaſons, with others, ſeem to have operated on his mind, to induce him to ſubmit to this loſs of revenue; he is pleaſed with having the management of the country, which ſecures to him a degree of credit and conſequence; whilſt he remains at *Madras*, he procures every neceſſary ſupply for his family and his numerous attendants. Was the jaghire once taken from him, I am perſuaded he would be under the neceſſity of removing to *Arcot*, or ſome of his own garriſons, for he would never be reconciled to remain here, entirely as a private Gentleman, under the neceſſity of making application for every trifling aſſiſtance he might require for the convenience of himſelf and thoſe about him. The driving him from our Preſidency, by ſuch an act as taking the jaghire from him, becomes a point for political diſcuſſion. I am aware, that there have been opinions, that it would, on many accounts, be better if his Highneſs was to reſide at his own capital; I muſt profeſs I always differed from them: we never can have a greater influence in the *Carnatic*, nor a ſtronger aſſurance of attachment, I may ſay dependence, than whilſt the Soubah, with his family, and every thing that is dear to him, is living with us, and abſolutely under the protection and fire of our own guns. Some inconveniences, I allow, ariſe, but I am perſuaded they are much overbalanced by the advantages accruing from his reſidence here, and it would be a diſagreeable and cruel taſk, at his preſent advanced ſtage of life, to oblige him to quit that ſituation which ſuits his inclination, and which, from all appearance, he has choſen for his retirement during the remainder of his life. The Company, though many repreſentations have been made to them, have always ſeemed cautious not to diſtreſs him, and have never given orders to deprive him of the jaghire. The letting it to him from year to year, is in my opinion the moſt deſtructive ſyſtem that can be adopted; he is always in doubt whether he ſhall have the renewal of it, and that fear has conſtantly made him backward to grant thoſe repairs which are abſolutely neceſſary, and has kept him from giving that encouragement that might be expected; and that would in ſome meaſure repay him the loſs he has ſuſtained by renting it, as I am aſſured that the laſt three years have not yielded, one year with another, more than 330,000 pagodas. I have been at ſome pains to come to a certainty on this point, and believe the account is to be depended on.

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The Nabob applies to have the jaghire for five years; I am of opinion it would be better to let it him for that term, upon ſuch conditions as I ſhall hereafter ſpecify, which it is our duty to ſee punctually complied with; but leaſt the Company would wiſh to draw any line, or make any new regulations with reſpect to the jaghire, I ſhall propoſe, that it be granted to the Nabob for three years only, during which time the Company may have every neceſſary information for their guidance, in their future diſpoſal of it.

I am abſolutely againſt letting of it from year to year, as well for the reaſons I have before aſſigned, as for another, in my opinion a very material one: the preſent expected war with *France*, and the ſteps we have in conſequence taken, make it abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould not leave to chance the ſettling of ſo material a ſource of revenue, which in caſe of troubles may, in other hands than the Nabob's ſubject us to diſappointment, and a great riſque of failure in the ſtated payments.

To conclude; the Company having in the ſtrongeſt manner, recommended to us to conciliate the mind of the Nabob, by every means in our power, and as they have lately ſent us a copy of the laſt Letter they wrote him, couched in the ſtrongeſt terms of friendſhip and regard, I do not think it would be politic, conſiſtent with our duty, or agreeable to the ſpirit of the Company's direction to us, or their expreſſions of friendſhip to him, to take the jaghire out of his hands, and at ſo critical a juncture to ſour his mind, and to treat him contrary to the wiſhes and directions of our Employers, and on a point he deems of conſequence, and on which he has ſhewn great anxiety.

Of all the propoſals that have been made in conſequence of the advertiſement, there is only one for renting the whole of the jaghire lands together, which is from Mr. *Antonio De Souza*; the others are only for ſeparate parts; and none of the propoſals advantageous. The dividing of the jaghire would, in my opinion, be a meaſure extremely detrimental. Mr. *De Souza's* propoſal is to rent it for ten years, a length of time we ſhould not agree for, without particular directions from the Company; and it appears to me, that the offer is made with a view to ſpeculate what may be done, more than from any certainty of ſucceeding in the undertaking; in caſe of failure, the loſs would fall heavy on the Company.

CONDITIONS on which the Jaghire is propoſed to be granted to the Nabob for the term of three years.

1ſt. His Highneſs the Nabob ſhall annually pay, at ſtated monthly payments, as formerly, the ſum of 324,000 pagodas, for the countries of *Trepaſſore*, &c. agreeable to the following kiſts, viz.

On the 31ſt day of January in each year	100,000
On the 30th of June	124,000
On the 30th of September	100,000
Pagodas	324,000

And

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And for the country of *Poonamalee* 40,000 Pagodas in different payments, as formerly.

2d. The juſt and proper ſhare of the produce muſt be given to the inhabitants.

3d. The tanks and watercourſes ſhall immediately, as the ſeaſon will permit, be put in repair.

4th His Highneſs is not to grant any village or portion of land, by way of free gift to any one, out of the jaghire belonging to the Company; and any grant, already made, without the knowledge and conſent of the Preſident and Council, to be void.

5th. In caſe the regular payments of the kiſts agreed on, are not punctually made, the Governor and Council, after one kiſt being a month in arrears, ſhall be at full liberty to re-let the jaghire in any manner they may think proper.

6th. Any Aumildar who may be found incapable of managing the buſineſs, or on proof of his oppreſſing the inhabitants, ſhall be removed at the requeſt of the Governor, and another be appointed in his room. But no Aumildar who has a Cowle granted him for any ſtated time, and fulfils the condition of the ſame, as making his regular payments, ſhall be removed till the expiration of the time for which the Cowle is granted, except for the reaſons mentioned in the former part of this article.

7th. The Aumildars of the Company's jaghire who ſhall be appointed by his Highneſs the Nabob, ſhall not, on any account, be ſent by force to *Arcot*, or out of the limits of the jaghire, without their own conſent.

8th. No part of the jaghire lands ſhall be mortgaged, or their produce, as ſuch mortgage will be conſidered as invalid, if there ſhould be a failure in the regular kiſts.

9th. The Preſident and Council ſhall be at full liberty to ſend, at any time, one or more of the Company's ſervants, to ſurvey or eſtimate the value of the jaghire and collection, and to ſee that the conditions herein expreſſed, are fully and punctually complied with.

Thos Rumbold.

APPENDIX, No. 149.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 5th October 1778.

THE Preſident propoſes, That his Minute relative to the Company's jaghire, delivered in laſt Conſultation, be now taken into conſideration, and that the jaghire be rented to the Nabob for the ſpace of three years, on the conditions expreſſed therein.

The Board taking into conſideration the Preſident's Minute;

Mr. *Perring* delivers in the following Minute on the occaſion:

Mr. *Perring* is of opinion, the Nabob ſhould have the jaghire for three years, becauſe none of the propoſals delivered in are admiſſible, except Mr. *De Souza*'s, which he thinks ought not to be accepted, as he has not engaged to give any ſecurity for the principal payment of the rent; and the ſmall increaſe he offers is too inconſiderable an object to induce this Government to deprive the Nabob of the jaghire, when he has the holding it ſo much at heart, and pays the Company, in the opinion of people in general, the full value of it.

Mr *Perring* is for extending the leaſe to three years, from an opinion that the Nabob's holding it for one only, will be injurious, by deterring both him and the inhabitants from making the advances for ſubſtantial repairs to the tanks and watercourſes, ſo neceſſary to ſecure the future proſperity of the country.

Mr. *Johnſon* delivers in the following Minute on the occaſion:

I conſent to the letting out the Honourable Company's jaghire to his Highneſs the Nabob, for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe our Superiors ſo earneſtly recommended (in their Letter to us, dated 11th June 1777) our uſing every means in our power for ſtrengthening that amity which ſubſiſts between them and him.

2dly. Becauſe the times are critical, and, I believe, the letting out the jaghire to another would greatly hurt him; therefore, policy ſuggeſts the meaſure juſt at this juncture.

3dly. Becauſe I conceive the jaghire is let at as high a rent as it will bear in its preſent plight; and I believe the conditions on which it is propoſed to be let, tend to its improvement, and therefore there is a proſpect of its being rendered more valuable, at the expiration of the Cowle now propoſed to be granted to the Nabob.

Laſtly, Becauſe I apprehend the diſtreſs of the times may render it extremely difficult for any private individual to pay his kiſts; and it may be productive of many inconveniences, independent of the diſtreſs it muſt create to the inhabitants, the letting it out in ſeparate diſtricts.

Mr. *Smith* delivers in the following Minute on the occaſion:

I am of opinion the jaghire ſhould be rented to his Highneſs the Nabob for three years, on the terms and conſiderations expreſſed in the Preſident's Minute, for the following reaſons:

1ſt. Becauſe it does not appear to me from the commands of our honourable Employers, and they have ſaid much on the ſubject of the jaghire, that it is their will we ſhould take it out of the hands of the Nabob; on the contrary, they have, on various occaſions, and particularly in their commands of the 11th June 1777, ſtrictly enjoined us to conciliate his mind by every means in our power; and in the preſent conjuncture of affairs, when it ſo much depends on the Nabob, it would, in my opinion, be bad policy to ſour his mind, by refuſing him what he ſeems ſo much to have ſet his heart on obtaining.

2dly. Becauſe it is evident, from the ſeveral propoſals now before us, that the Nabob has always paid the full value of the jaghire.

3dly. Becauſe annual rents are univerſally allowed to be deſtructive both to the renter and to the inhabitants; and the condition now propoſed, will enable the Board to ſee that the improvement of the country is attended to, and ſtrict juſtice done to the inhabitants.

4thly. Becauſe none of the propoſals, except thoſe of Mr. *Antonia de Souza*'s, are worthy of conſideration, and he makes no offer of ſecurity; ſhould therefore any troubles ariſe in the *Carnatic*, which are much to be apprehended, it would be difficult for any individual, particularly in theſe times when money is ſo very ſcarce, to be punctual in the payment of his kiſts; whereas, I preſume, the Nabob may always be relied on.

Charles Smith.

Mr. *Whitehill* delivers in the following Minute on the occaſion:

The Honourable the Court of Directors having, upon many occaſions, and eſpecially in the 29th paragraph of their commands of the 11th of June 1777, ſtrictly enjoined us to ſhew the Nabob every poſſible mark of reſpect and attention, as well on account of the intimate connection and alliance that hath for a long courſe of time uninterruptedly ſubſiſted between his Highneſs and the Company, as with the view of conciliating his mind, that had been apparently diſturbed by the late unhappy diſſentions in this Government; I think we ought to be extremely cautious of denying him any requeſt that is urged to us with the degree of ſolicitude, which he ſeems

to feel upon the preſent occaſion. I am, on the other hand, no leſs aware of deviating from the line which our Employers have in their commands of the 12th of April 1775, indirectly pointed out to us, as that which their intereſt required us to purſue; but ſince it is a line which they have not abſolutely authorized us to adopt, and as we have in our Letter of the 5th February laſt, apprized them that we ſhould not feel ourſelves at liberty to take any new meaſures with reſpect to letting out the jaghire, until we were furniſhed with their preciſe inſtructions concerning it; I do not doubt that they will approve of our ſuffering thoſe lands to continue ſome time longer under his Highneſs's management. I am, however, very far from thinking it neceſſary, or even adviſable, to gratify the Nabob to the full extent of his wiſh: there is, in my opinion, a middle courſe, which, if adopted, will avert the embarraſſment we ſhould be liable to from giving an abſolute refuſal to the Nabob's requeſt, and at the ſame time reſerve to the Company the option of laying out any new plan they may hereafter be induced to make choice of, for the ſecurity as well as improvement of this part of their poſſeſſions. The medium I ſpeak of is, to let the Nabob have the jaghire, not for five, but for three years, by which time, if not ſooner, we may expect to receive the Company's orders concerning the future diſpoſition of it; and in the meanwhile, I conceive that his Highneſs will have no juſt reaſon to complain of ſuch an abridgment of the term mentioned in his Letter. The Nabob has, till now, never held thoſe diſtricts upon a longer leaſe than a twelvemonth, and he ought therefore to be ſo well ſatisfied to find himſelf thus far accommodated, as not to think of murmuring at a deduction, which, if taken in a comparative view, will appear of too little conſequence to juſtify in him the leaſt ſhew of repugnance to the meaſures of this Government.

Reſolved in conſequence, That the jaghire be rented to the Nabob for the ſpace of three years, from the laſt day of July 1778, on the conditions propoſed in the Preſident's Minute, for the reaſons contained in the ſeveral foregoing Minutes delivered in; and particularly, as no offer has been made in conſequence of the advertiſement for letting the jaghire, of equal ſecurity and advantage to the Company, that ſhould induce the Board at the preſent criſis to take it out of the Nabob's hands. And that a Letter be written to him, acquainting him, that the Board have agreed, on certain conditions to be ſpecified, to rent the jaghire to him for the term of three years, that his Highneſs may be convinced of the attention the Board have ſhewn to his requeſt, and how ready they are at all times to co-operate with his wiſhes where it may be done with propriety, and where the intereſts of the Company are not affected by their compliance; and they hope and truſt, that in conſequence of having manifeſted ſo chearfully their diſpoſition to oblige him, his Highneſs will in all his future payments for the jaghire, obſerve a ſtrict punctuality, and that he will immediately order the payment of the balance that remains due for the laſt year.

APPENDIX, No. 150.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Revenue Conſultations, the 17th October 1778.

SENT the following Letter to the Nabob.

To his Highneſs, *Wallaw Jaw Ummeed ul Hind, Omdat ul Mulk, Aſuph ul Dowlah, Unwer ud Deare Khan Behader, Zephur Jung*, Sepoy Salar Soubahder of the *Carnatic*, Pauyez Ghaur.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

The Letter which your Highneſs has been pleaſed to favour me with, communicating to me your requeſt, that the Company's jaghire be continued to your Highneſs, I have received with every poſſible attention.

I have the pleaſure to acquaint your Highneſs, that the Board have come to a reſolution to rent the jaghire to your Highneſs for the term of three years, commencing from the 31ſt July 1778 and ending the 31ſt July 1781; ſubject however to the annexed conditions to be complied with on the part of your Highneſs, which I doubt not you will approve, as calculated equally for the advantage and credit both of the Company and your Highneſs. APPENDIX. No. 150.

I have the ſatisfaction to remark further, that nothing has given me more ſincere pleaſure than attending to the requeſt of your Highneſs in the preſent inſtance, and thereby convincing your Highneſs, that I embrace every opportunity, where I think I can with propriety do ſo, and where the intereſts of the Company do not ſuffer.

I hope and truſt, in conſequence of the readineſs I have ſhewn to oblige you, that your Highneſs will in your future payments for the jaghire obſerve a ſtrict punctuality, and that you will immediately order the payment of the balance that remains due for the laſt year.

CONDITIONS on which the Jaghire is propoſed to be granted to the Nabob for the term of three years.

1ſt. His Highneſs the Nabob ſhall annually pay at ſtated monthly payments, as formerly, the ſum of 324,000 pagodas, for the countries of *Tripaſſore*, &c. agreeable to the following kiſts, viz.

On the 31ſt day of January in each year -	100,000
On the 31ſt June - - - -	124,000
On the 30th September - - -	100,000
Pagodas	324,000

And for the country of *Poonamalee*, 40,000 in different payments, as formerly.

2d. The juſt and proper ſhare of the produce muſt be given to the inhabitants.

3d. The tanks and watercourſes ſhall, immediately as the ſeaſon will permit, be put in repair.

4th. His Highneſs is not to grant any village or portion of land, by way of free gift, to any one, out of the jaghire belonging to the Company; and any grant already made without the knowledge of the Preſident and Council, to be void.

5th. In caſe the regular payments of the kiſts agreed on are not punctually made, the Governor and Council, after any one kiſt being a month in arrears, ſhall be at free liberty to re-let the jaghire in any manner they might think proper.

6th. Any Amuldar who may be found incapable of managing the buſineſs, or on proof of his oppreſſing the inhabitants, ſhall be removed at the requeſt of the Governor, and another be appointed in his room. But no Amuldar who has had a Cowle granted him for any ſtated time, and fulfils the condition of the ſame, as making his regular payments, ſhall be removed till the expiration of the time for which the Cowle is granted, except for the reaſons mentioned in the former part of this article.

7th. The Amuldars of the Company's jaghire, who ſhall be appointed by his Highneſs the Nabob, ſhall not on any account be ſent by force to *Arcot*, or out of the limits of the jaghire, without their own conſent.

8th. No part of the jaghire lands ſhall be mortgaged, or their produce, as ſuch mortgage will be conſidered invalid, if there ſhould be a failure in the payment of the regular kiſts.

9th. The Preſident and Council ſhall be at full liberty to ſend at any time, one or more of the Company's ſervants, to ſurvey or eſtimate the real value of the jaghire and collection, and to ſee that the conditions herein expreſſed, are fully and punctually complied with.

Thomas Rumbold,
John Whitehill,
Charles Smith,
Saml Johnſon,
P. Perring.

APPENDIX. No. 151.

APPENDIX, No. 151.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated 17th October 1778.

Par. 12. IN regard to your jaghire lands, we have often mentioned to you the inconveniences that attended the Nabob's management; but as we have obſerved at all times a ſtrong diſpoſition in you to continue them with him, under proper reſtrictions, our conduct reſpecting them this year has been governed accordingly. After the expiration of the laſt Cowle, in July, the Nabob having neglected to make his uſual application to be continued in the management, we thought it a favourable opportunity for advertiſing them publicly to be let; more, however, with the view of aſcertaining the general opinion of the real value or produce, than of putting them into other hands. The Nabob, greatly alarmed at this proceeding, addreſſed us a Letter, anxiouſly deſiring to have the direction of them as uſual, for a term of five years inſtead of one. We ſuſpended our deciſion until we had ſeen the effect of our advertiſement. Several propoſals were delivered in, but none of them came up to our expectation; nor was any ſufficient ſecurity offered for the rent, though a thing abſolutely neceſſary to be inſiſted on. Under theſe circumſtances, their continuance with the Nabob was become a matter of neceſſity, even had we been diſinclined to the meaſure; but we confeſs to you, after the wiſhes you had expreſſed ſo lately, that we ſhould endeavour, by every means in our power, to calm the Nabob's mind, apparently much diſturbed, and to eradicate from it every ſuſpicion of your want of friendſhip or goodwill. We were pleaſed at the opportunity thus given us, of promoting ſo deſirable an end; and though we did not comply with the extent of his requeſt, to be continued in the direction of the country for five years, we thought it in every view eligible to let him have it for three years; and we came to that reſolution accordingly, which we hope you will approve. For a more particular explanation of our ſentiments and reaſons, we beg leave to refer to our Minutes of the 10th inſtant.

APPENDIX, No. 152.

Extract of a Letter from the Court of Directors, to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*; dated the 16th June 1779.

Par. 23. IN the 31ſt paragraph of the Company's Letter of the 12th April 1775, it was ordered, that no agreement ſhould be concluded with the Nabob for the jaghire lands, for more than one year. We are very ſorry you have thought fit to depart from that order; for although the Nabob was alarmed at your advertiſement to let the jaghire lands, we have no doubt but he might have been ſatisfied, as uſual, with a Cowle for one year.

APPENDIX, No. 153.

Letter from the Court of Directors, to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*; dated 10th January 1781.

Par. 1. YOU were acquainted by our Letter, dated 16th June 1779, that the propriety of calling the Zemindars to the Preſidency to ſettle their jemmabundy, would be taken into conſideration ſo ſoon as your proceedings were fully before us; we alſo expreſſed our hope, that your prudence would obviate any inconvenience or objections to which that meaſure might be liable; and particularly, that you would be upon your guard againſt any miſrepreſentation of the Zemindars, concerning the capacity of their lands to produce ſuch reaſonable revenue to the Company as ought to be paid by the ſaid Zemindars.

2. Your Revenue Conſultations from 14th March to 17th October 1778 per *Valentine*, were not received till the 24th of April laſt; the duplicates, per *Mount Stuart*, arrived in January preceding: and we are ſorry to be obliged to acquaint you, that your proceedings in that Department have not our approbation.

3. By Letter dated the 12th of April 1775, the Court directed, that when affairs reſpecting *Tanjore* ſhould have been accommodated and finally adjuſted, a Committee of Circuit ſhould be appointed, and conſiſt of five Members of Council. The objects of their inquiry were to be the produce of the country, the number of inhabitants, the ſtate of the manufactures, the fortified places, the groſs amount of the revenues, the articles from which they ariſe, the mode by which they are collected, the charges of collection, the ſpecific proportion uſually received by the Rajah or Zemindar, and that which cuſtom or uſage has allotted to the cultivator as the reward of his labour.

4. They were alſo particularly to inquire what ſecurity the Native has for his property, what Courts there are for the adminiſtration of juſtice, and how far ſimilar regulations to thoſe lately eſtabliſhed at *Bengal* by our Preſident and Council, might with propriety be introduced into the Circars.

5. The Committee of Circuit were likewiſe to aſcertain the ſtrength of each Rajah, Zemindar, or Landholder in the Circars; the expence of his houſhold and that of his troops, the means he has of defraying ſuch expences; and the number of regular Sepoys which it will be neceſſary for the Company to maintain in the reſpective diſtricts, in order to keep them in due ſubjection.

6. At the expiration of the then ſubſiſting leaſes, the Committee of Circuit were to re-let the lands for a term of years; and to take care that the proportion of produce to be received by Farmers of every denomination, ſhould be aſcertained and exactly defined; that all Farmers who might exact more from the undertenants than their due, ſhould forfeit their Farms; *and that the means of redreſs, in caſe of impoſition or oppreſſion, ſhould be rendered as eaſy as poſſible.*

7. After various delays, occaſioned in part by the unhappy diſſentions of our Council at *Fort Saint George*, we find, on your Conſultations of February 1777, that a Committee of Circuit had then ſet out from *Vizagapatam*, and entered upon the execution of their office. It alſo appears that the Members were indulged with Colonel's pay and batta for themſelves, and Captain's pay and batta to their aſſiſtants; which we think too great an allowance for the ſervice intended.

8. In the addreſs of the Committee of Circuit, dated at *Chicacole* the 5th of July 1777, complaint was made of the impriſonment of *Jaganaut Rauze*, the Company's renter of the Havelly Lands, by order of *Viziaram Rauze*. The Committee likewiſe complain of obſtacles being thrown in their way in the execution of their buſineſs; and repreſent, that through the intrigues of *Silterram Rauze*, *Jaganaut Rauze* had been deprived of his office of Duan to *Viziaram Rauze*.

9. The report of the Committee of Circuit, dated at *Chicacole* the 16th of Auguſt 1777, contains further important information concerning the amount of the revenues, and the military ſtrength of *Viziaram Rauze*, of which we ſhall take particular notice below.

10. At that juncture Mr. *Whitehill* arriving at *Fort Saint George*, Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Perring* were, in conſequence of the Court's orders, called to the Preſidency to aſſiſt in Council.

11. The 10th of September the Committee of Circuit tranſmit a further report to the Preſidency, accompanied with ſeveral Accounts from the Chicacole Circar; and the 6th of November the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* addreſs the Board very fully on the ſituation of affairs in that quarter; and both Committees of Circuit and

and Council of *Vizagapatam* report very unfavourably of the behaviour of *Sitteram Rauze*.

12. Upon the receipt of offers for Farms from *Ganjam*, the Board very properly conſider it contrary to the orders and intentions of the Company, that any Farms dependent on the Circars ſhould be let for any conſiderable length of time, until fully inveſtigated by the Committee of Circuit.

13. The 25th of November 1777, before Mr. *Whitehill* had been three months at *Fort Saint George*, *Viziaram Rauze*, the principal Zemindar of the diſtricts dependent on *Vizagapatam*, was ordered to the Preſidency; but Mr. *Johnſon*, the late Chief of that Subordinate, diſſented to the meaſure.

14. The 5th December 1777, after noticing that a variety of cauſes had combined to impede the execution of the Court's orders relative to a Committee of Circuit; the Board appear juſtly ſenſible of the advantages to be derived from the due diſcharge of that important commiſſion, and reſolve, that the buſineſs ſhall be proſecuted without further loſs of time; and perſons were nominated to fill the vacancies occaſioned by the ſuſpenſion of Mr. *Floyer* from the Company's ſervice, and the appointment of Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Perring* to be Members of Council.

15. When meaſures were ſuggeſted from *Ganjam*, for increaſing the value of the Company's Farms, you ſtill reſolve to keep in view the objects propoſed by the Company, in appointing a Committee of Circuit; and forbear to paſs judgment upon the meaſures propoſed by the Gentlemen at *Ganjam*, until the Committee's opinion upon the ſubject could be obtained; and as the ſeaſon of the year was advanced, it was reſolved, that the higheſt offers for the term of one year ſhould be accepted.

16. On your Conſultations of the 18th of November 1777, we find propoſals tranſmitted by the Committee of Circuit from *Padnah Rauze*, for renting the Havelly Lands in the Chicacole Circar. The 19th of December your Preſident lays before the Board propoſals for the ſaid Lands from *Sitteram Rauze*, who was then at the Preſidency. The propoſals of *Sitteram Rauze* were exactly 5,000 rupees higher upon every ſpecific ſum, than thoſe tranſmitted by the Committee of Circuit.

17. It is not eaſy to conceive, that ſo ſmall and ſo regular an advance upon the various mixed numbers contained in the offer of *Padnab Rauze*, could have been the effect of mere chance. Appearances were however preſerved, and by the Preſident's caſting vote the lands were let to *Sitteram Rauze* for ten years.

18. On your Conſultations of the 2d February 1778, the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* expreſs their concern at the Havelly Lands being thus let to *Sitteram Rauze*, and refer to the character given of him by the Committee of Circuit. The ſame Letter contains a tender of 40,000 Rupees more for the Havelly Lands than *Sitteram Rauze* had agreed to pay; but the precipitate acceptance of his propoſals had precluded further advantages to the Company from thoſe Lands for ten years.

19. Concerning this tranſaction, our preſent Governor remarks, that the Havelly Lands had been let on too long a leaſe before his arrival; but he does not ſee that they could be in better hands.

20. We are however of opinion, that the character of *Sitteram Rauze* appears on the records of your Preſidency too exceptionable to admit a doubt of the impropriety of ſuffering him to reſume a power in the Circars, of which he had juſt been diſpoſſeſſed; and the committing of the Havelly Lands to his management, without taking care to provide for and eſtabliſh ſuch reforms and regulations for the benefit of the Natives, and for the advantage of the Company, as were directed in the Court's General Inſtructions of April 1775, was a breach of the Company's orders.

21. Our preſent Governor arrived at *Fort Saint George* the 8th February 1778. The 24th of March he recommended, that the Committee of Circuit ſhould not *proceed*; but that the Zemindars of the Northern Circars ſhould be directed to repair to the Preſidency. No good reaſons had appeared for departing from the Court's poſitive orders; but the meaſure was nevertheleſs immediately adopted by the Council.

22. On your Conſultation of the 10th of April, the Council at *Vizagapatam* repreſent, that they have undeniable proof of the Agent of *Sitteram Rauze* having remitted to his Maſter, then at *Fort Saint George*, 131,000 rupees; that further bills were negotiating for him, which together would nearly amount to one year's rent of the Farm. This intelligence was communicated to you, that meaſures might be taken to ſecure payment of his arrears at the Preſidency; you were alſo adviſed of there being the ſtrongeſt reaſons to believe, that in order to raiſe the above money, the poor Farmers had been ſeverely oppreſſed; that ſome of them had fled the country, and that thoſe remaining were groaning under the oppreſſions of the Agent of *Sitteram Rauze*.

23. Your Preſident being deſired to communicate the above intelligence to *Sitteram Rauze*, he aſſured him that the firſt kiſt of his agreement ſhould be forthwith paid at *Vizagapatam*; with which the Board ſeemed ſatisfied.

24. By a Letter from Captain *Collins*, on your Military Conſultations of the 16th of October 1777, it appears that *Sitteram Rauze* ſet out for the Preſidency the 21ſt of September 1777; the agreement for the Havelly Lands was concluded with him in December 1777; the annual rent agreed to be paid for thoſe Lands was, for the firſt five years, Rupees 235,000, and in December 1778, his arrears of rent amounted to Rupees 180,530; but we do not find that a ſingle Rupee of the large ſums remitted by the Agent of *Sitteram Rauze* to his Maſter, was ever required by our Governor and Council in diſcharge of his arrears to the Company, during the whole of his reſidence at *Fort Saint George*.

25. By a Letter from the Rajah *Viziaram Rauze* to Mr. *Davidſon*, on your Conſultations of the 15th of May, we learn that the ſaid Rajah was to ſet out for the Preſidency the 28th of April 1778.

26. The principal Zemindars being abſent from the country, the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam* repreſent themſelves in the greateſt diſtreſs for the means of ſupport; there was no money to advance for the inveſtment, which was nearly at a ſtand; the Zemindary Agents were preſſed for money without ſucceſs, and pleaded want of inſtructions from their ſuperiors, as an excuſe for non-payment.

27. Upon this repreſentation, your Preſident informs the Board, that the Zemindars aſſured him they had not only left orders for diſcharging their arrears, but alſo provided for the management of their affairs during their abſence; that in particular *Sitteram Rauze* aſſured him, he had paid his kiſt due in February, and given orders for diſcharging the remainder as it became due: and with theſe profeſſions the Board ſeem to reſt ſatisfied.

28. The ſame day, after expreſſing his opinion that it was incumbent, without delay, to appoint a man of known abilities as Duan to *Viziaram Rauze*, to aſſiſt in eſtabliſhing the order and œconomy neceſſary to ſecure to the Company the punctual receipt of their revenue, and after paſſing the greateſt eulogiums on *Sitteram Rauze*, your Preſident propoſed to the Board to make *Sitteram Rauze* Duan of the Circar.

29. This ſudden predilection in favour of *Sitteram Rauze* appears to us very extraordinary; the profeſt objects of the appointment, as ſtated by the Preſident, were, that the jemmabundy might be ſettled, and that the balances due to the Company might be immediately collected. How far theſe ends have been anſwered we ſhall preſently inquire.

30. In your Preſident's Minute of the 20th of July, he ſtates, very truly, that the jemmabundy of the diſtricts dependent on *Vizianagrum* had been long thought very inadequate, and far ſhort of what other Zemindars had paid

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paid to the Company; and that the Court of Directors had higher expectations from the *Chicacole* than from any other diſtricts in the Circars.

31. He likewiſe obſerves, that as the reduction of the Vizianagrum troops had left the defence of that Circar to the Company, of courſe they would expect a ſum equal to the expence of which the Zemindar was eaſed, by the diſbanding of his troops. We agree with our Preſident in the reaſonableneſs of this expectation, and we are ſincerely concerned to find the idea ſo ſoon and ſo totally abandoned. He proceeds to ſtate, that although *Viziaram Rauze* had diſbanded his troops eleven months, and was thereby relieved of a conſiderable expence; though he paid the Company but 305,000 of rupees per annum out of the money he collected, which was probably upwards of ſeven times that amount, he was ſtill in arrears to the Company, and greatly in debt to individuals.

In another part of his Minute, your Preſident obſerves, that theſe are not times to trifle with the revenues, inveſtments, or reſources of the Circars: and we muſt remark, that it had been well for the Company, and honourable for your Board, if you had not departed from theſe ſentiments; that before a final concluſion of the tribute or jemmabundy could be made, *Viziaram Rauze* ſhould make good the expences of the Expedition under Colonel *Braithwaite*. The Preſident then declares his firm conviction, that the plan propoſed, namely, the appointment of *Sitteram Rauze* to be Duan, was calculated for the benefit of the Company, and free from every private view; that as the Rajah obſtinately perſiſted in keeping at variance with *Sitteram Rauze*, the Board ſhould forthwith appoint him Duan to the Circar; and, except Mr. *Johnſon*, you approve in general the ſentiments of your Preſident. The adoption of the ſon of *Sitteram Rauze* by the Rajah, was to be confirmed by the Cowle of the Governor and Council; but the Rajah was to be rendered ſenſible of the impropriety of adopting his brother's ſon without conſent of the Preſident and Council, and without giving a proper Nazir to the Company. This reprehenſion might have been ſpared, becauſe you are not authorized to require Nazirs for the Company on ſuch occaſions; and if they have at any time been exacted, it muſt have been for the benefit of individuals.

34. Having noticed theſe particulars, we proceed to inquire how far your conduct, reſpecting the increaſe of our revenues, has been agreeable to your profeſſions of diſintereſted zeal for the welfare of the Company.

35. It is ſtated in the Report of the Committee of Circuit, dated the 16th of Auguſt 1777, that Accounts of Lands had then been examined in the Chicacole Circar, for five years preceding, amounting to 14 lacks per annum: that 10 lacks of the above were on account of the Rajah: that from inquiries already made, and informations received, they had every reaſon to believe, that the countries under *Viziaram Rauze* yielded at leaſt 20 lacks of rupees; that he maintained a conſiderable force at a monthly expence of 50,000 or 60,000 rupees; that his military ſtrength conſiſted of 11,000 men, excluſive of 5,000 or 6000 pike and matchlock men, who might be collected from the neighbouring diſtricts; and we no where find theſe accounts of the Rajah's revenues, ſtrength, and military charges, controverted. Taken at the loweſt eſtimate, his military charges amounted to 6 lacks of rupees per annum. This ſum, therefore, according to the ſpirit of the Court's orders, and in perfect coincidence with your own ſentiments on the ſubject, ſhould, in any new agreement with the Rajah, have been ſecured for the Company, in order to enable them to provide effectually for the protection and defence of the country.

37. The rent or tribute paid by *Viziaram Rauze*, previous to the laſt agreement, was rupees 3,05,000. The Committee of Circuit, as above obſerved, had reported the produce of his revenues 20 lacks at the leaſt. And at an attendance of the two brothers upon your Board, the 29th of July 1778, *Sitteram Rauze* declares to the Rajah, in preſence of the Governor and Council, that when he undertook the management of his affairs, the annual revenues amounted to about 7 lacks of rupees; but that when he gave up the management thereof, he left the Rajah poſſeſſed of a revenue, amounting to upwards of 22 lacks per annum.

38. Whatever errors might attend the eſtimate of the Committee of Circuit, the evidence of *Sitteram Rauze* ſtands uncontroverted, and muſt be deemed concluſive reſpecting the amount of his brother's revenues.

39. Upon this declaration of *Sitteram Rauze*, you admoniſh the Rajah, that it is the laſt opportunity he will have of declaring himſelf to the ſatisfaction of your Board; you therefore recommend to him, in the moſt earneſt manner, to be reconciled to his brother; and enforce your arguments by aſſuring him, that his own welfare, and the intereſt of the Company, render the meaſure indiſpenſably neceſſary; that if he continues to withſtand your preſſing, repeated, joint and ſeparate applications, you will be under the neceſſity of forming ſuch reſolutions, as will poſſibly be extremely painful to him, but which, being once paſſed, could never be recalled.

40. The Rajah perfectly underſtood your meaning. He ſaw what was intended by the ſpecious pleas of his own welfare, and the intereſt of the Company; and immediately replied, *That he ſhould thenceforth conſider himſelf diveſted of all power and conſequence whatever, ſeeing the Board urged him to a meaſure which was contrary to his fixed determination, and that the reſult was to be the loſing of his Country.*

41. Whereupon your Preſident immediately propoſed, that *Sitteram Rauze* ſhould be appointed Duan of the countries dependant on *Vizianagrum*, for the management of the collections; that he ſhould be directed to look into the Accounts of the Province; that he ſhould acquaint the Board with the reaſons for outſtanding balances; *that he ſhould immediately take into conſideration the ſettling of the tribute to be in future paid to the Company*; and the neceſſary Sibbendy to be kept up, which was to be as ſmall as poſſible.

42. The above propoſitions were no ſooner made than agreed to, except by Mr. *Smith*, who adhered to his former opinions reſpecting *Sitteram Rauze*; whereupon,

43. The Preſident delivers a charge to *Sitteram Rauze*, the newly appointed Duan; and a Saned was ordered to be granted, conformable to the terms of his appointment.

44. The Rajah continuing averſe to the new Duan, your Preſident recommends, that he be poſitively ordered to ſend the Muſmadars, or Accountants, and other Officers of Revenue, to *Sitteram Rauze*; and alſo to proceed with him to *Vizianagrum*, ſo ſoon as the neceſſary ſtipulation for paying off his balance, and ſettling a new jemmabundy ſhould be concluded.

45. This conduct towards *Viziaram Rauze* was unjuſtifiable: as the Committee of Circuit were particularly directed to inquire what ſecurity the Native has for his property, and to take care that, in caſe of impoſition or oppreſſion, the means of redreſs ſhould be rendered as eaſy as poſſible to the undertenants and cultivators of lands in the Northern Circars. It would be a ſtrange perverſion of principles to ſuppoſe, that the undoubted rights of the hereditary Rajahs and Zemindars of the country might be reverſed or infringed with impunity, or that they were leſs an object of the Court's attention, than thoſe of the lower claſs of people. Our ſurprize and concern were therefore great, on obſerving the very injurious treatment which the ancient Rajah of *Vizianagrum* received at the Preſidency; when, deaf to his repreſentations and intreaties, you, in

the moſt arbitrary and unwarrantable manner, appointed his ambitious and intriguing brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, Duan of the Circar, and thereby put him in poſſeſſion of the revenues of his eldeſt brother, who had juſt informed you that he ſought his ruin. For, however neceſſary it might be to adopt meaſures for ſecuring payment of the Company's tribute, no circumſtance, except actual and avowed reſiſtance of the Company's authority, could warrant ſuch treatment of the Rajah.

46. How far it may be prudent, under all circumſtances, to revoke the appointment, now it has taken place, muſt be the ſubject of future conſideration.

47. *Sitteram Rauze* having carried all his points, and ſucceeded, as we apprehend, beyond his moſt ſanguine wiſhes, we are ſorry to find all appearances of large increaſe of tribute vaniſh immediately, and a very different language adopted, concerning the advantages to be expected from the Chicacole Circar; and that, for the revenues of a country reported worth upwards of 22 lacks per annum, *Sitteram Rauze* himſelf, he and his brother, will now give no more than 4,05,000 per annum.

48. The 18th of Auguſt, your Preſident reports to the Board, that a reconciliation had taken place between the Rajah and *Sitteram Rauze*; the means uſed to accompliſh this meaſure are not ſpecified.

49. In your Preſident's Minute of the 2d October, inſtead of perſevering in the ideas of immenſe benefits to be derived to the Company from the Circars, he changes his ground, and delivers himſelf in terms more likely to promote the views of the renter, than to increaſe the jemmabundy.

50. He repeats his former aſſertion concerning the Havelly Lands having been *granted before his arrival* to *Sitteram Rauze*, on a large increaſe of the revenue for a term of ten years. He hopes the agreement with him will be punctually fulfilled; but from all accounts received, he is led to believe, that the deſire of *different people* to have the country under their management, has induced them to offer more for Lands than they are really worth. That the method of letting them to the higheſt bidder, often proves deſtructive to the country; that it ends at laſt in a failure of revenue, and occaſions an accumulation of heavy balance from year to year: that the accounts given in by the Committee of Circuit, led you to imagine that the value of thoſe countries is much greater *than in reality they are ſaid to be*; but that it is not from accounts collected from different people, ſome of them intereſted, others diſcontented, and wiſhing for a change of Government, that the true value of a country can be eſtimated: that the collections alone ought to determine the jemmabundy: that he has found it extremely difficult to bring the two brothers, *Viziaram* and *Sitteram Rauze*, *to conſent to any increaſe of their tribute*: they plead inability on account of their debts to Soucars and others, of which they produce proofs; and aſſert, that their country is not ſo valuable, nor does it produce ſo conſiderable a revenue, as had been repreſented; and, finally, that they will only conſent, after much altercation, to increaſe the tribute of three lacks five thouſand rupees, which they have hitherto paid, to four lacks five thouſand rupees: he was in hopes you would have been able to ſettle a larger amount of revenues for the Company from the Vizianagrum country, but he did not believe it poſſible to obtain a further increaſe at that time.

51. He ſeems conſcious that the Company expect a greater revenue from thoſe countries; he therefore wiſhes to obtain the ſentiments of the Members of the Board on the point; and if any certain mode could be adopted, that would do juſtice to the Zemindars, and at the ſame time to add to the revenue of the Company, he would be happy to join in promoting it: but to this declaration he ſubjoins an immediate and deciſive opinion, that, in your preſent ſituation of actual war, and of an exhauſted treaſury, a certain *eſtabliſhed revenue* was preferable to any ſpeculative ſchemes, even if they ſhould, in the end, be productive of a larger tribute, which he thinks might be attempted with greater proſpect of ſucceſs, when there ſhould be a certainty of tranquillity in the country, and nothing to apprehend from the views of the French.

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52. This is the language of your Preſident, and theſe are the oſtenſible reaſons which induced you, after having been driven to the neceſſity of taking poſſeſſion of the refractory Zemindar's fort by force of arms, to reſtore the whole to him upon the moſt inadequate terms, and to put in the power of his intriguing brother, *Sitteram Rauze*, to maintain a larger army to oppreſs the country, and to reſiſt or elude the Company's orders with greater facility than at any time heretofore. And inſtead of care being taken that the proportion of produce due to the cultivators and undertenants ſhall be preſerved, and the means of redreſs, in caſes of impoſition or oppreſſion, rendered as eaſy as poſſible, according to the wiſe and humane inſtructions of a former Court of Directors, no check whatever is eſtabliſhed, but the whole country is left liable to all the miſeries which can be occaſioned by the cruelty, avarice, and rapacity of *Sitteram Rauze*.

53. The ſpeedy recovery of balances due to the Company, was one of the profeſſed objects of the appointment of *Sitteram Rauze*. The pretence was delufory, and the conſequences the very reverſe of the propoſition. *Sitteram Rauze* was appointed Duan in July 1778; in January 1779, the balances due for tribute, from himſelf and his brother, were rupees 5,75,999, beſides the charges of the expedition under Colonel *Braithwaite*, and excluſive of rupees 1,03,030, due from *Jagannaut Rauze* to the Company, who, by your new policy, had been ordered to ſettle his accounts with *Sitteram Rauze*.

54. After the ſtrong hand laid upon *Viziaram Rauze*, and conſidering the ſituation to which he had juſt been reduced by your veſting the management of his revenues in *Sitteram Rauze*, we think the change of ſentiments, expreſſed in his Letter of the 6th of October, not at all ſurprizing, more eſpecially as the reſtoration of his Fort, and the obtaining of the Zemindary of *Ancapillee*, were principal objects of that Letter. It ſuited his intereſt to expreſs himſelf in terms, which he could not but know would be acceptable to you. He did ſo; and the ſucceſs was anſwerable to his expectations; for, inſtead of your retaining poſſeſſion of his Fort, in order to preſerve an influence neceſſary to prevent future diſturbances and oppreſſions, you forthwith declared it to be an inconſiderable fortification, and order it to be delivered up on the following extraordinary condition; namely, that the *baſtions and walls ſhall remain in their preſent ſituation. Ancapillee* and *Sallaveram* Zemindaries were alſo granted to the Rajah; the ſon of *Sitteram Rauze* was confirmed in the poſſeſſion of ſupreme authority; all Zemindary Cowles were ordered in future to be made out in his name; and, what exceeds belief, his father, by your own ſuggeſtion, was to become ſecurity for the payment of the revenues ariſing from the country, thus ſubjected to his ſon's oſtenſible authority, and to his own real management.

55. *After adjuſting theſe points* in favour of *Sitteram Rauze*, you call the brothers before you, and profeſs to uſe every endeavour to prevail upon them, *if poſſible*, to conſent to a larger increaſe of jemmabundy: you aſſure them, *it is no more than an act of juſtice to the Company*; and your aſſertion was certainly founded on truth; but as the Rajah objected to the propoſed increaſe of revenue, though upon the moſt frivolous pretences, we have the mortification to find, that all your applications were inſufficient to procure an act of common juſtice to your Employers; from a perſon entirely within your power, and over whoſe property you had recently aſſumed and exerciſed the moſt abſolute and unlimited controul.

56. Your words on the occaſion are, that "the Board "are reduced to the diſagreeable neceſſity of declaring, "that their beſt endeavours have been uſed to raiſe the

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« jemmabundy, and are ſorry that they have proved in-
« effectual; that there ſeems to be little, if *any proſpect*
« of a larger increaſe; but the Preſident ſhall, however,
« once more endeavour to prevail with them to raiſe it."
That is, the Preſident ſhall ſolicit the Rajah and his brother to conſent to an agreement, to pay more than 405,000 rupees for a country, which, by their own confeſſion, yields upwards of 22 lacks; and which enables them to maintain an army of 11,000 men, to the terror of the neighbouring Zemindars, and, probably, to the inconvenience and danger of the Company in times of hoſtility.

57. Two days afterwards your Preſident reports, that notwithſtanding his moſt preſſing ſolicitation, they (the brothers) remain inflexible, and that he utterly deſpairs of ſucceſs: you ſeem prepared for the event; reſolve to accept the terms offered, for the preſent, and that Cowles for the Chicacole Circar be made out for five years, upon the very inadequate terms before mentioned.

58. Upon this view of the ſubject, we have a right to enquire, upon what grounds of policy, or of duty to the Company, you acted, when you thus ventured to gratify the dangerous ambition of *Sitteram Rauze*, before you had even ſettled ſuch a jemmabundy as by your own declaration would have been no more than an act of juſtice to the Company? The report of the Committee of Circuit, and the poſitive evidence of *Sitteram Rauze*, warrant us in aſſerting, that more than double the amount of the tribute for which you have agreed, might, and ought to have been obtained for the Company. The means of adding conſiderably to our revenues and ſtrength, were fully within your power; you have not availed yourſelves thereof; but have concluded an improvident ſettlement with the Vizianagrum Zemindar for five years, and thereby rendered redreſs to the Company, without breach of public faith, impracticable.

59. We are in poſſeſſion of one fact, which, ſo far as it extends, ſeems to convey an idea that the Zemindars have been abuſed, and their money miſapplied at the Preſidency.

60. On your Mayor's Court Proceedings we find, that the executors of the late Mr. *John Readhead* (one of the Governor's family) have lately obtained a warrant of arreſt againſt *Sitteram Rauze*, for the balance of a lack of rupees promiſed to Mr. *Readhead*. We have no conception of ſo large a ſum having been, *bonâ fide*, advanced by Mr. *Readhead* to *Sitteram Rauze*; and we muſt conſider you very reprehenſible for not exerting yourſelves to prevent, if poſſible, ſuch tranſactions, and alſo for not adviſing us thereof, ſo ſoon as it was in your power to afford us ſuch information.

61. We have, however, determined to take the moſt effectual meaſures for diſcovering whether any preſents have been lately received by any of our Servants, and if ſo, to recover the amount, and to return ſuch unlawful plunder to the Natives from whom it has been ſo unjuſtly obtained.

62. In your Letter to *Maſulipatam*, dated the 15th of April 1778, you order the Zemindars dependent thereupon, the Muſmedars of the countries under them, and the Company's Dubaſh, to repair to the Preſidency, where the jemmabundy is to be ſettled in future. The Chief and Council were alſo to repreſent, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the neceſſity of an immediate compliance on the part of the Zemindars, the danger of incurring your diſpleaſure, by ſhewing the ſmalleſt reluctance or unwillingneſs to obey your commands, and to enforce them, if a ready compliance were not obſerved by the ſaid Zemindars.

63. The balance of the diſtricts were very great at that time; and the Chief and Council repreſent, that the departure of the Zemindars for the Preſidency, left little room to hope that they would be able to negotiate bills with the Soucars to pay the kiſts then due, which otherwiſe they were in expectation of receiving.

64. Your Preſident's remark, that the mode which you intended to adopt, had not impeded the payment of former balances, was very proper; and the Chief and Council were highly blameable for ſuffering the Zemindars to fall ſo greatly in arrear; but it by no means follows, that the amount of the expences incurred in a journey to the Preſidency, would not have been better applied in diminiſhing thoſe arrears.

65. The 21ſt of May 1778, the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam* adviſe you of the Zemindars having taken leave, in order to proceed to *Madras*. Their Letter is entered on your Conſultations of the 12th of June, and three days afterwards you order them to adverriſe for propoſals to rent the ſeveral Farms under their management, for a period of 5, 8, or 10 years.

66. The 3d of July, they acquaint you, that no propoſals whatever had been received; on which we remark, that in the abſence of the Zemindars, and under the apprehenſions which muſt have been raiſed in the country by their departure, we are not ſurprized there ſhould be no bidders for our Farms.

67. The 20th July the Zemindars being arrived at *Fort Saint George*, your Preſident acquaints the Board, that he had for ſome time paſt been employed in endeavouring to recover the balances due from them, and in collecting particular information relative to the revenue of the different countries, which he propoſed ſhortly to lay before you: and on the 2d of October, he delivered in a Minute on the ſubject; in which he ſtates, that it *appears* from *inquiry*, that the Zemindars are ſo loaded with debts to the Company and to individuals, that he obſerves, with great concern, the little proſpect there is of any great increaſe of revenue from the Lands, or of the ſpeedy payment of what remains due from them; that it ſeems abſolutely neceſſary to ſettle the tribute for a length of time, to prevent the Zemindars from being liable to frequent calls for new ſettlements; that the ſituation of the ſeveral countries is ſuch, as to require indulgence and time to recover them; and that not the leaſt part of the heavy debts due to the Company were likely to be received.

68. After this extraordinary introduction, he gives a detail of ſeveral objections, obſervations, and promiſes, of the principal Zemindars. As for thoſe who were leſs conſiderable, he ſays, he has been aſſured, they will have no objection to an increaſe of tribute, in proportion to what ſhall be paid by others, he therefore is of opinion, that it ſhould be recommended to the Chief and Council to ſettle with them accordingly.

69. Annexed to the Preſident's Minute, he preſents you with a ſtatement of the old Mooriſh mamood or rent-roll of the diſtrict, alſo of the French jemmabundy; of *Huſſain Ally*'s jemmabundy; of the laſt year's jemmabundy; and of a propoſed increaſe of 9 per cent. for the enſuing five years.

70. Three days afterwards he renews the ſubject, and informs you, that he has uſed his utmoſt endeavours to obtain from the Zemindars a large increaſe of jemmabundy, but it was with difficulty *he* had brought them to agree to the advance above ſtated; that, conſidering their debts to the Company and to individuals, *he believed* it to be the utmoſt the country would bear; and *he* did not think preſſing them further at that time would anſwer any other purpoſe than that of adding to their diſtreſs.

71. It was natural for us to expect, that the moſt unqueſtionable proofs of facts ſhould have accompanied theſe declarations of your Preſident; and that all the materials of information upon which he had formed an opinion ſo very unfavourable to an increaſe of revenue, ſhould not only have been produced to your Board, and there fully inveſtigated, but that your diſcuſſion and obſervations ſhould have enabled us to judge of the propriety of your having concurred in the Preſident's motion for aboliſhing the mode of inquiry preſcribed, and upon the moſt mature conſideration, ſtrictly enjoined by the Court of Directors. In ſhort, it behoved you to

have taken care, that the moſt unexceptionable, public, and complete information, on the principal objects expreſsly ordered to be inveſtigated by a Committee of Circuit, ſhould have been obtained, and fully diſcuſſed, before you had a right to ſuppoſe yourſelves warranted to let the Lands on long leaſes, or that your abolition of the ſaid Committee could have our approbation. Inſtead of which, your Preſident becomes almoſt the only channel of information to the Board; and his opinions and declarations are received by you, and tranſmitted to us on Conſultation, as the principal foundation of your reſolutions on points which required the moſt careful and deliberate inveſtigation of facts, before any concluſion could with propriety have been drawn from the premiſes.

72. On this intereſting occaſion your language is, that "as the exacting of terms from the Zemindars which "there was no likelihood of the fulfilling, would render "any ſettlement with them rather nominal than real, and "be the ſource of endleſs diſappointments both to your "Government and to the Company at home, and alſo "be productive of diſtreſs and diſcontent to the Zemin"dars; all which ought, even in times of peace, to be "guarded againſt, but more eſpecially in your then cri"tical ſituation of war, when the unavoidable expences "of military operations alone had almoſt exhauſted "your treaſury; therefore, on mature conſideration, "you were clearly of opinion, that it was not in the "power of the Maſulipatam Zemindars to make any great "increaſe of their jemmabundy at preſent, and that "endeavouring to draw more from them than they had "*with ſo much difficulty been prevailed upon to pay*, would "be treating them with a degree of ſeverity inconſiſtent "with that juſtice and lenity which it has ever been the "Company's inclination to ſhew them; that it could "not be denied in their preſent unfavourable circum"ſtances, but they were entitled to compaſſion, and that "every reaſonable indulgence ſhould be exerciſed to"wards them; particular care being nevertheleſs taken, "to recover the balance then due to the Company, in "preference to every other demand."

73. Upon this ſtate of the caſe you forthwith reſolved, that the jemmabundy, agreeable to the ſtatement of the Preſident, ſhould take place for five years; and in the 9th paragraph of your Letter, of the 17th of October, you aſſure us, that it is as high as the country will bear.

74. We ſhall not waſte time in commenting upon theſe incoherent proceedings, nor in proving that an unavoidable increaſe of expences on the part of the Company, and an empty treaſury, were by no means concluſive arguments againſt receiving an increaſe of tribute from the diſtricts of *Maſulipatam*. It never was our wiſh to oppreſs the Zemindars, but, on the contrary, to afford them the moſt effectual protection; in order thereto, it was neceſſary to poſſeſs the means. A meaſure was adopted by the Court of Directors, by which the ends propoſed might have been accompliſhed to the mutual advantage of the Zemindars and the Company. The Court's inſtructions were poſitive and unequivocal; they could not be miſtaken; no diſcretionary power was given you to depart therefrom; you have done it at your own riſk, without producing one good reaſon for ſo doing.

75. It is impoſſible for us to aſcertain the amount of damage to be ſuſtained by the Company in conſequence of your engagements, becauſe the countries have not been examined in the manner directed by the Court; but it is incumbent upon us to convince you, and all our ſervants in *India*, that diſreſpect to the authority, and willful diſobedience to the orders of the Company, ſhall not be permitted, nor delinquents be ſuffered to eſcape with impunity.

76. In the fifth paragraph of your Letter of the 14th of October 1779, you inform us, that advertiſements had iſſued for ſealed propoſals to rent the Farms and Havelly Lands dependent on *Maſulipatam*, for the term of five years: that after paying every degree of attention to the ſeveral propoſals, and making the neceſſary inquiries concerning the bidders, whether they were men of character, could be reſponſible to the Company, and were reſident on the ſpot, and how far their ſecurities were admiſſible, you, on due conſideration, thought it moſt adviſable to rent the whole (excluſive of the Salt Farms) to *Letchema Narſinvaloo*, for the term of five years, at the annual rent of one lack of Madras pagodas, being an advance upon the former rent; and the propoſer, a perſon more to be depended upon than others, from his character, the circumſtance of his being reſident in the Circars, and the unqueſtionable ſecurity he had produced.

77. On your Conſultations of the 10th of Auguſt, we find the Havelly Lands and Farms abovementioned, were diſpoſed of in the following manner:

78. After conſidering the ſeveral propoſals, your Preſident puts the queſtion, whether the offers of *Mopooy Vencata Pentaloo*, at 1,25,000 pagodas per annum ſhall be accepted?

79. Mr. *Perring* was of opinion, that, as the higheſt propoſals, they ſhould be accepted, if the man was of fair character, and could find ſecurity.

80. Mr. *Johnſon* and Mr. *Smith* underſtood the ſecurity was good, and were of opinion the higheſt offer ſhould be accepted.

81. General *Munro* was of opinion, that the higheſt offer ſhould be accepted, if the bidder be of fair character, reſident on the ſpot, and give good ſecurity: But the Bidder not being reſident at *Maſulipatam*, the General objected to his propoſal; Mr. *Whitehill* and the Preſident being alſo againſt it, the offer was rejected by the caſting vote of the Preſident.

82. Your Preſident ſays, the Bidder proceeds on ſpeculation, has been a Soucar's Gomaſtah, does not offer Soucar ſecurity, but the ſecurity of a family, whoſe property was much divided; and who, as your Preſident had been aſſured, had not entirely agreed to the propoſer's terms; he therefore offers his opinion, that the Farms (except Salt Farms ſhould be let to *Letchema Narſinvaloo*, who was a man of repute, reſident in the Circars, converſant in the revenue buſineſs, and who offers reſponſible Soucar ſecurity. The meaſure was carried by the Preſident's caſting voice; and the Salt Farms, on a ſubſequent motion of your Preſident, were alſo let for 42,500 rupees per annum, to another renter.

83. The difference between the two offers was 45,000 rupees per annum. The exceptions of your Preſident againſt the higheſt bidder, were mere aſſertions; and, if true in the fulleſt extent, amount to nothing like proof that *Pentaloo* was incompetent, or that the revenue would be inſecure in his hands; if the property of the family propoſed for ſecurity was divided, ſtill, if a family of real property, the ſecurity would not be precarious. The renter having been the Gomaſtah of a Soucar, could be no objection; the Lands were Havelly, not Zemindary; therefore the ancient inhabitants and Zemindars could neither be diſhonoured nor diſguſted by his renting thoſe Lands: and the Salt Farms were unqueſtionably eligible to the beſt bidder, with ſufficient ſecurity. In all events, it ſhould have been aſcertained, that *Pentaloo* could not give ſecurity to fulfil his engagements, before his advantageous offers had been rejected.

84. Your Preſident ſays, the higheſt bidder to whom the Farms could with propriety have been granted, did not exceed the offers of *Narſinvaloo* above 1,000 pagodas per annum. Suppoſing this to be true, we ſee no good reaſon for giving away 1,000 pagodas per annum to *Narſinvaloo*, much leſs were you authorized to conclude an agreement with him for five years, upon terms by which the Company are, in all probability, deprived of 2,25,000 rupees: the meaſure has therefore our diſapprobation.

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85. In your Revenue Letter of the 14th of October 1779, you acquaint us, that a propoſal having been delivered to you by *Ball Kiſtnab*, for renting the whole Itchapore Diſtrict, excluſive of the Ganjam Sea and River Cuſtoms, for the term of ten years, commencing the 25th September 1779, and ending 25th September 1789, at the rate of four lacks and fifteen thouſand rupees per annum; you proceed to take into conſideration the ſtate of the Ganjam revenues, with the heavy balances due from the Zemindars, which appeared to be yearly accumulating: that after deliberating on the ſubject, and giving it a full diſcuſſion, you came at length to the reſolution of accepting *Ball Kiſtnab's* propoſals, on condition of his paying into our treaſury four lacks fifteen thouſand rupees per annum, at ſtated payments; forty thouſand rupees per annum on account of a balance due from the Zemindars; and 20,000 rupees per annum on account of a balance due from *Jagabundoo Chowdry* for the Havelly Lands, till the whole of thoſe debts be diſcharged

86. That your Preſident, in a ſhort introductory Minute, had requeſted the opinion of the Members of the Council upon the revenues of the Ganjam diſtrict, in order to aſſiſt his own judgment when final deciſion ſhould be thought neceſſary. That in a Minute of Conſultation the 29th July, he expreſſed his ſentiments more at large on the ſtate of the Ganjam diſtrict, its diſtance from the Preſidency, and the difficulty of bringing it under proper controul, except by letting it out to a renter at a certain fixed rent. You then refer us to your proceedings; and truſt, from what has paſſed on the ſubject, and from a ſubſequent petition of *Ball Kiſtnab*, that we ſhall approve the ſteps you have taken, as you have reaſons to hope the good effects of his conduct, in managing the diſtrict, will ſoon be experienced in the country, as well by the Zemindars as the inhabitants.

87. Your conduct on this occaſion certainly ſtood in need of an apology, being in direct contradiction to the Company's orders, and to former reſolutions of your own Board.

88. (1.) We ſhall recapitulate the dates of your proceedings before we enter upon the merits of the caſe before us, as it reſpects the intereſt of the Company.

88. (2.) The 18th November 1777, you deem it *contrary to the orders and intentions of the Company*, that any Farms dependent on the Circars, ſhould be let for a conſiderable length of time, until fully inveſtigated by a Committee of Circuit; you therefore decline ſeveral offers from *Ganjam* on that ſubject.

89. The 5th of December you expreſs your concern at low propoſals tranſmitted from *Ganjam*; you are ſenſible of the propriety of long leaſes, but ſtill reſolve to keep in view the objects propoſed by the Court, in the appointment of a Committee of Circuit; you therefore reſolve, that the higheſt offers for one year ſhall be accepted; which was ſignified in your letter to *Ganjam*, dated the 10th of December.

90. The 8th of February our preſent Governor (as noticed above) arrived at *Fort Saint George*.

91. The 27th of February he requeſts, amongſt other things, that conſideration of the appointment of a Committee of Circuit may be deferred.

92. The 24th of March he recommends, contrary to your own conſtruction of the expreſs orders of the Company, that the Committee of Circuit do not proceed, but that the Zemindars ſhould be directed to repair to the Preſidency, and that the annual rent ſhould be ſettled there in future, which was reſolved accordingly.

93. The 15th of April 1778, the Ganjam Zemindars were ordered to the Preſidency, together with *Ball Kiſtnab*, the Company's *Dubaſh*, or *Interpreter*.

94. The Chief and Council of *Ganjam* having repreſented the inability of the Zemindars to proceed to *Fort Saint George*; you agree, the 20th of July, to diſpenſe with their attendance, but repeat your orders for *Ball Kiſtna* to come to the Preſidency.

95. We find *Jagabondoo*, the oſtenſible renter of the Ganjam Havelly Lands, was, at the above period, in arrear for rent to the amount of rupees 1,52,666, and when preſſed for payment, that he declared, that he had in fact nothing to do with the Havelly Lands; that at the particular requeſt of *Ball Kiſtna*, he had lent him his name; that *Ball Kiſtna* was actually the renter; and that for fear of offending him, he had been induced to ſubmit to be looked upon as the renter; which *Ball Kiſtna* denies.

96. We paſs over the various explanations of the parties, becauſe in your own Letter to *Ganjam* dated the 21ſt of May 1779, after the peruſal of all papers relative to the ſubject, you ſay, it would appear *that the real renter of the Havelly Lands was Ball Kiſtna*; and the Council at *Ganjam* have declared, that it plainly appeared that one lack of rupees, which had actually been received from the Government (or Havelly Lands) remained at that time unaccounted for to the Company.

97. The 28th of February 1779, upon information that *Ball Kiſtna* had long been, and ſtill remained, at *Maſulipatam*; you direct the Chief and Council of that ſettlement, in caſe he ſhall refuſe to ſet out for *Fort Saint George* immediately, to ſend him down under a guard of Sepoys.

98. The 20th of April *Ball Kiſtna* being arrived at the Preſidency, you direct his attendance at the next Conſultation.

99. The firſt appearance of *Ball Kiſtna* at your Board was the 26th of April 1779. After anſwering your inquiries relative to the Gumſoor Zemindary, and ſtating his tranſactions with *Jagabondoo*, we find, at the ſame Conſultation, he preſents a propoſal to rent the whole of the Itchapore Diſtrict, including Havelly Lands, Sea and River Cuſtoms, and Zemindary Diſtricts, for ten years.

The three firſt years, at rupees — 350,000 per annum.
The two next years, at rupees — 425,000 per annum.
The five next years, at rupees — 430,000 per annum.

100. The 17th June 1779, your Preſident requeſts the Members to give their opinion what plan ſhall be adopted.

101. The 2d July you reſume the buſineſs; when Mr. *Perring* declares his belief, *that* Ball Kiſtna *is the fitteſt perſon the Board could appoint to* collect the revenues; he is, however, of opinion, that the offers of *Ball Kiſtna* are inſufficient, being much leſs than had been collected by the Chief and Council.

102. Mr. *Johnſon* was of opinion that all the Zemindars ſhould be obliged to ſettle their Accounts up to April preceding; that they ſhould give bonds payable by reaſonable inſtalments, and on no pretence be ſuffered to poſtpone payment of their current jemmabundy.

103. That the Havelly Lands ſhould be continued under Mr. *Maunſell*, who had given proofs of his attachment to the Company's intereſt, and in his opinion would not ſuffer the revenue to decreaſe.

104. That from inſuperable objections to a renter of the whole diſtrict, and from numerous examples which he had ſeen of the inſufficiency of ſuch renters, he was convinced that the plan which he had juſt ſugg-ſted was the moſt eligible, and therefore he wiſhed to ſee it adopted.

105. Sir *Hector Munro* ſtates the military expence of the Ganjam diſtrict at 80,000 pagodas per annum; the balances againſt the Zemindars at 400,000 pagodas. He notices the eaſe with which our troops ſuppreſs oppoſition, and therefore wonders that the balances ſhould nevertheleſs increaſe; he thinks reformation highly neceſſary, but entertains no hope of more than temporary advantage from any mode which could then be adopted; he apprehends there is a grand defect in our ſyſtem; that the reſponſibility of our Servants is not ſufficient to bind them to ſacrifice their intereſt to their duty; he conceives it very ſingular that a black man ſhould offer to do more than a Chief and Council had been able to accompliſh, and would look upon him as an adventurer, if he were

not

not known to be well acquainted with the diſtricts, and ſtrongly recommended as a man of capacity and integrity; he did not therefore ſee on what grounds his propoſals could be rejected. That ſince they were made public, he underſtood the Gentlemen at *Ganjam* had offered to increaſe the revenues, and to enſure payment for ſome time at leaſt; that one of them had ſaid, the country would bear a tribute of five lacks of rupees; he wiſhed to know if they would enſure the payment, and had no deſire to determine finally till it ſhould be known what the Gentlemen at *Ganjam* would perform.

106. On your Conſultations of the 13th July 1779, the Council at *Ganjam* inform you, that their receipts of laſt year *had been upwards of five lacks of rupees*, notwithſtanding the receipts of Gumſoor Zemindary had been only 10,000 rupees, owing to the troubles in the country. The Ganjam Letter containing the above information, is accompanied with a complete ſtatement of the tribute of the diſtrict at large, and of balances incurred for about ten years preceding; which you defer to future conſideration.

107. The 29th of July *Ball Kiſtna* new models his propoſals. His former offers were upon an *increaſing* annual rent, and amounted to 40,50,000 rupees in ten years; his ſubſequent propoſals were at an *equal* annual rent, but the total amount was 41,50,000 rupees in ten years; beſides which he agrees to pay 40,000 rupees per annum towards the diſcharge of old balances.

108. In a further application he tells you, that his offer of 4,15,000 rupees is full as large a ſum, as the Company can expect; that the revenues will never bear to be any thing like five lacks, without oppreſſing the inhabitants.

109. (1.) That he ſhall have little advantage to himſelf; that his whole ſcheme is to put the revenues upon a proper footing, without oppreſſing anybody, and to obtain the Company's favour and protection:

109. (2.) That to pay off 40,000 rupees per annum, is a great offer; that ſeveral of the inhabitants are *ſaid* to have abſconded, which muſt occaſion a deduction of revenue. In ſhort, he hopes you will conſider his propoſals, and determine as ſhall be for the Company's intereſt, and according to the juſtneſs of his repreſentation.

110. Your Preſident now takes the lead; he tells you he has fully conſidered the ſtate of the diſtrict, its diſtance from the Preſidency, and the difficulty of bringing it under proper controul, except by letting it out to a renter, over whom the Chief and Council may be a check; he therefore gives it as his opinion, *that the terms of Ball Kiſtna* ſhould be accepted, and that a Cowle ſhould be immediately granted him.

111. This opinion is followed by an attempt to prove, that *Ball Kiſtna*'s propoſals amount to a larger ſum than has heretofore been received; that balances ſtill accumulate, and create a fictitious quick ſtock, which cannot be realized; that civil and military charges in the diſtrict dependant on *Ganjam*, are exceſſive, and have reduced the Company's clear gain for the laſt two years to 24,585 pagodas; and that if unexpected receipts had not happened in March and April, there would have been an actual loſs upon the ſaid diſtrict; that at preſent two battalions of Sepoys are kept there, but by *Ball Kiſtna*'s account, one will be ſufficient; that he will diſcharge the batta of thoſe employed with him, and pay his ſtipulated rent, free from all charges of collection.

112. Upon this repreſentation of the caſe, and the decided declaration of the Preſident in favour of *Ball Kiſtna*, Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* requeſt further time for conſideration of the ſubject; whereupon it was agreed to poſtpone it until the following Tueſday.

113. At your next meeting, the 6th of Auguſt, your Preſident opens the buſineſs, by offering a few more obſervations, by which he had been confirmed in his opinion, *that it would be for the credit and intereſt of the Company, to accept the propoſals of Ball Kiſtna.*

114. His mode of proving this propoſition was, by exhibiting a ſtatement of ſums collected within the laſt two years, under the head of *old balances*, and the total amount of the two years collections, old balances included, which, together, fell ſhort of five lacks of rupees per annum; but he does not bring to your recollection, that *Ball Kiſtna* had been the manager of the Gumſoor diſtrict for one of thoſe years, and only paid 10,000 rupees on that account during his management; nor, that under the oſtenſible name of Jagabundoo, he was largely in arrear for the Havelly Lands.

115. The ſtatement of your Preſident reſpecting old balances collected within the year, may be true; but his concluſions are inadmiſſible. If no balances had been incurred during the two years alluded to, it might have been to his purpoſe; but as there remained a larger ſum of the current revenue to be collected than has been brought in aid of the year's receipts from the recovery of old balances, the obvious concluſion is, that the current jemmabundy ought not to be diminiſhed; the actual receipt of ſo large a ſum annually, on account of balances of ſeveral years ſtanding, is a preſumptive proof at leaſt that recent balances are far from being deſperate, and may be recovered by proper care and application.

116. Had your Preſident exerted his influence in ſeconding our views, and promoting an early and effectual inquiry into the cauſes of temporary decline in the Circars, he had merited our thanks, and rendered eſſential ſervice to the Company. But as we muſt conſider his propoſition as tending to ſhut the doors againſt all inveſtigation, and that you have been induced, in conſequence of his motions, to tie up our hands from effectual interference, controul, and improvement, in the Itchapore diſtrict for ten years, we really want words to expreſs a ſentence of condemnation equal to the ſenſe we entertain of your demerit.

117. It is however with ſingular pleaſure, that we find ourſelves authorized by your proceedings, to make ſome exceptions in this general cenſure. All our ſervants could not be induced to concur in a meaſure, which appeared to them as abſurd as it was detrimental to the intereſt of the Company. We obſerve by Mr. *Smith*'s Minute, on Conſultations of 6th of Auguſt 1779, that the balances of the diſtrict had increaſed 77,000 pagodas in five years, or about half a lack of rupees per annum, upon the full amount of the jemmabundy, which he ſtates at rupees 5,55,000 per annum, including 20,000 rupees added to the Gumſoor diſtrict; that the Rajah of that diſtrict had then been reduced to a proper degree of obedience and dependance upon the Company's authority.

118. *Ball Kiſtna* offers to pay a tribute of 4,15,000 rupees per annum. In regard to the payment of 40,000 rupees on account of Zemindars balances, we have no doubt of his recovering the whole of thoſe ſums in a ſhorter ſpace of time, and in larger proportions, than he has agreed to pay them: and as to the payment of the large balance upon the Havelly Lands in a courſe of years, your own deciſion renders the ſtipulation an additional indulgence to him; becauſe you have declared it would appear, that he was, under the oſtenſible name of Jagabundoo, the real renter of thoſe lands, and therefore he ought to have been compelled to clear off the whole balance immediately.

119. If *Ball Kiſtna* fulfills his agreement, he will pay off 400,000 rupees on account of old balances in ten years: but, including the above ſum, the Company will, in the ſame period, receive 14 lacks leſs than their tribute; and if we deduct 50,000 rupees per annum, as the average of the preceding five years balances, and conſider it as an abſolute and unavoidable loſs, the Company's additional loſs, by accepting the propoſals of *Ball Kiſtna*, over and above ſuch deduction, will be nearly 10 lacks of rupees in ten years.

120 In Mr. *Johnſon*'s diſſent, he tells you plainly, that the decreaſe of revenue has been occaſioned by circumſtances which no longer exiſt: Mr. *Smith* had held the

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ſame language. You have not attempted to controvert the fact, nor had you the decency to vouchſafe a reply to the able and ſatisfactory arguments uſed by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* againſt this very extraordinary meaſure; on the contrary, your Preſident immediately puts the queſtion, which is carried in favour of *Ball Kiſtna*'s propoſal, without further debate; and the Chief and Council of *Ganjam* are forthwith ordered to give the country in charge to whomſoever *Ball Kiſtna* ſhall appoint, until his arrival, and to afford the renter all neceſſary aſſiſtance to enable him to fulfil his engagements to the Company.

121. And notwithſtanding the terms of *Ball Kiſtna* are ſo very favourable, we do not find that ſecurity has been taken for the payment even of this reduced demand.

122. On the preſent occaſion we cannot avoid expreſſing our diſſatisfaction at the ſmall remains of apparent dignity, conſequence, and comfort, which had hitherto been preſerved to the ancient Zemindars, being thus totally and unneceſſarily extinguiſhed. Subjection to the Company's authority was neceſſary; but to be conſigned into the hands of their Dubaſh and Interpreter muſt, we think, ſo totally alienate their affection, and detach them from our intereſt, that we fear the ſtrong hand of power muſt be conſtantly exerted to preſerve the country in tranquillity; for as to the propoſal of *Ball Kiſtna*, to lower the tribute of ſome of the Zemindars, in order to render them more comfortable, after his own terms had been accepted and ſettled, we conceive it too glaring an abſurdity to entertain any expectation of its operation in favour of the miſerable Natives.

123. We remark, with particular concern, that General *Munro*'s deſire of having the matter referred to *Ganjam*, before *Ball Kiſtna*'s propoſals were accepted, was not operative; and our concern is exceedingly increaſed on finding the General vote for the agreement without heſitation, when he knew that an idea ſuggeſted by, and worthy of himſelf, had been paſſed over with ſilent diſregard.

124. Upon receipt of your orders at *Ganjam*, the Chief and Council obſerve, that by the reduction of the Gumſoor Zemindary, the diſtrict in general is brought into a ſtate of tranquillity, and the revenue ſecured on a more permanent footing than at any former period ſince the firſt eſtabliſhment of the Company's authority. This corroborates and confirms the arguments urged by Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon*, in debate at your Board. Our ſervants at *Ganjam* had flattered themſelves, that their late repreſentation of the affairs of the diſtrict, and information of the very conſiderable collections of the preceding year, would have prevented the acceptance of a propoſal which, even admitting the terms fully complied with, appears inadequate to the amount which would have been collected by the Company's ſervants. They were, however, deceived in their reaſonable expectation, and we are ſorry to be obliged to lament the embarraſſment occaſioned to our affairs, by this and ſimilar tranſactions. They aſſure you, that however *Ball Kiſtna* might be ſcreened by an artful conduct, they had not the ſmalleſt doubt of his having been, to all intents and purpoſes, the renter of the Havelly Lands. And we have already remarked, to our great mortification, that a balance to the amount of 1,82,666 rupees, was then due from thoſe lands.

125. It appears, by your inſtructions to Mr. *Hollond*, on Select Conſultations of 22d of February 1779, that you were then anxious to know how the Nizam ſtood diſpoſed towards the Company; what his deſigns were, and in particular, whether he meant to take any, and what, part in the preſent war with the French; or in conſequence of meaſures lately adopted by the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, in ſupport of *Ragonaut Row*; or by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, reſpecting the march of our troops, and the propoſed alliance with the Rajah of *Berar*.

126. You take for granted that a great degree of jealouſy and diſtruſt muſt have been excited in the Nizam, becauſe thoſe proceedings had been directed in oppoſition to his profeſſed views and intereſt. You ſay, he had openly remonſtrated to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, and to you, againſt the ſupport given to *Ragonaut Row*, whom he conſidered as his declared enemy; and that there was reaſon to believe, he was not leſs adverſe to the meaſures which had been purſued relative to the Rajah of *Berar*.

127. To remove theſe impreſſions from the mind of the Nizam, and to ſubſtitute others more favourable to the preſent ſituation of the Company's affairs, you fear will be a work of time and difficulty, but relying much on the *ſincerity* of *your own intentions*, and the ſeaſonable exertion of Mr. *Hollond*'s abilities, you did not deſpair of accompliſhing the ends you had in view, at leaſt ſo far as to prevent the Nizam from entertaining hoſtile deſigns againſt the Company, while they are engaged in a war with our national enemies, which was likely to employ all their ſtrength.

128. You encloſe copies of Treaties concluded with the Nizam in 1766 and 1768, and deſire Mr. *Hollond* to aſſure the Nizam of your firm intentions to abide ſtrictly by the terms of our engagements, *in all reſpects*; and that you had nothing ſo much at heart, as the preſervation of the peace and friendſhip eſtabliſhed between him and the Company by the Treaty of 1768. But as ſome circumſtances had happened concerning the Guntoor Circar, which might be thought to affect the terms of that Treaty, you explain them to Mr. *Hollond*, and prepare him to act as occaſion ſhall require; you direct him to correſpond with our ſervants at *Bengal*, and to convey to them all neceſſary intelligence: and thus far your conduct appears commendable, and has our approbation.

129. In a Letter from Mr. *Hollond*, dated the 17th of May, we find the moſt ſtriking repreſentations of the Nizam's concern and diſpleaſure at your tranſactions with his brother, relative to the Guntoor Circar. This Letter comes before us in the Conſultations of our Governor General and Council, having been tranſmitted to *Bengal* by Mr. *Hollond*, in the regular courſe of his correſpondence with that Preſidency. We have carefully examined your Records, but do not find the ſaid Letter on your proceedings. A copy is now tranſmitted a number in the packet; and we hope will appear to have been only an official and accidental omiſſion, and not an intended ſuppreſſion. We however cannot help remarking, that, with the ſaid Letter before you, we are utterly at a loſs to account for your future conduct on this important buſineſs.

130. You had juſt inſtructed your Reſident to aſſure the Nizam of your firm intentions to abide ſtrictly by the Treaty of 1768, and that you had nothing ſo much at heart: you had ſeen in the Letter abovementioned, to what degree of reſentment he had been raiſed, not by our aſſiſting *Ragobah*, and treating with the Rajah of *Berar*, but by your own proceedings concerning *Bazalet Jung*, and the march of your troops towards *Adoni*: yet, inſtead of abiding by your former ground, and ſoothing him by further promiſes of a punctual adherence to public Treaties and Engagements, you, at a criſis ſo very alarming and improper, depart abruptly from all thoſe declarations, and direct Mr. *Hollond* to attempt a remiſſion or conſiderable abatement in the ſtipulated Peſcuſh, which you had ſuffered to be more than two years in arrears.

131. It is not our intention at this time to proceed further on the ſubject, than to point out the glaring inconſiſtency of your conduct, in a meaſure of ſo much conſequence in our political ſyſtem; and to notify to you, that under all the circumſtances of the caſe, we fully approve of the interpoſition of our Governor General and Council, of the ſteps taken by them on the above occaſion, ſo far as they have hitherto come to our knowledge.

132. By a Letter from your Preſident, dated the 14th of May 1779, we were informed that you had concluded

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the Treaty with *Bazalet Jung*, mentioned by the Select Committee in their Letter of the 13th of March 1779.

133. The ſentiments delivered by your Preſident on the ſubject, recorded on Conſultation the 10th of July, were very proper. Your care to effect the removal of the French from the Guntoor Circar, was commendable; and the hints ſuggeſted by our Governor General and Council, in their Letter of the 25th of January 1779, were alſo very judicious.

134. Your Letters and Proceedings, per *Naſſau* and *Southampton*, were received the 28th of Auguſt laſt: we ſhall now reply to ſuch parts thereof, as immediately reſpect the Guntoor Circar, and more particularly the letting of that diſtrict to the Nabob of *Arcot*.

135. In the 15th paragraph of your Letter of 14th October 1779, you acquaint us, that the Guntoor Circar having been delivered into your hands, your Preſident employed himſelf in aſcertaining its annual produce while in the poſſeſſion of *Bazalet Jung*; that having obtained particular Accounts of the receipts for the laſt four years, with the charges of collection, he laid them before you; that your deliberations were, in what manner to diſpoſe of the Circar, ſo as to realize the ſum for which you are to account to *Bazalet Jung*, according to the tenor of your agreement; that the Nabob, by the Court's Letter of the 4th of March 1767, par. 13, had been *promiſed* the Guntoor Circar at rent, whenever it ſhould come into the Company's hands; that his Highneſs addreſſed you a Letter on the occaſion, putting you in mind of that *promiſe*, and offering propoſals to rent the ſaid Circar for ten years; that the terms of his propoſals were higher than the ſums obtained from the Circar by *Bazalet Jung*, at leaſt for the laſt four years, of which you had the particulars before you; that of courſe you would be enabled to account with *Bazalet Jung*, for rather more than he could have expected by the agreement which had been concluded.

136. That there were only two ways of realizing, with any certainty, the produce of the diſtrict; the one by collecting the revenues on the Company's account, and the other by letting it to the Nabob; becauſe there appeared to you no other perſon of ſufficient reſponſibility to be entruſted with ſo large a rent; that if, by collecting the produce yourſelves, it ſhould, from any miſmanagement or bad ſeaſon, fall ſhort of the rent to be accounted for with *Bazalet Jung*, the difference muſt be made up from the Company's treaſury, which might be inconvenient; that if let to a reſponſible perſon, ſuch deficiencies were not to be apprehended. For the above reaſons, but more particularly becauſe the orders of 1767 *ſeemed to favour* the Nabob's application, you reſolved to grant him the Guntoor Circar at rent, ſubject to the pleaſure of the Court of Directors, and to ſuch reſtrictions as might appear neceſſary for ſecuring the rights of the Zemindars and inhabitants.

137. You inform us, that Mr. *Smith* had differed from the reſt of the Members of the Select Committee, reſpecting the propriety of diſpoſing of the Guntoor Circar in the ſaid Committee. That being a matter of revenue, he thought it ſhould have been ſettled in the Council. That you thought otherwiſe, becauſe all the previous ſteps, of a political or military nature, had been adjuſted in the Committee; and becauſe, in your idea, the laſt meaſure being connected with the reſt, could not with propriety be ſeparated, or ſubmitted to the opinion of thoſe Members of Council, who were unacquainted with previous proceedings. That Mr. *Smith* had likewiſe objected to giving his vote upon the queſtion, for granting the Guntoor Circar at rent to the Nabob, for the reaſons ſtated on your Minutes.

138. However commendable it might be for your Preſident to endeavour to obtain all poſſible information concerning the produce of the Guntoor Circar, it was exceedingly unbecoming in him to obtrude Accounts of that nature upon you, as a principal ground of agreement with *Mahomed Ally Khan*; and unpardonable in you to conclude ſuch agreement for ten years, without farther inveſtigation of the ſubject.

139. As an additional help to your deliberations, your Preſident lays before you the 13th paragraph of the Court's Letter of the 4th of March 1767, wrote in anſwer to an intimation from *Fort Saint George*, that the Guntoor Circar being intermixed with the country to the Northward, the troops which he was obliged to keep to guard that frontier, would, at the ſame time, preſerve tranquillity in *Condavir*; and therefore it might be for our intereſt to give him the management at a reaſonable rent, ſo ſoon as our authority was perfectly eſtabliſhed.

140. We ſhall not waſte time in pointing out the very different ſituation of affairs at preſent, compared with the period of 1767; nor need we ſtate the circumſtances at large, which convey the fulleſt conviction, founded upon many years experience, that no troops whatever, except ſuch as are regularly paid by the Company, and under their diſcipline, ought to be truſted with the protection of any part of the Nabob's country.

141. We think it far from certain, that our authority was ſo *perfectly eſtabliſhed* in the Guntoor Circar, at the time of letting it to the Nabob, as was neceſſary; and if that point had been incontrovertible, and there had been no other objection than the term of ten years, the idea is ſo repugnant to the letter and ſpirit of repeated inſtructions concerning lands already under the Nabob's management, that we think your conduct, in that reſpect, amounts to little leſs than open contempt of the authority of the Court of Directors.

142. We find no expreſſion in the Court's Letter of the 4th of March 1767, which amounts to any thing like an abſolute *promiſe* that the Nabob ſhould have the Guntoor Circar at rent; nor does his Highneſs pretend to claim it as a *promiſe*; he only ſays, *he has heard that leave has been given* to the Company's repreſentatives for that purpoſe, and requeſts to rent it for ten years.

143. Had you conſidered the 12th paragraph of the ſaid Letter of 1767, and reflected but a moment upon the various repreſentations of our Governor and Council, relative to inconveniences experienced ſince that period, on account of the Jaghire Lands being left in the Nabob's hands, and ſubjected to his Managers; and had you paid the ſmalleſt attention to the Company's ſentiments and orders on that ſubject, you muſt have been ſtruck with the impropriety of committing additional countries to the care of the Nabob's people; and have been convinced, that no conſideration whatever ſhould have induced you, to eſtabliſh authority or influence, except that of the Company, in a country of which you had ſo recently obtained poſſeſſion, which may be capable of very great improvements, and which ſeparates us by land from our more Northern diſtricts.

144. As to the oſtenſible clauſe, which ſubjects the bargain to our approval, we are really concerned to find you capable of ſheltering behind a ſubterfuge, which you ought to have been aſhamed of ſtating to us, knowing, as you muſt, the inconvenience and embarraſſment that would unavoidably attend the operation of that proviſo, if the Company ſhould think fit to annul the agreement.

145. And however repugnant it may be to us, to take any ſtep that may hurt the feelings of our antient friend and much reſpected Ally, we cannot conſent to diveſt ourſelves of that immediate and abſolute authority in the Guntoor Circar, which we deem neceſſary for its protection and improvement; and therefore we muſt, and hereby do expreſsly diſallow the agreement, and poſitively direct, that poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar be, without fail, and without waiting our further orders, reſumed for the Company ſo ſoon as the neceſſary ſteps can be taken, and the Accounts of the collections and balances properly adjuſted between the Nabob's Managers, the Natives of the diſtrict, and the Company.

146. In the execution of a meaſure ſo very diſagreeable, care muſt be taken that every attention and reſpect be ſhewn to the Nabob, which the nature of the buſineſs will

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will admit, in order to render your proceedings as little offenſive or diſtreſſing to his Highneſs as poſſible.

147. In a political view we are alarmed for the probable conſequences of your conduct. You are informed, by means of the Nabob himſelf, that *Hyder Ally* had intelligence of all that paſſed at *Madras*, and in the Durbar of his Highneſs. You are not ignorant of the ſettled hatred ſubſiſting between the Nabob and *Hyder*; nor could you ſuppoſe, that *Hyder* would be an indifferent ſpectator, when, in addition to the oſtenſible plea of expelling the French, he found, that the Guntoor Circar, which borders upon the Cuddapah country, was to be granted to his inveterate enemy; and, upon this ground, we ceaſe to wonder at *Hyder*'s oppoſition to the march of Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur*'s detachment; though we are extremely concerned at the diſcredit which our arms have ſuſtained by that expedition.

148. In regard to the march of the detachment, we remark, that unleſs you had been certain of *Hyder* remaining peaceable, it was highly imprudent for Lieutenant Colonel *Harpur* to attempt a paſſage of ſix days march through *Hyder*'s country; more eſpecially, as every ſubaltern in the army might have known, that by croſſing the *Kiſtnah* twice, *Hyder*'s territories might have been avoided, and the mortification and diſhonour of a retreat prevented.

149. As the Nabob's people have, no doubt, commenced the collection of revenues in the Guntoor Circar, the impreſſions made thereby upon the minds of the Natives will certainly be unfavourable to our intereſt; and we fear, that the removal of his Managers, however tenderly it may be done, will be conſidered by his Highneſs as a very deep and grievous wound to his dignity.

150. In regard to *Bazalet Jung*, if you keep his country, and are unable to afford him the ſtipulated protection, he will probably fall a ſacrifice to the reſentment of the Nizam and *Hyder Ally*: the latter has, by your imprudence, had an opportunity of acquiring and manifeſting additional conſequence; the reſult may render him ſtill more troubleſome, and the concluſion be unfavourable to the Company's affairs on that ſide of *India*.

151. Beſides theſe political conſiderations, if the Nabob has advanced money for cultivation, another field of litigation and embarraſſment will be opened with his Highneſs, relative to his claims on the Guntoor country: and as it may require the utmoſt exertion of wiſdom and ability to diſtinguiſh in all caſes what is right, we are alſo apprehenſive that the moſt unremitting and diſintereſted perſeverance and integrity may be found inſufficient to bring ſuch complicated affairs to an happy concluſion, when poſſeſſion ſhall be reſumed for the Company: however, ſo fully are we convinced of the neceſſity of eſtabliſhing proper regulations in the Circars, and of the impoſſibility of doing it under a divided authority, that in all events we are determined to diſallow and revoke every agreement that has a tendency to deprive us of the power of interfering, immediately and effectually, and of preventing or reforming abuſes committed againſt the Natives or the Company, in thoſe diſtricts.

152. As the letting of the Guntoor Circar to the Nabob was an impolitic and indefenſible meaſure, we are ſorry to obſerve alſo, that the mode of carrying it into execution appears precipitate, and equally unjuſtifiable.

153. The 4th of October 1779, your Preſident lays before you the Nabob's requeſt to rent the Guntoor diſtrict for 10 years.

The conditions propoſed were,

For 2 years	2,00,000	Pagodas per annum.
next 3 years	2,05,000	D°.
next 3 years	2,10,000	D°.
next 2 years	2,15,000	D°.

Upon reading the Nabob's Letter and Propoſals in the Select Committee, Mr. *Smith* gave his opinion, as before obſerved, that as a buſineſs of revenue, it ſhould have been conſidered and determined by the Council in their Revenue Department. His opinion coincides exactly with our ſentiments on the point, and ought not to have been over-ruled.

154. At the ſame inſtant, in order to enable you to judge of the Nabob's propoſals, your Preſident produceth ſundry Accounts of the produce of the country; which, he ſays, were ſent him by *Bazalet Jung*. In this inſtance, *Bazalet Jung* and his Accounts become a ſubſtitute for a Committee of Circuit; with this difference indeed, that the Committee of Circuit's Reports would, in the firſt inſtance, have come before the Board at large, but *Bazalet Jung*'s repreſentations, by the cuſtom of the ſervice, were, in the firſt inſtance, ſubject to the inſpection of your Preſident alone.

155. Having produced the Nabob's Letter, *Bazalet Jung*'s Accounts, and a partial Extract of the Court's Letter of March 1767, your Preſident immediately brings forward the following queſtion, viz.

> " Whether the Nabob's propoſals ſhall be accepted,
> " ſubject to the Company's approval, and under
> " ſuch limitations as might be neceſſary for ſecu-
> " rity of the revenue and welfare of the inha-
> " bitants?"

Whereupon Mr. *Smith*, much to his credit, and as became his ſtation, declared, that having never before ſeen the Nabob's Letter, nor the Papers delivered by the Preſident, he was unprepared to give an opinion upon a queſtion of ſo much importance; he therefore begged the conſideration might be deferred till the next meeting of the Committee; but this requeſt, however reaſonable, was not granted.

156. From the foregoing particulars, it ſhould ſeem that you were determined to preclude all proper inveſtigation, and to ſee through no other medium than your Preſident.

157. We cannot omit remarking, that the Nabob's Letter muſt have been in your Preſident's poſſeſſion a fortnight before it was produced to the Committee; when brought to light, a majority appear ripe for a deciſion; a queſtion is forthwith put, and carried, for letting the Guntoor Circar, for *ten* years, with as little ceremony as though it had been only for the purchaſe of a bale of cloth! as though it had involved no one conſideration of importance, nor been of the leaſt conſequence to the peace of the country, or welfare of the Company, although you had every reaſon to believe, from the ſtrong repreſentations of *Hyder Ally* and the Nizam, that it would be extremely difficult to reconcile them to the meaſure, or to fulfil your ſtipulations with *Bazalet Jung*, even by force of arms.

158. Your Preſident's concluſions on the ſubject are very extraordinary; he ſays, it ſeems to be the *wiſh of the Company*, that the Nabob ſhould have the Guntoor Circar; that with the Court's paragraph before you, he was unable to ſee how you could be juſtified in rejecting the Nabob's propoſals; he was againſt delay, becauſe the ſeaſon was advanced; he aſſures you he had obtained every neceſſary information: the poſſeſſion of the Circar was of very material conſequence to the Company; and he wiſhed us to be acquainted of the ſteps taken, by the ſhips under diſpatch: he flatters himſelf with the Company's approval; and ventures to anticipate the credit which he expects you to obtain, from a tranſaction which in our opinion proves a majority of your Council unfit, and renders them unworthy, to be continued in the further adminiſtration of our affairs.

159. Under theſe circumſtances, the abolition of the Committee of Circuit, in violation of an expreſs appointment of the Company; the trouble and expence occaſioned to the Rajahs and Zemindars, by obliging them to proceed to *Fort Saint George*; the letting of the Havelly Lands to *Sitteram Rauze* for ten years; the appointment

of

of him to the Duan of the Vizianagrum diſtrict; the cruel and unneceſſary degradation of the Rajah, his brother, by that appointment; the agreement for the Vizianagrum Zemindary Lands, for the Itchapore Diſtrict, for the Maſulipatam Havelly Lands and Farms, upon terms ſo very inadequate to their value; and the diſpoſal of the Guntoor Circar to the Nabob, for ten years; appear to us tranſactions ſo detrimental to the intereſt of the Company, and ſo inconſiſtent with your known duty, that we ſhould be wanting in our duty as Directors, if you were not made to experience the ſevereſt marks of our reſentment.

160. We have therefore reſolved, that Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Bart. Preſident of our Council, and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, *John Whitehill* and *Peter Perring*, eſquires, Members of our ſaid Council, be diſmiſſed from the ſervice of the *Eaſt India* Company; and they are hereby diſmiſſed accordingly.

161. We have already obſerved, that the conduct of Meſſrs. *Charles Smith* and *Samuel Johnſon* have, on ſome occaſions, been commendable, and particularly ſo, in reſiſting the agreement made with *Ball Kiſtnah*; but as thoſe Gentlemen concurred in the abolition of a Committee of Circuit, which had been expreſsly appointed by the Company, and as that act of diſobedience of poſitive orders has been ſo very prejudicial to our intereſt, we can no longer deem Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* fit perſons to be of our Council, nor have any ſhare in the immediate adminiſtration of our Government at *Fort Saint George*: it is therefore our order, that Meſſrs. *Charles Smith* and *Samuel Johnſon* be not admitted to a ſeat or ſeats in our Council, except they ſhall be appointed, or ordered to ſucceed thereto, by the expreſs authority of the Court of Directors.

162. The concurrence of General *Munro*, in the reſolution for aboliſhing the appointment of a Committee of Circuit, and the countenance given by him to very improper meaſures, on ſeveral occaſions, relative to the letting of the diſtricts, deſerve the ſtrongeſt mark of our diſpleaſure; but as thoſe ſubjects were foreign to the General's military profeſſion, as we cannot ſuppoſe he was influenced by corrupt motives, and as the military conduct of General *Munro* has been highly meritorious, we ſhall not, on the preſent occaſion, proceed further than to expreſs our diſapprobation of his conduct on the occaſions beforementioned.

We are,

Your loving Friends,

London,
the 10th January 1781.

John Michie,
Wm Devaynes,
Nath. Smith,
L. Sulivan,
John Harriſon,
John Woodhouſe,
Wm Mills, jun^r.
Wm James,
H. Fletcher,
Chas Boddam,
Ben. Booth,
Richd Becher,
W. G. Freeman,
J. Stables,
Fra^s Baring,
L. Darell,
John Roberts,
Thos Cheap.

THIRD

REPORT

(BEING A SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST AND SECOND)

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Reported by the LORD ADVOCATE *of* SCOTLAND (HENRY DUNDAS, Esq.)
4th February 1782.

VOL. VII.

THIRD REPORT

(BEING A SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST AND SECOND)

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

The 4th February 178:

The COMMITTEE of SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts, and to report the ſame to the Houſe, with their Obſervations thereupon; and who were inſtructed to enquire into the Riſe, Progreſs, Conduct, and preſent State of the Maratta War, and all other Hoſtilities in which the Preſidency of *Bengal* now are, or have been, engaged, in the Support of that War, and of the Effects which the ſaid War and Hoſtilities may have produced in *Bengal*, and the other Settlements and Poſſeſſions of the *Eaſt-India* Company;—

HAVING been furniſhed with ſome additional materials reſpecting the ſubject matter of their Firſt and Second Reports, ſince they were directed by the Houſe, at the commencement of the preſent Seſſion of Parliament, to reſume their enquiries, have thought it their duty to lay before the Houſe the ſubſtance of thoſe additional materials, by way of Supplement to their former Reports; following the ſame arrangement according to which the ſeveral ſubjects were originally treated; and ſubjoining to their former Appendixes the Papers and Examinations from which this Supplement is compiled.

Supplement to the Firſt Report.

YOUR Committee, in their Firſt Report, laid before the Houſe, among other matters, the actual ſtate of the *Carnatic*, as far as it could then be collected from the various materials ſupplied by the *Eaſt India* Houſe, and other public offices. They then proceeded to ſtate the grounds which the Government of *Fort Saint George* had to expect the calamitous events which have happened; and to ſet forth the ſtate of defence in which the Settlement had been kept previous to thoſe events.

With reſpect to the firſt of thoſe points, Your Committee purſued the narrative of the tranſactions ſubſequent to *Hyder Ally*'s irruption into the *Carnatic* down to Sir *Eyre Coote*'s laſt diſpatches (vide Firſt Report) repreſenting the ſtate of his army, compared with that of the enemy, the total want of field artillery, and of the neceſſary precautions for the ſecurity of the *Carnatic* at large, or *Fort Saint George* in particular. The ſubſequent intelligence received from that country, informed your Committee, that on the 30th December 1780, Sir *Eyre Coote* thought it proper to call a council of war, conſiſting of himſelf, Sir *Hector Munro*, General *Stewart*, and Lord *Macleod*. The facts, upon which the queſtion to be determined aroſe, were thus ſtated by Sir *Eyre Coote*: No. 1. Supplemental Appendix to 1st Report.

"That the whole effective ſtrength of his army, in-
"fantry, cavalry, and artillery, amounted to 6,885 men;
"and that 500 ſepoys might perhaps be added to them.
"That *Vellore*, *Wandewaſh*, and *Permacoil*, were cloſely in-
"veſted by the enemy; the firſt of thoſe places, from the
"Commanding Officer's account, he did not think in im-

" mediate danger, except from treachery, which had found " its way among the Nabob's people; but that *Permacoil* " muſt ſoon fall, as the gallant reſiſtance of ſo ſmall a gar- " riſon could not long be effectual againſt *Hyder*'s re- " ſources;—that batteries were already raiſed againſt *Wan-* " *dewaſh*, and playing with ſucceſs, the garriſon inadequate, " conſiſting of two European companies, and a few ſepoys " belonging to the Nabob, who were diſſatisfied on account " of their arrears of pay, and actually deſerting; and the " natural advantages of the place not being ſo great as thoſe " of *Permacoil*, that it could not long reſiſt the great efforts " which would certainly be made againſt it; and that the " quantity of grain in it was a conſiderable object. The " General conſidered the ſafety of theſe two garriſons, and " that of *Chingleput*, which was alſo inveſted, as points of " very great importance.—Taking a comparative view of " the enemy's force and his own, the General was of opi- " nion, that they might engage, if forced ſo to do, with ſuc- " ceſs; that detachment was not adviſable, as the army " could not afford a diviſion. A movement for the relief of " thoſe garriſons, the General obſerved, would neceſſarily " expoſe *Fort Saint George*, the foundation of the Engliſh " intereſts on the Coaſt, from whence their own army muſt " derive its ſupplies—on that point he wiſhed to have the " advice of the general officers; and alſo upon this other " point, whether, if they ſhould ſucceed merely in relieving " the garriſons above mentioned, and return to the ſta- " tion which they had left, any diſadvantage to their " affairs would follow from that ſtep?—That he deſpaired " of ſepoys being ſent by ſea from *Bengal*, and thoſe who " were to march by land had not ſet out on the 14th of " March, and that it depended on *Moodajee Boonſela* whe- " ther they ever ſhould come or not."

It appears, that the general officers were unanimous in opinion, that the whole army ſhould march to the relief of thoſe garriſons, and return to their preſent ſtations; and that Sir *Eyre Coote* (obſerving at the ſame time that he tranſgreſſed againſt the uſual rules) laid the reſult of this council of war before the Preſident and Select Committee; who much approved of the reſolutions which had been taken.

As no intelligence whatſoever has been received by the *Eaſt-India* Company, directly from *Fort Saint George*, ſince the month of January 1781, Your Committee can only offer the ſubſtance of ſuch information as has been received from other quarters. A Letter from the Chief and Council of *Anjengo*, dated 11th February 1781 to the Court of Directors, repreſents, that Lieutenant *Hughes*, of the *Seahorſe*, who had left *Madras* on the 21ſt ultimo, and touched at *Anjengo* on his way to *Bombay*, had informed them, that Sir *Eyre Coote* had marched from his ſtation near *Madras* about the 17th ultimo; and a private Letter which the Preſident had juſt received from the Commandant at *Palamcotah*, dated the 8th February, acquainted them, that the ſiege of *Carongoly* and *Wandewaſh* was raiſed on Sir *Eyre Coote*'s approach. The Governor and Council of *Bombay*, in a Letter dated the 30th April 1781, acquaint the Court of Directors, that they very much wiſh they had any late authentic accounts to give of the ſituation of affairs on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, the hopes of which was the principal cauſe of detaining the *Mercury* ſo long; that it is certain the French had left the Coaſt of *Coromandel* in February, without lending any aſſiſtance to *Hyder*; and that they had been much diſtreſſed for proviſion, by means of the poſition of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s army, and that General's having burnt all the boats at *Pondicherry*, which prevented their being ſupplied from on ſhore; and they add, that Mr. *Stewart* at *Goa* mentions that *Hyder* had quitted the *Carnatic*. Your Committee find, by a ſubſequent Letter from *Anjengo*, dated on the 6th Auguſt 1781, and received on the 16th of December laſt, addreſſed to the Court of Directors, and enclofing a Letter of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s to Colonel *Braithwaite*, dated the 6th of July preceding, that a very conſiderable advantage had been obtained by that General over *Hyder Ally*, on the 1ſt of July, between *Porto Nuovo* and *Mooteapollom*. It appears that the action laſted eight hours, and was hard fought on both ſides; the enemy's force conſiſted of 25 battalions of infantry, 400 Europeans, 40 or 50,000 horſe, about 100,000 matchlock men, and 47 pieces of cannon well ſerved; yet that force was obliged to yield to the ſteadineſs of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s ſmall army, four thouſand of the enemy being left dead on the field, and *Meer Saib* (*Hyder*'s near relation, and ſecond in command) having been mortally wounded, whilſt the Britiſh army loſt very few officers, and but 3 or 400 men were killed and wounded.

This Letter from *Anjengo* ſtates it as confidently reported, that a veſſel from *Holland* had reached *Colombo* in June laſt, and appriſed that ſettlement of the probability of a rupture between the Engliſh and Dutch in *Europe*; and that the factory at *Colombo* were preparing themſelves accordingly.

Such was the actual ſtate of the *Carnatic*, according to the moſt recent information which the Directors of the *Eaſt-India* Company have received from any of their Settlements in *India*.

Your Committee next proceeded to proſecute their enquiry into the grounds which the Government of *Madras* had to expect an invaſion of the *Carnatic*, by *Hyder Ally*, and the means taken to avert it, or to defend themſelves, in caſe that event ſhould take place; and they find, from a Letter addreſſed to the Court of Directors, by the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, dated January 9th 1781, that the Maratta war is conſidered by them, as the ſole cauſe of theſe calamities; to which Sir *Eyre Coote* did not entirely aſſent.—They then proceed to ſtate, that, " ſo far back as October " 1779, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* informed the Committee, " that the Letters and Meſſages received from *Hyder* " *Ally*, for ſome time paſt, were couched in terms ſo " hoſtile and unfriendly, that he could ſcarcely conceive " them to be the genuine productions of that Prince— " that he had in conſequence ſent the Reverend Mr. " *Schwarts* to *Seringapatam*, with private inſtructions, to " learn the real diſpoſition of *Hyder*; but the iſſue of " this ſecret negotiation was ſuch, as left him no reaſon " to doubt, but his intentions were hoſtile both to the " Company and the Nabob. Alarming (ſay they) as this " information was, no reſolution was taken, more than " that the Gentlemen at *Bengal* ſhould be made acquainted " with it, and that General *Goddard* ſhould be adviſed of " it alſo.—About three weeks after, the matter was " again agitated, and a Member of the Committee " moved, that the moſt vigorous and ſpirited meaſures " ſhould be adopted; and ſubmitted, whether it would " not be proper to collect a ſtrong body of troops at " *Vellore* and *Conjeveram*, where they might be cantoned, " in readineſs to act as occaſion might require. This, " however, met with a ſimilar fate; nothing more was " done that had been in the former inſtance.

" From this time, until the beginning of June, no " further notice is taken of the meaſures of *Hyder* and " the Marattas, although the intelligence communicated " by the Nabob, gave us every reaſon to ſuppoſe that " he meditated ſome formidable blow againſt the *Car-* " *natic*; then indeed the Letters which came in daily " from the frontier garriſons, were ample confirmations " of what had been apprehended; and to increaſe our " difficulties, the Select Committee of *Bombay* adviſed " us, under date the 18th of May, that the Marattas " had declared in poſitive terms to General *Goddard*, " that they would not make peace unleſs *Salſette* were " reſtored, and the perſon of *Ragobah* given up.—The " undoubted information which was received of the " warlike preparations that were making by *Hyder Ally* " *Cawn*, induced Mr. *Johnſon*, in a Minute, ſeconded by " Mr. *Smith*, to recommend to the Committee, to take " into conſideration, the means of maintaining an army " in the field; and if that were impracticable, that they " would deliberate upon meaſures for reinforcing our " garriſons,

Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report. N 4.

No 2. Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report.

No 3. Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report.

Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report. No 2.

" garriſons, and for keeping up a force at leaſt ſufficient to " protect the Company's and Nabob's poſſeſſions. Had this " opinion been followed, the troops which were ſeparated, " would have been formed into a body within the " ſpace of a month, without obſtruction or difficulty; " they would have marched unmoleſted into the very " heart of the *Carnatic*, and would have been ready to " have faced the enemy on their firſt entering the " Ghauts.—But the ſeaſonable precautions pointed out " in this Minute were diſregarded; the apprehenſions " about *Hyder* were thought groundleſs; and the oppor- " tunity was loſt, which might have poſſibly prevented " the invaſion of the *Carnatic*.—Had indeed, a peace " been concluded with the Marattas, or had there been " the proſpect of ſo deſirable an event, the rumour of " *Hyder*'s intentions might have been diſregarded; but " when we had the cleareſt proof before us, the declara- " ration of the Maratta Court itſelf to General *Goddard*'s " propoſition, it no longer became a matter that could " admit of further heſitation; a pacification with that " Government ſeemed to be as diſtant as ever, whilſt " every exertion that we might be enabled to make, " would unavoidably create an expence of both blood " and treaſure, which muſt infallibly exhauſt us in the " end.—The diſpoſition of the troops belonging to this " eſtabliſhment, was likewiſe a circumſtance of conſi- " derable diſadvantage to us;—one part under the com- " mand of Colonel *Braithwaite*, was at *Pondicherry*; " Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* had a fine detachment to " the northward of the *Kiſtna*; and Colonel *Browne* had " one battalion of Europeans, one company of artillery, " and one battalion of ſepoys, acting under the orders " of General *Goddard*.

" Our force being in this manner diſperſed, no mo- " ment could have been more favourable for *Hyder* to " have entered the *Carnatic*, than the moment he em- " braced.—We were unuſually weak from the different " detachments we had on ſervice.—*Bengal* was plunged " into the moſt ſerious difficulties, and the treaſuries of " the Company in every part of *India* were reduced to " the moſt alarming ſituation.

" Since the 5th of November, when General *Coote* " arrived, every kind of exertion hath been made to in- " ſure to us ſucceſs in the next campaign. The General " himſelf is now encamped at *Saint Thomas's Mount*; " and we have every reaſon to expect that we ſhall reap " the moſt ſignal ſervices from his conduct and ability. " Circumſtanced as General *Coote* is, the Commander in " Chief of your forces in *India*; and more particularly, " having the entire direction of General *Goddard*'s army " on the other ſide of *India*, where *Hyder* is moſt vul- " nerable, we could not, we conceive, have acted with " greater attention to your intereſt, than in entruſting to " him the general management of the war, as we have " done in public orders.—The orders which Sir *Eyre* " *Coote* informs us he has ſent to General *Goddard*, will, " we truſt, draw that officer from his offenſive meaſures " againſt the Marrattas, and enable him to make a di- " verſion in the Ridamore country, where the Nairs " even, we are told, are ready to revolt and join us: " they have kept the garriſon of *Tellicherry* cloſely con- " fined to the walls of their fort for a conſiderable time " paſt. The preſence of Sir *Edward Hughes* alſo ren- " ders it more probable; the ſquadron he has under his " command being at hand to co-operate, and tranſport, " if neceſſary, both men and ſtores to *Mangalore*."

They then proceed to acquaint the Court of Directors, that *Mahomed Nudjif Cawn*, the Nabob's manager in the Arcot province, inſinuates, that the capture of that place was owing to the conduct of the Company's officers; who aſſert on the other hand, that it was owing to the Nabob's people, eſpecially to Rajah *Beerbur*, who had the ſupreme authority at *Arcot*, and is now in the confidence of *Hyder*. They alſo acquaint them of an offer from *Fazel Beg*, of four or five thouſand diſciplined cavalry, which they had not poſitively accepted, by reaſon of the great expence, and by reaſon of expectation of aſſiſtance from *Moodajee Bounceilo*, but had kept the negotiation open. They likewiſe ſtate, that repeated repreſentations to the Rajah of *Tanjore* had not been able to procure either money or cavalry, and that nothing but empty words and profeſſions had hitherto been the fruit of their applications; and proceed to acquaint the Directors, that they had been informed by Sir *Edward Hughes* (by Letter, dated December the 4th) that His Majeſty's fleet had arrived ſafe at *Tellicherry*, where he had landed, for the reinforcement of that garriſon, 1 captain, 4 ſubalterns, and 108 marines; and that he had ſupplied them with 80,000 rupees, and a quantity of grain; and that he had directed two of the Company's ſhips to remain there, for the purpoſe of keeping the Port open for a ſupply of proviſions, until a reinforcement ſhould arrive.

Your Committee judged it expedient to examine *William Petrie*, eſquire, touching the grounds for expecting that *Hyder*'s intention was to invade the *Carnatic* long before that event took place. That Gentleman, having ſerved the Company ſeveral years, in the different capacities of Commiſſary, Secretary to the Council, and reſident at *Tanjore*, informed your Committee, that, from the long miſunderſtanding and jealouſy which had ſubſiſted between *Hyder Ally* and the Madras Government, he never doubted but that we ſhould be involved in war with that power, as ſoon as he ſhould find an opportunity, which could only have been prevented by a poſitive alliance between him and the Engliſh, a meaſure which he had frequently courted; that *Hyder* viewed our attack on *Pondicherry* with a jealous eye, and would, in his opinion, have given aſſiſtance to the French, but for a favourite enterprize which he was engaged in at that time. Our attack at *Mahé*, and the ſubſequent operations in the Guntoor Circar, he believes, were conſidered by *Hyder* as acts of hoſtility; and that he would venture to ſay, that that Prince certainly meditated an attack as early as the time of the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, which Mr. *Petrie* heard at *Tanjore*, from a man who had formerly been in *Hyder*'s ſervice, and who had viſited him at *Nagore*, at a time when this man was acting as an inferior Vackeel with the Dutch at *Negapatam*. It may be proper for your Committee to ſtate, that Mr. *Petrie* expreſſed himſelf to your Committee, as of opinion that the Rajah of *Tanjore* is well inclined to the intereſts of the Company; and imputed all difficulties which he met with during his reſidence there, to the jealouſy and general bad conduct of his miniſtry (co-operating with the Rajah's mild and indolent turn of mind) to whom he has intirely reſigned himſelf.—Upon the ſubject of the ſtate of affairs in *Tanjore*, your Committee beg leave to attract the particular attention of the houſe to Mr. *Petrie*'s teſtimony, which affords much clear and eſſential information on this important point.

N° 5. Supplemental Appendix to 11th Report.

Appendix 4th Report N° 12.

On a ſubſequent occaſion, Mr. *Petrie* informed your Committee, in addition to his former teſtimony, that he knew *Hyder* had been inimical to the Engliſh ſince a ſhort time after the peace of 1769; at which time the Madras Board withheld from him the ſuccours which he thought he had a right to claim (in conſequence of that treaty) when his country was invaded by the Marattas. That the misfortunes of that war, in which he loſt his army, and a conſiderable part of his dominions, *Hyder* charged to our breach of engagements; from which period he eagerly looked for a favourable opportunity of making war upon the Engliſh. That the tranſactions of that time gave riſe to his ſubſequent connection with the French; but that, finding he could expect no eſſential ſupport from them, and apprehenſive of a ſecond viſit from the Marattas in the year 1773, he again ſolicited the friendſhip and alliance of the Engliſh againſt the common enemy, as he then termed the Marattas, and made ſuch advantageous offers to the Company, that had the Madras Board deemed it expedient in other reſpects to accede to his requeſt, the moſt ſolid commercial

tial advantages might then have been obtained for the Company. Mr. *Petrie* further acquainted them, that he was at that time Secretary to the Board at *Madras*, where the ſubject was often debated; but that at laſt it was reſolved to decline the propoſed alliance, and to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality between *Hyder* and the Marattas. His reſentment on this occaſion, Mr. *Petrie* believes, cemented his connection with the French, and not improbably gave him the firſt idea of an alliance with his old enemies the Marattas; and that from this period the correſpondence between *Hyder* and the Company's Government he believed to have been merely civil, certainly not cordial. That on Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s arrival at *Madras*, he underſtood ſome correſpondence had taken place on the ſubject of an alliance; yet when *Pondicherry* was attacked, it was generally imagined, and juſtly, as he believes, that *Hyder* would have tried to raiſe the ſiege, had not his arms at that time been employed in another quarter. That the ſubſequent attack on *Mahé*, and the operations in the Guntoor Circar, were conſidered by *Hyder* as poſitive acts of hoſtility, who from that time ſeemed to make no ſecret of his hoſtile deſigns againſt the *Carnatic*. That his own reflections upon all theſe circumſtances, added to his information from Mr. *Schwarts*, who had juſt returned from *Hyder*'s Durbar, and from other channels of intelligence, made him conclude, when he was about to leave *India*, that a war was not far diſtant, and that *Hyder* only waited for an opportunity to begin hoſtilities; and that he was ſorry to ſee that the Maratta war, by exhauſting the Company's reſources, and diſperſing their force, was likely to afford him a very favourable one; ſo that he never doubted of the *Carnatic*'s becoming the theatre of war. That although the affairs of the Guntoor Circar, and of *Mahé*, were powerful provocations, yet *Hyder* would not have involved himſelf in the war had there been peace in *Hindoſtan*, until he had received the troops promiſed him by *France*; and does not think *Hyder* would have truſted his infantry and guns in the *Carnatic*, had the Madras Government only aſſembled the forces under that Preſidency in proper time, and ordered the army to move towards the Weſtern Paſſes, when they heard of *Hyder*'s approach from *Bengalore*.

As the facts contained in Mr. *Petrie*'s evidence appear to your Committee to be material, they have inſerted his evidence much at large, without meaning to paſs any judgment upon the conduct of the Madras Government, relative to the alliance with *Hyder Ally*, alluded to by Mr. *Petrie*.

Your Committee, in the courſe of their reſearches, have met with a tranſaction which originated with the Governor General and Council; in which, however, the Government of *Madras* was intereſted, and which they think it neceſſary to ſtate to the Houſe, though not directly connected with the ſubject matter of their Firſt Report.

They find, by Diſpatches from *Calcutta*, dated 7th January 1781, that the Governor General and Council (then conſiſting of Mr. *Haſtings* and Mr. *Wheler* only) after ſtating the neceſſity of uſing every means to relieve the *Carnatic*, acquainted the Court of Directors with a Treaty ſet on foot with the Dutch, whoſe poſſeſſions at *Cochin* and its neighbourhood had been attacked by *Hyder Ally*, and which had been formed under the advice and correction of Mr. *Roſs*, Director of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Settlements in *Bengal*. Theſe Gentlemen repreſent the force actually ſtationed at *Cochin* and near it, as able to furniſh the proportion of European infantry and artillery therein ſtipulated, as well as of Mallays, who might be quickly marched by a near route into the *Carnatic*, if the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin* ſhould accede, who have no regular powers to bind their Company, being ſubject to the Supreme Government of *Batavia*. They therefore ſtate this as a reaſon for having offered to the Dutch Director more advantageous terms than would otherwiſe have been expedient in an equal and formal negotiation, or adequate to their ſhare of the common intereſt in the war. But that no time is to be loſt, and inſtant relief is required, and that the dependent ſtate of thoſe perſons, whom they ſolicit to be the immediate parties, claims ſome additional conceſſions to indemnify them, and win the concurrence of their Superiors: this they ſay has induced them to offer the Tinnivelly country to the Dutch, "which may be ſeparated from the *Carnatic*, without either embarraſſment or danger of future competition; and, from its contiguity to the Dutch poſſeſſions in *Ceylon*, would prove a greater acquiſition to them, than loſs to the Nabob:" that the Treaty had been ſuddenly prepared, and, "without his knowledge, and of courſe without his conſent, though they know that the latter is indiſpenſibly neceſſary to that article of the Treaty in which the ceſſion of *Tinivelly* is ſuggeſted;" but that a ceſſion of a minute and diſtant part of his dominions, is but a ſmall ſacrifice for the preſervation of the whole, as the Nabob of *Arcot* is the principal in the war. In this Letter, the Supreme Government encloſe copies of the Treaty executed by them, and of their Letters to the Preſidency of *Madras*, the Nabob, the Directors of *Cochin* and *Columbo*, and the Supreme Government of *Batavia*.

The Minute of the Governor General and Council of the 4th January 1781 (recapitulating the reaſons abovementioned) contains the "propoſals for a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies, and the Nabob *Wallah Jaw Behader*;" and after reciting the invaſion of *Hyder Ally*, his attack on the Dutch Settlements, the common intereſt of the Nabob, and the advice and ſuggeſtion of the Dutch Director, declares, that the Treaty ſhall be propoſed to the ſeveral intended parties to it, and that it ſhall be binding on the Engliſh Company as ſoon as it ſhall have received the ſeals and ſignatures of the other parties. The ſubſtance of this Treaty appears to be, that the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin* ſhall furniſh 1,000 European infantry, 200 European artillery, and 1,000 Malays, with their complement of officers, ſubject to the Engliſh Commander, until the concluſion of the war and their re-delivery to their proper Government, and receiving their preſent pay, together with their field and garriſon expences: that it ſhall be propoſed and recommended to the Nabob of *Arcot*, to grant proper Sunnuds to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, transferring to them his right and property in the province of *Tinivelly*, together with the excluſive right of the Pearl fiſhery on all the Coaſt lying to the ſouth of *Remfirem*: that the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company may make ſuch conqueſts in the neighbourhood of *Cochin* as they ſhall be able, without the participation of the Nabob, or of the Engliſh: that if further aſſiſtance is required, the Dutch ſhall engage to obtain it from the Supreme Government of *Batavia*, on the ſame terms: that the Treaty being executed by the Supreme Council of *Bengal*, ſhall be forwarded to the Nabob of *Arcot*; and if executed by him, to the Directors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*; but liable to no diminution or alteration. Your Committee find, that their Letter to the Nabob repreſents the perilous ſtate of their common affairs, and the great ſacrifice made, by relinquiſhing the proſecution of the Maratta war, almoſt in the moment when they had reaſon to expect, from the ſucceſs which had attended it, that it would have ſpeedily terminated in an honourable and advantageous peace; and that the neceſſity of the utmoſt expedition muſt apologize for the want of his previous conſent. The Letter intended for *Columbo* and *Cochin*, repreſents to the Governors of thoſe ſettlements, the impoſſibility of correſponding with *Batavia*, by reaſon of the time which would thereby be loſt; and holds out the great advantage accruing to the Dutch, as an ample indemnification for their want of authority from their Superiors. In the Letter intended for the Supreme Government of *Batavia*, the ſame arguments of advantage are urged, to ſecure their ratification, and the neceſſity of expedition offered as an apology for having

N° 6. Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report.

N° 7. Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report.

having applied themſelves, in the firſt inſtance, to ſubordinate Governments. In the Letter from the Governor General to that of *Madras*, accompanying this Treaty, inſtructions are given to preſs the Nabob to a compliance, by repreſenting his neceſſities, his obligations, and the juſtice of the claims which they have upon him; and no doubt is entertained but that, from motives of policy as well as juſtice, the Nabob will accede to the terms offered in his name.

On the 12th of January 1781, the Government of *Madras* acquainted the Court of Directors, that they had particularly attended to His Majeſty's order in Council, of the 17th of April laſt, and ſhould vigilantly guard againſt any conſequences which might eventually ariſe from the meaſures that His Majeſty had been under the neceſſity of adopting; and on the 17th of February, tranſmit to the Directors their ſentiments on the Treaty above ſtated. They obſerve, that the ceſſion of the Tinnivelly country and Pearl fiſhery, which are to be perpetually ceded for a temporary aſſiſtance, are eſtimated at 35 lacks of rupees, equal in that country to £.385,750 ſterling. That a ſcheme of aſſiſtance from the Dutch had been intimated ſome months before, but that the weighty conſideration of expence ſeemed alone ſufficient to deter them from accepting it, though they had not abſolutely declined it; more eſpecially as the requiſite ſum might be more advantageouſly applied, by entertaining a body of cavalry, the want of which had been ſeverely felt. In addition to theſe arguments, they hold themſelves not to have been warranted in forwarding the Treaty, as Sir *Eyre Coote*'s ſucceſs had been ſo conſiderable, as much was to be expected from General *Goddard*'s operations, and as the reinforcement expected from *Bengal* would enable them to act with effect on the offenſive; but above all, as the revenue of the Southern Provinces were almoſt the only reſources left to the Nabob, and as his Highneſs had aſſigned them over to the Company (reſerving ſome ſhare for his houſhold expences) and were the moſt conſiderable part of their funds for carrying on the war, the ceſſion of ſo much revenue in perpetuity would ſtrip them of their beſt means of ſupporting themſelves in the *Carnatic*. To this they add, that His Majeſty's declaration in Council, of the 17th of April 1780, rendered the giving to the Dutch an opportunity of acquiring ſo much influence in that country, a meaſure both highly impolitic and detrimental to the Company's affairs.

Your Committee find, that the Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company, in their General Letter to *Fort Saint George* by the ſhips now under diſpatch, have expreſſed their opinion of this tranſaction in the following terms: "It is needleſs to enter upon an examination of the propoſed Treaty with the Dutch for the Tinnivelly country. Nothing but the moſt deſperate neceſſity could have warranted ſuch ceſſion of territory to the Dutch; however, as *Great Britain* and the States General are at open war, every effort muſt be continued to guard againſt, and, if poſſible, to reduce and deſtroy the power of the Dutch in *India*."

Supplement to the Second Report.

THE Abolition of the Committee of Circuit, and calling down of the Zemindars to *Madras*, was the point firſt attended to in your Committee's Second Report. In addition to what they have already ſtated on that ſubject, it appears to them, that on the 5th May 1778 (about three months after the arrival of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* at *Madras*) a Letter was written to him by Mr. *Sadlier*, then Chief of *Maſulipatam*, repreſenting, "that "he always had in mind how much the Governor ſeemed "to have at heart the coming of the Zemindars to the "Preſidency:—My utmoſt endeavours (ſays he) have "been uſed to facilitate your wiſh; but leſs ſanguine "than you appear, of the eligibility of undertaking ſud- "denly great reformation of ſyſtem, and aware of the "difficulties in which you may be involved. As I could "not, conſiſtently with the warm ſupport, gratitude and "inclination prompt me to, flatter you of the immediate "ſucceſs of your meaſures, I thought it beſt to be ſilent, "and not awake diſtruſt in you, till a full and complete "ſtate of the ſettlement and our ſituation were ſent you: "ſuch is now completed, and goes this night to "Council.

No. 1. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

"If it had pleaſed you to have repoſed confidence in "me, and appriſed me of the ſtate of this Settlement "previous to my departure from *Madras*, and intruſted "to me after I could have communicated to you my "opinion on your plan, and the time fitteſt for its being "undertaken, poſſibly our treaſury might have been "repleniſhed, and the ſcheme forwarded. But having, "previous to my knowledge of your intentions, written "to the Zemindars, I found my influence and the in- "fluence of the Board here, annulled, and nothing to "be done till you have the Zemindars with you, or till "this Government is inveſted with their uſual authority." Upon theſe grounds Mr. *Sadlier* proceeded to ſtate the neceſſity of loſing no time in putting the meaſure in execution, after the ſubject ſhould have had due conſideration, and the Governor ſhould have ſatisfied himſelf how the calls on *Maſulipatam* for money were to be ſatisfied; and ſtates, that Sepoys might be neceſſary to enforce the order, "as it commonly requires ſuch an exertion "to get the Zemindars from their reſpective countries," and make them fulfil their engagements to Government.

It appears alſo, that this Letter contains a deſcription of the characters and private circumſtances of ſome of the principal Zemindars in that Settlement, which your Committee think it neceſſary to ſtate ſhortly, as affording matter for judging of the neceſſity, policy, or propriety, of calling down the Zemindars to the Preſidency, in preference to the meaſure which was ordered by the Court of Directors; namely, that a Committee from the Preſidency ſhould enquire upon the ſpot into every circumſtance which affected the reſpective intereſts of the Peaſants, the Zemindars, or the Company; and alſo as tending to throw light upon the ſuggeſtions made by the ſubordinate Settlements, and by the Zemindars themſelves, of their inability to afford the expence of a journey to the Preſidency, and a reſidence there for ſome length of time, and of the detriment which would thence ariſe to the ſubordinate treaſuries, and ultimately to the Company.

Tripetty Rauze is repreſented as very punctual in his engagements to the Company, as an able and frugal Manager of his country; uſeful to the Company, by aſſiſting them in ſettling with others of his own claſs, but a great ſufferer by having become ſecurity for the countries under his management, inſomuch as to be reduced to a "manœuvre," to endeavour to extricate himſelf from his difficulties; thus embarraſſed as he now is, Mr. *Sadlier* knows not how he can ſettle his affairs to the ſatisfaction of the Preſidency of *Madras*.

Opparow is repreſented as having a fine country, great part of which is under the management of others; But that his affairs are in ſo unproſperous a ſtate, that nothing ſhort of the ſequeſtration of his country, and giving him an allowance for his maintenance, can enable him to pay off his heavy debts, and reſtore him to his former ſituation.

Jagapetty Rauze is repreſented to have the name of being able to ſettle with the Company, either at *Maſulipatam* or *Madras*, but that a cloſe connection is ſaid to have taken place between him and *Sitteram Rauze*: "that Vackeels and correſpondence are in uſe between "them, and that there is cauſe to imagine that there "are intrigues on foot between the Zemindars of *Chica-"cole* and thoſe of this diſtrict, from this man's in-"fluence. This (ſays Mr. *Sadlier*) ſhould be diſ-"couraged, and may cauſe a combination of the whole "of the Zemindars to diſtreſs and embarraſs your plan. "To overcome ſuch confederacy, you might ſettle the "affairs of the different diſtricts ſeparately and at different "times, and not hazard the effects of intrigue, by "bringing the whole of them together."

Row Vencata Row is repreſented as having paid up his kiſts; and a renewal of his agreement, in the uſual mode, it is thought may be effected.—*Ram Chundre Rauze* is ſaid to wiſh to have his pretenſions to the Cotah country (now in charge of a Fouzdar for the Company) ſettled before he pays his inſtalments.—*Coſtant Ram* and *Veſſereddy Ram*, as having been always punctual, and likely ſo to continue.

The Chief of *Maſulipatam* then proceeds to draw the Governor's attention to the effects which this meaſure would, in his judgment, have upon the treaſury of the Settlement under his charge. "By the eſtimate (con-"tinues he) of probable receipts and monthly diſburſe-"ments, ſent to the Board, you will find, we have hope "of receiving very little; and our diſburſement, not leſs "than 33,000 pagodas monthly, (£. 13,300 ſterling) "beſides which, we owe to the Soubah, 31ſt March laſt, "77,922 pagodas, on account of his tribute; which ſum "is increaſing monthly, at the rate of 10,822½. The "payment of the laſt money was completed by the "Soucars only a few days ſince, which occaſioned the "Soubah, by one of his people, to write *Vencata Royloo*, "as you will perceive by tranſlate of the Letter now "ſent. It becomes an object of your moſt ſerious "attention, in caſe the Zemindars proceed as at preſent "intended, to find means by which our treaſury may be "ſupplied; the moſt valuable part of the Company's "inveſtment depends on it, and the Zemindars with-"holding as they do aſſiſtance of any kind, leaves little "hopes of reſources in ourſelves; for whatever may "appear due, ſuch is the ſtate of credit, and ſuch the "uncertainty of payment, I do not at this hour know "where I can apply with certainty for the ſmalleſt ſums, "and all I expect to be able to do, will barely furniſh "the demands of the preſent month, independent of our "ſilver, which may amount to about a lack of rupees, "which will be ſold to great loſs.—Thus, miſcarriage in "any of the affairs dependent on this Settlement, may "therefore be imputed to the change of ſyſtem, and what "diſappointments enſue, juſtified by the Council here on "this plea, and all misfortunes incident to it imputed to "your Board.—If too, by improper management here-"tofore, deficiency in payment of the kiſts now due, and "the revenue of this country, according to the preſent "ſettlement, ſhould happen, may not the cauſe, by its "effect of giving the firſt ſhock, to common and long "practiſed credit in the mode of ſecurities in thoſe coun-"tries, be alſo aſcribed to the preſent plan? In ſhort, if "it ſhould happen that the Settlement, by bad ſeaſons and "cauſes alledged by the Zemindars, is on the decline, "would it not be prudent to leave the Government "hitherto charged with reſponſibility, to juſtify its mea-"ſures, and bear the cenſure it deſerves? are queſtions "with deference I ſubmit to your better judgment.

"The period of ſettlement by Mr. *Floyer*, expires the "25th September next; a new jamabundy muſt then be "agreed on; that time or October may be better ſuited, "and the people better prepared to viſit the Preſidency. "In caſe then no change is intended in the preſent ſettle-"ment, ſuch ſeaſon may be equally convenient for the "Company for a future plan; and the Board here, by "being left to accompliſh its preſent payments, may "poſſibly at that time have its treaſury in a ſtate to "anſwer the exigencies, and the plan proceed without "inconvenience.—I am led to theſe obſervations, by a "ſincere wiſh to promote the ſucceſs of your meaſures; "and ſtimulated by ſuch motives, led to a freedom of "remarks I would not have uſed, but to the perſon whoſe "honour and ſucceſs highly intereſts me; I truſt there-"fore I ſhall not have given offence:—you have now (if "you think the ſubject deſerves it) but to afford it due "conſideration, and ſignify your further wiſhes to enſure "in me an arduous deſire to ſecond them, by the moſt "implicit obedience to your further commands. The "preſent Letter is meant as a private one, but whatever "obſervations concern the public, may be uſed as you "have occaſion."

Your Committee, upon this point reſpecting the abolition of the Committee of Circuit, and calling down the Zemindars, examined *William Petrie*, eſquire; who acquainted them, that he went firſt to *Madras* in the Company's Civil Service about ſeventeen years ago, and had acted in the ſtations of Commiſſary and Paymaſter to the army, during the laſt war with *Hyder Ally*, at the firſt ſiege of *Tanjore*, and in the ſubſequent campaigns: that he was afterwards appointed Secretary to the Government of *Madras*, in which department he remained till his return to *England* in 1776; that in the ſucceeding year he returned to *India* with Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and was appointed Envoy or Reſident to the Rajah of *Tanjore*, and to the Chief-ſhip of *Nagore* and *Caricole*. That he again left *India* in January 1780; was proſecuting his journey over land, but was obliged, on account of the plague in *Turkey*, to return to *Bombay*; was preſent at the capture of *Baſſein* by the Bengal army; and on the Malabar coaſt, had an opportunity of hearing of *Hyder Ally*'s alarming ſucceſs in the *Carnatic*, and the diſtreſſed ſtate of the Engliſh Government at *Madras*. That he left the coaſt of *India* on the 11th February, on board of a Portugueſe ſhip, and arrived in *England*, September 1781.—Mr. *Petrie* informed your Committee, that he remained with Sir *Thomas Rumbold* about twelve days after his arrival at *Madras*, and was not in that place when the Committee of Circuit was aboliſhed, but heard of it at *Tanjore*, which is diſtant from *Madras* three days journey by poſt, and ſix or ſeven in the uſual way: that moſt of the Zemindars, he believes, were at *Madras* when he returned to the Preſidency, but that he had no communication with them: that he was acquainted with the objects of the Committee of Circuit, and knew of its diſſolution; and from his knowledge of the affairs of that Preſidency, and the objects of that Committee, he is clearly of opinion, they were more likely to be attained by the continuance of the Committee, than by calling down the Zemindars; becauſe the Committee was directed to proceed to the Northern Circars, and inveſtigate the various matters which had been complained of in that branch of the Company's Government; and becauſe the inſtructions given to them for their guide, appear to him well calculated to accompliſh the purpoſes of reformation; whereas, by calling the Zemindars to *Madras*, the Board could only have partial evidence, and muſt be liable to impoſition and deception from thoſe men, whoſe intereſt it was to keep them in the dark. From his knowledge of the men appointed to form that Committee, Mr. *Petrie* thought they were very capable of that truſt; and being aſked whether there were other Gentlemen fit to ſupply their places in caſe of vacancy? he anſwered, "A great many indeed." With reſpect to the Zemindars having complained of the hardſhip of being brought down to the Preſidency, Mr. *Petrie* informed your Committee, that he did not know it, ſo as to warrant him in calling it perſonal knowledge; but that it was the notorious and univerſal ſenſe of the Preſidency, that they had ſo complained.

Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report, No. 5.

Mr. *Cotsford*, who as Chief of *Maſulipatam* for upwards of two years ſubſequent to the latter end of 1778, and whoſe

Vide Report on the Revenues.

whoſe departure from thence, on board of a Daniſh ſhip, without waiting for the approbation of the Government, had given offence, was examined by your Committee to this point; and informed them that, that great inconvenience had ariſen from the meaſure of calling down the Zemindars; that the collections had thereby been impeded, and that they had complained of the expence incurred by their journey, their reſidence at *Madras*, and the neceſſity of leaving their Zemindaries in the hands of ſervants. That he never had any converſation with any of the Zemindars reſpecting preſents given to any Members of the Government at *Madras*, although he had met with all the Zemindars on their return, and although, had they not been called down, he ſhould have accepted of certain advantages which were cuſtomary in his ſtation, after having firſt diſcharged his duty to the Company. Mr. *Cotsford*, upon the ſubject of the utility of the Committee of Circuit, ſeemed to think the Chiefs and Councils at the ſubordinate Settlements ought not to have been ſuperſeded by that inſtitution, and that a ſingle perſon might have done the duty of that Committee; of which he ſeemed to have too limited and inadequate an idea, confining it merely to ſurveying and letting the lands; whereas the Company's Letter of the 12th April 1775 (ſtated in the Second Report) comprehends many great and important objects of public policy, from the governing power down to the loweſt ſubtenant.

Vide Supplemental Appendix, to 2d Report, No. 7.

Your Committee, in their Second Report to which this Supplement is offered, after having digeſted the materials with which they were furniſhed reſpecting the nature and effects of aboliſhing the Committee of Circuit, and calling down the Zemindars in perſon, ſtated the manner of dealing with them, and the remittances which were made to *China* by Sir *Thomas Rumbold* during that period. In addition to the formal materials on this head, they have been furniſhed with the following evidence:

Private Tranſactions of the Members of Government.

Captain *Johnſton*, of the *Granby*, informed them, that he ſailed from *Britain* on the 7th March 1779, for *Madras*; arrived there on the 18th January 1780, when Sir *Thomas Rumbold* was Governor; that he remained there about five months, and ſailed for *China* about the 18th June, where he arrived about the 29th Auguſt; that he carried with him treaſure belonging to individuals, and among the reſt 8,000 pagodas (£. 3,200 ſterling) belonging to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, which he delivered to Meſſrs. *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou*; that Meſſrs. *Oakley* and *Proctor*, Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s attornies, had applied to him to take it on board, about fourteen days before he ſailed. That the treaſure was not regularly entered in the books where other effects are entered, and that a bill of lading was given. That he had 30,000 pagodas beſides, belonging to different individuals, but none belonging to any Member of Government, except that abovementioned. That the *Seahorſe* man of war ſailed in company, as convoy to the ſhips, and had money and jewels on board to a large amount, as he learnt from Captain *Panton* (Captain of the *Seahorſe*) whom your Committee find to be ſince deceaſed; of which 16,000 pagodas (£. 6,400) were the property of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. That in converſation with Captain *Panton*, on board of his own ſhip, that Gentleman aſked him, what quantity of pagodas he had of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s? and that upon his anſwering, that he had 8,000, Captain *Panton* replied, that he had double the number.

Supplemental Appendix, to 2d Report, No. 2.

Captain *Parker*, Captain *Montgomerie*, Captain *Blanchard*, Captain *Wakefield*, Captain *Pierce*, and Captain *White*, informed your Committee, that they had carried ſmall quantities of treaſure to *China*, on account of individuals (ſpecifying the ſums and names of the owners) no part of which appears to have been on account of any Member of the Government of *Madras*. Mr. *Farrington Butterfield*, Purſer of the *Sandwich*, which ſailed to *China* with moſt of the Captains abovementioned, informed your Committee, that not leſs than 30,000 pagodas were on board of that ſhip, belonging to Merchants; but that the *Seahorſe* had carried a great deal of money, for which three per cent. freight was paid to the man of war, while the Company's ſhips had but one.

Your Committee proceeded to examine *Thomas Bevan*, eſquire; who informed them, that he was ſecond of the Select Committee at *China*, appointed at the end of the year 1778: that he ſailed on the 6th or 7th of March 1779, and arrived in *China* on the 3d or 4th of October in the ſame year: that he had left *Canton* on the laſt day of January 1781, and came home in the laſt ſhip.—Having been informed by Captain *Johnſton* that 15 or 16 country ſhips had ſailed from *Madras* to *China* in the year 1780, your Committee interrogated Mr. *Bevan* with reſpect to the remittance of treaſure by individuals, by means of thoſe veſſels; and were informed, that the Board at *China* had money tendered to them, from private perſons as well as ſervants of the Company, from all parts of *India*: that there were ſeveral remittances from individuals, which he had opportunity to know of; but that they never aſked whoſe property it was, but only the name of the perſon to whom it was wiſhed it ſhould be remitted: that the caſh paid in does not always belong to the perſon who pays it in: that he had heard of money being ſent by country ſhips, but that the Board takes no notice of country ſhips, having no concern with them; and that they ſometimes pay into the Company's caſh, ſometimes to foreigners; and that large ſums are frequently paid into foreign treaſuries, which, though a difficult matter, ſhould be put a ſtop to from home, as that would benefit the Company. Mr. *Bevan* alſo informed your Committee, that he did not of his own knowledge know of any ſpecific ſums remitted by, or on account of, any individuals from *Madras* or *Bengal*.—*Matthew Raper*, eſquire, another ſupercargo, confirmed Captain *Foxhall* and Mr. *Pigou*'s account, reſpecting the ſum ſtated in the 2d Report (*vid. ante* pp. 271. *et infra*) to have been paid in to him and his partner, on Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s account; and proved, that the portion belonging to Sir *Hector Monro*, was of the value of £. 466. 10*s*. 3*d*. He alſo confirmed the preceding teſtimony, reſpecting the importation of money by the *Seahorſe*; which, having been ſent up to the factory, "he did not know what it was, as it was not all public "money."

Some further light was afforded to your Committee, by the teſtimony of Mr. *Petrie*, reſpecting the preſent of a lack of rupees, ſtated in the 2d Report (p. 282, &c.) to have been ſecured to Mr. *Redhead*, the private Secretary of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, by *Sitteram Rauze*, whilſt he was at *Madras*.

That Gentleman acquainted your Committee, that he was one of the executors of Mr. *Redhead*; that there was a diſputed article in the will, relating to a ſum of money claimed from *Sitteram Rauze*; and that it appeared to be a ſum of money promiſed by *Sitteram Rauze*, or his Agent, to Mr. *Redhead*, for certain ſervices to be rendered by him: but that, being abſent from *Madras* on public ſervice, he left the executorſhip entirely to Mr. *Brodie*, his co-executor, and could therefore only ſay, that he believed the ſervices to have been the accompliſhing of certain points for *Sitteram Rauze* at the Preſidency, through his (Mr. *Redhead*'s) influence; that he had a copy of the agreement itſelf, tranſlated from the original by a perſon whom he knew well, and believes to be exact; with which Mr. *Petrie* furniſhed your Committee, and which they find to be as follows:

Supplemental Appendix, to 1ſt Report. D. No. 5.

Tranſlation of an Agreement granted by *Seeteramraz Mabaraz* to Mr. *Redhead*; dated 1ſt July 1778.

I *Seeteramraz Mabaraz* do hereby agree to pay one lack of rupees, as a preſent to Mr. *Redhead*, on account of his aſſiſtance in the following affair; viz.

That he ſhould cauſe to procure or get Cowls what I want from the Company to my Rajah, in the name of *Gajapatee*: that he ſhould procure Cowls of jamabundy in the name of *Gajapatee*.

That

That he ſhould cauſe to adjoin the countries of *Anachapallee* and *Secheveram* with my country or jemeendary, and to grant the Cowl for the ſame:

That he ſhould cauſe to remove the Sepoys from my fort, and deliver the fort to me to be as my own, with an order; and alſo to cauſe me and my brother to be in friendly manner with one another, and to aſſiſt in ſuch ſeveral other affairs:

And as for the abovementioned one lack of rupees, he has received a bond of 10,000 pagodas of the Shamarawoo; the particular of which is as follows:

He took upon himſelf, on account of Captain *Lyſaght*, to pay to *Shart* (Shamarawoo) pagodas 2540; which, upon deducting out of the above 10,000 pagodas, there remains 7460 pagodas, and the intereſt of which is 400 pagodas, both together is 7860 pagodas, which makes, at 356 rupees per 100 pagodas, is rupees 27981. 8 anas. For this ſum I cauſed my brother to give him a receipt; and as for the remainder of rupees 72018. 8 anas, I ſhall pay him rupees 22018. 8 anas at the time of my ſetting out from hence to my country; and the reſt of the balance of 50,000 rupees, I ſhall ſend it by the way of bills of exchange upon Soucars, and then I ſhall redeem my agreement from him.

Thus I willingly give this agreement to him, ſigned by

Jemeeander Rajah Seeteramraz Bahadar,
Muna Sultan.

By what has been ſtated in the Second Report, already preſented to the Houſe, it appears, that *Sitteram Rauze* had been ſucceſsful in carrying the points which he was deſirous of Mr. *Redhead*'s good offices in the proſecution of; and his ſuſpicious conduct ſoon after this ſucceſs, when a dangerous revolt broke out at *Vizagapatam*, has been adverted to, which is further evinced by the following documents. The Chief of *Ganjam* wrote on the 7th October 1780, the following Letter to *Vizeram Rauze*, whoſe conduct towards the Company had met with their commendation.

" I have heard with aſtoniſhment of the mutiny at " *Vizagapatam*, and the confinement of the Chief and " ſome other Gentlemen. In order to ſuppreſs and puniſh " this wicked act, I have ordered a force to proceed " immediately to *Vizagapatam*, under the command of " Captain *Bruce*; and I charge you, as you value the " Company's favour and conſider your own welfare, that " you render every aſſiſtance in your power, by ſending " your troops to join ours in reducing theſe faithleſs, " ungrateful villains. There is an opportunity for you " to diſtinguiſh and recommend yourſelf to the favour " of the Engliſh, and I have not a doubt but you will " acquit yourſelf in an honourable manner to the ſatis- " faction of the honourable Board at *Madras*. Let me " hear of your welfare, that I may rejoice."

" *Ganjam.*"

Notwithſtanding the urgency of the neceſſity which this Letter and other documents evince, the conduct of *Sitteram Rauze*, who had been in every inſtance favoured at his brother's expence, did not correſpond with the degree of favour which had been ſhewn him, but agrees with the character given of him by the Committee of Circuit, ſtated in the Second Report. On the 24th October 1780, the Chief and Council of *Vizagapatam*, in a Letter of that date, treating of the mutiny which had broken out there, ſtate the following particulars: " Without the leaſt partiality of our opinions, the beha- " viour of *Sitteram Rauze*, from the time of his return " to this diſtrict, now upwards of twenty days, is by no " means ſatisfactory; he has obſerved a reſerve, which " at this time betrays at any rate an indifference that is " inconſiſtent; two or three unmeaning Letters accom- " panying ſome horſes and plunder thrown away by the " mutineers; and obſerving in another addreſs, that he " was collecting money; is all that paſſed between the " Chief and him. He acknowledges the receipt of a " Letter, deſiring the mutineers ſhould be intercepted; " and ſays, that he has written to the Zemindars under " him: yet not one of the mutineers has been taken by " the Rajahs people, although they had timely advice, " and we know for a certain fact it has been in their " power. All theſe reflections have induced us to direct " the Chief to write to *Sitteram Rauze*, to ſtate the ac- " count of arrears, and to make a ſufficient demand to " anſwer all immediate expences."

Your Committee find, that Mr. *Sadlier* abovementioned, who was ſuſpended from his office in Council* by the caſting vote of Mr. *Whitehill*, joined by Sir *Hector Monro*, againſt thoſe of Meſſrs. *Johnſon* and *Smith*, for the reaſons and in the manner ſtated in the Firſt Report (pages 8, &c.) addreſſed himſelf to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, acquainting him by Letter with his whole conduct, from the time of his entrance into the Company's ſervice, down to the time of his ſuſpenſion; the cauſe of which he alledges to have been the freedom with which he gave his opinion in Council upon the bad conduct of the Government, but which his adverſaries alledge to have been neceſſary by reaſon of his intemperance, which tended to ſow ſedition and deſpondency among the inhabitants of *Madras*. In ſtating the whole courſe of his upright conduct and fidelity to the intereſts of his Employers, your Committee find, that this Gentleman dwells particularly on the early proof which he gave of his own diſintereſted- neſs, and of his deſire to put an end to the practice of receiving undue emoluments in the Chiefſhip of *Maſulipatam*, to which he had been appointed in April 1778; and complains that his endeavours were rendered fruitleſs, by the neglect of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, then Governor, to take advantage of the information which he communicated to him.

On the 13th of January 1781, Mr. *Sadlier* wrote the Letter alluded to from *Madras* to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, which was accompanied by a copy of a Letter which he had addreſſed to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, when Governor, dated 5th of May 1778, in which he told him, " the encloſed paper will let you into the " arcana of the ſweets of this Chiefſhip; it is com- " municated to you in proof of the confidence I repoſe " in you, and in teſtimony that I mean not to keep " ſecret any action which you may ſuppoſe can influence " my conduct; your honourable ſupport of me againſt " volumes of the baſeſt defamation, claims, and it ſhall " have it, this honourable and candid conduct from me— " the rapacity and peculation of men has nearly ruined " this country; the misfortune it is now involved in " originates from ſuch principles, and its effects may " have brought in diſtreſſes, poſſibly not to be re- " formed.

" The paper, if you pleaſe, may be deſtroyed, it is " intended but to ſhew the unſound ground you tread " in.

" Intereſt with me towards you bears no ſway. I " conſider my ſituation but temporary. I hope ere " long to afford you a better teſtimony of the hearty " good diſpoſition which actuates me for promoting " the honour of your Government; you have therefore " but to ſignify to me, without reſerve, what you wiſh, " and depend on its becoming my guide."

The paper which is referred to as encloſed by Mr. *Sadlier*, appears to be an Account delivered to him by *Vencatarogaloo*, the Company's Dubaſh and chief interpreter; tranſlations of which were ſent to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*. No. 3. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

This Account appears to be intituled (according to the tranſlation) " The private Account receiving from " the Zemindars for ſettling three years jemabundy, (or " tribute.)" It commences with the Account of Mr. *Floyer*.s

* See pages 8, &c. of Firſt Report, where this tranſaction is fully ſtated.

Floyer's private bargains for gratuities, on his own account, on a ſettlement of three years with the Zemindars and Renters during the years 1186, 1187, and 1188, according to the computation of that country, and correſponding to the years 1773, 1774, 1775 of the chriſtian computation, or thereabouts. In the Supplemental Appendix, the Account itſelf will be found, wherefore your Committee will here only ſtate the totals from that Account; by which it appears, that the total ſum ſtipulated to be paid to Mr. *Floyer*, by the different tributaries, for his own private uſe, amounted to 135,886 pagodas and a fraction (*i. e.* £. 54,354 ſterling) of which 50,364 pagodas were paid (£.20,144 ſterling) and 85,524 pagodas (about £.34,210) were owing at the time when this Account was made up. By a ſeparate Account, Mr. *Floyer*'s further ſtipulation for his own private advantage, appears to have amounted to 11,010 pagodas (equal to £. 4,409 ſterling) of which 7,055 pagodas were received (£.2,822 ſterling) and 8,955 pagodas due (*i. e.* £. 3,582 ſterling.) —Mr. *Statham*, the Salt Renter of this diſtrict, is alſo ſtated to have paid 6,000 pagodas (£. 2,400) for one year's leaſe. So that by this Account it appears, that Mr. *Floyer's* ſecret emoluments actually received, including the gratuity from Mr. *Statham*, amounted to £. 25,360; and that the arrears at the time of making up this account in May 1778, amounted to £. 37,742.

The ſame Paper alſo contains an Account of the private emoluments paid to Mr. *Whitehill*, on account of a ſettlement made for three years preceding the former one; viz. the years 1183, 1184, and 1185, correſponding to 1770, 1771, 1772, amounting in the whole to 192,261 pagodas and a fraction (*i. e.* £. 77,405 ſterling.)

It further ſtates, that Mr. *Q. C.* (which your Committee find means *Quintin Crawfurd*) received on his own private account 38,100 pagodas (£. 15,240); and that the opportunity afforded to Mr. *Crawfurd* for receiving theſe emoluments, is thus expreſſed in the tranſlation tranſmitted by Mr. *Sadlier* to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*: "Mr. *Q. C.* who not ſettled Zemabundy, only collected "the ſix kiſts of the third year of Mr. *Whitehill*'s Ze- "mabundy, and alſo the three kiſts of ſecond year.— From whence it ſhould ſeem, that if one Chief ſettled the tribute for a given ſpace of time, and upon his removal another ſhould collect it, new and additional perquiſites were demanded of the Renters and Zemindars by the new collector.

Your Committee alſo find, that this Account contains further receipts of Mr. *Floyer*'s, amounting to 27,875 pagodas (£. 11,146) under the following title: "Mr. "*Floyer* came the third year of Mr. *Whitehill*'s Ze- "mabundy, who collected the three kiſts of the third "year Zemabundy at the time, who demanded to receive "private buſineſs, as Mr. *Crawfurd*."

When your Committee compared the names of thoſe Zemindars as above mentioned, whom Mr. *Sadlier* deſcribes as very greatly embarraſſed in their circumſtances, and thereby diſtreſſed for means to obey the ſummons to *Madras*, with thoſe by whom the private emoluments of Mr. *Floyer*, Mr. *Whitehill*, and Mr. *Crawfurd*, were furniſhed (in their reſpective capacities of Settlers or Collectors) they were found to be comprehended in both catalogues.

No. 4. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

Your Committee find, that the receipt of the Letter abovementioned, containing this important information, was acknowledged by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, in a Letter, dated the 20th May 1778, in the following terms:

"I ſhould have replied to your Letter of the 5th "inſtant ſooner, had I not obſerved that there was no "probability of our orders to the Zemindars not having "the effect we expected, and that ultimately they muſt "be convinced of the propriety of an implicit obedience "to the orders of this Government; and I have no "doubt will experience the advantages of the new mea- "ſure. I am much obliged by your account of the "Zemindars, the ſtate of their countries, finances, &c.

"Your information has thrown much light upon this "ſubject; and though I cannot ſee the bad conſequences "that are to follow from the Zemindars being ordered "here to ſettle their jummabundy, inſtead of fixing it at "the different Chief-ships, yet I beg you will be aſſured, "I am no leſs ſenſible of the good intention with which "you have freely given me your opinion.—If any failure "happens in the payment of their kiſts, the exigencies "of your Government muſt be ſupplied from hence; "but I am willing to believe you will not require our "aſſiſtance.

"As to the money due to the Soubah, you will receive "our inſtructions on this head before you diſcharge the "balance."

In another Letter, dated the 27th of May 1778, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* expreſſes his obligation to Mr. *Sadlier*, for his zeal in forwarding the meaſure of obliging the Zemindars to repair to *Madras*.

No. 3. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

Your Committee alſo find, that the authenticity of the Letters and Accounts abovementioned, were verified by Mr. *Sadlier*, by an affidavit to be found in N° 3, Supplemental Appendix.

No. 3.

Your Committee do not find, that the official intelligence communicated by Mr. *Sadlier*, was made the ground of any enquiry or reformation during the government of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* or Mr. *Whitehill*; on the contrary, they find that Mr. *Sadlier* addreſſed a Letter to the Council of *Madras*, on the 8th January 1781, aſcribing the poverty of the public treaſury to the peculation practiſed by individuals, while the balances due at *Maſulipatam* amounted to upwards of four lacks of pagodas, as would appear by the Accounts to which he referred. In this Letter he urged the Council, with great earneſtneſs, to enquire into the conduct of his predeceſſors, which had, in his opinion, contributed greatly to the preſent diſtreſs; declaring, that a neglect of enquiry and proſecution would be treachery to their Employers. "Mr. *Whitehill*, ſays he, is now at *Madras*, and is upon "the point of departure for *Europe*, and if the Govern- "ment allow him to depart with ſuch information againſt "him, before he is acquitted by the forms of law, I "ſubmit it to the opinion of the Board, how far their "Employers may think them reſponſible for the con- "ſequences.

"If the Company's ſervants have been guilty of pe- "culation in office,—if they have abuſed the truſt re- "poſed in them,—if by theſe abuſes they have brought "diſhonour upon their country; let it be imagined how "much the opinion of their treachery may have laid the "foundation of our preſent reverſe of fortune, and what "influence it may have in future, not only to check the "Company's credit, but, from a want of dependance "upon our Government, to prevent thoſe alliances with "the country powers, which at preſent ſeem ſo eſſential "to our affairs.

"I have already urged, that the beſt foundation for "public ſpirit is public juſtice. Mr. *Whitehill* held the "firſt ſtation in the Company's ſervice upon this Coaſt "at the time when their affairs ſuffered the greateſt re- "verſe; and if it is proved, that he is one cauſe from "which our evil has originated, I ſubmit it to the Board, "whether he ſhould not receive puniſhment according "to law, both as an example to thoſe who hold truſt, and "that we may give our friends and our enemies an "opinion of our juſtice."

From theſe documents, it appeared to your Committee, that early in Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s government, information was communicated to him of the practices by which the Chiefs of *Maſulipatam* enriched themſelves, to which the poverty and diſtreſs of that Settlement were in a great meaſure aſcribed—That this communication was made by the Chief himſelf, whoſe ſtation gave him the beſt opportunity of diſcovering thoſe practices, and whoſe duty made it incumbent on him to diſcloſe them to the Government; and that his information was derived from the Company's Dubaſh, who was neceſſarily acquainted

with the tranſactions which took place on ſettling the tribute with his predeceſſors: notwithſtanding which, no ſteps appear to have been taken by the Governor, either to enquire into the abuſes ſtated by Mr. *Sadlier*, or to lay this information before the Select Committee or Council at large, or in anyway to proceed upon it, or that it was ever communicated to the Court of Directors by the Governor.

That the Preſidency of *Madras* was in fact much diſtreſſed, by reaſon of the inconſiderable collections of territorial revenue under *Maſulipatam*, appears to your Committee, from paragraph 7 of the Letter in their Civil Department from thence, dated 9th January 1781.

No. 7. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

" The diſappointments we experienced from the inconſiderable collections made for ſome time paſt of your " territorial revenue under *Maſulipatam*, and the heavy " charges incurred of late by the war with *Hyder Ally* " *Cawn*, having laid us under the neceſſity of appropriating all our reſources to the defraying military expences, " have been the means of impeding your inveſtment, " and have even obliged us to put a ſtop to the proviſion " of it for the preſent; indeed, the troubles now ſubſiſting in the *Carnatic*, render it impoſſible for the weavers " about *Madras* and *Cudalore* to work; we have, however, been able to give almoſt a full loading to the " *Duke of Kingſton*, and hope to ſend your honours 12 or " 1300 bales more, in the courſe of next month, or in " the month of March, ſhould the Governor General " and Council be able to ſupply us with tonnage for that " purpoſe, agreeably to a requeſt we made them in our " Letter 8th ultimo."

This further appears to your Committee, from another paſſage in the ſame Letter, in which the Select Committee obſerve, " That when the enormous outſtanding balances " of the Zemindars and Renters, inſtead of being greatly " decreaſed as they flattered themſelves would have been " the caſe, had on the contrary been ſuffered to augment " conſiderably, and at this time actually amount, including teeps, to M. Pags. 15,28,597; they cannot agree " with Mr. *Cottesford*, that nothing has been left undone " which the Chief and Council had the power of doing." And in this Letter they expreſs themſelves as greatly diſobliged at Mr. *Cottesford*'s determination to return to *Europe* on board of a Daniſh ſhip, on account of his alledged bad ſtate of health.

No. 8. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

Your Committee find, that a Revenue Letter of the ſame date, affords a very ſtriking proof of the difficulty with which the collection of the revenue was made in *Maſulipatam*. The Select Committee in that Letter repreſent, that the Zemindars having been collected there in June 1780, to ſettle their payments due, had ſo often evaded the delivering of their teeps (or promiſſory notes) that it became neceſſary to try what effect a ſhew of coerſive meaſures would have; and that Sepoy guards were actually placed upon their perſons; and that " it was " hoped this appearance of ſeverity would induce the " Zemindars to exert themſelves in the diſcharge of " their balances; but leſt it ſhould not, they had autho- " rized the Chief and Council, in the laſt extremity, to " adopt a plan which they had themſelves ſuggeſted, " which was, either to take poſſeſſion, in the name of the " Company, of their ſeveral countries, until they procured " bills for their ſeveral payments, in order to force them " to employ every reſource they poſſeſſed, to ſatisfy the " juſt demands of the Company; or to impreſs them with " an idea, that if they did not provide their teeps at a " certain period, ſhortly after the gathering in of har- " veſt, the beginning of the enſuing year, they had given " authority to the Chief and Council to ſeize on the " crops, and to keep poſſeſſion of them until the teeps " were produced." This Letter ſtates, that, after much diſpute, five teeps had at length been obtained, amounting to pagodas 388,988 (which deducted from 15,28,597, leaves a balance behind of 11,39,609 pagodas); and complains of want of vigour in the Chief and Council, in the matter of collections.

Your Committee further find, from a Letter of Mr. *Sadlier* to the Chairman of the *Eaſt India* Company, dated 30th November 1780, that upon the eve of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s departure, an interview took place between Sir *Thomas*, Sir *Hector Monro*, Mr. *Whitehill*, and Mr. *Sadlier*; which is here ſtated in Mr. *Sadlier*'s own words:

" A few days before the departure of Sir *Thomas* " *Rumbold* for *Europe*, and quite unprepared for the " event, I was called into a private room, where Sir " *Thomas*, Mr. *Whitehill*, and Sir *Hector Monro*, were " aſſembled before me. In this ſituation I was accoſted " by Sir *Thomas* to the following purport: " That he " heard I had joined Meſſrs. *Smith* and *Johnſon* in the " intention to oppoſe his meaſures after his departure, " and if he thought that this really was my deſign, he " would, before his departure, take a bold ſtep, by pre- " venting my ſucceeding to Council."—Thus then I " found myſelf in danger of being deprived of a ſtation " to which I was entitled by my ſtanding, and by years " of ſervice; I was to be robbed of the honeſt advantages " which the Company has annexed to that ſtation; and " my character was in danger of being murdered to " vindicate this triple act of baſeneſs, injuſtice, and " cruelty.

" Though my feelings were ſtrong, I had reaſon to rejoice that I was able to conceal them: I aſked Sir *Thomas*, " where he had his information? he ſaid, from report " only.—I aſked, if I deſerved cenſure in the ſtation held " under him as Chief of *Maſulipatam*; and whether he " could draw any inference to my prejudice, from my " manner of conducting myſelf in that ſtation? he anſwered, that ſo far from it, I deſerved praiſe.—I aſked " him, whether I had at any time communicated with " him about meaſures, or whether he was informed I " ſent for records and papers, or uſed any other means " by which I might acquire information? he ſaid, he did " not think me ſo communicative concerning meaſures " as I ſhould have been, and that he did not know I had " ſent for any papers.—I put the ſame queſtions to Mr. " *Whitehill* and Sir *Hector Monro*, and both anſwered me " in the negative; upon which I aſſured them, that I " had maintained an equal reſerve with Meſſrs. *Smith* " and *Johnſon*.—I then aſked Mr. *Whitehill*, whether, " during the time I had ſerved with him in Council, " previous to the arrival of Meſſrs. *Smith*, *Johnſon*, and " *Perring*, he had ſeen any thing in my conduct which " deſerved cenſure? and he aſſured me that he had not.— " Thus ended the inquiſition, before whom I neither " declared or diſavowed my ſentiments—the inquiſitors " however ſeemed to go away ſatisfied; and a few days " after, upon the departure of Sir *Thomas*, I was ſworn " in as a Member of Council."

Your Committee having peruſed and examined all the materials which have been tranſmitted to the Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company, ſince the concluſion of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, reſpecting the treaty concluded with *Bazalet Jung* by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and the negotiation with the Nizam during that Gentleman's government, find, that Sir *Eyre Coote*, in a Minute entered upon the Madras Conſultations, 12th January 1781, aſcribes the invaſion of the *Carnatic*, in a great degree, to thoſe meaſures—Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute was occaſioned by a paſſage in the General Letter from that Preſidency, dated January 9th, 1781, which aſcribes the calamities of the *Carnatic*, in ſtrong terms, to the Maratta war; which they conſider as viſionary in itſelf, as tending to unite *Hyder Ally* and that Power, who were before at conſtant variance with each other, and as laying the foundation of the confederacy formed againſt the Britiſh intereſts in *Hindoſtan*. " At the ſame time (ſays " Sir *Eyre Coote*) that I put my ſignature to the General " Letter of the 9th of January 1781, I muſt, in candour " and in conformity to thoſe opinions which I have both " held and expreſſed, except againſt one part of it, and " which

Vide Supplemental Appendix to 1ſt Report, No. 4.

No. 9. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

" which aſcribes all our preſent misfortunes to the " Maratta war.

" That that meaſure may firſt have given birth to the " idea of a general combination of the powers of *Hindoſtan* againſt us, I will not endeavour to diſprove; " but that to it alone we owe the formidable incurſion " of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, I cannot admit: firſt, " becauſe long after we had commenced hoſtilities againſt " the Marattas, *Hyder* himſelf continued to make con- " queſts upon them, and which our operations no doubt " facilitated. It was his favourite object, and which I " am confident he would never have quitted, or ſought " for a union with the Marattas againſt us, had not our " negotiations with *Bazalet Jung*, about the Guntoor " Circar, (on which he had alſo views) and the mode " in which they were carried on, awakened his jealouſy, " and very naturally made him apprehend, that our " ultimate intentions were to poſſeſs ourſelves of ſome " part of his country.—Whilſt it anſwered his purpoſe " to make peace with the Marattas, in order that his " attention or ſtrength might in no ſhape be diverted " from providing effectually for the ſecurity of his own " territories, it was entirely ſuitable to the Marattas in " their then ſituation, as it enabled them to direct their " whole force againſt the operations of our army under " Brigadier General *Goddard*. We alarmed his fears for " the ſafety of his own country; croſſed his views upon " the Guntoor Circar, which he was deſirous of obtaining " in form from *Bazalet Jung*. That an able agent " might not be wanting to foment theſe offences, we " deliberately gave umbrage to the Nabob *Nizam*; firſt, " by ſeeking and actually ſubſcribing to a treaty of friend- " ſhip with his brother and ſubject *Bazalet Jung*, without " aſking his conſent or approbation; and next, by de- " manding of him a remiſſion of the peſcuſh, or tribute, " which for theſe eleven years and upwards we have " paid him, as in treaty bound, on account of the North- " ern Circars. To prevent any bad conſequences ariſing " from the delay in the payment of the peſcuſh, which " was owing in the firſt place to a temporary inability, " created by the heavy current expences, which were " unavoidably incurred by the ſiege of *Pondicherry*; and " in the next place perhaps by miſmanagement; I was " induced, when I ſtopped here in my way to *Bengal*, to " recommend the miſſion of Mr. *Hollond*, as ambaſſador " to the Nizam's Court, to aſſure him, that the peſcuſh " ſhould be paid, and to explain to him the cauſe of its " detention.

" The Nizam has in his Letters to this Government, " and in his converſation with Mr. *Hollond*, who com- " municated them to the Governor General and Council, " avowed his diſpleaſure, on account of our behaviour " with regard to the peſcuſh and the Guntoor treaty; " and has, without ſcruple, acknowledged his having for " theſe reaſons encouraged and connived at a combination " of the Powers againſt us.

" With all theſe circumſtances before me, to which " the records both here and in *Bengal* bear teſtimony; " and further, knowing it is as a thing certain, that at " the very time the treaty was carrying on with *Bazalet* " *Jung*, *Hyder* would have entered into an offenſive and " defenſive alliance with us; I ſhould do an injury to " myſelf, and a ſtill greater one to our Superiors, who are " to paſs their judgment on men and meaſures by the " documents handed them from their reſpective Govern- " ments in *India*, did I tacitly ſubſcribe to that part of " the General Letter to the Court of Directors, which I " have hereby excepted againſt; and not alſo elucidate the " other cauſes, beſides the Maratta war, which have " aſſiſted to haſten our preſent diſtreſſes.

" I requeſt that this may go a number in the packet " now under diſpatch."

In a Letter, dated 2d December 1780, from the Governor General of *Bengal* to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, he acquaints him, that " another intereſt- " ing occaſion has now called for the exertion of this " Government, in the preſervation of that of *Fort Saint* " *George*: this at leaſt, ſays he, will not be imputed to " the Government of *Bengal*. If the extorted and pal- " liated confeſſion of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn* may " be credited, and we have the evidence of the moſt " public notoriety to confirm it, it was the ſole effect of " a confederacy formed at his inſtigation, and dictated by " his reſentment at the infringements made by the Select " Committee of *Fort Saint George*, on his rights obtained " by the treaty ſubſiſting between him and the Company, " and his natural apprehenſion of hoſtilities intended by " that Government againſt him. Whatever be the " cauſe, ſuch have been the effects, and it is our duty to " do all that may be in our power to avert them."

Your Committee have thus laid before the Houſe, the different poſitions maintained by the Governor General and Council on the one hand; who aſſert, that the confederacy which preceded the invaſion of the *Carnatic*, was entirely owing to the reſentment conceived by the Nizam againſt the proceedings of the Government of *Madras*, in the affairs of the Guntoor Circar and the peſcuſh;—and by the Preſidency of *Madras* on the other hand; who maintain, in their General Letter, dated 9th January 1781, that it is entirely to be aſcribed to the Maratta war;—and alſo the opinion of Sir *Eyre Coote*, who admits that the Maratta war may have given birth to the idea of a general confederacy, but maintains that it is a thing certain, that *Hyder* was ſolicitous to enter into a treaty with the Company, at the time when his views were croſſed, and the Nizam was diſguſted, which he conſiders as one immediate cauſe of the invaſion of the *Carnatic*.

Conduct of the Governor of Fort St. George reſpecting Mr. Hollond.

Your Committee, in their Second Report, have laid before the Houſe (from fol. 29 to 36.) the conduct of the Preſidency of *Madras* reſpecting Mr. *Hollond*, whom they had ſent as a public Miniſter to the Nizam's Court, originally for the purpoſe of apologizing to that prince for their not having obſerved a ſtrict punctuality in the payment of the tribute due to him by treaty. They have alſo ſtated the ſubſequent inſtructions ſent to Mr. *Hollond*, to obtain an entire relinquiſhment of the tribute both for the time paſt and time to come. This Gentleman, it will there be found, was recalled on the motion of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, 14th December 1779; but on the 14th February 1780, he was appointed to remain at *Hydrabad*, as reſident from the Supreme Government. Your Committee, from the loſs of the Madras records, from 31ſt December 1779 to 2d April 1780, were not enabled to purſue this tranſaction to its concluſion, excepting ſo far as a Minute of Mr. *Johnſon*'s afforded ſome light; but are now enabled to ſtate the remaining part of this tranſaction, from a Letter of the Supreme Government in their Secret Department, dated 29th November 1780, addreſſed to the Court of Directors. From this Letter it appears, that, in conſequence of a Minute and recommendation left by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, Mr. *Whitehill* moved for Mr. *Hollond*'s ſuſpenſion; which was carried. This does not appear to have had the effect of diſappointing the Supreme Council of the ſervices of Mr. *Hollond*, but, on the contrary, proved the very means of enabling them to continue him in his ſtation; he being then no longer a ſervant bound to the Settlement of *Madras*. The Letter abovementioned contains this paſſage:

No. 10. Supplemental Appendix to 2d Report.

" You were duly informed, in our addreſs by the " *Swallow*, of the recall of Mr. *Hollond* from the Court " of his highneſs the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, by the " Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*; " of the reaſons which induced us to wiſh for his con- " tinuance there, and of the application which we made " to the Preſident and Select Committee for their per- " miſſion to him to remain at *Hydrabad*, as the public " Miniſter of this Government. This application was " refuſed, and Mr. *Hollond* was directed, in peremptory " terms, to obey the orders of recall before ſent him. " Theſe orders were as unreaſonable as they appear to " us

" us ill-grounded. They proclaimed to all *India* a " diſunion and ſeparation of intereſts between the two " Preſidencies, and, in particular, affected the aſſurances " which we had given to the Nabab *Nizam Ally*. We " were, however, obliged, though very reluctantly, to " acquieſce, and Mr. *Hollond* was left at liberty to con- " form to them. He was directly ſubject to the autho- " rity of your ſervants at *Fort Saint George*, and it was " not in our power to indemnify him from the probable " conſequences of diſobedience to it. But the reſtraint " upon our wiſhes to be availed of the ſervices of Mr. " *Hollond* at *Hydrabad*, did not continue long; for the " ſame temper with which he had for ſome time before " been treated by his immediate Superiors, inducing them " to ſuſpend him from your ſervice, we were enabled to " confirm our appointment of him, and did accordingly " appoint him to be Reſident on the part of this Govern- " ment only, at the Nizam's Court. The high opinion " which we entertain of Mr. *Hollond*'s merits, our ſenſe " of his ſervices, believing him as we do to have been " the means of preventing a breach of the alliance ſub- " ſiſting between the Company and the Nabob *Nizam* " *Ally Khan*, at a moment when the Company's affairs " were very critically ſituated, and it became of the " utmoſt importance to ſecure even the neutrality of the " Nizam; the obligations, moreover, under which we " deem ourſelves to indemnify Mr. *Hollond*, by every " means in our power, from the effects which he has " unjuſtly ſuſtained of the reſentment of his Superiors at " *Madras*, for his obedience to inſtructions tranſmitted " to him by us, in conſequence of thoſe which he had " received from them, and which were notified to us by " them, call upon us to recommend him ſtrongly to " you; and in doing ſo, we make it our requeſt that you " reſtore him to the ſervice, and to his ſtanding on the " Madras Eſtabliſhment, or that he be transferred, with " his rank, to this.

" Mr. *Hollond* being placed under our immediate au- " thority at *Hydrabad*, our endeavours have been ſtrenu- " ouſly exerted to ſecure the friendſhip of the Nabob " *Nizam Ally Khan*, or to prevent him at leaſt from " taking part againſt us; but it has not been without " great difficulty, that theſe endeavours have hitherto " been exerted with a good effect. That power in the " Engliſh Governments which was ſettled in his neigh- " bourhood, and with whom of courſe his correſpondence " had always been principally held, had made demands " on him, which in his conception of them were deroga- " tory from the faith of the treaty ſubſiſting with him; " and had committed one act, which was a direct and " undoubted violation of it; and the general tenor of " their conduct had made him diſtruſtful of their inten- " tions to preſerve the peace with him. Such indeed was " his conviction of their unfriendly diſpoſition towards " him, that he found it neceſſary to be prepared for " hoſtilities; or ſuch was his reſentment of their conduct, " that he was determined to uſe the moſt likely means " within his compaſs, of cruſhing their ability to do him " further miſchief; and under the ſtrong influence of " thoſe impreſſions, it is a well-known and undenied fact, " that he had not only combined with the principal " powers of *Hindoſtan* againſt the Company, but was the " chief promoter of the alliance. For the particulars " of this hiſtory we beg leave to refer you to a Minute, " which has been delivered by the Governor General,
6 September. " and is entered in the Conſultations noted in the mar- " gin, as well as to a Letter from Mr. *Hollond* to the " Governor General, forwarded by the *Trial* packet, in " which the Nabob's avowal is declared, of his being " the author of the confederacy againſt us, and his juſti- " cation of it, on the plea of ſelf-defence, againſt the " ſuppoſed intention of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint* " *George* to break with him.

" To obviate a prejudice ſo rooted, and the effect of " an engagement ſo promiſing of ſucceſs as that in which " the Nizam is combined, would of itſelf have been no " eaſy taſk; but the difficulty has been ſo much " augmented, as to have been nearly invincible, from " the unwillingneſs of the Preſidency of *Madras* to uſe " the only means of reconciling him to us, and their " inattention to the advice and orders which are ſent them " for this purpoſe. It was the belief of the *Nizam Ally*, " that we were actually veſted with the controul, which " we declared ourſelves to poſſeſs; but he diſtruſted " the effect of that controul, ſince the orders which we " had repeatedly given, and declared to him, for the reſ- " titution of the Circar of *Guntoor*, had not only been " diſregarded, but Mr. *Hollond*, who had been the inſtru- " ment of the negotiation, had been puniſhed by them " for the part which he had taken in it.

" We have recited the great difficulties which oppoſed " our accommodation with the Nizam, of which we had " much reaſon to complain, ſo much, that it became " an object of neceſſity to remove them. The controul- " ing power, with which we are veſted by an Act of the " Britiſh legiſlature, had been, in repeated inſtances, " treated by the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George* with " ſlight and diſreſpect; but in the preſent inſtance, they " thought proper to take more upon them: they defeated " our acts by their refuſal to conform to them, and com- " ply with our orders, where we had eſpecial right to " them. The faith of this Government had been pledged " to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, for the reſtoration of " the Guntoor Circar to *Bazalet Jung*; they were ſo in- " formed, and required to reſtore it. They did not " reſtore it.—We had no alternative but by a tame ac- " quieſcence to ſacrifice the truſt repoſed in us, and ſuffer " your intereſts to be involved in a war by a breach of " public faith, or to maintain both by an application of " the powers which have been given us for ſuch a pur- " poſe. Upon theſe grounds we reſolved, on the 10th " ultimo, to give effect to our commands, and determined " to exert the authority with which we were veſted, in " ſuſpending Mr. *Whitehill*, the Preſident of *Fort Saint* " *George*, from the Company's ſervice. Our reaſons for " this meaſure are particularly ſtated in our Letter to " the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint* " *George*, of the 10th ultimo, which goes a number in the " packet, and to which we beg leave to refer you for " them: and at the ſame time that we are led to hope " that the beſt effects may be derived from it, in eſtab- " liſhing for the Company the neutrality or friendſhip of " the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, during the preſent " troubles, and in ſaving our authority in his eſtimation, " and that of the other country powers, we are under no " fear that the Councils of your Preſidency of *Fort Saint* " *George* will be leſs ably or ſucceſsfully conducted here- " after, than they have been during the period in which " Mr. *Whitehill* directed them.

" You will obſerve, by our Conſultations of the 13th " ultimo, that we were then informed, by Letter from " the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint* " *George*, dated 23d September, of the meaſures which " they had at length been pleaſed to adopt, for giving " effect to our requiſitions of the 12th of June, by im- " mediate orders to their officer commanding in the " Guntoor Circar, to deliver over that country to *Bazalet* " *Jung*'s agent; and by procuring an order alſo from " the Nabob to his Amildars, to relinquiſh all concern " in the management of the revenue."

Theſe additional materials your Committee humbly offer, as tending to complete that information reſpect- ing the different ſubjects treated of in their Firſt and Second Reports, which they have endeavoured, in obe- dience to the Commands of the Houſe, to procure.

Supplemental Appendixes

To the Firſt and Second Reports from the Committee of Secrecy on the Cauſes of the War in the *Carnatic*.

Supplemental Appendix to the Firſt Report.

No. 1.

Fort-Saint George.

Copy of a Council of War, held at Head Quarters, *Great Mount*, 30th December 1780.

At a Council of War, held at Head Quarters, near *Fort Saint George*, the 30th December 1780;

PRESENT,

Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, K. B.
Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.
Brigadier General *James Stuart*,
Colonel *John* Lord *Macleod*.

LIEUTENANT General Sir *Eyre Coote*.—In the preſent very critical conjuncture of the affairs of the *Eaſt India* Company, and the very near concern which I perceive the operations of the army under my command muſt have, in bringing the whole either to a favourable or unfavourable criſis, I am induced, equally from a ſenſe of duty, and a ſincere regard for the future welfare of the Public, to requeſt your attention, Gentlemen, to a few circumſtances, which I ſhall ſtate as briefly as poſſible, and whereon I muſt alſo beg to be favoured with your opinions.

In the firſt place, I lay before you an abſtract return of the effective ſtrength of the army which I can depend on carrying with me into the field; and which, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, you will obſerve, amounts to in all 6,885 men. There is beſides, one battalion of Sepoys, about five hundred men, which I may perhaps be able to draw from *Fort Saint George*.

In the next place, I ſubmit to your peruſal my lateſt Letters from the garriſons of *Vellore*, *Wandewaſh*, and *Permacoil*, by which you will perceive they are all beſieged, or very cloſely inveſted by the enemy.

From the aſſurances given me by the officer commanding at *Vellore*, and from the difficulty with which he obſerves the enemy muſt make their approaches, I am under no great apprehenſion of its being in immediate danger, from any efforts of the enemy againſt it, unleſs aſſiſted by ſome treacherous hidden villainy of that kind, which he has ſo fortunately diſcovered in the Nabob's renter, and which I am happy he has checked in ſo effectual a manner, by putting him in irons; in which ſtate I have directed him to keep him, as he may be inſtrumental to the diſcovery of thoſe dark deſigns which I have long ſuſpected to exiſt in the Court of a native Power, living under the very walls of our garriſon of *Fort Saint George*.

Permacoil, with a very ſmall garriſon, and but one officer, as you will obſerve, made as yet a very ſpirited reſiſtance, and done more than could well have been expected from ſo ſmall a body of men. They cannot poſſibly, however, long bear up, under ſuch conſtant fatigue as they muſt be ſubjected to, by the freſh reſources which *Hyder* can daily bring againſt them. I conclude then, that in a very ſhort period of time they may be reduced to the utmoſt diſtreſs.

The garriſon of *Wandewaſh* I conceive to be in a critical ſituation. Batteries are already raiſed againſt it, and I fear muſt play upon it with great ſucceſs, unleſs its defences have been made much more ſufficient than when I knew it. The number of men in the garriſon are, conſidering its great extent, in no ſhape adequate to its defence, there being only two companies of our own Sepoys, and a few Sepoys belonging to the Nabob, who are by no means to be relied on, ſeveral having already deſerted, and the reſt diſſatisfied and diſcontented for want of pay, and on account of the arrears due to them. Under theſe circumſtances, and not having thoſe advantages of ſtrength by nature which *Permacoil* poſſeſſes, I fear much, notwithſtanding I have the moſt perfect confidence in the bravery of the officer in command, that it cannot long reſiſt the reiterated and ſpirited attacks which the force *Hyder* has ſent againſt it will undoubtedly make. I am informed there is in it a very large ſtock of grain, which is certainly an object to be looked towards.

Supplemental Appendix to the Firſt Report. No. 1.

I conſider the ſafety of theſe two garriſons, and throwing ample ſtores and proviſions into the garriſon of *Chingleput*, which you will obſerve by a Letter from the officer in command is alſo inveſted by the enemy, as objects of the utmoſt importance; and I am therefore extremely deſirous, if poſſible, to apply means towards their immediate relief; but how far it may be prudent, under the following circumſtances, to attempt it, is the point to be determined:

The forces of *Hyder* are very numerous; and although his infantry, diſperſed and engaged as they at preſent are, in the ſiege of the garriſons before mentioned, and alſo in that of *Amboor*, cannot ſpeedily be called together, yet his cavalry, of which he has got a very large body, not leſs than from twenty-five to thirty thouſand, may ſoon be aſſembled; and I doubt not, before we proceed two days march from hence, will be all around us, and will exert their utmoſt endeavours to haraſs and impede us in our march, and thereby gain that time which may be neceſſary to draw his infantry together, and enable him to force us to a battle. If he ſhould make this his object, notwithſtanding our inferiority in numbers, I think, with the ſtrength we have in artillery, we are equal to engage him. It is to be obſerved, that he too cannot be deficient in this very eſſential military equipment; as, beſides what he brought with him into the *Carnatic*, he obtained, by the capture of *Arcot*, and the garriſons which have fallen to him in the courſe of the war, a very ample ſupply of all kinds of ordnance and ſtores.

Our force is too limited to admit of a detachment adequate to the propoſed ſervice; if then a movement is to be made, it muſt be of the whole army. Every article of proviſion for its ſupport, together with the ſtores neceſſary for the garriſons in queſtion, muſt be carried from hence. The town of *Arcadras* and *Fort St. George*, the very foundation of the intereſts of the *Eaſt India* Company and the Engliſh Nation on this coaſt, muſt be left in a manner inveſted; of courſe, all communication with it will be entirely cut off, and no ſupport of any kind can be drawn from it.

Supplemental Appendix to the First Report. No. 1.

If we are fortunate enough to arrive in time to ſave *Wandewaſh*, we ſhall, I am confident, have no difficulty in finding good ground to take poſt, and on which we may engage the enemy to advantage, ſhould they offer us battle. If on the contrary, they decline a general action, and look to detaining us there, by conſtantly haraſſing us with their cavalry, they may reduce us to much diſtreſs, as, after the proviſions we carry from hence are expended, we ſhall have no other means of ſubſiſtence, but from the grain in *Wandewaſh*; whereof, I underſtand, there is enough for the expenditure of the army for many months.

I have already mentioned *Fort St. George* as the ſheet anchor of the intereſts of the *Eaſt India* Company and the Engliſh Nation on this coaſt; and of courſe conſider it as the firſt object of my care and attention. Whether, in taking the ſtep I have here ſubmitted to your opinions, expoſed to all the events I have above ſuggeſted, I ſhall be able to conſult the ſecurity of that object, is what I wiſhed to be ſatisfied in; and whether a return of the army to their preſent ſtation, without deriving any other obvious advantage than merely the relief of the aforeſaid garriſons, might not be productive of effects pernicious to the general intereſts of our affairs?

The preſent diſpoſition of the inhabitants of the country is not unknown to you. We have not only to combat againſt *Hyder*, but againſt the whole *Carnatic*; and have therefore no reaſon to hope for the leaſt aſſiſtance in any part of the road we may march, or in any part of the country we may go into.

Permacoil and *Wandewaſh* I ſhould be ſorry were they to fall into the hands of the enemy, becauſe of the great advantage they might be rendered of to the French, ſhould they arrive on the coaſt during the preſent war with *Hyder*.

I recommended a reinforcement of Sepoys being ſent me by ſea from *Bengal*; but, by my lateſt Letters from thence, I have not the ſmalleſt encouragement to hope that my propoſal will be in any ſhape adopted. The detachment of ſix battalions of Sepoys, reſolved by the Supreme Council to be ſent by land as a reinforcement to the army here, not having commenced their march on the 14th inſtant; and their movement, as I am informed, depending chiefly upon the favourable iſſue of ſome negotiations now carrying on with the Rajah *Moodajee Booſla*, to whom that body of Maratras laying at *Cuttac* belongs, there is no certainty that that detachment will ever leave the Bengal provinces. Any expectations of addition to our preſent force that might have been entertained from that quarter, cannot therefore weigh in the preſent deliberation.

I have now, Gentlemen, ſtated to you circumſtances, in as explicit and at the ſame time as conciſe a manner as the importance of the ſubject will admit of. I ſhall be happy in having your candid opinions thereon, as I mean that my conduct on the occaſion ſhould be, in a great meaſure, regulated thereby.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

Colonel *John* Lord *Macleod*.—Sir *Eyre Coote*, Commander in Chief in *India*, having mentioned the preſent poſture of public affairs in *Indoſtan* in general, and particularly on the Coromandel coaſt at this period; that is to ſay, that *Vellore*, *Permacoil*, and *Wandewaſh*, are at this time inveſted or beſieged by *Hyder Ally*'s troops; that Colonel *Lang*, who commands in *Vellore*, writes with aſſurance that he will hold out for a conſiderable time; but that *Permacoil* and *Wandewaſh*, from being garriſoned principally by the Nabob's troops, cannot be expected to reſiſt long: and Sir *Eyre* having been pleaſed to aſk my opinion, whether he ſhould march the whole army to the relief of *Wandewaſh*, &c, as it is impoſſible to act by detachment, the whole force of our army, not amounting at preſent to 7,000 effective men? I have to mention, that the ſecurity of *Fort Saint George*, and our ſure communication with that place, is, in my opinion, at preſent the grand object of this army, and the hinge upon which every thing turns. I form that opinion from the unaccountable conduct of the Durbar, from the firſt commencement of the preſent hoſtilities, from the knowledge we all have of the hoſtile mind of all the Natives of the *Carnatic* to the Engliſh intereſt, and of their attachment to *Hyder Ally*; which fully convinces me, that we have no reinforcement to expect from this country, and that all our ſuccours muſt come from the other Settlements, and from *Europe*.

I therefore think, that in any march this army may during the preſent ſtate of affairs take, a hold of the principal object ought always to be kept; that is, having it in our power at any time to return and cover *Fort Saint George*. This being in our power, I approve much of the army's marching as ſoon as poſſible to the relief of *Chingleput*, *Permacoil*, and *Wandewaſh*, and afterwards to return and cover *Madras*.

(Signed) *Macleod*,
Col. 73d Regiment.

Brigadier General *James Stuart*.—After attending to what the General has been pleaſed to communicate, I am of opinion, that the immediate reinforcement and ſupply of the garriſons of *Chingleput*, *Wandewaſh*, and *Permacoil*, ſo as to enable them to hold out for two or three months, or until it ſhall be known certainly with what force this war is likely to be carried on by both ſides, is of ſuch conſequence, that I have no difficulty in declaring it, according to my judgment, to be a moſt adviſable meaſure, to proceed immediately with the whole army that can be ſpared from *Fort Saint George*, on purpoſe to throw ſuccours into thoſe garriſons, carrying with them every means of ſubſiſtence, without the neceſſity of making detachments on any other account whatever.

I am alſo of opinion, that ſo ſoon as thoſe ſuccours are ſent into theſe garriſons, the army ſhould return to their former encampment at the Mount, there to wait the arrival of news from *Europe*, according to which, the future operations in this country ought to depend, whether to be offenſive or defenſive, keeping in conſtant view, the great ultimate national object, namely, the preſervation of *Fort Saint George*, with the ſhipping and property of the *Eaſt India* Company in the commercial ſtate.

I think that *Hyder* cannot in the time aſſemble any force ſufficient to diſpute the direct progreſs of our army to or from *Wandewaſh*, even though his cavalry may attempt to diſpute the paſſage of the *Palar*, which no doubt will be attended to.

I am alſo of opinion, that the fame of the Britiſh arms will not ſuffer by the appearance of a retreat to the Preſidency, after the object of the reinforcement to the garriſons is anſwered.

In caſe it ſhould ſo happen that *Wandewaſh* ſhall have fallen before the army reaches that place, I think that volunteers from the army ſhould be encouraged to throw themſelves both into *Permacoil* and *Tiagar*, in ſeparate bodies; but that the main object ſhould be to ſtrengthen and ſupply *Chingleput*, as the only immediate means to enable us to form magazines for the recovery of *Arcot*, to which, as to the principal object, all our future operations ſhould be directed, without attending to the Nabob's hill forts, ſo lately loſt by the cowardice or treachery of his Highneſs's officers or ſervants.

(Signed) *James Stuart.*

Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, K. B.—The Commander in Chief having laid before Lord *Macleod*, General *Stuart*, and myſelf, a ſtate of the troops in camp, as well as Letters which he received from officers in ſome of the garriſons in the *Carnatic*, ſetting forth ſome of the operations carrying on by *Hyder*'s army; the Commander in Chief having at the ſame time told us, that the reinforcement expected from *Bengal* had not by late accounts began their march, and deſiring to have our opinions reſpecting

reſpecting the army's marching to the relief of *Wandewaſh*, &c. I am clearly of opinion that the army ſhould march as ſoon as poſſible, not only to throw in ſuccours to *Chingleput*, *Permacoil*, and *Wandewaſh*; but to know if the enemy will come to action; and if he ſhould, I am confident the army will be ſucceſsful under their leader.

There are many reaſons why this event ought to be wiſhed for; and as the army will always be able to make good its retreat to *Madras* or the Mount, the time of its return ought to depend on various circumſtances, and the pleaſure of the Commander in Chief; and the informations he may from time to time receive,

(Signed) *Hector Munro.*

A true Copy,
Wm Tierney,
Secretary to the Commander in Chief in *India*.

Extract from the Minutes of the Select Committee, dated January 1781.

The Committee are ſenſible of the attention of the Commander in Chief, in laying before them the aforegoing deliberations of the council of war. In intruſting Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* with the immediate management of the war, the Committee felt that they were committing the moſt important truſt into hands in every reſpect qualified for the great object which they had in view, the ſafety of not only the Company's and the Nabob's poſſeſſions, but even of the deareſt intereſts of the Engliſh in *India*. Anxious for the moſt ſpirited, at the ſame time that they would have the leaſt hazardous exertions on the part of the army, they entirely acquieſce in the General's opinion, and in that of the experienced officers whom he conſulted. The carrying that opinion into execution, reſts with the Commander in Chief himſelf. All that is left for the Committee to ſay upon the ſubject, is, that the like public zeal which hath hitherto prevailed in all their deliberations, ſhall ſtill continue to manifeſt itſelf in their councils; that the General ſhall find every ſupport which it is in their power to give him; and that as he and they have had but one mind ſince his arrival upon this coaſt, they cannot but aſſure themſelves, that the conſequences of that unanimity will be highly beneficial to the intereſts of their Employers, whoſe welfare is inſeparable from that of the Nation at large.

A true Extract,
R. I. Sullivan, Sec^y.

Minute of Sir *Eyre Coote*.

Sir *Eyre Coote*.—Reflecting on the preſent very critical ſituation of the affairs of the *Eaſt India* Company, and of the intereſts of the Engliſh Nation on this coaſt; and ſenſible how near a concern any movement I might make of the army under my command, muſt have therein; for which, from the nature, progreſs, and ſpirit of the operations carrying on by the enemy, there appearing to me a neceſſity; at the ſame time not chooſing, in a matter of ſuch real and weighty importance, to truſt entirely to my own judgment, as to the expediency and propriety of the ſervice to be performed, and my ability, with the forces I have, when compared to thoſe of the enemy, to execute it; I held a council of war, at which was preſent, Major General Sir *Hector Munro*, Brigadier General *James Stuart*, and the Right honourable Colonel Lord *Macleod*; to whom having ſtated circumſtances with as much explicity as time would permit, I had the honour to receive their reſpective opinions and approbations of the ſervice I propoſed ſhould be undertaken.

However unuſual it is to diſcloſe the proceedings or the reſult of councils of war, before or even after the purpoſes of them have been fulfilled; and how far I may be juſtifiable in a deviation from what are the rules preſcribed in ſuch caſes, are points, which in the preſent inſtance I do not conceive it material to enter upon a previous diſcuſſion of; but ſhall reſt the future judgment, to be formed by the world, of the rectitude of the action, firſt upon the declaration of the perfect confidence I have in your zeal for the public ſervice, confirmed by the ſupport you have already afforded my exertions, and the deſire you have profeſſed to continue it; and next upon the claim which the political truſt, repoſed in you by our Superiors, gives you to know, whatever is likely to affect the intereſts of the honourable Company in that particular; and which, as my late deliberation may, in a very eſſential degree do, I therefore chearfully lay before you copies of the proceedings of the council of war, in the full perſuaſion, that the purport thereof will in no reſpect be divulged; and in the hope, that the meaſures therein determined on, may alſo be honoured with your approbation.

Supplemental Appendix to the Firſt Report. No. 2.

No. 2.

(Copy.)

Letter from the Chief and Council to the Court of Directors.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

May it pleaſe your Honours,

A SNOW, called the *Hibernia*, diſpatched expreſs from *Madras* to *Bombay*, paſſed this port on the 6th inſtant, when her commander, in purſuance of orders he had received, ſent aſhore an atteſted copy of a Letter from the Select Committee at the former Preſidency, addreſſed to the Reſident, &c. Factors at *Tellicherry*; a copy of which we herewith tranſmit, judging, that as this is the moſt preciſe mode of communicating the very intereſting intelligence it contains, the ſame will prove more acceptable to your Honours than a recital of its contents.

Lieutenant *Hughes*, who commands the *Seahorſe* frigate, which left *Madras* on the 21ſt ultimo, and touched here on her paſſage to *Bombay*, informed us, that the army under Sir *Eyre Coote*, conſiſting of between nine and ten thouſand men, marched from its late encampment near *Madras* about the 17th ultimo, in queſt of *Hyder Ally*; and by a private Letter which the Reſident has juſt received from the commandant at *Palamcotah*, dated the 8th inſtant, we learn, that Sir *Eyre Coote*'s approach towards the enemy, compelled them to withdraw from *Carangoly* and *Wandewaſh*, which places they had beſieged.

Your Honours ſhip *Royal Admiral*, we have advices ſailed from *Goa* on the 31ſt ultimo, on her way to the Preſidency; and your five ſhips from *Bengal*, which left *England* in company with the *Royal Admiral*, arrived at *Madras* the 10th ultimo.

We have likewiſe the pleaſure to add, that we are now informed by Mr. *William Petrie*, of your civil ſervice on the Madras eſtabliſhment, that *Amol* ſurrendered on the 18th ultimo, to your army under Brigadier General *Goddard*, who, ſubſequent to this happy event, was preparing to march towards the Gauts.

Sir *Edward Hughes*, with His Majeſty's ſhips under his command (except the *Seahorſe*, which has not yet joined him) we have reaſon to believe was at *Bombay* the latter end of the laſt month.

As theſe advices are of ſo important a nature to your Honours' intereſt, we now deliver a duplicate hereof to Mr. *Petrie*, together with the original, in ſeparate packets; and have requeſted him to uſe his endeavours for forwarding one of them from the *Cape of Good Hope*, by ſome other ſhip than that on which he proceeds.

We are, with the greateſt reſpect,
May it pleaſe your Honours,
Your moſt faithful and
obedient humble Servants,
Ja. Morley,
Arthur King,
J. Hutchinſon.

Anjengo, the 11th February 1781.

Supplemental Appendix to the Firſt Report. No. 2.

Extract of a Letter from the Chief and Factors at *Anjengo*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 6th Auguſt 1781.

The *Morning Star* cruizer, from *Bombay*, having called here on her way to *Buſſorah*, we embrace the opportunity of communicating to your Honours, the pleaſing intelligence of Sir *Eyre Coote* having entirely defeated the army of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, in a general engagement, between *Porto Novo* and *Mooteapollam*, on the firſt of laſt month; the particulars of which your Honours will be fully informed of, by the accompanying extract of a Letter from Sir *Eyre Coote* to Colonel *Braithwaite* at *Tanjour*, dated the 6th ultimo, which was tranſmitted to the Reſident by Captain *Eidingtoun*, the commandant at *Palamcotah*, who has likewiſe adviſed him of the following particulars:—that the *Swallow* packet reached *Madras* on the 22d June, and the *Rodney* packet alſo on the 12th ultimo, the latter having parted from the fleet ſhe ſailed with from *England* on the 5th of April, in latitude 28° N°.—That the army commanded by Sir *Eyre Coote* paſſed *Permacoil* on the 18th ultimo, with a view of effecting a junction with the large detachment of Bengal troops, which, with three battalions from the Northern Circars, had for ſome time been on their way to *Madras*, where, by the laſt accounts, they were nearly arrived.

Extract of a Letter from Sir *Eyre Coote* to Colonel *Braithwaite*; dated 6th July 1781.—Referred to in the above Letter.

The 3d inſtant I had the pleaſure to acquaint you of the ſucceſs of our little army, in a general action on the 1ſt inſtant, with *Hyder Ally*, between *Porto Novo* and *Mooteapollam*. It laſted eight hours, and was a hard fought day on both ſides. The enemy's force conſiſted of twenty-five battalions of infantry, 400 Europeans, from 40 to 50,000 horſe, and above one hundred thouſand matchlock-men, Peons, and Polygars, with 47 pieces of cannon well ſerved.

Our ſecond line having occupied ſome heights, by which our rear was ſecured, I advanced with the firſt towards the enemy's guns, many of which, had we had a body of cavalry, muſt have fallen into our hands. They made repeated attempts to force us with their horſe, and kept up a briſk cannonade, which for a long time our heavy fire could not ſilence; yielding at length to the ſteadineſs, ſpirit, and bravery of our comparatively ſmall body of troops, they retreated precipitately, and left us maſters of the field. *Meer Saib* received a mortal wound; and among four thouſand killed, are many of the principal officers. On our ſide, we loſt very few officers, and have only three or four hundred killed and wounded. You will be pleaſed to communicate this fortunate event to all the ſouthern garriſons.

No. 3.

To the honourable the Secret Committee of the honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Gentlemen,

1. YOU receive herewith an addreſs, dated the 31ſt ultimo, containing a ſhort abſtract of the ſyſtem we had adopted for our conduct in the preſent ſituation of affairs.

2. We had made every neceſſary arrangement for putting in execution our reſolution for withdrawing *Tellicherry*, and the time fixed for the departure of the fleet was arrived within two days, when, on the 18th inſtant, we received a Letter from the Governor General and Council, dated the 7th of January, which might and ought to have reached us ſeven or eight weeks ſooner, wherein they acquainted us of their having ſent round five lacks of rupees for the ſervice of this Preſidency, on the *Duke of Portland*; and gave us authority to paſs drafts upon them for ſuch further ſum as we might ſtand in need of. We had alſo private intimation of their having provided a large quantity of rice for the ſervice of this Preſidency, of which we actually received a part by the veſſel that brought their Letter.

Theſe reſources in view, we immediately determined, late as the ſeaſon was, to uſe our utmoſt exertion to preſerve *Tellicherry*, and make a requeſt to the Admiral to poſtpone his departure for a few days, in order to give us time to collect troops, and the neceſſary ſupplies for the garriſon, to be ſent down in company with the fleet, without whoſe aſſiſtance we could not have executed our meaſures. The Admiral expreſſing great ſatisfaction in our reſolution, cheerfully acquieſced in our requeſt; and, by a vigorous diſpatch, the *Royal Admiral* and *Royal Charlotte* were equipped for ſea; troops brought from the foot of the Gauts, and, with ſtores and proviſions, embarked within ſeven days upon different veſſels, which with the fleet ſailed from this place the 27th of the month.

4. The *Royal Charlotte* has been detained a few days, to wait for rice, to complete a ſtock for the rains; that ſhip, as well as the *Royal Admiral*, will proceed from *Tellicherry* to *Fort Saint George*, to aſſiſt in tranſporting Major *Cotgrave*'s detachment to the coaſt of *Coromandel*, and will then purſue her voyage to *China*; whilſt the latter will return to *Bombay*, from whence ſhe will be diſpatched to *England* early in the enſuing ſeaſon.

5. The *Prime* will ſhortly ſail for *England*, and will carry our advices and proceedings at full length. We ſhall not now enter into a detail of the operations of the army, but ſhall only mention, that General *Goddard* has, in purſuance of our advice, relinquiſhed poſſeſſion of the paſs of *Bhore Gaut*, where he had propoſed forming a fortified poſt, marched the army to *Panwell*, in order to lodge his ſtores and heavy baggage, and proceed in his future operations according to the ſyſtem of defence we had concerted with him in march. This, a country favourable for the mode of attack, obſerved by the enemy; the army was extremely haraſſed by numerous bodies of horſe and foot, which had poured into the Concan country, and preſſed upon our troops with a degree of boldneſs, which can only be imputed to their exultation at the appearance of a retreat. Our troops in this ſituation behaved with their accuſtomed firmneſs and reſolution, and baffled every attack of the enemy to make an impreſſion either on the line or baggage, though our loſs, from ſuch continual attacks, could not fail being conſiderable; and we find, from our returns, that during the two days taken up in the march, three officers and fifty-five men were killed, and fifteen officers and three hundred and ninety-three men wounded; though we derive ſome ſatisfaction, that amongſt the privates killed and wounded, few or none were Europeans. We are very ſorry to add, that on the laſt day's march Colonel *Parker*, who commanded the rear guard, was mortally wounded, and died in a few hours.

6. Arrived at *Panwell* the 23d inſtant, when the General immediately, upon our requiſition, ſent over the troops we had appointed for the garriſon of *Tellicherry*, and will next proceed upon a plan for ſecuring the country from the ravages of the enemy, in the beſt manner poſſible, until the lateneſs of the ſeaſon ſhall compel them to retire. For this purpoſe, the army will immediately change its poſition, and move near *Callian*, a more centrical ſituation, and where it is propoſed to canton them during the rains. The Europeans and Bombay troops will be brought into this garriſon.

7. We very much wiſh we had any late authentic account to give you of the ſituation of affairs on the coaſt of *Coromandel*, the hopes of which were the principal cauſe of our detaining the *Mercury* ſo long. We can only now acquaint you, that it is certain the French left the coaſt of *Coromandel* in February, without landing any

aſſiſtance

aſſiſtance for *Hyder*, or doing any other material damage; and that they were much diſtreſſed for proviſions; the poſition of General *Coote*'s army, and his burning all the boats at *Pondicherry*, preventing their getting any ſupplies from the ſhore. Country intelligence, collected by Mr. *Stewart* at *Goa*, mentions that *Hyder* had quitted the *Carnatic*.

8. We have the pleaſure to adviſe you of Colonel *Carnac*'s having gained a very complete victory over *Mhadge Scindia*; which is the more agreeable, as the Colonel had been obliged to retreat, and was haraſſed four days together by a very powerful army. After the fourth day's retreat, the Colonel countermarched a detachment from his army in the night, with which he got in the rear of the enemy, and attacked their camp, which was forced and plundered, and two guns, four elephants, and a large booty, fell into our hands. Several accounts concur that the enemy's loſs amounted to eight thouſand men, and *Scindia* himſelf eſcaped with difficulty to *Seronga*, attended by only .... horſemen.

We have the honour to be,
with Reſpect,
Honourable Gentlemen,
Your faithful and
obedient humble Servants,

Bombay Caſtle, 30th April 1781.

Wm Hornby,
D. Draper,
N. Stackhouſe.

No. 4.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 9th January 1781.

Vide Letter 19. 3d April 1780, by General Barker.

FROM the invariable term of our advices to your Honours, you will perceive a ſtrong, and we are ſorry to believe a juſt opinion of the ruinous conſequences which would ſooner or later fall upon the Company, from the war which your ſervants at the other Preſidencies had unneceſſarily entered into with the Maratta State. Bordering upon each others dominions, and heated by jealouſy and a deſire of plunder, *Hyder* and the Marattas never could have remained on amicable terms. Every year, unleſs when we ſtepped in to ſuſpend their operations, the country of the one or the other was the theatre of war. Their ſucceſs was various, but the effect, to the Engliſh intereſts, was the ſame. They reciprocally waſted their ſtrength, and found a ſufficiency of employment at home, to hinder their diſturbing the tranquillity of their neighbours.

20. While theſe two Governments, the moſt powerful in *Hindoſtan*, were thus weakening themſelves by an inveterate war, which, from the known diſpoſition of the parties, was never likely to have an end, your Settlements were at peace, and your proſperity was making the quickeſt advances to its fulleſt ſtate. Unhappily for your intereſts, the flame of diſſention at length broke forth at *Bombay*; the ſeeds of war which were then ſown in ſupport of the cauſe of *Ragonaut Row*, and which were afterwards nouriſhed in the moſt unbounded manner by the Government of *Bengal*, gave a reſpite to their rival powers. They ſoon began to ſlacken in their oppoſition. The pretenſions of each became every day more moderate. At length they combined againſt us, and from being enemies, cemented the ſtrongeſt ties of mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport againſt a conſequence which they had every reaſon to conſider as too formidable and interfering for the repoſe of *India*.

Committee, 23d October 1779.

21. The effect of this very early began to ſhew itſelf. So far back as October 1779, Sir *Thomas Rumbold* informed the Committee, that the Letters and meſſages received from *Hyder Ally* for ſome time paſt, were couched in terms ſo hoſtile and unfriendly, that he could ſcarcely conceive them to be the genuine productions of that Prince: that he had in conſequence ſent the Reverend Mr. *Swartz* to the Court of *Seringapatam*, with private inſtructions, to learn the real diſpoſition of *Hyder*; but that the iſſue of his ſecret negotiation was ſuch as left him no reaſon to doubt but his intentions were hoſtile both to the Company and to the Nabob.

Supplemental Appendix Letter from Fort St. George, No. 4.

22. Alarming as this information was, no reſolution was taken, more than that the Gentlemen at *Bengal* ſhould be made acquainted with it; and that General *Goddard* ſhould be adviſed of it alſo. About three weeks after, the ſame matter was again agitated and a Member of the Committee moved, that the moſt vigorous and ſpirited meaſures ſhould be adopted; and ſubmitted, whether it would not be proper to collect a ſtrong body of troops at *Velore* or *Conjeveram*, where they might be cantoned in readineſs to act as occaſion might require. This, however, met with a ſimilar fate; nothing more was done than had been in the former inſtance.

Committee, 17th January 1780.

23. From this time until about the beginning of June, no further notice is taken of the meaſures of *Hyder* and the Marattas, although the intelligence communicated by the Nabob, gave us every reaſon to ſuppoſe that he meditated ſome formidable blow againſt the *Carnatic*. Then indeed the Letters which came in daily from the frontier garriſons, were ample confirmation of what had been apprehended; and to increaſe our difficulties, the Select Committee of *Bombay* adviſed us, under date the 18th of May, that the Maratta Durbar had declared, in poſitive terms, to General *Goddard*, "that they would "not make peace with the Engliſh unleſs *Salſet* was "reſtored, and the perſon of *Ragobah* was given up."

Committee, 17th July 1780.

24. The undoubted information which was then received of the warlike preparations that were making by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, induced Mr. *Johnſon*, in a Minute, ſeconded by Mr. *Smith*, to recommend to the Committee, to take into conſideration the means for maintaining an army in the field; and if that were impracticable, that they would deliberate upon meaſures for reinforcing our garriſons, and for keeping up a force at leaſt ſufficient to protect the Company's and the Nabob's poſſeſſions.

Committee, 19th June 1780.

25. Had this opinion been followed, the troops, which were ſeparated, would have been formed into a body within the ſpace of a month without obſtruction or difficulty; they would have marched, unmoleſted, into the very heart of the *Carnatic*, and would have been ready to have faced the enemy on their firſt entering the Ghauts. But the ſeaſonable precautions pointed out in this Minute, were diſregarded; the apprehenſions about *Hyder* were thought groundleſs; and the opportunity was loſt, which might have poſſibly prevented the invaſion of the *Carnatic*.

26. It is not our intention here to throw an uncandid cenſure on the conduct of the majority of our Committee, in this early ſtage of the buſineſs. We give our opinions at the time, and they ſtand recorded for your Honours' information.

27. Had indeed a peace been concluded with the Marattas, or had there been the proſpect of ſo deſirable an event, the rumour of *Hyder*'s intentions might have been diſregarded. But when we had the cleareſt proof before us, the declaration of the Maratta Court itſelf to General *Goddard*'s propoſitions, it no longer became a matter that could admit of further heſitation. A pacification with that Government ſeemed to be as diſtant as ever, whilſt every exertion that we might be enabled to make, would unavoidably create an expence of both blood and treaſure, which muſt infallibly exhauſt us in the end.

28. The diſpoſition of the troops belonging to this eſtabliſhment, was likewiſe a circumſtance of conſiderable diſadvantage to us. One part, under the command of Colonel *Brathwaite*, was at *Pondicherry*; Lieutenant Colonel *Baillie* had a fine detachment to the northward of the *Kiſtna*; and Colonel *Brown* had one battalion of Europeans, one company of artillery, and one battalion of Sepoys, acting under the orders of General *Goddard*.

Supplemental Appendix to the First Report. No. 4.

29. Our force being in this manner diſperſed, no moment could have been more favourable for *Hyder* to have entered the *Carnatic*, than the moment he embraced. We were unuſually weak, from the different detachments we had on ſervice. *Bengal* was plunged into the moſt ſerious difficulties, and the treaſuries of the Company, in every part of *India*, were reduced to the moſt alarming ſituation.

44. Since the 5th November, when General *Coote* arrived, every kind of exertion hath been made to inſure to us ſucceſs in the next campaign. The General himſelf is now encamped at *Saint Thomas's Mount*; and we have every reaſon to expect that we ſhall reap the moſt ſignal ſervices from his conduct and ability.

45. Circumſtanced as General *Coote* is, the Commander in Chief of your forces in *India*, and more particularly having the entire direction of the army under General *Goddard* on the other ſide of *India*, where *Hyder* is moſt vulnerable; we could not, we conceive, have acted with greater attention to your intereſt, than in entruſting to him the general management of the war; which we have done in the ampleſt manner in public orders.

46. The orders which Sir *Eyre Coote* informs us he has ſent to General *Goddard*, will, we truſt, draw that Officer from his offenſive meaſures againſt the Marattas, and will enable him to make a diverſion in the Bidanore country, where the Nairs even, we are told are ready to revolt and join us, although they have kept the garriſon of *Tellicherry* cloſely confined to the walls of their fort for a conſiderable while paſt. The preſence of Sir *Edward Hughes* alſo renders it ſtill more probable; the ſquadron he has under his command being at hand to co-operate, and tranſport, if neceſſary, both men and ſtores to *Mangalore*.

47. While meaſures for the general good are thus purſuing here, at *Bengal*, and at *Bombay*, we have not been inattentive to the reſources which it is reaſonable to imagine we ſhould be enabled to draw from thoſe in alliance, and thoſe who live under the immediate protection of the Company.

The ſurrender of *Arcot* comes in another point of view. *Mahomed Nudjif Cawn*, who though not the firſt, was yet a man of conſiderable conſequence in the management of the Nabob's intereſts in that province, has, ſince his return, delivered in a narrative of the ſiege to his maſter. In this narrative your Honours will obſerve a degree of inſinuation, tending to caſt a principal ſhare of blame on your Officers who commanded there. Your Officers, on the contrary, complain of the Nabob's people, and eſpecially of *Rajah Beerbur*, who had the ſupreme authority at *Arcot*, and who is now confidentially employed by *Hyder*.

Committee, 27th Nov. 1780.

55. A matter of this nature is of great importance. Individually it carries a ſtain which, in all military ſervices, it is neceſſary ſhould be cleared up; and as it relates to the public welfare, it is fraught with conſequences of the moſt ſerious moment. Were the parties concerned in any other ſituation than that to which they are reduced by the capitulation, a ſtrict inquiry ſhould be had into every part of this affair; as they are at preſent, we muſt patiently wait, until an opportunity ſhall favour the inveſtigation.

56. The Nabob, who has uniformly kept up a cloſe and friendly correſpondence with *Fazul Beg Cawn*, the Commander in Chief of the Nizam's forces, ſome days ago informed our Preſident, that he had offers from the ſide of the *Decan*, of four or five thouſand well-diſciplined cavalry. Theſe offers, we had reaſon to conclude, had come from *Fazul Beg*. The expence, however, was too heavy for our preſent reſources. Moreover, there appeared a probability of aſſiſtance from *Moodajee Bonſalah*, the Rajah of *Berar*; and until we were certain of his intentions, it ſeemed the more prudent line to refrain from any poſitive engagements which might lead us into pecuniary difficulties, that our means were in every reſpect inadequate to.

57. The door of negotiation with *Fazul Beg Cawn* for this body of cavalry, it was ſtill politic to keep open. We impowered the Chief of *Maſulipatam* therefore, to enter into a correſpondence with that Sardar on the ſubject; but to determine on nothing until he had our final directions.

58. Early in our proceedings of the laſt year, your Honours will be pleaſed to obſerve, that we reſolved upon raiſing a corps of Sibbendies, for the purpoſe of collecting the revenues in the Circars dependant upon *Maſulipatam*, to conſiſt of five companies; and that we likewiſe directed, that theſe companies ſhould be raiſed and incorporated at *Vizagapatam*, with the two independent companies of Sepoys there on the ſame account.

Committee, 22d May 1780.

59. This force leaving our regular Sepoys more to the detail of real military ſervice than they were before in the Circars, and the Circars themſelves being far from any appearance of diſturbance, we reſolved, on a repreſentation from our Preſident, that the Northern Zemindars ſhould be ordered to furniſh a certain quota of troops to join the detachment, if neceſſary, ex, ected from *Bengal*. The Zemindars have accordingly been written to; and their numbers in cavalry, Sepoys, and pikemen, it is ſuppoſed, will amount to 13,500 men. With regard to their pay, that is to be accounted for, and deducted from the tribute of the Zemindars when the preſent troubles are over, at the ſame rate the Zemindars themſelves pay their people during the time they keep them in employment.

Committee, 4th Dec. 1780.

60. The tranquillity indeed of the Chicacole diſtrict, received a dangerous momentary ſhock, from a mutiny amongſt the grenadier Sepoys, who were ordered from *Vizagapatam* to this Preſidency, and who, refuſing to embark, turned upon their Officers, and all the Europeans of the garriſon. (The particulars of this unfortunate revolt, are entered in the proceedings referred to in the margin.) Lieutenant *Criſp*, Mr. *Venner*, a cadet, and Mr. *Rutherfurd*, one of your civil ſervants, were killed upon the ſpot. Mr. *Caſamajor*, the Chief, with ſeveral other Gentlemen, were ſeized, and cloſely confined for ſeveral hours.

Committee, 13th Oct. 1780.

61. The plunder of the place was the principal object of the mutineers; that accompliſhed, they left the fort in a body. We loſt no time, however, in ſending every aſſiſtance in our power to their relief. We ſent a party of fifty invalid Europeans by ſea, and ordered the Reſident at *Ganjam*, to reinforce them with thirty coffres from that garriſon.

62. Before this acceſſion to their ſtrength had arrived at *Vizagapatam*, the revolters had purſued their way inland towards the hills. Then they met with oppoſition from ſome of the Zemindars, and were drove to the neceſſity of diſperſing. In the meanwhile, conſiderable rewards having been offered for apprehending any of thoſe concerned, particularly the ringleader *Sheik Mahomed*, Soubahdar, ſeveral of them were detected. The conſequence was an immediate and exemplary puniſhment.

63. The conduct of *Guzziputty Narrain Deo* on this occaſion, was ſuch as to merit the higheſt marks of our favour. We accordingly reinſtated him in the Zemindary of *Kinnedy*, on terms to the advantage of the Company, as your Honours will perceive, on reference to our proceedings on that head in the Revenue Department.

64. The Letter from your Honours to the Rajah of *Tanjore*, which came by your ſhip *Laſcelles*, we deputed one of your civil ſervants to deliver to him. The Rajah received this mark of your friendſhip with the ſtrongeſt profeſſions of attachment to your Honours, and of reliance upon your protection. But the main object propoſed by the deputation of Mr. *Lewin*, that of procuring a ſupply of money, was not effected; the Rajah declaring himſelf totally unable to make any further exertions on that head. Mr. *Lewin*'s report is entered on the proceedings of the Committee referred to in the margin.

Committee, 2d Oct. 1780.

65. The

65. The backwardneſs of the Rajah to raiſe the inconſiderable ſum required of him, was the cauſe of ſome diſſatisfaction to us; at the ſame time, we conceived it our duty to aſſure him, that every thing in our power ſhould be done for the ſecurity of his fort and country. Committee, 10th Oct. 1780 But as it would be abſolutely neceſſary, during the continuance of the preſent troubles, to get a ſufficient force into the field to act againſt the enemy, we informed him, we expected his ready acquieſcence in every thing that ſhould be propoſed to him for our common ſafety. We told him, that finding great difficulty in carrying on our military operations for want of a body of cavalry; we were uſing our endeavours to procure a ſufficient number, and that we ſhould take it as a favour if he would give us his aſſiſtance.

66. We again explained to him the heavy diſburſements neceſſary for the ſupport of the war, and earneſtly deſired he would aſſiſt us in the article of money. We pointed out to him how ſtrongly you had written to him on this ſubject in your laſt Letter, and hoped that he would want no other inducement to exert himſelf in giving you an extraordinary aid at this conjuncture, when you were called upon for the defence of your own and your allies poſſeſſions, againſt a formidable power.

67. We even went ſo far, leſt he ſhould have any colour of excuſe, as to tell him, if he could not poſſibly find means of procuring ready money on this occaſion, (which we truſted however could not be the caſe) that in ſuch an event, we had no doubt of his being able to put into our hands a quantity of grain, with liberty to mortgage or diſpoſe of it, in ſuch manner as might enable us to raiſe the neceſſary ſupplies.

68. To all theſe repreſentations, the Rajah of *Tanjore* has returned nothing but empty words and profeſſions, which he does not ſeem inclinable to realize.

69. This being the caſe, another Letter has been ſince written to him. We have told him, that the numberleſs Country Correſpondence, 26th Dec. 1780 No. 141. difficulties which have preſented themſelves to him, to the raiſing a body of 1,000 cavalry, are aſtoniſhing to us, eſpecially as he had concluded the expence of it would be deducted from his ſubſidy.—That our former Letters to him on the ſubject of cavalry was wanted, and as one immediately under the protection of the Company, he was the firſt looked to for aſſiſtance. We told him, the day of difficulty was the only one in which real friendſhip could be ſhewn; that procraſtination manifeſted a want of warmth in thoſe who, from the peculiarity of their ſituation, might be naturally ſuppoſed concerned in public affairs. That had means been taken in the beginning, the ſmall corps he had been ſolicited to raiſe might have been now complete; but that thoſe means had been unaccountably neglected, until it was almoſt too late to undertake any thing in a matter of ſo much importance to your affairs.—That the Tanjore country, however, having heretofore eſcaped every kind of ravage and devaſtation, we ſtill placed the greateſt dependence upon the aſſiſtance in both men and money, which it was peculiarly incumbent upon him to give, who enjoyed the ampleſt benefit of your protection.

70. Poſſibly this repreſentation to the Rajah, may have the effect upon him we deſire; we have incloſed a copy of it to the Commanding Officer at *Tanjore*, with directions to enforce the ſpirit of it firmly, but at the ſame time with the greateſt delicacy, leſt the Rajah's fears ſhould be alarmed.

93. Involved as your affairs are in every quarter of *Hindoſtan*, the accuſation of wantonly adding to the flame, carries in its conſequences a degree of criminality, which every Government, ſatisfied with the rectitude of its actions, is warranted to clear itſelf of, and even to retort upon thoſe who are primarily and principally concerned.

94. We have already ſaid, and we again repeat it, the Maratta war is the ſole cauſe of all the miſchiefs which hitherto have been felt, or hereafter may befal the intereſt of *England* in *India*.—The viſionary purſuit of that ſcheme, hath plunged you into the moſt complicated public calamity. The country powers, tired of the yoke, rejoice at the ruinous meaſures which, to the expenditure of all your treaſure in *Bengal*, and of all that hath been borrowed, hath been offenſively carried on againſt the combined Maratta empire. Nor ſhall we heſitate in declaring it our opinion, that unleſs a peace is ſpeedily concluded with that power, the hard earned ſupremacy of your ſituation will ſink under a blow the moſt ſevere that it hath ever yet received.

Fifth Report. No. 4.

97. Shortly, upon the departure of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, we were ſolicited by the Nabob to aſſiſt him with a ſmall loan he was in want of, for diſcharging a demand made upon him by Colonel *James Capper*. As the Nabob appeared very anxious that this debt ſhould be cleared off, and as he engaged that the Company ſhould neither ſuſtain loſs nor riſk by the tranſaction, we acquieſced in the propoſition made to to us by his Highneſs; and accordingly granted Colonel *Capper* a bond for the amount, as is particularly ſet forth in our proceedings of the day referred to in the margin. Committee, 2d Jun 1780

120. In conſequence of an addreſs, which we received from our Surgeon General, in which he recommends a plan for the Hoſpital expences of his Majeſty's 73d regiment, we came to the reſolution, although there was no precedent for the mode recommended by him, to adopt it, it appearing the moſt equitable, until your pleaſure ſhould be known. The ſame to be carried to a diſtinct account, under the head of expences incurred for His Majeſty's 73d regiment. 10th May 1780

121. Towards the latter end of the year 1777, a Memorial was given in to us by the Captain Lieutenants of artillery, relative to their rank in the general line of the army; and again, in May 1780, they preſented us another petition, and begged we would write to the Gentlemen of *Bengal*, for information of the regulations they had thought proper to eſtabliſh in a ſimilar caſe, at the recommendation of your Commander in Chief in *India*. Committee, 1st May 1780

122. We accordingly wrote to *Bengal* on the ſubject. —The anſwer from thence was full as to the artillery rank they had eſtabliſhed; we therefore reſolved, that the Officers who held commiſſions as Captain Lieutenants of artillery on this eſtabliſhment, ſhould be put on the ſame footing with the Captain Lieutenants of artillery at *Bengal*, viz. that ſuch Officers as held commiſſions as Captain Lieutenants on the 17th April 1775, ſhould take rank as Captains in the army from that day; and that ſuch Officers as had been appointed Captain Lieutenants of artillery ſince that period, ſhould take rank as Captains in the army, agreeably to the date of their Captain Lieutenants commiſſions. 17th July 1780

123. Captain *Robert Wood*, whom your Honours were pleaſed to nominate to the Town Majorſhip of *Fort Saint George*, during the government of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, having been diſappointed in his expectation of filling that office again, applied to us on the departure of the *General Parker*, and ſolicited the appointment agreeably to the tenor of your orders.

124. This matter had already been agitated at our Board, and it had been ſubmitted home to your conſideration; we therefore agreed, as our Preſident, in conſequence of your military inſtructions of March 17 4, and the latitude given him by the Company's orders relative to Captain *Wood's* appointment, had nominated Captain *Sydenham* to act in the office of Town Major, and the ſame had been given out in general orders, that no further ſtep ſhould be taken in it until your pleaſure ſhould be known.

125. Captain *Harcourt Woodhouſe* having been recommended to us by Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, we have granted him a certificate to partake of the military fund, he having ſworn that he was not directly or indirectly poſſeſſed of £. 2,000.

126. We have granted our permiſſion to Captain *Charles Fraſer* and Captain *Thomas Hagot*, to proceed to *Europe* for the re-eſtabliſhment of their health.

127. Lieu-

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127. Lieutenant Colonel *Thomas Fletcher*, agreeably to your commands, ſucceeded to his rank on this eſtabliſhment; but we are concerned to inform your Honours, that that brave and valuable officer was amongſt thoſe who fell in the action of the 10th of September.

128. Major *Alexander Maclellan*, after a ſhort illneſs, died on the 29th of laſt Auguſt. In conſequence of which we appointed Colonel *Brathwaite* to the command of the fort and garriſon, and of the troops ſtationed in the Tanjore country.

129. Mr. *Robert Smith Bird*, one of your Surgeons on this eſtabliſhment, has requeſted our permiſſion to accompany Mr. *Whitehill* to *England*, on the *Duke of Kingſton*; we have accordingly granted Mr. *Bird* our leave to attend Mr. *Whitehill*, and we take this opportunity of recommending him to your Honours, that he may return with his rank in the line of Surgeons.

130 Sir *Edward Hughes* having recommended that a proper perſon ſhould be ſtationed at the Daniſh Settlement of *Tranquebar*, for the purpoſe of collecting intelligence there with reſpect to the enemy, and having at the ſame time mentioned Mr. *Edward Mackintoſh* as a Gentleman well qualified for that employ; we have accordingly appointed Mr. *Mackintoſh* our Reſident at *Tranquebar*, with an allowance of 100 pagodas per month.

Committee, 9th Oct. 1780.

138. Your Honours have been frequently adviſed of the diſtreſſes, in which Colonel *James*, your Commanding Officer of artillery, hath been involved, from a failure on the part of the Nabob, in payment of a conſiderable ſum of money, advanced by him to his Highneſs's mutineus troops in 1776 and 1777. The particulars of his caſe are worthy of your attention.

139. In November 1776, the firſt dangerous mutiny broke out in the Nabob's ſecond regiment of cavalry. Colonel *James* was then Commandant of *Trichinopoly*. As ſoon as he received intelligence of the revolt, he ſent parties of Sepoys with Letters wrote in different languages, to learn their route, and with offers to them of 5,000 pagodas immediately on their returning to their duty, and of 1,000 pagodas per month, until the Nabob's pleaſure ſhould be known. "I did this," ſays he, "be-
"cauſe, on my appointment to the command of *Trich-*
"*inopoly*, I had an opportunity of viſiting the cavalry,
"which was then in that well-diſciplined ſtate, as to
Committee, 11th Apr. 1780. "command applauſe from every Gentleman who ſaw
"them, many encomiums having been paid them by
"Officers of cavalry formerly in His Majeſty's ſervice.
"From their appearance, and the pains that were taken
"by their Officers to render them complete, I could not
"but duly conſider the very extenſive ſervice they would
"be of to the *Carnatic*, in caſe of trouble, and therefore
"I was fully determined to give every aſſiſtance in my
"power to relieve them in their diſtreſſes."

140. For this firſt advance, Colonel *James* received the thanks of the Board, under date 4th December 1776. This induced Colonel *James* to make further advances of caſh; which he continued until the 1ſt April 1777, when a ſecond mutiny broke out in Captain *Campbell*'s regiment, cantoned at *Zepherabad*, a few miles from *Hyder Ally*'s country, and which had every appearance of being productive of fatal conſequences, the regiment being completely equipped for ſervice, with eight field pieces, and every thing elſe in proportion.

141. The intelligence of Captain *Campbell*'s ſituation, he and his Officers having been made cloſe priſoners, was carried to Colonel *James* by the mereſt accident. He, however, ſaw no time was to be loſt; and accordingly, conſidering nothing but his duty, immediately ſent to them, and bound himſelf for the payment of ſo much of their arrears as he poſſibly could provide funds for. His obligation they looked upon as ſufficient. They releaſed their Officers, and ſhortly afterwards went upon ſervice, having received their laſt dividend of 6,000 pagodas from Colonel *James* the 1ſt of June 1777.

142. Conſiderable as theſe advances were, they yet were inadequate to the payment of all the arrears due to the cavalry, as appeared from the very alarming conduct of the other regiments who ſurrounded the Nabob at *Chepauk*, and obſtinately refuſed retiring, unleſs they were ſatisfied in what they had a right to demand, in conſequence of their agreement on entering his ſervice. The loan made by Meſſieurs *Taylor* and Co. on this account, hath repeatedly been ſtated to your Honours in the fulleſt manner.

143. Colonel *James* had indeed another reaſon for making the conſiderable advances he did to theſe regiments of cavalry. "I was encouraged to do this," ſays he, "by the directions of the Commander in Chief to
"me to raiſe more money; and he had full powers
"from the Honourable Board, to take every meaſure he
"ſaw neceſſary to quell the mutiny."
Committee, 11th Apr. 1780.

144. Under theſe ſanctions, therefore, Colonel *James* advanced all the money he could raiſe. The Nabob, however, was ſlow and uncertain in refunding either the principal or intereſt. This drew a remonſtrance from Colonel *James*. We ſaw and felt for his diſtreſſes, and, ſenſible of the juſtneſs of his demand, intereſted ourſelves for him with the Nabob; but his Highneſs ſtill continued dilatory. He promiſed, indeed, that Colonel *James* ſhould be repaid; but yet the day was at a diſtance, and Colonel *James*, though ſuffering under a ſevere complaint, had the painful proſpect of being obliged to remain in this country, when a change of climate was become abſolutely neceſſary to his recovery.
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145. Thus reduced, he made us ſeveral applications, and at length got the Nabob to requeſt we would on his account, ſatisfy Colonel *James* for the money he had advanced.

146. Senſible of the merit which Colonel *James* manifeſted at the time of making the advances, and of the real neceſſity there was for ſome ſpirited exertion for the preſervation of a corps which might have been of the greateſt utility, we readily agreed, that on the Nabob's engaging to repay the Company within a ſhort period of time, a bond ſhould be granted to Colonel *James* for the balance which ſhould be due to him. Accordingly, the Nabob having acquainted us, through our Preſident, that the amount ſhould be diſcharged as expeditiouſly as poſſible, we have granted a bond to Colonel *James* for pagodas 40,742. 25. 60, the ſum now owing to him by his Highneſs.

148. The proceedings of a council of war, held by the Commander in Chief of your forces, now go a number in the packet, together with our ſentiments on the ſubject. To theſe proceedings we beg your particular attention.

149. We have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that, by a Letter from Sir *Edward Hughes*, dated the 4th December, we are informed of the ſafe arrival of His Majeſty's fleet at *Tellicherry*, where he landed for the reinforcement of that garriſon, 1 Captain, 4 Subalterns, and 108 Marines; and of his having ſupplied them with 80,000 rupees for their diſburſements, and a quantity of grain. Sir *Edward* has likewiſe informed us, that, at the earneſt ſolicitations of the Chief and Factors, as well as of Major *Colgrave*, who commands the troops at *Tellicherry*, he had directed the Captains of the Company's ſhips *Pondbane* and *Contractor*, to remain there for the purpoſe of keeping open the Port for ſupplies of proviſions, until reinforcements ſhould arrive.

150. From *Tellicherry* Sir *Edward* propoſed proceeding with the ſquadron towards *Bombay*, touching in his way at *Mangalore*, to ſee if any thing effectual could be done againſt *Hyder*'s veſſels in that part.

151. By a Letter from our Reſident at *Ganjam*, we are acquainted that a French privateer, mounting 18 guns, and ſuppoſed to be in concert with another, had been cruiſing off the Northern Ports of this coaſt for ſome time paſt, and had taken ſome few country veſſels.

No. 5.

WILLIAM PETRIE, eſquire, attending, according to order, was called in; and examined.

I went firſt to *Madras* in the Company's civil ſervice, about 17 years ago—have acted in the ſtations of Commiſſary and Paymaſter to the army during the laſt war with *Hyder Ally*, at the firſt ſiege of *Tanjore*, and the ſubſequent campaigns. I was then appointed Secretary to the Government at *Madras*; in which department I remained till my return to *England*, in 1776—the ſucceeding year I returned to *India* with Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—was appointed Envoy or Reſident to the Rajah of *Tanjore*—I was next appointed to the Chiefſhip of *Nagore* and *Carricole*—I left *India* again in January 1780, and being coming over land, was obliged, on account of the plague in *Turkey*, to return to *Bombay*. I was preſent at the capture of *Baſſein* by the Bengal army; and on the Malabar Coaſt had an opportunity of hearing of *Hyder Ally*'s alarming ſucceſs in the *Carnatic*, and the diſtreſſed ſtate of the Engliſh Government at *Madras*. I left the coaſt of *India* the 11th of February, returned to *Europe* upon a Portugueſe ſhip, and arrived in *England* September 1781.

How long did you remain at *Madras*, after your arrival there with Sir *Thomas Rumbold*?—About twelve days.

How many days journey is it from *Madras* to *Tanjore*?—By going poſt, it may be done in three days; in the general way, it requires ſix or ſeven.

Was you at *Madras* when the Committee of Circuit was aboliſhed?—No, I was then at *Tanjore*; I heard of it there.

Were the Zemindars at *Madras* at your return then from *Tanjore*?—Moſt of them I believe were there—I had not any converſation or communication with them.

Had you reaſon to know that the Committee of Circuit had been aboliſhed?—Yes.

Were you acquainted with the objects of the appointment of the Committee of Circuit?—Yes.

From your knowledge of the Preſidency of *Madras*, and the affairs under their adminiſtration, is it your opinion, that the objects of the Committee of Circuit were moſt likely to be accompliſhed by the continuance of the Committee, or by calling the Zemindars to *Madras*?—I am clearly of opinion, by the continuance of the Committee of Circuit, for the following reaſons; viz.

Becauſe the Committee of Circuit was directed to proceed to the Northern Circars, and inveſtigate the various matters which had been complained of in that branch of the Company's Government; and becauſe the inſtructions given them for their guide, appeared to me well calculated to accompliſh the purpoſes of reformation; whereas, by calling the Zemindars to *Madras*, the Board could only have a partial evidence, and muſt be liable to impoſition and deception from thoſe men whoſe intereſt it was to keep them in the dark. From my knowledge of the men who were appointed to form that Committee, I think they were very capable of executing that truſt.

Were there other Gentlemen in the ſervice under that Preſidency, capable of ſupplying the place of any Member of that Committee, in caſe of a vacancy?—A great many indeed.

Had you reaſon to know that the Zemindars complained of the hardſhip of being brought down to the Preſidency of *Madras*?—I do not know it, ſo as to warrant my calling it perſonal knowledge; but it was the notorious and univerſal ſenſe of the Preſidency, that they had ſo complained.

Was it your opinion, or the general belief, either at *Madras* or *Tanjore*, that *Hyder Ally* meant an invaſion of the *Carnatic* a conſiderable time before his irruption there?—From the long miſunderſtanding and jealouſy which had ſubſiſted between *Hyder Ally* and the Madras Government, I never doubted but that we ſhould be involved in war with that Power, as ſoon as he ſhould find a favourable opportunity, which could only have been prevented by a poſitive alliance between him and the Engliſh, a meaſure which he had frequently courted. He viewed our attack on *Pondicherry* with a very jealous eye; and would, in my opinion, have given aſſiſtance to the French, but for a favourite enterprize which he was engaged in at that time. Our attack on *Mahé*, and the ſubſequent operations in the Guntoor Circar, I believe he conſidered as open acts of hoſtility;—but in anſwer to the queſtion, I will venture to ſay, that he certainly meditated war as early as the time of the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, which I heard from *Tanjore*, and from a man who had formerly been in *Hyder Ally*'s ſervice, and who had paid me a viſit at *Nagore*; at which time I believe he was acting as an inferior Vakeel with the Dutch at *Negapatam*.

Are you one of the excutors of Mr. *Redhead*'s will?—Yes.

Is there a diſputed article in that will, relating to a ſum of money claimed from *Sitteram Rauze*?—Yes.

Had you occaſion to know any thing of the foundation of the debt claimed by Mr. *Redhead*'s executors from *Sitteram Rauze*?—It appeared to be a ſum of money promiſed by *Sitteram*, or his Agent, to Mr. *Redhead*, for certain ſervices to be rendered by him.

What were thoſe ſervices?—Being abſent from *Madras* on public ſervice, during all the time alluded to in the queſtion, I was under the neceſſity of leaving the executorſhip of Mr. *Redhead*'s will to Mr. *Brodie*, who was the other executor; I can therefore only ſay, that I believe the ſervices were the accompliſhing of certain points for *Sitteram Rauze* at the Preſidency, through his (Mr. *Redhead*'s) influence.

In what ſtation was Mr. *Redhead* at that time?—Private Secretary to Sir *Thomas Rumbold* the Governor.

Do you know, from any circumſtance whatever, at what time the ſaid preſent was promiſed to Mr. *Redhead*?—I cannot poſitively ſay the time; but I have a copy of the agreement, which was tranſlated from the original by a perſon who I know well, and believe to be exact, which I will ſend to the Committee.

What defence did *Sitteram* make againſt the claim made by Mr. *Redhead*'s executors?—I cannot clearly anſwer, on account of the diſtance of time, and my being then abſent from *Madras*.

At the time I left *India*, I ſhortly ſuſpected that *Hyder Ally* was meditating an attack upon the *Carnatic*; and I will now ſtate to the Committee, my reaſons for that opinion.

Becauſe I know *Hyder* has been inimical to the Engliſh, ſince a ſhort time after the peace of 1769, when the Madras Board withheld from him the ſuccours which he thought he had a right to claim in conſequence of that treaty, when his country was invaded by the Marattas. The miſfortunes of that war, in which he loſt his army and a conſiderable part of his dominions, he charged to our breach of engagements; and from that period, I believe, he has eagerly looked for a favourable opportunity of making war upon the Engliſh in *India*. It was the tranſactions of that time, which gave riſe to his ſubſequent connections with the French. Nevertheleſs, finding that he could expect no eſſential ſupport from that Power in *India*, and apprehenſive of a ſecond viſit from the Marattas, in the year 1773, he again ſolicited friendſhip and alliance with the Engliſh againſt the common enemy, as he then termed the Marattas; and made ſuch advantageous offers to the Company, that had the Madras Board deemed it expedient in other reſpects to accede to his requeſt, the moſt ſolid commercial advantages might then have been obtained for the Company. I was then Secretary to the Board, where the ſubject was often debated; but at laſt it was reſolved to decline the propoſed alliance, and to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality between *Hyder Ally* and the Marattas. His reſentment upon this occaſion, I believe, cemented his connections

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with the French, and not improbably, gave him the first idea of an alliance with his old enemy the Marattas.—From that period, until my return to *India* in 1778, I believe the correspondence between *Hyder Ally* and the Company's Governments was merely civil; I am certain not cordial. Upon the arrival of Sir *Thomas Rumbold* at *Madras*, some correspondence I have understood took place, on the subject of an alliance; yet, when *Pondicherry* was attacked on the commencement of hostilities with *France*, it was generally imagined, and I believe justly, that *Hyder* would have tried to raise the siege, had not his arms at that time been employed in another quarter.

The subsequent attack upon *Mahé*, and the operations in the Guntoor Circar, was considered by *Hyder* as positive acts of hostility; and from that time he seems to have made no secret of his hostile designs against the *Carnatic*. I was then leaving *India*, and my own reflections upon all these circumstances which I have now related, added to the information which I received from Mr. *Schwartz*, who had just then returned from the Mysore Durbar, and from other channels of intelligence, made me conclude that a war was not far distant, and that *Hyder* only waited for an opportunity to begin hostilities; and I was sorry to see that the Maratta war, by exhausting the Company's resources, and dispersing the force, was likely to afford him a very favourable one; so that when I left *Madras*, I never doubted but that the *Carnatic* would very soon be the theatre of war. I must however add, that although I have mentioned the capture of *Mahé*, and the measures with respect to the Guntoor Circar, as powerful provocations to hostility; yet, in my opinion, *Hyder* would not have involved himself in a war with the English, had there been peace in *Hindostan*, until he had received the troops which were promised him from *France*; nor do I think he would ever have trusted his infantry and guns in the *Carnatic*, had the Madras Government only assembled the forces under that Presidency in proper time, and ordered the army to move towards the western passes, when they heard of *Hyder*'s approach from *Bengalore*.

No. 6.

Fort William, Secret Department.

General Letter, dated 7th January 1781.

To the honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *East-Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. THE departure of Major *John Scott* to *Europe*, by express appointment from the Governor General, as his private Agent, affording us an opportunity of addressing you, we have the honour to avail ourselves of it in transmitting to you, in triplicate, our last advices from this Department, by the ships *Fox* and *Walpole*. Major *Scott* has taken his passage on board a Portuguese ship, which being to stop in her way at *Fort Saint George*, we have recommended it to the President and Select Committee at that place, to embrace the same occasion of transmitting to you a relation of the occurrences upon the Coast, to the latest period of Major *Scott*'s stay. We beg leave to recommend this Gentleman to your favour, and that he may be restored to the Company's service, without prejudice to his rank, if he should be hereafter desirous of returning to *Bengal*.

2. We send to you numbers in this dispatch, copies of the Letters which we have received from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, since we had the honour of addressing you by the *Fox*. We are much concerned that the information contained in them obliges us to say, that we still continue in expectation of more favourable accounts of the state of your affairs on the Coast. The confidence which we place in the exertions of Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his experience in military affairs, and in his zeal for the public service, will not permit us to despond of a prosperous change in it, while he continues at the head of your army; nor shall any assistance be wanting which we can render, to give effect to his efforts. The military expences are indeed large, but we have promised to provide for them as long as we are able; and acting upon that promise, we have ordered that the sum of C. R^{s} 4,23,672. 10. 3. should be remitted to *Fort Saint George*, in specie, by the ship *Duke of Portland*, now under sailing orders. We have taken measures to continue to that Presidency supplies of grain, and other articles of which they are in need, and shall in no instance relax in our declared resolution to relieve their wants, as far as we may be able to supply them; but it is not in our power to afford that aid which the army is said greatly to require, in an increase of its strength in Europeans. The unfortunate disaster which befel the detachments from General *Munro*'s army near *Conjeveram*, in September last, was attended with an important diminution of it, and we are not able to spare, from the defence of our own provinces, more than have been already detached from them.

ited 10. 19, 20 Nov.

3. This consideration, added to others which arise from the present state of your affairs on the Coast, and the necessity which we feel of giving every aid to your Presidency of *Fort Saint George* that can possibly be obtained, without too disproportionate a sacrifice of the possessions of the Company, or of those of the Nabob *Walaw Jaw*, have induced us to propose a treaty of alliance with the Dutch, whose possessions at and adjacent to *Cochin*, have lately been invaded by *Hyder Ally Khan*. The treaty itself appears on our Proceedings of the 4th instant, which go a number in the packet, and has been formed with the advice and correction of Mr. *Ross*, Director and Governor of the Dutch *East India* Company's settlements in *Bengal*.

Conf. 4th January.

4. It appears, from an account, which the Governor General informs us has been communicated to him by Mr. *Ross*, that the force actually stationed at or near *Cochin*, will easily enable that Government to supply the proportion, both of European infantry and artillery, which are chiefly wanted, and of Malays, specified in the treaty; and these may be marched, at a very short notice, and by a very near route, into the *Carnatic*, if the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, on which they depend, will accede to the proffered alliance. To engage their assent, which will in such case involve both in great personal responsibility, as we understand that they have no regular powers to bind their Company in such an act without the sanction of the Superior Government of *Batavia*, we have offered to them much greater advantages than perhaps are suitable to the common interest which the Dutch Company have in the war, or than we should be inclined to yield in an equal and formal negotiation; but for this we have no time, the necessities of the Company require an instant relief, and the dependent state of those whom we solicit to be immediate parties in the treaty, claims some additional concessions, both to indemnify them, and to win the concurrence of their Superiors.

5. Urged by these considerations, we have proposed in the treaty the cession of the country of *Tinivelly* to the Dutch *East-India* Company. Its situation is such, that it may, as we conceive, be separated from the Government of the *Carnatic*, without either present embarrassment or danger of future competition; and from its contiguity to the Dutch possessions in *Ceylon*, will prove a greater acquisition to them than loss to the Nabob.

6. The treaty has been suddenly prepared without his knowledge, and of course without his consent; and the latter is, we know, indispensably necessary to that article of it, in which the cession of *Tinivelly* is suggested, and which, on our part, we can only propose; but it is the only part which he is likely to have in the

war,

war, although the principal in it; and we have, in our opinion, a right to claim at leaſt this ſmall return both for the hazards which we incur and the exertions which we make for the ſupport of his cauſe—a return, amounting only to the ſacrifice of a minute portion of his dominions, and that the moſt diſtant of them, for the ſalvation of the whole.

7. A copy of the Letter, written by the Governor General to the Nabob on this occaſion, as well as of thoſe addreſſed to the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, and to the Superior Government of *Batavia*, appear on our Proceedings of the 4th inſtant; to which we have already referred you for a tranſcript of the treaty itſelf: the latter has received our execution of it, and has been entruſted with our other diſpatches to *Fort Saint George*, to Mr. *James Dighton*, whom we have recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee, to be employed to proceed with the Treaty and Letters, and ſuch other diſpatches as they may have occaſion to add, to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*.

8. We think it proper to ſend, for your information, an Extract of a Letter which we have received from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, under date the 23d September, accompanied by a Letter to them from Mr. *Henſhaw*, their Reſident at *Goa*; it goes therefore a number in this diſpatch, but we deem the report therein conveyed to us, unworthy of our ſerious attention. We are generally inclined to believe, that although a connection may ſubſiſt between the Portugueſe and the Marattas, its effect cannot be important: they have no rank among the Powers in *India*; they have no means of ſubſiſting an army in the field; and no ſuch advantages are likely to be yielded to them, as can weigh againſt the ſtrong conſideration of the alliance which has long ſubſiſted between our nation and theirs. The claims which they prefer are claims of form, and perhaps would be preferred by any other Nation having them, whether they were or were not juſtly founded.

9. With reſpect to the ſuppoſed intention of aſſerting and maintaining the claim on *Baſſein* by force, it ſeems to us nugatory, and it cannot be effectual, ſince we have received certain advices that Brigadier General *Goddard*, with his army, was before *Baſſein* on the 18th of November laſt; and we are informed, that there was no force, excepting that in garriſon, to oppoſe his early capture of the place.

10. The inſults which have repeatedly been offered to the Portugueſe by our common enemy *Hyder Ally*; the friendſhip and alliance which has long ſubſiſted between their Nation and ours, and independently of this laſt conſideration, the intereſt which they have in common with us, in curbing an increaſe of power in that ambitious Chief, have induced us to make overtures to that Government, for an union with us in diſtreſſing *Hyder Ally*, by ſending a body of forces into his country; and we have availed ourſelves of the ſervices of Mr. *Auriol*, our Secretary, who had before received our permiſſion to proceed to the Weſt of *India*, for the re-eſtabliſhment of his health, by deputing him to *Goa* on this occaſion.

11. A copy of our inſtructions to Mr. *Auriol* goes a number in this packet: we confeſs that our expectations of ſucceſs from the overtures made to the Viceroy of *Goa* are not very ſanguine; but there appeared to us a poſſibility of adding to the force engaged againſt *Hyder Ally*, by the union of that Government with ours, and we were not willing to neglect even the remote chance of ſuch an advantage.

12. The perfidious conduct of thoſe of the French nation at *Pondicherry*, are repreſented in Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Letter of the 19th of November, ſuggeſting to us the neceſſity of taking immediate meaſures for preventing the example from having effect among thoſe reſident at *Chandernagore*, and within the provinces. We have given public notice to the higher claſs of Frenchmen, of our poſitive requiſition, that they all quit the provinces, by ſea, on or before the 31ſt inſtant, on pain of being made priſoners, ſhould they be found in them after that period; and we have given orders for the immediate ſeizure of thoſe of the lower claſs. They had been all required in June laſt to leave the provinces by the 1ſt October, and our indulgence had permitted their remaining in them to this time; but the flagrant and hoſtile conduct of their countrymen at *Pondicherry*, would not allow us to continue the favour ſhewn to them any longer.

13. We have the honour to ſend to you encloſed, copies of the Letters which we have received from Brigadier General *Goddard*, ſince we addreſſed you by the *Fox*; the information before quoted, of his arrival at *Baſſein*, will not be found in them, but it is ſufficiently authenticated by our receipt of a bill of exchange drawn by him, and dated the 18th of December.

14. Excepting the Letter from *Bombay* before-mentioned, and which is ſent a number in the packet, we have received no advices from that Preſidency of a later date than thoſe tranſmitted to you in our Proceedings ſent by the ſhip *Fox*. We have remitted to them by the ſhip *Portland*, treaſure to the amount of five lacks of rupees; and we have authorized them to draw bills on us for any further ſums, at a reaſonable exchange.

15. The provincial Commander in Chief, in the perſuaſion that to derive from the native infantry of our eſtabliſhment, thoſe capital advantages which can only reſult from exact diſcipline, tempered with a ſtrict adminiſtration of the rights of the ſoldiery, it was poſitively neceſſary thoroughly to reform and new model the corps compoſing this part of our military force, preſented to us on the 26th ultimo, a ſeries of propoſitions beſt calculated, according to his judgment, for compaſſing ſo important and uſeful an end. Theſe propoſitions were accompanied with figured ſtatements, exhibiting, as nearly as might be, the extraordinary expence which would be incurred by the new Sepoy eſtabliſhments, and the annual ſaving which would accrue from the general arrangements.

16. The Letters which we have received from Brigadier General *Stibbert* on this ſubject, and copies of the ſtatements and propoſitions accompanying them, are ſent to you numbers in this diſpatch. After maturely conſidering the principles on which the plan ſubmitted to us was obviouſly founded, after meaſuring the extent of the advantages it promiſed to produce, and after ſatisfying ourſelves that it united œconomy and utility, we delayed not, in the conviction that the late military conſtitution of our native infantry was pregnant with defects, which, unleſs timely corrected, threatened the moſt ſerious and alarming conſequences, to paſs the whole of General *Stibbert*'s propoſitions into reſolutions of our Council.

17. We will here delineate, as far as may be neceſſary, the general ground-work of this new ſuperſtructure; marking the leſs obvious motives of particular regulations, and diſtinguiſhing, in a conciſe manner, the advantages they poſſeſs over former inſtitutions and arrangements.

18. The apparent ſtrength of the battalions of the European regiments being at all times very inconſiderable (rarely exceeding 300 rank and file) and their poſitive or effective ſtrength being frequently below 200 men, the large eſtabliſhment of Officers annexed to theſe corps appeared to be productive of an utterly irrequiſite expence, without yielding a ſingle advantage in a military point of view; influenced by theſe reflections, we made it our requeſt to General *Stibbert*, to examine the expediency of doubling up the battalions of the regiments; and accordingly we have had the ſatisfaction of receiving his concurrence in a meaſure that while it occaſions in our monthly expences a retrenchment of 37,186 ſonat rupees, furniſhes us with a conſiderable number of Officers towards completing our native infantry on the new eſtabliſhment.

19. Although the Commander in Chief has, in the annexed

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annexed propoſitions, inſerted a clauſe expreſſing that when the ſtrength of the European regiments ſhall exceed 762 rank and file, they ſhall revert to their former conſtitution (becauſe in that caſe the corps would be too unwieldy for the purpoſe of manœuvring with celerity and exactneſs) yet we muſt remark, that it is by no means probable that we ſhall be reduced, during the continuance of the war in *Europe*, to the neceſſity of re-adopting this burthenſome aſylum, on the military principle ſuggeſted; and that the period at which alone ſuch a neceſſity is likely to occur, will be the beſt ſuited to its favourable and eaſy operation.

20. Having reſolved, in conſequence of the approaching departure of a diviſion of our army towards *Madras*, to augment our military force, we iſſued orders for the raiſing of ſix new battalions; but the Commander in Chief having ſuggeſted to us the expediency of new modelling the native infantry, and of applying an immediate and effectual remedy to the abuſes which had crept into the corps compoſing this part of the army, to the great detriment of the ſervice, we thought proper to recall thoſe orders, and to ſignify to him that we were prepared to receive his ſentiments at large upon this important and intereſting ſubject; when he accordingly preſented to us the annexed propoſitions, explaining them as far as was requiſite, in our Conſultations of the 26th ultimo, at which he was preſent.

21. As the advantages of the new Sepoy arrangements, as far as relate to the purpoſes of manœuvring and diſciplining the corps, as well as to the effects which may be produced on the minds of the Country Powers, by ſuch an apparent increaſe of the number of battalions on our eſtabliſhment, are fully ſet forth in General *Stibbert*'s Letter to us of the 31ſt of October, we beg leave to refer you to the ſame for his arguments on thoſe heads; which, we are to obſerve, had their due weight with us. We muſt alſo requeſt of you to ſeek, in the ſame Letter, the reaſons adduced by him for aboliſhing the office of Native Commandant to the Sepoy regiments; in the propriety of which we entirely acquieſced, as well as in the expediency of the regulation, directing the native adjutants to be made from jamautdars (inſtead of ſubadars) with a view of preventing theſe Officers from ſucceeding to the dangerous influence and authority of the Commandants.

22. At the ſame time that, in order to the correcting of the abuſes which had crept into the army, and which were of a nature tending directly to the deſtruction of the corps compoſing it, it was become neceſſary to fix ſuch checks, and to eſtabliſh ſuch rigid rules with regard to muſtering and paying the Sepoys, as ſhould put it totally out of the power of the Commanding Officers of regiments to derive any emoluments from their corps, and thereby engage their attention wholly to the diſciplining of them; it alſo became requiſite to annex ſuch rank and allowances to the command of theſe Officers, as ſuited its importance and the length of their ſervices. For to have entirely excluded them from all perquiſites and emoluments whatever, without advancing their rank and ſalary, would, ſuppoſing it poſſible to have eſtabliſhed ſuch a regulation, have produced no other conſequence, than that of rendering them to a man diſaffected to the ſervice; an evil that muſt have neceſſarily been followed by an univerſal relaxation of diſcipline, for which the moſt violent remedy would, under ſuch circumſtances, be ineffectual.

23. This danger however is avoided, by granting, as we have done, advanced rank and allowances to the Officers commanding regiments of Sepoys; who no doubt will, ere long, be reconciled to the reform; and being diſengaged from the purſuit of other objects, exert themſelves more than ever, in training and diſciplining the corps committed to their charge.

24. You will be ſatisfied, on examining the annexed papers, that notwithſtanding the great increaſe of Field Officers and Captains, conſequent to the new arrangements, there will be ſtill an annual ſaving on the whole of near three lacks and a half of ſonat rupees, after allowing for the actual increaſe of force gained to the eſtabliſhment. But as the Commander in Chief is aware, that, excluſive of pay and batta, there may be ſome other expences incurred by his regulations, of which he has not taken any notice, he does not reſt their propriety or utility on the head of ſaving. He will be ſatisfied if they ſhould not increaſe the diſburſements on the army account, and though, contrary to appearances, as well as to his hope, they ſhould add in a ſmall meaſure to the military burthen, he aſſerts himſelf confident, that the beneficial conſequences which will in due time reſult from them, will be abundantly more than adequate to the extraordinary expence they may occaſion.

25. It is unneceſſary for us to offer any remarks on the other parts of the annexed regulations. We conceive that they will ſpeak for themſelves; and we are particularly hopeful, that the preſcribed forms for muſtering and paying the native troops, will convince you that it was our deſign (in theſe arrangements) to ſtrike at the root of every abuſe that could poſſibly affect either the good order and diſcipline of your forces, or the rights of the native ſoldiery.

26. We ſend you herewith, a return of the European infantry and artillery on this eſtabliſhment: it will ſerve to place before you, in a clear view, the alarming diſproportion of our ſtrength in Europeans, to the number of native infantry; and at the ſame time the neceſſity of an early and ſtrong reinforcement of the former. We have before frequently ſuggeſted to you, the neceſſity of preſerving this eſtabliſhment entire; it was particularly ſubmitted to your attention in one Letter of the 13th of October laſt; and we muſt now repeat to you our moſt earneſt requeſt, that you will give the ſubject an early and particular conſideration. Your fixed eſtabliſhment of Europeans, even in time of peace, is not more than ſufficient to give reſpect to your military forces. In time of war, it is greatly inferior to its wants; and when the exiſting numbers are below the eſtabliſhment, it is our duty to declare to you, that your poſſeſſions are in danger of a ruin as ſudden as it may prove irretrievable. The eſſential ſtrength of this country, and the only ſtrength on which you can depend, is in the number of Europeans. You are not ſtrangers to this fact; and although there is no late proof from experience, of the truth of the aſſertion, it cannot be inferred, from this inſtance of our good fortune, that we may never experience the reverſe.

27. The ſum of forty-five lacks of rupees, to which the firſt loan on bonds, bearing an intereſt of 8 per centum per annum, was reſtricted by your reſolution of the 2d October laſt, having been completely ſubſcribed, we have determined to authorize the receipt of ſuch further ſums into the Treaſury as might be tendered to it for like bonds.

28. The ſtate of our Treaſury this day is as follows:

Ready Money	8,17,446	11	9
Bills receivable	1,85,728	2	—
Mint General Treaſury	4,80,732	13	—
Unſorted Treaſure	6,58,964	14	6
Current Rupees	21,42,872	9	3

Deduct

Deduct the amount of appropriated ſums as follows:

Balance account depoſits		11,00,900 8 5	
D° Accomptant General of the Mayor's Court		1,36,358 4 —	
Amount of the old bonded debt, in which the intereſt has ceaſed by public advertiſement	79,342 11 10		
D° D°, on account of the Churchwardens, bearing a running intereſt, by order of the Court of Directors	98,200 — —		
D° of the new bonded debt	62,58,651 1 6		
D° 4 per cent. remittee loan	14,55,550 — —		
D° annuities 1780	94,720 — —		
	78,08,921 1 6		
		79,86,463 13 4	
Rup'		92,23,722 9 9	

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful humble ſervants,

Fort William,
7 January, 1781.

Warren Haſtings.
Edward Wheler.

No. 7.

Fort William, the 4th January 1781.

Secret Department,
Thurſday,

At a Council;

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident, and
Edward Wheler, Eſquire,
Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* abſent on ſervice.

THE misfortunes which have attended the Company's arms in the *Carnatic*, in the war with *Hyder Ally*, and the diſadvantages which attend the proſecution of it, requiring that every aid ſhould be given to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, that can poſſibly be obtained, without too diſproportionate a ſacrifice of the poſſeſſions, either of the Nabob or the Company, the following draft of a treaty has therefore been formed, with the advice and correction of Mr. *Roſs*, the Director of *Chinſura*; the expediency of it having been ſuggeſted by the late hoſtilities which have been committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, upon the Dutch dependencies at *Cochin*. The force actually ſtationed at and near *Cochin*, as appears from an account communicated by Mr. *Roſs* to the Governor General, will very well enable that Government to ſupply the proportion both of European infantry and artillery, which we chiefly want, and of Malays, ſpecified in the treaty, and theſe may be marched at a very ſhort notice, and by a very near route, into the *Carnatic*, if the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, on which they depend, will accede to the propoſed treaty. To engage their aſſent, which will in ſuch caſe involve both in great perſonal reſponſibility, as we underſtand that they have no regular powers to bind their Company in ſuch an act, without the ſanction of the Superior Government of *Batavia*, we have proffered to them much greater advantages than perhaps are ſuitable to the common intereſt which the Dutch Company have in the war, or than we ſhould be inclined to yield in an equal and formal negotiation; but for this we have no time; our neceſſities require an inſtant relief, and the dependent ſtate of thoſe whom we ſolicit to be the immediate parties in the treaty, claims ſome additional conceſſions, both to indemnify them, and to win the concurrence of their Superiors. It is for this reaſon we have agreed to propoſe the ceſſion of the country of *Tinnevelly* to the Dutch. Its ſituation is ſuch, that it may, as we conceive, be ſeparated from the Government of the *Carnatic*, without either preſent embarraſſment, or danger of future competition; and, from its contiguity to the Dutch poſſeſſions in *Ceylon*, will prove a greater acquiſition to them, than loſs to the Nabob. His conſent, indeed, is eſſentially and indiſpenſably neceſſary to this article of the treaty, which on our part we can only propoſe; but it is the only part which he is likely to bear in the war, although the principal in it; and we have a right to claim at leaſt this ſmall return, both for the hazards which we incur, and the exertions which we make, for the ſupport of his cauſe; that is the ſacrifice of a minute portion, and that the moſt diſtant of his dominions, for the ſalvation of the whole.

For all the foregoing reaſons, we have reſolved, both on the ſubſtance of the treaty, as we have conſtituted it, and on its immediate execution on our part; and that it be tranſmitted, with the Letter entered on the Proceedings of this day, to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.—Other remarks, upon the treaty itſelf, we preſume will be unneceſſary, as we conceive their object and tendency will be obvious.

Propoſals for a Treaty of Alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies, and the Nabob *Walla Jah Bahâder*.

Whereas the Nabob *Hyder Ally Cawn* has, without any cauſe, invaded the *Carnatic Payengaut*, and the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company which are ſituated therein, and attacked the ſettlements and forts of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company dependent on the Government of *Cochin*, on the Malabar Coaſt; whereof it hath become the common intereſt of the Nabob *Wallajah Bahâdar*, who is the Sovereign of the *Carnatic Payengaut*, and of the two Companies aforeſaid, to unite in repelling and defeating the attempts and deſigns of the ſaid *Hyder Ally Cawn*, the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, with the advice and ſuggeſtion of the Directors for the management of the affairs of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, do propoſe and offer the following conditions of a treaty to the Nabob *Wallajah*, and to the proper Agents and Repreſentatives of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company aforeſaid; hereby declaring them to be from the time in which the ſaid conditions ſhall receive the ſeals and ſignatures of the other parties to this treaty, binding on the Governor General and Council, and on all the Governments and dependencies of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, in virtue of the ſeal of the Company, and the ſignatures of the Governor General and Council herein firſt prefixed; viz.

Article the firſt.—The Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin* ſhall engage to provide and aſſign for the quota of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in the war with *Hyder Ally Cawn*, at or near *Cochin*, a diſciplined force, conſiſting

Supplemental Appendix to the Firſt Report. No. 7.

ſiſting of not leſs than one thouſand European infantry, two hundred European artillery, and one thouſand Malays, with their complement of Officers, not exceeding the rank of Captains, it being underſtood and agreed, that all the Officers of a ſuperior rank ſhall either be furniſhed by the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, or appointed by commiſſions from them. Theſe forces ſhall be delivered over to the charge of ſuch Officer or Officers as ſhall be appointed by the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* to receive them; who ſhall for that purpoſe proceed to *Cochin*, to receive charge and command of the ſame; and from that time the ſaid forces ſhall remain ſubject to the general authority and command of the Commander in Chief of the Engliſh forces, in like manner as the Engliſh forces in *India* are ſubject to his command, until the concluſion of the war, whether by the final conqueſt of the dominions of *Hyder Ally Cawn*, or by peace concluded with him, and their re-delivery in conſequence thereof to their original and proper Government; and their pay, according to the rates at which they are paid in the ſervice of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, together with all expences of the field or garriſon, ſhall be at the charge of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, from the day on which they are transferred to the Engliſh command, until the day of their return, and re-delivery at *Cochin*, or ſuch other place as ſhall be mutually appointed for that purpoſe.

Article the ſecond.—In conſideration of the aſſiſtance granted in the manner ſtipulated in the preceding article, beſides their pay and expence, which are to be defrayed by the Governor General and Council on the part of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, it is propoſed and recommended by the Governor General and Council to the Nabob *Wallajah Babader*, that he ſhall, on his part, grant and aſſign, by proper ſunnuds, to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, his right and property in the province or diſtrict of *Tinnevelly*, together with the excluſive right in the Pearl Fiſhery of all the Coaſt lying to the ſouth of *Remfirem*, to the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company; who ſhall be permitted to take poſſeſſion thereof from the day on which this treaty ſhall receive its final ratification, without any let or impediment on the part of his Aumils or Officers, of whatever denomination; and the ſaid province or diſtrict ſhall remain the property of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company for ever.

Article the third.—It ſhall be allowable to the Government of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company at *Cochin*, to carry on any ſeparate operations againſt the common enemy with their own forces, and to make conqueſts of any lands or countries adjacent to *Cochin*, and to keep poſſeſſion of the ſame without any claim of participation on the part of the Nabob *Wallajah Bahâder*, or of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company.

Article the fourth.—If a further aid of troops ſhall be required from the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company, for the maintenance of the war, they ſhall engage to furniſh the ſame ſo ſoon as they can be obtained from the Supreme Government at *Batavia*, on the ſame terms and in the ſame manner as are ſtipulated in the firſt article.

Article the fifth.—This treaty being firſt executed in the manner above-mentioned by the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, for and on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, ſhall be next tendered to the Nabob *Wallajah Bahâder*, for his acceptance and ratification; and having received the ſame, it ſhall be forwarded to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, that it may, in like manner, receive their aſſent and final ratification, without any addition, diminution, or alteration whatſoever, to be made either by the Nabob *Wallajah Bahâder*, or by the Government of *Columbo* and *Cochin*.

Ordered, that the treaty above propoſed be copied fair, and that it be circulated by the Secretary to the Members of the Board for execution.

Agreed, that Mr. *James Dighton* be appointed Agent on the part of the Governor General and Council on this occaſion, with the uſual allowances; that he be entruſted with the care of our diſpatches to *Fort Saint George*, and recommended to the Preſident and Select Committee, to be employed by them to proceed with the Treaty and Letters written to *Columbo* and *Cochin*, together with ſuch other diſpatches as they may have occaſion to add, to thoſe Governments.

The Governor General lays before the Board the draft of a Letter which he has prepared to his Highneſs the Nabob of the *Carnatic*.

To his Highneſs the Nabob *Wallajah*, &c. &c. &c.

May it pleaſe your Highneſs,

The very critical ſituation in which the affairs of your Highneſs are at preſent involved, by the invaſion of the *Carnatic*, by *Hyder Ally Cawn*; the diſgrace which the Britiſh arms have lately ſuſtained on the Coaſt, and the conſequent neceſſity of every vigorous exertion on your part, not only to recover what has been loſt, but to preſerve what remains; are points too cloſely connected with your Highneſs's intereſt and proſperity, to require many arguments to enforce them.

From theſe circumſtances, which alone I conceive to be of ſufficient weight, but which derive greater force from the obligations your Highneſs is under to the Company, for the benefit of their protection and aſſiſtance upon repeated occaſions, I cannot but entertain hopes that your Highneſs will readily and cheerfully cooperate with us in any plan which may be propoſed for the common advantage, and for the more ſucceſsfully defeating the ambitious deſigns of *Hyder Ally Cawn*; eſpecially when you reflect how much has been already done by this Government, and in how ſhort a ſpace of time, from the firſt intelligence of the late heavy diſaſter which has befallen our arms on the Coaſt, to redeem, as far as it is in our power, the national credit, and with it to retrieve the particular loſs which your Highneſs has ſuffered; and the great ſacrifice we have made in relinquiſhing the proſecution of the Maratta war, almoſt in the moment when we had reaſon to expect, from the ſucceſſes which have attended it, that it would have ſpeedily terminated in an honourable and advantageous peace. Relying therefore upon the effect which I doubt not theſe conſiderations will produce on the mind of your Highneſs, I proceed to acquaint you, that in conſequence of the information which has long ſince been received, of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, on the territories belonging to the Dutch, at or adjacent to *Cochin*; and his late invaſion of the *Carnatic*, by which the ſafety of your poſſeſſions is endangered, equally with thoſe of the Company; we have prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies and yourſelf; and having firſt tendered it for approval to Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, and obtained his concurrence, we have affixed our ſeals and ſignatures to it, declaring it to be binding on us, and have requeſted the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to preſent it to your Highneſs for your aſſent and ratification, with an apology for having introduced your name into the treaty, without the previous ſanction of your authority; but as the ſtep would have required too tedious a proceſs, and would have opened a channel of negotiation and correſpondence, by which the ends propoſed by the treaty, which are immediate aſſiſtance, would have been defeated; your Highneſs will perceive the impoſſibility of an application of this ſort, which otherwiſe that proper reſpect and attention which is due to your Highneſs would moſt certainly have ſuggeſted. When the treaty has been approved of and ſigned by your Highneſs, it will be tranſmitted to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, for their final ratification. Depending that your Highneſs, from your firm alliance with, and friendſhip for, the *Eaſt India* Company, and from the confidence which you repoſe in them,

them, will contribute cheerfully your aſſiſtance, in the manner and on the terms which have been ſtated in the treaty, I will conclude with wiſhing an increaſe of health and proſperity to your Highneſs.

Agreed to the draft of the Letter propoſed by the Governor General, and ordered that it be tranſlated.

Agreed, that the following Letters be written to the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, and to the Superior Government of *Batavia*.

To the Governor of *Columbo*:

Honourable Sir,

Having long ſince received information of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn*, on the Dutch territories at or adjacent to *Cochin*; and taking into our conſideration, the circumſtance of his being at preſent in open war againſt them, together with the neceſſity of repelling his ambitious deſigns upon the *Carnatic*, which involve your ſtate equally with thoſe of the Nabob *Wallajah*, and the Engliſh Company; we have prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies, and the Nabob *Wallajah Bahâder*, upon ſuch terms as we truſt will be accepted by you and the Governor of *Cochin*; having firſt tendered it to the peruſal of Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, and obtained his approval of it; and as the evident advantage to be derived to the Dutch Company, from the ratification of the treaty on your parts, muſt free you from every apprehenſion of reſponſibility to the Superior Government at *Batavia*, for having acceded to it without the previous ſanction of their authority, the obſtacle which might otherwiſe have been allowed weight, will by this means be removed.

The ſame reaſon which prevented us from making an application direct to *Batavia*, will be ſufficient to evince the impoſſibility of its entering into a correſpondence with your Government and that of *Cochin*, on the ſubject, ſince in both caſes the time which would be required for receiving an anſwer reſpecting the ratification of the treaty, would have defeated the ends of it, which are, immediate aſſiſtance.

We have therefore, for the greater diſpatch, affixed our ſeals and ſignatures to the treaty, declaring it to be binding on us, and all the dependencies of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and have tranſmitted it to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, requeſting them to tender it to the Nabob for his aſſent; and as ſoon as the Nabob ſhall have made himſelf a ſubſcribing party to it, that it may be forwarded with all poſſible expedition to you; depending, that when the true intereſt of your nation is provided for ſo materially, you will not be the cauſe of a moment's delay in the execution of it.

We have the honour to be, &c.

The ſame to the Governor of *Cochin*.

To *Batavia*.

To the Superior Government at *Batavia*.

Honourable Sirs,

In conſequence of the information which we have long ſince received of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* on the Dutch territories, at or adjacent to *Cochin*, and his late invaſion of the *Carnatic*, by which the ſafety of your poſſeſſions in that part of the world is endangered equally with our own; and in conſideration of the neceſſity of a mutual co operation to repel the deſigns of ſo ambitious an enemy, we have prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies; and the Nabob *Wallajah Bahâder*, having firſt tendered it for approval to Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, and obtained his concurrence in conſideration of the terms of it being ſo favourable to your Company; and we have now, to prevent delay, diſpatched it to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, with our ſeals and ſignatures affixed, together with a declaration, that it ſhall be binding on our parts; and we have further requeſted, as ſoon as the conſent of the Nabob *Wallajah* ſhall have been obtained to the treaty, that it may be forwarded with all poſſible expedition to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, for their final ratification and concurrence. As the time which would be required for receiving an anſwer from you reſpecting the ratification of the treaty would have defeated the ends of it, which are immediate aſſiſtance, the impoſſibility of a previous application for this purpoſe will, we truſt, be ſufficiently evident, and apologize for our having recourſe to the only method which could be effectual in ſo critical a conjuncture, that of forwarding it to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, who, we doubt not, will obtain your approbation for having ſubſcribed to a treaty in which the manifeſt advantages to your State will free them from every ſhare of reſponſibility.

We have the honour to be,

Fort William, the 4th January 1781. &c. &c. &c.

Ordered, That copies of the above Letters of the propoſed Treaty, and of the Letter from the Governor General to the Nabob, be prepared for the peruſal of the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George*, and that a Letter be written to them as follows:

To the Honourable *Charles Smith*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Select Committee, *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Having long ſince received information of the hoſtilities and depredations committed by *Hyder Ally Cawn* on the territories belonging to the Dutch, at or adjacent to *Cochin*; and taking into conſideration the circumſtance of his being at preſent engaged in open war againſt them, together with the neceſſity of defeating his ambitious deſigns upon the *Carnatic*, and preſerving, as far as in us lies, the poſſeſſions of the Company and the Nabob; we have, with the advice and ſuggeſtion of Mr. *Roſs*, Director and Governor of the Dutch *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, prepared the draft of a treaty of alliance between the Engliſh and Dutch *Eaſt India* Companies, and the Nabob *Wallajah Bahader*, upon ſuch terms as we have every reaſon to hope will be accepted. But as the time which would be required for receiving an anſwer from the Superior Government of *Batavia*, reſpecting its ratification of, and final aſſent to the treaty, would entirely fruſtrate the ends of it, which are immediate aſſiſtance, we have reſolved to make our application direct to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*; for which purpoſe we have affixed our ſeals and ſignatures to the treaty, declaring it to be binding on our parts; and we requeſt, that on the receipt of it, you will uſe all poſſible expedition in diſpatching it to thoſe Governments, having firſt tendered it to the Nabob, and obtained his aſſent to it. You will be pleaſed to accompany this tender with an apology for the Nabob, from us, for having introduced his name into the treaty without the ſanction of his approbation; but as this ſtep would have been attended with too tedious a proceſs, and would have opened a channel for negotiation and correſpondence, which would have impeded the inſtant execution of the meaſure propoſed, upon which, in this critical moment, ſo much depends, we truſt he will perceive the impoſſibility of our previous application to him, which otherwiſe a proper attention and reſpect to him would not have ſuffered us to omit.

In the event of a refuſal on the part of the Nabob, we deſire you will repreſent, in the ſtrongeſt terms to him, the nature of his ſituation, and the indiſpenſable obligation he is under of making common cauſe with the Company,

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leſs to ſecure their poſſeſſions than his own, from the encroachments of the enemy; that his very exiſtence is now at ſtake; that he is more a principal in the war than ourſelves; that it is not by any means which can be furniſhed by him, or by any reſources or treaſure of his, that the *Carnatic* is to be ſaved and defended, but by the wealth of *Bengal*, and the blood of Britiſh ſubjects ſacrificed in his ſervice; that therefore we expect his aſſent to the treaty, and urge it as a juſt claim, which we have upon him, in return for the protection which he has experienced at our hands.

We ſhall wait to hear the reſult of your application; not doubting that, from motives of policy and neceſſity, as well as juſtice, he will accede to the terms which we have offered in his name.

We have appointed Mr. *James Dighton* to be the bearer of our diſpatches, and have entruſted to his care a copy of the Letter addreſſed by the Governor General to the Nabob ſeparately; together with copies of the Letters to the Governors of *Columbo* and *Cochin*, for your inſpection; and we requeſt that he may be employed to proceed with the Treaty and Letters, together with ſuch other diſpatches as you may have occaſion to add, to the Governments of *Columbo* and *Cochin*.

We rely upon your zeal and activity in this buſineſs, and depend on receiving every neceſſary information as early as it is in your power.

We have the honour to be,
&c. &c. &c.

Fort William, 4th January 1781.

Warren Haſtings.
Edwd Wheler.

No. 8.

Extract of Poſtſcript of Letter from the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated the 12th January 1781.

WE have particularly attended to His Majeſty's order in council, dated the 17th of laſt April, relative to the line he has been graciouſly pleaſed to take with the United Provinces; and ſhall be cautious to avoid becoming aggreſſors in any act againſt the ſubjects of the Republic in *India*: at the ſame time that we ſhall vigilantly guard againſt any conſequences which may eventually ariſe from the meaſures which His Majeſty has been under the neceſſity of adopting.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated 17th February 1781.

Par. 15. Alarmed at the ſituation to which it was reported in *Bengal* we were reduced, and deſirous, in every event, that our whole influence ſhould not be loſt in the *Carnatic*, the Governor General and Council conceive it of importance, that a treaty ſhould be concluded with the Dutch Government of *Ceylon* and that of *Cochin*; whereby 1,000 European military, 200 artillery, and 1,000 Malays, to be paid by us, were to be brought to our aſſiſtance by the Dutch, for the entire and perpetual ceſſion of the *Tinnevelly* Countries, and the excluſive right to the Pearl Fiſhery; both of them eſtimated at about 35 lacks of rupees per annum; and, that no time ſhould be loſt by negotiation, they furniſhed us with a treaty, ratified on their part, and deſired that we would prevail upon the Nabob to conclude it finally, by giving it the ſanction of his ſignature and ſeal.

16. A ſcheme of aſſiſtance from the Dutch, on certain conditions, was ſome months ago indirectly intimated to us; but although we did not totally lay aſide the conſideration of it, we were well aware of ſome weighty objections to which it appeared liable. The great additional expence that ſuch a number of troops would amount to, ſeemed alone ſufficient to deter us from liſtening to the propoſal; and, even were that impediment obviated, the ſum which would be required might, we were of opinion, be employed to much more advantage, by entertaining a body of cavalry; the want of which had already been ſeverely felt. But this was not the only difficulty which occurred; the diſgrace that would probably attend ſuch a meaſure, in the opinion of the Country Powers, as well as the danger to which our affairs might in the courſe of the war be expoſed, through the intrigues of ſo extraordinary and enterprizing a character as *Hyder Ally*. There were ſuch powerful arguments againſt the meaſure, that even had ſuch a body of troops been ready to join our army at a ſhort notice, and a junction with them rendered certain, it was by no means clear that our ſituation, diſtreſſing as it then was, would have warranted an acquieſcence on our part.

17. Theſe having been our ſentiments when the poſture of affairs wore ſo very unfavourable an aſpect, we ſhould have held ourſelves highly reprehenſible, were we in any manner to have promoted the ratification of the treaty, at a time when, from the ſpirited and prudent conduct of General Sir *Eyre Coote*, your affairs on this Coaſt were experiencing the moſt happy and favourable turn; and, not to mention the good effects to be expected from the operations of General *Goddard* on the Malabar Coaſt, when the approach of the reſpectable body that is coming from *Bengal*, would probably work ſo material a change in our affairs, as to put it in our power to act, and we doubt not with effect upon the offenſive.

18. The revenues of the Southern Provinces likewiſe, being almoſt the only reſources left to the Nabob, and his Highneſs having aſſigned them over to your uſe, reſerving only to himſelf ſuch part as ſhould be neceſſary for his houſhold expences; and as theſe form the moſt conſiderable part of what we are to receive for carrying on the war, the making them over in perpetuity to the Dutch, would be to deprive ourſelves of the only probable means we had left in the *Carnatic*, independent of which His Majeſty's declaration in council, of the 17th April 1780, relative to the ſubjects of the States General, rendered the giving them the opportunity of acquiring an undue influence in this country, a meaſure both highly impolitic, and detrimental to your affairs.

Supplemental Appendix to the Second Report.

No. 1.

Mr. *Sadlier*'s Letter to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, from *Maſulipatam*, explaining the probable conſequences of ſummoning the Zemindars to the Preſidency; dated 5th May 1778.

To the honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, eſquire, Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

Dear Sir,

BY my long ſilence, I fear you may conclude I have been ſlack in my promiſe, of giving you regularly the information you might have expected. However much appearances are againſt me, I truſt the preſent Letter will remove ſuch impreſſions. I have always had in mind how much at heart you ſeemed to have the coming of the Zemindars; and my utmoſt endeavours have been uſed to facilitate your wiſh, but leſs ſanguine than you appear, of the eligibility of undertaking ſuddenly great reformation of ſyſtem, and aware of the difficulties in which you may be involved. As I could not, conſiſtently with the warm ſupport, gratitude and inclination prompt me, flatter you of the immediate ſucceſs of your meaſures,

ſures, I thought beſt to be ſilent, and not awake diſtruſt in you, till a full and complete ſtate of the Settlement and our ſituation were ſent you: ſuch is now completed, and goes this night from the Council.

If it had pleaſed you to have repoſed confidence in me, and appriſed me of the ſtate of this Settlement previous to my departure from *Madras*, and intruſted to me after I could have communicated to you my opinion on your plan, and the time fitteſt for its being undertaken, poſſibly our treaſury might have been repleniſhed, and the ſcheme forwarded. But having, previous to my knowledge of your intention, written to the Zemindars, I found my influence and the influence of the Board here, annulled, and nothing to be done till you have the Zemindars with you, or till this Government are inveſted with their uſual authority.

The Zemindars having now conſented to proceed to *Madras*, in conſequence of the order ſent them, enforced by us, with every mark of ſubmiſſion and obedience becoming our ſtation. After giving the ſubject referred to you its due conſideration, and ſatisfying yourſelf how the calls on us for money here are to be ſupplied, I humbly think no time ſhould be loſt, in compelling the Zemindars attendance at the Preſidency, that you ſhould even fix a day for their departure, and empower us here to enforce it with Sepoys. The apparent violence in ſuch meaſure ought not to deter you, as it commonly requires ſuch an exertion to get them from their reſpective countries here, and when here frequently in uſe to attain the end of Government in fulfilling their engagements.

I have now the pleaſure to encloſe you the neceſſary ſtatements requiſite for a complete knowledge of our finances; viz.

No. 1. Complete view of the annual zemabundy, and amount of kiſts to be accounted for at this period.

2. Nett balances now owing and unaccounted for of the preſent year's zemabundy, including balances of the laſt kiſts of the laſt year.

3. An account kiſts due 31ſt Auguſt next, in full of zemabundy, to 25th September.

4. Balances owing by Renters, in which is ſpecified the parts received ſince the 13th April laſt.

5. Particulars of the Soucars bills now in hand.

6. Account money ſaid by the Soucars to be owing them by the Zemindars.

Which accounts will inform you of the money owing and to be received to the 25th September next, or expiration of the year Phazula 1187, amounting to ſix lack and near eighty thouſand pagodas. The payment of which money will fall chiefly on *Tripety Rauze* of *Muglatore*, *Juggapetty Rauze* of *Pedapore*, *Row Vencato Row* of *Pettapore*, *Opparow*, and *Ramchundra Rauze*. It is therefore proper to ſay ſomething of theſe men's circumſtances reſpectively.

Tripety Rauze, to the preſent time, is a man who has always punctually fulfilled his engagements to the Company, is ſaid to be a good and able manager of his country, well verſed in buſineſs, and at little expence for Sibbendy. Has been extremely uſeful to the Company's Revenue, in aiding different Chiefs to ſettle the zemabundy, by ſubſtituting himſelf ſecurity for Zemindars, who otherwiſe could not have found it; and has hitherto preſerved great influence among the Zemindars, in concluding the Company's buſineſs. He is ſaid to have loſt conſiderably by the countries under his management, for which he became ſecurity; and has paid on this account what money he may have ſaved by his former good management. At preſent he is much in arrears to his Soucars and others; and the failure of payment of *Narſanah Naik* is imputed to this cauſe. *Tripety Rauze*'s intention was, I believe, to have changed his Soucar; to have let the balance owing him remain till his circumſtances bore a better aſpect; and by this manœuvre might have ſettled his affairs for the preſent with the Company. Thus embarraſſed as he now is, I know not how he can conclude his affairs to your ſatisfaction at *Madras*.

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Opparow's country has long been in the management of other hands; three Purgunnahs of it under *Tripety Rauze*, and the remainder under Meſſrs. *Hodges* and *Pringle*. It is ſaid to be a fine country, capable of diſcharging its tribute, when properly managed; but *Opparow* not thought equal to the undertaking, being given up to indolence, and pleaſed with the name of a large Sibbendy: his affairs were neglected, and unneceſſary expences incurred. No hope of this man if left to himſelf, ſettling by Soucars; nor do I ſee a proſpect of proſperity to his country, or ſecurity to the Company, but by ſequeſtration, under the management of proper perſons: and from his conduct laſt year, there is reaſon to believe he will continue ſatisfied with the produce of his land cuſtoms, for his maintenance and expences, until his country has paid off the heavy debts it is now liable to, and he can be eſtabliſhed on the footing he before enjoyed.

Juggapety Rauze has the name of being able to ſettle his affairs with the Company, according to the uſual mode, either here or at *Madras*; but ſeems to aſſume much, from the name his family have had of firſt Zemindar, and the deference others ſhew him on that account. Knowing the preſſing occaſions of the Company, he wiſhes to take advantage of it; and before he will conſent to give bills, intends, as a preliminary, to have ſettled diſputes, which have long ſubſiſted between his family and that of *Row Vencata Row*. It is ſaid a cloſe connection has taken place between him and *Sitteram Rauze*; that Vackeels and correſpondence are in uſe between them; and from this man's influence, I muſt remark here, that I have cauſe to imagine an intrigue on foot between the Zemindars of the Chicacole diſtrict, *Juggernaut Rauze*, *Sitteram Rauze*, &c. and thoſe of theſe countries. This ſhould be diſcouraged, and may cauſe a combination of the whole of the Zemindars to diſtreſs and embarraſs your plan. To overcome ſuch confederacy, you might ſettle the affairs of the different diſtricts ſeparately and at different times, and not hazard the effects of intrigue, by bringing the whole of them together.

Row Vencata Row, by grants obtained of Mr. *Whitehill*, has his country in proſpect of proſperous cultivation, by the preſent allotment of water; which allotment *Juggaputty Rauze* loudly complains of, and wants reverſed. This man's Soucar has paid up all his kiſts; and I fancy his credit ſuch, that a renewal of agreement in the uſual mode may be effected.

Ramchundra Rauze has claim to the Cotah country; and has repreſented to us his pretenſions of right. At preſent, the Cotah country is in charge of a Tonadar for the Company. He wiſhes, before he gives bills for his kiſts, to have this matter decided; after which he may be able to ſettle his buſineſs in the uſual way.

Codant Ram and *Vaſſereddy Ramanah* have always been punctual in the performance of their engagements to the Company, and may be expected to continue ſo.

To ſuch Letters as were written the Zemindars, the anſwers leave me entirely ignorant of the mode by which they expect to manage their affairs at *Madras*; nor am I able to give you other account than conjecture, of the proſpect of their doing it to your ſatisfaction. What I have ſaid is my opinion of their circumſtances; and the concluſion to be drawn from it muſt now be ſubmitted to yourſelf. When they are at *Madras*, I am humbly of opinion you ſhould firſt inſiſt on their finding ſecurity for the money now owing, before you think of interfering in the differences and diſſentions exiſting among them. It will be their endeavour, and you will find them obſtinately bent on it, to have theſe matters ſettled previouſly.

In order to ſhew how anxious I have been to accompliſh your wiſh, and aſſiſt in its ſucceſs, I ſend you copy of a Minute I read to the Council, and intended recording; but reflecting that any apparent violence, in the

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execution of orders of ſo delicate a nature, might be liable to miſrepreſentation, and the intention miſconſtrued, I withdrew it. The Council nevertheleſs would have concurred with me; and here I beg leave to inform you, that all of them have afforded me publicly ſuch ſupport as was proper and becoming their ſituation.

By the eſtimate of probable receipts and monthly diſburſements, ſent the Board, you will find we have hope of receiving very little; and our diſburſements, no-leſs than 33,000 pagodas monthly; beſides which, we owe the 31ſt March laſt, to the Soubah, pagodas 77,922, on account of his tribute; which ſum is increaſing monthly, at the rate of pagodas 10,822½. The payment of the laſt money was completed by the Soucars only a few days ſince; a delay which occaſioned the Soubah, by one of his people, to write *Vencata Royloo*, as you will perceive by tranſlate of the Letter now ſent.

It becomes an object of your moſt ſerious attention, in caſe the Zemindars proceed as at preſent is intended, to find means by which our treaſury may be ſupplied; the moſt valuable part of the Company's inveſtment depends on it; and the Zemindars withholding as they do aſſiſtance of any kind, leaves little hopes of reſources in ourſelves; for whatever may appear due, ſuch is the ſtate of credit, and ſuch the uncertainty of payment, I do not at this hour know where I can apply with certainty for the ſmalleſt ſums; and all I expect to be able to do, will barely furniſh the demands of the preſent month, independent of our ſilver, which may amount to about a lack of rupees, to be ſold to great loſs, the exchange being now near 400 *P*. pagodas. Miſcarriage in any of the affairs dependent on this Settlement, may therefore be imputed to the change of ſyſtem, and what diſappointments enſue, juſtified by the Council here on this plea, and all misfortunes incident to it imputed to your Board.

If too, by improper management heretofore, deficiency in payment of the kiſts now due, and the revenue of this country, according to its preſent ſettlement, ſhould happen, may not the cauſe, by its effect of giving the firſt ſhock, too common and long practiſed credit in the mode of ſecurity in theſe countries, be alſo abſcribed to the preſent plan? In ſhort, if it happens that the Settlement, by bad ſeaſons and cauſes alledged by the Zemindars, is on the decline, would it not be prudent to leave the Government charged hitherto with full reſponſibility, to juſtify its meaſures, to work out its own misfortunes, and bear the cenſure it deſerves? are queſtions with deference I ſubmit to your better judgment.

The period of ſettlement by Mr. *Floyer*, expires the 25th September next; a new zemabundy muſt then be agreed on; that time or October may be better ſuited, and the people better prepared to viſit the Preſidency. In caſe then no change is intended in the preſent Settlement, ſuch ſeaſon may be equally convenient for the Company for a future plan; and the Board here, by being left to accompliſh preſent payments, may poſſibly at that time have its treaſury in a ſtate to anſwer its exigencies, and the plan proceed without inconvenience. I am led to theſe obſervations, from a ſincere wiſh to promote the ſucceſs of your meaſures; and ſtimulated by ſuch motives, led to a freedom of remark I would not have uſed, but to the perſon whoſe honour and ſucceſs highly intereſts me; I truſt therefore I ſhall not have given offence: you have now (if you think the ſubject deſerves it) but to afford it due conſideration, and ſignify your further wiſhes to enſure in me an arduous deſire to ſecond them, by the moſt implicit obedience to your further commands.

The preſent Letter is meant a private one, but whatever obſervations concern the Public, may be uſed as you have occaſion.

I have the honour to remain moſt reſpectfully,
My dear Sir,
Your faithful and moſt
obliged humble Servant,
Anth. Sadlier.

Mazulipatam,
5th May 1778.

No. 2.

Captain *Johnſton*, of the *Granby*, examined.

I SAILED from *Britain* 7th March 1779—went to *Madras*—arrived there the 18th of January 1780—Sir *Thomas Rumbold* was Governor—I remained there five months, and ſailed about the 18th of June, and went to *China*—touched at *Malacca* in my way—arrived in *China* about 29th Auguſt 1780.

Did you carry any treaſure from *Madras* to *China*?—Yes, I did.

Was it belonging to the Company or individuals?—To individuals—Sir *Thomas Rumbold* ſome of it—I had 8,000 pagodas for him—I delivered them to Mr. *Bradſhaw*—there were no other ſpecie or effects belonging to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—his attornies, Meſſrs. *Oakley* and *Proctor*, applied to me to take it on board—Sir *Thomas* had quitted *Madras*—the application was made to me about fourteen days before I ſailed—the treaſure was not regularly entered in the books where other effects were entered—a bill of lading was given for it.—I had beſides this, about thirty thouſand pagodas belonging to other individuals—ſome to Mr. *Cuthbert*—I don't recollect the other—none belonged to either the Governor or Council, except the above of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s; nor any goods upon freight.—I had ſome cotton and pepper belonging to others—no jewels nor pearls—the *Seahorſe* man of war ſailed in company, and was convoy to the ſhips, and had money and jewels on board to a large amount, as I underſtood from Captain *Panton*—the treaſure did not belong to the Company, but to individuals.

Do you know to whom?—I heard from Captain *Panton*, that 16,000 pagodas belonged to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—in converſation with Captain *Panton* on board my ſhip, he aſked me what quantity of pagodas I had of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s? I told him 8,000; and his reply was, that he had double the number belonging to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—five of the Company's ſhips and the *Seahorſe* ſailed together—Captain *Panton* did not mention who the other property in his ſhip belonged to.

There were fifteen or ſixteen country ſhips at *China* the year I was there—I don't know they carried any treaſure, as they generally carry cargoes belonging to different perſons, the produce whereof they generally pay into the different treaſuries in *China*.

Withdrew.

Captain *Parker*, of the *Bridgewater*, examined.

I left *Britain* the 12th of February 1780—went to *Madras*—arrived there the 23d of July—remained there twenty-three days—went from thence to *China*—arrived at *Macao* the 2d of Auguſt—ſailed from *China* the 2d of February 1781, and arrived at *Spithead*, the 12th of October.

Did you carry any treaſure from *Madras* to *China*?—I did.

Was it public, or belonging to individuals?—It belonged to myſelf and *Richard Lewin*, who was a ſecond mate in the Company's ſervice—a little for an Armenian—Mr. *Lewin*'s was about 8 or 9,000 pagodas—I had none other—I delivered Mr. *Lewin*'s property into the Company's caſh at *China*—Mr. *Bradſhaw* did it for me—I had nothing belonging to the Governor, Council, or any of the Civil Servants of the Company.

Withdrew.

Captain *Montgomery*, of the *Beſsborough*, examined.

I ſailed from *Britain*, July 15th 1777—went to *Madras*—carried out Sir *Thomas Rumbold*—arrived at *Madras*, 8th February 1778—ſtaid there about 14 days—went from thence to *Bombay*—arrived there April 30th, and left it 12th July—Went back to *Madras*—arrived there

there the 29th July—ſailed Auguſt 6th to join Sir *Edward Vernon* at *Pondicherry*—arrived there 11th—quitted him the 21ſt of October, and went to *Madras* again, and arrived there the 4th of November 1778—proceeded from thence the 19th to *Bengal*—arrived there the 31ſt December—ſailed from thence the 24th of February 1779, and arrived at *Madras* the fourth time, the 16th of March 1779—from *Madras* I went the 23d of March to *Bombay*, and touched at ſeveral places on the Coaſt, and arrived on June 17th—I ſailed from thence 23d September, and returned to *Bengal* again; arrived there the 1ſt of November—left *Bengal* the 9th of January 1780, and arrived at *Madras* the fifth time, the 21ſt of the ſame month.—I went from thence the 10th of February—went to *Pondicherry*, where I arrived the 11th, to take in Sepoys for *Surat*—I arrived at *Surat* with 400 Sepoys the 19th of April—remained there three days—went to *Bombay*, and arrived there the 23d of April 1780—ſailed from thence the 2d of July for *Madras*—arrived there the ſixth time, the 15th of the ſame month—ſtaid there till the 1ſt of Auguſt, when I ſailed for *China*—arrived there the 16th of September—ſtaid there till the 2d February 1781, and arrived in the *Downs* the 20th of October.

Had you any treaſure or jewels on board, to carry to *Bengal*, *Bombay*, or any other parts of *India*, during the coaſting voyages, mentioned in the firſt part of your evidence?—I had ſome treaſure; it was public treaſure; I had ſome private, but can't remember for whom, it was a little.

When you laſt ſailed from *Madras* to *China* had you any treaſure on board?—I had ſome private treaſure on freight, *viz.* Mr. *Taſwell* 7,551 pagodas, Mr. *Cuthbert* 5,000, and Mr. *Brodie* 2,000 pagodas, in all, 14,551 pagodas—there was none belonging to the Governor or Council. Withdrew.

Captain *Blanſhard*, of the *York*, examined.

I left *Britain* the 12th of February 1780—went to *Madras*—arrived there the 23d of July—ſtaid there 22 or 23 days—ſailed for *China* the 14th of Auguſt—arrived there the 9th of October, and ſailed from thence the 2d of February.

Had you any treaſure on board when you went from *Madras* to *China*?—Yes, about 6 or 7,000 pagodas, part belonging to *De Caſtro*, a jew, on freight for *China*—it was delivered to *Silveſter Roſe*—1,500 of the pagodas belonged to Mr. *Young*, and the remainder to a perſon, who I believe was an Armenian—I had none belonging to the Governor, Council, or Servants of the Company—the whole belonged to free merchants.—I brought home no treaſure from *China* to *England*—the *London* and *Bridgewater* ſailed for *England* with me—I carried no cargo from *Madras* to *China* for any one but myſelf—ſome red wood. Withdrew.

Captain *Wakefield*, of the *Laſcelles*, examined.

I left *Britain* the 13th of February 1780—went to *Madras*—arrived there the 29th of June—ſailed from thence the 1ſt of Auguſt for *China*—arrived there the 11th of September—ſailed from thence the 2d of February 1781, and arrived in the *Downs* the 12th of October.

Had you any treaſure or jewels on board, when you went from *Madras* to *China*?—Yes, treaſure belonging to private perſons—about 16,000 pagodas belonging to different people—9,000 for Meſſrs. *De Caſtro*—5,000 Mr. *Jones*—Daniſh Company 1,850—a black merchant 985 ditto; in all, 16,835 pagodas—I had none on account of any of the Gentlemen of the Council at *Madras*. Withdrew.

Thomas Bevan, eſquire, attending according to order, was called in, and examined.

I was ſecond in the Select Committee appointed at the end of 1778, for *China*.—I ſailed the 6th or 7th of March 1779—I arrived there the 3d or 4th of October in the ſame year, on board the Company's ſhip the *Worceſter*.—We have money tendered to us private, as well as ſervants of the Company, from all parts of *India*, which is admitted into the Company's caſh—I came home in the laſt ſhips—I left *Canton* the laſt day of January 1781.

Had you opportunity to know of any conſiderable remittances of individuals from *Madras* to *China*?—Yes; there were ſeveral remittances from individuals—we never aſk whoſe property it is, only the name of the perſon to whom they wiſh to have it remitted—the caſh paid in, is not always belonging to the perſon who pays it in.

Have you any knowledge of money being ſent by country ſhips?—I have heard ſo, but we don't take any account of country ſhips—we have no concern with them—they ſometimes pay into the Company's caſh, and ſometimes to foreigners.

Have you any knowledge of large ſums being paid by Britiſh ſubjects into foreign treaſuries?—It is frequently done, and ſhould be put a ſtop to if poſſible—that is a difficult matter, it muſt be done from hence, and would be a benefit to the Company.

Can you give any account of the ſtate of the demand of private perſons on the Chineſe merchants?—Refers to the book of private debts, with particular account of all private debts due to Britiſh ſubjects by the merchants, ſubjects of *China*; and alſo, the application made by Captain *Panton*, of the *Seahorſe*—and the tranſactions between the Committee and Chineſe Government.

We never made application for the names of the principals—the Agents gave an account of the amount of the debts, but not the names of the principals.—I diſcovered the names of ſome of thoſe from the Chineſe; but by their mode of expreſſing themſelves could not make out all, and that is the meaning of the blanks in the diary—they are not many.

Do you know of any ſpecific ſum remitted by or on account of any individuals, from *Madras* or *Bengal*?—I do not, of my own knowledge.

The Committee were forbid at my laſt going out, from receiving any private commiſſions of any ſort—all private commiſſions were permitted to be received by the Gentlemen under the Select Committee jointly, not ſeparately; but I never from my firſt employment, near thirty years ago, received any private commercial commiſſion, from which I derived any emolument.

The Court of Directors permitted, before I came to *England* in 1773, the receiving private commiſſions by their ſervants—they afterwards revoked it—I underſtand every Gentleman under them in *China*, is permitted to receive private conſignments. Withdrew.

Mr. *John Farrington Butterfield*, Purſer of the *Earl of Sandwich*, a Company's ſhip, examined.

We ſailed from *England* 17th June 1779, for *Madras*—arrived there 18th January 1780—many men from thence for *China* 18th June 1780—the *Seahorſe* man of war, and four other Indiamen, went in company with us—we arrived in *China* the 1ſt of September.

Did you carry any treaſure from *Madras* to *China*?—Yes.

To what amount?—We had leſs than any ſhip; what we had, moſtly belonged to paſſengers—ſome ſmall matter from Armenians, and ſome from a Jew houſe—the *Seahorſe* carried a great deal of money—we had under 80,000 pagodas on board our ſhip—can't ſay the particulars—the man of war had 3 per cent. and we had but 1 per cent. freight. Withdrew.

Mr. *George Blachford* called in, and examined.

I was chief Officer on board the *Sandwich*—we ſailed from *England* in June 1779—went to *Madras*—arrived there in January 1780—ſailed from *Madras* about July 1780, for *China*, where we arrived the middle of September

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tember—the *Seahorſe* man of war and four Indiamen ſailed with us.

Do you know of any treaſure carried on board your ſhip from *Madras* to *China?*—A little—can't tell exactly—don't know of my own knowledge what treaſure there was on board—I don't know of any money being on board the other ſhips. Withdrew.

Matthew Raper, eſquire, was called in, and examined.

I was ſupercargo—went out in 1767, the firſt time—returned, and went out in 1768, and remained in *China* till the return of the laſt fleet—I was of the Select Committee—before the appointment of that Committee, the Company's Servants had liberty of taking commercial conſignments—the firſt I had was in 1777 or 1778.

The only tranſaction for Sir *Thomas Rumbold* was relating to 25,000 pagodas, the produce of which I remitted myſelf—it was ordered to be paid to me and Mr. *Cromline*, by *Bradſhaw* and *Pigou*, on Sir *Thomas*'s account—this was the latter end of 1778—Mr. *Cromline* being abſent at the time the money was remitted, I ſent it in my own name, by a bill on the Company, in January 1779, payable to *Robert Mackreth*, *John Stables*, and *Thomas Raikes*, eſquires, amounting to £. 10,769. 12*s.* 11*d.*

I had a conſignment from *Madras* to *China*, belonging to Sir *Hector Munro*, of dollars amounting to £. 466. 10*s.* 3*d.*

The *Seahorſe* imported money into *China*—it was ſent up to the Factory, and I did not know what it was, it not being all public money.

Do you know the reaſon of the high price of gold in *China?*—Becauſe it makes an agreeable preſent to the Emperor, and becauſe it is eaſier hid from the Mandarines—that Government is more oppreſſive now than it uſed to be—the Mandarines, on calling merchants before them, if they do not comply with the demands readily, chains are produced, and the merchants informed they will be put round their necks, and they will be led to priſon, to remain there till they comply—Gold varies in its price in *China* very much; ſometimes fifty per cent. in the ſame year—The difference between gold and ſilver is as 15 ounces of ſilver to one of gold; but it has been up to 22 of ſilver. Withdrew.

Mr. *Bevan* attends again, and informs the Committee, that he recollects a circumſtance in his own knowledge, of a ſmall ſum of money being remitted by Sir *Eyre Coote* to Mr. *Pigou* and himſelf—he does not recollect the amount, nor what ſhip it was ſent in; it was the laſt year—it came from *Bengal*—Sir *Eyre Coote* was there.

Before he arrived in *China*, there was a box of gold belonging to Sir *Thomas Rumbold* and Sir *Hector Munro*—it was ſtolen out of Captain *Foxall*'s ſhip—the Committee was deſired to apply to the Country Government, to endeavour to recover it. He ſpoke to the magiſtrate; who told him, endeavours would be uſed to recover it; but it was not recovered when he came away. He thinks it came by the *Morſe* or *Seahorſe*; but is not certain. Withdrew.

No. 3.

Mr. *Sadlier*'s atteſted Account of Monies ſaid to have been received by Mr. *Whitehill* and others, in the Station of Chief of *Maſulipatam*.

The Private Account receiving from the Zemindars, for ſettling three years Zemabundy.

	Mr. Floyer ſettled uſual Preſents for 3 years, for the year of Phuzulle 1186, 1187, and 1188.	Mr. Floyer received an account of uſual Preſents in laſt year.	Mr. Floyer leave to collect in this year the remainder from the Zemindars.
Culdindee Trippetterauze, Zemindar of Muglatore - - - 24,275 — —			
Gootalah, his ſecurity - 3,000 — —			
Pollaveram, D° - - 3,000 — —			
Chaar Mahalls, D° - - 6,000 — —			
	36,275 — —	18,100 — —	18,175 — —
Vaſſereddy Ramanah, Zemindar of Nundigamah	11,750 — —	5,000 — —	6,750 — —
Cullava Cullue, Timmanarow, and Ramarow, Zemindars of Bezoara - - - -	1,500 — —	750 — —	750 — —
Mundapetty Trippetterauze Zemindar of Corcondah - - - - - - - -	2,100 — —	1,050 — —	1,050 — —
Kiſſero Vencalaram, Deſpondah of Munagalah -	600 — —	300 — —	300 — —
Nurahurry, Deſpondah of Lingagree - -	150 — —	75 — —	75 — —
Row Vencalarow, Surdar of Pettapore - -	18,000 — —	9,000 — —	9,000 — —
Erlaguddah Codant Ram, Zemindar of Davercotah - - - - - - - -	11,250 — —	4,625 — —	6,625 — —
Zupellah Vencalarow, &c. Zemindars of Chintalapoody - - - - - - -	1,500 — —	750 — —	750 — —
Velluntree Mullarow and Sunjeevarow, &c. Zemindars and Meraſſdars of Zumalavoy and Madoor Guttoo - - - - - -	1,500 — —	375 — —	1,125 — —
Vechavoy Jaggapetterauze, Zemindar of Peddapore - - - - - - - -	28,761 27 —	9,587 9 —	19,174 18 —
Sooranany Naſſinvarow and Vencataramrow, Zemindars of Mylavaram - - - -	1,500 — —	- - -	1,500 — —
Conatee Naſſinvaloo, the diſtricts of Cottapillee	1,500 — —	750 — —	750 — —
Opparow, Zemindar of Noogud, ought to pay as the above people as former - - - -	19,500 — —	- - -	19,500 — —
Pag'	135,886 27 —	50,362 9 —	85,524 18 —

The

Supplemental Appendix to the Second Report. No. 3.

The Private Account receiving from the Renters.

	Mr. Floyer ſettled for Three Years.	Mr. Floyer received on Account of Three Years.	Remaining on Account of Three Years.
Culdindee Trippetterauze, for the Farms of Tumedee, Peddanah, Tundoroo, and Bondara, Nanapore Town, and Nanapore Salt	7,500 — —	3,750 — —	3,750 — —
D° - - D°, on Account Dooa	750 — —	375 — —	375 — —
Collava Collue Timmanarow and Ramarow, Renter of Vellore Sematoo	900 — —	450 — —	450 — —
Muzumadar Veneatachillum, Renter of Condapellee Havelly only, he promiſed	900 — —	- - -	900 — —
Jellalah Ramajee Barow, Renter of Sir Iſland	960 — —	480 — —	480 — —
Pag'	11,010 — —	5,055 — —	5,955 — —
Ragogee Puntaloo, Renter of the Havelly of Ellore, who not conſented for 3 years, only for 2 years, at 2,500 Pag' each year, and paid Mr. Floyer only	- - -	2,000 — —	3,000 — —
M' Pag'	11,010 — —	7,055 — —	8,955 — —

Mr. Samuel Stathom, Salt Renter of Mazulipatam and Penracca, paid Mr. Floyer, for one Year of his Rents, Rupees 6,000; but this year Governor and Council confirmed the ſame Rent for this year, therefore who ought to pay for this year as laſt year.

	Preſent firſt.	For Three Years Settlement.	In lieu of Land Cuſtoms.	Paroor.	Tatipaca.	TOTAL.
	Pagodas.					
Culdindee Trippetterauze - 5,000 D° - at Muglatore - - 1,000	6,000 — —	20,000 — —	2,000 — —	4,275 — —	- - -	32,275 — —
Gootalah Zemindar - -	5,000 — —	3,000 — —	1,300 — —	- - -	- - -	9,300 — —
Pollaram D° - - -	2,500 — —	3,000 — —	1,000 — —	- - -	- - -	6,500 — —
Chahaar Mahalls Zemindar -	3,500 — —	6,000 — —	1,000 — —	- - -	- - -	10,500 — —
Chintalapoody D° - - -	100 — —	1,500 — —	200 — —	- - -	- - -	1,800 — —
Zemalavoy and Medoor Guttoo Zemindars, in part of Trippetterauze's Security - -	153 — —	765 — —	300 — —	- - -	- - -	1,218 — —
Macca Narſinva Opparow - -	5,000 — —	19,500 — —	3,000 — —	- - -	- - -	27,500 — —
Vachevoy Juggapetterauze - -	4,000 — —	23,721 27	1,900 — —	- - -	5,040 — —	34,661 27
Pettapore - - -	2,000 — —	18,000 — —	900 — —	- - -	- - -	20,900 — —
Erlagudda Codant Ram - -	1,000 — —	5,250 — —	900 — —	- - -	- - -	7,150 — —
D° - - ariſen this year - -	- - -	6,000 — —	- - -	- - -	- - -	6,000 — —
Vaſſereddy Ramanah - - -	1,000 — —	5,750 — —	125 — —	- - -	- - -	6,875 — —
D° - at this year ariſen - -	- - -	9,000 — —	- - -	- - -	- - -	9,000 — —
D° - M. Sulivan - - -	- - -	3,000 — —	- - -	- - -	- - -	3,000 — —
Collava Collue Timmanarow and Ramarow - - - -	250 — —	1,500 — —	400 — —	- - -	- - -	2,150 — —
D° - D° - D° - at this year - -	- - -	3,000 — —	- - -	- - -	- - -	3,000 — —
Conatee Trippetty - - -	500 — —	1,500 — —	100 — —	- - -	- - -	2,100 — —
Kiſſera Vencataram Deſmooh -	100 — —	600 — —	87 18	- - -	- - -	787 18
Nurharry - - D° - -	- - -	150 — —	12 18	- - -	- - -	162 18
Sooranany Narſinvaloo Zemindar -	500 — —	1,500 — —	100 — —	- - -	- - -	2,100 — —
Mundapetty Trippetterauze, D° -	700 — —	2,100 — —	600 — —	- - -	- - -	3,400 — —
Ramachendrarauze - - -	- - -	- - -	900 — —	- - -	- - -	900 — —
Zumolavoy Guttoo - - -	147 — —	735 — —	100 — —	- - -	- - -	982 — —
	32,450 — —	135,571 27	14,925 — —	4,275 — —	5,040 — —	192,261 27

This private buſineſs ſettled for 3 years, beginning from the year of Phuzullee 1183 to 1185, Mr. Whitehill ſettled at Rajahmundry.

Supplemental Appendix to the Second Report. No. 4.

Mr. *Q. C.* who not ſettled zummabundy, only he collected the ſix kiſts of the third year of Mr. *Whitehill's* zummabundy; and alſo the three kiſts of ſecond year.

Row Vencata Row, Zemindar	4,000
Erlagudda Codant Ram, D°	3,000
Vaſſereddy Ramanah, D°	4,000
Conatee Rajapah	1,500
Collava Collue Timmanarow and Ramarow	1,000
Culdindee Trippetterauze	5,000
Chahaar Mahalls People	1,000
Gotala and Pollaram, Zemindars	2,000
Opparow	5,000
Zumolavoy and Madoor Guttoo	500
Chintalapoody	500
Mundapetty Trippetterauze	1,000
Munagala People	100
Juggapetterauze, not paid by my means, but he paid ſeparately	9,000
Mylavaram Zemindar	500
M[r] Pag[a]	38,100

Mr. *Floyer* came the third year of Mr. *Whitehill's* zummabundy, who collected the three kiſts of the third year zummabundy at the time, who demand to receive private buſineſs, as Mr. *Crawfurd.*

Vachavoy Juggapetterauze	6,000
Row Vencata Row	3,000
Vaſſereddy Ramanah	3,000
Erlagudda Codant Ram	3,000
Culdinee Trippetterauze	5,000
Gootalah and Pollaram	2,000
Chaar Mahalls	1,000
Collava Collue Timmanarow and Ramarow	1,500
Conatee Narſinvaloo	1,500
Mundapetty Trippetterauze	1,000
Munagala People	125
Chintalapoody	500
Zumalavoy and Madoor Guttoo	250
Opparow	
Mylaveram	
Pag[a]	27,875

Dear Sir,

The encloſed paper will let you into the arcana of the ſweets of this Chiefſhip; it is communicated to you, in proof of the confidence I repoſe in you, and in teſtimony that I mean not to keep ſecret any action which you may ſuppoſe can influence my conduct. Your honourable ſupport of me againſt volumes of the baſeſt defamation, claims, and it ſhall have it, this honourable and candid conduct from me.—The rapacity and peculation of men has nearly ruined this country; the misfortune it is now involved in, originates from ſuch principles, and its effects may have brought in diſtreſſes poſſibly not to be reformed.

The paper, if you pleaſe, may be deſtroyed, it is intended but to ſhew the unſound ground you tread in.

Intereſt with me towards you bears no ſway.—I conſider my ſituation but temporary—I hope ere long to afford you a better teſtimony of the hearty good diſpoſition which actuates me for promoting the honour of your Government; you have therefore but to ſignify to me, without reſerve, what you wiſh, and depend on its becoming my guide.

To the honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, eſquire.

Anthony Sadlier, of *Fort Saint George*, eſquire, and heretofore Chief of *Maſulipatam*, maketh oath and ſaith, That ſoon after his arrival at *Maſulipatam*, in the month of April 1778, to take upon him the charge of that Chiefſhip, this deponent applied to *Vencataroyaloo*, then and now the Honourable Company's Dubaſh and Chief Interpreter for the ſaid Chiefſhip, to give unto this deponent an account of the cuſtoms heretofore appertaining to the ſaid office; and that the ſaid *Vencataroyaloo* thereupon delivered into the hands of this deponent, two ſeveral paper writings, whereof the above are true copies. And this deponent further ſaith, that he addreſſed a Letter unto the honourable *Thomas Rumbold*, eſquire (now Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, bart.) then Governor of *Fort Saint George*; a true copy of part whereof is alſo above written; and that he encloſed true copies of the ſaid two papers ſo received, and the ſaid original Letter, whereof the above part is a true copy, under the ſame cover and ſeal, with another Letter from this deponent, dated the 5th day of May 1778, to the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*. And this deponent ſaith, that the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* hath ſince acknowledged the receipt of the ſaid Letter of the 5th day of May 1778, but did not make any mention of the receipt of the ſaid two copies of papers, or of this deponent's ſaid Letter which accompanied them, although this deponent is ſatisfied that the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold* did receive them encloſed under the ſaid cover, which contained this deponent's ſaid Letter of the 5th day of May 1778, and at the ſame time that he received the ſaid Letter of the 5th day of May 1778. This deponent further ſaith, that he is well acquainted with the hand-writing of the ſaid *Vencataroyaloo*, and that the original two papers, whereof the above are true copies, are of the proper hand writing of the ſaid *Vencataroyaloo*; and that the ſaid *Vencataroyaloo* hath acknowledged unto this deponent, that they were of his hand-writing. And this deponent further ſaith, that he is now in poſſeſſion of the ſaid two original papers. And this deponent further ſaith, that from what he has underſtood to have been the cuſtom of the ſervice, he verily believes that the ſaid two paper writings, ſo delivered unto this deponent by the ſaid *Vencataroyaloo*, contain a true account of the emoluments ſo received, and of the manner in which they were received by the ſeveral perſons therein mentioned, while they were reſpectively Chiefs of *Maſulipatam* aforeſaid.

Sworn in *Madras*, this 6th day of January 1781, before me,
(Signed) *Anth. Sadlier.*
(Signed) *Benj. Roebuck*, Mayor.
(Signed) *James Taylor*, Reg[r].

No. 4.

Letter from Sir *Thomas Rumbold* to Mr. *Sadlier*, acknowledging the receipt of his Letter of 5th May 1778; dated 20th May 1778.

My dear Sir,

I SHOULD have replied to your Letter of the 5th inſtant ſooner, had I not obſerved that there was no probability of our orders to the Zemindars not having the effect we expected, and that ultimately they muſt be convinced of the propriety of an implicit obedience to the orders of this Government; and I have no doubt will experience the advantages of the new meaſure. I am much obliged by your account of the Zemindars, the ſtate of their countries, finance, &c. Your information has thrown much light upon this ſubject; and though I cannot ſee the bad conſequences that are to follow from the Zemindars being ordered here to ſettle their jummabundy, inſtead of fixing it at the different Chiefſhips, yet I beg you will be aſſured, I am no leſs ſenſible of the good intention with which you have freely given me your opinion.—If any failure happens in the payment of their kiſts, the exigencies of your Government muſt be ſupplied from hence; but I am willing to believe you will not require our aſſiſtance.

As to the money due to the Soubah, you will receive our inſtructions on this head before you diſcharge the balance,

balance. I ſhall write you again in a few days. In the meantime I beg you to believe me,

Dear Sir,

Your much obliged and obedient humble ſervant

(Signed) *Tho' Rumbold.*

Madras, May 20th 1778.

A true copy,

Anth. Sadlier.

A. Sadlier, eſquire.

No. 5.

Letter from Sir *Thomas Rumbold* to Mr. *Sadlier*; dated 27th May 1778.

Dear Sir,

I AM favoured with the duplicate of the Letter you ſent by *Vencataroyaloo*; he is not yet arrived. I am obliged to you for your conduct, in preſſing the Zemindars to repair to the Preſidency as ſoon as poſſible, agreeably to the orders they received. I never expected otherwiſe from you, being convinced your own honour and zeal for the ſervice would ſuperſede every private conſideration. You muſt be convinced my regard for you has been ſteady; and that it will be my wiſh, on all occaſions, to ſhew you my attachment and deſire of promoting your intereſt; being,

Dear Sir,

Your affectionate humble ſervant,

(Signed) *Thomas Rumbold.*

Fort Saint George, 27th May 1778.

A true copy,

Anthony Sadlier.

Anthony Sadlier, eſquire.

No. 6.

Mr. *Sadlier*'s laſt Letter to the Council; dated 8th January 1781.

To the Honourable *Charles Smith*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I HAVE long been a concerned and anxious ſpectator of the ruin into which the Company's affairs were falling, from the miſmanagement of their Servants; the conſequences are now ſeverely felt by us all; we are threatened with danger, which almoſt appears inſurmountable, and therefore every exertion tending to public good, muſt be laudable, in proportion to the difficulties which render it uſeful to ſociety.

From clear and evident cauſes, the moſt common obſerver might have foreſeen ſome ſuch diſaſter as that which we now ſuffer—a degeneracy of character, and over-love of riches, a want of public ſpirit, and even of the common feelings of humanity towards the people who lived under our Government, joined to a diſſipated revenue, and a want of inclination to employ the few reſources which remained, muſt have rendered, and did render, us dangerous to our friends, and contemptible in the eyes of our enemies.

To ſtop the torrent of corruption, by an exemplary puniſhment or detection of thoſe who were moſt guilty, was a chief and favourite wiſh which I brought with me, when I became a Member of Government; and it is to this diſpoſition alone, and the fear which it occaſioned in the minds of men conſcious of guilt, that I impute my ſuſpenſion from the Service, and other things ſubſequent to that want.

I hope I ſhall prove, in the courſe of this Letter, that my conduct in the Chiefſhip of *Maſulipatam** was conſiſtent with that which I have ſince purſued, and that my foreſight of conſequences have been fully juſtified by the event. In that ſtation I complained, as I do now, that rapacity and peculation had nearly ruined the country. And after I was admitted a Member of the Council at *Madras*, I can appeal to the ſecond Minute, delivered in by me at the Board, in proof that it was my idea that a retroſpect of paſt evil was the only foundation of future good.—My words then were as follows:—"It is true "that we are ſurrounded with difficulties on all ſides, "as the Governor is pleaſed to obſerve;—large arrears "of revenue are due to the Company from countries "which have ſuffered no public calamity; — the "Company have incurred a heavy debt, to anſwer the "immediate demands of Government; while theſe arrears remain due to them, their Treaſury is empty, "and without the hope of a ſupply, at a time when it "is uncertain how great their occaſion may be for "money.—Government has difficulty in paying its moſt "ordinary expences; trade is loſt to individuals; "the Company have had little or no inveſtments, and "yet, great as theſe evils are, they are likely every day "to increaſe.

"This deſperate ſituation of our affairs has not been "occaſioned by public misfortune, and muſt therefore "be imputed to private miſmanagement. We are no "longer in a ſituation where we can hold up the veil of "deceit to our Employers, or adopt the meaſures of our "predeceſſors, without weighing their conſequences. "It is our duty to know the evil, that we may be able "to apply relief; and, inſtead of patching up a broken "ſyſtem, to make it anſwer a purpoſe or a day, to form "ſome laſting and regular plan of conduct adequate to "the dangers which ſurround us, and capable of extri-"cating the Company's affairs from the difficulties in "which they are involved."—Why no enquiry was ſet on foot when the Governor acknowledged that we were ſurrounded with difficulties? why the revenue was allowed to fall in arrear, without an exertion to recover it? why no attempt was made, excepting by myſelf, for the re-eſtabliſhment of ſyſtem; and why the other Members of Council ſtood ſilent ſpectators of approaching ruin? are queſtions which their own conſcience muſt ſolve, but of which the ſubject of this Letter may convey ſome demonſtration.

I have traced my own conduct, to ſhew that my opinions have been invariable, and that I have preſerved a degree of uniformity, ungoverned by ſubſequent events, or by perſonal animoſity, further than that honeſt indignation, which cannot but ariſe in my mind, on ſeeing the intereſt of the community, and the honour of the nation, ſacrificed to the unworthy motives of men, who, being placed our Guardians, were largely paid for doing juſtice.

The criſis of the times do ſtill more preſſingly call for enquiry; at a time when we are ſurrounded with public enemies; when our reſources upon the Coaſt ſeem in a manner annihilated, and an army, on which our ſafety depends, ſubject to every difficulty which the want of money can occaſion. If it can be proved, that thoſe who were intruſted with power, employed it only to increaſe their private fortune, without any regard to principle or to the good of their Employers, they ſhould be made to refund the ſpoil they have acquired, both as an example to others, and that it may be applied to relieve the exigencies of Government.

In bringing ſuch men to light, I deſpiſe the odium which the intereſted may annex to the character of an informer; the act is only diſhonourable when the motive is not good: but as I have in view the intereſt of the Company and of the Nation, the preſervation of the Community, and the happineſs of Thouſands, who look up to us for protection—as I am not influenced by private advantage, and, in oppoſition to theſe great concerns, have no motive to ſway me but the eaſe of a few individuals, who, inſtead of indulgence, deſerve both ſhame and puniſhment, the act of informing is honourable; and he who has the courage to ſurmount prejudice, in ſupport of principle, cannot, in my opinion, but deſerve praiſe,—I court this honeſt praiſe in reward for my conduct, and I ſhall now proceed to ſtate the circumſtances which have occaſioned the above reflections.

Supplemental Appendix to the Second Report. No 6.

Supplemental Appendix to the 5e and Report. No. 7.

I left the Presidency to take charge of the Chiefship of *Masulipatam*, with the fullest confidence that it was Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s intention to correct the abuses in the Company's system upon this Coast.—I thought myself in a great measure indebted to him, for the honourable station I was about to hold; and gratitude concurred with principle, in making me desirous to fulfil what I thought to be his inclination.—Upon taking charge of the Chiefship, I found it much impoverished; I determined therefore to trace causes back to their source, with a view to the establishment of future order; and though before my enquiry was finished, I had reason to think that I was imposed upon, under the cloak of friendship, I communicated the result of it with that unreserved openess and candour which I thought the public service required.

I hope the accompanying Papers will be no bad proof of the uniform consistency and disinterestedness of my conduct.

The first contains accounts which were delivered to me in the hand-writing of *Vencatarayaloo*, the Company's Dubash at *Masulipatam*, of the emoluments received by three of my predecessors in the Chiefship of that place, amounting to Madras pagodas - - 3,17,154 —

And a balance remaining due, amounting to the additional sum of - - - 94,479 18

In all, Madras pagodas - - 4,11,633 18

The second Paper is an extract of a Letter which accompanied these Accounts to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, then Governor of *Madras*; and the third is an Affidavit made by me to authenticate these Papers, and the manner in which they were received.

In addition to these Papers, I now transmit to the Board, the copy of a Letter which went under the same seal with the above Letter to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, giving him an account of the circumstances and situation of the different Zemindars, together with my opinion of the measure adopted by Government, in summoning the Zemindars to the Presidency: as also the copies of two Letters from Sir *Thomas Rumbold* to me, in one of which he acknowledges the receipt of my packet, of the 5th of May 1778, containing the above information.

The alarming situation to which the Company's affairs are reduced upon this Coast, is enough of itself to occasion suspicion in the mind of a man unacquainted with causes; and when the safety of a country is at stake, suspicion is just ground of enquiry—but when information is so duly authenticated, and partly against a character, which by subsequent conduct has contributed so greatly to our present distress; it cannot be imagined that Government here will be so treacherous to their Employers, as to neglect instituting such prosecution as the law directs, and the nature of the case may require.

It is unnecessary to urge to the Honourable Board, as they must be sufficiently aware, that inferences will be drawn to their own prejudice as individuals, if they neglect to execute public justice, if pointed out to them, when the mode is so apparent, and the means so much in their power. Mr. *Whitehill* is now at *Madras*, and is upon the point of departure for *Europe*; and if the Government allow him to depart with such information against him, before he is acquitted by the forms of law, I submit it to the opinion of the Board, how far their Employers may think them responsible for the consequences?

If the Company's Servants have been guilty of peculation in office; if they have abused the trust reposed in them; if by these abuses they have brought dishonour upon their country; let it be imagined, how much the opinion of their treachery may have laid the foundation of our present reverse of fortune, and what influence it may have in future, not only to check the Company's credit, but from a want of dependance upon our Government to prevent those alliances with the Country Powers, which at present seem so essential to our affairs.

I have already urged, that the best foundation for public spirit is public justice. Mr. *Whitehill* held the first station in the Company's service upon this Coast, at the time when their affairs suffered the greatest reverse; and if it is proved that he is one cause from which our evil has originated, I submit it to the Board, whether he should not receive punishment according to law, both as an example to those who hold trust, and that we may give our friends and our enemies an opinion of our justice.

I have already declared, that I consider myself a Member of the Board, and that the act of violence by which I was driven from it, in no respect deprives me of the right inherent in the station. I now repeat the same sentiments; and as the information I have laid before the Board, lays the foundation of an enquiry most material to the interest of my honourable Masters, I hereby formally demand my seat at the Board, that I may be able to prosecute that enquiry in the manner most proper to produce the desired effect.

I have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your most obedient
humble servant,
Anthony Sadlier.

Fort Saint George,
8th January 1781.

No. 7.

Extract of a Letter from the President and Council at *Fort Saint George*, in their Civil Department, to the Court of Directors of the *East India* Company; dated 9th January 1781.

Par. 7. THE disappointments we experienced from the inconsiderable collections made for some time past of your territorial revenues under *Masulipatam*, and the heavy charges incurred of late by the war with *Hyder Ally*, laying us under the necessity of appropriating all our resources to the defraying military expences, have been the means of impeding your investment, and have even obliged us to put a stop to the provision of it for the present; indeed, the troubles now subsisting in the *Carnatic*, render it impossible for the Weavers about *Madras* and *Cudulore* to work. We have, however, been able to give almost a full lading to the *Duke of Kingston*, and hope to send your Honours 12 or 1,300 bales more, in the course of next month, or in the month of March, should the Governor General and Council be able to supply us with tonnage for that purpose, agreeably to a request we made to them in our Letter of the 8th ultimo. Cons. 14th Nov.

8. The hostile situation of public affairs all around us in July last, on the incursion of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, pointed out to us the evident propriety of exerting ourselves immediately to collect a competent garrison store. And to endeavour all in our power to prevent the distressful consequences to the inhabitants, of the country being laid waste by the enemy, we wrote to the Governor General and Council for supplies of grain, and of salt provisions; and had soon the pleasure to learn from them, that they had entered into contracts for a considerable supply of salt provisions, and for a most ample quantity of rice for our relief, amounting to upwards of 80,000 bags, near 50,000 of which are already arrived here. Cons. 8th Aug. 12th Aug. 8th Sept. Cons. 30th Sept.

9. In order to encourage the importation of all such articles as the Natives use for food, we resolved to remit the duty usually levied on them, until the 1st May next; we have written to the Subordinacies, to send hither every species of provisions they can collect; and in fine, we hope we have, by our timely precautions, averted the dreadful effects of famine, which appeared to threaten this Settlement. Cons. 5th Dec.

10. We have acquainted your Honours with the particulars

Conſ. 29th July, 1st Aug. 7th Nov. 8th Nov. 14th Nov. ticulars of the ſuſpenſion of Meſſrs. *Whitehill* and *Sadlier* from the ſervice, in our Letters of the 15th October, and 29th November; we therefore think it unneceſſary to ſay any thing more on this ſubject, than to refer you to our Proceedings, ſorted in the margin, which will fully explain the reſpective conduct of each Member of Government, when thoſe Reſolutions took place.

Conſ. 14th Nov. 11. We likewiſe in our Letter of the 29th November, explained to you our reaſons for having called Meſſrs. *Morgan Williams* and *William Cuming* to the Board, as acting Members of Council, in the place of Meſſrs. *Whitehill* and *Sadlier*.

Conſ. 9th June. 10th June. 23d June. 30th June. 13. We mentioned to you in our Letter of the 15th October, the ſteps we had taken in conſequence of your orders, for the detection of the perſons under this Government, ſaid to have been concerned in the French ſhip, called the *Elizabeth*. The Proceedings noted in the margin, contain a full diſcuſſion on this ſubject.

14. On the 3d inſtant, Mr. *Cotsford* addreſſed us a Letter, intimating his intention of returning to *Europe* on a Daniſh ſhip then in the Road, as his ſtate of health did not permit him to apply ſo cloſely to buſineſs as he could wiſh. We are much concerned to obſerve, that Mr. *Cotsford* ſhould judge this a ſufficient reaſon, at the preſent moſt critical and alarming criſis of the Company's affairs, for relinquiſhing the honourable and conſpicuous ſtation to which you had been pleaſed to appoint him.

Conſ. 7th Jan. 1781.

We have no doubt but Mr. *Cotsford*'s repreſentation of the fort of *Maſulipatam*, being put into as good a ſtate of defence as circumſtances permitted, is juſt; but when the enormous outſtanding balances of the Zemindars and Renters, inſtead of being greatly decreaſed, as we had flattered ourſelves would have been effected, have on the contrary been ſuffered to augment conſiderably, and at this time actually amount, including the teeps due, to Madras pagodas 1,528,597. 17; we cannot agree with him, that nothing has been left undone, which the Chief and Council had the power of doing; and we ſubmit to your Honours, whether this ſubject could any where be diſcuſſed with more propriety than at the Preſidency?

The other parts of his Letter are too futile for us to treſpaſs on your time, by remarking upon them; but cannot help obſerving, that his application to us for our permiſſion, after he had on every occaſion avowed his determination to return to *Europe* on the Daniſh ſhip, which was on the point of ſailing, and his embarking without waiting for our anſwer, carry the appearance of great diſreſpect to that ſuperior authority veſted in us by your Honours as your repreſentatives.

Conſ. 8th Sept. 15. In the month of September your Standing Counſel at this Preſidency, Mr. *Benjamin Sulivan*, applied to us for an increaſe of ſalary; ſetting forth his being precluded by his preſent ſtation from every exerciſe of his profeſſion, but what is devoted to the information of Government, and that his allowance annexed to his employ was not adequate to the unavoidable expences of a perſon, in a reſpectable ſituation in this country. After much conſideration, on a compariſon of Mr. *Sulivan*'s advantages with thoſe of your Advocate General in *Bengal*, and on the evident neceſſity there is for our having an able aſſiſtant, to adviſe with in all matters of law; we came to the reſolution of doubling his ſalary, as a ſuitable encouragement to Mr. *Sulivan*, whoſe abilities and judgments we have every reaſon to be ſatisfied with.

19. A ſhort time ſince we received a Letter from Mr. *Sadlier*, ſetting forth the hardſhips he had ſuffered, and ſubmitting to us, what compenſation was deemed adequate to his ſervices. As we did not think ourſelves authorized to grant him any other conſideration for his loſſes, ariſing from ſuperceſſion or ſuſpenſion, than what had hitherto been allowed to covenanted Servants in the ſame predicament, we could only agree to pay him the ſalary and allowances he omitted to draw for, as ſet forth by him, until the time of his late ſuſpenſion.

Conſ. 30th Dec.

21. Sir *Eyre Coote* having recommended to our conſideration, a Letter addreſſed to him from the Commander of the *Duke of Kingston*, repreſenting the loſs he had ſuſtained, by being ordered to tranſport the troops and ſtores to this Preſidency; we thought it but equitable to allow him the ſame compenſation, for his great attention in forwarding the public ſervice, and for the detriment it had been of to his private intereſt, that had been formerly granted by the Governor General and Council to each of the Commanders of the Company's ſhips employed againſt *Pondicherry*; but as we could not advance him caſh, we have given him a Company's intereſt bond for the amount.

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Conſ. 5th Dec.

22. Mr. *John Douglas* made a purchaſe from the Company, in September 1779, of a piece of ground, ſituated on the Eſplanade, forming part of the ſea beach; as we had ſince been convinced, by the repeated repreſentations of the Merchants belonging to this Settlement, of the great inconvenience and detriment it would be of to trade, ſhould we allow the ground to fall into the hands of any individual, we agreed to give Mr. *Douglas* the ſum of eight thouſand pagodas, on condition that he relinquiſhed all claim to the purchaſe; which he accepted.

Conſ. 5th May.

24. We lately received an account from the Chief and Council at *Vizagapatam*, of the loſs to the Company, occaſioned by the mutiny of the Sepoys in October laſt; and I have ordered the amount, which exceeds the ſum of fifteen thouſand pagodas, to be written off to the head of profit and loſs.

Conſ. 5th Dec.

28. The books of the ſeveral Subordinacies not having been forwarded to us, on account of the preſent difficulty of conveying large packages from one part of this Coaſt to the other, the general books, ending April laſt, could not be cloſed; and their ſtatements of revenues and expences ſince that time, not having been yet received, has likewiſe prevented us from forwarding to your Honours any other than our annual ſtatements.

29. The number of Arcot rupees in the treaſury, and the expected ſupplies from *Vizagapatam* and *Ganjam* being always received in that ſpecie, induced us, in Conſultation the 30th ultimo, to eſtabliſh the currency of Arcot rupees throughout this Settlement, in all payments not exceeding three hundred pagodas; and we truſt we have fixed their exchange at ſo juſt a medium, that the Public will not be aggrieved, nor the Company ſuffer any loſs by this regulation.

30. The amount of the invoice by this ſhip, is one hundred and ſixty-four thouſand nine hundred and thirty-ſix pagodas, thirty-one fanams, and fifty-five caſh (164,936. 31. 55.)

32. Your honours have this day in your treaſury as follows; viz.

Current pagodas	299	35	27
Madras pagodas	584	—	—
Arcot rupees	98,455	11	4
German crowns	1,281	—	—
Muſters of gold			
Current pagodas	158	—	—
Madras pagodas	194	—	—

And you have in your caſh cheſt, twenty-ſix thouſand three hundred and forty-four pagodas, twenty-eight fanams, and one caſh, (26,344. 28. 1.)

No. 8.

Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, in their Revenue Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 9th January 1781.

To the honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honourable he United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. AS our proceedings in this Department will be

Supplemental Appendix to the Second Report. No. 8.

be forwarded to your Honours, by your ſhip *Duke of Kingston*, now under diſpatch for *Europe*, we take the ſame opportunity of explaining fully to you, ſuch particulars reſpecting your revenues, as have occurred ſince our addreſs under date the 4th April.

2. The Zemindars of the four Northern Circars under *Maſulipatam*, being aſſembled there in June laſt, to ſettle the payments due from them reſpectively; your Chief and Council informed us, they had been ſo long amuſed by the repeated promiſes of the Zemindars to deliver in their teeps, and had ſo conſtantly found thoſe promiſes broken, that they had at length thought it neceſſary to try what effect a ſhew of coercive meaſures towards the Zemindars would have, and in conſequence, Sepoy guards were actually placed over their perſons, after the Chief and Council had explained to them, that their late unpardonably evaſive conduct could alone have brought upon them ſo conſpicuous a mark of diſgrace. Conſ. 7 July.

3. It was hoped this appearance of ſeverity would induce the Zemindars to exert themſelves in the diſcharge of their balances; but leſt it ſhould not, we authorized your Chief and Council, in the laſt extremity, to adopt a plan that they themſelves had ſuggeſted; which was, either to take poſſeſſion in the name of the Company, of the ſeveral countries belonging to the Zemindars, until they procured bills for their ſeveral payments, in order to force them to employ every reſource they poſſeſſed, to ſatisfy the juſt demands of the Company; or to impreſs them with an idea, that if they did not provide their teeps at a certain period ſhortly after the gathering in the harveſt the beginning of the enſuing year, we had given an authority to the Chief and Council, to ſeize on the crops, and to keep poſſeſſion of them until their teeps were produced. Conſ. 12 Aug.

4. Having thus furniſhed your Chief and Council with ſuch ample powers, to put in force their own propoſal, which we were the more readily led to give our ſanction to, from the opinion repeatedly advanced by them, that the principal Zemindars had larger ſunds at command than they choſe to bring forth on this occaſion; we truſted we ſhould experience the deſired effect from the activity of the Board at *Maſulipatam*. About two months afterwards, we received a Letter from them, recapitulating to us the diſputes that had ariſen between the Zemindars and the Soucars, with their meaſures in conſequence (for a full account of which, as repreſented to us, we beg leave to refer your Honours to their Letters of the 31ſt July and of the 25th September) and informing us, that they had at length obtained teeps from the Zemindar of *Bidapore* for P. 128,000: from the Zemindar of *Munglatore* for P. 185,000: from the Zemindar of *Ramchunderaporam* for P. 11,641. 34. 15: from the Zemindar of *Corcondah* for P. 6,853. 6. 30: and from the Manager at *Pittapore* for P. 57,494. 31. 10. Conſ. 3 Nov.

5. There appeared ſuch a want of propriety and vigour in the conduct of the Chief and Council, in the courſe of their negotiations with the above-mentioned Zemindars, that we could not avoid expreſſing to them our diſſatisfaction at their meaſures; and, in order the more ſtrongly to evince the neceſſity of their uſing every poſſible means to recover the heavy balances ſtill outſtanding from the Zemindars, we ſent them copy of the 18th, 19th, and 20th paragraphs of your orders of the 16th June 1779; which, we flatter ourſelves, will have every good effect we could wiſh. Conſ. 5th Dec.

6. In the beginning of laſt year, the minor Zemindar of *Pittapore*, named *Comara Vincata Row*, fled from his uncle *Maheputty Row*, who was in the temporary management of his country, and took refuge with his adherents; in particular, *Byrava Puntaloo*, the late Dewan of *Pittapore*, in the fort of *Piddapore*; alledging, that his uncle meant to make away with him, and to eſtabliſh himſelf in the Zemindary. Your Chief and Council being adviſed of this, ordered all the parties to *Maſulipatam*, in order to enquire into the cauſes of ſo extraordinary an event; but finding, on a full inveſtigation of the ſubject, that there were no juſt grounds of complaint againſt *Maheputty Row*, and that this diſturbance had ariſen from the intrigues of *Byrava Puntaloo*, and of *Jaggaputterauze*, Rajah of *Peddapore*, your Chief and Council directed the child to be returned to his uncle, and exhorted *Byrava Puntaloo* to be reconciled to *Maheputty Row*; pledging themſelves to ſecure the rights of the young Zemindar from any intended incroachments of his uncle. Conſ. 23d Feb.

7. This determination was accordingly ſignified to both parties by the Chief, at an interview he had with them at the Company's Garden Houſe. *Byrava Puntaloo* and his followers ſhewed ſome appearances of diſſatisfaction at the deciſion; and on their taking leave of the Chief, the young Zemindar expreſſed great unwillingneſs to go with his uncle; which the Chief perceiving, thought fit to inſiſt on his compliance with the orders of the Council. A ſcuffle between the two factions enſued, and *Comara Vencata Row* was finally carried off to the pettah of *Maſulipatam*, by the adherents of *Byrava Puntaloo*.

8. When theſe circumſtances came to our knowledge, we judged it proper to direct your Chief and Council to confine the rioters, and to eſtabliſh *Maheputty Row* and *Byrava Puntaloo* in the joint management of the Pittapore Country, until *Comara Vencata Row*, to whom we gave permiſſion to remain under our protection at *Maſulipatam*, ſhould come of age; and if either party made any objections, to acquaint them, the Zemindary muſt then be converted into Havelly Lands during the minority of *Comara Vencata Row*. The Chief and Council, in anſwer, pointed out to us the impoſſibility of reconciling *Maheputty Row* and *Byrava Puntaloo*, to accede to the terms of this deciſion. Conſ. 25 Mar.

9. To avert the ill conſequences that muſt neceſſarily enſue, from the country being any longer in a ſtate of confuſion, after different plans had been ſuggeſted by the ſeveral Members of Council at our meetings, held as noted in the margin, we at length reſolved, as *Maheputty Row* appeared clearly, from his near relationſhip to *Comara Vencata Row*, to have a prior claim to the management of the Zemindary, and as we never had reaſon to be diſpleaſed with his conduct, that he ſhould have a Cowle granted him, eſtabliſhing his former authority in the Zemindary, until *Comara Vencata Row* ſhould arrive at the age of eighteen years; when, if the different branches of the family ſhould agree to manage the Pettapore Country in harmony together, they ſhould be permitted to do ſo; otherwiſe, that their ſeveral claims ſhould hereafter be referred to the deciſion of the Preſident and Council at that time. When theſe reſolutions were made known to *Maheputty Row*, he expreſſed much diſſatisfaction at them; and ſtated to the Chief and Council his claim, agreeably to the cuſtom of the country, to an equal ſhare in the Zemindary with his nephew. Conſ. 23 June, 30 June, 19 July. Conſ. 8th Aug.

10. *Maheputty Row*'s repreſentation of his ſituation appearing ſo well founded; and his aſſertion of his rights ſo juſt, that ſeeing no proſpect of ſecuring payment of the Company's kiſts from that country, which was our principal object, but by means of *Maheputty Row*, we were induced to reverſe our former judgment, and to confirm the firſt Cowle granted to him; which ſtill remains in his poſſeſſion, in its full force. We have every expectation from this meaſure of a punctual diſcharge of the arrears due from the Pettapore Zemindary; at the ſame time your Honours may depend upon our carefully protecting the perſon of the young *Comara Vencata Row*, who is now at *Maſulipatam*, from any machinations of either party, until he ſhall be of a proper age to take upon himſelf the charge of public buſineſs. Conſ. 12 Aug.

11. We are concerned to acquaint your Honours of a ſlight diſturbance that happened ſome time ſince in the Cotapillee Diſtrict, from the refractory conduct of the manager, *Conaty Narſinvalloo*; who, upon being repeatedly ſent for by your Chief and Council, to repair to *Maſulipatam*, to ſettle the payment of his tribute, actually took up arms againſt the Company. We have, however, Conſ. 8th Aug.

the

the pleaſure of informing you, that the peace of that country is reſtored, and that we have placed *Trimubrow*, a man of large property, Dewan to the Rajah of *Mugletore*, in the management of Cotapillee Havelly, on terms very advantageous to the Company.

12. The Cowle for the Chaharmall Country, which was under the management of the Zemindar of *Mugletore*, expiring the 31ſt May laſt, we placed that diſtrict under the charge of *Vencata Royaloo*, the Company's Interpreter at *Maſulipatam*; who has agreed to pay to us the ſame jemabundy or tribute as was ſettled for this Zemindary in 1778, to make an annual aliowance of 2,000 Madras pagodas to the young Zemindar; and to deliver the ſum of 8,000 Madras pagodas per annum, to the creditors of *Opparow*; who has conſiderable claims on the Chaharmall Country, but whom we could not truſt with the care thereof, in his preſent embarraſſed circumſtances.

Conſ. 7th July. 8th Aug. 30th Dec.

13. *Sitteram Rauze* delivered in a petition to us ſome months ſince, whilſt he was at the Preſidency; ſetting forth, that *Atſhowteram Rauze*, Zemindar of *Cotah*, had made over to the ſon of *Sitteram Rauze*, four villages of that diſtrict, as a compenſation for a debt due to him from *Atchooteram Rauze*. Though the demand might be juſt, yet we could not, upon any account, ſuffer an alienation of Zemindary lands, not conſidering the Zemindars to have a right, under any circumſtances, thus to diſmember the countries committed to their charge, without our ſanction being firſt obtained; and as we underſtood from the Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, that the interference of *Sitteram Rauze* was the only obſtacle to the payment of the tribute of the Cotah Country, we releaſed the four villages from the obligation they were under to him; but we directed the Chief and Council to be careful when the Company's balance was diſcharged, that *Sitteram Rauze* had ſatisfaction for his demand. We have ſince had reaſon to think, from the evaſive conduct of *Atchooteram Rauze*, that we ſhall be at laſt under the neceſſity of ſending collectors, on account of the Company, into his country, as the only means of ſecuring the heavy arrears due from him.

Conſ. 12 Aug. Conſ. 12 Aug.

14. We are happy to acquaint your Honours, that we have the moſt ſanguine hopes of recovering, in the courſe of a ſhort time, a great part of the large balances outſtanding in the Chicacole Circar. In effecting this deſirable object, we cannot ſufficiently commend the activity and vigour ſhewn by Mr. *James Henry Caſamajor*, the preſent Chief of *Vizagapatam*, and his Council, ever ſince the return of *Sitteram Rauze* to the northward. Their arrangements have been judicious, they have already actually realized a conſiderable ſum of money on account of the Company, and their conduct on the whole has anſwered our warmeſt expectations.

15. In conſequence of a petition received in July laſt from *Sitteram Rauze*, we were induced to remit payment to the Vizinagrum family, of one quarter year's tribute of Ankapillee diſtrict, amounting to rupees 25,000, in conſideration of the loſſes ſuſtained by the fort of *Sattieveram* being withheld from their managers by the family of *Pyakerow* in 1778, which much impeded the cultivation of the country. We likewiſe at the ſame time allowed a deduction of R$ 60,881, from the rent of the Chicacole Havelly, as that ſum appeared to us to have been received from the country by *Jaggernaut Rauze*, the late Renter, before *Sitteram Rauze* took charge of thoſe diſtricts.

Conſ. 18 June. 7th July.

16. You will have been informed from the Select Committee, of a mutiny that happened at *Vizigapatam* among your Sepoys, on their being ordered to embark on board ſhip for the Preſidency. During the many exceſſes committed by the mutineers, *Guzza Putty Narrain Deo*, who was depoſed from the Zemindary of *Kimedy* for miſbehaviour in the year 1774, and who has ſince reſided at *Vizapatam*, on the ſtated allowance, was of ſuch uſe, and ſhewed ſo much attachment to your Servants there, whilſt they were abſolutely in imminent danger of ſuffering every barbarity which unreſtrained violence might dictate, that it induced them to recommend his being reinſtated in his Zemindary. The conduct of his brother *Jagganaut Deo*, who was then in charge of the Kimmedy Country, had been by no means ſatisfactory. His incapacity had been before repreſented to us, and the continual diſputes between him and his Dewan had been the means of impeding the collections of tribute for ſuch a length of time, that the arrears due to the Company amounted to ſo large a ſum as R$ 2,04,658, though the annual jemabundy is only R$ 86,000: urged by theſe motives, added to the conſideration of the youth of *Guzzyputty Narrain Deo*, at the time he committed the offence which brought him under the Company's diſpleaſure, we yielded to the ſolicitations of the Chief and Council, and reſtored him to the Zemindary Kimedy, making a ſuitable proviſion for *Jaggernaut Deo*. Your Chief and Council have ſince agreed with *Guzzyputty Narrain Deo*, that he is to pay the Company the ſame jemabundy as heretofore, being R$ 86,000, and the ſum of R$ 30,000 annually, towards the diſcharge of the debt from his country. He himſelf is well ſatisfied to live on an allowance of 1,200 rupees per month, the reſidue of the collections from his Zemindary to be appropriated to the further liquidation of the arrears due to the Company. In diſcuſſing the ſubjects of this and the foregoing paragraphs of the preſent addreſs, ſome difference of opinion occurred among the Members of Council; for the particulars of which, we beg leave to refer you to that part of our Proceedings noted in the margin.

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Conſ. 28th Apr. Conſ. 8 Aug. Conſ. 23 Oct. Conſ. 30 Dec.

17. We acquainted your Honours in our Letter of the 15th October, that we had come to the reſolution of taking away the Cowles for the Farms of *Nagore Cuddalore*, and thoſe under this Preſidency, from the renters who then held them; and that we had publiſhed advertiſements for reletting: as we have not yet finally ſettled this buſineſs, we ſhall defer ſaying more on the ſubject until another occaſion offers of addreſſing your Honours, when we hope to give you the fulleſt ſatisfaction, from our attention to your intereſts in this inſtance.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful
humble Servants,
Charles Smith,
Eyre Coote,
Saml Johnſon,
Hector Munro,
Alex^r Davidſon,
M. Williams.

Fort Saint George, 9th January 1781.

No. 9.

Minute of Sir *Eyre Coote*, 12th January 1781.

AT the ſame time I put my ſignature to the General Letter of the 9th of January 1781, I muſt, in candour and in conformity to thoſe opinions which I have both held and expreſſed, except againſt one part of it, and which aſcribes all our preſent misfortunes to the Maratta war.

That that meaſure may firſt have given birth to the idea of a general combination of the Powers of *Hindoſtan* againſt us, I will not endeavour to diſprove; but that to it alone we owe the formidable incurſion of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, I cannot admit: firſt, becauſe long after we had commenced hoſtilities againſt the Marattas *Hyder* himſelf continued to make conqueſts upon them and which our operations no doubt facilitated. It was his favourite object, and which I am confident he would never have quitted, or ſought for a union with the Marattas againſt us, had not our negotiations with *Bazalet Jung*, about the Guntoor Circar (on which he had alſo views) and the mode in which they were carried on awakened his jealouſy, and very naturally made him apprehend, that our ultimate intentions were to poſſeſs ourſelves of ſome part of his country. Whilſt it anſwered his

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his purpoſe to make peace with the Marattas, in order that his attention or ſtrength might in no ſhape be diverted from providing effectually for the ſecurity of his own territories, it was entirely ſuitable to the Marattas in their then ſituation, as it enabled them to direct their whole force againſt the operations of our army under Brigadier General *Goddard*. We alarmed his fears for the ſafety of his own country; croſſed his views upon the Guntoor Circar, which he was deſirous of obtaining in form from *Bazalet Jung*. That an able agent might not be wanting to foment theſe offences, we deliberately gave umbrage to the Nabob *Nizam*; firſt, by ſeeking and actually ſubſcribing to a treaty of friendſhip with his brother and ſubject *Bazalet Jung*, without aſking his conſent or approbation; and next, by demanding of him a remiſſion of the peſcuſh, or tribute, which for theſe eleven years and upwards we have paid him, as in treaty bound, on account of the Northern Circars. To prevent any bad conſequences ariſing from the delay in the payment of the peſcuſh, which was owing in the firſt place to a temporary inability, created by the heavy current expences, which were unavoidably incurred by the ſiege of *Pondicherry*; and in the next place perhaps by miſmanagement; I was induced, when I ſtopped here in my way to *Bengal*, to recommend the miſſion of Mr. *Hollond*, as Ambaſſador to the Nizam's Court, to aſſure him, that the peſcuſh ſhould be paid, and to explain to him the cauſe of its detention.

The Nizam has in his Letters to this Government, and in his converſations with Mr. *Hollond*, who communicated them to the Governor General and Council, avowed his diſpleaſure, on account of our behaviour with regard to the peſcuſh and the Guntoor treaty; and has, without ſcruple, acknowledged his having for theſe reaſons encouraged and connived at a combination of the Powers againſt us.

With all theſe circumſtances before me, and which the Records both here and in *Bengal* bear teſtimony; and further, knowing it as a thing certain, that at the very time the treaty was carrying on with *Bazalet Jung*, *Hyder* would have entered into an offenſive and defenſive alliance with us; I would do an injury to myſelf, and a ſtill greater one to our Superiors, who are to paſs their judgment on men and meaſures by the documents handed them from their reſpective Governments in *India*, did I tacitly ſubſcribe to that part of the General Letter to the Court of Directors, which I have hereby excepted againſt; and not alſo elucidate the other cauſes, beſides the Maratta war, which have aſſiſted to haſten our preſent diſtreſſes.

I requeſt that this may go a number in the packet now under diſpatch.

(Signed) *Eyre Coote.*

No. 10.

Letter from the Governor General and Council in *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 29th November 1780.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

(Secret Department.)

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1ſt. THE diſpatch of the ſhips now under ſailing orders, affording us an opportunity of addreſſing you from this Department, and of tranſmitting to you a connected narrative of our proceedings in it ſince the date of our advices by the *Swallow*, we avail ourſelves of it for this purpoſe; and at the ſame time ſend you a complete copy of our Conſultations ſince the 24th February laſt, together with a duplicate tranſcript of the broken ſet of them, which was forwarded by that packet. We have alſo the honour to tranſmit to you, triplicate of our Letter by the ſame veſſel, and of thoſe ſince addreſſed to you by the *Trial* ſchooner, under date the 15th and 17th of laſt month. We take the ſame opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your advices of the 24th February and 24th of March.

2. You were duly informed, in our addreſs by the *Swallow*, of the recall of Mr. *Hollond* from the Court of his Highneſs the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, by the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*; of the reaſons which induced us to wiſh for his continuance there; and of the application which we made to the Preſident and Select Committee, for their permiſſion to him to remain at *Hydrabad*, as the public Miniſter of this Government. This application was refuſed, and Mr. *Hollond* was directed, in peremptory terms, to obey the orders of recall before ſent him. Theſe orders were as unreaſonable as they appeared to us ill grounded. They proclaimed to all *India* a diſunion and ſeparation of intereſts between the two Preſidencies; and, in particular, affected the aſſurances which we had given to the Nabob *Nizam Ally*. We were, however, obliged, though very reluctantly, to acquieſce; and Mr. *Hollond* was left at liberty to conform to them. He was directly ſubject to the authority of your Servants at *Fort Saint George*, and it was not in our power to indemnify him from the probable conſequences of diſobedience to it. But the reſtraint upon our wiſhes to be availed of the ſervices of Mr. *Hollond* at *Hydrabad*, did not continue long; for the ſame temper with which he had for ſome time before been treated by his immediate Superiors, inducing them to ſuſpend him from your ſervice, we were enabled to confirm our appointment of him; and did accordingly appoint him to be Reſident, on the part of this Government only, at the Nizam's Court. The high opinion which we entertain of Mr. *Hollond*'s merits, our ſenſe of his ſervices, believing him, as we do, to have been the means of preventing a breach of the alliance ſubſiſting between the Company and the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, at a moment when the Company's affairs were very critically ſituated, and it became of the utmoſt importance to ſecure even the neutrality of the Nizam; the obligations, moreover, under which we deem ourſelves to indemnify Mr. *Hollond*, by every means in our power, from the effects which he has unjuſtly ſuſtained of the reſentment of his Superiors at *Madras*, for his obedience to inſtructions tranſmitted to him by us, in conſequence of thoſe which he had received from them, and which were notified to us by them, call upon us to recommend him ſtrongly to you; and in doing ſo, we make it our requeſt that you reſtore him to the ſervice, and to his ſtanding on the Madras Eſtabliſhment, or that he be transferred, with his rank, to this. Conſ. 15 May.

3. Mr. *Hollond* being placed under our immediate authority at *Hydrabad*, our endeavours have been ſtrenuouſly exerted to ſecure the friendſhip of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, or to prevent him at leaſt from taking part againſt us; but it has not been without great difficulty, that theſe endeavours have hitherto been exerted with a good effect. That power in the Engliſh Governments which was ſettled in his neighbourhood, and with whom of courſe his correſpondence had always been principally held, had made demands on him, which in his conception of them were derogatory from the faith of the treaty ſubſiſting with him; and had committed one act, which was a direct and undoubted violation of it; and the general tenor of their conduct had made him diſtruſtful of their intentions to preſerve the peace with him. Such indeed was his conviction of their unfriendly diſpoſition towards him, that he found it neceſſary to be prepared for hoſtilities; or ſuch was his reſentment of their conduct, that he was determined to uſe the moſt likely means within his compaſs, of cruſhing their ability to do him further miſchief; and under the ſtrong influence of thoſe impreſſions, it is a well-known and undenied fact, that he had not only combined with the principal Powers of *Hindoſtan* againſt the Company, but was the chief

promoter of the alliance. For the particulars of this hiſtory, we beg leave to refer you to a Minute, which has been delivered by the Governor General, and is entered in the Conſultations noted in the margin, as well as to a Letter from Mr. *Hollond* to the Governor General, forwarded by the *Trial* packet; in which the Nabob's avowal is declared, of his being the author of the confederacy againſt us, and his juſtification of it, on the plea of ſelf-defence, againſt the ſuppoſed intention of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* to break with him.

Conſ. 4th Sept.

4. To obviate a prejudice ſo rooted, and the effect of an engagement ſo promiſing of ſucceſs as that in which the Nizam is combined, would of itſelf have been no eaſy taſk; but the difficulty has been ſo much augmented, as to have been nearly invincible, from the unwillingneſs of the Preſidency of *Madras* to uſe the only means of reconciling him to us, and their inattention to the advice and orders which we ſent them for this purpoſe. It was the belief of the Nabob *Nizam Ally*, that we were actually veſted with the controul, which we declared ourſelves to poſſeſs; but he diſtruſted the effect of that controul, ſince the orders which we had repeatedly given and declared to him, for the reſtitution of the Circar of *Guntoor*, had not only been diſregarded, but Mr. *Hollond*, who had been the inſtrument of the negotiation, had been puniſhed by them for the part which he had taken in it.

5. We refer you to our Letter to *Fort Saint George*, of the 12th June, for the arrangement on which we had reſolved to give the Soubah ſatisfaction, and of which he was immediately informed. The Preſident and Select Committee, inſtead of withdrawing their forces, Collectors and Agents, from the Circar of *Guntoor*, agreeable to our requiſition, reſtoring it to the poſſeſſion of *Bazalet Jung*, and replacing every thing in the ſtate in which it ſtood before they entered into any negotiation with him, did in no one inſtance comply with our orders, nor appear to have taken the leaſt notice of them till the 2d of September; when they informed us, that they were willing to comply with our requiſition of them, to deliver back to *Bazalet Jung* the Guntoor Circar; but that the Circar having been farmed to the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, his claim on it, as Renter, muſt be firſt relinquiſhed; and that they had written to him, expreſſing their hope that he would give it up, and that they would inform us of his anſwer as ſoon as they receive it.

6. We have recited the great difficulties which oppoſed our accommodation with the Nizam, of which we had much reaſon to complain, ſo much, that it became an object of neceſſity to remove them. The controlling power, with which we are veſted by an act of the Britiſh Legiſlature, had been, in repeated inſtances, treated by the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George* with ſlight and diſreſpect; but in the preſent inſtance, they thought proper to take more upon them: they defeated our acts by their refuſal to conform to them, and comply with our orders, where we had eſpecial right to them. The faith of this Government had been pledged to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, for the reſtoration of the Guntoor Circar to *Bazalet Jung*; they were ſo informed, and required to reſtore it. They did not reſtore it.—We had no alternative but by a tame acquieſcence to ſacrifice the truſt repoſed in us, and ſuffer your intereſts to be involved in a war by a breach of public faith, or to maintain both by an application of the powers which had been given us for ſuch a purpoſe. Upon theſe grounds we reſolved, on the 10th ultimo, to give effect to our commands, and determined to exert the authority with which we were veſted, in ſuſpending Mr. *Whitehill*, the Preſident of *Fort Saint George*, from the Company's ſervice. Our reaſons for this meaſure are particularly ſtated in our Letter to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, of the 10th ultimo, which goes a number in the packet, and to which we beg leave to refer you for them: and at the ſame time that we are led to hope that the beſt effects may be derived from it, in eſtabliſhing for the Company the neutrality or friendſhip of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Khan*, during the preſent troubles, and in ſaving our authority in his eſtimation, and that of the other Country Powers, we are under no fear that the Councils of your Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* will be leſs ably or ſucceſsfully conducted hereafter, than they have been during the period in which Mr. *Whitehill* directed them.

7. You will obſerve, by our Conſultations of the 13th ultimo, that we were then informed, by a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, dated the 23d September, of the meaſures which they had at length been pleaſed to adopt, for giving effect to our requiſitions of the 12th of June, by immediate orders to their officer commanding in the Guntoor Circar, to deliver over that country to *Bazalet Jung*'s Agent; and by procuring an order alſo from the Nabob to his Aumildar, to relinquiſh all concern in the management of the revenues.

8. Our Letter by the *Trial* packet, will have acquainted you with the calamity which had befallen a large detachment of your troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonels *Baillie* and *Fletcher*, in the *Carnatic*, and of the conſequent retreat of Major General *Munro*, with the main army, to *Chingleput*. The ſame Letters will inform you of the exertions we have made for the relief of your affairs on the Coaſt, in diſpenſing with the ſervices of Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote* at this Settlement, where they were very neceſſary, for the ſake of affording the aid of them to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*; in detaching to it a conſiderable force of European infantry and artillery; in remitting for its uſe, a large ſupply of treaſure, amounting to the ſum of fifteen lacks of rupees; and in providing it with a great ſtore of grain. We have not been thus liberal in our ſervices to the Preſidency of *Madras*, without ſome inconveniences to our Government; but our efforts being made under the conviction of their being neceſſary to the preſervation of the Company's affairs under that Preſidency, and to the retrieval of them from the ſad effect of the misfortune which they had ſuſtained, they have been exerted with the firſt degree of chearfulneſs, and will be continued with the ſame, while our aſſiſtance can be given without certain danger to your ſuperior intereſt in *Bengal*.

9. It has been ſtrongly recommended by us to Rear Admiral Sir *Edward Hughes*, to aſſiſt in diſtreſſing *Hyder Ally*, by the deſtruction of his ſhips and ports on the Coaſt of *Malabar*, during the Admiral's voyage to *Bombay*; and we doubt not but the uſe of this meaſure will appear to him in the ſame light as it appears to us.

10. We have the pleaſure to inform you, that we have received advice from Sir *Eyre Coote*, under date the 6th inſtant, of his arrival at *Fort Saint George*, on the preceding day, which is exactly one month and thirteen days, from the receipt of the advices which firſt informed us of the diſtreſſes of that Preſidency, that all the veſſels, with the troops and ſtores were alſo ſafely arrived, and the troops and treaſure ſafely landed. A copy of his Letter to us, goes a number in the packet.—We much fear that the account which it contains, of the loſs of *Arcot*, though not deemed certain, is too true; but we truſt, that the preſence and good conduct of Sir *Eyre Coote*, will ſoon change the face of your affairs in that country.

11. In further aid of the operations of the Company's troops on the Coaſt, and on the advice and recommendation of the Commander in Chief, before his departure from *Bengal*, we reſolved, on the 26th ultimo, to detach over-land towards *Madras*, a company of European artillery, and a body of ſix battalions of Sepoys, with their guns, chiefly intended for the defence of the Circars; but generally for ſuch other ſervices as may be required of them. The Commander of this detachment is veſted in Lieutenant Colonel *Pearſe*; Major *Edmundſon* is appointed ſecond in command, and we have allowed for it the eſtabliſhment noted in the margin. We have it in contemplation, to ſupply the loſs of this force to the defence of our own provinces, by new levies, but our reſo-

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lution has not yet been taken on the beſt and leaſt expenſive mode of carrying our intentions in this reſpect into execution. The orders of march for the troops going towards *Madras*, being to depend on the hopes given us, that the Maratta army now lying at *Cuttack*, will either join us, or return to *Berar*; we are anxiouſly waiting before we paſs the order, for advices from the Government of *Berar*; in anſwer to the Letters which were written to them by the Governor General, in conſequence of our reſolutions of the 26th September, reſpecting a propoſed treaty with the Maratta ſtate. Theſe reſolutions ſhall be more fully noticed hereafter; but we here think it neceſſary to obſerve, upon the general conduct of the Rajah of *Berar* towards this Government, upon the ſtrong profeſſions of friendſhip which he has made to it, and upon the declarations of his Vakeel, that even though his troops ſhould not have quitted *Cuttack* when our forces reached it on their way to the Circars, our opinion is, that they will offer them no hindrance or moleſtation.

11. You will obſerve by our Proceedings of the 20th July, that we reſolved to detach a battalion of Sepoys to the banks of the *Sōubenreka*, for the purpoſe of ſecuring the boats on that river, ſhould the troops of the Rajah of *Berar* attempt to croſs it; and to watch their motions. This was a meaſure of precaution, not of neceſſity.

12. Our knowledge of this country has informed us too well of the arts and policy uſually obſerved in the Indian Courts, to permit us to place an implicit faith or reliance on the mere profeſſions and oſtentatious diſplay of friendſhip which we may receive from any of them; and we muſt confeſs, that, if our belief of the friendly intentions of the Rajah of *Berar* towards the intereſt of the Company, had no other grounds than his profeſſions of them, ſtrong as theſe have been (and they are the ſtrongeſt that were ever penned by an Indian Power) it would be but weakly founded. Our impreſſion of the truth of them, is received from a knowledge of his real intereſts; and the proofs that he has hitherto afforded us, that we have not been miſtaken in our opinion of his ſincerity.—From the firſt intimation that he received of our intentions to detach a body of troops, under the command of Colonel *Leſlie*, to the Weſt of *India*, to the preſent time, he has given us the moſt powerful reaſons to ſuppoſe him a friend of the Company; and though, by his alliance, in which he is engaged with the Maratta State againſt us, he might be deemed an enemy, we are not perſuaded that this is a clear proof of his being ſo; for we believe, that the part which he has been ſaid to take in union with that State, was a part taken by neceſſity, not by choice; that he was forced into it, on conſideration of the ſafety of his own Government; and that, if a favourable opportunity ſhould preſent itſelf, whereat he could ſhew himſelf the friend of the Company with ſecurity to his own country, he would abandon an alliance into which he entered againſt his will, and act as his true intereſt led him.

13. We wiſh to draw your attention to the following facts, as the grounds of the opinion which we have formed, that the declared friendſhip of the Maha Rajah *Moodagee Booſla* for the Company, is not inſincere.

14. On the firſt formation of the detachment of your troops, placed under the command of Colonel *Leſlie*, an application was made to the Rajah of *Berar*, to permit it to paſs through a part of his dominions; he chearfully complied, and not only wrote to Colonel *Leſlie*, offering him a free paſſage through his country, and the means of ſubſiſtence, but cauſed a large ſtore of grain to be provided on his borders, where it lay ſome months waiting for his arrival; and during the continuance of Colonel *Goddard*, who then commanded the detachment of *Hoſhingabad*, he was received and treated with the greateſt hoſpitality.—Upon a viſit paid by the Rajah's Dewan, *Dewagur Pundit*, to *Poonah*, a confederacy was formed by the Maratta Miniſter, *Nana Furnuſe*, *Madajee Scindia*, and *Hyder Ally*, againſt the Company; and in this confederacy the Berar Government was required to take a part, and to furniſh their quota of troops for the common cauſe; the requiſition was accompanied with threats of invaſion of their country in the event of refuſal; and the Rajah having at that time diſbanded his army, and being therefore unprepared to aſſert his own rights and independency, was obliged to enter into the general confederacy, claiming, at the ſame time, the privilege of mediation. We are informed by the Governor General, that the firſt intelligence which he received of the confederacy, was from the Miniſter *Dewargur Pundit* himſelf; and believing the fact to be ſo, we cannot ſuppoſe that ſuch important communications would have been ſo readily imparted to us by *Dewargur Pundit*, if the Berar Government had been as hoſtile to us in reality, as motives of ſecurity to themſelves compelled them to appear. The part aſſigned in the confederacy to the Berar Rajah, was to ſend an army, during the courſe of the laſt ſeaſon, to lay waſte the provinces of *Bengal*. With this requiſition he certainly complied; but, at the ſame time, he informed us, that he ſhould uſe ſuch means of delay as ſhould prevent the army from approaching our borders, until the cloſe of the fair ſeaſon, when it could not enter upon immediate action; that in the interim, he ſhould be able by the next ſeaſon, to raiſe ſuch an army as would effectually eſtabliſh his own independence, and qualify him to act according to the dictates of his own judgment. Theſe declarations have hitherto been literally verified; for we have ſeen a large body of his troops, which he had detached in compliance to the requiſition made of him at *Poonah*, ſpin out a march to ſeven months, which might with eaſe have been accompliſhed in two, and arrive at the place of their deſtination at the commencement of the rains. We have alſo ſeen, that, ſince their arrival at *Cuttack*, inſtead of committing hoſtility and diſturbance, they have continued as quiet as if cantoned at their own capital. Conſ. 4th Sept.

15. Theſe circumſtances, added to the ſtrong profeſſions made to us, which we have not found falſified in any inſtance, and to the conſideration of his real intereſt, which in our judgment of it, attaches him to the Company, rather than to any of the Powers with whom he is obliged to wear the maſk of amity and confederacy againſt them, unleſs we ſhould in general admit, what we are very unwilling to admit, that the power which the Company poſſeſs in *Hindoſtan* is ſo extenſive and obnoxious to the whole empire, as to make it the intereſt of all its provinces, to unite with one another in overthrowing it. Theſe reaſons, we repeat, induce us to believe that the Rajah of *Berar* is well diſpoſed towards the Company; and that if the war with the Marattas ſhould continue, he will remain neutral; or that, ſhould he be compelled to take an active part in it, it will not be againſt us.—The belief of his attachment to your intereſt, and the confidence which we placed in it, have induced us to attend to the requeſt made to us for ſupplying his army with ſuch proviſions as they wanted at *Cuttack*, where it might have been greatly diſtreſſed without ſuch aſſiſtance.

16. We have been particular in acquainting you with our ſentiments regarding the Rajah of *Berar*, becauſe, from ſuſpicions of his intentions, grounded on the ſituation of his troops, ſo near our borders, you might be inclined to apprehend that theſe provinces were in danger of an invaſion from them; and becauſe we deſire to be juſtified on a late occaſion, which we have taken to ſhew our confidence in the Berar Government, and to add to its importance in the opinion of the other Country Powers, by the choice which we have made of it to be the guarantee for the faithful obſervance of a propoſed treaty with the Maratta State. Of this treaty you have already been informed by our advices of the 10th ultimo, and it appears on the Proceedings noted in the margin. We truſt, that you will approve the terms of it:—they were the beſt that we could offer in the ſituation of affairs at that time; and if accepted, we ſhall hope to ſee a peace firmly eſtabliſhed throughout *India*, or a war ſo vigorouſly ſupported Conſ. 26th and 27th Sept.

ſupported by the alliance which they propoſe, as to give an early and very proſperous turn to the preſent troubles, and ſuch an iſſue to them as we think fit to command.

17. We have hitherto been ſucceſsful in our endeavours to preſerve the neutrality of the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, notwithſtanding his engagement with the confederate Powers. The Rajah of *Berar* has not taken, and, as has been before obſerved, we believe will not, take any part againſt us; and if the Marattas could be perſuaded to abandon the temporary alliance which they have formed with their natural, and, till lately, inveterate enemy, *Hyder Ally*, whoſe ſucceſſes cannot be conſidered by them without ſome degree of jealouſy, we ſhould hope to be ſoon able effectually to cruſh the alarming efforts of this extraordinary uſurper, to add to the number of his conqueſts, and in the event of his oppreſſions, without reaſon or pretext.

18. You were informed in our General Letter of the 3d of March, of the operations of the army ſerving under General *Goddard* at the lateſt period from which we had received authenticated accounts of them. Continuing the narrative, we have now to inform you, that agreeable to the plan concerted with him by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and notwithſtanding the dubious conduct of *Futty Sing Row Guicawar*, when offers were firſt made to him by Brigadier General *Goddard*, a treaty of alliance was concluded with him on the 29th January laſt, generally correſponding with the objects that appear in Mr. *Hornby*'s plan, dated 30th March 1779.

Deeming this alliance an event of conſiderable importance to the intereſt of the Company, and as having tended to facilitate, in a great degree, the ſucceſsful operations of our troops in the province of *Guzerat*, we beſtow only a juſt praiſe on the Officer who negotiated, when we declare our opinion, that he has rendered an eſſential ſervice to the Company, in concluding it. Some correſpondence having paſſed between Brigadier General *Goddard* and the Select Committee of *Bombay*, and between us and them, reſpecting the partition of territory ſtipulated in the treaty, we refer you for a full account of it to the Proceedings on which it is recorded, and to our Conſultations of the 15th May and the 2d October, for the orders which were ſent to General *Goddard*, on the ſubject of his replies to them. The treaty with *Futty Sing*, amended and ratified by us, will be found on our Proceedings of the 5th June. Two copies have been tranſmitted to Brigadier General *Goddard*, ſo far different from each other, that in the one the Articles which form the ſixth and tenth numbers of the treaty are omitted, and in the other, concluded with certain corrections, which we found it neceſſary to make in them; and we have left it to his diſcretion, to obtain the ſignature of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and of *Futty Sing*, to either of them; adding his own to that which may receive their concurrence, and returning the other cancelled to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to be ſent back to us.

19. We beg leave to refer you to the Conſultation noted in the margin, for the further obſervations which we made on the proviſions of the treaty concluded with *Futty Sing*, for our orders reſpecting them, and the replies made to thoſe orders by the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, and Brigadier General *Goddard*.

20. The treaty with *Futty Sing* had not long been concluded, before the General marched his forces to the city of *Ahmedabad*, the capital of *Guzerat*. His ſucceſs at this place, which he took by ſtorm on the 15th of February, after a ſiege of three days, completed the reduction of the rich province of *Guzerat*, for the advantage of the Company, and their Ally *Futty Sing*, and to the entire loſs of it to the Maratta State. On the army's quitting *Ahmedabad*, a detachment of our forces was left there in garriſon; and we have directed that *Futty Sing* ſhould be required to fix a ſubſidy for the expence of theſe troops during their continuance there, to make full payment of it from the time when they were left at *Ahmedabad*, and to diſcharge any extra expence incurred by the Company in the capture of the place. The detachment under the command of General *Goddard* having croſſed the river *Mybe*, on their return to the ſouthward from *Ahmedabad*, was joined by the forces of the Madras Eſtabliſhment, conſiſting of 500 Europeans, commanded by Colonel *Brown*.

Supplemental Appendix to the 2nd Report. No. 10.

21. On their arrival on the ſouth ſide of *Mahie*, it was found that *Madajee Scindia* and *Tuckojee Holcar*, with their forces, conſiſting of about 40,000 horſe, after entering *Chandith*, had proceeded towards *Surat*; within 30 miles of this place, they had advanced, when receiving intelligence of the ſiege of *Ahmedabad*, they bent their courſe to the northward, in hopes of arriving in ſufficient time to ſuccour the beſieged; but finding their expectations diſappointed, by the early capture of the place, and that the General with his army was marching quickly towards them, they had moved off with their whole force towards *Pawenghur*, a ſtrong, and by them deemed an impregnable fortreſs, ſituated on a high and ſteep hill. Here they continued for ſome time; and during their ſtay, there was ſome negotiation ſet on foot between the two Chiefs and Brigadier General *Goddard*. The intercourſe commenced by their releaſe of Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart* from the confinement which they had long ſuffered, as hoſtages for the performance of the engagements made at *Worgaum*, and the miſſion of a confidential perſon, named *Abajee Shabajee*, charged with Letters to the General, and accompany theſe Gentlemen to the Engliſh camp. A particular account of the correſpondence between the General and the Maratta Chiefs, appears in his Letters to the Preſident and Select Committee, of the 10th, 13th, and 17th March: it commenced, on the part of *Scindia*, with general expreſſions of his friendſhip for the Engliſh, on account of the proofs which he had given of it, in the regard ſhewn them at *Worgaum*; his perſeverance in the ſame ſentiments towards them to the preſent period, manifeſted by his treatment of Meſſrs. *Farmer* and *Stewart*, during their reſidence in his camp, and the liberty which he had granted them to return; and a deſire to be informed if our intentions were of a hoſtile or friendly nature towards the Peſhwa and himſelf. The replies made by General *Goddard* were as general as the profeſſions to which they were anſwers; reſted the cauſe of quarrel with the Miniſter, to whoſe pernicious Councils he aſcribed it, and its conſequences. It is neceſſary to obſerve, that at this period there was a ſuppoſed enmity between *Nana* the Miniſter, and *Mhadajee Scindia*, and that the ſame was avowed by *Abajee Shabajee*, the confidential perſon before named as charged with Letters to the Engliſh camp; though it is ſaid by General *Goddard*, that there is reaſon to believe that no ſuch enmity actually exiſted, and that it was declared merely to anſwer purpoſes expected from it. The propoſals at laſt made by *Scindia*, through his confidential Agent, were to this effect: that the agreement ſaid to have been made between *Ragoba* and *Scindia*, at *Tilliagong*, after the return of the Engliſh army to *Bombay*, ſhould be revived.—In this agreement the former is ſaid to have conſented to relinquiſh all claims to any ſhare in the adminiſtration of *Poonah*, and to retire towards *Jancy*, where he would receive an allowance from the Peſhwa's revenue of twelve lacks of rupees per annum; that the Sicca ſhould be ſtruck in the name of the young Peſhwa *Madadow Narain*; and that *Badjarow*, the ſon of *Ragoba*, ſhould be appointed his Dewan; but being only four years of age, and therefore too young to tranſact the buſineſs of the office himſelf, the care and management of it ſhould be left entirely to *Scindia*. This agreement, it was propoſed, ſhould now be put in force, that *Ragoba* ſhould immediately go to *Jancy*, and young *Badjarow* accompany *Scindia* to *Poonah*, in order to fix the adminiſtration in the manner above-mentioned. The anſwer made by General *Goddard* to theſe propoſals, was to the following effect: "that the Engliſh could "not, conſiſtently with their honour, nor ever could, "agree to put any reſtraint on *Ragoba*, or compel him "to leave their dominions againſt his own conſent: "that

Supplemental Appendix to the Second Report. No. 10.

" that however much they might be induced to unite in " the propoſed Settlement, they muſt be perfectly ſatis- " fied reſpecting the ſafety of young *Badjarow*; that " every thing muſt be quietly ſettled at *Poonah*, before " his preſence would be expedient, or even neceſſary " there; and that, admitting even the Engliſh did agree " to aſſiſt in putting the power of the State into the " hand of *Scindia*, it was neceſſary that he alſo ſhould, " on his part, and in the name of the Peſhwa, conſent " to the performance of certain conditions favourable " to their intereſts, as well in conſideration of the im- " portant advantages he was to receive through their " means, as to compenſate for the heavy expence of the " wars, which formerly, and in particular at this time, " they had been involuntarily compelled to wage with " the Maratta State." With this anſwer, and general aſſurances of a ſincere diſpoſition towards an accommoda- tion, on terms of an honourable nature, the Maratta Agent was diſmiſſed to his Maſter; it does not appear that any farther correſpondence paſſed between the two camps.

22. In a Letter written by us to General *Goddard*, on receipt of the advices which have been above quoted, we explained to him the principles which we required him to follow, with reſpect to *Ragoba*; deeming our obligations to this Chief little more than negative, en- tirely confined to the preſent protection of his perſon, and a future proviſion for his ſubſiſtence. Theſe points having been ſecured, we poſitively directed, that no conſideration of the ſuppoſed rights or intereſts of *Ragoba* ſhould ever be a bar or obſtacle to a peaceable accom- modation with the Maratta State. The proviſion ſtipu- lated for him in the treaty of *Poorunder*, being in our opinion adequate to his rank and wants, and placing him in a ſtate of ſafety and independence, we ſhould have approved of the offers made to General *Goddard* by *Mhadajee Scindia*, for the reſidence of *Ragoba* at *Jancy*, with ſuch a proviſion for his ſubſiſtence, if that fortreſs and its dependency, or ſuch a portion of it, was equal to the clear revenue intended to be appropriated to his uſe, were aſſigned to him abſolutely and independently of any other controul.

23. Theſe are the principles which we laid down with reſpect to *Ragoba*; and we have confirmed them in late Letters to Brigadier General *Goddard*, deſiring him to aſſure *Ragoba* that he may depend upon our protection during the war in which we are involved with the Peſhwa, and on our regard to his perſonal ſafety and intereſt, as far as it may be in our power to provide for him after it.

Conf. 9th Oct.

24. You will obſerve in the peruſal of the General's correſpondence, the reaſons which he aſſigns for the large allowance which he had allotted to *Ragonaut Row*; and as theſe are ſtated by him in his juſtification upon an im- portant point, we do him merely juſtice in deſiring your attention to them. Our orders had been poſitive and re- peated for the diſcontinuance of the ſtipend allotted to *Ra- goba*; but the neceſſity of affording him ſome allowance ap- pearing to the General in a ſtrong point of view, and to the Preſident and Select Committee of *Bombay*, whoſe advice and opinion he received on this occaſion, we have conſented, for the reaſons ſtated to us, to the reduced allowance granted by the General to *Ragoba* of 10,000 rupees a month.

Conf. 20th Apr. Conf. 29th Nov. 1779. 24. Jan. 1780.

25. With reſpect to the operations of your troops under the command of General *Goddard*, ſince the cap- ture of *Ahmedabad*, we ſhall be as brief as poſſible in our account of them, referring you for a fuller detail to his own accounts.

26. In the morning of the 23d April, Brigadier Gen- eral *Goddard*, taking with him a part of his army, conſiſting of 200 Europeans, 10 companies of Grena- dier Sepoys, 3 battalions of Sepoys, and the Mogul and Candahar cavalry, ſurprized and ſtormed the Maratta camp, obliging the enemy to make a quick flight.—On the 23d May, Major *Forbes*, with two battalions of Sepoys, ſurprized a body of the enemy, conſiſting of 6,000 horſe, commanded by two principal officers, named *Baghſetty Scindia* and *Parajee Punt*, whoſe deſign was to watch the motions of our army, and to lay waſte the country, and he diſperſed the whole.

27. About the ſame time Lieutenant *Welch* having been detached with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar horſe, and the 7th battalion of Sepoys, againſt *Gunneſe Punt*, a Maratta officer, who with a body of 4,000 horſe, 3,000 foot, and 3 field pieces, had been ravaging and greatly infeſting the environs of *Surat*, performed this ſervice with complete ſucceſs; and what redounds to the credit of his gallantry and conduct, with the aſſiſtance only of the cavalry, for the infantry were left purpoſely at a diſtance, his intention being to puſh forward with all poſſible expedition, and to reach the camp of the enemy before day-break: he put them all to a precipi- tate flight, and poſſeſſed himſelf of their whole camp, their guns, their tents, and their bazar. Lieutenant *Welch* has ſince diſtinguiſhed his conduct in the capture of *Parnegre*, and on other ſervices, and ſhewn himſelf an active and good officer.

28. We have only generally to obſerve, in addition to this recital, that the unprofitable taſk of purſuing a Maratta force, without the poſſibility of bringing them to an engagement, has induced Brigadier General *Goddard*, ſince his ſucceſſes, which have made the Company and their Ally complete maſters of *Guzerat*, to employ his arms chiefly for the defence of the acquired countries, and in ſecuring the collections of revenue from it; and we have the happineſs to know, at the ſame time that we lament the heavy expence which has been neceſſarily incurred in the proſecution of the war, that the opera- tions of your forces in the courſe of it, have retrieved the character which they loſt by the melancholy diſaſter which befel them in January 1779, and placed them in the firſt decree of credit and eſtimation.

29. The neceſſity of maintaining ſo large a force at the expence of the Bengal treaſury, has occaſioned ſo quick a drain of it as to make the further ſupport of the charge almoſt impoſſible; and it ſeeming to us only reaſonable, that every acceſſion of revenue which might immediately ariſe to the Company, from the operations and ſucceſſes of the army, ſhould be appropriated excluſively to the payment of its expences, we informed the Gentlemen of *Bombay* of our expectations in this particular; and have the pleaſure to know from their late Letters, that they have aſſigned the firſt collections from the Pergunnahs, under the management of the Chief and Council at *Surat*, ſolely to that purpoſe.

30. The neceſſity of a reduction of expence, no leſs than a belief that the Gentlemen at *Fort Saint George* would require the ſervices of the troops under Colonel *Brown*, detached from that Preſidency, to make a part of General *Goddard*'s army, induced us on the 20th April, to direct that they ſhould be ſent back, as ſoon as he could diſpenſe with their ſervices. They conſiſt of one company of European artillery, ſeven of infantry, and one battalion of Sepoys. The ſame conſideration of leſſening expence, induced us to order the reduction of the 1ſt regiment of cavalry with General *Goddard*'s army. They had not been at that time even noticed to us as a uſeful corps to the operations of the detachment, and the expence attending it was very conſiderable; but the ſtrong recommendation which we have ſince received of their merits, from General *Goddard*, grounded on their late activity and ſervices, and the deſire which he has expreſſed for their continuance in his army, have pre- vailed on us to revoke our orders to him of the 20th April to diſband them.

31. We have not yet ſufficiently conſidered the laſt advices from General *Goddard*, or thoſe from *Bombay*, reſpecting the future operations of their troops, and the other ſubjects to which they relate, to reply to them; but they appear on the Proceedings noted in the margin. The whole army under the command of Brigadier Gene- ral *Goddard*, was probably embarked from *Surat* the

Conf. 3d Oct. 23d Nov.

beginning of October; we entertain a hope that they are now in poſſeſſion of *Baſſein*, and by the aſſiſtance of the Bombay troops of the country around it. At this diſtance from the ſcene of action, it has not been poſſible for us to preſcribe a fixed plan of operations for General *Goddard*'s forces after the capture of *Baſſein*. Well acquainted as he is with our general ſentiments, we have thought it beſt to leave him generally to his own diſcretion in this reſpect, excepting where he ſhall receive orders from the Commander in Chief, which we have directed him to obey; and in the event of the arrival of a French armament on the Coaſt of *Malabar*, when he is poſitively ordered to employ his force for the aſſiſtance of the Preſidency of *Bombay*.

Conſ. 9th Oct.

Conſ. 26th Oct.

32. We thought it neceſſary on the 16th ultimo, to impower Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, and did accordingly impower him, to iſſue ſuch orders as he ſhould judge expedient, to every detachment that has or may be made from the military eſtabliſhment of this Preſidency, for the general ſervice of the war in which the Company's forces are engaged.

33. We are happy to inform you, that our ſucceſſes againſt the Marattas have not been limited to the operations in *Guzerat*. The ſame ſpirit which has animated your forces in that country, and the ſame gallantry and good conduct which has diſtinguiſhed their Commanders, has ſhewn itſelf in the detachment of your troops employed in the ſervice of our Ally, the *Rana* of *Ghode*.—The capture of *Lahaar* fort, the 28th April, and the ſubſequent and very important capture of the fortreſs of *Gualior*, of which you were adviſed in a ſeparate Letter, written to you under date the 24th Auguſt, by a neutral ſhip, reflect the higheſt honour on the officer in command of your troops, as well as thoſe ſubordinate to him. We have thought it neceſſary to reward the ſervice of Captain *Popham*, by promoting him to the rank of Major; and we have granted a commiſſion accordingly, ſpecifying particularly in the body of it, for what ſervices it was given him, his title to the rank which he held by it, not being in the regular courſe of ſucceſſion. His conduct during the whole courſe of this ſervice, has been ſo meritorious, that we think it a duty incumbent upon us, to recommend him particularly to your favour. We have directed that the fort of *Gualior* ſhould continue in poſſeſſion of your troops, during the continuance of the war.

Conſ. 12 } 19 } 26 } 29 } June

23th } 20 } July.

11th Sept.

13th Nov.

34. Long before the capture of *Gualior*, we had reſolved on the relief of the battalion of drafts, acting under the command of Captain *Popham*, by four regular battalions detached from the brigades; and the command of the troops ſo detached, was given to Major *Carnac*. Some difference of opinion having ariſen, on a propoſition made by the Governor General, for an increaſe of this force, and on the powers and inſtructions to be granted to Major *Carnac*, we beg leave to refer you for an explanation, to the ſeveral Minutes which are entered in the Conſultation, noted in the margin; content now to inform you generally, that the inſtructions given to Major *Carnac*, were as propoſed on the 12th of June; that the battalion of drafts, formerly ſerving under Captain *Popham*, are appointed to the eſtabliſhment; and that the whole force, conſiſting of ſeven battalions of Sepoys, is now under the command of Major *Carnac*, as well as the corps of foreign rangers, formerly on duty as a guard to the Commander in Chief.

Conſ. 12 June. 13 Nov.

35. Our endeavours have been exerted to obtain for the Nabob Vizier, complete payment of the Company's whole demand upon him for the laſt year; but without effect. The diſtreſs of his ſituation, and his inability to attend to the requiſitions made of him now deſcribed in ſo ſtrong colours, that we have been obliged to relax in ſome degree from our demand upon him for the preſent, though not without an expectation that the claims of the enſuing year will have been entirely provided for, together with the debt of the foregoing, at the late ſettlement. Having ſtrongly recommended to Mr. *Purling*, to urge his Excellency to the diminution of ſome large and unneceſſary expences, which we obſerved in a ſtate of his finances tranſmitted to us, we truſt that the advice given him will have a good effect, and that better œconomy for the future will enable him to diſcharge his entire debt to the Company, without diſtreſs to himſelf. Mr. *Purling* has lately remitted to us the ſum of five lacks of Fyzabad rupees, which is ſafely arrived here, and placed in our treaſury.

Conſ. 3d and 30th April.

36. We have thought it neceſſary to require from the Rajah of *Benares*, the ſame ſubſidy for the enſuing year that he paid in the laſt, as his proportion in the expence of the war. He for ſome time heſitated to comply with the demand, and we were obliged to reſolve on meaſures of compulſion; but he has ſince paid the account, and we have ſtopped the execution of thoſe meaſures. The ſupport which he receives from this Government, to whom he owes all that he poſſeſſes; the known affluence of his circumſtances, notwithſtanding his pretexts to the contrary; and the intereſt which he poſſeſſes in chief over all other perſons ſubject to us in the Company's proſperity and ſucceſs, have induced us to require of him the aſſiſtance of ſuch a body of cavalry as he can ſpare for the Company's employ; under a promiſe made to him, that their ſervices will not be required beyond the continuance of the war. We have alſo ſtrongly recommended to the Nabob Vizier to require from *Fyzoola Cawn*, the quota of troops, conſiſting of 5,000 horſe, ſtipulated by treaty to be furniſhed by the latter; and we do not doubt of his ready obedience to the requiſition.

Conſ. 23 June.

Conſ. 2d Nov.

Conſ. 2d Nov.

37. We have at preſent no more to add to the advices herewith ſent you from this Department, and to thoſe which we had the honour to tranſmit you by the *Trial* packet. In our next diſpatches, we ſhall hope to be able to inform you of the event of the offers made by us to the Maratta State, and to ſend you a proſperous account of the ſtate of your affairs on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings.
Edwd Wheler.

Fort William, the 29th November 1780.

FOURTH

REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Reported by the LORD ADVOCATE *of* SCOTLAND (HENRY DUNDAS, Esq.)
6th February 1782.

VOL. VII.

FOURTH REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

The 6th February 1782.

The COMMITTEE of SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts; and to report the ſame, with their Obſervations thereupon, to the Houſe; and who were inſtructed to inquire into the Riſe, Progreſs, Conduct, and preſent State of the Maratta War, and all other Hoſtilities in which the Preſidency of *Bengal* now are, or have been, engaged, in the Support of that War, and of the Effects which the ſaid War and Hoſtilities may have produced in *Bengal*, and the other Settlements and Poſſeſſions of the *Eaſt-India* Company;—

IN the original Plan of their Report, propoſed, after giving an account of the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, with the military tranſactions that happened in conſequence thereof, and the intelligence which the Company's Servants had received of the hoſtile intentions of that Prince; to ſtate the conduct of the Company's Servants, as far as it appears to have had any influence on theſe tranſactions, under three heads; Military, Political, and Revenue.

Of theſe three general heads, the firſt makes the ſubject of a former Report; the ſecond will be ſeparately conſidered. In the preſent Report, your Committee propoſe, as far as the materials they have had acceſs to enable them, to mention ſuch particulars reſpecting the Revenue of the Company, under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as may be of importance for the information of the Houſe.

Your Committee, however, beg leave to obſerve, that this part of their buſineſs has been much abridged, in conſequence of the variation which they thought it neceſſary to make upon their original plan. In the introduction to their Second Report, they informed the Houſe, that having found ſeveral ſpecial matters relating to the conduct of the two laſt Governors of *Fort Saint George*, and of their reſpective Councils, which appeared proper to be communicated to the Houſe; they thought it their duty to make a Report of theſe ſpecial matters as early as poſſible, and without waiting to complete their General Report. Of thoſe ſpecial matters, which make the ſubject of the Second Report, a very conſiderable part relates to the conduct of the Company's Servants, in the management of the Revenues; and in that view, was originally intended to be introduced under this general head. To introduce the ſame matters here again, would occaſion an unneceſſary repetition. To that part of the Second Report, therefore, your Committee beg leave to refer for information in theſe particulars; propoſing here, after mentioning what appears to have been the ſtate of the treaſury at the time of the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, to give only a general view of the nature, amount, and expenditure, of the Revenues; with ſuch obſervations reſpecting them, as did not fall within the plan of that ſpecial Report.

Your Committee find, that at the time of *Hyder Ally*'s irruption into the *Carnatic*, the ſtate of the treaſury of *Fort Saint George*, and of the money at their command, was by no means ſuch as could enable the Preſidency, from its own reſources, to reſiſt ſo formidable an attack. Mr. *Sadlier*, in his Minute of July 29th, 1780, charges the Preſident and Council with having taken "no pains "to repleniſh an empty treaſury; that the Nabob had "declared he had no money; that the Rajah of *Tanjore* "had made the ſame declaration; that the *Maſulipatam* "diſtricts of the Northern Circars were ſo far from "being

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" being able to furniſh the ſupplies, that arrears of tribute " then amounted to ſeventeen lacks of pagodas; that " *Sitteram Rauze*, the moſt wealthy Zemindar under " the Company, had not paid his kiſts, and inſtead of " his being preſſed to pay them, a remiſſion of tribute " was voted to him; that *Ball Kiſtna* was in arrears, " nor was it believed that he would be ever induced to " make good his engagements." — Mr. *Sadlier* adds, " that notwithſtanding that bad ſtate of the revenue, " money might be raiſed, and enough of it too, had " Government acted with ſpirit and reſolution; but that " both were wanting when both were moſt required— " that the Nabob's territories had remained in peace " ever ſince the year 1769; that conſiderable additions " had been made to them ſince that time; that his ex- " pences were by no means adequate to his revenue— " he aſks, what then is become of the overplus?—that " his revenues had been diminiſhing annually; that " the revenues of the other Countries, ſubject to " *Madras*, had been diminiſhing in the ſame pro- " portion; that their ſpecie had been tranſported to " *China* and to *Europe*, at the rate of ten and fifteen " lacks of pagodas annually; but that though much " had been carried away, enough ſtill remained, and " that the means were ſtill within their reach, if they " would but exert themſelves with activity and ſpirit."

This melancholy picture of the finances, drawn by Mr. *Sadlier*, remains uncontradicted; nor, though an anſwer is made to his Minute by the Governor and Commander in Chief, is any reply made to this part of the charge contained in it.

Appendix, No. 1.

Your Committee find, that in a Letter dated 26th July, the Governor had applied to the Nabob, to know what aſſiſtance might be depended upon from him, to reſiſt the attack of *Hyder Ally*, and particularly to know what ſupplies of money might be depended upon from him, and at what period; adding, that however deſirous he might be to defend the Company's and his Highneſs's forts and poſſeſſions, it would in a great meaſure depend upon the ample ſupplies of money his Highneſs could furniſh him with at that critical juncture.

See Appendix to 1ſt Report No. 8.

To this demand the Nabob returns a very long anſwer, ſtating his utter inability to advance any money; imputing his diſtreſs to his being deprived of the *Tanjore* country, to the anticipations he had been under the neceſſity of making on his revenues, and the depredations of the enemy's cavalry; and concludes with intreating the Governor to uſe every exertion in his power to procure what might be immediately wanted, which he would diſcharge in time of peace, conſidering himſelf, in every reſpect, as principal in the war then waged againſt the *Carnatic*.

Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the Committee of Correſpondence, Nov. 30th, 1780.

This account of the Nabob's diſtreſs, is confirmed by Sir *Eyre Coote*; who, in his Letter to the Committee of Correſpondence at the *India* Houſe, dated 30th November 1780, after deſcribing the bad ſtate in which he found the affairs under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, upon his arrival there, and the total want of all neceſſary ſupplies, adds, " I naturally turned my eyes " towards the Nabob *Mahomed Ali*; but figure my diſ- " appointment, when, inſtead of finding him in a ſituation " to aſſiſt our exigencies, I learnt from his own mouth, " that he had neither men, money, nor influence, and " that he looked to the Company for the ſupport of both " his intereſt and credit."

Appendix, No. 2. Aug. 7th, 1780.

A ſimilar application was made to the Rajah of *Tanjore*, but with as little ſucceſs. He excuſed himſelf on the ground of want of money, and the oppreſſion his country had ſuffered under the Nabob, which had left him ſo little in condition to aſſiſt the Company with money, that it was with difficulty he had paid his ſubſidy of four lacks.

Your Committee find, that in this exigency, application was made to the Supreme Governor and Council for aſſiſtance, and particularly for a ſupply of money, which was urged in the moſt preſſing terms. The Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, informs the Governor General and Council, in their Letter of the 26th of July 1780, that it would be impoſſible for them to draw reſources from the country, ſo as to be able to act with vigour and effect: and in that of the 14th of September, that they had no means whatever to anſwer the extraordinary expences of the war; and that it would be totally impoſſible for them to carry it on, unleſs they could be ſure of ſupplies of money from *Bengal*.—They add, " that it would be a great relief, if a ſum of money " could be ſent immediately after the receipt of theſe " diſpatches." And Sir *Edward Hughes*, in his Letter of the ſame date, to the Governor General and Council, after mentioning the neceſſity of ſending a ſupply of troops from *Bengal*, adds, " nor will troops alone ſave " this ſinking Settlement; for I am aſſured by the Go- " vernor, that they have no money in the treaſury, nor " any evident means of raiſing it, in any proportion " adequate to their preſent exigencies."

Appendix, No. 3.

Appendix, No. 3.

Secret Proceedings of the Governor General and Council, 22d Sept. 1780.

And your Committee find, that the Preſident and Council expreſs themſelves in the ſame manner with reſpect to their finances, in their diſpatches to the Court of Directors. In the Letter from the Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors, dated October 15th, 1780, they write that, " they had been " put to the greateſt diſtreſs for the want of money to " carry on the war." And in their General Letter of the ſame date, they inform the Directors of the means they had taken to ſupply that want—that they had iſſued advertiſements for receiving loans from the inhabitants, on certain terms which they mention: but that the ſupply, by that means obtained, proving inadequate, and having no hope of any immediate relief that could be deemed effectual, they had been under the unavoidable neceſſity, as the laſt reſource, to draw bills on the Directors to the amount of £. 200,000.

Appendix, No. 4.

Appendix, No. 4.

Your Committee find, that the conſequence of the application to *Bengal*, was a ſupply of fifteen lacks of rupees, which the Governor General and Council ſent by Sir *Eyre Coote*. But they find that this ſum, being intended wholly to anſwer military expences, was entruſted not to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, but to Sir *Eyre Coote*, Commander in Chief; and that a Paymaſter was appointed by the Governor General and Council, to whom the immediate charge of it was committed: but the Governor General and Council authorized Sir *Eyre Coote* to make uſe of this money, in ſupplying the requiſitions of the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George*, if he ſhould be ſatisfied of the expediency of doing ſo.

Appendix, No. 5.

And your Committee find, that theſe ſupplies appear ſtill to have been inſufficient: for in a Letter of the 29th of November, to the Court of Directors, the Select Committee writes, " that they can place but little de- " pendence on any reſource, but that of *Bengal*, for " carrying on the war; and that as to the expences of the " Civil Department, they have very ſlender hope of pro- " curing ſufficient to anſwer them from any quarter."

Appendix, No. 5.

Letter from Sir Eyre Coote to the Governor General and Council, 10th Nov. 1780.

And Sir *Eyre Coote*, in a Letter dated 10th of November 1780, to the Governor General and Council, informs them, that " by the neareſt computation he could make, " the future diſburſements at *Fort Saint George* would " rather exceed ſeven lacks of rupees per month, every " cowrie of which muſt come from *Bengal*, as he found " there were no reſources there, from which a ſingle " pagoda could be expected."

Your Committee, obſerving this diſtreſs for money at *Fort Saint George* at this particular period, ordered the Servants of the *Eaſt India* Company to lay before them, a ſtate of the treaſuries at the different Preſidencies for the laſt four years.

In obedience to this order, there was laid before your Committee, a ſtate of the ſeveral treaſuries, for four years preceding the laſt period to which they could be made up. That of *Madras* is made up to the 25th of March 1780, and is as follows:

30th June 1777	Pag' 4,29,552 at 8*s.*		£.171,820.
31ſt January 1778	3,57,794		143,117.
28th February 1779	2,36,916		94,766.
25th March 1780	2,88,238		115,295.

Your Committee are aware, that as this Account is made up only to the 25th of March, which your Committee was informed was the loweſt period to which the materials at the *India* Houſe admitted of its being brought, it cannot be conſidered as giving any ſatisfactory information with reſpect to the ſtate of the treaſury, at the time of the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*; and as there is a difference in the periods to which the ſtate is made up each year, no very exact compariſon can be made of the ſtate of the treaſury in theſe reſpective years. But ſo far your Committee think themſelves warranted to obſerve from this Account, that on the 25th of March 1780, the ſtate of the treaſury was not ſuch, as upon a compariſon with its ſituation at other periods, implied any particular attention to that object.

It is proper that your Committee ſhould obſerve, that on various occaſions preceding the period of *Hyder Ally*'s irruption, the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George* appear to have repreſented their difficulties with reſpect to money. The revenues under that Preſidency are ſtated as barely ſufficient for their peace eſtabliſhment; and even thoſe revenues as not to be depended upon in caſe of an emergency, owing to the irregularity of the payments, particularly from the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*. On the 31ſt of December 1778, they inform the Governor General and Council, by Letter, that they had written particularly to the Court of Directors, on the ſubject of their engagements with the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*; and requeſted that they would fall on ſome means of relieving them from the embarraſſments they were expoſed to, in defending ſuch extenſive territories, without having the leaſt command over one reſource belonging to them—that, in the meantime, they flattered themſelves that the Governor General and Council would yield them every aid in their power, and particularly at a period when they were obliged to make exertions much beyond their natural ſtrength; and when they had nothing to truſt to for ſupporting them, but engagements to be performed, and revenues to be collected.

Select Conſultations, 31ſt Dec. 1778.

At a Conſultation on the 14th January 1779, at which Sir *Eyre Coote* then at *Madras* on his way to *Bengal*, was preſent, the Preſident — after mentioning Sir *Eyre Coote*'s preſence as a fortunate circumſtance, becauſe, having an opportunity, from his own obſervation, to form a judgment of their reſources, and of the difficulties they had, and ſtill have, to ſtruggle with, he might, from his own knowledge, be able to enforce their repreſentations to the Supreme Council—refers to former Minutes, in evidence of their difficulties; apologizes for the neceſſity they had been under of drawing bills upon the Company, from the impoſſibility of raiſing money in any other manner, for paying the arrears due to the troops: and adds, that notwithſtanding the money borrowed, they had then an empty treaſury—that if the Nabob ſhould fail in his engagements, the moſt ſerious conſequences were to be apprehended—that they had repreſented their ſituation to the Governor General and Council; and that, if they did not receive a ſupply, they would be under the neceſſity of drawing on *Europe*—that it was abſolutely neceſſary to act with vigour, in order to obtain money from thoſe channels from whence it ought to flow; and by a determined plan of œconomy, and a reduction of all expence, to endeavour to ſupply the treaſury—that though it would be improper and dangerous to reduce their military force at the commencement of a war, yet, that he had no heſitation to give it as his opinion, that their eſtabliſhment was too great for their reſources.

Appendix, No. 6.

In a ſubſequent Minute, of date the 4th of February 1779, at which Sir *Eyre Coote* was alſo preſent, the Preſident lays before the Board, the intelligence he had received of the bad ſucceſs of the Bombay army againſt the Marattas, and the neceſſity thence ariſing, of taking into conſideration their own ſtate and reſources, as well for the defence of the *Carnatic* as for affording aſſiſtance to any other parts of the Company's poſſeſſions, or of thoſe of their Allies;—mentions his frequent repreſentations of the difficulties they had to ſtruggle with; and that the utmoſt they could expect, was to ſupply their exigencies on a peace eſtabliſhment, and to provide their inveſtments. That their ſituation had been repreſented to the Governor General and Council; but that they ſhould ſtill addreſs them in a more particular manner on the ſubject, and requeſt that they would not only afford them aſſiſtance from the Bengal treaſury, in order to enable their army to take the field (ſhould circumſtances make it neceſſary) but that they would give them their opinion on ſuch points as they had ſubmitted to their conſideration; and in particular, the mode of ſecuring the regular payment of the ſubſidies from the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*.

Appendix, No. 7.

In a Minute of the ſame date, Sir *Eyre Coote* expreſſes his concurrence with the Preſident, in the neceſſity there was of making this repreſentation to the Government of *Bengal*.

Appendix, No. 7.

And your Committee find, that, upon other occaſions, the revenues under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, have been ſtated in the ſame manner, as barely equal to their eſtabliſhment in time of peace, and providing the inveſtment, but not to the contingent expences of war; and accordingly it appears, that to enable that Government to carry on the expedition againſt *Pondicherry* and that to *Mahé*, they received a ſupply of twenty lacks of rupees from *Bengal*.

Appendix, No. 8.

Letter from the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George to the Court of Directors, April 3d 1780.

Your Committee next proceeded to inquire more particularly into the nature of the revenues under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and the different ſources from which theſe revenues ariſe: and your Committee find, that the revenues under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, properly ſo called, conſiſt of three general heads:

Firſt, Revenues iſſuing out of lands.
Secondly, Duties and cuſtoms.
Thirdly, Farms of excluſive privileges.

And your Committee find, that the lands ſubject to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, are,

Firſt, The lands immediately contiguous to the Preſidency, conſiſting of the diſtrict round *Fort Saint George*, of which the Company had been long in poſſeſſion; and the jaghire lands, which were acquired from *Mahomed Ali Cawn*, Nabob of the *Carnatic*, by grant, dated October 29th 1763, and confirmed to the Company by the Mogul's Firmaun, dated the 12th of Auguſt 1765.

Appendix, No 9.

Appendix, No. 9.

Secondly, The territory of *Cuddalore*, or *Fort Saint David*'s.

Thirdly, The diſtricts of *Maſulipatam* and *Nizampatam*, with the five Circars of *Elur*, *Rajahmundry*, *Muſtaphanagur*, *Chicacole*, and *Mortezanagur Condavir* or *Guntoor*, commonly called the five Northern Circars.

And your Committee find, that the diſtricts of *Maſulipatam* and *Nizampatam* were acquired from the Soubah of the *Decan* by a grant, dated May 14th, 1759; and that the five Circars were granted to the Company by the Mogul's Firmaun, dated the 12th of Auguſt 1765, and afterwards confirmed to them by treaty with the Nizam or Subah of the *Decan*, to whoſe Government they had been ſubject. By this treaty, dated 12th November 1766, the Circar of *Montezanagur* or *Guntoor*, which had been, previous to the treaty, granted in jaghire by the Nizam to his brother *Bazalet Jung*, is reſerved to that Prince during his life; and the Company engages to pay to the Nizam for the three Circars of *Elur*, *Rajahmundry*, and *Maſtaphanagur*, five lacks of rupees yearly, and two lacks for each of thoſe of *Mortezanagur* and *Chicacole*; the firſt of which was in the poſſeſſion of *Bazalet Jung*, and

Appendix, No. 10.

Appendix, No. 10.

Appendix, No. 10.

and the other, not then reduced to obedience, as ſoon as the Company ſhould be put into poſſeſſion of them; making in all nine lacks yearly.

Appendix, No. 10. And your Committee find, that, by a ſubſequent treaty, dated the 23d day of February 1768, between the Company, the Nizam, and the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, in which the Northern Circars are confirmed to the Company, the annual payment to the Nizam for the four Circars of which the Company was then in poſſeſſion, is reduced to two lacks of rupees for ſix years, and one lack more, if during that time they ſhould obtain poſſeſſion of the Circar of *Guntoor*; and after the ſix years, five lacks for the four Circars, with two more when *Guntoor* ſhould come into their poſſeſſion; making in all ſeven lacks.

Select Letter from Fort St. George, 17th Oct. 1778. Fourthly, The Company did, in the year 1778, acquire from the Rajah of *Tanjore* the territory of *Nagore*.

Your Committee find, that this diſtrict, which lies upon the ſea coaſt in the kingdom of *Tanjore*, and is valued at 2½ lacks of rupees yearly, was obtained from the Rajah, in lieu of a grant of lands round *Devicottah*, which the Rajah had voluntarily offered to the Company, in gratitude for being reſtored to his dominions, under the government of Lord *Pigot*.

Laſtly, The Company has, ſince the commencement of the preſent war, acquired from the French, *Pondicherry* and *Karrical*, with their territories.

And your Committee having made inquiry into the nature of the territorial poſſeſſions of the Company, find, that theſe poſſeſſions are diſtinguiſhed chiefly into two kinds, known by the names of the Havilly or Government lands, and the Zemindary lands. That the Havilly or Government lands, are lands which belong in full property to the Government (in this caſe the Company) and to which no Rajah or Zemindar has any right; and theſe lands are either poſſeſſed by the Government itſelf, or let out to Renters for a certain annual rent.

That the Zemindary lands are the poſſeſſions of certain Rajahs or Chiefs, who pay an annual tribute, as ſettled by a rent roll, or jummabundy, to the Government, according to the value of their poſſeſſions.

And your Committee find, that though the amount of the tribute in the Zemindary lands is variable, and ſettled only by temporary agreements between the Government and the Zemindars, either for one or more years; yet that theſe laſt are underſtood to have a permanent claim to the poſſeſſion of their lands, and a right of tranſmitting them to their heirs.

Appendix, No. 11. In a Letter from the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors, dated 8th March 1769, in which they ſtate the diſtinction between Zemindary and Havilly lands: it is ſaid, that the tribute paid by the Zemindars, ought to be certain and invariable, though that has not always been ſtrictly obſerved; and changes of Government have always introduced changes in the tribute—they add, that this is of no great conſequence, for beſides theſe firſt tributes (ſuppoſing they were ſo) the Supreme Government has always demanded, and cuſtom has given ſanction and title to, a further ſum, as a nazâr or free gift; and that theſe two ſums, the tribute and nazâr, are what they mean when they ſpeak of ſettling the jummabundy with the Zemindars.

Your Committee do not find in the Records of the Company which they have peruſed, any other mention of this nazâr or free gift, as paid to the Government, diſtinct from the tribute; nor do either the agreements made with the Zemindars, or the accounts of the revenues tranſmitted home, make any mention of it.

Your Committee find a paſſage in the Revenue Conſultations of *Fort Saint George*, of date 31ſt Auguſt 1774, which, as it tends to explain the nature and origin of the rights of the Rajahs or Zemindars to the poſſeſſion of their lands in the Northern Circars, where alone there are any Zemindaries under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, and to illuſtrate the ſtate of the Company's poſſeſſions in that quarter, they will here inſert: "the "Zemindars in general are hereditary landholders, who, "on certain conditions, have held the lands they now "poſſeſs in their families for a conſiderable number of "years; ſome however cannot claim ſuch long right, "but have been created Zemindars by the Subahs, who "have governed at *Hyderabad*, ſince the death of *Nizam ul Mulk*.

"During the rigour of the Mooriſh Government, "they were obliged, by the condition of their tenure, "to aſſiſt the Subahs with a certain number of troops "for military ſervices, and to pay a tribute beſides, in "proportion to the value of their countries; but as the "Government became weakened, they often refuſed "obedience, until compelled by force, and their refuſal "often ended in their expulſion from their Zemindaries; "but even in ſuch caſes, the Government found the "attachment of the people to the Zemindars ſo ſtrong, "that they could ſeldom collect any part of the reve- "nues; and in general, they rather choſe to give the "lands again to one of the family, than to annex them "to the crown.

"This weakneſs of the Mooriſh Government, gave "frequent opportunities to the principal Zemindars to "increaſe their power—they ſeized upon the lands of "thoſe who were unable to reſiſt them, and ſo far, as to "wreſt the Havilly or Government lands from the Go- "vernment itſelf—by theſe means many of them became "poſſeſſed of large tracts of country, and maintained a "conſiderable number of troops, particularly the Ze- "mindar of *Vizianagrum*, in the Chicacole Circar.

"In this ſituation we found the Zemindars when we "obtained the Mogul's Phirmaunds. Unaccuſtomed "to ready compliance with any requiſitions of Govern- "ment, and apprehenſive of ſuffering by a change of "maſters, it is eaſy to conceive how little they were "diſpoſed to obey the new orders of the Mogul. The "Board conſidering theſe difficulties, and the inconve- "niences which might ariſe to the Company, were they "forcibly to poſſeſs themſelves of the country, in oppo- "ſition to the will of the Zemindars, thought it moſt "prudent and adviſable upon every account to make "ſuch agreements with them as might ſecure a reaſon- "able tribute, and yet leave them in an honourable "ſituation, by confirming them in the rights and privi- "leges they had enjoyed, and yielding to them a com- "petent maintenance out of the produce of their coun- "tries. This was explained at a meeting with ſome of "them; and the Zemindars of the Elur and Muſtapha- "nagur Circars, in conſequence ſubmitted, and entered "into an agreement, which may be ſeen on reference "to the Circar Conſultations for 1766. The Zemin- "dars of *Rajahmundry* and *Chicacole* held out ſome time "longer, and troops were ſent againſt them; but at "length they ſubmitted, and the ſame mode of ſettlement "took place with them, as with the Zemindars above- "mentioned."

Your Committee find, in the Conſultations of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, in their Revenue Department, of date January 11th, 1777, certain queſtions ſent to the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*, to be by them put to ſome of the principal Zemindars dependant on that Settlement, with reſpect to the rules of ſucceſſion in Zemindaries. They find, in a ſubſequent Conſultation, of date the 23d of May 1777, the anſwers returned to theſe queſtions by four of the principal Zemindars; which, as they tend to illuſtrate the ideas entertained of the rights of theſe hereditary landholders, with the rules of ſucceſſion eſtabliſhed among them, your Committee judged proper to inſert in the Appendix. Appendix No. 12.

Your Committee find, that the right of theſe hereditary landholders to the poſſeſſion of their lands, has been recognized by the Court of Directors; who, in their orders for eſtabliſhing the Committee of Circuit, 12th April 1775, ſay, "that it was by no means their wiſh "to deprive the hereditary Rajahs or Zemindars of their

"annual

" annual income; on the contrary, that they meant to " ſecure it to them." They add, " that if any of the " Zemindars ſhould prefer receiving their income from " the Company, and relinquiſh their hereditary claims, " they had no objection to allowing them ſuch ſtipends, " as ſhould be found reaſonable, in lieu of the benefits " ariſing from their Zemindaries."

Beſides the Havilly and Zemindary lands, from which the Company draw a revenue, your Committee find, that there are various parcels of land in the Circars which are held by the poſſeſſors under the name of Inaums, or Charity Lands, whether granted originally for charitable purpoſes, on account of ſervices performed, or in free gift. The Committee of Circuit (the inſtitution and object of which has been explained in a former Report) in their Letter to the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, of date the 10th of September 1777, ſtate the amount of theſe charity lands in the Chicacole Circar, at 40,000 rupees a year; and give it as their opinion, that the titles to many of theſe charity lands being founded on ſuppoſed grants in the time of the Mooriſh Government, had either flowed from the Governors of the province, who had no right to make ſuch grants, or from colluſion with the Renters; the holders of the grants, from a conviction that their claims could not ſtand the teſt of examination, being contented, for a ſmall gratification, to lend their names for the purpoſe of carrying on this impoſition on Government.

Your Committee next proceeded to enquire into the nature of the ſecond branch of the revenue, viz. the Cuſtoms and Duties.—Theſe your Committee find to conſiſt chiefly of a duty of 5 or 2½ per cent. according to the quality of the goods, imported by ſea or brought in by land; in reſpect of which diſtinction, theſe goods either fall under the ſea or land cuſtoms.

Your Committee find, that theſe cuſtoms or duties have been uſually received by Collectors appointed by the Company—they find, however, that in February 1779, advertiſements have been publiſhed for letting them at rent for five years; and a variety of propoſals appear to have been given in, in conſequence of theſe advertiſements—this plan, for which a decay or falling off in the receipt, was given as the chief motive, appears to have been much objected to by the merchants and traders of *Madras*, as hurtful to trade, and unuſual in a free Government. The conſideration of it was therefore remitted to the Directors at home; who do not appear hitherto to have made any alteration in the mode of collection.

And your Committee find, that the Farms of excluſive privileges, which make the third branch of the revenue, are, excluſive rights of trade in certain articles, ſuch as beetle nut, tobacco, arrack, &c. and for which an annual payment is made to the Company.

Beſides the three great branches of the revenue abovementioned, there falls to be reckoned, as part of the reſources of the Company under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, ſuch proportion of the military expences as is defrayed by the Nabob of *Arcot* and the Rajah of *Tanjore*. And your Committee find, that by agreement between the Company and the Nabob, that Prince is engaged to defray the expence of ten battalions of Sepoys in the *Carnatic*, beſides that of all his garriſons:—And that the Rajah of *Tanjore* pays annually, by agreement, four lacks of pagodas, for the expence of the Company's troops in his country.

Mill from George, 29th Oct. 1773. Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore in Conſ. 24th April 1776.

And your Committee find that theſe revenues are either accounted for immediately at the Preſidency, or at one or other of the ſubordinate ſtations, at which a Chief and Council reſide—that of theſe ſubordinate ſtations, there are four under the Preſidency of *Madras*; viz. one at *Cuddalore*; one at *Maſulipatam*, for the Circars of *Elur*, *Rajahmundry*, and *Muſtaphanagur*; and the Chicacole Circar is divided into two diſtricts, that to the South being under the management of a Chief and Council reſiding at *Vizagapatam*, and that to the North, commonly called the Itchapore diſtrict, under a Chief and Council reſiding at *Ganjam*.

Your Committee having aſcertained the nature of the revenues under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, with the ſources from which they flow, proceeded next to enquire into the produce of theſe revenues; and with that view they gave directions that there ſhould be laid before them, an Account of the territorial and other revenues received by the Preſidency of *Madras*, from 1ſt May 1763 to the laſt Accounts received, diſtinguiſhing each year, and diſtinguiſhing the heads under which theſe revenues are received, and the balances under each head at the end of each year. This Account they think it proper to lay before the Houſe.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues received by the Presidency of Madras, from 1st May 1763, to the last Accounts received; distinguishing each Year, and distinguishing the Heads under which it is received, and the Balances under each Head at the end of each Year.

	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Gross Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
1763-4.					
Fort St. George.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.
Land Revenues	213,426	190,854			
Customs and Duties	63,686	2,005			
Farms and Licenses	46,110	13,085			
			323,222	205,944	322,222
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	14,650	10,650			
Customs and Duties	3,864				
Farms and Licenses	8,800	3,400			
			27,314	14,050	27,314
Masulipatam.					
Land Revenues	98,656	122,169			
Customs and Duties	6,198	4,571			
Farms and Licenses	1,155	1,816			
			106,009	128,556	106,009
Vizagapatam.		No Accounts are received of the Balances of this Year.			
Land Revenues	3,922				
Customs and Duties	226				
Farms and Licenses	644				
			4,792	—	4,792
		Pag'.	461,337	348,550	460,337
				Commission	6,239
				Pag'	454,098
1764-5.					
Fort St. George.					
Land Revenues	242,073	295,863			
Customs and Duties	57,201	2,205			
Farms and Licenses	26,143	9,871			
			325,417	307,939	322,217
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	19,333	8,850			
Customs and Duties	6,014				
Farms and Licenses	8,030	3,050			
			33,377	11,900	33,377
Masulipatam.					
Land Revenues	88,373	146,371			
Customs and Duties	12,341	3,809			
Farms and Licenses	1,816	1,485			
			102,530	151,665	102,530
Vizagapatam.		No Accounts received.			
Land Revenues	4,838				
Customs and Duties	145				
Farms and Licenses	984				
			5,967	—	5,967
		Pag'.	467,291	471,504	464,091
				Commission	6,596
				Pag'	457,495

1765-6.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Groſs Receipts.	Total Balances	Total Nett Receipts.
Fort St. George.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
Land Revenues - - -	390,180	294,463			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	73,103	2,205			
Farms and Licenſes - -	35,470	10,381			
			498,753	307,049	497,753
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues - - -	11,584	8,850			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	5,233				
Farms and Licenſes - -	7,642	3,050			
			24,459	11,900	24,459
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues - - -	88,365	171,761			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	11,490	3,809			
Farms and Licenſes - -	1,486	1,285			
			101,341	176,855	101,341
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues - - -	3,542	No Ac-			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	58	counts			
Farms and Licenſes - -	762	received.			
			4,362	—	4,362
		Pag^{s}.	628,915	495,804	627,915
				Commiſſion	14,267
				Pag^{s}.	613,648

1766-7.					
Fort St. George.					
Land Revenues - - -	375,250	311,396			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	61,689	2,045			
Farms and Licenſes - -	36,376	26,737			
			473,315	340,178	472,315
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues - - -	14,637	10,550			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	5,092				
Farms and Licenſes - -	6,483	2,567			
			26,212	13,117	26,212
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues - - -	104,025	183,272			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	9,669	4,685			
Farms and Licenſes - -	1,285				
			114,979	187,957	114,979
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues - - -	4,703	No			
Cuſtoms and Duties - -	300	Accounts			
Farms and Licenſes - -	517	received.			
			5,520	—	5,520
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues. - - -	351,545	358,630			
			351,545	358,630	332,705
		Pag^{s}.	971,571	899,882	951,731
				Commiſſion	8,368
				Pag^{s}.	943,363

	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Gross Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
1767-8.					
Fort Saint George.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
Land Revenues	304,962	397,664			
Cuſtoms and Duties	54,398	2,175			
Farms and Licenſes	85,492	29,903			
			394,852	429,743	387,848
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	25,486	7,700			
Cuſtoms and Duties	4,533				
Farms and Licenſes	6,000	2,565			
			36,019	10,265	33,215
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	100,739	206,715			
Cuſtoms and Duties	7,925	6,638			
Farms and Licenſes	1,350	450			
			110,014	213,803	109,786
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	3,447	No			
Cuſtoms and Duties	84	Accounts			
Farms and Licenſes	779	received.			
			4,310	—	4,272
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	419,525	434,880			
			419,525	434,880	418,200
		Pag^{s}.	964,720	10,88,691	953,321
				Commiſſion	— —
				Pag^{s}.	953,321
1768-9.					
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	252,509	523,684			
Cuſtoms and Duties	72,048	3,109			
Farms and Licenſes	35,833	34,771			
			360,390	561,564	355,227
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	18,456	9,700			
Cuſtoms and Duties	5,237				
Farms and Licenſes	6,000	2,566			
			29,693	12,266	29,053
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	105,502	214,615			
Cuſtoms and Duties	11,006	6,638			
Farms and Licenſes	1,800	450			
			118,308	221,703	115,452
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	5,907	No			
Cuſtoms and Duties	233	Accounts			
Farms and Licenſes	527	received.			
			6,667	—	6,667
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	490,972	659,155			
			490,972	659,155	431,100
		Pag^{s}.	10,06,030	14,54,688	937,499
				Commiſſion	13,200
				Pag^{s}.	924,299

1769-70.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Groſs Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	479,553	394,157			
Cuſtoms and Duties	61,040	2,320			
Farms and Licenſes	41,803	31,157			
			582,396	427,634	462,036
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	29,220	14,436			
Cuſtoms and Duties	4,920				
Farms and Licenſes	6,000	2,566			
			40,140	17,002	28,690
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	124,778	191,668			
Cuſtoms and Duties	11,471	5,829			
Farms and Licenſes	2,250	450			
			138,499	197,947	138,499
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	4,776	No			
Cuſtoms and Duties	63	Accounts			
Farms and Licenſes	691	received.			
			5,530	—	5,530
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	801,280	548,134			
			801,280	548,134	714,805
		Pag^{s}.	15,67,845	11,90,717	13,49,560
				Commiſſion	99,285
				Pag^{s}.	12,50,275

1770-1.					
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	381,671	288,792			
Cuſtoms and Duties	68,506	2,795			
Farms and Licenſes	36,834	23,568			
			487,011	315,155	474,026
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	28,817	14,422			
Cuſtoms and Duties	4,382				
Farms and Licenſes	6,000	2,000			
			39,199	16,422	39,199
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	111,198	187,927			
Cuſtoms and Duties	9,774	4,543			
Farms and Licenſes	2,807	785			
			123,779	193,255	123,090
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	5,160	No			
Cuſtoms and Duties	285	Accounts			
Farms and Licenſes	778	received.			
			6,223	—	5,796
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	879,296	750,555			
			879,296	750,555	813,291
		Pag^{s}.	15,35,508	12,75,387	14,55,402
				Commiſſion	49,506
				Pag^{s}.	14,05,896

1771-2.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Groſs Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	381,003	6,210			
Cuſtoms and Duties	67,037	2,045			
Farms and Licenſes	53,652	1,117			
			501,692	9,372	494,892
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	21,791	2,100			
Cuſtoms and Duties	4,928				
Farms and Licenſes	7,067	633			
			33,786	2,733	33,786
Maſuliparam.					
Land Revenues	133,122	166,429			
Cuſtoms and Duties	13,603	5,686			
Farms and Licenſes	3,143	785			
			149,868	172,900	149,868
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	3,238	9,230			
Cuſtoms and Duties	141				
Farms and Licenſes	303	480			
			3,682	9,710	3,682
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	866,930	766,280			
			866,930	766,280	788,935
		Pag^{s}	15,55,958	960,995	14,71,163
				Commiſſion	74,014
				Pag^{s}	13,97,149

1772-3.					
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	396,785				
Cuſtoms and Duties	70,486				
Farms and Licenſes	43,895	1,541			
			511,166	1,541	501,517
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	21,405	2,100			
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,665				
Farms and Licenſes	7,600	633			
			32,670	2,733	32,670
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	92,389	134,373			
Cuſtoms and Duties	13,913	3,972			
Farms and Licenſes	3,143				
			109,445	138,342	109,445
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	1,692	13,870			
Cuſtoms and Duties					
Farms and Licenſes	572	225			
			2,264	14,095	2,264
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	855,512	418,719			
			855,512	418,719	762,488
		Pag^{s}	15,11,057	575,430	14,08,384
				Commiſſion	85,304
				Pag^{s}	13,23,080

1773-4.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Gross Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag.
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	383,264	2,310			
Cuſtoms and Duties	63,053				
Farms and Licenſes	42,600	2,391			
			493,917	4,701	485,845
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	20,540	2,100			
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,888				
Farms and Licenſes	7,600	633			
			32,028	2,733	32,028
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	79,307	166,795			
Cuſtoms and Duties	8,967	4,829			
Farms and Licenſes	2,357	786			
			90,631	172,410	90,631
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	1,653	16,396			
Cuſtoms and Duties					
Farms and Licenſes	372				
			2,025	16,396	2,025
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	889,615	502,484			
			889,615	502,484	790,097
		Pag^{s}	15,08,216	698,724	14,00,626
				Commiſſion	88,720
				Pag^{s}	13,11,906

1774-5.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Gross Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag.
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	387,214	5,670			
Cuſtoms and Duties	70,064	2,030			
Farms and Licenſes	49,100	3,241			
			506,378	10,941	504,048
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	20,950				
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,093				
Farms and Licenſes	7,293	1,017			
			31,336	1,017	31,336
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	124,604	153,925			
Cuſtoms and Duties	15,080	4,829			
Farms and Licenſes	3,143	785			
			142,827	159,539	142,817
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	4,508	15,890			
Cuſtoms and Duties	144				
Farms and Licenſes	302	126			
			4,954	16,016	4,954
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	881,085	646,676			
			881,085	646,676	663,969
		Pag^{s}	15,66,580	834,189	13,47,134
				Commiſſion	88,059
				Pag^{s}	12,59,075

1775-6.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Gross Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	303,155	93,090			
Customs and Duties	66,252	830			
Farms and Licenses	42,682	3,668			
			412,089	97,588	408,893
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	20,452				
Customs and Duties	3,173				
Farms and Licenses	4,787	1,017			
			28,412	1,017	27,116
Masulipatam.					
Land Revenues	76,875	140,113			
Customs and Duties	16,102	6,829			
Farms and Licenses	1,571	1,571			
			94,548	148,513	94,548
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	5,124	14,382			
Customs and Duties	64				
Farms and Licenses	329	177			
			5,517	14,559	5,517
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	10,12,670	590,150			
			10,12,670	590,150	833,427
		Pag^{s}	15,53,236	851,827	13,69,501
				Commission	83,024
				Pag^{s}	12,86,477

1776-7.					
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	375,485	108,181			
Customs and Duties	47,422	936			
Farms and Licenses	42,200	4,621			
			465,107	113,738	459,454
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	16,585	2,100			
Customs and Duties	3,439				
Farms and Licenses	4,850	1,017			
			24,874	3,117	24,874
Masulipatam.					
Land Revenues	131,194	94,689			
Customs and Duties	17,084	2,829			
Farms and Licenses	3,143	1,571			
			151,421	99,089	151,421
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	2,564	15,430			
Customs and Duties	74				
Farms and Licenses	252	303			
			2,890	15,733	2,890
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	963,712	575,053			
			963,712	575,053	854,731
		Pag^{s}	16,08,004	806,730	14,93,370
				Commission	85,000
				Pag^{s}	14,08,370

1777-8.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Groſs Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
Fort Saint George.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
Land Revenues	338,993	153,674			
Cuſtoms and Duties	49,236	2,536			
Farms and Licenſes	66,859	3,568			
			455,088	159,778	453,284
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	20,029	8,700			
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,006	—			
Farms and Licenſes	4,668	1,017			
			27,703	9,717	26,452
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	100,000	109,084			
Cuſtoms and Duties	14,605	2,829			
Farms and Licenſes	3,143	1,571			
			117,748	113,484	107,103
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	2,783	15,805			
Cuſtoms and Duties	—	—			
Farms and Licenſes	685	157			
			3,468	15,962	3,468
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	333,985	11,90,213			
			333,985	11,90,213	162,691
		Pag^{s}.	937,992	14,89,154	752,996
				Commiſſion	45,000
				Pag^{s}	707,996

1778-9.					
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	521,929	121,783			
Cuſtoms and Duties	42,985	791			
Farms and Licenſes	62,653	1,311			
			627,567	123,885	626,595
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	24,979	8,700			
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,459	—			
Farms and Licenſes	3,806	1,017			
			32,244	9,717	32,244
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	74,792	138,009			
Cuſtoms and Duties	12,209	6,829			
Farms and Licenſes	1,571	2,357			
			88,572	147,195	87,144
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	4,400	14,206			
Cuſtoms and Duties	—	—			
Farms and Licenſes	438	126			
			4,838	14,382	4,838
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	584,000	13,50,996			
			584,000	13,50,996	556,320
		Pag^{s}	13,37,221	16,46,125	13,07,141
				Commiſſion	71,621
				Pag^{s}	12,35,520

1779-80.	Received under each Head in the Year.	Balances of each Head.	Total Groſs Receipts.	Total Balances.	Total Nett Receipts.
	Pag^{a}.	Pag^{a}.	Pag^{a}.	Pag^{a}.	Pag^{a}.
Fort Saint George.					
Land Revenues	388,052	No Books			
Cuſtoms and Duties	44,211	received.			
Farms and Licenſes	54,957				
			487,220	—	485,720
Cuddalore.					
Land Revenues	15,398	—			
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,799	—			
Farms and Licenſes	4,837	—			
			23,034	—	23,034
Maſulipatam.					
Land Revenues	44,064	—			
Cuſtoms and Duties	13,832	—			
Farms and Licenſes	786	—			
			58,682	—	57,282
Vizagapatam.					
Land Revenues	—	—			
Cuſtoms and Duties	—	—			
Farms and Licenſes	229	—			
			229	—	229
Karrical.					
Land Revenues	9,650	—			
			9,650	—	8,446
Nagore.					
Land Revenues	62,875	—			
			62,875	—	62,875
Northern Circars.					
Land Revenues	656,259	—			
			656,259	—	608,781
		Pag^{a}	12,97,949	—	12,46,367
Eaſt India Houſe, 19th December 1781. Errors excepted.			Commiſſion eſt^{d}		70,000
				Pag^{a}	11,76,367

Charges of Collection, excluſive of Commiſſion.

	Pagodas.
1763— 4	1,000
1764— 5	3,200
1765— 6	1,000
1766— 7	19,840
1767— 8	11,399
1768— 9	68,531
1769—70	218,285
1770— 1	80,106
1771— 2	84,795
1772— 3	102,673
1773— 4	107,590
1774— 5	219,446
1775— 6	183,735
1776— 7	114,634
1777— 8	184,991
1778— 9	30,080
1779—80	51,582

Errors excepted,

Eaſt India Houſe, 31ſt December 1781.

John Annis, Auditor of Indian Accounts.

The Charges of Collection annexed to the above Account, make the difference between the groſs and the nett receipts. In theſe charges your Committee find, that, beſides ſurveying charges, repairs, preſents to the renters, and allowances to them on account of loſſes, are comprehended the payments made on account of the peſcuſh, or annual tribute due to the Nizam for the Northern Circars; with certain penſions payable out of the revenues.

The Commiſſion, which appears by the above Account to be deducted from the nett receipts, is a commiſſion upon the revenues allowed to the Company's Servants.

Your Committee find, in the General Letter to *Fort Saint George* of the 25th of March 1768, the commiſſion regulated in the following manner: Appendix, No. 13.

The ſum of 60,000 pagodas yearly, out of the revenues, was to be divided into one hundred ſhares, proportioned among the Company's Civil and Military Servants, as follows:

For the Governor, twenty-one ſhares.

For the ſecond in Council, five ſhares and an half.

For the reſt of the Council, not having Chiefſhips, two ſhares and an half each.

The Commander in Chief, eleven ſhares.

The Colonels each, four ſhares.

The Lieutenant Colonels each, two ſhares and an half.

The Majors each, one ſhare and a quarter.

Out of what remained of the above fund unappropriated, there was appointed to be paid a gratuity of three ſhillings a day to each Captain, two ſhillings to each Lieutenant, and to Enſigns and Lieutenants Fire-workers one ſhilling a day each.

The deficiency of the fund to make good the above payments, was directed to be ſupplied out of the Company's caſh; and the ſurplus, if any, ſhould remain to be carried to the credit of the Company till further orders.

And

Appendix, No. 14.

And your Committee find, that, by the General Letter of 23d March 1770, a variation was made, both upon the amount and the diſtribution of the commiſſion. Inſtead of the ſpecific ſum of 60,000 pagodas, 5 per cent. was ordered to be taken from the nett territorial revenues, to be divided among the Civil and Military Servants, as follows:

One twenty-fourth part to be firſt drawn, and paid as a ſeparate ſhare to Major General *Coote*, Commander in Chief in *India*.

The remainder to be divided into one hundred ſhares, proportioned as follows:

To the Governor, twenty-one ſhares.

To the ſecond in Council, five ſhares and an half.

To the reſt of the Council, not having Chiefſhips, as far as the Eſtabliſhment of 12 Members of Council, each two ſhares and an half.

To Brigadier General *Joſeph Smith*, as the firſt Colonel, eleven ſhares.

To the other Colonels, equally among them, eight ſhares.

To the Lieutenant Colonels, twelve ſhares and an half, to be equally divided.

To the Majors, to be equally divided, ſix ſhares and a quarter.

The unappropriated ſhares, and ſuch as might fall by the death or reſignation of Major General *Coote* or Brigadier General *Smith*, being to be carried to the credit of the Company.

The commiſſion allowed to the Company's Servants appears to have remained upon this footing till the year 1777; in which year your Committee find, that a new regulation was made with reſpect to the payment of the Company's Servants. The General Letter to *Fort Saint George*, of the 11th of June in that year, after narrating, that much of the preſent confuſion had ariſen from the private engagements of the Company's Servants, and their concerns, dealings, and tranſactions, on their own ſeparate account, with the Princes and Natives of the country; and ſtrictly forbidding the Governor, or any of the Council, to carry on or to be concerned, either by themſelves or others, in any dealings or tranſactions, by way of traffic or commerce, for his or their uſe, benefit, or advantage, or for the uſe or benefit of any other perſon, the trade and commerce of the Company only excepted; or to lend money upon mortgage to any of the Country Powers, or to any perſon employed or entruſted by them; proceeds to direct, that, in conſideration of the above-mentioned reſtrictions, every future Governor ſhould be allowed a ſalary of 40,000 pagodas, and each of the Council 16,000 pagodas, and that in full of all fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever; except ſuch field allowances as the Directors ſhould think fit to make to any perſon who ſhould have a military command, and likewiſe except that the Governor ſhould have the advantage of continuing to reſide in the Fort Houſe, together with the uſe of the Company's plate and furniture, and the commiſſion on coral, in uſe to be taken by former Governors.

Appendix, No. 15.

This regulation, which ſeems not to have extended to the Military Department, continued in force till the 11th of January 1781; during which period, no commiſſion appears to have been payable to the Company's Civil Servants. But your Committee find, from the General Letter of that date, that the former ſyſtem was again reverted to, with reſpect to all the Company's Servants, except the Governor. The ſalary of 40,000 pagodas by the year is continued to Lord *Mac Cartny*, then appointed Governor, in conſideration of his being totally reſtricted from every kind of dealing, tranſaction, or commerce, in money or goods, the trade and commerce of the Company excepted. But with regard to the other Members of Council, the orders given in the General Letter of the 11th of June 1777, reſpecting the ſalary of 16,000 pagodas yearly, is revoked; and the ſame ſalaries and allowances ordained to be paid to them, as were in uſe to be paid to the Members of Council prior to that period; and all the Members of Council, below the Preſident, are allowed to trade, in the ſame manner as they might have done before the reſtrictions in the ſaid Letter of the 11th of June 1777.

Appendix, No. 16.

In order that the Houſe may be enabled to ſee ſtill more in detail the particulars of which the three great branches of the revenue conſiſt, your Committee will here inſert a particular Accompt relative to each; the firſt ſhewing to whom each head of the territorial revenue has been let on leaſe, or by whom it has been managed, with the rent payable on each leaſe, from May 1763; the ſecond, a particular Accompt of the duties and cuſtoms: and the third, an Accompt of the revenues ariſing from the excluſive Farms and Licenſes: theſe two laſt Accompts commencing in 1767, and ending, as well as the firſt, in 1779, which is as low as the materials at the *India* Houſe permit of their being brought.

AN ACCOUNT, shewing to whom each Head of Territorial Revenue, under the Presidency of Madras, has been let on Leaſe, or by whom managed, from May 1763.

Names of the Farms.	Names of the Farmers.	Periods of the Leaſes.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Pagodas.	Total per Annum.	Pagodas.	REMARKS.
1763-4.							
Fort Saint George.							
Poonamallee	Puſhponada Nynar	5 years from Aug. 1761 to July 1766		41,000			
Deve Cotah	Rajah Pundal	4 years from Aug. 1762 to July 1766		7,800			
Saint Thomé	D°	5 years from Aug. 1761 to July 1766		3,700			
Trivetore	Paupah Braminey	5 years from 1° to D°		3,000			
Egmore	Paupah Rajah	5 years — D° — D°		1,550			
Perembore	Paupah Braminey	5 years — D° — D°		1,650			
Paddy Fields and Salt Pans	Saubramoney	5 years — D° — D°		730			
Karrical	Tremalrow Kiſtnagee	1 year from Aug. 1763 to July 1764		20,000			
Jagueer, granted by the Nabob to the Company in 1763.							
Trepaſſore	Guntoor Vencatachillum	9 months, 15 days, 16th Oct. 1763, to 31ſt July 1764	for	5,900			The Rents of the Lands as inſerted in this Account, are excluſive of all Jagueers, &c.
Seven Magans of D°	Raſhponada Nyſar	D°	for	15,900			
Manamungalum	Meer Audel Cawn	D°	for	14,700			
Chingleput	Raſhponada Nynar	D°	for	55,000			
Two Conjeverams	D°	D°	for	43,000			
Covelong	Jyah Pillah	D°	for	8,250			
Watremalour and Salivauk	Puſhponada Nynar	D°	for	27,500			
Cavantandelum	D°	D°	for	19,000			
Chinnamanaick Pollam, and Naidpet	Nella Chitty, and Rama Linga	D°	for	1,270			
Carangoly	Mahomed Auzem	D°	for	45,200			
						3,68,250	
Cuddalore.							
Trevendeporam	Sadaſheverord	5 years, Aug. 1761 to July 1766		9,300			
Fort Saint David's Bounds	D°	D°		7,156			
						16,450	
Maſulipatam.							
Nellapillee, and Towns	Condrogulla Jogapah	1 year, 1 June 1763 to 31 May 1764		2,310			
Bandarmalanka, and Towns	Mooſlacontee Vencatram	D°		3,355			
Goorgunapillee	Mauderauze Bogana	D°		330			
Sokanapillee and Ramaſerum	Modalareddy Naigue	D°		1,705			
Innogodroo	Madalareddy Naigue and Bodapetty Gorauze	1 year to 31 May 1764		2,200			
Nizampatam	Meer Mahomed Bauker	D°		26,286			
Devee Iſland	Madalreddy, and Bodapetty	D°		10,670			
Six Iſlands of Devee	D° — — D°	D°		3,080			
Antraviddee	Madalareddy Naigue	D°		715			
Gondore and Auclanada	D°, and Bodapetty Gorauze	D°		11,660			
Tondore and Bondora	Arnachunda Rauze	D°		18,150			
Tumedee and Peddanah	D°	D°		9,350			
Narſapore Salt Farm	D°	D°		3,850			
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Salt Farms	Ruſtum Ally Cawn, and Meer Seid Huſſein	1 year, to 10th Nov. 1764		20,000			
Narſapore Town	Vencataram Rauze	1 year, to 29th Dec. 1764		600			
						1,14,261	
1764-5.					Pagodas	4,98,961	
Fort Saint George.							
Poonamallee	Guntoor Vencatachillum	7 years, from 1 Aug. 1764 to 31 July 1771		22,000			
Deve Cotah, &c. &c.	As laſt year			18,430			
Karrical Magans	Mooda Kiſtnah	1 year, to 31 July 1765		4,500			Karrical was given up to the Raja of Tanjore, Sept. 1764, and the Magans to the French ſoon after.
Jagueer, viz. Trepaſſore, Seven Magans, &c. Manamungulum, Chingleput, Two Conjeverams, Covelong, Watremalour and Salivauk, Cavantandelum, Carongoly	Guntoor Vencatachillum	7 years, 1 Aug. 1764 to 31 July 1771		3,24,000			
						3,68,930	
					Carried over Pag°	3,68,930	

Names of the Farms.	Names of the Farmers.	Periods of the Leases.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Total per Annum.	REMARKS.
1764-5—*continued.*	Brought forward			Pagodas. 3,68,930	
Cuddalore.					
Trevendeporam - -	As laſt year		16,450	- - 16,450	
Fort Saint David's Bounds					
Chinnamanaick Pollam and Naidpet - -	Audemoorlapillee, Amildar for the Company.				
Maſulipatam.					
Nizampatam - -			25,300		
Gondore and Auclanada			11,660		
Devee Iſland - -	Madalareddy Naigue Bodapetty Gorauze and Condrogullah Juggapah	1 year, from 31 May 1764 to 31 May 1765	11,000		
Six Iſlands of Dº - -			3,080		
Innogodroo - - -			2,200		
Bandarmalanka, &c. -	Bodapetty Gorauze, Bompa, rauze, and Audorty Narſoo	Dº	3,520		
Nellipellee, &c. -	Condrogullah Juggopah	Dº	2,310		
Sakanapillee and Ramaſerum	Madalareddy Naigue	Dº	1,705		
Antraviddee - -	Dº	Dº	715		
Goorganapillee -	Moſlacontee	Dº	330		
Tondore and Bandora	Arnachunda Rauze	Dº	18,150		
Tumedee and Peddanah	Dº	Dº	9,350		
Narſapore Salt -	Dº	Dº	3,850		
Maſulipatam & Ponracca Salt	Meer Sied Huſſein	3 years, 29 Nov. 1764 to 28 Nov. 1767 -	17,143	- - - -	1ſt ye and 3d year 20,000.
Narſapore Town -	Culdindee Arnachundee Rauze	1 year, 28 Dec. 1764— 27 Dec. 1765 -	600		
				- - 1,10,913	
				Pagodas 4,96,293	
1765-6.					
Fort Saint George -	As laſt year			- - 3,68,930	
Cuddalore - -	As laſt year			- - 16,450	
Maſulipatam.					
Nizampatam - -			25,300		
Gondoree and Auclanada	Condragoloo Juggoo Puntaloo, and		11,880		
Devee - - - -	Moſlacontee Caumagee Puntaloo	5 years, 1 June 1765 to 31 May 1770 -	11,660		
Six Iſlands - - -			3,168		
Innogodroo - - -			2,255		
Sakanapille & Ramaſerum			1,760		
Nellapillee & Goorganapille	Condragoloo and Vencataraloo	Dº	2,475		
Antraviddee - -	Condragoloo and Juggoo Puntaloo -	Dº	770		
Bandarmalanka, &c. -	Moſlacontee Vencataramdoo	5 years, to 31 May 1770	3,630		
Tondore and Bandora -		Dº	18,700		
Tumedee and Pedana -	Arnachunda Rauze	Dº	9,680		
Narſapore Salt - -		Dº	3,850		
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Salt - - -	Meer Sied Huſſein	3 years, 29 Nov. 1764 to 28 Nov. 1767 —	18,571		
Narſapore Town -	Culdindee Arnachundee Rauze	5 years, 28 Dec. 1765 to 27 Dec. 1770	628		
				- - 1,14,327	
				Pagodas 4,96,707	
1766-7.					
Fort Saint George.					
Poonamallee - -	Guntoor Vencatachillum	7 years, from Aug. 1764 to July 1771	44,350		
Deve Cotah - -	Rajah Pundat -	5 years, from Aug. 1766 to July 1771	11,000		
Saint Thomé - -	Dº	Dº	4,800		
Trivetore - -			3,010		
Egmore - -	Paupah Braminey	Dº	1,600		
Perembore - -		Dº	1,655		
Paddy Fields and Salt Paps			815		
Jaqueer - -	Guntoor Vencatachillum	7 years, to July 1771	3,24,000	- - 391,230	
				Carried over Pag' 3,91,230	

Names of Farms and Zemindaries.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leases.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.		Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
				Pagodas.			
1766-7—*continued.*	Brought forward					3,91,230	
Cuddalore.							
Trevendeporam	Moodoo Kiftnah Pillah	5 years, Aug. 1766 to July 1771		9,400			
Fort Saint David's Bounds	D°	D°		5,500		14,900	
Maſulipatam.	As laſt year			94,756			
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Salt	Meer Sied Huſſein	3 years, 29 Nov. 1764 to 28 Nov. 1767		20,000		1,14,756	
Northern Circars.							
Rajahmundry Circar	Huſſein Aly Cawn, and Jogue Pundat	3 years, Sept. 1766 to Sept. 1769		1,31,450			1ſt year, pag° 131,450—2d, 131,450—3d, 158,950.
Ellore and Muſtaphanagar	Huſſein Ally Cawn	D°		1,43,550			1ſt year, 143,550 — 2d, 143,550—3d, 171,050.
Cicacole	Vackeroy Ragorauze	1 year, Sept. 1766 to Sept. 1767		1,50,269			
Vizianagrum (in Cicacole)	Rajah Sitteramrauze	D°		78,302		5,03,571	
					Pagodas	10,24,457	
1767-8.							
Fort Saint George	As laſt year					3,91,230	
Cuddalore	As laſt year					14,900	
Maſulipatam	As laſt year			94,756			1 year, pag°. 11,428, — 2d 14,571,—3d 18,285.
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Salt	Moſlaconte Caumagee	3 years, Nov. 1767 to Nov. 1770		11,428		1,06,184	
Northern Circars.							
Rajamundry	Huſſein Ally Cawn, and Jogue Punda	3 years, Sept. 1766 to Sept. 1769	2d year	1,31,450			
Ellore and Muſtaphanagur	Huſſein Ally Cawn	D°	D°	1,43,550			
Cicacole and Caſſimcotah	Dabbier Accajee Pundat	1 year, Sept. 1767 to Sept. 1768		43,571			
Sattieveram	Pykarow	D°		21,429			
Vizianagrum	Sitteramrauze	D°		92,588			
Tekaly	Juggut Doo	2 years, Sept. 1767 to Sept. 1769		8,571		4,41,159	
					Pagodas.	9,53,473	
1768-9.						Pagodas	
Fort Saint George as laſt year, except Deve Cotah. See Cuddalore and Saint Thomé; not let this year.						3,75,430	
Cuddalore.							
Trevendeporam Fort Saint David's Bounds	As laſt year			14,800			
Deve Cotah	Mootu Comerah Saumy Tomberan	1 year to 31 July 1769		9,300		24,100	
Maſulipatam.	As laſt year			94,756			
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Salt	Moſlacontee Caumagee	3 years, Nov. 1767 to Nov. 1770	2d year	14,571		1,09,327	
Northern Circars.							
Under Maſulipatam.							
Rajamundry	Huſſein Ally Cawn, and Jogue Pundat	3 years, Sept. 1766 to Sept. 1769	3d year	1,58,930			
Ellore and Muſtaphanagur	Huſſein Ally Cawn	D°	3d year	1,71,050			
Cicacole, Caſſimcotah, &c.	Dabbier Accajee Pundat			57,143			
Vizianagrum (in Cicacole)	Sitteramrauze			92,588			
Sattiaveram (in D°)	Pykarow	1 year, Sept. 1768 to Sept. 1769					
Cowloor, &c. (Villages in Muſtaphanagur)	Jaffeir Beg Cawn			22,429			
				2,200			
Tekaly (in Cicacole)	Juggot Doo	2 years, Sept. 1767 to Sept. 1769		8,571			
						5,12,911	
				Carr. forw. Pag°		5,08,857	

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leases.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Total per Annum.	REMARKS.
1768-9—*continued.*	Brought forward			Pagodas 5,08,857	
Under Gaujam, being the Itachapoor District of Cicacole.					
Itchapoor Havilly Lands	Accajee Pundat		24,286		The sums here set down, include the full Tributes of the different Zemindars for the year 1768-9; that is, from Sept. 1768 to Sept. 1769; and part of the Tribute for the former year: the remaining part was collected by force from the Zemindars, by Narraindoo, Zemindar of Kimmeedy, who raised disturbances in the Circar.
Moherry	Narraindeer		20,857		
Daracoote	Rajender Sing		12,077		
Goomsur	Kissen Bunge		14,287		
Sourerah	Raya Sing		2,028		
Beroudi	Mahurta		2,143		
Hoummah	Santarow		1,101		
Hautgur	Hurry Chunder		18,121		
Callicoot	Murda Rauze		17,169		
Vizianagur	Bemadoo	1 year, Sept. 1768 to Sept. 1769.	25,016		
Seergur	Hurry Kissen Sing		3,988		
Paloor	Gazender		1,513		
Mundisaw	Rajahmunny		5,998		
Jeridah	Santarow		3,772		
Turlah	Ragonaud Soor		4,715		
Chigutty	Rajender Doo		16,175		
Sourunghi	Hurry Chunden		5,429		
Jellantra	Choterow		6,429		
Bouraursinghi	Nisthunk		1,332		
Burragur			1,714		
Restored Villages	Vencajee Pundat		8,143		
Inaums in the Purgunnahs	Gaudé Purshotum, &c.	1 year, Sept. 1768 to Sept. 1769,	5,143		
Purgunnah of Courlah, &c.	Shamsunder Chowry		2,000		
				2,03,436	7,16,367
1769-70.					
Fort Saint George	As last year		3,75,430	Pagodas. 12,25,224	
Saint Thomé	Sadashava	2 years, Aug. 1769, to July 1771	3,800		
				3,79,230	
Cuddalore	As last year			24,100	
Masulipatam	As last year		94,756		
Masulipatam and Ponracca Salt	Moslacontee Caumagee	3 years, Nov. 1767 to Nov. 1770	3d year 18,285	1,13,041	
Northern Circars.					
Under Masulipatam, viz. Rajamundry, Ellore, and Mustaphanagur.					
Neozeed and Havilly Lands of Ellore	Macca Opparow, and Macca Narrain Row		1,17,221		
Muglatore	Culdindee Trippetterauze		96,030		
Chapar Mehal	Camidenah, Paupiarow and Ancaparow		26,647		
Devra Cotah	Erlagudda Codant Ram		17,193		
Nandigamah	Vessireddy Vencatradiniadoo		16,500		
Mylaverom	Sooranany, Narsinvarow and Vencatramarow		5,637		
Bezoara	Callavacollee Timmenarow and Ramarow		4,558		
Chintalapoody	Joopellah Mullarow Vencatrow, and Ramarow		5,098		
Medoor Guttoo and Jemmalavoy	Vellanky Mullarow, Varigonda Vissemrauze, &c.		5,996		
Munagalah	Kissera Vencatram	1 year, Sept. 1769 to Sept. 1770	1,608		
Lingagera	Codant Ram and Narahurry		209		
Tellicacherlah	Upparapatty Vencatapettirauze		495		
Peddapore	Vackevoy Jaggepettirauze		1,77,315		
Pellahpore	Row Neeladerow		68,002		
Ramachendeporam	Cacarlamody Ramchenderauze		12,422		
Cotah	Cacarlamody Vencapettirauze		14,788		
Pollaram	Reddy Vencatramala Doo		8,536		
Gootalah	Reddy Letchinnarain Doo		8,635		
Corcondah	Mundapetty Trippettirauze		7,219		
Casanacorree	Condraigulla Stenwaparow		5,698		
Velumapollam	Angara Bramajee Kistnow		2,805		
Vegayamapettah	Gunnapatty and Sunderapah		1,129		
Jallimoody and Paliconah	Jellala Ramajee Banow		82		
				Carried over Pag.	5,16,378

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leases.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
			Pagodas.	Pagodas.	Pagodas.	
1769-70—*continued.*	Brought forward				5,16,371	
Tanangapillee	Sabineveſs Neganah		144			
Vellah	Cujee Mahomed Ruffey		165			
Vencatarypellam	Sadacælry Cawn		220			
Muccamulah	Dumoderdoſs		39			
Voudalafloram	Vencatram Pundat		165			
		1 year, Sept. 1779 to Sept. 1770.				
Cotapillee	Conaty Tripetty		2,629			
Havilly Lands of Muſtaphanagar	Jaffier Beg Cawn		2,365			
Dº Rajamundry	Timmagee Pundat		770			
Veloor, Samatoo and Dooa	Huſſein Ally Cawn		11,000			
				5,61,320		
Circar under Vizagapatam in part of Cicacole.						
Havilly Lands	Accajee Pundat		60,000			
Vizianagrum	Sitteramrauze	1 year, Sept. 1769 to Sept. 1770	82,857			
Satrlaveram	Pykarow		18,571			
				1,61,428		
Circar under Ganjam.						
Itchapoor Havilly Lands	Shamſunder Chowdry		45,715			
Burragur	Permanund Sing		2,857			
Daracoote	Rajendet Sing		7,143			
Moherry	Narrainder		12,857			
Goomſur	Kiſſenbunge		8,572			
Sourcrah	Raya Sing		1,429			
Beroudi	Mahurtah		1,429			
Hoummah	Santarow		857			
Haurpur	Hurry Chunder		10,572			
Callicote	Murda Rauze		9,715			
		1 year, Sept. 1769 to Sept. 1770.				
Vizianagur	Beemadoo		13,429			
Seer Gur	Hurry Kiſſen Sing		3,143			
Paloor	Gazender		1,000			
Mundeſaw	Rajamutiny		5,286			
Jerridah	Santerow		2,143			
Turlah	Ragonaud Soor		4,000			
Chigutty	Rajender Doo		10,000			
Sourunghi	Hurry Chunden		3,429			
Jellantra	Choterow		4,286			
Bouraurſinghi	Niſshunk		857			
				1,48,719		
					8,71,467	
				Pagodas	13,87,838	
1770-71.						
Fort Saint George	As laſt year				3,79,230	
Cuddalore	As laſt year				24,100	
Maſulipatam.						
Nizampatam			21,560			
Devee			16,500			
Gondore and Auclunada	Condragulloo Jogue Puntaloo		12,320			
Innogodoo			2,849			
Antraviddee		5 years, from 1 June 1770 to 31 May 1775	1,001			
Six Iſlands	Sevajee Pundat		3,465			
Tondore and Bondora			18,700			
Tumudee and Pedanah			9,680			
	Culdindee Tripettiruze.					
Narſapore Salt			3,850			
		Ys. Ms. Ds.				
Ditto Town		4 5 3 28 Dec. 1770 to 31 May 1775	629			
Nellapillee and Goorganapillee	Condragulloo Vencatrayloo	5 years — to Dº	2,865			
Bandarmalanka, &c.	Huſſein Ally Cawn		1,400			
Sakenapillee and Ramaſerum	Dº	5 years — to Dº	2,200			
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Sala	Moſlacontee Caumajee Puntaloo	5 years, 29 Nov. 1770 to 28 Nov. 1775	11,714			
			Carried over Pagº		4,03,330	

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leaſes.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.		Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
1770-1—*continued.*	Brought over				Pagodas.	5,15,063	
Under Maſulipatam.							
Noozeed and Havilly of Ellore	Macca Opparow and Narrain Row	1 year Sept. 1770 to Sept. 1771		1,18,046			
Vondeleſſoram	Boochenah Pundat	D°		165			
Havilly Lands of Rajamundry	Timmejee Pundat	D°		1,100			
D° Muſtaphanagur	Not Lett.						
Dutch Factory at Pallicole				158			
D° Jaggernaut Poram				238			
The reſt as laſt year				4,40,799			
					5,60,506		
Under Vizagapatam, viz. Chicacole.							
Vizianagrum, &c.	Sitteramrauze			85,714			
Sattiaveram	Pykarow			18,571			
Tekaly	Juggut Doo	3 years, Sept. 1770 to Sept. 1773.		5,714			
Havillee Lands	Abdulla Ryman Bay			54,286			
Kimmedy	Guzzeput D°		1ſt year	14,286			1 year, Pag[a] 14,286—2d and 3d, 18,857.
					1,58,571		
Under Ganjam.							
Itchapour Havilly Lands	Shamſunder Chowdry			40,571			
Turlah	Ragonaut Soor			4,286			
Mundeſaw	Rajamunny			5,715			
Bouraurlinghi	Niſshunt			857			
Jellantra	Choterow			4,572			
Jerridah	Santerow			2,286			
Sourunghi	Hurry Chunden			3,715			
Chigutty	Rajender Doo			10,000			
Palour	Gazender			1,000			
Beroudi	Mahurtah	1 year, Sept. 1770 to Sept. 1771		1,629			
Hoummah	Santarow			857			
Daracoote	Rajender Sing			7,143			
Seergur	Hurry Kiſſen Sing			3,143			
Moherry	Narrainder			12,857			
Goomſur	Kiſſen Bunge			8,572			
Hautgur	Hurry Chunder			10,572			
Sourerah	Raya Sing			1,428			
Callicote	Murda Rauze			9,715			
Vizianagur	Beemadoo			13,429			
Burragur	Permanund Sing			2,857	1,45,204	8,84,281	
					Pagodas	13,99,344	
1771-2.							
Fort Saint George.							
Poonamallee	The Nabob	1 year, Aug. 1771 to July 1772		44,350			
Saint Thomé	Tanacooty Pillah			5,100			
Irvetore	Paupah Brammey			2,700			
Egmore	D°			1,100			
Perembore	D°	5 years, Aug. 1771 to July 1776		1,200			
Paddy Fields and Salt Pans	Natchipah Moodaly			600			
Deve Cotah	Antonio de Soza, and Medda Ball Kiſtnah			11,525			
Jagueer	The Nabob	1 year, Aug. 1771 to July 1772		3,24,000		3,90,575	
Cuddalore.							
Trevendeporam	Sadaſheverow	5 years, Aug. to July 1776		12,600			
Fort Saint David's Bounds		D°		6,600		19,200	
Maſulipatam.	As laſt year.			1,05,133			
		Y[s]. M[s]. D[s].					
Bandarmalanka, &c.	Moſtacontee Caumajee	3. 9. 5. 27 Aug. 1771		4,400			
	Puntaloo	to 31 May 1775					
Sakanapillee, &c.	D°	D°		2,200		1,11,733	
		Carried forward				5,21,508	

Names of the Farms, Zémindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leaſes.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
1771-2—*continued.*				Pagodas.	Pagodas.	
Northern Circars, viz.	Brought forward				5,21,508	
Under Maſulipatam.						
Noozeed and Havilly of Ellore	Macca Opparow, and Narrain Row		1,14,471			
Havilly Lands of Muſtaphanagur	Mulloo Pundat		6,050			
D° Rajamundry	Coja Joerulla Cawn		2,310			
Valoor Samatoo	Sevajee Puntaloo and Timajee Puntaloo	1 year, Sep. 1771 to Sep. 1772	5,940			
Dooa	Culdindee Tripeterauze		4,950			
Paroor Diſtrict, &c.	D°		18,408			
Tautipauka	Vackevoy Jaggepetirauze		21,252			
The reſt as laſt year			4,30,360	6,03,741		
Under Vizagapatam	As laſt year		1,64,285			
Kimmeedy	Guzzeput doo	3 years, Sep. 1770 to Sep. 1773	18,857	1,83,142		
Under Ganjam						
Itchapoor Havilly	Shanſunder Chowdry	1 year, Sep. 1771 to Sep. 1772	42,857			
The reſt as laſt year			1,04,633	1,47,490	9,34,373	
1772-3.				Pagodas.	14,55,881	
Fort Saint George	As laſt year		22,225			
Poonamallee	To the Nabob	1 year, Aug. 1772 to July 1773	44,350			
Jagueer	D°	D°	3,24,000		3,90,575	
Cuddalore	As laſt year				19,200	
Maſulipatam	As laſt year				1,11,733	
Northern Circars.						
Under Maſulipatam	As laſt year		5,97,801			
Valloor Samatoo	Timagee Pundat, and Savagee Pundat	1 year, Sept. 1772 to Sept. 1773	8,360	6,06,161		
Under Vizagapatam	As laſt year			1,83,142		
Under Ganjam	As laſt year			1,47,490	9,36,793	
1773 4.				Pagodas.	14,58,301	
Fort Saint George	As laſt year		2 2,225			
Poonamallee	To the Nabob	1 year, Aug. 1773 to Sept. 1774	44,350			
Jagueer	D°	D°	3,24,000		3,90,575	
Cuddalore	As laſt year				19,200	
Maſulipatam.						
Nizampatam			21,560			
Devee			16,500			
Gondore Auclanada	Condraigulloo Venkatarayulloo	2 years, 1 June 1773 to 31 May 1775	12,320			
Inogodroo			2,849			
Antraviddee			1,001			
The reſt as before			57,503		1,11,733	
Northern Circars.						
Under Maſulipatam.						
Havelly of Ellore	Sobraram Lollah		1ſt year 13,475			1ſt year, Pag' 13,475; 2d, 14,025; 3d, 14,575.
Rajamundry	Cojah Jorullah Cawn		2,310			
Muſtaphanagur	Timmagee Pundat	3 years, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1776	1ſt year 4,400			1ſt year, Pag' 4,400; 2d, 4,950; 3d, 5,500.
Valloor Samatoo	Savagee Pundat		6,875			
Dooa	Culdindee Trippeterauze		1ſt year 4,400			1ſt year, Pag' 4,400; 2d, 4,537½; 3d, 4,675.
		Carried forward Pag'	31,460	Car. over Pag'	5,21,508	

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leases.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.		Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
					Pagodas.	Pagodas.	
1773-4.	Brought forward					5,21,508	
Northern Circars under Masulipatam		Brought forward		Pagodas. 31,460			
Noozed	Macca Narsinva Opparow		1st year	100,171			1st and 2d years each P°. 100, 171; 3d year 101, 821.
Muglatore, &c.	Culdindee Trippetterauze		D°	97,680			1st and 2d years each 97,680; 3d year 99,880.
Chahar Mehal	Camidenah, Paupiarow and China Paupiarow		D°	26,647			1st and 2d years each 26,647; 3d year 27,197
Devra Cotah	Erlagudda Codant Ram		D°	17,193			1st and 2d years each 17,193; 3d year 17,743.
Nandigamah	Vassireddy Ramanah		D°	16,500			1st and 2d years each 16,500; 3d year 16,675
Mylaverom	Soorananah, Marsinvarow and Venca tramarow		D°	5,637			1st and 2d — each 5,637; 3d — 5,692.
Bezoara	Callavacollue Timenarow and Ramarow		D°	4,558			1st and 2d — each 4,558; 3d — 4,778.
Chintallapoody	Joopdilah Mullarow Vencatrow, and Narsinvarow		D°	5,098			1st and 2d — each 5,098; 3d — 5,208.
Medoor Gutto, and Jemmalavoy	VallankeyMullarow, Vencatrow, &c.		D°	5,996			1st and 2d — each 5,996; 3d — 6,216
Munagalah	Kilsara Marsinvarow		D°	1,608			1st and 2d — each 1,608; 3d — 1,656.
Lingagerah	Codant Ram, and Marahurry		D°	209			1st and 2d — each 209; 3d — 216.
Tellicacherlah	Uppalapatty Vencatapettirauze		D°	495			
Peddapore, and Tautipauka	Vackevoy Jaggepettirauze	3 years, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1776.	1st year	138,567			1st and 2d — each 138,567; 3d — 140,767.
Pettahpore	Row Vencatrow		D°	68,002			1st and 2d — each 68,002; 3d — 68,992.
Ramachenderperam	Cacarlanwody Ramachenderauze		D°	12,423			1st and 2d — each 12,423; 3d — 12,919.
Cotah	Cacarlamody Vencatapettirauze			14,788			
Pollaram	Reddy Mungapetty doo		1st year	8,536			1st and 2d — each 8,536; 3d — 9,088.
Gootalah	Reddy Letchminaraindoo		D°	8,635			1st and 2d — each 8,635; 3d — 9,350.
Corcondah	Mundapetty Trippettirauze		D°	7,219			1st and 2d — each 7,219; 3d — 7,549.
Casanacorro	Cordraigullo Vencatrow Jaggernaut			5,698			
Velamapollam	Angara Bramajee Kistnow			2,805			
Vegayamapetah	Vandra Gunnapetty and Sundrapah			1,128			
Jalamoody and Paliconah	Jellala Bramajee Banow			82			
Penangapillee	Sabbineveis Nanganah			144			
Vellah	Cajee Mahomed Ruffey			165			
Vencataypollam	Sadacallee Cawn			220			
Muccamalah	Damoderdoss,			38			
Vondeletforam	Boochenah Pundat			165			
Cotapullee	Conaty Tripetty		1st year	2,629			1st and 2d years each 2,629; 3d year, 2,684.
Parver	Culdindee Tripettirauze			16,759			
Dutch Factories				396			
orthern Circars under Vizagapatam.							
Vizianagrum	Sitteramrauze			85,714			
Sattiaveram	Pykerow			18,571			
Tekaly	Juggut Doo			5,714			
Chicacole and Jellmore Havilly	Sitteramrauze	8 years, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1776		47,866			
Cassimcoatah	Vizieramrauze			6,420			
Kimmeedy	Not settled				1,64,285		
ider Ganjam.							
Itchapoor Havilly Lands	Juggabundoo Chowdry	1 year, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1774		37,143			
The rest as last year				1,04,633			
					1,41,776		
						9,07,712	
1774-5.					Pagodas		
ort Saint George	As last year			2,225		14,29,220	
Poonamallee	The Nabob	1 year, Aug. 1774 to July 1775		44,350			
Jagueer	D°	D°		3,24,000			
						3,90,575	
uddalore	As last year					19,200	
lasulipatam	As last year					1,11,733	
				Carried forw. Pag°		5,01,508	

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leaſes.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.		Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
1774-5—*continued.*	Brought forward				Pagodas.	5,01,508	
Northern Circars.							
Under Maſulipatam,							
Havilly of Ellore	Sobrarum Lollah		2d year	14,025			
D° of Muſtaphanagur	Timmagee Pundat	3 years, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1776.	D°	4,950			
Dooa	Culdindee Trippeterauze		D°	4,537			
The reſt as laſt year				5,79,376			
					6,02,888		
Under Vizagapatam	As laſt year			1,64,285			
Kimmeedy	Jaggernautdoo	2 years, Sept. 1774 to Sept. 1776,		22,857			
Gulgundah	Sitteramrauze	D°		1,428			
					1,88,570		
Under Ganjam	As laſt year			1,04,633			
Itchapoor Havilly Lands	Juggabundy Chowdry			45,715			
Reſtored Villages of Goomſur	Gungader Chowdry			1,715			
D° Hautgur	Baremdayoo Santaroy			500			
D° Moherry	Damadoo Mahunty	1 year, Sept. 1774 to Sept. 1775		428			
D° Viziauagur	Cherna Chowdry			569			
D° Houmman	Antana Puntaloo			30			
					1,53,590		
						9,45,048	
1775-6.					Pagodas	14,66,556	
Fort Saint George	As laſt year					3,90,575	
Cuddalore	As laſt year					19,200	
Maſulipatam.							
Devee	Antonio de Souza	8 years, from 1 June 1775 to 31 May 1783		19,800			
Nellapillee & Goorganapillee	Mr. Anthony Sadlier	5 years, from 1 June 1775 to 31 May 1780		4,125			
Antraviddee	Balabadrauze	8 years, from 1 June 1775 to 31 May 1783		1,595			
Nizampatam				21,560			
Gondore and Auclanada				12,320			
Six Iſlands of Devee				3,465			
Innogodroo				2,849			
Sakenapillee and Ramaſerum	The Farms not being let, were			2,200			
Bandermalanka & Towns	managed by the Chief and			4,400			
Tondore and Bandora	Council of Maſulipatam this			18,700			
Tumedee and Pedana	year; they are ſet down at			9,680			
Narſapore Salt	the Rents of laſt year.			3,850			
Maſulipatam and Ponracca Salt				11,714			
Narſapore Town				629			
						1,16,887	
Northern Circars.							
Under Maſulipatam.							
Havelly of Ellore	Sobraram Lollah		3d year	14,575			
— — Rajamundry	Cojah Jorullah Cawn			2,310			
— — Muſtaphanagur	Simmajee Pundat		3d year	5,500			
Valloor Samatoo	Sevajee Pundat			6,875			
Dooa	Culdindee Trippeterauze		3d year	4,675			
Noozeed	Macca Narſinva Opparow	3 years to Sept. 1776.	D°	1,01,821			
Muglatore, &c.	Culdindee Trippeterauze		D°	99,880			
Chahar Behal	Camadenah, &c.		D	27,197			
Devra Cotah	Erlagudda Codant Ram		D°	17,743			
Nandigamah	Vaſſiriddy Ramanah		D	16,675			
Mylaverom	Sooranany, &c.		D°	5,692			
Bezvara	Callivacollue Timenarow, &c.		D°	4,778			
Chintalapoody	Joopellah Mullarow, &c.		D°	5,208			
Modoor Guttoo and Jemmalavoy	Vallankey Mullarow, &c.		D°	6,216			
Munagalah	Kiſſarah Narſinvarow		D°	1,656			
Lingagera	Codant Ram and Rarahurry		D	216			
Tellicacherlah	Uppalapatty Vencatapettirauze			495			
Peddapere and Tautipaukah	Vachevoy Jaggepettirauze		3d year	1,40,767			
				Carried over Pag[e]		5,26,662	

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leaſes.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.		Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
1775-6—*continued.*	Brought forward - -	- - - - - -	- -	Pagodas.	- -	5,26,662	
Pettapore - -	Row Vencatarow - -	3 years, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1776 - -	3d year	68,992			
Ramachendeporam -	Cacarlamoody Ramachenderauze - -	- - - - -	D°	12,919			
Cotah - - -	Cacarlamoody Vancatapettirauze -	- - - - -	- -	14,788			
Pollaram - -	Reddy Mungapetty Doo	- - - - -	3d year	9,086			
Gontalah - -	Reddy Letchminarain Doo	- - - - -	D°	9,350			
Corcondah - -	Mundapetty Tripetterauze	- - - - -	D°	7,549			
Caſanacorro - -	Condraigullo Vencatrow Jaggernaut - -	- - - - -	- -	5,698			
Velamapollam -	Angara Bramajee Kiſtnore	- - - - -	- -	2,805			
Vagayamapettah -	Vandravoo Somapah -	1 year, Sept. 1775 to Sept. 1776 - -	- -	564			
Jalimoody and Paliconah	Jellala Bramajee Banow	- - - - -	- -	82			
Panangapille - -	Sabineveſs Nanganah	- - - - -	- -	144			
Vellah - - -	Cajee Mahomed Ruffy	- - - - -	- -	165			
Vencataypollam -	Sadacallee Cawn - -	3 years, Sept. 1773 to Sept. 1766 - -	- -	220			
Muccamalah -	Damoderdoſs - - -	- - - - -	- -	38			
Vondelaſſoram -	Boochenah Pundat -	- - - - -	- -	165			
Cotapillee - -	Conaty Tripetty - -	- - - - -	3d year	2,684			
Paroor - - -	Culdindee Tripetterauze -	- - - - -	- -	16,759			
Dutch Factories -	- - - - - -	- - - - -	- -	396			
Nellatore, &c. Villages	Somapah - - - -	1 year, Sept. 1775 to Sept. 1776 - -	- -	935			
					6,15,618		
Under Vizagapatam	As laſt year - -	- - - - -	- -	- -	1,88,570		
Under Ganjam -	As laſt year - -	- - - - -	- -	1,41,776			
Goomſur - -	Kiſſen Bunge - -	- - - - -	- -	14,286			
Reſtored Villages of Goomſur	Latchemah Bunge -	- - - - -	- -	2,000			
— — Hautgur	Bandarvo Santaroy -	1 year, Sept. 1775 to Sept. 1776 - -	- -	1,257			
— Moherry and Hoummah	Madoo Praharauze -	- - - - -	- -	1,657			
— — Vizianagur	Colloor Ballarum -	- - - - -	- -	1,943	1,62,919	9,67,107	
					Pagodas	14,93,769	
1776-7.							
Fort Saint George -	As before - - -	1 year, Aug. 1776, to July 1777 - -	- -	- -	- -	3,90,575	
Cuddalore - - -	As before - - -	D° - - - -	- -	- -	- -	19,200	
Maſulipatam - -	As before - - -	- - - - -	- -	- -	- -	1,16,887	
Northern Circars.							
Under Maſulipatam.							
Havelly of Ellore -	Chief and Council of Maſulipatam -	Calculated at a medium of laſt 3 years - -	- -	14,025			
— Rajamundry	Coja Joerullah Cawn	- - - - -	- -	2,310			
— Muſtaphanagur	Timmajee Pundat -	- - - - -	- -	4,950			
Valloor Somatoo -	Savagee Pundat -	1 year, Sept. 1776 to Sept. 1777 - -	- -	6,875			
Dooa - -	Culdindee Trippettirauze	- - - - -	- -	4,538			
The reſt as laſt year -	- - - - - -	2 years, Sept. 1776 to Sept. 1778 - -	- -	5,81,683	6,14,381		
Under Vizagapatam.							
Vizianagrum and Gulgundah	Vizieramrauze - -	- - - - -	- -	87,143			
Sattieveram - -	Pykarow - - -	- - - - -	- -	18,571			
Tekaly - -	Puggut Doo - - -	1 year, Sept. 1776 to Sept. 1777 - -	- -	5,871			
Havilly Lands -	Jaggernautrauze -	- - - - -	- -	48,571			
Kimmedy - - -	Jaggernaut Doo - -	- - - - -	- -	22,857	1,83,013		
Under Ganjam.							
Itchapoor Havilly -	Juggabundoo Chowdry	- - - - -	- -	42,857			
Reſtored Villages of Goomſur	Carlujee - - -	- - - - -	- -	1,151			
— — Hautgur	Gauda Vencataſſia -	- - - - -	- -	1,150			
— Moherry and Hoummah	Jimmundra Shewaram	1 year, Sept. 1776 to Sept. 1777 - -	- -	1,446			
Vizianagur -	Lingum Juggiah -	- - - - -	- -	1,729			
The reſt as laſt year -	- - - - - -	- - - - -	- -	1,10,347	1,58,680		
						9,56,074	
					Pagodas.	14,82,736	

Names of the Farms, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leases.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Total per Annum.		REMARKS.
1777-8.			Pagodas.			
Fort Saint George.						
Poonamallee	The Nabob	1 year, Aug. 1777 to July 1778	44,350			
Saint Thomé			7,000			
Trivetore			2,850			
Egmore	Tanacooty Pillah	10 years, 1 Aug. 1777 to 31 July 1787	1,310			
Perembore			1,510			
Paddy Fields and Salt Pans			920			
Deve Cotah	Nella Permaul and Conary	10 years D° D°	13,600			
Jagueer	The Nabob	1 year Aug. 1777 to July 1778	3,24,000			
					3,95,541	
Cuddalore.						
Trevendeporam	Nalla Permaul and Conary	10 years, Aug. 1777 to July 1787	14,390			
Fort Saint David's Bounds	D°	D° D°	7,265			
					21,655	
Masulipatam.						
Devee, Nellipellee, Autraviddee	As before		25,550			
Tondore and Bandora			14,520			
Tumedee and Pedanah			8,580			
Narsapore Town	Culdindee Trippetterauze	2 years, 1 June 1777 to 31 May 1779	880			
D° Salt Farm			2,420			
Six Islands of Devee			3,300			
Masulipatam and Ponracca Salt	Mr. Samuel Statham	1 year, 1 Dec. 1777 to 30 Nov. 1778	11,714			
Nizampatam			21,560			
Gondore, &c.			12,320			
Innigodroo	Not let; estimated as before		2,849			
Sakenapillee, &c.			2,200			
Bandarmalanka, &c.			4,400			
					1,10,293	
Northern Circars.					5,27,489	
Under Masulipatam.						
Havelly of Ellore	Ragogee Puntaloo	2 years, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1779	14,300			
Rajahmundry	Chief and Council established as la.		2,310			
Mustaphanagur	Vencatachillum	2 years, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1779	5,720			
Valloor Samatoo	Callivacollue Jimmenarow, and Ramarow	D°	7,425			
Dooa	Culdindee Trippetterauze	D°	4,675			
The rest as last year			5,81,683			
				6,16,113		
Under Vizagapatam.						
Vizianagrum, &c.	Vizieramrauze		87,143			
Salliaveram	Jaggernautrauze		18,571			
Tekaly	Juggutdoo	1 year, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1778	5,871			
Havilly Lands	Sitteramrauze	10 years, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1787	67,143			First 5 years, Pag° 67,143 each—6th year, 68,857—7th, 72,571—8th, 73,428 9th, 75,714—10th year, 78,000.
Kimeedy	Jaggernautdoo	1 D°, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1778	22,857			
				2,01,585		
Under Ganjam.						
Itchapour Havilly	Under charge of Chief and Council of Ganjam	Estimated at the former Rent	42,857			
Mundesaw	D° D°	D°	5,715			
Jellantra	D° D°	D°	4,572			
Jeridah	D° D°	D°	2,286			
Vizianagur	Munnidoo	1 year, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1778	7,143			
Pretapaghire	Jaggernautdoo	D°	6,285			
Restored Villages of Goomsur	Under charge of Chief and Council	Estimated at former Rent	1,151			
Hautgur	Nebanpoody Dunamanow	1 year, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1778	1,196			
Moherry and Hoummah	Vancataramadoo	D°	1,593			
Nizianagur	Ramdoss	D°	1,571			
The rest as last year			84,346			
				1,58,715	9,76,413	
				Pagodas	15,03,902	

Names of the Farmers, Zemindaries, &c.	Names of the Farmers, Zemindars, and Renters.	Periods of the Leaſes.	Rent of each Farm, &c. per Annum.	Total per Annum.	REMARKS.
1778-9.			Pagodas		
ort Saint George.					
As laſt year			27,190		
Poonamallee	The Nabob	3 years, Aug. 1778 to July 1781	40,000		
Jagueer	D°	D°	3,24,000		
				3,91,190	
uddalore	As laſt year			21,655	
afulipatam	As laſt year			1,10,293	
Northern Circars.					
nder Maſulipatam.					
Havelly of Ellore, Rajahmundry, Muſtaphanagur	As laſt year		34,430		
Valloor Samatoo					
Dona					
Noozeed	Macca Narſinva Opparow		1,01,821		
Muglatore	Culdindee Tripetterauze		1,07,758		
Chihar Mehal	Camdenah Subrah		30,596		
Devra Cotah	Erlagudda Codant Ram		19,960		
Nandigamah	Vaſſireddy Ramanah		18,717		
Mulaverom	Sooranany Narſinvarow, &c.		6,342		
Bezoara	CallivacolleeTimmenarow, &c.		5,374		
Chintalapoody	Joopellah Mullarow, &c.		5,614		
Madoor Gutto and Jemmalavoy	Vallankey Mullarow, &c.		6,993		
Munagalah	Kiſſarah Vencatramrow		1,656		
Lingagera	Codant Ram, and Marahurry		216		
Tellicacherla	Uppalapatty Vencatapettirauze		495		
Peddapore	Vachevoy Jaggapettirauze		1,53,622		
Pettahpore	Row Vencatrow		68,992		
		5 years, Sep. 1778 to Sept. 1783			
Ramachenderporam	Cacarlamoody Ramachenderauze		13,970		
Cotah	Cacarlamoody Achetaramrauze		16,636		
Pollaram	Reddy Mungapettydoo		9,933		
Gootalah	Reddy Letchminaraindoo		10,197		
Corcondah	Mundapetty Tripettarauze		8,220		
Cafanacorro	Condraigulla Vencatrow		6,296		
Velamapollam	Angara Bramajee Kiſtnow		3,080		
Vegayamapettah	Vandravoo Somapah		1,619		
Jalimoody and Paliconah	Jellalah Bramajee		99		
Panangapullee	Sabbineveſs Neganah		158		
Vellah	Cauzy Mahomed Ruffey		165		
Vencatavpollam	Saccacally Cawn		220		
Muccamalah	Damoderdoſs		38		
Vondalalloram	Vencatty Narſinva		206		
Cotapillee	Conaty Narſinvaloo		3,405		
Paroor	Culdindee Tripettirauze		18,327		
Pullicondah	Nellapahrauze		200		
Dutch Factories			396		
				6,55,751	
Inder Vizagapatam.					
Vizianagrum, &c.	Vizieramrauze	5 years, Sept. 1778 to Sept. 1783	1,15,714		The brothers, Vizieramrauze and Sitteramrauze, promiſed, as an acknowledgment for the Cowle granted in the name of Guzzeputtyrauze, to make a Nazar of one Lack of Rupees to the Company.
Sattieveram	D°	D°	25,714		
Tekaly	Juggutdoo	D°	5,714		
Havilly Lands	Sitteramrauze	10 years, Sept. 1777 to Sept. 1787	67,143		
Kimmeedy	Jaggernautdoo	5 years, Sept. 1778 to Sept. 1783	24,571		
				2,38,856	
Inder Ganjam.	As before		1,54,355		The whole of the Itchapore Diſtrict was let in Auguſt 1799 to Ball Kiſtna, for 10 years, from Sept. 1779 to Sept. 1789, at Pag^{a} 1,32,857 per Annum.
Reſtored Villages of Moherry and Hoummah	Caumojee	4½ years, Sept. 1778 to Mar. 1783	2,250		
Hautgur	Arnagerry	D°	2,284		
Vizianagur	Arnachillum	D°	2,319		
				1,61,208	
				10,55,815	
Nagore	Kiſtnajee Pundat and Tanacooty Pillah	6 years, July 1778 to July 1784		70,600	3 firſt years, Pag^{a} 70,600 each, 3 laſt, 76,600 Pag^{a}.
				Pagodas 16,49,553	

East India Houſe,
13th June 1781.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accoⁿ.

An ACCOUNT of Cuſtoms and Duties received at Fort Saint George and Subordinates, from May 1767, to the laſt Accounts received.

May.	April.	Sea and River Cuſtoms.	Land Cuſtoms.	Mint Cuſtoms.	Barkſall Duty.	Meaſuring Duty.	Town Duty.	TOTAL.
		Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
1767 to	1768	40,528	19,285	5,307	520	1,300	259	67,199
1768 —	1769	59,719	21,212	5,500	650	1,091	352	88,524
1769 —	1770	49,769	22,727	3,302	- -	1,374	322	77,494
1770 —	1771	53,675	24,019	3,660	- -	1,165	428	82,947
1771 —	1772	57,949	22,457	3,679	- -	1,290	334	85,709
1772 —	1773	59,326	20,695	3,296	2,875	1,600	272	88,064
1773 —	1774	50,129	20,124	2,976	830	1,600	249	75,908
1774 —	1775	65,247	18,531	4,029	- -	400	174	88,381
1775 —	1776	58,582	20,300	3,884	425	2,400	-	85,591
1776 —	1777	40,417	20,773	5,168	354	1,200	107	68,019
1777 —	1778	44,080	18,901	3,647	213	- -	-	66,841
1778 —	1779	35,592	18,485	4,576	- -	- -	-	58,653
1779 —	1780	35,336	14,694	5,659	325	2,050	-	58,064

An ACCOUNT of the Revenues ariſing from Farms and Licenſes at Fort Saint George and Subordinates, from May 1767, to the laſt Accounts received.

May.	April.	Beetle and Tobacco Farm.	Arrack and Toddy Licenſes.	Town Brokerage.	Ruby Brokerage.	Rental general and Scavenger.	TOTAL.
		Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.	Pag^{s}.
1767 to	1768	26,582	14,158	600	300	1,722	43,362
1768 —	1769	26,437	12,423	1,000	300	4,000	44,160
1769 —	1770	31,612	16,111	200	300	2,521	50,744
1770 —	1771	26,279	16,989	1,151	300	1,700	46,419
1771 —	1772	36,299	17,914	613	450	8,889	64,165
1772 —	1773	34,725	18,590	425	600	870	55,210
1773 —	1774	34,743	17,586	- -	600	- -	52,929
1774 —	1775	34,443	18,295	- -	600	6,500	59,838
1775 —	1776	31,887	16,800	382	300	- -	49,369
1776 —	1777	31,950	17,170	425	900	- -	50,445
1777 —	1778	43,393	21,921	682	350	9,008	75,354
1778 —	1779	48,803	18,352	613	700	- -	68,468
1779 —	1780	42,042	17,567	500	700	2,778	63,587

East India Houſe, 6th July 1781, and 11th Decem^{r} 1781.

(Errors excepted)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Your Committee, in the courſe of their enquiries into the receipt of the Revenues under the Preſidency of *Madras*, could not but obſerve the very large arrears due by the Renters and other poſſeſſors of lands, and which appear to have rapidly increaſed of late, particularly in the Northern Circars. And your Committee, being deſirous to aſcertain the progreſs of theſe balances, called for a particular ſtate of them, as they ſtood at the reſpective terminations of the Governments of Lord *Pigot*, Mr. *Stratton*, Mr. *Whitehill*, and Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, and at the date of the laſt advices; in obedience to which, the following Account was produced:

A State of the balances of the Northern Circars, as they ſtood at the end of Lord *Pigot*'s Government, of Mr. *Stratton*'s, of Mr. *Whitehill*'s, of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*'s, and as they ſtood according to the laſt advices.

At the end of Lord *Pigot*'s Government, 24th Auguſt 1776.

			Pag^{s}.
Maſulipatam	- -	Northern Circars -	2,79,604
Vizagapatam	- -	Northern Circars -	72,203
Ganjam	- - -	Northern Circars -	2,71,672
		Pag^{s}	6,23,479

At the end of Mr. *Stratton*'s Government, 31ſt Auguſt 1777.

Maſulipatam	- -	Northern Circars -	2,50,942
Vizagapatam	- -	Northern Circars -	2,52,858
Ganjam	- - -	Northern Circars -	3,21,909
		Pag^{s}	8,25,709

At the end of Mr. *Whitehill*'s Government, 7th February 1778.

Maſulipatam	- -	Northern Circars -	3,84,283
Vizagapatam	- -	Northern Circars -	1,93,891
Ganjam	- - -	Northern Circars -	3,77,021
		Pag^{s}.	9,55,195

Sir *Thomas Rumbold* reſigned the Government of *Madras* the 4th of April 1780; the laſt accounts received of

of the balances due from the Circars, are dated the 29th of February 1780, at which time they ſtood as follows:

		Pag^{a}.
Maſulipatam - -	Northern Circars -	9,92,962
Vizagapatam - -	Northern Circars -	3,24,156
Ganjam - - -	Northern Circars -	4,02,482
	Pag^{a}.	17,19,600

Eaſt-India Houſe,
18th May 1781.

Errors excepted.
John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

From the above Accompt it appears to your Committee, that the balances due from the Circars have not only been conſtantly increaſing during the period to which the Accompt relates, but that during each ſucceeding Government they have advanced more rapidly than under the preceding; the average increaſe under the Government of Mr. *Stratton* being exceeded by that under Mr. *Whitehill*'s Government, in the proportion of three to two, and by that under Sir *Thomas Rumbold* by nearly two to one, in the ſame period of time.

No exact account of the balances to a later period appears hitherto to have been received at the *India* Houſe; but in a Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, in their Civil Department, to the Court of Directors of the 9th of January 1781, the balances due by the Zemindars and Renters under *Maſulipatam* alone, are ſaid to amount, including the keeps due, to no leſs than Madras P^{a}. 15,28,597. 17. 0

General Letter from Fort St. George, 9th Jan. 1781, Par^{a} 14, 28.

To what cauſes this growing deficiency in the Revenues of the Northern Circars ought chiefly to be imputed, your Committee cannot take upon them to ſay. They obſerve, in the Letters to the Preſidency from the ſubordinate Councils, much ſaid of the poverty and large debts of many of the Zemindars; the refractory diſpoſition of others, particularly in the Chicacole Circar, are alſo repreſented, as contributing to ſwell the arrears. Your Committee beg leave to refer to what is ſaid in the Second Report, with reſpect to the poverty of many of the Zemindars. The Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, in their Letter to the Court of Directors of the 17th of October 1778, write, that few of the Zemindars, except thoſe whoſe paternal inheritance was too conſiderable to be waſted, were in circumſtances of reſponſibility to anſwer their engagements to the Company. They ſay that various cauſes had contributed to produce that effect; but that one alone was ſufficient to account for it; the practice of exacting in advance from the Zemindars two-thirds of their annual jemmabundy (rent) and the neceſſity by that means laid upon them of taking up from the Soucars (bankers) or any other who would lend them, conſiderable ſums of money at an exorbitant intereſt of two or three per cent. per month, giving aſſignments on the harveſt, by way of ſecurity for repayment.

2d Report, Page 10.

Appendix, No. 17.

Another cauſe is in the ſame Letter mentioned, as having contributed to the diſtreſs of the Zemindars, and that is, the ſhort term of the ſettlements made with them for their lands, which had led them to attend only to their own immediate intereſt, without regarding the conſequences to the revenue in future.

The great exportation of ſpecie from the country, which is ſtated by Mr. *Sadlier* at 10 or 15 lacks of pagodas per annum, and which does certainly take place to a great amount, muſt tend to render payments more difficult.

Under this head of the arrears, your Committee muſt refer to what has been ſaid in the Second Report, with reſpect to the meaſure of calling down the Zemindars to *Madras*, leaving it to the Houſe to judge upon what is there ſaid, how far that meaſure may have contributed to ſwell their amount. Other facts ſtated in that Report, and in its Supplement, ſeem to imply that private exactions have alſo contributed to the ſame evil. That ſuch exactions have actually been made by the Servants of the Company, the facts here alluded to ſeem to leave no doubt. To what amount they may have gone, it is impoſſible for your Committee to ſay. To inveſtigate that matter to its full extent, would require other kind of evidence than the records at the *India* Houſe, or the witneſſes they have had it in their power to examine, could be expected to afford.

Since this Report was drawn up and ready to be preſented to the Houſe, your Committee have had an opportunity of examining *Edward Cotsford*, eſquire, who is recently returned from *India*, where he had reſided from the month of Auguſt 1778 to the latter end of the year 1780, as Chief of *Maſulipatam*. The whole of his evidence, and the anſwers given by him to the queſtions put to him by the Committee, reſpecting the preſent ſtate of the Company's poſſeſſions on the Coaſt of *Coromandel*, are inſerted in the Appendix. Some part of thoſe anſwers tends to throw no ſmall light upon the preſent ſubject.

Appendix, No. 23.

Mr. *Cotsford* being aſked, if, under the Mahomedan Government, the Zemindars and Renters were ſubject to any payments beſides the rents of the diſtricts which they held? anſwered, that he believed the deputies of the Government did receive, over and above the tribute payable to the Government, a further ſum, under the name of nazar, or preſent, which they pretended was for the payment of their troops; but that their ability to procure this nazar, was in proportion to the ſtrength of their army—that theſe preſents were arbitrary, and bore no certain proportion to the tribute payable to the Government.

Being aſked, if, after the Circars came under the Government of Europeans, any remains of the nazar, or preſents, exiſted? he ſaid, he believed it did exiſt; and that he thinks he had ſeen a paper of Mr. *De Buſſy*'s, in which a part of the tribute was brought to account under the head of Preſent.

Being aſked, if after that country came to be under the Britiſh Government, the ſame practice had continued? he ſaid, he believed it had exiſted in a greater or leſs degree ever ſince.

Being aſked, under what head thoſe preſents were entered in the Company's Accounts? he ſaid, there was no ſuch head of Account, nor did he underſtand that any ſuch articles were ever brought to the credit of the Company; that thoſe preſents are conſidered as a perquiſite of the ſtation, and not in any reſpect as a part of the tribute.

Being aſked, whether, upon the ſuppoſition of the Zemindars not having been called down to ſettle their tribute at *Madras*, he would have thought himſelf at liberty, in conſiſtence with his duty, to accept ſuch gratuities from the Zemindars? his anſwer was, that he ſhould have thought it his firſt duty to inforce the payment of the Company's tribute, without ſuffering his own intereſt to interfere with it; but that he did not mean to ſay, he ſhould have declined the cuſtomary advantages of his ſituation.

Your Committee will make no commentary upon this evidence; but leave it to the Houſe to conſider, how far, when combined with the facts ſtated in the Supplement to the Second Report, it tends to explain the diſtreſs of the Zemindars.

To whatever cauſes the general diſtreſs of the Zemindars, and the increaſing difficulty of obtaining payment from them, is owing, the fact ſeems to your Committee to be certain.

The negotiations of the Chief and Council of *Masulipatam* with the Zemindars and Renters of that diſtrict, and the means uſed by them to enforce payment of their balances, as contained in their Revenue Conſultations, from June to December 1780, brought home by the laſt diſpatches, are exceedingly voluminous. It appears in theſe Conſultations, that after various fruitleſs endeavours to obtain payment from ſundry of the principal Zemindars, the Chief and Council had found it neceſſary to proceed to meaſures of compulſion, by confining their perſons under guards of Sepoys, and threatening to ſequeſtrate their eſtates. By theſe meaſures they ſeem to have got the ſecurity of Soucars for part of the arrears; but they at the ſame time inform the Preſident and Council, that moſt of thoſe whoſe tributes had been lately raiſed, had intimated an intention of applying for a reduction of them to the rate at which they had formerly ſtood; and at the ſame time expreſs their apprehenſions that, unleſs ſome meaſure of that kind were adopted, they would not in future be able to procure payment without a renewal of the ſame ſort of violence they had lately been compelled to employ; a meaſure which, however effectual it might be to bring money into the treaſury, they conſider as productive of ruinous conſequences, by alienating the minds of the people, and filling the country with ſecret enemies.

Letter from Maſulipatam, 25th Sept. 1775, in Fort Saint George Conſultations, 3d October 1780.

From the Account above inſerted, reſpecting the perſons to whom the territorial Revenues have been let on leaſe, it appears, that the Jaghier Lands, with the diſtrict of *Poonamallee*, being by far the greateſt part of the territory immediately under the Preſidency, has been almoſt uniformly let to the Nabob: for *Guntoor*, *Vincatachillum*, to whom theſe lands appear to have been let for ſeven years in the year 1764, ſeems to have been merely an interpoſed name for the Nabob, who gave his own ſecurity for the rent. Your Committee find in the records of the Company, frequent repreſentations made by the Governor and Council to the Directors, of the diſadvantages ariſing from theſe lands being poſſeſſed by the Nabob. Even before the expiry of the leaſe to *Vincatachillum*, theſe diſadvantages had been inſiſted upon; and upon the expiration of that leaſe in 1771, the Governor and Council write, that, "It is beyond a doubt, "that the advantages that might be reaped from ſuch "territorial poſſeſſions, will never be obtained ſo long as "the Nabob has any thing to do with them." They repreſent the inhabitants as undergoing continual oppreſſions; that the lands, though capable of great improvements, experienced none; that the great reſervoirs, by which the lands are ſupplied with water, were going to decay; that almoſt all the weavers who manufactured the Madras inveſtment, reſided within the Jaghire; and that more might be induced to come, had they proper encouragement, which it was not in their power to give them; that they had as little influence in theſe lands, as in thoſe of the immediate property of the Nabob; and that, except the mere rent, no one benefit was derived from them; and that in caſe they ſhould have occaſion for their produce, they had no more reaſon to expect it, than from the Nabob's country.

General Letter from Fort St. George, 16th Jan. 1765, Par. 17. Do, 22d Jan. 1767.

In the Letter from *Fort St. George*, to the Directors, dated the 14th of October, 1775, theſe Lands are repreſented as in a moſt wretched ſtate, and the inhabitants as much oppreſſed. And,

Appendix, No. 18.

Appendix No. 18.

Sir *Eyre Coote*, in his Letter to the Committee of Correſpondence at the *India* Houſe, of the 30th of November 1780, lamenting the neceſſity there was of both the army and inhabitants being, in the ſtate in which the country then was, maintained chiefly by ſupplies from *Bengal*, ſtates that neceſſity, as a convincing proof of the bad policy of renting theſe Lands to the Nabob, and thereby rendering themſelves entirely dependant upon him for every kind of ſupply.

Appendix, No. 19.

For farther particulars reſpecting theſe Lands, and the conduct of the late Government of *Madras*, in letting them anew to the Nabob for three years, your Committee beg leave to refer to the Second Report, page 293.

In the ſame Report (page 286) it has been ſeen, that when the Government of *Madras* had obtained poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar from *Bazalet Jung*, that country too was agreed to be let to the Nabob.

Your Committee having ſtated the nature and amount of the Revenues, under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, proceeded next to inquire into their expenditure. And your Committee having found, in the Third Report of the Committee of Secrecy appointed in the year 1773, to inquire into the ſtate of the *Eaſt India* Company, a General State of the Receipts and Diſburſements at each of the Chief Settlements of the Company in *India*, for ten years preceding the month of April 1771, thought, that the moſt diſtinct method for them to follow, would be to lay before the Houſe; a ſimilar State of Receipts and Diſburſements for the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, commencing at the period at which that in the Report of the former Committee ended. Such a State therefore commencing in May 1771, and ending in April 1778, which your Committee was informed was as low as it could be brought, having been produced in compliance with the orders of your Committee, by Mr. *John Annis*, Auditor of Indian Accounts, the ſame is here laid before the Houſe.

RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS;

&c.

GENERAL STATE of RECEIPTS and DISBURSEMENTS at

RECEIPTS.

	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues and Customs, clear of Charges of Collection, Commiſſion to the Company's Servants, &c.		Received on ſeveral Accounts; viz. of the Nabob towards the Military Expences; Stores returned from him; on Account Depoſits.	Bond Debt contracted in the Year.	Amount of ſundry Gains ariſing on Bale, Gains at the Factories on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount received for Bills of Exchange on the Court of Directors.	Amount of Remittances from other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes from Europe, at European Price, with 10 per cent.	Amount of Profit on European Goods ſold in the Year.	TOTAL RECEIPTS.
	Nett Amount of Revenues ariſing from Cuſtoms, &c. poſſeſſed before the Year 1757.	Nett Amount of Territorial Revenues lately obtained.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods & Stores.			
May to April.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1771 — 1772	59,088	499,772	204,884	14,000	24,064	55,225	- -	1,015	21,542	61,705	7,488	948,783
1772 — 1773	72,157	457,076	332,666	21,249	19,662	56,500	17,790	18,661	77,366	87,907	11,383	1,172,417
1773 — 1774	64,738	460,024	362,545	200	28,662	1,600	- -	4,664	16,474	104,405	14,961	1,058,273
1774 — 1775	72,951	430,678	467,241	- -	33,640	46,193	- -	- -	9,782	145,232	29,368	1,235,085
1775 — 1776	62,187	452,404	245,200	- -	11,670	49,091	- -	- -	93,122	103,794	19,009	1,036,477
1776 — 1777	67,337	496,012	191,466	- -	16,712	60,243	- -	- -	89,202	93,620	22,698	1,037,290
1777 — 1778	72,972	205,276	419,499	- -	14,663	50,645	26,563	8,754	166,522	206,659	26,790	1,198,348
£. *Stg.*	471,430	3,001,242	2,223,501	35,449	149,073	319,497	44,358	33,094	474,010	803,322	131,697	7,686,673

Amount of Bond Debt at the following Periods:

	£.
30th April 1772	53,797
1773	75,046
1774	75,246
1775	68,624
1776	51,522
1777	51,145
1778	50,889
30th Sept[r] 1778	53,992
28th Feb[y] 1779	113,882
13th Oct[r] 1779	118,770

Part of the Sum of £. 2,223,501. being the Total of the Third Column of Receipts, in the above Account, to the amount of £. 1,990,498. was received of *Mahomed Ally Cawn*, towards defraying Military Expences; and another part of the ſaid ſum, to the amount of £. 230,770. was received of the King of *Tanjore*, to defray part of the Military Expences; and another part of the ſaid ſum, to the amount of £. 1,955. is the amount of the Depoſits made by the Accountant General of the Mayor's Court; and the remainder of the ſaid ſum, to the amount of £. 278. is received on ſundry accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe,
12th May 1781.

FORT SAINT GEORGE, for Seven Years, from May 1771 to April 1778.

DISBURSEMENTS.

CIVIL and MILITARY CHARGES.			Amount of Payments on ſeveral Accounts; Stores ſupplied for the Nabob, &c.	Bond Debt diſcharged in the Year.	Amount of ſundry Loſſes ariſing on Batta, Loſſes at Factories on Indian Goods, &c.	Amount of Loſſes on European Goods ſold in the Year.	Amount of Remittances to other Settlements.			Amount of Cargoes to Europe, valued at Prime Coſt.	TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS.	
Civil.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.					Bullion.	Bills.	Goods and Stores.			
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	May to April.
49,926	633,440	65,811	2,450	- -	15,045	262	17,326	13,163	22,139	242,036	1,061,598	1771 — 1772
52,508	544,185	55,031	17,162	- -	22,737	- -	36,902	16,912	35,731	205,090	986,258	1772 — 1773
51,104	677,114	86,774	12,699	- -	48,059	76	4,664	25,436	2,781	247,702	1,156,409	1773 — 1774
48,729	594,908	113,783	744	6,623	45,875	7,180	1,825	73,523	16,589	161,701	1,071,480	1774 — 1775
47,118	474,559	16,410	828	17,072	14,530	3,937	19,652	28,924	19,525	268,487	911,042	1775 — 1776
48,662	550,663	150,254	18,050	407	23,838	4,580	4,702	21,202	16,183	293,275	1,131,816	1776 — 1777
90,368	648,870	82,007	994	256	34,307	4,682	86,422	18,822	20,901	328,587	1,316,126	1777 — 1778
388,415	4,123,739	570,070	52,837	24,358	204,391	20,717	171,493	197,982	133,849	1,746,878	7,634,729	£. Ste.

Total of Civil and Military Charges and Buildings.

	£.
1771 - - - -	749,177
1772 - - - -	651,724
1773 - - - -	814,992
1774 - - - -	757,429
1775 - - - -	538,087
1776 - - - -	749,579
1777 - - - -	821,245
	£. 5,082,2[illegible]

Part of the ſum of £. 52,837. being the Total of the Fourth Column of Diſburſements in the above Account, and ſtated under the Head of Payments, &c. to the amount of £. 26,117. was the amount of Stores ſupplied to *Mahomed Ally Cawn*; and another part, to the amount of £. 11,169. was paid to ſundry perſons employed on the Expedition to *Manilla*; and another part, to the amount of £. 1,955. was the amount of Depoſits repaid the parties to whom they belonged; and the remainder of the ſaid ſum, amounting to £. 13,596. was paid to ſeveral perſons, on ſundry accounts.

(Errors excepted)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accoun[illegible]

The ſums in the foregoing Account being expreſt in Britiſh money, in conformity to the ſimilar Accounts in the Third Report of the former Committee of Secrecy, of which this is a continuation, your Committee think it proper to mention, with a view to a compariſon between this Account and the former, relative to the receipts of the Company, that two pagodas and a half are equal to one pound ſterling.

By the foregoing State, it appears how much of the Revenue has been annually expended upon the Civil and Military Charges and Fortifications; and conſequently how much has remained to be applied to the purchaſe of the inveſtment for *Europe*, and to the other purpoſes of the Company.

In order to ſhew ſtill more diſtinctly the application of the Company's Revenues, unmixed with their Commercial Receipts, your Committee will here ſubjoin an Account, in which are entered, firſt, the Nett Revenues, as in the preceding General State, and then the Civil and Military Charges, with the Expence of Buildings and Fortifications; diſtinguiſhing ſuch part of the Military Charges as is put to the Account of the Nabob, from thoſe that are defrayed out of the Company's proper Revenues.

The ſame Account ſhews the difference between the Nett Revenues and the Charges borne by the Company for each year to which it relates.

ANNUAL AMOUNT of Civil and Military Charges incurred by the *Eaſt India* Company at *Fort Saint George*, and Subordinates, from May 1767 to the laſt Accounts received: Alſo the Amount of the Difference between the Nett Revenues and Charges.

		CHARGES.							
	Total Nett Revenues, Cuſtoms, &c.	CIVIL.	MILITARY.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.	Revenues more than Charges.	Charges more than Revenues.
			Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Defrayed by the Company.				
May. April.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.
1767 - 1768	381,330	68,042	560,485	169,151	391,334	29,636	489,012	- -	107,682
1768 - 1769	369,720	41,154	809,041	189,216	619,825	30,492	691,471	-	321,751
1769 - 1770	500,110	57,345	519,822	138,725	381,097	2, 050	467,492	32,618	
1770 - 1771	562,359	49,865	452,178	150,322	301,856	82,672	434,393	127,960	
1771 - 1772	558,860	49,926	633,440	341,731	291,709	65,811	407,446	151,414	
1772 - 1773	529,233	52,508	544,185	342,586	201,599	55,031	309,138	220,095	
1773 - 1774	524,762	51,104	677,114	407,848	269,266	86,774	407,144	117,618	
1774 - 1775	503,629	48,729	594,908	302,831	292,077	113,783	454,589	49,040	
1775 - 1776	514,591	47,118	474,559	192,220	282,339	16,410	345,867	168,724	
1776 - 1777	563,349	48,662	521,005	186,739	334,266	150,254	533,182	30,167	
1777 - 1778	283,198	90,368	522,655	209,200	313,455	82,007	485,830	- -	202,632
1778 - 1779	494,208	92,743	835,018	200,488	634,530	76,651	803,924	-	309,716
£. ſt.	5,785,349	697,564	7,144,410	2,831,057	4,313,353	818,571	5,829,488	897,642	941,781

Deduct Revenues more than Charges - - 897,642

Total Charges more than Revenues - £. ſt. 44,139

Auditor's Office,
10th July 1781.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

It is proper to obſerve, for the better underſtanding this Account, and the general State of Receipts and Diſburſements, that your Committee was informed, that in the Account laſt inſerted, the ſums ſtated as defrayed by the Nabob in part of the Military Charges, are the ſums with which he is debited on that head; whereas the ſums entered in the third column of Receipts, in the General State of Receipts and Diſburſements, are the payments actually made by the Nabob.

From a compariſon between the free Revenue, which by the Account laſt inſerted, appears to have remained to the Company, after defraying the Civil and Military Charges, and expence of Buildings and Fortifications, with the expence of the Inveſtment for *Europe*, as entered in the

the laſt column but one of the General State of Receipts and Diſburſements, it is manifeſt that, except in one year (viz. the year 1772-3) during the whole period to which the Account relates, the Surplus Nett Revenues, above the Charges, have never been equal to the purchaſe of the Inveſtment for *Europe*. It further appears, that in the two firſt and two laſt years of the Account, within the former of which the firſt war with *Hyder Ally* happened, and within the latter the expeditions to *Pondicherry* and *Mahé*, thoſe charges and expences exceed the Nett Revenues in no leſs than £. 941,781. It appears upon calculation, that the Average Surplus Revenue for each of the eight years from 1769 to 1777, during which the Company was at peace, is £. 112,205; whereas the average of the Inveſtment, calculated upon the whole period of the General State of Receipts and Diſburſements, is £. 249,554. yearly, or more than double the former ſum; and taking in the four years of war abovementioned, the Revenues under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*; excluſive of their Commercial Receipts, have been ſo far from ſufficient to furniſh an Inveſtment, that in the whole period ſince 1767, they have fallen ſhort of the charges by £. 44,139.

Your Committee obſerving no notice taken in the Account laſt inſerted, of that part of the Military Charges which is defrayed by the Rajah of *Tanjore*, were informed by Mr. *Annis*, the Auditor of Indian Accounts, that the ſaid Account of charges is excluſive of thoſe incurred in *Tanjore*, with the exception of £. 96,100, or pagodas 2,40,250, in the year 1776-7—that this exception was occaſioned by an error in the Accounts ſent home from *Madras*, which ſtated that no expences on account of *Tanjore* were included therein; but that by ſubſequent Accounts received, it was found that the above ſum of £. 96,100 had been included in the Military Charges of that year, which conſequently ought to have been ſtated at £. 424,905, inſtead of £. 521,005, as in the Account.

With the exception of this error, the omiſſion of the Tanjore charges makes no material difference in the reſult, with reſpect to the Company. The addition of thoſe charges would have had the effect of making the total amount of charges appear ſo much higher; but the Company's ſhare of thoſe charges, and the difference between that ſhare and the nett Revenues, would have remained the ſame; with the exception only of the ſum, in which the ſubſidy from the Rajah of *Tanjore* may be ſuppoſed to have exceeded what was actually laid out by the Company, for the Military Eſtabliſhment in his country from the period ſince 1776, when the agreement with him took place.

The error juſt mentioned in the Madras Accounts for the year 1776-7, ſo far makes a difference on the ſtate of the Account, that the Revenue for that year, inſtead of exceeding the charges by £. 30,167, as in the Account, did really exceed the charges by £. 126,267; and the Revenues, inſtead of falling ſhort of the charges by £. 44,139 upon the whole period of the Account, have in fact exceeded them by £. 51,961; a ſum, however, little more than equal to one-fifth of the Inveſtment for one year.

And Your Committee, being deſirous to know in what the Civil and Military Charges conſiſt, ordered the Particulars of theſe Charges to be laid before them: an Account of which, as produced by Mr. *Annis*, they now lay before the Houſe.

COMPARATIVE VIEW of the Civil and Military Charges of *Fort Saint George*, and Subordinates, from 1ſt May 1771 to 30th April 1778.

	1771-2.	1772-3.	1773-4.	1774-5.	1775-6.	1776-7.	1777-8.
CIVIL.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.	Pag'.
Salary	19,438	19,892	20,340	20,861	22,054	12,401	1,01,735
Diet and Allowances	23,017	23,499	23,867	24,428	23,761	23,124	24,269
Peons and Servants Wages	9,224	10,032	10,000	11,315	10,015	9,569	9,352
Mayor's Court Charges	840	1,381	840	1,056	1,263	1,110	840
Court of Requeſts	175	171	171	172	172	172	180
Repairs of Buildings	10,178	8,601	10,884	8,598	6,851	12,279	912
Charges Extraordinary	26,414	10,902	18,522	17,366	19,078	27,181	46,734
Account Preſents	4,938	4,821	1,754	1,896	994	1,506	1,274
Allowances to the Officers of His Majeſty's Squadron	- -	12,000	5,787	5,797	3,687	8,765	8,689
Charges General	30,592	39,979	35,594	30,333	29,920	33,812	31,936
Total Civil, Pag'	124,816	1,31,269	1,27,759	1,21,822	1,17,795	1,30,419	2,25,921
MILITARY.							
Garriſon Charges at Subordinates	69,809	58,025	28,039	21,124	22,215	23,882	33,130
Hoſpital Charges	26,851	32,108	30,112	31,484	33,424	40,052	38,206
Pay to the Troops, &c. Stores expended, and Garriſon Charges at the Preſidency	4,70,805	2,57,619	4,60,799	4,62,347	4,46,620	3,68,310	4,83,755
Military Pay and Allowances, Stores expended, and Repairs of Forts in the Circars	1,61,809	1,56,250	1,54,213	2,15,237	2,03,588	1,54,407	2,28,547
Military Charges to be defrayed by the Nabob	8,54,327	8,56,465	10,19,620	7,57,077	4,80,550	4,66,847	5,23,000
Military Charges to be defrayed by the Rajah of Tanjore	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3,14,396	3,10,537
Total Military Charges	15,83,601	13,60,467	16,92,783	14,87,269	11,86,397	13,67,894	16,17,175

Eaſt India Houſe,
31ſt December 1781.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

YOUR Committee will here ſubjoin the preſent Military Eſtabliſhment under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, with the pay of the ſeveral Corps; by which the expence of that Military Eſtabliſhment will appear at one View.

The

The present MILITARY ESTABLISH-

EUROPEAN.

CORPS, &c.	Commissioned Officers.										Cadets.	Non-commissioned Officers & Private.							Invalids.			Staff.					
	Major General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Cornet.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enfigns.	Total Commissioned Officers.		Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Private Troopers.	D° Soldiers.	Total Non-commissioned and Private.	Commissioned.	Non-commissioned and Private.	Total Invalids.	Adjutants.	Serjeant Majors.	Quarter Masters.	Quarter Master Serjeants.	Drum Majors.	Total Staff.
Cavalry, 1 Troop	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	3	-	2	3	-	-	32	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Artillery, 1 Regiment of 8 Companies	-	1	1	1	9	14	-	16	-	42	-	49	47	31	474	-	-	601	3	134	137	1	-	1	-	-	2
European Infantry, 2 Regiments, each 2 Battalions	1	3	7	4	51	41	-	-	36	143	81	138	-	84	-	-	1,854	2,076	3	694	697	4	11	4	9	7	35
Engineers	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	7	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sepoys, 29 Battalions	-	-	-	-	31	86	-	-	210	327	-	134	-	-	-	-	-	134	-	1	1	31	29	-	28	-	88
Lascars attached to Artillery and other Corps	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Artificers with Artillery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bheasties, Bildars, Leoapecks, and Coolies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
European Militia, Native Artillery, Sibindy Militia	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	300	303	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	4
Total present Strength	1	4	8	6	94	144	1	16	254	-	81	326	50	115	474	32	2,154	-	-	6	829	-	36	44	5	37	7	-
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	185	214	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Eſtabliſhment	1	4	8	6	94	144	1	16	254	-	81	326	50	115	503	32	2,339	-	-	6	829	-	36	44	5	37	7	-
Grand Total of Ditto	528										81	3,365							835			—					

LOSS from the above ſince September.

European	Officers	85	Killed, wounded, and miſſing in Colonel *Baillie*'s engagement with *Hyder Ally*.
	Rank and File	499	
Sepoys, Officers included		3,521	
Total		4,105	

European	Officers	9	Taken priſoners at *Arcot*, and by Articles of Capitulation not to ſerve againſt *Hyder Ally* during the War.
	Rank and File	150	
Sepoys	Remainder of Two Companies		

Arrived from Bengal with the Commander in Chief, on 5th November 1780.

1 Company of Volunteers	43
2 D° of Artillery	200
1 Battalion of European Infantry	370
2 D° Lascars	660
Total	1,273

MENT of the Preſidency of FORT SAINT GEORGE.

NATIVE.

Officers and Sepoys.						Staff.			Laſcars.							CORPS, &c.
Subadars.	Jamaudars.	Drummers.	Puckallys.	Havildars, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Total Officers and Sepoys.	Invalids.	Commandants.	Adjutants.	Pioneers.	Commandant.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Laſcars.	Total Laſcars.	Artificers.	Bheaſties, Bildahs, Leoapecks, and Coolies.	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Cavalry, 1 Troop.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Artillery, 1 Regiment of 8 Companies.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	European Infantry, 2 Regiments, each 2 Battalions.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Engineers.
292	295	354	292	22,067	23,300	850	29	30	210	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Sepoys, 29 Battalions.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	41	127	2,320	2,489	-	-	Laſcars attached to Artillery and other Corps.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	462	-	Artificers with Artillery.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500	Bheaſties, Bildars, Leoapecks, and Coolies.
45	52	21	13	4,199	4,330	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	European Militia, Native Artillery, Sibendy Militia.
337	347	375	305	26,266	-	850	29	30	210	1	41	127	2,320	-	462	1,500	Total preſent Strength.
-	-	-	-	64	64	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Wanting to complete.
337	347	375	305	26,330	-	850	29	30	210	1	41	127	2,320	-	462	1,500	Total Eſtabliſhment.
27,694						850	—			2,489					462	1,500	Grand Total of Ditto.

ABSTRACT.

EUROPEAN.						NATIVE.						
Commiſſioned Officers.	Cadets.	Non-commiſſioned and Privates.	Invalids. Commiſſioned.	Invalids. Non-commiſſioned and Private.	Total European.	Officers and Sepoys.	Invalids.	Laſcars.	Artificers.	Bheaſties.	Total Native.	Grand Total.
528	81	3,365	6	829	4,809	27,694	850	2,489	462	1,500	32,995	37,804

N. B. All the Cadets have been made Officers ſince September.

Pay, Gratuity, Additional Pay, Batta, and other Allowances, of the different Ranks in the ſeveral Corps compo the Army on the Madras Eſtabliſhment.

For a Month of 30 Days.		Pay.	Gratuity.	Additional Pay.	* Batta when on Command, &c.	Horſe Allowance.	Oil and Peon Allowance.
Cavalry.	Captain	55 11 20	11 9 —	- -	48 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Lieutenant	33 27 —	7 18 —	- -	32 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Cornet	30 — —	3 27 —	- -	24 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Serjeant	9 — —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Corporal	7 — —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Private Trooper	5 — —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
Artillery.	Lieut. Colonel	79 24 60	†	- -	150 —	- -	2 1 —
	Major	60 24 30	- -	- -	120 —	- -	2 1 —
	Captain	41 24 —	11 9 —	- -	48 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Lieutenant	20 30 —	7 18 —	- -	32 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Lieut. Fireworker	15 — —	3 27 —	- -	24 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Serjeant	7 18 —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Corporal	6 9 —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Drummer	3 27 —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Bombardier	5 22 40	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Gunner	5 — —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Mattroſs	3 27 —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
European Infantry.	Colonel	93 27 —	- -	- -	180 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Lieut. Colonel	75 — —	- -	- -	150 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Major	56 9 —	- -	- -	120 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Captain	37 18 —	11 9 —	- -	48 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Lieutenant	18 27 —	7 18 —	5 15 —	32 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Enſign	15 — —	3 27 —	4 — —	24 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Serjeant	6 9 —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Corporal	4 13 40	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Drummer	4 13 40	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Private Centinel	3 4 40	- -	- -	2 29 20		
Sepoys.	Captain	37 18 —	11 9 —	- -	48 — —	- -	2 1 —
	Lieutenant	18 27 —	7 18 —	- -	32 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Enſign	15 — —	3 27 —	- -	24 — —	- -	— 15 —
	Serjeant	7 9 —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Commandant	32 — —	- -	- -	5 — —		
	Subadar	17 — —	- -	- -	5 — —		
	Jemautdar	5 — —	- -	- -	2 18 —		
	Havildar	3 — —	- -	- -	1 4 20		
	Naick	2 12 —	- -	- -	1 4 20		
	Drummer	3 — —	- -	- -	2 29 20		
	Puckalley	1 25 16	- -	- -	1 4 20		
	Sepoy	1 25 16	- -	- -	1 4 20		
Engineers.	Lieut. Colonel	75 — —	- -	- -	150 — —	Pag*. 12	2 1 —
	Major	56 9 —	- -	- -	120 — —	6	2 1 —
	Captain	37 18 —	11 9 —	- -	48 — —	6	2 1 —
	Lieutenant	18 27 —	7 18 —	- -	32 — —	6	— 15 —
	Enſign	15 — —	3 27 —	- -	24 — —	- -	— 15 —
Laſcars.	Head Serang or Commandant	10 — —	- -	- -	2 18 —		
	Serang	7 — —	- -	- -	2 18 —		
	Tindal	2 18 —	- -	- -	1 24 —		
	Laſcar	1 30 —	- -	- -	1 4 20		

* Batta is only allowed to the Troops when on March, in the Field, or on particular occaſions, except to Officers commanding.

† N. B. Beſides, the above Field Officers ſhare in the Commiſſion on the Revenues, as follows, viz.

Colonel	Pag*. 2,555 15 40 per Annum.
Lieut. Colonel	1,330 34 26 D°.
Major	665 17 12 D°.

Staff and contingent Allowances to the Commiſſioned, Warrant, and Non-commiſſioned Staff of the ſeveral Corps compoſing the Army on the Madras Eſtabliſhment.

For a Month of 30 Days:		Staff Allowance.	Contingent Allowances.			
			Writers.	Oil and Peon.	Horſes.	Stationary.
		Pag.f. c.			Pag'.	fan'.
Artillery	Adjutant	18 27 —	- -	- -	6	
	Quarter Maſter	15 — —				
	Surgeon	21 7 —				
	Inſpector of Stores	37 18 —				
	Director of Laboratory	20 — —				
	Conductor	15 — —				
	Serjeant Major	4 — —				
	Quarter Maſter Serjeant	4 — —				
	Drum Major	2 — —	-	- -	- -	18
Cavalry	Adjutant	18 27 —	- -	- -	- -	18
	Quarter Maſter	21 20 10				
	Surgeon	15 12 60				
	Serjeant Major	4 — —				
	Quarter Maſter Serjeant	4 — —				
	Rough Rider	6 9 —				
	Farrier	6 — —				
	Camp Colourman	2 30 70				
European Infantry	Adjutant	18 27 —	- -	- -	6	18
	Quarter Maſter	15 — —	- -	- -	- -	18
	Surgeon	21 7 —				
	Serjeant Major	4 — —				
	uarter Maſter Serjeant	4 — —				
Sepoys	rum Major	1 24 —				
	djutant	17 1 —	- -	- -	6	18
	rjeant Major	2 — —				
	uarter Maſter Serjeant	2 — —				
General and Warrant Staff.	Commiſſary General	37 18 —				
	Judge Advocate General	37 18 —				
	Adjutant General	75 — —	Pag'. 40	- -	12	
	Aſſiſtant D°.	18 27 —				
	Town Major	37 18 —	30	2 1		P. 1
	Town Adjutant	18 27 —	5	- -	- -	
	Aide du Camp	37 18 —	- -	- -	6	
	General's Secretary	37 18 —	20			

ESTABLISHMENT of the Troop of Cavalry.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity.	Batta when commanding.	Staff Allowance.	Stationary.	Oil and Peon Allowance.	TOTAL.
			Pag^{a} f. c.						
1	Captain		55 11 20	11 9	48 —		-	2 1	116 21 20
1	Lieutenant		33 27 —	7 18	32 —		-	— 15	73 24 —
1	Cornet		30 — —	3 27	24 —		-	— 15	58 6 —
2	Serjeants	9 —	18 — —	- -	- -		-	- -	18 — —
3	Corporals	7 —	21 — —	- -	- -		-	- -	21 — —
32	Private Troopers	5 —	160 — —	- -	- -		-	- -	160 — —
	STAFF.		318 2 20	22 18	104 —		-	2 31	447 15 20
							fa.		
1	Adjutant		- -	- -	- -	18 27 —	18	- -	19 9 —
1	Quarter Master		- -	- -	- -	21 20 10	18	fan.	22 2 10
1	Surgeon		- -	- -	- -	15 12 60	-	— 15	15 27 60
1	Serjeant Major		- -	- -	- -	4 — —	-	- -	4 — —
1	Quarter Master Serjeant		- -	- -	- -	4 — —	-	- -	4 — —
1	Rough Rider		- -	- -	- -	6 9 —	-	- -	6 9 —
1	Farrier		- -	- -	- -	6 — —	-	- -	6 — —
1	Camp Colourman		- -	- -	- -	2 30 7	-	- -	2 30 70
	Total Staff		- -	- -	- -	78 27 60	1	— 15	80 6.60
	Contractor for Horſes.								
	37 Horſes, at 8. 18. per Day.		314 18 —	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	314 18 —
	Total Expence of the Troop for 1 Month - Pag^{a}		632 20 20	22 18	104 —	78 27 60	1	3 10	842 4 —
	Grand Total, D^{o} — D^{o} for one Year - Pag^{a}		7,590 27 —	270 —	1,248 —	945 9 —	12	39 12	10,105 12 —

ESTABLISHMENT of the Regiment of Artillery.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity.	Staff Allowance.	Batta when commanding.	Horſe Allowance.	Stationary.	Oil and Peon.	TOTAL.
						Pag^{a}.				
1	Colonel by Brevet }	79 24 60	159 13 40	- -	- -	300 —	- -	-	4 2	463 15 40
1	Lieutenant Colonel }									
1	Major	- -	60 24 30	- -	- -	120 —	- -	-	2 1	182 25 30
9	Captains	41 24 —	375 — —	101 9	- -	- -	- -	-	18 9	494 18 —
14	Lieutenants	20 30 —	291 24 —	105 —	- -	- -	- -	-	5 30	402 18 —
16	Lieutenant Fireworkers	15 — —	240 — —	60 —	- -	- -	- -	-	6 24	306 24 —
49	Serjeants	7 18 —	367 18 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	367 18 —
47	Corporals	6 9 —	293 27 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	293 27 —
31	Drummers	3 27 —	116 9 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	116 9 —
57	Bombardiers	5 22 40	320 22 40	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	320 22 40
114	Gunners	5 — —	570 — —	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	570 — —
332	Mattroſſes	3 27 —	1,245 — —	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	- -	1,245 — —
	Staff.		4,039 30 30	266 9		420 —	- -	-	36 30	4,762 33 30
								fa.		
1	Adjutant	- -	- -	- -	18 27	- -	6	18	- -	25 9 —
1	Quarter Maſter	- -	- -	- -	15 —	- -	- -	18	- -	15 18 —
1	Surgeon	- -	- -	- -	21 7	- -	- -	-	- -	21 7 —
1	Inſpector of Stores	- -	- -	- -	37 18	- -	- -	-	- -	37 18 —
1	Director of Laboratory	- -	- -	- -	20 —	- -	- -	-	- -	20 — —
4	Conductors	15 — —	- -	- -	60 —	- -	- -	-	- -	60 — —
1	Serjeant Major	- -	- -	- -	4 —	- -	- -	-	- -	4 — —
1	Quarter Maſter Serjeant	- -	- -	- -	4 —	- -	- -	-	- -	4 — —
2	Drum Majors	2 — —	- -	- -	4 —	- -	- -	-	- -	4 — —
				Total	184 16	- -	6	1	- -	191 16 —
	Total Exp^{ce} of the Regt. for 1 Month - Pag^{a}.		4,039 30 30	266 9	184 16	420 —	6	1	36 30	4,954 13 30
	Grand Total, D^{o} of D^{o} for 1 Year - Pag^{a}.		48,478 4 40	3,195 —	2,213 12	5,040 —	72	12	442 —	59,452 16 40

ESTABLISHMENT of One Regiment of European Infantry.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity.	Staff Allowance.	Batta when commanding.	Horſe Allowance	Stationary.	Oil and Peon.	TOTAL.
1	Colonel	- -	93 27 —	- -	- -	180	-	-	2 1	275 28
4	Lieutenant Colonels	75 — —	300 — —	- -	- -	600	-	-	8 4	908 4
2	Majors	56 9 —	112 18 —	- -	- -	240	-	-	4 2	356 20
25	Captains	37 18 —	937 18 —	281 9	- -	- -	-	-	50 25	1,269 16
21	Lieutenants	18 27 —	393 27 —	157 18	- -	- -	-	-	8 27	560 —
18	Enſigns	15 — —	270 — —	67 18	- -	- -	-	-	7 18	345 —
44	Serjeants	6 9 —	275 — —	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	275 —
44	Corporals	4 13 40	192 18 —	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	192 18
42	Drummers	4 13 40	183 27 —	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	183 27
1,000	Private Centinels	3 4 40	3,125 — —	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	3,125 —
	Staff.		5,883 27 —	506 9	- -	1,020	-	-	81 5	7,491 5
2	Adjutants	18 27 —	- -	- -	37 18	- -	12	1	- -	50 18
2	Quarter Maſters	15 — —	- -	- -	30 —	- -	-	1	- -	31 —
3	Surgeons	21 7 —	- -	- -	63 21	- -	-	-	- -	63 21
2	Serjeant Majors	4 — —	- -	- -	8 —	- -	-	-	- -	8 —
2	Quarter Maſter Serjeants	4 — —	- -	- -	8 —	- -	-	-	- -	8 —
4	Drum Majors	1 24 —	- -	- -	6 24	- -	-	-	- -	6 24
				Total	153 27	- -	12	2	- -	167 27
	Total Expce of 1 Regt. for 1 M°. - Pags.		5,883 27 —	506 9	153 27	1,020	12	2	81 5	7,658 32
	D° D° of 2 D°, for D° - Pags		11,767 18 —	1,012 18	307 18	2,040	24	4	162 10	15,317 28
	Grand Total D° of 2 Regts. for one year, Pags		1,41,210 —	12,150 —	3,690 —	24,480	288	48	1,947 12	1,83,813 12

ESTABLISHMENT of One Battalion of Sepoys.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity.	Additional Allowance.	Staff Allowance.	Horſe Allowance.	Stationary.	Oil and Peon.	TOTAL.
1	Captain	- -	37 18	11 9	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 1	50 28
3	Lieutenants	18 27 —	56 9	22 18	16 9	- -	- -	- -	1 9	96 9
7	Enſigns	15 — —	105 —	26 9	28 —	- -	- -	- -	2 33	162 6
5	Serjeants	7 9 —	36 9	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	36 9
1	Commandant	- -	32 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	32 —
10	Subadars	17 — —	170 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	170 —
10	Jemautdars	5 — —	50 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	50 —
50	Havildars	3 — —	150 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	150 —
50	Naicks	2 12 —	116 24	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	116 24
13	Drummers	3 — —	39 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	39 —
10	Puckallys	1 25 16	17 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	17 —
650	Sepoys	1 25 16	1,105 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1,105 —
	Staff.		1,914 24	60 —	44 9	- -	- -	- -	6 7	2,025 4
								fa.		
1	Adjutant	- -	- -	- -	- -	17 1	6	18	- -	23 19
1	Serjeant Major	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 —	- -	- -	- -	2 —
1	Quarter Maſter Serjeant	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 —	- -	- -	- -	2 —
7	Pioneers	2 — —	- -	- -	- -	14 —	- -	- -	- -	14 —
					Total	35 1	6	18	- -	41 19
	Total Expce of 1 Battn for 1 M° - Pags		1,914 24	60 —	44 9	35 1	6	18	6 7	2,066 23
	D° 29 D° for D° - Pags		55,525 12	1,740 —	1,283 9	1,015 29	174	14 18	179 23	59,932 19
	Grand Total D° of 29 D° for 1 Yr - Pags		6,66,304 —	20,880 —	15,399 —	12,189 24	2,088	174 —	2,155 24	7,19,190 12

ESTABLISHMENT of the Corps of Engineers.

Strength		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity.	Horſe Allow-ance.	Oil and Peon.	TOTAL.
1	Lieutenant Colonel	- -	75 — —	-	12 —	2 1	89 1 —
1	Major	- -	56 9 —	- -	6 —	2 1	64 10 —
2	Captains	37 18 —	75 — —	22 18 —	12 —	4 2	113 20 —
1	Lieutenant	- -	18 27 —	7 18 —	6 —	— 15	32 24 —
7	Enſigns	15 — —	105 — —	26 9 —	42 —	2 33	176 6 —
Total of the Corps of Engineers for one Month			330 — —	56 9 —	78 —	11 16	475 25 —
Ditto of D° for one Year - - -		Pag'	3,960 — —	675 — —	936 —	137 12	5,708 12 —

ESTABLISHMENT of Laſcars attached to Artillery and other Corps.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	TOTAL.
1	Commandant - - - - - -	10 — —	10 — —
41	Serangs - - - - - - -	7 — —	287 — —
127	Tindals - - - - - - -	2 18 —	347 18 —
2,320	Laſcars - - - - - - -	2 — —	4,640 — —
	Total Eſtabliſhment of Laſcars for one Month -		5,254 18 —
	Ditto of D° - for one Year - -	Pag'	63,054 — —

EXPENCE of INVALIDS.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity	Oil and Peon Allowance.	TOTAL.
1	Captain - - - - - -	- -	37 18 —	- -	- -	37 18 —
2	Lieutenants - - - - - -	18 27 —	37 18 —	- -	- -	37 18 —
33	Serjeants - - - - - -	7 — —	231 — —	- -	- -	231 — —
12	Corporals - - - - - -	6 — —	72 — —	- -	- -	72 — —
6	Bombardiers - - - - - -	5 9 —	31 18 —	- -	- -	31 18 —
35	Gunners - - - - - -	4 27 —	166 9 —	- -	- -	166 9 —
47	Mattroſſes - - - - - -	3 18 —	164 18 —	- -	- -	164 18 —
	Total Artillery -	Pagodas	740 9 —	- -	- -	740 9 —
	European Infantry.					
1	Captain - - - - - -	- -	37 18 —	11 9	2 1	50 28 —
1	Lieutenant - - - - - -	- -	18 27 —	7 27	— 15	26 33 —
1	Enſign - - - - - -	- -	15 — —	3 27	— 15	19 6 —
1	Adjutant - - - - - -	- -	18 27 —	7 27	— 15	26 33 —
99	Serjeants - - - - - -	6 — —	594 — —	- -	- -	594 — —
12	Drummers - - - - - -	4 — —	48 — —	- -	- -	48 — —
583	Rank and File - - - - -	3 — —	1,749 — —	- -	- -	1,749 — —
	Total European Infantry -	Pag'	2,481 — —	30 18	3 10	2,514 28 —
	Sepoys.					
6	Commandants - - - - -	32 — —	192 — —	- -	- -	192 — —
1	Serjeant Major - - - - -	- -	10 — —	- -	- -	10 — —
1	Serjeant - - - - - -	- -	7 9 —	- -	- -	7 9 —
2	Drummers - - - - - -	3 — —	6 — —	- -	- -	6 — —
27	Subadars - - - - - -	17 — —	459 — —	- -	- -	459 — —
40	Zemaultdars - - - - -	5 — —	200 — —	- -	- -	200 — —
50	Havildars - - - - - -	3 — —	150 — —	- -	- -	150 — —
50	Naicks - - - - - - -	2 12 —	116 24 —	- -	- -	116 24 —
675	Sepoys - - - - - -	1 25 16	1,147 18 —	- -	- -	1,147 18 —
	Total Sepoys - - - -	Pagodas	2,288 15 —	- -	- -	2,288 15 —
	Total Expence of Invalids for 1 Month -	Pag'	5,509 24 —	30 18	3 10	5,543 16 —
	Grand Total D° D° for 1 Year -	Pag'	66,116 — —	360 —	39 12	66,521 12 —

ESTABLISHMENT of Artificers.

Number

462 Artificers—not being particularized in the Returns, the Expence cannot be aſcertained.

ESTABLISHMENT of Bheaſties, Bildahs, Leoapecks, and Coolies.

Number

1,500 Bheaſties, &c.—not being particularized in the Returns, the Expence cannot be aſcertained.

ESTABLISHMENT of Sibindy Militia.

Strength.		Pay of each per Month of 30 Days.	Pay.	Gratuity.	Additional Allowance.	Oil and Peon Allowance.	TOTAL.
						Fan.	
1	Lieutenant	— —	18 27 —	7 18	5 15	15	32 3 —
1	Enſign	— —	15 — —	3 27	4 —	15	23 6 —
4	Serjeant Majors	4 — —	40 — —	— —	— —	— —	40 — —
3	Serjeants	7 9 —	21 7 —	— —	— —	— —	21 7 —
45	Subadars	17 — —	765 — —	— —	— —	— —	765 — —
52	Jemautdars	5 — —	260 — —	— —	— —	— —	260 — —
21	Drummers	3 — —	63 — —	— —	— —	— —	63 — —
13	Puckallys	1 25 16	22 3 48	— —	— —	— —	22 3 48
126	Havildars	3 — —	378 — —	— —	— —	— —	378 — —
126	Naigues	2 12 —	294 — —	— —	— —	— —	294 — —
3,948	Sepoys	1 25 16	6,711 21 48	— —	— —	— —	6,711 21 48
	Total Eſtabliſhment of Militia for 1 Month		8,588 23 16	11 9	9 15	30	8,610 5 16
	Grand Total D° D° for 1 Year, - Pag°		1,03,063 26 32	135 —	113 —	10	1,03,321 26 32

N. B. The Havildars, Naigues, and Sepoys, not being ſpecified in the Return, the Proportion is eſtimated in the above Account.

ESTABLISHMENT of General and Warrant Staff.

Strength.		Staff Allowance per Month of 30 Days.	Contingent Allowances.				TOTAL.
			Writers.	Horſe.	Stationary.	Oil and Peon.	
		Pag°.					
1	Commiſſary General	37 18 —	— —	— —	— —	— —	37 18 —
1	Judge Advocate	37 18 —	— —	— —	— —	— —	37 18 —
1	Adjutant General	75 — —	40	12	— —	— —	127 — —
1	Aſſiſtant ditto	18 27 —	— —	— —	— —	— —	18 27 —
1	Town Major	37 18 —	30	— —	— —	2 1	69 9 —
1	Town Adjutant	18 27 —	5	— —	1	— —	24 27 —
1	Aid du Camp	37 18 —	— —	6	— —	— —	43 18 —
1	General Secretary	37 18 —	20	— —	— —	— —	57 18 —
	Total Eſtabliſhment of General and Warrant Staff for 1 Month -	300 — —	95	18	1	2 1	416 1 —
	Grand Total D° D° for 1 Year -	3,600 — —	1,140	216	12	24 12	4,992 12 —

GENERAL ABSTRACT of the Pay of the Army, agreeable to the foregoing Eſtabliſhments of the ſeveral Corps.

	Pay.	Gratuity	Additional Allowance	Staff Allowance.	Batta when commanding.	Contingent Allowances. Writers.	Horſe.	Stationary.	Oil and Peon.	Sum Total for a Month of 30 Days.	Grand Sum Total for a Year.
Troop of Cavalry	632 20 20	22 18	- -	78 27 60	104	-	-	1 —	3 10	842 4 —	10,105 12 —
Regiment of Artillery	4,039 30 30	266 9	- -	184 16 —	420	-	6	1 —	36 30	4,954 13 30	59,452 16 40
2 Regiments of European Infantry	11,767 18 —	1,012 18	- -	307 18 —	2,040	-	24	4 —	162 10	15,317 28 —	1,83,813 12 —
29 Battalions of Sepoys	55,525 12 —	1,740 —	1,283 9	1,015 29 —	- -	-	174	14 18	179 23	59 932 19 —	7,19,190 12 —
Corps of Engineers	330 — —	56 9	- -	- -	- -	-	78	- -	11 16	475 25 —	5,708 12 —
Laſcars attached to the ſeveral Corps	5,254 18 —	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	- -	5,254 18 —	63,054 — —
Invalids	5,509 24 —	30 18	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	3 10	5,543 16 —	66,521 12 —
Sibendi Militia	8,588 23 16	11 9	9 15	- - -	- -	-	-	- -	— 30	8,610 5 16	1,03,321 26 32
General and Warrant Staff	- -	- -	- -	300 — —	- -	95	18	1 —	2 1	416 1 —	4,992 12 —
Grand Totals - Pagodas	91.648 1 66	3.139 9	1,292 24	1,886 18 60	2,564	95	300	21 18	399 22	1,01,346 21 46	12,16,159 6 72
£. ſts.	36,660 — —	1,256 —	517 —	755 — —	1,025	38	120	8 —	160 —	40,539 — —	

Major General, Commander in Chief - - - - - - - - 5,000 — —

Pagodas - 12,21,159 6 72

£. ſts. 488,464 — —

Eaſt India Houſe,
2d June 1781.

(Errors excepted)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Your Committee having ſtated ſuch particulars, reſpecting the Receipt and Expenditure of the Revenues under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as the materials they had acceſs to have enabled them, called for an Account of the debts due by the *Eaſt India* Company at that Preſidency for each year, ſince the year 1771, to the lateſt period to which it could be made up. This Account, as delivered in by Mr. *John Annis*, Auditor of Indian Accounts, they now lay before the Houſe.

AMOUNT of Debts due by the *Eaſt India* Company at *Madras*, at the following Periods:

1771-2.	Pag^{a}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,36,220
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court	8,697
Prize Mignione	2,245
Depoſit of the Captors of Manilha	1,37,044
Sundry Debts	1,915
Sundry Eſtates	3,081
Pagodas	2,89,202

1772-3.	Pag^{a}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,89,342
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Depoſit of the Captors of Manilha	1,37,044
Sundry Debts	1,557
Sundry Eſtates	3,081
Pagodas	3,37,078

1773-4.	Pag^{a}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,88,116
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Depoſit of the Captors of Manilha	—
Sundry Debts	1,498
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	1,96,059

1774-5.	Pag^{a}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,73,692
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	1,495
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	1,81,632

1775-6.	Pag^{s}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,31,012
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	1,476
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	1,38,933

1776-7.	Pag^{s}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,29,995
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	6,093
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	1,42,533

31ſt January 1778.	Pag^{s}.
Debt at Intereſt	1,36,362
Accountant General of Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	6,093
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	1,48,900

28th February 1779.	Pag^{s}.
Debt at Intereſt	2,81,716
Accountant General of Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	6,093
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	2,94,254

29th February 1780.	Pag^{s}.
Debt at Intereſt	4,06,878
Accountant General of Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	2,572
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	4,15,895

30th November 1780.	Pag^{s}.
Debt at Intereſt	6,29,302
Accountant General of Mayor's Court	3,809
Prize Mignione	2,245
Sundry Debts	—
Sundry Eſtates	391
Pagodas	6,35,747

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe,
21ſt January 1782.

Your Committee might here conclude what they have to ſay reſpecting the Revenues of the Company under the Preſidency of *Madras*; but, conſidering how large a part of the reſources of the Company under this Preſidency depends upon the payments from the Nabob of *Arcot* and the Rajah of *Tanjore*, they think it not foreign to the object of this Report, to lay before the Houſe ſuch information as they have been able to obtain, reſpecting the Revenues of theſe two Princes.

In a Letter from the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George* to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, dated the 7th of December 1774, the territories of the Nabob, including *Tanjore*, then in his poſſeſſion, are eſtimated at upwards of two crores of rupees. Fort Saint George Mil. Cons. 8th Dec. 1774, Fol. 8305.

Mr. *William Petrie*, who has reſided for above fifteen years in *India*, and was for ſome time Secretary to the Political Department of the Government of *Madras*, having been deſired to give ſuch information as he could, reſpecting the Revenues of the Nabob of *Arcot*, informed your Committee, that while he was in the ſtation abovementioned, the amount of the Nabob's collections was a ſubject which came frequently under the conſideration of the Board—that an exact Account was often wiſhed for, but, he believed, never obtained—that he had ſeen various eſtimates, ſome at 36 lacks of pagodas annual Revenue, others at 32, and ſome lower—that he underſtood, as he thought from good authority, that, under proper management, the country would produce conſiderably above 30 lacks; but that he had it from good information, that, for ſome time paſt, not 20 lacks a year had been carried to the credit of the Nabob's Exchequer.

And your Committee find, in the Select Conſultations of *Fort Saint George*, of the 30th of November 1778, a Minute of Sir *Thomas Rumbold's*, then Governor; in which, after mentioning that the Governor General and Council of *Bengal* had written very preſſingly for an Account of the Revenues of the *Carnatic*, he proceeds to lay before the Board, the beſt Account of theſe Revenues, which, he ſays, he had been able to obtain. He adds, that the Governor General and Council did not ſeem to be aware, that an exact Account of the Revenues of the *Carnatic* was not very eaſily obtained; for that the Nabob was very jealous of their interference, and would not furniſh them with a rent-roll of his Receipts; but that, however, he believed the Account he then delivered in, might be depended on. The Account then delivered in by Sir *Thomas Rumbold* is as follows: Fort Saint George Select Conſ. 30th Nov. 1778, Fol. 6751.

Annual Rent and Revenue of the Nabob of the *Carnatic*.

	Pagodas.	
Arcot	12,00,000	
Nellore	3,50,000	
Pulnadoo	70,000	
Vingote	1,00,000	
Serva Pully	50,000	
Bengar Yeſma	25,000	
Bomaraſe	40,000	
Damel Vanketa	10,000	
Veloor Jageer	1,00,000	
Trichinopoly	4,00,000	
Madura	85,000	
Tinnavelly	6,00,000	
Ramnadaporam	2,00,000	
Sevagunga	1,00,000	
Mel Naut Keeſtmah	25,000	
Voaderjan Palum Ancayalore	1,20,000	
Trivengore	50,000	
Arney	60,000	
Sautgaddy	40,000	
Teaga Durgum	17,000	
Culva Fort	10,000	
Palam Cotah	8,000	
		36,60,000
Deducting Sebundy	4,00,000	
And loſs on collections, or uſual allowance	2,60,000	
		6,60,000
Suppoſing the *Carnatic* to be properly managed, in point of the rent and revenue, it will yield every year, about	Pagodas	30,00,000

In the year 1776, the nett collection, about	Pagodas	26,00,000
In the year 1777 - D° -	D° -	22,00,000

Of the eſtabliſhment and expences of the Nabob, your Committee has not been able to obtain any accurate information. They obſerve that Mr. *Sadlier*, in his Minute of the 29th of July 1780, quoted above, ſays, that the Nabob's expences are by no means adequate to his Revenues—that his country had remained in peace ever ſince the year 1769, and yet that his Revenues had been daily diminiſhing.

It is certain that the Nabob is very much in debt to individuals, independent of the demands of the Company. The amount of his debts to individuals cannot he exactly aſcertained; beſides that, from the nature of the thing, they muſt be variable. The Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, in their Letter upon this ſubject to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, of date February 25th, 1779, ſay, "It is conjectured "that the Nabob's whole debt, which has been accu- "mulating ever ſince his firſt connection with the Company, amounts at this time to fifty lacks of pagodas." They add, "He has indeed acquired in his hands, by "degrees, a very conſiderable ſhare of the property "belonging to individuals in the Settlement, Europeans "and Natives; and from the plan he has invariably "purſued, of borrowing as much, and paying as little as "he can, his debt continues to ſwell daily, and threatens, "by its enormity, to become a perpetual incumbrance "on the *Carnatic*."

Letter from the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George to the Governor General and Council, 25th Feb. 1779.

Your Committee find, in the Records of the Company, much correſpondence between the Preſidency of *Madras* and the Nabob, upon the ſubject of his debts and arrangements with his creditors; which ſhews, in a very ſtrong light, to how great a degree he is diſtreſſed. This ſituation of the Nabob's finances is repreſented by the Preſident and Council to the Directors, as very alarming. In their Letter of the 19th of September 1777, they ſay, "The Nabob's affairs at preſent appear "much embarraſſed by the debts he has contracted, and "the large aſſignments granted upon the *Carnatic*, as a "ſecurity for thoſe debts. Whatever cauſes may have "produced this embarraſſment, it can admit of no "doubt, that whilſt the Revenues of his Country, upon "which we principally rely for ſupport, are abſorbed by "private creditors, the Company's affairs muſt be en- "dangered, even in time of peace; but in caſe of a war, "we need not ſay what muſt be the conſequence of the "Nabob's inability to apply any part of his Revenues to "the ſupport of the heavy charges that would thereby "be incurred."

Letter from the Preſident and Council of Fort Saint George, in their Military Department, to the Court of Directors, dated 19th Sept. 1777, Par. 16th.

The growing amount of the debts contracted by the Nabob, great part of which was due to Servants of the Company, together with the danger to be apprehended with reſpect to the payments to the Company, from aſſignments of lands to private creditors, appear to have been the motives for the ſtrict orders given by the Directors, "That no Company's Servant, nor any perſon "under the Company's protection, ſhould be permitted "to lend money to any of the Country Powers in *India*, "nor to any perſon holding commiſſion under, or em- "ployed by them, directly or indirectly, to be repaid "at a future time, on mortgages, or ſecurities in the "nature of mortgages, upon lands, or from the produce, "or any growing Revenue of the Country. And for "more effectually preventing ſuch loans, they direct "that all the Country Powers, with whom ſuch tran- "ſactions were likely to take place, ſhould be informed "of this regulation, and requeſted not to permit any "dealings of the nature above-mentioned, with the "Company's Servants, or with perſons under the Com- "pany's protection."

Letter from the Court of Directors, dated 11th June 1777, Par. 18.

The large arrears frequently due to the Nabob's troops, have been taken notice of in a former Report.

See 1ſt Report, page 37, 38.

Your Committee find, that the irregular payment of the troops, and their conſequent mutinous diſpoſition, joined to the very diſordered ſtate of the Nabob's finances, induced the Preſidency frequently to urge the Nabob to a reduction of his expences, and particularly to the meaſure of diſbanding part of his troops. To this meaſure the Nabob had been generally very averſe. It does however appear, that in the year 1777, under Mr. *Stratton*'s Government, the Nabob agreed to diſband nine thouſand of his Sepoys, and to reduce his cavalry from four thouſand to two thouſand one hundred, provided the Company would aſſiſt him with a loan of four lacks of pagodas, to enable him to pay their arrears. The Government of *Madras* informed the Nabob, that they could not comply with his propoſal for a loan of the ſum wanted; but being ſenſible of the advantages that would ariſe to his affairs from ſuch a reduction of his expence, they recommended to him to borrow the money from individuals; promiſing, on the part of the Company, to become ſureties to the lenders for its repayment.

Fort Saint George Military Conſ. 17th and 18th April 1777.

Accordingly, it does appear, that the four lacks of pagodas were advanced to the Nabob by Meſſrs. *Call*, *Majendie*, and *Taylor*, three of the Company's Servants; and the Preſident and Council gave the Company's ſecurity for the debt.

This tranſaction your Committee find to have been very much diſapproved of by Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, when he came to take poſſeſſion of the Government. In his Minute upon that ſubject, of date the 23d of February 1778, he ſays, "He could not help expreſſing his "aſtoniſhment at the late Adminiſtration venturing to "lend the Company's ſecurity to Meſſrs. *Call*, *Majendie*, "and *Taylor*, three of the Company's Servants, for ſo "conſiderable a ſum as four lacks of pagodas; at a time "too, when the Gentlemen then in Government obſerve, "that they are apprehenſive they ſhall be diſtreſſed even "for ſufficient to defray their own current charges, and "ſupply the ſums abſolutely wanting for the inveſtment." He adds, "When they had gone ſuch a length, as they "ſay, to accompliſh ſo deſirable an end as the reduction "of his Highneſs's forces, unneceſſarily kept up, would "it not have been proper they ſhould have ſeen the "money wholly applied to that purpoſe? but, on the "contrary, we find nothing on the Records, but vague, "uncertain declarations, that his Highneſs has made a "conſiderable progreſs in the reduction of his troops; "and this large ſum becomes a further burthen upon the "Revenues and Reſources of the *Carnatic*." Upon the Preſident's Motion, therefore, it was reſolved, "That "the ſecurity given by the late Adminiſtration to Meſſrs. "*Call*, *Majendie*, and *Taylor*, for the ſum of four lacks "of pagodas, do not receive the ſanction of the Govern- "ment, but wait to be determined by the Company's "own authority."

Fort Saint George Military Conſ. 23d Feb. 1778.

Fort Saint George Mil. Conſ. 4th Mar. 1778.

And your Committee find, that the Court of Directors, in their Letter to *Fort Saint George*, of the 17th of April 1778, expreſsly diſavow the tranſaction, as being a direct breach of their orders, and entered into without any authority from them.

Letter from the Court of Directors, 17th April 1778, Par. 7th.

The irregularity in the payment of the Nabob's troops gave riſe to a tranſaction ſomewhat ſimilar, and about the ſame period, which alſo affords an example of the diſtreſſed ſtate of the Nabob's finances. The Nabob's ſecond regiment of cavalry, quartered at *Mellore*, exaſperated at their pay being eighteen months in arrear, had, in the month of November 1776, gone off in a body, with their arms and accoutrements. Lieutenant-Colonel *James*, then commanding at *Trichinopoly*, alarmed at this event, and with a report that two other regiments were ready to purſue the ſame meaſures, did, by the advice of the Nabob's Manager, immediately ſend after them, inviting them to return; and promiſing, upon their ſo doing, to pay them inſtantly five thouſand pagodas, and to be anſwerable for one thouſand every month, until their affairs ſhould be ſettled by the Nabob. He ſent, at the ſame time, to each of the other two regi-

ments,

ments, 1,500 pagodas, in order to pacify them; promiſing to do all he could to aſſiſt them in their diſtreſs. The attempt of Lieutenant-Colonel *James*, to bring back the regiment of cavalry, failed; but, upon the matter being reported to the Preſident and Council, they "ordered their Secretary to acquaint him, that his conduct in ſending and promiſing money to the mutinous cavalry of the Nabob, merited their entire approbation."

Fort Saint George Mil. Department, 25th Nov. 1776.

The means uſed to keep the other two regiments quiet, appear to have been effectual for a very ſhort time; for in the month of April 1777, your Committee find that a general mutiny broke out in one of them, commanded by Captain *Dugald Campbell*, in which Captain *Campbell* himſelf and ſeveral of the Officers were wounded, and all of them put into cloſe confinement; and their lives threatened, in caſe of any attempt being made to relieve them. In this extremity, it appears that Lieutenant-Colonel *James* did, upon his own credit, advance them ten thouſand pagodas, which had the effect to pacify them for the time; in which his conduct was approved of by Colonel *Stuart*, then Acting Commander at *Tanjore*; and, upon his report, by the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*.

Fort Saint George Mil. Conſ. 7th April 1777.

Beſides theſe ſums, it appears that money had been advanced at other times by Lieutenant-Colonel *James*; for the pay of the Nabob's troops; which advances, he ſets forth, in a repreſentation to the Preſident and Council, on the 11th of April 1778, to have been made in dependance upon the promiſes of *Ameer Ul Omrah*, the Nabob's ſon, for his repayment.

It appears, however, that during the courſe of three years and an half, Colonel *James* had applied in vain to the Nabob, for payment of this debt, then amounting, as by an Account given in by him to the Preſident and Council, to upwards of forty thouſand pagodas. He frequently repreſented, during the ſame time, the hardſhip of his caſe to the Preſident and Council; the Preſident and Council as often urged the Nabob to diſcharge the debt, who excuſed himſelf on account of the difficulties and diſtreſſes in which he was involved.

Fort Saint George Mil. Conſ. 20th April 1778.

But your Committee find, that in the month of November 1780, upon the Nabob's refuſing to repay the money in a ſhort time, the Company's bond was given by the Preſident and Council to Colonel *James*, for pagodas 40,742. 25 f. 60 c. the ſums to which the debt then amounted.

Fort Saint George Sel. Conſ. 20th Nov. 1780.

In the above caſes, in which the ſecurity of the Company was interpoſed for the Nabob, the reaſons given by the Preſident and Council appear upon the face of the tranſactions themſelves. But your Committee find another and a more recent inſtance, ſo late as the 26th of June 1780, in which the Preſident and Council appear to have paid a debt of the Nabob's, amounting to pagodas 25,880½, for no other reaſon that appears upon the face of the tranſaction, than that the creditor was deſirous to have his money, and the Nabob wiſhed the Company to advance it. The debt here alluded to was due to Colonel *James Capper*, and conſiſted, as the Nabob himſelf explained it, principally of diſburſements which Colonel *Capper* had made in *England*, upon his Highneſs's account, when he laſt went home with diſpatches from the Preſidency. The Nabob adds, that the Colonel ſoon after his return to *India* had ſettled accounts with him, taking his bond as an acquittance of his demand. That the bond would not fall due till the month of December following, but that the Colonel had preſent occaſion for the money, to enable him to make good a ſum he owed to Sir *Robert Barker* in *England*, and which Sir *Robert* had ordered his Attornies in *India* to depoſit in the Company's treaſury, until good opportunities of remitting could be procured; and that the Nabob had promiſed to Colonel *Capper* to requeſt of the Government to paſs the Company's receipt to him for the amount of his Highneſs's bond, meaning that the ſame ſhould be included in the kiſts which were then ſettling

Appendix, No. 20.

to be paid by his Highneſs to the Company in the courſe of the year ending the 30th of April 1781.

This propoſition being ſtated by the Preſident, appears to have been immediately agreed to by the Council. —A bond for the money was ordered to be granted to Colonel *Capper*, with a recommendation to the Preſident, to make ſuch a ſettlement with the Nabob, as that the Company ſhould ſuſtain no loſs or riſk by the tranſaction.

It is remarkable that this tranſaction, by which the Company was ſubjected to an advance for the Nabob, was upon the 26th day of June 1780, juſt twenty-ſeven days before *Hyder Ally*'s irruption into the *Carnatic*.

When the Country was actually invaded, your Committee find the Nabob was even then unable to bring his troops into the field for want of money to pay their arrears. On the 2d of Auguſt 1780, he writes to the Preſident, repreſenting his inability to diſcharge the pay due to his cavalry; that the collections of the Revenues ſet apart for their pay were at a ſtand from the depredations of the enemy; that he had been endeavouring to treat with individuals for a loan, but could not procure the money unleſs the Company would give their ſecurity to the lenders.—Upon this application, the Council was of opinion, that it was better to ſupply the Nabob with what he wanted, than to give ſecurity to individuals for what they might chuſe to advance; and accordingly at a ſubſequent Conſultation, the Nabob having agreed to aſſign certain diſtricts of country for repayment of the money, it was reſolved that the arrears of pay due to the reſpective regiments of cavalry ſhould be diſcharged in the manner propoſed by the Nabob, viz. two-thirds, amounting to pagodas 91,750, in notes or bonds payable in a limited time, and the remainder, amounting to pagodas 45,875, in ready money.

Fort Saint George Sel. Conſ. 2d Aug. 1780.

Sel. Conſ. 30th Oct. 1780.

Your Committee find repeated complaints of the Nabob's irregularity in fulfilling his engagements to the Company. A very ſtrong picture of that irregularity, and of the inconvenience as well as the danger thence ariſing to the Company's poſſeſſions, is drawn in the Governor's Minute of the 20th July 1778, inſerted in the Appendix to the Second Report.

Appendix to 2d Report, No. 143.

Similar complaints occur in many other paſſages of the Proceedings of the Preſidency.

In their Letter to the Governor General and Council, of the 25th of February 1779, in reply to what the Governor General and Council had ſaid, that it depended upon their own firmneſs to obtain from the Nabob the regular diſcharge of his debts to the Company, they write, that they are not conſcious of wanting firmneſs in their tranſactions with the Nabob; but as their firmneſs could only conſiſt in words, and words were too weak a weapon to force money from him, they aſk, how they were to act in caſe he ſhould deceive them? They then ſtate a recent failure in the Nabob's engagement to reduce his debt by certain inſtalments, and conclude in this manner, "the difficulties we experience in reſpect to "the Nabob, may be comprized in a few words. We "ſuſtain a conſiderable monthly expence on his account. "We have nothing to truſt to for reimburſement but "monthly promiſes, which may or may not be performed. If they be performed, we are able to make the "neceſſary advances for the enſuing month. If they "be not performed, we inſtantly find ourſelves involved "in the greateſt diſtreſs. In ſuch alarming ſituations, "what courſe can we take to procure relief?"

Letter from Fort St. George to the Governor General and Council, 25th Feb. 1779.

Your Committee will here inſert a State of the Nabob's debt to the Company, for his Military Charges at various periods, excluſive of the arrears of rent due for the lands he poſſeſſes.

Nabob of *Arcot*'s Debt at ſeveral Periods.

30th April	1771	-	-	Pag^{s}	2,26,604	22	7
	1772	-	-	-	4,44,251	16	6
	1773	-	-	-	4,52,314	8	54
	1774	-	-	-	8,02,689	34	57

30th April

30th April	1775	-	-	-	7,25,433	5 70
	1776	-	-	-	5,94,879	20 9
	1777	-	-	-	7,71,332	9 48
	1778	-	-	-	6,62,559	33 22
28th Feb.	1779	-	-	-	7,70,174	2 34
30th Sept.	1779	-	-	-	7,12,383	30 49
15th March	1780	-	-	-	5,92,447	34 21
31st Dec.	1780	-	-	-	8,83,396	11 32

The last sum includes pag^{a}. 1,21,599. 6. 30. due from the Nabob, for a loan to him for the payment of his cavalry.

The above sums are what was due from the Nabob at the respective periods, for the charges of his garrisons, and sundry stores, &c. supplied him, exclusive of what he remained indebted to the Company, for the rent of lands leased to him.

Errors excepted.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

East India House,
9th Jan. 1782.

With respect to *Tanjore*, your Committee find, in the Select Consultations of *Fort Saint George*, of the 21st of November 1778, a particular Account of the Revenues of that Country for a series of years, delivered in to the Board by Mr. *William Petrie*, who resided in *Tanjore* for a considerable time, first, as Resident at the Rajah's Court, and afterwards as Chief of *Nagore* and *Karical*. This Account, Mr. *Petrie* informs the Board, he had received from an old man, who had been a writer under the Dobeer and Manager in the time of *Pretap Sing*, father to the present Rajah of *Tanjore*.

Mr. *Petrie* at the same time delivered in to the Board, an Account of the *Tanjore* Revenues, extracted from the Circar books.

Appendix, No. 21. The extract of the Consultation upon this subject, with the two Accounts themselves, are inserted in the Appendix.

Supposing the first of these Accounts to be accurate, it affords a striking proof of the decline of the Revenues of *Tanjore*, which are stated as having amounted from the year 1675, during the 36 years of the reign of one of the Princes of that Country, to no less than 32,050,000 collums of paddy (a mode of computation which will be explained in the Appendix) and to have fallen in the reigns of the succeeding Princes to twenty-four, to twenty, to fifteen, and during the two years immediately preceding 1778, so low as thirteen millions of the same measure of grain.

Mr. *Petrie* having lately returned to *Great Britain*, was examined by your Committee respecting the present state of the country of *Tanjore*. Such part of his evidence as relates to the Revenues of that Country, is inserted in the Appendix.—He represents *Tanjore* as having been not many years ago one of the most flourishing, best cultivated, and most populous countries in *Hindostan*; that in 1768, when he first saw it, it exhibited a very different picture from what it does at present. After giving a general account of its trade, and description of its fertility, he adds, "Such was *Tanjore*, not many years ago; "but its decline has been so rapid, that in many districts, "it would now be difficult to trace the remains of its "former opulence."

Appendix, No. 22.

For this rapid decline, Mr. *Petrie* assigns various causes;—the Revenues having fallen short of the former collections even before the capture of *Tanjore*, he imputes to the rapacity of the ministers who governed the Country, and plundered their master while they oppressed the inhabitants, mortgaging districts for present supplies, and settling jaghires upon themselves, many of which have not yet reverted to the Circar. But that as those evils were not of long duration, their effects were only partially felt; and that even at that period, as he was informed, manufactures flourished, the Country was populous, and well cultivated, the inhabitants were wealthy and industrious. That from the year 1771, the æra of the first siege, till the restoration of the Rajah, the Country having been the seat of war, and having undergone two revolutions of Government, trade, manufactures, and agriculture, were neglected; and many thousands of inhabitants went in quest of a more secure abode. He mentions at the same time, as a remarkable circumstance, that during the year 1774, while *Tanjore* was governed by the Nabob, all the Accounts which he had seen make the Revenue to amount to one-third more than the year preceding the conquest, and to more than double the sum which appeared in the Circar books for the year he resided at *Tanjore*;—he accounts for a circumstance so extraordinary at first sight, by the high price of grain in the year 1774, when the scarcity was so great as almost to amount to a famine; by the Tuncan duties being raised; and by many of the old jaghires, or grants from the Circar, being resumed by the Nabob.

That since the restoration of the Rajah in 1776, many causes had contributed to lessen the Revenues, and to impoverish the Country—first, the ignorance and rapacity of his principal managers;—secondly, the failure of many of the principal farmers, and the unusual cheapness of grain;—and thirdly, the general opinion which had prevailed, that the Rajah's Government would not be of long duration; and that another revolution was approaching.—"Hence every species of embezzlement "and peculation; his ministers extorting money from "the Zemindars; they oppressing the people, who were "often obliged to dispose of their cattle, and the very "implements of husbandry, to satisfy the calls of their "unrelenting landlords."

Mr. *Petrie* mentions the great scarcity of specie in *Tanjore* as an evil which had been long felt, and which, when he left *India*, had got to an alarming height.—That ever since the Rajah's restoration, he had been oppressed with a heavy load of debt—his expenditure had been enormous—that many of the farmers who owed him large balances had absconded—that he had no money but what was levied from his people, or raised by destructive loans, at an exorbitant and ruinous interest.

With regard to the payments due by the Rajah to the Company, complaints of his irregularity in making those payments have been above inserted—at the same time, your Committee has not found evidence in any of the Accounts hitherto transmitted home, or produced to them, of his having been actually much in arrear during the short time for which his agreement with the Company, for his subsidy of four lacks, has subsisted—they find that Governor *Rumbold*, in a Letter to the Rajah, dated August the 6th 1779, charges him with being very backward in his payments; and writes, that one lack was due for the June preceding—the Rajah in his answer, dated the 3d of September 1779, vindicates himself from the charge; and by a Statement of Accounts, shews that he had paid in full for the three years for which his agreement with the Company had subsisted, and that he was even 56,000 pagodas in advance.

Letter from Governor Rumbold to the Rajah of Tanjore, 6th August 1779.

Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore to Gov. Rumbold, 3d Sept. 1779.

Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort Saint George, 18th Oct. 1780.

The Directors, in their Letter to the President and Council, dated 18th October 1780, pronounce in favour of the Rajah, and write to him a Letter of the same date, in which they say, "They observe with satisfaction, "that the arrears of money due by his Excellency, on "account of his annual subsidy, were reduced to a very "inconsiderable sum."

Letter to the Rajah of Tanjore, 18th Oct. 1780.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX, No. 1.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor to the Nabob; dated 26th July 1780.

I HAVE the honour to receive your Highneſs's ſeveral Letters on the ſubject of *Hyder Ally*; whoſe motions within theſe few days, have unveiled the deſign he ſeems to have entertained for ſome time paſt againſt the *Carnatic*.

Whilſt there was any poſſibility of his intentions being fruſtrated, or directed to another object, I choſe not to put the Company or your Highneſs to the expence of great military preparations, becauſe I am very ſenſible, after the exertion we have lately made againſt the French, that ſuch expence could not be provided for without much difficulty, and without neglecting other objects of great importance; but now, when hoſtilities are actually commenced on the part of *Hyder*, it becomes expedient, at all events, to attend to the ſafety of the country; and I truſt your Highneſs will exert yourſelf to the utmoſt on this occaſion, to promote the ſucceſs of our operations.

As I have given orders for aſſembling troops in the field, I earneſtly entreat your Highneſs to inform me what ſupplies of money you can depend upon furniſhing, and at what period, that I may take the neceſſary ſteps accordingly. I beg your Highneſs will alſo take the moſt effectual meaſures for collecting bullocks and proviſions for the uſe of the army. Give me leave to add, that however deſirous I may be to defend the Company's and your Highneſs's forts and poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*, it will in a great meaſure depend upon the ample ſupplies of money your Highneſs can furniſh me with at this critical juncture: it will likewiſe determine me in what manner I ſhall write to the Supreme Council of *Bengal*; and how far I ſhall feel myſelf authorized, with conſiſtency, to engage them in the preſent expected troubles, ſo as not only to co-operate with this Government in what may tend to the intereſt of the Company, but alſo anſwer your Highneſs's purpoſes fully, with reſpect to chaſtiſing *Hyder Ally*, and the protection of the ſubject, and the future ſafety of the *Carnatic*.

APPENDIX, No. 2.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor to the Rajah of *Tanjore*; dated 29th July 1780.

YOU have doubtleſs been already informed by report, of the ſudden march of *Hyder Ally*'s troops into the *Carnatic*. We cannot account for this invaſion otherwiſe than by ſuppoſing that *Hyder* has entered into ſome engagements with the French, to diſturb the peace of the country. However this may be, the Company and their Allies are called upon to act with the utmoſt vigour in repelling this attack. I truſt you will ſhew yourſelf particularly zealous in a cauſe, in which the welfare of your Government, as well as that of the Company and the Nabob, are ſo much intereſted. A large ſupply of money is abſolutely neceſſary to carry on the military operations; and to this object I ſhall be thankful if you will contribute amply, and ſoon. The Nabob's country has always ſuffered conſiderably by the incurſions of *Hyder*'s horſe: your's being as yet uninvaded, I flatter myſelf you will find leſs difficulty in furniſhing money to the Company. I requeſt alſo that you will encourage, as much as poſſible, the exportation of grain to *Madras*. The duties in that article are taken off at this port, a circumſtance which will, no doubt, when known to the people of your country, induce them to ſend large ſupplies. May your happineſs daily increaſe. What can I ſay more?

APPENDIX Nos. 1. 2. 3. 4.

APPENDIX, No. 3.

Extract of a Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*; dated the 26th July 1780.

OUR laſt Letter (of which we encloſe a duplicate) gave you information of the approach of *Hyder Ally*, with a large army, towards our frontiers. We now tranſmit two papers of intelligence juſt received from the Nabob, by which you will learn that he has actually detached part of his cavalry into the *Carnatic*, and is preparing to follow with his whole army. Extract Fort Saint George Select Conſ. 26 July 1780.

We are taking meaſures for aſſembling our troops in a proper ſituation to oppoſe this attack, and defend the country in the beſt manner we are able; but the alarm already occaſioned by the report of an invaſion, and the ravages which have been actually committed by *Hyder*'s horſe, have driven the people from their habitations, and put an entire ſtop to the tillage of the ground.

Under theſe circumſtances it will be impoſſible for us to draw reſources from the country, in any degree equal to the expences which this war muſt inevitably produce; and if we do not obtain a ſpeedy ſupply of money from you, we ſee no probability of our being able to act with vigour and effect proportionate to the exigency of our ſituation.

Extract of Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*; dated 14th September 1780.

But beſides troops, our occaſions for money are very preſſing. We have no means whatever to anſwer the extraordinary expences of this war; and it will be totally impoſſible for us to carry it on, unleſs we can be ſure of receiving ſupplies of money from you. We earneſtly requeſt your immediate attention to this object; and that you will do us the favour to inform us to what extent we can be aſſiſted. It would be a great relief to us if a ſum of money could be ſent immediately after the receipt of theſe diſpatches. Extract Fort Saint George Select Conſ. 14 Sept. 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 4.

Extract of Letter from the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated 15th October 1780.

WE have been put to the greateſt diſtreſs for the want of money to carry on the war, owing to a total failure in our uſual reſources. The *Carnatic* waſte, by the incurſions of the enemy. The Nabob pleads this in excuſe for not diſcharging any of his engagements.

The Rajah of *Tanjore*, whoſe country hath not been diſturbed in any ſhape, has yet given us no aſſiſtance; nor

APPENDIX. Nos. 5. 6.

nor have we yet obtained any ſupply of money from *Bengal*, though the Governor General and Council have expreſſed an intention to aſſiſt us.

Under theſe circumſtances we had no alternative for ſupplying the various exigencies of the ſervice, but that of borrowing from individuals, and taking up money for drafts upon *England*. The reſolutions we came to on this ſubject, will be communicated to you from the Civil Department.

Extract of the General Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated the 15th of October 1780.

On a review of the ſtate of your treaſury, when *Hyder Ally* invaded the *Carnatic* in July laſt, we judged it abſolutely neceſſary to iſſue advertiſements for receiving loans from the inhabitants of this Settlement, for which Company's bonds were to be granted, payable in eight months after date, bearing an intereſt of eight per cent. per annum.

But the ſupply raiſed by this means proving very inadequate to the heavy expences of Government, and having no hope of any immediate relief that could be deemed effectual, either from the Northern Subordinacies, from the Nabob, or from *Bengal*; in this exigency, after much deliberation, however averſe we are in any inſtance to act contrary to your orders, we found ourſelves under the unavoidable neceſſity, as the laſt reſource, to draw bills on your Honours to an amount not exceeding £. 200,000.

APPENDIX, No. 5.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council, at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors; dated the 13th of October 1780.

WITH reſpect to the treaſure which we have ſent to them, as it is a handſome, ſo we truſt it will be a ſeaſonable ſupply. We have not ſpared the ſum of fifteen lacks of rupees, the amount of the ſupply, without great inconvenience to ourſelves. The demands on us at home are large and preſſing; but on a general conſideration of the Company's intereſts, we have not heſitated, and ſhall not heſitate, to uſe every exertion within our power and ability, both in this and every other inſtance, to contribute our utmoſt to ſupport them. The treaſure which has been diſpatched we have conſigned to the Commander in Chief; and we have nominated a Paymaſter for the immediate charge of it. It is intended for the payment of the troops under Sir *Eyre Coote*'s command, and is wholly to anſwer military expences: but we have impowered him alſo to make uſe of it in ſupplying the requiſitions of the Preſident and Select Committee, if he ſhall agree in the expediency of doing ſo.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, to the Court of Directors; dated 25th November 1780.

We cannot obtain any money from the Nabob, or the Rajah of *Tanjore*. The Nabob is indeed, we believe, very much diſtreſſed, by a total failure in the Revenues of that part of the *Carnatic* which has been ſubject to the incurſions of *Hyder*'s horſe; but the Rajah of *Tanjore* has not yet had a grain of his country touched. Thus, from our paſt diſappointments and preſent proſpects, we can place but little dependance on any other reſource than that of *Bengal*, for carrying on the war; and as to the expences of the Civil Department, we have very ſlender hope of procuring ſufficient to anſwer them from any quarter.

APPENDIX, No. 6.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations; dated the 14th January 1779.

Par. 105. THE arrival of Sir *Eyre Coote* at this Preſidency, on his way to *Bengal*, at ſo critical a juncture, I eſteem on many accounts a fortunate circumſtance. He will be able to form a judgment from his own obſervation of your real ſituation, with reſpect to reſources, and the conduct both of the Nabob and the Rajah of *Tanjore*; and I moſt earneſtly recommend to him, to take a view of our proceedings both before and ſince the capture of *Pondicherry*, that he may be fully acquainted with the difficulties we have had, and ſtill have, to ſtruggle with; that when he takes his ſeat at the Council General at *Bengal*, he may, from his own knowledge, inforce the repreſentation we have found it neceſſary to make, that we may be ſupported and aſſiſted in the advice and opinion of that Board, in any means we may be obliged to adopt for the public good, and the preſervation of the *Carnatic*. I have been ſo full in the ſeveral Minutes I have given in to the Committee, that I have only to refer Sir *Eyre Coote* to them, for a true repreſentation of our difficulties. The meaſures we have been obliged to adopt, of drawing bills on the Company, though not to a great amount, was unavoidable. It was againſt my wiſh and inclination, truly ſenſible that the Company are very deſirous we ſhould avoid giving any drafts on them; and indeed they have a right to expect that their reſources here ſhould more than anſwer the expences of the eſtabliſhment; but every trial was made in vain to procure money from the Nabob, from the Rajah of *Tanjore*, and even from individuals, on granting them intereſt notes payable to a certain time. The diſtreſs for ſpecie was ſo great, that we had no alternative; we were obliged, by the proſpect of an advantageous remittance, to induce thoſe who had caſh by them to ſupply our immediate wants, as the Account delivered in to the Committee will ſhew. There was an abſolute neceſſity that the troops ſhould not be kept in arrears; and notwithſtanding the money borrowed, we have now an empty treaſury. It is true, the Nabob has promiſed us a conſiderable ſum this month, and to be more regular in his payments in future; but we have no other ſecurity than his word. Should he fail us, as he has ſeldom been very punctual in engagements, I apprehend the moſt ſerious conſequences. We have repreſented to *Bengal* our ſituation. We have acquainted them in a former Letter, that if we did not receive a ſupply, we ſhould be under the neceſſity of drawing upon *Europe*. The Council General, however, were unable to ſupply us, I will not ſay unwillingly, being convinced the co-operation with the different Preſidencies, for the mutual ſupport of the Company's poſſeſſion, is the firſt and moſt material object of their political conduct. Under all theſe circumſtances, I have no doubt but we ſhall ſtand juſtified to the Company for our conduct; but at the ſame time it is abſolutely neceſſary to act with ſpirit and vigour, to obtain money from thoſe channels from whence it ought to flow; and, by a determined plan of œconomy, and reduction of all expences, to endeavour to ſupply our treaſury, that we may never again be under the neceſſity of giving drafts on the Company. To accompliſh this point, I have no doubt of meeting with the concurrence and ſteady ſupport of the Committee: and I propoſe, that an Auditor of Accounts may be immediately appointed; that he proceed to examine the Accounts, both Civil and Military, for the laſt ſix months; or, if it ſhould be thought too great a taſk for one perſon, that two perſons be appointed, the one to audit the Civil, the other the Military Accounts; and that all unneceſſary charges may be ſtruck off; and that they make a Report to the Committee or Council, every fortnight, of the progreſs they have made; and that their allowance and emolument depend in a great meaſure on the reduction made by them in the monthly expences.

It would appear extraordinary, at the commencement of a war, to propoſe a reduction of our military force; it would at this juncture undoubtedly be highly improper and dangerous. But I do not heſitate to give it as my opinion, that our eſtabliſhment is too great for our reſources; and either a fixed or certain Revenue from the *Carnatic*, or Tanjore country, muſt be allotted for the payment of our troops, or a conſiderable reduction muſt take place at a more favourable period. The Nabob ſhould be in advance, not in arrear, for the payment of what depends on him; but on the contrary, the debt is accumulating; and the Company ſtrongly recommended to us, in their Letter of the laſt ſeaſon, to call upon him for payment, and not to ſuffer the payment of individuals to interfere with their demands. We know not what ſtep our enemies are taking, what force they have at the *Mauritius*; but we have every reaſon to believe that they are not inactive, and that they will attempt ſome ſtroke to recover the ground they have loſt. We have no immediate proſpect of ſupport, and therefore muſt find reſources amongſt ourſelves, and muſt purſue ſuch a conduct as to provide againſt all difficulties and contingencies.

APPENDIX, No. 7.

Extract of *Fort Saint George* Select Conſultations; dated the 4th February 1779.

THE Preſident lays before the Committee the following Minute, with intelligence juſt received from the Nabob.

I am concerned to lay before the Committee, a Letter from the Nabob, containing advices from his Vackeel at *Poonah*, of a very ſerious nature; and though we may ſuppoſe the account of the unfortunate ſituation of the Bombay army is greatly exaggerated, and that when we hear from *Bombay*, we ſhall be informed of ſome favourable circumſtance with which we are not yet acquainted; ſtill, from the circumſtantial Account received, we have no reaſon to doubt but the event of the expedition for conducting *Ragonaut Row* to *Poonah*, has been unfortunate and diſgraceful, both to our Arms and Councils; and our preſent ſituation, with reſpect to the different powers of *Hindoſtan*, renders it abſolutely neceſſary that we ſhould immediately take into conſideration our own ſtate and reſources, as well for the defence of the *Carnatic*, as to afford aſſiſtance to any other parts where the Company have poſſeſſions or alliances, that may ſtand in need of our ſupport.

The firſt conſideration is, the ſtate of our treaſury. I have already, on many occaſions, repreſented to the Committee, the difficulties we have to ſtruggle with, and that the utmoſt we can expect, is to ſupply our exigencies on a peace eſtabliſhment, and provide our inveſtments; which being an object of conſequence to the Company, ought not to be neglected. Our ſituation has been repreſented to the Governor General and Council; but I am of opinion, we may ſtill, in a more particular manner, addreſs them again on the ſubject, and requeſt, that they will not only afford us aſſiſtance from the Bengal treaſury, that we may be ſupplied with a fund to enable our army to take the field, ſhould circumſtances make it neceſſary; but that they will give us their opinion on thoſe points we have already ſubmitted to their conſiderations, and upon ſuch others as we may now propoſe to them. Firſt, I would recommend, that we fully ſtate to them the ſituation of the Tanjore country, and the meaſures we have taken in conſequence, in order to ſecure the regular payment of the Rajah's ſubſidy, and the Nabob's peſcuſh; which, if punctually remitted to our treaſury, will not only greatly aſſiſt in keeping up our preſent eſtabliſhment, but will contribute, with other means, to ſecure in time ſuch a ſupply, as will enable us to act with vigour as occaſion may require. The Tanjore Revenues ought to be taken care of. Neceſſity obliges us to watch over them with attention; and ſhould the preſent negotiation entruſted to General *Munro* fail of producing the deſired effect, I am perſuaded it is our duty to take ſuch meaſures that no miſmanagement, or any cauſe whatever, may deprive us of that ſupport which is abſolutely neceſſary to contribute to the protection of the *Carnatic*, *Tanjore*, and our Northern Settlements: for, where is the force for the defence of thoſe ſeveral countries, but what is kept up, diſciplined, and paid by the Company?

Secondly: It will be neceſſary that we take the opinion of the Governor General and Council, how we are to act in caſe of failure in the Nabob's engagements. I hope we ſhall never be drove to take any meaſures inconſiſtent with his rights, or diſagreeable to his feelings; but without we ſtate with preciſion our difficulties, we may find ourſelves embarraſſed, and at a loſs to act in particular points when our diſtreſſes preſs with force upon us. It is true, we have lately received a very conſiderable ſum from the Nabob; but the Account delivered in by me to the Committee, dated the 30th of November laſt, will ſhew, that he was, at the end of January, greatly in arrears of the amount which, by his own voluntary agreement, he engaged to pay to that period; and the debt is monthly increaſing. Our expences are certain, and muſt be provided for: our burthens at preſent are great; for, excluſive of our ſtanding army, upwards of twenty ſeven thouſand men, we have the heavy expence of completing our fortifications, which muſt not, on any account be neglected; and we have the maintenance of the French priſoners, military and civil, with the number of articles to be provided for, which the capitulation of *Pondicherry* obliges us to fulfil. All attention and ſupport is certainly due to the Nabob, as our old and faithful Ally, connected with us by every tie, and demanding from us every indulgence: for, if we take a view from the Southern boundary of *Hindoſtan* to the Northern extremity, where the Engliſh forces have proved victorious, where ſhall we find one native Prince who has not ſeverely felt the effects of our power, and that is not now lamenting the rapid ſucceſs of our arms, and the credulity that ever induced him to truſt to our engagements? *Mahomed Ally* can alone boaſt, that we have not entirely violated every principle on which he has depended, and who, with his family, it is to be wiſhed, may long remain inſtances of our national faith; but at the ſame time I expreſs theſe ſentiments towards the Nabob, it is neceſſary that we inſiſt on a punctuality in fulfilling his engagements, or that the Committee are furniſhed with ſome line to guide their conduct, when they find him fail in his engagements. To various cauſes may be imputed his reluctance to part with money, and ſeveral circumſtances may have contributed to give him diſguſt. We have no right or grounds to ſuppoſe his reluctance proceeds from diſaffection. We are to conſider his load of debt, the increaſed expences of the eſtabliſhment; the decreaſe, from various cauſes, and perhaps from ſome miſmanagement of his Revenue; the diſappointments he has been ſubject to in this matter, where he conceived himſelf to be juſtly entitled to deciſions in his favour; and, laſtly, to the impoſitions of individuals, and the attendant paſſion ſo common to men of advanced ſtages in life, of hoarding up for future unforeſeen contingencies; all theſe may have operated to increaſe the difficulties of obtaining from him the neceſſary ſupplies of caſh: that ſuch difficulties have frequently exiſted, no one acquainted with this Government can doubt: but the reflection alone, of our depending on precarious circumſtances for certain and unavoidable expences, on which our very ſafety depends, render it abſolutely neceſſary to have the advice of the Governor General to aſſiſt our reſolutions, if ever we ſhould be obliged to go beyond the line that we wiſh to be preſerved.

Extract

APPENDIX, Nos. 8 & 9.

Extract of Sir *Eyre Coote*'s Minute.

I agree entirely with the Governor's firſt propoſition, in regard to the neceſſity there is for repreſenting to the Supreme Council the ſtate of our treaſury, and the ſituation of the Tanjore country, as well as to require their ſentiments upon the meaſures which the Board here ought to adopt, in caſe the Nabob's engagements ſhould not be ſo punctually fulfilled as the neceſſity of our affairs may demand. And I imagine thoſe repreſentations cannot fail to have the deſired effect, in inducing them to give ſuch ſpeedy and proper aſſiſtance as may enable the Governor and Council here, to purſue the diſintereſted and ſpirited plan which they have hitherto ſupported alone, ſo much to the national benefit, and to their own honour.

APPENDIX, No. 8.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; dated 7th December 1774.

1774. Fort Saint George Mil. Cons. 8 Dec. fol. 833.

OUR expences on the Coaſt, in time of peace, are generally about 14 lacks of pagodas; and the inveſtment for *Europe* requires 6 lacks, which makes the diſburſements on the Coaſt amount to 20 lacks of pagodas. The annual amount of the Revenues, upon a mean calculation, may be eſtimated at upwards of 16 lacks; and the ſums paid by the Nabob, in certain kiſts, in the courſe of the year, for the pay of the troops kept by the Company on his account, and the expences of the garriſons defrayed by them, at about 4 lacks; making in all 20 lacks of pagodas: but of theſe receipts, near 8 lacks are to be paid by the Nabob; for, excluſive of the money advanced on his account, eſtimated as above at 4 lacks, he has, by the Company's orders, the Inaum Lands at rent for pagodas 3,68,350 per annum; which is likewiſe received in certain kiſts, payable in the courſe of the year. But even this reſource, from the Nabob's own declarations, muſt become precarious in time of war.

APPENDIX, No. 9.

Grant of the Jaghire to the Company.

BE it known to the Deeſmookees, Deeſpondees, principal inhabitants and huſbandmen of the *Tripaſore*, &c. Pergunnahs, belonging to the *Carnatic Payen Gaut*, and dependant upon the Subah of *Mahomed Poor*, alias *Arcot*; that I have appointed and made over to the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company (who have taken great pains and labour in my affairs, are my true friends, and will ever remain firm and ſteady in alliance with, and in ſupporting, myſelf and ſons) the aforeſaid Pergunnahs, &c. as hereunder expreſſed, by way of jaghire; the Revenues of which, as entered in the Mogul's book, amount to four lacks four hundred and ninety-four pagodas four annas and a quarter (4,00,494. 4¼), and chucrams ſix thouſand and thirty-three (6,033): you the ſaid Deeſmookees, &c. muſt therefore take care to live in due obedience to the ſaid Company, and to pay them the proper Revenues, at the fixed and ſtated times, as, according to their Report, whether in your praiſe or diſpraiſe, will be our favour or diſpleaſure upon you. Look upon this as an order, and comply accordingly.

Computed Revenues as put down in the Mogul's Book.

	Pagodas.	Annas.	Chucrams.	No. of Diſtricts.	No. of Villages.
Madras, cuſtoms included	1,200	—	—	1	1
St. Thomés Diſtrict, cuſtoms included	6,346	15	—	1	7
Poonamalee Diſtrict, cuſtoms included	34,840	—½	—	1	231
Trevenda Poor, &c.	—	—	26,250	1	28

N. B. The Revenues of theſe four within the circumflex, amounting to pagodas 42,386. 15½. chucrams 26,250, are mentioned not to be included in the ſum of pagodas 4,00,494 4¼, and chucrams 6,033 ſpecified in the Sunnud, theſe being in a prior grant.

Computed Revenues as put down in the Mogul's Books.

	Pagodas.	Annas.	Chucrams.	Ann.	No. of Mehurs or Diſtricts.	No. of Villages
Tripaſore entire, cuſtoms included	37,177	4	—		1	211
The villages of Cotumbauc, &c. belonging to the Seven Magans entire	17,450	½	—		1	99
Poneer Diſtrict entire, cuſtoms included	20,351	—	—		1	150
Chiccutcota Diſtrict entire, cuſtoms included	4,050	—	—		1	3
Peddapollam Diſtricts entire, cuſtoms included	12,414	12	—		1	80
Perrumbauc Diſtrict entire	6,207	9	—		1	32
Munemungulum Diſtrict entire, cuſtoms included	19,000	—	—		1	81
Ootremaloor Diſtrict, cuſtoms included	20,985	13	—		1	62
Saliwauc Diſtrict entire, cuſtoms included	19,229	11	—		1	71
Seeva, or Great Conjeveram, ditto	19,414	6	—		1	99
Biſhun, or Little Conjeveram, ditto	25,195	12	—		1	133
Cavantandelum Diſtrict entire	18,585	2½	—		1	74
Chingleput Diſtrict entire, cuſtoms included	100,446	10	—		1	363½
Siaudet Bunder, alias Covelong Diſtrict entire, cuſtoms included	17,512	9½	—		1	54
Carangoly ditto, all on this ſide the river Mercawn, entire, cuſtoms included	62,257	7½	—		1	387½
Chinnamanaik Pollum Village, belonging to the Trivedy Pergunnah, entire	—	—	1,072	8	1	1
Nuddeput Village, belonging to the Venkatompente Pergúnnah, entire	—	—	927	8	1	1
Curremundel, &c. villages, belonging to the Pullicat, entire	216	2	—		1	4

Chittamoor

APPENDIX, No 10.

	Pagodas.	Annas.	Chuckrams.	Ann^{s}.	N^{o}. of Mehurs or Diſtricts.	N^{o}. of Villages.
Chittamoor, &c. villages, belonging to the Tundewullum Pergunnah, all that ariſe on that ſide the river Mercawn, entire -	-	-	744	8	1	12
Huſoor, &c. villages, belonging to the Pergunnah of the ſame name, all that are on this ſide the river Mercawn, entire, cuſtoms included - - - - -	-	-	3,288	8	1	15
Total amount of the preſent Grants, and thoſe of the 16th of October 1763 - -	4,00,494	4½	6,033	—	20	1,934
Ditto of the old Grants mentioned in the Firſt Part - - - - - -	42,386	15½	26,250	—	4	267
Grand Total, Pagodas -	4,42,881	3¾	32,283	—	24	2,201

Subdiviſion thereof.

	Pag.	Ann.	Chuc.	Dif.	Vill.
By the preſent Grants now - - -	34,430	4¾	4,033	—	175
By thoſe of the 16th of October 1763 -	3,66,064	0	2,000	20	1759
By the old Grants - - - - - -	42,386	15½	26,250	4	267
Pagodas - -	4,42,881	3¾	32,283	24	2,201

Dated the 21ſt of the moon Rabbi ul Sauni, in the year of Hegira 1177, equivalent to the 29th of October 1763.

Forms on the back of the Sunnud.

The Seriſhtadar's Letter to the Nabob, informing him of the Sunnud's having been made out for the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, the 16th of October 1763, to the amount of pagodas 3,66,064, and chucrams 2,000, out of the ſeveral Countries from which that ſum aroſe; there were many villages, to the value of pagodas 34,430. 4¾, and chucrams 4,033 (as entered in the Mogul's books) excepted; he requeſts therefore the Nabob's orders, whether a new Sunnud for the whole (which he particulariſes in the ſame manner as it is in the Sunnud) ſhould be made out or not? To which the Nabob is ſaid to anſwer, in his own hand-writing: "In conſideration of the true friendſhip of the Engliſh "*Eaſt India* Company, and their remaining always in "alliance with me, let a Sunnud for the whole jaghire, "without any exception, be made out."

Regiſtered in the Dewan's office, the 21ſt of the moon Rabbi ul Sauni, in the year of Hegira, 1177, equal to the 29th of October 1763.

N. B This is twice mentioned.

Regiſtered in the Nabob's own office the ſame day.

Firmaun from the Mogul, being a confirmation of the Nabob's Grants to the Company in the *Carnatic*.

In theſe happy times, our Firmaun, full of ſplendor, and worthy of obedience in all, is deſcended, purporting, that whatever formerly has been given by preceding Moguls, or lately by *Serajah Dowlah Mahomed Ally Khan*, from the Circar of the *Carnatic*, in the parts above *Madras*, &c. to the high, mighty, &c. &c. Engliſh Company: we, in conſideration of their great pains and ſervices, have, from our throne, the baſis of the world, conferred upon, or confirmed to them, by way of Inaum or free gift, without allowing any perſon whatever any part or ſhare therein. You, therefore, our Sons, Omrahs, Vizirs, Governors, Muttaſſeddees, for the affairs of the Dewanſhip; Mootecophils for thoſe of our kingdom, Jaghiredars and Karorees, both now and hereafter, for ever and ever, exert yourſelves in the ſtrengthening and carrying into execution this our moſt high command, and cede and give up to the abovementioned Engliſh Company, their heirs and deſcendants, for ever and ever, the aforeſaid Circar; and eſteeming them likewiſe as entirely exempt, free, and ſafe from all diſplacing or removal, by no means whatever moleſt or trouble them, either on account of the demands of the Dewan's office, or thoſe of our Imperial Court.

Looking upon this high Firmaun as an abſolute and poſitive order, obey it implicitly.

Dated the 24th of the moon Sophar, in the ſixth year of our reign, equal to the 12th of Auguſt 1765.

APPENDIX, No. 10.

A Copy of Requeſts made by Colonel *Forde* to Nabob *Salabut Jung*, and his compliance thereto, in his own hand.

THE whole of the Circar of *Maſulipatam*, with eight diſtricts, as well as the Circar of *Nizampatam*, and the diſtricts of *Condavir* and *Wacalmanner*, ſhall be given to the Engliſh Company as an Inaum or free gift, and the Sunnuds granted to them in the ſame manner as was done to the French.

The Nabob *Sabalat Jung* will oblige the French troops which are in his Country, to paſs the river *Ganges* within fifteen days, or ſend them to *Pondicherry*, or to any other place out of the Decan Country, on the other ſide of the river *Kiſtna*; in future he will not ſuffer them to have a ſettlement in this Country, on any account whatſoever, nor keep them in his ſervice, nor aſſiſt them, nor call them to his aſſiſtance.

The Nabob will not demand or call *Gauzeputty Rauze* to an account for what he has collected out of the Circars belonging to the French, nor for the computation of his Revenues of his own Country in the preſent year, but let him remain peaceable in it in future, and according to the computation of the Revenues of his Country, before the time of the French, agreeable to the cuſtom of his grandfather and father; and as was then paid to the Circar, ſo he will now act and pay accordingly to the Circar; and if he, the Rajah, does not agree to it, then the Nabob may do what he pleaſes. In all caſes the Nabob will not aſſiſt the enemies of the Engliſh, nor give them protection.

The Engliſh Company, on their part, will not aſſiſt the Nabob's enemies, nor give them protection.

Dated moon Ramadan, the 16th Hegira 1172, which is the 14th of May 1759.

* I ſwear

APPENDIX, No. 19.

* I ſwear by God and his Prophet, and upon the holy Alcoran, that I with pleaſure agree to the requeſts ſpecified in this Paper, and ſhall not deviate from it, even an hair's breadth.

Firmaun from the Mogul for the Northern Circars.

In theſe happy times, our Firmaun, full of ſplendor, and worthy of obedience, is deſcended, purporting, that whereas *Salabat Jung Behauder*, Subahdar of the *Decan*, conferred the Circar of *Siccacole*, &c. on the French Company; and that, in conſequence of its not being confirmed by us, either by Firmaun or otherwiſe, the high, mighty, glorious Chiefs of the Khans, choſen of the Omrahs Sepoy Sardars, truly faithful, worthy of receiving favours and obligations, our invariable and never-failing friends and well-wiſhers, the Engliſh Company (having ſent a large force for that purpoſe) did expel the French therefrom; we therefore, in conſideration of the fidelity and good wiſhes of the above high, mighty, &c. &c. Engliſh Company, have, from our throne, the baſis of the world, given them the aforementioned Circars, by way of Inaum or free gift, without the leaſt participation of any perſon whatever in the ſame, from the beginning of the Fuſſul of Tuccaucooul, in the year of Phaſely 1172, equal to the month of April 1762: it is incumbent therefore on you our ſons, Omrahs, Vizirs, Governors, Muttaſſeddees for the affairs of our Dewanſhip, Mootecophils for thoſe of our Kingdom, Jaghiredars and Karorees, both now and hereafter, for ever and ever, to uſe your endeavours in the ſtrengthening and carrying into execution this our moſt high command, and to cede and give up to the abovementioned Engliſh Company, their heirs and deſcendants, for ever and ever, the aforeſaid Circars; and eſteeming them likewiſe free, exempt, and ſafe from all diſplacing or removal, by no means whatever either moleſt or trouble them, on account of the demands of the Dewan's office, or thoſe of our Imperial Court.

Looking upon this high Firmaun as an abſolute and poſitive order, obey it implicitly.

Dated the 24th of the Moon Sophar, in the ſixth year of our reign, equal to the 12th of Auguſt 1765.

Forms made uſe of on the back of the Firmaun.

From the Secretary, ſetting forth, that his Majeſty had been pleaſed to ſign a petition (ſuppoſed to be from the Company) of the ſame date as the Firmaun, directing, that whereas *Salabut Jung Behauder*, Subahder of the *Decan*, conferred the Circar of *Siccacole*, &c. on the French Company; and that in conſequence of its not being confirmed by his Majeſty, either by Firmaun or otherwiſe, the high, mighty, &c. &c. Engliſh Company, (having ſent a large force for that purpoſe) did expel the ſaid French therefrom; his Majeſty therefore, in conſideration of the fidelity of the aforeſaid Engliſh Company, has given them (without the participation of any perſon whatever in the ſame) the abovementioned Circars, by way of Inaum or free gift.

Then follow two orders from the Mogul; the firſt ſuppoſed to be in his own hand, addreſſed to his ſon, *Mirza Mahomed Akbur Shah Behauder*, telling him to comply with the contents of this Firmaun; the other directing, that the Engliſh Company be under his ſon's command, or in his Reſſaula.

The whole atteſted under *Kazi Inauyet Khan*'s ſeal, to be a true copy from the original.

A TREATY of perpetual Honour, Favour, Alliance, and Attachment,

Between the Great Nabob, high in ſtation, famous as the Sun, *Nabob Auſuph Jaw*, *Nizam-ul-Mulck*; *Nizam-ud-Dowla*, *Meer Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Behauder Phuttah Jung*, Sepoy Sardar, and the Honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company.

Signed, ſealed, and ratified, on the one part, by his Highneſs the ſaid Nabob, and on the other, by *John Caillaud*, eſquire, Brigadier General, inveſted with full powers on behalf of the ſaid Company.

Done at *Hydrabad*, the ninth of the Moon Gemace-duſſuny, in the year of Hegyra 1180, equal to the 12th of November 1766.

Article 1.—The two contracting parties do, by virtue of this Treaty of honour, favour, alliance, and friendſhip, ſolemnly engage a mutual aſſiſtance, to eſteem the enemies of one the enemies of both, and contrarywiſe, the friends of one the friends of the other.

Article 2.—The honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, in return for the gracious favours received from his Highneſs, conſiſting of Saneds for the five Circars of *Ellour*, *Siccacole*, *Rajahmundry*, *Muſtephanagur*, and *Murtezanagur*, expreſſing the free gift thereof, on them and their heirs for ever and ever, do promiſe and engage to have a body of troops ready to ſettle the affairs of his Highneſs's Government, in every thing that is right and proper, whenever required, provided that they be at liberty to withdraw the whole, or ſuch part thereof as they ſhall judge proper, whenever either the ſafety of their own Settlements and Poſſeſſions, or the peace and tranquillity of the *Carnatic*, be the leaſt endangered. In caſe of the falling out of which circumſtances (which God forbid) they do promiſe and engage to give the moſt timely notice thereof to his Highneſs, in their power.

Article 3.—The honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company do further engage and promiſe, that in whatever year the aſſiſtance of their troops ſhall not be required, they will pay to his Highneſs, as a conſideration for the free gift of the abovementioned five Circars, for ever and ever, the following ſums, by kiſts, as ſpecified in the eighth article of this Treaty; viz. for the three Circars of *Rajahmundry*, *Ellour*, and *Muſtephanagur*, five lacks of rupees; and for thoſe of *Siccacole* and *Murtezanagur*, as ſoon as they are in their hands, and the ſettling the ſame is well effected, two lacks each, in all nine lacks of rupees per annum.

Article 4.—The reduction of the Siccacole Circar, by the bleſſing of God, the Company will effect as ſoon as poſſible; but that of *Murtezanagur*, in conſideration of his Highneſs having, by former agreements, given it to his brother *Bazalet Jung*, as a jaghire, the honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company do promiſe and engage not to take poſſeſſion of, until it be his Highneſs's pleaſure, or until the demiſe of his ſaid brother: but to prevent all future diſputes and difficulties that may hereafter ariſe concerning the ſame, the aforeſaid Company do further explain their intentions in the following Article:

Article 5.—As the Circar of *Murtezanagur* borders on that of *Nizampatam* and the Country of the *Carnatic*, which, by virtue of the former and preſent Treaties and alliances, the aforeſaid Company are bound to maintain and protect in all its extent; *therefore*, in caſe the ſaid *Bazalet Jung*, his agents or dependants, ſhould cauſe any diſturbances to the prejudice thereof, it is hereby agreed on by both parties, that the aforeſaid Company ſhall then have it in their power to take immediate poſſeſſion of that Circar.

Article 6.—As by the tenor of the ſecond Article of this Treaty, the aforeſaid Company have engaged to furniſh a body of troops, to be ready to march to the aſſiſtance of his Highneſs, it is agreed on by both parties, that the expences thereof ſhall be paid in the following manner; to wit, if the expence of the number of troops his Highneſs may require, ſhould fall ſhort of the ſum of five lacks of rupees, mentioned to be paid for the

* In the Nabob's own hand, which may be ſeen on the top of the original, as well as his Grand Seal.

three

three Circars of *Rajahmundry*, *Ellour*, and *Muſtephanagur*, the Company will account to his Highneſs for what balance may remain due; and in caſe of its exceeding the abovementioned ſum, the aforeſaid Company do hereby engage themſelves to be anſwerable for the payment of the remainder. The ſame agreement in like manner to hold good for the ſums ſtipulated to be paid for the two Circars of *Siccacole* and *Murtezanagur* when ſettled.

Article 7.—In conſideration of the fidelity, attachment, and ſervices of the aforeſaid Company, and the dependance his Highneſs has upon them, his ſaid Highneſs, out of his great favour, does hereby entirely acquit the abovementioned Circars of all arrears and demands, down to the preſent date of theſe writings.

Article 8.—In caſe the aſſiſtance of the honourable Company's troops is not required, the annual ſtipulated ſum expreſſed in the third Article of this Treaty, the aforeſaid Company do engage to pay in three kiſts, after the following manner, and to give Soucar ſecurity for the ſame; viz. the firſt payment, the thirty-firſt of March; the ſecond, the thirtieth of June; and the third, the thirty-firſt of October.

Article 9.—Whenever his Highneſs goes into winter quarters, and the troops of the other Sardars have leave for that purpoſe, thoſe of the aforeſaid Company ſhall have leave alſo to depart to their own Country.

Article 10.—His Highneſs engages to give as early notice as poſſible, (not leſs than three months) of the ſervice in which he will require the aſſiſtance of the troops of the aforeſaid Company, that they may have timely notice to make the neceſſary preparations; and that the number of troops ſent may be ſufficient for the ſervice required of them, of which the aforeſaid Company are to be left the entire and ſole judges; and as the ſucceſs of all expeditions depends much upon ſecrecy in council, both parties do hereby engage themſelves not to reveal any ſuch deſigns as they may communicate to each other, until every thing on both ſides is ready for execution.

Article 11.—The honourable Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, in conſideration of the Diamond Mines, with the Villages appertaining thereto, having been always dependant upon his Highneſs's Government, do hereby agree that the ſame ſhall remain in his poſſeſſion now alſo.

Article 12.—His Highneſs, in order to convince the whole world of the great confidence and truſt he repoſes in the Engliſh nation, agrees and conſents, that the fort of *Codapillee* ſhall be entirely garriſoned by the troops of the aforeſaid Company; in conſideration of which, the aforeſaid Company do hereby agree and conſent likewiſe, that there be a Killedar therein on the part of his Highneſs, and that the uſual jaghire annexed to the Killedary ſhall be ceded to him.

Article 13.—In virtue of this treaty of mutual favour, alliance and friendſhip, between the two contracting parties, his Highneſs promiſes and engages to aſſiſt the aforeſaid Company with his troops, when required, reſerving to himſelf the ſame liberty of withdrawing the whole, or any part thereof, in the ſame manner as is expreſſed for the aforeſaid Company in the ſecond Article of this Treaty, whenever the ſame ſhall become neceſſary.

Article 14.—In virtue of the above Treaty of favour, alliance, and friendſhip, both parties do mutually and ſolemnly engage to the punctual and ſtrict obſervance of all and every one of the abovementioned Articles; that from this time all doubts and ſuſpicions ſhall ceaſe between them, and in their room a perpetual, juſt, and ſincere confidence be eſtabliſhed, ſo that the great affairs of the Decan Government, and the buſineſs of the Company, may increaſe every day in honour, riches, and happineſs, from generation to generation.

In confirmation of which his Highneſs on the one part, and *John Caillaud*, eſquire, Brigadier General, inveſted with full powers from the Engliſh Company, on the other, have hereunto affixed their hands and ſeals.

Dated at *Hydrabad* the 9th of the moon Gemace-duſſuny, in the year of Hegyra 1180, equal to the 12th of November 1766.

APPEND. No. 10.

A TREATY of perpetual Friendſhip and Alliance, made and concluded at *Fort Saint George*,

Between the honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, in conjunction with the Nabob *Wolau Jau, Omdetul Mulck, Ummeer-ul-Hind, Serajah Dowlah, Anneverdeen, Cawn Behauder, Monſoor Jung*, Sippa Sardar of the *Carnatic Payen Gaut*, on the one part; and the Great Nabob, high in ſtation, *Auſuph Jau, Nizam-ul-Mulck, Meer Nizam, Ally Cawn Behauder, Phuttah Jung*, Sippa Sardar Soubah of the *Decan*, on the other part; by the honourable *Charles Bourchier*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and the Council thereof, on behalf of the ſaid Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, the Nabob *Wolau Jau, Omdetul Mulck*, on behalf of himſelf as Nabob of the *Carnatic*, and the Nabob *Ruccun-ud-Dowlah*, Dewan, inveſted with full powers on behalf of the ſaid Nabob *Auſuph Jau, Nizam-ul-Mulck*, his heirs and ſucceſſors, as Soubah of the *Decan*.

Done on the 23d day of February, in the year 1768 of the Chriſtian Æra, and on the 4th of the moon Shevaul, in the year of the Hegyra 1181.

The Treaty.

WHEREAS on the 12th of November, in the year of the Chriſtian Æra 1766, or on the 9th of the moon Gemace-duſſuny, in the year of the Hegyra 1180, a Treaty was concluded at *Hydrabad*, by and between General *John Caillaud*, inveſted with full powers on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and the Nabob *Auſuph Jau, Nizam-ul-Mulck*, &c. on behalf of himſelf, as Soubah of the *Decan*, with a deſign to eſtabliſh an honourable and laſting friendſhip and alliance between the two contracting powers; and whereas ſome miſunderſtandings have ſince ariſen, which have perverted the intent of the ſaid Treaty, and kindled up the flames of war: Now, be it known to the whole world, that the beforementioned Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, and the Engliſh Company, with the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, have entered into another Treaty, of the ſtricteſt friendſhip and alliance, on the following conditions:

Article 1.—The exalted and illuſtrious Emperor of *Hindoſtan, Shaw Allum Padtcha* having, out of his gracious favour, and in conſideration of the attachment and ſervices of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, given and granted to them for ever, by way of Inaum or free gift, the five Circars of *Muſtephanagur, Rajahmundry, Siccacole*, and *Murtezanagur*, or *Condavir*, by his royal Firmaund, dated the 12th of Auguſt 1765, or on the 24th of the Moon Suphier, in the 6th year of his reign, and the Nabob *Auſuph Jau, Nizam-ul-Mulck*, as Soubah of the *Decan*, having, by the ſecond and third articles of the aforementioned Treaty, ceded and ſurrendered by Sanads, under his hand and ſeal, to the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company for ever, the aforementioned five Circars; it is now further acknowledged and agreed by the ſaid *Auſuph Jau, Nizam-ul-Mulck*, Soubah of the *Decan*, that the ſaid Company ſhall enjoy and hold for ever, as their right and property, the ſaid five Circars, on the terms hereafter mentioned.

Article 2.—By the aforementioned Treaty of *Hydrabad*, it was ſtipulated, that the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, having given the Circar of *Murtezanagur* as a jaghire to his brother the Nabob *Ummeer ul-Omrah, Seujah-ul-Mulck Behauder, Bazalet Jung*, the Company ſhould not take poſſeſſion of the ſaid Circar, till after the death of *Bazalet Jung*, or till he broke the friendſhip with the ſaid Company, by raiſing diſturbances in the country of *Nizampatam*, or the *Carnatic*; and though the Company might juſtly claim a right to take poſſeſſion of the ſaid Circar,

APPENDIX, No. 10.

Circar, from the late conduct of *Bazalet Jung*, yet, in consideration of their friendſhip for *Auſuph Jau* and his family, and that they may not diſtreſs his affairs, by obliging him to provide his brother *Bazalet Jung* with another jaghire, the Company do agree and conſent, that *Bazalet Jung* ſtill hold the Circar of *Murtezanagur* on the aforeſaid conditions, or till it be the pleaſure of *Auſuph Jau*, that the Company ſhould take poſſeſſion thereof; provided that the ſaid *Bazalet Jung* returns immediately to his own country of *Adony*, and neither keeps with nor receives from *Hyder Naigue*, any Vackeel or correſpondence, but lives in peace and harmony with the Engliſh Company and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, and gives no protection or aſſiſtance whatever to the ſaid *Naigue*, or any of his people, nor any other enemies of the Company or the Nabob *Wolau Jau*: but if this article ſhall at any time be infringed, the Company ſhall be at liberty, by virtue of this Treaty, to take poſſeſſion of, and keep the Circar of *Murtezanagur*, in the ſame manner as the other four; and the Nabob *Auſuph Jau* engages to aſſiſt them therein with his troops, if neceſſary.

Article 3.—The fort of *Condapillee*, with its jaghire, ſhall for ever hereafter remain in poſſeſſion of the Engliſh Company, and be garriſoned with their troops, under their own officers only; notwithſtanding any thing to the contrary ſtipulated in the 12th article of the Treaty of *Hydrabad*.

Article 4.—*Narraindoo*, one of the Zemindars of the Circar of *Siccacole*, having lately raiſed diſturbances in the Itchapore Country, and refuſed (as he alledges, in conformity to the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*'s orders) to pay his rents, or obedience to the Company, the Nabob *Auſuph Jau* agrees, on the ſigning and exchange of the preſent Treaty, to write Letters not only to *Narraindoo*, but to all the Zemindars in the Circars of *Ellour*, *Muſtephanagur*, *Rajahmundry*, and *Siccacole*, acquainting them, that they are in future to regard the Engliſh Company as their ſovereign, and to pay their rents and obedience to the ſaid Company, or their deputies, without raiſing any troubles or diſturbances: the Nabob *Auſuph Jau* further agrees, that he will not in future encourage or protect in raiſing troubles or diſobedience, any Zemindars, Renter, or Servants of the Engliſh Company, or the Nabob *Wolau Jau*; who on their parts engage the ſame to his Highneſs *Auſuph Jau*.

Article 5.—It has been the conſtant deſire and endeavour of the Engliſh Company, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, to preſerve their poſſeſſions in peace; and to live on terms of friendſhip with the Soubah of the *Decan*: they ſtill deſire to do the ſame; and though the operations of war have lately obliged the Company to ſend their troops towards *Hydrabad*, and to take poſſeſſion of the Circars of *Commamet* and *Worangole*; yet, as a proof of their friendſhip for the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, &c. Soubah of the *Decan*, on the ſigning and exchange of this Treaty, the Company's troops ſhall be recalled to the fort of *Commamet*, from whence they ſhall alſo retire into their own Circars, ſo ſoon as the Soubah, with his army, has croſſed the *Kiſtnah*, leaving the fort of *Commamet* to the Soubah's deputy. And as a farther proof of the Company's ſincere deſire to preſerve a friendſhip with the Soubah of the *Decan*, they agree to bury in oblivion what is paſt, and to pay him annually, for the ſpace of ſix years, to be computed from the 1ſt of January 1768, or the 10th of the Moon Shibaun, in the year of the Hegyra 1181, the ſum of two lacks of Arcot rupees, at *Madras* or *Maſulipatam*; that is to ſay, one lack on the 31ſt of March, and alſo one lack on the 31ſt of October, or two lacks every year, and one lack more at each of theſe periods, whenever the Circar of *Condavir* is put into the Company's poſſeſſion. The Company moreover promiſe, that if they peaceably poſſeſs the Circars during the aforeſaid term of ſix years, and the Soubah gives them no trouble, they will pay annually, from the 1ſt of January 1774, the ſum of five lacks, in two equal payments, as before expreſſed; or of ſeven lacks, if *Condavir* be then in their poſſeſſion; but in caſe the Soubah, or the Marattas, by his inſtigation, ſhould invade the Circars or *Carnatic*, or they, or any other Power ſhould conquer the Circars from the Engliſh Company, the payment of the ſaid ſums ſhall be ſuſpended till peace, and the Circars are reſtored to the Company.

Article 6.—It was ſtipulated, in the former Treaty made at *Hydrabad*, that the Company and the Soubah ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other with their troops, when required, and their own affairs would permit; but it being apprehended at preſent that ſuch an agreement may ſubject both parties to difficulties, and that miſunderſtandings may ariſe on that account, it is now agreed only, that a mutual peace, confidence, and friendſhip, ſhall ſubſiſt for ever between the Engliſh Company, his Highneſs *Auſuph Jau*, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*; the enemies of either ſhall be regarded as the enemies of the other two Powers, and the friends of either be treated as the friends of all: and in caſe any troubles ſhould ariſe, or any enemies invade the Countries under the Government of either of the contracting parties, the other two ſhall give no countenance or aſſiſtance to ſuch enemies or invaders; the Company, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, willing however to ſhew their voluntary attachment to the Soubah, will always be ready to ſend two battalions of Sepoys, and ſix pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans, whenever the Soubah ſhall require them, and the ſituation of their affairs will allow of ſuch a body of troops to march into the *Decan*; provided the Soubah pays the expence during the time that the ſaid troops are employed in his ſervice.

Article 7.—The exalted and illuſtrious Emperor *Shaw Allum* having been pleaſed, out of his great favour and high eſteem for the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, to give and grant to him and his eldeſt ſon, *Meyen-ul-Mulck Omdetul Omrah*, and their heirs for ever, the Government of the *Carnatic Payen Gaut*, and the Countries dependant thereon, by his royal Firmaund, bearing date the 26th of Auguſt 1765, or the 27th of the Moon Zuphur, in the 6th year of the ſaid Emperor's reign; and the Nabob *Auſuph Jau Nizam-ul-Mulck*, &c. having alſo, out of his affection and regard for the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau*, releaſed him, his ſon *Meyen-ul-Mulck*, &c. and their heirs in ſucceſſion for ever, from all dependance on the *Decan*, and given him a full diſcharge of all demands, paſt, preſent, and to come, on the ſaid *Carnatic Payen Gaut*, by a Saned under his hand and ſeal, dated the 12th of November 1766, in conſideration of the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau* having paid the Soubah five lacks of rupees; it is now agreed and acknowledged by the ſaid *Auſuph Jau Nizam-ul-Mulck*, that the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau*, and after him his ſon *Meyen-ul-Mulck*, and their heirs in ſucceſſion, ſhall enjoy for ever, as an Ultumgau, or free gift, the Government of the *Carnatic Payen Gaut*, in the fulleſt and ampleſt manner; the ſaid Nabob *Auſuph Jau* promiſing and engaging not to hold or keep up any kind of correſpondence with any perſon or perſons in the ſaid *Carnatic Payen Gaut*, or in the Circars before and now ceded to the Engliſh Company, except the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau*, or the ſaid Engliſh Company, by the means of their Preſident and Council of *Madras*; who on their part, in conjunction with the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau*, engage likewiſe not to hold or maintain any correſpondence with any perſon or perſons in the *Decan*, except the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, his Dewan, and the Securities whoſe names are hereunto ſubſcribed.

Article 8.—The Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, out of his great regard and affection, and from other conſiderations, having been pleaſed to grant and confer on the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, and his eldeſt ſon, *Meyen-ul-Mulck Omdetul Omrah*, ſeveral Saneds, viz.

An Ultumgau Saned for the whole of the *Carnatic*.

An Ultumgau Saned for the whole of the Pergunnah of *Imungundela*, with the Gudda of *Ghunpoora*.

An Ultumgau Saned for the whole of the villages of *Cathaſera*, &c.

An Ultumgau Saned for the Killedary of the fort of *Colaur*.

An Ultumgau Saned for the whole of the diſtrict of *Senedaupe*; and,

A full and ample Saned, containing a diſcharge for all demands paſt, preſent, and future, on account of the *Carnatic*, &c.

It is hereby agreed, that all and every one of theſe Saneds ſhall be regarded equally binding with any other article of the Treaty, and be as duly obſerved by the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, as if entered here at full length.

Article 9.—*Hyder Naigue* having for ſome years paſt uſurped the Government of the Myſore country, and given great diſturbances to his neighbours, by attacking and taking from many of them their poſſeſſions; and having alſo lately invaded, and laid waſte with fire and ſword, the poſſeſſions of the Engliſh Company, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, in the *Carnatic*, it is certainly neceſſary, for the peace and for the general benefit of all the neighbouring Powers, that the ſaid *Naigue* ſhould be puniſhed, and reduced ſo that he may not hereafter have the power to give any perſon farther trouble; to this end, the Nabob *Auſuph Jau* hereby declares and makes known to all the world, that he regards the ſaid *Naigue* as a rebel and uſurper and as ſuch diveſts him of, and revokes from him, all Saneds, honours, and diſtinctions, conferred by himſelf, or any other Soubah of the *Decan*, becauſe the ſaid *Naigue* has deceived the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, broken his agreement, and rendered himſelf unworthy of all further countenance and favours.

Article 10.—That the Engliſh Company may hereafter carry on their trade peaceably on this Coaſt of *Coromandel*, and alſo on the Coaſt of *Malabar*; and that they, with the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, may hold the *Carnatic* and their other poſſeſſions in peace, it appears neceſſary that the countries of *Carnatic Balagaute*, belonging to the Soubahdarry of *Viziapour*, now or lately poſſeſſed by *Hyder Naigue*, ſhould be under the management and protection of thoſe who will do juſtice, and pay obedience to the high commands from Court; it is therefore agreed by the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, that he ſhall relinquiſh to the Engliſh Company, all his right to the Dewannee of the ſaid *Carnatic Balagaute*, belonging to the Soubahdarry of *Viziapour*, and that the Company ſhall preſent an arzee or petition, to the royal preſence, to obtain from the Emperor *Shaw Allum*, a firmaund, confirming and approving their right thereto; but that the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, as Soubah of the *Decan*, may not loſe his dignity, or the Revenue ariſing from the ſaid countries, the Engliſh Company agree to pay him annually, out of the Dewannee collection, from the time they are in poſſeſſion thereof, the ſum of ſeven lacks of Arcot rupees, including Durbar charges, being the ſum annually paid heretofore, in two equal payments, at the ſpace of ſix months from each other; provided the ſaid *Auſuph Jau*, Soubah of the *Decan*, aſſiſts the ſaid Company, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, in puniſhing *Hyder Naigue*, and neither receives from or ſends either Vackeels or Letters to him.

Article 11.—As the Engliſh Company do not intend to deprive the Marattas of their chowte, any more than the Soubah of his peſcuſh, which uſed to be paid from the *Carnatic Balagaute*, belonging to the Soubahdarry of *Viziapour*, now or lately poſſeſſed by *Hyder Naigue*, it is hereby agreed, and the Company willingly promiſe, to pay the Marattas, regularly and annually, without trouble, for the whole choute, as ſettled in former times, from the time the ſaid countries ſhall be under the Company's protection as Dewan; provided however that the Marattas guarantee to the Company the peaceable poſſeſſion of the ſaid Dewannee: to this end, the Nabob *Auſuph Jau* promiſes to uſe his beſt endeavours, jointly with the Engliſh and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, to ſettle with the Marattas concerning the choute of the ſaid countries, how and where it is to be paid, ſo that there may be no diſturbances hereafter on that account, between any of the contracting parties or the Marattas.

Article 12.—All the foregoing Articles are ſincerely agreed to by the ſubſcribing parties, who reſolve faithfully to execute and abide by the ſame, ſo that a firm and laſting friendſhip may mutually ſubſiſt between them; and while ſuch an alliance ſubſiſts, what power will dare to diſturb the poſſeſſions of either party. The Engliſh Company, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, will endeavour, on all occaſions, to ſhew their friendſhip and attachment to the Nabob *Auſuph Jau Nizam-ul-Mulck*, as Soubah of the *Decan*, and look on the ſupport of that Government as the ſupport of their own; in ſhort, there will be no manner of difference in intereſt between them.

In witneſs and confirmation of all the above Articles, and every part of the aforegoing Treaty, we whoſe names are underwritten, have interchangeably ſubſcribed to and ſealed three inſtruments of the tenor and date, viz. The Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, on the behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company at that place, this 26th day of February, in the year of the Chriſtian Æra 1768; the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, Soubah of the *Decan*, at his camp near *Pillere*, on the 22d day of the moon Shevaul, in the year of Hegyra 1181; and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, for himſelf, at *Fort Saint George*, the 7th day of the moon Shevaul, in the 1181ſt year of the Hegyra.

Charles Bourchier,
Samuel Ardley,
John Call,
George Stratton,
George Dawſon,
James Bourchier,
George Mackay.

(Company's Seal.)

N. B. The names of the contracting parties were tranſferred in the parts kept by each of them, and each took the precedence by turn.

The above contracting parties, to wit, the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, the great Nabob, high in ſtation, *Auſuph Jau*, Soubah of the *Decan*, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, Soubah of *Mahomed Poor*, having duly conſidered, and voluntarily entered into the above Articles, which they have reſpectively ſigned and ſealed in our preſence, we whoſe names are hereunto ſubſcribed, do ſolemnly promiſe and engage, under our hands and ſeal, that we will guarrantee to the ſaid Engliſh Company, and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, the due and juſt obſervance of the above Treaty on the part of the Nabob *Auſuph Jau*.

I take God to witneſs, that of my own free will, I am ſecurity.

(The Seal of Ruccun ud Dowla.)

I ſwear by Vencataſh and Bail Behauder, that of my own free will and conſent I am ſecurity.

(The Seal of Rum Chunder Rauze.)

I ſwear by Sactaſha and Bail Behauder, that I am truly and ſincerely ſecurity.

(The Seal of Beer Behauder.)

I ſwear by Uncataſh and Bail Behauder, that of my own free will and conſent I, *Dundaveram*, Vackeel to *Mahaudavarow*, Pundit Predane, am ſecurity on the part of the ſaid *Mahaudavarow*.

(The Seal of Dundaveram.)

N. B. The foregoing guarantee agreement was ſigned and executed by the guarantees ſubſcribing the ſame, and annexed to the parts of the Treaty delivered to the Company and the Nabob, and to the part delivered to *Nizam-Ally Cawn*, the following guarantee or agreement was fixed, viz.

APPENDIX. Nos. 11. & 12.

The above contracting parties, to wit, the great Nabob, high in ſtation, *Auſuph Jau*, Soubah of the *Decan*, the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, of *Mahomed Poor*, and the Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, on behalf of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, having duly conſidered, and voluntarily entered into the above Articles, which the Preſident and Council, on behalf of the ſaid Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, have ſigned and ſealed in my preſence, I the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau*, whoſe name is hereunto ſubſcribed, do ſolemnly promiſe and engage, under my hand and ſeal, that I will guarantee to the ſaid Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, the due and juſt obſervance of the above Treaty, on the part of the ſaid Engliſh Company.

(The Nabob's Seal.)

And we, the ſaid Preſident and Council of *Fort Saint George*, on behalf of the ſaid Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, do ſolemnly promiſe and engage, under our hands, that we will guarantee to the ſaid Nabob *Auſuph Jau*, the due and juſt obſervance of the above Treaty, on the part of the ſaid Nabob *Wolau Jau*.

Charles Bourchier,
Samuel Ardley,
John Call,
George Stratton,
George Dawſon,
James Bourchier,
George Mackay.

APPENDIX, No. 11.

Extract of the General Letter from *Fort Saint George*; dated the 8th of March 1769.

Par. 50. LEST your Honours ſhould not clearly underſtand the diſtinction between Zemindaries and Government Lands, we beg leave to inform you, that the Zemindaries are lands held by certain Rajahs or Chiefs, as their hereditary eſtates, paying a certain tribute to the Government, and being ſubject to ſuit and ſervice, in manner very ſimilar to the ancient feudal tenures. The tributes ought to be certain and invariable, though that has not always been ſtrictly obſerved; and changes in Government have alſo introduced changes in the tributes, which indeed is of no great conſequence; for, beſides theſe fixed tributes (ſuppoſing they were ſo) the Supreme Government has always demanded (and cuſtom has given ſanction and title to) a further ſum, as a nazar or free gift; and theſe two ſums, the tribute and nazar, are what we mean when we ſpeak of ſettling the jumabundy with the Zemindars. Beſides theſe Zemindaries or hereditary eſtates, there are certain lands (more in *Chicacole* than any other of the Circars) which are called Havelly or Government Lands, and are the property of the State or Lord Paramount; ſuch are your Jaqueer, &c. lands in the *Carnatic*; and theſe are the lands which we purpoſe to let out, even ſhould we by way of trial endeavour to ſettle ourſelves the jumabundy with the Zemindars for their lands.

APPENDIX, No. 12.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, in their Revenue Department, the 11th January 1777.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, to the Chief and Council of *Maſulipatam*; dated 11th January 1777.

WE deſire you will ſtate the following queſtions to ſome of the principal Zemindars dependant on your Settlement, and obtain their anſwers in writing for our information.

1ſt.—In what manner ought Zemindaries to deſcend by the laws and cuſtoms of the country?

2d.—If a Zemindar dies, leaving no children, but male couſins of different degrees, and alſo ſiſters, in what manner ought the Zemindary to be diſpoſed of?

3d.—Suppoſing there to be children of daughters of ſiſters, or of aunts, as well as male couſins, how ought the eſtate to be diſpoſed of?

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, in their Revenue Department, the 23d May 1777.

Read the following Letter from *Maſulipatam*, with the ſeveral Papers encloſed.

To the honourable *George Stratton*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort Saint George*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Conformable to your commands, we have the honour to tranſmit to you, tranſlates of the opinions of four of the principal Zemindars in theſe Circars, on the queſtions you directed us to put to them, reſpecting the rights of ſucceſſion in Zemindary lands.

As we conceived it would be acceptable to your Honour, &c. to receive, at one point of view, the fulleſt information we could obtain on the ſubject, we have neceſſarily deferred the ſending you any, until all their reſpective opinions could be collected.

We are, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble Servants,

Charles Floyer,
Charles Deſvoeux,
James Hodges,
Alex^r. Pringle.

Maſulipatam,
9th May 1777.

The Replies of *Row Vencaterow*, Sirdar of Rajamundry Circar, to the queries referred to him, concerning the laws and cuſtoms, in matters of ſucceſſion, of his caſt and country.

1ſt. That a Zemindar who has ſeveral ſons may, during his life-time, name one of them to ſucceed him in the management of his country; which ſon ſhall, at his father's death, ſucceed accordingly to the management; but then his brother ſhall have a right to ſhare in the profit ariſing from the country.—Should the father, during his life-time, not have appointed any one of his ſons to ſucceed him, or ſhould the ſon ſo appointed die, the mother ſhall have a right to give the power to whichever ſon ſhe ſhall pleaſe; but the other brothers have a right to ſhare in the profits.

2d. If a Zemindar dies without ſons, or brother's ſons, or uncle's ſons, then, after the death of the wife, the Zemindary is to go to the diſtant male couſins, and not to the ſiſters.

3d. If a Zemindar dies without ſons, and he has couſins of the male line, and alſo aunts, and ſiſters, and daughters ſons, then his wife has a right to appoint whichever of the male couſins ſhe chooſes to ſucceed; but he muſt take care of, and ſupport the relations of the female line.

The Replies of Rajah *Culdindy Tripettirauze*, Zemindar of *Mogultore*, to the queries referred to him concerning the laws and cuſtoms, in matters of ſucceſſion, of his caſt and country.

After the death of a Zemindar, his ſon is to inherit his country. If he has no ſons, and his brothers have divided into ſhares, he may adopt any one of his nephews or couſins; which nephew or couſin ſo adopted, ſhall have

have a right to ſucceed to the Zemindary. If he has not adopted any ſon, and has either brother or brother's ſon, they are to ſucceed. If he has neither brothers nor nephews, then his father's brothers, or their ſons, are to ſucceed. If a Zemindar dies without having any of the abovementioned relations, or any couſins of the male line, and if he has a daughter, and at her wedding he publicly declares, that on her having a ſon he will adopt him, and fix him in the right of his Muras, then, according to the Gentoo laws, ſuch daughter's ſon being adopted, ſhall ſucceed to the Zemindary; but in caſe there ſhould be no daughter's ſons ſo adopted, then any diſtant relation of the male line may ſucceed; but even if there are no ſuch relations, neither his daughter's huſband's family, his ſiſter's ſon, his father's ſiſter's ſon, nor any of the female line, cannot inherit the Zemindary. This is what I think.

The Replies of Rajah *Opparow*, Zemindar of *Noozeed*, to the three queries referred to him, concerning the laws and cuſtoms, in matters of ſucceſſion, of his caſt and country.

1ſt. If a Zemindar leaves ſeveral ſons, the eldeſt is to have a large ſhare, ſeparately for himſelf, the reſt is to remain equally with the other ſons.

2d. If a Zemindar dies without ſons, and has male couſins and ſiſters, then, I think, that if the wife of the Zemindar be alſo dead without ſons, that the male couſins ſhould ſucceed.

3d. If a Zemindar dies without ſons, then his wife may chooſe any of his male line couſins, and appoint him to the Zemindary; but if the Zemindar, in his life-time, appointed any allowance for the maintenance of his daughters, or ſiſters, or aunts, then the perſon who ſucceeds, is to take care and give them ſuch allowance.

The Replies of Rajah *Vochovoy Jaggapetyrauze*, Zemindar of *Peddapore*, to the queries referred to him, concerning the laws and cuſtoms, in matters of ſucceſſion, of his caſt and country.

1ſt. If a Zemindar has a ſon, then the ſon is to be the heir of the father.

2d. If his Zemindar has no ſons, or has brother's ſons, or uncle's ſons, whichever of them he, or (after his deceaſe) his wife, ſhall impower, that perſon ſhall ſucceed to the Zemindary.

3d. If a Zemindar dies without appointing any body to ſucceed him, then the neareſt male couſin ſhall ſucceed; but not the generation of his father's ſiſter, his own ſiſter, or his daughter.

APPENDIX, No. 13.

Extract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*; dated 25th March 1768.

Par. 109. HAVING taken under our conſideration, the ſtate of the Company's Servants upon the Fort Saint George Eſtabliſhment, and being ſenſible that they will be conſiderably affected in point of trade, by the great and neceſſary demands for extending the Company's inveſtments; conſidering alſo the great increaſe of buſineſs in which our principal Servants are engaged, and which requires their utmoſt care and attention, we are come to a reſolution to allow them a reaſonable encouragement, to exert themſelves with zeal and alacrity in their ſeveral departments; but which, however, they are to look upon as a free gift from the hand of their Employers, offered to them annually, ſo long as their behaviour ſhall continue to merit the ſame, and the Revenues of the country ſhall admit of ſuch a gratification; we therefore hereby order and direct, that in order to conſtitute a fund for the ſaid purpoſe, you do ſet apart a ſum not exceeding 60,000 current pagodas yearly, out of the produce of the Company's territorial Revenues, to be diſtributed among the Company's Civil and Military Servants; which ſaid ſum is to be divided into 100 parts or ſhares, and proportioned out in the following manner, viz.

APPENDIX, No. 13.

For the Governor, 21 ſhares.

For the ſecond in Council, five ſhares and an half.

For the reſt of the Council, not having Chiefſhips, two ſhares and an half each.

For it is our meaning and directions, that the Chiefs of *Mazulipatam*, *Vizagapatam*, and *Ingeram*, are not to have any proportion of the ſaid ſhares.

110. You are to obſerve, that the ſhares allotted to the Governor, as abovementioned, are in addition to his preſent ſalary of three thouſand pounds a year, and his perquiſites ariſing from coinage, and conſulage on coral and diamonds. The ſhares for the other civil Servants are to be in addition to their preſent appointments of ſalary, diet money, and the poſts they may reſpectively hold, excepting the Chiefſhips as before excepted.

111. Having likewiſe taken into conſideration the preſent ſtated allowance to the Company's junior Servants, and finding them to be inadequate to their ſupport and maintenance, we do hereby order and direct that the following additions be made thereto, by way of gratuity, to all ſuch of them who do not enjoy any poſts of profit, viz.

To a Factor, five pounds a year.
To a Writer, ten pounds a year.

Theſe laſt gratuities are to be paid out of the Company's caſh, and not out of the ſaid fund of 60,000 current pagodas a year.

112. We further direct, that all the beforementioned allowances, as well out of the fund, as of the Company's caſh, do commence upon your receipt of theſe advices.

Extract of ſeparate General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Preſident and Council, at *Fort Saint George*; dated 25th March 1768.

Par. 80. Being ſatisfied how much our trade and poſſeſſions may be affected by the good ſervices of the Company's Military Officers, the better therefore to encourage them to exert their endeavours in the preſervation of theſe great objects, we have thought proper to allow them alſo to partake of the fund mentioned in our General Letter of this date, of 60,000 pagodas a year, by way of gratuity, over and above their eſtabliſhed pay and allowances, and on the ſame conditions as our Civil Servants; in the following proportions, that is to ſay,

The Commander in Chief is to have, as ſuch only, he not being to have any proportion as a Counſellor, if he ſhould at any time hereafter be admitted of Council, eleven ſhares.

The Colonels, each, four ſhares.

The Lieutenant Colonels, each, two ſhares and an half.

The Majors, each, one ſhare and a quarter.

81. The ample proviſion here aſſigned to the Commander in Chief, aſſures him of an honourable competency; and we expect Colonel *Joſeph Smith*, and his ſucceſſors in the command, will have a conſtant and zealous attention to their duty, by keeping up a regular diſcipline among the troops, and in preventing, by good œconomy, all frauds and abuſes in the expences of the army.

82. The appointments to the reſt of the field officers are ſuch as put our Servants on a more advantageous footing than in any other military ſervice whatſoever, and gives them a proſpect of improving their fortunes by a gradual, but certain progreſſion.

83. After the diſtribution to our Civil, as directed in our ſaid General Letter, and the above to our Military Servants, there will remain a conſiderable ſum of the ſaid fund unappropriated; in order, therefore to encourage the reſt of the Company's Military Officers, we direct,

APPENDIX, Nos. 14. & 15.

that they alſo be granted, by way of donation or gratuity, over and above their uſual pay and allowances, viz.

A Captain, three ſhillings a day.
A Lieutenant, two ſhillings a day.
Enſigns and Lieutenants, Fireworkers, one ſhilling a day each.

84. In caſe it ſhall happen, that the amount of the unappropriated ſhares ſhould not be ſufficient to anſwer the ſaid laſt mentioned gratuities, we direct, that the deficiency be made good out of the Company's caſh; on the contrary, if there ſhall happen to be a ſurplus, the ſame is to be carried to the Company's credit, under the head of Unappropriated Fund, until you ſhall receive further orders from us concerning the diſpoſition of it. But we muſt here obſerve to you, and accordingly direct, that neither a Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, or Major, is to be allowed the three ſhillings a day as Captain of a company.

85. We further direct, that all the beforementioned allowances, as well out of the fund as the Company's caſh, do commence upon your receipt of theſe advices, in like manner as ordered with reſpect to our Civil Servants.

APPENDIX, No. 14.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated 23d March 1770.

47. FROM the variation to which the ſtate of your Revenues is at all times ſubject, and the more to animate your care, and excite your attention to the ſecurity and improvement of them; we have thought fit to regulate our bounty to the principal of our Civil and Military Servants on your eſtabliſhment, in proportion to the advantages the Company ſhall receive from the Revenues of your Preſidency. And we accordingly do hereby order and direct, that from the receipt of theſe diſpatches, a commiſſion of five-per-cent. be drawn by you, on the amount of the nett territorial Revenues of *Fort Saint George* and its ſubordinates, as a fund to be appropriated for the benefit of our Civil and Military Servants, inſtead of the ſpecific ſum Pag' 60,000, directed in our General and Separate Letters of the 25th March 1768.

48. And as we have thought it neceſſary, for the greater ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions, and the better diſcipline of their forces, to augment the number of field officers on your eſtabliſhment; it is become expedient for us to make a new and certain diſpoſition of the ſhares to be divided amongſt our principal Civil and Military Servants; we therefore hereby direct, that from the amount of a commiſſion of five-per-cent. on your nett territorial Revenues, as beforementioned, one twenty-fourth part be firſt drawn, and paid as a ſeparate ſhare to Major General *Coote*, Commander in Chief of all the Company's forces in *India*; and that after ſuch deduction, the reſidue of the ſaid commiſſion be divided into 100 parts or ſhares; which parts or ſhares are to be appropriated in the following manner, viz.

To the Governor 21 ſhares.
Second of Council 5½.
Reſt of the Council (not having a Chiefſhip) as far as the eſtabliſhment of 12 Members of Council, each 2½.
Firſt Colonel, Brig' General *Joſeph Smith*, as 1ſt Colonel, 11.
The other Colonels 8 ſhares, to be divided in equal proportions amongſt them.
The Lieut. Colonels 12½ ſhares, to be divided in equal proportions.
The Majors 6¼ ſhares, to be equally divided amongſt them.

49. By the reſt of the Council abovementioned, beſides the Governor and Second, we mean only the Members of the Council next in rotation to them, and who are not Chiefs of *Maſulipatam*, *Vizagapatam*, or *Ingeram*; for it is our poſitive orders, that neither of thoſe Chiefs, nor any of the junior Members of the Council, exceeding the eſtabliſhment of twelve, do receive any advantage from the ſaid ſhares; nor muſt thoſe proportions of this fund, which we have allowed to Major General *Coote* or Brigadier General *Smith*, be continued to any perſons who may be appointed to ſucceed them, without our expreſs leave.

50. And you are to take notice, that the whole of the unappropriated ſhares, together with what may be added thereto, by the deceaſe or reſignation of Major General *Coote*, or Brigadier General *Smith*, be applied as directed in 84th paragraph of our Separate Letter of 25th March 1768.

APPENDIX, No. 15.

Extract of General Letter to *Fort Saint George*, of 11th June 1777.

Par. 16. AS it appears by the advices already received, that much of the preſent confuſion has ariſen from the private engagements of our Servants, and their concerns, dealings, and tranſactions, on their own ſeparate account, with the Princes and Natives of the country; we hereby order, that no Governor and Preſident of our Council at *Fort Saint George*, at *Madras*, after our preſent Governor and Preſident *George* Lord *Pigot*, nor any of the Council of our ſaid Preſidency, except as hereafter is mentioned, ſhall, directly or indirectly, by themſelves, or by any other perſon or perſons for his or their uſe, or on his or their behalf, carry on or be concerned in, or have any dealings or tranſactions by way of traffick or commerce, in money or in goods of any kind whatſoever, for his or their uſe, benefit, profit, or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whomſoever, the trade and commerce of the Company only excepted.

Par. 17. And it is our further order, that in caſe any perſon or perſons who ſhall have carried on any trade, or have been concerned in the buying or ſelling any goods, wares, or merchandize, or other commodities whatſoever, by way of traffic or trade, or ſhall have been anyway concerned in money tranſactions as aforeſaid, ſhall be appointed to be Governor and Preſident, or to be of the Council of the ſaid Settlement, or ſhall hereafter ſucceed to any of the ſaid Offices reſpectively, every ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall be permitted to collect in his or their outſtanding debts, and to ſell and diſpoſe of the goods, wares, merchandize, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall ſeverally be poſſeſſed at the time when ſuch prohibition ſhall, with reſpect to him or them, take place; ſo as each ſuch perſon or perſons who is, are, or ſhall be ſo reſtrained, ſhall, and each and every of them reſpectively do, deliver to the Preſident and Council at *Fort Saint George*, at *Madras*, for the time being, within thirty days from the time when ſuch reſtrictions and prohibition ſhall take place as aforeſaid, a full and juſt ſpecification, upon oath, of the debts due to ſuch perſon or perſons, and ſo to be collected, and of the goods, wares, merchandize, effects, and ſtock in trade of which he or they ſhall be at that time ſo reſpectively poſſeſſed; and ſo as ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall and do ſell and diſpoſe of ſuch goods, wares, merchandizes, effects, and ſtock in trade, within the ſpace of nine months after ſuch reſtriction and prohibition as aforeſaid, ſhall commence and take place; and ſo as no new trade, or concerns in commerce or merchandize, or in money tranſactions, be entered into, contracted for, or carried on by ſuch perſon or perſons.

Par. 18. It is our further order, that no Company's Servant, or any perſon under the Company's protection, be permitted to lend money to any of the country powers in *India*, nor to any perſon or perſons holding commiſſions

miſſions under, or employed by them, directly or indirectly, to be repaid at a future time, on mortgages, or ſecurities in the nature of mortgages, upon lands, or from the produce or any growing Revenue of the country; and in caſe any of the Company's Servants are now concerned in any ſuch loans as aforeſaid, ſuch Servant or Servants ſhall draw up a ſpecific and particular Account current of the whole tranſaction from the beginning, ſetting forth how ſuch loan or loans is or are ſecured, to be delivered to our Preſident and Council within thirty days after the regulation ſhall be made known, and before ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall proceed to recover ſuch money; and afterwards they ſhall and may proceed to recover the ſame as they ſhall think fit.

19. And, for more effectually preventing ſuch loans, we hereby direct, that you inform all the country powers with whom ſuch tranſactions may be likely to take place, of this regulation, and requeſt them not to have or permit any dealings of the nature abovementioned, with any of the Company's Servants, or with perſons under the Company's protection.

20. In conſideration of the expected ſervices of our Governor and Preſident, and of our Council of *Fort Saint George*, and of the reſtrictions and prohibitions to which they are ſubjected by the preceding regulations, we direct, that every Governor and Preſident of *Fort Saint George* aforeſaid, after Lord *Pigot*, be allowed and paid the certain and eſtabliſhed ſalary of 40,000 pagodas by the year, and each of the Council for the time being, as hereafter is mentioned, 16,000 pagodas by the year; ſuch ſalary to any perſon who ſhall have a military command, to be in full of all pay and allowances as a military commander except ſuch field allowances as the Court of Directors ſhall think fit to make to him, whilſt employed on ſervice in the field. And we direct, that the abovementioned ſalaries be paid to each perſon out of the Revenues ariſing and accruing from our territorial poſſeſſions within and under the management of the ſaid Preſidency; and that ſuch ſalaries ſhall commence and take place, in reſpect to the ſaid *Thomas Rumbold*, *John Whitehill*, and *Hector Munro*, and to all ſuch other perſons as ſhall be reſident in *Great Britain* at the time of their appointment, upon and from the day on which ſuch perſons ſhall embark for *India*; and in reſpect to all thoſe who are or ſhall be reſident in *India* at the time of their appointment, upon and from the day of their taking upon them the execution of their offices. And we direct that all ſuch ſalaries to ſuch Governor and Preſident and Council, ſhall be in lieu of all fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever; and that no fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever, ſhall be accepted, received, or taken, by ſuch Governor and Preſident, and Council, or any of them, in any manner, or on any account or pretence whatſoever, other than ſuch ſalaries and allowances as are hereinbefore directed to be paid to them reſpectively; except as beforementioned, reſpecting field allowances to a military commander, and likewiſe except that the Governor and Preſident ſhall continue to have the advantage of reſiding in the Fort Houſe, together with the uſe of the Company's plate and furniture, and ſhall likewiſe be allowed to take ſuch commiſſion on coral as hath uſually been allowed to be taken by the Governor of the ſaid Preſidency.

21. To prevent any miſunderſtanding of the foregoing regulation, for payment of certain ſalaries to our Governor and Council, in lieu of trade, or other advantages, we think it proper to ſay, that we do not mean the regulation ſhall take place in reſpect to Lord *Pigot*, but that his Lordſhip, during his continuance in the Government, ſhall enjoy the ſame ſalary, and other advantages, as he was entitled to under his former commiſſion; nor do we mean it to extend to the ſaid *Alexander Davidſon*, *John Hollond*, and *James Daniel*, but as they are only named as occaſional Members, as before is mentioned, and their continuance in their office as Members of Council will be very ſhort, they are to be allowed to trade in the ſame manner as perſons of the Council might have done before the ſaid reſtrictive regulation; and as they are to be allowed to trade, they are to be paid ſuch ſalary, and have ſuch allowance only, as were paid and given to Members of Council before the ſaid regulations took place.

APPENDIX, No. 16.

Extract of General Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated the 11th of January 1781.

Par. 3. IN conſideration of the expected ſervices of Lord *Macartney*, our preſent Governor of *Fort Saint George*, and of his Lordſhip being totally reſtricted by his covenants, from being concerned, directly or indirectly, in any dealings, tranſactions, or commerce, in money, or in goods of any kind whatever, for his uſe, benefit, profit, or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whatever, the trade and commerce of the Company excepted, we have agreed, and hereby direct, that Lord *Macartney* be allowed and paid the certain and eſtabliſhed ſalary of 40,000 pagodas by the year; to commence upon, and be computed from, the day of his Lordſhip's arrival at *Fort Saint George*.

4. We hereby revoke the orders given in the 20th paragraph of the Court's Letter of the 11th of June 1777, reſpecting the ſalary of 16,000 pagodas per annum to each of the Members of Council at *Fort Saint George*

5. It is our order, that the ſalary and allowances to be paid to all the Members of Council below the Governor, be the ſame as were paid and allowed to the Members of our Council at *Fort Saint George*, before the eſtabliſhment of the temporary Government of the 11th of June 1777; the preſent Commander in Chief of our forces excepted, in whoſe ſalary we for the preſent make no alteration.

6. It is our pleaſure, that Lord *Macartney* be allowed to take ſuch commiſſion on coral as has uſually been taken by the Governor of *Fort Saint George*.

7. It is our further pleaſure, that all the Members of Council, below the Preſident, be allowed to trade in the ſame manner as Members of Council might lawfully have done, before the reſtrictive regulation in the Court's before mentioned took place. They muſt alſo fill ſuch places of truſt and emolument as hath been uſual at the Preſidency, and likewiſe ſucceed or be appointed to Chiefſhips of ſubordinate factories, when ſuch Chiefſhips ſhall not be filled by ſpecial appointments made by the Court of Directors.

APPENDIX, No. 17.

Extract of General Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated the 17th of October 1778.

Par. 6. IT appears from the ſyſtem hitherto purſued in the management of the Circars, that the Zemindars have been unneceſſarily incumbered with heavy debts, accumulating and preſſing upon them with ſuch increaſing weight, from year to year, that they are at length become almoſt inſupportable; and few of the Zemindars, except thoſe whoſe paternal inheritance was too conſiderable to be waſted, are in circumſtances of reſponſibility to anſwer even their former engagements to the Company. Various cauſes may have contributed to produce that effect; but one alone, which we ſhall mention, is of itſelf ſufficient to account for it. The practice hitherto obſerved in ſettling with the Zemindars

APPENDIX Nos. 18 & 19.

of the Maſulipatam diſtrict, to whom we principally allude, has been, to receive in advance from them, at the time of ſettling, two-thirds of the annual amount of their jemmabundy, and to follow the ſame rule in the beginning of every year. The Zemindars, unable to make ſuch advances from the produce of their Revenues, which could not be realized till ſome months after, having been obliged, at every time, to take up from the Soucars, or any other who would lend them, conſiderable ſums of money, at the exorbitant intereſt of two and three-per-cent. per month, giving aſſignments on the harveſt, by way of ſecurity for repayment. This mode, ſo deſtructive to their own fortunes, and ultimately to the intereſts of the Company, might have been eaſily avoided, only by fixing upon the periods for receiving the different kiſts of the year, ſo as to give time to the Zemindar to realize the produce of his grain, and relieve him thereby from the neceſſity of borrowing. However ſimple this remedy may appear, the evil has been ſuffered to continue ſo long, that it is become almoſt too late to apply it. The Zemindars, with countries for the moſt part ruined or impoveriſhed, have exhauſted all their credit with the Soucars, and are now fallen into arrears, which cannot, together with the growing jemmabundy, be diſcharged, but by a long courſe of prudent management, under every indulgent conſideration that can be ſhewn them by the Company.

Par. 7. Another cauſe, which has operated in no ſmall degree to the diſtreſs of the Zemindars, ariſes from the ſhort term of the ſettlements with them, which have been farmed for one, two, and never more than three years at a time. When the leaſes are ſo confined, it can never be expected that the Zemindar will attend to the improvement of his lands; on the contrary, extending his views no further than the term of his leaſe, all his endeavours will be employed to benefit himſelf to the utmoſt, without regarding the conſequences which may fall upon the Revenue at a future time. This conduct is natural enough, and we cannot blame it, if we conſider how unſettled the ideas of theſe people muſt be concerning the ſtate of their property, after it has paſſed through ſuch various changes, and the ſovereignty ſo often transferred from the Soubah of the *Decan* to the French, then back to the Soubah again, and laſtly to the Engliſh, all in the courſe of a few years.

APPENDIX, No. 18.

Extract of the General Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated the 20th of July 1771.

Par. 41. THE cowles for the Enaum called Jaghire Lands, and for *Poonamalee*, expired at the ſame time: and we had great hopes, that in conſequence of our repeated repreſentations, we ſhould have been furniſhed with your clear directions for the future diſpoſal of thoſe lands; but, notwithſtanding our firſt application on this ſubject was ſo long ago as the 27th of June 1769, by the *Thames*, we have not, to this hour, the moſt diſtant hint of your ſentiments, and we did not dare to be guided by our own judgment, in a point ſo truly critical. The inconveniences of continuing them under the Nabob, the oppreſſions which have been exerciſed in them, have been clearly ſtated to you; and to us it is beyond a doubt, that the advantages that might be reaped from ſuch territorial poſſeſſions, will never be obtained, ſo long as the Nabob has any thing to do with them; but theſe reaſons were not ſufficient to deprive him of them, when through the whole of your orders laſt year, it is evident, that you inclined to favour him, and to diſcredit the repreſentations of your Servants. Theſe circumſtances conſidered, we would not venture on ſuch a ſtep, however neceſſary, without your orders; and not having them, the only method was to temporize. The Nabob applied to us to have the management of the Jaghire in future. We replied, through our Preſident, that we willingly acquieſced to their continuance under him for one year longer; by which time your further and full ſentiments relative to the Jaghire would certainly be known.

42. As this Letter will probably reach you in time for us to be furniſhed with your orders in conſequence, by the ſhips of next year, ſhould your Honours not have finally determined on this ſubject before the receipt of it, we beg you will be pleaſed to conſider all that we have repreſented on the ſubject. We believe it may be ſummed up in theſe few words: that the inhabitants undergo continual oppreſſions: that the lands, though capable of great improvement, experience none: that the great reſervoirs by which the lands are ſupplied with water, are yearly falling into decay: that almoſt all the weavers that manufacture the Madras Inveſtment, reſide within the bounds of the Jaghire, and more might be induced to come, had they proper encouragement, which it is not in our power to give: that we have as little influence in theſe lands as in thoſe the immediate property of the Nabob; and that, except the mere rent, no one benefit is derived from them: we know not what they are capable of producing; and in caſe we ſhould have occaſion for their produce, we have no more reaſon to expect it, than from the Nabob's country. Such are, in brief, the inconveniences; and it remains with you to determine, whether they ſhall be ſubmitted to, or whether an attempt ſhall be made to render theſe lands more beneficial.

Extract of General Letter from *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated 14th October 1775.

Revenue Conſ.

Par. 41. It is not in our power at preſent to enter on the ſubject of the Inaum Lands, as the Survey and Accounts of the lands collected by Mr. *Barnard* are not all tranſlated and copied fair; but from the examinations which have been made, we cannot help forming an opinion, that they are in a moſt wretched ſtate; and we ſee the abſolute neceſſity of your adopting ſome other plan. That we might omit no opportunity of providing, as far as we are able, for their improvement, and for the relief of the people reſiding in them, we took occaſion to point out and recommend to the Nabob, ſuch meaſures as appeared to us neceſſary for theſe purpoſes; and though we can hardly flatter ourſelves, that what we have ſaid to him, will produce any favourable change in the management of the country, it is ſome ſatisfaction to us, when we reflect, that nothing has been wanting on our part to make it beneficial, and to free the people from thoſe oppreſſions to which they have been ſo long expoſed. We ſhall ſend copies of the Survey, and of all Mr. *Barnard*'s Accounts, as ſoon as they can be fairly tranſcribed.

APPENDIX, No. 19.

Extract of a Letter from Lieutenant General Sir *Eyre Coote*, to the Committee of Correſpondence; dated *Fort Saint George*, 30th November 1780.

BOTH the army and inhabitants maintained chiefly by ſupplies from *Bengal*, and upon which, I am ſorry to obſerve, they muſt principally depend for their future ſupport. A circumſtance, than which we can have no more convincing proof of the bad policy, in renting the Company's lands under this Preſidency, to the Nabob, and of thereby rendering ourſelves ſo entirely dependant upon him for every kind of ſupplies; and which, by keeping them in our own hands, we might ourſelves command. It is a ſyſtem which, from the preſent experience of its bad effects, I am induced to recommend to your ſerious conſideration for remedy.

APPENDIX, No. 20.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, the 19th June 1780.

READ Letter from the Nabob.

From the Nabob to the Governor; dated 15th June, received 17th ditto.

Colonel *Capper* has my bond for the ſum of twenty-five thouſand eight hundred and eighty ſtar pagodas and a half (25,880½); this is not due for ſix months to come; yet, as Colonel *Capper* has repreſented to me the difficulties he is put to, by the demand of his creditors, it is my deſire to pay the abovementioned ſum into the Company's treaſury (provided the country is in peace) along with the kiſts for current charges, ending the 30th June 1781. You will be kind enough to ſatisfy Colonel *Capper* regarding the diſcharge of this money.

What ſhall I ſay more?

The Preſident is requeſted to deſire the Nabob to explain the nature of his debt to Colonel *Capper*.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*, the 26th June 1780.

The Preſident delivers in the following Minute.

The Preſident acquaints the Committee, that having, at their recommendation, applied to the Nabob for an explanation of the ground of his Letter, concerning an Account now ſubſiſting between his Highneſs and Colonel *James Capper*, he has, in conſequence, been requeſted by the Nabob to inform the Committee, that the balance due from him to Colonel *Capper*, amounting as per his bond, to pagodas 25,880½, excluſive of intereſt upon it, conſiſted principally of diſburſements which the Colonel had made in *England*, upon his Highneſs's account, when he laſt went home with diſpatches from this Preſidency: that the Colonel, ſoon after his return to this country, ſettled Accounts with the Nabob, taking the ſaid bond from him as an acquittance of his demand: that the bond will not become due till the month of December next, but that the Colonel having preſent occaſion for this money, to enable him to make good a ſum which he owes Sir *Robert Barker* in *England*, and which Sir *Robert* had ordered his attornies here to depoſit in the Company's treaſury, until good opportunities of remitting could be procured, had ſolicited the Nabob to aſſiſt him in this emergency, ſo that he might be authorized to tell Sir *Robert*'s attornies, who were conſtantly importuning him for payment of his debt, that ſo much had, through his means, been ſafely lodged in the Company's funds, agreeably to Sir *Robert*'s directions; and that the ſame would be forthcoming whenever they (his attornies) ſhould have occaſion to draw for it, in order to remit it by ſuch conveyances as Sir *Robert* had pointed out. APPENDIX, Nos. 20 & 21.

That the Nabob being inclined to do all in his power towards relieving Colonel *Capper* from his preſent embarraſſment, had promiſed the Colonel that he would requeſt of this Government, to paſs the Company's receipt to Colonel *Capper*, for the amount of his Highneſs's bond to him, as ſo much paid into the Company's caſh, on account of General Sir *Robert Barker*; he (the Nabob) meaning that the ſame ſhould be included in the kiſts which are now ſettling to be paid by his Highneſs, in the courſe of the year ending 30th April 1781.

That by this tranſaction the Nabob's benevolent intentions towards Colonel *Capper* would be fulfilled, the Company, in all probability, ſo far from becoming loſers by their interference, would enjoy the full uſe of the money in queſtion for a conſiderable ſpace of time without intereſt, by the Nabob's making good the payment of it, before Sir *Robert*'s attornies could meet with ſuitable occaſions of remittance.

Upon a review of the above recited particulars, which the Preſident ſubmits to the conſideration of the Committee, the Preſident is of opinion, that the requeſt of the Nabob ſhould be complied with, as there does not appear in it any thing unreaſonable, or in any ſhape inconſiſtent with the intereſt of the Company; and as our duty enjoins us to treat, with the moſt favourable attention, every matter thus ſituated, in which his Highneſs's wiſhes are immediately concerned.

As the Nabob ſeems very anxious that the Committee ſhould ſatisfy Colonel *Capper*, in regard to the debt due to him; it is agreed, to oblige the Nabob in this inſtance, by granting Colonel *Capper* a bond for the money; but it is recommended to the Preſident to make ſuch a ſettlement with the Nabob, that the Company may ſuſtain no loſs or riſque by this tranſaction.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort Saint George* to the Court of Directors; dated 9th January 1780.

Par. 97. Shortly upon the departure of Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, we were ſolicited by the Nabob to aſſiſt him with a ſmall loan he was in want of, for diſcharging a demand made upon him by Colonel *James Capper*. As the Nabob appeared very anxious that this debt ſhould be cleared off; and as he engaged that the Company ſhould neither ſuſtain loſs nor riſk by the tranſaction, we acquieſced in the propoſition made to us by his Highneſs, and accordingly granted Colonel *Capper* a bond for the amount, as is particularly ſet forth in our proceedings of the day referred to in the margin. Committee, 26th June 1780.

APPENDIX, No. 21.

Extract of Governor Rumbold's Minute.

MR. *Petrie*, when he was called before the Board, before the ſiege of *Pondicherry*, promiſed to deliver in a ſtate of the Tanjore Revenues for ſome years paſt, which he had obtained from good authority. That ſtatement he has delivered to me, and I now lay it before the Committee; they will ſee from it how the rents have been reduced. Fort Saint George Sel. Conſ. 21 Nov. 1778, fol. 615.

A particular Account of the Tanjore Country.

The Yacoſee Rajah was the firſt man who took poſſeſſion of the fort and country of *Tanjore* from a Gentoo king. This event happened on the 7th day of February 1675; dated in Gentoo, Rauchina Nama Sum Vackaram Magah Sudda Septmee. Fol. 620.

It appears from the books which are kept in the Palace, that there were 5,753 villages, which ſaid villages were divided into the five following Soubahs or Diſtricts:

Soubah Trivady,
Soubah Combiconum,
Soubah Marjaveram,
Soubah Mannergoody,
Soubah Pattacotah and Vallamput.

APPENDIX, No. 21.

The Country produced, in the year 1675, under Yaccogee Rajah, Paddy Collums - - 32,050,000
Yaccogee's eldeſt ſon, Shajajee, ſucceeded to the Government, and the Country yielded annually, during a reign of thirty-ſix years, Paddy Collums - - - - - - - - - 32,050,000
Shajajee was ſucceeded by his brother Sharabajee, and held the Government 18 years. The country produced annually - - - - - - - - - - - - - 24,000,000
This deficiency in the Revenues was attributed to the careleſsneſs of his Manager.
Tuccajee ſucceeded his brother Sharabajee, and reigned ſix years. The produce of the country was annually - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 24,000,000
Tuccajee was ſucceeded by his ſon Baba Saib, who lived one year; the lands produced - 20,000,000
At his deceaſe, his wife Sucjanaboy took charge of the Government for two years, and the produce was per annum - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20,000,000
At her death, the ſon of Sharabajee (called Colerajah) ſucceeded to the Government for one year. The produce was - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 20,000,000
And Colerajah's ſucceſſor was Pretap Sing, youngeſt ſon of the deceaſed Tuccajee. He enjoyed the Government 24 and an half years. His four Managers were Aunajee, Shanjejee, Ragupaty, and Yanjore Manajee, and a Dobeer. Under theſe four Managers the country produced every year - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17,000,000
Pretap Sing's eldeſt ſon, Tulajee Maharajah, ſucceeded to the throne. He employed the undermentioned Managers, viz. Manajee Huſſain Cawn, Swororow Balajee Sindar Dobeer, Gilbileapah Buchanna, Hircarrh Rangia. The country produced, under theſe Managers, every year - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15,000,000
Some time after this the Nabob took poſſeſſion of the country and fort of Tanjore. He appointed the Dobeer to be the ſole Manager; under whoſe management the country produced - 17,000,000
As ſoon as the Rajah was reſtored to his fort and country, he appointed Buchana Laula Vincatraputty, Tondamanapa Ranajia. Under theſe Managers the country annually yielded - 15,000,000
The two laſt years I believe it has fallen as low as - - - - - - - - - 13,000,000

N. B. The foregoing Account I received from an old man, who was a Writer under the Dobeer, and Manager, in the time of *Pretap Sing*, father to the preſent Rajah of *Tanjore*. I have given it literally from the Maratta tranſlation.

Wm Petrie.

An Account of the Tanjore Revenue, extracted from the Circar Books.

In the three laſt years of the Rajah's father's reign, viz.

In the year 1759	32 Lacks of* Chuckrams	
1760	33 D°	D°
1761	37 D°	D°
In the two firſt years of the preſent Rajah's Adminiſtration,		
In the year 1762	28 D°	D°
1763	33 D°	D°
In the year 1771 being the year of the firſt ſiege of Tanjore	34½ D°	D°
During the Nabob's Government,		
1773	33½ D°	D°
1774	52 D°	D°
1775 being the year of the Rajah's reſtoration, the Nabob received during the time the country was poſſeſſed by him	20 D°	D°
The Rajah received, in the remainder of that year	10 D°	D°
Loſt by a change of Government	10 D°	D°
In the year 1776	26 D°	D°
1777	24 D°	D°

Wm Petrie.

* 10 Fanams make One Chuckram.
2 Chuckrams and 3½ Fanams, or 23½ Tanjore Fanams make One Star Pagoda.

Extract of Mr. *Petrie*'s evidence before the Committee, in explanation of the above Accounts.

The Committee will obſerve, that the Account of the Revenues of the Tanjore country is eſtimated in Collums of Paddy, or in Chuckrams. The Collum is a meaſure which varies in different parts of *Hindoſtan*. In *Tanjore* I believe it is between 70 and 80 Engliſh quarts, and the medium price of a Collum of Paddy (or rice before it is beat out) is 3½ Gold Fanams, or 7 Silver Fanams, or nearly one ſhilling and four pence ſterling; ſo that one lack, or 100,000 Collums of Paddy, at the aforementioned price, will produce Star Pagodas 15,555. 25 fs.

In the Tanjore country the Star Pagoda is valued at 45 Madras or Silver Fanams. The Porto Novo Pagoda is from 10 to 15 per cent. inferior to the Star.

A Chuckram is equal to 20 Madras or 10 Gold Fanams.

Two Chuckrams and one Fanam are equal to one Porto Novo Pagoda.

Forty two Madras or Silver Fanams are equal to one Porto Novo Pagoda, in the Tanjore Accounts; but in the Company's books the Porto Novo Pagoda is reckoned at 36 Fanams, and the Star Pagoda at 42, although in fact it varies from 41 to 47, and even more.

APPENDIX, No. 22.

Extract from Mr. *Petrie's* Evidence before the Committee.

BEFORE I ſpeak of the preſent ſtate of the Tanjore country, it will be neceſſary to inform the Committee, that not many years ago, that Province was conſidered as one of the moſt flouriſhing, beſt cultivated, populous diſtricts in *Hindoſtan*. I firſt ſaw this country in 1768, when it exhibited a very different picture from its preſent ſituation. *Tanjore* was formerly a place of great foreign and inland trade; it imported cotton from *Bombay* and *Surat*; raw and worked ſilks from *Bengal*; ſugar, ſpices, &c. from *Sumatra*, *Malacca*, and the Eaſtern Iſlands; gold, horſes, elephants, and timber, from *Pegu*, and various articles of trade from *China*. It was by means of *Tanjore* that a great part of *Hyder Ally's* dominions, and the North Weſtern parts of the Maratta empire, were ſupplied with many European commodities, and with a ſpecies of ſilk manufacture from *Bengal*, which is almoſt univerſally worn as a part of dreſs by the natives of *Hindoſtan*. The exports of *Tanjore* were, muſlins, chintz, handkerchiefs, ginghams, various ſorts of long cloths, and a coarſe painted cloth; which laſt conſtitutes a material article in the inveſtments of the Dutch and Danes, being in great demand for the African, Weſt Indian, and South American markets.—Few countries have more natural advantages than *Tanjore*; it poſſeſſes a rich and fertile ſoil, ſingularly well ſupplied with water from the two great rivers, *Cavery* and *Coleroon*, which, by means of reſervoirs, ſluices, and canals, are made to diſperſe their waters through almoſt every field in this country: to this latter cauſe we may chiefly attribute the uncommon fertility of *Tanjore*; the face of the country is beautifully diverſified, and in its appearance approaches nearer to *England* than any other part of *India* that I have ſeen. Such was *Tanjore* not many years ago; but its decline has been ſo rapid, that in many diſtricts it would now be difficult to trace the remains of its former opulence.

To account for this revolution, various cauſes muſt be aſſigned. That the Revenues fell ſhort of former collections ſome years preceding the capture of *Tanjore* for the Nabob, muſt be charged upon the rapacious miniſters who at that time ruled the country, and plundered their maſter while they oppreſſed the inhabitants: diſtricts were mortgaged for preſent ſupplies; and jaghires to a large amount ſettled upon themſelves, many of which have not yet reverted to the Circar. But as thoſe evils were not of long duration, their effects were only partially felt; for at this period, as I have been informed, the manufactures flouriſhed, the country was populous, and well cultivated, the inhabitants were wealthy and induſtrious. Since the year 1771, the æra of the firſt ſiege, until the reſtoration of the Rajah, the country having been during that period twice the ſeat of war, and having undergone two revolutions in the Government, trade, manufactures, and agriculture, were neglected, and many thouſands of inhabitants went in queſt of a more ſecure abode. It is, however, neceſſary in this place to obſerve, that during the year 1774, while *Tanjore* was governed by the Nabob, all the accounts which I have ſeen, make the Revenue to amount to one-third more than the year preceding the conqueſt, and to more than double the ſum which appeared in the Circar books for the year I reſided at *Tanjore*. Strange as this circumſtance may appear at firſt view, I think it may be explained by the unuſual high price of grain in the year 1774, when the ſcarcity was ſo great as almoſt to amount to a famine, by the Tuncan duties being raiſed, and by many of the old jaghires and grants from the Circars being reſumed by the Nabob.

Since the reſtoration of the Rajah in 1776, many cauſes have contributed to leſſen the Revenue, and impoveriſh the country. I will firſt mention the ignorance and rapacity of his principal Managers, as I look upon this as the great and primary evil from whence moſt of the other originate. Secondly, to the failure of many of the principal Farmers, and to the unuſual cheapneſs of grain. And, thirdly, to a general opinion, which for a long time ran through the country, that the Rajah's Government would not be of long duration, and that another revolution was approaching. Hence every ſpecies of embezzlement and peculation; his miniſters extorting money from the Zemindars; they oppreſſing the people, who are often obliged to diſpoſe of their cattle, and the very implements of huſbandry, to ſatisfy the calls of their unrelenting landlords. The thouſand evils reſulting from ſuch a regular ſyſtem of oppreſſion, are too obvious to render it neceſſary to enlarge upon the ſubject.

APPENDIX. Nos. 22 & 23.

Ever ſince his reſtoration, the Rajah has been oppreſſed with a heavy load of debt. His expenditure has been enormous. Many of the Farmers who owed him large balances, have abſconded. He had no money but what was levied from his people, or raiſed by deſtructive loans at an exorbitant ruinous intereſt.

The great ſcarcity of ſpecie in the Tanjore country is an evil which has been long felt, and when I left *India*, it had got to an alarming height. Pagodas and fanams were formerly coined to a large amount at *Tanjore*. But a former Rajah having ſold the right of coinage to the Dutch at *Negapatam*, the country depends chiefly upon that ſource now for its ſupplies of ſpecie.

APPENDIX, No. 23.

2d February 1782.

EDWARD COTSFORD, eſquire, attending, was examined as followeth; viz.

1ſt.—Q. How long has he been in *India*, and in what ſtations?

2d.—Q. When did he go laſt there, and when return?

3d.—Q. In what ſtation was he?—A. I was appointed a writer on the Madras eſtabliſhment, in November 1757: I was firſt put under the Military Storekeeper, as his aſſiſtant; ſome months before the ſiege of *Madras*, I was appointed to act as Practitioner Engineer, with the rank of Enſign in that corps; I continued in it (but chiefly in the field) until the reduction of *Madura*, about the latter end of 1764: I then went to *England*, where I arrived about the end of March 1765: about a year after I returned again to *India*, and upon quitting my military employment, was appointed Chief or Reſident at *Ganjam*, in April 1768: I quitted *Ganjam* (as I think) the latter end of the year 1772; and upon my arrival at *Madras*, was ſworn in as a Member of the Council (my due by rotation) and ſoon after left *India*: in January 1778, I was appointed Chief at *Mazulipatam*, by the Court of Directors: the following Auguſt I arrived at *Madras*, and took charge of *Mazulipatam* in the December of the ſame year: I quitted that Chiefſhip at the end of 1780, and left *Madras* for *England* in January following, where I arrived the end of the year 1781.

4th.—Q. He will pleaſe to give the Committee ſuch information reſpecting the Company's poſſeſſions under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, as may enable them to judge of their preſent ſtate.—A. The ſtate of the affairs of the Company, under the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, is, I think, alarming.

All that part of the *Carnatic* contained between *Nelloor* to the northward, and *Trichinopoly* inland, and *Cuddalore* on the ſea coaſt to the ſouthward, is poſſeſſed by the enemy, and (as I believe) almoſt all the forts and ſtrong holds therein, except *Trichinopoly*, *Vellore*, and *Wandewaſh*, conſequently no immediate ſupplies of any kind can be drawn from thoſe countries.

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In the diſtricts under *Nelloor* to the northward, the authority of the Nabob's Government is much ſhaken; and the conduct of his Servants in the Revenue branch there, has been contradictory to his orders, therefore their fidelity to him may be ſuſpected. This information I received in private Letters from Captain *Welsford* of the Company's troops, who was in the command of *Nelloor* when I left *Maſulipatam*, but is (as I underſtand) ſince dead.

The Vencatyghery and Calaſtry Rajahs, whoſe Zemindaries are inland of *Nelloor* may, and probably will, be dilatory in paying any tribute; for which conduct, conſidering their near ſituation to *Cuddapah*, in *Hyder*'s poſſeſſion, they may urge ſeveral oſtenſible reaſons.

The Ongole and Palnaud countries, ſituated ſtill to the northward of *Nelloor*, were, when I left *India*, unmoleſted, but the Revenue ariſing from them is inconſiderable. It is my opinion, the reſources to be drawn from all the countries abovementioned are uncertain, and, at all events, cannot be conſiderable.

From the four Circars at preſent in the poſſeſſion of the Company (if the inveſtment for *England* muſt for the preſent be diſcontinued to ſupply the exigencies of the Government abroad) after diſburſing the civil and military charges dependant upon them, the following ſupplies for the *Carnatic* might be drawn annually:

	Star Pagodas.
From Maſ[m] and its dependencies - -	3,00,000
Viz[m] and its dependencies - -	1,00,000
Ganjam, and its dependencies -	70,000
Total -	4,70,000

There is an annual payment of Peſcuſh to *Nizam Ally*, the Soubah of the *Decan*, for the Circars, which is not provided for in the above.

The countries dependant upon *Trichinopoly*, *Madura*, and *Palamcotah*, are liable to incurſions of the enemy's cavalry (which although ſuch a force may not attempt for the preſent a permanent poſſeſſion) may, and probably will, prevent any Revenue from being collected, particularly in the two latter of theſe countries, where the leading people, I underſtand, are not entirely attached to the Nabob's Government.

The preſent ſtate of *Tanjore*, and the degree of good will of the Rajah towards the India Company, I really do not know, therefore I cannot ſay what aſſiſtance he may be able or willing to give in the preſent conjuncture.

The diſtrict of *Nagore* (a part of the Tanjore country poſſeſſed by the Company) has been over-run and deſtroyed by a detachment of Hyder's troops, ſome time in February 1781.

The total inability (as it ſhould ſeem) of the Nabob *Mahommed Ally Cawn*, to bear any part of the great charges which the war in the *Carnatic* will inevitably incur, muſt be mentioned. Without powerful aſſiſtance from him in the article of money, the Governor and Council may be driven to great extremity, before *Hyder* (even if not aſſiſted by an ally) can be compelled to retire from the *Carnatic*.

5th.—Q. Whether does he, from his knowledge of the Circars at different periods, conſider them to be now in a ſtate of advancement or decline in wealth and population?—A. I conſider the Zemindaries to be at preſent in a ſtate of decline. I am led to this opinion from comparing the management of the buſineſs at *Maſulipatam* under former Chiefs, at the times I have paſſed through that place, as alſo from the records which I have read, together with my own, in the years 1779 and 1780. I do not find, that in times previous to my adminiſtration of affairs there, any difficulties of moment occurred; whereas, during my time, the impediments to the collection of the Revenue were great and continual, as will appear from a peruſal of the correſpondence between the Madras Preſidency and *Maſulipatam*, at the time.

I underſtand, from converſing with perſons long reſident there, that the vicinity of *Maſulipatam* is not ſo populous as it has been; but I ſee no cauſe to imagine, that the Circars in general are leſs ſo than they have been for ſome years paſt, particularly as the countries have ſeldom, even in a partial degree, experienced the rigours of war, ſince they have been in the poſſeſſion of the Company.

6th.—Q. What are the cauſes of that ſtate of the Zemindars?—A. From the beſt information I have received during my reſidence in the Circars (at *Ganjam* and *Maſulipatam*) the tribute received from the Zemindars, in the Government of the Mahomedans, ſince the time of *Nadir Shaw*'s invaſion of the empire, was very uncertain and irregular; frequently large ſums were exacted, but rarely paid, owing to the very uncertain poſſeſſion which thoſe exerciſing the Government had in thoſe fluctuating times: pretenders alſo to authority have frequently entered the countries, and demanded money. In theſe times the Zemindars found it neceſſary to maintain troops, both for immediate protection, and to enable them to make uſe of ſuch advantages as the frequent changes of Government preſented to them; and, upon the whole, they generally evaded paying any thing conſiderable. When the French, under Monſ[r] *Buſſy*, took poſſeſſion of theſe Circars, the different Zemindars entertained large bodies of men. Things were in much the ſame ſtate when Colonel *Forde* took *Maſulipatam*. Since that period, the Company have had permanent poſſeſſion of the Circars, under the juriſdiction of *Maſulipatam*, and have enforced regular payment of their tribute: but the Zemindars took ſome years before they diſbanded their troops; and even now, in many of their Zemindaries, great portions of land are ſequeſtered, and held by the poſſeſſors as jaghires. Whether it proceeds from a principle of pride in the Zemindars, that theſe lands are not reſumed, or whether their principal ſervants prevent it from other motives, I cannot ſay. This drawback, however, without any advantage attending it to them, as formerly, is in my opinion one reaſon of their decline. The Zemindars pay very high intereſt to Soucars, or bankers, who advance them money to make good their tribute, before the collections in the country can be made: this is a heavy charge upon the Zemindars. European individuals have alſo been accuſtomed to lend money at high intereſt to the Zemindars, before the publication of the Regulating Act; but I know of no ſuch interference by Europeans ſince that time. This I conſider as another cauſe of their decline.

I do not recollect that the Company's tribute has ever been remitted in conſideration of unfavourable ſeaſons, though delays in payments in ſome inſtances have. As the tribute paid to the Company exceeds what had been generally paid to *Nizam Ally*, the Soubah of the *Decan*, this alſo may have had ſome influence to their detriment.

7th.—Q. In what circumſtances are the Zemindars in general? Are they in a proſpering or declining ſtate?—A. The principal Zemindars under *Maſulipatam* are much in debt to Soucars and other individuals: I believe, not leſs than ſix lacks of pagodas, over and above their arrears due to the Company.

In the Coſſimcotah and Chicacole provinces of the Chicacole Circar, which are under the juriſdiction of *Vizagapatam*, moſt of the Zemindaries are at preſent held by *Vizeram Rauze*. He cannot, I think, be much in arrear to the Company, or in any reſpect diſtreſſed, as the tribute he pays is comparatively very ſmall to the countries in his poſſeſſion. What his concerns with Soucars or other individuals are, I know not.

In the Itchapore diſtrict of the Chicacole Circar, under the juriſdiction of *Ganjam*, the Zemindars have ever, I believe, been poor and inconſiderable; but I know no immediate cauſe why that country ſhould not flouriſh, ſince the terms upon which the preſent renter holds it are reaſonable; the Maratta war may indeed have an

APPENDIX No. 23.

influence to its detriment. The latter part of this query is already anſwered above in the 6th Article.

8th.—Q. What are the cauſes of their advance or decline?—A. This query is already anſwered in the 6th Article.

9th.—Q. Does he conſider the meaſure of calling down the Zemindars to *Madras*, as having contributed to the deficiency of the payment?—A. Certainly the calling down the Zemindars to *Madras* muſt have occaſioned them ſome additional expence, and ſome confuſion in the internal management of their countries muſt have ariſen from their long abſence; for theſe reaſons I think it has contributed to the deficiency of the payment in ſome degree; but whether in the degree equal to what the Zemindars themſelves alledge, I will not take upon me to ſay; but probably not. Conſidering the ſtate of the Zemindars in general, and the ſtate of *India* at the time, I think the inſiſting upon an increaſe of their tribute or jemmabundy was injudicious.

10th.—Q. To what is the neceſſity owing of the dependance of the Zemindars upon the Soucars?—A. It has been the conſtant uſage of the country, for the Zemindars to make their payments through the medium of the Soucars: ſometimes, and moſt frequently, they are conſtrained to borrow of them through neceſſity; ſometimes their interference is intended to conceal the real ſtate of the Zemindar's affairs, and excite an idea that he is poor. The tranſactions between them are conducted with the greateſt ſecrecy, the Soucar never diſcloſing the ſtate of the affairs of the Zemindars.

11th.—Q. Do the Soucars oppreſs the Zemindars?—A. Soucars are money-lenders: they do not, I believe, always take the ſame premiums for the ſums they advance, but proportion their demand to the exigency of the borrower; and this is the only way that I know of, in which they can be ſaid to oppreſs the Zemindars.

The Chief and Council at *Maſulipatam*, in a Letter to the Preſident and Council at *Madras*, under date the 13th of June 1780, have entered pretty largely on this matter.

12th.—Q. Would it be adviſable to render the tribute of the Zemindars fixed and certain?—A. That the annual tribute ſhould be fixed, is, I conceive, the mode beſt calculated for the welfare of the countries and the Zemindars, and in no ſhape detrimental to the Company. In ſaying it ſhould be fixed, I by no means mean that the Company ſhould be bound by any written engagement to the Zemindars to that effect. Indeed I have always underſtood, that the aſſembling the Zemindars was principally to receive from them ſufficient bills upon the Soucars, for their tribute due; at the ſame time the Zemindar received annually a Cowle, ſtating, with other matters, the particular periods of payment. Some years ago they aſſembled at *Rajahmundry*, where the Chief ſettled with them; and of later years at *Maſulipatam*, where their concerns came more immediately under the cognizance of the Chief and Council.

13th.—Q. Does he think the preſent mode of leaſing the lands a proper one; or does he conſider it as having a tendency to oppreſs the Zemindars and Renters?—A. I do not conceive that the mode of receiving the Revenues from the Zemindary lands is at all oppreſſive to the Zemindars. No agents of the Company have any interference with the internal management of their countries, unleſs in caſes where they forfeit their excluſive right, by non-payment of tribute, or ſome other great cauſe; and even in thoſe caſes the Zemindar himſelf gives a written order to his Servants in truſt in the country, to deliver up his principal fort, and the management of his country, to ſuch perſons as the Company may ſend to take charge of them.

In the 6th Article, I have obſerved, that Europeans have ſometimes lent money to the Zemindars. This, I think, might have been in ſome inſtances a ground for oppreſſion. It has been cuſtomary in theſe caſes, to make over the produce of certain villages or diſtricts, in which the creditor has his agent, to take care that the Revenue thereof is properly applied. When ſuch creditor is the Chief, or any other Member of the Council, the Servant employed under the ſtrength of his Maſter's influence, may be very faulty, almoſt with impunity. Indeed I believe it has been no very uncommon caſe, where the Servants of the Zemindar and his creditor have combined together to cheat their reſpective Maſters. Chiefs of ſubordinates may be in ſome degree oppreſſive, by granting duſtucks or orders for the paſſage of certain articles through the country, duty-free, by which the Zemindars are deprived of ſo much of their Revenue. The principal Servant of the Chief has it alſo much in his power to oppreſs individuals, and in many caſes with ſecurity. I do not mean here to apply the two laſt caſes to any individual. It is an evil ariſing from the principles of deſpotic Government, although that Government is adminiſtered by an authority not profeſſing thoſe principles.

Renters may be liable to oppreſſions from ſimilar caſes.

14th.—Q. Does he think the agreements for the poſſeſſion of the lands too ſhort?—A. What concerns the Zemindars in this Article, is already anſwered in the 12th.

With reſpect to the Havelly lands (which may be tranſlated Demeſne lands) given in farm to renters, I think ſhort leaſes are preferable, not exceeding three years. When I was reſident at *Ganjam*, I recommended the letting the Havelly lands for one year only. My reaſon for this opinion is, that there is a greater probability to a renter who has regularly fulfilled his engagements, that he may have a renewal of his leaſe, than there is to the Company, that they may not ſuffer conſiderable loſſes in a long leaſe, taking it for granted, that the Servants of the Company continually watch over the welfare of the countries committed to their charge.

15th.—Q. Does he think the ſums exacted from them above what the lands can bear?—A. I have already in part given an anſwer to this query, as far as the ſame concerns the Zemindars.

I believe it is no very uncommon caſe for renters to give in propoſals, by which, where they have been accepted, they have been conſiderable loſers. They have chiefly been urged to this from a principle of pride or competition. Where this happens, the countries ſo rented out, muſt ſuffer ſome devaſtation. I think many of the Farms are rented out too high.

I have been told, that in times before the Europeans had any interference in theſe matters, the tribute from the Zemindars, and the rents from the Havelly lands, were much lower than they have ever been ſince. Such a conduct certainly qualified the rigour of a deſpotic Government, and provided for the proſperity of the country.

Anwar a dien Cawn (father to *Mahommed Ally*, the preſent Nabob of the *Carnatic*) who was the Nizam's deputy in the Chicacole Circar, took a very low tribute from the Zemindars; the Havelly lands alſo were leaſed out upon eaſy terms. This I learned from the records of the country when I was at *Ganjam*.

16th.—Q. Does he think the renters really unable to pay, or is it only a pretence?—A. I believe in general, when the renters fail in their payments, it proceeds from inability; the cauſe of this inability is partly ſtated in the laſt Article; the natives in general do not pay attention enough to œconomy; and in ſome caſes they are very extravagant, particularly in celebrating the weddings which happen in their families, which may alſo promote this inability.

17th and 18th.—Q. Are the inferior poſſeſſors of the lands in a ſtate of eaſe or not?

Q. What are the cauſes?—A. When the lands are farmed out at a rent higher than they will bear (as ſtated before) the inferior poſſeſſors will be oppreſſed. I do not recollect any other cauſe, ſpeaking in general.

Appendix. No. 23.

19th.—Q. Are the lands better or worſe cultivated than formerly?—A. From the conſideration that a larger rent is now exacted from the lands, whereby the ryots or inhabitants have a ſmaller ſhare, the inference to be drawn muſt be, that they are worſe cultivated now than formerly: and I think I may venture to ſay they generally are ſo, from what has paſſed within my own obſervation during my reſidence in *Lalore*.

20th.—Q. Does he think the eſtabliſhment, and other expences, of the Zemindars and Renters, in any degree the cauſe of their diſtreſs?—A. I have taken notice, that many of the Zemindars have not put aſide entirely their eſtabliſhment of troops, under the name of Sibbendy. I know of no particular cauſe for their diſtreſs more than I have already mentioned.

I have already noted, that the renters are generally extravagant in the celebration of their weddings. As their manner of living is very ſimple, and always the ſame, I do not think it can conduce to their diſtreſs. If it does in any degree, it muſt ariſe from their hoſpitality; the natives hold this virtue in high reſpect, and are ſometimes almoſt unbounded in their acts of benevolence: all this may be equally applied to the Zemindars.

21ſt.—Q. Is the country more or leſs populous than it formerly was.—A. I have frequently heard it affirmed, that the Company's Jaguire lands in the *Carnatic*, are leſs populous than they were ſome years ago; but as I have never ſeen any proof that it is ſo, I cannot aſſent to that belief, particularly as it may reaſonably be ſuppoſed, that the Nabob's reſidence in the vicinity of *Madras*, muſt have drawn many people from the interior parts of the country. As I have not been much at *Madras* of late years, I am not ſufficiently informed of the ſtate of population in the *Carnatic* in general. What concerns the Northern Circars has been already anſwered in the 5th Article.

22d.—Q. What are the cauſes of the difference of population in the neighbourhood of *Maſulipatam*, as beforementioned.—A. As it was in times preceding the arrival of Europeans, in which *Maſulipatam* was more populous than it has been of late years, I cannot tell the cauſes of the decreaſe of population there; but moſt probably, it has been from the great decreaſe of trade, which I underſtand was formerly very conſiderable there.

23d.—Q. Have the Revenues under *Maſulipatam* been well paid? if not, what have been the cauſes?—A. I believe, when the Circars firſt came into the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, the countries dependent upon *Maſulipatam* were in a much more flouriſhing ſtate than they are at preſent, and the Revenue ariſing from them more punctually paid. In a former paragraph, I have noted the probable cauſes why the Zemindars have decreaſed in wealth; but until theſe few years back, this influence was not felt by the Company immediately, as the Revenue was ſtill regularly received: but the Zemindars began to contract debts, which have ſince become very conſiderable. Since the period of the unhappy diſputes in the Council in which Lord *Pigot* was deprived of his authority, the affairs of the Company every where on the Coromandel Coaſt have viſibly declined. Upon my arrival at *Madras* in 1778, I found the general ſtate of things entirely altered, and much for the worſe, ſince the time of my leaving *India* in 1773.

During the time that the concerns of *Maſulipatam* were under my charge as Chief, the Revenues have been ill paid, although no endeavours were wanting on my part to enforce order and obedience in the Zemindars; and I believe I may venture to affirm, that no former Chief had ſo many impediments to encounter as I had, over and above the general ill ſtate of the Company's affairs. The following I conſider as the immediate cauſes of the difficulties I experienced.

The calling down the Zemindars to the Preſidency, which I have already taken notice of in the 9th paragraph; the loſs of time alſo, from their ſtay at *Madras* after my arrival, was very conſiderable, and of detriment.

The increaſing the jemabundy or tribute of the principal Zemindars, occaſioned much diſcontent amongſt them.

The depriving the Company's Interpreter, or Dubaſh, named *Vencety Royalon*, of certain poſſeſſions held in the Circars, and the leſſening his authority in the opinion of the Zemindars, was the cauſe of giving me much additional trouble, and the meaſure itſelf was a great impediment to me.

The ſuffering the Zemindars to have vakeels, or agents, reſiding at the Preſidency, was alſo a very conſiderable bar in conducting the affairs at *Maſulipatam*.

To theſe cauſes may be added the eventual one which the war with *Hyder Ally* occaſioned, I mean his overrunning the Guntoor Circar with a conſiderable body of cavalry (from 3 to 5,000) by which the minds of the Soucars were much embarraſſed at a very critical time, as will more fully appear in the correſpondence with the Preſidency.

24th.—Q. Are manufactures in a ſtate of advance or decline?—A. I think upon the whole they may be ſaid to be upon the decline, as the cloths are in general higher priced, and not ſo well fabricated as they have been: I ſpeak chiefly of manufactures in the Circars; in what ſtate they are in the *Carnatic*, I am in a great degree ignorant.

25th.—Q. What are the cauſes?—A. In conſequence of our ſucceſſes laſt war, the manufactures have been in a great degree in the hands of the Company, which enabled their Servants at the different factories, to provide cloth upon their own account, after ſupplying the Company to the extent of their demands. The French during the peace have alſo had an agent or agents at *Tanam*, living there under our Government, who have provided cloth for private adventurers of their own nation chiefly. Of late years the Danes have fallen into this track of trade, and I believe have been ſupplied in a great degree by Britiſh agents. The demand for this trade being great, without any check, or that nice inſpection into the fabrick of the cloths, which is conſtantly obſerved in the inveſtment provided for the Company, may be, and I think is, the cauſe that the cloths in general are higher rated, and not ſo well fabricated.

The almoſt inſuperable difficulties which the Company have put in the way of remitting money to *England* by individuals, together with the great falling-off of their own inveſtments, have afforded ſtrangers both the opportunity and the means of carrying on a very advantageous trade, which in its conſequences muſt be detrimental to the Company. This matter, I think, deſerves the attention of the Committee.

26th.—Q. What is his opinion of the eſtabliſhment of the Committee of Circuit?

27th.—Q. Was it well calculated to anſwer the purpoſes of its inſtitution?—A. The Court of Directors, in their Letter to *Madras* under the date, April 12th 1775, certainly directed the attention of the Government of *Madras* to proper objects for the inquiry of a Committee of Circuit; but I think the mode ordered for that inquiry, which has been, and is ſtill ſo much wanted, is open to ſome objections.

The eſtabliſhment of ſuch a Committee as was ordered by the Directors, would be attended with more expence than the nature of the buſineſs to be done made neceſſary.

The buſineſs they were to be employed upon was not, as I conceive, of the deliberative kind, except in the ſingle caſe of letting out the lands at the expiration of the former leaſes; therefore, that the appointment of ſo many Gentlemen was unneceſſary.

The empowering them to re-let the lands independent of the Chief and Council, under whoſe juriſdiction the countries might be, would diminiſh too much the authority and reſponſibility of ſuch Chief and Council, and make it very difficult for them to act with vigour in caſes where a particular exertion might be neceſſary. I hold it as a maxim, that in the Government of deſpotic countries, the ſhort

power

power cannot be divided without detriment; diſputes alſo would ariſe between the Committee and the Chief and Council, to the detriment of the Company: Upon the whole, I think it very poſſible, that the inconveniences of ſuch an eſtabliſhment might more than counterbalance any advantage that would ariſe from it.

Obſerving how great the hopes entertained by the Directors were, from the eſtabliſhment of the Committee of Circuit, by the great diſapprobation they have ſhewn, from their orders not having been executed, I give my opinion on theſe two queries with ſome diffidence. If I did not conceive there was another mode for gaining a very accurate knowledge of theſe countries, not attended with thoſe inconveniences, perhaps I ſhould not have hazarded this opinion.

28th.—Q. Was there a ſufficient number of the Servants of the Company capable of executing that commiſſion independent of the Members of Council employed in it when it was aboliſhed?—A. I have no doubt but there were many Servants of the Company equally capable with the Members of the Board when the Committee of Circuit was aboliſhed; unleſs indeed, from their ſtation, the latter could receive any additional weight.

29th.—Q. What is his opinion of the meaſure of aboliſhing it?—A. I think when it was aboliſhed ſome other mode ſhould have been ſubſtituted by the Governor and Council, that the ſpirit of the orders from home might have been followed; but it is poſſible that the general ſtate of the Company's affairs at the time might have obſtructed the proſecution of the orders received; and of this I am not maſter enough of the ſubject to judge. It certainly is an implication, that a country is in a ſtate of tranquillity, where inquiries of this nature can be made.

30th.—Q. Would not an accurate inveſtigation of the Circars, upon the plan of the Committee of Circuit, be ſtill of great advantage?—A. Admitting that the Committee of Circuit is a good mode, I fear the ſtate of affairs there is ſuch as to diſcourage the putting it in immediate execution.

31ſt.—Q. What is the ſtate of the Jaguire lands?—A. To this query I cannot anſwer from my own knowledge; but I have heard it frequently, and indeed always aſſerted, that the Jaguire lands are rather in a declining than a flouriſhing ſtate; and the reaſon given is, that the Nabob is ſo tenacious of holding theſe lands, that he gives for them more than they are worth, to exclude any other candidate; this probably obliges him to draw a greater Revenue from the countries, than is conſiſtent with ſound policy, or the dictates of ſimple juſtice.

32d.—Q. Is it of advantage that they ſhould be continued with the Nabob?—A. Conſidering the conduct of the Nabob of late years, and the power he has aſſumed, I think it highly improper that the Jaguire lands ſhould be under his management.

The principal motive of the Nabob in renting the Jaguire is, as I believe, that the ſole authority throughout the *Carnatic* ſhall be in him. I believe he would conſider the letting any other perſon have theſe lands as diſgraceful to him.

It is not conſiſtent with the Company's proſperity, that any perſon poſſeſſing ideas of independence, ſhould have unlimited power in the Jaguire lands; as in that caſe the benefits ariſing from a territory which is ſo well ſituated to afford reſources of all kinds to the Preſidency may be much leſſened, and abuſes committed in the country not be effectually inquired into. I believe there are inſtances mentioned in the records at *Madras* to this purpoſe, but I do not remember them ſufficiently to point them out particularly.

33d.—Q. Are his own lands in a better ſtate?—A. I have always underſtood that the Nabob's Government is very oppreſſive, and that the inhabitants are kept in great poverty, and conſequently that his countries have greatly declined. As it is now ſome years ſince I have been any where in the interior parts of the *Carnatic*, I can ſay nothing to this query from my own knowledge.

34th.—Q. What is the cauſe of his diſtreſs?—A. Upon public grounds this I think cannot be accounted for, as the Nabob has held the *Carnatic* in a ſtate of uninterrupted peace for many years.—That the Nabob ſhould be in actual diſtreſs under ſuch circumſtances, is a matter of great moment, and highly deſerving the attention of the Committee; becauſe, if it is a fact, it demonſtrates that the Company, ſo far from being gainers from their concerns in the *Carnatic*, muſt be loſers.—The expence of reducing *Pondicherry* and *Mahé* may have been conſiderable, but the amount of this expence is greatly over-balanced by the immenſe debts he has contracted with individuals.

35th.—Q. Is there not a great annual exportation of ſpecie from the country?—A. Independent of the ſpecie ſent to *China* on account of the Company (chiefly from *Bengal*) I believe within the laſt twelve years very conſiderable ſums have been exported by individuals from the Coromandel Coaſt, and ſome from *Bengal* alſo, but to what amount annually I cannot take upon me to ſay.

36th.—Q. To what is the exportation of ſpecie owing?—A. Some few individuals may have ſent ſpecie to *China* for the advantage of the high intereſt paid for money there; but it is owing, in a much greater degree, to the difficulties which individuals find in making remittances to *England* directly, by which (amongſt other expedients) they have fallen upon the mode of ſending it to *China*, from whence the amount is remitted to *England*, either by bills on the Company or others.

37th.—Q. What does he think will be the effect of that exportation of ſpecie?—A. I believe it is generally underſtood, that the exportation of the ſpecie is of detriment to a State; the exportation to *China*, therefore, muſt be in a more particular manner ſo, as it is believed that none is ever ſent out of that country.

Further queſtions put to Mr. *Cotsford*.

Were the Zemindars and Renters under the Mahomedan Government ſubject to any payments more than the rents agreed to be paid annually for the diſtricts which they held?—I believe the deputies of the Government did receive, over and above the tribute ſettled under the Government, a further ſum under the name of nazar or preſent, which they pretended was for payment of their troops; but their ability to procure this was in proportion to the ſtrength of their army.

Did the preſents bear any proportion to the tribute, or were they arbitrary?—I think they were arbitrary.

After the Zemindaries came under European Government, did any of the remains of the nazar or preſents exiſt?—I believe it has exiſted, and think I have ſeen a paper of Mr. *Buſſy*'s, where a part of the tribute is brought to account under the head of Preſent.

When it came from the French, under our Government, did the ſame practice exiſt?—I think it has exiſted in a greater or leſs degree ever ſince.

Under what head is it entered in our Accounts?—There is no ſuch head. I never underſtood any ſuch articles were brought to account in the Company's Accounts.

What comes of the money ſo exacted?—I think whatever preſents were received were conſidered as a perquiſite of the ſtation, and not conſidered in any reſpect as a part of the tribute.

Are the preſents now given certain, and bearing a ſettled proportion to the fixed tribute paid by the Zemindar, or are they optional at the diſcretion of the giver?—They are entirely optional.

Suppoſe the Zemindars had not been called down to *Madras*, would not you have thought yourſelf at liberty, conſiſtent with your duty, to have accepted ſuch gratuities

APPENDIX. No. 23.

ties from the Zemindars?—I ſhould have thought it my firſt duty to enforce the payment of the Company's tribute, without ſuffering my own intereſt to interfere with it; but I don't mean to ſay I ſhould have declined the cuſtomary advantages of my ſituation.

Is any preſent of importance paid upon the collections?—I don't know that there is.

Had you occaſion to ſee any of the Zemindars after their return from *Madras*?—I ſaw almoſt all belonging to *Maſulipatam* at *Maſulipatam*.

Had you any converſation with them about the preſents made to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, or any of the Council of the Madras Government?—I had no converſation with them concerning preſents to Sir *Thomas Rumbold*, or any of the Council of the Preſidency of *Madras*; but they complained of the expences to and from *Madras*, and while reſident there, as reaſons for not being ſo punctual as formerly in paying their tribute; and upon the ſame occaſion, and with the ſame view, they mentioned the diſorders created in the management of their affairs in their abſence, particularly alluding to the miſconduct of their ſervants, and in the courſe of buſineſs I found ſome of it verified.

Did it come to your knowledge by any other means, that preſents were given at *Madras*?—I have no authority to aſſert that preſents were given at *Madras*. I don't know any were given.

Did the Zemindars when at *Madras* pay any ſums for tribute, they would otherwiſe have paid at *Maſulipatam*?—I think they gave Soucar ſecurities for ſome, but I had much difficulty in recovering it; nor were the ſums promiſed to be paid, equal to what at the ſame time would have been received at *Maſulipatam*, had the Zemindars been there to look after their own buſineſs.

What other mode do you apprehend might have been taken inſtead of appointing the Committee of Circuit?—I recommend the ſame mode which was taken when Mr. *Burnard* ſurveyed the Jaghire in the *Carnatic*.

Could an individual execute the orders given by the Court of Directors in their Letter of 12th April 1775, relating to the inveſtigation of the Circars, with that authority as five perſons under the authority of the Government of the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*?—I think the inquiries pointed out for the inſtruction of the Committee of Circuit by the Court of Directors, could be as well executed by one perſon of ability, it being merely the taking the records of the ſeveral villages as I underſtand; which records, by the cuſtoms of the country, are kept in every Pergunnah and village by black ſervants belonging to the Circar or Government.

FIFTH

REPORT

FROM THE

COMMITTEE OF SECRECY,

APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR IN THE

CARNATIC,

AND OF

THE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN THOSE PARTS.

Reported by the LORD ADVOCATE *of* SCOTLAND (HENRY DUNDAS, Esq.)
1st March 1782.

FIFTH REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY, &c.

The First Maratta War.

The COMMITTEE of SECRECY, appointed to enquire into the Cauſes of the War that now ſubſiſts in the *Carnatic*, and of the preſent Condition of the Britiſh Poſſeſſions in thoſe Parts; and to report the ſame, to the Houſe, with their Obſervations thereupon; and who were inſtructed to enquire into the Riſe, Progreſs, Conduct, and preſent State of the Maratta War, and all other Hoſtilities in which the Preſidency of *Bengal* now are, or have been, engaged, in the Support of that War, and of the Effects which the ſaid War and Hoſtilities may have produced in *Bengal*, and the other Settlements and Poſſeſſions of the *Eaſt-India* Company;—

HAVE laid before the Houſe, in their Firſt Report, the beſt account which from various ſources of enquiry and information, they had been able then to procure, of the irruption of *Hyder Ally* into the *Carnatic*, and of the military tranſactions that happened, and of the other meaſures that were purſued, in conſequence thereof; and having thought it their further duty, in order more fully to inform the judgment of the Houſe, to carry forward their enquiry into an inveſtigation of the conduct of the Company's Servants, as far as it might appear to have had any influence on thoſe tranſactions, or to have been the cauſe of the misfortunes which had lately happened; they have ſubmitted to the Houſe the reſult of that part of their enquiries alſo (as far as they had proceeded therein) in the ſame Report.

But in tracing theſe ſuppoſed ſources of misfortune, your Committee were naturally induced to make it the object of their firſt attention, to examine the previous ſituation and proceedings of that Government, into whoſe immediate dependencies the invaſion of the enemy had been brought, with ſuch rapid and fatal ſucceſs. It has been already explained to the Houſe, what early and authentic intelligence of the hoſtile deſigns of *Hyder Ally*, appears to have been received by the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, and what ſteps they had taken by negotiation to prevent the attack, or by defenſive preparation to repel it.

But in the courſe of this particular inveſtigation into the previous meaſures of the Madras Preſidency, there having been diſcovered among their Records ſeveral ſuggeſtions of other cauſes extrinſic to their own conduct, and which, though ariſing at a diſtance, might be ſuppoſed, by connection or control, to have had a material effect in weakening the powers of their Government, and giving advantage to the enemy; your Committee conſidered an examination of thoſe ſuggeſtions to be incumbent upon them; and thought that they ſhould not have completed, with the impartiality they are anxious to give proof of, the duty entruſted to them, if they did not purſue every probable cauſe, however diſtant, and involved in whatever difficulties, of events ſo intereſting to the honour and welfare of the Britiſh nation, and her dependencies.

And they have received, with great ſatisfaction, an encouragement and confirmation to their opinion and intentions, by the declared ſentiments of the Houſe, at the time when the Committee was revived, at the opening of this Seſſion of Parliament. Theſe conſiderations have

naturally and neceſſarily directed the immediate proſecution of their renewed enquiries, to collect and lay before the Houſe an account of the conduct and circumſtances of the Maratta war. It has appeared to the Houſe from a former Report, that the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* had openly attributed a part of their misfortunes, ariſing from the inſufficiency of their force and reſources, and the defenceleſs ſtate of the *Carnatic* at the time of the irruption of *Hyder Ally*, to the war in which the two other Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay* had impoliticly involved the Company's poſſeſſions with the Maratta nation, and in ſupport of which, at the requiſition of thoſe Preſidencies, a conſiderable body of troops on the Madras eſtabliſhment had been ſent to *Bombay* and *Surat*. Theſe circumſtances were ſaid to have much influenced the deſigns of *Hyder Ally*; becauſe he by this means found it eaſy to make his own peace with the Marattas, and received additional encouragement to carry into execution his intended invaſion upon the territories of the Company, and of their ally the Nabob *Mahomed Ali*, in the *Carnatic*, while they were thus deprived, not only of the aſſiſtance of the other Preſidencies, but alſo of a conſiderable part of their own forces. In order to make the Houſe more competent judges of the truth and extent of this charge, your Committee have thought it proper to carry back their inveſtigation to that period in the year 1774, when the Preſidency of *Bombay* ſeized upon *Salſette* and the adjacent iſlands, which appears to have been the firſt open act of hoſtility againſt the Marattas, and to have been followed by a Treaty with *Raghonaut Row*, for the purpoſe of aſſiſting him in conſideration of certain conceſſions to the Company, to recover poſſeſſion of the Peſhwaſhip, or chief rule of the Maratta ſtate, over which a great confederacy had in his ſtead placed an infant, the real or ſuppoſititious ſon of *Narayan Row*, the deceaſed Peſhwa.

For as the ſubject of this enquiry is new and extenſive, involving in it a neceſſity of frequent references, not only to the particular ſituation of the Company's Settlements, but alſo to the general ſtate of political connections and intereſts in *India*; and as the ſingular conſtitution, as well as the actual condition of the Maratta empire, will be found to have operated with eſſential influence at the beginning, and during the continuance of the war which your Committee are to treat of, they think it improper to break at once abruptly into a mere narrative of events, without laying a previous ground-work of local information, by which alone a fair and ready judgment can be formed, of the wiſdom or impolicy, of the equity or injuſtice, of the political and military proceedings in queſtion.

The conſtitution and eſtabliſhment of a new plan of adminiſtration in *Bengal*, by which that Preſidency became entruſted to many eſſential purpoſes, with a ſuperintending power over the reſt of the Britiſh Governments, and by which the general ſyſtem of Indian affairs was materially affected, appears to your Committee, to be the proper æra in which to take a view of the political perſpective, and to make a ſlight ſketch of its general outline.

Extract from the Act 13th Geo III. c. 63. Appendix, No. 1.

The Act, intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing certain "Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs "of the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in "*Europe*," was paſſed in the 13th year of His preſent Majeſty. The general clauſes in it, which regarded only matters at home, were to take effect from and after the 1ſt October 1773; ſuch as extended in their operation to the *Eaſt Indies*, were not to be in force till the 1ſt Auguſt 1774. But your Committee find it provided, that for the Government of the Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, there ſhould be appointed a Governor General and Four Counſellors, who ſhould have the ſame powers, as were then or at any time might have been exerciſed by the Preſident and Council, or Select Committee, in the kingdoms of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*. The opinion of the majority was in all caſes of difference to decide the queſtion; and where the numbers preſent ſhould by any accident be equally divided, the Governor General, or in his abſence the next Senior Member, were to have a caſting voice. Then follows a clauſe, by which a ſuperintending and controlling power was given to them in the following words:

"And be it further enacted by the authority aforeſaid, that the ſaid Governor General and Council, or the major part of them, ſhall have, and they are hereby authorized to have power of ſuperintending and controlling the government and management of the Preſidencies of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen* reſpectively, ſo far, and in ſo much, as that it ſhall not be lawful for any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making war againſt any Indian Princes or Powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace, or other treaty, with any ſuch Indian Princes or Powers, without the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Governor General and Council firſt had and obtained, except in ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity as would render it dangerous to poſtpone ſuch hoſtilities or treaties until the orders from the Governor General and Council might arrive; and except in ſuch caſes where the ſaid Preſidents and Councils reſpectively ſhall have received ſpecial orders from the ſaid United Company: and any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, who ſhall offend in any of the caſes aforeſaid, ſhall be liable to be ſuſpended from his or their office, by the order of the ſaid Governor General and Council; and every Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, for the time being, ſhall, and they are hereby reſpectively directed and required to pay due obedience to ſuch orders as they ſhall receive, touching the premiſes, from the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being, and conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the ſaid Governor General and Council, advice and intelligence of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the Government, Revenues, or Intereſt of the ſaid United Company."

In the ſame clauſe the Governor General and Council were directed to obey the orders of the Court of Directors, and to tranſmit regular advices to them; which, within a limited time, they (the Directors) ſhould lay before one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of ſtate.

Mr. *Haſtings* was appointed the firſt Governor General; General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, Mr. *Barwell*, and Mr. *Francis*, the firſt Counſellors; and they were to hold their offices for five years, from the time of their arival in *Bengal*, and of their taking upon them the Government of that Preſidency, and not to be removable in the meantime, except by the King, upon repreſentation made by the Court of Directors. The next in rank was appointed to ſucceed in caſe of any avoidance of the office of Governor General, and the Court of Directors were impowered to ſupply the vacant place of any Counſellor, with the conſent of his Majeſty, under his ſign manual, during the firſt five years. The powers of Government, until ſuch appointment ſhould be made, were to continue in the meantime in the remaining body. After the firſt five years the nomination was to be in the Court of Directors.

The eſtabliſhment of a Board of Trade, and Regulations for the conduct of thoſe matters, which were made the particular objects of that juriſdiction, formed alſo a material part of this Act.

And your Committee alſo find herein a prohibitory clauſe againſt receiving, directly or indirectly, any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwiſe, or any promiſe or engagement for them, and againſt the carrying on, or being concerned in, any dealings or tranſactions, by way of traffic or commerce of any kind whatſoever, (the trade and commerce of the United Company only excepted); and the firſt of theſe

prohibitions were extended not only to any Governor General or Members of the Supreme Council, and to any Chief Juſtice or Member of the Supreme Court of Judicature, but alſo againſt every perſon holding a civil or a military office under the Crown or the Company. The latter was directed only againſt any Governor General and Council, and any Chief Juſtice or Member of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and againſt all Collectors, Superviſors, and any of his Majeſty's ſubjects employed in the collection of the Revenues.

All the proviſions relative to the Governor General and Council were enacted by another clauſe, to commence from the time that public proclamation ſhould be made of their arrival, or of any three of them, at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, which proclamation they were required to make.

And your Committee find, that Mr. *Haſtings* and Mr. *Barwell* were at that time in *India*, Mr. *Haſtings* being Governor, and Mr. *Barwell* one of the Members of the exiſting Council of the Preſidency of *Bengal*; that the three other Gentlemen left *England* in the month of April 1774; and that, previous to their departure, the Court of Directors had agreed upon a body of inſtructions, which were approved by Counſel as legal and and conſiſtent with the proviſions of the Act—Theſe, dated 29th March, appear to be addreſſed to the Governor General and Council of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and will be found in the Appendix, N°

N. B. They ſailed in the Anſon, April 11, 1774.

Appendix, No. 2.

Your Committee will only obſerve in this place, that they are introduced with an earneſt recommendation to the Board "of the moſt perfect harmony amongſt themſelves, as an object of the higheſt concern to the proſperity of the Company, and the due execution of the great truſt repoſed in them;" and with a direction, "that they ſhould fix their attention to the preſervation "of peace throughout *India*, and to the ſecurity of the "Poſſeſſions and Revenues of the Company." And in regard to the controlling power over the other Settlements, in matters of treaty, and on queſtions of making peace or war, your Committee find this general direction:

"That you attentively view the general poſture of "our affairs in *India*, reſpecting the country powers, "their intereſts, and probable connections with each "other, with us, and other European nations; and that "you take ſuch meaſures as ſhall, upon the whole, be "moſt conducive to our general intereſt; and in all "your deliberations and reſolutions, that you make the "ſafety and proſperity of *Bengal* your principal object."

Appendix, No. 3.

28 Auguſt 1771. Par. 32. 18 December 1771. 7 April 1773, Par. 28.

But your Committee have obſerved, that previous to theſe regulations, thus ſanctified and enforced by parliamentary authority, the Court of Directors had inſtructed the exiſting Adminiſtration, and particularly Governor *Haſtings*, to be watchful of every opportunity to reduce and regulate the expences of their Government and its dependencies, and to be earneſtly attentive to an enquiry into the conduct of their Servants under that Preſidency.

Appendix, No. 4.

And in a Letter of the 16th April 1773 to the Governor, they expreſſed an high approbation of his ſervices, and encouraged him to proceed in the arrangements he had ſo happily begun, under aſſurance of their protection and ſupport, and with this expreſs direction: "We "deſire particularly, that you will diſtinguiſh and encourage merit, wherever you find it; ſo do we moſt "ſtrictly conjure you not to ſuffer rank, ſtation, or any "connection or conſideration whatever, to deter you "from bringing every oppreſſion to light, and every "offender, Native and European, to condign puniſhment."—And in their Letter of the ſame date to the Council, they deſired them to aſſiſt their Preſident with their unanimous efforts for the full accompliſhment of all regulations.

Letter from Governor Haſtings, 1 Septem.ber 1772.

Letter to Preſident and Council, 16 April 1773. Par. 1, 2, 3.

See alſo Letter from Governor and Council of Bengal, 1 September 1772, Par. 2 and 3. From Do. to Ditto, 19 November 1772, Par. 1 and 6.

And we perceive that the Governor, in the anſwer which he ſent to the Court in acknowledgment of the favour and kindneſs ſhewn to him, "found himſelf "under the neceſſity of avowing his inability to obey "their commands in regard to an effectual enquiry into "the conduct of their Servants;" and he at the ſame time declared, in excuſe of the behaviour not only of individuals, but of the collective Members of former Adminiſtrations, "that the blame was not ſo much im"putable to them, as to the want of a principle of Go"vernment adequate to its ſubſtance, and a coerſive "power to enforce it," and he remarked upon the incompetency of their conſtitution, "for the Government "of a great Kingdom, under ancient charters, which "were framed merely for the juriſdiction of trading "Settlements." He rejoiced therefore, in being appriſed of an intended change in the ſyſtem of law and polity, and after pointing out ſuch actual defects, as ſeemed to him to require correction, he ſuggeſted certain regulations for that purpoſe, with an excuſe, for the appearance of thereby ſeeking to gratify his own ambition; as he principally recommended the propriety of increaſing the power and duration of the office of Governor, by an expoſition of the miſchiefs which aroſe from its weakneſs and inſtability.

Letter from Governor Haſtings, 11 November 1773.

Appendix, No. 5.

But in order to proſecute the plan which we have announced, and to lay before the Houſe the fulleſt information of the ſtate of the Company's territorial and other poſſeſſions, and of the Revenues ariſing therefrom, under the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay*, previous to the arrival of the Members of the new Adminiſtration, your Committee have arranged the ſeveral particulars in a methodical chart, by which they may be ſeen and examined at one comprehenſive view. And we have thought it proper to begin this repreſentation at that period, when the Report of your Secret Committee, appointed in the year 1772, cloſed the ſtate of Accounts, which had then been laſt tranſmitted from *India*.

In the ſame deſign your preſent Committee here further exhibit to the Houſe, a conciſe Abſtract of the annual deductions which thoſe Preſidencies were, by Treaty or otherwiſe, obliged to make out of their Revenues to the ſeveral country powers; and alſo a detail of the expences which were incurred in each year for the adminiſtration of the Civil Government.

The condition of the public treaſuries, and the amount of the bonded, and other debts, will be placed in the ſame order and method, and hereby every ſubject of Revenue will be at once within reach, for occaſional reference and inſpection.

After theſe, your Committee have, upon the ſame plan, and for the like purpoſes, put together the materials from which the ſtate and circumſtances of the Military Eſtabliſhment were drawn, and may be as readily ſurveyed. The number, quality, and diſtribution of the troops, both European and Natives, in the Company's Service under thoſe Governments, compoſe this head of information, and it is completed by an annexed Account of the Charges which attended them.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial, and other Revenues, of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1771 to April 1772.

	Groſs Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
	CR.	CR.	CR.	£. S[ts].
Calcutta Purgunnahs.				
Land Revenues	14,31,780			
Charges of Collection		2,64,324		
Jaghire to Lord Clive		2,58,631		
Nett Revenues			9,08,825	102,243
Burdwan Province.				
Land Revenues	52,39,496			
Charges of Collection		10,16,112		
Nett Revenues			42,23,384	475,131
Chittagong Province.				
Land Revenues	6,04,232			
Charges of Collection		63,270		
Nett Revenues			5,41,052	60,868
Midnapore Province.				
Land Revenues	10,18,248			
Charges of Collection		46,661		
Nett Revenues			9,71,587	109,304
Bengal Province.				
Land Revenues	178,11,826			
Charges of Collection		7,54,484		
Tribute, Stipends, and Allowances paid		64,18,702		
Nett Revenues			106,38,640	1,196,847
Bahar Province.				
Land Revenues	49,55,148			
Charges of Collection		5,43,918		
Allowances and Penſions paid		3,09,344		
Nett Revenues			41,01,886	461,462
Duties on Coinage	21,304		21,304	2,397
Court of Cutcherry	5,000		5,000	562
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta	2,76,860		2,76,860	31,147
CR.	313,63,894	96,75,446	216,88,538	2,439,961
Commiſſion on the Revenues		5,89,430	5,89,430	66,311
		102,64,876	210,99,108	2,373,650

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Fort William and Subordinates, from 1771 to 1772.

Civil.	Marine.	Military.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
154,620	52,161	1,164,348	20,766	1,143,582	354,916	1,705,279

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Acco[ts].

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond, and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company in Bengal, from May 1771 to April 1772; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

		C. R^{s}.
Balances in the Treaſuries - - -	CR^{s}. 65,99,041	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - - -		107,84,520
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - -		1,01,331
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - -		6,153
Contract with Country Government for materials for building		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - -		52,463
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - - -		10,468
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - -		231
Debts at Chittagong - - - - - - -		1,010
His Majeſty Shah Allum, the balance of his ſtipend - -		17,29,099
Mahomed Reza Cawn, the balance of his allowance - -		3,04,913
Juggut Seat - - - D^{o} - D^{o} - - -		21,604
Ahteram O Dowlah - D^{o} - D^{o} - - -		22,049
Rou-ul-din Huſſein Cawn D^{o} - D^{o} - - -		16,530
Oudy-Poory Gouſſaine - D^{o} - D^{o} - - -		27,187
Nabob Mobarick O Dowlah, the balance of his ſtipend -		13,74,546
Nudjeef Cawn, the balance of his allowance - - -		1,16,000
Cur^{t} Rupees - -		160,33,000

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Acco^{ts}.

ABSTRACT GENERAL RETURN of the Troops

	ARTILLERY.																		ENGINEERS							IN-												
	Commissioned Officers.								Non-commissioned and Private.					Staff.												Commissioned Officers.									Non-commissioned and Private.			
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenant.	Lieutenant.	Lieutenant Fireworker.	Total.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Total.	Surveyor General of Stores.	Adjutants.	Adjutant and Quarter Master.	Surgeons Assistant.	Conductors.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Total.	Cadets.	Brigadier General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Total.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals and Private.	Total.
Strength - - - -	1	1	4	4	16	16	42	11	30	20	18	332	400	1	1	5	3	12	1	1	3	4	2	11	22	1	2	7	6	56	55	79	206	179	226	131	2,662	3,019
Supernumeraries - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	8	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	3	3	8	7	26	11	63	100
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	11	-	101	114	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	4	756	785
Establishment - -	1	1	4	4	16	16	42	-	30	31	17	425	503	1	1	5	3	12	1	1	3	4	2	11	22	1	2	6	6	55	52	76	198	172	225	124	3,355	3,704

	LASCARS.					INVALIDS.				
						Infantry.				Artillery.
	Non-commissioned Officers.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Total.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commissioned and Private.	Total.	Non-commissioned and Private.
Strength - - -	18	48	196	2,350	2,594	2	1	248	251	31
Wanting to complete	7	2	4	150	157					
Establishment - -	25	50	200	2,500	2,751					

under FORT WILLIAM PRESIDENCY, 30th November 1772.

| INFANTRY. | | |

DISTRIBUTION of the Troops under the Command of the Presidency of *Fort William*, 30 November 1772; consisting of Five Companies of Artillery, Twenty-five Companies of Artillery Lascars, Three Regiments of Infantry, Twenty-eight Battalions of Sepoys, Corps of Engineers, Artillery and Infantry Invalids.

	ARTILLERY		INFANTRY.				ENGINEERS.					INVALIDS.			
	European.	Lascars.	European.		Sepoys.							Artillery.		Infantry.	
	Compan.ˢ	Compan.ˢ	Regim.ᵗˢ.	Battalions	Battalions	Compan.ˢ	Lieut. Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Non-Commif.	Rank and File.	Non-Commif.	Rank and File.
At Fort William, &c.	2	8	—	1	2	8	1	1	1	3	1	5	11	18	106
At Budge Budge	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	4	48
At Ghyretty	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Midnapore and Purgunnahs depending	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Chittagong and - Ditto	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	4	3	—	—
At Burdwan and - Ditto	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Muxadavad and - Ditto	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Berhampore, in Cantonments	1	5	—	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—
At Rajahmall	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Purneah	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Boglepore	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Monghyr, in Garrifon	1	5	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—
At Dinapore, in Cantonments	1	5	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Patna and Purgunnahs depending	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Buxar	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
At Lucknow	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Benares	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Chunar Gur	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	8	64
On Survey	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	5	25	1	4	26	20	1	1	3	4	2	9	22	30	218
Grand Total	5	25	5		46		11					31		248	

(Signed) *Robert Kyd*,
Town Major.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid from May 1772 to April 1773.

		Groſs Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
		CR.ˢ	CR.ˢ	CR.ˢ	£ ſt.
Calcutta Purgunnahs. Land Revenues		14,39,121	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	99,235	—	—
Jaghire to Lord Clive		—	2,58,631	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	10,81,255	121,641
Burdwan Province. Land Revenues		49,08,322	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	10,03,321	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	39,05,001	439,312
Chittagong Province. Land Revenues		5,77,182	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	62,450	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	5,15,362	57,978
Midnapore Province. Land Revenues		8,63,040	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	39,100	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	8,23,940	92,693
	CR.ˢ				
Bengal Province. Land Revenues	148,07,659				
Duties on Salt collected in the Province	3,06,540				
		151,14,199	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	5,42,297	—	—
Stipends and Allowances paid		—	43,00,097	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	102,71,805	1,155,579
Bahar Province. Land Revenues		50,91,012	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	4,63,670	—	—
Allowances and Penſions paid		—	1,69,317	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	44,58,025	501,528
Duties on Coinage		13,002	—	13,002	1,463
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta		2,55,347	—	2,55,347	28,726
	CR.ˢ	282,61,855	69,38,118	213,23,737	2,398,920
Commiſſion on the Revenues			6,38,071	6,38,071	71,783
	CR.ˢ		75,76,189	206,85,666	£. 2,327,137

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Fort William, and Subordinates, from 1772 to 1773.

Civil.	Marine.	Military.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
180,093	53,958	1,288,667	63,342	1,225,325	299,895	1,759,271

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the *Eaſt India* Company in *Bengal*, from May 1772 to April 1773; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CR°.	CR°.
Balance in the Treaſuries - - -	39,01,727	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - -		115,07,827
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - -		1,04,577
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - -		6,153
Contract with the Country Government for materials, &c. for building - - - - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - -		2,19,895
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - - -		10,468
Debts at Chittagong - - - - - - -		1,010
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - -		231
His Majeſty Shah Allum, the balance of his ſtipend - -		45,13,099
Mobarek ul Dowlah - D° - D° - -		7,17,162
Nudjeef Cawn, balance of his allowance - - - - -		3,48,000
Mahomed Reza Cawn - D° - D° - -		2,57,111
Ahteram ul Dowlah - - D° - D° - -		16,974
Rou-ul-din Huſſein Cawn - D° - D° - -		7,250
Oudy Poory Gouſſaine - D° - D° - -		27,187
Munney Begum, balance of her allowance - - -		46,400
Rajah Goordaſs, balance of his allowance - - -		29,000
Curr' Rupees - -		192,77,251

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

Errors excepted,

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

ABSTRACT GENERAL RETURN of the Troops

EUROPEAN.	ARTILLERY.																								ENGINEERS.						IN-
	Commissioned Officers.							Non-commissioned and Private.						Staff, &c.																		Commissioned Officers.		
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Total.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Total.	Surveyor General of Stores.	Adjutant of the Corps.	Adjutants and Quarter Masters.	Deputy Commissaries.	Surgeons Assistants.	Conductors.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Total.	Cadets.	Brigadier General.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Total.
Present Strength	1	2	5	5	16	15	44	8	32	16	17	384	449	1	1	5	4	3	12	1	1	3	5	2	12	10	1	2	7	8	63	70	211
Supernumeraries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	9	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	8
Wanting to complete		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	14	-	156	172	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eſtabliſhment	1	2	5	5	16	15	44	-	32	30	17	531	610	1	1	5	4	3	12	1	1	3	5	2	12	-	1	2	7	7	59	67	203

HINDOSTAN.	SEPOYS.																							
	European Officers.							European Staff					Native Officers and Sepoys.					Native Staff.							
	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Total.	Non-commiſſioned.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſters.	Deputy Judge Advocate.	Surgeons.	Surgeons Aſſiſtants.	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Havildars, Naigs, and Sepoys.	Total.	Commandants.	Adjutants.	Sircars.	Writers.	Linguiſts.	Doctors.	Armourers.	Watermen.
Present Strength	3	4	25	128	106	266	316	3	3	1	3	5	269	557	549	16,640	18,015	24	24	233	24	13	71	96	242
Supernumeraries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	59	258	358	684	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	207	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	3	608	620	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eſtabliſhment	3	4	25	128	106	266	523	3	3	1	3	5	264	503	294	16,890	17,951	24	24	233	24	13	71	96	242

under FORT WILLIAM PRESIDENCY, 30th November 1773.

FANTRY.																											INVALIDS.				
Non-commissioned and Private.					Staff, &c.																						Infantry.			Artillery.	
Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals and Private.	Total.	Majors of Brigade.	Aids de Camp.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Chaplains.	Deputy Judge Advocates.	Surgeon General.	Surgeons Major.	Surgeons.	Surgeons Affiftants.	Commiffaries.	Deputy Commiffaries.	Paymafters.	Deputy Paymafters.	Quarter Master General.	Barrack Maſters.	Secretary to Commander in Chief.	Perſian Interpreter to Dº.	Regulating Officer of Calcutta Militia.	Arjutant & Quarter Maſter, Chunar Gur.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Non-commiſſioned and Private.	Total.	Non-commiſſioned and Private.	EUROPEAN.
53	232	124	2,519	2,875	3	7	7	7	4	3	1	3	6	21	5	4	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	278	281	14	Preſent Strength.
7	19	6	53	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Supernumeraries.
-	16	1	905	922	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Wanting to complete.
-	229	119	3,371	3,719	3	7	7	7	4	3	1	3	6	21	5	4	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	Eſtabliſhment.

N. B. Not included above - - - 1 Lieutenant Colonel, Military Secretary to the Governor.

INVALID or MILITIA SEPOYS.												LASCARS.					
European Officers.				Native Officers and Sepoys.				Native Staff.									
Captains.	Lieutenants.	Serjeants.	Total.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Havilders, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Total.	Sircars.	Writers.	Doctors.	Armourers.	Watermen.	Non-commiſſioned Officers.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Laſcars.	Total.	HINDOSTAN.
3	1	8	12	25	26	26	3,016	3,093	8	4	12	16	26	19	51	205	2,459	2,715	Preſent Strength.
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	-	6	Supernumeraries.
-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	41	41	Wanting to complete.
3	1	8	12	26	26	26	3,016	3,094	8	4	12	16	26	25	50	200	2,500	2,750	Eſtabliſhment.

DISTRIBUTION of the Troops under the Command of the Presidency of Fort William, the 30th November 1773, consisting of the Corps of Engineers, Five Companies of Artillery, Twenty-five Companies of Artillery Lascars, Three Regiments of Infantry, Twenty-two Battalions of Brigade Sepoys, One Battalion of Purgunnah Sepoys, One Battalion of Light Infantry, Twenty-six Companies of Invalid or Militia Sepoys, Artillery and Infantry Invalids.

STATIONS.	ENGINEERS.					ARTILLERY.		INFANTRY.						INVALIDS.				
	Lieut. Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	European Compan.	Lascar Compan.	Europeans. Regim.	Europeans. Battalions	Brigade Sepoys. Battalions	Brigade Sepoys. Compan.	Purgunnah Battalion.	Light Infantry.	Artillery. Non Commissioned.	Artillery. Rank and File.	Infantry. Non Commissioned.	Infantry. Rank and File.	Sepoys. Compan.
At Fort William	1	1	1	2	2	2	8	-	1	4	8	-	-	-	-	20	132	7
At Budge Budge	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	48	—
At Chittagong	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	3	—	—	—
At Dacca	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
At Midnapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Beerbhom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Muxadavad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
At Rajahmall	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Bettiah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Berhampore	-	-	-	-	-	2	10	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—
At Ramgur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Cooch Beyhar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Monghyr	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—
At Dinahpore	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	1	-	2	3	-	-	-	2	—	—	—
At Patna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
At Buxar	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
At Chunar Gur	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	4	6	68	—
Total	1	1	3	5	2	5	25	2	2	18	40	1	1	4	10	30	248	26
Grand Total	12					5	25	3		22		1	1	14		278		26

Fort William,
20th January 1774.

(Signed) *Robert Kyd*,
Town Major.

IN carrying forward our inquiries into the ſtate of alliance or other connection between the Engliſh ſettlements in queſtion and the country powers, your Committee think it proper to introduce the relation, which we have to ſubmit to the Houſe upon that ſubject, with ſome remarks on the orders ſent by the Court of Directors to their principal Servants, who conducted the adminiſtration of their affairs in *India*. The plan preſcribed for their political tranſactions with the native powers ſeems uniformly, before the eſtabliſhment of the new adminiſtration, to have been formed with a view to the preſervation of peace, and a prohibition from all ſchemes of conqueſt. It does indeed appear, that the Court of Directors, upon information of the ravages committed by the Marattas on the territories of the King and *Souja Dowla*, and alſo on thoſe of the Rohillas and Jauts, all of whom had been thereupon apparently ſunk into deſpondence, manifeſted their indignation at the puſillanimity of the two greater potentates, while they expreſſed more concern than ſurprize at the conduct of the leſſer powers, becauſe the King and the Vizier might, by an united effort with thoſe people, have effectually repelled the common enemy. But in regard to carrying their arms beyond the bounds of their own dominions, they were not diſpoſed to authorize ſuch proceedings, till they ſhould receive more convincing accounts of their expediency; and in the meantime they truſted, that the ſole objects of their Servants would be the ſecurity of their poſſeſſions, and thoſe of the powers with whom they were connected both by treaty and intereſt. And when, in the beginning of the year 1773, they diſcovered a very anxious deſire to acquire the actual poſſeſſion of *Chunar Gur*, they alſo took care to explain the motives of it in the following terms: "The importance of this poſt "being the ground of our deſire to have it in our poſ- "ſeſſion, we cannot be ſuppoſed to aim hereby at "extending our acquiſitions, ſince this can only be con- "ſidered as giving ſecurity to what we already poſſeſs "in the kingdom of *Bengal*."

But your Committee find, that the Preſident and Select Committee of *Fort William*, in their Letter, dated September 20th 1772, had declared their previous reſolution to conduct themſelves by that rule, which they had of their own accord conceived to be moſt prudent, and moſt conducive to prevent the being drawn into any unneceſſary war. And in a ſubſequent Letter, dated 10th November 1772, they repeated the ſame determination, with an additional aſſurance of ſincerity and ſatisfaction in adopting the meaſures recommended by the Company; and they claimed ſome merit from their having acted in conformity to them before ſuch orders had reached them, promiſing not to ſuffer the ambitious temper of the Vizier to engage them further than in the paſſive defence of his dominions, and in affording him that

Appendix, No 6. Letter to Preſident and Sel. Committee of Bengal, 16 March 1768, Par. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

Dº 27 March 1769, Par. 2, 3, 4, 5. with Reference to Letter to Fort Saint George, 13 May 1768; and ſeparate Letter, 27 March 1769.

General Letter to Bengal, 30 June 1769. Par. 1 to 10.

Letter from Governor and Council of Bengal, 10 November 1772. Par. 1.

Par. 45. Letter from Court of Directors, 28 Auguſt 1771.

Appendix, No. 7.

Par. 13. 7th April 1773. Appendix, No. 8.

Letter from Preſident and Sel. Com. of Bengal, September 20, 1772.

Appendix, No. 9.

Par. 1. *See Appendix, No. 6.*

See alſo Par. 30. of Sel. Letter, dated 10 November 1772.

Appendix, No. 10.

that countenance and ſupport which, by the nature of their connections with him, they conceived themſelves bound to beſtow.

But in order to explain with more clearneſs and extent the ſituation and the diſpoſitions of the country powers, as far as they appear to have affected the policy of the Britiſh Governments, and to have had any influence on their conduct at that period, your Committee will take a ſhort and diſtinct view of each, as we find them repreſented in the ſeveral records of the Company, which we have conſulted for that purpoſe.

1772. 10 November, Par. 6. Sec. Dept. from Bengal. Sel. Letter Dº, Par. 4 and 5. Appendix, No. 11. See alſo Appendix, Nos. 13, 18, 19, 21, and 264, and particularly Beng. Conſ. 2 June 1774, in Appendix 27.

And your Committee find, that the ſmall remains of that puiſſance and ſplendour, which had dignified and decorated the throne of the Moguls, was now daily conſuming away under the feeble Government of their ſucceſſor *Shaw Allum*. The great Dependencies and Revenues of the empire had been ſquandered and torn from it, to become the prey of the ſervants and ſupporters of the crown. The independent greatneſs of its former vaſſals now hardly allowed the mere name of ſubordination; and the King was apparently ſuffered to retain poſſeſſion of the ſcanty relics of dominion, becauſe mutual jealouſy alone prevented the extinction or uſurpation of his titular ſovereignty; which, beſides, was made uſe of as a political pageant to attract ſome ſmall popularity to the party which carried it with them. Yet it appears to your Committee, that in this decline of his power, he was gone to *Delhi*, where the grandeur of his family had, for near 300 years, been uſed to ſhine with ſuperior brightneſs, to expoſe himſelf to contempt by the idle parade of a coronation, which he thought indiſpenſable for the exerciſe of his impotent ſovereignty; and, "in the more idle ſcheme of reſtoring the Mogul "empire to its ancient dignity and extent."

See Appendix, No. 6.

See Sir R. Barker's Minute, Appendix, No. 13.

It muſt be obſerved, that the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah*, which, by the treaty of *Iliabad* in 1765, had been allotted to him for his royal reſidence and demeſne, were, perhaps from neceſſity, previouſly abandoned by him; and ſo imprudent, or ſo unfortunate had he been in the choice and in the change of his friends and allies, that he, by theſe means, afforded a pretence or colour of juſtice to thoſe who were ſtripping him of almoſt the laſt reſervation for his bare ſubſiſtence. The Marattas, whom he had called to his aſſiſtance, compelled him to make a ſurrender to them of the very prize, for the preſervation of which their aid had been ſolicited by him; and the Government of *Bengal* deemed themſelves thereby juſtified in reſuming thoſe provinces into their own hands.—And your Committee find them to have reaſoned as follows upon this occaſion: "In no ſhape "can this compulſatory ceſſion by the King releaſe us "from the obligation we are under to defend theſe pro- "vinces which we have ſo particularly guaranteed to "him, and which his own Viceroy, *Munnar ul Dowlah*, "at this time puts under our protection. Independent "of our own conviction of the propriety of this plan, "your orders in the 5th paragraph of your Letter of "30th June 1769, on a caſe exactly parallel to that be- "fore us, left us without an option." And when they afterwards reſolved on making a ſecond diſpoſal of theſe provinces to their own better advantage, they adduced an argument of ſimilar juſtification, becauſe (to uſe their own expreſſion) "they ſhould not reſume them from "the King, whoſe property and right were annulled by "his own alienation of them, but from the Marattas, "the now proprietors."

See Appendix, 163, 164.

Appendix, No. 12. Sel. Letter, 15th Jan. 1773. Par. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

Dº. Letter, 1 March 1773. Par. 9. and References.

See Minute of Governor Haſtings, 12th October 1773.

Dº.

See the Inſtruction to Governor Haſtings, on his Deputation to Benares, dated 23 June 1773. On Conſ. 4 October 1773.

Appendix, No. 13. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 7th Oct. 1773.

Dº.

It may further be deduced from other of their expreſſions, that it was to mark their reſentment of his diffidence in their ſupport, and of his proceeding to *Delhi*, in oppoſition to their ſtrenuous remonſtrances, that they had at the ſame time come to a reſolution of diſcontinuing the tribute, which they were engaged to pay him, for the grant of the Dewannees of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*. It muſt be obſerved, that another motive was aſſigned by them, in the lowneſs of their treaſury, and their inability to diſcharge the arrears; motives which might perhaps have with at leaſt equal juſtice, though not with the like avail, been urged by the King for a reſumption of the Dewannee: and indeed we ſhould not omit to remark, that an argument of this nature was uſed by the General, Sir *Robert Barker*, in his diſſent and proteſt againſt theſe meaſures.

Alſo Sec. Letter to Court of Directors, 10 Dec. 1772. Par. 4. Ibid. See alſo Letter to Col. Champion, 6th October 1774, in Appendix 28.

It appears, however, that a long time previous to theſe tranſactions, the Court of Directors had written to their adminiſtration at *Bengal* upon the ſubject of the King's deſire and deſign of going to *Delhi*, and forbad them to continue one of the Company's brigades at *Allahabad*, which he had earneſtly requeſted. And in regard to the probable conſequences of this refuſal they ſeemed little ſolicitous; but they obſerved upon the poſſibility of his throwing himſelf into the hands of the Marattas, that in ſuch caſe they ſhould be diſengaged from him, and that ſuch a ſtep might open a fair opportunity of withholding the 26 lacks, which they then paid as a tribute for the Dewannees.

Par. 32, 33, 34, 35. Sel. Letter to Bengal, 11 November 1768. Appendix, No. 14.

Upon this occaſion, however, your Committee find, that the Nabob Vizier, *Souja ul Dowla*, one of the great independent Servants of the empire, was the object whom the Bengal Preſidency choſe to favour with the ſpoils of the Emperor; but it is at the ſame time to be noticed, that they did not make a free gift of them, but ſtipulated for a conſideration of a large ſum in ready money, and the entire expence of the troops which ſhould be employed in caſe of requiſition for the defence of the Vizier's dominions. By the treaty of *Illahabah* in 1765, the guarantee of them was not engaged on ſuch advantageous terms to the Company; and it now appeared to the Calcutta Board, more deſirable to improve the conditions of it, and to procure a ſum of money for their treaſury (which, as we have remarked above, was in ſo impoveriſhed a ſtate) than to ſeize the opportunity of acquiring the provinces of *Chunar* and *Gauzipore*, in exchange for thoſe of *Korah* and *Currah*; it being thought at all events not adviſable themſelves to retain poſſeſſion of them, becauſe of the diſtance from *Bengal*, and the conſequent expence of their protection. Having therefore determined to diſpoſe of them on the beſt terms that could be had, and the King's helpleſs ſtate being held an inſuperable objection to their ſurrendering them to him, they conſidered that the pretenſions of the Vizier came next in preference on many accounts; but particularly as being conſonant to the Company's orders.

See Inſtructions to Governor Haſtings on Bengal Sec. Conſ. 4th October 1773. *See No. 13.*

Inſtructions to Gov. Haſtings, No. 13.

Your Committee indeed have obſerved, that the Court of Directors had enjoined the Government of *Bengal* to uſe their endeavours to effect an exchange of the provinces abovementioned, while in poſſeſſion of the King, for thoſe of *Chunar* and *Gauzipore*, with a view to make his Majeſty's ſituation more neighbouring on their own poſſeſſions under that Preſidency; but by withholding the tribute due for the Dewannee, the adminiſtration thought, according to their conſtruction of the Company's motives, that they had ſuperſeded the expediency of the exchange for ſuch a purpoſe. And it appears to have been the declared opinion of the Governor, that they acted on true political grounds of advantage to the Company, in ſeeking to increaſe the power and influence of their ally, the Nabob Vizier; and indeed we find this principle to have been an avowed inducement, ſecond only to the conſideration of the pecuniary benefits ariſing therefrom, for conſenting alſo to the ſupport of the Vizier in an expedition againſt the Rohillas with the Company's brigade, and in that inſtance to tranſgreſs the extent of the defenſive line, which was preſcribed by the regulations of treaty, and the orders of the Company; we ſhould not omit to take notice, that there was a further motive declared, which pointed out this meaſure as the ſureſt means of acquiring another barrier to the Vizier's country againſt the incurſions of the Marattas, whom it was only wiſhed to keep at a diſtance, without the neceſſity of entering into a war with them.

In General Letter to Bengal, 10 April 1771 Par. 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51. Appendix, No. 15.

Inſtructions to Gov. Haſtings, No. 13.

See his Minute, 12th October 1773. *See Appendix, No. 12.*

See Letter from the Sel. Committee of Ben. to Court of Directors, 31 December 1773 Appendix, No. 16.

Inſtructions to the Governor.

Your Committee do not mean in theſe introductory obſervations to enter into a very circumſtantial diſcuſſion

of particular tranſactions, or of the arguments by which the Government explained the motives of their conduct on theſe occaſions. We ſhall confine ourſelves to material facts, and only invite the attention of the Houſe to a reference in the Appendixes for ſuch authorities and reaſonings, as we eſteem eſſential to their explanatory illuſtration.

Extract of Sec. Letter from Ben. to the Court of Directors, 12 March 1773. Appendix, No. 17

Letter to Sir R bert Barker, 15 April 1773. Appendix, No. 21.

1 March. Vid. *ſup.*

Your Committee indeed find, that the conſtant profeſſion of the Bengal Government was the protection of their allies, without forming any deſigns againſt other people, and ſo ſtrict were they in exacting obedience to their orders againſt carrying the forces beyond the bounds of limitation, that they expreſſed ſome diſſatisfaction at the General for a very momentary deviation from them. Yet this ſhould ſeem to have ariſen more from a principle of diſcipline than policy, as in a Letter under an earlier date to the Court of Directors, they recommended the advantages of a greater latitude for action; and eſpecially in regard to the Marattas, they ſeemed to think, that (as they could never be abſolutely aſſured againſt the enterprizes of ſo capricious a nation) "if "they were to have a war with them, it would be better "to meet them beyond the line of their own frontiers; "ſupporting the Vizier their beſt barrier; their expences "paid; and in a manner defending themſelves rather "than to be confined to their own poſſeſſions, and their "own reſources."

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Sel. Committee of Bengal, dated 31 March 1773. Appendix, No. 18.

Extract of Sec. Letter, dated 16 Auguſt 1773. D.

And it appears (with a view to the ſame object) to have been the wiſh of the General at that time, that the Marattas might boldly advance to an attack upon the Korah province, by which means it would be within the reach of his inſtructions to come to ſome deciſive conflict with them, and an end might thereby be put to the ineffectual campaigns in that quarter. In this hope however he was diſappointed, as they ſtill avoided a general action; the Company's brigade therefore took poſſeſſion of the provinces, and a Member of the Bengal Board was ſent to receive charge of them from the General, becauſe they required the immediate ſuperintendance of a perſon well ſkilled in the buſineſs of the Revenues. In a ſhort time after this, the Governor, as will appear by the Papers ſubjoined in the Appendix, No, 18, proceeded to a conference with the Vizier at *Benares*, upon the deſign of ſurrendering them to him.

12th July 1773. See, firſt, Bengal Sel. Conſult. from Jan. to May 1773; and, ſecondly, Bengal Secret Conſult. from Feb. to Sept. 1773.

Letter from the Governor at Benares to Court of Directors, dated 20 September 1773. Appendix, No. 19.

Sec. Letter from Bengal, 22 October 1773. Bengal, Sec. Conſ. 4th October 1773; 7th and 12th Oct. D° in Appendix, Nos. 12, 13, and 33.

It appears to your Committee, that the Bengal Council wrote from their Secret Department to the Court of Directors, on the 12th October 1773, and informed them of the Governor's return, about a week before, from the interview with the Vizier; and that he had brought with him the original of a new Treaty concluded between them. And we perceive that the Board tranſmitted this Treaty to the Court with copies of the inſtructions which they had given to the Governor, and his report on his return, with all the Papers referred to in it, together with the Conſultations, Minutes, &c. at large, which had paſſed upon it. Theſe your Committee have placed in the Appendix, N° 19. and they contain very full information on the ſubject. The material points of agreement, which we find therein repreſented, were the ceſſion of the provinces of *Korah* and *Illahabad* to the Vizier, on condition of his paying fifty lacks of rupees to the Company, twenty of which in ready money, and the remainder in equal payments at the expiration of one or two years. And the equivalent which the Vizier was to pay for the charge of their troops, when ſent to his aſſiſtance at his requiſition, was ſtipulated at two lacks and ten thouſand rupees per month, inſtead of the payments of thirty thouſand, fixed by General *Smith* in the year 1767, and augmented in the two laſt campaigns to one lack fifteen thouſand.

See Appendix, No. 12.

In regard to the engagements entered into with the Vizier, for an attack on the Rohilla country, your Committee find, by the Governor's Minute of the 12th October, that he had aſſented to that propoſition for the general reaſons abovementioned. But by a Letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated 11th October, we perceive, that in addition to the

Sel. Letter from Bengal, 11 October 1773. Appendix, No. 20.

apparent expediency of preventing the Marattas from making an impreſſion on that quarter, to which they chiefly directed their operations, and of gaining thereby an inroad into the Vizier's country, there was another inducement which ſeems to have been the more immediate ground of *Soujah Dowlah*'s application for the aſſiſtance of the Company's troops. One of the Rohilla Chiefs, by name *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, whoſe territories lay contiguous to thoſe of the Vizier and to the province of *Korah*, had formerly entered into a treaty with him, in which he agreed to pay him forty lacks of rupees for his protection and aſſiſtance, the half of which ſum the Vizier promiſed to pay the Company in conſideration of the ſuperior part they took in theſe tranſactions. But it afterwards appearing that *Hafez Rhamet* was rather backward in fulfilling his engagements, and eſpecially after the retreat of the Marattas, when, being under no preſent apprehenſions from the enemy, he began to plead inability, and the neceſſity of conſulting the other Chiefs; the Vizier, exaſperated at this delay, reſolved to force a compliance, by invading his territories, and in caſe of further refuſal, to add them to his own dominions; for which purpoſe he ſolicited the aid and concurrence of the Bengal adminiſtration. This appears to have been a ſubject of conſideration in the Select Committee, before the time when the Governor went to meet the Vizier at *Benares*. And indeed, in a ſubſequent account of theſe affairs, the Governor himſelf ſtated that this enterprize, *the deſign of which furniſhed the firſt occaſion of his meeting the Vizier*, formed an Article in the original draft of that Treaty, but was afterwards omitted at the deſire of *Soujah Dowlah*; to whom he however promiſed, that it ſhould ſtill take place if it ſuited the affairs of the Company at any other time.

See Sir Robert Barker's Letters on this ſubject, and the Treaty with Hafez Rhamet, and other Papers of information on this ſubject. Appendix, No. 21.

See Governor General's Minute, 25th October 1774. Appendix, No. 45.

And it appears that two Letters from the Vizier to the Preſident were recorded on the Select Conſultations of the 19th November, in which he renewed his propoſitions, and reminding the Governor of what had paſſed between them at *Benares*, he deſired to procure the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh brigade on the terms then agreed to, for the puniſhment and extermination of the Rohillas.

Ben. Sel. Conſ. 19th November 1773. Appendix, No. 22.

The Select Committee immediately and unanimouſly reſolved to grant him the ſupport required, thinking the terms highly advantageous to the Company, not only on account of the ſum, which was ultimately ſtipulated as a conſideration for the ſervice, but by relieving them from the heavy expence of a large part of their army; provided they had full aſſurance and ſecurity of his intention and ability to make good the many payments which would from that event be due to them. By the terms indeed of the preſent propoſition, your Committee find that an attack was meditated not only againſt the Rohillas, but alſo on the *Doaub*, or the country lying between the *Jumma* and the *Ganges*, beyond the province of *Korah*. And in the anſwer which was drawn up and aſſented to in the Select Committee, to theſe Letters, they expreſſed ſome difficulties about the deſign againſt the *Doaub*, becauſe of the peremptory orders of the Company againſt diſtant expeditions; but they intimated to him, that if he ſhould engage in a war beyond their borders, and ſhould ſtand in need of aſſiſtance, they certainly could not ſit ſtill and ſee his danger without endeavouring to relieve him, and for that reaſon they hoped he would avoid an enterprize at that diſtance.

Sel. Conſ. 22d Nov. 1773. D°.

Concerning the country of the Rohillas, they were ready to agree to whatever was formerly propoſed at *Benares*, only repeating the terms very explicitly, and inſiſting on the neceſſity of perſeverance, if the enterprize was once undertaken, till it ſhould be accompliſhed; without which aſſurance, they recommended a ſuſpenſion of the project till a more favourable time, "as they "could not hazard or anſwer for the effects of the Com-"pany's diſpleaſure, if they ſhould find themſelves in-"volved in a fruitleſs war, or in an expence for the pro-"ſecution of it." If however he was ſatisfied of his abilities, and would aſſure them of his reſolution to perform

form the conditions, they gave him authority to ſummon the brigade to *Dinapore* to his aſſiſtance, whenever he pleaſed.

But we perceive, that ſome doubts having ariſen concerning the regularity of the Committee's iſſuing the neceſſary orders of their ſole authority, it was agreed that the proceedings of the 19th, as well as the Letter to the Vizier recorded on the 22d, ſhould be ſubmitted to the Council at large.

22 Nov. 1773.

And it appears that this reference was made to them in their Secret Department, on the 26th of the ſame month, when the Preſident introduced this propoſal and requiſition of the Vizier's, and the proceedings of the Committee, with an explanatory Minute in recommendation of an agreement with their reſolutions, ſtating the circumſtances of what had paſſed in the conference at *Benares* relative to this ſubject, though he at the ſame time ſtrongly pointed out his own difficulties in bringing himſelf to adopt ſuch a meaſure at that juncture, which difficulties he obſerved muſt alſo have conſiderable weight with them, as their reſponſibility would be great in an unuſual degree, becauſe the circumſtances of the Company were unfavourable at home, "expoſed to popular "clamour, all their meaſures liable to be canvaſſed in "Parliament, their charter drawing to a cloſe, and his "Majeſty's Miniſters unqueſtionably ready to take ad- "vantage of every unfavourable circumſtance in the "negotiations for its renewal."

Ben. Sel. Conſ. 26th Nov. 1773. Appendix, No. 23. See alſo General Barker's Minute of Diſſent under ſame date.

The Board were induced by theſe repreſentations of the Governor, to concur in the whole of the plan adopted by the Committee. In the account which they ſoon afterwards tranſmitted of theſe matters to the Court of Directors, they obſerved, that without heſitation they had diſapproved of the deſign againſt the *Doaub*; and in regard to that of the Rohilla expedition, they thought it expedient not immediately to diſmiſs it, though it appeared adviſable to avoid (as far as they could conſiſtently with their cloſe connection with the Vizier) engaging at that juncture in a plan of conqueſt over the Rohilla provinces: that it had therefore been reſolved to make the terms of their compliance ſuch as from their nature ſhould induce him to relinquiſh the project, out of regard to his own intereſt. It will appear, by referring to the Appendix, in which theſe Papers are placed at length, that the General, who was the only Member of the Board preſent who was not alſo a Member of the Committee, recorded his reaſons againſt the meaſures of attacking thoſe diſtricts.

Sec. Letter from Ben. 30 Dec. 1773. Appendix, No. 24.

In a former Appendix will be found an extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee to the Court of Directors, dated 31ſt December 1773, wherein they gave a ſhort account of the introductory ſteps to theſe proceedings, and of the motives of their conduct in the proſecution of them, declaring, "that from the "aſſurances given to the Vizier by the Preſident at *Be-* "*nares*, on the firſt projection of the enterprize, they "thought themſelves not at liberty to reject it."

See Appendix, No. 16.

But your Committee find, that the Vizier had taken advantage of the abſence of the Marattas, whom the diſſenſions in their own Government had called back into the *Decan*, to enter into the province of the *Doaub*, and to engage in the reduction of the forts which they yet held poſſeſſion of in it; and the Select Committee expreſſed ſome apprehenſions, that he might make uſe of the liberty they had found themſelves under the neceſſity of granting him, to call for the ſervice of the brigade, which had been removed for that purpoſe from *Dinapore* to *Patna*. It will alſo be obſerved, that they made profeſſions of their adopting with diffidence a meaſure of ſuch conſequence, without the orders and ſentiments of the Company, and they therefore earneſtly deſired to know, "if they ſhould implicitly adhere to the defenſive "line hitherto preſcribed to them, or extend their views "to bounds more remote;" giving at the ſame time an account of the ſtate of the neighbouring powers, and adding thereupon the following obſervation: "we ſhould "not regard the Marattas themſelves in a light of much "more importance, were the force and connections of "the three Preſidencies united under one active con- "troul, which we do not heſitate to foretel will, when- "ever ſuch a plan ſhall take place, render you the ſo- "vereign arbiters of *Hindoſtan*, while the preſent ſyſtem "continues."

Appendix, No. 24. Sel. Letter, 9th Nov. from Bengal. Do.

But your Committee find, that the Vizier, on the firſt receipt of the Preſident's Letter to him, declined the acceptance of the Company's aid on the terms propoſed, though he requeſted to have the brigade ſtationed within a convenient call to the defence of his own dominions, if they ſhould be attacked. And the Government of *Bengal*, who teſtified their ſatisfaction at having put the end they wiſhed to that affair, very readily acquieſced in this laſt deſire, conſidering the provinces of *Corah* and *Illiabad* to be included in the line of defence. The accounts indeed, which they continued to receive from *Poonah*, made it very improbable that the Marattas would be at liberty to appear with any offenſive force in *Hindoſtan*.

Letter from Gov. and Council in Sec. Depart. Jan. 17, 1774. The Vizier's Letter alſo. Appendix, No. 25.

The reſolution however of the Vizier ſeems to have ſoon undergone another change, and he demanded the aſſiſtance of the brigade on the terms required, his object being ſtill the reduction of the Rohilla country between the *Ganges* and the Mountains, to which the Preſidency limited the employment of their troops upon this occaſion, as appears by the inſtructions ſent to the Commander; and they expreſſed much pleaſure in this requiſition of *Soujah Dowla*, becauſe it would tend to preſerve the troops from inaction and relaxation of diſcipline; the conqueſt would probably be attended with no difficulty, and the reward of the ſervices was to be forty lacks of rupees, beſide the ſtipulated monthly ſubſidy for the payment of the army.

Appendix, No. 26. See Letter 15 March 1774. See Bengal Secret Conſult. 3 and 14 Feb. 1774.

And your Committee find, that the operations of the united forces were attended with very great ſucceſs; and the Governor and Council, on the 24th May, wrote a congratulatory Letter to the Court of Directors, on the happy accompliſhment of the undertaking, began and decided almoſt in the ſame inſtant of time, and on the right which they had unqueſtionably acquired to the ſum ſtipulated for the ſervice. It ſoon however afterwards appeared, that there ſtill remained ſome part of the country, and ſome relics of force aſſembled under *Fizoola Cawn*, which it was neceſſary to reduce, and Colonel *Champion* was prevailed upon to put his troops again in the field for that purpoſe, though the ſeaſon of the rains was already ſet in; but freſh advices from *Poonah*, of the ſettlement of the Marratta diviſions, and intimations of ſome hoſtile ſteps taken by the King (at which indeed the Bengal Government ſeem neither to have been ſurprized or alarmed) made it however be thought at all events adviſable to accelerate the completion of that buſineſs, before any material obſtacle ſhould intervene. And we perceive, that the Colonel advanced by eaſy marches to *Patter Ghur*, from whence the Rohillas retreated into the hills on his approach, and left him by that means in poſſeſſion of the whole country. He conſidered himſelf indeed as precluded from making any further movements to diſtreſs or attack the enemy, as he ſhould thereby tranſgreſs the limits preſcribed him; but it is to be obſerved, that the Governor and Council ſent inſtructions, giving him a latitude of action beyond the limits to which he thought himſelf reſtricted, and it was therefore expected that the war would be brought to a ſpeedy iſſue, either by accelerating an agreement, or attacking and diſperſing the enemy.

Letter from Bengal, 14 May 1774. Appendix, No. 27. See ſeveral Letters from Col. Champion.

Letter from Governor and Council, 24 Aug. 1774. Do.

Ben. Sel. Conſ. 15 June—Do 1. and 14 July—10 and 29 Aug. and 8 Sept. 1774.

It appears, indeed, that they thought themſelves entitled, from what had already been accompliſhed by the co-operation of their forces, to demand the payment of the forty lacks from the Vizier; who however requeſted a further delay, till he had entirely ſubdued the Rohilla army; and in conſideration of his former punctuality, and of the riſk which their inſiſting on the performance of his engagement at that time might occaſion to the advantageous concluſion of hoſtilities, they agreed to wait for that event, which they were confident would be fortunate.

Letter from Governor and Council, Bengal, 19th Oct. Letter dated 22 Aug. alſo Letter from Gov. Haſtings to Colonel Champion, dated 16 Sept.—alſo from Sel. Committee to Do. 17 and 19 Sept. 1774.

They had little dread of any interruption from the Mahrattas, as all internal diſſenſions were far from being accommodated in that empire. But it ſhould ſeem that the enjoyment of this good fortune was however likely to be diſturbed before its entire accompliſhment, by a more ſerious competition with the King; in whoſe name, and in virtue of a pretended Treaty, *Nudjif Cawn* was ſaid to be on his march with a conſiderable army, to demand a moiety of the conqueſts made upon the Rohillas. This circumſtance had occaſioned ſome uncertainty to the Commanding Officer of the Company's brigade in what manner to act; but here again the Board removed the difficulty, by giving him immediate inſtructions to pay no regard to this claim, nor ſuppoſe the exiſtence of the Treaty, if the Vizier denied it, but to proceed in the conqueſt of that country againſt *Nudjif Cawn*, and all other opponents. This however was not found neceſſary, as the interference of *Nudjiff Cawn* did not extend to hoſtilities; and the ſubſequent correſpondence with the King, did not produce any change in the orders of the Board.

Letter from Governor and Council Par. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 27 October 1774. Appendix, No. 28. See Bengal Conſ. in Appendix, No. 27.—and Bengal Sel. Conſ. 6 Oct. 1774.

29th October 1774. *No.* 27.

The Vizier, who ſeems to have been attentive by every means to ſecure the conqueſts he had made, wiſhed to have an interview with the King under that pretence. And your Committee obſerve, that the Governor and Council agreed to the attendance of their Commanding Officer on that occaſion, enjoining him at the ſame time very ſtrictly to avoid engaging the Company as guarantee to any agreement which might take place between them; but they were not altogether neglectful of the poſſible advantage which might ariſe to the Company, from the influence of their brigade extending itſelf to the ſecurity of any country that might be allotted to the King. And they accordingly informed the Court of Directors, of their having inſtructed Colonel *Champion* "to make a merit of their protection to his Majeſty, "and to demand as a return the renunciation of the "Bengal tribute, upon the footing of thereby removing "every cauſe of further diſcontent between his Majeſty "and them." It ſeems however to have been reſolved at all events to diſcontinue the payment of it; and in their reference made ſome time before to the Court of Directors, concerning that queſtion, they had urged every argument which could induce them to forbid it; and the Governor very expreſsly declared his wiſh, that their connection with *Shaw Allum* might never be renewed, as it had proved a fatal drain to the wealth of *Bengal*, without yielding one advantage or poſſible ſervice even of remote benefit in return.

See Governor General's Minute, 25th October 1774. Appendix, 45. See in Appendix, Letter to Col. Champion, dated 10 Aug. 1774.

Your Committee indeed find, that ſome ſucceſs had lately attended the operations of the King's forces in the field, under the conduct of *Nudjif Cawn*, who ſupported by his perſonal abilities the remains of the royal authority. After he had defeated the Jauts in a pitched battle, he beſieged and took *Agra*, their capital city, the Vizier having previouſly diſpatched a body of his troops to aſſiſt in the ſiege, out of jealouſy, as was partly ſuppoſed, "of the undivided reputation which his perſonal "rival was about to gain by the reduction of it." This event was likely to haſten the ruin of that people, who had been gradually ſtripped of their extenſive dominions, out of which *Nudjif Cawn* had formed for himſelf a princely eſtabliſhment.

Extract of a Letter from Governor and Sel. Committee, 17 March 1774. Appendix, No. 29. Appendix, 45. See in Appendix 164, Gen. Clavering's Minute.

It ſhould be remarked, that his allowance of two lacks per annum, which in conſideration of his ſervices had been granted to him in 1765, out of the Revenues allotted to the King from the territories of *Bengal*, was ſtopped by order of Council, 17th March 1772, upon a ſuppoſition that he had voluntarily accompanied *Shaw Allum* in his expedition to *Delhi*. And it appears, that he made application to the Governor when he was at *Benares*, for the continuance of this penſion; and that Mr. *Haſtings* referred it to the determination of the Board; who, upon receiving aſſurances that he had reluctantly attended the King, and that he bore a real attachment to the Company, thought it juſt as well as politic to continue it, in hopes alſo by ſuch proceeding "they might impreſs an idea in the minds of the people, "of the generoſity of the Company towards thoſe who "were faithful in their attachment to them." They however reſerved the payment of his arrears to the particular determination of the Court of Directors.

No. 22, Printed Treaties, p. 147. Appendix, No. 30. Ben. Conſ. 17 March 1772, fol. 22. See Letter to Court of Directors, Par. 13, Dº. *See alſo Appendix, No.* 19. See Sir R. Barker's Letter, 9th June, &c. in *Appendix, No.* 22.

We perceive alſo, that on the ſame occaſion a renewal of the Sunnuds in favour of *Cheitſing*, the Rajah of *Benares*, and his poſterity, were obtained from the Vizier on the ſame footing as they had been granted to his father *Bulwart Sing*, excepting only the increaſe of two and a half lacks to his annual tribute, which he had agreed to at his acceſſion in 1770.

Par. 5. 12 October 1773. *Appendix* 19. See Art. 5. of Treaty Allahabad 1765, *No.* 21. Appendix, No. 31.

The great object of the conference at *Benares* being avowedly to augment the power and conſequence of the Vizier, and more intimately to connect the Company's political intereſts with his, the Governor, on his return to *Calcutta*, had propoſed to eſtabliſh a Reſident at his Durbar, for the readier communication with him on any buſineſs which might ariſe; and the Board having concurred with him in this opinion, Mr. *N. Middleton* was appointed; and, in conſideration of the great diſtance of his place of reſidence from *Calcutta*, whence he muſt draw the chief neceſſaries for his table, they allotted him 1,000 rupees per month for his extra expences.

Letter 17 Jan. 1774. Par. 5. *See Appendix, No.* 19 *and* 25.

In regard to the Soubahdar of *Bengal*, who now remained the only incumbrance on the Dewanſhip of thoſe provinces, your Committee find, that on the 21ſt March 1770, a treaty was concluded between the Britiſh Government and the Nabob *Mobareek ul Dowla*, which will be found in the Appendix, N° 32, and contains articles to the ſame effect as thoſe entered into with his father, *Jaffier Ally Khan*, upon his acceſſion to the Nizamut, and afterwards with his brothers, *Nudjum ul Dowla* and *Sief ul Dowla*. Theſe agreements gave the direction of the Soubah's military eſtabliſhment entirely to the Company. A certain annual ſtipend of 31,81,991,9. (excluſive of the King's tribute) was ſettled upon him, and a Naib appointed over the provinces, at the recommendation of the Preſident and Council. Having by theſe means ſecured to themſelves the complete guidance of the Government, they did not then ſeem to have extended their views beyond that virtual poſſeſſion of the real ſovereignty. It appears however, that in the year 1772, the Governor and Council, in obedience to the Company's orders, under date 10th April 1771, reduced the annual ſtipend during the non-age of the Nabob, to 16 lacks; and this was ſtated as requiſite, with a view to diſcharge the incumbrances on the Dewannee before the Company became poſſeſſed thereof, and in the hope, that out of the ſavings occaſioned by this reduction, there might be eſtabliſhed a fund for military exigencies, reſpecting ſolely the defence of the provinces. In the courſe of that year, the Governor put the domeſtic affairs of the Nabob under the controul and management of *Munny Begum*, who was the widow of *Meer Jaffier*, and mother-in-law to the Nabob, and repreſented to be a woman of great prudence and dignity; introductory to which regulation, the office of Naib Soubah was extinguiſhed, and by that means the Company became certainly yet more principals in the Government.

Appendix, No. 32. No. 26. Printed Treaties.

See 17th Oct. 1774. Par. 11. in Appendix 41. Letter to Bengal, 10 April 1771. Par. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43. No. 32.

Letter from Bengal, Sec. Depart. 10 Nov. 1772. Par. 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14. No. 32.

It has further appeared to your Committee, that Sir *Robert Barker*, in his Minute of complaint againſt the terms of agreement between Governor *Haſtings* and the Vizier, had ſuggeſted, among other preferable equivalents which might have been obtained of the King, for the reſtitution of *Korah* and *Illiabad* to him, the renunciation of the tribute and Sunnuds for the entire poſſeſſion of *Bengal*, leſt they ſhould fall into the hands of other nations. But the Governor, in his anſwer, treated both the renunciation and the Sunnuds as ſuperfluous and uſeleſs, becauſe they could not pay the one, and did not want the other. He then expreſſed alſo his doubt of any right by which the King could give, or the Company take from the Nabob, the little ſhare he by treaty poſſeſſed of the Soubarſhip; adding thereupon this obſervation, "It was not the want of the Sunnuds of *Shaw Allum*, "which defeated the long-concerted projects of the

Appendix, No. 33. Sir Rob. Barker's Minute, 7 October 1773. fol. 588. Governor Haſtings' Minute, 12 October 1773. Par. 6. in Appendix, No. 12.

"*Duc*

" *Duc de Choiſeul*, nor will the poſſeſſion of them quicken " the deſigns of the Marattas againſt us. The ſword " which gave us the dominion of *Bengal*, muſt be the " inſtrument of its preſervation; and if (which God " forbid) it ſhall ever ceaſe to be ours, the next pro- " prietor will derive his right from the ſame natural " charter."

Having thus taken a review of the Military and Political Tranſactions in the countries bordering on *Bengal*, before the arrival of the new adminiſtration, your Committee will now proceed to examine into ſo much of the Hiſtory of the Maratta State, as may tend to throw a light upon the proceedings and events which, in the proſecution of our taſk, we are to collect together, and ſubmit to the Houſe.

Upon this ſubject, indeed, your Committee have thought it proper to give a more circumſtantial account, not only becauſe the riſe and progreſs of the hoſtilities between that Nation and the Britiſh Settlements in *India* form the chief object of our preſent enquiry, but becauſe incidents, ariſing from the nature of its conſtitution, ſeem to have given a particular caſt to the ſtate of the quarrel at different periods, and to have alſo had a material influence on the negotiations ſeverally entered into with the oppoſite parties of the Government. We ſhall therefore lay before the Houſe a brief relation of ſuch material points as we have able to extract from the Records of the Company, which were ſubmitted to our inſpection for that purpoſe. It does not however appear neceſſary to go ſo far back into the hiſtory of this people, as to point out in detail the firſt coalition of their various tribes under one chief Rajah of the *Raypout* or Warrior Caſt, or to trace the increaſe of their numbers and ſtrength from the time of their ſucceſsful reſiſtance to the victorious arms of *Auranzebe*, till they became ſufficiently powerful to carry their offenſive incurſions into the heart of his empire, and to impoſe a tributary ſubjection upon the territories of his ſucceſſors. It is obſervable, that their chief force conſiſted in a very numerous cavalry, with which they committed dreadful devaſtations in the ſeveral countries they invaded. No ceſſation of them was to be purchaſed at a leſs price than the payment of a regular choute or tribute, being one-fourth of the nett Revenues, which they exacted in lieu of theſe more deſtructive levies. By theſe means they extended this impoſition over the provinces of *Bengal*, long before a grant was made of them to the Engliſh Company; nor did they afterwards indeed diſcontinue their claim, nor was it ever expreſsly denied. By the ſame right they collected or demanded the like contribution from the *Ballagaut* and *Payengaut*, or countries of *Myſore* and the *Carnatic*; and we perceive that theſe were acknowledged rights; and in the Treaty of 1768, between the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* and the Nizam, an article was inſerted for the avowal and preſervation of that tribute to the Marattas. The territories under the immediate dominion of their Rajah, or of his feudatories, became very extenſive, and reached from the northern boundaries of the *Guzerat* to the coaſt of *Oriſſa*. But in the formation of this empire, the ſovereignty of which was held by a Chief of the Raypout race, the principal direction of civil affairs was entruſted to a Council conſiſting of eight Bramins, whoſe caſt was eſteemed ſuperior to that of the Rajah, and who, by their religious influence over the minds of the people, had it in their power to regulate, in what degree they pleaſed, the authority of the prince. Of this prevailing intereſt they did not fail to take advantage for their own aggrandizement; they were the chief officers of the State, and amongſt them the Peſhwa, which title in its literal conſtruction means him who precedes the reſt, was endued with the higheſt rank and power. In the reign of *Saboo* Rajah, the Bramin called *Kiſhwanath Ballajee*, who had been raiſed to the office of Peſhwa from an inferior ſtation, gained ſuch an entire aſcendancy over the temper of his maſter, as to perſuade him to make a total reſignation of the conduct of affairs into his hands. He accordingly took upon him, with the appellation of Row Pundit, Praden or Chief and Elect of the Pundits, the real power of the Rajahſhip, which was alſo confirmed by a formal inveſtiture with the Sirpaw, a ceremony that has ever ſince been held neceſſary, and was very ſoon made the only mark of any remaining ſovereignty in the prince, for the dereliction of the exerciſe of Government on the part of *Saboo*, or the aſſumption of it by *Kiſhwanath Ballajee*, were not merely perſonal agreements, but became an hereditary practice, with this additional confirmation, that *Bajerow* (the ſon of *Ballajee*) who ſucceeded to his authority, confined the Rajah in his reſidence at *Sattarah*, and eſtabliſhed himſelf in undiſputed ſupremacy in another capital called *Poona*. *Chimnajee Oppa*, the brother of *Bajerow*, led the troops of the empire to conqueſt over the ſettlements of the Portugueſe, and added *Salſet* and *Baſſein*, and their dependencies, to their other dominions; and it appears, that on account of this ſingular inſtance of ſucceſs againſt an European Power by one of the Peſhwa family, the ſucceſſors in that office have always conſidered thoſe acquiſitions as particularly their own property, and have conſtantly manifeſted a jealous attention to the preſervation of them. The poſſeſſion of theſe diſtricts, adjoining to the Britiſh ſettlements on the Malabar Coaſt, induced ſome ſort of explanatory connection between the two Governments, and eſpecially as the eſtabliſhment of a marine very ſoon appeared to be another object of ambition in the new adminiſtration. And your Committee obſerve, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* upon that occaſion thought it proper and prudent to addreſs themſelves only to the Peſhwa, as to the efficient ſovereign of the State, and that from that time, in all tranſactions with the Marattas, they have never regarded the Rajah of *Sattarah* as any thing but an empty pageant. The articles of agreement concluded at that time with the Marattas, regarded only queſtions of trade and navigation. In the time of *Ballajee Bajerow*, the third reigning Peſhwa, who was the grandſon of the firſt, another Treaty appears to have been concluded between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and the Maratta Government; by which alſo ſome particulars of commercial concern to the excluſion of the Dutch were regulated, and Sunnuds were given to the Company for the ſole poſſeſſion of *Fort Victoria*, or *Bancote*, and *Hematgur*, upon their ſurrender of the fort of *Ghereah* (which they had taken from *Toolajee Angria*) to the Poona dominion. In conſequence of conformity to the articles of this Treaty, all diſputes were to ſubſide, and no claims were to be made by the Maratta Governmen on the Company to that date; and all former Treaties were to be maintained inviolable by both parties. In 1761, *Ballajee Bajerow* died, by ſome accounts of grief for the death of his couſin *Sudabah* or the *Bhow*, who was killed in the battle of *Paniput* againſt the emperor *Abdallah*. *Bajerow* left a ſon, *Madharrow Ballajee*, then a minor, of 14 years of age. But the regular ſucceſſion to this high office was now ſo eſtabliſhed, that the minority of the heir ſeemed to ſuggeſt no cauſe of objection; and his authority was immediately recognized under the regency of his uncle *Ragonaut Ballajee Row*. This ready acquieſcence may however, in a great meaſure, be attributed to the management of the Bramin miniſtry, which had ſtill continued to poſſeſs the guidance of the civil adminiſtration, and had thereby found means to accumulate very conſiderable riches; the ſecurity of which, involving alſo their perſonal ſafety, became of courſe an eſſential object of their policy in a State, where both on that account were conſtantly in hazard. This attention naturally incited them to take advantage of a minority to diſſeminate jealouſies and diviſions in the reigning family, and to ſeek by their intrigues to perpetuate them. In this inſtance it appears, that they had a powerful coadjutrix in *Gopicaboy*, the mother of *Madharrow*, of whoſe influence over her ſon they did not neglect to avail themſelves for the purpoſe of fomenting a difference between the uncle and the nephew, which led to an open rupture between

Appendix, 115.

Appendix, No. 34. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 9th October 1775, p. 539 to 539. Do 11 Dec. 1775, fol. 297 to 302, &c.

See Appendix, No. 91 and 115.

Printed Treaties, No. 7, page 46. Art. 11.

Mr. Tayler's Letter.

See Appendix, No. 115, and 121.

1739. See Appendi 68.

1756, dated 18 Oc No. 34.

between them; and the consequence of it was, the confinement of *Ragoba*. It should however be observed, that the accounts of these transactions differ very materially; and that while the friends of the uncle charge them to the ambition and avarice of the ministers, and the reproved licentiousness of the mother's character, his enemies on the other hand ascribe them to the failure of his traiterous designs to usurp the office, which he was only to have held during the minority of his nephew, and from which having at his own desire retired upon a large pension to a residence on the banks of the *Gungba*, he had suddenly taken up arms, with unprovoked violence, against his prince. In the conduct of these intrigues, *Siccaram Baboo* was reported to have taken a great lead. He had been promoted by *Ragoba* from a menial service in his household to an eminent post in the administration of affairs under the Peshwa, with the avowed engagement of obedience to his patron's directions; and he was of course stigmatized with ingratitude for deserting and betraying him. The power of the ministers having thus for a time no controul, their wealth increased in proportion to an immense degree; but their ascendency nevertheless began to decline as the Peshwa advanced in years, and in the display of an enlarged and manly spirit. In the beginning of his reign, while *Ragoba* yet held the undisputed regency, a treaty was concluded between the Maratta Government and the Presidency of *Bombay*; the chief object of which was to establish a permanent plan for the mutual restitution of deserters from either country. In the latter end of the reign (for *Madharrow* died in 1772, at the age of 25 years) the Marattas appeared so very formidable enemies to *Hyder Ally*, as to threaten the destruction of his power, and to compel him to prefer very earnest entreaties to the President and Council of *Fort Saint George*, for the succours with which they were by Treaty engaged to furnish him in such an exigency. But the fears of the Nabob for his own possessions, the bias of the British minister plenipotentiary in those parts, to an alliance with *Madharrow*, and the instructions of the Court of Directors to preserve a strict neutrality, conspired to prevent a compliance with his demands. It will be remembered, that *Hyder* was not insensible of the disappointment; from the bad effects of which however he was relieved by the changes in the situation of his enemies when they lost their chief Governor. It appears, that a little time before his death, he recommended his brother and successor, *Narrain Row*, to the guardianship and direction of *Ragonaut Row*, whom he therefore released from confinement; and for a short period afterwards, affairs were conducted by his governance under the title of Naib, for which he received the Sirpaw from the Rajah at the same time that *Narrain* was invested with that of Peshwa. But the influence of *Gopicaboy* and of the ministers, particularly of *Nanna Furnese*, again prevailed, and he was once more deprived of power, and very soon of his liberty also, under pretence that he was concerting a plan with *Hyder Ally* for an usurpation of the Government, or at least for his escape from *Poona*, where he had been for some time before detained a prisoner at large. The enmity of his sister-in-law seemed to have been stimulated by his adoption of a youth named *Amrut Row*, a relation and favourite of *Moodajee Boosla*, the brother of the Rajah of *Berar*, left by this procedure, contrary to the custom of their cast, his riches and future possible title to the Peshwaship, might be transferred to a different race. According however to some accounts, he was not so entirely debarred from access or communication with his friends, or rather with the enemies of the young Peshwa, whose vicious giddiness estranged from him even the ministers of his own party, but that a plan was formed to bring about a revolution, which promised again to place him at the head of the Government. Your Committee think it proper here to observe, that various informations, which we have found of these occurrences, are so strongly tinctured with party prejudice and design, that we cannot venture to decide upon any one as wholly free from misrepresentation. We have therefore placed the several narrations in the Appendix, from which the House will be enabled to judge of the circumstances and intrigues which led to the assassination of *Narrain Row*, and shall only state in this place the apparent fact, that on the 30th August he was murdered in the apartment where *Ragoba* was confined, and to whom he had fled for refuge. It is certain, that the odium of this deed was very generally thrown upon *Ragoba*, though it was by himself and his friends asserted, that the necessity of self-defence compelled him to sacrifice the life of his nephew and sovereign. The Duan, *Siccaram Baboo*, was also charged with being the principal contriver of this bloody action, and he was said to have been instigated to it, upon hearing of the Peshwa's intentions to deprive him of his office, from which might result the loss of his riches, and perhaps of his life.

Your Commiitee find, that *Ragoba* was immediately acknowledged Peshwa, and soon after received from the Rajah the Sirpaw of office, when the usual compliments of the ministers were paid to him, and Mr. *Mostyn*, who was then at *Poona*, having been appointed by the Company to be their Resident there, waited upon him in form, repeating all the same ceremonies and assurances which it had ever been usual to make on the accession of a new Peshwa. Too distrustful however of the old ministers, to appoint any one of them his Dewan, *Ragoba* appears to have instantly conceived an earnest design of strengthening his power to a degree of independence on them, by the means of an army at his own devotion, and also of employing it to revenge the hostilities and usurpations committed by the Nizam during the confusions of the late Government. This attempt proved very unfortunate, for we perceive, that by the treachery of his own officers, he suffered a total defeat in an engagement with the Soubah; and though he afterwards recovered sufficiently from this blow to collect his scattered forces, and the Nizam made overtures of accommodation and concession, which led to a promise of assistance with a body of troops in case of an emergency, he was nevertheless obliged to remit those arrears which he chiefly wanted as a supply of money, and was in the end totally deceived in his expectations of military support. The need of pecuniary resources for the accomplishment of his domestic plan of independent Government, prompted him to direct his march towards the *Carnatic*, with a view of exacting a large arrear of choute from the Nabob *Mahomed Ally*, having previously compromised his demands on *Hyder Naig* for the immediate payment of the sum of 25 lacks of rupees, in consideration of which he made over to him the three provinces of *Mudgewarry*, *Hauscootah*, and *Chunderdroorg*.

Your Committee however find, that the prosecution of these offensive measures was interrupted by the necessity of returning to the defence of his own authority, against which, in his absence from *Poona*, a confederacy of five of the chief Bramin ministers had taken place, who set on foot a considerable army, which was strengthened by the junction of the Nizam's forces to oppose him. At first indeed *Ragoba* having escaped the effects of their machinations in his camp, was soon afterwards fortunate enough to give their army a signal overthrow, and take prisoner their Commander in Chief *Trimbuck Row*, who was also one of their most respectable partizans But it appears that this event, however successful, had not sufficient efficacy to raise him above the efforts of future opposition. *Gungaboy*, the widow of *Narrain Row*, had been for some time reported with child, and in the beginning of April 1774, was said to be delivered of a son, whom the ministers immediately recognized as the true heir to the Peshwaship. Your Committee have here again found various and discordant accounts of this event; from some of which it should seem, that there were reasons to suspect that this child, pretended to be born of *Gungaboy*, was in reality the offspring of another woman, several

Appendix, No. 35. Pers. Corref. 1775, p. 398.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 12 February 1776, fol. 243.

See also Appendix, No. 34.—and Beng. Country Corref. received 18 Sept. 1775.

Printed Treaties, No 12, page 220. 14th Sept. 1761. No. 35.

See two Letters from Hyder to Bombay. No. 35.

General Letter to Fort Saint George, 24 Nov. 1772. No. 35.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 12th Feb. 1776, fol. 245.

11 April 1773.

Ben. Conf. 12th Feb. 1776, fol. 246.

Appendix No. 36. Extract from Poonah Diary, 29 Dec. 1773. Ben. Sec. Conf. 12 Feb. 1776, fol. 240, 241.

Appendix, 34 & 35.

Mr. Taylor's Letter, &c.

Appendix, No. 83, 127, 170.

Mr. Taylor. No. 34.

Extract of Poonah Diary, 28 Dec. 1773. Do 36.

See Appendix 34.

November 1773.

Appendix 34.

Beng. Sec. Country Corref. received Oct. 27, 1775.

Appendix, No. 37.

9 March 1774, Ben. Sec. Conf.—Letter from Mr. Mostyn, 31 Jan.

Pen. Sec. Conf. 9th May 1774.—Letter from Mr. Mostyn, dated 30 March. Do 37.

Ben. Conf. 12 Feb. 1776, fol. 238, 249. Mr. Mostyn, 13 April 1774. Do 37.

Mr. Taylor. See all Amount given by the ministers. Appendix 34.

several of whom, in a ſtate of pregnancy, had been ſhut up with her in the fort of *Poorunder*. By others, the reality of this birth was ſtrongly affirmed; and it appears by Mr. *Moſtyn*'s Letters from *Poona*, that the widow was apparently with child, and afterwards delivered of a ſon, which however lived but a ſhort time, and at his death, the introduction of a ſuppoſititious child immediately followed. The fortune of *Ragoba* in the meantime was marked with a variety of changes in the acquiſition and loſs of the powerful adherents with whom he occaſionally connected himſelf. Among theſe we perceive, that two great Maratta Chiefs, *Toukajee Holkar*, and *Madajee Scindia*; promiſed the moſt effectual ſupport and re-eſtabliſhment to his cauſe. The intrigues however of the Bramin miniſters were here again ſo ſucceſsful, as to break theſe connections by means of a real or pretended correſpondence with the two Jaghiredars; and *Ragoba*, who appears to have been ſuſceptible of fear, and actuated by ſudden impreſſions of alarm, ſeparated himſelf from his principal followers, and retreated into the Guzerat country where *Govind Row Guicawar*, who was then beſieging *Brudra*, agreed to aſſiſt him with all his forces. The conſequence of this ſtep was the immediate union of *Scindia* and *Holcar*, and five other Maratta Chiefs, with the Bramin confederacy, who, under the denomination of the Barrah Bhi, or Twelve Friends, agreed to acknowledge the title of the infant Peſhwa (for whom they obtained from the Rajah the Sirpaw of office) and to exclude *Ragonaut Row* from all ſhare in the Government of the empire.

Appendix, No. 38. Letter dated 31 Jan. above referred to, and 28 April 1774, 20th May, and 2d July.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 9th October 1775.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 28th December 1774.

Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, 9th Nov. 1774.

See Appendix 35 and 83.

In the courſe however of theſe tranſactions, *Ragoba* applied to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* for their aſſiſtance, with the offer of acceding to conditions which ſhould be made advantageous to the Company; and in a ſubſequent account of his ſituation and motives of action at that time, he wrote as follows: "By the favour of the Almighty the firſt battle was well fought; "but as all the fortified places were in their poſſeſſion, I "thought proper to go to *Guzerat*, where I applied to "the General of *Bombay*, who was my old friend, and "well verſed in affairs, for his alliance." The immediate reſult of this application, and the conſequences which afterwards enſued from it, will be the principal ſubject of the preſent enquiry.

'August 1774. Mr. Tayler's Letter, fol. 557. No. 34.

Received 27 October 1775, p. 349.

But it appears to be proper in the firſt place, to add to the account which your Committee have given of the Marattas, and of the ſovereign power of their empire, ſome few remarks in regard to the different branches of it; and upon this head we have found, that ſome of the principal Rapout officers, who conducted the various bands which iſſued forth after the invaſion of *Nadir Shaw*, to eſtabliſh themſelves by conqueſt on the ruins of the Mogul empire, were appointed Governors of the more diſtant provinces, which had during theſe conflicts been added to their dominions; and that they took early advantage of their ſituation, and by degrees uſurped an almoſt independant authority over the territories they had in charge. In the earlier periods of their hiſtory, theſe detached Governments were bound to furniſh a certain quota of cavalry completely equipped for ſervice, at the requiſition of the ſovereign; but the ſeverities which upon theſe occaſions they exerciſed over the inhabitants, ſoon occaſioned the depopulation of the countries, and it became neceſſary to eſtabliſh, upon a very different footing, the military force, with which in proceſs of time they went into the field, no longer as tributaries, but under the title of alliance, and on conditions of a ſtipulated ſubſidy. The pay of the troops was ſettled upon terms which were in lieu of all preparatory equipment, and every Cavalier brought with him, and was the owner of his own horſe and arms. Their mode of war, which was wholly directed to deveſtation and plunder, enticed into the ſervice, upon any ſudden or favourite expedition, every adventurer who could procure a horſe; and by theſe means very numerous armies would in a ſhort time be collected together. But as every common trooper was anxious for the preſervation of that horſe and of thoſe arms which were his own property, and the loſs of which he was obliged himſelf to make good, it cannot ſeem extraordinary that they avoided, as much as poſſible, all regular conflicts with diſciplined forces, before whom however their flight was not therefore an aſſurance of entire defeat or diſperſion. The rapidity of their movements from one country to another were truly ſurpriſing, as they took both their food and their ſleep upon horſeback. Yet the real ſtrength of the military force of the empire conſiſted in the private cavalry or houſhold troops commanded by the Paha Sirdars, and whoſe horſes were the property of the State. How troubleſome and deſtructive was their mode of warfare, and how difficult to be guarded againſt, is very ſtrikingly deſcribed in a Letter from the Select Committee of *Bengal*, upon whoſe frontiers they had made ſeveral very diſtreſſing attacks.—"We certainly labour under very "great diſadvantages with reſpect to the Marattas, ſince, "in every conteſt with them, they being neceſſarily the "aggreſſors, and we acting only on the defenſive, it can "never be in our power to hurt them effectually, nor "even to act againſt them longer than they chuſe to "ſtand in our way. But they, on the contrary, have it "continually in their option to affail us at home, and by "the immediate effect of their ravages, or by their "alarms, diſturb the peace of our country, and affect "our Revenues, although we are ſufficiently able to de-"feat the moſt ſtrenuous efforts which they may at any "time make againſt us."

Appendix, No. 39. (Mr. Tayler, p. 602.) Letter K.

&c. See Appendix, No. 34.

Cuttack Correſ. 1779. p. 42. No. 3.

See Cu. Correſ. 1779 p. 2 . No. 3.

See Appendix, No. 16; 31 Dec. 1775.

Your Committee find, that among the great Chiefs of the Maratta nation, the *Bouncello*'s held indiſputably the firſt rank, from the extent of dominion, and the independency of Government. They were allied in blood with the Rajah of *Sittarah*, and had pretenſions to the ſucceſſion of that ſovereign power. *Ragojee*, in the proſecution of that claim in favour of his ſon *Moodajee*, had marched with a conſiderable army to *Poona*, where he forced the Government to a compromiſe of great preſent advantage to him, without abandoning that contingent right upon the death of the Ram Rajah.—His eldeſt ſon *Jannajee* ſucceeded to his dominions of *Berar*, and having at his deceaſe, without children, left the inheritance to the ſon of his youngeſt brother *Moodajee*, he occaſioned thereby a great contention between the ſurviving brothers *Shabajee* and *Moodajee*. The former claimed the right of Government as the elder; and the latter as father and guardian of the adopted child. In the diſſenſions, of which your Committee have taken notice in the Poona Government, the two brothers took different parts; *Shabajee* had appeared in league with the Miniſters and the Nizam, and *Moodajee* had ſupported the cauſe and pretenſions of *Ragoba*. But from about the time of the ſuppoſed birth of the young Peſhwa, their own animoſities and quarrels roſe to ſuch a height, as to engage them wholly in the moſt implacable hoſtilities againſt each other, and to prevent their interference in the diſputes of their neighbours.

See Governor General's Minute, 9th July 1777 in 6th Report, Append. No. 6; and alſo ſee Appendix, No. 76, of this Report.

Appendix, No. 40.

See Ben. Sec. Conf. 12 February 1776.

Mr. Tayler's Letter, &c.

No. 42.

Your Committee find, that the Guzerat country, which lays to the northward of *Bombay*, and extends from *Demaum* up to the river *Puddar*, bounded by the ſea of *Cambay* on the ſouth-weſt, and by the territories of other Maratta Chiefs to the eaſt, was one of the lateſt conqueſts made from the Mogul empire. It appears to have been reduced by *Pillagee Guicawar*, a Maratta family, two brothers of which, *Futty Sing* and *Govind Row*, at the period in queſtion, were contending for the ſovereignty of it. It had been held for ſome time independent of the Poona Durbar; but in the reign of *Nanna* or *Bajerow*, they compelled *Dummajee* the ſon of *Pillajee*, or, according to other accounts, the principal Chief under *Temeck Row* (who had received the command of the country from the Sahoo Rajah, but was afterwards killed in an engagement with the Peſhwa, leaving a ſon who fled to the Mogul's) to yield them ſeveral places in it, a part of the Revenue, and to furniſh a certain quota of troops

Mr. Tayler, &c.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 6th March 1776.

See Appendix, No. 102.

troops when called for; and in short, pretended to a supremacy over the Guicawar Government. The Revenues arising from the country, and the military force kept up in it, were considerable. But the dissensions in the reigning family ha! prevented them from taking an active part in the divisions at *Poona*; the protection however of the different interests having been given in opposition to each other to the two brothers, *Futty Sing* owed his title and the support of his pretensions to the favour of the Bramin ministers; and *Ragoba* on his accession to the Musnud, decreed the Government of that province to *Govind Row*, whom we have found in arms against his brother at the siege of *Brodera*, when *Ragoba* joined him.

No. 40. Mr. Tayler's Letter.

Morary Row Gosparáh, an old and experienced Maratta Chief, who possessed the Fort of *Gatti*, and a considerable district bordering on the Nizam's country, had at first appeared to be a partizan of the ministers; but *Ragoba* upon his return from the borders of the *Carnatic*, having thrown himself under his protection against the machinations of his enemies at *Poona*, he for a time declared himself in favour of that prince, and was principally instrumental in his preservation. Towards the end however of these transactions, he had been found more anxious to secure and enlarge his own situation, than to intermeddle as an adherent with the pretensions of either party.

Mr. Tayler.

No. 40. Mr. Tayler's Letter.

The two northern Jaghierdars, *Holcar* and *Scindia*, whom your Committee mentioned as having become parties with the Mutseddies and Maratta Chiefs after the retreat of *Ragoba* into the *Guzerat*, appear to have possessed extensive districts bordering upon the Vizier's countries to the east, and to the dominions of *Berar* on the south. They were looked up to as, in a military line, the great supporters of that cause, but were at the same time conceived to have no design of co-operating with the ministers to such an extent as entirely to crush the opposition of *Ragoba*; because a regard to their own interests, which was considered to have at least an equal influence on their political conduct, should naturally induce them to keep up the balance of dissension, that neither party might be encouraged, from a confidence in their unrivalled power, to demand of them the arrears of their tribute: your Committee have indeed observed, that some degree of personal disaffection might subsist between *Ragoba* and *Madajee Scindia*, because upon the death of *Tookajee*, the elder brother of *Madajee*, *Ragoba*, then Regent of the empire, had established his son *Godarjie* in the Government held by his father, and appointed *Madajee* his guardian: but when *Ragoba* had given up his trust into the hands of the Peshwa *Madharow*, *Siccaram Baboo* his minister, in consequence of a bribe, displaced the nephew, and gave the jaghires in absolute possession to the uncle; against which proceeding *Ragoba* made representations, which proved not only unsuccessful, but very unfortunate to him.

No. 35. Bengal Sec. Pers. Co. Corref. 1775, No. 399.

No. 40.

In regard to the Mutseddies or Bramin ministry, your Committee have found, that in the time of *Narrain Row*, *Siccaram Baboo* was supposed to have conceived great indignation at the superior ascendancy which *Nanna Furnese*, a much younger man than himself, had acquired over the mind of the Peshwa; and it appears, that upon the murder of that prince, and the proclamation made by *Siccaram* of *Ragoba*'s accession to the Government, *Nanna* fled from the capital, and was hardly prevailed upon to return to it on the assurances of entire forgiveness and restoration to favour. Yet it is observable, that Mr. *Mostyn* reported it as a general opinion, that most of the ministers were instrumental in the perpetration of the murder; and it is certain that whatever jealousies had in reality subsisted between *Siccaram* and *Ballajee* the subsequent absence of *Ragoba*, in his expedition to the *Carnatic*, and the distrust and neglect which he betrayed of them all, together with a reflection on their mutual advantage, apparently reconciled them; and they will be found to act as joint conductors of the public affairs

See his Letters before referred to.

of the empire (though *Siccaram* was in effect the only nominal Duan) from the time that their conspiracy succeeded so far as to keep *Ragoba* out of possession of the Peshwaship. It is not therefore surprizing, that we should perceive in most of his Letters, strong expressions of a severe resentment against them, for the ingratitude and deceit they had, in his idea, practised against him. But it is proper to remark, that self interest was generally reported to be predominant in them over every other passion; and that increase of power, and accumulation of wealth, as the surest supporters of each other, were the undeviating principle and object of their administration: many therefore of those who had confirmed themselves in this opinion, used it as a strong argument against the legitimacy of the infant Peshwa, because the ministers were at all events so much interested to provide both a disputed succession and a long minority.

Mr. Mostyn, 2 July 1774.

Your Committee find, that the neighbouring powers, took the opportunity which these dissensions afforded them, of making encroachments on the Maratta territories. The Nizam, though the avowed partizan of the ministerial cause, was evidently attentive in a higher degree to his own interest than to the decision of the dispute in favour of his allies; and he found continual pretext for complaints, which were of course to be soothed by further cessions of country, and larger remittances of money.

Letter from Mr. Mostyn, 13 April 1774—28 April, 22 August and 9 November.

See Appendix, No. 37 and 38.

Hyder Ally, to whom *Ragoba* had granted some forts, with their appendant districts, found it however necessary to employ force in order to obtain possession of them; and he had good opportunity in this juncture to accomplish his views.

28 April, 9 November.

The *Boosilas* were still at enmity with each other, and upon the eve of coming to some decisive trial of force for the mastership. It appears indeed, that *Shabajee* had in view objects more grand and extensive than the mere dominion of *Berar*, and that he bore in mind his claim to the Government of the Maratta State, in the prosecution of which he hoped to be greatly assisted by the present dissensions among the ministers. His Vackeel had been attending on the Governor of *Bengal* for more than a twelvemonth, and frequently repeated the earnest wish of his master to enter into a defensive alliance with the Company; and the administration of that Presidency, thinking the overtures worthy of their attention, as of great probable advantage to their employers, at last sent back the Agent with Letters and presents to his master.

Par. 7. Letter from Bengal to Court of Directors, 19 Oct. 1774. *Appendix, No. 27.*

Your Committee find, that there had arisen some disputes with the French factories in the Bengal provinces, the Chief of which was *Chandernagore*, upon their pretension to the right of establishing subordinates wherever they thought fit; for which purpose also they produced Phirmaunds and Sunnuds, granted to their Company by the Mogul Government. These encroachments however did not appear of consequence enough to require an immediate and vigorous controul, in which there might be more danger than use; and the Calcutta Board therefore thought it proper to wave any discussion upon those subjects so near the close of their administration. Nor indeed was the force of the French influence in those parts apparently a just object of much jealousy to the English Government, except from the possibility of intrigues with the country powers, which in case of future differences between the two nations might tend to the more feasible introduction of their troops from the islands, or from *Europe*, and thereby enable them to create more consequential disturbances.

Appendix, No. 41.

See Letter 10th November 1773.

Letter 17 Oct. 1774

But for the representation of the state of political affairs under the Presidency at the expiration of the old Government, your Committee desire to refer the House to the extract of a Letter which we have placed in the Appendix, from the Governor and Council, dated 17th October 1774, In this will be found a recapitulation of the motives for their conduct in undertaking the Rohilla war, which, from the latest intelligence, they believed to be finally closed with that success which they had foreseen from

No. 41. Beginning at par. 10.

from the beginning. Upon the ſuppoſition of that event, they concluded their Letter in the following words: "We ſhall then again return to the ſtate of peace from "which we emerged when we firſt engaged in the Ro-"hilla expedition, with the actual poſſeſſion or acknow-"ledged right (which the power of this Government "can amply and effectually aſſert) of near ſeventy lacks "of rupees, acquired by the monthly ſubſidy and the "ſtipulation; and it reſts with you to paſs the ultimate "judgment on our conduct."

The annexed chart will ſhew the general ſtate and diſtribution of the military force under the Preſidency at that period. By the agreement formed between *Souja Dowla* and Meſſrs. *Cartier*, *Smith*, and *Ruſſell*, on the part of the Bengal Government in 1768, which was expreſsly deſigned as an explanatory clauſe to be inſerted in the treaty of *Iliabad*, the number of forces under the Vizier's eſtabliſhment was not to exceed 35,000 men of all denominations whatever; and of them only 10,000 were to be trained in the diſcipline of the Engliſh troops. Your Committee have however obſerved, that the Vizier made application about this time to the Preſident, for the purpoſe of obtaining an Engliſh Officer to command a regular battalion in his ſervice, which he propoſed to raiſe, diſcipline, and pay, after the European manner, and to employ chiefly in the protection of his perſon, and to be a check upon the mutinous diſpoſition of his own troops, which he had often experienced ſince the recal of Captain *Harper*'s battalion. The Board appear to have granted his requeſt.

And it appears to your Committee, that the Board, in their Letter of the ſame date, from the public department, gave an account of ſeveral advances which had been made in the plan recently formed for the reduction of the military expences under the management of the Commiſſary General (Colonel *Maclean*) whom the Court of Directors had ſent out to inveſtigate the Army Accounts of *Bengal*. Theſe expences were declared by the Court, in their inſtructions to the Governor General and Council, to have increaſed to a degree which was become inſupportable to them; and they, therefore, in an eſpecial manner enjoined the new Adminiſtration to make ſtrict enquiry into the cauſes of ſuch increaſe in every particular, and to retrench every ſuperfluous charge, and reduce every incidental expence to the loweſt ſum poſſible.

Appendix, No. 42. Agreement with Souja Dowla in 1768. Printed Treaties N° 25.

Par. 10. Letter from Governor and Council, 17 Oct. 1774.

See Article 28 of the Inſtructions to Governor General and Council.

ABSTRACT GENERAL RETURN of the Troops

		COMMISSIONED.								WARRANT.							NON-COM-		
		Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enfigns.	Total.	Surgeon General.	Surgeon Majors.	Surgeons.	Surgeon Affiftants.	Chaplains.	Affiftant Deputy Commiffary.	Paymaster.	Deputy Do.	Total.	Conductors.	Serjeant Majors.	Serjeants.
Effective Strength, 30th September 1774	5 Companies of Artillery	-	1	2	5	6	15	15	-	44	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	4	3	38
	3 European Regiments of Infantry	3	5	7	38	-	39	-	41	133	1	3	3	13	3	1	3	3	30	-	3	133
	21 Battalions of Sepoys	-	2	2	27	-	114	-	100	251	-	-	-	3	6	-	-	-	9	-	21	173
	1 Battalion Light Infantry	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	5	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
	1 Battalion of Purgunnah Sepoys	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4
	28 Companies of Invalid Sepoys	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7
	1 Troop of Hindoftan Body Guards	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
	Staff	-	2	2	19	1	19	-	8	51	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	13
	Garrifons and Magazines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Recruits on the way to join the 2d and 3d Brigade	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
	Total	3	10	13	95	7	198	15	160	501	1	3	8	23	3	1	3	3	45	4	32	383
	Supernumeraries	-	1	2	16	1	16	-	32	68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58
	Eftablifhment	3	9	11	79	6	182	15	128	433	1	3	8	23	3	1	3	3	45	4	32	441

PRESENT Diſpoſition of the Troops under the Command of the Preſidency of Fort Engineers, Five Companies of Artillery, Five Diviſions of Artillery Laſcars, Three of Purgunnah Sepoys, One Battalion of Light Infantry, Twenty-eight Companies of

STATIONS.	Cavalry Troop.	ENGINEERS.					ARTILLERY	
		Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	European Compan.	Laſcars Diviſion.
At Fort William	-	1	1	-	3	3	2	2
Budge Budge	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Chittagong	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dacca	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Midnapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burdwan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beerbhoom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Muxadavad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rajahmahl	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Betteah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berhampore	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Ramgur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cooch Beyhar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Monghyr	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Patna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dinapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Buxar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chunar Gur	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
In the Field, 2d Brigade	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	1
Total	1	1	1	4	4	5	5	5
Grand Total	1	15					5	5

under FORT WILLIAM PRESIDENCY, 30th September 1774.

MISSIONED and PRIVATE.							CAVALRY.				LASCARS.				HINDOSTAN OFFICERS and SEPOYS.								STAFF EFFECTIVE.							
Corporals.	Drummers.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Infantry, Private.	Total.	Duffadars.	Trumpeters.	Private Moguls.	Total.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Total.	Commandants.	Sabadars.	Jemautdars.	Trumpeters.	Havildars.	Naicks.	Sepoys.	Total.	Writers.	Sircars.	Doctors.	Farriers.	Head Armourers.	Inferior D°.	Watermen.	Total.
26	16	-	-	398	-	485	-	-	-	-	15	32	800	847	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	77	-	-	-	2,274	2,487	-	-	-	-	3	8	200	211	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	236	-	-	-	-	430	-	-	-	-	1	4	112	117	20	231	491	411	-	-	14,771	15,924	-	210	63	-	21	63	210	567
-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	1	2	24	27	1	10	30	12	50	50	620	773	-	3	2	-	1	3	12	21
-	2	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	10	30	40	50	40	700	871	-	10	3	-	1	3	10	27
-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	30	28	224	224	2,800	3,335	4	9	13	-	4	13	28	71
-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	2	100	108	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	4
4	1	-	-	-	5	24	-	-	-	-	4	16	350	370	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	12	149	163	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	3	-	-	-	273	284	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
30	335	-	-	398	2,552	-	6	2	100	108	26	74	1,635	1,735	22	280	581	491	324	314	18,891	20,903	4	233	81	1	27	82	262	690
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73	201	-	-	171	445	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	19	553	-	-	-	-	630	-	-	157	157	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
30	335	-	-	417	3,105	-	6	2	100	738	26	74	1,792	1,892	22	280	508	290	324	314	18,720	20,458	4	233	81	1	27	82	262	690

William, 26th October 1774, consisting of the Troop of Mogul Cavalry, Corps of Regiments of European Infantry, Twenty-one Battalions of Brigade Sepoys, One Battalion Invalid or Militia Sepoys, Artillery, and Infantry Invalids.

INFANTRY.						INVALIDS.				
Europeans.		Brigade Sepoys.				Artillery.		Infantry.		Sepoys.
Regts.	Compan°.	Battal°.	Compan°.	Per-gunnah Battalion.	Light Infantry.	Non-Commiſſioned.	Rank and File.	Non-Commiſſioned.	Rank and File.	Compan°.
-	5	3	-	-	-	-	2	29	163	7
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	71	—
-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	4	2	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1	5	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
-	-	-	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	6	52	—
1	-	6	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	-	21	-	1	1	-	3	43	288	28
3		21		1	1	3		331		28

(Signed) *J. Clavering*,
Commander in Chief.

The

The repreſentation of the ſeveral particulars under the head of Revenue at that period, is exhibited in the following abſtracts upon the plan already explained. In addition to which your Committee will here take notice of ſome material remarks, that the expiring Adminiſtration made upon that ſubject, and on the proſpect of improvement in the eſſential circumſtances of it.

Appendix, No. 43.

In their Letter, under date 22d Auguſt 1774, to the Court of Directors, after obſerving on the ſteps they had taken for the reduction of their debts, and on the probable reſources by which they ſhould be enabled to diſcharge great part of them before the 1ſt of January ſucceeding, they ſtated the principal ſum of C^r. rupees 79,89,312 and 4 piſe, to be that which would then remain of the old debt, beſides the new loan of 5 per cent. "which they had no doubt of paying off in the "courſe of a few years, provided their expences were "confined within the bounds to which they had lately "reduced them; that a great part of their army con- "tinued employed and paid by the Vizier; and that he "ſhould be punctual in the other payments for which "he was engaged to the Company.—The courſe of "events" (they ſaid) "is not in our hands; but we "have ventured to pledge our endeavours for accom- "pliſhing this deſirable end."

On this known proſpect of the decreaſe of their incumbrances, their credit immediately aroſe ſo much as to allow the introduction of operations for reducing the current rate of intereſt; and on the 17th October following, they wrote their laſt Letter, (extract of which is placed in the Appendix) to the Court of Directors, in ſimilar terms of ſatisfaction on the proſperous ſtate of their finances and commerce, on a review of their ſeveral branches of reſource. The expected receipt of fifteen lacks of rupees, on account of the ceſſion of *Corah*, and twenty lacks out of forty engaged for the Rohilla expedition, added to fifteen for the bills the Court had authorized them to draw upon them, would be a further fund for the diſcharge of their bond debt, and reduce it to 35 lacks inſtead of 125, which was the amount in Auguſt preceding. The further ſum of 35 lacks, which would remain due from the Vizier, the payment of which they deemed perfectly ſecure, would therefore be ſufficient to cancel the whole of the bond debt in the courſe of the enſuing ſeaſon, excluſive of the ſavings ariſing both from the reduction of expences, and from one of the brigades being employed out of the provinces, and in conſequence paid by the Vizier.

No. 43. Public Letter 17 October 1774.

Your Committee to theſe Accounts add only the ſtate of balances in the treaſuries, as made up by the Board to the 17th October 1774.

Balance in General Treaſury, C^r. rupees	4,02,837	11	0
D^o in the Dewannee Treaſury, Sicca rupees	8,90,165	2	3
And in the Caſh Current rupees -	15,170	11	6

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1773 to April 1774.

		Groſs Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
		CR^s.	CR^s.	CR^s.	£. ſt.
Ceded Lands (comprehending Calcutta and Purgunnahs Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong Provinces, according to the new eſtabliſhment of the Council of Revenue) Land Revenues - - - - - -	CR^s. 64,00,473				
Duties on Salt collected in the Provinces - - -	5,33,330	66,53,793	—	—	—
Charges of Collection - — —		—	4,13,337	—	—
Jaghire to Lord Clive - — —		—	2,58,631	—	—
Nett Revenues - - — —		—	—	59,81,825	672,956
Bengal Province. Land Revenues -	149,23,357				
Board of Cuſtoms collected -	4,60,750				
Duties on Salt collected -	5,53,520	159,36,627	—	—	—
Charges of Collection - — —		—	5,32,320	—	—
Stipends and Allowances paid - — —		—	32,41,220	—	—
Nett Revenues - - — —		—	—	121,63,087	1,368,348
Bahar Province. Land Revenues - — —		46,19,492	—	—	—
Charges of Collection - - — —		—	3,49,744	—	—
Allowances and Penſions paid — —		—	2,32,245	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - — —		—	—	40,37,503	454,219
Duties on Coinage - - - - — —		18,430	—	18 430	2,073
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta - - — —		3,82,214	—	3,82,214	42,999
	CR^s	276,10,556	50,27,497	225,83,059	2,540,595
Commiſſion on the Revenues - -			5,26,140	5,26,140	9,191
	CR^s		55,53,637	220,56,919	2,531,404

AN

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Fort William and Subordinates, from 1773 to 1774.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
159,537	53,700	1,304,883	131,430	1,173,453	101,745	1,488,435

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782. (Errors excepted)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company in Bengal, from May 1773 to April 1774; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CR^s.	CR^s.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	21,62,994	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - -		117,71,486
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - -		1,27,818
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - -		6,153
Contract with the Country Government for Materials, &c. for Building - - - - - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - -		4,79,895
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - - -		10,468
Debts at Chittagong - - - - - - - -		1,910
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - -		231
Debts at Coſſimbuzar - - - - - - - -		553
Debts at Patna - - - - - - - -		2,063
His Majeſty Shah Allum, the Balance of his Stipend - -		50,31,232
Nabob Mobarek ul Dowlah D° - D° - -		6,74,739
Nudjeef Cawn, Balance of his Allowance - - -		3,48,000
Mahomed Reza Cawn D° - D° - - - -		2,57,111
Ahteram ul Dowlah D° - D° - - - -		17,779
Rou ul-din Huſſein Cawn D° - D° - - - -		7,250
Oody Poory Gouſſaine D° - D° - - - -		27,187
Munny Begum, Balance of her Allowance - - -		1,04,400
Rajah Goordaſs, Balance of his Allowance - - -		23,200
Fund for the Diſcharge of old Salt Balances - - -		9,57,799
Curr^t Rup^s -		213,13,281

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782. (Errors excepted)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Appendix, No. 44. Ben. Conſ. 20 October 1774.

Your Committee find, that the firſt exerciſe of Government under the new Adminiſtration in the Preſidency of *Bengal*, with the ſuperintending and controlling powers before mentioned, over the other Settlements, took place on the 20th October 1774. And it appears by their Letter of 21 November following, which will be found in the Appendix, N° 44, that their firſt Conſultations had not begun in that unanimity, or their reſolutions formed in that harmony, which were the objects of the Company's inſtructions. The neceſſity and propriety of the Rohilla war ſeems to have furniſhed a conſtant ſource of diſcordancy. It is foreign from the direct deſign of the enquiry on which your Committee are here engaged, to point out every particular of the diſagreements which divided the opinions of the Board. We ſhall only take notice of ſuch reſolutions as tend to complete the introductory

ductory account we have given of the general ſtate of political affairs about that period.

Secret Letter from Governor General and Council, 21 November 1774. No. 44.

In order to elucidate the grounds and conduct of the war, it was thought neceſſary to ſee the whole of the original correſpondence between the Governor General, Mr. *Middleton*, and Colonel *Champion*; but we perceive, that the Governor General declined laying the whole of them before the Board, and only offered ſuch parts as related to the conduct of public affairs. This refuſal appears to have occaſioned a formal proteſt, and a reſolution of the majority to recal Mr. *Middleton*, and to appoint Colonel *Champion* to treat with the Vizier in his room. The inſtructions ſent to Colonel *Champion* were not agreed to without much diſcuſſion. He was therein directed to wait upon the Vizier, and to require payment of the forty lacks for the aid which the Company had furniſhed in the Rohilla war, and of ſuch other ſums as would be then due in virtue of his other engagements; there was indeed ſuperadded a diſcretionary power to relax in part of theſe demands, if apparently neceſſary, to accept twenty lacks in ready money, and to ſettle a kiſtbundie for payment by inſtalments of the remainder, at any term not exceeding twelve months for the laſt. Directions were alſo tranſmitted for his conduct, in regard to the movements of the troops dependent on the alternative of the Vizier's compliance or refuſal. Some alterations however took place in theſe inſtructions, on the receipt of advices from Colonel *Champion*, that an end was put to the war by a definitive treaty between the Vizier and *Fizoola Cawn*, who agreed to lay down his arms, and ſurrender to the former one half of the treaſure which he had with him in his camp; and on condition of the Vizier's putting him in poſſeſſion of a ſmall diſtrict, the capital of which was called *Rampore*, he conſented to hold it dependent on him, and to renounce all pretenſions to any other part of the country. On the concluſion of this engagement, and the transfer of the treaſure, in part diſcharge of his debt to the Company, *Souja Dowla* returned to *Fizabad*, at which place Colonel *Champion* was ordered to wait upon him for the purpoſes abovementioned, notwithſtanding the repreſentation made by the Governor General of his claim to ſome indulgence, as he had put himſelf in the way of diſcharging his engagements, and the army was removed ſo much nearer his frontiers.

Appendix, No. 45. Ben Sec. Conſ. 25 October 1774, &c.

Your Committee have placed in the Appendix N° 45, the Proceedings and Reſolutions, and ſeveral Minutes, of the Members of the Board upon this ſubject, which were then ſent numbers in the packet, particularly an addreſs from the Governor General to the Court of Directors, a joint addreſs from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, and a Minute of Mr. *Barwell*, all upon the ſame ſubject. As theſe contain the very different ideas which their ſeveral authors entertained of the political points in queſtion, we ſhall only deſire to refer the Houſe to them as documents of information, and think it proper to conclude theſe obſervations on this part of the ſubject, with ſome remarks on the ſentiments which the Court of Directors expreſſed upon the moſt material of theſe tranſactions, and on the orders which they tranſmitted to their Servants in *India* in conſequence thereof.

In regard to the tribute due to the King *Shaw Allum*, and which we have ſeen had been withheld by the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, the Court pronounced a confirmation of that meaſure in the following terms:

General Letter to Bengal, 3 March 1775. Par. 32. Appendix, No. 46.

" Having taken into our moſt ſerious conſideration
" the circumſtances which induced our Preſident and
" Council to ſuſpend payment of tribute to his Majeſty
" *Shaw Allum*, we muſt declare, that his own conduct
" has rendered that meaſure not only expedient, but
" abſolutely neceſſary."

And your Committee further remark, that after ſeveral other pointed obſervations of complaint againſt the conduct of the King, by which he had forfeited their favour and protection, they ſignified to the Government of *Bengal* a further approbation of thoſe Proceedings alſo, which led to the Conference at *Benares*, and of great part of the agreement concluded at that place by Governor *Haſtings*, in theſe words:

" Although the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*
" were reſerved to the King by the Treaty of 1765,
" we can by no means allow, that his Majeſty acquired
" by that Treaty a right to reſign them into the hands of
" our enemies. As the Vizier of the empire is the firſt
" officer under his Majeſty, and as the territories in
" queſtion were formerly held by the Vizier, we cannot
" but be of opinion, that our Servants acted with great
" propriety in committing them again to his manage-
" ment, when it became abſolutely impoſſible for his
" Majeſty to hold them in his own immediate poſſeſſion.
" And as the King had not only withdrawn himſelf from
" our protection, and abandoned the countries aſſigned
" to him, but alſo continued by his preſence to coun-
" tenance the depredations of the Marattas, we fully
" approve the Reſolution of our Preſident and Council,
" under thoſe circumſtances, to ſuſpend payment of tri-
" bute to his Majeſty, as we think the general principles
" of ſelf-preſervation warranted them to withhold re-
" ſources which, if ſent, they knew muſt fall into the
" hands of the Marattas, and which they had every rea-
" ſon to believe would be appropriated to the uſe of
" their army, and contribute towards enabling them to
" commit hoſtilities in our own provinces, or in thoſe
" of our allies.

" For the above reaſons we, upon the matureſt deli-
" beration, confirm the Treaty of *Benares*; and we alſo
" hereby direct, that no further remittances be made to
" the King without our expreſs permiſſion firſt obtained
" for that purpoſe."

It does not appear that any direction or permiſſion of that ſort have, ſince the date of this Letter, been ſent by the Court of Directors to their Government of *Bengal*; or that the Superior Council have in this inſtance ventured to tranſgreſs the orders of the Company.

The penſion, which had been again apparently reſtored to *Nudjiff Cawn*, was alſo at this time approved of by the Court of Directors; conditionally, however, " that it
" might be in his power to render them future ſervices,
" and that therefore it would be prudent to pay it." By referring to the Accounts of the year 1776, the Houſe will perceive the accumulated balance due to *Nudjiff Cawn*, and will of courſe be ſatisfied, that the further payment of the ſtipend had been diſcontinued. Several Letters which are placed in the Appendix will further corroborate this obſervation, and point out the reaſons of it.

Par. 38.

Letters to and from Nudjiff Cawn, No. 45.

Concerning the engagement entered into with the Vizier, for the expedition againſt the Rohillas, your Committee obſerve, that the Court of Directors, in the ſame Letter, uſed the following expreſſions:

" Notwithſtanding the pecuniary advantages which the
" Company have gained by the event, we are exceed-
" ingly concerned to find, that our arms have been em-
" ployed in the conqueſt of the Rohillas; though we
" muſt confeſs the conduct of their Chiefs, in refuſing
" to fulfil their ſolemn ſtipulations with the Vizier, ſeems
" to have drawn upon them the calamities they have
" ſuffered."

They added, however, aſſurances that had the object in view been extended no further than to compel payment of the 40 lacks of rupees due to the Vizier and to the Company for the protection afforded the Rohillas, they ſhould have had leſs objection to the meaſure. And while they acknowledged the force of the Treaty of *Allahabad*, they again declared their abſolute prohibition againſt warlike enterprizes beyond the Vizier's territories, on any pretence whatever.

In a ſubſequent Letter of the 7th of the ſame month, the Court appear to have repeated theſe reſtrictions with ſtill greater force; as by a Letter from the Select Committee, under date the 24th Auguſt preceding, they had been informed of the greater diſtance to which their arms

Extract of General Letter to Bengal, 7 March 1775. No. 46.

had been carried acroſs the *Ganges* into the center of the Rohilla country, and more eſpecially as ſome ſteps taken by the King, and the probability of depredations by the Marattas, rendered the time and the circumſtances peculiarly unfavourable.

But it has appeared to your Committee, that after the receipt of all the documents relative to theſe tranſactions, which were tranſmitted by the new Adminiſtration, the opinion and reſolutions of the Court of Directors were pronounced with yet more ſerioufneſs, and were attended with that additional weight which the confirmation of the Court of Proprietors might be ſuppoſed to give them.

Appendix, No. 46. 5th December 1775.

The following extract of a Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council, under date 5th December 1775, will fully explain the ſentence delivered by them both.

" As the ſeparate addreſſes of our Governor General, " and of the majority of Council to the Court of Direc- " tors, and of the latter to our late Chairman and Deputy " Chairman, are entered upon your Records, we ſhall " conſider them as Proceedings or Minutes of Council, " and as ſuch reply to thoſe particulars which require our " obſervation, direction, or determination; and herein " we ſhall be guided by that equal regard which we bear " towards every Member of our Board, expreſſing our " approbation of ſuch meaſures as are right, and repre- " hending thoſe which appear to us deſerving of cenſure; " but before we proceed to thoſe particulars, we think " it neceſſary to communicate to you the following Re- " ſolutions, agreed to by a General Court of Proprie- " tors, held on the 6th inſtant, relative to ſundry ob- " jects on which you have been divided."

" Reſolved unanimouſly, That notwithſtanding this " Court hath the higheſt opinion of the ſervices and " integrity of *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, and cannot ad- " mit a ſuſpicion of corrupt motives operating on his " conduct, without proof; yet they are of opinion, with " their Court of Directors, that the agreement made " with *Sujah Dowla* for the hire of a part of the Com- " pany's troops for the reduction of the Rohilla coun- " try, and the ſubſequent ſteps taken for carrying on " that war, were founded on wrong policy, were con- " trary to the general orders of the Company, frequently " repeated, for keeping their troops within the bounds " of the provinces, and for not extending their territo- " ries; and were alſo contrary to thoſe general principles " which the Company wiſh ſhould be ſupported."

" Reſolved unanimouſly, That this Court do agree " with the opinion of the Court of Directors, that the " whole correſpondence between the Governor General " and Mr. *Middleton*, ſhould have been laid before the " Members of the Superior Council, who ought to have " received every information reſpecting the tranſactions " of the Company's Agent at *Sujah Dowlah*'s Court, in " order to regulate their conduct on that critical period."

" Reſolved, that this Court do agree in opinion with " the Court of Directors, that it is neceſſary to wait the " arrival of the *Anſon*, or ſome further advices from " *Bengal*, before a preciſe judgment can be formed, re- " lative to the future reſources of that Preſidency."

" Reſolved, that this Court do agree in opinion with " the Court of Directors, that the meaſure of recalling " the troops from the Rohilla expedition, as ſoon as it " could be done with propriety, was agreeable to the " ſpirit of the Company's general orders; but conſider- " ing the ſituation of affairs at that time, between the " Company and *Shujah Dowla*, and other circumſtances, " the Court think the recalling them ſo haſtily might " have been attended with inconveniences."

" Having thus laid before you the ſenſe of the Pro- " prietors at large on the above ſubjects, taken after the " moſt candid examination of your Records, we proceed " to make ſuch further obſervations, and to give ſuch " orders and inſtructions, as from the nature of your " advices, and the ſituation of our affairs in *Bengal*, ap- " pear to us neceſſary.

" We diſapprove all ſuch diſtant expeditions as may " eventually carry our forces to any ſituation too remote " to admit of their ſafe and ſpeedy return to the protec- " tion of our own provinces in caſes of emergency.

" We alſo utterly diſapprove and condemn offenſive " wars; diſtinguiſhing however between offenſive mea- " ſures unneceſſarily undertaken with a view to pecuniary " advantages, and thoſe which the preſervation of our " honour, or the protection or ſafety of our poſſeſſions, " may render abſolutely neceſſary.

" The attention paid by the majority to the tenor " and ſpirit of our orders on this ſubject, is highly agree- " able to us; and it is our moſt poſitive direction, that no " deviation from thoſe orders be permitted, but upon " the moſt urgent and abſolute neceſſity (as that alone " can juſtify a departure from them) For the proſpect " of any advantages, however alluring, can in nowiſe be " adequate to the pernicious conſequences which muſt " reſult from examples of diſobedience to our orders.

" The ſentiments expreſſed by the majority in the " 36th paragraph of their addreſs, coincide exactly with " our own; their determination to endeavour to maintain " peace in *India*, and vigorouſly to defend our poſſeſſions " and allies, cannot be too much applauded: we there- " fore ſtrictly enjoin every Member of our Council, to " concur heartily in ſuch meaſures as may be neceſſary " for accompliſhing theſe deſirable purpoſes."

The ſame plan of repreſentation which has before been ſhewn in regard to the general ſtate of the Revenues, and of the condition and diſtribution of the Military Force, is here annexed, being taken at a period when the new Government had examined and arranged the ſeveral objects of them. And as the mode of collecting the Revenues is both a curious and intereſting ſubject of information, and as many new arrangements and alterations had taken place therein, ſince the Report made by your former Committee in 1773 upon that ſubject, we now deſire to refer the Houſe to the Appendix, wherein is inſerted the Account which the Governor General gave of it to the other Members of the new Government, who might be ſuppoſed as yet unacquainted with the regulations in practice.

Governor General's Minute, 25 October 1774. — Appendix, No. 45.

The further proſecution of this branch of enquiry, after the ſubject of it came under the regulation of a new Government in *Bengal*, may be hereafter advantageouſly attended to by your Committee, in a ſeparate Report. The object of the preſent Report, upon this head, is completed (according to our intimation ſtated above) at this period.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1774 to April 1775.

	CR^s.	Groſs Collections. CR^s.	Charges. CR^s.	Nett Revenues. CR^s.	Nett Revenues. £. Sc.
Ceded Lands.					
Land Revenues	67,34,400				
Duties on Salt collected	1,89,920				
		69,24,320			
Charges of Collection			1,03,190	—	—
Jaghire to Lord Clive			2,58,730	—	—
Nett Revenues				65,62,400	738,270
Bengal Province.					
Land Revenues	159,13,940				
Board of Cuſtoms collected	9,14,010				
Duties on Salt collected	5,61,630				
		164,89,580			
Charges of Collection			5,19,380	—	—
Stipends and Allowances paid			19,86,250	—	—
Nett Revenues				139,83,950	1,573,194
Bahar Province.					
Land Revenues		48,89,750	—	—	—
Charges of Collection			1,42,360	—	—
Allowances and Penſions paid			1,60,290	—	—
Nett Revenues				45,87,100	516,048
Duties on Coinage		7,210		7,210	811
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta		4,09,900		4,09,900	46,114
	CR^s.	287,20,760	31,70,200	255,50,560	2,874,437
Commiſſion on the Revenues			4,48,470	4,48,470	50,473
	CR^s		36,18,670	251,02,090	2,823,964

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Fort William and Subordinates, from 1774 to 1775.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY. Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
231,722	36,510	1,080,304	240,750	839,554	105,104	1,212,890

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company in Bengal, from May 1774 to April 1775; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CR^{s}.	CR^{s}.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	123,95,598	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - -		90,68,584
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - -		1,61,023
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - -		6,153
Contract with the Country Government for Materials, &c. for Building - - - - - - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - -		2,02,342
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - - -		10,468
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - -		231
Debts at Coſſimbuzar - - - - - - -		200
Money refunded on account of General Coote's Commiſſion -		28,056
His Majeſty Shah Allum, the Balance of his Stipend - -		50,31,232
Nudjeef Cawn, Balance of his Allowance - - - -		5,80,000
Mahomed Reza Cawn, D° - D° - - - - -		1,84,288
Ahteram ul Dowlah, D° - D° - - - - -		17,779
Oody Poory Gouſſaine D° - D° - - - - -		27,187
Munny Begum, Balance of her Allowance - - - -		23,070
Juggut Seat, the Balance of his Annual Payment - - -		62,204
Fund for the Diſcharge of old Salt Balances - - - -		9,06,731
Curr^{t} Rupees - -		177,74,455

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

ABSTRACT RETURN of the STRENGTH of the EUROPEAN

FORT WILLIAM, January 31st, 1776.	PRESENT STRENGTH. Commissioned. Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Ensigns.	Non-commissioned and Private. Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Rank and File.	ESTABLISH- Commissioned. Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Ensigns.
Corps of Engineers	-	1	1	3	-	5	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	-	5	-	4
Battalion of Artillery	-	1	2	5	5	16	13	-	43	14	31	387	-	1	2	5	5	15	15	-
1st Brigade Regiment	1	1	3	12	-	12	-	11	54	30	-	751	1	1	2	11	-	14	-	9
1st Brigade Sepoy Corps	-	1	1	7	-	26	-	34	37	66	-	-	-	1	1	7	-	37	-	35
2d D° Regiment	1	2	3	10	-	20	-	13	51	23	-	748	1	1	2	12	-	14	-	8
2d D° Sepoy Corps	-	1	1	7	-	29	-	32	63	87	-	-	-	1	1	7	-	37	-	35
3d D° Regiment	1	1	2	12	-	10	-	18	48	24	-	781	1	1	2	11	-	15	-	8
3d D° Sepoy Corps	-	1	1	7	-	27	-	33	68	84	-	-	-	1	1	7	-	37	-	35
Mogul Troop	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Light Infantry	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	4	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	4
Purgunnah Sepoys—Chittagong	-	-	-	1	-	5	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	-
Presidency, Invalid Sepoys	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
Moorshedabad, D°	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—
Patna D°	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—
Dacca D°	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—
Burdwan D°	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—
Chunar Gur—European Invalids	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	-
Presidency D°	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Staff to the Army	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	—	—
Staff to Governor General	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1
Staff to Commander in Chief	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—
Staff to Fort William	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Staff to Dinapore	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—
Staff to Berhampore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Staff to Monghyr	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—
Not returned in any Corps	2	-	1	2	-	-	-	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Not arrived from Europe	-	-	1	2	-	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
D° Recruits, per the Granville	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Doing Duty in the Nabob's Troops	-	-	-	9	1	25	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	1	25	2	6
D° Nabob, Moorshedabad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total effective Strength	5	10	17	86	6	191	16	163	394	333	31	2,715	3	9	15	83	6	215	17	146
Supernumerary	2	1	4	3	-	-	-	17	-	-	1	-								
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	24	1	-	33	3	-	844						432		
General Establishment	3	9	13	83	6	215	17	146	427	336	32	3,559								

Fort William,
25th March 1776.

N. B. In this Abstract, the Adjutants and Quarter Masters of European Regiments are considered as Effective, and the Drums and Fifes of the Army Europeans.—The Two Companies of European Invalids at Chunar Gur and Presidency, consisting of 54 Serjeants, 9 Drummers, 301 Rank and File, with 60 Cadet, now on the List of the Army, are not included.

TROOPS under the PRESIDENCY of FORT WILLIAM.

MENT.	SUPERNUMERARY In the ſeveral Corps.								WANTING TO COMPLETE											
Non-commiſſioned and Private.				Commiſſioned.							Non-commiſſioned and Private.				Commiſſioned.							Non-commiſſioned and Private.			
Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Rank and File.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Rank and File.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enſigns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Rank and File.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
30	15	30	425	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	13	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	38
44	22	-	1,042	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	10	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	291
77	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	1	40	18	—	—
44	22	-	1,042	-	1	1	-	-	6	-	5	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	294
77	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	3	14	—	—	—
44	22	-	1,042	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	10	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	261
77	84	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	2	9	—	—	—
4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	—	—	—
5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	1	-	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
127	336	30	3,559	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	25	2	-	33	3	-	884
4,352				—								—				14								919			

(Signed) *J. Clavering,*
Commander in Chief in India.

ABSTRACT RETURN of the STRENGTH of the

31ſt JANUARY 1776.	PRESENT STRENGTH.																		
	Cavalry.				Native Officers and Sepoys.				Staff Effective.						Laſcars.				
	Duffadars.	Trumpeters.	Private Moguls.	Horſes.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Trumpeters.	Havildars, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Writers.	Sircars.	Doctors.	Farrier.	Armourers.	Watermen.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Laſcars.	Artificers and Labourers.
Troop of Body Guard	6	2	100	107	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
Corps of Engineers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	50	-
Artillery — 1ſt Company 1ſt Brigade	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	125	87
Artillery — 2d D° 2d D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	125	160
Artillery — 3d D° 3d D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	16	436	831
Artillery — 4 & 5 D° Fort William	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	10	250	70
1ſt Brigade — Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	50	90
1ſt Brigade — Sepoy Corps	-	-	-	-	81	171	244	4,954	-	70	21	-	28	70	-	1	28	59
2d D° — Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	100	412
2d D° — Sepoy Corps	-	-	-	-	80	148	107	4,976	-	71	21	-	28	72	1	2	56	318
3d D° — Regiment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	50	333
3d D° — Sepoy Corps	-	-	-	-	85	140	70	4,900	-	70	21	-	28	70	-	2	34	148
Light Infantry	-	-	-	-	13	30	12	720	1	3	3	-	4	12	1	2	24	6
Purgunnah Sepoys, Chittagong	-	-	-	-	11	30	40	790	-	10	3	-	4	10	2	6	92	45
Preſidency, Invalid Sepoys	-	-	-	-	8	10	7	810	1	2	3	-	4	7	-	-	-	-
Moorſhedabad D°	-	-	-	-	7	8	7	771	1	2	3	-	4	7	-	-	-	-
Patna - - D° &c.	-	-	-	-	30	56	9	1,045	1	2	3	-	4	9	2	6	88	34
Dacca - - D° &c.	-	-	-	-	4	5	5	580	1	2	3	-	4	5	-	-	-	3
Chunar Gur Garriſon	-	-	-	-	9	29	-	155	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	42	56
Buxar - - D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	24	16
Monghyr - D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	13	29
Dinapore - Barrack-maſter	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	176
Berhampore - D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	176
Fort William - D°	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	276
—— D° Inſpector General of Stores	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	12	300	379
Midnapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	10	-
Burdwan	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	232	-	2	-	-	2	2	-	1	5	-
Total effective Strength	6	2	100	107	332	629	503	19,939	5	238	81	1	110	268	30	86	1,882	3,704
Supernumerary	-	-	-	-	30	121	213	481	1	5	-	-	1	6	3	6	97	1,524
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
General Eſtabliſhment	6	2	100	117	302	508	290	19,458	4	233	81	1	109	262	27	80	1,785	2,180

HINDOSTAN TROOPS under the PRESIDENCY of FORT WILLIAM.

| ESTABLISHMENT. | | |

(COPY.)

DISPOSITION OF THE ARMY.

RANK.	STATION.	TROOPS.
		3d Company of Artillery.
		3d Regiment.
2 Colonels - - - -	In the Field - -	15 - - 16 - - 18 - - 19 - - 20 - - 21 - - } Battalions of Sepoys.
1 Lieutenant Colonel - - -	Chunar - - -	1 Company of European Invalids. 17th Battalion of Sepoys.
1 Major - - - - -	Dinapore - -	1st Company of Artillery. 5 Companies of the 1st Regiment. 3d, 4th } Battalions of Sepoys.
1 Lieutenant Colonel - - -	Mongeer - -	7th, 10th } D°
1 Colonel - - - -	Berhampore - -	2d Company of Artillery. 5 Companies of the 1st Regiment. 5 D° 2d D° 1st, 8th } Battalions of Sepoys.
1 Colonel - - - - -	Presidency - -	4th, 5th } Companies of Artillery. 5 Companies of the 2d Regiment. 9th, 12th, 13th } Battalions of Sepoys.
1 Captain - - - - -	Beerboom - -	1 Company European Invalids.
1 D° - - - - -	Midnapore - -	14th Battalion of Sepoys.
1 D° - - - - -	Ramgur - - -	11th D° D°
1 D° - - - - -	Boggah - - -	6th D° D°
1 D° - - - - -	Cooch Beyhar - -	5th D° D°
1 D° - - - - -	Buxar - - -	2d D° D°
1 D° - - - - -	Chittagong - -	2 Companies Patna Militia Sepoys.
1 D° - - - - -	Pointee - - -	22d Battalion Purgunnah Sepoys.
1 D° - - - - -	Moorshedabad - -	Battalion of Light Infantry.
1 D° - - - - -	Presidency - -	7 Companies Militia Sepoys.
1 D° - - - - -	Patna - - -	7 D° - D°
1 Lieutenant - - - -	Dacca - - -	7 D° - D°
1 D° - - - - -	Burdwan - - -	5 D° - D°
		2 D° - D°

(Signed) *J. Clavering*,
Commander in Chief in India.

Your Committee find, that a few days after the assumption of their new Government, the Supreme Council acquainted the other Presidencies of that event, in the following General Letter: "We are to inform you of "our having taking possession of the Government of "this Presidency, in virtue of the late Act of Parliament; and as by that Act we are also charged with "the political concerns of the Company all over *India*, "we desire that as soon as possible you transmit to us "an accurate state of the posture of affairs in your Pre-"sidenc respecting the Country Powers, their interests "and probable connections with each other, with the "Company, and with other European nations; and in "fine, that you furnish us as soon as possible, and from "time to time, with the most complete lights possible "on these points, to enable us to form a judgment "upon them, and to direct their fututure conduct.

"We are,

"*Fort William*, "Your obedient
"24 Oct'. 1774. "humble Servants, &c."

Your Committee however observe, that previous to the arrival of this Letter at *Bombay*, the President and Council had resolved to engage in a scene of active operations in that quarter; the relation of which, with their long train of consequences, is to form the bulk of this Report, which we put together for the information of the House, on the history of the Maratta war.

Before however that we enter into this narrative, your Committee think it necessary to give some introductory

Account

Account of the ſtate of the Revenues, and of the poſture of political affairs under that Preſidency, for a few years previous to the commencement of theſe tranſactions, that a more certain judgment may be formed of the ſtrength and reſources on which alone they could aſſuredly depend for ſupport, when they ventured to begin an enterprize directly tending to a war with the Marattas.

Your Committee have already explained to the Houſe, the plan which we have adopted for a conciſe, and at the ſame time an accurate repreſentation of the ſources of Revenue, and the objects of diſburſement, under the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay*; and we have in the courſe of our obſervations on the ſtate of the former, ſubmitted the finiſhed ſpecimens of information on thoſe heads. Meaning to proceed in the ſame method with reſpect to *Bombay*, your Committee here preſent the view of the ſtate of that Government, in the years 1771, 1772, 1773, under the title of Revenue and Military Force, to which it has been neceſſary in this caſe to add an Account of the aids received from *Bengal*.

AN ACCOUNT of the Revenues of Bombay and its Dependencies, from Auguſt 1771 to July 1772.

		Groſs Collections.	Charges of Collection.	Nett Revenues.		
		Rup^{s}.	Rup^{s}.	Rup^{s}.		£. ſt.
Bombay.						
Land Revenues	Rup^{s} 40,456					
Cuſtoms and Duties	1,97,312					
Farms	1,49,744					
		3,87,512	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions		—	33,360	—	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	3,54,152	—	44,269
Tellicherry.						
Land Revenues	Rup^{s} 12,816					
Farms	3,032					
		15,848	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions		—	2,208	—	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	13,640	—	1,705
Surat.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		2,29,512	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions		—	17,136	—	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	2,12,376	—	26,547
Anjengo.						
Farms		832	—	832	—	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues	Rup^{s} 7,368					
Cuſtoms and Duties	4,024					
Farms	1,224					
		12,616	—	12,616	—	1,577
Buſſorah.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		10,184	—	10,184	—	1,273
	Rupees	6,56,504	52,704	6,03,800	£. ſt.	75,475

An ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from Auguſt 1771 to July 1772

	Civil.	Marine.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges
	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.
1771 - 1772	75,618	80,210	214,870	40,155	410,853

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company at Bombay, from August 1771 to July 1772; also the Balance in the Treasuries.

	R°.	R°.
Balances in the Treasuries - - -	2,48,960	
Debt at Interest - - - - - - - - - -		12,03,544
Due Account Deposits - - - - - - - - -		22,255
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		49,738
Coja Yacoob, Contractor for Raw Silk - - - - - -		36,321
Rupees - -		13,11,858

East India House,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1771 to 1772.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - - - -	—
Bills - - - - - - - - - - - -	12,13,643
Goods - - - - - - - - - - - -	6,57,395
Rupees	18,71,038
£. sts.	233,879

East India House,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

NUMBER and DISTRIBUTION of the TROOPS under BOMBAY,

APRIL 1772.

GENERAL RETURN of the HONOURABLE COMPANY'S

	ARTILLERY.																IN-															
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Surgeon.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Drums and Fifes.	Gunners.	Matroſſes.	Brigadier General, &c.	Colonel.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids de Camp.	Secretary.	Surgeon Major.	Adjutants.				
Bombay	-	1	3	-	7	10	1	1	1	16	7	2	1	37	126	1	1	2	1	12	17	23	1	1	3	1	1	2				
Surat	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	3	2	2	1	2	11	-	-	-	1	2	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	1				
Tellicherry	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	3	3	3	2	3	16	-	-	-	-	3	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	1				
Anjengo	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	7	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Total	-	1	3	4	10	12	1	1	1	16	12	32	13	51	160	1	1	2	2	18	25	33	1	1	3	1	1	4				
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Supernumeraries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	5	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Eſtabliſhment	1	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	12	12	32	8	48	160	1	-	2	2	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	4				

N. B. Captain Lockhart Ruſſel abſent as per laſt Return, and not included.

The Staff Officers are included in their Rank, as well as in the Columns of Staff.

(Signed) *David Wedderburn,*

Brigadier General and Commander in Chief.

TROOPS, under the PRESIDENCY of BOMBAY, 27th APRIL 1772.

INFANTRY.							SEPOYS.												IRREGULARS.									INVALIDS.				
																			Tiveys.				Nairs								
Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subidars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subadies.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Waitermen.	Sepoys.	Topasses.	Adjutant.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	C. Moopas.	Private.	Captains.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
2	2	24	57	57	57	1,170	3	14	19	3	3	33	71	32	200	191	21	7	95	33	2,600	327	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	8	4	1	91
-	-	-	9	8	6	133	1	5	2	1	1	8	17	8	49	49	8	2	21	8	572	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	21	16	13	69	-	-	-	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	-	-	-	9	152	1	2	59	65	1	30	-	4	6	—	4
-	-	-	4	4	3	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	65	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	2	24	91	85	79	1,397	4	19	21	4	4	41	88	40	249	240	30	9	116	41	3,181	544	1	2	59	650	1	30	1	12	10	1	125
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	99	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	15	7	23	117	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	-	9	-	6	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	2	-	76	76	56	1,280	4	20	20	4	4	40	84	40	240	240	24	8	120	40	3,280	-	1	2	60	600	1	30	—	—	—	—	—

Since last Return.

	Dead.	Deserted.	Discharged.	Invalided.	Entertained.	Transferred.	Received.
Artillery - - -	-	1	1	—	—	—	—
Infantry - - -	38	17	10	-	24	11	6
Sepoys - - -	9	31	14	1	34	-	44
Total - -	47	49	25	1	58	11	50

AN ACCOUNT of the REVENUES of Bombay and its Dependencies, from Auguſt 1772 to July 1773.

		Gross Collections.	Charges of Collection.	Nett Revenues.		
	Rupees	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.		£. ſt.
Bombay.						
Land Revenues	53,603					
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,63,528					
Farms	1,47,888					
		4,65,024	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions	—	—	35,216	—	—	—
Nett Revenues	—	—	—	4,25,008	—	53,126
Tellicherry.						
Land Revenues	8,176					
Cuſtoms and Duties	5,040					
Farms	6,416					
		20,232	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions	—	—	2,088	—	—	—
Nett Revenues	—	—	—	18,144	—	2,268
Surat.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		2,43,256	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions	—	—	17,384	—	—	—
Nett Revenues	—	—	—	2,25,872	—	28,234
Anjengo.						
Farms		832	—	832	—	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues	7,376					
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,456					
Farms	760					
		11,592	—	11,592	—	1,449
Scindy.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		344	—	344	—	43
Buſſorah.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		6,008	—	6,008	—	751
	Rupees	7,42,288	54,488	6,87,800	£. ſt.	85,975

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from Auguſt 1772 to July 1773.

Civil.	Marine.	Military.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.
72,914	57,748	176,306	77,848	384,816

(Errors excepted.)

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company, at Bombay, from Auguſt 1772 to July 1773; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balance in the Treaſuries - -	3,98,978	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - -		9,30,354
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - - -		29,921
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		39,002
King of Travencore, Account Pepper - - - - - -		33,340
Rupees		10,32,617

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1772 to 1773.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - - - -	—
Bills - - - - - - - - - - - -	11,95,528
Goods - - - - - - - - - - - -	99,927
Rupees	12,95,455
£. ſt.	161,932

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

GENERAL RETURN of the HONOURABLE COMPANY'S

	ARTILLERY.															IN-													
	Major.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutants.	Quarter Maſter.	Surgeons.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Fifes and Drums.	Gunners.	Matroſſes.	Colonel.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids de Camp.	Secretary.	Surgeon Major.	Adjutants.			
BOMBAY	1	4	3	7	11	1	1	1	12	7	26	10	33	123	1	2	1	12	14	23	1	1	3	1	1	2			
SURAT	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	3	2	2	1	8	10	-	-	1	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	1			
TELLICHERRY	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	3	3	3	2	3	17	-	-	-	3	5	3	-	-	-	-	-	1			
ANJENGO	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	6	6	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Total	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	18	12	32	13	50	156	1	2	2	18	24	30	1	1	3	1	1	4			
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-			
Supernumeraries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Eſtabliſhment	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	12	12	32	8	48	160	1	2	2	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	4			

N. B. Lieutenant Seton and Enſign Johnſon gone to England for the recovery of their health, not included.

The Troops at Baroche, belonging to the Preſidency, are included in the number at Bombay.

(Signed) *Charles Egerton*, Col.

TROOPS under the PRESIDENCY, BOMBAY, 27th January 1773.

INFANTRY.							SEPOYS.														IRREGULARS.									INVALIDS.						
																					Topasses.	Tiveys.						Nairs.									
Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals	Fifes and Drums.	Private.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naiques.	Subniffes.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Adjutants.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Tom Toms.	Private.	Moopa.	Private.	Captains.	Black Officers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
2	2	23	60	61	53	1,418	3	15	18	3	3	33	71	31	191	186	23	7	98	53	2,394	326	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	11	5	-	97
-	-	-	9	8	6	129	1	4	3	1	1	8	17	8	48	4	1	2	25	7	635	—													
-	-	-	14	16	7	70	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	15	150	1	6	2	60	4	600	1	30	-	-	6	4	2	52
-	-	-	5	4	3	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71													
2	2	23	88	89	69	1,638	4	19	21	4	4	41	88	39	239	234	25	9	123	60	3,044	547	1	6	2	60	4	600	1	30	1	2	17	9	2	149
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	6	-	-	-	-	164	—													
-	-	-	12	13	13	358	-	-	1	-	-	1	4	-	-		1	1	3	20	—	—													
2	2	-	76	76	56	1,280	4	20	20	4	4	40	84	40	240	240	24	8	120	40	3,280	—	1	6	2	60	4	600	1	30	—	—	—	—	—	—

Since last Return.	Dead.	Deserted.	Discharged.	Invalided.	Entertained.	Transferred.	Received.
Artillery - -	7	-	-	-		-	1
Infantry - -	58	9	17	-	1	4	4
Sepoys - - -	54	125	10	1	99	184	234
Total -	119	134	27	1	100	188	239

AN ACCOUNT of the Revenues of Bombay and its Dependencies, from Auguſt 1773 to April 1774.

		Groſs Collections.	Charges of Collection.	Nett Revenue.		
Bombay.		R°.	R°.	R°.	R°.	£. ſt.
Land Revenues	R° 51,936					
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,75,216					
Farms	1,38,248					
		4,65,400	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions		—	27,560	—	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	4,37,840	—	51,730
Tellicherry.						
Land Revenues	R° 5,712					
Cuſtoms and Duties	9,344					
Farms	4,448					
		19,504	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions		—	2,232	—	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	17,272	—	2,159
Surat.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		2,20,720	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions		—	17,184	—	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	2,03,536	—	25,442
Anjengo.						
Farms		832	—	832	—	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues	R° 7,376					
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,920					
Farms	760					
		11,056	—	11,056	—	1,382
Buſſora.						
Cuſtoms and Duties		6,008	—	6,008	—	751
Broach.						
Land Revenues	R° 1,76,792					
Cuſtoms and Duties	19,968					
		1,96,760	—	1,96,760	—	24,595
	Rup°	9,20,280	46,976	8,73,304	£. ſt.	109,163

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from Auguſt 1773 to April 1774.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.
81,376	63,237	172,978	29,696	347,387

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

AN

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company at Bombay, from Auguſt 1773 to April 1774; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries -	2,88,847	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - -		16,31,562
Due Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - -		33,860
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		41,555
King of Travencore, Account Pepper - - - - - -		40,630
Rupees		17,47,607

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1773 to 1774.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - - - -	—
Bills - - - - - - - - - - - -	12,93,911
Goods - - - - - - - - - - - -	25,945
Rupees	13,19,406
£. ſt.	164,926

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

Eaſt India Houſe
26th February 1782.

GENERAL RETURN of the HONOURABLE COMPANY'S

	ARTILLERY.																															IN-
							Staff																Staff.									
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Surgeon.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Fifes and Drums.	Gunners.	Matrosses.	Brigadier General, &c.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids du Camp.	Secretaries.	Surgeons Major.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.	Volunteers.
BOMBAY	-	2	4	4	6	7	1	1	1	8	6	21	7	18	227	-	1	1	1	9	17	18	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	2	20
BAROCHE	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	2	1	4	2	12	16	-	-	1	-	3	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	4
SURAT	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	3	2	3	1	9	12	-	-	-	1	2	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
TELLICHERRY	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	3	3	3	2	3	16	-	-	-	-	3	2	5	-	-	-		-	1	-	-	-
ANJENGO	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	6	9	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-	2	4	4	10	11	1	1	1	16	12	32	12	48	280	-	1	2	2	18	24	33	1	1	3	1	1	5	3	2	24
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supernumeraries	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Establishment	-	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	12	12	32	12	48	284	-	1	2	2	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	5	3	2	-

LASCARS.	Syrangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.
Bombay	3	11	243
Baroche	1	2	60
Surat	1	1	30
Tellicherry	1	1	28
Anjengo	-	-	10
Total	6	15	371
Wanting to complete	—	—	—
Supernumeraries	-	1	3
Establishment	6	14	368

N. B. Lieutenant Fireworker Smith of Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Brewer, Lieutenant Seton, Ensigns Mackenzie and Johnson, gone to England with leave, but to retain their Rank, not included.

(Signed) *Robert Gordon*,
Colonel.

TROOPS under the PRESIDENCY of BOMBAY, the 11th April 1774.

INFANTRY.				SEPOYS.													IRREGULARS.											INVALIDS.					
																		Tivoys.							Nairs.								
Sergeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private Europeans.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subadar.	Jemadar.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subahdars.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	Topaſſes.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutants	Serjeant.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Moopas.	Private.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals	Drummers.	Private.
63	66	30	1,30 4	1	2	6	10	2	2	18	37	22	96	90	12	4	54	18	1,57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	10	0	-	145
8	9	6	191	-	1	5	3	1	1	8	8	8	4	4	5	4	24	8	711	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	8	6	130	-	1	4	3	1	1	6	13	6	30	30	5	-	16	6	403	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14	15	8	59	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	1	6	2	50	514	13	-	1	3	3	2	65
5	4	2	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
103	102	61	1,460	1	4	15	16	4	4	32	68	36	160	160	22	8	94	32	2,692	168	-	-	1	6	2	50	514	13	0	-	13	9	2	230
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	188	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9	8	5	180	1	-	7	8	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
94	94	56	1,280	-	4	8	8	4	4	32	68	32	160	160	21	8	96	32	2,880	170	-	-	1	6	2	50	515	13	0	—	—	—	—	—

SINCE LAST RETURN.

	Dead.	Deſerted.	Diſcharged.	Invalided.	Tranſferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery - - -	6	7	2	-	-	4	1
Infantry - - -	27	20	12	-	4	83	8
Sepoys - - - -	29	77	141	4	8	8	140
Total - -	62	104	155	4	12	95	149

The orders of the Company before and during the period in queſtion, to their adminiſtration at *Bombay*, your Committee find to be drawn up in the ſame ſpirit, and directed to the ſame objects, as thoſe which they had addreſſed to their other Governments, viz. the preſervation of peace, and a ſyſtem of defence.

Yet it is to be obſerved, that they were not without wiſhes for ſome extenſion of territory in that quarter, and had early recommended, in very ſtrong terms, to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, an attentive endeavour upon every occaſion that might offer, to obtain a grant of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* from the Marattas. And it is further to be remarked, that their inſtructions in regard to the mode of making this acquiſition were at firſt rather indefinite: "We cannot directly point out the "mode of doing it, but rather wiſh they could be ob- "tained by purchaſe than war." In the following year, when the Court had been informed of ſome negotiations which the Bombay Government had attempted to enter into with the Marattas for theſe purpoſes, they thus expreſſed their approbation of thoſe proceedings:

Appendix. No. 47. Extract of General Letter to Bombay, 18 March 1768.

Extract of a General Letter to D°, 31 Mar. 1769.

"The opening a negotiation with the Marattas "was a very proper meaſure, and Mr. *Moſtyn* acquitted "himſelf highly to our ſatisfaction.

"The demands made on them in return for the ad- "vantages they were to expect from our ſucceſs againſt "*Hyder Ally*, were alſo very proper: *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, "with their dependencies, and the Marattas proportion "of the Surat provinces, were all that we ſeek for on "that ſide of *India*.

"Theſe are the objects you are to have in view, in all "your treaties, negotiations, and military operations, "and that you muſt be ever watchful to obtain; always "attentive to convince the Country Powers theſe are and "ever will be the utmoſt limits of our views on the "weſtern ſide of *India*."

Your Committee do not find that any ſucceſs attended theſe negotiations. In 1770, a treaty of peace took place between the Preſidency and *Hyder Ally*; and the Court of Directors, in the obſervations which they made upon it in their Letter to the Select Committee, ſignified their diſſatisfaction at any engagement to furniſh *Hyder* with warlike ſtores, and urged, as a powerful reaſon againſt it, that it might interrupt the good underſtanding they were very deſirous of cultivating with *Madarow* the Peſhwa; becauſe by a ſteady adherence to a neutral plan, and by keeping up a reſpectable force, ready to repel invaders, they could alone hope to enjoy peace at their Settlements.

Letter dated 18 April 1772 to Select Committee. No. 47.

But it appears that the Court wrote at the ſame time to the Council, and that Mr. *Moſtyn*, who had been in *England*, was the bearer of the Letter in which they ſignified their orders for the appointment of that Gentleman to be their Reſident at *Poona*, in the view of acquiring an advantageous agreement with the Durbar for the general welfare of their Settlements on the Malabar Coaſt, and in pointing out again, as the particular aim of this deputation, the deſire of obtaining *Salſette* and *Baſſein*; they however expreſsly declared their reſolution to maintain a ſteady harmony with *Madarow*, and to hold out to him certain objects as equivalents in exchange for thoſe places. And we perceive that the Government of *Bombay* accordingly diſpatched Mr. *Moſtyn* with inſtructions; which will be found in the Appendix.—Of the events ariſing from this meaſure, nothing more ſeems in this place neceſſary to be obſerved, than that the Reſident was ſoon made ſenſible, that the acquiſition of the diſtricts in queſtion, were not to be hoped for by the means of negotiation.

Appendix, No. 48. Letter to Preſident and Council, 1ſt April 1772.

Bombay Sel. Conſ. 26th September 1772. Letter to Court of Directors, 4 December 1772, Par. 10.

No. 48.

But though the views and expectations of the Company, and of their Servants, were in this inſtance diſappointed, another tranſaction was carried on by the Preſident and Select Committee with more ſucceſs. They appear to have made a demand upon the Nabob of *Broach*, in the month of April 1771, for a conſiderable ſum pretended to be due on account of the Phoorza, which had been withheld from the Government of *Surat* for 40 years, and the overcharge in the Cuſtoms, on the Merchants trading under the Company's protection for near ſix years. The Government ſoon after thought it neceſſary to ſend a body of troops towards *Broach*, in order to perſuade the Nabob to compliance: but this expedition was attended with no adequate effect; and indeed, the attempt made for the reduction of the place, was quickly abandoned with circumſtances of diſgrace. In conſequence however of theſe threatening deſigns, the Nabob came down to the Preſidency to ſettle terms of agreement; and the Preſident and Select Committee thereupon added a further charge for the expence which they had incurred, in being obliged to march the detachment on that ſervice. Your Committee have placed in the Appendix the moſt material Papers, which contain the beſt information of theſe proceedings, wherein it will be found, that the Nabob complained of his inability to pay the ſums required; that his hand had been held; he had been brought down to *Bombay*, and only depended on their moderation and favour for the eſtabliſhment of a friendſhip agreeable to his wiſhes. The ſtate of the demand which the Preſident, according to his own account, made upon the Nabob was as follows:

No. 49.

"The demands on account of the Phoorza of *Broach* "is eſtimated at 70,000 rupees a year; which having "been withheld for 40 years, amounts to 28 lacks; but "the Nabob ſays, it has not been paid theſe 50 or 60 "years, which increaſes the demand proportionably. "This was granted by Phirmaund, from the Mogul to "the Nabobſhip of *Surat*, about 150 years ſince.

President Hornby's Minute.

"The next is for what has been collected on account "of Cuſtoms, from the Merchants trading under the "Company's protection for about ſix years paſt, eſtimated "at 25,000 a year, amounts to R. 1,50,000; next the "charge of the expedition laſt May, amounting to be- "tween two and three lacks of rupees, which makes "the whole demand on him amount to about 33 lacks; "and that he ſettles a certain ſum to be paid in *Surat* "annually, in the month of July, on account of the "Phoorza, viz. 12, 15, or 20,000 R', with proper "ſecurity."

But your Committee obſerve, that it was not expected to gain the diſcharge of the whole demand: "If we "can get 5 or 6 lacks for our demands, it will be well, "or more if poſſible, when I think we may enter into "an alliance with him, and take into conſideration what "he has pointed out regarding *Guzurat*."

Of this latter circumſtance, your Committee have obſerved theſe particulars. The Nabob ſoon after his arrival at the Preſidency, endeavoured to conciliate the favour of the Government, and he ſeems to have conſidered the following repreſentation as the moſt efficacious argument he could uſe for that purpoſe.

"If you will think about having the country of the "*Guzurat* into your hands for the Company, I ſhall, "agreeable to your order, be ready with my forces, "being very well acquainted therewith. This affair "ſhall be ſettled ſo that you will be much pleaſed there- "by, and it will bring in a large income and property, "becauſe all the country is empty (meaning without "proper forces to guard it). The whole of this country "can be conquered within a year: the revenues are "more than one crore of rupees. When you will "ſettle about this affair, and reſolve to undertake this "enterprize, I ſhall give you all the particulars regard- "ing it, after your Honour's pleaſure."

It appears, however, that the terms of accommodation between the Nabob and the Bombay Government were not eaſily ſettled, and that after the offer and refuſal of ſeveral overtures, he was about to quit the Preſidency, when at laſt, on the 30th November 1771, he was induced to ſign the treaty of agreement, which will be ſeen in the Appendix, and by which all fees and exactions on trade at *Broach* were to be impoſed and levied only by the Company. They were to have a factory to the excluſion

Appendix, No. 49. General Letter from Bombay, 12th April 1771; and General Letter from Bombay, 5th June 1771.

No. 49.

exclusion of all other Europeans except the Dutch, who had already eſtabliſhed one in it; ſtipulations of military engagements were arranged; and finally, the Nabob acknowledged himſelf indebted to the Governor and Council, the ſum of 4 lacks, which he promiſed to pay at ſtated periods.

1ſt April 1772. Par. 34, 35, 36, 37. Appendix, No. 50.

But your Committee find, that the Court of Directors ſignified their ſevere diſpleaſure at the conduct of their Servants at *Bombay*, both on account of undertaking this enterprize, which they deemed unwarrantable as well as expenſive, and of the failure of it, which reflected diſcredit on their arms, and was wholly to be attributed to their miſmanagement. They added a further mark of cenſure, becauſe of this attempt being wantonly ſet on foot at a time when the Committee had declared themſelves under the greateſt difficulties to raiſe ſupplies for the indiſpenſable occaſions of their Preſidency.

Ibid. Par. 32, 33, & Treaty with Nabob of Cambaye.

And it appears, that the Court expreſſed no leſs reſentment at another expedition (deſcribing it as the reſult of ſudden caprice and cruelty) which the Government of *Bombay* had undertaken againſt the Coolies, when the firſt object of their armament had been diverted, by the ſubmiſſion of the Nabob of *Cambaye*, to receive a Naib at their recommendation.

Do.

Letter to the Court of Directors, 20 November 1772, Par. 42 to 52 inclusive. Appendix, No. 51.

Previous to the arrival of this Letter to *Bombay*, ſome doubts had ariſen about the ſincere intention of the Nabob of *Broach*, to perform the articles of agreement, and a queſtion was thereupon agitated, but left undecided in the Committee, reſpecting the proper conduct they ſhould hold towards him. The ſame point, however, appears to have been thereupon referred to the Council Board, when the majority of the Members (the Letter from the Court being then before them) reſolved to fit out an armament to procure ſatisfaction for the baſe violation of the treaty, and to reſtore the credit of their arms, which had ſuffered by the failure of the firſt expedition.

See Letters of Governor Hornby, Gen. Wedderburne, &c. Letter from Bombay to Court of Directors, 4th Dec. 1772. Letter 12 Apr. 1775, Par. 43 to 52 inclusive. No. 51.

But although the event of this enterprize was entirely ſucceſsful, except in the loſs of a gallant and able Commander, Colonel *Wedderburne*, who was killed at the attack of the fort, and was very much regretted, your Committee obſerve, that it was not attended with ſuch advantages as to reconcile the Court of Directors to it; who indeed on this occaſion repeated their general diſapprobation of engaging, without abſolute neceſſity, in military expeditions, and teſtified their particular diſpleaſure at this conqueſt, the expences of which were not likely to be defrayed from its reſources in a reaſonable time, without oppreſſing the inhabitants.

The reduction of this place was followed by an agreement with *Futty Sing*, under date 12th January 1773, by which the ſeparate ſhares of the Revenues were regulated between him and the Bombay Government in the ſame proportions as before the conqueſt, both within the town and the territory annexed thereto.

Bom. Conſ. 24 January 1773, and 2 [illegible] 1773. Appendix, No. 52.

It may be proper here to remark, that no reference was made to the Poona Government for a confirmation of this agreement; and that no objection was ſtated by them at that time to Mr. *Moſtyn*, againſt the right of the Guicawars to form ſuch engagement without their interference. It ſhould however be at the ſame time obſerved, that the attention of the ruling powers of the Maratta State was then wholly occupied with the management of their own nearer concerns; and the Mudſuddies, after the death of *Madhaiow*, and the appointment of *Ragoba* to the Naibſhip, were directing their principal vigilance to ſupplant him in the adminiſtration of the Government.

Appendix, 53. Bom. Conſ. 17 September 1773; Preſident's Propoſals.

The opportunities which the enſuing diſtractions of the Durbar apparently offered to the neighbouring powers, of accompliſhing any object of negotiation with the Marattas, were not overlooked by the Select Committee of *Bombay*, wherein it was propoſed to make ſome advantage of the late events, for obtaining the ſeveral points propoſed by their honourable Maſters, when they fixed a Reſident at that Court. And your Committee find, that in the month of January following, the Select Board wrote to the Court of Directors, informing them of the new revolution at *Poona*, whereby *Ragoba* had acquired poſſeſſion of the ſupreme government, though his ſituation therein was deemed precarious; and they further obſerved, that as the meaſures they had uſed to obtain *Salſette* by treaty were not likely to prove ſucceſsful, they had determined, in caſe of his death, or that he ſhould be depoſed, to poſſeſs themſelves of it by a different method.

12 January 1774, Par. 2, 3, 4. No. 53.

But it appears that the Court of Directors, in their Diſpatch under date 12th April 1775, though they ſtill continued to avow their great deſire of gaining poſſeſſion of that Iſland and of *Baſſein*, ſtrictly prohibited their Servants at *Bombay* from attempting the acquiſition of them by any other means than by negotiation. Long however even before the writing of that Letter, *Salſette* and the ſmaller adjacent Iſlands were reduced under the dominion of the Company, by the other method, of which the Select Committee had intimated their probable intentions to make experiment on the failure of pacific overtures,

Appendix, No. 54. General Letter from the Court of Directors, Par. 53, 12th April 1775.

The particular circumſtances which haſtened the execution of that plan, your Committee will proceed to relate, premiſing only a few obſervations on the ſtate of the Military force, and of the Revenues under that Preſidency at the period immediately preceding, and at the commencement of theſe tranſactions. Theſe indeed will be made apparent by the annexed Abſtracts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Revenues of Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1774 to April 1775:

			Gross Collections.	Charges of Collection.	Nett Revenues.		
			R'.	R'.	R'.		£. s.
Bombay.							
Land Revenues	R'	30,320					
Customs and Duties		2,78,688					
Farms		1,27,712					
			4,36,720				
Charges and Deductions			—	43,328	—	—	—
Nett Revenues			—	—	3,93,392	—	49,174
Tellicherry.							
Land Revenues	R'	11,032					
Customs and Duties		7,672					
Farms		7,208					
			25,912				
Charges and Deductions			—	2,216	—	—	—
Nett Revenues			—	—	23,696	—	2,962
Surat.							
Customs and Duties			2,14,936				
Charges and Deductions			—	17,064	—	—	—
Nett Revenues			—	—	1,97,872	—	24,734
Anjengo.							
Farms			832	—	832	—	104
Fort Victoria.							
Land Revenues	R'	7,368					
Customs and Duties		1,368					
Farms		1,184					
			9,920	—	9,920	—	1,240
Sundy.							
Customs and Duties			120	—	120	—	15
Broach.							
Land Revenues	R'	2,73,536					
Customs and Duties		29,424					
			3,02,960	—	3,02,960	—	37,870
Tannah.							
Land Revenues	R'	87,464					
Customs and Duties		800					
			88,264				
Charges and Deductions			—	960	—	—	—
Nett Revenues			—	—	87,304	—	10,913
Carranjah.							
Land Revenues	R'	7,936					
Customs and Duties		5,512					
			13,448				
Charges and Deductions			—	1,416	—	—	—
Nett Revenues			—	—	12,032	—	1,504
		Rupees	10,93,112	64,984	10,28,128	£. s.	128,516

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1774 to April 1775.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.	£. s.
117,959	55,087	209,918	36,598	419,562

East India House,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

An

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the Eaſt India Company at Bombay, from May 1774 to April 1775; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	4,26,544	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - -		22,72,629
Due Account Depoſits - - - - - -		14,264
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - -		25,604
King of Travencore, Account Pepper - - - -		11,301
Rupees - -		23,23,798

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1774 to 1775.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - -	9,32,717
Bills - - - - - - - - - -	16,89,109
Goods - - - - - - - - - -	99,927
Rup^{s} - -	27,21,753
£. ſt. - -	340,219

Eaſt India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

GENERAL RETURN of the HONOURABLE COMPANY's

	ARTILLERY.															INFAN-											
							Staff.														Staff.						
	Lieutenant Colonel.	Major.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Surgeon.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Fifes and Drums.	Gunners.	Matroffes.	Brigadier General, &c.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids de Camp.	Secretaries.	Surgeon Major.	Adjutants.	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.
Bombay	-	2	2	1	1	2	-	1	-	3	2	7	5	9	92	1	1	-	1	7	13	13	1	1	1	1	-	2	1	1
On Expedition	1	-	2	1	4	4	1	-	1	4	3	10	4	9	75	-	-	-	-	5	4	6	-	-	2	-	1	-	1	1
At Carranja	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Salfet	-	-	1	2	2	1	-	-	-	2	2	5	1	7	56	-	-	1	-	2	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Baroche	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	2	1	3	1	10	9	-	-	1	-	2	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Surat	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	1	3	1	8	11	-	-	-	-	1	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Tellicherry	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	3	3	3	2	3	18	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Anjengo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1	2	5	4	10	10	1	1	1	16	12	32	14	48	263	1	1	2	1	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	6	4	2
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supernumeraries	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eſtabliſhment	1	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	12	12	32	12	48	284	1	-	2	-	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	6	4	2

LASCARS.	Syrangs.	Tindals.	Private.
Bombay	1	6	134
On Expedition	3	6	111
Carranja	1	3	133
Salfet	-	-	60
Baroche	1	1	30
Surat	1	1	28
Tellicherry	-	-	10
Anjengo	-	-	-
Total	7	17	506
Wanting to complete	-	-	-
Supernumeraries	-	-	8
Eſtabliſhment	7	17	498

RETURN of a Detachment from Madras

	INFANTRY.								SEPOYS.											
	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Surgeon.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutant.	Commandant.	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Nargues.	Drummers.	Watermen.	Sepoys.
At Bombay	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	1	1	3	6	5	18	20	3	1	156
On Expedition	2	1	5	1	8	8	4	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sick	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Total	2	1	5	1	8	8	4	100	1	2	1	1	1	3	6	5	18	20	3	1	156

TROOPS under the PRESIDENCY of BOMBAY, 30th April 1775.

TRY.					SEPOYS.														IRREGULARS.										INVALIDS.				
																				Tiveys.							Nairs.							
Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private Europeans.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enſigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subniſſes.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Topaſſes.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutants.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Moopas.	Private.	Captain.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
2	41	42	22	363	-	1	4	5	-	1	8	24	15	51	46	10	2	66	13	1,262	86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	12	8	-	154
4	23	23	14	372	-	3	11	8	3	1	14	27	13	68	70	6	6	24	13	1,286	—														
-	3	2	-	25	-	-	1	1	-	-	4	5	-	10	7	1	1	6	1	274	—														
-	13	13	8	202	-	1	4	4	1	1	10	25	12	50	56	6	2	8	10	516	—														
-	6	6	5	127	-	-	1	3	1	1	6	8	5	20	19	3	-	16	11	461	—														
-	6	6	5	83	-	1	3	2	1	1	3	1	3	15	15	4	1	8	1	240	—														
-	12	9	3	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	1	5	2	50	516	1	30	-	-	2	3	2	62
-	3	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36							—							
6	107	104	58	1,186	-	6	24	23	6	5	45	90	48	214	213	30	12	128	42	4,039	222	-	-	1	5	2	50	516	1	30	1	-	14	11	2	216
-	-	-	-	94	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	12	-	26	27		-	16	6	281	—							—							
-	13	10	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1		—					
-	94	94	56	1,280	-	6	24	4	6	6	48	102	48	240	240	30	12	144	48	4,320	-	-	-	1	5	2	50	515	1	30						

	SURAT SEPOYS.									
	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Colour Bearers.	Subniſſes.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.
Total - -	4	8	20	20	4	4	1	12	4	397

SINCE LAST RETURN.

	Dead.	Deſerted.	Diſcharged.	Invalided.	Tranſferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery - -	2	1	-	-	-	1	—
Infantry - -	9	-	1	1	2	3	3
Sepoys - -	9	92	22	-	1	4	526
Total - -	20	93	23	1	3	8	529

(Signed) *Robert Gordon*,
Brig' General.

We ſhall add to them merely theſe remarks, that, in the year 1771, upon the alarm of a rupture with *France* and *Spain*, the Court of Directors, anxious to provide againſt any poſſible attempt on their Settlements on the Malabar Coaſt, inſtructed and exhorted their adminiſtration of *Bombay* to ſtrengthen their fortifications and other means of defence. Theſe articles indeed appear to have been before that time expenſive to the Company in a conſiderable degree, as may be ſeen by an account of them which we have placed in the Appendix, eſpecially in 1768, when Colonel *Campbell* was ſent to inſpect the ſtate of the fortifications, and poſitive orders were given to the Council implicitly to follow his plan. The military eſtabliſhment was at the ſame time much enlarged. In the courſe however of the year 1772, ſome ſteps were taken by the Preſident and Committee, towards a reduction of the military charges, becauſe they were aware of their inability to ſupport them, and a reform ſtill more effectual was only delayed by the repreſentation of the Commander in Chief, that it would be adviſable to wait for his return from the expedition then ſet on foot againſt the Nabob of *Broach*. On the Select Conſultations of the 3d of April 1773, your Committee find a diſcuſſion of the ſubject of a proper eſtabliſhment for the defence of *Bombay* in time of war, which very greatly exceeded the number of men that was thought to be neceſſary by the Court of Directors, who argued from analogy to the force which had protected *Madras* againſt the French when it was beſieged by them; and they reſted alſo much on the advantageous ſituation of *Bombay* for a leſſer garriſon than that propoſed, being able to prevent a ſiege, or to protract it, till ſuccours could be ſent from *Bengal* and *Madras*, which, as long as they maintained their ſuperiority in thoſe Provinces, and eſpecially their ſuperiority at ſea, might be provided on the ſhorteſt warning. And on the extent and expence of the fortifications, requiring ſo large a garriſon, they obſerved, that they had reaſon "to lament, that any new works had been undertaken, "being fully of opinion, that if the old walls had been left, "as they ſtood many years ago, the intereſt of the "money which had been ſunk in fortifications ſince that "time, would have maintained troops ſufficient to have "rendered the place impregnable to the combined forces "of *Indoſtan*, and to have ſecured it from any attack "which the French were capable of making in that "quarter."

In the orders which the Court tranſmitted at the ſame time, for fixing the future military eſtabliſhment of that Preſidency, they included every command and detachment for the ſubordinates; adding this particular direction in regard to *Broach*: "So long as *Broach* ſhall be in "our poſſeſſion, and yield us an adequate Revenue, we "permit you to keep a garriſon in that place, conſiſting "of 1,000 men, over and above the number ſpecified in "our ſaid eſtabliſhment."

From an account given of ſome of theſe circumſtances by a Member of the Bombay Council, your Committee have found, that as the ſituation of that place, the excellence of its port, and more eſpecially the advantages afforded by it to the marine in receiving large ſhips into dock for the purpoſe of repairs, were conſidered as objects of the firſt importance, and the preſervation of which would juſtify very extraordinary expences on the works and fortifications; ſo however from thence there aroſe a greater difficulty to ſupply the neceſſary reſources of treaſure. On this head he wrote as follows; "Previous "to this (1768) the expences of *Bombay* exceeded its "Revenues, but this great increaſe they (the Court of "Directors) were ſenſible muſt diſtreſs the Government "there for means to defray them, and furniſh their Inveſt-"ments for *Europe* and *China*. Knowing that a terri-"torial acquiſition could alone furniſh a Revenue equal "to the neceſſities of that Settlement, they laid down a "ſyſtem for the attainment of one; this was the acqui-"ſition of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* with the Maratta ſhare of "the Revenues of *Surat*, which they imagined would "about complete their views."

The convenient ſituation of *Bombay* for commerce, which alone for a long time ſeems to have engaged the attention of the Company in that Settlement, and the means of introducing into the Maratta Country a ſupply of Engliſh goods, are pointed out in the paper which we have put in the Appendix; and we have alſo found therein ſome obſervations on the benefits which aroſe to the Company in that light, from the influence they had in the Government of *Surat*, which not only enabled them in a great meaſure "to give a conſiderable "check to the commerce of the European Nations "already eſtabliſhed there, but if well exerted, to pre-"vent any others from interfering; a power more valu-"able, as *Surat* was next to *Bombay*, the chief mart "for the vend of ſtaples, the monopoly of which was "their great and leading commercial view in the Weſt of "*India*."

Concerning the ſtate of the finances, your Committee have only to obſerve, that the Preſidency of *Bombay* made frequent declarations of their diſtreſs for want of money; and in a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal* to the Court of Directors, under date 22 Auguſt 1774, we find the following ſtriking account of it: "the Pre-"ſidency of *Bombay* have again applied to us for a large "ſupply of money, ſetting forth their diſtreſſes in the "ſtrongeſt terms, and requeſting immediate relief. We "have anſwered them, that the ſtate of our finances and "demands here did not enable us to furniſh them to the "extent they required, but that we would cheerfully lend "our aſſiſtance in the moſt ſpeedy manner, as far as 15 "lacks we had engaged to ſupply them within the courſe "of the year, could we find the means of remittance."— And it appears that ſome ſhips returning from the gulph with the produce of the trade for three years, furniſhed an opportunity of leaving ſpecie at *Bombay* to the amount for which the Preſident and Council were permitted to draw bills on *Bengal*, though not to the extent which they had repreſented the diſtreſſes of their ſituation to require.

Your Committee having thus finiſhed, as fully as the ſhorteſs of the time would allow for conſulting the very voluminous records from which we have extracted our materials, an introductory review of the general ſtate of Indian politics, and alſo of the territorial poſſeſſions, revenue and military eſtabliſhments, under the two Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay*, for a few years previous to the commencement of the new Adminiſtration, which took place at the cloſe of the year 1774; we ſhall only in concluſion expreſs a wiſh that this account, incomplete and incorrect as it certainly is, may tend to elucidate in ſome degree ſeveral incidents of the following narrative, which we now ſubmit to the Houſe, of the riſe and progreſs of the Maratta war.

Your Committee find, that in the month of November 1774, the Select Committee of *Bombay*, in conſequence of advices from their Reſident at *Goa*, that the Portugueſe deſigned to attempt the recovery of the dominions they formerly poſſeſſed to the Northward (eſpecially *Salſette* and *Baſſein*) and that there could be no doubt of their ſucceſs in the enterprize, came to a reſolution of preventing the execution of theſe plans, by ſeizing the Iſland of *Salſette* for the Company, "who had ſo frequently ex-"preſſed their ardent wiſhes to obtain it." They at the ſame time explained many reaſons in confirmation of this reſolution; ſome ariſing from the ill conſequences to their trade, if the Portugueſe ſhould take poſſeſſion of that Iſland, and thereby gain the command of the Paſſes inland; others from the favourable opportunity to make themſelves maſters of it, as the diviſions in the Maratta Government relieved them from the apprehenſion of any obſtruction to their proceedings. It appears alſo from the Preſident's Report, that there was reaſonable hope of effecting this acquiſition by the aſſiſtance of certain people,

Set in the Appendix a Part of the Expences of Fortifications in 1768, 1769, and 1770.

No. 54.

Bombay Conſ. 30th June 1772, Gov. Hornby's Letter to, and 8th July, Letter from Brig. Gen. Wedderburne.

Appendix, No. 55. Bomb. November 20, 1772, Letter to Directors.

See their Letter 12 April 1775. Par 25, 26, 27, 28.

No. 55.

See the Appendix, No 55.

Appendix. No. 56. Mr. Taylor's Letter.

No. 56.

Appendix, No. 55.

Letter from Governor and Council, 22 Auguſt 1774, Par. 8.

General Letter fro Bengal to Court of Directors, 17 October 1774. Appendix 43.

Bomb. Sel. Conſ. 28 November 1774. Appendix, No. 58. Letter from Mr. Hodſhaw, dated Goa, 31 October 1774.

Do.

people, who had offered to deliver up the Iſland to the Company's forces; and the Committee accordingly reſolved to deſire and empower the Preſident to cloſe as expeditiouſly as poſſible with this offer, on the beſt terms that could be had: and, that no interruption might be given to the negotiation then depending with *Ragoba*, it was further determined to write a Letter to Mr. *Gambier* at *Surat*, containing inſtructions to him, by which he was directed to aſſure *Ragoba*, "that if he would not be "induced to cede the Iſland to the Company, they would "give it up to him, on his granting them what they "would deem an equivalent for it, and paying the charge "they ſhould incur, whenever he might be in full poſſeſ-"ſion of the Maratta Empire." It appeared alſo neceſſary to acquaint Mr. *Moſtyn*, who was then Reſident at *Poonah*, with theſe intentions; and (as they wiſhed not to make this ſtep a means of breaking the good underſtanding they had till now maintained with the Miniſters) they directed him to remain at *Poonah* as long as he could conſiſtently with a regard for his perſonal ſafety, and endeavour to reconcile the Miniſters to this meaſure, by giving them the like aſſurances of future ceſſion on the ſame terms, in caſe their party ſhould prevail in the conteſt, and ſhould not agree to leave it in the poſſeſſion of the Company. The Letter, however to Mr. *Moſtyn*, was not to be forwarded "till matters were ſo far advanced, as "to put it out of the power of the Miniſtry in any degree "to obſtruct their views."

Letter dated 29th November 1774. No 58.

Letter to Mr. Moſtyn, 29th November 1774. No. 58.

And it appears, that a remark was then entered by the Select Committee in this Conſultation, that they did not think themſelves prohibited from undertaking this affair, as they had not heard of the arrival of all the Council at *Bengal*, who under the late Act of Parliament were to compoſe the new Government; and that indeed had they been apprized of their arrival, they ſhould ſtill think themſelves authorized to proceed without delay, agreeable to a Clauſe in the Act, "and to the repeated orders "of the Court of Directors."

And, in order to be provided with an additional force at *Bombay* for theſe purpoſes, they (the Select Board) "agreed to embrace that opportunity of reducing the "garriſons of *Tellicherry* and *Anjengo*."

Bombay Sel. Conſ. 1 December 1774. Appendix, No. 59.

And your Committee find, that the Select Board informed the Court of Directors of theſe affairs and deſigns by Letter, dated 1ſt December 1774; and it appears thereby, that a negotiation had been carrying on with *Ragoba*, for the grant of certain territories in return for the aid of a body of the Company's troops, which he ſolicited of the Preſidency, with the view of eſtabliſhing him in the Government of the Maratta Empire; that he was not however willing to cede the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, which they had demanded; but as they expected to gain much more material advantages elſewhere, "they did not think it for the intereſt of their honourable "Employers to run the riſque of overſetting the whole "on that account." That they had therefore tendered the aſſiſtance of their troops on ſpecified terms, by which they were to acquire to the Company for ever, an increaſe of territory yielding an annual Revenue of above 18 lacks of Rupees; that they had empowered Mr. *Gambier* to enter into a Treaty with *Ragoba* on thoſe conditions; from which, even if they might recede in part, they ſhould hope for the approbation of the Company, as the benefit would be ſtill conſiderable and laſting, and there could be no doubt of ſucceſs to the attempt in favour of *Ragoba*, with the body of forces which they propoſed to ſend to him.

B. C. Gordon's Journal, December 18th, 1774. Appendix, No 60. N.B. Portuguese Proteſt, Do.

And your Committee find, that on the 12th December Brigadier General *Gordon* ſet out from *Bombay* with a conſiderable force for the reduction of *Tanna*, the principal fort in the Iſland of *Salſette*; and that on the 30th of the ſame month, the Preſident and Council wrote to the Court of Directors an account of the complete ſucceſs of the expedition, *Tanna* having been carried by aſſault on the 28th.

Bomb. Gen. Conſ. 20 December 1774.

But it appears, that on the 20th the Preſident and

Council read in General Conſultation, a Letter from the Governor General and Council, which was received on the 7th, ſignifying their having taken upon them the Government of *Bengal*, and deſiring to be furniſhed with accounts of the Company's political concerns on that ſide of *India*.

Appendix, 61. Dated 24th October 1774.

The anſwer, dated 31ſt December, appears to contain information (particularly) of the motives which had induced that Preſidency to undertake the reduction of *Salſette* by force of arms; which attempt had been begun, and accounts of it ſent to *Europe*, previous to the receipt of the Letter dated 24th October from *Bengal*, by which they were firſt made acquainted with the actual commencement and exerciſe of the new Government.

Appendix, No 62. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 8 March 1775.

The acquiſition of this Iſland and *Baſſein*, and their dependencies, had been, they obſerve, recommended to them by the Court of Directors, to be made the conſtant object of their view in all their treaties, negotiations, and military operations. That Mr. *Moſtyn*, one of their Members, had by expreſs inſtructions from home been appointed to reſide at *Poona*, whether he went in 1772, before the troubles began in the Maratta State; and that although it appeared impoſſible to gain poſſeſſion of theſe places by grant from the Marattas, they had long abſtained from any violent meaſures, notwithſtanding the favourable conjuncture, and "the reaſons to conclude, that *Salſette* "and the ſmaller adjacent Iſlands were ceded to the "Crown by the marriage contract between King *Charles* "II. and the Princeſs of *Portugal*;" but that the deſigns of the Portugueſe had at laſt impelled them to proceed by force and without delay, which had been the occaſion of their not having waited to hear of the eſtabliſhment of the Supreme Council in *Fort William*, and to conſult them on ſo important a matter. That although they had thought it adviſable to recal Mr. *Moſtyn* from *Poona* on that occaſion, they ſhould nevertheleſs take every proper ſtep to reconcile the Miniſters to their proceeding, and to prevent a rupture with them; but as the Maratta fleet might probably make depredations on the Malabar Coaſt, which they had not a ſufficient marine to defend, they ſhould apply to Sir *Edward Hughes*, ſuppoſing him to be at *Madras*, for ſome of his ſquadron to protect their trade; and that as their military force was not ſufficient to garriſon their new conqueſts, they alſo intended to ſolicit a reinforcement from the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*: that *Ragoba* had about twelve months before, made overtures for aſſiſtance of men and money, in return for which, he was ready to cede ſome territorial advantages to the Company: that a negotiation which enſued, was brought nearly to a concluſion, when the Agent employed for that purpoſe, being abſent in collecting Revenues for his maſter, was ſurprized and ſeized by a party of the miniſterial forces; and *Ragoba*, who had drawn near to *Surat* with a conſiderable army, ſuddenly ſeparated himſelf, on an apprehenſion of treachery from the greateſt part of them, and was then retreating with thoſe he could confide in towards *Delhi*, but had promiſed a ſpeedy return, and immediately thereupon to conclude the Treaty, which they on their part alſo meant to complete as ſoon as poſſible; and did not doubt of the approbation of the Court of Directors, and of the Supreme Council, when they reflected on the advantage ariſing from it to the Company; and particularly, that this Preſidency would thereby no longer continue an annual incumbrance on that of *Fort William*.

See Ben. Sec. Conſ. 9 Oct. 1775. Mr. Taylor's Examination. App. No. 83.

N. B. It appears they write accordingly on 4 January 1775, that Sir E. Hughes had ſent them with two ſhips. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 13 March 1775.

Do.

Your Committee find, however, that this Letter was not received by the Governor General and Council till March; and that ſome time before they had been made acquainted of theſe proceedings by intimations and reports from Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poona*, and from the Chief of *Tellicherry*, tranſmitted by the Governor and Council of *Madras*; who had at the ſame time deſired advice by which to regulate their conduct, in caſe they ſhould receive a demand for aſſiſtance from *Bombay*, ſtating, at the ſame time, the inſufficiency of their force and reſources to engage in a war, as they ſo much depended for both

Appendix, No. 63. Letter dated 5th December 1774, in Ben. Sec. Conſ. 16 January 1775.

Letters dated 10th and 11th January 1775, in Sec C. of 31 January. See alſo Conſ. 3 February for Letter from Tellicherry, dated 31 December. Do.

Letters to Bombay, 16 January and 3 February.

both on the Nabob of the *Carnatic*. It appears, that in consequence of these accounts, Letters had been sent from *Fort William* on the 16th January and 3d February, to *Bombay*, in which the Governor General and Council express their surprize at not receiving more immediate information from them of their political situation: that they must expect the most particular accounts of all events that had happened, or might occur, as they must remain inactive till they heard from *Bombay*; and therefore held the President and Council responsible for the consequences of this suspence.

Appendix, No. 64. Your Committee also find, that the Governor General, on the 3d of February 1775, proposed the contents of a Letter to be written to *Fort Saint George*, in which, after thanking the President and Council for conveying the intelligence respecting the affairs of *Bombay*, they should declare, "that they could not apprehend any consequences "which were likely to affect the Company's interests in "the *Carnatic*, or require the interposition of that Pre-"sidency," or draw them from a cautionary attention to the defence of their own possessions to any more distant operations; and that they would therefore only "recom-"mend it to them to keep a watchful eye over the French "and *Hyder Ally*."

February 3d, 1775. Dr. The Governor General appears to have at the same time offered to the consideration of the Board, some observations upon the probable consequences of the step which the Presidency of *Bombay* had taken; and he seemed to think, that there should be no apprehension of any attempt at retaliation on the part of the Marattas, because of the prevailing distractions in their Government, and the exhausted state of their strength and resources; "where those who composed the actual Govern-"ment, had yet too formidable an opponent in *Ragonaut* "*Row*, the regular Chief, to engage in new contests," or even to act with vigour against the Presidency of *Bombay*: that of the other powers who might on this pretext seek to create trouble to the Company's affairs, *Hyder Ally* "understood his own interest too well to quarrel with the "English, from whom he could gain nothing, and with "whom he might hazard all he had:" that on these grounds, he "thought it unnecessary to take any imme-"diate measure for obviating the consequences of the "supposed injuries offered by the Presidency of *Bombay* "to the Maratta Government."

The draft of the Letter thus proposed by the Governor General, appears not to have been agreed to by the majority of the Council.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 8 March 1775. Appendix, No. 65. But your Committee find, that it was agreed by the Governor General and Council, on the 8th March 1775, to send a Letter over land to *Bombay*, in reply to the President and Council's Letter of 31st December; and in it to complain of their proceedings against *Salsette* and *Bassein*, as a step of too much importance to have been undertaken, without giving the most early intelligence of their design, even to the last Administration of *Fort William*, had they really not known of the new Government's having taken place. They observed, that they were informed of the assistance sent by *Fort Saint George* on their requisition (which appears to have been a battalion of Sepoys) and that they would themselves afford them such support as might be necessary to prevent injury to the Company's affairs, though they should suspend their opinion on the late measures.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 23 March 1775. Sup.

N.B. This received at Bombay 21 May 1775.

They declared their disapprobation of the intended junction with *Ragoba*, and pointed out its impolicy, and the ill consequences which might ensue from it; and "positively directed the President and Council to suspend "their negotiations with him, till they should receive "further instructions from *Bengal*."

Ben. Sec. Conf. 23 March 1775, Letter, dated 4 January. Sec. Conf. 11 May 1775. Dr. Letter from Tellicherry, dated 9 February 1775. Appendix, No 66. And your Committee find, that Sir *Edward Hughes*, in consequence of application from *Bombay*, resolved to assist them with two ships; but that in the meantime the Company's cruizers had an engagement with the Maratta fleet, and defeated it; destroying their largest ship, and thereby probably disconcerting their plans.

Sec. Conf. 25 May 1775. Appendix, No. 67. See also Appendix 83. And it appears to your Committee, that the next intelligence which was received from *Bombay* at *Bengal*, was laid before the Board on the 25th of May, by General *Clavering*, being copies of a correspondence between Brigadier General *Gordon* and the President and Council, occasioned by their refusing him, and appointing Lieutenant Colonel *Keating* to the command of a body of troops which were to be sent to the assistance of *Ragoba*. And it further appears, that the Board having received no authentic information from the Government of *Bombay* of these transactions, resolved to dispatch a Letter of complaint on account of this neglect, and of the measures which, according to the above and other private intelligence, had been pursued in regard to *Ragoba*, protesting against all offensive engagements without consent of the Supreme Council, "as contradictory to the provisions "of the Act of Parliament for uniting the several Pre-"sidencies under the political superintendance of *Bengal*."

Sel. Conf. 31st M. 1775. Appendix, No. 68. And your Committee find, that on 31st of May a Letter was received from the President and Council of *Bombay*, dated 31st March, by which it appears, that they had not before written to the Governor General and Council since the 31st December, and that in the interval they had concluded an offensive Treaty with *Ragoba*, to whom they engaged the support of 2,500 of the Company's troops, on certain stipulations for their pay while in service, and for the cession of a considerable territorial Revenue, including *Salsette* and *Bassein*: that however in the moments of happily completing the articles of this agreement, and when the Company's troops had actually proceeded to *Surat* in order to join his army, *Ragoba* was unfortunately defeated in a sudden attack by the Minister's, and obliged to fly with only about 1,000 horse to *Cambay*, where being refused admittance, he made the best of his way to *Bownagar*, and from thence came in a galliot to *Surat*: that notwithstanding this severe loss, the majority of them did not consider his situation as desperate, he having still many powerful adherents, and had therefore resolved "not to give up the great advan-"tages they were to reap by the Treaty, when so fair an "opportunity offered of retrieving his affairs, by sending "their forces to *Cambay* to join his army." And as two companies of Europeans had actually arrived to their assistance from *Madras*, and a battalion of Sepoys was shortly expected, they resolved to complete a detachment of 2,500 men; and they sent them accordingly to *Cambay*, under Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*. It is to be observed, that *Ragoba* while at *Surat*, on the 6th March ratified the treaty, which was also executed by the Chief of *Surat*; and afterwards by the President and Council of *Bombay* on the 16th March, and will be found in the Appendix.

See Mr. Draper's dissentient Minute, dated 11 March 1775. No. 68. 7 March.

No. 68.

It appears, that the Governor General recorded a Minute upon this occasion; in which he avowed himself to condemn the conduct of the President and Council of *Bombay*, in making this Treaty, as "unreasonable, impolitic, "unjust, and unauthorized," because it had been attended with no decisive effects, but was likely to create an indefinite scene of troubles throughout *India*. He expressed an equal disapprobation of the manner in which the prosecution of the measure had been commenced, and therefore would protest against the Treaty as invalid, and the war as impolitic, dangerous, and unauthorized; but at the same time he confessed his doubts about the most advisable method of correcting the mischief "amidst such "a variety of probable contingencies, and under a total "ignorance of their plan of operations;" on which account he would only venture to propose, that the President and Council should be peremptorily enjoined to cancel the Treaty, and withdraw the detachment immediately to their own possessions, unless any of the following cases shall have occurred, viz.

31 May 1775. No. 68.

1st. "That they shall have obtained any decisive ad-"vantages over the enemy.

2d. "That the detachment shall have proceeded to "such

" ſuch a diſtance, or be in ſuch a ſituation, as to make it " dangerous either to retreat, or not to go on.

3d. " That a negociation ſhall have taken place be- " tween *Ragoba* and his opponents, in conſequence of the " ſupport afforded by their alliance."

He confeſſed that he offered his opinions with theſe exceptions, becauſe in this unfortunate dilemma, he ſaw no option but that of the leaſt evil.

The majority of the Board appear to have agreed to withdraw the troops without any exception but the ſingle conſideration of their ſafety; and at the ſame time to have all reſolved, in conſequence of a motion made by General *Clavering*, to endeavour to open a negociation with the ruling Government at *Poona*, to inform the Preſidency of *Bombay* of this reſolution, to direct them to encourage and receive any pacific overtures which might be made to them; and to " hold as the firſt objects, " an immediate ceſſation of arms, and a confirmation " of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to the Company."

See Letter to Bombay of this date. Do.

31 May 1775.

And your Committee find, that the Governor General hereupon informed the Board, that the perſon whom the miniſterial party had conſtituted Peſhwa, was an infant; and that the conduct of the affairs of the ſtate being entruſted to *Siccaram Baboo*, it would be proper to communicate to him by Letter, the intentions of the Board previous to the entering upon a negociation. A Letter appears to have been agreed to and prepared accordingly.

Letter to Siccaram Baboo, 31 May 1775. Do.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 21 June 1775. Appendix, No. 69.

And it appears, that on the 21ſt of June, in Conſultation on the appointment of a proper perſon for the deputation to *Poona*, the Governor General propoſed Colonel *Dow*; but the majority of the Board agreeing in high eſteem of the merits and abilities of Colonel *Dow*, were at the ſame time of opinion, that he was too uſefully employed in his office of Commiſſary General to be ſpared from that duty; and General *Clavering* having therefore named Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* for this charge of negociation, the Board unanimouſly agreed to depute him, immediately ſettled his allowance, and ordered that he ſhould be ſent for by the Secretary to receive his inſtructions; in which it was reſolved to direct him, that in any Treaty he might form with the Maratta miniſters, he would endeavour alſo to include *Ragoba* in ſuch Treaty, " and to obtain for him ſuch terms, as in his " actual ſituation it might appear reaſonable to expect, " and which might not fruſtrate the immediate objects of " the negociation:" that he ſhould try to make it on terms as advantageous to the Company as could be obtained; and particularly to be aware, that he muſt not relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, but ſeek to convince the Miniſters that thoſe places would not be ſafe in their hands if they ſhould be given up to them, becauſe the Portugueſe would immediately ſeize them from the Marattas, which they would not attempt to do from the Engliſh.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 26 June 1775. Appendix, No. 70.

And your Committee find, that on the 26th June, a Letter dated 30th April was received by the Governor General and Council from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, acquainting them of the junction of their forces with thoſe of *Ragoba* near *Cambay*, on the 19th April; that ſome of the Miniſters had deſerted the grand confederacy, and that his affairs were proſperous and promiſing, except in the want of money, which he had ſolicited of them, and they had refuſed; but that they muſt requeſt a large ſupply from *Bengal*, as the whole expence of the army would for the preſent fall on the Company.

See Conſ. July 5, 1775. Appendix, No. 71.

And it appears, that on the 5th July, further accounts of the ſituation of the Bombay affairs were received at *Fort William*, by Letters from *Fort Saint George*, dated 30th June 1775, incloſing a Letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay* to their Government, dated 1ſt June, and an Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Keating*; who informed them, that at the cloſe of a ſucceſsful engagement with the Marattas on the 18th May, a part of the Company's troops had by accident ſuſtained a conſiderable loſs.

Similar accounts arrived on the 10th of the ſame month, immediately from *Bombay*, in a Letter dated 1ſt of June from the Preſident and Council, who therein add, that the Company's troops, in conjunction with *Ragoba*'s army, were on their march to *Poona*, and at that time probably arrived near *Broach*; they alſo acknowledged the receipt of the Letter from the Governor General and Council of the 8th March, which reached them on the 21ſt of May, and they promiſed to ſend their reply by the firſt direct conveyance, expreſſing only by this opportunity their thanks for aſſurance of aſſiſtance, and repeating their requeſt to be aided particularly by a ſum of money; they tranſmitted alſo a return of their forces, and of the ſtate of their revenues, and informed the Supreme Council, that they had appointed Mr. *Moſtyn* to reſide at *Ragoba*'s Durbar, in order to relieve the Commander of the forces from all but military duties.

Sec. Conſ. 10 July 1775. Appendix, No. 72.

Your Committee obſerve, that the Board, after reading this Letter, reſolved to ſend an anſwer, expreſſive of their diſappointment and diſpleaſure at the unſatisfactory and imperfect accounts which they ſtill continued to receive from that Preſidency, particularly complaining of the unintelligible extract from Colonel *Keating*'s Letter, and of the inattention and ſlight ſhewn to their enquiries and poſitive inſtructions of the 8th March; that a reply to them had been delayed for ten days, and then contained no information of the meaſures taken or meant to be purſued, except of one, of which they entirely diſapproved, namely, the deputation of Mr *Moſtyn* to *Ragoba*'s Durbar, without acquainting them of the deſign of his miſſion. It appears that the copy of the inſtructions prepared for Mr. *Moſtyn*, were afterwards ſent to the Supreme Council on 14th October, but did not reach them till the 5th February following. They will be found in the Appendix.

No. 73.

Appendix, No. 97.

And your Committee find, that in the meantime Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* had arrived at the Preſidency, and had drawn up propoſals, which were laid before the Board by General *Clavering*, for his route to *Poona*, which he wiſhed to purſue by land through *Allahabad* to *Calpee*, from whence the high road uſually taken by the Marattas, leads to that capital. This plan appears to have been unanimouſly approved, and the Governor General being deſired to furniſh him with paſſes, and to write to the ſeveral powers through whoſe dominions he was to travel, for paſſports, guards, and other aſſiſtance to him on his journey, he received his letter of diſpatch on the ſame day; but we obſerve, that a few days afterwards he tranſmitted a paper of remarks on ſundry parts of his inſtructions which he thought required explanation; and it appears that the Board on the 17th ſent their anſwer to him, containing their explanatory orders and reſolutions on his queſtions and memorandums; and in them we remark, that they again poſitively enjoined him to hold a confirmation of the Iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* to be an indiſpenſable article in any Treaty he might enter into; and further apprized him, that *Ragoba* being the Peiſhwa or Ruler of the Maratta State, but driven out from *Poona* by the miniſterial party, who had proclaimed an infant in his ſtead, they could not in ſuch ſituation formally addreſs themſelves to either of the competitors, and had therefore referred him to *Siccaram Baboo* the ruling minister.

Appendix, No. 75. Ben. Sec. Conſ. 10th July 1775.

Sec. Conſ. 17 July 1775, Letter dated 14 July. Do

The Board appear alſo to have ſettled other leſs important matters relative to his pecuniary appointments, and to the number and quality of his attendants. They likewiſe, we find, then gave notice to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, that no Treaty negociated with them by the miniſterial party at *Poona*, would be eſteemed valid, unleſs ratified by Colonel *Upton*. And they alſo on the ſame day wrote a Letter of information to the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George*, of the appointment and objects of this deputation, and ordered a letter of credence to be delivered to Colonel *Upton*.

Sec. Conſ. 24 July 1775. Letter dated 17th Appendix, No. 74. Do.

We ſhould not omit to obſerve, that the Board moreover reſolved, on the motion of Colonel *Monſon*, to make this miſſion uſeful in other reſpects than in the direct

Sec. Conſ. 24 July 1775. Do.

object of it; and therefore agreed to take that opportunity of surveying the peninsula of *India*, and of ascertaining the true distances of places through which Colonel *Upton* should pass, and appointed the Reverend Mr. *Smith* to attend him for that purpose.

Appendix, No. 75.

And the Governor General having received an account of the prosperous situation of *Ragoba*'s affairs, in a paper of intelligence from the *Decan*, which he at this time laid before the Board, it was agreed on his proposition, to instruct Colonel *Upton*, that he should, in case of *Ragoba*'s farther success, treat with that Prince, and that he should be provided accordingly with a letter of introduction to him, implying such powers of negociation.

See Letter to Ragoba, Co. Corr. July 31, 1775; and See also Letter to Saccaram Baboo, of the same date.

Your Committee find, that the promised answer from the Select Committee of *Bombay* to the Governor General and Council's Letter of 8th March, reached *Fort William* in the beginning of August; and we perceive thereby, that the Select Committee considered their Letter of 30th April, as containing satisfactory reasons for their former silence in regard to their designs and proceedings; and that, relying on the distractions in the Maratta State, for a security against the effects of any inimical disposition in the Ministers, they thought they might also depend upon the operation of the Treaty (in case of *Ragoba*'s success) as a bond of restraint and gratitude upon him; that they never had any negociation with the Ministerialists, even before their agreement with *Ragoba*, but in what they had observed on that head to the Supreme Council, they meant only to intimate their intention of endeavouring, should that party become superior in the contest, to reconcile them to the attack on *Salsette*: that since the alliance formed with *Ragoba*, they had thought no more of the opposite party, and now were only bent on accomplishing their views in his favour, which, notwithstanding unpromising appearances, they should hope soon to effect; that they were herein actuated by the reflection of his being the rightful Supreme Governor of the Marattas, and of the advantages to be derived to the Company from the Treaty with him, particularly the right of possessing such places as *Salsette* and *Bassein*; that nothing was to be apprehended from the Bouncello's, as *Mordajee Bouncello*, who had now succeeded to the Berar Government by the death of his brother *Shabajee*, was a friend of *Ragoba*; that the opportunity of acquiring these advantages would have been lost if delayed till answers could have been returned from *Bengal* to their Letters, and that therefore they hoped for approbation, but at all events could point out a justification of their conduct in the clause of the Act before referred to; "that except "in such cases of necessity or expediency, they should "take no material step in political matters, without con- "currence of the Supreme Council."—They concluded with expressing more confident hopes from the reports of a successful engagement with the Marattas, and of dissensions in the ministerial confederacy.

Bom. Sec. Corr. Appendix, No. 76. Dated 24th June 1775. Ben. Sec. Cons. 10 August 1775. No. 76.

See Letter from Mordajee in Country Corr. 1775. No. 76.

Appendix, No 1.

And your Committee find, that a Letter from the Nabob of *Arcot* was now received by the Governor General; wherein the Nabob informed him, that the ministerial party at *Poona* having complained to him of the hostilities commenced against them by the Presidency of *Bombay*, and asked his mediation for peace, he was desirous, that the person deputed from *Bengal* should visit him in his route, and hear his sentiments upon the necessity of introducing some article or clause in the Treaty for the ease and security of the *Carnatic*, which might otherwise be in danger of attack from the resentment of the Marattas; and he hoped at all events, that, should the Deputy be already set out, he might be instructed by Letter to have regard to their mutual interests. And it appears that the Board having taken this Letter into consideration, did in consequence send directions to Colonel *Upton*, that he should pay attention to this request of the Nabob; and they at the same time added a command, that in any Treaty he might enter into with the Maratta State, he should require it, as an indispensable point, to be signed by all the Chiefs nominally and individually.

10 August 1775. Appendix, No. 77.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 16 August 1775. Letter to Col. Upton. 16 August, No. 77

On the same day the Board appear to have written to the Nabob, assuring him of their readiness to gratify his wishes; and repeating their disapprobation of the measures pursued by the Presidency of *Bombay*, they expressed their sincere resolution to restore tranquillity, by making peace with the ruling Government at *Poona*.

Letter to the Nabob 16 August. No. 77.

But your Committee find, that the receipt of two Letters from *Bombay*, dated 13th July and 6th August, occasioned much difference of opinion between the Members of the Supreme Council in their Secret Consultations of the 7th September following.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 7 September 1775. Appendix, No. 78.

The President and Council of *Bombay* in these Letters represented the important expediency of prosecuting the war in favour of *Ragoba*, at the same time declaring their disappointment from the ill behaviour of his troops, which had prevented the good consequence of constant advantages gained by the Company's troops, and made it necessary to ask for considerable reinforcements to them, as well as again to repeat their request for a liberal remittance of money "over and above the annual one of "15 lacks:" that they had written also on this subject to the Governor and Council of *Fort St. George*, and hoped, that from one or both of the Presidencies they should receive an adequate supply of troops in time to act with them on the opening of the campaign after the rains, which had now obliged their army to go into quarters at *Dubboy* near the Banks of the *Nerbuddah*, *Ragoba* having engaged to make further concessions of Territory for such additional aid. They however had some good accounts to communicate, as *Futty Sing* had made his peace with *Ragoba*, on terms very advantageous to that Prince and to the Company, especially by agreeing to pay *Ragoba* a contribution of 26 lacks of rupees within six weeks after the conclusion of the Treaty.

The Board, in consequence of these applications for assistance of men and money, appear to have then proposed the question, whether it should be granted? and we desire to refer the House to the Appendix, in which they will find the different opinions at large of the several Members; and we shall only observe in this place, that the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* were disposed to agree to the proposition for granting assistance both of men and money; chiefly, because however improper and unjustifiable the conduct of the President and Council of *Bombay* might have been in the beginning of this contest, it was now become necessary, out of regard to the safety of all the Company's interests in *India*, to give them support, and endeavour by such means to extricate them from their difficulties; and that success to their future negociations could only be insured by a temporary, though vigorous exertion of the powers of their Government to maintain the ascendency they had acquired. General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monson*, and Mr. *Francis*, were against the question, on grounds principally of obedience to the orders of the Company, who had given it as a first and essential command to the new Administration, that they should be particularly attentive to the preservation of peace in *India*, which they had accordingly observed as an established principle and object of their own conduct; but the President of *Bombay* had in every respect unwarrantably and impolitically broken in upon that plan of the general tranquillity. They insisted, that it would indeed be impossible to spare a proper reinforcement from the Brigades in their Provinces; "and they supposed it "could not be thought advisable to divide and weaken "the Company's Forces upon the Coast, as the *Carnatic* "would be thereby left open to the invasions of the Ma- "rattas, and *Madras* itself exposed to insult from *Hyder* "*Ally*, or perhaps from an European enemy." They imputed at the same time to the Governor General a contradictory change of opinion, reminding him of his former sentiments expressed to the Board on the 31st May—The Governor General defended the consistency of his present arguments with those he formerly held, under the reservation of certain exceptions to the orders for recalling the troops, which he at that time advised.

Appendix, No. 78.

It

It appears that in the end the majority of the Board reſolved to ſend no reinforcement of troops, and to make an addition only of five lacks to the annual remittance of money, reckoning from the 1ſt May preceding. And we perceive, that a Letter was then written to the Preſident and Council, informing them of this reſolution, and directing them implicitly to obey the orders for withdrawing their troops, if they had not already executed them, and "to confine their views to the protection of the Com-"pany's poſſeſſions, including *Salſette* and the ceſſions "made by *Futty Sing*." The Board alſo acquainted them of their having poſitively enjoined the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George* not to furniſh any ſupply of troops from their Preſidency.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 11 September 1775. Appendix, No. 79.

A Letter indeed dated 26th Auguſt, was at this time received from *Madras* by the Governor General and Council; from which they learned that the requiſition of the Preſidency of *Bombay* had, in conſequence of the former orders from *Bengal*, been refuſed by the Governor and Council. And it appears, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* had the more earneſtly urged the Madras Board to compliance with their requeſt, from the reflection, that though the Governor General and Council had promiſed aſſiſtance from *Bengal*, the tranſporting of troops might be more eaſily made from *Madras*; and they expreſſed a further hope, that in conſideration of their great expences and the inſufficiency of their reſources, owing to the ſtop which the preſent ſituation of the Maratta Country had occaſioned to trade on their Coaſt, it might be convenient to them (the Madras Board) to furniſh the reinforcement they ſhould ſend with their own military cheſt.

Letter, dated 13 July, 1775.

Do.

Letter, 26 Auguſt 1775.

Do.

The Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George* appear to have ſuggeſted an idea, that as the brother of *Fezel Beg Cawn*, Commander of the Souba's troops, was coming into their neighbourhood, they ſhould probably have an opportunity by his means of cementing a cloſer connection than already ſubſiſted between the Company and that Prince, which they thought might prove advantageous, not only in regard to the Northern Circars, but by forwarding the intention of this deputation to *Poona*. But it appears that the Governor General and Council in their anſwer thus expreſſed themſelves:—"We do not con-"ceive it neceſſary to employ the mediation of the Nizam "in effecting the propoſed Treaty with the Maratta Go-"vernment; and we think it is not likely that he would "willingly engage in it without ſome view to his own "advantage; and as it is not our intention to ſolicit a "reconciliation with the Maratta State, but to propoſe it "to them as an act of juſtice due from this Govern-"ment, and as being a duty enjoined us by the inſtructions "of the Court of Directors, for the preſervation of peace "throughout *India*, we judge it unneceſſary to enter into "any negociation for this end, either with the Nizam or "any other power, and mean to rely ſolely on our own "influence for effecting it."

No. 77.

Sec. Conſ. September 21, 1775. Appendix, No. 80.

And your Committee find enclоſed in the above-mentioned Letter from *Madras*, a correſpondence between the Poona Miniſters in the name of the infant Peſhwa, and the Nabob of *Arcot*, in which the former earneſtly requeſted the mediation of the Nabob, and the interference of the Supreme Council with the Preſidency of *Bombay*, to put an end to the preſent hoſtilities. And we obſerve, the Madras Board informed the Governor General and Council, that they had deſired the Nabob to aſſure the Peſhwa of their wiſh for peace, and of the ſteps which were taken to forward the accompliſhment of it, particularly by the deputation of Colonel *Upton*.

Ad 79.

Sec. Conſ. September 28, 1775. Appendix, No. 81.

In a few days after theſe Reſolutions and Diſpatches, Letters appear to have been received by the Governor General and Council from the Maratta Miniſters, expreſſive of their ſatisfaction in the view of an early accommodation. And we find, that in the beginning of October following, a Letter from the Bombay Preſidency, dated 22d Auguſt, reached the Supreme Council,

Sec. Conſ. October 5, 1775. Appendix, No. 82.

and appears to be in anſwer to theirs of 31 May, and to contain expreſſions of great concern at the meaſures preſcribed for bringing about a general pacification. The Preſident and Council declare their apprehenſions of much miſchief therefrom to the intereſts of the Company, and of irretrievable diſgrace to their Preſidency, which had not been guilty of any wilful diſreſpect to the Supreme Council, but for the reaſons before aſſigned had thought it neceſſary to act without delay; and after poſſeſſing themſelves of *Salſette*, and being conſequently obliged in good policy to ſide with one of the parties in the Maratta contentions, they could not heſitate about a preference in favour of *Ragoba* the Peſhwa, who beſides was diſpoſed to make a Treaty with them ſo beneficial to the Company, by giving them the right of acquiring a Revenue of nearly £. 250,000 per annum. "And "though they had not the plea of any injury ſuſtained "from the Poona Government, yet that it ſhould be "obſerved, that party was compoſed of the rebellious "ſubjects of *Ragoba*." They wiſhed at leaſt, that they had been made the inſtruments of the deſigns to reſtore peace, which they could have done with honour and credit, had not poſitive injunctions to recal the troops, and ſuch public condemnation of their conduct, been expreſsly tranſmitted even to the miniſterial faction, from whom they had heard of it; and in conſequence of which, an Agent, who had before been to ſolicit peace, would now make no overtures but on condition of their delivering up *Ragoba* and the iſland of *Salſette*, and relinquiſhing all claim to *Baſſein*. That orders however were ſent to the Commanding Officer of their forces, to ceaſe from hoſtilities (orders of a like purport, they underſtood, having alſo been diſpatched from *Poona* to the Miniſterial army) and to withdraw them, as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit, into their own garriſons.

Letter from the Preſidency of Bombay to Madarow Narrow.

That they would nevertheleſs ſtill hope, that when the Supreme Council ſhould have heard the repreſentations of Mr. *Tayler*, a Member of their Board, and of the Select Committee, whom they had deputed for that purpoſe, a change in the plan of meaſures would enſue, their Treaty would be ratified, and permiſſion given them to carry *Ragoba* to *Poona*, which might yet, with proper ſupport, be ſucceſsfully attempted, and for which they would willingly be reſponſible. Mr. *Tayler* was alſo inſtructed to give exact information to the Governor General and Council, of all the places and benefits ceded to the Company by the Treaty with *Ragoba*.

It appears to your Committee, that the Governor General and Council, in conſequence of theſe accounts, ſent immediately a Letter of information to Colonel *Upton*, that he might proceed with the utmoſt diſpatch on his journey; and at the ſame time an early day was appointed to receive Mr *Tayler* at the Board; where he appeared on the 9th October, and delivered in a paper which he had drawn up in his paſſage from *Bombay*, of ſuch repreſentations as he thought neceſſary to make on the ſubjects which he had been deputed to treat upon.

Appendix, No. 83 Letter of Col. Upton. See Appen. 34, 40, 56, & 83.

Ben. Sec Conſ. 9 October 1775.

Your Committee have placed this, and the whole of the examination which followed, in the Appendix; and recommend them to the Houſe for their peruſal, as, in addition to the arguments in juſtification of the nature, motives, and object of the proceedings of the *Bombay* Preſidency, in their engagement with *Rugonaut Row*, and againſt the interruption given to them by the reſolutions and orders of the Supreme Council, they contain an introductory account of the Maratta State, the riſe and eſtabliſhment of the Peſhwa's power; of the contiguity and connection in policy and commerce with the Company's poſſeſſions in the Weſt of *India*; of the dominions or diſtricts held by the great chiefs of the nation, in what degree dependent on the Poona Government, particularly the Bouncelos, the Guicawars, and the Northern Jaghiedars (*Holkar* and *Scindia*); of thoſe events and intrigues of their Government, which gave occaſion to the diviſions in the Peſhwa's family, and thereby led to the interference of the Preſidency of *Bombay* in their quarrels;

of the comparative ſituation and force of the contending parties in the war at the time of the ceſſation of hoſtilities, with ſome remarks on the probable diſpoſition or policy of the great country powers (particularly the Nizam and *Hyder Ally*) in regard to theſe contentions, and the competitors. They contain alſo an exact deſcription of the ſituation, revenues, and other productive advantages ariſing from the ſeveral ceſſions of territory made by *Ragoba* and *Futty Sing*: and therein alſo will be found, ſtated in very earneſt terms, the dangerous and diſgraceful conſequences of declaring the Treaty to be invalid and null, and eſpecially if *Ragoba* ſhould in ſuch caſe have recourſe to the aſſiſtance of other powers, and throw himſelf for example "on the protection of *Hyder*, thereby "creating the additional diſadvantage of increaſing the "power of a man, whoſe mortal and declared averſion "to the Company and their Ally, and his open partiality "and encouragement of their declared rivals, render "every acceſſion of country or connexion the juſt objects "of our jealouſy; his forces joined to the Allies of "*Ragoba* would be irreſiſtible by the Confederates, and "then in what ſafety would be the Company's poſſeſſions "in the *Carnatic*?"—We find, that above all, the opinion is here ſtrongly enforced, that whether it ſhould be reſolved to terminate theſe affairs by arms or negociation, it would be abſolutely expedient to revoke the orders for withdrawing the troops, which ought to be left with *Ragoba*, until a pacification ſhould be completed; but which would begin their retreat from his army on 15th November enſuing, unleſs ſuch counter orders were ſent to them.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 9th October 1775. No. 83.

The Board having then conſidered the queſtion, whether their former orders ſhould be enforced, or they ſhould for the preſent ſuſpend them? the ſeveral Members appear to have perſiſted in their firſt opinions; and the conſequent determination of the majority was a confirmation of their original Reſolutions, except that it was agreed to leave the option with the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, to withdraw their troops into ſuch of their Garriſons as they might chuſe. And a Letter was thereupon written to Mr. *Tayler*, acquainting him of this their final deciſion upon the repreſentations he had ſubmitted to them. At the ſame time, the Board appear to have acknowledged the receipt of the Letter dated 23d Auguſt, from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in a very ſhort reply, containing only an explanation of their meaning, into what garriſons the troops ſhould be immediately withdrawn.

No. 83.

No. 83.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 18 October 1775. Appendix, No. 97.

And your Committee find, that on the 18th of the ſame month, Mr. *Tayler*, after expreſſing his concern at the determination of the Board, deſired to add a further repreſentation of the great indignity it would be to the Preſidency of *Bombay*, if they entruſted the conduct of the negociation to an entire ſtranger; remarking, that one of the Members of their Board had been by the Company themſelves appointed to reſide at *Poona*, with particular inſtructions and powers for negociation with *Mhadarow* the then Peſhwa; and that they, from their knowledge of the views, connections, and intereſts of the different perſons in the Poona Durbar, muſt be beſt qualified to tranſact ſuch matters, and that they ſhould all be actuated by zeal for the honour and intereſts of their Employers, and would pay implicit obedience to whatever directions they might receive from the Supreme Council, in regard to the management of this meaſure.

Ibid. No. 84.

It appears that the Supreme Board, in anſwer to theſe repreſentations, informed Mr. *Tayler*, that they could not agree to repeal or change the appointment of Colonel *Upton*, conſiſtently with the reſolutions which they had publicly ſignified to the Miniſters at *Poona*; that they did not however intend to throw any ſlight on the Preſidency of *Bombay*, which they ſhould always endeavour to ſecure from any diſreſpect of their authority.

Ib. J. No. 84.

But we find that the Governor General and Council, by Letter of the ſame date, enclоſing copies of their inſtructions ſent to Colonel *Upton*, ſignified to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* their deſire that they would communicate to that Gentleman, all the uſeful information in their power, whenever after his arrival at *Poona* he might conſult them; and that, not meaning entirely to deſert *Ragoba*, they alſo deſired them "to afford him a "ſanctuary for himſelf, his domeſtics, or attendants, in "caſe he ſhould ever be neceſſitated to apply for their "protection, in order to avoid any perſonal danger."

That they likewiſe directed them to retain poſſeſſion of the diſtricts made over to the Company by *Futty Sing* (who, they obſerved, appeared to be the perſon having authority to make theſe grants) until a definitive Treaty of peace ſhould be concluded. It appears that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* had, by Letter of 11th September, already made an offer of furniſhing Colonel *Upton* with every neceſſary information, either by Letter or by deputing a gentleman to him at *Poona*.

Sec. Conf. 5 February 1776. No. 83.

And your Committee find, that the Nabob *Mahomed Alli* had, by Letter dated 14th October, deſired the aſſent of the Governor General and Council to his wiſh of deputing a gentleman (naming Mr. *Chambers*) on his part to *Poona*, who ſhould co-operate with Colonel *Upton* in the management of the Treaty, on ſuch points as might regard his or the Company's poſſeſſions in the *Carnatic*. And it appears that the Supreme Board, in their Conſultation of the 9th November following, agreed to the appointment of Mr. *Chambers*, if the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint George*, to whom they wrote on this occaſion, ſhould make no objections; and we obſerve, that they immediately ſent a Letter alſo to Colonel *Upton*, acquainting him of this matter, and of their having however reſtricted the Nabob's deputy to particular conditions, and from tranſacting any buſineſs except through him. And they further remarked, that they were informed of Lieutenant Colonel *Keating*'s having retired to the South of *Surat*, where he would remain inactive, but that it would be neceſſary to aſſure the Miniſters at *Poona* of the ſincerity of his pacific deſigns, unleſs they, by putting their army in motion, made it neceſſary for him again to take the field.

See Perſ. Corr. 14 October 1775. Appendix, No. 85.

No. 85.

No. 85. Do.

And your Committee find that Colonel *Upton*, who appears to have been at *Calpee* on the 26th October, in his Letter from thence of that date, gave an unpleaſant account of the diſtreſs and confuſion of the country through which he was paſſing, and of the apprehenſions which might with too much reaſon be entertained, that a conſiderable Maratta army would ſoon enter the dominions of the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowla*.

Appendix, No. 86.

From the Bengal Secret Conſultations of the 29th November 1775, we collect, that *Ragonaut Row* had addreſſed the Board upon the ſubject of the Treaty executed by him with the Preſidency of *Bombay*; and that Mr. *Tayler* in conſequence of it took occaſion to offer new repreſentations in a paper dated 18 November, and to propoſe a plan, by which, "ſhould the concerns of "*Ragoba* be made a more leading object in the intended "negociation at *Poona*, that point might be effected moſt "conſiſtently with the ſteps already taken, the good faith "of the Nation, and the intereſts of the Company, ſo as "to ſecure a permanent ſettlement." That the principal baſis of the accommodation ſhould for this purpoſe be an acknowledgment of the title of the infant Peſhwa, the regency of *Ragonaut Row* during his minority, and the ſucceſſion of *Imrut Row Ragoba*'s adopted ſon, in caſe of their death, and a general guarantee of all parties for a ſecurity of perſons and poſſeſſions; he repeated his obſervation, that at all events the late threatening declaration of the miniſtry made it more than ever a neceſſary ſtep to delay the final recal of the troops till the concluſion of peace.

Appendix, No. 87. Ben. Country Corr. received 27 Oct. 1775. See alſo a Letter from Bombay, 14 October 1775, in Sec. Conf. 18 December.

And your Committee obſerve, that on the 29th November Mr. *Tayler* having received accounts from Colonel *Keating*, of great diviſions in the miniſterial confederacy (many principal perſons of which had engaged to join *Ragoba*) conveyed intelligence of this circumſtance to the

Letter from Col. Keating, dated 29 October 1775. Appendix, No. 88.

the Supreme Board, and added his apprehenſion that *Ragoba*, when he ſhould receive their abſolute determination againſt contributing by their aſſiſtance to his reſtoration, would turn his reliance on the junto, and by their means might be put in poſſeſſion of the Government, and thus the Company would be deprived of the advantages ſtipulated in the Treaty with him; recommending it therefore again to them, to endeavour ſtill to become the inſtruments of his ſucceſs, and to alter their reſolutions to that effect. In the Appendix, will be found the Minutes of the ſeveral Members of the Board on this occaſion; in which we perceive an adherence to former opinions, and that the majority reſolved to acknowledge the Letters communicated by Mr. *Tayler*, and in anſwer to expreſs their determination to wait for advices from Colonel *Upton* of his firſt interview and negociations with the Miniſtry, before they would ſend him any new inſtructions for his conduct.

See the Minutes. No. 88.

And your Committee find, that Mr. *Tayler* tranſmitted accounts of all theſe tranſactions in Letters to the Court of Directors, in which he endeavoured to convince them of the propriety, expediency, and probable ſucceſs of thoſe meaſures which the Preſidency of *Bombay* had purſued, and of the precipitancy, injuſtice, and impolicy, of the contrary proceedings adopted by the Governor General and Council, and of the bad conſequence which he apprehended would ariſe therefrom to the Company's affairs.

See Mr. Tayler's Letters to the Court of Directors, 26 Nov. 29 Nov. 30 Nov. and 20 Jan. 1776. Appendix, No. 89. See alſo Bombay Letter to Court of Directors 17th Feb. 1776.

We find alſo, that the Supreme Council explained the motives of their conduct in their Secret Correſpondence with the Court of Directors, and likewiſe acquainted them of the diverſity of opinions in the Members of their own Board, which appear alſo to have been farther made known by the Conſultations tranſmitted at the ſame time, and the ſeveral Minutes contained therein.

Ben. Sec. Letters, 5 Auguſt, 11 September, and 20 November 1775. Appendix, No. 90. See alſo the Minutes of Meſſrs. Clavering, Monſon, and Francis, and the Gov. General's Reply, in Appx. No. 156 and 157.

In order to examine all the accounts and opinions which may throw light on this ſubject, and may lead the Houſe to an impartial judgment, your Committee have read a Letter from Captain *Farmer*, commanding one of his Majeſty's ſhips in thoſe ſeas, to Commodore Sir *Edward Hughes*, dated *Bombay*, 24th Auguſt; which, after an introductory account of the Maratta State, ſomewhat ſimilar in the manner, though not in the ſtatement of facts, to that drawn up by Mr. *Tayler*, concludes in theſe words: "However raſh and inconſiderate the commencement of this war may have been, they have evidently gone "too far to retreat, without the greateſt danger of loſing "not only *Salſette*, but *Bombay* itſelf; beſides, their arms "on this ſide *India* would ever after be held in contempt. "Only think of their expending ſo many men (for they "have loſt a number without coming to any deciſive "action) ſuch ſums of money, and vaſt quantities of "ammunition and ſtores, at the diſtance of 500 miles "from *Bombay*, whilſt the avowed object of the war is "to be in poſſeſſion of *Poonah*, and placing *Ragoba* on "the Peſhwa Muſnud. Would a ſtranger to the geo"graphy of the Country believe then, that *Poonah* is only "70 miles from *Bombay*, and only one Paſs of any diffi"culty between them, which is ill-fortified, and worſe "defended in point of troops? The real caſe is, by all "that I could anyway diſcover, that half of Colonel "*Keating*'s army could march from *Bombay* to *Poona* in "four days, in ſpite of all that they have in that Country "to oppoſe him; ſo that nothing but the expectation of "a great body of horſe joining *Ragoba* at *Cambay*, could "induce them to take that roundabout way."

Appendix, No. 91. Captain Farmer's Letter enclosed in one from Sir Edward Hughes, Ben. Sec. Conſ. 12 December 1775.

While the Governor General and Council appear to have been thus waiting impatiently for news of Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at *Poonah*, and the beginning of his negociations with the miniſterial Government, they received various accounts of the poſture of affairs, very different from each other; and from ſome of which, the ready diſpoſition of the Miniſters to accommodation might be ſuſpected to have ſuffered ſome diminution.

Appendix, No 92. See Letter from the Nabob of Arcot in Country Corref. received December 20, 1775. Letters from Sir Edward Hughes, dated 30 September.

No. 92.

For your Committee find, that Letters in the name of *Madarow Narrain*, the infant Peſhwa, and from *Siccaram Baloo*, dated 22 November 1775, reached *Calcutta* the beginning of January 1776; and appear to be written in terms of diſcontent and complaint, betraying a backwardneſs to allow any preludes of pacification, and threatening, upon very ſlight grounds, a renewal of hoſtilities, unleſs the places taken from them were immediately reſtored. And although they contained aſſurances of orders having been given to facilitate the route of Colonel *Upton*, through the Maratta dominions, accounts received at this very time from him ſeemed to convey a doubt of that fact; for he appears to have only reached *Bhowp l* on 25th November, and aſcribed the delay of his journey to the inattention of the Miniſters, from whom he had received no advices, and who had not apprized the Sirdars of the different diſtricts of the buſineſs on which he was deputed, and of his travelling through their Country, which he found all in arms.

See Appendix, No 56

Appendix, No. 93. Sec. Conſ. 8 January 1776. Letter from Col. Upton, dated 25 November 1775.

It appears to your Committee, that the Supreme Council wrote an immediate account of theſe informations received from *Poonah* to Colonel *Upton*, and recommended the greateſt diſpatch in bringing the negociations to a concluſion; enclosing at the ſame time the Letters from the Peſhwa, and from *Siccaram Baboo*, with their anſwer to them, in which they expreſs their ſurprize at the unfriendly interruptions given to their trade; and declare, that they had on their part ſent ſtrict orders for a ceſſation of hoſtilities, and the withdrawing of their forces; and that they believed them to have been obeyed.

Ib'd. No 93.

Appendix, No. 94.

And it is indeed to be obſerved, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, in a Letter dated 14th October, which reached *Calcutta* in the beginning of December, informed the Supreme Council, that Colonel *Keating* had been directed to retire with the troops into the diſtricts contiguous to *Surat* or *Broach*, as ſoon as the weather would permit.

Sec. Conſ 12 December 1775. Appendix, No. 95.

And we perceive, that in their Secret Letter of the 15th January 1776, the Governor General and Council acquainted the Court of Directors of theſe circumſtances, and obſerved, "that they could not reconcile the threat"ening declarations of the Miniſters to the reduced ſtate "in which, by the advices from Colonel *Keating* of the "29th of October, they appeared to be." That they hoped, however, a general equilibrium would be preſerved till Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at *Poonah*, and that they had warned the Miniſters of the neceſſity they ſhould find themſelves under, to oppoſe any hoſtile proceedings which might originate from them. That *Ragoba* had indeed, in conſequence of the intended negociation, required the aſſignment of a certain ſupport for himſelf and adherents, till it ſhould be concluded; and entreated that his pretenſions to the Government ſhould be then examined, and that he might be declared either Peſhwa or Regent during the minority, at the end of which he ſhould reſt ſatisfied with a penſion.

Appendix, No. 96. Sec. Conſ. Court of Directors, 15 January 1776.

The correſpondence of Colonel *Keating* with the Preſidency of *Bombay*, from which moſt of theſe particulars had been collected, was forwarded to the Supreme Council on 14th October 1775, but appears not to have reached *Calcutta* till 5th February 1776; and with it were enclosed copies of the inſtructions given to Colonel *Keating* by the Bombay Preſidency, on his proceeding with the troops to join *Ragoba*, and of thoſe prepared for Mr. *Moſtyn*, upon his being deputed to reſide at his Durbar. They will be found in the Appendix.

Appendix, No. 97.

No. 97. Sec. Conſ 12 February 1776. Appendix, No. 98.

And your Committee find, that the Governor General and Council, on the 12th February, received a Letter from Colonel *Upton*, dated 5th January; by which they were informed, that he was at laſt arrived at *Poonah*, on the 30th of December preceding, after a journey conſiderably longer than was imagined, it being 948 miles from *Calpee*, "and very little aſſiſtance to be procured "in any way, owing to the miſcarriage of orders from the "Miniſters, and the diſturbed ſtate of the country."

He gave an account of the manner of his reception and introduction, and of the debate which immediately aroſe

in the Durbar, from the oppoſition given by the Miniſters to the ſignature of all the Chiefs individually; and he wiſhed to have inſtructions on that head, being himſelf of opinion that the requiſition might be ſafely diſpenſed with. He informed the Board of the apparent power of the miniſterial party, and of their deſire to haſten the concluſion of peace; of their doubts about the conduct and ſituation of the Bombay forces, and their aſſurances of the pacific behaviour of their own; and laſtly, of the diſappointment expreſſed by them, at his not having brought any preſent on the part of the Company, which had obliged him to ſend to *Bombay* for different articles, to the amount of fifteen thouſand rupees.

No. 98. In this Letter Colonel *Upton* enclоſed alſo the form of a Treaty, ſuch as he intended to make uſe of, if the Governor General and Council ſhould think no alterations neceſſary; and alſo the account related by the Miniſters, of the riſe and progreſs of the actual diſſentions and diſturbances in the Maratta Empire.

Beng. Sec. Conſ. 22 February 1776. Appendix, No. 99. In the anſwer which the Governor General and Council appear to have immediately agreed upon, they ſent a proper preamble for the intended Treaty; and obſerved, that though "they ſtill thought the concurrence of the "Maratta Chiefs, in the preſent undecided ſtate of the "Government equally deſirable, they would not let that "point be made any obſtruction to the concluſion of the "Treaty, but leave it to his diſcretion to recede from "the requiſition, in ſuch degree as he ſhould find it "unattainable."

And your Committee perceive, that General *Clavering* then propoſed to add another diſcretional order to Colonel *Upton*, not to inſiſt on "the iſland of *Baſſein* being "granted to the Company in the future Treaty of Peace, "unleſs the Miniſters had already conſented to acquieſce "in the demand he had made for it, or that he ſhould "perceive a diſpoſition in them to yield the poſſeſſion of "it to the Company."—That Mr. *Francis* thought the ceſſion of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* ſhould be inſiſted on, eſpecially as Colonel *Upton* had not ſuggeſted that he ſhould expect to meet with any difficulty on either of thoſe points—That Colonel *Monſon* was of opinion, that he ſhould have "inſtructions to obtain *Baſſein* and "its dependencies, if he could, from the miniſterial "party, but not to make it an article on which to break "off the Treaty he was now inſtructed to conclude"—That the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* agreeing with Mr. *Francis*, it was of courſe reſolved, "that no "alteration ſhould be made in the inſtructions already "given to Lieutenant Colonel *Upton*, for requiring the "ceſſion of the iſlands of *Salſette* and *Baſſein* as a con-"dition of the Treaty."

Appendix, No. 100. It appears that General *Clavering*, in conſequence of this confirmed reſolution, entered an immediate proteſt againſt it, and the fatal conſequences likely to enſue from ſuch a double act of injuſtice; and we obſerve, that after conſulting the Letter from the Court of Directors to the Sec. Conſ. 14 February 1776. No. 100. Preſidency of *Bombay*, dated 12th April 1775, which arrived that day, he at the next meeting of the Board delivered in a continuation of his Minute of diſſent; becauſe that Letter from the Court of Directors contained their poſitive commands, "not to take poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, "without their permiſſion, but by negociation;" and though he ſhould be glad to obtain *Baſſein* by the ſame means, he would not, merely to acquire territory, riſk the continuance of a war, which muſt probably be the conſequence if the orders of Colonel *Upton* were not made diſcretional.

Sec. Conſ. 15 February 1776. The Minutes of the ſeveral Members of the Board on this re-conſideration of the queſtion, and in the adjourned debate on the next day, upon the motion of Mr. *Francis*, for inſtructing Colonel *Upton* to propoſe ultimately the exchange of *Broach* for *Baſſein*, will be found in the No. 109. Appendix, to which we deſire to refer the Houſe, and only here obſerve, that the reſult of the deliberations appears to have been a reſolution of the majority, that in caſe Colonel *Upton* "ſhould find unſurmountable difficulties in obtaining *Baſſein* without a compenſation, he "ſhould be authorized to propoſe certain conceſſions to "the Poona Government; and that in return for a compliance with his firſt demand, a ſurrender of our right "and intereſt in *Broach* be the condition of that compliance; but that he be particularly inſtructed to reſerve "this conceſſion, until he ſhall find it abſolutely impoſſible to ſucceed without it." And, upon an additional propoſal of Mr. *Francis*, it appears to have been unanimouſly agreed, "that, in caſe Colonel *Upton* ſhould "find the Maratta Government inflexibly determined "not to yield *Baſſein* at any rate, he ſhould ſuſpend his "negociations, and wait for further orders from the "Board."

Appendix, No. 101. By accounts from *Bombay*, in a Letter dated 29th December, which reached *Calcutta* 26th February following, your Committee obſerve, that the Preſident and Council had adviſed *Ragoba* to accompany the Britiſh troops with ſuch part of his army as he might be able to maintain, in order to avoid the ill conſequences of a ſeparation, both to him and to the ſucceſs of Colonel *Upton*'s negociation; and that they had been further prevailed upon, by the earneſt intreaties of *Ragoba*, to agree that the two armies ſhould remain at *Corrode*, a place only 15 coſs from *Surat*, belonging to the Nabob, till preciſe orders ſhould arrive from *Bengal*, in anſwer to the repreſentations made by Mr. *Taylor*, as they foreſaw that *Ragoba* would probaby be forſaken by all adherents when deſerted by their army, or if he ſhould ſtill be able to keep up his force, the plan of pacification would be thereby defeated—That they had, however, refuſed to permit their troops to accompany his army in levying contributions, not thinking themſelves authorized to take ſuch a ſtep.

See Letter from Ragonaut Row to Governor Hornby, dated 28th November, and received 4 December 1775. No. 102.

We further perceive in theſe accounts the following obſervations: "The miniſterial party have made no "overtures for accommodation to us, ſince thoſe mentioned in our Letters of 23d Auguſt, and the ſeveral "acts of hoſtility committed by their troops, as mentioned in Colonel *Keating*'s Letters, give us great reaſon to ſuſpect the ſincerity of their intentions;" while, on the other hand, "the many overtures and offers of "aſſiſtance made to *Ragoba* by *Madajee Scindia*, and "other moſt conſiderable men of the confederacy, and "the differences ſubſiſting between the Chiefs of that "party, have cauſed ſo great an alteration in the poſture "of affairs in favour of *Ragoba*, that we beg leave to "ſubmit it to you as our deliberate opinion, that a Treaty "with him would be more advantageous to the Company, promiſes more ſtability and permanency, and is "more likely to inſure the general peace of *India*, than "one with the Miniſters. The reaſons on which we "ground this opinion, are fully ſtated in a Letter we "have diſpatched to Colonel *Upton*, thinking it very "neceſſary he ſhould be apprized of the true ſituation "of *Ragoba*'s affairs, before he commenced his negociations."

See this Letter in the Appendix, No. 101.

And on the ſubject of the ceſſions made by *Ragoba*, the Preſident and Council wrote thus:

"The ceſſions of territory made by *Ragoba*, appear "to us objects of ſuch importance to the Company, that "we are greatly alarmed at your intentions of relinquiſhing them. The Company's right to them is indiſputable, as being derived from valid grants made "by the lawful Sovereign of the ceded countries; and "we are convinced, that if Colonel *Upton* ſhews a determination not to part with them, it will be no obſtacle to the concluſion of a general peace, which ever "party he may treat with."

"We have been ſome time in peaceable poſſeſſion of "all the ceded territories, except *Baſſein*; the revenues "are collecting without any difficulty, and the Marattas "already conſider them as diſmembered from the empire."

The Governor General alſo, in his obſervations, which are placed in the Appendix, on the Minutes of Sec. Conſ. 29 February 1776. No. 157.

General

General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, of the 21ſt November 1775, before taken notice of, expreſſes himſelf nearly to the ſame effect:

" The Honourable Court of Directors will be the " beſt judges of the merits of the Gentlemen of the ma- " jority, in the ſteps they have taken to degrade the " Preſidency of *Bombay* in the eyes of the Marattas, and " to deprive the Company of the advantages which might " have been ſecured to them even with an honourable " peace; which there is every reaſon to believe might " have been much ſooner obtained by more vigorous " meaſures."

And your Committee find, That Colonel *Upton*, in a Letter dated 2d February, received 6th March, informed the Governor General and Council of what he conceived to be the diſpoſition of the people at *Poona* regarding the terms of accommodation. " The Letters (he obſerves) " they had received from *Calcutta* before my arrival, " had perſuaded them fully that I was deputed to treat " with them on equal terms, without making any de- " mands whatever; however, at a few meetings I made " them ſenſible, that they had underſtood theſe Letters " too literally." He found them nevertheleſs apparently decided againſt allowing the further poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, or agreeing to the ſurrender of *Baſſein*; and attributed this reſolution to their imagining " that he muſt treat " with them at any rate, and that he had exceeded his " inſtructions by aſking a ſurrender of thoſe Iſlands."

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 6th March 1776. Appendix, No. 102.

On this head he wrote as follows: " They aſk me a " thouſand times why we make ſuch profeſſions of ho- " nour, and diſapprove the war entered into by the " Bombay Government, when we are ſo deſirous of avail- " ing ourſelves of the advantages of it?

" They ſay, the Governor General and Council of " *Calcutta* have deputed me to negociate with them on " terms honourable to both nations, yet all advantage " and honour is confined to ourſelves."

He then informed the Board, that deſpairing of the acquiſition of *Baſſein*, he ſhould endeavour to prevail upon the Miniſters to allow a Britiſh Factory, with certain privileges of trade in it, to the excluſion of other Europeans; that he ſhould inſiſt upon keeping poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, though the breaking off the Treaty would conſequently follow the refuſal of their acquieſcence; that the Miniſters diſputed the right of the Guicawars to make any grants in the *Guzurat*, and it was therefore agreed to leave that queſtion in regard to them undetermined, till the pleaſure of the Board ſhould be known; that a certain ſtipend and number of attendants would be allowed to *Ragoba*; and as to the report of the weakneſs of the miniſterial party, he imagined them not to be in the deplorable ſituation they had been thought, for they had a numerous army, and no want of money, and lately engaged in alliance with the Nizam, who had ſent a large body of troops to join their forces.

See Colonel Keating's Letter. No. 102.

In concluſion, he notified his intentions of retiring to *Bombay*, in caſe terms of accommodation could not be agreed on. We find enclоſed an account of the eſtabliſhment of the Guicawars in the command of the Guzurat Country, which we have placed in the Appendix.

No. 102.

See this Letter, dated 9th March 1776.

Mr. *Tayler* appears to have at this time ſent in a Letter to the Board, in which he enforced ſtrongly the repreſentations made by the Government of *Bombay*, in regard to the favourable appearance of *Ragoba*'s affairs, and ſupported their arguments for preferring, even on political motives, a treaty with him to any which might be ſettled with the miniſterial party. And in order to weaken the impreſſion which the Board might have taken from the informations and reaſonings contained in Colonel *Upton*'s Letter, he deſired them to obſerve, " that Colonel *Upton* dated from the fort of *Poorunder*, " where he is ſurrounded by the Miniſters and their crea- " tures, whoſe intereſt is to miſinform him with reſpect " to their own ſtrength and importance, and to ſecrete " from him every circumſtance favourable to *Ragoba* " and his partizans. Their patience, ſkill, and diſſimu- " lation, in conducting political negociations, are very " well known in *India*. It is almoſt uſeleſs to inſiſt on " the different credibility that is due to informations col- " lected under thoſe diſadvantages, and thoſe communi- " cated by Gentlemen in whoſe honour you have a ſecu- " rity from intentional deceit, and whoſe caution is war- " ranted by the danger they incur, ſhould their ill- " grounded intelligence miſlead you into meaſures that " might not otherwiſe be deemed expedient."

Appendix, No. 103.

From the Conſultations of the Board in conſequence of theſe informations, your Committee have found that the Governor General ſuggeſted an advice, " That what- " ever orders were then ſent to Colonel *Upton* in reply to " his Letter, they ſhould be peremptory and concluſive; " that he ſhould be directed to bring the buſineſs of his " negociation to an iſſue, either by an immediate con- " cluſion of the Treaty, or by demanding his diſmiſſion, " and retiring to *Bombay*, where he might ſtill remain, " and wait the orders of the Board for his future pro- " ceedings."

Ben. Sec. Conſ. 6th March 1776. Appendix, No. 104.

That the conſequences of the latter ſtep muſt be conſidered and provided for, but that " in the mean time he " would recommend that Colonel *Upton* be referred to " the inſtructions which he had already received, and " directed to conform literally to them." In regard however to the exchange of *Broach* for *Laſſein*, he repeated one objection, which he had before intimated, from a doubt in which he was now confirmed by conſidering the clauſe of the Act, being of opinion, " that it clearly " limited the controlling powers of the Government of " *Bengal* over the other Preſidencies, to that of the com- " mencing of hoſtilities, the declaring of war, the nego- " ciating or concluding Treaties of Peace; but did not " authorize them to order the ſurrender or exchange of " any of the Company's poſſeſſions dependent on the " other Preſidencies, nor thoſe Preſidencies to obey ſuch " orders."

Some of the other Members of Council appear to have differed with the Governor General in the conſtruction of the clauſe, ſuppoſing, " that a power to make peace " muſt, in its nature, include a power to agree to the only " terms on which, in ſome caſes, peace could be ob- " tained." In regard to the buſineſs before them, it will be found from the Minutes which we have placed in the Appendix, that there was much difference of opinion, as well on the juſt principle and grounds of their demands and expectations from the Poona miniſtry, as on the probable diſpoſition of that Government to make the conceſſions required. And that the Board in the end came to the following agreement: " That in caſe Colonel " *Upton* ſhall not have already concluded a Treaty, he be " ordered to conform to his former inſtructions; and if " the miniſtry at *Poona* ſhould not accede to thoſe con- " ditions, that he require his diſmiſſion, and retire to " *Bombay* within ſix days from the receipt of thoſe orders; " but if a treaty ſhall have been concluded before the " arrival of the laſt inſtructions, without obtaining a " ceſſion of *Baſſein* to the Company, he be ordered to " offer them the terms of exchange therein mentioned."

No. 104.

We obſerve, however, that a Letter was received the next day by the Governor General and Council, from Colonel *Upton*; the contents of which informing them, that the Treaty was broken off, were held to ſuperſede the orders ſtated above; and the Board, though they thought there was a probability that the abrupt declaration of the Miniſters might have been a feint only for the purpoſe of trying what impreſſion it would make on the mind of Colonel *Upton*, reſolved, that it was become neceſſary to ſuppoſe the war renewed, and to provide the means of conducting it with the greateſt probability of ſucceſs: and by the return laid before the Board by General *Clavering*, it appeared that the whole military force at the Preſidency of *Bombay*, excluſive of the remote Factories, was as follows:

Letter, dated 9th Feb. 6 Sel Conſ 7th March 1776. Appendix, No 105

At

	Artillery.	Infantry.	Sepoys.
At Bombay - - -	112 -	450 -	1,776
Madras Detachment at D°	— -	— -	893
In the Field - - -	114 -	378 -	1,454
Madras Detachment at D°	— -	106 -	—
At Salsette - - - -	75 -	193 -	955
At Caranje - - - -	1 -	29 -	240
Total -	302 -	1,156 -	5,318

And we obſerve in Colonel *Upton*'s Letter, referred to in the Appendix, the following paſſage on this ſubject: "I wrote the laſt week to the Governor and Council of "*Bombay*, to prepare them for this event; alſo to Colonel "*Keating*, that he might guard againſt any ſurpriſe. His "Majeſty's ſquadron being here at this time, is a for- "tunate event; and I think if the war is to be proſe- "cuted, if three or four companies of Europeans, a "ſmall detachment from the corps of Artillery, and two "or three battalions of Sepoys, were embarked from "*Bengal* to join the army from *Bombay*, we might ſoon "command peace on our own terms; for the Chiefs of "this country are quite at a loſs which ſide to take, and "are willing to ſee what the Engliſh do."

Appendix, No. 106. Bombay Letter, dated 1ſt February 1776.

And by a Letter, dated 1ſt February, from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to Colonel *Upton*, which he enclоſed in his of 7th to the Governor General and Council, we obſerve, that on the ſubject of the then ſituation of the Company's troops they wrote as follows: "We "are much pleaſed to find you are convinced of the pro- "priety of the Company's troops not being entirely "withdrawn from *Ragonaut Row*'s before the concluſion "of the Treaty, and we are ſenſible you will experience "the good effects of this meaſure in your negociation."

See Colonel Keating's Letter to the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated 24 Jan. 1776. Appendix, No. 107.

It appears alſo, that *Ragoba* had lately made freſh ſolicitations for aſſiſtance from the Preſidency of *Bombay*, and had offered on that condition to enlarge conſiderably the intereſts and advantages of the Britiſh Company, to whom he acknowledged himſelf to be much indebted.

Appendix, No. 108.

And your Committee find, that in conſequence of theſe informations, the Governor General and Council came to ſeveral reſolutions, and particularly, to apprize the different dependencies of the Company of the actual ſtate of affairs, and of their future intentions "(to which "they were compelled by the obſtinacy of the Mini- "ſters) to ſupport the cauſe of *Ragoba* with the utmoſt "vigour, and with a general exertion of the whole power "of the Engliſh arms in *India*. That the grand object "however ſtill was peace." And that they were deter- mined to act in all quarters at once; and by the deciſion and rapidity of their proceedings, to bring the war if poſſible to a ſpeedy concluſion.

That Letters would be written to *Nizam Ally*, *Hyder Ally*, *Mrary Row*, *Moodajee Bouncello*, *Tookajee Holkar*, and *Madajee Scindia*, with a view of engaging their aſſiſt- ance in favour of *Ragoba*, or at leaſt to ſecure their neutrality.

That the Reſident at *Oude* ſhould be directed to pre- vail upon the Nabob, to ſuffer the Company's brigade to be removed from *Oude* to the frontiers of *Corah* neareſt *Calpee*, in order to forward the ſucceſs of the correſpondence with *Madajee Scindia* and *Tookajee Holkar*.

That they ſhould recommend it to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, to ſuccour the united army with a reinforcement of two battalions of Sepoys, or more if they could ſpare them; adding this aſſurance "to alle- "viate any danger which you might apprehend from "being deprived of ſo large a body of your military "forces, you will, if you deem it adviſable, raiſe new "corps to ſupply the place of ſuch as you may ſend on "this ſervice during their abſence, and we are willing to "defray any extraordinary charge that you may incur "on this account."

That they deſired Sir *Edward Hughes* to continue with the ſquadron under his command on the Malabar Coaſt during the troubles, and to grant all the aſſiſtance in his power to the operations of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*.

That they wrote a Letter to *Ragoba*, and forwarded it to *Surat* with the following directions to the Chief and Council: "If Colonel *Upton* ſhould have been obliged "to break off his negociations with the Miniſters at "*Poonah*, and a continuation of the war ſhould in con- "ſequence have been reſolved upon, we deſire you will "immediately forward the enclоſed Letter by a ſafe "conveyance to *Ragonaut Row*; but if on the contrary "a treaty of peace ſhould have been concluded, you "will deſtroy it."

They aſſured *Ragoba* in this Letter, that in the in- tended negociation at *Poonah*, Colonel *Upton* had expreſs directions "to ſtipulate ſuch conditions for him as he "ſhould approve, and might enſure his future ſafety "and welfare;" that now however, as the Miniſters had rejected the overtures of peace, they had great ſatisfac- tion in offering him "the aſſiſtance of their arms in all "parts of *India*, to replace him with full authority in "the ſeat of his Government at *Poonah*."

And in their Letter of this date to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* (while they declare themſelves not reſponſible for the meaſures which had involved the Company in this quarrel) they releaſed that Government from the reſtrictions which they had laid upon the ope- rations of their army, and authorized them to give the moſt effectual ſupport to *Ragoba*; inſtructing them to aſſign the command of the troops to General *Gordon*, whom alone they deemed fit to be entruſted with a charge of ſuch conſequence, and to order him to march imme- diately to *Poonah*, making the acquiſition of *Baſſein* a preſent object of their attempt, by negociation only with the Killedar; and they required them to appropriate the ſupplies of money ſent from *Bengal* to the operations of the war alone.

Your Committee further obſerve, that they informed Colonel *Upton* of all theſe matters, and of their waiting in impatient expectation of freſh accounts from him; directing him if he ſhould be ſtill at *Poonah* to adhere to his former inſtructions.

From the Minutes of the Board on this occaſion, which, with the Letters ſtated briefly in the body of this Report, are placed at large in the Appendix, it will appear that the conviction of neceſſity was declared to have been the only ground on which the Members in general agreed to thoſe meaſures; and we obſerve, that General *Clavering* in particular expreſſed himſelf as fol- lows, "I think it neceſſary to enter this declaration, to "obviate any objection that may be made to my con- "ſenting to carry the Company's arms beyond the line "of defence preſcribed by them; nothing but the ne- "ceſſity of the caſe ſhould have obliged me to it; and "to prevent our being dazzled by the lures which "*Ragoba* has thrown out to the Government of *Bombay*, "of various ceſſions which he will make to the Company "as ſoon as he is in complete poſſeſſion of the Maratta "Government, I think the Government of *Bombay* "ſhould be inſtructed to make a renunciation of every "ceſſion he has made, except the iſlands of *Salſette* and "*Baſſein*, and their dependencies, together with ſo much "territory in the neighbourhood of *Broach* and *Surat*, "as will be juſt ſufficient to pay the expences of thoſe "two eſtabliſhments."

Appendix, No. 108.

And Mr. *Francis* having recommended the following propoſal to the Board, "that in authorizing the Pre- "ſidency of *Bombay* to treat again with *Ragoba*, they "may be confined to the agreeing on preliminary arti- "cles, but that the definitive treaty may be reſerved to "be ſettled and executed with him by this Government, "as it is poſſible that the views of this Council, parti- "cularly with regard to territorial acquiſitions, may not "be ſo extenſive as we have reaſon to think may be "propoſed by the Bombay Preſidency;" it appears to your Committee, that at the next meeting of the Council it was unanimouſly agreed to.

Appendix, No. 108. Sel. Conſ. 12 Mar. 1776.

And

Sel. Conf. 12 March 1776.

No. 107.

Appendix, No. 109.

And your Committee find, that the Governor General and Council having taken into conſideration the articles propoſed by *Ragoba* (which are inſerted in the Appendix) agreed (with the ſingle exception of Mr. *Barwell*) not to accept all the ceſſions offered, "as it would extend the Company's poſſeſſions to a diſtance unwarranted by the general ſpirit of their orders, and diſproportional to the means of defence." That they declined their aſſent to his ſolicitation for a loan of 10 lacks of rupees, as they had reſolved to ſend a ſupply of 10 lacks (being all they had in their power to ſpare) to *Bombay*, and had appropriated it ſolely to the military operations of that Preſidency. But they at the ſame time engaged to aſſiſt him with their forces in all parts of *Hindoſtan* and the *Decan*; for the payment of which by him, a monthly ſubſidy of two lacks was to be fixed.

It was finally agreed to encloſe a copy of the articles, with the reſolutions of the Board upon them, in a Letter to the Bombay Government, inſtructing them to conclude a preliminary Treaty with *Ragoba* conformably thereto; and further informing them, that a ſmall detachment of infantry, with camp equipage and artillery, were ſent to their aſſiſtance on board the *Indian Queen* and other ſhips.

Appendix, No. 110.

In this Letter was afterwards inſerted an additional paragraph (containing a recommendation of Colonel *Upton* to be appointed ſecond in command to their army) which was propoſed by General *Clavering*, and agreed to by the majority of Council, though ſtrongly and repeatedly oppoſed by the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*, as unauthorized and unjuſt. The Conſultations and Minutes of the Board relative to this ſubject will be found in the Appendix.

No. 110.

Sec. Conf. 21 March 1776.
Appendix, No. 111.

It appears that the Board at the ſame time rejected an application from Mr. *Taylor*, to be employed by them in any negociation which in conſequence of their late reſolutions they ſhould intend to enter into with *Ragoba*, referring him to the Preſidency of *Bombay* for ſuch an appointment if they might judge it proper, and leaving him at liberty to return thither at the time moſt agreeable to his own choice or convenience.

Appendix, No. 112. See alſo Appendixes, Nos. 117, 118, & 136.

And it further appears that General *Clavering* deſired to inſert in the General Letter, which was then about to be diſpatched by the *Talbot*, a paragraph of complaint againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*, in regard to the Maratta diſputes, "whilſt they were under the injunctions "of orders to obſerve the ſuſpenſion of arms, and to "withdraw their army into their own garriſons, or at "leaſt into the Purgunnahs belonging to them." The obſervations of the Governor General in reply to the ſubject of this complaint, with ſeveral papers which your Committee have found to be explanatory of it, are put together in the Appendix.

N. B. Siege of Ahmedabad.

No. 112.

Appendix, No. 113. Sec. Conſ. 1 April 17[illegible]. *See Appendix, No.* 102.

But your Committee find, that all theſe preparatory reſolutions for a war in ſupport of *Ragoba*, were, by the receipt of a Letter from Colonel *Upton*, dated at *Poonah Dhur*, 24th February, converted into an immediate determination to revoke them; as he therein informed the Board that the Miniſters had at laſt agreed to the conditions mentioned in his Letter of the 2d of the ſame month, and that he hoped to have the articles ready in three or four days.

Theſe appear to have been ſettled upon the 1ſt March, and tranſmitted to *Bengal* on that day; and Colonel *Upton*, in a Letter dated 3d March (placed in the Appendix) acquainted the Board of ſeveral particulars in regard to the difficulties he had experienced in arranging the plan, the terms, and the language of the pacification, and of the further ſteps he ſhould take to accommodate all remaining points of doubt or difference, eſpecially the queſtion about the ceſſion made by *Futty Sing* in the Guzerat Country.

Appendix, No. 114. Sec. Conſ. 1 April 1776.

And your Committee diſcover by this Letter, that the Poonah Government declared a poſitive reſolution, that as the Company had not the ſmalleſt claim to the acquiſition of *Baſſein* it ſhould never be accompliſhed but by force; and that Colonel *Upton* further informed the Board, that the Miniſters would write to them to offer a Country of 3 lacks per annum in exchange for *Salſette* and the ſmall iſlands in the Bay; and that when he had objected to them "the impropriety of propoſing a Country of much leſs value," they declared in reply, "they truſted entirely to the honour of the Gentlemen "of *Calcutta*, who muſt be conſcious of their having no "right to theſe iſlands, and would therefore reſtore "them." He alſo ſtated the reaſons, why the articles propoſed in favour of the Nabob of *Arcot* could not be obtained, and why the Miniſters inſiſted on paying the houſehold troops ſtipulated for *Ragoba*.

See Letters upon the ſubject from Bombay Conſ. 1776. Appendix, No. 115.

Your Committee think it proper to obſerve, that the articles of the Treaty, as tranſmitted by Colonel *Upton*, are placed in the Appendix, and that immediately annexed to them will be found the obſervations made by the Bengal Council, when they took them into conſideration, and agreed upon the amended draft of a treaty, which they diſpatched to Colonel *Upton*, and inſtructed him to explain their reaſons for making a few alterations in the original articles of accommodation.

Appendix, No. 116.

The clauſe of reference to the Board, in regard to *Salſette* and the adjacent iſlands, appears to have been immediately ſettled by their determination not to ſurrender them in exchange for the proffered territory. The omiſſion of two articles and a part of another, ſeem to be the only alterations made by the Governor General and Council to the Treaty ſent by Colonel *Upton*. And your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe for the motives of theſe omiſſions, to the debate on that ſubject, ſubjoined in the Appendix.

No. 116.

Your Committee however think it proper here ſhortly to ſtate the advantageous acquiſitions which would be ſecured to the Company by the execution of this Treaty:

See Appendix 83

	R[illegible].
Salſette and the adjacent iſlands in the bay of *Bombay*, value - - - - - -	3,50,000
The Maratta right and title to the entire ſhare of the City and Purgunnah of *Broach*, ſo that the Engliſh Company ſhould poſſeſs it, without participation or claim of any kind - - - - - - - - -	3,50,000
A Country of three complete lacks of rupees, near or adjoining to *Broach* - -	3,00,000

The ceſſions made in the Guzerat Country by *Futty Sing*, were indeed to be reſtored, in caſe it ſhould be made appear that he had no right to grant them.

It may not be improper here to obſerve, that by the accounts received from *Bombay*, dated 19th February, it appears that the Preſident and Council, apprehenſive of the ruin of *Ragoba*, previous to the concluſion of a Treaty with the Miniſters, and becauſe ſuch event muſt have had an unfortunate influence on thoſe negociations, had reſolved to ſend him a remittance of 80,000 rupees, to quiet the clamour of his army for a few days, and for which they avowed the following inducement: "this "ſum we advance upon the ſecurity of a ſupply of about "24,000 pagodas, furniſhed him by the Nabob *Hyder* "*Ally*, and which is ſince arrived upon one of the Com-"pany's cruizers." And your Committee would add this further remark, that it appears from the correſpondence between the Preſidency of *Bombay* and Colonel *Upton*, that the latter had deſired to be informed if the ceſſions made by *Futty Sing* were antecedent to the receipt of the Governor General and Council's Letter, ordering the troops to diſcontinue hoſtilities, becauſe the Miniſters aſſured him, that *Futty Sing*, who ſtill correſponded with them, had complained of having been compelled to grant them, after the ceſſation of arms had taken place.

Bom. Sec. Conſ. 19 April 1776. Appendix, No. 119.

Appendix, No. 118. Colonel Upton's Letter dated 24 January 1776.

To this the Bombay Council replied on the 1ſt February, and acquainted him, that the ſeveral ceſſions

No. 118.

from *Futty Sing* (except batta) were made long before the receipt of the Governor General and Council's orders: the Treaty between him and *Ragoba* having been executed on the 18th July 1775, near *Brodera*, whereas the orders did not reach *Bombay* till the 12th Auguſt. And in another Letter to Colonel *Upton*, dated the 15th of February, the Preſident and Council further obſerve, that they were equally alarmed and ſurprized at the ſuppoſition, that the ceſſions in the Guzerat Country ſhould not be retained by the Company.

No. 118.

But your Committee further find, that the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, when a copy of the articles at laſt agreed upon between Colonel *Upton* and the Miniſters reached them, made ſeveral remarks of diſapprobation on the different particulars in them, as will appear from a view of the whole, which is put in the Appendix. Thoſe Gentlemen therein endeavour to depreciate the conceſſions made by the Maratta Government, as in one inſtance nugatory (they having no right in the ſhare of the City and Purgunnah of *Broach*) and in another, difficult in execution, eſpecially as the country near *Broach* was not to be jaghire land, which was the tenure of all the beſt lands near that place, and moſtly belonging to *Siccaram Baboo*. And upon ſerious conſideration of all circumſtances, they pronounced an opinion, that the Treaty was inadequate and highly injurious to the reputation, honour, and intereſts of the Company.

Appendix, No. 119. Remarks of the Preſident and Council of Bombay, dated 15 March 1776.

No. 119.

Vide Colonel Upton's Letter. No. 121.

Your Committee indeed obſerve, that Brigadier General *Gordon*, whoſe obſervations are placed in the ſame Appendix, differed almoſt entirely with the other Members of the Board in his eſtimation of the advantages acquired to the Company by the Treaty, conſidering it in whatever related to the Company's intereſts, honourable, advantageous, and expedient, and only expreſſing a wiſh, that the article in regard to the eſtabliſhment propoſed for *Ragonaut Row*, ſhould be altered, as much danger might ariſe to him from the entire dependance on the miniſterial Government to which he would thereby be reduced. In forming his judgment of the terms of the Treaty, General *Gordon* appears to have conſidered what ought reaſonably to have been expected, when the unjuſtifiable circumſtances of the riſe and progreſs of the war, the ill management of it under the Commander of the troops employed, the want of reſources for carrying it on, the ſtate of the contending parties, Colonel *Upton's* inſtructions, and the ſentiments of the Company, were attended to.

His Letter, dated 15 March. No. 119.

And we perceive, that Colonel *Upton* himſelf reaſoned in like manner before the concluſion of the Treaty, when in anſwer to the complaint of the Government of *Bombay*, for his intention of not inſiſting on the ſurrender of *Baſſein*, he wrote as follows; "You will perceive by "my inſtructions, that I am directed to act as appears "to me beſt (particularly regarding this very iſland of "*Baſſein*) for the honour and benefit of the Company, "and this I am determined to do. We have little juſt "claim to any thing. If the peace ſhould take place, "it will be both honourable and beneficial. You know "as well as myſelf the ſenſe of the Governor General "and Council regarding this war, you will therefore "eaſily conclude what it muſt be, reſpecting the Treaty "they wiſh to have concluded with the Marattas."

Sec. Conſ. 6 March 1776. Extract of Letter, dated 20 February. Appendix, No. 120.

And your Committee find, that in another Letter to that Preſidency, dated 2d March, encloſing an extract of the Articles of Treaty, he again defended his conduct in regard to the terms of it; and added, "I am quite clear "alſo, that I have acted conſiſtently with the *private* "*verbal* inſtructions I received before I left *Calcutta*, "and I never had or ſeen cauſe to deviate from them."

Appendix, No. 121. N. B. See Letter from Col. Upton to Bengal, dated 10 April, in Conſ. 25 May 1776. See Appendix, 125.

In this Letter he alſo informed them, that as ſoon as advice ſhould arrive at *Poona*, of the Engliſh army having marched into their own garriſons, the Miniſters would order the communications to be opened.

Letter dated 15 Mar. 1776. Appendix, No. 122.

But your Committee obſerve, that the Preſident and Council ſoon after informed Colonel *Upton*, that *Ragoba* would not accept the terms ſtipulated for him, as he was of opinion his perſon would be endangered by putting himſelf ſo much in the power of his enemies, and, "that "they ſhould therefore offer him an aſylum in one of the "Company's ſettlements, agreeable to his requeſt, and "the latitude given them by the Governor General and "Council in their Letter, dated 20th October 1775."

It appears that Colonel *Upton*, in his anſwer dated the 19th and 21ſt of March, expreſſed his apprehenſion of ill conſequences from the reſolutions taken by them and by *Ragoba*, which he foreſaw would raiſe the diſpleaſure and reſentment of the Superior Council, and of the Poona Government. And he declared, that though he would ſtill exert his endeavours to procure terms more agreeable to *Ragoba*, he ſhould at the ſame time rely on their uſing the influence of their advice to perſuade him into an acquieſcence in thoſe already ſettled.

Appendix, No. 121

And your Committee find, that intelligence of theſe matters was conveyed to the Governor General and Council by Letters from Colonel *Upton*, and from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, both dated 30th March; in which the latter much inſiſted on Colonel *Upton's* having departed from his inſtructions, and remarked upon his pretence of obeying *private verbal inſtructions*. They obſerved, that *Ragoba* ſhould have had the option of reſiding at one of the Company's ſettlements; that the Miniſters would not have objected to it, had their intentions been good; and that he would have proved a moſt uſeful inſtrument for alarming their fears, and the beſt ſecurity for their obſerving the peace; that he had now determined to appeal to the juſtice of the Honourable Company, and await their determination at *Bombay* to which place he was about to proceed. That they lamented the dereliction of the many advantages ſecured by the Treaty of *Surat*, and foreſaw the loſs of the Guicawar diſtricts, as it would now be ſo much for the intereſt of that family to allow that they had no right to grant them. They complained of preſent inconveniency and loſs to the Company, by the delay ariſing from a reference in regard to *Salſette* and the leſſer iſlands; but in the end informed the Supreme Board, that their troops were to march into garriſon on the 26th of that month, though the communication with the Maratta countries ſtill remained ſhut.

Your Committee obſerve, that the Governor General on this occaſion propoſed, that a queſtion ſhould be put to Colonel *Upton*, relative to the *private verbal inſtructions* mentioned above; but as the majority of the Board thought it would anſwer no good purpoſe, he withdrew his motion.

Appendix, No. 124.

Whereupon General *Clavering* appears to have called the attention of the Board to a conſideration of the conduct of the Government of *Bombay*, in affording an aſylum to *Ragoba* and his attendants, under pretence of being authorized by the Governor General and Council's Letter of the 18th of October 1775. And we obſerve that a debate then aroſe on the following queſtions:

"Whether the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* were "authorized to grant the protection of their Govern- "ment to *Ragoba*, under the ſituation of affairs at the "time in which that application was made to them?

"Secondly, Whether the Board ſhould approve of "the protection granted to *Ragoba*, or ſhould direct the "Preſident and Council of *Bombay* to withdraw it?

"And laſtly, Should *Ragoba* be ſuffered to remain at "*Bombay*, whether the Council ſhould be authorized to "grant him a penſion for his maintenance at the Com- "pany's expence?"

The opinion of the different Members of the Board will be ſeen by their Minutes, which are put in the Appendix. And your Committee therefore think it proper only to obſerve in this place, that they diſcover in them great contrariety of argument and deciſion, but that the majority on a further conſideration of the queſtions, at the next Council held on the 9th of May, agreed to the draft of a Letter to the Preſident and

No. 124.

Ben. Sec. Conſ. May 17 & 9. No 124.

and Council of *Bombay*, which was then laid before the Board by the Secretary, and ordered to be diſpatched. It contained aſſurances of their concern at *Ragoba*'s intentions to ſeek an aſylum at *Bombay*, and of their diſpleaſure at the permiſſion given to him by that Preſidency; explaining the ſenſe of their Letter of the 20th October, to have allowed no ſuch authority beyond the period of the ceſſation of arms, whilſt the negociation was carrying on; and that a proviſion having been made for that Prince by the 11th Article of the Treaty, the pretended exigency did not exiſt; that they were very apprehenſive of danger from the uſe deſigned to be made of him, as an inſtrument of alarm to the Miniſters, and ſhould hold them to be anſwerable to the Court of Directors and to the Britiſh Nation, if the Government of *Poonah* ſhould in conſequence refuſe to ratify the Treaty, and ſhould renew the war.

Ben. Sec. Conf. May 15th 1776. Appendix, No. 125.

And your Committee find, that Colonel *Upton* increaſed theſe apprehenſions by accounts which he ſent from *Poorunder* on 10th April, of the manner in which the Peſhwa and his Miniſters received the news of *Ragoba*'s being permitted to ſeek a reſidence in one of the Company's ſettlements, and wherein he added the following obſervation: "Your full directions to the Preſidency of *Bombay* are neceſſary; otherwiſe I fear the "articles of the peace will with great difficulty be carried into execution. The Miniſters ſay they cannot "withdraw their army, and that ſubſiſting this army "(including the Nizam's forces) amounts to thirty lacks "of rupees per month, and that we occaſion this heavy "expence to them by protecting, or rather taking part "in the diſputes between them and *Ragonaut Row*."

See the Letters from the Peſhwa to the Governor General and Council, and the reference to Articles of forfeiture Treaties. No. 125.

And it alſo appears to your Committee, that Colonel *Upton* ſuggeſted further grounds of uneaſineſs, from the ſtile which Colonel *Keating* had uſed in proclaiming the peace "between the Honourable Company and the "Poonah Miniſters, at the head of the forces under his "command," and alſo from the promiſe of protection given likewiſe by Colonel *Keating* to *Ragoba*, and the deſign of ſending his elephants, horſes, &c. into the neighbourhood of *Broach*, under eſcort of a detachment from that garriſon.

See Colonel Upton's Letter to Bombay, dated 8th of April 1776. Appendix, No. 126.

That he likewiſe expreſſed much alarm at the probable conſequences of ſuch proceedings, and gave the following reaſon in confirmation of his fears.

"I underſtand that the Miniſters have not ſent a "Vackeel to *Bombay* as they promiſed, to have explained any difficulties that might have ariſen, and "they now refuſe to ſend one."

Appendix, No. 127. Ben. Sec. Conf. 16 May 1776.

And your Committee find, that in conſequence of theſe ſuggeſtions, General *Clavering* deſired to warn the Board of the urgent neceſſity which now manifeſtly appeared, of ſending more poſitive orders to thoſe who had in ſo many inſtances ſhewn ſuch contempt of all authority; and therefore, to prohibit "expreſsly the "Preſidency of *Bombay* to receive *Ragoba* in any of the "Company's poſſeſſions; and in caſe he ſhould be there "before a Letter could reach it, that they ſhould be "commanded to ſend him away."

And further, "that it would be adviſable, in order to "obviate all doubts and uncertainties concerning the "authenticity of the Treaty, that the Preſidency of "*Bombay* ſhould be directed to proclaim it expreſsly in "the name of the Maratta State;" and that the Miniſters at *Poonah* ſhould be informed of the orders given to that purpoſe.

No. 127.

The Minutes delivered on this Conſultation will be found in the Appendix. And from them it will appear how far the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* objected to the propoſition as contrary to good policy, and not required by the terms of the Treaty, though they diſclaimed all ideas of ſupporting or encouraging any hoſtile attempts in favour of *Ragoba*; the Governor General remarking at the ſame time, that from the extraordinary declaration made by *Siccaram Baboo*, in his Letter received the 1ſt April, he was led to doubt of the validity of the Treaty on the part of the Maratta State; "and that he ſhould never think it "binding on the Company, while a latitude was avowedly claimed by the oppoſite party, to declare it null, "whenever the caprice or intereſt of the parties ſhould "invite them to break it."

Sec. Pol. Cons. Nov. 1776. Sec. Appeals, No 115.

It appears, however, that the majority of the Board agreed nearly in ſentiments with the General, except that Mr. *Francis* did not approve of the removal of *Ragoba* by force from *Bombay*, ſhould he be there, adviſing rather, as in all probability an equally effectual means of getting rid of him, to withhold all ſupport and encouragement from him; and it was accordingly reſolved to ſend directions to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, and to Colonel *Upton*, agreeable to this opinion.

It has appeared to your Committee, that the event of a pacification with the Maratta Miniſters having been notified to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, the Governor and Council held it to be unneceſſary to ſend to *Bombay* the reinforcement they intended, in conſequence of the recommendation from the Calcutta Board, of two battalions of Sepoys, and therefore countermanded the orders for their march to *Anjengo*. And we have further ſeen, that the Bombay Council, by Letter dated 24th March, apprized the Government of *Madras*, that they ſhould, as opportunity might offer, ſend round the detachment of Europeans and *Kelly*'s battalion of Sepoys, belonging to the latter Preſidency.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 24 May 1776. Appendix, No 128.

No. 128.

But this intention appears, by a ſubſequent Letter from the Preſidency of *Bombay* to that of *Fort Saint George*, dated 15th April 1776, to have been laid aſide; and the reaſon aſſigned for it was the expediency of being provided againſt all events in ſo uncertain a ſituation of affairs; as the Miniſters, not having ſhewn much inclination to perform their own part of the late Treaty, had pretended nevertheleſs to term the protection granted to *Ragoba* by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, an infringement of it on theirs.

No. 128.

And your Committee obſerve, that the Government of *Bombay*, in their Letters dated the 10th, 22d, and 24th of April, to the Supreme Council, expreſſed their ſentiments in ſimilar terms of diſguſt at the impolicy and defects of the Treaty, and of complaints againſt the Poonah Government for repeated breaches of it, particularly in attacks made by their ſhips upon thoſe of the Company; defending at the ſame time their own behaviour in the protection afforded to *Ragoba*, and hoping, that were the Miniſters to break with them on that account, they ſhould be fully juſtified in making reſiſtance.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 2 May 1776. Appendix, No. 129.

As a further proof of the defects of the Treaty, they acquainted the Board, that *Futty Sing* had demanded reſtitution of the ceſſions made to the Company by his Treaty with *Ragoba*, as the conditions of it were not fulfilled; and he poſitively denied all right of the Poonah Government to alienate the Guicawar territories.

No 129.

Your Committee alſo obſerve, that the Bombay Preſidency having received the Letter beforementioned of the 7th March, from the Governor General and Council, took occaſion in acknowledging it to ſubmit to them, whether for many reaſons, and eſpecially on account of the probable conſequences of their own proceedings, in having made offers to *Ragoba*, and applied for the aſſiſtance or neutrality of the Country Powers, it might not yet be more eligible and conſiſtent with the honour and advantage of the Company, not to ratify the Treaty formed by Colonel *Upton*, but to permit them to enter into new engagements upon the plan laid down in that Letter (of 7th March) with *Ragoba*, who was then at *Surat* in great diſtreſs, and not able to diſband his army for want of money to pay their arrears.

But we perceive, that notwithſtanding this ſituation, they repreſented ſome favourable circumſtances which had happened, and by the interference of the Company, might be rendered of effectual advantage to him; that

commotions were likely to arise in the Maratta State by the escape of *Sudabah* out of prison, where he had been long confined by the Poonah Government, and from his claiming the office of Regent, either for himself singly, or jointly with *Ragoba*, during the minority of the young Peshwa, in opposition to the Ministers; *Sudabah* being the son of *Chimnajee Oppah*, the brother of *Badajee Row*, who was *Ragoba*'s father, was consequently next to *Ragoba* entitled to the Peshwaship or the Regency of the Maratta Empire.

See Letter from Ragoba, dated Surat, 7th April 1776. No. 129.

That *Ragoba* had likewise informed them of his having received promises of assistance from the Nizam, upon condition that the Company would not assist the ministerial party, and they desired instructions for their conduct in these particulars.

Appendix, No. 130.

And your Committee find, from the Consultations of the Supreme Board on this occasion, that a reply to these Letters from *Bombay* was agreed upon by the majority after much difference of opinion, which will appear to the House from the Minutes subjoined in the Appendix, No. 130. And it appears to contain express instructions to that Presidency, that they should conform strictly to the terms of the Treaty, and avoid any step whatsoever which might give occasion of distrust or jealousy to the Maratta Government; that it therefore became necessary for them peremptorily to require the immediate departure of *Ragoba* and his army out of the Company's possessions, and to decline giving the assurances of neutrality which *Ragoba* had demanded of them for the satisfaction of the Nizam.

With regard to the possessions claimed by *Futty Sing*, they gave the following directions: "As these possessions "are all stipulated, either to be restored to the Maratta "State, or ceded to the Company, we desire you will "reject the pretensions of *Futty Sing* to the restoration of "a moiety in the revenues of the town and Pergunnah "of *Broach*, and his demand for the Pergunnahs of "*Chickley*, *Veriow*, *Batta*, and the three villages of "*Chureaey*, as inadmissible."

See Message from the Nabob Fazel Beg Cawn, on the part of the Nizam, dated 29 April 1776; and see Letter from Col. Upton, dated 6 May, on Ben. Sec. Cons. 6 June 1776.

Appendix, No. 131.

And it appears to your Committee, that overtures were also made secretly to Colonel *Upton* from the Nizam through *Fazel Beg Cawn*, for a plan to restore *Ragoba* to the Maratta Government, by their joint assistance, upon terms of mutual advantage to them; among which we find the following specific engagement:

"After *Ragoba* is settled in *Poonah*, the Nabob Nizam "does promise to make him grant to the English Com- "pany, Sunnuds for the Cuttack Country, and relin- "quish all claims of the Chout." And Colonel *Upton* was requested to write to the Supreme Council, and get a Treaty under their signatures and seals for that purpose. It further appears, that Colonel *Upton* in his answer expressed some degree of resentment at such an application at so late a period, and considered the alliance proposed as, in the present circumstances, dishonourable to the English; and that although he would keep the secret, as he was desired, communicating it only to the Supreme Council, he would not have the Nabob flatter himself with their doing any thing to the prejudice of the Treaty lately entered into with the Ministers. This indeed appears to have been confirmed by the Governor General and Council, who in their Letter to Colonel *Upton*, dated 20th June following, declared their approbation of the answer which he had returned to *Fazel Beg Cawn*'s message, adding however a wish that he had declined giving any countenance to it whatever, even in promising to transmit it to them, and directing him for the future to avoid all correspondence with any foreign Power, for fear of exciting the jealousy of the Maratta Government.

Nov 1771. Col. Upton's Letter, dated 6 May 1776.

Ben. Sec. Conf. June 20, 1776. Appendix, No. 132.

It would be tedious and useless to call the attention of the House to every minute circumstance of mutual complaint between the Ministers of *Poonah* and the Presidency of *Bombay*, in regard to pretended infringements of the Treaty; and your Committee will therefore only observe, that the language of the former seems to have in some instances approached to menace. "They were "afraid (they said) that they should be at last under the "necessity of following the example of *Hyder Ally*, who "secured his peace with the English in a manner very "honourable to himself; and that it was their resolu- "tion, if war again commenced, to carry fire and sword "through all the Company's possessions, be the con- "sequence ever so fatal to themselves;"—That they should allow only a fortnight for the disbanding of *Ragoba*'s forces, and had directed their General *Hurry Punt Furkia* to attack and disperse them, in case they should still remain embodied at the end of that period.

Appendix, No. 133. See part of a Consultation between Col. Upton and Madha Row, on the part of the Ministers, 22 April 1776.

See Letter from Col. Upton, to Bombay, dated 4th May 1776. No. 133.

But your Committee find, that the execution of these threatenings, if ever really intended, was prevented by the defection of the greatest part of *Ragoba*'s troops, which joined the Maratta General; and Colonel *Upton*, in a Letter dated 27th May, informed the Governor General and Council, that the Ministers had consented to the omissions required by them in the Treaty, and had signed it, desiring only that a few alterations might be made, which however he had not agreed to, but had engaged to represent them to the Supreme Council, and at the same time to request, that a confidential Vackeel from *Poonah* might be permitted to go and reside at *Fort William*. It appears by the answer of the Governor General and Council, dated 3d July, that they were determined not to admit of any alterations in the Treaty, but gave a ready assent to the proposed residence of a Maratta Vackeel; and by their Letter of the same date to the President and Council of *Bombay*, they directed them to receive the stipulated payment of the twelve lacks of rupees, at the periods when it should become due from the Poonah Government, in whatever money it should be offered to them.

Appendix, No. 134.

No. 134.

No. 134.

Your Committee observe, that the executed Treaty was transmitted by Colonel *Upton* to the Supreme Council, with a Letter dated 3d June, wherein he acquainted them, that the ministerial forces were put in possession of all the ceded Purgunnahs except *Jambosier*, which was to remain as a pledge until the Country of three lacks near *Broach* was given up to the Company's Agents.

Ben. Sec. Cons. 24 July 1776. Appendix, No. 135.

And it appears by Letters from *Bombay*, that *Ragoba*, after the disbanding of his army, had retired to *Surat* with only 200 of his attendants, and that the President and Council had desired Colonel *Upton* "to use his en- "deavours to induce the Ministers to assign him a "suitable establishment, to relieve the Company from "the heavy expences they would otherwise incur by his "maintenance." They further apprized the Supreme Board, that the communication between the Company's settlements and the Maratta dominions being now opened, they had returned the Bengal detachment, and should be obliged for want of money to send back the Madras battalion.

Dated 10th June, and 30th June 1776. Ben. Sec. Cons. 22d July, and 5th August 1776. Appendix, No. 136.

The Board appear to have ordered the Treaty to be placed among their Records, and directed Colonel *Upton* to return immediately to *Bengal*. Your Committee indeed observe, that they had already on 1st of July sent instructions to him to quit *Poonah*; that having then received a General Letter from the Court of Directors in their Secret Department, dated the 15th December 1775, and found it to contain a declaration of their intentions to keep all territories and possessions ceded to the Company by the Treaty concluded with *Ragoba*, they resolved, that as they had considered that Treaty to be invalid, and had since concluded another with the Ministers of the Maratta State, by which many of those possessions were given up, they could not carry into execution the orders of the Court; and that esteeming Colonel *Upton*'s presence at *Poonah* to be no longer necessary, but that his services might be more effectually employed at *Bombay*, for the full accomplishment of what remained to be settled in the execution of the Treaty, they directed him to repair thither, and to exert his endeavours to effect the con-

Appendix, No. 137. 24 July 1776, Ben. Sec. Cons. 3d July 1776.

No. 137.

clusion

cluſion of the different articles required by it. And your Committee further obſerve, that they at the ſame time encloſed a copy of the Company's orders, and of their reſolutions upon them, to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, repeating their injunctions to them to execute on their part every article of the Treaty of *Poorunder*. It may be proper to remark, that Mr. *Barwell* on this occaſion declared, that "he did not mean, by ſubſcribing "to the reſolution of the Board, to allow that their "Government was not at liberty to adopt hoſtile reſo-"lutions, and to ſeize the firſt opportunity that offered "to execute the Company's intentions."

Ben. Sec. Conf. 8th July 1776, and 15th July 1776. Appendix, No. 138.

It will be proper further to obſerve, that Mr *Tayler*, a few days after the diſpatch of the Letters abovementioned, ſent in to the Board a paper, containing a complaint and proteſt againſt their deciſion upon this ſubject; in anſwer to which, they having deſired to be informed by what authority he thought himſelf juſtified to make a repreſentation in ſuch a ſtile, he appears to have replied in ſtrong terms of ſelf-juſtification under the powers deputed to him by the Preſidency of *Bombay*. Theſe papers, with the Minutes of the Board, containing their ſeveral opinions and reaſonings, are, for the fuller information of the Houſe, placed together in the Appendix.

No. 138.

But your Committee find, that the orders of the Company relative to the territories acquired under the Treaty with *Ragoba*, occaſioned reſolutions very different from thoſe of the Supreme Council, to be taken by the Government of *Bombay*; who ſignified by their Letters to *Bengal* and to Colonel *Upton*, their determination to retain ſuch of the poſſeſſions ceded by the treaty of *Surat*, as had not yet been yielded up in conſequence of that of *Poorunder*; and we perceive, that Colonel *Upton* having received this information at the ſame time that the directions of the Supreme Council for quitting *Poonah* and retiring to *Bombay* reached him, found himſelf under great perplexity, and repreſented the ill conſequences which would certainly enſue from his obeying ſuch directions in the actual circumſtance of affairs, eſpecially as *Ragonaut Row* had ſuddenly departed from *Surat*, and was ſaid to be on his march to join *Sudabah*, whoſe increaſing force and deſign of attacking *Poonah* had induced the Miniſters to augment the ſtrength of their army; and he ſuggeſted, that if *Sudabah* ſhould ſucceed, in the governing power of that country, his confirmation of the late Treaty would be neceſſary, as the Peſhwa was a minor. And the Governor General and Council appear to have immediately written to the Preſidency of *Bombay* in terms of great diſpleaſure at their intended proceedings, reminding them of their own repreſentations of the low ſtate of their treaſury, and the reduced eſtabliſhment of their army, which ought to make them cautious "of expoſing "the Company's poſſeſſions under their Government, "to the immediate hazard of a war, admitting that no "other motive oppoſed their engaging in it." And in a Letter of the ſame date to Colonel *Upton*, they directed him to act in regard to his ſtay at *Poonah* according to his own diſcretion, but declared their alarm at his idea, that it might be neceſſary for *Sudabah* to ſign the Treaty, "as they on their parts had always conſidered it, to be "formed with, and binding on the Maratta State, with-"out regarding in whoſe hands the actual power of the "Government might then or hereafter be lodged."

Appendix, No. 139. Letters from Colonel Upton, dated 19th July, 26 and 28 Aug. 1776.

Letters from Bombay to Bengal, dated 7 and 20 Auguſt 1776.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 30th September 1776. Letter to Bombay. Appendix, No. 140.

See Appendix 141.

See alſo Letter from Ragonaut Row.

No. 140.

But your Committee obſerve, that the Select Committee of *Bombay* had altered their reſolutions before the receipt of the Letter from the Supreme Board, and that Colonel *Upton* nevertheleſs ſtill thought it imprudent for him to depart from *Poonah* till the Treaty ſhould be accompliſhed, or till a Reſident ſhould be ſent from *Bombay*. But it appears that the Governor General and Council hereupon repeated their opinion, that his longer continuance at the Maratta Court was unneceſſary, and required him immediately to demand his diſmiſſion in terms of the greateſt delicacy. And they at the ſame time expreſſed, in a Letter to *Bombay*, their ſatisfaction in the change which the Preſident and Council had made in their reſolutions, and recommended it to them to appoint an Agent to reſide at *Poonah*, and to adviſe them of the perſon whom they might nominate to that ſtation.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 14th Oct. Letter from Col. Upton, dated 9th Sept. and Letter from Bombay to Col. Upton, dated 4th Sept. 1776. Letter from Bombay to Bengal, dated 14th Sept. incloſing the Minutes of their Select Conf. on the Conſtruction of the Company's Orders. Appendix, No. 141. 24 October 1776.

Appendix, No. 142.

And your Committee find, that Colonel *Upton*, in his Letter dated the 26th of October, informed the Governor General and Council of ſeveral circumſtances which had happened in advancing the Treaty to its entire accompliſhment, which he hoped was then nearly effected: that the Peſhwa had conſented to make over the Pergunnahs of *Hanſood*, *Occlaſeer*, and *Delberah*, for the Country of three lacks, and mortgaged the collections of *Jamboſir* till the ſtipulated ſum of twelve lacks ſhould be paid. But neither Vackeel or Letter had arrived from *Futty Sing*, and he imagined that he kept back until he ſaw which party would get the better. He (Colonel *Upton*) had however again aſſured the Miniſters, that the proofs reſpecting the Peſhwa's having the ſole right to the Guzerat Country muſt be found ſatisfactory before the ceſſions made by *Futty Sing* would be reſtored.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 9 December 1776. Appendix, No. 143.

See Letter from Bengal to Bombay, dated 9 December 1776. No. 143.

And it appears by another Letter from Colonel *Upton*, dated 13th November, that the Peſhwa intended in a few days to ſend a large army againſt *Hyder Ally*, as all the apprehenſions of the Poonah Government on account of the diſturbances raiſed by *Sudabah* were at an end, he having been entirely defeated and taken priſoner. That many complaints however were made againſt the Preſidency of *Bombay*, between whom and that State Colonel *Upton* obſerved, there was every appearance of a recommencement of hoſtilities, for the encouragement and protection they had openly given to *Sudabah* and to *Ragonaut Row*, who had been for ſome time paſt near the Portugueſe ſettlement of *Damaun*, endeavouring to procure for himſelf the aſſiſtance of that Nation, "but had lately "written to the Miniſters, and propoſed accepting a "Jaghire, which they being diſpoſed to grant, expected "ſoon to ſee him ſettled."

Appendix, No. 144. Ben. Sec. Conf. 2d December 1776.

See Letter from the Peſhwa Madhoo Row to Colonel Upton, received 8 November; and alſo Mr. Hornby's Letters from Surat. No. 144.

But your Committee obſerve, that accounts were ſome days after received from Colonel *Upton*, dated 24 November, by which it appears that *Ragonaut Row* had been received at *Bombay* a ſhort time before, which had occaſioned very great ſurprize and concern to the Peſhwa and his Miniſters; and the Governor General and Council expreſſed the ſame ſentiments on their part alſo in Letters which they immediately diſpatched to that Preſidency, urging with the greateſt earneſtneſs a demand for an explanation of their proceedings, and repeating injunctions to them to inſiſt upon the inſtant departure of *Ragoba* from *Bombay* and all its dependencies. It is however to be remarked, that in a Letter which they wrote at the ſame time to Colonel *Upton*, they took notice of circumſtances which they thought betrayed too ready a diſpoſition to enmity in the Miniſters, and ſeemed to ſuſpect, that he was himſelf detained by compulſion at *Poonah*, for which reaſon they again enjoined him to take his leave immediately of the Maratta Court, acquainting him alſo that they had written to the Peſhwa on that ſubject. And it may be proper further to obſerve, that the Supreme Board having in their Letter to the Court of Directors mentioned their apprehenſions on this head, General *Clavering* deſired at the ſame time to tranſmit his Minute, in which he proteſts againſt ſuch concluſions as unwarrantable.

Ben. Sec. Conf. 30th December 1776. Appendix, No. 145. See Bombay Advices, 14 April 1777, on Ben. Sec. Conf. 17 July.

Appendix, No. 146.

See Letter to the Peſhwa Miniſters.

Ben Sec Conf. 13 January 1777.

And it indeed appears by other Letters afterwards received from Colonel *Upton*, that theſe ſuſpicions of the majority of the Supreme Council were not well founded, and that he had been only prevailed upon to continue at *Poona* till Mr. *Moſtyn*, who was at laſt appointed by the Preſidency of *Bombay* to go thither as their Reſident, ſhould arrive; which however did not happen, as Mr. *Moſtyn*, who was at his firſt nomination particularly objected to by the Miniſters, did not arrive at *Poona* before the beginning of April, and Colonel *Upton* left it on the 7th of March preceding, having before his departure communicated to the Governor General

Ben Sec Conf 27 January, 5th and 26 February, 17 April, 1777. Appendix, No. 147. Letter from Colonel Upton, dated 5th December with Enclosures; 22 January with ditto; 26 March with ditto.

Letter from Mr. Moſtyn, 4th April 1777.

neral and Council several circumstances which had occasioned fresh disgust in the Poonah Government to that of *Bombay*, particularly by a Letter to the Peshwa from the President, and because that no satisfactory explanations of their conduct in regard to *Sudabah* and *Ragonaut Row*, had been sent to the Ministers. But your Committee have perceived that the President and Council of *Bombay*, in their Letter dated 1st February 1777, to the Supreme Council, thus expressed their future intentions: "We "shall likewise direct Mr. *Mostyn* to do all in his power "to promote the most friendly correspondence with the "Poonah Government, and we hope a suitable and per- "manent accommodation will be effected between that "State and *Ragonaut Row*, who still resides at *Bombay*, "whereby all future jealousies will be removed, and the "Honourable Company relieved from the expence "incurred by his residence."

Such is the most material information relative to the first quarrel with the Maratta State, which your Committee have been able to collect and lay before the House; and upon which they may regulate their judgment of the conduct and disposition of the Company's servants in some of their chief settlements in *India*. Such was the apparent state of composition to which those disputes between the Presidency of *Bombay* and the Poona Government were brought, at the time of Colonel *Upton*'s departure from the Maratta Court, in the beginning of the year 1777.

It may not be improper to turn our attention for a moment to consider the political situation of affairs in other quarters at this period; so far as they appear to have had any connection with, or may be supposed to have been influenced by the transactions we have related.

The Presidency of *Fort Saint George*, to which of course we direct our first regard on this occasion, was then betraying apprehensions of hostile designs from *Hyder Ally* in conjunction with the French, which were only allayed by the report of his preparations being against the Marattas. But the following Extract of a Letter from that Presidency, dated the 4th of December 1776, to the Supreme Council, will best explain their circumstances and situation.

"We have the honour to enclose you intelligence "received in a Letter from the Nabob, which, after "giving an account of the situation of affairs at *Poonah*, "represents *Hyder Ally Cawn* to be raising troops and "preparing for war; and that the Polygars and Zemin- "dars were ordered to attend at the passes towards the "*Payen Ghaut*; this is in a great degree weakened by "advices we have received through another channel, "copy of which we enclose you, which represents *Hyder*'s "preparations to be in consequence of the apprehensions "of the Marattas."

"We understand that the French have received at the "Islands troops and stores from *France*, and that barracks "are building in *Pondicherry*. They most probably look "forward to dispute with us the government of this "Country; and considering their views with those of "*Hyder Ally*, who has reduced many petty Princes "around him, we ought to prepare ourselves against the "designs of either. Were we able when necessity "should require to take the field with a well-regulated "and well-paid army, with good conduct, we might hope "one vigorous campaign would restore peace to the "Country; we are sensible of the necessity of peace, and "every endeavour shall be used towards a continuance "of it."—The rest of this Letter, and some of the Enclosures which it contains, are put in the Appendix, and may appear worthy of inspection.

Appendix, No 148.

See Letter from Seringapatam dated 20 Sept. 1775, on Ben. Sec. Conf. 12 February 1776.

Appendix, No. 149.

Your Committee have indeed found that *Hyder Ally* in the beginning of these quarrels had discovered a distrust and resentment against the English, advising *Ragoba* to be aware of them as a deceitful people. It should however be added, that he was suspected at the time of tampering with the ministerial party and the Nizam, to the disadvantage of *Ragonaut Row* and his allies. We have seen that he had nevertheless afterwards assisted that Prince with money, and that the Peshwa had lately threatened to send a great force against him. It appears in reality, that about this time a very large body of Maratta horse penetrated into the Mysorean country, committing great ravages; and that *Hyder* detached the chief part of his army, under his son *Tippoo Saib*, to oppose them.

Country Correspondence 1777, Letter to Gov. Stratton, 12 Jun. N° 149.

We have observed, that the Nabob of *Arcot* had been invited, by the ministerial powers at *Poona* to assist with his mediation in procuring a peace for them with the Company; but that afterwards, upon the deputation of Colonel *Upton*, they had refused to accede to the articles proposed in his favour, assigning, as a chief ground of their refusal, that the Rajah of *Tanjore*, a relation of the Ram Rajah, had been dispossessed of his Country, and that they would not treat upon any terms of concession with the Nabob, till after the restoration of the Maratta Prince. This event had now taken place; and though the inclinations of the Nabob had not been much consulted therein, he had however been obliged to acquiesce in it, and was so far become a less object of resentment to the Poona Administration. It is evident indeed, that his inveterate enmity to *Hyder Ally* made him almost of course a well-wisher to the Marattas, who had been before their troubles *Hyder*'s most formidable opponents. How far *Mahommed Ally* was at this time to be dreaded by other Powers as an enemy, and of what importance he appeared to the Company as their ally, will be found in the Letter above referred to, and has been seen by the First Report.

See Appendix, No. 80.

See Appendix, No. 115.

Appendix, No. 150.

Appendix, No. 148.

The Subah of the *Decan* had been manifestly employed in watching the turns of fortune of the several combatants, and endeavouring to convert every change to his own advantage. In this view, though he had latterly sent a large body of troops to join the ministerial army, he was well known not to wish them to be engaged in action, especially against the British forces; and he has appeared, at the very time, to have been forward in proposing a plan of hostile union against the same Power, with whom he was seemingly connected in close alliance. But a representation made by himself of his own conduct and designs, with some remarks on those of other Powers, having been given by him to Colonel *Upton*, who passed through *Hyderabad* in the beginning of April on his return to *Bengal*, we shall desire to refer the House to it, as the latest information of his political views, and particularly of his real or pretended attachment, both to the English and Marattas.

See Appendix, No. 79. No. 102. No. 129. No. 130. No. 131.

Appendix, No. 151. Letter from the Nizam, dated 23 April 1777.

Moodajee Boosila, the Rajah of *Berar*, was imagined to have been well disposed to the cause of *Ragonaut Row*. But in a Letter received from him on the 28th March 1777, by the Governor General, he mentions his having determined to send *Ragojee* his son, with 5,000 men, to pay a visit to the Peshwa, as a measure which their long friendship had rendered absolutely necessary. He however had sent a Vackeel to reside at *Calcutta*, and seemed with much sincerity to desire a connection of friendship with the Company; and though he had lately declined compliance with a request made to him by them, he softened his refusal by the warmest assurance of his attention to remedy the complaints which had induced them to make it. If, however, the insinuations of the Nizam were to be credited, he was not entirely sincere in these professions of friendship, but had at the same time formed a design to urge his demand of Chout from the province of *Bengal*, at the head of an army.

See Appendix, No 75.

Appendix, N° 152.

N° 152.

See Ben. Sel. Conf. 17 October 1776. N° 52. Country Correspondence 1777, and the Paper from the Nizam, above mentioned.

Tookajee Holkar and *Madajee Scindia*, upon whose declarations in his favour *Ragoba* had so often repeated his reliance, were now openly engaged in measures very contrary to his interests; and they appear also to have been very troublesome and alarming neighbours to the Company's ally, the Nabob Vizier.

Ben. Country Corr. 1777, received 28 March.

Appendix, N° 153.

In regard to the dominions and ſituation of the Vizier, many very material alterations had taken place in this interval, ſince your Committee cloſed their laſt remarks upon them, at the concluſion of the Rohilla war. *Souja Dowla*, who, ſoon after that event, began to feel a decay of health, did not long ſurvive it, but died in the beginning of the year 1775. Previous to his death, Mr. *Middleton* left his Durbar in obedience to the commands of the Governor General and Council, and returned to the Preſidency, bringing with him fifteen lacks of rupees, which he has before been mentioned to have received, in part of the Rohilla agreement. It appears alſo, that five lacks had been received on the Company's account at *Benares*, being an aſſignment by the Vizier on the Rajah *Cheit Sing*; and the Commander of the Company's brigade ſtationed in *Oude* had alſo received three lacks, in further acquittal of his engagement, on account of the aſſiſtance given him in that war.

Appendix, N° 154. Letter from Governor General and Council, February 24th 1775.

Your Committee do not find, that before his death *Souja Dowla* had diſcharged any more of his debt due on that account. He appears to have nominated his only legitimate ſon, *Miza Ammany*, otherwiſe called *Aſoph ul Dowla*, as his ſucceſſor in the Soubadarry of *Oude*; and the Bengal Government determined to ſupport his pretenſions, though by all accounts he poſſeſſed neither the qualities of the heart or head equal to ſuch a ſtation, his right however not ſeeming to have been diſputed.

In theſe reſolutions of advancing the ſucceſſion of *Aſoph ul Dowla*, your Committee find, that the Supreme Council paid no regard to the bonds of treaty by which they were connected with his father. They conſidered thoſe as mere perſonal obligations, and avowedly directed the line of their conduct towards the ſon, by a view of drawing from it the greateſt poſſible benefit to the Company's affairs; having determined, that the ſpecific conditions of their former alliances with the Vizier expired with him. Under the controul of theſe intentions, Mr. *Briſtow*, who was appointed to ſucceed Mr. *Middleton* in the Reſidency of *Fizabad*, ſet out in the beginning of February 1775, to enter upon the duties of his function, being particularly charged with the buſineſs of ſettling the payments of the different ſums due from the late Vizier. It ſhould be further obſerved, that the Council, in their orders to Colonel *Galliez*, diſcouraged the offer of any preſent from the Nabob to the army, or to individuals.

See Appendix, N° 27. Letter to Col. Champion, 15 June 1774.

N° 154.

It is not the purpoſe or intention of your Committee to enter in this place into a minute inveſtigation of the proceedings tranſacted at the Court of *Oude* by the Reſident on the part of the Company; we think it proper only to obſerve, that a Treaty was agreed to between the Nabob and Mr. *Briſtow* on the 21ſt May 1775, which was confirmed by the Governor General and Council, on the 6th June following, by which the provinces of *Corab* and *Iliabad* were guaranteed to the Nabob, and the ſtipulated ſubſidy for the ſervice of the brigade was increaſed to two lacks ſixty thouſand Sicca rupees per month. But the great point of advantage which the Company derived from this treaty, was the ſovereignty and poſſeſſion in perpetuity of the diſtricts under Rajah *Cheit Sing*, as hereunder ſpecified:

Appendix, N° 155.

Sirkar Benares - - - - the Diſtrict of Juanpore.
Sirkar Chunar - - - - Bighpore Bahdore.
Sirkleſſgun - - - - - Mullvooz Kawſs.
Sirkar Gauzipore.
The Purgunnah of Sickunderpore - Jeinde Shaah Abad.
Toppa Surchehar, &c. as formerly.
The Mint and Cutwally at Benares.

The tribute reſerved on theſe Provinces amounting to 22,10,000 rupees, payable by *Cheit Sing* to the Nabob, was of courſe transferred to the Company; and the Nabob moreover engaged to pay all balances according to the engagements of the late Vizier, as they ſhould become due.

The advantages and honourable ſtipulations acquired to the Company by this Treaty, are earneſtly pointed out in the joint Minute of Meſſrs. *Clavering*, *Monſon*, and *Francis*, recorded on the Secret Conſultations of the 7th December 1775, and they claimed great merit with the Directors on account of this meaſure, which they declared to be ſtrictly and excluſively their own, in deſpite of the oppoſition given to it by the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*; and they expreſſed alſo the higheſt ſatisfaction to obſerve, that by the terms of the Treaty, the guarantee of the Nabob's dominions, and the ſervice of the Company's troops, were exactly confined within the ſame limits which the Court of Directors in their laſt Letter had thought fit to preſcribe to them for their engagements with the Vizier. It is however to be obſerved, that the Governor General, in his remarks upon theſe beneficial repreſentations, perſiſted in his prophetic apprehenſions, that the conditions of the Treaty could never be fulfilled, and therefore ought not to be eſteemed advantageous; neither did he think it honourable to have extorted from the Nabob conceſſions inconſiſtent with their former Treaties, to which the neceſſity of his ſituation alone obliged him however unwillingly to ſubmit.

Ben Sec Con 7 December 1775. Para. 9. Appendix, N° 156

N° 156.

Appendix, 157. Ben. Sec. Conf 29 February 1776.

Your Committee have remarked, that the Court of Directors had at the end of the year 1775, expreſſed their ſentiments very ſhortly on the line of policy which the majority of their Council in *Lengal* had reſolved to follow in regard to *Aſoph ul Dowla*.

" Although the death of *Sujah Dowla* may render it " neceſſary to make new arrangements with his ſucceſſor, " we cannot agree with our Council, that our Treaties " with the State of *Oude* expired with the death of that " Nabob."

Extract of the Company's General Letter to Bengal, dated 15 December 1775.

But it is to be obſerved, that when they were informed of the further proceedings of the Calcutta Board upon this ſubject, and had conſidered the conditions upon which the new Treaty with the Nabob was formed, the Court ratified it with their complete ſanction in the following words:

" It is with ſingular ſatisfaction we obſerve at any time " the attention paid by our ſervants to the great intereſts " of their Employers; and it is with particular pleaſure we " here ſignify our entire approbation of the late Treaty " concluded with *Aſoph ul Dowla*, ſucceſſor of *Sujah Dowla*, " by which ſuch terms are procured as ſeem to promiſe " us ſolid and permanent advantages."

Extract of the Company's General Letter to Bengal, dated 24 December 1776.

In conſequence of this engagement, the Company's brigades remained in thoſe provinces, but ſtill the frontiers were perpetually haraſſed by flying parties of the Marattas. The temper and conduct of the Nabob ſeemed ill-ſuited to accommodation and harmony with his neighbours or dependants; who indeed on their part did not ſhew a readineſs to ſervice and obedience. The inſtructions of the Governor General and Council to their ſervants, both civil and military, pointed out the extent and limitation of their interference in theſe diſputes; and it was particularly however recommended to them to avoid engaging the Company in any new Treaty for the purpoſe of guarantee, or otherwiſe, without obtaining the expreſs orders of the Board.

Ben Sec. Conf 8 January 1776. Appendix, N° 158.

N° 158.

See alſo Appendix 162, 164, & 166.

Ben Sec. Conf. 8 January 1776. Appendix, N° 159.

The pretenſions of the Nabob to the Vizierat, met with many interruptions; and other competitors were ſtrongly ſupported by different Powers, particularly by the Nizam. The ſituation and conduct of the King was naturally thereupon marked with doubt and irreſolution; nor did he ſeem at laſt to act with confidence, or perfect inclination, when he ſent his ambaſſador, in the month of April 1776, to inveſt the Nabob *Aſoph ul Dowlah* with the Kilaat.

Appendix, N° 160. Ben Country Corr. received 15 June, and 21 June 1776, &c.

See Appendix 161, Letter from Nujiff Cawn, received 2 July 1776. Appendix, N° 161.

And your Committee have found, that frequent accounts were afterwards received at *Calcutta* of continual alarms from the threatening appearances of the enemy, particularly on the frontiers of the province of *Korab*; and that the Governor General, in conſequence of theſe informations, and of intelligence ſent by Colonel *Goddard* (then

See Colonel Stibbert's Letter, 19 April 1776, on Conſ 2d May. Appendix, N° 162.

Ben Sec Conf 23 Auguſt 1776. Appendix, N° 163.

(then commanding the new-eſtabliſhed battalions) had ſtated his apprehenſions of a combination being formed by the King, the Marattas, the Seikes, and the Rohillas, to invade the dominions of the Vizier; and that having thereupon ſuggeſted the expediency of eſtabliſhing a defenſive alliance with the Nabob *Nudjif Cawn*, he recommended the private deputation of Major *Hanney* to his Durbar, for the purpoſe of ſettling all terms of agreement by perſonal negociation.

See the Minutes of the ſeveral Members of the Board on Cons. 28 and 29 Auguſt 1776, and General Clavering's Minute of Diſſent, incloſed in the General Packet to England, 23d September.
Appendix, N° 164.

That this meaſure, after much debate and explanation (the whole of which will be found in the Appendix) was agreed upon by the majority of the Council, and Major *Hanney* was accordingly diſpatched after receiving his inſtructions; by which he was directed to inſiſt upon *Nudjif*'s previous compliance with certain requiſitions before he ſhould paſs the boundaries of their own dominions. It will not be improper here to remark, that many doubts of the Nabob's friendly diſpoſition towards the Vizier, were entertained by the Company's Reſident at *Oude*, who however at the ſame time declared his opinion, that although the Marattas had got poſſeſſion of the conquered Countries on the other ſide of the *Jumna*, "the awe in which foreign Powers were held by "the Britiſh troops, and the ſubordination and diſcipline "introduced among the Vizier's forces under the com-"mand of Britiſh officers, would prove a ſecurity to his "dominions," and defeat the accompliſhment of that combination which was certainly projecting againſt him.

Letter from Mr. Briſtow, dated 22 Auguſt 1776.
Appendix, N° 165.

The deputation to *Nudjif Cawn* appears not to have had an immediate ſucceſs, as in anſwer to Major *Hanney*'s Letter, containing the motives of his viſit and the requiſitions preſcribed, the Nabob endeavoured to excuſe himſelf for delaying a compliance with them; but nevertheleſs aſſured him of a welcome reception at his Durbar. In conſequence however of the accounts which Major *Hanney* immediately tranſmitted to the Supreme Council, freſh debates and difference of opinion enſued; but it being finally reſolved to make no alteration in their original inſtructions, Major *Hanney* was of courſe left in attendance at *Chunar Gur*, till *Nudjif Cawn* ſhould be diſpoſed by compliance with the requiſitions preſcribed to allow him to proceed. In the meantime, at the period in queſtion a deſultory kind of warfare ſeems to have been carrying on in various parts near the frontiers of the Vizerat; in which *Nudjif Cawn* is found combating with the Marattas and Jauts, and in great diſtreſs for money to pay his troops. The Vizier's affairs, and eſpecially his finances, do not appear to have been in a more flouriſhing condition; and the balances due to the Company, already conſiderable, were likely to increaſe.

Appendix, N° 168.
Ben. Conſ. 3 February 1777.
See alſo 21 April 1777.

In regard to the King, the confidence which he does not ſeem to have fully reſtored to *Nudjif Cawn*, diminiſhed daily: his diſtreſſes, under the cabals of his Miniſters, and the diſappointment of his expectation of being relieved, had a great influence on his conduct; while the proſpect before him was the more unpromiſing from the certainty that *Nudjif Cawn*, however unable or unwilling in the preſent ſituation of affairs to aſſiſt him, was the only perſon he could ultimately look to for ſupport.

See General Letter 25 Nov. 1776, N° 168.

The Rana of *Gohud*, whom Colonel *Goddard* had recommended to the protection of the Company and the Vizier, as his ſmall dominions might be eſteemed a good barrier to theirs, was obliged to make peace with the Marattas, after a ſpirited reſiſtance to their attacks. The Governor General and Council, in their Secret Letter of the 9th May 1777, take notice of this with other circumſtances deſcriptive of the poſture of affairs at that period, when they were in immediate expectation of Colonel *Upton*'s arrival at the Preſidency, on his return from *Poonah*.

Appendix, N° 169.
Letter from Mr. Middleton, dated 16 April 1777, on Ben. Sec. Conſ. 5 May.
See alſo Conſ. 24 Oct. 1776.
Ben. Secret Letter, 9 May 1777.
Appendix 169.

To theſe obſervations which your Committee have thus ſubmitted to the Houſe on the ſituation of political affairs, relating in any degree to the ſubject of the Maratta war, we ſhall only add, for your more complete information on the general circumſtances of the Company's poſſeſſions under the Preſidencies of *Bengal* and *Bombay* at this period, the ſtate of their territorial and other Revenues, and of the number, quality, and diſtribution of their military force. Theſe will appear by the Charts hereunto annexed, to which your Committee deſire to refer the Houſe.

Appendix, N° 166.
Letter from Nudjiff Cawn.
See alſo Ben. Sec. Conſ. 24 Oct. and 30 Dec. 1776; and ſee Appendix 46.
Appendix, N° 167.
Ben. Sec. Conſ. 4th November 1776, and 2 Dec.
See alſo Letter from Mr. Briſtow, Ben. Sec. Conſ. 30 Dec. 1776.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial, and other Revenues, of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1775 to April 1776.

		Groſs Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
		CR.	CR.	CR.	£. Ste.
Ceded Lands. Land Revenues		71,55,750	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	81,930	—	—
Jaghire to Lord Clive		—	2,58,530	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	68,15,290	766,720
	CR.				
Bengal Province. Land Revenues	154,60,380				
Board of Cuſtoms collected	4,45,340				
Duties on Salt collected	4,48,820				
		163,34,540	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	6,76,620	—	—
Stipends and Allowances paid		—	24,39,730	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	132,18,190	1,487,040
Bahar Province. Land Revenues		47,61,410	—	—	—
Charges of Collection		—	1,56,420	—	—
Allowances and Penſions paid		—	1,67,820	—	—
Nett Revenues		—	—	44,37,170	499,181
Duties on Coinage		2,310	—	2,310	260
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta		4,29,480	—	4,29,480	48,316
Rajah Cheit Sing's Tribute		19,07,440	—	19,07,440	214,587
	CR.	305,90,930	37,81,050	268,09,880	3,016,110
Commiſſion on the Revenues		—	4,41,980	4,41,980	49,723
	CR.		42,23,030	263,67,900	2,966,387

An

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Fort William and Subordinates, from 1775 to 1776.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
291,903	44,065	1,051,969	327,800	724,169	101,484	1,161,621

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company in Bengal, from May 1775 to April 1776; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	CR^s.	CR^s.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	134,75,416	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - -		43,23,427
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - -		1,61,023
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - - -		6,153
Contract with the Country Government for Materials, &c. for Building - - - - - - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - -		3,08,906
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - - - -		10,468
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - - -		231
Money refunded on account of General Coote's Commiſſion -		39,050
His Majeſty Shah Allum, Balance of his Stipend - - -		50,31,232
Nudjeef Cawn, Balance of his Allowance - - - -		8,12,000
Ahteram ul Dowlah, D° - D° - - - - -		26,769
Oudy Poory Gouſſaine, D° - D° - - - - - -		27,187
Fund for the Diſcharge of old Salt Balances - - - -		8,43,501
Curr^t Rupees - - -		130,54,854

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

ABSTRACT GENERAL RETURN of the TROOPS

		European Commissioned Officers.										European Non-commissioned and Private.					
		Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Ensigns.	Total.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matrosses.	Infantry-Rank and File.	Total.
Hindostan. European.	Artillery, 5 Companies	-	1	2	5	6	15	14	-	43	-	38	15	30	381	- -	464
	Corps of Engineers	-	1	1	3	-	5	-	4	14	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-
	Infantry, 3 Regiments	3	4	7	28	-	39	-	30	111	31	125	68	-	-	2,214	2,407
	Invalids, 2 Companies	-	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	6	-	61	20	36	-	265	382
	Troop of Body Guard	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	- -	4
	Infantry, 23 Batt[s], and Militia	-	2	3	26	-	103	-	99	233	-	188	249	-	32	- -	469
Serving with the Vizier's Troops	Artillery	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-
	Cavalry	-	1	-	2	-	6	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-
	Infantry	-	-	-	7	-	12	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-
Total	Present Strength	3	9	13	75	6	187	14	133	440	31	416	352	66	413	2,479	3,726
	Supernumeraries	-	-	1	-	2	4	-	10	17	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-
	Wanting to complete	-	1	-	2	2	19	1	14	39	-	65	17	1	44	910	1,037
	Establishment	3	10	12	77	6	202	15	137	462	-	481	369	67	457	3,389	4,763

		Native Officers and Sepoys.								
		Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Retinders.	Duffadars.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Private Troopers.	Grenadiers.	Havildars, Naicks, and Sepoys.	Total.
Hindostan.	Troop of Body Guard	-	-	1	6	2	100	-	- -	109
	Infantry, 23 Battalions	254	475	-	-	232	-	-	16,198	17,159
	Militia or Invalid Sepoys	46	57	-	-	36	-	-	5,146	5,285
	Lascars attached to European Corps, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-
Total	Present Strength	300	532	1	6	270	100	-	21,344	22,553
	Supernumeraries	15	28	-	-	2	-	-	57	102
	Wanting to complete	5	9	-	-	-	-	-	23	37
	Establishment	290	513	1	6	268	100	-	21,310	22,488

under FORT WILLIAM PRESIDENCY, July 1776.

European Staff, &c.																				Supernumeraries					Wanting to complete.						
Adjutants.	Adjutants and Quarter Masters.	Quarter Masters.	Inspector & Commis. Gen. of Stores.	Commissaries.	Deputy Commissaries.	Conductors.	Quarter Master General.	Judge Advocate General.	Aids de Camp.	Military Secretary.	Town Major.	Barrack Masters.	Deputy Judge Advocate General.	Surgeon General.	Surgeons Major.	Surgeons.	Surgeon's Assistants.	Chaplains.	Fort Adjutant.	Majors.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Non-commissioned and Private.	Lieutenant Colonel.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Ensigns.	Non-commissioned and Private.
-	4	-	-	2	6	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	2	3	1	-	45
4	-	4	1	-	-	-	1	1	3	1	1	2	3	1	3	3	13	3	1	-	-	-	9	-	1	2	-	3	-	3	910
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	13	-	11	82
-	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10	17	7	1	2	6	12	1	1	3	1	1	2	3	1	3	7	23	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	4	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	19	1	14	1,037
10	17	7	1	2	6	12	1	1	3	1	1	2	3	1	3	7	23	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Native Staff, &c.											Lascars.				Supernumeraries.							Wanting to complete.						
Commandants.	Adjutants.	Writers.	Sircars.	Doctors.	Armourers.	Watermen.	Farriers.	Riding Masters.	Muttafeddies.	Camp Colourmen.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Total.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Trumpeters.	Rank and File.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Subadars.	Jemautdars.	Trumpeters.	Rank and File.	Serangs.	Tindals.	Lascars.
-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22	22	-	221	66	78	220	-	-	-	-	2	65	742	809	2	6	-	55	-	-	-	4	8	-	23	—	—	—
2	1	4	10	12	19	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	22	2	2	-	-	-	1	1	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	72	1,632	1,729	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—
24	23	4	232	78	97	254	1	-	-	-	27	137	2,374	2,538	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	28	2	57	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	9	-	23	-	1	—
24	23	4	232	78	97	254	1	-	-	-	27	138	2,374	2,539	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

DISPOSITION of the foregoing TROOPS.

European.	Artillery	1 Company	Dinapore.
		1 D°	Berhampore.
		1 D°	In the Field.
		2 D°	Fort William.
	Infantry	1ſt Regiment — 5 Companies	Berhampore.
		1ſt Regiment — 5 D°	Dinapore.
		2d D° — 5 Companies	Berhampore.
		2d D° — 5 D°	Calcutta.
		3d D°	Belgram.
	Invalids	1 Company	Preſidency.
		1 D°	Chunar.
Hindoſtan.	Infantry	4 Battalions	Berhampore.
		1 D°	Saheb Gunge.
		1 D°	Dinapore.
		1 D°	Boggah.
		1 D°	Ramgur.
		2 D°	Mongheer.
		3 D°	Barrackpore.
		1 D°	Midnapore.
		6 D°	Belgram.
		1 D°	Chunar.
		1 D°	Chittagong.
		1 D° (Light Infantry)	Chackye.
	Militia or Invalid Sepoys	Stationed at	Preſidency.
			Moorſhedabad.
			Patna.
			Dacca.
			Burdwan.
			Dinagepore.

AN ACCOUNT of the Territorial and other Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, the Expences of collecting the ſame, the Tribute and Stipends paid, from May 1776 to April 1777.

	CR°.	Groſs Collections.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.	
		CR°.	CR°.	CR°.	£ſt.
Ceded Lands. Land Revenues		59,41,185	—	—	—
Charges of Collection			57,936	—	—
Jaghire to Lord Clive			2,58,631	—	—
Nett Revenues				56,24,618	638,770
Bengal Province. Land Revenues	136,88,614				
Board of Cuſtoms collected	6,11,148				
Duties on Salt collected	7,26,112				
		150,25,874	—	—	—
Charges of Collection			4,92,853	—	—
Stipends and Allowances paid			24,31,639	—	—
Nett Revenues				121,01,382	1,361,405
Bahar Province. Land Revenues		49,47,465	—	—	—
Charges of Collection			1,86,149	—	—
Allowances and Penſions paid			1,61,099	—	—
Nett Revenues				46,00,217	517,524
Duties on Coinage		5,213		5,213	586
Cuſtoms collected at Calcutta		2,61,862		2,61,862	29,459
Rajah Cheit Sing		26,03,145		26,03,145	292,854
	CR°	287,84,744	35,88,307	251,96,437	2,834,598
Commiſſion on the Revenues			4,45,303	4,45,303	50,096
	CR°.		40,33,610	247,51,134	2,784,502

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Fort William and Subordinates, 1776 to 1777.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.			Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges defrayed by the Company.
		Total Amount.	Defrayed by the Nabob.	Nett Amount defrayed by the Company.		
£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
290,075	35,117	942,119	280,081	662,038	85,986	1,073,216

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782. (Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company in Bengal, from May 1776 to April 1777; alſo the Balancies in the Treaſuries.

	CR^{s}.	CR^{s}.
Balances in the Treaſuries - - -	156,09,844	
Money borrowed at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - - - -		6,82,637
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - - - - - - -		1,57,643
Bills of Exchange unaccounted for - - - - - - - - - - -		6,153
Contract with Country Government for Materials, &c. for Building - - - - -		2,47,451
Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - - - - - -		5,06,169
Unclaimed Goods - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,822
Tuncan Account - - - - - - - - - - - - -		54,914
Military Fund - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,50,720
Sundry old Debts - - - - - - - - - - - - -		6,265
Debts at Dacca - - - - - - - - - - - - -		231
Debts at Patna - - - - - - - - - - - - -		59,163
Money refunded on Account of General Coote's Commiſſion - - - - - - -		39,050
His Majeſty Shah Allum, the Balance of his Stipend - - - - - - - -		49,50,216
Nudjeef Cawn, Balance of his Allowance - - - - - - - - - -		10,44,000
Ahteram ul Dowlah, D° - D° - - - - - - - - - -		1,31,406
Oudy Poory Gouſſaine, D° - D° - - - - - - - - - -		27,187
Fund for the Diſcharge of old Salt Balances - - - - - - - - -		7,84,952
Curr^{t} Rupees		98,60,179

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782. (Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

ABSTRACT-GENERAL RETURN of the TROOPS under

		European Commissioned Officers.									European Non-commissioned and Private.					
		Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fireworkers.	Enfigns.	Total.	Cadets.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Bombardiers, Gunners, and Matroffes.	Infantry Rank and File.	Total.
Hindoftan. European.	Artillery 5 Companies	-	1	3	5	6	16	11	-	42	-	31	17	31	355	- -	434
	Corps of Engineers	-	2	-	2	-	6	-	4	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Infantry 3 Regiments	3	6	5	44	-	63	-	51	172	-	154	79	-	-	2,250	2,483
	Invalids 2 Companies	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	3	-	54	8	-	-	287	349
	Troop of Body Guard	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	- -	4
	Infantry 23 Batt[s], and 36 Comp[s] Militia or Inv[d]	-	1	3	25	-	110	-	81	220	-	185	257	-	-	3	445
Temporary Brigade.	Artillery 3 Companies	-	-	1	-	3	3	2	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	- -	- -
	Cavalry 3 Regiments	-	-	1	3	-	6	-	2	12	-	-	-	-	-	- -	- -
	Infantry 9 Battalions	1	1	1	9	-	21	-	4	37	-	-	-	-	-	- -	- -
Total	Preſent Strength	4	11	14	91	9	226	13	143	511	-	428	361	31	355	2,540	3,715
	Supernumeraries	-	3	2	2	-	19	-	25	51	-	20	18	1	16	85	140
	Wanting to complete	-	2	2	2	-	17	4	30	57	-	75	11	-	86	967	1,139
	Eſtabliſhment	4	10	14	91	9	224	17	148	517	-	483	354	30	425	3,422	4,714

		Native Officers and Sepoys.								
		Subadars.	Reſſoldars.	Jemautdars.	Duffidars.	Tom Toms and Trumpeters.	Private Troopers.	Golundazees.	Havildars, Naiks, and Sepoys.	Total.
Hindoftan:	Troop of Body Guard	-	1	-	6	2	100	-	- -	109
	Infantry 23 Batt[s], and 36 Comp[s] Militia or Inval[s]	333	-	575	-	271	- -	-	20,710	21,889
Temporary Brigade.	Artillery 3 Companies	3	-	8	-	-	- -	240	48	299
	Cavalry 3 Regiments	-	12	36	216	24	1,200	-	- -	1,488
	Infantry 9 Battalions	105	-	178	-	396	- -	99	6,217	6,995
	Laſcars attached to European Corps	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	- -	- -
Total	Preſent Strength	441	13	797	222	693	1,300	339	26,975	30,780
	Supernumeraries	28	1	62	-	4	- -	-	344	439
	Wanting to complete	8	-	6	-	1	- -	-	103	118
	Eſtabliſhment	421	12	741	222	690	1,300	339	26,734	30,459

FORT WILLIAM PRESIDENCY, September 1777.

| European Staff, &c. | | |

DISPOSITION of the foregoing TROOPS.

European.	Artillery	1 Company		Allahabad.
		4 Companies		Fort William.
	Infantry	1ſt Regiment	5 Companies 5 D°	Allahabad. Dinapore
		2d Regiment		Berhampore.
		3d Regiment		Fort William.
Hindoſtan.	Infantry	4 Battalions		Allahabad.
		2 D°		Dinapore.
		1 D°		Chunar Gur.
		5 D°		Berhampore.
		1 D°		Boggah.
		3 D°		Midnapore.
		5 D°		Preſidency.
		1 D°		Iſlamabad.
		1 D° (Light Infantry)		Chackye.
	Militia or Invalid Sepoys	2 Companies		Ramgur.
		7 D°		Patna and Buxar.
		6 D°		Dacca.
		2 D°		Dinagepore.
		2 D°		Burdwan.
		8 D°		Moorſhedabad.
		9 D°		Preſidency.
	Temporary Brigade. Artillery	2 Companies		Doab.
		1 D°		Rohilcund.
	Cavalry	3 Regiments		Doab.
	Infantry	7 Battalions		Doab.
		2 D°		Rohilcund.

AN ACCOUNT of the Revenues of *Bombay* and its Dependencies, from May 1775 to April 1776.

		Groſs.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.		
Bombay.		R°.	R°.	R°.	R°.	£. ſ°.
Land Revenues - - -	R° 32,638					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	3,16,302					
Farms - - - - -	93,104					
		4,42,184	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	76,048	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - -		- -	- -	3,66,136	- -	45,767
Tellicherry.						
Land Revenues - - -	R° 18,432					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	8,992					
		27,424	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	6,288	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - - -		- -	- -	21,136	- -	*2,642
Surat.						
Land Revenues - - -	R° 2,29,120					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	2,10,696					
		4,39,816	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	57,560	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - - - -		- -	- -	3,82,256	- -	47,782
Anjengo.						
Farms - - - - - - -		832	- -	832	- -	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues - - -	R° 7,376					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	1,648					
Farms - - - - -	712					
		9,736	- -	9,736	- -	1,217
Broach.						
Land Revenues - - -	R° 6,46,072					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	55,408					
		7,01,480	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	80,232	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - - - -		- -	- -	6,21,248	- -	77,656
Tannah.						
Land Revenues - - -	R° 1,68,192					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	7,448					
		1,75,640	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	18,232	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - - -		- -	- -	1,57,408	- -	19,676
Carranjah.						
Land Revenues - - - -	R° 32,296					
Cuſtoms and Duties - - -	25,256					
Farms - - - - - -	424					
		57,976	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	14,016	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - - -		- -	- -	43,960	- -	5,495
Jambooſier.						
Land Revenues - - - - -	R°	2,93,776	—	—	—	—
Charges and Deductions - - - -		- -	82,736	—	—	—
Nett Revenues - - - - - -		- -	- -	2,11,040	- -	26,380
Buſhire.						
Cuſtoms and Duties - - - -	R°	3,560	- -	3,560	- -	*445
	Rup°	21,52,424	3,35,112	18,17,312	£.	227,164

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at Bombay and its Dependencies, from May 1775 to April 1776.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
£. ſts.	£. ſts.	£. ſts.	£. ſts.	£. ſts.
86,981	63,915	199,558	22,498	372,952

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

East India Houſe,
6th February 1782.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company, at Bombay, from May 1775 to April 1776; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries - -	5,18,880	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - -		25,95,000
Due Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - -		27,394
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		29,098
King of Travencore, Account Pepper - - - - - -		11,301
	Rupees	26,62,793

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at Bombay from Bengal, from 1775 to 1776.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - - - -	12,19,455
Bills - - - - - - - - - - - -	11,28,077
Goods - - - - - - - - - - - -	—
Rupees	23,47,532
£. ſts.	293,441

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

NUMBER and DISTRIBUTION of the TROOPS under BOMBAY,

MARCH 1776.

GENERAL RETURN of the Honourable Company's TROOPS

| | ARTILLERY. | | |

under the PRESIDENCY of BOMBAY, 1st March 1776.

					SEPOYS.																IRREGULARS.										INVALIDS.					
																						Tiveys.							Nairs.							
Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private Europeans.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subniffes.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Topasses.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutant.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Moopas.	Private.	Captain.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
1	45	47	23	260		2	5	8	1	2	19	39	18	113	104	12	4	42	20	1,591	99		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	12	9	1	134
-	20	20	12	280	-	2	13	8	2	1	14	28	11	77	77	6	5	17	9	1,188	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	3	2	-	24	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	5	3	5	7	-	-	4	3	206	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	12	12	7	144	-	1	6	5	1	1	13	27	12	53	75	7	1	15	11	724	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	3	4	5	141	-	-	3	2	1	1	6	12	4	13	16	2	1	14	3	342	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	7	6	5	71	-	1	3	4	1	1	6	11	4	30	30	2	1	8	5	360	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	12	8	3	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	100	-	-	1	5	3	47	520	1	30	-	-	2	3	1	57
-	3	3		- -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	36	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1	105	102	56	935	-	6	31	27	6	6	60	122	52	291	309	29	12	100	51	4,411	246	-	-	1	5	3	47	520	1	30	1	-	14	12	2	191
-	-	-	-	315	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	4	8	69	51	8	-	20	9	509	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	11	8	-	- -	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	94	94	56	1,280	-	6	30	30	6	6	60	126	60	360	360	37	12	120	60	4,920	-	-	-	1	5	2	50	515	1	30	—	—	—	—	—	—

IRREGULAR SEPOYS.

	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Colour Bearers	Subniffes.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.
Baroche - -	4	8	20	20	2	4	4	12	4	624
Surat - - -	6	14	35	35	7	7	5	21	7	666
Total -	10	22	55	55	9	11	9	33	11	1,290

SINCE LAST RETURN.

	Dead.	Deserted.	Discharged.	Invalided.	Transferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery - -	16	1	8	1	-	6	3
Infantry - -	69	13	4	8	18	2	23
Sepoys - -	76	373	82	6	31	113	541
Total -	161	387	94	15	49	121	567

(Signed)
Robert Gordon,
Brig. General.

AN ACCOUNT of the Revenues of *Bombay* and its Dependencies, from May 1776 to April 1777.

		Gross.	Charges.	Nett Revenues.		
		R.	R.	R.		£. ß.
Bombay.						
Land Revenues	R 31,584					
Cuſtoms and Duties	3,3 ,056					
Farms	93,104					
		4,57,744	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	25,12	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	4,32,616	-	54.077
Tellicherry.						
Land Revenues	R 22,520					
Cuſtoms and Duties	11,272					
Farms	7,648					
		41,440	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	3,296	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	38,144	-	4,768
Surat.						
Land Revenues	R 1,52,640					
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,40,552					
		3,93,192	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	55,648	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	3,37,544	-	42,193
Anjengo.						
Farms		832	-	832	-	104
Fort Victoria.						
Land Revenues	R 5,728					
Cuſtoms and Duties	2,496					
Farms	1,088					
		9,312	-	9,312	-	1,164
Broach.						
Land Revenues	R 5,51,600					
Cuſtoms and Duties	60,584					
		6,12,184	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	57,696	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	5,54,488	-	69,311
Tannah.						
Land Revenues	R 2,10,784					
Cuſtoms and Duties	12,640					
		2,23,424	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	26,576	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	1,96,848	-	24,606
Carranja.						
Land Revenues	R 27,232					
Cuſtoms and Duties	24,208					
Farms	4,712					
		56,152	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	3,312	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	52,840	-	6,605
Jamboofier.						
Land Revenues	R 3,30,520					
Cuſtoms and Duties	40,000					
		3,70,528	—	—		—
Charges and Deductions		—	16,504	—		—
Nett Revenues		—	—	3,54,024	-	44,253
Buſhire.						
Cuſtoms		9,096	-	9,096	-	1,137
Vingorla.						
Land Revenues		13,576	-	13,576	-	1,697
	Rup'	21,87,480	1,88,160	19,99,320	£. ß.	249,915

AN

AN ACCOUNT of the Civil and Military Expences at *Bombay* and its Dependencies, from May 1776 to April 1777.

CIVIL.	MARINE.	MILITARY.	Buildings and Fortifications.	Total Charges.
£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.	£. ſt.
78,515	57,320	208,037	16,907	360,779

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Bond and other Debts of the East India Company at *Bombay*, from May 1776 to April 1777; alſo the Balances in the Treaſuries.

	Rupees.	Rupees.
Balances in the Treaſuries - - -	12,88,948	
Debt at Intereſt - - - - - - - - - -		34,52,867
Due on Account Depoſits - - - - - - - - -		39,106
Accountant General of the Mayor's Court - - - - -		22,887
King of Travencore, Account Pepper - - - - - -		20,589
Rupees - -		35,35,449

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

AN ACCOUNT of the Aids received at *Bombay* from Bengal, from 1776 to 1777.

	Rupees.
Bullion - - - - - - - - - - - - -	2,70,480
Bills - - - - - - - - - - - - -	9,52,545
Goods - - - - - - - - - - - - -	2,49,153
Rupees	14,72,178
£. ſt.	184,022

East India Houſe,
26th February 1782.

(Errors excepted.)

John Annis,
Auditor of Indian Accounts.

GENERAL RETURN of the Honourable Company's TROOPS

	ARTILLERY.							Staff.								INFANTRY.								Staff.							
	Lieutenant Colonel	Majors.	Captains.	Captain Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenant Fire-workers.	Adjutant.	Quarter Master.	Surgeon.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers	Fifes and Drums.	Gunners.	Matroffes.	Brigadier, General, &c.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Enfigns.	Major of Brigade.	Town Major.	Aids de Camp.	Secretaries.	Surgeon Major.	Adjutants	Quarter Masters.	Surgeons.
Bombay	-	1	4	3	5	5	1	1	1	11	7	17	7	21	78	1	1	-	2	10	8	13	1	1	3	1	1	2	2	2
Carranja	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Salfette	-	-	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	1	1	6	1	8	29	-	-	1	-	1	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Baroche	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	1	4	2	12	15	-	-	1	-	2	5	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Surat	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	2	2	3	1	8	15	-	-	-	-	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Tellicherry	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	2	8	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anjengo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	-	1	5	4	9	10	1	1	1	17	13	31	11	51	146	1	1	2	2	16	20	23	1	1	3	1	1	5	4	2
Wanting to complete	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	138	-	-	-	-	2	4	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supernumeraries	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eſtabliſhment	-	1	4	4	10	12	1	1	1	12	12	32	12	48	284	1	-	2	2	18	24	32	1	1	3	1	1	5	4	2

IRREGULAR SEPOYS.

	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subriſſis.	Colour Bearers.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.
Baroche	4	8	1	20	20	4	4	4	12	4	396
Surat	2	4	-	10	10	2	2	2	6	2	202
Anjengo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Total	6	12	1	30	30	6	6	6	18	6	606

N. B. The Officers on leave in Europe not included above, but as wanting to complete.

Fifty-four Artificers belonging to the ſix battalions of Sepoys not included in the above Return.

(Signed)

Wm Richardſon,
Bd Major.

Brigr General Gordon, and Major Thos Lee, Commandt of Artillery, have died ſince the date of this Return; there are alſo about 65 ſick Europeans in the Bombay Hoſpitals alone, which are not diſtinguiſhed from the effective, and 35 Commiſſioned Officers, not fit for duty.

(Signed)

Edwd Ravenſcroft,
Secy.

under the PRESIDENCY of BOMBAY, 30th April 1777.

					SEPOYS.																IRREGULARS.										INVALIDS.					
																						Tiveys.							Nairs							
Volunteers.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Fifes and Drums.	Private Europeans.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Commandants.	Subedars.	Jemidars.	Serjeants.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Subnisses.	Trumpeters.	Tom Toms.	Watermen.	Sepoys.	Topasses.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Adjutants.	Serjeants.	Head Moopas.	Under Moopas.	Private.	Moopas.	Private.	Captain.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.
3	64	64	20	81	-	4	18	12	4	4	34	67	33	184	193	20	6	66	27	2,491	72	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	-	1	-	12	9	1	123
-	1	1	-	- -	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	3	-	6	8	-	-	1	1	117	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	12	12	6	108		1	4	6	1	1	10	21	10	58	60	6	2	19	10	813	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	11	10	5	142	-	1	5	5	1	1	10	20	7	59	57	6	2	20	10	748	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	8	8	5	138	-	1	5	5	1	1	9	21	9	58	56	4	2	22	10	648	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	6	4	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	- -	- -	-	-	- -	-	- -	66	-	-	1	2	2	22	222	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	31
-	1	-	-	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	103	99	38	683	-	7	32	29	7	7	64	132	59	365	374	36	12	128	58	4,817	150	-	-	1	2	2	22	222	-	-	1	-	14	11	1	154
-	- -	-	18	597	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	4	1	25	16	4	-	7	2	528	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	9	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
-	94	94	56	1,280	-	7	31	30	7	7	65	136	66	390	390	40	12	135	60	5,345	- -	-	-	1	2	2	22	222	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

LASCARS.

	Serangs.	Tindals.	Private.
Bombay - - - -	4	9	210
Carranja - - - -	-	-	3
Salsette - - - -	1	2	150
Baroche - - - -	1	2	70
Surat - - - -	1	1	30
Tellicherry - - -	-	-	19
Total - -	7	14	473
Wanting to complete - -	—	—	—
Supernumeraries -	—	—	—
Establishment - -	—	—	—

SINCE LAST RETURN.

	Dead.	Deserted.	Discharged.	Invalided.	Transferred.	Received.	Entertained.
Artillery - - - -	2	1	-	-	-	-	2
Infantry - - - -	16	1	1	-	-	-	5
Sepoys - - - -	34	77	25	-	-	-	316
Total - -	52	79	26	-	-	-	323

(Signed)
Ch^t Egerton,
Col^l Commd^t.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

Extracts of an Act, made in the 13th year of the Reign of King *George* the Third, intituled, "An "Act for eſtabliſhing certain Regulations for the "better Management of the Affairs of the *Eaſt* "*India* Company, as well in *India* as in *Europe*."

Preamble.

WHEREAS the ſeveral powers and authorities granted by charters to the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, have been found, by experience, not to have ſufficient force and efficacy to prevent various abuſes which have prevailed in the government and adminiſtration of the affairs of the ſaid United Company, as well at Home as in *India*, to the manifeſt injury of the public credit, and of the commercial intereſts of the ſaid Company; and it is therefore become highly expedient that certain further regulations, better adapted to their preſent circumſtances and condition, ſhould be provided and eſtabliſhed.

A Governor General and Four Counſellors to be appointed, in whom the whole Civil and Military Government of Bengal, Bahar, and Oriſſa, ſhall be veſ

And, for the better management of the ſaid United Company's affairs in *India*, Be it enacted, that for the Government of the Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, there ſhall be appointed a Governor General and Four Counſellors; and that the whole Civil and Military Government of the ſaid Preſidency, and alſo the ordering, management, and government of all the territorial acquiſitions and revenues in the kingdoms of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, ſhall, during ſuch time as the territorial acquiſitions and revenues ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the ſaid United Company, be, and are hereby veſted in the ſaid Governor General and Council of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, in like manner, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as the ſame now are, or at any time heretofore might have been, exerciſed by the Preſident and Council, or Seleſt Committee, in the ſaid kingdoms.

In caſe of difference of opinion, the deciſion of the major part to be concluſive;

and in caſe of death, removal, or abſence, the Governor or eldeſt Counſellor to have a caſting voice.

And be it enacted, that in all caſes whatſoever wherein any difference of opinion ſhall ariſe, upon any queſtion propoſed in any Conſultation, the ſaid Governor General and Council ſhall be bound and concluded by the opinion and deciſion of the major part of thoſe preſent: and if it ſhall happen, that by the death or removal, or by the abſence of any of the Members of the ſaid Council, ſuch Governor General and Council ſhall happen to be equally divided, then, and in every ſuch caſe, the ſaid Governor General, or in his abſence the eldeſt Counſellor preſent, ſhall have a caſting voice, and his opinion ſhall be deciſive and concluſive.

Power of the Governor General and Council.

And be it further enacted, that the ſaid Governor General and Council, or the major part of them, ſhall have, and they are hereby authorized to have, power of ſuperintending and controlling the government and management of the Preſidencies of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen* reſpectively, ſo far and in ſo much as that it ſhall not be lawful for any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hoſtilities, or declaring or making war againſt any Indian princes or powers, or for negotiating or concluding any Treaty of Peace, or other Treaty, with any ſuch Indian princes or powers, without the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Governor General and Council firſt had and obtained; except in ſuch caſes of imminent neceſſity as would render it dangerous to poſtpone ſuch hoſtilities or treaties, until the orders from the Governor General and Council might arrive, and except in ſuch caſes where the ſaid Preſidents and Councils reſpectively ſhall have received ſpecial orders from the ſaid United Company; and any Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, who ſhall offend in any of the caſes aforeſaid, ſhall be liable to be ſuſpended from his or their office, by the order of the ſaid Governor General and Council; and every Preſident and Council of *Madras*, *Bombay*, and *Bencoolen*, for the time being, ſhall, and they are hereby reſpectively directed and required, to pay due obedience to ſuch orders as they ſhall receive, touching the premiſes, from the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being, and conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to the ſaid Governor General and Council, advice and intelligence of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the Government, Revenues, or Intereſt, of the ſaid United Company; and the ſaid Governor General and Council for the time being ſhall, and they are hereby directed and required to pay due obedience to all ſuch orders as they ſhall receive from the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, and to correſpond from time to time, and conſtantly and diligently tranſmit to the ſaid Court an exact particular of all advices or intelligence, and of all tranſactions and matters whatſoever, that ſhall come to their knowledge, relating to the Government, Commerce, Revenues, or Intereſt, of the ſaid United Company; and the Court of Directors of the ſaid Company, or their ſucceſſors, ſhall, and they are hereby directed and required from time to time, before the expiration of fourteen days after the receiving any ſuch letters or advices, to give in and deliver unto the High Treaſurer, or Commiſſioners of his Majeſty's Treaſury for the time being, a true and exact copy of ſuch parts of the ſaid letters or advices as ſhall anyway relate to the management of the Revenues of the ſaid Company; and, in like manner, to give in and deliver to one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State for the time being, a true and exact copy of all ſuch parts of the ſaid letters or advices as ſhall anyway relate to the Civil or Military Affairs and Government of the ſaid Company; all which copies ſhall be fairly written, and ſhall be ſigned by two or more of the Directors of the ſaid Company.

Names of the firſt Governor General and Counſellors, who ſhall continue in office five years after their arrival at Fort William in Bengal.

And it is hereby further enacted, that *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, ſhall be the firſt Governor General; and that Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, eſquire, and *Philip Francis*, eſquire, ſhall be the Four firſt Counſellors; and they, and each of them, ſhall hold and continue in his and their reſpective offices for and during the term of five years from the time of their arrival at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and taking upon them the Government of the ſaid Preſidency, and ſhall not be removable, in the meantime, except by His Majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors, upon repreſentation made by the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company for the time being: and in caſe of the avoidance of the office of ſuch Governor General by death, reſignation, or removal, his place ſhall, during the remainder of the term aforeſaid, as often as the caſe ſhall happen, be ſupplied by the perſon of the Council who ſtands next in rank to ſuch Governor General; and, in caſe of the death, removal, reſignation, or promotion,

APPENDIX No. I.

of any of the ſaid Council, the Directors of the ſaid United Company are hereby empowered, for and during the remainder of the ſaid term of five years, to nominate and appoint, by and with the conſent of his Majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors, to be ſignified under his or their ſign manual, a perſon to ſucceed to the office ſo become vacant in the ſaid Council; and until ſuch appointment ſhall be made, all the powers and authorities veſted in the Governor General and Council ſhall reſt and continue in, and be exerciſed and executed by, the Governor General and Council remaining and ſurviving; and from and after the expiration of the ſaid term of five years, the power of nominating and removing the ſucceeding Governor General and Council ſhall be veſted in the Directors of the ſaid United Company.

Time when the proviſions relating to the Governor and Council ſhall commence.

And be it further enacted, that the ſaid ſeveral proviſions, relating to the ſaid Governor General and Council, ſhall commence and take place from and immediately after the time that public proclamation ſhall be made of the arrival of the ſaid Governor General and Counſellors hereinbefore appointed, or any three of them, at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; which proclamation the ſaid Governor General and Council are hereby required to make.

The Company may appoint Officers in purſuance of former Acts or Charters.

Provided always, that nothing in this Act ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prevent, controul, or reſtrain, the ſaid United Company from conſtituting and appointing ſuch officers, factors, or agents, as they ſhall think proper and neceſſary, by virtue or in purſuance of any powers, rights, or privileges, granted to them by any former Act or Acts of Parliament, or by any Charter or Charters, for managing, conducting, and tranſacting the trade and commerce of the ſaid Company, at and within the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*.

So much of the Charter granted by Geo. II. (ſhould a new Charter be granted) to be repealed;

And be it further enacted, that ſo much of the ſaid Charter, granted by his ſaid late Majeſty, as reſpects or relates to the eſtabliſhment of the Mayor's Court at *Calcutta* aforeſaid, in *Bengal*, or to the civil, criminal, or eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction thereof, in the ſaid United Company's Settlement there, or the Subordinates thereunto belonging, in caſe a new Charter ſhall be granted by his Majeſty in purſuance of this Act, and ſhall be openly publiſhed at *Fort William* aforeſaid, from and immediately after ſuch publication ſhall ceaſe, determine, and be abſolutely void, to all intents and purpoſes: but nevertheleſs, the ſaid Charter, ſo granted by his ſaid late Majeſty, ſhall, in all other reſpects, and as for and concerning all or any other of the ſaid Company's principal Preſidencies or Settlements to which the ſame relates, or to any factories or places now or hereafter to be ſubordinate to ſuch principal Settlements, continue, be, and remain in full force and virtue, according to the true intent and meaning thereof, and that as fully and effectually, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as if this Act had never been made, or ſuch new Charter as aforeſaid ſhould never have been granted.

otherwiſe to be in full force.

Salaries eſtabliſhed to the Governor General, Council, Chief Juſtice, and Judges

And be it further enacted, that during ſuch time as the territorial acquiſitions ſhall remain in the poſſeſſion of the ſaid Company, the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company ſhall, and they are hereby required to direct, and cauſe to be paid, certain and eſtabliſhed ſalaries to the Governor General, and to each of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and to the Chief Juſtice, and each of the Judges of ſuch Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William*, as ſhall be by the ſaid new Charter eſtabliſhed; (that is to ſay) to the Governor General, twenty-five thouſand pounds by the year; and to each of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, ten thouſand pounds by the year; and to the Chief Juſtice, eight thouſand pounds by the year; and to each of the Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William*, ſix thouſand pounds by the year: and that ſuch ſalaries ſhall be paid and payable to each and every of them reſpectively, for the time being, out of the ſaid territorial acquiſitions in the kingdoms of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*.

When ſuch ſalaries ſhall commence

And be it further enacted, that the ſalaries of ſuch Governor General and Council, and of ſuch Chief Juſtice and Judges, of ſuch Supreme Court of Judicature as aforeſaid, ſhall take place and commence in reſpect to all ſuch perſons who ſhall be reſident in *Great Britain* at the time of their appointment, upon and from the day on which ſuch perſon ſhall embark from *Great Britain*; and that the ſalaries of all ſuch perſons who ſhall, at the time of their appointment, be reſident in *India*, ſhall commence and take place from and after their reſpectively taking upon them the execution of their office as aforeſaid; and that all ſuch ſalaries to ſuch Governor General and Council, and of ſuch Chief Juſtice and Judges, ſhall be in lieu of all fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, and advantages whatſoever; and that no fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever, ſhall be accepted, received, or taken by ſuch Governor General and Council, or by ſuch Chief Juſtice and Judges as aforeſaid, or any of them, in any manner or on any account or pretence whatſoever, other than ſuch ſalaries and allowances as are in and by this Act directed to be paid to them reſpectively.

The Governor General or Council ſhall not accept of any preſent;

And be it further enacted, that no Governor General, or any of the Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, or any Chief Juſtice, or any of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* aforeſaid, ſhall, directly or indirectly, by themſelves, or by any other perſon or perſons for his or their uſe, or on his or their behalf, accept, receive, or take, of or from any perſon or perſons, in any manner or on any account whatſoever, any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwiſe, or any promiſe or engagement for any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward; and that no Governor General, or any of the ſaid Council, or any Chief Juſtice or Judge of the ſaid Court, ſhall carry on, be concerned in, or have any dealing or tranſactions, by way of traffick or commerce of any kind whatſoever, either for his or their uſe or benefit, profit or advantage, or for the benefit or advantage of any other perſon or perſons whatſoever (the trade and commerce of the ſaid United Company only excepted); any uſage or cuſtom to the contrary thereof in anywiſe notwithſtanding.

nor be concerned in any tranſaction by way of traffick.

No perſon holding a Civil or Military Office under the Crown, &c. ſhall accept any donation or gratuity.

And be it further enacted, that from and after the firſt day of Auguſt, One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, no perſon holding or exerciſing any civil or military office under the Crown, or the ſaid United Company, in the *Eaſt Indies*, ſhall accept, receive, or take, directly or indirectly, by himſelf, or any other perſon or perſons on his behalf, or for his uſe or benefit, of and from any of the Indian princes or powers, or their miniſters or agents (or any of the natives of *Aſia*) any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, pecuniary or otherwiſe, upon any account, or on any pretence whatſoever, or any promiſe or engagement for any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward: and if any perſon, holding or exerciſing any ſuch civil or military office, ſhall be guilty of any ſuch offence, and ſhall be thereof legally convicted in ſuch Supreme Court at *Calcutta*, or in the Mayor's Court in any other of the ſaid United Company's Settlements where ſuch offence ſhall have been committed, every ſuch perſon ſo convicted ſhall forfeit double the value of ſuch preſent, gift, donation, gratuity, or reward, ſo taken and received; one moiety of which forfeiture ſhall be to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who ſhall inform or proſecute for the ſame; and alſo ſhall and may be ſent to *England*, by the order of the Governor and Council of the Preſidency or Settlement where the offender ſhall be convicted, unleſs ſuch perſon ſo convicted ſhall give ſufficient ſecurity to remove him or themſelves within twelve months after ſuch conviction.

Counſellors, Phyſicians, Surgeons, and Chaplains excepted.

Provided always, and be it further enacted, that nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prohibit or prevent any perſon or perſons who ſhall carry on or exerciſe the profeſſion of a Counſellor at Law, a Phyſician, or a Surgeon, or being a Chaplain, from accepting,

APPENDIX, No. 1.

accepting, taking, or receiving any fees, gratuities, or rewards, in the way of their profeſſion.

The Company may proſecute and recover any gift, upon waving forfeitures.

And it is hereby further enacted, that every ſuch preſent, gift, gratuity, donation, or reward, accepted, taken, or received, and all ſuch dealing or tranſaction by way of traffick or commerce, of any kind whatſoever, carried on, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this Act, ſhall be deemed and conſtrued to have been received, taken, had, and done, to and for the ſole uſe of the ſaid United Company; and that the ſaid United Company, upon waving all penalties and forfeitures, ſhall and may ſue and proſecute for the recovery of the ſame, or the full value of ſuch preſent or gift, or the profits of ſuch trade, reſpectively, together with intereſt at the rate of five pounds per centum per annum, from the time of ſuch preſent, gift, gratuity, donation, or reward, being received, or of ſuch dealing or tranſaction by way of traffick or commerce, as aforeſaid, by action for money had and received to the uſe of the ſaid Company.

No Collector, Superviſor, &c. to buy goods by way of traffick.

And be it further enacted, that from and after the firſt day of Auguſt, One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, it ſhall not be lawful for any Collector, Superviſor, or any other of his Majeſty's ſubjects, employed or concerned in the collection of the revenues, or the adminiſtration of juſtice, in the provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, or *Oriſſa*, or their agents or ſervants, or any perſon or perſons in truſt for them, to buy any goods, wares, merchandiſe, or other commodities whatſoever, by way of traffick or trade, at any place within the provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, and to ſell the ſame again, or any part thereof, at the place where he or they bought the ſame, or at any other place within the ſaid provinces reſpectively; and it ſhall not be lawful for any of his Majeſty's ſubjects in the ſaid provinces, to engage, intermeddle, or be any way concerned, directly or indirectly, in the inland trade, in ſalt, beetlenut, tobacco, or rice, except on the account of the ſaid United Company, on pain of forfeiting all ſuch goods or commodities which he ſhall ſo buy and ſell again by way of traffick, or in which he ſhall ſo trade, and alſo treble the value thereof; one moiety to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who will ſue for the ſame in the ſaid Supreme Court; and every ſuch perſon, on conviction, ſhall moreover be liable to be ſent to *England* by ſuch order as aforeſaid, unleſs he or they ſhall give ſufficient ſecurity to remove him or themſelves within twelve months after ſuch conviction.

Not to reſtrain his Majeſty's ſubjects not herein prohibited:

Provided always, that nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prohibit or reſtrain any of his Majeſty's ſubjects, or any perſon or perſons whatſoever, (except ſuch perſons as are by this Act prohibited and reſtrained from being concerned in trade) from carrying on or exerciſing any trade or traffick within *Fort William* and the town of *Calcutta*.

Nor to extend to outſtanding debts, nor to ſelling merchandiſes poſſeſſed by perſons before ſuch prohibition take place.

Provided nevertheleſs, and be it enacted, that nothing herein contained ſhall extend, or be conſtrued to extend, to prohibit or prevent any ſuch perſon or perſons, who is, are, or ſhall be hereby reſtrained from carrying on any trade, or being concerned in the buying or ſelling any goods, wares, merchandiſes, or other commodities whatſoever, by way of traffick or trade as aforeſaid, or from being any way concerned in the inland trade, in ſalt, beetlenut, tobacco, or rice, from collecting in their outſtanding debts, or from ſelling and diſpoſing of the goods, wares, merchandiſes, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall ſeverally be poſſeſſed at the time when ſuch prohibition ſhall reſpectively take place, ſo as each ſuch perſon or perſons who by this Act, is, are, or ſhall be ſo reſtrained, ſhall, and each and every of them reſpectively do, deliver in to ſuch Governor General and Council of the provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa* aforeſaid, within thirty days from the time when ſuch reſtriction and prohibition ſhall take place, as aforeſaid, a full, true, and juſt ſpecification, upon oath, of the goods, wares, merchandiſes, effects, and ſtock in trade, of which he or they ſhall be at that time ſo reſpectively poſſeſſed; and ſo as ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall and do ſell and diſpoſe of ſuch goods, wares, merchandiſes, effects, and ſtock in trade, within the ſpace of nine months after ſuch reſtriction and prohibition as aforeſaid ſhall commence and take place; and ſo as no new trade or concern in commerce or merchandiſe be entered into, contracted for, or carried on, by ſuch perſon or perſons.

No perſon ſhall take on loan of money above the rate of twelve per cent. per annum.

And be it further enacted, that no ſubject of his Majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors, in the *Eaſt Indies*, ſhall, upon any contract which ſhall be made from and after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt, One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, take, directly or indirectly, for loan of any monies, wares, merchandiſe, or other commodities whatſoever, above the value of twelve pounds for the forbearance of one hundred pounds for a year, and ſo after that rate for a greater or leſſer ſum, or for a longer or ſhorter time; and that all bonds, contracts, and aſſurances whatſoever, made after the time aforeſaid, for payment of any principal, or money to be lent or covenanted to be performed upon, or for any uſury whereupon or whereby there ſhall be reſerved or taken above the rate of twelve pounds in the hundred as aforeſaid, ſhall be utterly void: and all and every ſuch perſon or perſons whatſoever who ſhall after the time aforeſaid, upon any contract to be made after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt, One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, take, accept, and receive, by way or means of any corrupt bargain, loan, exchange, ſhift, or intereſt, of any wares, merchandiſes, or other thing or things whatſoever, or by any deceitful way or mean, or by any covin, engine, or deceitful conveyance, for the forbearing or giving day of payment for one whole year, of and for their money or other thing, above the ſum of twelve pounds for the forbearing of one hundred pounds for a year, and ſo after that rate for a greater or leſſer ſum, or for a longer or ſhorter term, ſhall forfeit and loſe, for every ſuch offence, treble the value of the monies, wares, merchandiſes, and other things ſo lent, bargained, exchanged, or ſhifted, with coſts of ſuit; one moiety whereof ſhall be to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who will ſue for the ſame, in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* in *Calcutta*, or in the Mayor's Court in any other of the ſaid United Company's Settlements where ſuch offence ſhall have been committed, by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, in which no eſſoign, wager of law, or protection, ſhall be allowed; and in caſe no ſuch action, bill, plaint, or information, ſhall have been brought and proſecuted with effect within three years, that then it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the party aggrieved to ſue and proſecute for recovery of all ſums of money paid over and above ſuch rate of intereſt.

Perſons by covin accepting loans, &c. ſhall forfeit for every offence treble the value;

One moiety to go to the Company, and the other to the proſecutor.

And be it further enacted, that no informer or plaintiff ſhall or may compound or agree with any perſon or perſons that ſhall offend, or ſhall be ſurmiſed to offend, againſt this Act, for any offence committed, or pretended to be committed, before anſwer made in the ſaid Supreme Court, unto the information or ſuit in that behalf exhibited or proſecuted, nor after anſwer, but by the order or conſent of the ſaid Court, on pain that if any perſon or perſons ſhall offend in making of any compoſition or agreement, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this Act, or ſhall, by colour or pretence of proceſs, or without proceſs upon colour or pretence of any matter of offence againſt this Act, make any compoſition, or take any money, reward, or promiſe of reward, for himſelf, or to the uſe of any other, without order or conſent of the ſaid Court; that then he or they ſo offending, being thereof lawfully convicted, ſhall for every ſuch offence be liable to be fined and impriſoned at the diſcretion of the ſaid Court.

Perſons making compoſitions contrary to the meaning of the Act,

liable to be impriſoned at the diſcretion of the Court.

And be it further enacted, that from and after the ſaid firſt day of Auguſt, One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, it ſhall not be lawful for any perſon or perſons whatſoever, who ſhall have been diſmiſſed from, or ſhall have voluntarily reſigned, the ſervice of the ſaid United Company, or for any free Merchant, free Mariner, or

Perſons who may be diſmiſſed the ſervice, or reſign, &c.

or other perſon, whoſe covenants or agreements with the ſaid United Company for reſiding or trading in *India* ſhall be expired, from thenceforth to carry on, or be in anywiſe concerned in, any trade, traffick, merchandiſe, or commerce whatſoever, in the *Eaſt Indies*, other than for the diſpoſal of his or their ſtock in hand, without the licence of the ſaid United Company, or the Governor General and Council of the Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, or the Preſident and Council at the place or ſettlement where ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall reſide, for that purpoſe firſt had and obtained.

not to be concerned in any Traffick, other than for diſpoſal of Stock in hand.

And be it further enacted, that it ſhall and may be lawful for the Governor General and Council of the ſaid United Company's ſettlement at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, from time to time, to make and iſſue ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, for the good order and civil government of the ſaid United Company's ſettlement at *Fort William* aforeſaid, and other factories and places ſubordinate, or to be ſubordinate thereto, as ſhall be deemed juſt and reaſonable (ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, not being repugnant to the laws of the realm) and to ſet, impoſe, inflict, and levy, reaſonable fines and forfeitures for the breach or non-obſervance of ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations; but nevertheleſs the ſame, or any of them, ſhall not be valid, or of any force or effect, until the ſame ſhall be duly regiſtered and publiſhed in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, which ſhall be, by the ſaid new Charter, eſtabliſhed with the conſent and approbation of the ſaid Court; which regiſtry ſhall not be made until the expiration of twenty days after the ſame ſhall be openly publiſhed, and a copy thereof affixed in ſome conſpicuous part of the Court-houſe or place where the ſaid Supreme Court ſhall be held; and from and immediately after ſuch regiſtry as aforeſaid, the ſame ſhall be good and valid in law: but, nevertheleſs, it ſhall be lawful for any perſon or perſons in *India* to appeal therefrom to his Majeſty, his heirs or ſucceſſors, in Council, who are hereby impowered, if they think fit, to ſet aſide and repeal any ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations reſpectively, ſo as ſuch appeal, or notice thereof, be lodged in the ſaid new Court of Judicature, within the ſpace of ſixty days after the time of the regiſtering and publiſhing the ſame; and it ſhall be lawful for any perſon or perſons in *England* to appeal therefrom, in like manner, within ſixty days after the publiſhing the ſame in *England*; and it is hereby directed and required, that a copy of all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, from time to time, as the ſame ſhall be ſo received, ſhall be affixed in ſome conſpicuous and public place in the India-houſe, there to remain and be reſorted to as occaſion ſhall require; yet nevertheleſs ſuch appeal ſhall not obſtruct, impede, or hinder the immediate execution of any rule, ordinance, or regulation, ſo made and regiſtered as aforeſaid, until the ſame ſhall appear to have been ſet aſide or repealed, upon the hearing and determination of ſuch appeal.

Governor General and Council may make ſuch Regulations as may appear juſt;

which ſhall not be valid until duly regiſtered in the Supreme Court.

Appeals may be made to the King in Council, who may repeal ſuch Rules,

and a copy of all Regulations to be affixed in the India Houſe.

Provided always, and be it enacted, that the ſaid Governor General and Council ſhall, and they are hereby required, from time to time, to tranſmit copies of all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations as they ſhall make and iſſue, to one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State for the time being; and that it ſhall and may be lawful to and for his Majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors, from time to time, as they ſhall think neceſſary, to ſignify to the ſaid United Company, under his or their ſign manual, his or their diſapprobation and diſallowance of all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations; and that from and immediately after the time that ſuch diſapprobation ſhall be duly regiſtered and publiſhed in the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, ſhall be null and void; but in caſe his Majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors, ſhall not, within the ſpace of two years from the making of ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, ſignify his or their diſapprobation or diſallowance thereof as aforeſaid, that then and in that caſe, all ſuch rules, ordinances, and regulations, ſhall be valid and effectual, and have full force.

Governor General and Council to tranſmit copies of their Rules to one of the Secretaries of State;

which, if his Majeſty does not ſignify his diſallowance of, ſhall have full force.

And be it further enacted, that the Governor General and Council for the time being of the ſaid United Company's ſettlement at *Fort William* aforeſaid, and the Chief Juſtice and other Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, ſhall and may, and they are hereby reſpectively declared to be, and to have full power and authority to act as Juſtices of the Peace for the ſaid ſettlement, and for the ſeveral ſettlements and factories ſubordinate thereto, and to do and tranſact all matters and things which to the office of a Juſtice or Juſtices of the Peace do belong and appertain; and for that purpoſe the ſaid Governor General and Council are hereby authorized and impowered to hold Quarter Seſſions within the ſaid ſettlement of *Fort William* aforeſaid, four times in every year; and the ſame ſhall be at all times a Court of Record.

Governor General and Council act as Juſtices of the Peace.

And be it further enacted, that if any Governor General, Preſident, or Governor or Council of any of the ſaid Company's principal or other ſettlements in *India*, or the Chief Juſtice, or any of the Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature to be by the ſaid new Charter eſtabliſhed, or of any other Court in any of the ſaid United Company's ſettlements, or any other perſon or perſons who now are, or heretofore have been employed by or in the ſervice of the ſaid United Company, in any civil or military ſtation, office, or capacity, or who have or claim, or heretofore have had or claimed, any power or authority, or juriſdiction, by or from the ſaid United Company, or any of his Majeſty's ſubjects reſiding in *India*, ſhall commit any offence againſt this Act, or ſhall have been, or ſhall be guilty of any crime, miſdemeanor, or offence, committed againſt any of his Majeſty's ſubjects, or any of the inhabitants of *India*, within their reſpective juriſdictions, all ſuch crimes, offences, and miſdemeanors, may be reſpectively enquired of, heard, tried, and determined, in his Majeſty's Court of King's Bench; and all ſuch perſons ſo offending, and not having been before tried for the ſame offence in *India*, ſhall on conviction in any ſuch caſe as is not ſpecially provided for by this Act, be liable to ſuch fine or corporal puniſhment as the ſaid Court ſhall think fit, and moreover ſhall be liable, at the diſcretion of the ſaid Court, to be adjudged to be incapable of ſerving the ſaid United Company in any office, civil or military; and all and every ſuch crimes, offences, and miſdemeanors as aforeſaid, may be alledged to be committed, and may be laid, enquired of, and tried, in the County of *Middleſex*.

If the Governor General, President, &c. commit offences, the ſame may be tried and determined in the Court of King's Bench.

And whereas the proviſions made by former laws for the hearing and determining in *England* offences committed in *India*, have been found ineffectual, by reaſon of the difficulty of proving in this Kingdom matters done there; Be it further enacted, that in all caſes of indictments or informations, laid or exhibited in the ſaid Court of King's Bench, for miſdemeanors or offences committed in *India*, it ſhall and may be lawful for his Majeſty's ſaid Court, upon motion to be made on behalf of the proſecutor, or of the defendant or defendants, to award a writ or writs of Mandamus, requiring the Chief Juſtice and Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature for the time being, or the Judges of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, as the caſe may require, who are hereby reſpectively authorized and required accordingly to hold a Court, with all convenient ſpeed, for the examination of Witneſſes, and receiving other proofs concerning the matters charged in ſuch indictments or informations reſpectively, and in the meantime to cauſe ſuch public notice to be given of the holding the ſaid Court, and to iſſue ſuch ſummons or other proceſs as may be requiſite for the attendance of Witneſſes, and of the Agents or Counſel, of all or any of the parties reſpectively, and to adjourn, from time to time, as occaſion may require; and ſuch examination as aforeſaid ſhall be then and there openly and publicly taken *vivâ voce* in

Manner of Proceeding in caſes of Indictments and Informations laid in the King's Bench.

APPENDIX. No. 1 & 2.

the ſaid Court, upon the reſpective oaths of Witneſſes, and the oaths of ſkilful Interpreters, adminiſtered according to the forms of their ſeveral religions; and ſhall, by ſome ſworn Officer of ſuch Court, be reduced into one or more writing or writings on parchment, in caſe any duplicate or duplicates ſhould be required by or on behalf of any of the parties intereſted, and ſhall be ſent to his Majeſty, in his Court of King's Bench, cloſed up, and under the ſeals of two or more of the Judges of the ſaid Court; and one or more of the ſaid Judges ſhall deliver the ſame to the Agent or Agents of the party or parties requiring the ſame, which ſaid Agent or Agents (or, in caſe of his or their death, the perſon into whoſe hands the ſame ſhall come) ſhall deliver the ſame to one of the Clerks in Court of his Majeſty's Court of King's Bench in the public office, and make oath that he received the ſame from the hands of one or more of the Judges of ſuch Court in *India*; (or, if ſuch Agent be dead, in what manner the ſame came into his hands) and that the ſame has not been opened or altered ſince he ſo received it (which ſaid oath ſuch Clerk in Court is hereby authorized and required to adminiſter): and ſuch depoſitions being duly taken and returned, according to the true intent and meaning of this Act, ſhall be allowed and read, and ſhall be deemed as good and competent evidence as if ſuch Witneſs had been preſent, and ſworn and examined vivâ voce, at any trial for ſuch crimes or miſdemeanors as aforeſaid, in his Majeſty's ſaid Court of King's Bench, any law or uſage to the contrary notwithſtanding; and all parties concerned ſhall be entitled to take copies of ſuch depoſitions at their own coſts and charges.

The Chancellor, or Speaker of the Houſe of Commons, may iſſue Warrants for the Examination of Witneſſes in India, which ſhall be deemed competent Evidence to both Houſes of Parliament.

And be it further enacted, that in all caſes of proceedings in Parliament, touching any offences againſt this Act, or any other offences committed in *India*, it ſhall and may be lawful for the Lord High Chancellor or Speaker of the Houſe of Lords, and alſo for the Speaker of the Houſe of Commons for the time being, in like manner to iſſue his or their warrant or warrants to the Governor General and Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William*, and to the Chief Juſtice and Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature, or the Judges of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, as the caſe may require, for the examination of Witneſſes; and ſuch examination ſhall be returned to the ſaid Lord High Chancellor or Speaker of the Houſe of Lords, or to the Speaker of the Houſe of Commons reſpectively, and proceeded upon in the ſame manner, in all reſpects, as if the ſeveral directions hereinbefore preſcribed and enacted in that behalf were again particularly repeated; and every ſuch examination returned either to the Lord Chancellor or Speaker of the Houſe of Lords, or to the Speaker of the Houſe of Commons, as aforeſaid, ſhall be deemed good and competent evidence, and ſhall be allowed and read in both Houſes of Parliament, or either of them reſpectively, as occaſion may require; any law or uſage to the contrary notwithſtanding.

No Proceedings in Parliament, touching Offences in India, to be diſcontinued by any Prorogation.

And whereas, by the uſage and cuſtom of Parliament, no proceedings by bill in Parliament, have continuance from one ſeſſion to another: and whereas it would be impracticable that the examination taken upon ſuch warrant as aforeſaid, could ever be returned within the ordinary length of a ſeſſion of Parliament; Be it enacted, that from and after the firſt day of November, One thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-three, no proceedings in Parliament, touching any offence committed or to be committed in *India*, wherein ſuch warrant as aforeſaid ſhall have been iſſued, ſhall be diſcontinued by any prorogation or diſſolution of the Parliament; but that ſuch proceedings may be reſumed and proceeded upon in a ſubſequent ſeſſion, or in a ſubſequent Parliament, in either Houſe of Parliament, in like manner, to all intents and purpoſes, as they might have been in the courſe of one and the ſame ſeſſion; any law, uſage, or cuſtom, to the contrary notwithſtanding.

Writs of Mandamus may be awarded by the Courts at Weſtminſter, when the Company commence Suits in Law or Equity there.

And whereas his Majeſty's ſubjects are liable to be defeated of their ſeveral rights, titles, debts, dues, demands, or ſuits, for which they have cauſe ariſing in *India* againſt other ſubjects of his Majeſty; now, for preventing ſuch failure of juſtice, Be it further enacted, that when and as often as the ſaid United Company, or any perſon or perſons whatſoever, ſhall commence and proſecute any action or ſuit, in law or equity, for which cauſe hath ariſen, or ſhall hereafter ariſe, in *India*, againſt any other perſon or perſons whatever, in any of his Majeſty's Courts at *Weſtminſter*, it ſhall and may be lawful for ſuch Court reſpectively, upon motion there to be made, to provide and award ſuch writ or writs, in the nature of a Mandamus or Commiſſion, as aforeſaid, to the Chief Juſtice and Judges of the ſaid Supreme Court of Judicature for the time being, or the Judges of the Mayor's Court at *Madras*, *Bombay*, or *Bencoolen*, as the caſe may require, for the examination of Witneſſes as aforeſaid, and ſuch examination being duly returned, ſhall be allowed and read, and ſhall be deemed good and competent evidence at any trial or hearing between the parties in ſuch cauſe or action, in the ſame manner, in all reſpects, as if the ſeveral directions hereinbefore preſcribed and enacted in that behalf were again repeated.

No Depoſitions returned to be allowed as Evidence, in Caſes not proceeded againſt in Parliament.

Provided nevertheleſs, and be it enacted, that no ſuch depoſitions taken and returned as aforeſaid by virtue of this Act, ſhall be allowed or permitted to be given in evidence in any capital caſes, other than ſuch as ſhall be proceeded againſt in Parliament; any thing in this Act contained to the contrary notwithſtanding.

The Privileges of the Company not hereby varied, ſhall remain in force.

And be it further enacted, that all and every the rights, intereſts, powers, privileges, and authorities, which are now veſted in the ſaid United Company of Merchants trading to the *Eaſt Indies*, and which are not hereby expreſsly taken away, altered, or varied, ſhall remain to and continue in the ſaid Company, in as full and ample a manner, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever, as if this Act had never been made.

Public Act.

And be it further enacted, that this Act ſhall be deemed and taken to be a Public Act; of which notice ſhall be judicially taken by all Judges, Juſtices, and other perſons whatſoever, without ſpecially pleading the ſame.

APPENDIX, No. 2.

Inſtructions from the Court of Directors of the United Company of Merchants of *England*, trading to the *Eaſt Indies*;

To *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Governor General, Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the Honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, eſquire, and *Philip Francis*, eſquire, Counſellors, conſtituted and appointed the Governor General and Council of the ſaid United Company's Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, by an Act of Parliament, paſſed in the laſt Seſſion, intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing certain Regulations "for the better management of the Affairs of "the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in "*Europe*."

Preamble.

THE Legiſlature of this kingdom having entruſted you with the civil and military government of the ſaid Preſidency of *Fort William*, and alſo with the ordering, management, and government of all the territorial acquiſitions and revenues in the kingdoms of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, for the term and in the manner directed and preſcribed by the ſaid Act (to which you will refer yourſelves, with reſpect to the execution of ſuch powers, and the obſervance of ſuch rules and directions therein contained, as are incumbent on you to execute and perform) we, the ſaid Court of Directors, in virtue of the power reſerved in the ſaid Act, whereby the ſaid Governor General and Council, for the time being, are directed and

and required to pay due obedience to all ſuch orders as they ſhall receive from the Court of Directors of the ſaid United Company, do now proceed to give you ſuch orders and inſtructions, to be by you executed and put in force, as appear to us the moſt prudent and effectual for the good government and management of the Company's affairs in *India*.

Harmony recommended, and Attention to the Preſervation of Peace in India, and Security of the Company's Revenues.

I. And firſt, after earneſtly recommending to you the moſt perfect harmony amongſt yourſelves, as an object of the higheſt concern to the proſperity of the Company, and the due execution of the great truſt repoſed in you, we direct, that you fix your attention to the preſervation of peace throughout *India*, and to the ſecurity of the Poſſeſſions and Revenues of the Company.

Regulation of Proceedings of Council; and Correſpondence with Country Powers.

II. We direct, that you aſſemble in Council twice in every week, and that all the Members be duly ſummoned; that the correſpondence with the Princes or Country Powers in *India*, be carried on by the Governor General only; but that all Letters to be ſent by him be firſt approved in Council, and that he lay before the Council, at their next meeting, all Letters received by him in the courſe of ſuch correſpondence, for their information: we likewiſe direct, that a copy of ſuch parts of the country correſpondence be communicated to our Board of Trade (to be conſtituted as hereinafter mentioned) as may anyways relate to the buſineſs of their department.

Treaties with Indian Powers.

III. As it is now become unlawful for the Preſidents and Councils of our other Settlements to make peace or war with any Indian Powers, or to conclude any treaties with ſuch Powers, without your conſent or approbation, except in caſes of imminent neceſſity, or where they ſhall have received ſpecial orders from the Company, we direct, that you attentively view the general poſture of our affairs in *India*, reſpecting the Country Powers, their intereſts, and probable connections with each other, with us, and other European Nations; and that you take ſuch meaſures as ſhall, upon the whole, be moſt conducive to our general intereſt: and in all your deliberations and reſolutions, that you make the ſafety and proſperity of *Bengal* your principal object; and in all treaties with Indian Powers, or conventions with European Nations, whereby our commerce can be affected, we direct, that before any ſuch treaties ſhall be agreed to by you, you take the opinion of our Board of Trade thereon in writing.

Eſtabliſhment of a Board of Trade, with Power to appoint ſubordinate Officers.

IV. As the welfare of the Company muſt in a great meaſure depend on the proper management of their Commercial Affairs in *Bengal*, and particularly on receiving well-choſen inveſtments, in order that thoſe valuable purpoſes may be anſwered, we have judged it expedient to eſtabliſh a Board of Trade; and thinking it incumbent on us to avail ourſelves of the abilities and experience of our late Council, we therefore direct, that *Samuel Middleton*, *William Alderſey*, *John Reed*, *Philip Milner Dacres*, *Thomas Lane*, *James Lawrell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *William Lambert*, *George Vanſittart*, and *Nicholas Grueber*, being our eleven ſenior civil ſervants, be our Board of Trade, for managing, conducting, and tranſacting our trade and commerce in *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*; and we hereby empower our ſaid Board of Trade to appoint ſubordinate Officers and Agents under them, from amongſt our covenanted ſervants only; and to ſuſpend or remove any ſuch Officers or Agents, when they ſhall find it neceſſary for our intereſt ſo to do; but in every appointment made by our Board of Trade, we direct, that they do not require any perſon, who ſhall be employed by the Governor General and Council in the collection or management of the Revenues, to execute any office under the ſaid Board; it being our intention, that none of our ſervants ſhall hold employments in thoſe different departments at the ſame time.

Appointment of Preſident of the Board of Trade.

V. We hereby appoint *Samuel Middleton*, eſq. Preſident of our Board of Trade; and in caſe of his death, reſignation, or removal, the ſenior Member in rank ſhall ſucceed.

VI. That *ſeven* Members of the Board do conſtantly reſide at *Calcutta*; that *four* be appointed Chiefs of Subordinates, or Reſidents at the Aurungs, as the Board ſhall deem neceſſary; and that the appointment to each Chiefſhip or Reſidency be determined by a ſeparate ballot of the Members of the Board; but that no ſuch Chief or Reſident be permitted to remain at the ſame Subordinate or Aurung for more than three years ſucceſſively.

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Seven Members of the Board of Trade to reſide at Calcutta, and Four to be Chiefs of Subordinates, or Reſidents at the Aurungs.

Mode of Proceedings of the Board of Trade againſt any of their own Members.

VII. We order and direct our Board of Trade, in caſe any Member of the ſaid Board, being reſident at *Calcutta*, or at the Aurungs, or Chief of a ſubordinate Factory, be at any time charged with negligence in the execution of the truſt repoſed in him, or diſobedience of orders, that they ſummon him to the Board, and that he be made acquainted in writing with all accuſations preferred againſt him; that he have a reaſonable time to make his defence; and that if the charge be proved to their ſatisfaction, they ſuſpend him from the Company's ſervice; and if he ſhall be charged with any offence cognizable by the Supreme Court of Judicature, that they cauſe him forthwith to be proſecuted for the ſame.

Succeſſion to the Board of Trade, by Seniority.

VIII. That in caſe of the death or removal of any Member of the Board of Trade, the next ſenior ſervant upon the civil eſtabliſhment do immediately ſucceed to a ſeat at that Board, until our pleaſure be known.

Vacancies at Subordinates to be filled by Ballot of the Members of the Board.

IX. That in caſe of the death or removal of a Chief of a ſubordinate Factory or Reſident at any Aurung, a ſucceſſor be choſen by ballot by the Members of our Board of Trade then reſident at *Calcutta*; and in every caſe where the number of votes, ſhall be found equal that the ſame be finally determined by drawing lots.

Orders to Subordinates to be ſigned by Four Members.

X. That all orders to the Aurungs, or to ſubordinate Factories, be ſigned by at leaſt four Members of the Board of Trade reſiding at *Calcutta*.

Order of Proceedings of the Board of Trade.

XI. It is our order, that our Board of Trade aſſemble twice in every week; that five Members, and not a leſs number, do conſtitute a Board; that they regularly enter all their proceedings upon Conſultation, and all diſſents, if ſuch ſhall at any time be made by any Member of the ſaid Board, together with all Letters received and ſent in their department; that copies thereof, ſigned by the Members of the Board, be from time to time delivered to you, and by you tranſmitted to us, and duplicates by the next conveyance, as hath been uſually practiſed by our Preſident and Council reſpecting their Conſultations and Proceedings; and that if the Board of Trade ſhall at any time have particular information or remarks, which they ſhall think neceſſary to communicate to us, the ſame be tranſmitted by you; and we further direct, that you tranſmit at the ſame time your ſentiments at large upon the ſubject.

Senior Member of the Board to preſide in the Abſence of the Preſident.

XII. That in caſe of ſickneſs of the Preſident, or of his being unavoidably prevented from attending at any meeting of the Board of Trade, the ſenior Member who may then be preſent do take the chair; and that the Board do thereupon proceed to the diſpatch of buſineſs.

Salaries of the Board of Trade.

XIII. That there be paid to the Preſident of our Board of Trade £. 2,000 ſterling per annum, and to each of the other Members of the ſaid Board £. 1,500 per annum, by quarterly payments; which ſums are to be in lieu of commiſſion upon the Revenues, and in full for ſalary, diet money, and every emolument, except ſuch advantages as may ariſe from carrying on a legal trade, and the uſual commiſſion to the Preſident on coral and diamonds, which we direct to be given to him.

Requiſition for Money by the Board of Trade to be complied with.

XIV. We hereby direct, that you iſſue from time to time to our Board of Trade ſuch ſums of money as they ſhall require, in order to make the uſual advances to the Aurungs, and for all neceſſary payments reſpecting the Company's inveſtment, or other diſburſements in their department.

Servants employed in Collection of the Revenues to be continued; and thoſe employed in the Inveſtments to be under the Direction of the Board of Trade.

XV. We direct, that in the collection and management of the Revenues, you continue ſuch of our ſervants as are or have been employed with reputation in that department; and that you leave under the direction of our Board of Trade, thoſe of our ſervants whom they may report

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report to you as ſkilled in the proviſion of the Company's inveſtment.

Salaries to Officers in the Revenue Department, to be provisional only.

XVI. When you take into conſideration the ſalaries to be allowed to the Officers employed in the Revenue Department, we recommend the ſtricteſt œconomy, and direct, that no greater ſalaries be eſtabliſhed, than the importance of their ſeveral ſtations may render neceſſary; which ſalaries are to be deemed proviſional only, until they ſhall have received our approbation.

Conſignment of Ships to be made to the Governor General and Council, and ſeparate Invoices to the Board of Trade.

XVII. It is our intention to conſign all our *Bengal* ſhips directly to you; but we ſhall make ſeparate invoices of ſuch parts of their cargoes as may be intended for ſale, and conſign the ſame to our Board of Trade; who are hereby directed to apply the produce thereof towards the proviſion of our inveſtment. Our orders for inveſtments will be tranſmitted through your hands to our Board of Trade; and if at any time we ſhould require an inveſtment larger than your finances may enable them to furniſh, you are to ſignify to the ſaid Board of Trade, what diminution you may deem neceſſary, and direct them to limit their purchaſes accordingly; but in all tranſactions of this nature, we ſhall hold you reſponſible for any deviation from our orders.

Proceedings of Board of Trade to be inquired into by the Governor General and Council.

XVIII. We empower and direct you to inquire, from time to time, into the books, correſpondence, accounts, and proceedings of our Board of Trade, in order that you may be fully informed of the meaſures taken, and proviſions made for lading our ſhips with proper cargoes for *Europe*, and for completing ſuch cargoes in due time; and that you communicate to us ſuch obſervations as may occur to you thereon, and particularly if you ſhould obſerve any miſconduct in their department, that you inform us thereof by the earlieſt opportunity.

Members of the Board of Trade to be proſecuted for Breach of Truſt or Oppreſſion.

XIX. If any Member of our Board of Trade ſhall appear to you guilty of embezzlement of the Company's money, or of oppreſſion, or of any other breach of the truſt repoſed in him by us, we direct, that you forthwith cauſe him to be proſecuted for the ſame in the Supreme Court of Judicature to be eſtabliſhed under the ſaid Act of Parliament.

Vacancies in the Service to be filled by Perſons next in rank.

XX. If any of the Company's ſervants, civil or military (except the Members of our Board of Trade, whom we do not make liable to your ſuſpenſion) ſhall at any time be ſuſpended by you from the execution of his office, or any vacancy ſhall happen by reſignation, or death, it is our order and direction, that the perſon next in rank, office, or rotation, be appointed to ſupply ſuch vacancy in our civil or military ſervice, until our pleaſure ſhall be known. We alſo further direct, that before the removal of any Company's ſervant from any office, the party be made acquainted, in writing, with the accuſation preferred againſt him; that he be ſummoned to make his defence, having a reaſonable time allowed him for that purpoſe; and that you proceed on all ſuch occaſions with the greateſt tenderneſs and circumſpection; and we further direct, that all ſuch charges made before you, againſt any of our ſervants in your department, with all proceedings thereon, be regularly entered upon your Conſultations, and with them tranſmitted to us.

Accuſations againſt Company's Servants to be made in writing; Time to be allowed for defence; and all Proceedings to be tranſmitted to Europe.

Aſſiſtance to be given to Board of Trade for recovering Debts due to the Company.

XXI. As it hath frequently happened, in our intercourſe with the native manufacturers of *Bengal*, that by reaſon of advances made to them at the beginning, they have been largely indebted to us at the cloſe of the ſeaſon, it is our expreſs direction, that you afford effectual aſſiſtance to our Board of Trade for obtaining full payment of all outſtanding debts due from the Natives of *Bengal* to the Company, upon application made by our Board of Trade to you for that purpoſe.

Agents for Foreign Companies, Free Merchants, and others, to be prevented from embaraſſing the Board of Trade.

XXII. And as the Agents of Foreign Companies, Free Merchants, and others, may greatly embarraſs our Board of Trade in the proviſion of our inveſtments, by obtaining from the Company's manufacturers the goods manufactured by means of our advances; we direct, that you forthwith form ſuch regulations, as ſhall effectually guard our property againſt attempts of this nature.

Eleven ſenior Servants to be ſummoned to Cal

XXIII. We direct, that ſo ſoon as poſſible after the arrival of theſe our orders and inſtructions at *Fort William*, you ſummon *Samuel Middleton*, *William Alderſey*, *John Reed*, *Philip Milner Lacres*, *Thomas Lane*, *James Lamb*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *William Lambert*, *George Vanſittart*, and *Nicholas Grueber*, being our eleven ſenior civil ſervants, to aſſemble within thirty days at *Calcutta*: and that you deliver to them an authenticated copy of theſe our inſtructions; and it is our order, that our ſaid ſervants, immediately upon receipt of ſuch copy, do forthwith proceed to carry into execution ſuch parts as anyways relate to the eſtabliſhment or conduct of a Board of Trade in *Bengal*.

Copies and Extracts of Inſtructions to be delivered to them.

Governor General and Council to give Advice to the Board of Trade.

XXIV. Having thus communicated to you our ideas on the ſubject of the Company's inveſtments, under the direction of a Board of Trade, we moſt earneſtly recommend, that you cordially unite with our ſervants in that department, and that you afford them every aſſiſtance in your power, in order to enable them to anſwer the eſſential purpoſes intended by their appointment.

Europeans not to exerciſe any Office in the Company's Service, unleſs appointed by the Court of Directors.

XXV. As we have never permitted our Governor and Council, or our Select Committee in *Bengal*, to admit Europeans into our ſervice, unleſs by the appointment of the Court of Directors; nor to licenſe free merchants, free mariners, or others, to reſide in *India*; we expreſsly direct, that you do not, on any account, or under any pretence whatſoever, ſuffer any European to hold any poſt, or to exerciſe any office in our ſervice, civil or military, who ſhall not have been appointed or admitted into the Company's ſervice by the expreſs authority of the Court of Directors.

Copies of ſuch parts of Letters or Advices as are to be delivered to the Lords of the Treaſury, or Secretary of State, are to be tranſmitted to the Court of Directors by every Ship.

XXVI. You will obſerve, that by the before-mentioned Act, you are required to correſpond with the Court of Directors from time to time, and conſtantly and diligently to tranſmit to them exact particulars of all advices or intelligence, and of all tranſactions and matters that ſhall come to your knowledge, relating to the Government, Commerce, Revenues, or Intereſt of the Company; and that the Court of Directors are required, within fourteen days after the receipt of any ſuch Letters or Advices, to deliver in to the Lords of the Treaſury, a copy of ſuch parts of the ſaid Letters or Advices as ſhall anyway relate to the management of the Company's Revenues; and in like manner, to deliver in to one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, a copy of all ſuch parts of the ſaid Letters and Advices as ſhall any way relate to their Civil and Military Affairs and Government: in order, therefore, to enable us to comply with the directions of the ſaid Act, we hereby order and direct, that you tranſmit to us, by every ſhip, an exact copy, and a duplicate by the next conveyance, of all ſuch parts of your Letters and Advices, as are by this law directed to be delivered to the Lords of the Treaſury, and to his Majeſty's Secretary of State reſpectively; and that every copy and duplicate be authenticated under the hands of the Governor General and Council.

Intelligence reſpecting foreign Companies to be communicated.

XXVII. In your correſpondence with the Court of Directors, it is our order, that the moſt regular and preciſe intelligence be from time to time communicated, reſpecting the commerce, the number of forces, and the general ſtrength, of all foreign Companies in *India*; and ſuch intelligence muſt, ſo far as it is practicable, be continued by every Britiſh ſhip which ſhall ſail for *Europe*.

Military Expences to be enquired into, and ſuperfluous Charges retrenched.

XXVIII. Our military expences at *Bengal* having increaſed to a degree which is become inſupportable to us, we in an eſpecial manner enjoin you to make ſtrict inquiry into the cauſes of ſuch increaſe, and particularly into the number of Laſcars, draught bullocks, and boats kept for the uſe of the army; into contracts for ſupplying the troops with proviſions, and into all contingent charges; and we direct, that you forthwith retrench every ſuperfluous charge, and reduce every incidental expence to the loweſt ſum poſſible.

Annual Expence of public Buildings reſtricted to One hundred thouſand Pounds Sterling; and Accounts of Expenditure to be ſent to the Court of Directors.

XXIX. Having found it neceſſary to limit expreſsly the charges of erecting, repairing, or completing fortifications, barracks, and all other public buildings in *Bengal* and its dependencies, to the annual ſum of One hundred thouſand pounds ſterling, and having given orders to our Governor and Council to that purpoſe, we hereby

hereby confirm our ſaid orders, and direct that you, on no account or pretence whatever, permit more than the ſaid ſum to be annually expended on the above-mentioned ſervices; and that the keeping of our fortifications and public works in a defenſible ſtate and condition, be firſt conſidered in the expenditure thereof, until a further reduction can take place; and that a very exact and particular account of ſuch expenditure be tranſmitted to us by every opportunity, with your ſentiments and obſervations *minutely on the ſtate of the ſaid works and fortifications.*

Orders relative to the Supreme Court of Judicature; and to the Fees of the Clerks and miniſterial Officers.

XXX. As in purſuance of the Act of Parliament, a Supreme Court of Judicature, conſiſting of a Chief Juſtice and three other Judges, is intended to be erected at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, to exerciſe and perform all civil, criminal, admiralty, and eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction at the ſaid Preſidency; we direct, that upon the eſtabliſhment of ſuch Court, you give all neceſſary aſſiſtance to the Judges; that you provide a Court-houſe, and proper Offices for ſuch Clerks and miniſterial Officers as ſhall be appointed by them; and when the fees to be payable to the Officers of the Supreme Court are fixed, we direct, that you cauſe tables thereof to be hung up in the moſt public places, in the different languages of the Country; that no perſon take more than ſuch fees, upon pain of being diſmiſſed; and you will take into conſideration the amount of thoſe fees, in approving the ſalaries of the reſpective Officers; and you are to tranſmit to us, ſo ſoon as poſſible, a particular account of ſuch ſalaries and fees.

Salaries to be paid to the Governor General and Council, and to the Judges and Officers of the Court of Judicature.

XXXI. We direct, that you duly pay to the Governor General, to each of the Council, to the Chief Juſtice, and to each of the Judges, the ſeveral ſalaries eſtabliſhed by the ſaid Act; obſerving at the ſame time, that thoſe ample ſalaries given to them by Parliament, are to be in lieu of all fees of office, perquiſites, emoluments, or advantages whatſoever, and therefore that we are not to be at any further expence on their account; and as the Officers of the Court are to be allowed ſuch ſalaries as ſhall be approved by the Governor General and Council, we recommend the ſtricteſt frugality in that reſpect; and direct, that no greater allowances be made to any of them, than their reſpective ſtations ſhall require.

Governor Haſtings, and the Preſident of Board of Trade, to be allowed Company's Houſes.

XXXII. But in conſideration of our reſpect for *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, we direct that he continue to enjoy our principal houſe, together with the plate and furniture, both in town and country, rent-free; and that our Preſident of the Board of Trade ſhall, in like manner, have his choice of the next beſt houſe belonging to the Company, without the payment of any rent.

Reduction of Bond Debt in Bengal recommended.

XXXIII. As the reduction of our debt on bond or intereſt notes in *Bengal*, is of the utmoſt conſequence to our proſperity, we recommend it to you, to pay every attention to this object, conſiſtent with the ſafety and protection of our poſſeſſions, and with the requiſitions that ſhall be made to you for our inveſtments.

Lands and Farms to be continued on Leaſe; and no Abatement of Rent to be made, without the Licence of the Governor General and Council.

XXXIV. The Lands and Farms of the Provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, having been already let by our Governor and Council, and chiefly upon leaſe for a term of years, we have approved of the conduct of our ſaid Governor and Council in letting them; and in caſe it ſhould happen that any Lands or Farms fall to the Company before the expiration of the time for which they have been let, our order is, that you advertiſe for propoſals, and proceed in the ſame manner to relet ſuch Lands and Farms as hath heretofore been done, to the higheſt bidders, who may be able to give good ſecurity for the performance of their engagements. And it is our order and direction, that no forbearance of rent be permitted when due, nor any diminution or abatement of Revenue made, until, upon full repreſentation to you of all circumſtances which may entitle any Farmer to indulgence, the Collectors of Revenue ſhall have obtained your licence for temporary forbearance, or for the abſolute remiſſion of any part of our Rents or Revenues; and we alſo direct, that ſuch licence do ſpecify the reaſon for every indulgence or remiſſion, the name of the perſon to whom made, the groſs amount of the Farm rented, and the ſpecific ſum or ſums received for or in lieu of the whole; and it is our further pleaſure, that a regular account be kept of all ſums finally remitted to Renters, and that you tranſmit ſuch account to us annually, under the head of *Abatements to Farmers*; accompanied with the general rent-roll of the Provinces, for the year in which ſuch abatements may be made.

Enquiry to be made into paſt Oppreſſions, and Regulations to be formed for preventing future Abuſes.

XXXV. We direct, that you immediately cauſe the ſtricteſt enquiry to be made into all oppreſſions which may have been committed either againſt the Natives or Europeans, and into all abuſes that may have prevailed in the collection of the Revenues, or any part of the civil Government of the Preſidency; and that you communicate to us all information which you may be able to obtain relative thereto, or to any diſſipation or embezzlement of the Company's money; and that you ſo ſoon as poſſible form ſuch regulations as ſhall ſeem moſt effectual for the remedy thereof, and for regulating the police of the Country; paying the greateſt attention therein to the protection and welfare of the Natives, and to his Majeſty's European ſubjects, as well as to the intereſt of the Company.

Company's Buſineſs in Bengal to be carried on as uſual by Contract, and Preference given to the loweſt Propoſal.

XXXVI. As all the Company's buſineſs, which can conveniently be performed by contract, is ſo performed in *Bengal*; we have only to direct, that all contracts, with the conditions, be publicly advertiſed, and ſealed propoſals received for the ſame; that every propoſal be opened in Council, and the preference given to the loweſt, provided ſufficient ſecurity ſhall be offered for performance; and that all ſuch propoſals, with all proceedings thereon, be entered in a book, to be kept apart for that purpoſe, and regularly tranſmitted to us.

All Proceedings and Diſſents to be entered on Conſultations, and tranſmitted to the Court of Directors.

XXXVII. In tranſacting the buſineſs of your department it is our order, that you enter, with the utmoſt perſpicuity and exactneſs, upon Conſultations, or Minutes of Council, all your Proceedings whatſoever, and all diſſents, if ſuch ſhould at any time be made by any Member of your Board; together with all Letters received and ſent in the courſe of your correſpondence; and that broken ſets of all ſuch Proceedings, to the lateſt periods poſſible, be tranſmitted to us by every ſhip; a complete ſet at the end of every year; and a duplicate by the next conveyance.

New Committee of Treaſury to be appointed, and all Iſſues of Money to be made by Warrant of Governor General and Council.

XXXVIII. We direct that all monies which may ariſe from our Revenues, or be received by you on our account, be ſecured under three locks as uſual; that the keys be kept by the Governor General, and ſuch other Members of Council as you ſhall appoint, who ſhall be a Committee of Treaſury; that exact particulars of all monies paid into our Treaſury be firſt regularly entered on your Conſultations, ſpecifying from whom received, and on what account; and that all iſſues of money from our ſaid Treaſury be made by warrant under your hands, directed to the Committee of Treaſury, and not otherwiſe.

Paymaſters and other Perſons applying for Advances, to ſpecify what Caſh they have in hand, before the Application be complied with.

That all applications for money be made to you in writing; and that all Paymaſters, and other perſons, who may apply for money in advance, do at the ſame time ſpecify whether they have any of the Company's money in hand, and to what amount; and alſo the particular ſervices to which the money applied for is intended to be appropriated; and it is our expreſs order, that no advance be made from the Treaſury upon any application which ſhall be deficient in any of the circumſtances above-mentioned. And we direct, that the Committee of Treaſury prepare exact Accounts, monthly, of all monies received and iſſued by that Board; that the monies in the Treaſury be viewed monthly by thoſe Members of the Council who may not be of the Committee of Treaſury; and that they compare the caſh in the Treaſury with the balance of the ſaid Committee's Accounts, and report their Proceedings to the Council at large; and we alſo direct that the ſaid Accounts, and copies of all receipts and warrants, be tranſmitted to us by every opportunity for our information.

APPENDIX. No. 3.

Former Orders of the Company to be ſtrictly attended to, and carried into execution.

XXXIX. It is alſo our expreſs direction, that you not only ſtrictly attend to the ſtanding orders of the Company, communicated to their Preſidency of *Fort William*, but to all ſuch orders and inſtructions as the Court of Directors have tranſmitted to the Governor and Council, or Select Committee of the ſaid Preſidency; and in an eſpecial manner to thoſe which anyways relate to forming proper ſtatements of our Revenues, and to the keeping of our Treaſury Accounts; and if any of our orders remain unexecuted, you are to take care that the ſame be carried into execution, in every inſtance, wherein they have not been annulled by the before-mentioned Act of Parliament, or ſuperieded by our preſent orders and inſtructions.

Your opinions are deſired, whether theſe inſtructions are legal, and conſiſtent with the proviſions of the Act of Parliament of the 13th of his preſent Majeſty, ch. 63.

We are of opinion, theſe inſtructions are legal, and conſiſtent with the proviſions of the Act of Parliament of the 13th of his preſent Majeſty, ch. 63.

14th January 1774. *Ja. Wallace.* *J. Skynner.* *Rd. Jackſon.* *J. Dunning.* *C. Sayer.*

APPENDIX, No 3.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 28th Auguſt 1771.

Par. 32. WE therefore expect and require you to be attentive to the conduct of our ſervants who ſhall be appointed Reſidents at your Subordinates; and if any of them ſhall appear to have acted contrary to our pleaſure (which you are to ſignify to them in this reſpect, and involved us in any expence not abſolutely neceſſary for carrying on our commercial concerns, we require you to ſuſpend ſuch perſons our ſervice, and inform us of the nature and extent of their offences, that they may receive from us ſuch further puniſhment as their diſobedience ſhall deſerve.

Letter from the Court of Directors to Governor *Haſtings*.

18th December 1771.

Warren Haſtings, eſquire, our Preſident and Governor of *Bengal*.

1. Notwithſtanding we have ſo often expreſſed, to the ſucceſſive Governors and Councils of our Preſidency of *Bengal*, our ſolicitude to promote the proſperity and happineſs of the Natives of thoſe Provinces, from which the public, as well as the Company, derives ſuch great advantages; and that to effect the ſame, we have repeatedly given the moſt peremptory orders for laying open to the Natives the ſeveral articles of the inland trade, more particularly thoſe of ſalt, beetlenut, and tobacco, which are conſidered by them as the neceſſaries of life; yet we are at length conſtrained to believe, that our intentions have been counteracted, and our orders diſobeyed, even by ſome of our ſervants, whoſe ſtations we had reaſon to hope would have prevented them from purſuing their private emolument by any indirect and unwarrantable means.

2. We therefore ſhall not heſitate to declare, that we have received ſuch information as will not permit us to doubt, but that ſeveral of our Council, who were Members of that Board at the time of the diſpatch of the *Lord Mansfield* in April 1771, and many of our ſervants in the different diſtricts of the Country, appointed as Superviſors of the Collection of our Revenues, had, in manifeſt violation of our orders, entered into a combination, and unduly exerciſed the power and influence derived from their ſtations, in order to carry on a monopoly in the ſeveral articles of ſalt, beetlenut, and tobacco; and that they had been ſo far loſt to the principles of juſtice and humanity, as to include rice and other grain in the ſame deſtructive monopoly; by which an artificial ſcarcity was made of an article ſo neceſſary to the very being of the inhabitants.

3. As upon a charge of this nature, we cannot but apply every means in our power to detect the guilty, and, by exemplary puniſhment, prevent the continuance of ſuch proceedings, as are not only a diſhonour to our ſervice, but a reproach to human nature; and as we repoſe the moſt perfect confidence in your abilities, integrity, and zeal for our ſervice, we have thought fit to commit to your ſole care the detection of thoſe crimes which have been charged on the ſervants of the Company: It is therefore our pleaſure and command, that you enter, without delay, into a ſtrict ſcrutiny of the conduct of the ſeveral Members who compoſed our Council at the time of the *Lord Mansfield*'s departure from *Bengal* in April 1771, and of the perſons appointed to ſuperviſe, in the different diſtricts of the Country, the collection of the Revenues, in reſpect to their having been engaged in a monopoly of ſalt, beetlenut, tobacco, and grain. And in this inveſtigation we moſt ſeriouſly enjoin you, not to ſuffer any bias of friendſhip to interrupt or weaken your reſearches; and this we have the greater reaſon to expect, ſince the reſult of your enquiries may bring due chaſtiſement upon the offenders, and thereby conciliate the minds of the Natives to our Government, and reſtore proſperity to thoſe extenſive Provinces, which are entitled to our utmoſt care, both from the ties of intereſt and humanity.

4. Relying therefore upon your judgment and impartiality, and not doubting but they will lead you to the means of obtaining full evidence of thoſe enormities which may have been committed, we hereby direct, that if it ſhall appear to you that any Member or Members of our before-mentioned Council, or any of our ſervants appointed to ſuperviſe the collection of our Revenues, or any other perſons in our ſervice, civil or military, have been anyways concerned in theſe unwarrantable monopolies, ſuch ſervant or ſervants be forthwith diſmiſſed our ſervice; and we hereby declare them to be actually ſo diſmiſſed, as unworthy of holding any office or employment under the Company.

London, 18th December, 1771. We are Your loving friends,

Daniel Wier. *J. Purling.*
Edwd Wheler. *Geo. Dudley.*
Peter. Du Cane, junr. *Fredk Pigou.*
Joſhua Smith. *John Roberts.*
Henry Savage. *J. Hurlock.*
Robt Gregory. *Henry Fletcher.*
John Harriſon. *Jno Woodhouſe.*
George Cuming. *Wm James.*
J. Manſhip. *Jno Michie.*
L. Sulivan.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since writing the above, being well aſſured that the Reſident of *Hughly* in 1770 and 1771 has been particularly engaged in the monopoly of rice complained of in the above 2d par. and although this grievance was of ſuch a degree, it appears that the Governor only reprimanded him for it; you are therefore eſpecially to make his conduct one of the immediate objects of your enquiry; and if he ſhall have been a delinquent in that reſpect, he muſt be puniſhed in the manner we have ordered other defaulters to be.

London, 18th December, 1771. We are Your loving friends,

Peter Du Cane, junr. *J. Purling.*
John Harriſon. *Geo. Dudley.*
Henry Savage. *H. Fletcher.*
Robt Gregory. *J. Hurlock.*
Edwd Wheler. *Jno Woodhouſe.*
John Roberts. *Daniel Wier.*
J. Manſhip. *Wm James.*
George Cuming. *Jno Michie.*
L. Sulivan. *Joſhua Smith.*
Fredk Pigou.

Extract

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 7th April 1773.

Par. 28. Having, as we conceive, fully inveſtigated the cauſes of the failure of our inveſtments in goodneſs, price, and quantity, and much to our concern, proved alſo that almoſt every ſtream has been polluted, we now arm you with our full powers, to make a complete reformation. The taſk, we are ſenſible will be arduous, but we rely on your zeal for the ſervice of the Company; and as we have the ſatisfaction to aſſure ourſelves that you will not miſuſe the powers we have delegated to you, we heſitate not to promiſe you our entire ſupport and protection.

APPENDIX, No. 4.

Letter from the Court of Directors to Governor *Haſtings*.

16th April 1773.

Warren Haſtings, eſquire, our Preſident and Governor of *Bengal*.

1. WE have received by the *Nottingham* your Letter addreſſed to our Secret Committee, dated at *Coſſimbuzar*, the 1ſt September 1772; informing us of the meaſures you had adopted for carrying into execution the orders of the Secret Committee, dated 28th Auguſt 1771, and of the arrangements and regulations which you deemed neceſſary for the public peace and welfare of the Provinces. And although the public records, to which you refer us, are not come to hand, we aſſure you that ſo far as we are enabled to judge of your Proceedings by your own Letter, and by that our Council received by the ſame conveyance, they appear to us in the moſt favourable light; the ſteps you have taken judicious, and indeed the whole of your conduct ſeems to have fully juſtified the choice of the Secret Committee, who entruſted to your management the execution of a plan of the utmoſt importance.

2. We have been long ſenſible of the utter impropriety of lodging an abſolute power in the hands of *Mahomed Reza Cawn*, but the remedy was not without its difficulties; we truſt the evil is on the point of being eradicated. Inconveniences generally attend great and ſudden alterations; but we dare ſay that your agency will render them as few, as temporary, and as light as poſſible.

3. Although you will obſerve, that ſundry changes have lately taken place in the direction of the Company's affairs at home, thoſe changes will not in the leaſt affect the meaſures in which you are engaged; on the contrary, we take this early opportunity not only for teſtifying our entire approbation of your conduct, but of aſſuring you of our firmeſt ſupport in accompliſhing the work you have ſo ſucceſsfully commenced; and we doubt not but it will iſſue in the deliverance of *Bengal* from oppreſſion, in the eſtabliſhment of our credit, influence, and intereſt in *India*, and conſequently in every advantage which the Company or the Nation may juſtly expect from ſo important a tranſaction.

4. As you have diſtinctly marked in your Letter thoſe objects of enquiry and regulation which we ſhould otherwiſe have pointed out to you, we aſſure ourſelves that you will proſecute your enquiries with ſteadineſs, impartiality, and to full effect; notwithſtanding the many difficulties and temptations which we are ſenſible may be thrown in the way of perſons engaged in enquiries of this nature, in order to weaken their zeal for the public good, and to render their endeavours ineffectual for the great purpoſes of reformation.

5. Your attention to the ſettlement of the Revenues, as a primary object, has our entire approbation, and it is with the utmoſt ſatisfaction we obſerve, that the farming ſyſtem will be generally adopted, more eſpecially as the reſearches and diſcoveries made in the two preceding years muſt have nearly aſcertained the value and produce of the lands, ſo that impoſition on the part of the Farmers, reſpecting the value of the lands and oppreſſion of the tenants, may, we hope, be eaſily avoided.

6. The extirpation of *Mahmud Reza Khân*'s influence was abſolutely neceſſary; and the apprehending of *Shitabroy* equally ſo, as the latter has been too long connected with *Mahmud Reza Khân* to be independent of him; but if that had not been the caſe, it would have been abſurd to continue a Naib Dewan in the Province of *Babar*, after aboliſhing that office in *Bengal*: and as to any hopes which *Mahmud Reza Khân* may entertain of profiting by changes in the Court of Directors, thoſe hopes muſt ſpeedily vaniſh; for however different their ſentiments may be in ſome particulars, they heartily concur in the propriety and neceſſity of ſetting him aſide, and of putting the adminiſtration of the Company's affairs in the hands of perſons who may be rendered reſponſible in *England* for their conduct in *India*.

7. Your choice of the Begum for guardian to the Nabob, we entirely approve; *the uſe* you intend making of *Nundcomar* is very proper; and it affords us great ſatisfaction to find, that you could at once determine to ſuppreſs all perſonal reſentment when the public welfare ſeemed to claſh with your private ſentiments relative to *Nundcomar*.

8. We obſerve with great pleaſure the teſtimonial given by you of Mr. *Middleton*; you will aſſure him of our entire approbation of his conduct on this occaſion. And as the Committee have concurred heartily in ſupporting a meaſure which in the courſe of debate the Majority had ſtrenuouſly oppoſed; we cannot be diſſatisfied with their conduct, unleſs the peruſal of their debates ſhould oblige us to alter our opinion reſpecting them.

9. As the ſhortneſs of our time will not permit us to be more particular, we can only repeat to you our aſſurances of protection and ſupport, in carrying into full execution the arrangements you have ſo happily begun; and as we deſire particularly that you will diſtinguiſh and encourage merit wherever you find it, ſo do we moſt ſtrictly conjure you not to ſuffer rank, ſtation, or any connection or conſideration whatever, to deter you from bringing every oppreſſion to light, and every offender, Native or European, to condign puniſhment.

10. If the abolition of the office of Naib Dewan, and ſtepping forth as principals, ſhould in any degree alarm your European neighbours, we rely on your prudence for removing every improper jealouſy that may be entertained on this account.

11. Notwithſtanding this Letter is ſigned by us the Court of Directors, we mean it as ſecret, and tranſmit it confidentially to you only; and we leave it to your diſcretion to lay the contents, or any part thereof, before the Council, if circumſtances ſhould in your opinion render it neceſſary, or if you ſhould judge it for our intereſt ſo to do, and not otherwiſe.

London, the 16th April 1773.

We are
Your loving friends,

George Tatem.	*Hy Crab Boulton.*
Rd Hall.	*Edwd Wheler.*
Daniel Wier.	*John Woodhouſe.*
Jnº Michie.	*John Harriſon.*
Samuel Peach.	*Wm James.*
Joſeph Sparks.	*Fredk Pigou.*
Jn Hawkſworth.	*Peter Du Cane*, junr.
T. B. Rous.	*Peter Laſcelles.*
John Smith.	*Henry Fletcher.*
Chas Chambers, junr.	*Chas Boddam.*

Letter from Governor *Haſtings* to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

Coſſimbuzar, 1ſt September 1772.

To the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors, for the Affairs of the Honourable United *Eaſt India* Company.

Gentlemen,

Para. 1. This accompanies a duplicate of my Letter of the 24th April laſt.

2. Since

APPENDIX. No. 4.

2. Since that date I have duly received the duplicate and triplicate of your commands of the 28th Auguſt 1771.

3. The immediate departure of the *Colbrooke*, which ſailed (as I recollect) the day after my Letter of the 24th April had reached her, prevented my giving you further intelligence of the iſſue of the meaſures which I had taken for the arreſt of *Mahmud Rizza Cawn*. As your commands were peremptory, and addreſſed to myſelf alone, I carefully concealed them from every perſon except Mr. *Middleton*, whoſe aſſiſtance was neceſſary for their execution, until I was informed by him that *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* was actually in arreſt, and on his way to *Calcutta*. To have conſulted the Board on a point on which your authoritative commands had left me without a choice, or to have deſired their aſſiſtance when I had ſufficient power to act without it, would have been equally improper. But I will confeſs that there were other cogent reaſons for this reſerve. I was yet but a ſtranger to the characters and diſpoſition of the Members of your Adminiſtration. I knew that *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* had enjoyed the ſovereignty of this Province for ſeven years paſt; had poſſeſſed an allowed annual ſtipend of nine lacks of rupees, the uncontrouled diſpoſal of thirty-two lacks entruſted to him for the uſe of the Nabob, the abſolute command of every branch of the Nizâmut, and the chief authority in the Dewannee. To ſpeak more plainly, he was in every thing but the name, the Nazim of the Province, and in real authority more than the Nazim. I could not ſuppoſe him ſo inattentive to his own ſecurity, nor ſo ill verſed in the maxims of Eaſtern policy, as to have neglected the due means of eſtabliſhing an intereſt with ſuch of the Company's Agents, as by actual authority, or by repreſentation to the Honourable Company, might be able to promote or obſtruct his views. I choſe therefore, to avoid the riſk of an oppoſition, to put the matter beyond diſpute, and then to record what I had done. The ſame reflections occurred to me when I propoſed to entruſt Mr. *Middleton* with the execution of your commands, which might with more certainty have been effected by an order to the Commanding Officer of the Brigade ſtationed at *Burrampoor*: but this would have been productive of much diſturbance.

I was convinced that I might ſecurely rely on Mr. *Middleton*, and his behaviour juſtified that confidence. Indeed I am bound in juſtice to bear the ſame teſtimony to his faithful attention to your intereſts in many other inſtances which I have had occaſion to experience of his ſubſequent conduct, in which he has ſhewn himſelf a zealous aſſerter of your rights, and a ſupporter of the authority of your Government.

4. Your public Records will inform you that *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* was brought without delay to *Calcutta*, where he has been detained ever ſince in an eaſy confinement; that it was judged adviſable and conſiſtent with the tenor of your commands, that Rajah *Shitab Roy* ſhould be arreſted, and brought likewiſe to *Calcutta*. For the particulars of theſe tranſactions, and the debates concerning them, I beg leave to refer you to the Proceedings themſelves, which will better explain than I can, the motives which influenced the reſolutions of the Board, and the opinions of the different Members upon them. Something more may be neceſſary to be ſaid concerning my own conduct, which, as it was grounded ſolely on the ſecret inſtructions which you had been pleaſed to give me for my guidance, become a proper ſubject of this addreſs.

5. It may at firſt ſight appear extraordinary that *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* and Rajah *Shitab Roy* have been ſo long detained in confinement without any proofs having been obtained of their guilt, or meaſures taken to bring them to a trial. Very valid reaſons for this delay have been aſſigned in our Minutes. I beg leave to call to your recollection, that by a ſtrange concurrence of unforeſeen cauſes, your Adminiſtration had at this time, every object that could engage the care of Government, war only excepted, all demanding their inſtant attention; the ſettlement of the Revenue of *Bengal*—the diſmiſſion of the Naib Dewan and Naib Subah of the Provinces—the enquiry into his conduct for a courſe of years preceding—the diſmiſſion of the Naib Dewan of *Babar*, and enquiry into his conduct—the eſtabliſhment of the Dewannee on the plan directed by the Honourable Company—the arrangement of the Nabob's houſehold—the reduction of his allowance and expences—the eſtabliſhment of a regular adminiſtration of juſtice throughout the Province—the inſpection and reformation of the offices at the Preſidency—and, independent of all theſe, the ordinary duties of the Preſidency, which, from the amazing growth of your affairs, were of themſelves ſufficient to occupy the whole time and application which we could beſtow upon them, and even more than we could beſtow, from the want of a regular ſyſtem, the natural conſequence of the rapidity with which theſe affairs have accumulated. So circumſtanced, we were under an abſolute neceſſity to leave many affairs ſuſpended, that we might give due diſpatch to the reſt. The firſt in immediate conſequence claimed our immediate regard: this was the ſettlement of the Revenue. It was late in the ſeaſon; the Lands had ſuffered unheard-of depopulation by the famine and mortality of 1769; the collections violently kept up to their former ſtandard had added to the diſtreſs of the Country, and threatened a general decay of the Revenue, unleſs immediate remedies were applied to prevent it. The farming ſyſtem for a courſe of years, ſubjected to proper checks and regulations, ſeemed the moſt likely to afford relief to the Country, and both to aſcertain and produce the real value of the Lands without violence to the Roiats. It was therefore reſolved that this buſineſs ſhould firſt take place; and it was deemed neceſſary for this purpoſe, that a Committee, compoſed of the Members of the Council, ſhould be appointed to carry it into execution. The arrangement of the Dewannee, and the regulation of the Nabob's houſehold, were added to the charge of the Committee; and as theſe comprehended the moſt valuable parts of your concerns, it was thought proper that I, as Preſident, ſhould be joined with it. This rendered it neceſſary to ſuſpend the trials of *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* and Rajah *Shitab Roy*, and this reaſon is aſſigned for it in our Minutes. Neither *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* nor Rajah *Shitab Roy*, complain of the delay as a hardſhip. Perhaps all parties, as is uſual in moſt caſes of a public concern, had their ſecret views, which on this occaſion, though oppoſite in their direction, fortunately concurred in the ſame points. Theſe had conceived hopes of a relaxation of the Company's orders; *Mahmud Rizza Cawn* had even buoyed himſelf up with the hopes of a reſtoration to his former authority by the intereſt of his friends, and a change in the direction, and his Letters and the Letters of his Dewan to the City, declared theſe expectations.—I pretend not to enter into the views of others; my own were theſe: *Mahmud Rizza Cawn*'s influence ſtill prevailed generally throughout the Country; in the Nabob's houſehold, and at the Capital, it was ſcarce affected by his preſent diſgrace; his favour was ſtill courted, and his anger dreaded; who, under ſuch diſcouragements, would give information or evidence againſt him? His agents and creatures filled every office of the Nizâmut and Dewannee; how was the truth of his conduct to be inveſtigated by theſe?—It would be ſuperfluous to add other arguments to ſhew the neceſſity of preſſing the enquiry by breaking his influence, removing his dependants, and putting the directions of all the affairs which had been committed to his care, into the hands of the moſt powerful or active of his enemies. With this view too, the inſtitution of the new Dewannee obviouſly coincided. Theſe were my real motives for poſtponing the enquiry. Whether my precautions will have their effect, is yet a queſtion of doubt.

6. The ſame principles guided me, though not uninfluenced by other arguments of great force, in the choice of *Munny* Begum, the widow of the Nabob *Meer Jaffier*, and of Rajah *Goondaſs*, the ſon of Mahrajah *Nundcomar*,

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Nundcomar, the former for the chief Adminiſtration, the latter for the Dewannee of the Nabob's houſehold; both the declared enemies of *Mahmud Rizza Cawn*. To the latter indeed I was principally inclined by your commands; and I hope it will appear that I have adopted almoſt the only expedient in which they could be exactly fulfilled. You directed that "if the aſſiſtance and information of *Nundcomar* ſhould be ſerviceable to me in "my inveſtigating the conduct of *Mahmud Rizza Cawn*, "I ſhould yield him ſuch encouragement and reward as "his trouble, and the extent of his ſervices, may deſerve." —There is no doubt that *Nundcomar* is capable of affording me great ſervice, by his information and advice; but it is on his abilities, and on the activity of his ambition and hatred to *Mahmud Rizza Cawn*, that I depend for inveſtigating the conduct of the latter; and by eradicating his influence, for confirming the authority which you have aſſumed in the adminiſtration of the affairs of this Country. The reward which has been aſſigned him will put it fully in his power to anſwer theſe expectations, and will be an encouragement to him to exert all his abilities for the accompliſhment of them. Had I not been guarded by the caution which you have been pleaſed to enjoin me, yet my own knowledge of the character of *Nundcomar* would have reſtrained me from yielding him any truſt, or authority, which could prove detrimental to the Company's intereſt. He himſelf has no truſt or authority, but in the aſcendancy which he naturally poſſeſſes over his ſon. An attempt to abuſe the favour which has been ſhewn him, cannot eſcape unnoticed; and if detected, may ruin all his hopes. The ſon is of a diſpoſition very unlike his father; placid, gentle, and without diſguiſe: from him there can be no danger.

7. You will perceive by the Records, that this appointment has not taken place without oppoſition from a majority of the Gentlemen who form the Committee now at this place.—I know not whether you will approve or diſapprove of the ſilence which I have obſerved, with reſpect to your orders, in the arguments which I have uſed in ſupport of my recommendation. My reaſon was, that I thought the meaſure in itſelf ſo proper, that I did not doubt of its receiving the confirmation of the Board at large; and unleſs ſome material advantage could be gained by it, I did not think myſelf at liberty to divulge your ſecret commands. I am at this time moſt firmly perſuaded, that no other meaſure whatever would have been likely to prove ſo effectual, either for promoting the enquiry which you have directed, or giving ſtrength and duration to the new ſyſtem.

8. I hope I ſhall not appear to aſſume too much importance, in ſpeaking thus much of myſelf, in juſtification of the motives which led me to this recommendation: that I had no connection with *Nundcomar* or his family prior to the receipt of your Letter by the *Lapwing*; that on the contrary, from the year 1759 to the time when I left *Bengal* in 1764, I was engaged in a continued oppoſition to the intereſts and deſigns of that man, becauſe I judged him to be adverſe to the welfare of my Employers; and in the courſe of this contention, I received ſufficient indications of his ill-will to have made me his irreconcileable enemy, if I could ſuffer my paſſions to ſuperſede the duty which I owe to the Company: my ſupport of *Nundcomar* on the preſent occaſion could not therefore proceed from partiality. It will be as obvious, that my preference of him to other competitors could not ariſe from intereſted motives. I may be charged with inconſiſtency; but the reaſons which I have urged in the Minutes of the Committee, in ſupport of this meaſure, will, I truſt, acquit me to my honourable Employers; and if my conduct ſhall ſtand the teſt of their judgment, it is a point of duty to bear with the reproaches of the uninformed part of the world. To the ſervice of the Company, and to your commands, I have ſacrificed my own feelings (pardon the preſumption of this repetition); and I have combated thoſe of others joined with me in the adminiſtration of your affairs. I claim your approbation of what I have done, not as a recompence of integrity, but as the confirmation of the authority which you have been pleaſed to confide in me, and of your own which is involved in it.

9. I with pleaſure do juſtice to the Committee, in declaring that, ſtrenuouſly as they oppoſed the meaſure while it was a point of debate, it had no ſooner received the ſanction of your Council, than they all concurred with me in ſupporting both that and the other reſolutions which were connected with it, as ſteadily as if they had never diſſented from it.

10. The appointment of *Munny* Begum I believe will require no apology. It was unanimouſly approved; and if I can be a judge of the public opinion, it is a meaſure of general ſatisfaction.

11. The only man who could pretend to ſuch a truſt was the Nabob *Yeterám e' Dowlah*, the brother of *Meer Jaffier*; a man indeed of no dangerous abilities, nor apparent ambition, but the father of a numerous family; who, by his being brought ſo nigh to the Muſnud, would have acquired a right of inheritance to the Subahſhip; and if only one of his ſons, who are all in the prime of life, ſhould have raiſed his hopes to the ſucceſſion, it would have been in his power at any time to remove the ſingle obſtacle which the Nabob's life oppoſed to advancement of the family. The Guardian at leaſt would have been the Nazim while the minority laſted; and all the advantages which the Company may hope to derive from it, in the confirmation of their power, would have been loſt, or could only have been maintained by a contention hurtful to their rights, or by a violence yet more exceptionable. The caſe would be much the ſame were any other man placed in that ſtation. The truth is, that the affairs of the Company ſtand at preſent on a footing which can neither laſt as it is, nor be maintained on the rigid principles of private juſtice: you muſt eſtabliſh your own power, or you muſt hold it dependent on a ſuperior, which I deem to be impoſſible.

12. The Begum, as a woman, is incapable of paſſing the bounds aſſigned her. Her ambition cannot aſpire to higher dignity. She has no children to provide for, or miſlead her fidelity. Her actual authority reſts on the Nabob's life, and therefore cannot endanger it; it muſt ceaſe with his minority, when ſhe muſt depend abſolutely on the Company for ſupport againſt her ward and pupil, who will then become her maſter; of courſe her intereſt muſt lead her to concur with all the deſigns of the Company, and to ſolicit their patronage. I have the pleaſure to add, that in the exercile of her office ſhe has already ſhewn herſelf amply qualified for it, by her diſcernment, œconomy, and a particular attention to affairs.

13. In the execution of your commands, of the 8th May 1771, I hope I ſhall not appear to you to have been guilty of remiſſneſs. The enquiry therein directed, I have been obliged to entruſt to the previous conſideration of a Committee, the many weightier affairs of your Government rendering it abſolutely impoſſible for me to enter on a ſcrutiny of that nature myſelf; which however I mean to take up as ſoon as I conveniently can, after my return to the Preſidency.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
and faithful ſervant,
Warren Haſtings.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated 16th April 1773.

Par. 1. On the 10th inſtant we received by the ſhip *Nottingham* your General Letters in the Public and Secret Departments, of the 5th September, alſo the ſeveral Encloſures, agreeable to the liſt of the packet.

2. The lateneſs of the ſeaſon not permitting us to detain the *Egmont* and *Harcourt* longer than has already been done for the purpoſe of this diſpatch, we are prevented from entering fully into the important ſubjects noticed to

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us on your advices per *Nottingham*, but we cannot omit the preſent opportunity to expreſs the ſatisfaction which we receive from that readineſs and zeal for our ſervice, with which you have united with our Preſident, Mr. *Haſtings*, in carrying into execution thoſe eſſential objects, which, from the nature of them, we judged it neceſſary confidentially to commit to his immediate care and conduct.

3. And here we muſt obſerve, that the meaſures taken in conſequence of the removal of *Mahomed Reza Cawn* from the office of Naib Dewan and Naib Subah, have manifeſted to us ſo much judgment and prudence, as confirm us in the hope we had, of the many advantages which would thereby reſult both to the Company and to the Country in general. And as we are fully ſatisfied of our Preſident's conſtant and ſteady endeavours to effectuate every good purpoſe intended by that Miniſter's diſmiſſion, we have the further pleaſure to find that you are actuated by the ſame principle for the advancement of the Company's intereſt and welfare; we therefore rely on your continuing to yield him every aſſiſtance and ſupport for the full accompliſhment of all regulations which may conduce thereunto. Your unanimity in this reſpect will merit our higheſt commendation, and we doubt not but that the further meaſures you may take for effecting the ſame will inſure you our firmeſt protection.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 5th September 1772.

Par 2. As the early diſpatch of the *Nottingham* from the Coaſt to *Europe* may poſſibly occaſion her arrival with you before the *Lapwing* packet, on which we purpoſe forwarding a minute detail of our Proceedings, we ſhall in this Letter confine ourſelves to a ſummary relation of the meaſures that have been purſued in compliance with your orders; and it will ſuffice, we flatter ourſelves, until a fuller explanation can reach you, accompanied by the ſeveral Records to which we muſt refer.

3. The Preſident, upon the receipt of your commands, executed the commiſſion you intruſted to him, by the ſeizure of the Naib Soubah *Mahomed Reza Cawn*; he was accordingly brought down under a guard to *Calcutta*, where he has ſince that time continued under reſtraint at his own houſe.

4. At the ſame time we deemed it neceſſary, in purſuance of the 20th Par. of your above-noted commands, to order to the Preſidency Raja *Sitabroy*, the Naib Dewan of the province of *Bahar*, that the great deficiency in the *Bahar* Revenue, which you charge to the miſconduct of the Officers of the Government, might be explained and adjuſted.

5. Theſe previous meaſures taken, we thought it neceſſary, in further proſecution of your commands, to iſſue a proclamation at the City and at *Patna*, advertiſing the removal of the Nabob *Mahomed Reza Cawn* and of Rajah *Sitabroy*, and the abolition of the office of Naib Dewan of the Provinces. Advertiſements were at the ſame time affixed at the public Cutcherries, deſiring all who might have any cauſe of complaint againſt the late Naib Soubah to prefer the ſame, that they might be enquired into and redreſſed. Advertiſements have in like manner been affixed at all the public Cutcherries, to encourage the people to inform againſt any perſons whatever engaged in purchaſing up grain in the time of the famine, to the deſtruction of the poor, and in direct contradiction to the expreſs orders of the Government.

6. Thus far have we proceeded in the execution of your orders; and upon the return of our Preſident we flatter ourſelves with being enabled to give you the reſult of thoſe meaſures which we already have, and hereafter may find it neceſſary to purſue, for the accompliſhment of your intentions upon the ſubject above-mentioned.

7. Agreeably to the recommendations repeated in your Letters for farming the Lands of the Provinces upon long leaſes, we framed ſuch regulations as appeared to us the beſt calculated for carrying that plan into execution in the moſt effectual manner, and for the future management of the collections. The next thing conſidered was the mode in which theſe regulations were to be executed; and on this head nothing appeared more adviſable than to form a Committee of our own Members, who by an actual viſitation of the diſtricts, and local enquiry into their preſent ſtate and reſources, might not only be able to ſettle the Lands to the greateſt advantage on the new ſyſtem, but alſo to furniſh us with lights to guide us in time to come to thoſe concluſions, which are ever the moſt earneſt object of our ſolicitude: we mean ſuch as tend to your intereſt and honour, to the proſperity of this Country, and conſequently to our own reputation.

8. In purſuance of theſe ideas a Committee was formed, of which it was thought indiſpenſable that the Preſident ſhould be a Member; not only becauſe the ſettlement of the Revenue deſerved his firſt attention, but becauſe there were alſo various matters of importance to be tranſmitted at the City which demanded his preſence and immediate agency.

9. The Committee was accordingly compoſed of the Governor, the Chief of the Revenue Council at *Moorſhedabad*, and Meſſrs. *Dacres*, *Laurell*, and *Graham*.

10. In the beginning of June they proceeded to *Kiſtnagur*, the chief town in *Nuddea*. This diſtrict was an important though diſagreeable ſubject for their firſt operations; every thing bore the moſt diſcouraging aſpect, the Country had been greatly deſolated by the famine, the Lands were abandoned, and the Revenue falling to decay; in ſpite of all theſe obſtacles, we have the pleaſure to learn from the Letters of the Committee, that they finiſhed the ſettlement upon advantageous terms. The next ſhip will convey to you their Proceedings at large; at preſent we muſt content ourſelves to inform you from their advices, that the Lands were all let to farm for the term of five years, on an increaſing rent from the firſt year, the amount of which is, Rupees 10,64,530. 10. 8. 2. to the laſt, the amount of which is, Rupees 13,19,695. 10. 8. 2.

11. From *Nuddea* the Committee proceeded to *Moorſhedabad*; they arrived there the beginning of July, and have ever ſince been employed in the management of the various affairs which were committed to their charge.

12. Beſides the ſettlement and new arrangement of the two diviſions of *Rajeſhahy*, and the numerous leſſer collections comprehended with thoſe under the general name of the Huzzoor Zellahs, they were alſo charged with the execution of your commands concerning the reformation of the Nabob's houſehold, and the reduction of his expences. They were further inſtructed to conſider the means and ſettle a plan for conducting the buſineſs of the Khalſa, upon the new ſyſtem preſcribed by your orders for taking the office of Dewan upon ourſelves. The adminiſtration of juſtice has alſo been an object of their deliberation, and they have it in reference to take the ſilk inveſtment under their inſpection and conſideration, for the forming of ſome general reſolutions, that may tend to the reſtoration of that important branch of your commerce.

13. The appointments which have been thought indiſpenſable upon the abolition of the office of Naib Soubah, are as follows: a Guardian to the young Nabob, a Dewan of his houſhold, and for the buſineſs of the collections a Dewan of the Khalſa. The perſons named to theſe truſts are, *Munnee* Begum (the relict of the late Nabob *Jaffier Ally Cawn*) Guardian; Rajah *Goordaſs*, the ſon of Maha Rajah *Nundcomar*, Dewan; and Rajah *Rajibullub*, the ſon of the late Maha Raja *Dullubram*, Dewan of the Khalſa.

14. The nomination of *Munnee* Begum to the ſuperintendance of the houſehold and guardianſhip of the perſon of the Nabob, is a meaſure from which we expect the happieſt conſequences; her known averſion to *Mahomed*

med Rezza Cawn, and oppoſition of intereſts to his, renders her the fitteſt perſon to eradicate his influence in the houſhold, and her high rank and abilities equally qualify her to repreſent the dignity of the family, without any danger to the Company from ſuch pretenſions as might be apprehended from any male relation of *Jaffier Ally Cawn*, or from the ambition of any other man of conſideration, to whom ſuch a truſt might be delegated.

15. The Company having thought proper to ſtand forth themſelves as Dewans of theſe Provinces, it became naturally a ſubject of conſideration, whether it would not be expedient to remove the ſeat of the collections from *Moorſhedabad* to *Calcutta*. The opulence it might be expected to bring with it, by drawing the principal families of the Country to reſide here, by which the demand for imports from our mother-country would be greatly increaſed, and the opportunity we ſhould have of the more immediate inſpection and controul of the Revenue, ſupported by other concurrent arguments, convinced us of the urgency of this meaſure, which we have therefore reſolved upon. The arrangements which appear to us neceſſary to be taken upon this occaſion have been fully weighed and digeſted by the Governor and Committee at the City, and having received the aſſent of the Board, we have empowered them to take the neceſſary ſteps for carrying it into execution. Our Proceedings at large upon this ſubject will wait upon you by the firſt direct diſpatch from this Preſidency.

16. The removing the ſeat of the collections to the Preſidency, having rendered unneceſſary the Revenue Eſtabliſhment at *Moorſhedabad*, it has been of courſe withdrawn; and the reluctance with which the late arrangements have been ſubmitted to by a part of the Nabob's houſhold, required the preſence and conſtant attention of a perſon of authority, to prevent the Nabob's affairs from falling into more diſorder than that from which we have endeavoured to retrieve them. We joined in opinion with the Committee, on the propriety of continuing the Chief of the Durbar Reſident at the Nabob's court, and acquieſced in their propoſition of uniting the charge of the collections with the proviſion of the raw ſilk inveſtment, which, from experience, we are perſuaded will be better encouraged, and receive more improvement by the adoption of this mode, than by continuing it under the direction of a ſeparate authority; and we hope this meaſure will meet your approbation.

17. After the allotment of ſuch diſtricts as we judged might be moſt conveniently ſettled by the Committee of Circuit, thoſe which fell under our immediate management were the *Calcutta* lands, the Zellahs of *Midnapore*, *Burdwan*, *Houghly*, *Burbhoom*, and *Jeſſore*. *Burdwan* was laſt year farmed out for the term of five years; *Houghly*, *Burbhoom*, and *Jeſſore*, have been let upon leaſes of the ſame time from this period, and to good advantage; the *Calcutta* lands and *Midnapore* will next be concluded upon, and we hope in our ſubſequent advices to be enabled to give you ſuch an account of the ſettlement of the Revenue upon the plan already deſcribed, as ſhall prove to your entire ſatisfaction.

18. *Midnapore* and the *Calcutta* lands as yet remain unleaſed; the former, becauſe the *Oriſſa* year, agreeably to which the ſettlement is made, is not yet expired; the latter, becauſe we have not been able to obtain an explanation of the heavy balances which have accumulated from the year 1174, amounting at preſent to about 14,50,000 Rupees: and here we are concerned to be under the neceſſity of remarking, that the call we made on the Collector, Mr. *Holme*, for the neceſſary Papers to lead to a ſettlement of the *Calcutta* lands, being about a month after enforced by a peremptory order from the Superintendent Mr. *Barwell*, was noted by the Collector with a degree of contumely and evaſion that has forced us to the diſagreeable neceſſity of removing Mr. *Holme* from his office; and it was with much reluctance we proceeded to this extremity, but it was neceſſary in order to vindicate our authority from the diſregard with which it had been treated. As ſoon as the explanation of the balance due from the *Calcutta* lands is prepared, we will effect the ſettlement of thoſe lands on the general plan which we have adopted from your inſtructions. When the whole is completed, the Revenue of *Bengal* for the five ſucceeding years, the time to which the leaſes extend, ſhall be exhibited to your view in one general ſtatement.

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Copy of a Letter from *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Governor of *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 11th November 1773.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Fort William, 11 November 1773.

Honourable Sirs,

1. I HAVE been duly honoured with your Letter of the 16th April by the *Harcourt*, and Duplicate of the ſame by the *Egmont*.

2. I am at a loſs for words to convey the ſenſe which I entertain of the honourable terms in which you have been pleaſed to expreſs your approbation of my ſervices. While my gratitude is excited by theſe inſtances of your kindneſs, I feel my zeal encouraged by the aſſurances which you have been pleaſed to afford me of your continued protection; my beſt expreſſion of thanks for both muſt be made by my future conduct; which, (if I know my own heart) will never be drawn by any bias, however powerful, from the purſuits of your intereſts; nor do I wiſh or aſpire to any reward ſuperior to your applauſe.

3. While I indulge the pleaſure which I receive from the paſt ſucceſſes of my endeavours, I own I cannot refrain from looking back with a mixture of anxiety on the omiſſions, by which I am ſenſible I may ſince have hazarded the diminution of your eſteem. All my Letters addreſſed to your honourable Court, and to the Secret Committee, repeat the ſtrongeſt promiſes of proſecuting the enquiries into the conduct of your ſervants, which you had been pleaſed to commit particularly to my charge. You will readily perceive that I muſt have been ſincere in thoſe declarations, ſince it would have argued great indiſcretion to have made them, had I foreſeen my inability to perform them; I find myſelf now under the diſagreeable neceſſity of avowing that inability, at the ſame time that I will boldly take upon me to affirm, that on whomſoever you might have delegated that charge, and by whatever powers it might have been accompanied, it would have been ſufficient to occupy the entire attention of thoſe who were entruſted with it; and even with all the aids of leiſure and authority, would have proved ineffectual. I dare appeal to the public records, to the teſtimony of thoſe who have opportunities of knowing me, and even to the detail which the public voice can report of the paſt acts of this Government, that my time has been neither idly nor uſeleſsly employed; yet ſuch are the cares and embarraſſments of this various ſtate, that although much may be done, much more even in matters of moment muſt neceſſarily remain neglected. To ſelect from the miſcellaneous heap which each day's exigencies preſent to our choice, thoſe points on which the general welfare of your affairs moſt eſſentially depends; to provide expedients for future advantages, and guard againſt probable evils, are all that your Adminiſtration can faithfully promiſe to perform for your ſervice, with their united labours moſt diligently exerted. They cannot look back without ſacrificing the objects of their immediate duty, which are thoſe of your intereſts, to endleſs reſearches, which can produce no real good, and

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and may expoſe your affairs to all the ruinous conſequences of perſonal malevolence both here and at home.

4. May I be permitted, in all deference and ſubmiſſion to your commands, to offer it as my opinion, that whatever may have been the conduct of individuals, or even of the collective Members of your former Adminiſtrations, the blame is not ſo much imputable to them as to the want of a principle of Government adequate to its ſubſtance, and a coercive power to enforce it. The extent of *Bengal* and its poſſible reſources are equal to thoſe of moſt ſtates in *Europe*. Its difficulties are greater than thoſe of any, becauſe it wants both an eſtabliſhed form and powers of Government, deriving its actual ſupport from the unremitted labour and perſonal exertion of individuals in power, inſtead of the vital influence which flows through the channels of a regular conſtitution, and imperceptibly animates every part of it. Our conſtitution is no where to be traced, but in ancient charters, which were framed for the juriſdiction of your trading ſettlements, the ſales of your exports, and the proviſion of your annual inveſtment. I need not obſerve how incompetent theſe muſt prove for the government of a great kingdom, and for the preſervation of its riches from private violence and embezzlement.

5. Among your ſervants, who, for a courſe of years have been left at large in the poſſeſſion of ſo temping a depoſit, it is not to be wondered at that many have applied it to the advancement of their own fortunes, or that thoſe who were poſſeſſed of abilities to introduce a ſyſtem of better order, ſhould have been drawn along by the general current, ſince few men are endowed with ſo large a ſhare of public virtue, as to ſacrifice their intereſts, peace, and ſocial feelings to it, and to begin the work of reformation on themſelves.

6. I ſhould not have preſumed to expatiate on a ſubject of this nature, although my own juſtification has made it in ſome meaſure neceſſary, but that your late advices have given hopes, that we ſhall ſpeedily be furniſhed with your inſtructions for eſtabliſhing a ſyſtem of law and polity, which we hitherto want. Whenever this work ſhall be accompliſhed on a foundation of conſiſtency and permanency, I will venture to foretel, from the knowledge which I have of the general habits and manners of your ſervants, that you will hear as few inſtances of licentiouſneſs amongſt them as among the Members of any community in the Britiſh Empire. As this, whenever attempted, muſt neceſſarily be a work of time, I intreat your permiſſion to ſubmit to your conſideration, ſuch defects in your preſent ſyſtem as my experience has ſuggeſted to me, and I hope my intention will be judged with candour; although my own ambition may be gratified by the regulations which I wiſh to recommend.

7. I ſhall offer but two points to your notice; one is, the rapid ſucceſſion of your Governors; the other, the undefined powers of the reſpective Members of your Adminiſtration. Both are productive of the ſame ill effects; a want of vigour and conſiſtency in public meaſures; and a general diffidence, and the conſequent ſpirit of intrigue, in thoſe whoſe intereſts or ſervices are, by any mode of relation, connected with our Government.

8. Theſe well-known infirmities in our conſtitution, were frequently alluded to by the Vizier in the late conferences which I had with him at *Benares*. He lamented the perpetual hazard to which he was expoſed, of loſing the Engliſh friendſhip by the continual changes of their Chiefs, who were no ſooner known to him, and a confidence eſtabliſhed with them, than they were recalled, and others ſubſtituted in their ſtead, whoſe tempers he was to ſtudy, and whoſe affections he was to conciliate anew, and then to loſe them as he had loſt their predeceſſors, and have the ſame fruitleſs labour to repeat for ever. He once aſked me, in plain terms, what aſſurances I could give him, that new conditions would not be required of him, or that thoſe for which I ſhould have pledged the faith of the Company, ſhould not be eluded by a new act of Government, if ſix Members of the Council ſhould at any time propoſe an infraction of the treaty, and four only joined me in oppoſing it?

9. The powers of the Governor, although ſuppoſed to be great, are, in reality, little more than thoſe of any individual in his Council. Their compliance, his own abilities, or a ſuperior ſhare of attention, and the opinion that he poſſeſſes extraordinary powers, may give him the effect of them, and an aſcendant over his aſſociates in the Adminiſtration; but a moment's conſideration is ſufficient to diſcover the nakedneſs of his authority, and to level him with the reſt. Happily, I find myſelf ſufficiently ſecured againſt ſuch effects. The notice with which you have diſtinguiſhed my ſervices, the injunctions which you have laid on the other Members of the Board to afford me their ſupport, and the degree of reſponſibility which you have been pleaſed to attribute to my particular conduct, have contributed to ſtrengthen my hands againſt any improper oppoſition. At the ſame time, I muſt do the Gentlemen of the Board the juſtice to declare, that I have found in them ſo cordial a diſpoſition to co-operate with me in every meaſure for the public good, that I feel no want of extraordinary powers for myſelf; nor under ſuch favourable circumſtances, is it my wiſh to poſſeſs them. I mention this want only as a defect in the ſervice, which is rendered ſtill more important by the falſe opinion, that the principal authority reſts conſtitutionally in the hands of the Preſident, when in effect it is merely accidental.

10. To draw the line between him and the other Members of the Adminiſtration, and to define the powers which may be entruſted to his charge, would not be an eaſy taſk. In me it may be deemed aſſuming; yet I conceive it to be my duty, becauſe I am convinced that the future proſperity, and even the being of the Company, and the national intereſts in this great kingdom, depend upon it. The diſtant and ſlow interpoſition of the ſupreme power which is lodged in your hands, cannot apply the remedies to the diſorders which may ariſe in your ſtate. A principle of vigour, activity, and deciſion, muſt reſt ſomewhere. In a body of men intruſted with it, its efficacy is loſt by being too much divided.

11. It is liable to ſtill worſe conſeqoences; the leſs the number is of which the body conſiſts, becauſe the majority is eaſier formed. Fixed to a ſingle point only, it can command confidence and enſure conſiſtency. I am compelled to affirm, becauſe I know not by what arguments to prove, what appears to me a ſelf-evident maxim.

12. On the other hand, there is a danger that ſuch a power may be abuſed, unleſs powerful checks be provided to counteract the miſapplication of it. Theſe I leave to your wiſdom to form, if the modification of it, which I ſhall propoſe, ſhall be found inadequate to the purpoſe. I will not take up more of your attention on this ſubject, but proceed to deſcribe the points of diſtinction which appear to me neceſſary for aſcertaining the reſpective provinces of the Council, the Select Committee, and the Preſident.

" 1ſt. The Select Committee ſhall have the " power of making peace and war, and of deter- " mining all meaſures reſpecting both, independent " of the Council at large. But they ſhall enter " into no treaty of alliance, whether offenſive or " defenſive, for a longer duration than two years, " without a ſpecial authority from the honourable " the Court of Directors. Every ſuch treaty ſhall " be communicated to the Council at large, as " ſoon as it conveniently may be, that their opinion " upon it may be tranſmitted with it to the Court " of Directors.

" 2d. It ſhall nevertheleſs be allowable for the " Preſident to bring any matter before the Council " at large, although included within the foregoing " limitations; and the deciſion of the Council " thereon ſhall be valid, and binding on the Select " Committee

" Committee. But no other Member of the Com-
" mittee ſhall be allowed the ſame privilege.
" 3d. The Preſident ſhall have the privilege of act-
" ing by his own ſeparate authority, on ſuch urgent
" and extraordinary caſes as ſhall in his judgment
" require it, notwithſtanding any deciſion of the
" Council or of the Committee paſſed thereon.
" On every ſuch occaſion the Preſident ſhall
" record his reſolution to act, in the manner above
" ſpecified, in virtue of the power thus veſted in
" him; and ſhall expreſsly declare, that he charges
" himſelf with the whole reſponſibility.
" 4th. All civil appointments within the pro-
" vinces ſhall be made by the Board at large; but the
" Preſident ſhall be empowered, of his own autho-
" rity, to prevent any particular appointment, and
" to recal any perſon, not being a Member of the
" Board, from his ſtation, even without a reaſon
" aſſigned All appointments beyond the provinces,
" and all military appointments which are not in the
" regular line of promotion, ſhall be made by the
" Preſident alone."

13. I ſhall forbear to comment on the above propoſitions; if juſt and proper, their utility will be ſelf-apparent. One clauſe only in the laſt article may require ſome explanation; namely, the power propoſed for the Governor of recalling any perſon from his ſtation, " without " aſſigning a reaſon for it." In the charge of oppreſſion, although ſupported by the cries of the people, and the moſt authentic repreſentations, it is yet impoſſible in moſt caſes to obtain legal proofs of it; and unleſs the diſcretionary power which I have recommended be ſomewhere lodged, the aſſurance of impunity from any formal enquiry will baffle every order of the Board; as on the other hand, the fear of the conſequences will reſtrain every man within the bounds of his duty, if he knows himſelf liable to ſuffer by the effect of a ſingle controul.

14. I beg leave to return to the firſt ſubject herein offered to your conſideration, by declaring, that as I have no wiſh in life equal to that of being uſeful in the ſphere which has been allotted me, ſo it is my fixed reſolution to devote my ſervices to the Honourable Company, ſo long as your pleaſure and my health will allow me. And I offer it as my humble opinion, that on whomſoever you ſhall think fit to beſtow the place which I now hold in your ſervice, it will be adviſable to fix him in it for a long period of time. I have already mentioned the principal evils which ariſe from the too frequent change of your Governors. I will beg leave to add another, in which I ſhall need your candour to obviate any miſconſtructions of it to my own prejudice.

15. The firſt command of a ſtate, ſo extenſive as that of *Bengal*, is not without opportunities of private emolument; and although the allowances which your bounty has liberally provided for your ſervants may be reaſonably expected to fix the bounds of their deſires, yet you will find it extremely difficult to reſtrain men from profiting by other means, who look upon their appointment as the meaſure of a day; and who, from the uncertainty of their condition, ſee no room for any acquiſition but of wealth, ſince reputation, and the conſequences which follow the ſucceſsful conduct of great affairs, are only to be attained in a courſe of years. Under ſuch circumſtances, however rigid your orders may be, or however ſupported, I am afraid, that in moſt inſtances they will produce no other fruits than either avowed diſobedience, or the worſt extreme, of falſehood and hypocriſy.

Theſe are not the principles which ſhould rule the conduct of men whom you have conſtituted the guardians of your property, and checks on the morals and fidelity of others. The care of ſelf-preſervation will naturally ſuggeſt the neceſſity of ſeizing the opportunity of preſent power, when the duration of it is conſidered as limited to the uſual term of three years, and of applying it to the proviſion of a future independency; therefore, every renewal of this term is liable to prove a reiterated oppreſſion.

16. It is perhaps owing to the cauſes which I have deſcribed, and a proof of the exiſtence, that this appointment has been for ſome years paſt ſo eagerly ſolicited, and ſo eaſily reſigned.

There are yet other inconveniencies attendant on this habit; and perhaps an inveſtigation of them all would lead to endleſs diſcoveries. Every man whom your choice has honoured with ſo diſtinguiſhed a truſt, ſeeks to merit approbation, and acquire an eclat by innovations, for which the wild ſcene before him affords ample and juſtifiable occaſion. But innovations of real uſe require a length of time, and the unremitted application of their original principles, to perfect them. Their immediate effects are often hurtful; and their intended benefits remote, or virtually diffuſed through ſuch concealed channels, that their ſource is not eaſy to be traced. Of this nature are the late regulations in your revenue, cuſtoms, and in the commerce of the country, which have been attended with an immediate loſs in the collections, and in the price of your inveſtment; and it will require a long and intricate train of reaſoning, to prove that the future increaſe of population, of national wealth, of revenue and trade, ſhould ſuch be the happy effects of theſe expedients, were really produced by them. But who that looks only for preſent applauſe, or preſent credit, would hazard both for remote advantages, of which another might arrogate the merit, and aſſume the reward? Or who will labour with equal perſeverance in the accompliſhment of meaſures projected by others, as of thoſe of which he was himſelf the contriver?

17. Although I diſclaim the conſideration of my own intereſt in theſe ſpeculations, and flatter myſelf that I proceed upon more liberal grounds, yet I am proud to avow the feelings of an honeſt ambition, that ſtimulates me to aſpire at the poſſeſſion of my preſent ſtation for years to come. Thoſe who know my natural turn of mind will not aſcribe this to ſordid views. A very few years poſſeſſion of the Government would undoubtedly enable me to retire with a fortune amply fitted to the meaſure of my deſires, were I to conſult only my eaſe; but in my preſent ſituation I feel my mind expand to ſomething greater; I have catched the deſire of applauſe in public life. The important tranſactions in which I have been engaged, and my wiſh to ſee them take complete effect, the public approbation which you have been pleaſed to ſtamp on them, and the eſtimation which that cannot fail to give me in the general opinion of mankind, lead me to aim at deſerving more; and I wiſh to dedicate all my time, health, and labour, to a ſervice which has been ſo flattering in its commencement.

18. Such are my views, and ſuch my ſentiments; I expoſe them without reſerve, becauſe I am conſcious that you will find nothing unworthy in them, whatever opinion you may form of their expediency.

19. I ſhall wait your determination with becoming expectation, but without anxiety; nor ſhall I ever leſs eſteem the favours I have already received, becauſe others are withheld, which it may be either not expedient or impracticable to grant.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient,
and moſt humble ſervant,
Warren Haſtings.

APPENDIX. No. 5.

APPENDIX, No. 6.

Extract of the Company's Select Letter to *Bengal*, dated the 16th March 1768.

Par. 3. IT is with great pleaſure we ſee an appearance of peace and tranquillity being eſtabliſhed in the pro-

APPENDIX. No. 6.

vinces; and that the Abdallah's return gives us the proſpect of their being undiſturbed another year.

4. Our principal doubts now ariſe from the nature of our connections with *Sujah Dowlah* and the King, on which we have little more to ſay than in general to approve the inſtructions left by Lord *Clive*.

5. As all our views and expectations are confined within the *Caramnaſſa*, we are impatient to hear our troops are recalled from *Allahabad*; the reaſon for their remaining there no longer ſubſiſts. As *Sujah Dowlah* has now had three years to repleniſh his coffers and recruit his army, and muſt be ſuppoſed to be in a ſtate of defence againſt any country powers who may invade him, therefore we ſee no neceſſity for further connection between us than what may ariſe from the 2d article of the Treaty, by which we are "to march to his aſſiſtance at his expence when his dominions are invaded." And with reſpect to the King, the ſame reaſon ſubſiſts for our not continuing the brigade at *Allahabad*, that *Sujah Dowlah*, as his Vizier, muſt ſupport and protect him: we therefore hope that the next advices will be, that you have recalled that brigade; or, if very ſufficient reaſons are not aſſigned for continuing them, we ſhall deem you accountable for all the conſequences it may be productive of.

6. As it ſeems not impoſſible that *Sujah Dowlah* may undertake to eſcort the King to *Delhi*, it becomes neceſſary we ſhould give you our idea of the proper conduct to be held on that occaſion, which entirely coincides with Lord *Clive*'s opinion in his Letter to the Select Committee, that to march any part of our army on ſuch an expedition, might bring on the total ruin of our affairs; and we add, that ſhould you be perſuaded into ſo raſh and dangerous a meaſure, we ſhall deem you reſponſible for all the conſequences; and as ſuch a meaſure would be attended with the greateſt danger to our affairs, be aſſured we ſhall be extremely jealous of every one, high in our ſervice, civil or military, who ſhews a tendency to ſuch an expedition.

S. C. Proceedings 16 January 1767.

7. The Treaty entered into with the Soubah of the *Decan* by our ſervants at *Fort Saint George*, and the tendency of your negociation with the Country Powers on the approach of the Abdallah, gave occaſion to the ſhort remark we made on ſuch treaties and alliances in our Letter to you of the 20th November laſt. We now repeat our diſapprobation of ſuch alliances, which we think no circumſtance in our affairs can require, and determined as we are not to aim at any power or poſſeſſion but what we hold in virtue of the Mogul's grants, and what ariſe from the office of Dewan, and conſequently are confined within the boundaries of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Orixa*, we truſt our own force will always ſuffice for the protection and defence of theſe; ſhould they not, foreign aſſiſtance will avail us very little; the experience of all the country wars we have been engaged in, evinces how little advantage is to be derived from the country troops in a general action, who rather croud upon us for protection than afford us any advantage over the enemy, and never fail to quit their allies, and make peace at their expence whenever the iſſue grows precarious.

Par. 16.

8. We entirely diſapprove the idea adopted of ſupporting the Soubah of the *Decan* as a barrier againſt the Marattas. It is for the contending parties to eſtabliſh a balance of power among themſelves: their diviſions are our ſecurity; and if the Marattas moleſt us, you muſt conſider whether an attack from *Bombay*, which being near the capital of their dominions, may not be preferable to any defenſive operations with the country powers on your ſide of *India*.

Extract of the Company's Select Letter to *Bengal*; dated 17th March 1769.

Par. 2. The contents of Sir *Robert Barker*'s Letter would be very alarming to us, if we had not received your ſentiments on a ſimilar repreſentation of *Sujah Dowla*'s proceedings from General *Smith*, and did not Lord *Clive*'s advice in his Letter to you of the 16th January 1767, and our Letter to you of the 16th March 1768, par. 4, 5, and 6, direct you how to conduct yourſelves with reſpect to the King and *Sujah Dowlah*.

3. With ſuch directions before you, we cannot ſuppoſe you can be ſo raſh as to carry your attachment to the King ſo far as to engage us in hoſtilities with *Sujah Dowlah* for his ſake. And we have been ſo very full and explicit on this ſubject in our laſt Letter to you, under date of the 11th November laſt, that we do not think it neceſſary to add any thing thereto.

4. That you may be appriſed of the general plan we would have adopted for all *India*, with reſpect to our political concern, we have incloſed copies of our further advices to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* on that ſubject, which are to govern you as well as our other Preſidencies, ſo far as you or they may be called to interfere in thoſe matters.

5. From the ſaid advices you will obſerve the conduct of that Preſidency has merited our ſevere reprehenſion, for deviating from our moſt poſitive and expreſs orders. We have therefore found it neceſſary to entruſt the management of theſe important concerns to a Select Committee, who are to conduct them upon a more permanent ſyſtem, by confining the Company's influence and poſſeſſions within the boundaries of the *Carnatic* and the Northern Circars; the names of the Gentlemen who are to compoſe the Committee are, viz.

Charles Bourchier, Eſq. Preſident,
Joſiah Du Pre, Eſq.
Warren Haſtings, Eſq.
Brigadier General *Joſeph Smith*,
Alexander Wynch, Eſq.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated 13th May 1768.

10. The Dewanny of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Orixa*, with the poſſeſſions we hold in thoſe provinces, are the utmoſt limits of our views on that ſide of *India*. On the Coaſt, the protection of the *Carnatic* and the poſſeſſion of the Circars, free from all engagements to ſupport the Soubah of the *Decan*, or even without the Circars, preſerving only influence enough over any country power who may hold them to keep the French from ſettling in them; and on the *Bombay* ſide, the dependencies thereof, the poſſeſſion of *Salſette*, *Baſſein*, and the caſtle of *Surat*. The protection of thoſe are eaſily within the reach of our power, and may mutually ſupport each other, without any country alliance whatever. If we paſs theſe bounds, we ſhall be led on from one acquiſition to another, till we ſhall find no ſecurity but in the ſubjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would loſe us the whole, and end in our extirpation from *Indoſtan*.

11. Much has been wrote from you and from our ſervants at *Bengal*, on the neceſſity of checking the Marattas, which may in ſome degree be proper; but it is not for the Company to take the part of umpires of *Indoſtan*. If it had not been for the imprudent meaſures you have taken, the Country Powers would have formed a balance of power among themſelves, and their diviſions would have left you in peace. But if at any time the thirſt for plunder ſhould urge the Marattas to invade our poſſeſſions, they can be checked only by carrying the war into their own country; it is with this view that we laſt year ſent out field officers to our Preſidency at *Bombay*, and put their military force on a reſpectable footing, and when once the Marattas underſtand that to be our plan, we have reaſon to think they will not wantonly attack us.

12. You will obſerve, by the whole tenor of theſe diſpatches, that our views are not to enter into offenſive wars in *India*, or to make further acquiſitions beyond our preſent poſſeſſions. We do not wiſh to enter into any engagements which may be productive of enormous expences, and which are ſeldom calculated to promote the Company's

Company's eſſential intereſts; on the contrary, we wiſh to ſee the preſent Indian powers to remain as a check one upon another, without our interfering; therefore we recommend to you, ſo ſoon as poſſible, to bring about a peace upon terms of the moſt perfect moderation on the part of the Company, and when made, to adhere to it, upon all future occaſions, except when the Company's poſſeſſions are actually attacked; and not to be provoked by freſh diſturbances of the country powers to enter into new wars.

Extract of the Company's Separate Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated 17th March 1769.

25. When we reflect on the vaſt length of country from the northern parts of *Chicacole* to the ſouthern diſtricts of *Madura* and *Tinnevelly*, the number of garriſons to be maintained, and the wild independence of moſt of the Rajahs and Polygars, from whom nothing can be collected but by a ſtanding force, we regret our having ever paſſed the boundaries of the *Carnatic*, even for the poſſeſſion of the Circars; for we have great doubts whether the charges will not always exceed the collections, and apprehend many ill conſequences from ſo great a diviſion of our forces.

The preſervation of the advantages we hold in the *Bengal* provinces, is the great object of our attention. Every thing muſt yield to that extenſion of influence, or poſſeſſions on your Coaſt will diſable you from affording ſuccours to them ſhould any unhappy event require it; and no advantage that can be obtained on your ſide of *India* can be brought in competition with the loſs we ſhould ſuſtain by having *Bengal* the theatre even of a ſucceſsful war.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated 30th June 1769.

Par. 3. In ſeveral of our Letters ſince we have been engaged as principals in the politics of *India*, and particularly during the laſt two or three years, we have given it as our opinion, that the moſt prudent ſyſtem we could purſue, and the moſt likely to be attended with a permanent ſecurity to our poſſeſſions, would be to incline to thoſe few Chiefs of *Indoſtan* who yet preſerve an independence of the Maratta power, and are in a condition to ſtruggle with them; for ſo long as they are able to keep up that ſtruggle, the acquiſitions of the Company will run the leſs riſque of diſturbance.

4. The Rohillas, the Jauts, the Nabob of the *Decan*, the Nabob of *Oude*, and the Myſore Chief, have each in their turn kept the Marattas in action, and we wiſh them ſtill to be able to do it; it is therefore with great concern we ſee the war continuing with *Hyder Naique*, and a probability of a rupture with *Sujah Dowlah* and *Nizam Ally*. In ſuch wars we have every thing to loſe, and nothing to gain; for ſuppoſing our operations be attended with the utmoſt ſucceſs, and our enemies reduced to our mercy, we can only wiſh to ſee them reſtored to the condition from which they ſet out, that is, to ſuch a degree of force and independence as may enable them ſtill to keep up the conteſt with the Marattas and with each other. It would give us therefore the greateſt ſatisfaction to hear that matters are accommodated both at *Bengal* and on the Coaſt; and in caſe ſuch a happy event ſhall have taken place, you will do your utmoſt to preſerve the tranquillity.

5. We eſteem ourſelves bound by Treaty to protect the King's perſon, and to ſecure to him the poſſeſſion of the Korah and Illahabad diſtricts. When we wrote the 11th November 1768, we apprehended the conſequences of keeping the brigade at *Illahabad* would be creating in *Sujah Dowlah* a jealouſy that would involve us in freſh troubles, having at that time no cauſe to eſteem him an enemy; but, impreſſed as you were with the opinion of his hoſtile intentions and growing ſtrength at the time of the diſpatch of the *Valentine*, we ſhall not blame your caution for deferring the execution of our orders for its removal; nor ſhall we at this time attempt to give poſitive directions for your conduct, which in ſuch critical caſes ought ſeldom to be done, and in which the ſituation of affairs may be varied by unforeſeen events at the very moment we are writing. But having given you, with as much preciſion as poſſible, a general view of the ſyſtem by which we wiſh to ſee our affairs regulated, we muſt leave it to you to improve to the utmoſt of your power every opportunity of drawing towards that point; and whenever you think yourſelves obliged, for our ſecurity, upon emergent occaſions to adopt meaſures of a contrary tendency, you are to give us very full reaſons for a ſuch a deviation, and endeavour to return to the path we have marked out as ſoon as circumſtances will admit.

6. Upon theſe reaſons we ſhall judge whether you merit praiſe or cenſure; and if you had obſerved this courſe in the Letter of your Select Committee by the *Valentine*, we ſhould have had no cauſe of diſpleaſure; but to ſay you are *aſtoniſhed* at our orders, is as uſeleſs as unbecoming.

7. The only article of our preſent engagements, that ſeems to throw a difficulty in the way of the limited plan which we wiſh to eſtabliſh, is, the obligation before mentioned with reſpect to the King's perſon, and the diſtricts aſſigned him out of *Sujah Dowlah*'s country. If you have ſucceeded in reſtoring confidence between the King and *Sujah Dowlah*, which we ſincerely hope, this difficulty may be eaſily removed; for, in ſuch caſe, it is probable that the King, ſeeing our poſitive determination not to take any part in the proſecution of his projects towards *Delhi*, may truſt to *Sujah Dowlah* for that ſervice; the care and management of the *Korah* and *Illihabad* diſtricts will then naturally belong to *Sujah Dowlaa*, or ſome equivalent will be ſettled between themſelves, in lieu of that revenue; which done, we hope there can be no occaſion for any part of our forces at *Illihabad*, and we ſhall be ſubject to no further claim or requiſition from the King, excepting for the ſtipulated tribute for *Bengal*, which you are to pay to his agent, or remit to him, in ſuch manner as he may direct.

8. Should the event of your deputation to *Sujah Dowlah* have proved contrary to our wiſhes, and been productive of a war, we have very little doubt of the ſucceſs of our troops: but having no point to gain, nor ambition to ſatisfy, beyond the bounds of the Bahar province, we hope peace was ſoon reſtored, and that you obtained a reimburſement of your expences, and avoided all engagements of ſuch a ſort, as may have a tendency to embroil you again.

9. We find by your advices by the *Kent* and the *Vereſt*, that *Sujah Dowlah*'s offer of coming to *Calcutta* had been no further attended to, and that Mr. *Cartier*, General *Smith*, and Mr. *Ruſſell*, had proceeded upon their deputation. No obſervation of ours upon this meaſure can alter the conſequences, which, whether they are good or bad, have been long ſince paſſed; but as, upon the peruſal of your Letters, Proceedings, and Country Correſpondence, we do not ſee ſufficient reaſons to juſtify ſome parts of the inſtructions given to thoſe Gentlemen, we ſhall point out to you wherein our judgment does not coincide with yours.

10. The number of *Sujah Dowlah*'s forces not being limited by any Treaty, your demand upon that ſubject can only be juſtified upon the principle of ſelf-defence, where conſideration of juſtice muſt ſometimes give place to neceſſity; but we do not ſee in the preſent inſtance, any ſuch danger impending. Colonel *Barker*, in his Letter of the 23d March 1768, gives an opinion that a ſingle brigade would be an overmatch for all *Sujah Dowlah*'s army; this opinion ſtands uncontroverted, and indeed, it is founded upon the uniform experience of our former ſucceſs; we do not therefore ſee the neceſſity of coming

to

APPENDIX. Nos. 7, 8, & 9.

to a reſolution, ſo very diſguſting and humiliating, without ſome overt act committed on his part, manifeſtly ſhewing his hoſtile intentions againſt us; whenever that happened, you were able enough to reduce him, and we could not have been charged with being the aggreſſors, whereas, if a war ſhould break out in conſequence of this and other aggravating circumſtances attending the deputation, the breach of friendſhip will be imputed to the Company.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 10th November 1772.

Par. 1. We addreſſed you laſt from this Department by the *Nottingham*, in a ſhort Letter, informing you of the hoſtile preparations of the Marattas, with our conjectures on the probable objects of their operations; and ſignifying to you the line which, independent of contingencies, we had laid down for ourſelves in relation to

Conſ. 16 April. thoſe powerful and enterprizing neighbours. The communication which the Preſident and Select Committee have made to us of their Conſultations on this ſubject, has met with our approbation; to theſe we refer. We only in this beg leave to aſſure you, that your Adminiſtration here adopt with ſincerity and ſatisfaction the plan which you have preſcribed to us for our political tranſactions with the country powers, and we flatter ourſelves it would not be unpleaſing to you to find, that before your orders could reach us, we had acted in ſo much conformity to your ſentiments. The ſecurity and tranquillity of theſe provinces ſhall be the ultimate end of all our negociations, and you may truſt that we are too well aware of the ruinous tendency of all ſchemes of conqueſt ever to adopt them, or even to depart from the abſolute line of ſelf-defence, unleſs impelled to it by the moſt obvious neceſſity, and the immediate exigency of the circumſtance. How far the ambitious temper of the Vizier may involve him in difficulties, from which it may require our exertions to extricate him, we cannot yet within any degreee of certainty foretel. In the meantime you will obſerve, we have pertinaciouſly refuſed to engage ourſelves farther with him than in the paſſive defence of his dominions, and in affording him that countenance and ſupport, at his formal requiſition, which by the nature of our connections and the faith of ſubſiſting

Select Committee. Treaties, we conceive ourſelves bound to beſtow. The Letter and Proceedings of the Select Committee will ſupply you with every neceſſary information on this head.

APPENDIX, No. 7.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 28th Auguſt 1771.

Par. 45. IT is with the moſt ſerious concern we learn from your late advices, that the incurſions of the Marattas had ſpread ſuch a terror and deſpondence into the minds of thoſe powers, which were the remoter barrier of our poſſeſſions, that the irreſolution and timidity of the moſt potent of them have given riſe to ſuch ſucceſſes as have encouraged the Marattas to invade the dominions of the King, and lay claim to a part of the territory of *Soujah Dowlah*. But the conduct of the Rohillas and Jauts is rather a matter of concern than ſurprize to us, as the King and *Soujah Dowlah* neglected that occaſion to unite with thoſe powers effectually to repel the common diſturbers of the empire, and confine them within the limits of their former poſſeſſions. To whatever cauſes this general timidity or ſupineneſs may have been owing, we find ourſelves equally affected, and the tranquillity of the provinces endangered thereby; but as the projects of the King, or the conduct of the Vizier, are at preſent too myſterious for us to decide on the motives of their inactivity, and as we know not what alliances may be formed to juſtify us in carrying our arms beyond the bounds of their dominions, we are prevented from propoſing any preciſe plan for your guidance in this reſpect. But ſhould your ſubſequent advices enable us to form a more certain judgment of the expediency of departing from the plan we have laid down, we ſhall communicate to you by ſome early conveyance, how far we may be diſpoſed to carry our arms beyond the bounds of the provinces, or the territories of our allies, and become the parties in an offenſive war. In the meantime we truſt that your ſole objects will be the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions, and thoſe of the powers with whom we are connected both by treaty and intereſt; and as this appears to have been the guide of your conduct upon the Marattas invading the province of *Korab*, we with pleaſure approve the meaſures you have taken for defending the dominions of the King and Vizier from their inroads and depredations, more eſpecially as thoſe meaſures are not only juſtified by neceſſity, but are within the line which we have preſcribed for your conduct in ſuch a conjuncture.

APPENDIX, No. 8.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 7th April 1773.

Par. 33. THOUGH your advices of laſt year have not been anſwerable to the hope we had of your having been able to acquire actual poſſeſſion of the fortreſs of *Chunar Gur*, yet it affords us a ſenſible pleaſure to find that the Vizier has propoſed it ſhall be garriſoned by our troops, while affairs to the Weſtward may require our interpoſition, or himſelf ſtand in need of our aſſiſtance; and as you have ſo far advanced towards the completion of our wiſhes in this reſpect, we truſt that you will not loſe ſight of ſo important an object, but take every favourable opportunity to preſs the Vizier to cede it to us in perpetuity, or at leaſt for ſo long as it may be neceſſary for us to retain it. The importance of this poſt being the ground of our deſire to have it in our poſſeſſion, we cannot be ſuppoſed to aim hereby at extending our acquiſitions, ſince this can only be conſidered as giving ſecurity to what we already poſſeſs in the kingdom of *Bengal*.

APPENDIX, No. 9.

Select Letter from *Bengal*; 20th September 1772.

To the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Gentlemen,

1. MR. *Alderſey* addreſſed you in a Letter of the 10th inſtant, by the *Nottingham*, and forwarded to you the tranſlation of a Letter which the Preſident has juſt received, and tranſmitted to him from the Vizier.

2. As the tenor of this Letter will ſerve to ſhew the intentions of the Vizier, and the danger to which the peace of his country is expoſed, whether from the effects of his own ambition, or that of his ſuppoſed enemies, we think it neceſſary, for the clearer elucidation of this intereſting ſubject, to forward to you the copies of the two Letters preceding this, in the correſpondence with the Vizier; viz. the tranſlation of a Letter from him, received the 17th of July, and the Preſident's reply, which was written with the concurrence of the Board, to whom it was previouſly communicated.

3. We are ſorry to ſay, that the ſtate of affairs, ſo remote from our own view as thoſe of the Vizier, is ſo imperfectly

imperfectly known to us, that we can venture to give no other opinion upon them than mere conjecture, founded on the advices which have been occaſionally tranſmitted to us by the General Sir *Robert Barker*, and by the Vizier himſelf.

4. Permit us, however, to aſſure you, that it has been the ſtudy of your Adminiſtration, by every precaution in their power, to prevent your being drawn into an unneceſſary war; nor ſhall they relax of their attention to that end.

We are, with the utmoſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and moſt obedient
Fort William, humble ſervants,
September 20th, 1772. *Warren Haſtings.*
W. Alderſey.

APPENDIX, No. 10.

Extract of the Select Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 10th November 1772.

Par. 30. IN one point, you may reſt aſſured of our unanimous concurrence; that no object or conſideration ſhall either tempt or compel us to paſs the political line which we have had laid down for our operations with the Vizier. We have told him, and repeated, that we will aſſiſt him with your forces in the defence of his dominions againſt all invaders; but that we will not engage in any offenſive war, not ſuffer your army to be carried beyond the borders of his territories; and to this reſolution we will ſteadily adhere.

APPENDIX, No. 11.

Extract of the General Letter from *Bengal*; dated 10th November 1772.

6. WE have had no exact advices communicated to us of late, of the proceedings of *Shaw Allum*, or of his manœuvres in conjunction with his new allies. Till we have better aſſurances of his friendly intentions towards us, and of the juſtneſs and propriety of his views, we cannot think ourſelves either bound in honour or juſtifiable towards you, in the ſupport of them. In the meantime we regard his motions as too inconſequential to cauſe either jealouſy to us or alarm. The probable iſſue of his raſh enterprize will be, after having been led through all *Indtia* the ridiculous pageant of the Maratta power, to throw himſelf once more, friendleſs and forlorn, into your arms for protection and ſupport; the only event in our opinion which is capable of giving trouble to us in regard to him.

Extract of the Select Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 10th November 1772.

Par. 4 The Marattas, after the defeat of the Rohillas, proſecuted without any interruption their ravages on the defenceleſs country, if we except a little reſiſtance which they encountered from *Nedjib Gur* and ſome other forts, which however ſoon capitulated, and furniſhed the conquerors with the moſt acceptable of all plunders, grain and treaſure.

5. Their inſolence was now immoderate. Their ſucceſs had been equal to their moſt ſanguine expectations, and ſeemed to pave the way for further depredations to the ſouthward; they were in poſſeſſion of the perſon of the King, whoſe authority they contemned, and whoſe name and mandates they regarded ſolely as the inſtruments of their own aggrandizement; and ſo far were they from re-eſtabliſhing him in his Government, that they poſitively refuſed to perform their engagements of ſharing with him the ſpoils of the vanquiſhed, and he was left almoſt deſtitute, in the midſt of a rich and plentiful camp, of the common neceſſaries required to ſupport at leaſt an appearance of dignity.

APPENDIX, Nos. 10, 11, & 12.

APPENDIX, No. 12.

Extract of the Select Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 15th January 1773.

Par. 1. IN our laſt per the *Greenwich*, we gave you information that *Byſagu* had marched towards *Delhi* with a determination of intimidating the King into a compliance with his terms in favour of *Zabita Cawn*, and that his Majeſty was preparing to oppoſe him with all his troops ſhould he appear deſirous of puſhing matters to extremity.

2. The King's accuſtomed malevolent fortune ſeems at this time to have exerted its utmoſt influence, for as neither party would recede from their pretenſions, a battle enſued, which, after an obſtinate conflict of ſome hours, terminated in the total rout of the beſt appointed army the King ever poſſeſſed, and he became once more a priſoner in the hands of the Marattas.

3. They had, previouſly to this event, preſerved ſome little reſpect to the royal name; but a battle fought, and the ſlaughter of a conſiderable number of their body, had given them, for the firſt time, an appearance of a plea to treat him as a vanquiſhed monarch, and of which they did not fail to poſſeſs themſelves, by exacting from him a compliance with thoſe demands which firſt occaſioned the war, and with others of a more diſtreſſing nature.

4. He has ceded to them the provinces of *Corab* and *Kurrah*, and they have obliged him to appoint *Zabita Cawn* Buxy of the empire, with the proprietary of thoſe lands uſually annexed to this office. They require him to make over all the country conquered from the Jauts, to pay him the balance of the ſums he promiſed them when he firſt joined them, and to remain conſtantly in their protection.

5. The Vizier tranſmitted us the intelligence of this event, in terms ſufficiently expreſſive of his terror, and which ſeemed to us upon the firſt alarm to be not altogether without foundation, until we had conſidered with attention every poſſible circumſtance reſulting from it.

6. For, allowing that by the poſſeſſion of *Corab* and *Kurrah* the Marattas were become the formidable neighbours of the Vizier's country, we reflected, that previous to their rupture with the King, when they were in fact acting as one party and united in a common cauſe, they held in reality the ſame poſſeſſion of thoſe provinces, were as much in the vicinity of the Vizier's dominions, and might have invaded them with better proſpects of ſucceſs, as we had but a few battalions in his country, which the reſpect and delicacy we have ever ſhewn his Majeſty would have ever prevented our making uſe of until they had, by commencing hoſtilities, made an open declaration of their intentions, than at this time, when we have a complete brigade in the province of *Oude*, another at *Patna* in readineſs to march at a moment's warning for its defence and protection.

7. We allow the probability of *Zabita Cawn*, with the other Rohilla Chiefs paſſing the line of their own boundary into the Vizier's country, while the Marattas invaded it from the ſouthward: but yet we judged that the Rohillas, who had fought their ſafety in an alliance with the Marattas, to which they were of neceſſity compelled, would, when left to themſelves, attempt at leaſt to re-eſtabliſh their own independence rather than contribute to the increaſe of a Power, which they are well aſſured would uſe very little ceremony of cruſhing them in their turn, and which the Vizier, with the countenance of the Engliſh, ſeems to be the only Hindoſtan Prince capable of checking the rapidity of its progreſs.

8. We were certain likewiſe that much of the ſeaſon would be expended by delays attending the ſettlement of

APPENDIX. No. 12.

the ceded provinces, and by the *Ganges* not being fordable until the end of February, before the Marattas would have leiſure to invade the Vizier's provinces; in which undertaking, from all preſent appearances, they would undoubtedly be foiled.

9. How far our engagements with the King ought to influence us in defending him in the right of poſſeſſions we know to have been forcibly wreſted from him, at a time when no public act of his can be deemed valid, and when there is great reaſon to imagine he will himſelf ſolicit our aſſiſtance to protect them, or how far at this juncture it would be political or expedient to interfere, muſt remain undetermined until we have ſufficient leiſure to conſider the ſubject with that attention which the importance of it demands.

10. In the meantime, as the fortreſs of *Allahabad* is of the greateſt conſequence, and the only poſt belonging to the Vizier on that ſide of the river, we have judged it proper to direct Colonel *Champion*, ſhould the Vizier require it, to throw into the fort an adequate garriſon, to defend it againſt every attempt; but have deſired him at the ſame time to give the moſt explicit and poſitive orders to the Officer who may command, on no inducement whatever to exceed the limits of his ſtation.

Copy of the 9th Paragraph of a Letter from the Governor and Council in *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors; dated the 1ſt March 1773.

The circumſtance of the King's ſurrendering the province of *Korab* to the Marattas, hardly, as we have obſerved before, makes any difference as to our ſituation with regard to theſe turbulent and ambitious people. They had before declared their intention of attacking the Vizier, and by their motions, ſhewn themſelves ready to fall upon him. Our intereſt, our engagements obliged us to take up his defence, and our meeting his enemies in the above-mentioned provinces, inſtead of receiving them in his own proper dominions, was as conſonant to this principle, as it was conformable to our connections with the King, and the intereſt which we have in the protection of his demeſnes. We ſtill act on the principles we ſet out of protecting our allies, without forming any deſigns againſt other people. In no ſhape can this compulſatory ceſſion by the King releaſe us from the obligation we are under to defend the provinces which we have ſo particularly guaranteed to him, and which his own Viceroy, *Mineer ul Dowlah*, at this time puts under our protection: independent of our own conviction of the propriety of this plan, your orders in the 5th paragraph of your Letter of the 30th June 1769, on a caſe exactly parallel to that before us, left us without an option.

Copy of the 5th Paragraph of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 30th June 1769.

We eſteem ourſelves bound by Treaty to protect the King's perſon, and to ſecure to him the poſſeſſion of the Korah and Illahabad diſtricts. When we wrote the 11th November 1768, we apprehended the conſequences of keeping the brigade at *Ilahabad*, would be creating in *Suja Dowlah* a jealouſy that would involve us in freſh troubles, having at that time no cauſe to eſteem him an enemy; but impreſſed as you were with the opinion of his hoſtile intentions and growing ſtrength at the time of the diſpatch of the *Valentine*, we ſhall not blame your caution for deferring the execution of our orders for its removal; nor ſhall we at this time attempt to give poſitive directions for your conduct, which in ſuch critical caſes ought ſeldom to be done, and in which the ſituation of affairs may be varied by unforeſeen events, at the very moment we are writing; but having given you with as much preciſion as poſſible a general view of the ſyſtem by which we wiſh to ſee our affairs regulated, we muſt leave it to you to improve, to the utmoſt of your power, every opportunity of drawing towards that point; and whenever you think yourſelves obliged for our ſecurity, upon emergent occaſions, to adopt meaſures of a contrary tendency, you are to give us very full reaſons for ſuch a deviation, and endeavour to return to the path we have marked out, as ſoon as circumſtances will admit.

Extract of the Company's Select Letter to *Bengal*, the 11th November 1768.

Par. 31. As the war on the coaſt of *Coromandel* has been a very important event in our political ſyſtem in *India*, we think it proper to tranſmit you copy of all we have wrote to our ſervants at *Fort Saint George* on the ſubject, that you may know our ſentiments on the points diſcuſſed therein, and that the ſeveral Preſidencies may act on one uniform plan. We find this the more neceſſary, becauſe we obſerve they are countenanced in their wild ideas of eſtabliſhing a new Subah in the *Decan*, by the ſeveral Letters you have wrote them, and which indicate that you poſſeſs much more of the ſpirit of conqueſt than is conſiſtent with that permanency which is our object. You will therefore pay the ſame attention to the Letters addreſſed to our ſervants at *Fort Saint George*, as if they were addreſſed to yourſelves. And this leads us to a recapitulation of what we have wrote to you, and what advices we have received from you, relative to your conduct towards the neighbouring Powers.

32. It is evident that Lord *Clive*, in forming the Treaty of 1765, conſidered *Suja Dowla* as the proper barrier againſt the Marattas and the Northern Powers; and that his enemies might not take advantage of the weak ſtate to which our arms had reduced him, a brigade was for ſome time ſtationed at *Allahabad*. When the terms of the Treaty were fulfilled, and *Suja Dowla* had made ſome progreſs in recruiting his forces, Lord *Clive* withdrew the brigade, leaving only one battalion at the requeſt of the King. This was in July 1766. But in October following, the approach of *Abdallah*, and the earneſt ſolicitations of *Suja Dowla*, obliged the Select Committee to order a brigade to be ſtationed again at *Allahabad*, intending however, we ſuppoſe, to withdraw it as ſoon as the apprehenſions of an invaſion ſhould ceaſe: and Lord *Clive*, in his Letter to the Select Committee, 16th January 1767, recommends the withdrawing it as ſoon as poſſible, leaving a detachment of only one battalion to quiet the fears which the Vizier entertained even againſt the King himſelf, who had invited the Marattas to croſs the *Nerbuddah*, and join him, promiſing them our aſſiſtance in the execution of his favourite deſign of marching to *Delhi*. It is certain that the King, finding himſelf diſappointed in this ſcheme by our non-concurrence, was upon the point of throwing himſelf into the hands of the Marattas, forgetful as well of his own true intereſt as of his obligations to the Engliſh. That deſign you may be aſſured he has not, nor perhaps ever will, totally relinquiſh; but he ſtill flatters himſelf with the hope of our aſſiſtance, and ſo long as he ſees the ſtrong ſupport of one of our brigades at *Allahabad*, he will either be forming ſchemes to embroil us in the politics of the country, or ſoliciting us to gratify him in his project of going to *Delhi*. To deprive the *Bengal* provinces of one entire brigade, merely to allay his fears, or to feed his hopes, is a moſt pernicious conceſſion, and therefore we cannot but wiſh to hear of your having evacuated *Allahabad*. Poſitive orders upon this head we cannot give you, becauſe you muſt undoubtedly act according to the emergency of affairs; but we inſiſt upon your looking back to your own and Lord *Clive*'s reaſonings upon the firſt ſtationing of a brigade at *Allahabad*; and ſuffer not yourſelves to be duped by any ill-founded alarms of the King or *Suja Dowla*. The motive you alledge for continuing the brigade in that ſtation, is to watch the motions of the Marattas, and other Country Powers; and hence ariſes our anxiety, becauſe it ſeems founded on the principle

expreſſed

expreſſed in your Letters to *Fort Saint George*, and in the Letter of Preſident *Verelſt*; viz. "That the Engliſh are "to maintain the character of umpires of *Indoſtan*;" a principle that may involve us in every war from *Delhi* to *Cape Comarin*. One invariable maxim ought ever to be maintained; which is, that we are to avoid taking part in the political ſchemes of any of the Country Princes. If *Suja Dowla*'s dominions ſhould ever be actually invaded, we are bound by Treaty to aſſiſt him; but as to any ambitious views of his, he muſt execute them as well as he can, without the leaſt aſſiſtance from us; nor are you to interfere in or be anxious concerning the quarrels, defeats, or victories, of any Indian Power whatſoever: for the more they diſpute and fight with one another, the leſs will they be enabled or inclined to act offenſively againſt us.

33. The effects that we look for from withdrawing the brigade, will be, either that the King will put himſelf in *Suja Dowla*'s power, follow the brigade, or fling himſelf into the arms of the Marattas, or any other Power who will give him hopes of an army to conduct him to *Delhi*; either of which would be far more eligible than the preſent jarring ſyſtem. If he puts himſelf in *Suja Dowla*'s power, he, as Vizier, will poſſeſs himſelf of the power of diſpoſing of his revenues, and of the royal authority, and we ſhall be no longer embarraſſed with his machinations to excite us to a rupture with *Suja Dowla*. If he flings himſelf into the hands of the Marattas, or any other Power, we are diſengaged from him, and it may open a fair opportunity of withholding the 26 lacks we now pay him; but the moſt eligible for us would be to have him follow the brigade into the *Bahar* province; in that caſe you muſt inform *Suja Dowla*, that in virtue of the Treaty of *Illahabad* we, as guarantees, eſteem the King's poſſeſſions under our immediate protection, and that we ſhall repel any attempts that he may make to poſſeſs himſelf of them. But though this language is to be held, we do not mean that you ſhould engage in a war with *Suja Dowla*, even though he ſhould poſſeſs himſelf of the King's poſſeſſions; no intereſts of the King being of that importance to us as to plunge us into a war.

34. This being the concluſion we wiſh to have theſe affairs brought to; we rely on your abilities to conduct them, ſo as neither to involve us in a war, nor draw on us the imputation of violated faith.

35. The nature of the orders we have given you above, require the moſt profound ſecrecy, and therefore the knowledge of them muſt be confined to the Select Committee only, unleſs you ſhould have occaſion to produce them to the Council in juſtification of any meaſures you may take in conſequence.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultation; dated 12th October 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Preſident,

William Alderſey,
P. M. Dacres,
Henry Goodwin,
John Graham,
George Vanſittart,
} Eſquires.

The Governor's Reply to the General's diſſent.

The Preſident deſires to enter the following Minute, in reply to thoſe recorded by the General in the laſt Proceedings:

Remarks on the General's diſſent to the Preſident's meaſure at *Benares*.

The objections made by the General to the article of the Treaty which reſpects the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad* to the Vizier, are theſe:

1ſt. That they are repugnant to the Treaty of *Illahabad*.

2d. That the condition of the ceſſion were much below its worth, and what might have been obtained for them.

3d. That an exchange might have been obtained for them of the lands of *Chunar*, and that part of the Zemindary of *Gauzypore* which lies on the ſouth ſide of the *Ganges*.

4th. That it has contributed to the Vizier's purpoſe of accumulating as much power, wealth, and country as he poſſibly can, and rendering himſelf a ſtill more formidable and dangerous neighbour than he has hitherto been.

5th. That beſides the advance of a ſum of money, a continuation of half the revenues ariſing from theſe provinces ſhould have been obtained for the Company for a number of years.

6th. That equal advantages might have been obtained from the King for his reinſtatement in thoſe provinces, viz. the renunciation of his ſtipend of twenty-ſix lacks per annum, and grants for the Soubahs of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, to the Company, for ever.

To theſe I ſhall reply in their order.

1ſt. The 4th article of the Treaty of *Allahabad* runs in theſe words:

"The King *Shaw Allum* ſhall remain in full poſſeſſion "of *Corah*, and ſuch part of the province of *Illahabad* as "he now poſſeſſes; which are ceded to his Majeſty as "a royal demeſne for the ſupport of his dignity and "expences."

The General affirms, that in conſequence and by virtue of this ceſſion, the Company were to hold the provinces of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, in perpetuity. No ſuch declaration is made in the above, or in any ſubſequent Treaty, nor is the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Illahabad* either mentioned or alluded to in any other. Although no concluſion is drawn from this affirmation, I have thought it of conſequence to remove it, becauſe it ſeemed to imply, that the poſſeſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, and that of the Dewannee of *Bengal*, &c. ſtood upon the ſame tenure, and that if the former were loſt to the King, the right of the Company to the latter ceaſed with it.

The true ſtate of the caſe, as I conceive it, is this:

This Government beſtowed the diſtrict of *Corah* and *Allahabad* upon the King *Shaw Allum*, of its own free will, "for the ſupport of his dignity and expences." He firſt abandoned, and afterwards by a ſolemn grant he gave them away to the Marattas; we diſapproved of the grant, becauſe it fruſtrated the purpoſe for which theſe lands were beſtowed on the King, and becauſe we ſaw danger on admitting ſo powerful a neighbour on the borders of our ally. It was therefore reſolved to reſume the poſſeſſion of thoſe lands, not from the King, whoſe property and right were annulled by his own alienation of them, but from the Marattas their new proprietors.

If it was repugnant to the Treaty "to poſſeſs ourſelves of the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, and to cede them to the Vizier, becauſe the King had an undoubted right of doing what he judged proper with thoſe provinces, with reference to the Engliſh;" it was alſo repugnant to the Treaty to oppoſe the Marattas to whom he had aſſigned them, and to prevent them from taking poſſeſſion according to the intention of his grant. Yet this meaſure was reſolved on, after having been very maturely debated both in the Select Committee and at the Board, with the preſence, concurrence, and advice of the General in both. What was the opinion of the Board at that time on the ſubject, will beſt appear from the following extract of the Conſultation of the 1ſt February, at which the General was preſent.

"The Board are entirely of opinion with the Select "Committee, that they have the juſteſt grounds to con- "teſt this point with the Marattas. The province of "*Corah* was a grant of the Company to the King, and "declared to have been made for the ſupport of his dig- "nity and expences. By its being made an article of "their Treaty with the Vizier, they muſt be conſidered "as the guarantees of it. The preſent transfer is un- "queſtionably

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" queſtionably an act of violence; and as ſuch, can be " repelled by none with ſo good a plea of right, as by " thoſe from whom it was originally held. Were it even " a voluntary ceſſion, the equity of it might well admit " of a diſpute, and the Company might juſtly reclaim the " poſſeſſion of it; both becauſe the conditions of their " original grant to the King were defeated by his aſſign- " ing it to another Power, and their intereſts are like to " be endangered by it.—Reſolved, that meaſures be im- " mediately taken for the defence of the provinces of " *Corab* and *Currah*, againſt the Mahrattas: that the " President be deſired to communicate this our intention " to the Vizier: that Colonel *Champion* be directed to " conſult with him on the proper means of effecting it; " and, if adviſable, to croſs the river at *Illahabad*, either " with the whole, or ſuch a part of the brigade as he " ſhall judge adviſable for this ſervice, &c."

2d. Mr. *Laurell* has given his opinion, founded on the teſtimony of the moſt authentic records, that the net revenue of the provinces of *Corab* and *Illahabad*, after deducting all charges, may amount to 22,09,416 rupees, " if the country remains in peace, and is affected with " no unuſual calamity." This is a condition in which we have no right to expect them to continue long; and in war, or even the threatening of a war, it may be queſtioned, whether the collections would be ſufficient to defray the charges of the forces which would be required, at once to guard the country againſt an enemy, and to curb the ſeditious ſpirit of the people. I beg leave to quote an expreſſion which I have heard attributed to *Nudjiff Cawn*, and which ſtrongly marks the troubleſome and precarious tenure of thoſe diſtricts: " that the Ryots never pay their rents but with the dagger held to their throats." In effect we find, that on bare expectation of an invaſion of the Marattas the laſt year, notwithſtanding their diſtance, and the ſpeedy approach of our forces, the Zemindars and Farmers had withheld their rents, and ſome of the Rajahs had actually riſen up in rebellion; which circumſtances are mentioned by Mr. *Laurell* to have rendered the ſtate of the collections ſo precarious, that he was glad to accept of an agreement from *Munneer o Dowlah*, to rent the whole country for the net ſum of 16 lacks.

To the refractory ſpirit of the people let it be added, that the neareſt point of *Illahabad* lies at the diſtance of 180 miles, meaſured in a ſtrait line from our cantonments at *Dinapore*—The length of *Corab* and *Illahabad*, with the ſame meaſure, is 150 miles, and their breadth, which is in every part nearly the ſame, but 20: that they are annually expoſed to the attacks of the Marattas, who have an ancient claim to the poſſeſſion of *Corab*, which they are not likely to forego; and then let a calculation be formed of the probable amount which theſe lands would yield to us on a medium of ten years, with the probable amount of their expences.

Upon the whole, whatever may be the General's opinion, I am convinced that the terms which I obtained from the Vizier were fully adequate to the real worth of the lands, all circumſtances conſidered. I will not pretend to ſay, whether more might or might not have been extorted from him: it was not without much pains and perſuaſion that I brought him to theſe terms: beſides, I beg it may be remembered, that the Vizier was as well acquainted with the obvious difficulties which would have attended our retaining poſſeſſion of this territory on behalf of the Company, as I was with his motives for wiſhing to acquire it.

3d. I cannot avoid complaining of a want of candour in the aſſertion, " that had I perſevered in the demand of the *Gauzypore* lands, it is probable I might have obtained an equivalent in them for the exchange of *Corab* and *Illahabad*." The General may well remember, that he himſelf informed me of the extreme reluctance which the Vizier had to yield up the ſmalleſt part of that country. But I will plainly declare that territory was not my aim; my attention was wholly fixed on the means of relieving the diſtreſſes of the Company, by an acquiſition of ready money, rather than of embarraſſing them by an extention of poſſeſſion, which in the caſe ſuppoſed by the General would not have been an equivalent; but ſince the whole Zemindarry pays to the Vizier no more than 22½ lacks under our guarantee, and that part of it which the General refers to compoſes but about one-third of it, from which we could in juſtice claim no more than the proportional rent, that is ſeven or eight lacks.

4th. I have already declared my opinion, with my reaſons for it, that the acquiſition of *Corab* and *Illahabad* will increaſe the Vizier's dependance on the Company. I have often heard of the treacherous deſigns of the Vizier, and the danger of allowing him to poſſeſs either wealth or power; but I never heard this opinion well ſupported: on the contrary, I conceive that he would be a much more uſeful ally, if he had a greater degree of both; but while the policy prevails, of curbing him in every improvement, we do not only deprive ourſelves of every benefit of his alliance, and make him a burthen to us, but we alienate his affections, and teach him to abhor the hand which is held out to oppreſs, inſtead of relieving him. The additional revenue and ſecurity which the Vizier would have acquired, by the reduction of the Rohillas, had, I own, a conſiderable ſhare in the reaſons which induced me to conſent to that propoſition, although the ſtipulations which were propoſed for the Company were undoubtedly the firſt conſideration. I preſume that the General himſelf, when he firſt communicated the propoſal, was aware that the reduction of the Rohillas would have been an accumulation of wealth, power, and country to the Vizier, and a far more important one than the poſſeſſion of *Corab* and *Illahabad*.

In the above ſentiments, reſpecting the treatment of the Vizier, I am ſupported by the opinion of the honourable Court of Directors, which is ſtrongly implied in many of their commands, and pointedly expreſſed in the following paragraph of their Letter of 30th June 1769, which, though alluding to a different ſubject, evidently marks both their opinion and that of the General at another period, of the little danger which we have to apprehend from the power of the Vizier.

" The number of *Suja Dowla*'s forces not being limited " by any Treaty, your demand upon that ſubject can " only be juſtified upon the principle of ſelf defence, " where conſiderations of juſtice muſt ſometimes give " place to neceſſity; but we do not ſee, in the preſent " inſtance, any ſuch danger impending. Colonel *Bar-* " *ker*, in his Letter of the 23d March 1768, gives an " opinion, that a ſingle brigade would be an overmatch " for all *Suja Dowla*'s army. This opinion ſtands uncon- " troverted; and indeed it is founded upon the uniform " experience of our former ſucceſs. We do not there- " fore ſee the neceſſity of coming to a reſolution ſo very " diſguſting and humiliating, without ſome overt act " committed on his part, manifeſtly ſhewing his hoſtile " intentions againſt us. Whenever that happened, you " were able enough to reduce him; and we could not " have been charged with being the aggreſſors: whereas, " if a war ſhould break out in conſequence of this and " other aggravating circumſtances attending, the breach " of friendſhip will be imputed to the Company."

5. This being a mere ſpeculative opinion, unſupported by reaſons, I ſhall decline anſwering it: obſerving only, that a ſtipulation for the continued payment of one-half of the revenue (if the Vizier had agreed, to which I am morally certain he would not) would have made it neceſſary to join our own Officers with the Vizier's in the management of the collections, and beſides continual conteſts would have entailed upon us all the bad conſequences, but in a greater degree, of an unconnected poſſeſſion.

6. The renunciation of the tribute which we cannot pay, and the grant of the Sunnuds for *Bengal* which we do not want, cannot in propriety be termed equal advan-

tages with a poſitive payment of 50 lacks in money, and the Vizier's engagement to bear the whole expence of our troops when they ſhall be employed by him. Beſides, I know not by what right the King could give, or the Company take from the Nabob, the little ſhare which he poſſeſſes of the Soubaſhip. and which he holds by treaty. But the General adds, that "it is now more "than probable we ſhall ſoon ſee theſe Sunnuds in the "hands of other nations." And what will they avail them? It was not the want of the Sunnuds of *Shah Allum* which defeated the long concerted projects of the Duc *De Choiſeul*; nor will the poſſeſſion of them quicken the deſigns of the Marattas againſt us. The ſword which gave us the dominion of *Bengal*, muſt be the inſtrument of its preſervation; and if (which God forbid) it ſhall ever ceaſe to be ours, the next proprietor will derive his right from the ſame natural charter.

Opinions of what might have been done always have an advantage in the compariſon with what have been done. Any conjectures may be hazarded of the probable conſequences of the former; no events can refute them: the latter are fixed to certain and unavoidable proofs. I feel the force of this inequality in the preſent argument with the General; I can only oppoſe my own opinions to his conjectures, which cannot overthrow them. The meaſures which I have adopted can at this time admit of no amendment or variation, nor can any reaſoning avert the effects which muſt follow them, although it will always be eaſy to infer every diſappointment and every ill conſequence as the neceſſary deductions from them.

The remainder of the General's Letter conſiſts in a charge which reſpects the Board more immediately than myſelf; I ſhall beg leave however to reply to it. He complains "that he was not included in the commiſſion which the Board thought proper to entruſt to my ſole management; that he was never preſent at any of the conferences held between the Vizier and myſelf, excepting the laſt day, when every thing had been concluded; and that the natives of *Indoſtan*, influenced by theſe appearances, muſt view his conſequence in a leſſer degree than any of his predeceſſors, whom they have been taught to look on with reverence and reſpect." This latter charge he afterwards repeats in terms which too ſtrongly imply that his attendance at *Benares* was required for that purpoſe only.

The charges are ſevere, but how far they are merited may beſt appear from a [illegible] ſtate of my conduct in the points to which they ref[illegible]

Immediately on my arrival at *Benares* I acquainted the General very circumſtantially with the ſubject and deſign of my commiſſion. I ſhewed him my inſtructions, which he read with attention, and to the beſt of my remembrance expreſſed an approbation of every part, excepting that he mentioned a regret that ſome more notice had not been taken in it of himſelf. I expreſſed to him my wiſh to have the benefit of his aſſiſtance; and that he might know with what degree of cordiality he might in reaſon beſtow it, I very frankly informed him, that as it appeared evident to me that the Vizier was hitherto very little acquainted with the regular powers of our conſtitution, and had placed no dependence on the Government itſelf, but made all his applications to the Commander of the army, it was my intention to convince the Vizier, that in his concerns with the Company his immediate dependence was on the Governor alone, and to eſtabliſh a direct communication between him and myſelf without any intervention. At the ſame time I aſſured the General, that I conſidered the ſecond place as due to him, and that it ſhould be my ſtudy to add as much as was in my power to his importance within that limitation. In other points my views were no other than ſuch as were contained in the ſubſtance of my inſtructions.

I can truly declare that my whole ſubſequent conduct was conſiſtent with this declaration; I can indeed offer but one proof of it, to which the General himſelf will bear evidence, in the information which he received from the Vizier of my deſire, as I have before expreſſed it to him, that the General might be prevailed on to take the command of the army, in caſe the projected expedition againſt the Rohillas ſhould take place.

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With reſpect to his not participating in the conferences with the Vizier, a thouſand obvious cauſes forbid it. The purpoſe to which I have juſt alluded would have made the preſence of the military Commander a circumſtance equally of reſtraint and indelicacy; the commiſſion which I had undertaken required ſpeedy diſpatch; the very eſſence of it was the power of inſtant deciſion. Both theſe purpoſes would have been fruſtrated by the General's intervention; the converſation muſt have been broken by the interpretation of every word that was ſaid on both ſides for the General's information, his opinion muſt have been conſulted on every new point that aroſe out of the debate, and arguments diſcuſſed on both ſides till we ſhould concur in the ſame determination, while the Vizier was to ſit patiently and wait the iſſue of our diſcuſſions, or catch the difference of our ſentiments, and apply it, as he eaſily might, to his own advantage. Who too ſhould be the interpreter between us? I could not. A fourth perſon therefore muſt have been admitted to the conference to act in that capacity; the other Members of the Board muſt of courſe have been called in, or they would have had real cauſe to be offended; and if the Nabob had thought it neceſſary to ſupport his part of the negociation with an equal weight of numbers, our buſineſs would have been determined by a diet inſtead of a conference, and moſt probably concluded with nothing decided, or by compulſion, inſtead of a free and amicable accommodation.

The inſtances quoted by the General, were not applicable to the circumſtances of my commiſſion. There might have been no impropriety in the junction of General *Carnac* with Lord *Clive*; they ſtood in a different predicament together; their views, their way of thinking, their objects, were the ſame. Each equally ſtood in need of an interpreter; nor did the caſe then ſubſiſt of a difference of intereſt between the Government and the military authority. General *Smith* was joined in the deputation of 1768, becauſe his rank entitled him to it: their buſineſs was ſimple; to be effected by command, and not by perſuaſion, and might (I will preſume to affirm) have been concluded full as well by the General alone, as by the joint powers of a Committee. In a word, the Board in the two commiſſions above-mentioned, thought proper to compoſe them of more than one perſon. The Board choſe to delegate the truſt repoſed in me to myſelf ſingly; I have every reaſon to be convinced, that the effect was anſwerable to their intentions; and ſo well aſſured was I of the neceſſity of this mode before I accepted of the charge, that I would not have undertaken it on other conditions.

It will be recollected, that the various points referred to my management, were none of them fixed to any ſpecific terms; but the undefined ideas and wiſhes of the Board, and the political principles of the Court of Directors, given me at large for my guidance. The ſpirit of theſe laſt is ſtrongly repugnant to the imperious manner in which the Vizier has been too often treated by our Government, and enjoins a ſtile of perſuaſion in the place of command. Every circumſtance of the negociation required, that it ſhould be managed by that familiar and confidential intercourſe, which can take place only between two perſons, unembarraſſed by interruption, and unchecked by the reſerve which always attends a converſation held between ſtrangers, and before many witneſſes. Fortunately too, the habit which I had acquired of ſpeaking the Indoſtan language, though imperfect, yet aided on the part of the Vizier by a very clear and eaſy elocution, and an uncommonly quick apprehenſion, greatly facilitated this mode of communication, and not only forwarded the concluſion of our debates, but I am perſuaded left him much better pleaſed with what had paſſed, than

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if it had been conveyed to him through the doubtful channel of an interpreter.

I will only add my regret, that the General ſhould have ſuffered his feeling, on this occaſion, to hurry him into expreſſions of too perſonal reſentment, which I think his natural moderation would have led him to avoid, had he allowed himſelf time for cool and deliberate reflection.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

APPENDIX, No. 13.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations; dated the 4th October 1773.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire.
Willm Alderſey, } Eſq^rs { *Hen^y Goodwin*,
P. M. Dacres, } { *John Graham*,
and
George Vanſittart, Eſquire.

THE inſtructions given to the Governor before his departure for *Benares*, which the Board at that time thought proper to ſeal up and depoſit in the cuſtody of Mr. *Alderſey*, are now opened, and recorded as follows, with the Letter written in conſequence.

The Governor's Inſtructions given.

To the Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c. &c.

Honourable Sir,

At our Conſultation of the 19th April we expreſſed our approbation of the reſolution of the Secret Committee, for your obtaining a perſonal interview with the Vizier; and as in conſequence of the Vizier's repeated deſire, you have now determined on proceeding for that purpoſe to *Benares*, we ſhall beg leave to lay before you ſuch points in the political intereſts of the Company, as, from the orders of the Court of Directors, and the preſent ſtate of affairs in this Government, are the more immediate objects of our wiſhes; at the ſame time the circumſtances of our ſituation and connection with the King and the Vizier are liable to ſo many variations, that we find it difficult to mark out any preciſe line for your conduct, nor indeed do we judge it neceſſary, as we repoſe an entire confidence in your experience and abilities to improve to the utmoſt for the Company's benefit the different events that may occur.

It is evident that the Treaties which at preſent ſubſiſt between the Company and the Vizier, are ſettled upon an unequal footing. We are called on every occaſion to his aſſiſtance, without any immediate advantage to our Employers, or even any regular or adequate adjuſtment of the ſtipulation in the Treaty for the payment of our expences; while on his part, the aid which he is bound to afford us, is left looſe and undefined, and in all probability, from the nature and conſtitution of his army, in caſe of real danger, would prove uſeleſs and ineffectual; it is therefore adviſable to effect an alliance with him on grounds of reciprocal advantage and ſupport.

Of ſuch an alliance, one of the moſt eſſential articles will be to ſecure the regular payment of ſufficient ſubſidies for the charge of ſuch bodies of our troops as may march at the requiſition of the Vizier; and although in our former Treaty the ſtipulation is made only for our extraordinary expences, yet when we conſider that whilſt removed at ſuch a diſtance from our territories they are in effect loſt to our own ſervice, we think it reaſonable that the whole expence ſhould be borne by him; but this can only be effected by your addreſs and judicious management, as the engagements now ſubſiſting between us, from which we mean not to depart, do not entitle us to claim it as a right.

While the King continues at *Delhi*, whither he proceeded in oppoſition to our moſt ſtrenuous remonſtrances, we ſhall certainly conſider the engagements between him and the Company as diſſolved by his alienation from them and their intereſt; the province of *Corah* in this caſe will revert to them as to the original proprietors, by his inability to hold it on the terms, and for the purpoſes to which it was ceded to him.—As the poſſeſſion of ſo remote a country can never be expected to yield any profit to the Company, and the defence of it muſt require a perpetual aid of their forces, and prove a ſource of much jealouſy to the neighbouring Powers, it muſt be our earneſt wiſh to be freed from ſo inconvenient a poſſeſſion, on the beſt terms which can be obtained for the diſpoſal of it. If the King's pretenſions are removed, the claim of the Vizier to this diſtrict will come next in preference, both on account of our alliance with him, its contiguity and relation to his dominions, and this preference being conſonant to the Company's orders. In that caſe it would undoubtedly be our firſt wiſh to obtain from him the diſtricts of *Chunar* and *Gawzipore*, in exchange for it. The Honourable Company have earneſtly enjoined us to endeavour to effect this, for the ſole purpoſe of placing the King in the poſſeſſion of a territory, ſituated ſo near to our borders, and would no doubt be well pleaſed with the acquiſition of it to their own poſſeſſions; yet we are aware of the repugnance of the Vizier to part with ſo valuable and important a territory, and we cannot, either in juſtice or in obedience to the commands of our Superiors, which recommended the ſtricteſt delicacy in our negociations with their ally, uſe any peremptory requiſition with him to engage his acquieſcence in ſuch an accommodation. We content ourſelves with intimating the utmoſt extent of our deſires on this head, leaving the accompliſhment of them to your management and diſcretion, in ſuch a mode and to ſuch a degree as you ſhall find yourſelf enabled to effect it.

If, however, as is moſt probable, the King ſhould make overtures to renew his former connection, we are of opinion that his right to reclaim the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Illahabad* cannot with propriety be diſputed; and we authorize you to reſtore them on the condition of his granting to the Company a ſolemn renunciation of the tribute which has been allowed him from the provinces of *Bengal* and *Bahar*, both of the arrears which may be due, and of all future payments for ever.—While we require this as a juſt retribution for the ſervice afforded him in maintaining the poſſeſſion of theſe diſtricts againſt the Marattas, to whom his weakneſs had abandoned him, we are juſtified by the ſtronger plea of abſolute neceſſity, in inſiſting upon it, as our finances are utterly unable to ſupport any longer ſo ruinous an expence.

It is probable, that the ſevere proof which he has recently experienced of his utter inability to ſupport his pretenſions to the power and dominions of his anceſtors, and the diſgraceful treatment which he has received from his falſe protectors, will exempt him from the hazard of the like deluſion hereafter, and induce him to remain contented with his former reſidence, in a ſtate more ſuited to the moderate compaſs of his genius, and the reduced influence of his family. In that caſe it will be his beſt policy to connect himſelf again with the Vizier, and entruſt him with the adminiſtration of his affairs, as we do not ſee how it is poſſible for him to ſubſiſt by his own ſtrength, and the ſtate of our finances rendering it inconvenient to us to burthen ourſelves with ſo unprofitable a charge. The pride of the Vizier may be gratified with ſuch connection, and his authority may derive ſome degree of ſupport from the veneration which is yet paid to the royal name. This point, therefore, we heartily recommend to your attention; the power of the King and of the Vizier being united, and the object for which the preſence of the King near the borders of *Bahar* was deſired by the Company, being removed by the renun-

ciation of the tribute, it will then become an immaterial conſideration in what part of the territories of the Vizier he ſhall hereafter reſide.

We refer to you to adjuſt the claim of the Vizier on the Company, for the Tuncaw granted him by the King on the treaſury of *Moorſhedabad*, and herewith furniſh you with the extracts from our Conſultation of the 13th May, containing the only information which we have hitherto received concerning that tranſaction; and you will no doubt be furniſhed with the reſt from the Select Committee.

We empower you to receive on behalf of *Cheet Sing*, the ſtipulation which was formerly made with the Vizier in favour of his father *Rajah Bulwand Sing*, in conſideration of his ſervices to the Company in the year 1764.

In a Treaty of firm alliance with the Vizier, a free intercourſe of commerce with his dominions ought to form an article; and as you are acquainted with the earneſt wiſhes of the Company on this head, you will no doubt pay the greateſt regard to them. The regulation of this commerce, with reſpect to the mode of carrying it on, and the duties to be paid, will be an object of your attention; and we rely on your care and judgment for adjuſting theſe to the ſatisfaction of our Employers. A ſimilar regulation to that which we have lately adopted with reſpect to duties on our own territories, would be the moſt deſirable, if the Vizier's conſent can be obtained.

Mr. *Laurell* will have our orders to meet you at *Benares*, and furniſh you with ſuch informations as he may have collected regarding the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Illahabad*. He will alſo be directed to conform to any meaſure or ſtipulation which you may engage in for the ceſſion of theſe diſtricts.

We have found it neceſſary this ſeaſon, for the more effectual protection of the Vizier's dominions, to extend our operations to the country of the Rohillas on the north of the *Ganges*. We approve of your concerting with the Vizier any plan which may be neceſſary for his future ſecurity on that ſide, conſiſtently with the ſpirit of the Company's orders.

In conſequence of the meaſures you may adopt, it will reſt with you to determine whether or not any troops ſhall be ſtationed in the Vizier's dominions; if there ſhould, we recommend that the ſecond brigade do relieve the firſt, and take its tour of that duty.

We have already obſerved, that we mean rather to intimate our wiſhes than lay down any abſolute rules for your conduct on this occaſion. For your more particular guidance we furniſh you with copies of the public Treaties, and the Company's orders, extracted from their ſeveral Letters, ſince the laſt Treaty that was entered into with the Vizier.

Should you be able to afford any leiſure to inſpect into the ſtate of our affairs in the province of *Bahar*, and to regulate the expences of the revenue and factory at *Patna* and *Dinapoor* Cantonments, we deſire your aſſiſtance in theſe eſſential points, and ſhall ſend the proper inſtructions to the Chief and Council at *Patna*, to conform to any regulations you may think it proper to give them.

We are, with regard,

Honourable Sir, &c. &c.

Warren Haſtings,

Fort William, 23d June 1773. Signed *Willm Alderſey*, *H. Goodwin*, *P. M. Dacres*, *J. Graham*, *Thomas Lane*, *W. Lambert*, *Richd Barwell*, *G. Vanſittart*.

APPENDIX. No. 13.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultation, the 7th October 1773.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Preſident.

General Sir *Robert Barker* being arrived at the Preſidency, takes his Seat at the Board.

William Alderſey, *Philip M. Dacres*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *Geo. Vanſittart*, } Eſquires.

The General obſerves, that from the tenor of the Board's inſtructions to the Preſident, from his Letter to the King, and from the Report of his proceedings, as well as the Board's approbation of them, it ſeems abſolutely determined, that the tribute to the King from the revenues of *Bengal*, &c. ſhould ceaſe to be paid: he therefore deſires to know, if this is to be underſtood as a formal and final reſolution on the ſubject; and if it is not, he wiſhes that a formal determination may be now made, and recorded on the face of the Conſultations. The General's Obſervation.

Reſolved, for the reaſons already aſſigned on the Records of the Board, particularly in the Letter to the Court of Directors from this Department, dated 10th December 1772, that the payment of the tribute to the King *Shaw Allum*, ſhall be withheld, until expreſs orders concerning it are received from the Court of Directors. Reſolution to withhold the King's tribute.

The General having, on a former occaſion, recorded his reaſons for being againſt this meaſure, now enters his diſſent to the reſolution, in the following Minute: The General diſſents.

The General having already given his opinion on a meaſure which he conſiders truly impolitical to the intereſt of the Company's welfare in this country, it becomes neceſſary that he ſhould now enter his diſſent to the reſolution which has juſt paſſed the Board, to ſtop the payment of his Majeſty's tribute from *Bengal*.

The reaſons for this meaſure in the Minute of the Board, are in general, that the King hath withdrawn himſelf from our protection; that he has abandoned us, and deſerted from his place of reſidence; and that he has given the province of *Corah* and *Currah*, and which in fact is giving away alſo the province of *Allahabad*, to a ſet of people whoſe views are prejudicial to the Company's intereſt: that he is a pageant of our own creating; and that it is of little importance to the Company, whether he is treated as the ſovereign of *Hindoſtan* or no; and concludes by ſaying, "that the great want of currency in *Bengal* renders it impoſſible to pay the tribute."

In anſwer to theſe reaſons, the General begs leave to inform the Board, that the King has expreſſed himſelf in repeated Letters both to the Vizier and the General, his earneſt deſire and wiſh for a continuation of the favour and protection which the Engliſh have hitherto ſhewn him; and he believes alſo his Majeſty's ſentiments are thus expreſſed in the Letters which appear on the Records of the Select Committee. The King's motives for quitting his reſidence at *Allahabad* are alſo explained—that he wiſhed to be accompanied there by the Engliſh; that he had waited ſeven years, in hopes they would have come to ſuch a reſolution, but having deſpaired, he had determined on making uſe of the next moſt reſpectful Power in *Hindoſtan* to reinſtate himſelf in his empire, and to conclude a ceremony which it was neceſſary to have performed at the capital, before he would be the declared ſovereign of the empire; he choſe the Marattas for this purpoſe, at a time when no hoſtile intentions appeared between them and the Engliſh. That they have deceived him, and have carried their own purpoſes into execution under his banner, cannot be eſteemed a fault or deception in

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in him; it is well known he even riſqued the conſequences of a battle with them before he would conſent to the grant of the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah*, and the loſs of the action was the loſs of the province. In what reſpect therefore he has forfeited his engagements with us, the General is at a loſs to underſtand; he was under no tie or promiſe to remain perpetually at *Allahabad*, nor were the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad* conditionally ceded to him, but given and granted in the fulleſt extent of the words. But we ſeem to have drawn concluſions from what does not appear to be intended by the Treaty of *Allahabad*, and we have acted in conſequence, by withholding from him the revenue of 26 lacks per annum; by which it appears to the General, that the Company have forfeited the Firmaund granted to them, dated the 12th Auguſt 1765, at *Allahabad*, wherein it is expreſſed, that the Dewannee is given "on condition of their being "ſecurity for the ſum of 26 lacks of rupees a year for "our royal revenue." And an infringement of the articles of agreement between the King *Shaw Allum* and the Company, relative to the tribute to be paid to him from the revenues of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, dated Auguſt 19th, 1765, wherein "the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, in conſideration of his Majeſty's having been graciouſly pleaſed to grant them the Dewannee of *Bengal*, &c. do engage themſelves to be ſecurity for the regular payment of the ſame."

The obſervation of his Majeſty's being a pageant of our own creating, ſeems more calculated to ſoften the appearance of the meaſures lately taken, than to ſupport them. It is well known that *Shaw Allum* is the hereditary Prince of a line of Emperors who have governed this country for upwards of 300 years; that he was acknowledged by the Natives before he was by us; that he ſtruck coin, and was raiſed to the Muſnud by the aſſiſtance of *Munneer a Dowla*, at *Daoudneggeer*; that he was greatly aſſiſted and ſupported by the Engliſh is certain, and it would, in the General's opinion, have been found policy to have continued that ſupport to him. The lowneſs of the Company's finances cannot vindicate the meaſure; the Company ſhould have advanced as much as they could, and have acknowledged the tribute due.

For theſe reaſons the General diſſents from the reſolution of the Board, of withholding from the King the annual tribute from the *Bengal* revenues.

(Signed) *R^t Barker.*

Extract of the Secret Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 10th December 1772.

Par. 4. It was about the time that *Shaw Allum* had abandoned his reſidence at *Corah*, to throw himſelf into the arms of the Marattas, in proſecution of his idle ſcheme of reſtoring the Mogul empire to its ancient dignity and extent, that Major *Morriſon* ſet out, as he ſaid, on his return to *Europe* over land. He ſoon fell in with the King, and it is too apparent that it was his preconcerted intention to take ſervice with him, without conſidering how far ſuch engagements might oblige him to appear in arms againſt his own country, and the ſervice from which he had received his bread, and notwithſtanding the probability and general belief that the Marattas, with whom in effect he was enliſted, were preparing to invade the province of our ally the Vizier, and even to enter *Bengal*. In purſuance of this, he wrote the Letter to our Board, referred to in the preſent piece. We took notice of this Letter in our laſt; but independent of the arrogance of the ſtrain which dictated to us the part we were to take in a great public matter, we judged it highly impolitic and unſafe to anſwer the drafts of the King till we were ſatisfied of his amicable intentions, and thoſe of his new allies; and indeed, independent of this, the ſtate of our treaſury rendered it impracticable to comply with theſe payments, or with thoſe which he would doubtleſs have continued to demand in full of his ſtipend, as it was then empty of caſh, beſides that, the great amount of our debt at intereſt, required our firſt attention to its diminution, and the immediate diſcharge of the intereſt due upon it, inſtead of ſquandering away the wealth of the Company on a pageant of authority, from which you never derive any real benefit; and on theſe grounds we have ſuſpended the payment of his ſtipend till this time. This is the complaint which the Shaw and the ambaſſador of his preſence, Major *Morriſon*, have to prefer againſt your Adminiſtration here.—But this is not all; you, Gentlemen, are alſo charged with the crime of beſtowing only 26 lacks on the King of *Hindoſtan*, inſtead of the crores which uſed to come into the royal treaſury from *Bengal*; and Major *Morriſon* is deputed with full powers from a foreign Prince, to treat with his own Sovereign for the revenues of theſe countries, which are already by ſolemn treaty granted to the Company, and for which a valuable conſideration has been paid. With as much right and much greater propriety, the Major might have been ſent to the King of *France*; and we do not doubt, that whenever *Bengal* is to be put up to auction, that Monarch will bid high. It is evidently the Mogul's intention ſo to do, ſince he fixes its value at his preſent ſtipend 26 lacks, and leaves *Morriſon* to make for him the beſt bargain above that ſum which he can.

APPENDIX, No. 14.

Extract of the Company's Select Letter to *Bengal*; dated 11th November 1768.

Par. 32. IT is evident that Lord *Clive*, in forming the Treaty of 1765, conſidered *Sujah Dowla* as the proper barrier againſt the Marattas and the Northern Powers; and that his enemies might not take advantage of the weak ſtate to which our arms had reduced him, a brigade was for ſome time ſtationed at *Allahabad*. When the terms of the Treaty were fulfilled, and *Sujah Dowla* had made ſome progreſs in recruiting his forces, Lord *Clive* withdrew the brigade, leaving only one battalion at the requeſt of the King. This was in July 1766; but in October following, the approach of *Abdalla'h*, and the earneſt ſolicitations of *Sujah Dowla*, obliged the Select Committee to order a brigade to be ſtationed again at *Allahabad*; intending, however, we ſuppoſe, to withdraw it as ſoon as the apprehenſions of an invaſion ſhould ceaſe; and Lord *Clive*, in his Letter to the Select Committee, 16th January 1767, recommends the withdrawing it as ſoon as poſſible, leaving a detachment of only one battalion, to quiet the fears which the Vizier entertained even againſt the King himſelf, who had invited the Marattas to croſs the *Nerbuddah* and join him, promiſing them our aſſiſtance in the execution of his favourite deſign of marching to *Delhi*. It is certain that the King, finding himſelf diſappointed in this ſcheme by our nonconcurrence, was upon the point of throwing himſelf into the hands of the Marattas, forgetful as well of his own true intereſt, as of his obligations to the Engliſh. That deſign you may be aſſured he has not, nor perhaps ever will, totally relinquiſh; but he ſtill flatters himſelf with the hopes of our aſſiſtance, and ſo long as he ſees the ſtrong ſupport of one of our brigades at *Allahabad*, he will either be forming ſchemes to embroil us in the politics of the country, or ſoliciting us to gratify him in his project of going to *Delhi*. To deprive the *Bengal* provinces of one entire brigade, merely to allay his fears or to feed his hopes, is a moſt pernicious conceſſion, and therefore we cannot but wiſh to hear of your having evacuated *Allahabad*. Poſitive orders upon this head we cannot give you, becauſe you muſt undoubtedly act according to the emergency of affairs; but we inſiſt upon your looking back to your own and Lord *Clive*'s reaſonings upon the firſt ſtationing of a brigade at *Allahabad*, and ſuffer not yourſelves to be duped by any ill founded alarms of the King or *Sujah Dowla*. The

motive

motive you alledge for continuing the brigade in that ſtation, is, to watch the motions of the Marattas, and other Country Powers; and hence ariſes our anxiety, becauſe it ſeems founded on the principle expreſſed in your Letters to *Fort Saint George*, and in the Letter of Preſident *Verelſt*, viz. "That the Engliſh are to maintain the character of umpires of *Indoſtan*," a principle that may involve us in every war from *Delhi* to *Cape Comarin*.—One invariable maxim ought ever to be maintained, which is, that we are to avoid taking part in the political ſchemes of any of the Country Princes. If *Sujah Dowla*'s dominions ſhould ever be actually invaded, we are bound by Treaty to aſſiſt him; but as to any ambitious views of his, he muſt execute them as well as he can, without the leaſt aſſiſtance from us; nor are you to interfere in, or be anxious concerning the quarrels, defeats, or victories of any Indian Power whatſoever; for the more they diſpute and fight with one another, the leſs will they be enabled or inclined to act offenſively againſt us.

33. The effects that we look for from withdrawing the brigade, will be, either that the King will put himſelf in *Sujah Dowla*'s power, follow the brigade, or fling himſelf into the arms of the Marattas, or any other power who will give him hopes of an army to conduct him to *Delhi*; either of which would be far more eligible than the preſent jarring ſyſtem. If he puts himſelf in *Sujah Dowla*'s power, he, as Vizier, will poſſeſs himſelf of the power of diſpoſing of his revenues and of the royal authority, and we ſhall be no longer embarraſſed with his machinations to excite us to a rupture with *Sujah Dowla:* if he flings himſelf into the hands of the Marattas, or any other Power, we are diſengaged from him, and it may open a fair opportunity of withholding the 26 lacks we now pay him; but the moſt eligible for us would be to have him follow the brigade into the Bahar province. In that caſe, you muſt inform *Sujah Dowla*, that in virtue of the Treaty of *Illahabad*, we, as guarantees, eſteem the King's poſſeſſions under our immediate protection, and that we ſhall repel any attempts that he may make to poſſeſs himſelf of them; but though this language is to be held, we do not mean that you ſhould engage in a war with *Sujah Dowla*, even though he ſhould poſſeſs himſelf of the King's poſſeſſions, no intereſt of the King being of that importance to us, as to plunge us into a war.

34. This being the concluſion we wiſh to have theſe affairs brought to, we rely on your abilities to conduct them, ſo as neither to involve us in a war, nor draw on us the imputation of violated faith.

35. The nature of the orders we have given you above, require the moſt profound ſecrecy, and therefore the knowledge of them muſt be confined to the Select Committee only, unleſs you ſhould have occaſion to produce them to the Council in juſtification of any meaſures you may take in conſequence.

APPENDIX, No. 15.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated 10th April 1771.

44. THE advantages which muſt accrue to the Company, from the reſidence of the King within our provinces, are both, in the view of œconomy and ſound policy, too obvious to need any illuſtration. This object therefore exacts your moſt ſerious attention, and requires every judicious effort which can improve his confidence in our attachment to him, and thereby the better engage his compliance with our wiſhes in this reſpect.

45. As this point is equally delicate and important, we recommend to you to lay hold of the firſt favourable opportunity which ſhall offer for an overture to the King on this ſubject, in which we doubt not but your own judgment will ſuggeſt to you the expediency of repreſenting all the benefits his Majeſty will find, from having the forces of the Company nearer his perſon, and ready to unite on any occaſion (in ſupport of our alliance with him) without being obliged to march through the territories of any one who may be diſpoſed to take advantage of our ſituation, in any accidental circumſtance of weakneſs and diſtreſs. To this plea muſt be added, the ill effects of the continual drains of the ſpecie of *Bengal*, on account of his annual tribute, which, when carried beyond our poſſeſſions, muſt, in a great degree, be loſt to the neceſſary circulation, and may prevent that punctuality in our remittances which we have hitherto maintained, and may in time wholly incapacitate us from fulfilling the ſtipulations we are ſo deſirous to preſerve inviolate.

APPENDIX, No 15.

46. Theſe and ſuch further arguments as ſhall appear moſt conducive to the end, will, we hope, prevail on the King to eſtabliſh his reſidence at *Rajahmaul* or *Mongheer*, or ſuch other place within the provinces as may be thought moſt proper for the purpoſe, and moſt likely to preſerve to us that influence which is ſo eſſential to the Company's welfare.

47. The political intereſts of the Company make us no leſs ſolicitous to obtain from *Sujah Dowlah* an exchange of the territories of *Bulwan Sing*, for the provinces of *Khorah* and *Allahabad*, now held for the King; ſince, by ſuch an exchange, our frontiers would be more eaſily defended, a greater influence would be preſerved by us over the neighbouring Powers, and we might poſſibly be relieved from the neceſſity of keeping up ſo large and expenſive a military eſtabliſhment as we have at preſent in *Bengal*.

48. We are not inſenſible of the difficulties which may oppoſe your negociations on this ſubject. Theſe, however, we perſuade ourſelves, may in time be overcome, by a proper attention on the part of our ſervants, and by their availing themſelves of the circumſtances which may occur, either in the ſituation, deſires, projects, temper, or wants of this Prince: and we recommend to you to lay hold of every opportunity which may offer for accompliſhing, by a friendly negociation, ſo deſirable an end.

49. There is another object of the moſt eſſential conſequence, which calls for the utmoſt exertion of your ability; we mean, the obtaining from *Sujah ul Dowla* the abſolute ceſſion to us of the fort of *Chunargar*.

50. As we have experienced the ſtrength of this fortreſs, and are ſenſible of the vaſt importance the poſſeſſion of it would be to the Company, you muſt uſe your utmoſt endeavours to acquire, by friendly means, what could not be retained without violence. We therefore enjoin you not to leave uneſſayed any effort which prudence can ſuggeſt, for obtaining from *Sujah Dowlah* the ceſſion of Chunargur fort: but as our view is to acquire it by treaty, not by force, and conſidering alſo the ſituation, power, and influence of this Subah, your negociations muſt be conducted with the greateſt caution and delicacy; and you muſt ſtrive, by every fair and honourable means, to ſtrengthen his friendſhip, and engage his confidence; nevertheleſs, you muſt not abate of your attention to all his motions, nor forego any opportunity to impreſs him with an opinion of our activity and power.

51. And here we take occaſion to obſerve, that ſhould we at any time obtain from him the ceſſion of this fortreſs, you muſt not fail to keep in it a ſtrong garriſon of Europeans, under the command of an able and experienced Officer; which ſuch poſſeſſion would enable you to do, ſince the ſecurity which our poſſeſſions would thereby receive, would admit of a reduction in our other garriſons.

APPENDIX. No 16.

APPENDIX, No. 16.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee of *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 31ſt December 1773.

Para. 2. UPON the retreat of the Marattas to the *Decan*, the territories which they had occupied naturally attracted the attention of the neighbouring Powers, and the Vizier among others turned his views towards this object. He communicated his deſigns of invading that Country to the Preſident, and expreſſed at the ſame time a deſire of being aſſiſted by your forces; but while this was in agitation, he ſuddenly changed his reſolution, and ſeemed determined to carry his arms againſt the Rohillas. The Vizier had long entertained deſigns againſt this tribe, whoſe Country lies contiguous to his own, and whoſe Chief, *Hafez Rhamet*, had refuſed to perform the conditions upon which he had obtained protection from the ravages of the Marattas during the laſt campaign. He had mentioned his intentions on this ſubject to the Preſident while he was at *Benares*, offering to pay 40 lacks of rupees to the Company for the aſſiſtance of their troops on the reduction of the Rohilla Country, beſides the monthly ſtipulation for the expences of the army. The Preſident at that time encouraged this propoſal; but the execution of it was afterwards, at the deſire of the Vizier himſelf, ſuſpended for a more favourable opportunity, when he might run leſs hazard of oppoſition, and be more at liberty to act with vigour. This opportunity ſeemed now to preſent itſelf; the late revolution among the Matattas afforded little probability of interruption from that quarter, and the Vizier having acquitted himſelf of his firſt engagement to the Company, by a payment made to Mr. *Lambert*, felt himſelf relieved from anxiety on that account, and more at liberty to enter into any new undertakings; at the ſame time that the treachery of the Rohillas furniſhed him with a pretence of proceeding to extremities with them. He accordingly renewed the propoſition, and applied for the aſſiſtance of your forces on the ſame conditions as before.

3. From the engagements which ſubſiſted between the Vizier and the Company, and the aſſurances given him by the Preſident at *Benares* on the firſt projection of this enterprize, we thought ourſelves not at liberty to reject it; we reſolved accordingly to comply with his requeſt; and having obtained the concurrence of the Board at large, and taken every precaution to bind the Vizier to the performance of his part of the agreement, in caſe the meaſure ſhould be adopted, we ſent orders for the march of the brigade at *Dinapore* to the Chief at *Patna*, in whoſe hands they are to remain till the Vizier ſhall require the brigade to join him. He has ſince however entered the *Doaub*, or the lands which lie between the rivers *Jumna* and *Ganges*, and is engaged in the reduction of the forts of the Country which are in the poſſeſſion of the Marattas. We ſhall be well pleaſed to find that he does not make uſe of the liberty we were under the neceſſity of granting him; for although we conſider every acceſſion of ſtrength to *Suja Dowla* as beneficial to the intereſts of our Employers, yet we adopt with diffidence any meaſure of ſuch conſequence, until we ſhall have received the orders and ſentiments of the Company.

4. And here we muſt beg leave to repeat our earneſt deſire, that you will be pleaſed to furniſh us with your explicit commands for our conduct, with reſpect to the Countries ſituated beyond the limits of theſe provinces, and thoſe of your ally; whether our future operations are to be invariably circumſcribed by thoſe bounds, or in what caſes you will approve and authorize our proceeding beyond them. You are well acquainted with the ſtate of the neighbouring Powers. Of theſe the Marattas only are formidable to your poſſeſſions. The reſt are weak, and (the Vizier alone excepted) every way inconſiderable; nor ſhould we regard the Marattas themſelves in a light of much more importance, were the force and connections of your three Preſidencies united under one active controul, which we do not heſitate to foretel will, whenever ſuch a plan ſhall take place, render you the ſovereign arbiters of *Indoſtan*, while the preſent ſyſtem continues.

We certainly labour under great diſadvantages with reſpect to the Marattas, ſince in every conteſt with them, they being neceſſarily the aggreſſors, and we acting only on the defenſive, it can never be in our power to hurt them effectually, nor even to act againſt them longer than they chuſe to ſtand in our way; but they, on the contrary, have it continually in their option to aſſail us at home, and by the immediate effect of their ravages, or by their alarms, diſturb the peace of our Country, and affect our Revenues, although we are ſufficiently able to defeat the moſt ſtrenuous efforts which they may at any time make againſt us.

5. Having thus expoſed the ſtate of your political intereſts, it might be deemed preſumptuous to anticipate the orders which you may be pleaſed to preſcribe for our future guidance in the ſupport of them. We confeſs that we ſhould enter on ſuch a ſubject with great diffidence, from the fear that what we might offer as matter of mere ſpeculation, might be conſtrued into an intention of regulating our conduct accordingly, nevertheleſs we venture to offer to your conſideration the meaſures which occur, as reſulting from this ſituation of things. Theſe may be reduced to the three following propoſitions:

1ſt. To unite the powers of the three Preſidencies into one manageable ſyſtem; an object which we ardently wiſh to ſee accompliſhed.

2d. To ſtrengthen the Vizier, by adding the territories of the Rohillas within the *Ganges* to his preſent dominions: and,

3d. To raiſe up a new power in the perſon of the King; which might either be employed in conjunction with the Vizier in oppoſing the Marattas, or, ſhould there ever be an occaſion for it, to ſerve as a counterpoiſe to the Vizier. It would always be eaſy for us to hold the ſcale between them.

6. For the firſt of theſe propoſitions, the advantages are ſo great and ſo obvious, that any arguments in ſupport of it would be ſuperfluous. The ſecond we ſhould much incline to adopt, for reaſons which you will find largely diſcuſſed on our Proceedings in this Department of the 19th and 26th ultimo. The third, however beneficial the iſſue of it might prove, is liable to ſo many uncertain events in the accompliſhment of it, would carry our arms to ſo great and indefinite a diſtance, and would involve us in ſo heavy an expence, until we could extract from it the means of reimburſement, that we barely offer it to your notice, but do not recommend it.

7. Upon the whole, whether it be your pleaſure that we ſhould implicitly adhere to the defenſive line hitherto preſcribed to us, or extend our views to bounds more remote, we earneſtly entreat that we may be furniſhed with ſuch clear and full inſtructions from you, as your wiſdom ſhall judge expedient to enable us to act with confidence and with vigour in the execution of every meaſure which may be preſented to us for the advancement of your intereſts, and in ſtrict conformity to your intentions.

APPENDIX, No. 17.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 1ſt March 1773.

Par. 8. YOU will be pleaſed to take notice of the many reſtrictions under which we have laid the General, as to the object and extent of his operations; cautious of giving the leaſt colour to the Marattas for charging us with being the aggreſſors in the war; and equally ſtudious of avoiding all engagements which might involve us in diſtant connections unneceſſary to the defence of your poſſeſſions.

10. We have not however neglected, in undertaking theſe meaſures, to ſtipulate for ſuch ſubſidiary payments as will defray all the extra expences incurred by them; and the precautions which we have taken to enſure the punctual diſcharge of them, will, we perſuade ourſelves, free us from any hazard of ſuffering by the charges of this expedition. As we have been peremptory in our declarations and orders on this ſubject, we mean moſt rigidly to abide by them.

11. We muſt however obſerve, that we have extended our orders in one inſtance beyond the abſolute line of defence of the Vizier's dominions; we refer to what we have inſtructed the General reſpecting the Country of *Hafez Rhamut Cawn*, a ſmall territory lying on the eaſtern ſide of the *Ganges*. Our reaſons however are obvious; by allowing the Marattas, to get a footing there, the frontier on that ſide having no natural boundary or defence, would be continually expoſed to their incurſions, as by excluding them from this ſpace, we form a complete field of operation, with the river for a barrier, difficult at all times for an enemy to paſs, and dangerous to them in their retreat.

12. Although every thing ſeems thus to point to immediate hoſtilities with the Maratta armies in theſe parts, in ſupport of our allies, yet we are ſtill perſuaded that a general and direct war with theſe people is not near. They muſt be ſenſible of the little they have to expect in attacking us, and alſo of the little inclination we have to diſturb them in their other operations, provided they keep clear of our frontiers. To have remained idle ſpectators while they were invading the dominions of the Powers with whom we were moſt intimately connected, would have made them look upon us as weak and inactive, and conſequently a fit ſubject of their attempts; but to ſhew ourſelves active and ſteady in ſupport of our friends, muſt impreſs them with an idea of our ſtrength and vigour, and deſtroy any hopes they might entertain of prevailing againſt us in our own territories. We look therefore on our preſent meaſures as the beſt means to prevent a general rupture with them; at all events, as we can never be abſolutely aſſured againſt the enterprizes of ſo capricious a people, if we have a war with them, it is better to meet them beyond the line of your own frontiers, ſupporting the Vizier, our beſt barrier, our expences paid, and in a manner defending ourſelves, rather than to confine ourſelves to our own poſſeſſions, and our own reſources.

13. You will alſo be pleaſed to obſerve, that in our plan of defending others, we have not omitted the immediate protection of our own provinces. We have given it in particular inſtruction to the General, to be watchful of the motions of the Marattas, ſhould they bend towards *Babar*, the only province open to their incurſions; and have directed the meaſures he is then to purſue: beſides, we have taken care, in the diſtribution of the force left in *Bengal*, to have a brigade ready at *Patna*, and to ſecure a ſpeedy junction of the other corps, in caſe of an alarm.

14. Such are the meaſures which on this occaſion we have thought fit to purſue; and we humbly ſubmit them to your wiſdom for an approval.

APPENDIX, No. 18.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee at *Bengal*; dated 31ſt March 1773.

Par. 5. THESE conſiderations, joined to the advance of the Maratta army, has induced the General, in concert with the Vizier, to paſs the boundary of his Country into that of *Hafez Rhamet*, conformably to his inſtructions; and he is now encamped nearly oppoſite to the Marrattas on the banks of the *Ganges*.

6. In his ſubſequent advices, he gives us information that the good effects of the ſtep he has taken were already apparent, as it had prevented the Marattas croſſing the river, forming a junction with the Rohillas, and laying waſte the Vizier's country. But that as he had not declared his intentions of defending the Corah province, he was in hopes they would advance with confidence and poſſeſs themſelves of it; an event of all others to be wiſhed for, as the only means within the limits of his inſtructions to relieve the perpetual anxiety of the Vizier, and prevent the annual demand of our aſſiſtance; and that otherwiſe he ſees no end of our ineffectual campaigns in that quarter.

7. The Vizier at the ſame time is extremely deſirous that ſome deciſive blow be ſtruck, to weaken the enormous power of the Marattas, and regards this to be a favourable criſis for that purpoſe. He ſays further, that the Company will derive great advantages, ſhould they permit their troops to accompany him to *Delbi*, or wherever he may find a neceſſity of leading them; ſince in that caſe he will take upon himſelf the payment of the brigade, and excuſe them the delivery of the King's tribute.

8. The General has thrown a battalion into the lines of *Cawnpore*, not only to render his own paſſage ſafe acroſs the river, ſhould he find a neceſſity for it, but alſo to hold a claim to the Corah province on the part of the Company; and we have poſitively directed him, ſhould the Vizier ſtill delay making over the aſſignment we have required, or ſome other equivalent for the ſums now due, and for the monthly payment of the extra charges of the brigade, to quit him with the brigade immediately, and make the defence of *Corab* his ſole object.

9. In all theſe tranſactions we have kept in view your orders reſpecting the interchange of *Corab* for *Gazeypore*, and all our negociations are concentering towards this point.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 16th Auguſt 1773.

2d. Our Letters of laſt ſeaſon were full and particular as to the motions and ſuppoſed deſigns of the Marattas; the part we had determined to take on the occaſion in ſupport of our ally the Vizier; and the inſtructions we had for this purpoſe given the General, when he proceeded to join the firſt brigade in *Sujah Dowlah*'s dominions: according to the conjectures we then formed, the Marattas avoided a general action, and diſperſed on the approach of the Vizier with our troops.

3d. We at the ſame time informed you, that we had directed General *Barker* to receive poſſeſſion of the provinces of *Corab* and *Allahabad* from *Munnier ul Dowla*, Naib of the King, who had expreſſed his deſire to put theſe diſtricts under our protection; as the King his maſter, when defeated laſt year by the Marattas, had been compelled, whilſt a priſoner in their hands, to grant Sunnuds for the ſurrender thereof to them; but as the indiſpenſable occupations of the General called him to a diſtance, and engaged too much of his time to allow the attention requiſite to ſo material an object, the nature of which demanded the immediate ſuperintendance of a perſon well ſkilled in the buſineſs of the Revenues, we

thought

APPENDIX No. 18.

thought it eſſentially expedient, as well for preſerving the Company's influence and participation in the affairs of thoſe provinces, as for eſtabliſhing a right to the future diſpoſal of them in the moſt advantageous manner, whenever it might become a ſubject of negociation, to depute a Member of our Board to receive charge of the provinces of *Corab* and *Allahabad* from the General; and Mr. *Lawrel* was accordingly inveſted with the execution of this truſt, and inſtructions given him nearly ſimilar to thoſe of the General, which you have been furniſhed with in our Proceedings of the 17th February; adding, that although we took poſſeſſion of the Country as allies of the King, yet he was not to deliver it over to any Power whatever, not even to the King himſelf, without our expreſs orders: for we judged, that ſurrendering it to him in his preſent helpleſs ſtate would be in fact giving it up to the Marattas.

4th. The Vizier *Sujah ul Dowlah* about this time, in his Letters expreſſed the greateſt deſire to have an interview with the Governor; and as that circumſtance concurred with our wiſhes, for having many points of the greateſt conſequence adjuſted which could not well be effected without a perſonal conference, we acquieſced in opinion with the Select Committee, whoſe proceedings on this ſubject were laid before us, that ſuch an interview at this period might be attended with very beneficial conſequences to the Company's affairs.

Extract of Bengal Select Conſultations, the 7th January 1773.

PRESENT,

The Honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſq.
Brigadier General *Barker*.
William Alderſey, and
John Reed, Eſquires.

Three Letters from the Nabob Sujah ul Dowlah.

Read tranſlations of the three following Letters from the Nabob *Suja ul Dowla*, encloſing Papers of Intelligence.

Ordered the Papers of Intelligence be entered after this day's proceeding.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla*.

I have already written to you repeated Letters with intelligence from the capital, from which you have probably been particularly acquainted with the ſtate of affairs. Matters are now at the laſt extremity; the Marattas are victorious, and his Majeſty has conſented to give *Sabiter Coun* the Buxeyſhip and the other affairs of the Jauts, and to cede to them the Countries of *Kora* and *Kurra*, and every thing agreeable to their requeſts. I therefore write you, that now, my friend, you muſt on no account whatever be negligent in your planning and ſcheming for the affairs of this quarter, and be firm and ſtaunch to the buſineſs. Now that the King has given *Corab* and *Kurra* to the Marattas, and they are on every account become victorious, I likewiſe will take my meaſures as I ſhall think beſt, and I am prepared to oppoſe and repel my enemy: but ſend General *Barker* to me with ſpeed and expedition, for it is neceſſary; and if you have any ſcruples in ſending the General with the command, it is requiſite that you on no account entertain any difficulties thereon, and giving two or three Members of the Council with the General, you diſpatch him hence. This likewiſe was formerly the caſe, that the Council came with him; ſend him therefore in company with the Council, for the General's coming is very proper, and the greateſt advantages are centered therein. I have before written you particularly. You will not remain inattentive in forming your plan of operations for this quarter, and be careful and mindful of yourſelf, for the time of action is at hand, and I, by the bleſſing of God, am prepared, and will in every manner endeavour in oppoſing my enemies. I have written all the circumſtances for your information, and encloſe you a Paper of Intelligence.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *A. B. Goodlad*,
Perſian Tranſlator.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla*.

I have before written you, and I now encloſe you the Papers of Intelligence which have arrived from the capital. There is now an engagement between his Majeſty and the Marattas; you will accordingly learn the particulars from the encloſed advices. Your friend will now ſet out in company with the Engliſh forces, and remain prepared upon his confines for their ſecurity and defence, that he may oppoſe any enemies who may have an intention on this quarter; but from my foreſight my mind is in anxiety and uneaſineſs; for if the Marattas become victorious, and they bring his Majeſty to another condition, you muſt then reflect in what ſituation are you and I, my friend, and that there is room for perplexity and diſtreſs to every one. You, my friend, will not now remain negligent to this quarter, and in forming your plans accordingly. Affairs now carry with them a different aſpect, and you muſt conſider this with much attention and circumſpection, and that whenever the enemies of his Majeſty have conquered him, you muſt then certainly underſtand that they will entertain an intention on this quarter. My Country is in reality the door of *Bengal*, and I am what you may call the barrier to that Country; it is therefore abſolutely neceſſary that you remain careful and attentive to yourſelf, and in forming your plans for this quarter, and the ſending General *Barker* is in the higheſt degree proper and adviſable. You, my friend, are not acquainted with the advantages that are derived from the preſence of the General; but know for certain, that his being here is productive of the greateſt benefits; it is likewiſe very beneficial for the affairs of the Engliſh Company, as well as good for my concerns. It is therefore beſt that you diſpatch the General here with all expedition. You wrote me that you was with life and ſoul intent on the performance (as well in trifles as in matters of importance) of the affairs of your friend, and that you were deſirous of the benefits and advantages of his concerns: I have therefore written you particularly, that you muſt not now be negligent to the affairs of this quarter; and you muſt abſolutely ſend the General, for my pleaſure is centered therein. The time of action is now at hand. Other intelligence from the capital, which arrives with me morning and evening, I ſhall tranſmit for my friend's information.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *A. B. Goodlad*,
Perſian Tranſlator.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla*.

I have before this ſent you two Letters, with Papers of Intelligence, which has probably arrived. The further accounts which have arrived at this time, I have alſo ſent you. You will be fully acquainted with the ſituation of things. From theſe accounts it appears, that his Majeſty's affairs are at an end. At all events, I am ready and prepared for oppoſition; nor will I, by the bleſſing of God, be deficient; if my friend alſo ſhould be inclined to thoſe meaſures, it may be happily executed. You muſt reflect, that the ſuperiority gained by the Marattas over his Majeſty has many evil conſequences, that they will form an attempt on me and you. In this there is not the leaſt doubt. By the bleſſing of God, my friend has experience, forethought, and underſtanding; upon mature reflection you muſt conſider, that whenever the Marattas have got the King into their own hands, they will, taking him along with them, make an attempt upon me and you; their ſtrength and power will then be increaſed;

creaſed; as affairs will then be at the extremity, and the opportunity loſt, to oppoſe them will be attended with difficulty. I myſelf am a ſoldier, and the Engliſh Sardars, in the ſame manner, are ſoldiers; whatever can be done by me, by the bleſſing of God, in conjunction with the Engliſh troops, who are joined and united with me, I am ready and prepared to oppoſe and puniſh the enemy; nor am I under the leaſt uneaſineſs or apprehenſion. All this that has been wrote, does not proceed from an apprehenſion of danger or anxiety, but merely from a principle of caution and forethought, that I have wrote it. By the favour of God, the Engliſh Sardars alſo ſtand the foremoſt in knowledge and experience. You alſo will not be inattentive to the means and meaſures neceſſary on this occaſion, but with expedition form ſome regular and ſubſtantial plan. To me it appears adviſable, that you ſend General *Barker* to me with ſpeed and expedition, and that you, with the camp, come and continue at *Patna*, and another brigade be prepared and ready to join me in caſe of neceſſity. By the aſſiſtance and power of the Almighty, your friend, with the Engliſh forces, is ready to oppoſe and puniſh the enemy, and will effectually oppoſe them. Now, my friend, the time for action is arrived, I have therefore wrote you fully on the ſubject: whatever may be your ſentiments, deſires, and intentions, you muſt let me know with ſpeed, nor muſt you be inattentive to the neceſſary meaſures, but quickly determine on them, and ſend the General to me with ſpeed and expedition. What can I write more? you yourſelf have judgment and forethought.

A true tranſlation

A. B. Goodlad,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Reſolution of the Committee.

Notwithſtanding the alarms of the Vizier, expreſſed in the foregoing Letters, it does not clearly appear that the Marattas have acquired any acceſſion of power, or that this revolution is likely to affect the intereſts of the Vizier; ſince, whatever influence they derive from the ſanction of the King's name, when he was even with you and independent, every advantage of that kind muſt be either loſt or very much diminiſhed by their late rupture with him, by their having violently poſſeſſed themſelves of his perſon, and their uſurpation of his dominions. It is true, that by the poſſeſſion of the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah*, they are become the immediate neighbours of the Vizier; but if we conſider the King and the Marattas acting conjunctively as one party, they had in fact the ſame poſſeſſion of *Corah*, and were as much in the vicinity of the Vizier's dominions antecedent to their rupture with his Majeſty, and could, with the greater facility, have invaded the province acroſs the *Ganges*, which alone ſeparated them from the Vizier, had ſuch been their intention, becauſe the tenderneſs and delicacy which has ever been obſerved both by us and our ally towards his Majeſty, would have prevented our purſuing the ſame ſteps to oppoſe them, until they had openly declared themſelves. It does not therefore appear, upon a ſpeculative conſideration of the argument before us, on what the Vizier grounds his apprehenſions. As it is incumbent on us, however, to weigh well every probable iſſue of this event, we will venture, aſſiſted by the General's knowledge of affairs in thoſe parts, to conſider the ſubject in every point of view.

We will ſuppoſe (which indeed is moſt likely) that the Marattas will immediately poſſeſs, or attempt to poſſeſs themſelves of the province of *Corah*, and the other lands ceded to them by the King, and that they may be tempted likewiſe to invade the Vizier's territory; in ſuch caſe, it is probable their new ally, *Zabiter Cawn*, will be immediately diſpatched to his own dominions to unite himſelf with *Hafiz Khamet*, and the other Rohillas, and with them, and from that quarter, make their incurſions, while the Marattas enter it to the Southward. It is however ſtill more probable, that the Rohilla Chiefs, who have ſought their preſent ſafety in a treacherous alliance, to which neceſſity compelled them, with the Marattas, will, from the ſame principle, abandon, their cauſe, or employ the confidence repoſed in them to re-eſtabliſh their own independence, rather than contribute to the aggrandizement of a power which in the end muſt overwhelm them. The attempt, ſuppoſing every circumſtance to favour it, can hardly take place this ſeaſon, ſince they will require ſome time in ſettling *Tbutyebanabad*, and of poſſeſſing themſelves of the ceded provinces, before they can paſs the *Ganges*; neither will this river be fordable earlier than the end of February, from which period there will remain only four months to the ſetting in of the rains. There is at this time one complete brigade in the province of *Oude*, and another at *Patna*, in readineſs to join them ſhould it be required, which is ſurely not probable, ſince three battalions of Sepoys, with the preſence of the General, were found fully ſufficient to reſtrain the Marattas from entering *Sujah Dowla*'s provinces, when flushed with the moſt rapid unexpected victories, if they really entertained ſuch an intention.

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Opinion with reſpect to the Vizier.

On theſe grounds then we are clearly of opinion, that the Vizier's dominions are liable to little preſent hazard from the Marattas; that they will not attempt the invaſion of them, nor, if they ſhould, is there much fear of their ſucceeding. We think it however a very fortunate circumſtance, that the Board formed the reſolution of marching the firſt brigade into that quarter; for had that province been left deſtitute, as it would have been in effect guarded ſolely by the Vizier's forces, they might have been tempted to form ſuch a deſign with great colour of ſucceſs. All then that appears neceſſary to be immediately undertaken for the protection of that Country, is to leave matters exactly in the ſame ſtate in which they at preſent ſtand.

With reſpect to his Majeſty Shaw Allum.

Thus far we have conſidered the ſubject as it reſpects our alliance with the Vizier alone. It remains to be determined how far our engagements with the King will influence us to ſupport them in the right of thoſe poſſeſſions we know to have been exacted from him. It is poſſible he may ſolicit our aid: and, in point of right, we ſhould certainly be juſtified in affording it to him, ſince no act of his could be deemed valid in his preſent ſituation, and whilſt he continues a mere paſſive inſtrument in the hands of the Marattas; but whether it would be political to interfere, or whether, at this time eſpecially, it would be expedient, muſt continue a doubt with us. We have agreed, that the utmoſt which the Marattas can do this ſeaſon, will be to poſſeſs themſelves of *Corah*. They will be there full as vulnerable the next year as the preſent one. It is far from improbable, that the Marattas themſelves, within that period, may be diverted to other objects, by the demiſe of their late Chief *Mada Row*, and the ſucceſſion of *Narrain Row*, who may (as was the caſe with his brother) meet with competitors in his own family before he is thoroughly eſtabliſhed. On this ſubject however it may not be prudent to form any precipitate reſolution; we therefore ſuſpend the conſideration of the propriety of entering into the defence of the Corah province, until we are directed by clearer lights.

Immediate Meaſures to be taken.

In the meantime, as the fortreſs of *Allahabad* is ſituated on that ſide of the river, and is the only place there belonging to the Vizier, and a poſt of great conſequence; it is reſolved, that if he deſires it, we will garriſon it with a part of the firſt brigade, and take immediate ſteps for putting it in a poſture of defence; this we think not only due to the Nabob, but a neceſſary meaſure in inſuring us a footing on that ſide of the river, whatever our future determinations may be reſpecting the reſt of the Country.

Stores to be provided for the Service of the Garriſon, agreeably to the detail given by the General.

Reſolved, that the following detail of ſtores delivered in by the General, be provided and forwarded without delay, for the ſervice of that garriſon. There is no doubt of the Vizier's ſoliciting this aſſiſtance; ſhould he not, theſe ſtores may be appropriated to the uſe of our own

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own troops; but that the moſt expreſs and peremptory orders be given not to exceed the bounds of that frontier, or attempt any thing offenſively, whatever the provocation, againſt the Marattas.

The Preſident to write to the Vizier: alſo a Letter to Colonel Champion.

Agreed, that the Preſident addreſs the Vizier, informing him of the above intentions ſo far as they reſpect him, and that a Letter be written to Colonel *Champion*, containing the ſubject of the preceding reſolution.

Detail of Stores given in by the General.

It will be requiſite that orders be ſent to Colonel *Champion* to march one battalion of Sepoys, with a detachment of artillery, conſiſting of one ſubaltern officer and 20 men, including non-commiſſioned officers, and 40 Laſcars, two ſix pounders and a howitzer, with their proportion of ammunition, to the garriſon of *Allahabad*; and that Colonel *Wilding* be ordered to embark for tranſportation to that garriſon with all expedition, the five iron four-pounders, on garriſon carriages, with all the round and grape ſhot belonging to thoſe guns, 100 barrels of looſe powder, and 100 barrels of muſquet ammunition; 250 ſtands of ſpare arms, 20,000 muſquet flints, all the howitzer ſhells, with their fuzees, &c. and that the Commiſſary be directed to ſend up a ſuitable proportion of ſmall ſtores for this ordnance.

But as the Vizier has a conſiderable number of both heavy and light cannon, with a large quantity of powder and ball, I ſhould recommend that he be deſired to ſend cannon and ammunition to that garriſon, in which caſe it will be unneceſſary to remove the guns and cannon ammunition from *Chunar Gur*. But at any rate the muſquet ammunition, flints, ſpare arms, and howitzer ſhells, ſhould be ſent; his Excellency ſhould be deſired to ſend in ſpades, pickaxes, mamonties, &c. with gunnery bags, and proviſions for 4,000 men for three months. This appears to be all that is immediately neceſſary for the defence of *Allahabad*, ſince the forces will be able to raiſe the ſiege of that place, long before they can have expended ſuch a quantity of proviſions; but a ſupply of ammunition and ſtores muſt be ſent from the grand magazine at *Patna* to refurniſh the garriſon of *Chunar Gur*, as well alſo from the Preſidency, to ſupply the grand magazine; the indent for which, the General will lay before the Committee as ſoon as it is prepared.

Whatever battalions of Sepoys the Vizier may think proper to join in forming the garriſon of *Allahabad*, a proportion of ammunition ſhould be ſent with them from his magazines, ſince the above is only calculated for the Engliſh troops; and Colonel *Champion* ſhould confer with his Excellency on the number of troops and quantity of ammunition, which it will be neceſſary for him to ſupply for the defence of that garriſon.

To Colonel *Champion*, commanding the firſt brigade.

Sir,

Letter to Col. Champion.

As our late intelligence of the overthrow of the King's troops by the Marattas, and of their having exacted from him the ceſſion of the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah*, renders it probable they will extend their views to the poſſeſſion of the fort of *Allahabad*; you will be pleaſed, after having conſulted with the Vizier on the ſubject, and he appears deſirous of it, to march one battalion of Sepoys with a detachment of artillery, conſiſting of one ſubaltern officer, twenty men, including non-commiſſioned officers, and forty Laſcars, two ſix-pounders and a howitzer, with their proportion of ammunition, to that garriſon; you will likewiſe confer with his Excellency on the number of artificers and military ſtores neceſſary to be provided, with the quantity of proviſion, which may be required for the ſupport of the garriſon, until the ſeaſon of action is expired; and on the proportion of his own forces, guns, ammunition, &c. he may judge requiſite to ſend with your troops for the defence of the fort.

At the ſame time we direct you to give the moſt expreſs and peremptory orders to the officer who may command this garriſon, not to exceed, on any account, the limits of his ſtation, or attempt any thing offenſively againſt the Marattas, whatever may be the incitement or provocation.

We are, Sir,
Your obedient ſervants.

Read, three Letters from *Gabriel Harper*, under dates the 2d, 6th, and 25th of December 1772.

Ordered, they be entered after this Proceeding.

Reſolved, that this day's Proceedings be ſubmitted to the Council, in their Secret Department.

It appears from all the Papers of Intelligence encloſed in the preceding Letter from the Vizier, from the camps of his Majeſty, and the reſpective Maratta Sardars, that on the 22d Rumzane, the diviſion of *Biſagee*, amounting to 15,000 men, marched to *Secoy of Arub*, about four coſs from the capital; *Tookojee* with his diviſion, and *Sabiter Cawn*, amounting in all to about 20,000 horſe, marched along the banks of the *Jumna*, to oppoſe the troops of his Majeſty under the command of *Nudjif Cawn*, *Biſagee* himſelf being oppoſed to Monſieur *Madox*, with the two Engliſh diſciplined battalions, and his Majeſty's other regular troops; and that the action was general, and laſted till about four o'clock in the afternoon, when the Marattas made a general charge; after a ſevere ſtruggle, his Majeſty's troops were obliged to give way; nevertheleſs, they retreated regularly, and diſputed the ground as they retreated. Eleven pieces of artillery and five elephants, with a large number of horſes and camels, were taken by the Marattas. The action was bloody on both ſides. *Side Mahomed Bulloach*, a conſiderable Riſala Dar on the part of his Majeſty, was killed, and ſeveral Jemmadars of note on the ſide of the Marattas; between three or four thouſand men on both ſides, are ſuppoſed to have fallen in this day's action. The tents of *Nudjif Cawn* and Monſieur *Madox* fell into the hands of the Marattas; at length, the troops were actually routed, and *Nudjif Cawn*, who put great reliance in his Moguls, is much aſhamed of their conduct on the occaſion, and was obliged to take refuge under the conduct of *Madox*'s battalions, when they jointly retreated, and continued to oppoſe the Marattas till the cloſe of the evening. It is reported that *Nudjif Cawn* is wounded. One or two detachments of the Marattas made their way into the city, and plundered great part of it, which obliged the inhabitants to fly for ſhelter into the King's fort. Excepting Monſieur *Madox*, with the two diſciplined battalions, and *Nudjif Cawn*, with a handful of his choſen men, all his Majeſty's forces were entirely routed; but they continued reſolutely to defend themſelves under the walls of the fort till eight o'clock at night, when they retired.

From intelligence received, under date 24th Ruzani, it appears that his Majeſty wrote to the Marattas, acquainting them, that he would comply with all their demands; and ſent *Huſſain ut Dine Cawn* to them for that purpoſe. Other advices of this date add, that affairs are on the point of being concluded, by his Majeſty's having agreed to give up *Corah* and *Kurrah*, and *Saharanpoor* to the Marattas; to appoint *Sabiter Cawn* Buxey, to relinquiſh the territories of the Jauts, which his Majeſty had conquered; and, in ſhort, to comply with all the demands which they may now or hereafter make.

(Signed) *A. B. Goodlad*,
Per^n Tranſlator.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c. &c. &c. and to the Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

In my laſt addreſs I had the honour to acquaint you, that the Marattas had marched towards *Delhi*. By accounts

accounts that I have juſt received, they were arrived at *Duncore Gaut* on the *Jumna*, which is nine coſs from the capital. *Byſagee* by Arzus to the King, is endeavouring to lull him into ſecurity, and a belief of their good intentions; but his Majeſty ſeems to have a perfect knowledge of what they mean to do, and appears reſolutely bent to oppoſe their attempts in favour of *Zabita Cawn*; for this purpoſe (as he concludes they will not reſtrain from force to accompliſh their deſigns) he is taking every meaſure to ſtrengthen himſelf in *Delhi*, has recalled all the troops from different parts, mounted a number of guns, and aſſigned the poſts to be occupied by the different bodies of troops.

Inate Ulla Cawn a few days ago marched from *Burati* with the troops he had collected, to oblige his father to agree to his demands; he was followed by *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, with all his forces, a part of which he detached againſt his ſon four days ago; *Inate Ulla Cawn* did not decline the battle, and very ſoon defeated the Chiefs ſent againſt him, and obliged them to retreat to the main body; the day following, *Hafez Rhamet*, with all the army, marched, and *Inate Cawn* waited for them, being encouraged from his ſucceſs the preceding day, to hope to defeat his father alſo; but when the armies were on the point of engaging, ſome Chiefs of each party interpoſed, and brought about a reconciliation; and *Inate Cawn* is now with his father, who has promiſed him every thing he can in reaſon require.

The Vizier is now conſtantly at his camp, five coſs from hence, diſciplining his troops, and preparing for the field; and the fortifications at this place are going on with great alacrity.

I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Fayzabad, Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
2d December, 1772. *Gabriel Harper.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c. &c. &c. and to the Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I had the honour to addreſs you on the 2d inſtant; and am now to acquaint you, that part of the forces of *Byſagee* and *Tootogee* have croſſed the *Jumna*, and are making great ravages in the neighbourhood of *Delhi*; his Majeſty continues reſolute to oppoſe their meaſures in favour of *Zabita Cawn*, and has publicly declared his intentions of fighting the Marattas, ſhould they perſiſt in their unreaſonable demands.

Inate Ulla Cawn, after defeating the troops ſent againſt him by *Hafez Rhamet*, and being reconciled, as I had the honour to acquaint you in my laſt, has again quarrelled with his father, and with his troops is retiring from the Rohilla Country; it is not certain whither he intends to go, but I think it moſt likely he will come to the Vizier, who I imagine will be happy at ſuch an opportunity of encreaſing his animoſity already exiſting between himſelf and *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*.

I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf,
with the higheſt reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
Fayzabad, moſt humble ſervant,
6th December 1772. *Gabriel Harper.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, &c. Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c. &c. &c. and to the Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The ſucceſs of the Marattas againſt the King's forces on the 18th and 19th inſtant, the particulars of which have been ſent to the Governor by the Vizier, has reduced his Majeſty to the unhappy neceſſity of agreeing to the demands of the enemy; which are ſo exorbitant, that they will leave his Majeſty ſcarcely any thing. The provinces of *Cora* and *Allahabad* for themſelves; the poſt of Buxey, with all the territory dependent on it, for *Zabita Cawn*, are the principals. They require him to give up all the lands he has taken from the Jauts, to pay them the balance of the ſums he promiſed on his firſt going to them, and to remain conſtantly in their protection. The Vizier, who I believe always intended to get ſuch a body of troops to the King's aſſiſtance on the Engliſh troops coming into the Subah of *Oude*, has now given up all thoughts of the kind, and ſeems only ſolicitous for the ſafety of his Country: for this purpoſe he intends to proceed with the firſt brigade and his own army to the moſt eligible place near his frontiers, to oppoſe any attempts of the enemy. APPENDIX. No. 18.

From the ſucceſs the Marattas have had in every thing they have undertaken, they will probably be bold enough to march immediately into the province of *Corah* and *Allahabad*; and this, if any thing, will induce the Vizier to croſs the *Ganges*; for it ſeems always to have been his intention to attempt the defence of thoſe Countries, as he in ſome meaſure looked on them united to his own, and had formed hopes of obtaining them from the King.

The death of *Mhadarow*, with the ſucceſſion of *Narrain Row*, are confirmed beyond all doubts.

I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf,
with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and
Fayzabad, moſt humble ſervant,
25th December 1772. *Gabriel Harper.*

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 30th March 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire.
William Aldersey, }
John Reed, } Eſquires.
P. M. Dacres, }

Read, two Letters from General *Barker*, dated the 6th and 12th inſtant, encloſing tranſlation of a Shocca from the King to the General; received 7th March. Two Letters from General Sir R bert Barker.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Yeſterday I arrived at his Excellency's encampment at *Ghouni*, between the rivers *Gurrah* and *Gumbary*; and this morning I had a viſit from him.—He informs me the Marattas ſtill continue at *Ramgaut*. They have detached *Zabita Cawn* to *Hafez Rhamet*, with hopes of prevailing on him to join their arms; and are ſending threats to the Pattan Chief, *Muzzaffa Jung*, ſon to the late *Ahmud Cawn*, at *Furruckabad*; who, however, has agreed with the Vizier to withhold himſelf from their invitation, provided his Excellency will aſſiſt him in the defence of the place. In conſequence of this the Vizier has ſent over two thouſand infantry, to take poſſeſſion of the head of the bridge of boats thrown over the *Ganges* near *Furruckabad*.

The Marattas have ſent *Acber Ally Cawn* to inform his Excellency, that his Majeſty, having conferred the provinces of *Corab* and *Kurrab* on them, it is their intention to take poſſeſſion of thoſe countries; and they have therefore given him this early notice, that in caſe he has any troops on that ſide, they may be removed.—Upon the Preſident's information to the Vizier, of my being ordered to join the army, he ſuſpended the tranſaction of every kind of buſineſs until my arrival, and now appears deſirous of conducting himſelf as may be moſt agreeable to the advice and council of the Adminiſtration at *Calcutta*.

This conduct of the Vizier has thrown every thing in ſuſpence. *Hafez Rhamet* waits to ſee the effects of my arrival, charged, as he ſuppoſes I am, with the reſolution

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tion of the Board; *Muzzatta Jung*, until he can discover how the Nabob is disposed to assist him; and the Marattas, in expectation of the juncture of these powers. It is necessary therefore that something should be done. To remain inactive at a time when the expectation of the whole are at the highest pitch, will be to lose the opportunity of making that impression on their present undetermined state that might turn to our advantage, particularly as we are just now in the same situation as when the Marattas last season defeated and ravaged the Country of *Zabita Cawn*. *Hafez Rhamet* therefore cannot flatter himself with security, while we remain within the former prescribed line, until he is divested of these apprehensions, by our actual march across it; and we are in hopes that this movement will cause a decision in our favour. *Hafez* will probably refuse the invitation of the Marattas; it is possible *Zabita Cawn* will not return to them; and *Muzzatta Jung* will resolve to defend *Furruckabad*. Considering all these matters, together with the advice and request of the Vizier, I have come to a resolution of crossing the boundaries of his Excellency's dominions, and hope it will meet with your approbation.

In consequence of the troops having marched to such a distance from the Corah province, I have judged it necessary to order the 13th battalion at *Chunar Gur* into the lines at *Cawnpore*, not only to secure our passage across the *Ganges*, but to hold a claim and possession of that province in the Company's name, until I shall receive your instructions in what manner it is to be disposed of; and I hope you will judge it expedient to transmit them as soon as possible, or at least as soon as it is determined whether these provinces are to belong to the Marattas or the Company. His Excellency has eight thousand men at *Cawnpore*, *Moneer ul Dowlah*, four: now there is no danger of those lines being forced before the troops could arrive there; and as to their entering the province, it would probably reduce them to the very thing we wish for, a battle; since they could not, with any sort of reputation, desert their new acquisition without risking one blow, or making some effort to maintain their possessions.

Yacoot Cawn, Vackeel from the King, has brought kelaats or dresses for the Vizier and myself; but his embassy is purposely intended to convey a secret Letter from the King to me, under a private seal, the impression of which he gave me at his departure from the Corah province; a translate of this Letter shall be sent to-morrow.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient
humble servant;
R^t Barker.

Camp at *Ghonni*,
March 6, 1773.

Letter from the General.

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

This morning Captain *Cockerell* joined the army, and by him I received your Letter of Instructions, under date the 19th of February, which you may be assured it shall be my utmost endeavours to act conformable to.

Since my last address the army has made two marches, which has brought us two cos within the district of *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, and I shall continue to proceed to the most convenient spot on the banks of the *Ganges* opposite to *Ramgaut*, where the Maratta army still remain encamped. *Hafez Rhamet* has made a march from *Oundlah* to meet and join the detachment of their forces, which they have given out is to cross the river by a bridge of boats, now preparing for the purpose under the command of *Fuesgee Nulha*. Notwithstanding this advancement of our troops, *Moneer ul Dowlah* was on the point of setting out for *Cawnpore*, agreeable to the tenor of my address, to have taken possession of those provinces in right of the Honourable Company, as their Naib; but the arrival of your instructions has occasioned this to be altered, and he now proceeds as his Majesty's Naib; and the detachment of Sepoys I had ordered for the defence of the lines, will continue in the same manner I before designed. The information you have desired relative to those provinces, shall be observed and forwarded with the utmost dispatch.

I could wish you had not so strictly circumscribed my operations to the Northward of the *Ganges*, as I am persuaded you would have had no reason to complain of an infringement, if you had granted a greater limitation to the Southward, and you would put it in my power to have harassed the Maratta arms with greater success; since, if they should make an attack on the frontiers of *Corah*, my being enabled to have crossed the *Ganges* at *Furruckabad*, and so fallen on their rear or heavy division of their army, might have proved of the greatest benefit. Permit me to recommend this matter to your consideration.

Mahajee Syndiah, who had marched towards the *Decan*, and had reached *Jypoor*, has received orders to join their main body.

I am,
Gentlemen,
with respect,
Your most obedient
humble servant,
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp at *Azimpoor*,
March 12th, 1773.

Shocca from the King to General Sir Robert Barker.

Translate of a Shocca from the King to General Sir *Robert Barker*, in his own hand.

Our situation, and the situation of *Shajyahanabad*, must be known to you from report. We did not pay attention to your advice, and we have seen the consequences. We are now fallen alone into the hands of the Marattas. At this time it is necessary to confirm a peace with the Maratta Sardars, and give them admission into *Corah* and *Kurrah*, on condition that they return home; after they shall have retired you will receive us. When we ourselves, and the whole royal family shall have joined you, whatever may be advisable may with ease be carried into execution. If in case of a war, which God forbid, they should become superior, all those Countries will be ruined; if on the contrary they should be defeated they will fly from thence to the capital, and proceed upon a new plan; that is, they will send for *Gazyodin Cawn*, who they give out is approaching; they will cause the Vizeret to be conferred on him; they will collect a fresh army, and carry their intentions into execution. It is therefore advisable, by friendly means, to send them home. When we and you shall be together, whatever may be necessary to be done will with ease be carried into execution. If you are at all events determined on a war, in that case also a different plan must be formed; that is, you must by some means draw them to a greater distance from *Shajehanabad*, and then commence the war, and send a brigade, a battalion of Europeans, some battalions, and a body of cavalry, from the Vizier, under an experienced Chief, with necessaries for the journey, and a sum for our expences to the presence, as there are no kind of necessaries here, and nothing can be done without money. This you must send, that immediately on hearing their defeat we may with this force proceed to join you;—moreover, you must send an ample sum of money, five or six lacks of rupees, that we may be supplied with necessaries, and not distressed on the road.

W. Davy,
P. T.

Letter from the Vizier to the President.

Read, a Letter from the Vizier to the President, received the 24th March.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*.

After expressing his desire of an interview with Mr. *Hastings*, he proceeds: the friendship and regard that subsist

ſubſiſt between us, require no comment. By God's bleſſing, they will receive daily increaſing ſtrength; and the obſervance thereof, as was neceſſary and proper, has, on both ſides been brought to paſs, and I am ſenſible that it will ever continue to be our mutual ſentiments. I am exceſſively thankful and pleaſed with the friendſhip which you have performed, and may the Almighty preſerve you for all this goodneſs; for the reſt, I write you a few circumſtances which proceed from my penetration and foreſight. By God's bleſſing, in theſe days you, my friend, are likewiſe endowed with wiſdom, and you will reflect on them maturely and conſiderately; it is apparent that the Marattas are adventurers from the boundaries of iſlands and ports, and the *Decan*, to the country of *Hindoſtan*, and are ever planning and engaged in the conquering of Countries; that they poſſeſs not the quality of moderation; and this following is what they ſeek for, and the ideas that they entertain, "We muſt get ſuch a "Country in our poſſeſſion, we muſt advance forward, "and make greater acquiſitions and conqueſts." It therefore occurs to me, that hereafter a footing of cordiality will not ſubſiſt between the Marattas and the Engliſh Sardars; and you muſt certainly believe that they entertain a warlike intention, and from the depravity of their race, and their deſire of ſubduing Countries, will commit acts of hoſtility; it therefore appears to me, that there cannot be a better time for oppoſing them than the preſent, for by God's bleſſing the Engliſh forces and your friends are ſufficient to counteract them, and there is no one in *Hindoſtan* who is able to cope with us; retaining therefore in view, the aſſiſtance of the Almighty, I am ſenſible that the purpoſe of my heart will be effected, and in the performance of it I have conſidered the advantage of the Company, and the good name and reputation of the Engliſh Sardars. It is this; there is a Treaty ſubſiſting between me and the Engliſh Sardars, that I ſhould pay the Batta of ſuch troops who ſhould come for my aſſiſtance and ſupport; I am now reſolved, that if the Engliſh Sardars, bracing up the girdle of reſolution, will be firm in oppoſing the Marattas, I will pay the brigade that is with me, and diſcharge the whole of it myſelf; if when I entertain an intention of going to *Delhi* it accompanies me, I paying the amount of their wages; and I will clear the account of the Bengal tribute, which the Company pay annually to his Majeſty, and take theſe matters upon myſelf, and there will never be any variation therein. My friend, you are poſſeſſed of wiſdom and penetration, and well underſtand the iſſue of future events. In this matter there is no loſs or calamity whatever; it is as well advantageous now as hereafter, and may be productive of the moſt beneficial conſequences to the Engliſh Company; and you muſt certainly believe that in ſix months or a year, terms of amity will not ſubſiſt between the Marattas and the Engliſh Sardars, and they, from the character they bear to lay waſte the whole world, will commence improper acts of hoſtility; at that time it will be abſolutely neceſſary for the Engliſh to oppoſe them, and then this advantage which I have repreſented, cannot be obtained. Where is the neceſſity of giving them leiſure to collect ſtrength, and letting the advantage ſlip through your fingers? It is a ſaying of the anticnts, "that the ſource of a ſpring may be choaked "by a ſingle clod, but let it flow on and you will not "croſs it with an elephant." It is adviſable not to poſtpone till to-morrow what can be done to-day; and why ſhould you make a difficulty of what can be performed with eaſe and facility? It appears to me that this is the time of operation, and that ſuch an opportunity will not again happen, for I flatter myſelf, and indeed am certain, that affairs will be ſettled agreeable to our wiſhes, and all matters take a favourable turn, and be the ſource of advantage to the Engliſh Company; for I take upon myſelf the payment of the whole brigade, and excuſing them the delivery of the *Bengal* tribute to the King. Do you, my friend, attentively conſider this, and ſend me a proper anſwer to this with expedition; and give orders that a brigade of Engliſh troops, being united with me, exert themſelves in oppoſing and puniſhing the Marattas; and that they accompany me to *Delhi*, or any other place that I may have formed an intention of going to. By God's bleſſing every thing will be well. I have the utmoſt confidence and greateſt reliance on your friendſhip, and in this affair which I have ſolicited, may be the advantage of the Engliſh Company, the end of all quarrels and diſturbances, their good name and reputation: and this does not appear to me any loſs or diſadvantage whatever; and it is on every account beſt and adviſable, and the cauſe of the pleaſure and ſatisfaction of your friend. My writing proceeds from my advice. You, my friend, will likewiſe reflect upon the matter; and Colonel *Champion* will write the reſt.

The Deliberations of the Committee.

From the above advices the following appears to be the ſtate of affairs in that quarter. The General and the Vizier have croſſed the boundary of the Vizier's Country, and are encamped near the Marattas on the oppoſite ſide of the river; that *Zabita Cawn* had been deputed from the Marattas and *Hafez Rhamet* to perſuade him to join them, and that he had accordingly marched from *Oundlah*, the place of rendezvous for the Rohilla forces, to meet a body of their troops who were to croſs the river by a bridge of boats, notwithſtanding the advance of our army; yet it is ſuppoſed he does not entertain any deſign to unite himſelf with the Marattas, it being cuſtomary for that Chief to treat with both parties and adhere to neither:

That *Muzzatta Jung*, who by the death of his father *Aneed Cawn*, holds poſſeſſion of *Furruckabad*, had thrown himſelf into the Vizier's protection, and that the Nabob had actually ſent 2,000 of his infantry to aſſiſt him in the defence of his city:

That the Marattas have formally declared their intentions of poſſeſſing themſelves of *Corah* and *Kurrah*, conformably to the grants of the King, and have required the Vizier to withdraw his troops from thoſe provinces —That the Vizier had awaited the General's arrival, and by this means thrown every thing into a ſtate of ſuſpence—*Hafez Rhamet* is in expectation of the reſult of the Vizier's councils before he declares himſelf—*Muzzatta Jung*, until he can diſcover how far the Nabob is determined to aſſiſt him and the Marattas, regards the junction of thoſe powers as a meaſure unavoidable.—The General is of opinion that ſomething ſhould be done at this criſis, to make an impreſſion on their undetermined ſtate, which might turn to our advantage; that as the allies are at preſent ſituated and confined to a certain preſcribed line, the Rohillas cannot look for any ſecurity, and that our paſſing it at this juncture might be productive of a very favourable diverſion, for *Hafez Rhamet* would probably refuſe the invitation of the Marattas; *Zabita Cawn* might ſeize this occaſion of aſſerting his independence, and *Muzzutta Jung* would continue firm in his reſolution of defending *Furruckabad*, and that the General has been induced by theſe conſiderations to paſs the boundary of the Vizier's dominions; that he had likewiſe ordered the 13th battalion into the lines of *Cawnpore*, not only to ſecure a paſſage acroſs the *Ganges*, but to hold a claim and poſſeſſion of the Corah province on the part of the Company; that the Vizier appeared entirely ſatisfied with our intentions of holding this Country, until it ſhall be determined in what manner it is to be diſpoſed of, and thinks that the General ſhould direct *Meuire ul Dowlah* to continue the management of it in the name of the Company—That the good effects of the ſtep the General had taken in paſſing the bounds of the Vizier's dominions are already apparent, ſince it has been the means of preventing the Marattas from croſſing the river, forming a junction with the Rohillas, and ravaging the Nabob's territories; but that as he had not made his intentions public, of defending the Corah province, it is very probable the Marattas will advance confidently to poſſeſs themſelves of it, an event he is extremely deſirous of, as the only means within the limits of his inſtructions to re-

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lieve the anxieties of the Vizier, and the annual demands of our aſſiſtance; otherwiſe, that he ſees no end of the ineffective campaign in that quarter. The Vizier in the meantime ſeems extremely anxious that ſome deciſive blow be ſtruck to weaken the overgrown power of the Marattas, and thinks this to be the moſt favourable ſeaſon for undertaking it; that if our troops are permitted to accompany him to *Delhi*, or to any place where he may find a neceſſity of leading them, it will be the ſource of much advantage to the Company, ſince he will take upon himſelf the payment of the whole brigade, and excuſe them the delivery of the *Bengal* tribute to the King.

The King is deſirous that the Marattas be permitted to take quiet poſſeſſion of the ceded provinces, imagining, that in this caſe they will ſpeedily return to the *Decan*, and that then he will be able to join us with the royal family; but that if we are determined on a war with them, it ſhould be commenced at ſome diſtance from the capital: and that a brigade, with a body of the Vizier's troops, be ſent with a large ſum of money, to facilitate this junction, ſhould the Maratta army be defeated.

The Reſolution of the Committee in conſequence.

The Committee, having ſeriouſly conſidered the purport of the above advices, are of opinion, that nothing ſhould be done on our part until the poſſeſſion of *Corah*, and the grant of aſſignment from the Vizier for the arrears now due, and for the monthly payment of the 1,15,000 rupees, are finally ſecured to us. Thus far however it may be expedient to extend the lines of our inſtructions to the General, by authorizing him, in caſe the Marattas ſhould either attack *Corah*, or approach ſo near, as to place it in his power, by croſſing the river, to incloſe them between the province of *Corah* and his army, and attack them in their rear, that we permit him to paſs the river: that this ſtep once taken, and attended with ſucceſs, he be directed again to have recourſe to the orders he has already been furniſhed with, in the caſe of his having croſſed the boundary of the Corah province for the ſame purpoſe; that is to ſay, that he do not ſuffer himſelf to be drawn further from the borders of that province; but return immediately within the preſcribed line, after he has executed the ſervice he had undertaken.

That the Committee approve of his having entered the dominions of *Hafez Rhamet*; and that he be directed to divert the Vizier from the hope of accompanying him to *Delhi*, as we are determined invariably to purſue the defenſive plan we have adopted.

Agreed, that the following Letter be ſent to General *Barker*.

To Brigadier-General Sir *Robert Barker*, Commander in Chief under the Preſidency.

Letter to General Barker.

Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letters of the 6th and 12th inſtant, incloſing a tranſlate of a Letter from the King. Theſe, with extracts from your Letter to the Preſident of the 10th ſubmitted to our peruſal, have enabled us to form a competent judgment of the tranſactions in your quarter.

The aſſignment which we have required from the Vizier for the arrears now due, and for the monthly payment of 1,15,000 rupees, is a point of ſuch immediate concern to us, that we are reſolved to admit of no operation in concert with him, or for the defence of his territories, unleſs he ſhall have firſt complied with this requiſition. Should he, contrary to our expectations, refuſe us this ſecurity, you muſt immediately leave him, and make the defence of *Corah* your ſole object. Our inſtructions on this point are ſo very clear and explicit, that we refer you again to them for our reſolution upon it, which is fixed and unalterable. We are in daily expectation of hearing from you, that the alternative which we have enjoined is already carried into execution.

In conſequence of your repreſentations, we deem it expedient to extend the line of our inſtructions, by authorizing you, in caſe the movements of the Marattas ſhould put it in your power, by croſſing the river, to incloſe them between the Corah province and your army, and by this means to attack them in their rear, to paſs the river; but ſhould the Marattas, in conſequence of this ſtep, be entirely defeated, or compelled to retire, we again direct you to recur to the orders we have already given you, in the caſe of your croſſing the boundary of the Corah province for the ſame purpoſe; we mean, that you do not ſuffer yourſelf to be drawn further from the borders of that country, but retire immediately within the preſcribed line of your operations, after you have executed the ſervice which drew you beyond it.

We approve of your having entered the dominions of *Hafez Rhamet* at *Furruckabad*, or from any other part within the dominions of *Hafez Rhamet*; for this purpoſe, we deſire you will aſſure the Vizier, that we can by no means conſent to quit the defenſive plan we have adopted; and we recommend to you to divert him from all thoughts of our attending him to *Delhi*, or to any other place whither his ambition might lead him.

We are,

Fort William, Sir,

30th March 1773. Your obedient ſervants.

Read the following Letters from Colonel *Champion*, under dates the 28th January, the 5th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 17th, 19th, 26th, 28th February, and 3d inſtant.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, and Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your orders dated the 9th inſtant, and have conſulted with his Excellency according to your inſtructions. He by no means will give his conſent to my detaching a battalion of Sepoys, artillery, &c. for the garriſon of *Allahabad*; obſerving at the ſame time that it will be weakening the troops on which he has his greateſt dependance; but has agreed to ſend immediately four heavy pieces of cannon, with a thouſand rounds to each gun; a complete battalion of regulars, with four field pieces and five hundred matchlocks; ſo that the garriſon will be completed to three thouſand; and he has alſo ſent orders for four months proviſion to be laid in, &c. As I could not perſuade him to comply with your intentions of having a reinforcement ſent from the brigade, I then thought it beſt to have that battalion of Sepoys commanded by our own officers, and a field officer to command the garriſon, which he very readily acquieſced in, and was well pleaſed with the propoſal; therefore I intend to detach Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to command, with one captain, a lieutenant, and two enſigns, for which I hope, Gentlemen, to receive your approbation. The two twenty-four pounders belonging to the brigade will in a few days be at *Allahabad* with their ſtores; they are to wait there for further orders. I have this moment received advices from the officers commanding the brigade boats, that there is not a foot water in the *Ganges* near to *Allahabad* for above a coſs in length, which has obliged them to unload our boats; and will be the cauſe of detaining them eight or ten days; therefore I have ſent expreſs orders to have the lighteſt boats diſpatched forward with ammunition. And on a further converſation with his Excellency, I find he is determined to throw a bridge acroſs the *Ganges*, and to act offenſively againſt the Marattas, ſhould they enter the Corah and Currah provinces in a hoſtile manner. I then thought it neceſſary to aſk him, if he had received a duplicate of my orders? and on his replying in the negative, I explained them to him; at which he ſeemed greatly ſurpriſed, and has declared his intention of addreſſing

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dreſſing the Board on the ſubject this evening. On being aſked, if he eſteemed that country as his own? he anſwered, that he did, as the King had quitted it without any permiſſion; and further, that his opinion was, that by your orders of the 9th inſtant, you meant to prevent their taking poſſeſſion of that country: from its appearing to me abſolutely his intentions to repel his force to theirs, I would wiſh to be honoured, by the utmoſt expedition, with your inſtructions how far I am to engage the troops under my command in his ſupport; for a defeat to him may be attended with the utmoſt conſequence to ourſelves; and I hope my Letter of the 15th inſtant will be fully replied to. He mentioned to me, that *Nedjiff Cawn*, who by our accounts engaged to march with the Marattas, has made propoſals of joining him, on drawing near to our army; and that Mr. *Maddox*, with his detachment, had alſo offered to come in to him, but was afraid of being apprehended by us. As I am informed that the Adminiſtration had long ſince iſſued their pardon to this man, I told his Excellency I could have no objection under that circumſtance. By our laſt accounts, dated from *Delhi*, January 22d, the Marattas had not marched.

I have the honour to remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp near *Mohaun*, January 28th, 1773.

P. S. The troops under my command, with thoſe of his Excellency, march to-morrow morning towards *Cawnpore*.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Preſident, and Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

By advices dated February 1ſt, at night, from *Delhi*, the two Maratta Chiefs had marched. *Toocojee Holkar* to a place called *Palker Gunge*, ſix coſs, and *Buſagee* to *Aukley Gaut*, four coſs to the Eaſtward of *Delhi*; and that they had diſpatched *Abbar Alla Cawn* to his Excellency and *Myur ul Dowla*, to ſettle about the delivering up the province of *Corah*, &c. declaring they have no intentions of commencing hoſtilities againſt the Vizier, and hope that he will not prevent their taking poſſeſſion of thoſe countries which the King has lately ceded to them.

I have the honour to remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp oppoſite *Cawnpore*, 5th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that I have juſt received advices from the Weſtward, dated 5th inſtant in the morning, which mention that the Marattas had marched in two diviſions, and had directed the news writers to inform his Excellency they were determined to take poſſeſſion of thoſe provinces which were ceded to them by the King. And the ſame Papers mention alſo, that *Nudjiff Cawn* had refuſed to act with them, although they had offered a lack of rupees per month for himſelf and his people.

I have the honour to remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp oppoſite *Cawnpore*, February 7th 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In conſequence of the Marattas having ſent to his Excellency in the moſt public manner, that they are determined to take poſſeſſion of the Corah and Currah provinces; he came to the reſolution yeſterday evening of croſſing fifteen thouſand horſe over the *Ganges* before day, and to lay waſte their Country for twenty coſs to the Weſtward of *Corah*: upon my receiving this piece of intelligence, I immediately wrote to him, requeſting he would defer his intentions till I had the honour of an interview with him; which he readily complied with, and this morning he paid me a viſit: when I made uſe of all the arguments and perſuaſion in my power for him to ſet aſide his deſigns, repreſenting the conſequence of his commencing hoſtilities. To which he anſwered, that he was determined to prevent their taking poſſeſſion of the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah*, and that he would rather ſuffer a defeat and periſh, than ſee them in their hands. I again obſerved to him my orders, and that while we remained united, and were on our guard, there was nothing to be apprehended, were they double their numbers. He further replied, that he had long ſince wrote to them, intimating, that upon their marching towards *Furruckabad*, he ſhould eſteem it an open declaration of war, and would act accordingly.

His Excellency intends, after the Marattas have made two marches more, to move up to the frontiers of his Country which lies neareſt to *Furruckabad*, he having received ſtrong aſſurances that a body of Affgans were ready to join him, alſo *Hafez Mahomed Cawn* and *Zuttee Cawn*, and that he had wrote to the Seeks to ſend him a conſiderable body of cavalry. He intends taking the boats which form the bridge at *Cawnpore* along with him. Letters from the Weſtward, dated the 6th inſtant, bring advices that the Marattas only marched four coſs on that day, and were to halt till *Zabita Cawn* and *Nedjiff Cawn*'s forces had joined them, which were on their march with that intent.

I have the honour to remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp oppoſite *Cawnpore*, 8th February, 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have to acquaint you that the Marattas are on their march towards us, and were the 8th inſtant at *Jahangurrpoor*. His Excellency informs me, that he has received repeated aſſurances from *Zabita Cawn* that he will not act againſt him, and *Nedjiff Cawn* and *Hafez Rhamet Cawn* declare their intentions of joining him; alſo *Muzatta Jung*, who has a force ready to join; and he either has made, or is collecting, boats to throw a bridge acroſs the *Ganges* at *Furruckabad*. His Excellency obſerves, that it is neceſſary, in order to ſecure thoſe people in his intereſt, that we march to *Saundee*; and it is agreed that I march the 13th inſtant.

I have the honour to be,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp oppoſite *Cawnpore*, 11th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

By Letters received this day, dated the 9th inſtant, from the Maratta camp, brings advice of their having marched

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marched thirteen coſs, and encamping at *Rampore*, which is eighty coſs from *Furruckabad*; and they intend being at *Ramgaut* the 15th, which is twenty coſs further. *Zabiter Cawn* has wrote to *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, that if he has the leaſt ſpirit of a ſoldier he will immediately join our forces and his Excellency's, but that he cannot at preſent ſhew himſelf, being in the power of the Marattas. They talk of leaving their baggage, &c. at *Ramgaut*, ſurrounding the city of *Furruckabad*, and demanding a contribution from *Muzzatta Jung*. I march with the troops under my command to-morrow morning.

I have the honour to remain,
with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp oppoſite *Cawnpore*, 12th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your Letter dated the 2d inſtant, and have delivered yours to his Excellency, which ſeemed to give much ſatisfaction. At preſent he is come to no reſolution, but to-morrow I ſhall be able to write you more fully. By Letters dated the 14th inſtant the Marattas were at *Ramgaut*, and by accounts had written to the King, preſſing him to join, or to ſend one of his ſons. In the evening of that day they had determined to march towards *Furruckabad*. *Muzzatta Jung* has made a bridge acroſs the *Ganges*, near the fort of *Furruckabad*, and is ready to join the Vizier with a large force.

I have the honour to remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
A. Champion.

Camp at *Saundee*, 17th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c.

Sir,

I am this day favoured with a Letter, which I believe contains the ſentiments and orders of the Board, dated the 1ſt February, for my entering into immediate meaſures with his Excellency for the defence of the Corah and Currah provinces; but as this had no ſignature, I hope ſoon to receive the duplicate.

Upon my acquainting the Nabob with the contents of the Letter, he expreſſed great ſurprize, having flattered himſelf much with the peruſal of your's the preceding day, that the Board were determined to ſupport him effectually, by permitting our troops to croſs the *Ganges* in conjunction with his Excellency's, ſhould the Marattas attempt any thing againſt the Corah and Currah provinces; and in conſequence thereof, he had entered into a ſolemn engagement with *Muzzatta Jung*, conſented on his part, to permit the Vizier's troops to take poſſeſſion of the bridge which he has thrown acroſs the *Ganges*.—Five thouſand, moſtly infantry, marched yeſterday morning with five pieces of cannon, and this morning have taken poſſeſſion of it, with a ſmall fort which commands it on the Furruckabad ſide of the river.—He ſays he is determined to adhere ſtrictly to his engagements with *Muzzatta Jung*; and requeſts of me to march the army nearer to the aforementioned bridge, in order to intimidate the Marattas, and confirm *Muzzatta Jung* and *Hafez Rhamet Cawn* in his intereſt, as the former was much inclined, and the latter wavering and undetermined what part to take; but on our near approach, *Hafez Rhamet Cawn* would be convinced that he was ſerious in ſupporting him; and he would in conſequence thereof immediately join. And he expreſſed his further reſolution, that if the Marattas marched paſt *Furruckabad*, he would croſs with his whole army, and join the forces of *Hafez Rhamet Jung*, and *Muzzatta Jung*, and fall on their rear, whilſt we marched back on this ſide the river, as far as *Cawnpore*, where the bridge ſhould be ready for us to croſs over; and he made not the leaſt doubt but that he ſhould very ſoon drive the enemy out of the Corah province.

He is at this time collecting boats, to throw a bridge acroſs the *Gamberia*, which is not fordable: when it is completed, he will march. He propoſes moving nearer to *Furruckabad*. I much doubt his reſolution of croſſing the *Ganges* without our forces: however, at preſent the beſt appearances ſhould be put on, in order if poſſible to prevent the junction of thoſe troops with the Marattas, the main body of which are ſtill at *Ramgaut*. I have juſt received accounts of a body of 5,000 having croſſed the *Jumna* at *Calpee*—I ſhould ſuppoſe with an intention to plunder. To morrow we ſhall receive further accounts regarding them. I hope ſoon to ſee the General, who no doubt is better acquainted with your ſentiments, and how far he can venture to act on ſo important an occaſion.

I have the honour to remain,
with reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp near *Saundee*, 19th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c.

Sir,

I had the honour to receive your Letter, dated the 10th; to the contents of which I ſhall pay due attention. —Alſo the one for his Excellency, through Mr. *Goodlad*, which has been delivered to him.

By the newspapers from the Weſtward, the Marattas ſtill remain in the ſame ſituation as in my laſt.

I have the honour to remain,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp near *Dumnapore*, 26th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c.

Sir,

We have received certain intelligence that *Zabita Cawn*, with *Dader Mulhur*, who directs the Maratta Councils, were diſpatched the 26th inſtant with two thouſand horſe, on an embaſſy to *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, who they expect to bring over to their intereſt, and to obtain a ſum of money from.—The main body are ſtill at *Ramgaut*.

Since the news of the General's ſetting out in order to join the army, all buſineſs is at a ſtand. I hope to have the pleaſure of ſeeing him ſoon.

I remain,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A Champion.

Dumnapore, between the *Gurrah* and *Gamberia*, 26th February 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, &c.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that in conſequence of a particular requeſt made by his Excellency, I have this day received a viſit from *Muzzatta Jung*, between

the *Ganges* and *Gamberia* rivers, chiefly instructed to prove the friendship subsisting between the English and the Vizier; but no kind of business was brought on the carpet, nor am I acquainted with the Nabob's intentions. The customary presents on these occasions were made to him, for which I hope to receive your approbation.

By Letters dated the 2d instant, the main body of the Marattas still remain at *Rangaut*. The General I expect will be here the 5th in the morning.

I remain, with the greatest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient
humble servant,
A. Champion.

Camp on the
Banks of the *Gamberia*,
3d March 1773.

Agreed, That the receipt of them be acknowledged, and that we thank him in general terms for the conduct he has observed in the course of his command.

To Colonel *A. Champion*, commanding the first brigade.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 28th January, the 5th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and 28th, February, and the 2d instant.

And we take this opportunity of expressing our approbation of your conduct during the course of your command.

We are,
Sir,
Your humble servants.

Fort William,
30th March 1773.

Ordered, That the Papers of intelligence transmitted by Colonel *Champion*, be entered after this proceeding.

The ship *Hector* being under dispatch for *Europe*;

Ordered, That the Secretary do prepare a draft of a Letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors, from this department.

Warren Hastings.
Wm. Aldersey.
P. M. Dacres.

News from *Delhi*, the Maratta Camp.

It appears from the last Papers from *Delhi*, dated the 16th instant, that the Marattas were crossing, and were encamped with their buzar and carriage cattle, at *Inoor Gunge*.

The troops appeared to be dissatisfied with their commanders, being desirous of returning to the *Decan*; but *Bysagee* has pacified them with assurances, that after they take possession of *Furruckabad* and the province of *Corah*, and have adjusted the revenues of these territories, that he would return with them to the *Decan*. *Madajee Scindia*, the Chief, who seems so much dissatisfied with *Bysagee* and *Tuccojee*, was plundering the Country about *Roanie*, which is 40 coss from *Delhi*, and belongs to the Jauts; from whence it is said he will march to *Jannagur*, which is in the Ragapoot's Country. There is, however, little credit to be given to these appearances of disagreement amongst the Maratta Chiefs, as it seems to have been one of their fixed systems in politics to appear to disagree, the better to cover their real designs.

Bysagee and *Tuccogee* sent orders to *Nedjiff Cawn* to join their army with the troops he had under his command, which, by the several Papers, seem to be about 2,500 or 3,000: as it was not in his power to refuse them, he endeavoured to make terms, and demanded an hundred rupees per month for each horseman, and permission to encamp one coss from the body of their army; from which I should suppose he purposes embracing the first opportunity to leave them.

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Bengal Select Consultation, the 15th of April 1773.

PRESENT:

The honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire,
William Aldersey, and
Philip Milner Dacres.

Mr. *Reed* departed for *Chittagong*.

Read the five following Letters from General *Barker*, dated the 15th, 20th, 21st, 23d, 24th March, with one Enclosure in the first.

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President and Governor, Gentlemen of the Select Committee, at *Calcutta*.

Gentlemen,

At an interview with his Excellency the Vizier this morning, the balances of the Company's extra expences was finally settled to the end of February, agreeable to the statement which I herewith transmit to you; the ready specie will be paid immediately, and the orders on his Zemindars are to be sent to me. The balances of the last year the Nabob has desired may be defrayed from his Tuncaw of ten lacks on the Muxadabad treasury, accepted by the honourable *John Cartier*, esquire, amounting to two lacks seventy-nine thousand rupees; one lack has been paid by his Excellency to the Paymaster of the 1st brigade, and the remainder you will perceive is regulated in the statement, and for the statement of the future payments, *Lutch Cawn* is sent for to camp; this I hope to finally some regular monthly mode, since he does not chuse to give Tuncaws on the Gazypoor Zemindary.

The information of this morning is, that the Maratta Sardars, after a consultation on the approach of his Excellency's and the English forces, came to a resolution of sending all their valuable baggage to Corah, where a bridge is to be thrown over the *Jumna* for its passage, and the main army is to rendezvous at *Pallara*, in the neighbourhood of *Furruckabad*. I shall nevertheless continue my route towards *Ram Gaut*, to see what determination the Rohilla will come to. This retreat of the Maratta forces will do them much discredit with the generality of the Powers, and may stir some of the most principal near the Gauts of the *Jumna*, to effect some opposition. In this place, Gentlemen, I cannot but lament the signal advantages that might have been taken, had not you thought it improper for your forces to have crossed the great river, for had my crossing been discretional, I could not fail of attacking their heavy baggage, the collecting of all their late campaigns, with undoubted success, and this must either have brought on a general engagement, or their absolute flight from the Country. If this is not effected, I cannot at present see any benefit the Honourable Company will reap by the possession of the Corah province, since the Marattas may take the same advantage of the absence of your forces, which they have been doing these three years past.

I am, Gentlemen,
with respect,
Your most obedient,
humble servant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near the
Juar Vussadar river,
March 15th 1773.

APPENDIX. No. 18.

STATEMENT of the Extra Expences incurred by the Honourable Company's Forces employed in the Subah of Oude, and the Advances made by the Vizier, from June 1772 till February 1773, inclusive.

The Balance of the laſt Campaign, amounting to 2,79,000 Rupees, having been defrayed by an Order on his Excellency's Tuncaw for ten Lacks, accepted by the honourable John Cartier, eſquire, during his Government.

A Detachment of two battalions of Sepoys, from June 1772 till November following, 6 months at 5,000 per month	R^{s} 60,000	Caſh paid by the Vizier to the Pay^{r} of the firſt brigade	R^{s} 1,00,000
The firſt Brigade, 3 months, December, January, and February, at 1,15,000 R^{s} per month	3,45,000	March 15th 1773,	
		An Order on the Rajah of Biſſwarry	1,30,000
		D^{o} on the Nabob Moneer ul Dowla	1,10,000
		In Specie, to be paid in Camp	65,000
Total	4,05,000	Total	4,05,000

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since the date of my laſt, a few repeated marches brought me yeſterday about 10 coſs from *Ram Gaut*; and I there received information that a body of Marattas, under the command of *Tookajee Holkar*, had croſſed the *Ganges* with intent to ſeize and carry off the Rohilla *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, who has been carrying on the ſame double dealings as heretofore practiſed by that treacherous ſect. This body of Marattas were, however, firſt obliged to make themſelves maſters of a poſt and ſmall fort in the road to *Hafez*'s camp, defended by the Buckſhe, *Tuccoo*; after a very warm attack, carried the poſt, or rather obliged the Buckſhe to propoſe terms of capitulation, by having expended all his ammunition, and then made him priſoner, with great part of his baggage. This buſineſs detained the operations of the Marattas on this ſide till this morning, and the near approach of our forces has I ſuppoſe preſerved *Hafez* from an attack on the line of march. This morning I received information that the Gaut of *Curruckpore*, about 2½ coſs from *Ram Gaut*, was the only place fordable, and that a body of Marattas were at that juncture croſſing for the aſſiſtance of *Tuccogee*. I heſitated not immediately to quit my firſt route to ſecure this Gaut, and on my arrival found a body of about 5,000 were on the bed of the river, apparently juſt croſſed, and the oppoſite banks were crowded with their forces. I immediately made a motion to attack them, but they waited not for a trial, re-croſſing the river with ſome expedition; the whole body then took their route towards *Ram Gaut*, along the oppoſite banks of the river where *Biſſagee* was encamped; and I proceeded with the troops under my command to this place, which is ſituated between the *Curruckpore* and *Ram Gauts*, and near alſo to the poſt of the Buckſhe, the remains of whoſe troops, amounting to 1,500, have requeſted my protection. In this ſituation I was alſo very near oppoſite to *Biſſagee*'s encampment, the main channel of the river near under their encampment. The troops had ſcarcely lodged their arms, when *Biſſagee* began a cannonade from the high grounds on the oppoſite banks; the diſtance was very great, nevertheleſs many of his ſhot came into our encampment; however, no accidents have enſued, and a few ſhot returned from our 12 pounders diſperſed them.

I muſt beg leave to aſſure you, that no hoſtilities were commenced, or a ſhot fired, until the Marattas had diſcharged upwards of twenty rounds into the encampment. Further occurrences you ſhall be acquainted with as they happen.

I am,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters, near *Aſſutpore*, 20th March 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Calcutta*.

Gentlemen,

Under cover you will be pleaſed to receive a duplicate of an Addreſs I tranſmitted to you by yeſterday's daulks. During this morning the Marattas made their appearance in ſmall bodies on the oppoſite ſide of the *Ganges* and ſeemed to brave us by frequent diſcharges of ſmall arms.

The Rohilla *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, is come in to his Excellency; and to-morrow I purpoſe to give you information what may be determined regarding him.

Since my arrival at this place I find there are a great many places where the *Ganges* may be eaſily forded between the *Curruckpore Gauts* and *Anoopſhair*, about ten coſs diſtant; indeed it is almoſt inconceivable how exceedingly narrow the channel is at this time.

I am,
Gentlemen,
with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters, Camp near *Aſſutpore*, 21ſt March 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Encloſed I tranſmit you a duplicate of my Letter of the 21ſt.—In conſequence of a conſultation with his Excellency on the ſituation of the Maratta forces, which certain intelligence adviſes us were ſeparated by the *Ganges*, *Tuccogee Holkar* being in the Rohilla diſtrict about ten or fifteen coſs to the Weſtward of *Ramgaut*, and *Biſſagee* at the diſtance of only three coſs from the oppoſite banks; it was determined, as an advantage that promiſed much to diſtreſs and diminiſh the power of this tribe, that his Excellency the Vizier, with his cavalry, and that of *Hafez Rhamet*, ſhould march to attack *Tucco* in the Rohilla diſtrict, while the Engliſh troops croſſed the *Ganges* to attack *Biſſagee*.—Permit me, Gentlemen, here to aſſure you, that upon a mature conſideration on the ſpirit of your inſtructions, the latitude you gave to my operations from the frontiers of *Corah*, and that had you known the circumſtances of the very inſufficient defence the *Ganges* has proved to the irruptions of the Marattas into the Rohilla diſtricts lying to the Northward of the river, from the number of the fords, it would no doubt have attracted your attention. I conſider myſelf ſituated and empowered in like manner to make uſe of the advantage which offers itſelf of making an attack on their forces under *Biſſagee*, particularly as the diſtance was ſo ſmall that my return could be immediate. I therefore croſſed the *Ganges* at the Gaut of *Curruckpore* yeſterday morning (the depth of water no where exceeding 3½ feet)

without the ſmalleſt oppoſition. The army immediately encamped; and I puſhed on with the grenadiers of the army, and two battalions of Sepoys, to the diſtance of about three coſs. We ſaw ſeveral ſtraggling parties of their cavalry on our advance, to the number of near fifteen hundred. When the party reached the ground *Biſſagee* had occupied the evening before, intelligence was brought in that he had decamped with the greateſt precipitation, immediately on the advance of our troops beginning to croſs, and halted not till he had reached the diſtance of fifteen coſs. After remaining a few hours on the ground, I ordered the party to return to the encampment on the banks of the river. On our return, the party of horſe which had retired on our approach in the forenoon, made their appearance in our rear, and were very troubleſome. From ſome ſuſpicions of the treachery of the Rohilla, I ſuppoſe the plan of the attack of *Tuccojee*, by the joint endeavours of the Vizier and *Hafez*, was not undertaken.

As this attempt has failed to bring them to an action, I ſhall re-croſs the *Ganges* to-morrow, and wait for your further inſtructions; during which time I ſhall be able to ſettle the affairs of the Rohilla with his Excellency.

By the accompanying Papers of Intelligence, you will perceive how exceedingly terrified they are. Their retreat may be termed a flight; and it is ſaid the common villagers armed, and plundered their baggage, ſo great was their conſternation.

I had an Officer yeſterday wounded.

I am,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Ram Gaut*,
23d March 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I now beg leave to tranſmit a duplicate of my Addreſs to you under date of yeſterday. This morning the troops repaſſed the *Ganges* at the ſame Ghaut which they forded on the 22d inſtant. The Marattas made no attempts to interrupt the rear. *Biſſagee* with his diviſion took his march towards *Caoul* it is reported, and *Tuccogee* with about 15,000 continues in the Rohilla diſtricts on this ſide of the river; *Sunebul* he has already deſtroyed, and threatens the other principal towns. Yeſterday I had a viſit from *Hafez Ramut* and his Excellency the Vizier, when the ſituation of the affairs of the Rohilla were debated. The coming in of *Hafez* has aſſuaged his Excellency a good deal; and upon conditions of the Rohilla immediately clearing off the laſt year's treaty of 40 lacks of rupees, it has been determined to afford their families and country protection from the ravages of the Marattas; of which the Nabob is to pay the Company 20 lacks for the part they will take in this protection: but in default of the fulfilling of this agreement by the Rohilla, his Excellency agrees to pay the ſum of fifty lacks of rupees to the Company, for their aid in putting him in poſſeſſion of the Rohilla diſtricts, commonly known by the territories of *Hafez Ramut*.

In conſequence of the determination to protect the Rohilla, I ſhall to-morrow proceed with all expedition towards *Buſſouly*, about 18 coſs diſtant, whither the intelligence adviſes us *Tuccoges* has marched in expectation of ſecuring the family of *Hafez Ramut Cawn*.

I am, Gentlemen,
with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Aſſulpoor*,
24th March 1773.

Agreed, that the following reply be immediately made to the above Letters:

To Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*, Commander in Chief of the forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters, with their Encloſures, under date the 15th, 20th, 21ſt, 23d, and 24th ultimo.

We remark with much ſatisfaction the caution obſerved by you in not commencing hoſtilities with the Marattas, and in delaying to fire until our army had received repeated ſhots from them; but we cannot approve your having afterwards exceeded our orders, by croſſing the river *Ganges* to attack the Marattas, nor of the reaſons aſſigned for that meaſure. We muſt deſire you to carry in remembrance the very peremptory orders we have ourſelves received from our honourable Employers, to act only on the defenſive, and to avoid by every poſſible means the marching of our forces to ſuch a diſtance from our provinces as to leave them deſtitute of their aid. It was for this reaſon, and not from any opinion we had of the ſufficiency of the *Ganges* as a barrier againſt the Maratta army, that we made that river the boundary of your operations beyond the province of *Corah*. We are however ſatisfied, from your immediate return to your former ſtation within the preſcribed line, that you meant to conform yourſelf to the ſpirit of our inſtructions; nevertheleſs, as we have been particular in providing for every probable emergency, by recommending the manner in which we would have you act, and as the obſervance of the defenſive plan which we have been obliged to adopt can only be enſured by a literal adherence to the line marked out, we muſt inſiſt on your conducting yourſelf for the future by the letter, and not by the ſpirit of your inſtructions.

It was with ſome reluctance that we exceeded our original plan of defence in ſuffering our troops to paſs beyond the frontiers of the Vizier's dominions, and we were principally induced to this by the natural boundary which the *Ganges* and mountains formed to the Rohilla diſtrict, and of courſe to your operations in it, added to the danger to which the Vizier's dominions were expoſed, by the eaſy acceſs the enemy might have through that open country to his territories. But theſe lines once paſſed, it is not in our power to preſcribe any limitation to the progreſs of our troops, which either the retreat of the enemy, or any other favourable emergency, might lead to. The latitude allowed in our laſt Letter to you, was upon the ſame principle.

We approve of the plan formed for the protection of the Rohilla Country, and of the ſtipulation you have made in behalf of the Company, for the moiety of the ſum of forty lacks to be paid by the Rohilla Chief for this aid; and we authorize you to enter into ſuch engagements with the Vizier and the Rohillas. But we cannot as yet agree to the alternative propoſed, as it might not at this time be diſcreet to create new enemies, until our hands are entirely cleared of the Marattas, and eſpecially for an object of no permanent advantage to the Company; we therefore deſire that you will not engage in any meaſures for reducing the Country of the Rohillas, in caſe of default in their engagements with the Vizier, before you have adviſed us of every circumſtance, and have received our further inſtructions upon the ſubject.

That a plan of this kind would yield the moſt eſſential advantage to the Vizier in extending his territories, completing the defenſive line of his poſſeſſions, and freeing him from the moſt troubleſome neighbourhood, we can well conceive; but as this cannot be atchieved by the Vizier without the aſſiſtance of our forces, we can never conſent to engage in it (although we ſhould even be authorized by the treachery or miſconduct of the Rohillas) without ſuch previous conditions as ſhall ſecure to the Company an equivalent for ſo important a ſervice rendered to our ally. And here we cannot avoid expreſſing our regret, that in the whole courſe of our alliance and

operations

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operations with the Vizier, this neceſſary and equitable precaution has never yet been ſufficiently attended to; but every meaſure we have adopted in conjunction with him, appears wholly to have been calculated for his particular advantage; while he thus reaps the ſole benefit, to the entire excluſion of the Company, it muſt check us in every ſcheme propoſed for the ſucceſs of the cauſe in which we are jointly engaged, unleſs ſome more equal plan of alliance ſhall be formed with him.

We are,

Fort William, 15th April 1773. Sir, Your moſt obedient Servants.

It having been reſolved to take preſent poſſeſſion of the province of *Corah*, in behalf of the Company, the Committee are of opinion that it will be eſſentially neceſſary both for the ſecuring the Company's rights in that province, and as a preparatory ſtep to any exchange of that diſtrict, or other mode of ceſſion which may be reſolved on, immediately to depute a Member of the Board to *Corah*, to receive charge of it from the General, and to inveſtigate and form an account of its revenue; and that he be inveſted with full powers to exerciſe ſuch an authority and controul over the *Naib Moneer ul Dowla*, and the other Officers of that Government, as may be requiſite for theſe ends.

The ſervice in which the General is immediately engaged, as well as the nature of this truſt, which is totally foreign from theſe duties of his profeſſion, and requires the ſuperintendance of a perſon experienced in the buſineſs of the revenue, preclude us from receiving the aid of his ſervices on this occaſion. Beſides, that ſuch an expreſs deputation will have the effect of marking, in the moſt public and authentic manner, the determination of this Government to maintain its rights to the property or diſpoſal of the province of *Corah*. And this opinion we conceive to be of very great importance towards procuring an equivalent for the ceſſion of it, whenever that ſhall be made a ſubject of negociation, the more ſo as the remote ſituation of that Country too apparently ſhews that it cannot be our intention to return the poſſeſſion of it.

The Vizier having in ſeveral of his Letters expreſſed an earneſt deſire to have an interview with the Preſident, and many points of conſequence requiring an adjuſtment, which cannot be effected without a perſonal conference; the Committee are further of opinion, that a meeting between the Vizier and the Preſident, would at this ſeaſon be productive of great benefit to the Company's affairs.

Reſolved, That we ſubmit theſe ſubjects to the conſideration of the Council at large.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Bengal Select Conſultation, the 27th April 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire,
William Alderſey,
Philip Milner Dacres.

Read, and approved, the laſt Proceeding.

Read, Three Letters from General *Barker*, under dates the 26th and 28th March, and 4th April.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Agreeable to the information in my laſt addreſs, I yeſterday proceeded towards *Biſſouly*, to relieve the families of *Hafez* and ſome of the other principal Chiefs; and *Hafez* with his own troops advanced a few coſs in order to keep the Marattas in play till our arrival; but *Tucco* made not the attempt on this town, retreating immediately by the way of *Mauradabad* to join on the banks of the *Ganges*. The town of *Mauradabad* laid under contribution, and pillaged and burnt ſome other conſiderable villages; in conſequence of this, I alſo altered my rout, and this day marched towards *Moradabad*. I am juſt now informed that *Tucco* erected a bridge of boats at *Poot*, and has paſſed the river, breaking up the bridge on his retreat: a great deal of his baggage was however left on this ſide in his flight, and it was immediately plundered by the neighbouring Zemindars. The Country of the Rohillas is for this time freed from theſe invaders, without any probability of their re-croſſing the river whilſt our troops remain here; and in the interim of receiving your further inſtructions, I ſhall endeavour to ſettle the Treaty between his Excellency and the Rohillas; ſome difficulties will however intervene I fear, from the pleas *Hafez* will be able to make on account of the very great probability of his being reduced to the ſame circumſtances, while the Maratta Tribes are permitted to remain unoppoſed between the rivers. I muſt obſerve to you, Gentlemen, that I foreſee a very ſmall proſpect of meeting the intent of this campaign, ſince there is little probability of giving the Maratta forces the ſmalleſt check, unleſs by your troops being permitted to lay down before ſome of the principal cities between the rivers, in which caſe the ſecurity of their families and baggage might urge them to a trial; and if this ſhould happen, I ſhould not doubt of giving them ſome ſignal blow, and perhaps be a means of obliging them to retire to the *Decan*. Encloſed are ſome of the lateſt Papers of Intelligence.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
Camp near *Chajura*, 26th March 1773. humble Servant, *Robt Barker.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since my laſt, informing you of *Tucco Gur*'s retreat acroſs the *Ganges*, *Buſa*, in order to breed a diverſion in his favour, returned to the banks of the river at *Ram Gaut*, where the Nabob had left a guard of about four thouſand men, and a few pieces of cannon, to defend the fords; an attack which *Buſa* made yeſterday morning upon this detachment, with certain advices of the junction of the two Chiefs, has brought me back to this place; the Marattas choſe not to remain upon our near approach, but decamped at three o'clock in the morning, and retired towards the *Calliac Nudder*, about 15 coſs within land.

Upon a re-peruſal of my ſeveral Addreſſes, which were wrote as occurrences happened, I find it neceſſary to be more explicit in my reaſons for two operations, viz. marching immediately to the fords at *Curruckpere* or *Ram Gaut*, on the 20th, and my croſſing the river to diſlodge *Biſſagee* on the 22d, from the oppoſite banks.

When I marched from *Shaw Sewan* the 20th, at two in the morning, I expected to have ſurprized *Tuccoo* in his attack at *Aſſuhpoor*, where the Rohilla Buckſhey *Ahmed Khan* was poſted; but on the march I received information of his having capitulated, and *Tuccoo*, upon advice of our approach, in full march for the fords at *Curruckpore*. It became therefore neceſſary to gain the fords before him, which I did not a quarter of an hour, and *Buſa* upon this manœuvre was marching to his aſſiſtance. A conſiderable number had croſſed, and multitudes were on the oppoſite banks. On our appearance thoſe who had juſt croſſed retired with precipitation, and *Tuccoo*, who was advancing, went to the right about and fled up the river, whilſt *Buſa* kept moving ſlowly upwards on the oppoſite banks to engage our attention.

Upon

Upon our arrival at *Ram Gaut*, diſtant about 3 coſs from *Curruckpore*, I found there were ſeveral fords, and it was ſaid there were ſeveral others higher up. *Buſugee* had affronted our colours moſt indignantly by his preſumptuous cannonade on the day of our arrival, with his inſolent parades and firing of ſmall arms the ſucceeding day. *Tuccoo* was at the diſtance of 15 coſs up the banks of the river, *Buſagee* not encamped above 3 coſs from the oppoſite banks. To have followed *Tuccoogee* without diſlodging *Buſa* would have given him every advantage of falling on our ſupplies in the rear and cutting them off, and grain was at this time only 6 ſeer for a rupee in our Buzar. I could not prevail on his Excellency to croſs the river and attack *Buſa*; nor did I think it conſiſtent with the re uration of your forces that the Vizier ſhould attack the moſt conſiderable body of the Marattas, particularly the party to who had commenced open hoſtilities with us and their firſt Chief. In this exigency therefore, conſidering your inſtructions under the ſame predicament as thoſe for my conduct on the boundaries of the Corah province, I croſſed, and having diſlodged *Buſagee*, I returned to purſue *Tuccoo*, who has now quitted the Rohilla Country alſo; and I hope this will meet with your approbation.

I am, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble Servant,
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Ram Gaut*,
28th March 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since I laſt addreſſed you, the troops have continued encamped near *Ram Gaut*; the Vizier oppoſite the ford of *Curruckpore*, and *Hafez Rhamet* with his forces at the Gaut of *Poot*, where *Tuccoogee* croſſed from the Rohilla Diſtricts: nothing material has occurred ſince. The Marattas are encamped at the diſtance of 20 or 25 coſs on the medium road between *Caoul* and *Delhi*. I wait with impatience for your further inſtructions, and have thrown a bridge of boats acroſs the *Ganges*, to chaſtiſe the audaciouſneſs of the Marattas if they ſhould reſume their wanton boaſt of parade ſo near our encampment as they did before. The Intelligencer adviſes that they have daily meetings, but are not yet determined what plan to purſue. The hot ſeaſon is advancing faſt, and if it ſhould be your intention to carry the arms of the Company againſt them between the rivers, I would beg leave to recommend, on account of the mortality that it is probable might happen among the younger officers, Europeans, and ſoldiers, from the violent heats of this part of the country (unleſs abſolute occaſion ſhould require immediate operations) that I might be permitted to defer croſſing the river till the firſt week after the rains. The country between the rivers would render us ſubſervient to many difficulties at this dry ſeaſon, from the barrenneſs, the devaſtation of the Maratta army, and the want of water, there being only wells to be relied on, and thoſe but few. In the meantime I ſhall order granaries to be formed at *Cawnpore* and *Furruckabad*, leſt our daily ſupplies ſhould at any time fail. I am, however, very apprehenſive for his Majeſty's ſafety, leſt if the Marattas determine to retreat, they may retort on him, and carry the whole royal family with them.

I am, Gentlemen,
with reſpect,
your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Ram Gaut*,
4th April 1773.

Agreed, we acknowledge the receipt of his Letter, and refer him to our former orders for his further proceedings; which, we are of opinion, at this time require no addition; and the rather, as the General himſelf writes, that even if an offenſive war were to be carried on againſt the Marattas, it had better be ſuſpended till the heats are paſſed and the rains ſet in.

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The General, in the account enclosed in his Letter of the 15th March, having inſerted the ſum of 2,79,000 R^s, the balance of the extra charges of the laſt campaign, as having been diſcharged by an order on the King's Tuncaw, in favour of the Vizier, for 10 lacks accepted by Mr. *Cartier*, the late Preſident; the Committee are willing to take advantage of the preſence of Mr. *Middleton*, to refer to him for information of the particulars of this Tuncaw, and of the orders which Mr. *Cartier* may have given concerning the payment, as no mention appears to have been made of it in the public Records, either in the Council or Select Committee.

Mr. *Middleton* informs the Committee, that he received from his predeceſſor, Mr. *Alexander*, two of his Majeſty's Tuncaws, in favour of the Vizier, one for 10 lacks of rupees, and the other for one lack. Mr. *Alexander* at the ſame time delivered him a Letter from the then Preſident, Mr. *Cartier*, dated in November 1771, deſiring that theſe two Tuncaws might be diſcharged in preference to any other; in conſequence of which four lacks were paid in part, and are indorſed off the Tuncaws of 10 lacks. Soon after the diſburſement of this money, the Muxadabad Council of Revenue received an order from the Board, prohibiting any further payments from their Treaſury, on account of the King's ſtipend; therefore there ſtill remains a balance of ſeven lacks due on account of theſe Tuncaws. Mr *Middleton* further informs the Committee, that the order mentioned in the General's Letter for 2,79,000 R^s on account of the extra charges of the army, is now in his poſſeſſion; but is not paid nor accepted, he having not received authority to do either.

Reſolved, we refer it to the Council, whether the payment of the remaining balance of theſe Tuncaws ſhall be allowed; as this muſt be firſt decided before we can determine on crediting the Vizier for 2,79,000.

Agreed alſo, that in our Letter to the General, we remark the acceptance of the Tuncaw on *Monere ul Dowlah*, for 11,000 rupees, which we ſuppoſe could only be diſcharged from the revenues of the Corah province; and as he is now informed of our intentions relative to the collections of that diſtrict, we would have him decline any further aſſignments on them.

To Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*, Commander in Chief under the Preſidency.

Sir,

Since we wrote you under date the 15th inſtant, we have received your Letters of the 26th and 28th March, and 4th inſtant, with their Encloſures.

For your further proceedings we refer you to the ſeveral inſtructions you have already received, to which we think there is no neceſſity for adding any thing at this time; and the rather as you are of opinion yourſelf, that even if an offenſive war ſhould be carried on againſt the Marattas, it had better be ſuſpended until the heats are paſſed and the rains ſet in.

We hope that the aſſignment granted by the Vizier to the Nabob *Moner ul Dowlah*, of 1,10,000 rupees, is not to be paid out of the Corah Revenues, although we ſee no other means we can have to diſcharge it.

As you are now fully informed of our intentions relative to the collections of that diſtrict, we deſire you will not in future accept of any aſſignments on them.

We ſhall write to you ſhortly concerning the aſſignments given for the laſt year's expences on his Majeſty's Tuncaw.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings.
Wm Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Fort William,
27th April 1773.

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Bengal Select Consultations, the 14th May 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.
Wm Alderſey, and *P. M. Dacres*, } eſquires.

Read, the following extracts from the Proceedings of the Council in their Secret Department.

Extract from the Secret Department Conſultation, of the 13th May 1773.

The Preſident lays before the Board, the following extract from the Proceeding of the Select Committee:

The Board are of opinion, that in conformity to the orders iſſued by the Committee of Revenue, the laſt to the Council of Revenue at *Moorſhedabad*, to ſtop payment of the King's tribute, no part of it can be regularly diſcharged until they ſhall have formed ſome general reſolution concerning the ſubject of the King's right to the perpetual receipt of his tribute.

Agreed, That the aſſignment of any part of his tribute, whether to the Vizier or any other perſon, can make no alteration in the propriety of the former reſolution regarding it; neither does it confer any right to the perſons in whoſe favour ſuch aſſignment is granted, unleſs made by the authority of Government, or formally accepted of by it. Nevertheleſs, as many circumſtances relating to this tranſaction have occaſionally appeared, which were not originally entered on our Proceedings, and as we are yet unacquainted with what paſſed between the General and the Vizier, upon the occaſion of the Vizier's receiving the Tuncaws from the King, we cannot proceed to a final reſolution on this ſubject, until we ſhall be furniſhed with more complete materials for this purpoſe;

Agreed therefore, that for the preſent we ſuſpend our determination on this matter, and that it be referred to the Preſident as an article in his inſtructions, to ſettle this point with the Vizier at his propoſed interview.

Reſolved, in the mean time the Select Committee be deſired to write to the General, informing him of this reſolution, and directing him to require from the Vizier ſome other mode of payment for the extra charges of the brigade with him, as we cannot admit of their being blended with an account which yet remains undetermined; if after a candid enquiry it ſhall appear that the Vizier has a right to receive the account of his aſſignment, the balance thereof ſhall be immediately paid to him, but we will not prejudge the matter againſt ourſelves, by allowing him preſent poſſeſſion.

Agreed, we now write the General as follows:

To Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*, Commander in Chief under the Preſidency.

Sir,

Upon a reference to the Preſident and Council, of our Proceedings of the 15th April, relative to the acceptance of the aſſignments from the Vizier of 2,79,000 rupees on his Majeſty's Tuncaw, in part payment of the extra charges of the army, it is their opinion, that no part of it can regularly be diſcharged in conformity with the orders iſſued for ſtopping payment of the tribute, until ſome general reſolutions are firſt formed on this ſubject, and on the King's right to the perpetual receipt of the tribute; and that the aſſignment of any part of it, whether to the Vizier or any other perſon, can make no alteration in the propriety of that reſolution, nor confer any right on the perſons in whoſe favour ſuch aſſignments have been made, unleſs they were with the aſſent of Government, or they had been formally accepted.

As we are yet uninformed of the manner the Vizier became poſſeſſed of the aſſignments in queſtion, or of the circumſtances on which he has grounded a claim upon the Company for the payment of them, independent of the King's right transferred to him, we avoid coming to any immediate determination upon it; and ſhall wait till we can obtain other lights beſides the imperfect materials which we have collected on our Records, and wiſh to be furniſhed by you with the particulars of what paſſed between the Vizier and you, on the occaſion of his advancing the ſums for which he received the Tuncaws from the King.

We deſire you will for the preſent inſiſt upon ſome other mode of payment from the Vizier, of the extra charges of the brigade, as we cannot, nor will admit of their being blended with an account which yet remains undetermined; at the ſame time aſſuring the Vizier, that if, after a fair enquiry into this affair, it ſhall appear that he is entitled to the amount of the aſſignment, the balance of the Tuncaw ſhall be immediately paid.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
Fort William, 13th May 1773. humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings.
Wm Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 26th May 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire,
William Alderſey, and
P. M. Dacres, eſquires.

Read, and approved, the Proceeding of the 14th inſtant.

Read, the following ſix Letters from General Sir *Robert Barker*:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since my addreſs of the 4th inſtant, nothing worthy communication has occurred. The intelligence from the Maratta encampment contains nothing but conſtrained boaſt of men who are deſirous of keeping up the ſpirits of their people with a declaration of their intention of re-croſſing the river to give us a meeting. I only hope they will be as good as their declarations, as I promiſe it will ſave your arms much trouble and expence. Encloſed you will receive two Papers of Intelligence, one from the Maratta encampment, the other from *Delhi*; the laſt is but juſt arrived, and the ſhort ſpace of time for the diſpatch of the daulks, prevents my being able to ſend you a tranſlation of it; the contents are of an extraordinary nature.

I am, Gentlemen,
with reſpect,
Head Quarters, Camp near *Ram Gaut*, 11th April 1773. Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
R^t Barker.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since my laſt addreſs the Marattas have detached a body of men towards *Currumbauſs*, a ford about ſeven coſs above this place, which they have received intelligence of; and they have given out, that the main body, with *Buſagee* and *Tuccogee*, will march to-morrow by the ſame route. Leſt it may appear extraordinary to you that *Hafez* has remained at ſuch a diſtance from the Vizier ever ſince he firſt came in, I muſt beg leave to inform

inform you, that when we firſt quitted *Ram Gaut* in purſuit of *Tuccoo*, they ravaged the diſtricts of *Mauradabad*, &c. Upon his re-croſſing the river, *Hafez* marched to the Gaut of *Poor*, to ſecure that ford, where he has continued ever ſince; a meaſure equally neceſſary and uſeful It has not therefore been poſſible to come to any determination relative to the balance of laſt year's agreement, between the Rohilla and the Vizier; nor will it, until affairs are finally determined with the Marattas; ſince urging the matter at this juncture might cauſe a junction between thoſe powers, for he has as much to apprehend from the Vizier as them.

I am, Gentlemen,
with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Ram Gaut*,
April 13th 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The day before yeſterday I informed you of the march of a detachment of Marattas towards *Currumbauſſa*, and of a report that the main body were to follow as yeſterday: for the ſecurity of the Rohilla Country, and apprehending that the intentions of the Marattas were only to attack *Haſez*, and after ravaging the country to re-croſs at the fords above *Succurbaut*, which they could eaſily have effected had they been permitted to croſs, I thought it neceſſary to move alſo towards the reported ford at *Currumbauſſa*; which I did yeſterday morning, and have ſince learnt that the advanced detachment of the Marattas of about 4,000 regulars, and ſome of the Bendurra, after making a ſhort ſtay at *Currumdaſſa* moved up the banks of the river towards *Abar*, where there is ſaid to be a very good ford, and which is defended by about 5,000 of the Rohilla troops with ſome pieces of cannon.

The main body of the Marattas marched yeſterday to *Debbhi*, a town about eight coſs from this, where they have halted; *Abar* is about nine coſs from *Currumbuſſa*; the Vizier with his forces continues at *Ram Gaut*, for the ſecurity of the bridge of boats and the ford of *Curruckpore*.

Our late inactivity has appeared to them very differently from the real cauſe, imagining we were waiting for the ſwelling of the rivers, and then to commence our operations acroſs the *Ganges*, with this advantage, of their not being able to make any attempt on the Rohilla or the Vizier's dominions during our abſence. Theſe reflections have induced them to throw out hints of a deſire to come to ſome reconciliation, which they have communicated through *Nuzzuf Cawn* (whoſe intimacy with the Engliſh is not unknown to them) requeſting his influence with the mediation. The anſwer I have returned to *Nuzzuf Cawn*, to be communicated to the Maratta Sardars, I encloſe a tranſlation of, and is to this purport; that if the Maratta Sardars are inclined to a peace, they muſt give up every pretenſion to *Corah* and *Currah*, leave the whole up the country between the rivers at the diſpoſal of the King and Vizier, and themſelves return to the *Decan* without delay; that I alſo adviſe them in a friendly manner to retire with the laurels and credit they have been acquiring theſe five years paſt, and not to hazard the diſcredit of them with forces whoſe proweſs is univerſally known. Theſe conditions cannot poſſibly be agreed to; I think and I hope it will produce ſome determination, of which you ſhall be early adviſed.

I am,
Gentlemen, &c. &c.
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Currambuſſa*,
15th April 1779.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since the date of my laſt the Marattas have continued in the ſame ſituation near *Dubbhi*, and ſo have your forces on this ſide the river; the contents of my Letter to *Nudjuff Cawn* has aſtoniſhed the Maratta Sardars a good deal; they have not yet come to a determination what to do, but ſeem deſirous of a reconciliation; and I underſtand they have ſent a Vackeel to the Vizier to prevail on him and *Hafez Rhamut* to bring about a peace and ſave their credit. I yeſterday was favoured with your Letter of the 30th ultimo, and from its contents I flatter myſelf you will not diſapprove my attempt acroſs the *Ganges*.

I am in hopes that the preſent delay of operations may continue till the river has ſwelled ſufficiently to render the ford unpaſſable, and conſequently any attempt on *Hafez* or the Vizier's country impracticable; ſhould therefore the Marattas, from a failure in their overtures of a peace, form any attempts on the province of *Corah* in their way to the banks of the *Jumna*, to which intent they have already thrown out ſome declarations, I purpoſe to take the advantage which your extenuation of the former inſtructions authorizes, to croſs the river at *Ram Gaut* or this place, and attack their rear; but you may be aſſured of my ſtrict attention to your plan for my operations on that ſide the river.

Your inſtructions, under date the 17th February, directs the defence of the Corah province, as an ally to the King; viz. "It is underſtood, that whether you remain in quiet poſſeſſion of this province, or are engaged "in hoſtilities in it, you are to act only as in alliance with "the King, and you are to confirm and maintain his "Naib *Muneer ul Dowla*, the actual government of it; "but he is to remain under your controul, and to be "accountable to the Company for the revenues of the "province, till ſuch time as it ſhall be finally ſettled in "what manner they are to be hereafter diſpoſed." Notwithſtanding *Muneer ul Dowla* is nominally Naib of thoſe provinces on the part of the royal houſe, he acts in reality for the Company; and the King himſelf, entertaining no other idea, which he evinces in a Letter I have received from him, requeſting that a Jaghire, which he appropriated ſome time ago for the uſe of one of his ſons, might be paid as heretofore out of the revenues of theſe provinces, and requeſting the Board will grant him ſome alleviation to his diſtreſſes, by permitting *Muneer ul Dowla* to remit him one or more lacks of rupees, to be accounted for hereafter as the Board may direct.

His Excellency continues to pay the monthly extra expences regularly.

I am, Gentlemen, with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Robt Barker.

Head quarters,
Camp near *Currambuſſa*,
April 20, 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

The encloſed Papers of Intelligence from the Maratta camp, will inform you of the undeterminate and irreſolute ſituation they ſtill continue in; nor can I, with any proſpects of advantage, croſs the river, for I am too well aſſured they will not venture to remain within 20 coſs of me, and it is almoſt as certain the Marattas would retreat to the capital, of courſe render it impoſſible for me to attempt a purſuit, your inſtruction only authorizing me to act for the defence of the province of *Corah* and the Rohilla poſſeſſions on this ſide of the *Ganges*; or, it is not impoſſible but the Marattas might croſs the river higher up, and commit depredations afreſh on the already diſtreſſed country. Unleſs therefore the Marattas ſhould

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ſhould move towards the province of *Corah*, I ſhall not think of croſſing the river; but in that caſe I ſhall not heſitate to purſue them with all expedition, as it will be a means of ſecuring a paſſage for the King to the Vizier, as well as render the Marattas cautious how they attempt the Corah provinces with our army following in the rear.

A Vackeel from *Buſſagee* has been ſome days in the Vizier's camp, and he was introduced to me, but no buſineſs was talked on, any further than very warm cautions on my part againſt their preſuming to advance towards the Corah province. His Excellency tells me he will keep matters in the ſame ſtate of ſuſpence, if poſſible, till the riſing of the *Ganges* ſhall render the preſent fords impaſſable, and this muſt very ſhortly be the caſe, as it appears the ſnow on the mountains already begins to thaw, by the river having roſe ſomewhat ſince our coming to this ground.

I am,
Head Quarters, Gentlemen,
Camp near *Currambuſſa*, Your moſt obedient,
27th April 1773. humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

This day I have received your Letter, of the 15th ultimo, and with much concern it has conveyed to me your diſapprobation of my purſuit of the Marattas acroſs the *Ganges*; I hope the further explanation contained in my addreſs of the 28th March, will induce you to think more favourably of that meaſure, and that it will appear to you an act abſolutely neceſſary, for without ſuch an operation it would have been impoſſible for me to quit that ford for the relief of the Rohilla poſſeſſions, ſince by ſo doing it ſhould have given *Beeſa* every advantage of cutting off both our communication and ſupplies from the Vizier's dominions, a danger much to be apprehended from a body of horſe; and to have remained inactive and inſulted on the banks of the river, would not have been to have acted with that ſpirit which your inſtructions recommend to me in the proſecution of the war on this ſide of the *Ganges*; nor was it poſſible for me to view the nature of your inſtructions as you ſeem to have intended, or that my croſſing the *Ganges* would tend ſo immediately to the carrying off your forces to a greater diſtance from your own province than the purſuit of any body of Marattas on this ſide of it. Did the courſe of the *Ganges* run from north to ſouth, ſuch a ſurmiſe might be made; but if you will be pleaſed to examine into the map of *Hindoſtan*, you will find I am as unlimited on this ſide as the other with regard to diſtance; and your inſtructions inform me, that the latitude granted to my operations in the Corah province, which lying open to the Marattas may afford them too great an advantage in the attack, ſhould they be allowed to lie unmoleſted near its borders; but on the other ſide of the *Ganges* you conſidered that river as a ſufficient ſecurity againſt ſuch attempts, and therefore direct that I do not ſuffer any conſideration to lead me acroſs it. I am now informed, by your Letter of the 15th April, to avoid, by every poſſible means, the marching of your forces to ſuch a diſtance from your provinces, as to leave them deſtitute of their aid; it was for this reaſon, and not from any opinion you had of the ſufficiency of the *Ganges* as a barrier againſt the Maratta army, that you made that river the boundary to my operations beyond the province of *Corah*. It was natural for me to ſuppoſe, when you reſolved on the defence of *Hafez* country, that you meant to extend your forces to the diſtance of his territory, ſhould there be occaſion, otherwiſe your intentions might have proved abortive. I can aſſure you, Gentlemen, that at all times where I have urged the meaſure of proſecuting the war between the rivers, it was never my intention to carry your arms to a further diſtance than you have already preſcribed, nor had I any other view but of reducing the Maratta poſſeſſions that lie on the ſouth-eaſt of *Ram Gaut*. The ſiege of *Ettawa* and *Kanonga* would have produced a general action or the reduction of thoſe places, the reſtitution of which, or a grant of them to his Majeſty, could not fail of producing ſolid advantages to our honourable Employers; and I have reaſon to ſuppoſe the excluſion of the tribute, which the Company have engaged themſelves to pay annually to his Majeſty, might not have been the only advantage which they would have derived from ſuch an important campaign. Theſe were my motives, and if I have urged any meaſure which has not been conſonant with the ſyſtem and plans our honourable Employers have laid down, I can only ſay that it proceeds from a deſire of advancing and promoting the honour and intereſt of the Company in this empire.—*Neuroo Pundit*, the Maratta Vackeel, has left the Vizier, ſatisfied with the aſſurances of his Excellency to ſend along with them to the *Decan* a truſty perſon, who ſhall be impowered to ſettle the affairs of this quarter with their Chief, *Narrain Raio*; and with this happy excuſe the Marattas are in full march to the *Jumna*, in order to croſs that river: thus they have been ſuffered to go off with apparent reputation, when their moſt ſanguine expectations could promiſe them ſafety in a precipitate retreat only. As your Letter, of the 15th ultimo has deprived me of the only means of enforcing the payment of the moiety of the 40 lacks, viz. that affrightening the Rohilla to performance of their Treaty, it is well known, that neither promiſe or oaths have been able to bind this treacherous ſect of people to their engagements; their own intereſts, or their own fears, are the only ſprings by which they can be moved. I ſhall wait your further orders on this head, provided they pay not their promiſed ſtipulation. And here I cannot but remark your obſervation, that in the whole courſe of our alliance with the Vizier, an equivalent for our aſſiſtance has never been yet ſufficiently attended to; but every meaſure we have adopted in conjunction with him, appears to be wholly calculated for the peculiar advantage reaping the ſole benefits of the entire excluſion of the Company. As this in a great meaſure reflects on my conduct, and the inattention I have given to the Company's welfare, permit me to obſerve, that his Excellency giving the moiety of the 40 lacks of rupees to be received from the Rohilla, together with a payment at the rate of 14 lacks per annum, for the expence of the troops during their aſſiſtance in this undertaking, or an offer of half a crore of rupees, with his endeavours to obtain a remiſſion of the tribute from *Bengal*, cannot be eſteemed an entire excluſion of the Company; and if he has been remiſs in the diviſion, it was left with you, Gentlemen, to propoſe, and I am convinced he would readily enter into every previous condition that would ſecure to the Company an equivalent for ſuch important ſervice.

I cannot conclude this Letter without regretting, that inſtead of receiving your ſentiments on the plan on which you would have me proceed as circumſtances alter, and the conduct which I ſhould obſerve to the ſeveral Powers on matters which are perpetually on the change, of which you have had regular advices, your Letters are filled with admonitions. Since therefore it has been your pleaſure that I am invariably to attend to the direct literal ſenſe of your inſtructions, you may be aſſured, that I ſhall now religiouſly obſerve them, let whatever conſequences enſue.

I am, Gentlemen, with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
Head Quarters, humble ſervant,
Camp near *Currambuſſa*. *R^t Barker.*

Ordered, the Encloſures in the General's Letter, of the 11th April, be entered after the Proceeding.

The

The Preſident informs the Committee, that he is lately adviſed, from good authority, that *Baboo Sucheram*, the new Miniſter of *Narrain Raio*, on his firſt appointment ſent *Buſagee* an order to return with the forces under his command to *Poona*; that *Buſagee* in reply alleged, that the diſpute he was engaged in prevented his complying immediately with the order, which ſhould be obeyed as ſoon as he had brought them to a concluſion; and that *Succuram*, on the receipt of this anſwer, ſent a ſecond and peremptory order for his immediate return, whatever might be the ſituation of his affairs. In conſequence of which the Maratta forces have ſince retreated, and with ſome precipitation, towards their own country.

Agreed, we reply to the General's Letters, in the following manner:

To Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters under dates the 11th, 13th, 15th, 20th, 27th April, and 6th inſtant.

We are ſorry to obſerve, that you have taken our remark upon the inequality of our alliance with the Vizier, as a reflection upon yourſelf. We cannot perceive on what this ſuſpicion can be grounded; and can aſſure you, that we meant neither to apply it to you, nor had any part of your conduct in view at the time we wrote it.

As we meant only to give you inſtructions for your future conduct, and to avoid diſcuſſions upon haſty tranſactions, we forbear to reply to the arguments contained in your Letter of the 6th inſtant, but by this general remark, that we directed the army to march beyond our own territories through neceſſity, and upon the principle of defence alone; and that it was never our intention to enter into any active or offenſive operations.—We are glad to hear of the retreat of the Marattas, and hope there will be no further occaſion to require the preſence of the army at ſuch a diſtance from our borders.

Should the King, from the near approach of the armies of the Engliſh and the Vizier towards *Delhi*, be induced to make overtures for putting himſelf again under our protection, we deſire you will uſe every means in your power to diſcourage ſuch a propoſal; and in no manner pledge the faith of the Engliſh for his ſafety, if he offers to join the Vizier's upon ſuch an aſſurance, for we wiſh moſt maturely and deliberately to conſider a ſtep of ſo much importance to the Company, before it receives our aſſent; and we deſire therefore, that you will give us the earlieſt intelligence that may be intimated to you of the King's having ſuch a propoſal in view.

We are,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants.

Fort William,
27th May 1773.

The General's Letter of the 6th May, above recorded, containing many reflections upon the orders of the Select Committee; the Committee think it neceſſary to enter the following remarks for their own juſtification.—As a Member of the Board, and of the Select Committee, the General was entitled to know the reaſons on which my inſtructions given to him are grounded; and more eſpecially, as in the extenſive province of his command, many emergencies might occur for which his inſtructions would have made no proviſion, and by knowing the principles and tendency of our political meaſures, might adopt them to ſuch extraordinary cauſes when they happened; but if the latitude is allowed him, to put interpretation at his pleaſure on the reaſons there aſſigned for the orders given him, and to inveſtitute himſelf the judge in what caſes they are applicable to thoſe orders, or empower him to tranſgreſs them; it is ſurely unneceſſary, and we muſt conſider it as an indiſcretion, to ſubject the authority of Government to the appearance of ſo much levity or weakneſs, in preſcribing any limits to his operations, or laying down any rules for his conduct which are to depend on his will the inſtant they are communicated to him.

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The orders of the Board are full, minute, and peremptory, and implicit obedience is required to them. Every caſe which occurred to the foreſight of the Members of the Adminiſtration, of whom the General was one and perſonally preſent, was diſtinctly conſidered, and the mode of action preſcribed for each; the ſituation of the army in which the General thought proper to croſs the *Ganges* and attack the Marattas, was foreſeen, and expreſsly deſcribed in the inſtructions, which forbid him to croſs the river from the Rohilla diſtricts, whatever advantage or provocation the neighbourhood of the Marattas might afford him. The immediate conſequences of his thus tranſgreſſing the bounds preſcribed to him are immaterial; the Government was charged with the reſponſibility; it was their duty and it was their intereſt to keep the reins of controul in their own hands; once let fall they would not eaſily be reſumed. If they had ſuffered this ſingle inſtance of deviation from their commands to paſs unnoticed, by what power was the army to be reſtrained from proceeding to any diſtance, or engaging in the moſt dangerous enterprizes? or on what principle could the Commander be judged culpable for following the dictates of his own judgment, when he was thus indefinitely authorized to do it?

Every motive which ſwayed the Board could not be committed to record, neither was it neceſſary. It will eaſily be ſeen that it was with reluctance that the Board aſſented to the march of the army beyond our own frontiers; compelled to it by the double obligation of protecting the perſon and poſſeſſions of the Vizier our ally, and maintaining our own rights to the province of *Corah*, wreſted from the hands of the King, to whom it was conditionally granted on the part of the Company, and threatened with an inſtant invaſion. In both theſe objects we were happily furniſhed with clear and undoubted authority from the Company, and we were peremptorily forbid to go beyond them. Conſonant to the orders which had been given to us were thoſe we gave to the General, to defend the poſſeſſions of the Vizier and the province of *Corah*, and to make them the ſole object of his attention: he was forbid to paſs the borders of *Corah*, except for an inſtant in the proſecution of an immediate ſervice, becauſe no limitation could be fixed beyond it; he was allowed a greater latitude on the eaſtern ſide of the river, and authorized to penetrate into the Rohilla diſtricts, becauſe the whole ſpace which he was allowed to act in was bounded by ſuch clear limits, that it was impoſſible for him to paſs them without a breach of orders, and there was no danger of his acting at any diſtance within that extent. We knew that the whole ambition of the Vizier was to go to *Delhi*, and to declare open war with the Marattas; we knew, that both were points of powerful attraction to the ambition of a military Commander, and that the neighbourhood of the Marattas would afford an equal invitation to the luſt and pride of every officer of the army. It was our ſole fear only that we dreaded being led to exertions, which might involve us in an endleſs war with a Power with whom it was not our intereſt, and contrary to our duty, to break, and deprive our own poſſeſſions of the ſervice of one-third of our army for perhaps years to come. Theſe were the grounds of our precautions, and not any geographical diſtance, which the General ſuppoſes: be the ſole conſideration which excited them. Nothing more evidently marks this principle than the diſtinction made in our Letters of the 30th March from the original inſtructions given him, by allowing him to paſs the *Ganges*, and attack the Marattas if they ſhould attempt to invade the Corah province, and he could thus include them between his army and that province; but on no account to croſs the river to attack them in a ſituation

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which ſhould oblige him to a further removal from the preſcribed line of his operations.

We cannot have a more convincing proof of the neceſſity of the precautions which we had taken, than the Letter now before us, in which the General informed as he was of our reſolution to act on the defenſive only, and equally informed with the Board of the peremptory commands of the Court of Directors, not to mention the engagements between the Maratta ſtates and his Majeſty's miniſters at *Fort Saint George*, which though not binding on this Government, ought nevertheleſs to be a prudential conſideration in its concerns with that nation, yet heſitates not to declare, that it "was his view to reduce the "Maratta poſſeſſions, which lie to the ſouth-eaſt of *Ram* "*Gaut*, to beſiege *Ettawa* and *Kinnoge*, bring the Ma- "rattas to a general action, or reduce thoſe places," and we muſt include, as a conſequence inevitably implied, to conquer the whole extent of country ſituated between the *Ganges* and *Jumna*, a country exceeding in extent and power the whole diſtrict of *Corah* and *Illahabad*. Theſe he owns to have been his motives in the meaſure which he was proſecuting, of which we muſt ſuppoſe from the context the croſſing of the *Ganges* to be a conſequence, as the whole ſcope of his argument is the juſtification of that meaſure, in diametrical oppoſition to every letter of his inſtructions, and without a ſingle advantage offered in reverſion, which could recompence the Company, for the riſque and expence which would attend ſo irregular and boundleſs a project. If this is inſufficient to ſhew the tendency of the General's meaſures, whatever might have been his intention, the Letter from the Vizier to the Preſident will amply juſtify the Board in their apprehenſions of the conſequences which even the ſlighteſt deviation from their orders, in a point ſo eſſential, might produce to the Company's intereſt.

The reſtitution of theſe countries to the Marattas, or a grant of them to the King, and the exemption of the tribute, are the ſole benefits mentioned by the General as likely to be derived from ſuch a campaign. We ſhould not think ourſelves juſtified in involving the Company in a war at ſuch a diſtance, and with ſuch an enemy, on the ſole proſpect of recompence in the ſale of our conqueſts, which it would be impoſſible for us to maintain to their preſent poſſeſſors. We would gain nothing by the grant of them to the King; and as to the exemption of the tribute, it can be no object, while we actually withhold it on principles which it is unneceſſary to diſcuſs in this place, and moſt certainly the mere deed of renunciation cannot be ſo valuable an acquiſition as to juſtify our obtaining it at the price of ſo deſperate an expedient as a diſtant and endleſs war with the Marattas. The General ſeems to expect other advantages from the undertaking; we ſee none could poſſibly attend, unleſs by a previous Treaty, ſecuring for the Company an equivalent nearer home in exchange for the acquiſitions made by our arms in the proſecution of it. There is a wide difference between an actual ſtipulation for an equivalent in lieu of conqueſts to be made, and a negociation for the ceſſion of them when they are made, and when it is known that we cannot keep them. We find in many of the General's Letters, expreſſions which cannot be read in whatever ſenſe they were written, without conveying the idea of reproach caſt on the Adminiſtration, for reſtraining the General from commencing hoſtilities againſt the Marattas. A paſſage of this kind occurs in the Letter before us. "Thus (ſays he) they have been "ſuffered to go off with apparent reputation, when their "moſt ſanguine expectations could promiſe them ſafety "in a precipitate retreat only." We cannot perceive how it concerns the honour of this Government to ruſh unprovoked upon every Power which may become an object of our jealouſy or ambition, or whoſe weakneſs may afford our arms a ſure pledge of victory. We have received no injury from the Marattas; there are actually engagements ſubſiſting between them and the Company at their other Preſidencies, and we are forbid to engage in an offenſive war with them. Our duty and the general intereſts, the honour of our Employers, therefore equally enjoin the defenſive plan which we have adopted. Perhaps too it may be eaſily proved that even the deſtruction of the Marattas, could it have been effected as the General's advices ſeem to declare, by permitting him to act againſt them, although it would certainly have proved a circumſtance of infinite advantage to the Vizier, would have been an unfavourable event, or an unſeaſonable one at leaſt to the Company, in the preſent ſtate of our connections with him. We decline purſuing this argument, of which thus much only is introduced to ſhew that we had no objection in policy more than in duty, intereſt, or honour, to attempt the deſtruction of the Marattas, becauſe they chanced to lie within our reach (which however is a ſuppoſition liable to great doubt) and our forces had no other enemy to ſerve as an object to their military ardour. In a word, the campaign has terminated as we could wiſh and intended, nor ſhould we have been better pleaſed to have received the news of greater ſucceſs or more ſplendid advantages, by an open war with the Marattas.

The latter part of the Letter having received our reply, and being on a ſubject foreign from the deſign of theſe reflections, we forbear to remark further upon it.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 9th June 1773.

PRESENT:

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire,
William Alderſey, and } eſquires.
Philip Milner Dacres. }

Read, and approved, the laſt Proceeding.

Read the following Letter from *Fort Saint George*.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Reports have for ſome time paſt prevailed, that a conſiderable part of your troops, under the command of General Sir *Robert Barker*, had advanced near to *Delhi*; that ſome ſkirmiſhes had happened, and that an engagement with the Maratta army was expected. Theſe reports have alarmed the Nabob, who is apprehenſive that a rupture between the Engliſh and the Marattas may endanger the tranquillity of his country. As we have no intimation from your Honour, &c. of the object of the expedition, or of the operations of the troops, we are unable to give the Nabob any ſatisfaction. The intereſt of our Honourable Maſters on this coaſt is ſo materially concerned in the meaſures your Honour, &c. may adopt with reſpect to the Marattas, that we cannot avoid expreſſing our wiſh that you would be pleaſed to give us ſuch information as may appear to you neceſſary, that our meaſures may not at any time counteract your views and deſigns.

We are, with eſteem,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants,
A. Wynch.
John Smith.
Joſeph Smith.
J. M. Stone.

Fort Saint George, 17th May 1773.

Agreed, that in reply, we give them a ſhort recital of our views in firſt marching the troops beyond the provinces, and of the cloſe of the campaign.

To

To the honourable *A. Wynch*, eſquire, Preſident, and the reſt of the Members of the Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*.

Gentlemen,

We have been favoured with your Letter of the 17th May, expreſſing your apprehenſions leſt the meaſures purſued by us in this quarter ſhould anyways interfere with the Company's affairs under your management.

Senſible as we are of the important advantages attending on a free communication between the different Settlements, you may be aſſured we ſhall always tranſmit to you the earlieſt information of any event or meaſure which we judge likely to affect the general ſyſtem; but as your Adminiſtration are well acquainted with the cautious plan we have invariably purſued in reſpect to the Marattas, and as the ſteps we have taken this year tended rather to ſecure than endanger the public tranquillity, by preventing hoſtilities, which muſt have inevitably followed had our troops not marched, we omitted to adviſe you of circumſtances from which we did not apprehend any material conſequence.

Our engagements with *Sujah ul Dowla* obliged us, at his repeated and earneſt ſolicitations, to march a part of our army to protect him from an invaſion of the Marattas, which they had publicly threatened; and the intelligence of the King's defeat, and that the Marattas had extorted from him a grant of the province of *Corah*, which we had ceded for the ſupport of his dignity, induced us to advance our troops to the borders of that country to oppoſe their taking poſſeſſion, for we thought ourſelves certainly entitled to the reverſion of *Corah*, when the King could no longer maintain them.

Our troops were however ſtrictly enjoined to act only on the defenſive; and ſo religiouſly did we adhere to this our original plan, that although the two armies were a long time within view of each other, and the Marattas threw out repeated provocations, no hoſtilities took place on our part; a cannonading was indeed one day commenced by their army, and returned by ours, but it laſted only a few hours, for we acted no further than they abſolutely obliged us.

The campaign has terminated as we foreſaw, and entirely to our wiſh. The Marattas, after being near three months encamped oppoſite to our army on the Weſtward ſide of the *Ganges*, have at length retired; this retreat has been occaſioned either by a poſitive recal, which we were adviſed was immediately iſſued upon the eſtabliſhment of the new Government at *Poona*, or from a conviction that they could effect nothing in this quarter; and we are led to hope, from the little ſucceſs which has attended their expedition againſt the Vizier, that they will not attempt again to moleſt him.

We are, with eſteem,

Fort William, Gentlemen,

9th June 1773. Your moſt obedient humble ſervants.

Agreed, we at the ſame time write to the Preſidency of *Bombay* as follows:

To the honourable *Wm Hornby*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Gentlemen of the Secret Department at *Bombay*.

Gentlemen,

Senſible that any military operations at either of the Preſidencies muſt affect the intereſt of all, and of the important advantages that muſt reſult from a free intercourſe between the different ſettlements; apprehenſive wherein that you may have received fallacious reports of our intentions of marching a part of the army to the Weſtward, we think it adviſable briefly to inform you of our views and deſigns in that meaſure; and doubt not, when any thing material may happen to the Company's affairs under your management, that we ſhall be favoured with the like communication.

Our engagements with *Sujah ul Dowla* obliged us, at his repeated and earneſt ſolicitations, to march a part of our army to protect him from an invaſion of the Marattas, which they had publicly threatened; and the intelligence of the King's defeat, and that the Marattas had extorted from him a grant of the province of *Corah*, which we had ceded for the ſupport of his dignity, induced us to advance our troops to the borders of that country, to oppoſe their taking poſſeſſion, for we thought ourſelves certainly entitled to the reverſion of *Corah* when the King would no longer maintain it.

Our troops were however ſtrictly enjoined to act only on the defenſive, and ſo religiouſly did we adhere to this our original plan, that although the two armies were a long time within view of each other, and the Marattas threw out repeated provocations, no hoſtilities took place on our part; a cannonading indeed was one day commenced by their army, and returned by ours, but it laſted only a few hours, for we acted no further than they abſolutely obliged us.

The campaign has terminated as we foreſaw, and entirely to our wiſh. The Marattas, after being near three months encamped oppoſite to our army on the Weſtward of the *Ganges*, have at length retired; this retreat has been occaſioned either by a poſitive recal, which we are adviſed was immediately iſſued upon the eſtabliſhment of the new Government at *Poona*, or from a conviction that they could effect nothing in this quarter; and we are led to hope, from the little ſucceſs which has attended their expedition againſt the Vizier, that they will not attempt again to moleſt him.

We are, with eſteem,

Fort William, Gentlemen,

9th June 1773. Your moſt obedient humble ſervants.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 1ſt February 1773.

PRESENT:

The honourable *Warren Haſtings* eſquire, Preſident,
Brigadier Sir *Robert Barker*,
John Reed,
Richard Barwell,
Henry Goodwin,
William Lambert, eſquires:
Mr. *Anderſon*, in ſucceſſion,
Mr. *Lane*, at the Khalſa.

Read, and approved, the Proceedings of the 28th ultimo.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *A. Champion*:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

By Letters juſt received from his Excellency I am informed, that the King is on the point of ceding the Corah and Allahabad provinces to the Marattas; and as he talks of acting offenſively againſt their taking poſſeſſion of theſe provinces, I could wiſh to receive your orders on a matter of ſo much conſequence; and until I am honoured therewith I ſhall abide by the inſtructions which I have already received from you. Gentlemen, dated the 15th November 1772, which expreſsly enjoins me to act only for the defence of his dominions, and the ſecurity of his perſon.

Camp, *Illahabad*, I am, &c.

January 15th, 1773. (Signed) *A Champion*.

The Preſident lays before the Board the following Letters from the Vizier and the Nabob *Munneer Dowlah*:

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla*. Received 28th January 1773.

I at this time learn from the writers of intelligence, that a battle will ſhortly take place between your friend and

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and the Marattas. Notwithſtanding, by God's bleſſing and the aſſiſtance of our joint union, I am prepared to oppoſe them, and I am ſenſible that the Engliſh forces and your friend are enough and ſufficient to give them an anſwer, and in a proper manner to retort an injury; yet from my forethought I write you, that the forces of the enemy are compoſed of horſe, and I believe they will croſs the river, and ravage and lay waſte the country; it is therefore beſt that another camp, that is to ſay, five or ſix battalions, ſhould proceed and be ready near *Benares*, and they will then be a barrier to *Azom*, *Abad*, *Benares*, and *Allahabad*, and be very beneficial. For the reſt, I have before written you repeatedly to diſpatch General *Barker*; and you, my friend, likewiſe wrote me, that you obſerved the pleaſure and ſatisfaction of your friend, as well in trifles as matters of importance. He therefore flatters himſelf, from the friendſhip between us, that you will diſpatch the General hence with ſpeed and expedition, for in his coming many benefits and advantages are contained, and he is properly acquainted with the ſituation and affairs of this quarter.

My Friend,

I well underſtand the affairs and matters of this quarter, and retaining this in view, I write you that your ſending the General is exceſſively adviſable, and by the bleſſing of God the concerns of the Company and myſelf will take a proper turn, and the good name and reputation of my friend exceed his predeceſſors, and be productive of preſent and future benefits. With reſpect to what you have written, that the General is engaged in affairs in *Calcutta*, ſince by God's bleſſing my friend is there, I know that the General's preſence is not neceſſary, and it is my utmoſt pleaſure and exceſs of ſatisfaction that you diſpatch the General. In theſe times, your Letters ſhould arrive with me, and mine with you in the ſpace of two days, for it is neceſſary we ſhould be acquainted with each others ſituation; and what you write Colonel *Champion* on the ſubject of war and military matters, and the affairs of this quarter, you ſhould likewiſe write me agreeably thereto, that being both acquainted with it we ſhould act in conſequence thereof, and ſuffer it not to happen, that you write one thing to Colonel *Champion*, and I be ignorant of it, and when we begin to act there ſhould then be a contrariety and difference in our operations; on this account therefore it is requiſite you will make your heart perfectly eaſy on my part. By God's bleſſing, and the aſſiſtance of the union of the Engliſh Sirdars, I am prepared to oppoſe my enemies. Whoever ſhall entertain an intention againſt me, ſhall be ſeverely puniſhed; nevertheleſs of my forethought, the ſending a camp to the diſtricts of *Benares* is highly adviſable, and the diſpoſition of the General is exceſſive right and proper, and will be the ſubject of your friend's utmoſt ſatisfaction. Conſidering my heart in impatience, you will ever be writing me your friendly Letters.

A true tranſlation.

(Signed) *B. Goodlad.*

Perſian Tranſlator.

Tranſlation of a Letter from the Nabob *Muneer ul Dowla* to the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

After uſual compliments.

I have received your Letter relative to the royal revenues. You have been pleaſed to write that the ſituation of the country on account of the late deſtructive famine is not unknown; that the inhabitants were reduced to the laſt diſtreſs, and the country left deſolate; that no one has ever ſeen or even heard of ſo ſevere a misfortune in the country; that it will require a length of time for the country and inhabitants to recover their former ſtate; yet by the favour of the Almighty, the good fortune of his Majeſty, and the prayers of your friends, you flatter yourſelf that the country will become flouriſhing as heretofore, and that you ſhall require honour by tranſmitting the revenues, that I am well acquainted with your ſincere attachment to his Majeſty. What you have wrote is ſtrictly true; I myſelf was at *Calcutta* in the ſeaſon of the famine, and beheld with mine own eyes the diſtreſs of the inhabitants, and made his Majeſty fully acquainted with the circumſtances on my return to the preſence.

The duty, loyalty, and ſervices of the Engliſh Sirdars, are ſtrongly impreſſed on his Majeſty's mind; he eſteems you his moſt faithful well-wiſhers and the ſupporters of his throne; if from certain accidents there have been delays in tranſmitting the royal revenues, where is the conſequence? By the bleſſing of God and your endeavours, the country again flouriſhes, and you yourſelf ſincerely intent on ſending the revenues: you will tranſmit them in the beſt manner, and as heretofore they will regularly and monthly be paid. May the Almighty, agreeable to what you have wrote, ever protect your honour by your tranſmitting the royal revenues. Concludes with compliments.

A true tranſlation.

B. Goodlad,

Perſian Tranſlator.

Extract of a Letter from the Nabob *Muneer ul Dowla* to the honourable Mr. *Hiſtings*.

It is reported, that in a few days after the concluſion of affairs, the Maratta Sirdars will proceed from the capital towards *Furrouhabad*, and the country of the Vizier; they have ſome thoughts alſo of returning to the *Decan*; the Vizier with life and fortune is from his heart firmly united with you and the Engliſh Sirdars, and eſteems his own ſafety to be immediately connected with theirs, nor am I diſunited from the Vizier and the Engliſh Sirdars; I am now as your Naib, with ten thouſand good horſe and foot, and eight pieces of cannon ready and prepared the Chucklah of *Corah*, which is the frontier of the Company, and will give up my life in the ſervice of the Vizier, you, and the Engliſh Company. I will not retire before the Marattas, but will continue firmly prepared to receive them; you muſt ſupport me with expedition; at this time it appears abſolutely neceſſary that you ſhould ſend General *Barker* with ſix or ſeven battalions to join the Vizier; by the favour of the Almighty victory ſhall be yours. You have not a ſcarcity of troops or artillery; to ſubdue the Marattas is extremely eaſy; the Vizier alſo is prepared to receive them; I myſelf, agreeable to his directions, marched from *Corah*, and encamped on the ſixth Shouval with my troops at *Caunpoor*, on the banks of the *Ganges*. Further, agreeable to the directions of the Vizier I have, beſide my old forces, begun to entertain new, both horſe and foot; a copy of his Letter to me on that ſubject I encloſe for your inſpection.

The purport of the Vizier's Letter to *Munneer ul Dowla*.

After mentioning the ſituation of affairs at the capital, is to deſire he will immediately prepare for the defence of the Corah province, and promiſes to join him in a ſhort time; deſires he will immediately raiſe twenty or five-and-twenty thouſand men, and not to be uneaſy about the payment of theſe troops; repeats his intentions of joining him with expedition.

A true tranſlation,

by *A. Bennett Goodlad*,

Perſian Tranſlator.

Tranſlation of a Thouah from the King to the honourable Mr. *Haſtings*.

Uſual introduction.

We have received your Erzere, ſetting forth the attachment, duty, loyalty, and good intentions, and acknowledging the receipt of our royal Thouah, ſtrictly enjoining the payment of the revenues; and that *Munneer ul Dowla* alſo

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alſo has repeatedly wrote on the ſame ſubject; but the ſituation of the country, from whence alone money is to be obtained, how ſhall you deſcribe it? That in conſequence of the late famine, the whole wears the moſt deſolate appearance; but that you flatter yourſelf, by the favour of the Almighty, that the country will as heretofore become populous and flouriſhing; and that you will acquire honour in tranſmitting the royal revenues. We have received the above, and fully comprehend the contents. By the favour of the Almighty, the duty, obedience, ſtrict adherence to treaties, the probity of the Engliſh Sirdars is in the ſtrongeſt manner impreſſed on our royal mind, that they never have, or will, in the minuteſt circumſtance, or on any occaſion, deviate from their engagements. As the above-mentioned Sirdars engaged and promiſed to us, that wherever we ſhould reſide, they never would be deficient in their duty, in their obedience, or in tranſmitting the ſtipulated revenues, now that you have wrote in this manner, relative to the ſaid revenues, it is apparent that the Engliſh Sirdars, and that you alſo, approve of the difficulties we labour under, increaſed by the difficulties and loſſes that have at this time occurred, otherwiſe the treaties and engagements of the Sirdars admit of no alteration; and this circumſtance now gives us the greateſt ſurprize; yet it is not entirely a deficiency in you, it may be ſuppoſed by evils inſinuated, and of the times that Sirdars, known for their faith and probity, are inclined alſo to ſwerve from their integrity, though inconſiſtent with their principles, without remedy. A Letter, giving an account of this affair, will be wrote to Europe; that conſidering the ſtrict adherence to faith and treaties, what can be the reaſon of it? We are convinced, that if we continue to exiſt, there will be no difficulty from that quarter; and that the revenues will be paid as heretofore. As we eſteem you and the other Sirdars the ſupporters of our empire, and our ſincere well-wiſhers at this time, it was neceſſary that you ſhould have made an addition to the revenues, on hearing the difficulties we laboured under, and given a ſhining proof of your duty and ſervices; and not on the contrary to make ſuch a declaration as this. It will be conſiſtent with the good ſenſe of loyalty of you, and the other Sirdars, that adhering, as heretofore, to the duty and attachment, you ſend the revenues what is now due, and may become due, as formerly, to the preſence, and thus ſtudy our ſatisfaction; for we eſteem you our truly faithful ſubject, and the ſupport of our empire. Concludes as uſual.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *A. B. Goodlad*,
Perſian Tranſlator.

From theſe Letters, and from all other late Intelligence received from the Northward, the following appears to be the ſtate of affairs in that quarter:

The defeat of the King having placed the King under the abſolute controul of the Marattas, they have extorted from him a formal ſurrender of all his dominions, conſiſting of the provinces of *Kora* and *Kerra*, and the diſtrict of *Serampore*, which was lately conquered, by their aſſiſtance, from the Jauts. His towns are diſſipated. *Nedjif Cawn*, the only man of credit or ability near his perſon, has been diſmiſſed from his ſervice, and abandoned to the Marattas, who have placed guards round his houſe, and made demands upon him for large ſums of money. The King himſelf appears to have given up the little authority which he had left, to *Heſſum o Din*, an unworthy favourite, and a creature of the Marattas. The titular office of Buxey of the Empire has been conferred on *Narrain Row*, the Maratta Chief; and that of Naib Buxey, with the diſtrict of *Sarampoor*, to *Zabita Cawn*, who, though treated as their vaſſal, and in himſelf of no conſequence, is nevertheleſs repreſented as the means by which the other Rohilla Chiefs are united in the ſupport of the Marattas, although the dread impreſſed on them by their late misfortunes accounts more rationally for ſo unnatural an attachment. No attempts have been yet made by the Marattas, to take poſſeſſion of the province of *Kora*. It is not probable that they will venture upon it without their whole force, unleſs aſſured of meeting with no oppoſition from the forces of the Company in that neighbourhood. The Vizier either is, or affects to be, extremely alarmed at this ceſſion, which he repreſents as the immediate ſtep to an invaſion of his territories; and declares, that he has a certain knowledge that ſuch is their intention. He has urged *Moneer ul Dowla* to raiſe a force, and ſtand on his defence, promiſing to join him; and *Moneer ul Dowla* writes, that he has actually enliſted 10,000 horſe for that purpoſe. On theſe promiſes the Board now proceed to conſider whether it is incumbent upon them, or adviſable, to oppoſe the entrance into the province of *Kora*.

The Board are entirely of opinion with the Select Committee, that they have the juſteſt ground to contend this point with the Marattas. The province of *Kora* was a grant of the Company to the King, and declared to have been made for the ſupport of his dignity and expences; but its being made an article of the treaty with the Vizier, they muſt be conſidered as the guarantees of it. The preſent transfer is unqueſtionably an act of violence, and as ſuch can be repelled by none with ſo good a plea of right as by thoſe from whom it was originally held: were it even a voluntary ceſſion, the equity of it might well admit of a diſpute, and the Company might juſtly reclaim the poſſeſſion of it, both becauſe the conditions of the original grants to the King were defeated by his aſſigning it to another Power, and their intereſts were likely to be endangered by it.—With reſpect to the expediency of engaging in hoſtilities with the Marattas for the defence of *Kora*, it is undoubtedly liable to many objections: the decayed and yet unſettled ſtate of our own provinces requires a longer interval of reſt and ſecurity; the Maratta armies, weakened by a long campaign, will be more reduced by being diſperſed in the protection of every new conqueſt, and as there are no fortified places of great importance in the Kora province, and as it will always be at our option to begin inſtant hoſtilities with them on the advice of any reinforcements coming from *Poona*, they may be attacked with the ſame, if not greater probability of ſucceſs, at a diſtant period from that time, ſhould they have even made themſelves maſters of that territory. It is ſcarce poſſible to foreſee the iſſue of a war with ſo formidable a Power, or to preſcribe the exact bounds of it; yet this is what we muſt endeavour at if we engage in it. The Company have repeatedly promiſed to furniſh us with full and clear inſtructions on the conduct to be obſerved with reſpect to the Marattas, of whoſe increaſing powers their Letters are filled with expreſſions of the ſtrongeſt, and indeed the juſteſt apprehenſions. Not knowing what line their orders may preſcribe, there is this riſque alſo to be feared from our engaging too haſtily in hoſtilities with the Marattas, that it may counteract the intentions, and put it out of our power to conform to them when we ſhall be better informed: on the other hand, there is great cauſe to apprehend that our forbearance on ſuch an occaſion may prove injurious to our reputation, and by implying an idea of our weakneſs, intimidate our friends, and encourage the Marattas to form more dangerous projects againſt us, which it is our ſole aim by this pacific conduct to prevent. It is well known that the politics of the ſtate are more built on conveniency, than on reſentment or the point of honour: if they can aſſiſt us with impunity they will not wait for other provocation, or ſuffer the want of a juſt cauſe to retard their operations; neither are they likely to involve themſelves in a war for the ſake of retaliating an equivocal affront if they are unprepared for it, or unlikely to run an unequal hazard in the precaution of it. Although we are informed of the preciſe lines which the Honourable Company mean to lay down for our guidance, yet we are well aſſured, from the conſtant and uniform

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tenor of all their commands, that they will not approve of our permitting the encroachments of the Marattas, either upon their own poſſeſſions or that of their near allies, if by a mere defenſive conduct on our parts they may be prevented: the 45th paragraph of their General Letter by the *Grafton*, expreſſing their ſentiments ſo pointedly to this effect, that it precludes any further heſitation on the preſent argument; and we ſhall ſubjoin it as the ſtrongeſt authority for fixing our determination in tenor of the propoſition, to undertake the defence of the province of *Kora* againſt the Marattas.

Extract of a General Letter per *Grafton*; dated the 28th of Auguſt 1771.

It is with the moſt ſerious concern we learn from your late advices, that the incurſions of the Marattas had ſpread ſuch a terror and deſpondence into the minds of thoſe Powers which were the remote barriers of our poſſeſſions, that the irreſolution and timidity of the moſt potent of them have given riſe to ſuch ſucceſſes as have encouraged the Marattas to invade the dominions of the King, and lay claim to a part of the territory of *Sujah Dowla*; but the conduct of the Rohillas and Jauts is rather a matter of concern than ſurprize to us, as the King and Rajah *Dowla* neglected that occaſion to unite with thoſe Powers, effectually to repel the common diſturbers of the empire, and confine them within the limits of their former poſſeſſions. To whatever cauſes this general timidity or ſupineneſs may have been owing, we find ourſelves equally affected, and the tranquillity of the provinces are endangered thereby; but as the projects of the King, or the conduct of the Vizier, are at preſent too myſterious for us to decide on the motives of their inactivity, and as we know not what alliances may be formed to juſtify us in carrying our arms beyond the bounds of their dominions, we are prevented from propoſing any preciſe plan for your guidance in this reſpect. But ſhould your ſubſequent advices enable you to form a more certain judgment of the expediency of departing from the plan we have laid down, we ſhall communicate to you, by ſome early conveyance, how far we may be diſpoſed to carry our arms beyond the bounds of the provinces or the territories of our allies, and become the parties in an offenſive war. In the meantime we truſt, that your ſole objects will be the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions, and thoſe of the Powers with whom we are connected, both by treaty and intereſt; and as this appears to have been the guide of your conduct upon the Marattas invading the province of *Kora*, we with pleaſure approve the meaſures you have taken for defending the dominions of the King and Vizier, from their inroads and depredations; more eſpecially as thoſe meaſures are not only juſtified by neceſſity, but are within the line which we have preſcribed for your conduct in ſuch a conjuncture.

Reſolved, That meaſures be immediately taken for the defence of the province of *Kora* and *Kurra* againſt the Marattas; that the Preſident be deſired to communicate this our intention to the Vizier; that Colonel *Champion* be directed to conſult with him on the proper means for effecting it, and, if adviſable, to croſs the river at *Allahabad*, either with the whole brigade, or ſuch part of it as he ſhall judge adviſable for this ſervice; but on no account or provocation whatever to paſs the boundary of thoſe provinces, without further orders from this Board.

Reſolved, that the Preſident be deſired to addreſs the Vizier again upon the ſubject of the payment of the extraordinary charge of the brigade, and to propoſe an aſſignment; Gazypoor Revenue, or ſome other adequate ſecurity, for that purpoſe.

Reſolved, that the General do prepare to return with all convenient expedition, to take the command of the firſt brigade.

Ordered, that our Secretary do write to Colonel *Champion* in the following terms:

To Lieutenant Colonel *Champion*, commanding the third brigade.

Sir,

The honourable the Preſident and Council having judged it expedient to enter into immediate meaſures for the defence of the provinces of *Cora* and *Curra*, againſt the attempts of the Marattas, I have it in command from the Honourable Board, to ſignify their orders to you, that you immediately concert with the Vizier the proper means for effecting this purpoſe; and if you ſhould mutually think it adviſable, that you croſs the river at *Allahabad*, either with the whole brigade under your command, or ſuch part of it as you ſhall deem neceſſary for the ſervice required. You are on no account or provocation whatever to paſs the boundaries of thoſe provinces of *Cora* and *Curra*, without the further orders of the Board, but confine your operations ſolely to their defence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

Fort William, 1ſt February 1773.

J. Stewart, Secretary.

Warren Haſtings.
H. Goodwin.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 11th February 1773.

PRESENT,

Brigadier General Sir *R^t Barker*,
William Alderſey, *John Reed*, *Thomas Lane*, } Eſquires.

Meſſrs. *Barwell* and *Lambert* indiſpoſed.
Mr. *Goodwin* at the Khalſah.

Read, and approved, the Proceedings of the 4th inſt.

The General delivers in the following Letter and queries to the Board.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

As it is my earneſt wiſh to acquire the approbation of this Adminiſtration, I have on the accompanying paper drawn up, for your peruſal, a few queſtions relative to the nature of the ſervice I am going upon; the want of which appeared to be the occaſion of thoſe difficulties I was ſo unhappy to be involved in my laſt campaign to the Weſtward.

I am, Gentlemen,

Calcutta, February 7th 1773.

Your moſt obedient ſervant,
(Signed) *Robt Barker.*

General *Barker*, previous to his taking the command of the army, requeſts the Board's conſideration on the following queſtions, ſince the diſtance he will be at from the Preſidency, and the length of time required to communicate with the Adminiſtration on matters of immediate deciſion, will render it impoſſible for him to avail himſelf of their inſtructions with that expedition which the nature of the ſervice may require. The General ſubmits to the Board, whether ſome general plan ſhould not be laid down as a groundwork or guide to the conduct which he is to obſerve in the enſuing campaign; as it is his ardent deſire to execute every thing the Board can expect, without extending or deviating in any reſpect from their intentions.

Queſt. 1ſt. Should the Marattas advance to the limits of the Korah province, and there perform ſuch motions as may appear to deſign an attack on the provinces, and by ſeparation, or otherwiſe, throwing themſelves into an unguarded

unguarded poſition, afford an opportunity of being advantageouſly attacked, will it be allowed, or muſt the troops wait till they have actually croſſed the line?

2d. Should the Marattas croſs the *Ganges*, and in conjunction with *Zibetah Khan*, attack *Huffiz Rhamat* (who is not actually engaged with the Confederates) in order to induce him to engage with them in attacking the Vizier's poſſeſſions, and ſhould *Kaſeſs* or the Vizier requeſt the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh forces, how far will the Board grant ſuch aſſiſtance, or are the troops to wait till *Haffis* is reduced, and the whole of the Rohilla united to the Marattas, for the purpoſe of attacking the Vizier's dominions?

3d. Whether the Marattas croſſing the *Ganges* into the Rohilla Country (not being in actual hoſtilities with thoſe Powers) is not a declaration of war againſt the Vizier? which if allowed,

4th, Should not every advantage be taken, ſuch as ſecuring or deſtroying the bridge of boats, or otherwiſe preventing their repaſſing the river?

5th. Should the Marattas in conjunction with the Rohilla (by which they will become very numerous) ſeparate and form two armies, the one for the attack of the Kora province, the other for the attack of the Vizier's dominions, in order to ſeparate our force by the river *Ganges*, will not the Board grant the General a diſcretional power to draw his reinforcements from the 2d brigade, ſince the time of writing to the Preſidency will render abortive every advantage that might otherwiſe be received from ſuch reinforcement?

6th. Whether the General ſhould not have authority to make every advantage of the aſſiſtance of foreign Powers, either to breed diviſions or act offenſively againſt the enemy?

7th. Whether the General may draw money by way of loan from any foreign Power if he can acquire it, in caſes where the troops are in great diſtreſs for ſubſiſtence, and no expectation of ſupplies from the provinces?

Agreed, that they be conſidered on Monday next; and ordered in the meantime that they be ſent round to the different Members of the Board for their information.

Warren Haſtings.
Wm Alderſey.
Thomas Lane.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 15th February 1773.

Reſumed the conſideration of the General's Letter and Queries, recorded upon the Conſultation of the 11th inſtant.

The Preſident lays before the Board the following two Letters from Colonel *Champion*, directed to the Select Committee and to himſelf.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have been honoured with your orders, dated the 9th inſtant, and have conſulted with his Excellency according to your inſtructions. He by no means will give his conſent to my detaching a battalion of Sepoys, Artillery, &c. for the garriſon of *Allahabad*; obſerving at the ſame time that it will be weakening the troops on which he has his chiefeſt dependance; but has agreed to ſend immediately four heavy pieces of cannon, with a thouſand rounds to each gun, a complete battalion of regulars, with four field pieces and five hundred matchlocks, ſo that the garriſon will be completed to three thouſand; and he has alſo ſent orders for four months proviſions to be laid in, &c. As I could not perſuade him to comply with your intentions, in having the reinforcement ſent from the brigade, I then thought it beſt to have that battalion of Sepoys commanded by our own officers, and a field officer to command the garriſon, which he very readily acquieſced in, and was well pleaſed with the propoſal; therefore I intend to detach Lieutenant Colonel *Upton* to command, with one Captain, a Lieutenant, and two Enſigns, for which I hope, Gentlemen, to receive your approbation. The two twenty-four pounders belonging to the brigade will in a few days be at *Allahabad* with their ſtores; they are to wait there for further orders. I have this moment received advice from the officers commanding our brigade boats, that there is not a foot water in the *Ganges* near to *Allahabad* for above a coſs in length, which has obliged them to unload our boats, and will be the cauſe of detaining them eight or ten days; therefore, I have ſent expreſs orders to have the light boats diſpatched forward with ammunition. And on a further converſation with his Excellency, I find he is determined to throw a bridge acroſs the *Ganges*, and to act offenſively againſt the Marattas, ſhould they enter the Korah or Kurra provinces in a hoſtile manner. I then thought it neceſſary to aſk him, if he had received a duplicate of my orders? and on his replying in the negative, I explained them to him, at which he ſeemed greatly ſurprized, and has declared his intentions of addreſſing the Board on the ſubject this evening. On being aſked, if he eſteemed that Country as his own? he anſwered, that he did, as the King had quitted it without any permiſſion; and further, that his opinion was, that by your order of the ninth inſtant you meant to prevent their taking poſſeſſion of that Country. From its appearing to me abſolutely his intention to repel his force to theirs, I could wiſh to be honoured, with the utmoſt expedition, with your inſtructions, how far I am to engage the troops under my command in his ſupport; for a defeat to him may be attended with the utmoſt conſequence to ourſelves; and I hope my Letter of the 15th inſtant to you, will be fully replied to. He mentioned to me, that *Neziff Cawn*, who by our accounts had engaged to march with the Marattas, has made propoſals of joining him, on drawing near to our army; and that Mr. *Madox*, with his detachment, had alſo offered to come in to him; but he was afraid of being apprehended by us. As I am informed, that the Adminiſtration had long ſince iſſued their pardon to this man, I told him, I could have no objection under that circumſtance. By our laſt accounts, dated January the 23d, I find the Marattas had not marched.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp near *Mohawn*, January 28th 1773. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

P. S. The troops under my command, with thoſe of his Excellency, march to-morrow morning towards *Cawnpoor*.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to addreſs you yeſterday, acquainting you with having communicated to his Excellency the nature of my orders received from you, dated the 15th November and the 9th inſtant; but from the great deſire I had to tranſmit his deſigns to you without loſs of time, prevented my paying that attention to the tranſlation of his words, which I ought to have done, and ſhall in future be more attentive to.

When he was aſked, if he conſidered the provinces of *Korah* and *Allahabad* as part of his dominions? he replied, that the world knew that theſe provinces belonged to him: that the Engliſh were pleaſed to cede them to the King for part of his ſupport, with which he was perfectly ſatisfied; but as his Majeſty had, without his knowledge or concurrence, beſtowed them on the Marattas, he was determined, by force of arms, to prevent their taking poſſeſſion of theſe Countries. He further added, the Marattas had the King in their power, and they may on ſome future occaſion prevail on him to cede to them the provinces of *Oude* or *Bengal*. Would the Engliſh or myſelf,

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myſelf, in ſuch caſe, pay any reſpect to his Majeſty's Sunnuds? His Excellency alſo obſerved, that ſhould the Marattas obtain poſſeſſion of *Korah* or *Allahabad*, he would be obliged conſtantly to keep up a numerous army to prevent their making frequent incurſions into his Country; that ſucceſs would make them bold, and even the Engliſh would find them troubleſome neighbours. He talked much of his affection and ſteady friendſhip for the Engliſh, and obſerved, that his ſtrict alliance with them had rendered him hateful to all the Powers of *Indoſtan*. This day we have received no particular news from above.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp at *Sallergunge*, (Signed)
January the 29th 1773. *A. Champion.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that the troops under my command arrived this day at *Cawnpoor*, and thoſe of his Excellency will be here to-morrow. There is every thing neceſſary provided for croſſing the *Ganges*; but ſince my making known to the Nabob your inſtructions to me, he has declared he will not paſs over till the laſt extremity.

By our advices from *Delhi*, dated the 26th inſtant, the Marattas had not marched, and they ſeem from all accounts to be under great conſternation at our approach; and was I to form a judgment, I ſhould think they will not venture to move down this ſeaſon.

I have the honour, &c.

Camp at *Cawnpore*, (Signed)
January 31ſt 1773. *A. Champion.*

Agreed on the following Anſwers to the General's Queries:

The General is on no account, nor from any appearances whatever, to begin hoſtilities with the Marattas, nor croſs the line of the Korah province, not even with the ſmalleſt diviſion of the force under his command, until they ſhall have begun the war by an actual invaſion of it, and by open and direct hoſtilities. He is to confine all his operations on that ſide of the *Ganges* to the ſole defence of the province of *Korah*, and is ſtudiouſly to avoid every meaſure which may draw the Company's arms beyond it, or engage them in an offenſive war. If the Marattas ſhall have begun a war by an actual invaſion and attack of the Korah province, the General will in ſuch caſe proſecute ſuch meaſures as he ſhall judge moſt adviſable for repelling their attempts and deſtroying their force, and for this purpoſe he may either paſs the borders of *Korah* to attack them with advantage, or purſue them beyond the borders. But the Board muſt leave it to the judgment and diſcretion of the General to determine how far, in any circumſtance of affairs, it may be neceſſary to purſue the enemy, ſtill recurring to the firſt object of the war, namely, the defence of the province of *Korah*, to which he is invariably to attend; and having executed the immediate ſervice which may have induced him to paſs the preſcribed line of his operations, he is again to withdraw within it.

2d. If the Marattas ſhall have croſſed the *Ganges*, and *Haſiſs Ramut Cawn* ſhall ſolicit the aſſiſtance of the Company's forces to repel them, the General will be authorized and inſtructed to enter into a treaty of alliance with *Haſiſs Ramut Cawn* for the defence and protection of his dominions, on ſuch conditions as ſhall fully indemnify the Honourable Company from the additional charge which may be incurred by ſuch an engagement; and having done this, to carry the war into that part of the Rohilla dominions which is ſituated on the eaſt ſide of the *Ganges*, but on no account to croſs the *Ganges*, either for the purpoſe of completing the defeat of the Marattas, or protecting the Rohilla diſtricts lying on the weſt ſide of that river.

3d. The Board cannot admit the conſtruction of a declaration of war againſt the Vizier from the Maratta forces having croſſed the *Ganges*, nor ſhall they conſider the war begun in that quarter, unleſs by ſuch an engagement as we have allowed in the preceding reply, or by an actual invaſion and attack of the Vizier's dominions. In either caſe (and in no other) the General will be authorized and inſtructed to uſe his diſcretion, either in confining the war to the territories of the Vizier, or carrying it to the utmoſt extent of the Rohilla diſtricts lying within the laſt bank of the *Ganges*. We are induced to wait for the actual commencement of the war on the part of the Marattas in the latter caſe, by the conſideration of the confined ſituation of that country, and the hazard to which the Marattas muſt inevitably be expoſed by allowing themſelves to be ſhut up within its confines, if they ſhould advance ſo far as to preclude their own retreat before the month of at which time the deſcent of the floods will render the river impaſſable.

Our reaſon for anticipating the war for the defence of *Haſiſs Rhamut Cawn*, ſhould he require it, is obvious. Little danger is to be apprehended from the addition of the weak aid which he may afford to the Marattas if he unites with them, but it is of ſo much conſequence to preſerve that authority and influence which the actual poſſeſſion of that country and its defences may give him in it, if he unites with us.

4th. This is anſwered in the preceding reply.—We have explained in what caſe we ſhall conſider the war as begun, and have preſcribed the bounds of his operations; but the mode of conducting them is left entirely to the General.

5th. If the Marattas by a divided attack, as the General has ſuppoſed in the inſtance alluded to, and by an augmentation of their ſtrength, ſhall become too powerful to be oppoſed with effect by a ſingle brigade, the General will be authorized and inſtructed to call ſuch reinforcement from the ſecond brigade as he ſhall judge requiſite for the ſervice. But as this will leave the province of *Patna* deſtitute of its proper defence, it is earneſtly recommended to the General, whenever he ſhall find himſelf compelled to make uſe of this expedient, to keep a ſtrict watch on the motions of the Marattas, and to guard againſt any attempt which they may be encouraged, by ſuch an occaſion, to make in that province, by ſending back the reinforcements, and replacing the ſecond brigade in a ſtate for its protection.

6th. To give the General the authority required in this queſtion, will anſwer very little purpoſe, unleſs he be at the ſame time empowered to make uſe of the means, by which the aſſiſtance of foreign Powers is to be obtained and ſecured. We have not money to purchaſe alliances; and we are prohibited by the Company's orders, and equally by ſound policy, from undertaking remote conqueſts, and forming offenſive engagements with foreign States or Princes. If, by practiſing on the common fears to which all the Powers of *Indoſtan* are expoſed, from the ambition of the Marattas, or by holding out the proſpect of ſome immediate advantage, the General ſhall be able to prevail with any of them to co-operate with him, we ſhall conſider it as a moſt eſſential ſervice; but we will rather forego this advantage than purchaſe it by pay or promiſes.

7th. Though we are unwilling to ſuppoſe ſuch a diſtreſs to exiſt as is ſuppoſed in this queſtion, we muſt admit the poſſibility of it. Wherever it ſhall happen, the moſt deſperate remedy muſt be applied, if no other can remove it.

To obviate the effects of ſuch a calamity, the Preſident has been deſired to require of the Vizier an aſſignment on the Revenue of the Zemindary of *Gazypoor*, or ſome other adequate ſecurity, for the further payment of the extra charge of the brigade, while it ſhall be employed

on his ſervice; and to repeat to him the declaration, that no remittances can or will be made from theſe provinces for that purpoſe. If the Vizier really feels the apprehenſions which he has expreſſed of a Maratta invaſion; and means to deal ſincerely and honourably by this Government in return for the aſſiſtance afforded him, we have no doubt of his acquieſcing in ſo reaſonable a proportion; but it may happen otherwiſe; and indeed the principles on which it has been lately reſolved to maintain the province of *Korah* againſt the pretenſions of the Marattas, may afford him one ſpecious argument for refuſing to bear any ſhare of the charge incurred, by an undertaking in which the intereſt of the Company alone may appear to be directly concerned, and his own but in its remote conſequences. It will be neceſſary therefore to mark out the diſtinct plan and deſign of our operations on each ſide of the *Ganges*, and to preſcribe, as far as the nature of each ſervice will admit, the principal points which are to be attended to in the proſecution of them.

It has been reſolved, that as allies to the King we will defend the province of *Korah* againſt the threatened invaſion of the Marattas; and as allies to the Vizier, that we will defend his Country and Government againſt any attempts from the ſame enemy. Although the declared motive for the firſt ſervice is the maintenance of the King's right, and although as the original proprietors of the Korah province, we may juſtly lay claim to the reverſion of it whenever the King ſhall part with it, or be unable to keep poſſeſſion of it, yet the principal and only cauſe which has urged us to this undertaking, is the ſecurity of the dominions of the Vizier our ally, which would be expoſed to continual danger, were the Marattas to become the maſters of a country immediately bordering upon them. We have therefore as juſt a right to require the reimburſements of the charge incurred in this ſervice, as in that which reſtricts the more immediate ſafety of his dominions; neither will it be practicable to ſeparate the expences of this expedition from thoſe of the forces which may remain on the other ſide of the *Ganges*.

We will not therefore allow of any reduction of the ſum which the Vizier has engaged to pay for the monthly charges of the brigade, although a part of it may be employed in the province of *Korah*.

Yet as this ſum (which is all that we can claim by treaty from the Vizier) is inadequate to the whole amount of the pay and charges of the brigade, and we cannot afford to make up the deficiency by remittances from theſe provinces, we ſhall expect and require, that the province of *Korah* ſhall pay for its protection by contributing to the charge of it.

On theſe grounds therefore it is our deſire, that the General do uſe his endeavours to ſecure the poſſeſſions of the province of *Korah*, both againſt the Marattas and every competitor; and to confirm and maintain the Nabob *Monier o Dowlah* in the Government of it, as the repreſentative of the King, obliging him to aſſign a monthly payment of one lack of rupees from the treaſury of the province for the pay of the brigade, and for a proviſional ſecurity againſt any loſs or diſappointment to which the Honourable Company may be ſubjected by this deſtination of their troops, and by a failure of the other means appropriated to their pay and diſburſements. The General is to keep in his own hands the controul of the province of *Korah*, until the Board ſhall hereafter determine in what manner it ſhall be diſpoſed of.

In the operations on the other ſide of the *Ganges*, we have no other object beſide the ſecurity of the Vizier's Government and dominions. To enſure the due and effectual attainment of this end, we have required an aſſignment from the Vizier, of a part of his revenue, or an equivalent ſecurity for the ſum ſtipulated for the extra charges with which it will be attended, being (1,15,000 Rupees) one lack fifteen thouſand per month. And we direct, that the like aſſignment or ſecurity be previouſly demanded and received for the proportionable charge of any additional force which the General may find it neceſſary to call into the territories of the Vizier. If the Vizier ſhall refuſe to comply with this requiſition in its fulleſt extent, and ſhall perſiſt in the refuſal, it is our poſitive command that the General do immediately abandon him, and withdraw his whole force from the territory of the Vizier; either employing it, if neceſſary, in the Korah province, or remanding ſuch part of it as ſhall exceed the exigencies of that ſervice to the province of *Bahar*. In caſe of ſuch an event, he is to give us immediate advice thereof, that we may reſolve on the neceſſary meaſures for recovering the arrears which may ſtill be due from the Vizier, and the further expences of the brigade. If the above precautions are rigidly attended to, there will be little hazard of a want of money to pay the troops. Should any unforeſeen accident or circumſtance deprive us of theſe reſources, we repeat, that we muſt ſubmit to the alternative propoſed by the General, as to an unavoidable neceſſity, and leave it to him to act in every ſuch inſtance as his judgment ſhall direct him, for the good of the ſervice, and the ſafety of the troops under his command.

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Ordered, the Secretary do prepare Inſtructions for the General, in conformity to the above Queries and Anſwers.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 18th February 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident.

William Alderſey,
John Reed,
Thomas Lane,
Richard Barwell,
Henry Goodwin,
William Lambert,
} Eſquires.

Read, and approved, the Conſultation of the inſtant.

The Secretary having prepared the following Inſtructions for General *Barker*, agreeable to the Reſolution of the 15th inſtant, lays them before the Board for their conſideration.

To Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*.

Sir,

Inſtructions to Brig. General Sir Robert Barker, on his joining the army.

The ſituation of affairs on the frontiers of our poſſeſſions, and in the countries of *Corah* and *Oud*, requiring the appearance of the Company's forces to encourage their allies, and check the hoſtile deſigns of the Marattas; we have judged it expedient that you proceed to theſe parts without loſs of time, to aſſume the command of the troops employed in thoſe ſervices, and to tranſact ſuch other matters as ſhall be from time to time intruſted to your management by the Select Committee or this Board. In the meantime, for your immediate direction, you will conſult the following Inſtructions, conforming to them as cloſely as circumſtances will permit.

1ſt. You will repair with all convenient expedition to join the firſt brigade in the country of *Oud*, and to take the immediate command of it; but as we deem it highly neceſſary that you have an interview as ſoon as poſſible, with the Vizier, it is left to your diſcretion to proceed to him before you join the brigade, ſhould he be abſent from it.

2d. On a meeting with him, you are to conſult together on the beſt plan of operations for fulfilling the objects of your commiſſion, viz. the defence and ſecurity of his country, and of the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*.

3d. Although for the firſt object our intention was to confine our operations altogether within the limits of the Vizier's dominions, yet for reaſons, with which as a Member of the Board you are well acquainted, we have determined to include in the line of defence the Rohilla diſtrict laying on the ſame ſide of the river, known by the name of the Country of *Hafiz Rahmet Cawn*; and for that purpoſe you are hereby authorized to enter into

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treaty with *Hafiz Rahmet Cawn* for the defence and protection of his dominions, on ſuch conditions as ſhall fully indemnify the Company for the additional charge and hazard which may be incurred by ſuch an engagement.

4th. But ſhould *Hafiz Rahmet Cawn* either fall into the hands of the Marattas, or from any other ſimilar circumſtance be rendered incapable of entering into ſuch an engagement, you are ſtill to conſider his dominions as an object of your operations; and if the Vizier require you to undertake their defence, and engage to perform the conditions which we have deſired you to claim from *Hafiz Rahmet Cawn*, you will not heſitate to comply, but adopt the meaſure heartily, and purſue it as included in the Inſtructions for the immediate defence of the Vizier's dominions.

5th. It is however underſtood, that in all this you rigidly and ſtrictly adhere to the maxim laid down, of confining your operations on that ſide within the *Ganges*, and on no account croſs the river, or carry the war into the Rohilla diſtricts beyond it.

6th. It is further the determination of the Board, of which you will take particular notice, that no operation for the Vizier's defence ſhall be carried into execution without a previous ſtipulation on his part, for the extra charges attending the ſuccours we afford him. We have eſtimated this at rupees 1,15,000 per month, and have required an aſſignment on his revenue for the amount. You will therefore, as a preliminary, demand and receive the aſſignment required by us; and in caſe an additional force ſhould be hereafter called for on his requiſition, you are (previous to their march) alſo to require and receive a proportionable aſſignment for the extra expences on that account.

7th. If in either caſe the Vizier ſhould refuſe complying with theſe requiſitions in their fulleſt extent, and ſhall perſiſt in the refuſal, it is our poſitive command that you immediately abandon him, and withdraw your whole force from his territory, either employing it needful in the Corah province, agreeable to the Inſtructions hereafter given, or remanding to *Babar* ſuch part of it as ſhall exceed the exigencies of that ſervice; but in ſuch an event you are not to fail giving us the moſt ſpeedy advice, that we may reſolve on what future meaſures are to be purſued.

8th. The recovery of the arrears due from the Vizier for the expences of the laſt campaign is alſo to be a particular object of your attention; you are to endeavour immediately to get them diſcharged, or a proper ſecurity given for the payment on a future day.

9th. The next general object to be given you in charge is the defence of the Corah province; for this purpoſe it will be neceſſary that you immediately croſs the *Ganges* with ſuch part of your army as you judge neceſſary, to take poſſeſſion of it as allies to the King *Shaw Allum*.

10th. Should the Marattas on this motion keep at a diſtance without croſſing the boundaries of that province, you are to remain in quiet poſſeſſion without interfering in any manner with them or their tranſactions beyond it; but ſhould they croſs that line, and actually invade the province, you are then to endeavour to expel them by force, proſecuting ſuch meaſures as you ſhall deem moſt adviſable for that purpoſe.

11th. It is underſtood that whether you remain in quiet poſſeſſion of this province, or are engaged in hoſtilities in it, you are to act only as in alliance with the King, and you are to confirm and maintain his Naib *Minnur ul Dowlah* in the actual government of it; but he is to remain under your controul, and to be accountable to the Company for the revenues of the province, till ſuch time as it ſhall be finally ſettled in what manner they are hereafter to be diſpoſed.

12th. But as the defence of the province is undertaken for the King's behalf, we expect and require that part of the revenue ſhall be applied to defray the extra expence of the expedition; for this purpoſe you will demand and receive of *Minnur ul Dowlah*, monthly, one lacle of rupees, which we eſtimate to be nearly the expence which will be thereby incurred.

13th. We alſo recommend, that while you are in theſe provinces you endeavour to obtain in the beſt manner your prudence ſhall ſuggeſt, as exact an account as poſſible of their revenues, without taking any ſteps that may alarm *Minnur ul Dowlah*; and you will tranſmit to us ſuch accounts, with your ſentiments on the means of their further improvement.

14th. Whatever may be the circumſtances which attend the taking poſſeſſion of this province, whether war or peace, you are by no means to deliver over the poſſeſſion, either to the King or the Vizier, or any other Power whatſoever, or quit the controul as above directed, till our further pleaſure on this ſubject ſhall be ſignified to you.

15th. We repeat again, that in all your operations, whether for the defence of the Vizier's territories, or the Corah provinces, you are ſtudiouſly to avoid engaging the Company in an offenſive war with the Marattas; all your manœuvres muſt be directed to cover and protect theſe dominions, and to expel all hoſtile invaders from them; but you are on no conſideration whatever to carry the war beyond thoſe limits as above explained.

16th. It is not however meant ſo far to reſtrain your actions in the field as to prevent you from ſeizing on certain advantages (the war being once begun) beyond the ſtrict limits of the Corah province, or purſuing a ſignal ſucceſs to complete it on the other ſide. Theſe muſt be left to your diſcretion and experience, in which we repoſe our entire confidence; but it is our poſitive injunction, that the immediate end of ſuch an excurſion being accompliſhed, you retire again within the limits preſcribed, and act afterwards according to the ſpirit of theſe Inſtructions.

17th. This latitude is only given for your operations in the Corah province, which laying open to the Marattas, may afford them too great an advantage in the attack, ſhould they be allowed to lie unmoleſted near its borders. But on the other ſide of the *Ganges*, we conſider that river as a ſufficient ſecurity againſt ſuch attempts, and therefore direct that you do not ſuffer any conſideration to lead you acroſs it.

18th. If the Marattas, by a divided attack, or by an augmentation of ſtrength, ſhould become too powerful to be oppoſed with effect by one brigade of the Company's forces, you are hereby authorized to call for and order from *Patna*, any part of the 2d brigade which you ſhall think neceſſary for your reinforcement; but in this caſe you are to keep the moſt watchful eye over the motions of the Marattas, and if they ſeem to point towards *Babar*, truſting to that province being deſtitute of forces, you are with all expedition to ſend back your reinforcement, or even detach ſuch further ſuccours as may be wanting for its ſecurity; at all events you will not fail to adviſe us the moment you come to the reſolution of drawing troops from *Patna*, that we may on our part take ſuch ſteps here as we ſhall judge adviſable for the protection of the province during their abſence.

19th. Such are the points on which for the preſent we think it neceſſary to inſtruct you. As a Member of our Board you are acquainted with the motives on which they are drawn up, and you will be regularly furniſhed with ſuch occaſional Inſtructions as the alteration of circumſtances or progreſs of affairs ſhall render neceſſary. In the meantime theſe are for your guidance in the general line of your conduct, and as to the particular operations in the field, they will be left as is moſt proper to your ſole direction, in full confidence of their being carried on with all the ſucceſs that can be wiſhed for, the honour and advantage of the Company, and the reputation of this Government.

We are, with eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt humble ſervants,
&c. &c.

Fort William,
18th February 1773.

POSTSCRIPT.

POSTSCRIPT.

To avoid any miſapprehenſion of our Inſtructions reſpecting the Corah province, we think it neceſſary to add this explanation, that we mean by it, the province of *Corah* properly ſo called, that part of *Allahabad* which lies between the *Jumna* and the *Ganges*, and the diſtrict of *Currah*, which altogether form the territory ceded to the King by the treaty with the Vizier in 1765.

Agreed, they be written fair, and ſigned.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.

Thomas Lane.
Richd Barwell.
H. Goodwin.

W. Lambert.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 19th April 1773.

PRESENT,

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident,

William Alderſey, *P. M. Dacres*, *Richd Barwell*, Eſqrs. *James Lawrell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *Geo. Vanſittart*,

Mr. *Lane* at the Cutcherry.
Mr. *Lambert* indiſpoſed.

The Preſident lays before the Board the following Extract from the Select Committee Proceedings of the 15th inſtant:

Extract of the Select Committee Proceedings of the 15th April 1773.

It having been reſolved to take preſent poſſeſſion of the province of *Corah* on behalf of the Company, the Committee are of opinion that it will be eſſentially neceſſary, both for ſecuring the Company's rights in that province, and as a preparatory ſtep to any exchange of that diſtrict, or other mode of ceſſion which may be reſolved on, immediately to depute a Member of the Board to *Corah*, to receive charge of it from the General, and to inveſtigate and form an account of its revenue; and that he be inveſted with full powers to exerciſe ſuch an authority and controul over the Naib *Muneer ul Dowla*, and the other officers of that Government, as may be requiſite for theſe ends. The ſervice in which the General is immediately engaged, as well as the nature of this truſt, which is totally foreign from the duties of his profeſſion, and requires the ſuperintendance of a perſon experienced in the buſineſs of the revenue, preclude us from receiving the aid of his ſervices on this occaſion; beſides, that ſuch an expreſs deputation will have the effect of marking in the moſt public and authentic manner the determination of this Government to maintain its right to the property or diſpoſal of the province of *Corah*. And this opinion we conceive to be of very great importance towards procuring an equivalent for the ceſſion of it, whenever that ſhall be made a ſubject of negociation; the more ſo, as the remote ſituation of that country too apparently ſhews, that it cannot be our intereſt, and therefore not our intention, to retain the poſſeſſion of it.

The Vizier having in ſeveral of his Letters expreſſed an earneſt deſire to have an interview with the Preſident, and many points of conſequence requiring an adjuſtment which cannot be effected without a perſonal conference, the Committee are further of opinion, that a meeting between the Vizier and the Preſident would at this ſeaſon be productive of great benefit to the Company's affairs;

Reſolved, That we ſubmit theſe ſubjects to the conſideration of the Council at large.

The Board approve of both propoſitions offered by the Select Committee.

It being agreed to ſend a Member of this Board on a deputation to *Corah* as above;

Mr. *Lawrell* has offered his ſervices on the occaſion.

Mr. *Barwell* begs leave to repreſent to the Board, for their previous conſideration, whether the right of ſeniority is to be precluded by a propoſition ſo unprecedented, as the offer of ſervices from a junior Member of the Council before his ſeniors have been conſulted, or their inclinations made known; Mr. *Barwell* himſelf would have been very happy to have contributed his endeavours in this line of public ſervice; but as he can never ſo far condeſcend as to place himſelf in competition with any Member of this Board who may be junior to himſelf, he requeſts information of the Board, whether from the propoſal made by Mr. *Lawrell* they mean that that Gentleman ſhould be permitted to put himſelf up againſt his ſeniors for employs, for which they may be equally fit from their knowledge and abilities? Mr. *Barwell* has already remarked, that he means not to condeſcend to put himſelf on a footing with his juniors, and if the Board mean to take Mr. *Lawrell*'s offers ſo far into conſideration as to oppoſe them in any ſhape to the right of his ſeniors, he muſt for himſelf decline urging the wiſh he has already expreſſed to ſerve the Company in this line; and he cannot conclude without expreſſing his moſt earneſt hope, that ſuch an inſtance of predilection be not drawn into precedent.

The queſtion being put, Whether Mr. *Lawrell* ſhall be appointed to the ſuperintendance of *Corah*, or no?

Mr. *Vanſittart* is of opinion he ſhould

Mr. *Graham* is of opinion, that Mr. *Lawrell*'s offer of his ſervices does not nor was not intended to preclude or invalidate the rights of his ſeniors; but as he eſteems Mr. *Lawrell* a proper perſon for executing the truſt in queſtion, and as the offer was made previous to Mr. *Barwell*'s Minute, which implies but does not record a claim, he thinks Mr. *Lawrell*'s ſhould be accepted.

Mr. *Goodwin* does not aſſent, as he does not think Mr. *Lawrell*'s offer ſhould preclude his ſeniors.

Mr. *Dacres* aſſents to the appointment of Mr. *Lawrell*.

Mr. *Alderſey* alſo aſſents; and,

The Preſident likewiſe gives his aſſent.

Reſolved, That Mr. *Lawrell* be appointed to the ſuperintendance of *Corah*.

Mr. *Barwell* begs leave to ſubmit to the judgment of the Board, whether it might not be admitted, before this Reſolution takes effect, to read over the orders of the Company reſpecting the line drawn for a preference in all appointments, and whether that line ſhould be attended to; or whether, if not attended to, particular reaſons ſhould not be aſſigned for the deviation? and as Mr. *Barwell* further wiſhes to know the ſentiments of every Member of the Adminiſtration on ſo general a point as the right of ſeniority, if it is not too great a favour, he makes it his particular requeſt, that the whole ſcope of this matter, and not any one particular queſtion, be ſubmitted to the opinion of the abſent Members;

Read, the under-mentioned Paragraphs of the General Letters: Par. 39. of General Letter, 23d March 1770; Par. 28 and 29 of Letter 28th Auguſt 1771.

Upon theſe orders, which are the lateſt we are furniſhed with, it is evident that the Company, in particular inſtances, leave a diſcretionary power in the Board to ſet aſide the claim of ſeniority. The Board conſider, that to require the opinion of abſent Members on points already determined, or on matters of mere ſpeculation only, is irregular and unprecedented; in either caſe it would ſubject the Board to many embarraſſments, and an uſeleſs increaſe of buſineſs; for if admitted in one inſtance, on the requiſition of any Member of the Board, it muſt be allowed in all; the propoſitions muſt be accompanied with every document on which an opinion of it can be properly grounded, which would be very voluminous;

and

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and the abſent Members would have the load of reſponſibility of the meaſures of Government ſuperadded to thoſe immediately entruſted to them; to call upon the opinions of abſent Members, muſt obviouſly imply an inſufficiency in the Board to determine without them, and thus weaken the requiſite powers of Government: to require their judgment on Reſolutions already taken, can anſwer no end, and in either caſe may be productive of perſonal diſſatisfaction without neceſſity. For all theſe reaſons the Board are of opinion, that they cannot acquieſce in Mr. *Barwell*'s requeſt.

Reſolved, That the Preſident be deſired to inform the Vizier of the above appointment, and of his intentions to afford him a perſonal interview.

Ordered, That the Secretary do prepare a draft of Inſtructions for Mr. *Lawrell*, from the Reſolution of the Select Committee, and the General's Inſtructions, to be laid before the Board, together with a Letter to the General, acquainting him of theſe Reſolutions.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.
James Lawrell.
H. Goodwin.
J. Graham.
George Vanſittart.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 21ſt April 1773.

PRESENT,

William Alderſey,
Philip Milner Dacres,
Richard Barwell,
James Lawrell,
Henʳ Goodwin,
John Graham,
George Vanſittart, Eſquires.

Mr. *Barwell* begs to lay before the Board the following Minute, in conſequence of the appointment reſolved on at their laſt aſſembly:

Mr. Barwell's Minute.

I could have wiſhed, Gentlemen, that the occaſion had not offered, which influences me to tranſgreſs upon your time; but as it has been my misfortune to differ in opinion, and to oppoſe your ſenſe and wiſhes in the late appointment of Mr. *Lawrell* to the Eliabad and Corah ſtation, I am neceſſitated to requeſt you will reſolve me the following queſtion: Whether you had any, and what, objections to the Gentlemen, Mr. *Lawrell*'s ſeniors, and particularly to myſelf, that you precluded the option, which the rules of the ſervice give them, to all appointments falling to the lot of the Members of the Board? or, whether you have been ſolely influenced to the acceptance of Mr. *Lawrell*'s ſervices, by his previous voluntary tender of them, without any intention to derogate from the merit or abilities of others, who might have wiſhed to have executed the truſt repoſed in that Gentleman?—Pardon me for propoſing this queſtion, but it is become indiſpenſably neceſſary. The Gentlemen, my ſuperiors in rank, have given their aſſent to Mr. *Lawrell*'s nomination (I too, in juſtice, muſt declare, that I think his abilities may credit the commiſſion confided to him) and have obſerved an entire ſilence touching their own rights, further than by remarking the lateſt orders of the Company give the Board a latitude to deviate from the long-eſtabliſhed and fixed rule of ſeniority. As I was the only perſon preſent at the debate of the 19th ultimo, ſuperior to Mr. *Lawrell*, who expreſſed a diſapprobation of the meaſure, I of courſe appear conſpicuous, and particularly pointed to by every obſervation on the record of that day, in ſupport of his nomination; and as I would not have my name preſented to the public in an ambiguous light, I cannot be ſilent. An implied reflection, uncanvaſſed by me, would naturally prejudice my character in the opinions of all men. If no reflection is implied, I demand of your juſtice to declare as much; if any is implied, I expect from the ſame juſtice the particulars of my demerits. Excuſe this jealouſy with which I regard my reputation, a reputation that has hitherto been unſullied, and unaſperſed, during the long courſe of my ſervices. In almoſt every ſtation I have filled, it has been my happineſs to be diſtinguiſhed by the favourable notice of my Employers: and as I have filled, amongſt the various ſtations of the ſervice, many of the firſt conſequence, and diſcharged my duty in all to the public ſatisfaction, I confeſs it would mortify me much to find myſelf juſtly charged with any particular deficiency for the diſcharge of any particular branch of public duty; but as this is a point of too delicate a nature for me to dwell upon, I leave it, in the confidence of being able to preſerve the good opinion which the Company have entertained of my paſt ſervices, and to vindicate their ſentiments in my favour.

(Signed)
Richd Barwell.

The Preſident replies to the above Minute of Mr. *Barwell*'s in the following manner:

The queſtion, variouſly propoſed by Mr. *Barwell*, namely, "Whether the Board had any, and what, objections to the Gentlemen, Mr. *Lawrell*'s ſeniors, and "particularly to himſelf, in the nomination of Mr. *Lawrell* to the Corah commiſſion—Whether the Board intended to derogate from the merit or ability of others, "who might have wiſhed to execute the truſt repoſed in "that Gentleman—Whether any reflection is implied on "Mr. *Barwell*, with a demand on the juſtice of the "Board to declare the particulars of his demerits?"—is contrary to the rules of the ſervice, and unprecedented. Neither the Members of the Board collectively, nor individually, are obliged to reply to any queſtion put to them by a ſingle Member, much leſs to account to him for their private ſentiments, or to arraign the conduct and impeach the character of others. Preſident's Reply.

The demand made on the latter part of the above quotations, is in effect to require of the Board to bring a formal accuſation againſt him, or to give him a plenary abſolution and acquittance of all blame which may be imputed to him through the whole courſe of his ſervices. I know of no cauſe or neceſſity for the former—there would be the higheſt impropriety in the latter.

The general order alluded to by Mr. *Barwell*, was not before the Board when they reſolved on the appointment of Mr. *Lawrell*; nor does it any where appear to have been the ground of that Reſolution; on the contrary, they proceeded in this as hath been uſual in all extraordinary commiſſions, by making the election without any regard to the line of ſeniority; but merely to the nature of the ſervice which was to be performed, and to the fitneſs of the perſon who ſhould offer himſelf for that ſervice.

I have ſaid, that this is the rule of the ſervice. Many reaſons might be aſſigned why this ought to be ſo.

Thoſe to whoſe lot ſuch commiſſions would fall by ſeniority, may wiſh, from private motives, to decline them, although they might not chooſe to aſſign the reaſons, or declare their reluctance to go upon any ſervice in which the public intereſt is materially concerned; and it would be contrary to good policy to intruſt ſuch commiſſions to the charge of perſons who accepted of them with reluctance.

Extraordinary ſervices require particular talents to execute them; with which certain perſons may be endowed in a degree beyond others, who may be better qualified for affairs of a different kind, or for buſineſs in general. Why ſhould the Government preclude itſelf from the benefit of making its own election in ſuch caſes; or why muſt

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muſt it be accompanied by an invidious and partial compariſon of the merits of thoſe who may be competitors for it?

Perhaps alſo, as Mr. *Barwell* has aſſerted, objections founded on incapacity, on peculiarities of diſpoſition which diſqualify them for the particular ſervice which is to be performed, or on the general run or tenor of their character, which do not depend on detached circumſtances, nor can be eaſily eſtabliſhed by legal proof.

To prevent miſconſtructions, I declare that I do not in theſe inſtances mean to allude to any particular perſons, but only to ſhew the inconveniences which would ariſe from an invariable choice of the ſenior Members of the Board in all extraordinary commiſſions. I will however add, for the information of my honourable Employers, who, from the abundance of argument which has been waſted on this ſubject, may be led to ſuſpect ſome unworthy motive in the diſtinction which has apparently been paid to Mr. *Lawrell*, that *I myſelf was influenced by two conſiderations which may be deemed perſonal. I know Mr.* Lawrell *to be poſſeſſed of much knowledge in the general buſineſs of the revenue, of uncommon talents in accounts, and a great ſhare both of method and aſſiduity; qualifications peculiarly adapted to the ſervice on which he was to be employed.*

Lawrell.

Barwell.

Mr. Barwell *has made it neceſſary to declare, that although I have the juſteſt deference for his abilities, I have not yet had an opportunity of experiencing their effects but in points of controverſy or oppoſition, nor derived any benefit from his aſſiſtance*; that, whether from a different mode of thinking, or contrariety of temper, or from whatever cauſe, it has not been my good fortune to be upon a footing of confidential communication with him; and therefore I would not judge him to be the fitteſt perſon for a ſervice which was to be preparatory to my own, and which would impoſe upon me the neceſſity of taking his aſſiſtance, and of conſulting with him on points of the utmoſt importance to the political intereſts of the Company, and requiring inſtant deciſion if the propoſed interview with the Vizier ſhould take place.

I am ſorry to be compelled to ſuch a declaration. I am ſatisfied to refer the Court of Directors for the juſtice of it to their public records; and hope I ſhall ſtand juſtified in their opinion, for the motives which have led me to the preference of Mr. *Lawrell*, in a caſe which was never yet conſidered as determinable by the ſtrict line of ſeniority.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Mr. *Barwell* further begs leave to record his ſentiments in the following Minute.

Mr. Barwell's Anſwer to the Preſident's Obſervations.

The honourable the Preſident's obſervations, touching the queſtions I propoſed to the Board on the ſubject of the Corah appointment, which took place in favour of Mr. *Lawrell*, are ſuch as might have occurred to my mind; becauſe the propriety of the ſentiments urged for a deviation from the ſtrict line of ſeniority on extraordinary occaſions, and under very particular circumſtances, are doubtleſs obvious, and will always be admitted by men capable of diſtinguiſhing what is beneficial for the public ſervice. I ſhould not have given the Board the trouble of my preceding Minute, but for the reaſon therein aſſigned; the jealouſy with which I conceive every man will regard his own character, who is conſcious of meriting well from the public, and deſirous of vindicating himſelf againſt any public exception that can be made to his pretenſions to ſerve the Company in any line of duty to which he may with propriety aſpire. In this reſpect having acquitted myſelf of the duty I owed to myſelf, I can only lament my not being favoured with the Governor's confidence, to balance in his mind the objections which he declares to have preponderated againſt me. At the ſame time that I feel the deepeſt concern at ſo public a mark of his diſſatisfaction, I can ſafely aver my unhappineſs in the particular which he has reluctantly noticed, to be my thinking differently of the ſubjects which appear upon your records; my principle would be very much miſtaken indeed, if an idea of oppoſition ſhould be aſcribed to me, an idea I diſclaim as entirely foreign to my thoughts, while I admit that a free and impartial diſcuſſion of points that fell under the Board's conſideration, made me deem it my duty to ſpeak my particular ſentiments. Where they appear repugnant to the ſenſe of the majority, my wiſhes, my inclination, and my intereſt, lead me to deſire nothing more ardently than to conform to every opinion, the propriety of which may have been admitted by the ſanction of your approval: you may imagine then that the occaſions which aroſe, were a force upon my inclinations, and compelled me in the inſtances in which I have differed, either to give up my own judgment without conviction of its being erroneous, or to recoil it. Your candour, I am convinced, did not impoſe on me the firſt; and I am ſatisfied you will be no longer diſpleaſed with the laſt, when you credit my obſervation, that it was the reſult of the firſt.

The utility of the meaſure which has given riſe to the preſent argument, I approved from ſentiments formed regarding it long ſince; and theſe I ſubmitted to the Governor, actuated equally to lay them before him by private delicacy and deference to his ſtation, as by my public duty. It proved my happineſs on this occaſion to hear from him, that the ſame ſubject had a place in his thoughts, and that it would be ſhortly perfected and brought before the Board. You have ſince ſeen and approved the Governor's plan; and I flatter myſelf, from his great political knowledge and abilities, every happy conſequence will reſult to your affairs in the execution of the commiſſion with which he is entruſted. Pardon me, if you think I have unneceſſarily engaged your time; and let the idea which renders a ſubject intereſting to any particular character, influence your indulgence to the perſon who may be under the impulſe of that idea.

(Signed) *Richd Barwell.*

The Preſident craves the indulgence of the Board, while he ſubjoins a few words as a cloſe to the ſubject of the forgoing Minutes. The Preſident's ſecond Minute.

He ſincerely acknowledges the ſatisfaction he has received from the very candid and liberal reception which Mr. *Barwell* has been pleaſed to give to his explanation of the motives which induced him to prefer Mr. *Lawrell* for the deputation to *Corah*; and he here repeats, that his ſole view was to ſecure, in the execution of the important negociations which had been aſſigned him by the Board, a cordial and effective aſſiſtance from the Gentleman who was to be entruſted with the preparatory meaſures of them.

He is ſorry there was not at that time ſuch an eſtabliſhed confidence between himſelf and Mr. *Barwell* as might afford him the certainty of that aſſiſtance. As he ſhall always be happy to benefit by Mr. *Barwell*'s abilities, he ſhall on his part with great cheerfulneſs ſtudy to ſecond the deſire which that Gentleman has expreſſed, that there may be a perfect cordiality, and an unreſerved communication of ſentiments between them, ſo that in future there may be no room for ſuch objections, as the Preſident has been compelled in this inſtance to make uſe of; convinced, that while he at the ſame time finds his inclinations gratified, and his labours relieved, the public ſervice will equally benefit by a mutual harmony ſubſiſting between all the Members of the Adminiſtration.

Warren Haſtings.
William Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.
James Lawrell.
H. Goodwin.
J. Graham.
George Vanſittart.

APPENDIX. No. 18.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th *April 1773*. — *Preſent*, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *Wm Alderſey*, *Rd Barwell*, *Jr Lawrell*, *Hy Goodwin*, *Jr Graham*, *Wm Lambert*, *George Vanſittart*, eſquires.

Mr. *Lawrell* applies for two aſſiſtants in the buſineſs of his deputation to the province of *Corah*.

Mr. D. Anderſon and Mr. T. Graham appointed Aſſiſtants to Mr. Lawrell.

Agreed, that Meſſrs. *David Anderſon* and *Thomas Graham*, be appointed aſſiſtants to Mr. *Lawrell*; and that the Reſident of the Durbar be informed of Mr. *Anderſon*'s appointment in the following Letter.

Ordered, that the Secretary do acquaint the Board of Revenue with the appointment of Mr. *Graham*.

To the Durbar.

To *Samuel Middleton*, eſquire, Reſident at the Durbar.

Sir,

We have to acquaint you, that yeſterday we appointed Mr. *David Anderſon*, who is at preſent under you at the Durbar, to be aſſiſtant in a deputation under Mr. *Lawrell*, to the country of *Corah*, and that he is ordered to hold himſelf in readineſs to depart with Mr. *Lawrell* immediately.

We are, Sir, &c.

The Secretary lays before the Board the following drafts, which he has prepared of Inſtructions to Mr. *Lawrell*, and of a Letter to General Sir *Robert Barker*.

Inſtructions to Mr. Lawrell.

To *James Lawrell*, eſquire.

Sir,

Having judged it expedient to depute a Member of Council to receive charge of the ſuperintendance of the province of *Corah* from the General, who was by his Inſtructions inveſted with that truſt, you have been choſen to proceed thither for that purpoſe; and though, as a Member of the Board, you are acquainted with our intentions reſpecting that province, and the ſervice required from you there, yet, for your better guidance, we now convey you the following Inſtructions; to which you will pleaſe to adhere, and to repreſent to us ſuch circumſtances as ſhall appear to you to require a deviation from theſe orders, or an addition to them, that we may duly inſtruct you accordingly.

On your arrival at *Allahabad* you will immediately apply to the General (who will be inſtructed to that effect) to put you in regular poſſeſſion of the authority which has been delegated to him in the adminiſtration of that province; and you will receive from him ſuch Accounts, Eſtimates, and Papers concerning the Revenue, as he may have procured in conſequence of our Inſtructions to him.

As you will take poſſeſſion of the province in the name of the Company, acting as allies to the King *Shaw Allum*, you will take care to maintain his Naib *Munier o Dowla* in the actual government of it; but you will exerciſe, and you are hereby inveſted with full power for exerciſing, ſuch an authority and controul over him and the other Officers, as may be neceſſary to enable you properly to inveſtigate and form an account of the revenue. This inveſtigation and account you are particularly enjoined to undertake, and to tranſmit it to us when finiſhed, with ſuch remarks as ſhall occur to you in the courſe of this inquiry, and may prove of uſe to us hereafter in any negociations for the diſpoſal of that province, this being the immediate end and object of your commiſſion.

The defence of *Corah* being undertaken ſolely on behalf of the King, it is underſtood that the nett revenue, after defraying the ordinary charges, ſhall be wholly applied towards diſcharging the extra expence incurred by the Company on that account. For this purpoſe it will be neceſſary that you demand and receive, monthly, the nett income as above explained, and this we ſuppoſe will amount to a lack of rupees per month; but whatever may be the ſurplus amount of the collections, after payment of the other charges, we expect that the charge be ſo regulated, as to leave this amount at leaſt for the reimburſing our extra expence.

You will accordingly explain to the Nabob *Munier ul Dowla*, that he is to be accountable to the Company for the collections, from the entrance of our forces into that country, till ſuch time as it ſhall be finally ſettled in what manner it is hereafter to be diſpoſed of.

It being our intentions, by your appointment, to maniſeſt in the moſt public manner our determination to maintain the Company's influence and participation in the affairs and revenues of that province, and ultimately to eſtabliſh a right to the future diſpoſal of it in the moſt equitable manner, when it ſhall become a ſubject of negociation; and as we conceive that this public declaration of our intentions may be of great importance alſo towards procuring an equivalent for its ceſſion; you will therefore on all occaſions teſtify that you act upon thoſe views. And you are on no account, whether in war or peace, to deliver over the poſſeſſion of *Corah*, either to the Marattas or the Vizier, or any other Power whatſoever, or quit the controul as above directed, without expreſs orders from us for that purpoſe. We mean that this order ſhall alſo extend to the King; for although we have taken poſſeſſion of it, and hold it in his name, yet to ſurrender it to him while he continues in his preſent helpleſs ſtate, or in power of the Marattas, would be in effect to give it up to the latter; or to any other State who might have the poſſeſſion of his perſon.

To avoid any miſapprehenſion of theſe Inſtructions reſpecting the Corah province, we think it neceſſary to explain, that we mean by that expreſſion the province of *Corah*, properly ſo called, the diſtrict of *Currah*, and ſuch part of the *Allahabad* province as was confirmed to the King by the treaty with the Vizier in 1765.

We have nothing more to add at this time, but to recommend to you to be full and frequent in your advices, and to refer you to what further Inſtructions we may find neceſſary to give, according as the lights with which you may furniſh us, or other intelligence, ſhall enable us to be more particular.

For your information we encloſe a copy of that part of our Inſtructions to the General, which relates to the object of your preſent miſſion, and alſo of the Letter which we have now written to him, in conſequence of your appointment.

Proper Letters of introduction to the Vizier, and the Nabob *Muneer ul Dowla*, will be furniſhed you by the Preſident.

We have appointed Mr. *David Anderſon* and Mr. *Thomas Graham*, aſſiſtants to you in the buſineſs of your deputation. We wiſh you ſucceſs, and are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient ſervants.

To Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

It formed an article of our Inſtructions to you on your departure from the Preſidency, that at the ſame time you undertook the defence of the province of *Corah*, you ſhould alſo ſuperintend the conduct of the Naib *Munur ul Dowla*, in the management of its revenues, and the other dependant diſtricts, and obtain the moſt accurate and authentic accounts of them. This object ſtill appears to us in a light of the greateſt importance, as well for preſerving the Company's immediate influence and participation in the affairs of thoſe provinces, as for eſtabliſhing a right to their future diſpoſal of them in the moſt advantageous manner, whenever it ſhall be made a ſubject of negociation. But as not only the nature of the ſervice in which you are actually employed, and the great and important duties of your ſtation, but alſo the diſtance to which the operations of the Company have drawn you, preclude us from availing ourſelves of the continuance of your ſervices in this particular point; we

have

have judged it expedient to depute a Member of our Board to execute thoſe powers, relative to the ſuperintendance of *Corah*, &c. which were formerly delegated to you; and Mr. *Lawrell*, the Gentleman we have appointed, will for this purpoſe directly proceed to *Allahabad*.

On his arrival there, you will pleaſe to conſign over to him the charge of the province of *Corah* and its dependencies. We cannot ſuppoſe that your other indiſpenſable avocations have afforded either time or opportunity to obtain accounts of the revenue or ſtate of the country. If you have poſſeſſed yourſelf of any ſuch materials, we deſire you will deliver them to Mr. *Lawrell*. You will alſo ſignify to *Muner ul Dowla* the nature of Mr. *Lawrell*'s appointment, and the powers which he is to exerciſe, that he may treat both with a proper deference and regard.

All this you will pleaſe to execute in the moſt public formal manner that the diſtance of your ſituation will admit, in order to manifeſt our intentions by this ſpecial deputation; which are, as we have ſaid above, to preſerve an influence and participation in the affairs and revenues of thoſe provinces, and to eſtabliſh a right to the future diſpoſal of them, when it ſhall become a ſubject of negociation, in the moſt advantageous manner for our Employers.

We deſire you will afford Mr. *Lawrell* all the aſſiſtance and ſupport in the execution of his truſt which your ſituation may enable you to give, or he ſhall have occaſion to require.

We could wiſh to allot, for Mr. *Lawrell*'s accommodation during his ſtay at *Allahabad*, the houſe which was built there by the Company for the uſe of the Commanding Officer: we requeſt, therefore, that you will ſend the neceſſary directions that the houſe may be prepared for Mr. *Lawrell*'s reception.

Fort William, We are, &c.
26th April 1773.

Agreed, that they be drawn out fair, and ſigned.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 6th May 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Preſident. *William Alderſey*, *Rich*^{d} *Barwell*, *James Lawrell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *George Vanſittart*, eſquires, Mr. *Dacres*, indiſpoſed.

Mr. *Lawrell* intending to proceed on his deputation to *Corah* in a few days, now takes his leave of the Board.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt May 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *William Alderſey*, *Thomas Lane*, *Rich*^{d} *Barwell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *Geo. Vanſittart*.

The Preſident lays before the Board the following Letter he has received from *Shujah ul Dowla*:

From the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowla*. Received the 9th June 1773.

What you have written me on the ſubject of an interview, has given me infinite pleaſure and ſatisfaction; my deſire to ſee you is greater than can be expreſſed. I ſhall now return to *Fyzabad*, and it is neceſſary that you come up agreeable to your promiſe, and I ſhall give you the meeting at *Benares*. In this interview many affairs which have as yet been brought to no iſſue, will, with our mutual advice and concurrence, be eſtabliſhed upon a proper and advantageous footing. It is alſo certain, that what cannot take effect in the preſent year will be concluded in the next, and that this meeting will be a means of ſtrengthening the bonds of friendſhip and alliance ſubſiſting between us, as well as of eſtabliſhing an uniform and equally deſirable object of policy between us.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *W*^{m} *Redfearn*,
Perſ^{n} Tranſlator.

The Preſident acquaints the Board that in conſequence of the above Letter, with their conſent he intends to proceed to the interview with the Vizier already reſolved, on the 19th ultimo; and requeſts the permiſſion of the Board to take Mr. *Vanſittart* with him, that he may be benefitted by his aſſiſtance in the buſineſs to be tranſacted with the Vizier.

Agreed to.

Mr. *Lambert* ſends in the following Letter:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, Governor, &c. Council *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Mr. Lambert requeſts leave to accompany the Preſident on account of his ill health.

The very weak condition to which my ſevere illneſs at *Moorſhedabad* reduced my conſtitution, had long ago (and indeed more eſpecially ſince the return of the hot ſeaſon) ſhewn me the abſolute neceſſity of a change of ſituation for the perfect re-eſtabliſhment of my health; but the multiplicity of weighty buſineſs in which this Board has for ſome time been engaged, made it my duty to defer applying to you for permiſſion to remove from the Preſidency, and I ſhould moſt cheerfully have perſevered in the reſolution as long as I could poſſibly have been able to attend to the performance of the buſineſs of this ſtation.

The approaching unhealthy ſeaſon in *Calcutta* I could therefore wiſh to avoid; but as I am anxious at the ſame time to render what ſervice may be in my power in aſſiſting and promoting the public buſineſs, I would, with your permiſſion, take the preſent favourable opportunity that the Governor's propoſed viſit offers me (ſhould it meet his approbation) to accompany him out of the provinces. I ſhould not, as I have before remarked, have declined contributing my part to the diſcharge of the weighty buſineſs of the Preſidency, but my phyſicians have urgently preſſed me to try what ſalutary effect a change of air and climate may produce.

Fort William, I am, reſpectfully, &c.
31ſt May 1773. (Signed) *W. Lambert*.

Agreed, that Mr. *Lambert* be allowed, for the benefit of his health, to accompany the Preſident in his trip up the country.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 7th June 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *Tho*^{s} *Lane*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *Will*^{m} *Lambert*, *Geo. Vanſittart*, eſquires.

Received the following Letter from Brigadier General Sir *Robert Barker*:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council of *Fort William*. General Barker.

Gentlemen,

Your Letter of the 26th of April I have had the honour to receive; and it gives me ſatisfaction to find the Board have deputed one of its Members for a particular examination into the revenues of the Corah province. The diſtance I have been at has not allowed me to make any other than a general obſervation on the collections of this province, and you may be aſſured I ſhall with pleaſure afford Mr. *Lawrell* every information that has come to my knowledge in relation to the buſineſs he is deputed upon.

I have wrote *Muneer ul Dowla* to requeſt he will have the Company's houſe and lands prepared for the reception of Mr. *Lawrell*, in the beſt manner the very incomplete ſituation of the building, as left by General *Smith*, will admit of.

Camp at *Vuſſaſt*, I am, Gentlemen, with reſpect,
May the 20th 1773. (Signed) *R*^{t} *Barker*.

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Bengal Secret Conſultation, the 18th June 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *William Alderſey, Philip M. Dacres, Thomas Lane, Richd Barwell, Henry Goodwin, John Graham, Willm Lambert, George Vanſittart*, eſqrs.

Inſtructions to the Preſident.

The Board having aſſembled this day ſolely for the purpoſe of deliberating on the Inſtructions to be given to the Preſident, reſpecting his interview with the Vizier, and the other affairs in his journey to *Benares*, they have accordingly agreed on a ſet of Inſtructions, which they have ordered to be drawn out and ſigned: but as in an affair ſo delicate as the negociation with foreign Powers, was the leaſt intimation to eſcape of the intentions of the Company, it might ſerve to fruſtrate the accompliſhment; Ordered, That the Inſtructions be not, for the preſent, entered on the Conſultations; but that the Secretary draw out the fair copy with his own hands, for ſigning and delivering to the Preſident; and that he alſo make out a copy to be ſealed up and left with the ſenior Members of Council preſiding in his abſence, to be kept till his return, or until the Board ſhall order otherwiſe.

Not yet to be entered on Record.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.
H. Goodwin.
J. Graham.
George Vanſittart.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 12th July 1773.—Preſent, *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquire, Preſident. *Henry Goodwin, John Graham*, eſquires.

Received the following Letter from Mr. *Lawrell:*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of Council, *Fort William.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Mr. Lawrell arrived at Allahabad.

I have the pleaſure to acquaint you I arrived here this day; and in conſequence of your Inſtructions I immediately applied to General Sir *Robert Barker*, to be put in regular poſſeſſion of the authority you have delegated to me over the province of *Korab* and its dependencies.

Allahabad, the 12th June 1773. I am, with reſpect, &c. (Signed) *James Lawrell.*

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 19th July 1773.—Preſent, *William Alderſey*, eſquire, Preſident. *Philip M. Dacres, Thos Lane, Henry Goodwin, John Graham*, eſquires.

Received the following Letter from Mr. *Lawrell* at *Corab:*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of Council, *Fort William.*

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Mr. Lawrell, Corah.

In my Letter, under date the 12th inſtant, I had the honour to inform you that I had written to General Sir *Robert Barker*, to deliver over to me the authority delegated to him in the adminiſtration of theſe provinces. Upon receiving his anſwer I accompanied the Nabob *Muneer ul Dowla* to the public Cutcherry, where in the moſt formal manner I took poſſeſſion of the diſtricts of *Allahabad* and *Corab* in the name of the Company acting as allies to the King *Shaw Allum*; and I ſhall on all occaſions publicly declare your determination of maintaining the Company's influence and participation in their affairs and revenues.

The General informs me, that the great diſtance at which he has been obliged to act during the late campaign, has prevented him from procuring any accounts or eſtimates of the revenues: I have therefore begun an inveſtigation of the amount which theſe diſtricts have yielded for ſome years paſt; and as ſoon as I have collected the neceſſary Papers, I ſhall tranſmit you a complete account thereof, with ſuch remarks as that you may be enabled to form an accurate judgment of their preſent capacity and value.

A few days before my arrival here, the year 1180 of the Fuſſiller æra expiring, the engagements of moſt of the Farmers were diſſolved; and as they were unwilling to enter into new ones until they ſaw what form of Government would be adopted, I found every thing in a ſtate of ſuſpence and uncertainty, though the ſeaſon of cultivation, which laſts but a ſhort time, was near at hand. To prevent the evil conſequences which would have ariſen from a continuance of affairs in this State, I am employed, in concert with the Nabob *Muneer ul Dowla*, in eſtabliſhing order and regularity in the management of the public affairs, and in inſpiring the Farmers with confidence and aſſurance of ſupport and protection under the executive Government of *Muneer ul Dowla*. The rains have ſince ſet in, and I have the pleaſure to inform you, that the Ryots are every where buſy in cultivating their lands.

As *Muneer ul Dowla* is to be continued in the executive Government, I have inſinuated to him my inclination, that he ſhould become anſwerable to the Company for a fixed nett revenue. He has hitherto however given me no poſitive anſwer, and complains much of the loſſes he ſuſtained laſt year, and of the miſerable ſtate to which the provinces are at preſent reduced, owing to his being abſent greateſt part of laſt ſeaſon with the army, and the want of government that enſued, added to the diſorders occaſioned by the apprehenſions which the Natives univerſally entertained of an invaſion of the Marattas. Theſe cauſes are now indeed removed; but their effects ſtill manifeſtly ſubſiſt. A want of inhabitants is complained of throughout the whole country; and in *Corab*, where the lands have long been continued in the poſſeſſion of their original proprietors, ſeveral of the Zemindars and Rajahs, encouraged at firſt by the proſpect of a revolution, and afterwards by an experience of their own ſtrength, and the inefficacy of *Muneer ul Dowlah*'s troops, are even now in open rebellion. Notwithſtanding however all theſe unfavourable circumſtances from the Nabob's informations, and the enquiries I have made amongſt perſons of the beſt authority and credit in this place, I am led to hope, that whether the collections are received from the ſeveral Zemindars and Renters, or whether the Nabob becomes anſwerable for the whole himſelf, if theſe provinces are diſturbed by no foreign enemy, I ſhall be able to ſecure to the Company, during the courſe of the preſent year, a revenue conſiderably exceeding what you mention in your Letter of Inſtructions.

In obedience to your orders, I have called on *Muneer ul Dowlah*, for his collections from the entrance of our forces into the country; but though he has profeſſed the greateſt readineſs to comply with my demands, and has promiſed to lay before me his accounts of laſt year, he has nevertheleſs, in this reſpect, ſhewed a dilatorineſs in the performance not entirely conſiſtent with his profeſſions. I ſhall continue to urge him on the ſubject, and as ſoon as I have procured and adjuſted his accounts, I ſhall do myſelf the pleaſure of tranſmitting them to you, with ſuch obſervations and remarks as may occur to me regarding them.

Allahabad, the 26th June 1773. I am, with much reſpect, &c. (Signed) *James Lawrell.*

Approved of the ſteps he has taken,

The Board approve of the ſteps Mr. *Lawrell* has taken.

and anſwered accordingly.

Agreed, that he be therefore informed of the ſame in the following Letter, and deſired to tranſmit the accounts that he may be able to obtain, to us as early as poſſible; alſo to lay them before the Preſident on his arrival at *Benares*.

To

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To *James Lawrell*, eſquire, Superintendant at *Corah*.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 12th and 26th June, and approve the meaſures you have taken for attaining a knowledge of the revenue of *Corah*, and of the accounts from *Moneer ul Dowla*, of the collections from the period pointed out in your Inſtructions. When you have obtained and digeſted theſe accounts, we are deſirous they may be immediately tranſmitted to us, and alſo that you lay them before the honourable the Preſident for his information.

We are, &c.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 30th July 1773. — Preſent, *William Alderſey*, eſquire, Preſident. *Philip M. Dacres*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, eſquires.

Mr. Lawrell. Read, the following Letter from Mr. *Lawrell* at *Corah*.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Council, *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I am honoured with your Letter of the 23d ultimo. In obedience to your orders, I am employed in collecting and arranging the accounts of *Allahabad* and *Corah*, for the information of the Preſident; and I ſhall implicitly conform to all ſuch directions as he may think proper to give me, in conſequence of the meaſures he may engage in for the ceſſion of theſe diſtricts.

I am, with reſpect, &c.

Allahabad, 11th July 1773. (Signed) *James Lawrell*, *W. Alderſey*. *P. M. Dacres*. *H. Goodwin*. *J. Graham*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 16th Auguſt 1773.—Preſent, *William Alderſey*, eſquire, Preſident. *Philip M. Dacres*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, eſquires.

The Governor. Received, the following Letter from the Governor.

To *William Alderſey*, eſquire, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

I arrived here on the 3d inſtant; and as I learn that the Vizier is already on his way to *Benares*, I think it neceſſary to proceed without loſs of time to meet him; I have therefore only ſtopt here till ſuch time as all my boats were come up; and this morning they were again diſpatched on to *Munneer*, where I intend to join them the morning of the 8th, going over land for the greater expedition, and taking a view of the Cantonments of *Dinapore* in my way.

I purpoſe on my return to examine the Revenue Papers, and, with the aſſiſtance of the Gentlemen of the Board who have accompanied me, make any alterations which may appear requiſite in the buſineſs of this province. The plan which Captain *Brooke* had formed for the ſettlement of the Jungultirry, or mountainous diſtricts of *Curruckpore*, appearing to me adviſable, I have impowered him to conclude it, and directed him for the preſent to correſpond with me concerning them. I forbear to trouble you with other particulars till I return from *Benares*, and enter more fully on the conſideration of the Revenue Department.

I am, &c.

Patna, Auguſt 6th 1773. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 13th September 1773. — Preſent, *William Alderſey*, eſquire, Preſident. *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, eſquires. Mr. *Dacres*, indiſpoſed.

Received, a Letter from the Governor as follows. The Governor.

To *William Alderſey*, eſquire, and the reſt of the Gentlemen of Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

I arrived here yeſterday, and was met by the Vizier a few miles from the city; the General and Mr. *Lawrell* had arrived ſome time before me.

The firſt two or three days from my arrival will neceſſarily be taken up with viſits of ceremony, and other arrangements, but I mean as ſoon as poſſible to proceed on buſineſs. I will not at preſent pretend to give any intimation of my expectations, nor do I wiſh during the courſe of the negociations, which I truſt will be ſhort, to amuſe you with the different proſpects of ſucceſs or obſtructions which may occur, that I may not miſlead your judgment upon them; I therefore propoſe to delay writing on the ſubject till the buſineſs be concluded, or ſomething be done proper for your attention. This conduct I hope will meet your approbation.

I am, with eſteem, &c.

Benares, 20th Auguſt 1773. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 23d September 1773. — Preſent, *William Alderſey*, eſquire, Preſident. *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, eſquires.

Read, the following Letter from the Governor. The Governor.

To *William Alderſey*, eſquire, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

This day I finally concluded an agreement with the Vizier, the original of which I ſhall have the pleaſure of laying before the Board on my return; in the meantime I think it my duty, by the earlieſt opportunity, to communicate the ſubſtance of it to you for your ſatisfaction, as follows: He has completed his Negociation.

The diſtricts of *Corah* and *Allahabad* are ceded to the Vizier, on condition of his paying 50 lacks of rupees to the Company, 20 of which in ready money, and the remaining 30 in two years, by equal payments.

He has engaged to pay the whole expence of the Company's forces which may hereafter march to his aſſiſtance, on his requiſition; which has been computed and fixed at 2,10,000 rupees per month for a brigade.

I have obtained a renewal and formal confirmation of his former engagements with Rajah *Cheit Sing*.

I propoſe ſetting out from this place in two days.

I am, &c.

Benares, 7th September 1773. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*.

The Board agree to reply to the Governor's Letter in the following manner: Reply to the Governor.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir,

We have been favoured with your Letter, dated the 7th inſtant, and take the earlieſt opportunity of congratulating you upon the ſucceſsful iſſue of your negociation at *Benares*, which appears to us equally beneficial to the immediate intereſts of the Company, as it is conſonant to the ſyſtem to which our honourable Employers have been invariably inclined, of maintaining and

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ſtrengthening our alliance with *Sujah Dowla*, whoſe dominions by their ſituation form the natural barrier for their ſecurity of theſe provinces.

We are,

Fort William, with the utmoſt eſteem, &c.
23d September 1773.

Mr. Lawrell, with Accounts of the Corah and Allahabad Provinces.

Mr. *Lawrell* ſends a Letter to the Board, with copies of two from him to the Governor, and the ſeveral accounts therein mentioned.

Ordered, that the accounts be entered after this Conſultation, and the Letters recorded as follow:

To *William Alderſey*, eſquire, and to the reſt of the Gentlemen of the Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to tranſmit to you copies of two Letters from me to the honourable the Preſident, accompanying ſeveral accounts and eſtimates of the revenues of the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, copies of which are likewiſe ſent you encloſed.

I am, with reſpect, &c.

Benares, (Signed) *James Lawrell.*
2d September 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. &c.

Honourable Sir,

In obedience to the orders I have received from the Board, under date 23d June, I have the honour to lay before you the ſeveral accounts and eſtimates I have collected and prepared relative to the revenues that at preſent ariſe or may hereafter be drawn from the territories of *Allahabad* and *Korah*. That you may the more fully and clearly comprehend the nature of theſe accounts, I ſhall proceed to give you an explanation of each, agreeable to the numerical order in which they are arranged in the ſeparate liſt.

N° 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Jumma Waſel Baky of *Allahabad* for the Fuſſillee years 1176, 77, 78, and 79, exhibiting the amount ſettlements made by the Farmers, Phouzdars, Aumils, and Zemindars, in their reſpective diſtricts during theſe years; alſo the revenue they actually collected.—I muſt however remark, that the three laſt Mehals are inſerted at the rate they were farmed out by Government, and the ſum collected was what was brought to account clear of all Moſuſſil charges; whereas the collections of the firſt ſeven Mehals, being the groſs revenue levied by the Farmers, &c. according to the Kanoongoe Accounts, were liable to ſeveral deductions and expences before they could be brought into the Government's treaſury. It were, I am ſenſible, to be wiſhed that the ſeveral Mehals in theſe ſtatements could have all been inſerted on one uniform plan; but as the three laſt had been farmed out to individuals, and the Government, contented with receiving regularly the amount of their annual ſettlement, had not interfered further, I was unable to procure their Moſuſſil Papers. On the other hand, when I applied to the Nabob for the Sudder Accounts of the firſt ſeven Mehals, I was informed that the King, when he marched to *Delhi*, had carried them and all the public records along with him.

N° 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The Jumma Waſel Baky of *Korah* for the years 1176, 77, 78, 79, and 1180, drawn out on the ſame form as the preceding accounts of *Allahabad*.—Theſe accounts were delivered to me by the Nabob *Munneer ul Dowla*'s officers. The firſt column exhibits the Jumma, or the amount of the Government's ſettlement with the Farmers and Zemindars; the ſecond ſpecifies the amount actually realized into the treaſury of *Korah*; and the four laſt columns ſhew the particulars of the balances. In the account of the year 1180, the Nabob has omitted to inſert the mint; but as theſe ſtatements are wanted ſolely to enable us to form an eſtimate of the preſent revenue, my having pointed out this miſtake will I imagine be ſufficient.

N° 10. A Sudder Account Jumma Waſel Baky of *Allahabad* for the year 1180, ſupplied me by the Nabob *Munneer ul Dowla*, ſhewing the amount of his ſettlements and collections during laſt year.—I could have wiſhed to have accompanied it with a ſtatement of the Moſuſſil collections, but the Kanoongoes informed me, the year having ſo recently expired they had not had ſufficient time to adjuſt their accounts.

N° 11. A ſtatement of the province of *Allahabad*, ſpecifying the quantity of waſte lands, and the total number of Begaes at preſent in a ſtate of cultivation; the quantity to be deducted on account of Jaghires, Ahema, and other grants, with their eſtimated produce, and finally exhibiting the meaſurement of the Malguzarry lands, with the value thereof, taken from the regiſter of the Kanoongoes, according to their lateſt accounts and valuations.

N° 12. An account of the Jaghire and Etamghaw lands in *Allahabad*, ſpecifying the amount of their revenues, and the names of their holders.

N° 13. A ſimilar account for *Korah*.

N° 14. An abſtract account of the Ahema and other charity lands, ſhewing the quantity thus alienated at preſent in the ſeveral Pergunnahs of *Allahabad*.

N° 15. The ſame account of *Korah*.

N° 16. Accounts Achrajaut of *Allahabad* and *Korah*, being abſtracts of the eſtabliſhed as well as extra charges incurred on account of theſe provinces, for the year 1179.—I was deſirous of procuring a ſimilar account for laſt year; but at the time of my leaving *Allahabad*, the Nabob's officers had not been able to adjuſt it. The charges which appear under the head of *Allahabad* ſeem very heavy, owing to the greateſt part of the pay of the horſemen and ſepoys being defrayed from its revenue, though kept up equally for the protection of both provinces. The amount of this article ought therefore to be conſidered as a general charge for *Allahabad* and *Korah*, and the proportion which each ought to bear, will be ſhewn in the eſtimate of expences for the year 1181.

N° 17. An eſtimate of the groſs collections of both provinces, ſhewing the amount of the Government's revenue, and the ſum alienated in Jaghires, Etamghaw, Atreſma, and other grants.

No. 18. An eſtimate of charges which, from the accounts of former years, and the moſt authentic informations, it is thought will be neceſſary for making the collections of *Allahabad* and *Korah* for the preſent year.

N° 19. An eſtimate of the nett revenue of the provinces of *Allahabad* and *Korah*.

By the eſtimate, N° 17, corroborated by the accounts of the collections for 5 years paſt, it appears, that the total produce of the lands, duties, and other ſources of revenue in theſe provinces, amounts to ſo large a ſum as R° 349,52,274. 13. 9; but by the grants of Etamghaws, Jaghiers, Ahema, and other alienations, it has been diminiſhed in *Allahabad* to R° 9,90,541. 8. 9; and in *Korah* to R° 18,65,201. 2. making together only R° 28,55,742, 10. 9. Some of theſe grants however had, previous to my arrival, been reſumed by the Nabob *Muneer ul Dowla*. If we re-annex their revenue (rated laſt year as per account N° 19, at R° 1,73,587. 0. 1. to thoſe of the Government, they will then amount to R° 30,29,329. 10. 9. the ſum which may be collected annually from the Ryots of *Allahabad* and Zemindars of *Korah*; and from this ſum, if a deduction is made of 10 per cent. for the Moſuſſil charges of *Allahabad*, and we admit an allowance for Nankar, abatements and balances on a medium of former years, as per account N° 19, then will be left the ſum of R° 26,83,416. 11. 10.; from which, if we further deduct the amount of Sudder charges, computed as per eſtimate N° 18, at R° 4,74,000. there will then remain R° 22,09,416. 11. 10. the nett revenues which may be realized annually to Government. This is the revenue which, from theſe accounts, and the reſult

of my enquiries, I am of opinion, if the country remains in peace, and is affected with no unuſual calamity, we may in future years expect to reap from theſe provinces; and I doubt not but conſiderable augmentations may hereafter be made by examining the Sunnuds of Etamghaws, Jaghires, Ahema, and other alienations, and reſuming ſuch as may be found defective by the reverſion of Jaghires which are only granted for life, and by the retrenchment which may be made in the various articles of expence, when our Government becomes more firmly eſtabliſhed, and its effects are diffuſed throughout the whole detail of public affairs.

With reſpect to the preſent year, our expectations muſt be ſomewhat leſs. In my Addreſs to the Board of the 28th June, I repreſented to them the many diſadvantages under which the provinces laboured from the apprehenſions of the inhabitants, occaſioned by the threatened invaſion of the Marattas; from the ſuſpence in which the Farmers and Zemindars were kept during the moſt critical ſeaſon, reſpecting their future maſters; from the rebellion actually raiſed by ſome of the Rajahs; and, in ſhort, from the irregularities and diſorders which ſubſiſted in every branch of the Government. Finding, that under all theſe circumſtances, the collection of the revenue muſt be extremely precarious, whilſt *Muneer ul Dowlah* ſhould be continued in the executive Government as Naib to the King, unleſs he were bound to exert himſelf by ſome ſtronger tie than merely zeal and attachment to the intereſt of the Company, I thought it neceſſary to apply to him; and did, after ſome time and with much difficulty, prevail on him to grant me a writing, by which he made himſelf reſponſible for the nett ſum of 16 lacks of rupees during the preſent year, excluſive of the rents of the Jaghires already re-annexed to the public revenue, and of ſuch reſumptions as on an examination of the Sunnuds may be made hereafter; and without demanding any deductions for the charges of his own maintenance in the ſtation of Naib to the King. It remained for the approbation of the Board to confirm this agreement, and no obligation was granted by me in the meantime on the part of the Company.—Here, Sir, permit me to ſubmit to you my ſentiments on this ſubject. If our ſyſtem of policy ſhall ſtill render it neceſſary that *Muneer ul Dowlah* ſhould be continued as Naib to the King, it will, I think, be highly prudent in us to accept of this ſecurity for a certain revenue, and reſign to him the ſurplus of his collections as a compenſation for the charges of his expenſive ſtation; but on the contrary, if it ſhould be deemed no longer requiſite to ſupport him in this character, *Muneer ul Dowlah* will expect to be releaſed from his obligation; and we may, in my opinion, readily conſent to annul it, and take the collection of the revenues into our own hands, with a confidence of realizing a larger ſum than that for which he is become reſponſible, though perhaps leſs than that which in my eſtimate I have computed the provinces will hereafter yield.

APPENDIX No. 18.

It has ever been the cuſtom to allow the Ryots a total reſpite from collections, from the beginning of June till the end of September, in order that they may have leiſure to ſettle their annual accounts, and attend to the cultivation of their lands. So that during my reſidence at *Allahabad*, there has nothing been collected, unleſs ſome inconſiderable ſums received by *Muneer ul Dowlah* on account of duties and other articles of the Sayer revenue.

I am, &c.

Benares, the 22d Auguſt 1773. (Signed) *James Lawrell.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. &c.

Honourable Sir,

The Nabob *Muneer ul Dowlah* has delivered me a ſtate of his account current with the King, as Farmer of the provinces of *Allahabad* and *Korah* during the Fuſſille year 1180. A tranſlation of it I beg leave to lay before you for your approbation. The balance which thereby appears due from him I have nearly received.

I am, &c.

Benares, the 1ſt September 1773. (Signed) *James Lawrell.*

Agreed, That we teſtify our approbation of Mr. *Lawrell*'s Proceedings, in the following Letter to him:

To *James Lawrell*, eſquire.

Sir,

Reply to Mr. Lawrell.

We have received your Letter of the 2d inſtant, with the ſeveral Papers mentioned to be encloſed. Although we have been favoured with Advices at the ſame time from the honourable the Preſident, apprizing us of the iſſue of his negociations with the Vizier; and although we learn thereby that the ceſſions of *Korah* and *Allahabad* are comprehended in the Treaty; yet can we not omit expreſſing our ſatisfaction with the reſult of your reſearches into the ſtate of the revenue of theſe provinces. They appear to us to have been proſecuted with much accuracy and attention, as well as with great diſpatch; and we doubt not but they proved of utility and aſſiſtance to the Preſident in concluding his ſtipulations with the Vizier. We are, &c.

Fort William, 23d September 1773.

W. Alderſey.
H. Goodwin.
J. Graham.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſillee Year 1176.

Names of the Mehals, or Branches of Revenue.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Havelly Cheyll	1,48,866 2 3	1,40,818 12 3	8,047 6 —	2,159 — —	345 — —	5,543 6 —
Secunderpore	1,33,566 2 6	1,26,027 14 6	7,538 4 —	6,809 8 —	728 12 —	—
Arreyl with the Talook of Barah	2,49,087 3 —	2,18,267 10 3	30,819 7 9	14,716 1 9	10,628 1 9	5,475 4 3
Nuab Gunge	68,979 — —	58,569 — —	10,410 — —	3,535 — —	1,300 — —	5,575 — —
Mah	51,315 9 —	49,140 — —	2,175 — 9	1,000 — —	1,000 — —	175 — 9
Suram	1,23,583 15 6	1,06,680 1 3	16,903 14 3	5,073 1 3	4,617 5 9	7,311 14 9
Jouſſey	98,428 — —	91,671 2 —	6,757 5 —	3,242 — —	- - -	3,515 5 —
Mehal Sayer or Duties, &c.	1,20,000 — —	1,20,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Mehal Darul Zerb, or Mint	55,000 — —	55,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Kheyragur	1,75,000 — —	1,75,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Allahabad Rupees	12,23,825 15 —	11,41,174 9 3	82,651 5 9	36,534 11 —	17,619 3 6	26,497 7 3

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſulee Year 1177.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Havelly Cheyll	1,28,587 6 —	1,21,775 — —	6,811 15 9	3,422 — —	325 — —	3,064 15 9
Secunderpore	97,485 12 —	69,630 11 3	28,155 — 9	6,804 8 —	12,296 6 6	9,054 2 3
Arreyl and Barah	1,72,464 — —	1,57,921 9 3	14,542 6 9	9,346 10 —	3,370 — —	1,825 12 9
Nuab Gunge	51,606 — —	46,907 10 —	4,398 6 —	3,635 — —	- - -	763 6 —
Suram	87,020 13 9	74,733 4 9	12,287 9 —	6,991 13 3	1,057 15 9	4,237 12 —
Jouſſey	92,940 — —	87,398 — —	5,542 — —	3,242 — —	- - -	2,300 — —
Mah	40,675 — —	39,120 — —	1,555 — —	1,000 — —	- - -	555 — —
Mehal Darul Zerb, or Mint	55,000 — —	55,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Kheyragur	1,75,000 — —	1,75,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Mahal Sayer, or Duties, &c.	1,20,000 — —	1,20,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Allahabad Rupees	10,20,478 15 9	9,47,186 9 6	73,292 6 3	34,441 15 3	17,049 6 3	21,801 — 9

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſulee Year 1178.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated, or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Havelly Cheyll	1,61,693 11 3	1,53,652 10 9	8,041 — 6	3,422 — —	325 — —	4,294 — 6
Secunderpore	1,30,142 12 —	1,16,546 5 3	13,596 6 9	6,179 11 —	2,752 4 6	4,664 7 3
Arreyll and Barah	2,38,002 — —	2,26,524 9 —	11,477 7 —	7,836 15 6	355 — —	3,285 7 3
Nuab Gunge	83,443 — —	72,666 14 —	10,776 2 —	5,453 — —	1,000 — —	4,323 2 —
Mah	42,885 10 —	40,370 5 —	2,515 5 —	1,000 — —	- - -	1,515 5 —
Suram	1,19,720 12 —	92,282 15 9	25,437 12 3	5,601 13 9	4,776 — 6	17,059 14 —
Jouſſey	1,22,819 — —	1,12,327 — —	10,492 — —	3,242 — —	- - -	7,250 — —
Mehal Sayer or Diſtrict	1,20,000 — —	1,20,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Mehal Darul Zerb, or Mint	55,000 — —	55,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Kheyragur	1,75,000 — —	1,75,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Allahabad Rupees	12,48,706 13 3	11,64,370 11 9	84,336 1 6	32,735 8 6	9,208 5 —	42,392 4 —

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſillee Year 1179.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated, or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Havelly Cheyll	1,97,109 1 9	1,69,928 6 —	27,180 11 9	3,514 — —	383 — —	23,283 11 9
Secunderpore	1,26,430 6 —	1,03,682 11 3	22,747 10 9	5,867 1 —	1,900 2 —	14,980 7 —
Arreyl and Barah	1,92,772 — —	1,77,806 4 —	13,965 12 —	8,172 4 9	- - -	5,793 7 3
Nuab Gunge	79,175 14 —	68,484 14 —	10,691 — —	5,453 — —	- - -	5,238 — —
Mah	50,432 1 3	43,232 8 3	7,199 9 —	1,000 — —	2,133 — —	4,066 9 —
Suram	1,18,957 4 3	91,418 12 6	27,538 7 9	5,383 9 6	1,641 2 6	20,513 11 9
Jouſſey	1,30,001 — —	94,546 15 —	35,454 1 —	3,242 — —	4,227 — —	27,985 1 —
Mehal Sayer, or Duties, &c.	1,10,000 — —	1,10,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Meal Darul Zerb, or Mint	7,000 — —	7,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Kheyragur	1,75,000 — —	1,75,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Allahabad Rupees	11,85,877 11 3	10,41,100 7 —	1,44,777 4 3	32,631 15 3	10,284 5 3	1,01,860 15 9

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1176.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated, or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Khas Korah	1,98,279 2 —	1,94,941 11 6	3,337 6 6	2,110 — —	518 — —	709 6 6
Gautempore	1,82,192 — —	1,74,821 14 9	7,370 1 3	4,525 — —	1,026 — —	1,819 1 3
Jadgemou	1,27,772 11 —	1,19,927 6 —	7,845 5 —	6,349 — —	878 1 9	618 3 3
Beetore	2,10,230 14 —	2,05,919 8 —	4,311 6 —	2,815 — —	975 4 —	521 2 —
Bendkee	92,399 — —	90,377 5 9	2,021 10 3	1,414 — —	519 2 —	78 8 3
Kooteah Gooneer	70,000 — —	67,000 — —	3,000 — —	1,500 — —	301 4 9	1,198 11 3
Madjaun	1,64,427 — —	1,58,999 2 —	5,427 14 —	3,448 — —	1,400 — —	579 14 —
Ainjee	1,43,164 — —	1,40,075 1 —	3,088 14 9	- - -	599 — —	2,489 14 9
Futtehpore	1,97,113 — —	1,90,613 — —	6,500 — —	5,000 — —	500 — —	1,000 — —
Huſſua	70,000 — —	68,989 2 —	1,010 14 —	- - -	- - -	1,010 14 —
Hantgang	1,24,843 — —	1,22,250 3 —	2,592 13 —	2,500 — —	92 13 —	—
Kuteiah	19,500 — —	19,500 — —	—	—	—	—
Rarry	1,40,000 — —	1,39,500 — —	500 — —	- - -	500 — —	—
Havelly Kirrah	74,800 — —	69,376 9 —	5,423 14 —	4,270 — —	1,103 2 —	50 12 —
Attarbund	56,090 11 —	54,000 — —	2,090 11 —	1,900 — —	- - -	190 11 —
Mehal Sayer (of Korah and Kirrah)	73,502 — —	73,502 — —	—	—	—	—
Mehal Darul Zerb, or the Mint	16,000 — —	16,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Sayer Shawzadpore	6,500 — —	6,500 — —	—	—	—	—
Korah Rupees	19,66,813 6 —	19,12,292 8 3	54,520 13 9	35,831 — —	8,422 11 6	10,267 2 3

Benares, the 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1177.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated, or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Khas Korah	1,98,269 — —	1,93,713 2 6	5,155 13 6	3,075 — —	77 — —	1,293 13 6
Gautempore	1,71,152 6 —	1,68,209 3 —	2,943 3 —	2,840 — —	- - -	103 3 —
Jadgemou	1,05,245 — —	1,01,125 — —	4,120 — —	3,625 — —	495 — —	—
Beetore	1,77,323 1 —	1,69,532 — —	7,791 1 —	7,000 — —	- - -	791 1 —
Benkee	98,500 — —	93,213 — —	5,277 — —	2,832 — —	1,400 — —	1,045 — —
Kooteah Gooneer	65,508 8 —	65,008 — —	500 8 —	- - -	- - -	500 8 —
Madjaun	1,59,834 8 —	1,54,955 6 —	4,879 2 —	2,740 — —	2,139 1 —	— 1
Ainjee	1,34,532 — —	1,33,532 — —	1,000 — —	1,000 — —	—	—
Futtehpore	1,79,083 — —	1,74,000 — —	5,083 — —	4,000 — —	- - -	1,083 — —
Huſſua	74,882 4 3	72,218 — 9	2,664 3 6	1,500 — —	1,105 3 6	59 — —
Hantgang	1,07,383 — —	1,01,179 1 9	6,193 14 3	3,259 — —	1,348 — —	1,586 14 3
Kuteleh	19,401 — —	19,401 — —	—	—	—	—
Rarry	1,00,001 — —	95,632 — —	4,369 — —	3,300 — —	1,000 — —	69 — —
Havelly Kirrah	56,474 — —	52,164 — —	4,310 — —	2,199 — —	175 — —	1,936 — —
Attarbund	41,855 13 3	40,628 2 3	1,227 11 —	- - -	249 11 —	978 — —
Mehal Sayer, or Duties, &c.	78,001 — —	78,001 — —	—	—	—	—
Mehal Darul Zerb, or the Mint	16,000 — —	16,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Sayer Shawzadpore	6,500 — —	6,500 — —	—	—	—	—
Korah Rupees	17,89,945 8 6	17,34,431 — 3	55,514 8 3	38,137 — —	7,989 — 6	9,352 7 9

Benares, the 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1178.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated, or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Khas Korah	1,99,943 13 6	1,90,940 4 —	9,003 9 6	5,572 — —	2,315 — —	1,116 9 6
Gautempore	1,32,776 — —	1,17,386 13 —	15,379 3 —	8,476 9 —	2,503 2 —	4,409 8 —
Jadgemou	85,000 — —	71,749 11 —	13,250 5 —	8,799 — —	2,132 5 —	2,319 — —
Beetore	2,50,392 8 —	2,17,434 15 6	31,957 8 6	25,540 — —	3,169 4 9	3,248 3 9
Bendkee	95,776 8 —	91,668 1 9	4,108 6 3	3,556 4 —	- - -	552 2 3
Kooteah Gooneer	65,508 8 —	62,267 2 9	3,301 5 3	2,028 — —	510 — —	763 5 3
Madjaun	1,89,294 12 —	1,66,272 15 3	23,021 12 9	20,210 — —	- - -	2,811 12 9
Ainjee	1,36,002 — —	1,13,218 — —	22,784 — —	18,345 — —	1,270 5 —	3,168 11 —
Futtehpore	1,75,000 — —	1,68,042 2 —	6,957 14 —	3,500 — —	839 6 —	2,618 8 —
Huſſua	81,001 — —	75,971 10 3	5,029 5 9	5,001 — —	- - -	28 5 9
Hautgang	1,12,001 — —	1,06,003 — —	5,701 — —	4,263 — —	1,438 — —	—
Kutelch	19,001 — —	19,001 — —	—	—	—	—
Rarry	1,27,001 — —	1,22,557 8 —	4,453 8 —	4,222 — —	- - -	222 8 —
Havelly Kirrah	55,633 — —	50,977 14 —	4,655 2 —	4,655 2 —	—	—
Attarbund	44,001 — —	42,840 6 —	1,160 10 —	- - -	270 — —	890 10 —
Mehal Sayer, or Duties, &c.	82,001 — —	82,001 — —	—	—	—	—
Mehal Darul Zerb, or the Mint	16,000 — —	16,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Sayer Shawzadpore	6,500 — —	6,500 — —	—	—	—	—
Korah Rupees	18,71,833 1 6	17,21,069 7 6	1,50,763 10 —	1,14,167 15 —	14,448 6 9	22,148 4 3

Benares, the 22d Auguſt 1773.

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1179.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Abated, or Irrecoverable.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Khas Korah	1,62,503 3 9	1,52,129 7 3	10,373 12 6	5,572 — —	4,336 12 6	465 — —
Gautempore	1,18,849 13 —	97,204 1 —	21,645 12 —	10,476 9 —	2,454 1 6	8,715 1 6
Jadgemou	1,00,636 3 —	79,736 9 3	20,899 9 9	10,799 — —	3,149 5 6	6,951 4 3
Beetore	2,04,803 14 —	1,68,683 4 9	36,120 9 3	30,002 — —	- - -	6,118 9 3
Bendkee	1,08,398 2 6	1,03,018 3 9	5,379 14 9	3,556 4 —	- - -	1,823 10 9
Kooteah Gooneer	1,08,769 — —	1,08,768 9 3	— 6 9	- - -	- - -	— 6 9
Madjaun	1,85,793 12 —	1,30,148 14 —	55,654 14 —	21,850 — —	- - -	33,794 14 —
Ainjee	1,42,501 — —	93,434 — —	49,067 — —	20,290 — —	- - -	28,777 — —
Futtehpore	1,84,133 4 9	1,76,903 15 9	7,219 5 —	3,821 7 —	3,388 12 9	19 1 3
Huſſua	71,655 10 —	66,322 — 9	5,333 9 3	5,001 — —	332 9 3	—
Hautgang	1,09,900 9 —	1,01,724 13 3	8,175 11 9	8,017 2 —	158 9 9	—
Kutelch	21,001 — —	21,001 — —	—	—	—	—
Rarry	1,25,780 14 3	1,17,814 15 —	7,965 15 3	5,892 — —	- - -	2,073 15 3
Havelly Kirrah	75,982 13 6	66,796 9 3	9,186 4 3	4,655 2 —	- - -	4,531 2 3
Attarbund	47,001 — —	38,598 11 —	8,402 5 —	- - -	- - -	8,402 5 —
Mehal Sayer, or Duties, &c.	82,001 — —	82,001 — —	—	—	—	—
Mehal Darul Zerb, or the Mint	16,000 — —	16,000 — —	—	—	—	—
Sayer Shawzadpore	6,500 — —	6,500 — —	—	—	—	—
Korah Rupees	18,72,211 3 9	16,26,786 2 3	2,45,425 1 6	1,29,932 8 —	13,820 3 3	1,01,672 6 3

Benares, the 22d Auguſt 1773.

Jumma

JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1180.

Names of the Mehals.	Jumma, or Amount Settlement.	Amount collected.	Balance.	Nankar.	Balance due from the Diſtricts.
Khas Korah	2,10,000 — —	1,80,000 — —	30,000 — —	5,000 — —	25,000 — —
Gautempore	1,11,003 — —	89,442 — —	21,561 — —	4,000 — —	17,561 — —
Jadgemou	1,07,100 — —	65,316 — —	41,784 — —	- - -	41,784 — —
Beetore	1,02,586 — —	68,614 14 6	33,971 1 6	12,000 — —	21,971 1 6
Bendkee	95,001 — —	77,098 — —	17,903 — —	- - -	17,903 — —
Kooteah Gooner	1,08,769 — —	1,08,769 — —	—	—	—
Madjaun	1,27,521 2 0	82,824 6 9	44,696 4 3	13,650 — —	31,046 4 3
Taluck (Rajah Behauder Sing)	71,815 — —	42,648 4 —	29,166 12 —	10,100 — —	19,066 12 —
Ainjee	1,42,000 — —	63,822 — —	78,178 — —	20,000 — —	58,178 — —
Futtehpore, &c.	3,60,535 — —	3,60,535 — —	—	—	—
Attarbund and Rarry	1,58,565 — —	1,30,000 — —	28,565 — —	- - -	28,565 — —
Havelly Kirrah	75,000 — —	70,000 — —	5,000 — —	- - -	5,000 — —
Taluck (Dorea Sing)	1,15,306 — —	76,269 2 3	39,036 13 9	12,100 — —	26,936 13 9
Mehal Sayer, or Duties	80,000 — —	50,614 7 3	29,385 8 9	- - -	29,385 8 9
Korah Rupees	18,65,201 2 —	14,65,953 2 9	3,99,247 15 3	76,850 — —	3,22,397 15 3

Benares, the 22d Auguſt 1773.

SUDDER JUMMA WASEL BAKY of the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſilee Year 1180.

To Amount Settlement of the following Diſtricts, viz.		By Amount collected from the following Diſtricts:	
Havelly Cheyll, farmed by Iſhmael Beg	2,50,000 — —	Havelly Cheyll	2,23,700 — —
Nuab Gunge — Mahomed Azeem Cawn	80,000 — —	Nuab Gunge	60,821 3 1
Mah — Gootaul Chund	45,000 — —	Mah	45,000 — —
Suram and Secunderpore, Miza Huſſen Beg Cawn	2,49,000 — —	Suram and Secunderpore	1,18,588 2 —
Araeyl and the Talook of Barah	2,01,449 — —	Arreyl	89,456 12 2
Jouſſey	80,554 5 3	Jouſſey	41,562 8 1
The Sayer Mehal	1,05,001 — —	The Sayer Mehal	87,888 4 —
			6,67,016 14 4
		By Balance uncollected from the following Diſtricts:	
		Havelly Cheyl	26,301 — —
		Nuab Gunge	19,179 12 —
		Suram and Secunderpore	1,30,413 14 —
		Arreyl	1,11,992 3 2
		Jouſſey	38,991 13 1
		The Sayer Mehal	17,112 12 —
			3,43,991 7 3
Allahabad Siccas	10,11,008 5 7	Allahabad Siccas	10,11,008 5 7

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

A STATEMENT of the Province of Allahabad; specifying the Quantity of Waste Lands, and Lands in Cultivation, the Quantity deducted on account of Jagheer and Charity Lands, with their Value; and, finally, shewing the Quantity of Malguzarry Lands, with the Value thereof, as taken from the Registers of the Canoongoes, in the Fusselee Year 1181.

Names of the Pergunnahs.	Waste Lands.			Cultivated Lands.			Number of Begas contained in the cultivated Lands.		Value in Rupees.	Deductions.						Remains Malguzarry Lands.			Number of Begas contained.		Value in Rupees.
										Jagheers and Charity Lands.			Number of Begas contained.		Value in Rupees.							
	Villages.	Chucks.	Puttas.	Villages.	Chucks.	Puttas.	Begas.	Biswas.		Villages.	Chucks.	Puttah.	Begas.	Biwas.		Villages.	Chucks.	Puttahs.	Begas.	Biswas.	
In Cheyl	34	1	3	563	4	26	295,199	10	2,51,691 15 —	128	2	3	91,371	15	51,278 10 6	434	2	23	204,021	15	2,00,413 4 6
Jousley	30	-	-	556	-	-	171,362	-	1,34,677 — —	81	-	-	3,699	-	4,676 — —	495	-	-	107,663	-	1,30,001 — —
Sengrore, or Nabob Gung	3	-	-	198	12	-	49,142	-	80,281 6 —	3	9	-	1,551	-	1,186 6 —	194	3	-	47,509	-	79,175 — —
Mah	19	-	-	305	-	-	99,042	-	56,239 13 6	50	-	-	6,816	10	5,797 12 —	335	-	-	92,225	10	50,432 1 6
Arreyl	6	-	-	438	67	-	273,373	8	2,25,307 6 —	72	67	-	46,568	16	33,535 6 —	365	-	-	226,809	12	1,91,772 — —
Secunderpore	1	-	-	579	-	-	92,983	15	1,24,683 6 —	37	-	-	6,410	15	5,323 6 —	541	-	-	86,573	-	1,19,360 — —
Suram	26	-	-	411	4	-	91,400	-	1,20,599 3 —	15	-	-	3,390	-	6,211 — —	391	3	-	88,010	-	1,14,388 3 —
	119	1	3	3,130	87	26	1,023,096	13	9,93,470 1 3	368	79	3	159,802	16	1,97,928 8 6	2,761	8	23	863,293	17	88,541 8 9

N.B. The Jagheir of Rheyragur, held by the Nabob Mineer ul Dowla, is not included in the above Statement. In the quantity of Malguzarry Lands which remains, there is 15,412 Begas concealed, and otherwise improperly held or obtained, amounting to Rupees 9,490. 2. 6. which reduces the above Valuation to Rupees — — — — — — — — — — 8,76,051 6 3

Benares, 22d August 1773.

ACCOUNT of Jagheer Lands in the Province of Allahabad, under their different Denominations, specifying the Names of the Holders and the Amount of their Revenues.

	Jaghiraut, Allumgaw, or Jagheirs granted to perpetuity.		
In Kheyragur, held by Muneer ul Dowla, one Pergunnah amounting to R		1,80,000 — —	
In Cheyl, held by the Nabob Khan Allum, consisting of six Villages and one Puttah		6,000 — —	
In Ditto,	by Rajah Sowhet Roy, 17 Villages	4,000 — —	
In Ditto,	by Rajah Khy-aly Ram, 9 D° and 1 Chuck	3,000 — —	
In Ditto,	by Moonshey Khussaul Sing, consisting of 3 Villages, 1 Chuck, and a Tank	3,900 — —	
In Ditto,	by Roy Billas Ram, 200 Begars	500 — —	1,96,500 — —
	Jaghiraut, Jagheers granted for Life.		
In Keway, held by Khan Allum, one Pergunnah		60,000 — —	
In Cheyl,	Mirza Acbar Shaw, 17 Villages	5,500 — —	
In D°,	Sulliman Sheks, 3 D°	1,250 — —	
In D°,	Mobarek, 41 D°	8,300 — —	
In D°,	Tadje Mehal, 1 D°	1,500 — —	
In D°,	Rajah Ram Naut, 4 D° and 1 Puttah	1,500 — —	
In D°,	Khissam ul Dowlah, consisting of 65 Villages and 15 Gunwah	30,000 — —	
In D°,	Wajut Dowlah, 4 Villages	2,000 — —	
In D°,	Afghar Ally Gawn, 3 D°	450 — —	
In D°,	Hoosh Chushm Ally Cawn, 1 D°	400 — —	
In D°,	Futty Ally Cawn, 2 D°, 1 Chuck	2,000 — —	
In D°,	Gussam Ally Cawn, 2 D°	400 — —	
In Suram,	Bowanny Sing, 2 D°	1,100 — —	
In Mah,	Bekarey Dos Moonshy, 1 D°	150 — —	1,14,550 — —

(*continued.*)

Benares, 22d August 1773.

APPENDIX. No. 18.

Account of Jagheer Lands.—*continued.*

	Brought over - - -	3,11,650 — —
Baugat, or Ground denominated Gardens, held as Jagheers.		
In Cheyl, held by Rahut Efzan, 5 Villages and 1 Puttah - - -	4,000 — —	
In D°, - - Delferam, 1 D° - - - - - - - -	1,500 — —	
In D°, - - Jey Sing, 2 D° - - - - - - -	400 — —	
In Arreyll, - Allum Efzam, 4 D° - - - - - - -	2,000 — —	
In Cheyl, Ground granted the Engliſh, for cantoning their Troops. - -	1,000 — —	
		8,900 — —
	Allahabad Rupees -	3,19,950 — —

Benares 22d Auguſt 1773.

ACCOUNT of Jagheers in the Province of Corah; ſpecifying the Names of the Holders and the Amount of their Rents, as eſtimated for the preſent Year 1181.

In Kirary, held by Shetabroy - - - - - - - - - - - -				55,000 — —
Moſſimpore, held by Acbaz Shaw - - - - - - - - - -				50,000 — —
In Kirah, held by	Naſſer Munzoor Ally Cawn -	5	Villages - - - - -	4,000 — —
In D° - -	Ramnaut - - - -	8½	Villages - - - - -	5,000 — —
In Khaſs Khorah,	Naſſu Munzoor Ally Cawn -	10	D° - - - - - -	11,000 — —
In Jadgemow -	Jaje Mehal - - - -	15	D° and 1 Chuck - - - -	9,000 — —
In Gautimpore -	Boocha Khawaſs - -	3	Villages - - - - -	2,450 — —
In Allarbund -	Behader Ally Cawn Cojah - - - - - - - - -			1,737 — —
In Kirrah - -	Jaje Mehal - - - -	18	Villages - - - - -	4,000 — —
In Khaſs Rorah	The Badſhaw Zadah -	6	D° - - - - - -	22,000 — —
In Jadgemow -	Mizza Nudziff Cawn -	9½	D° - - - - - -	15,000 — —
			Korah Rupees -	1,79,187 — —

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

ABSTRACT ACCOUNT of Ayma, &c. Charity Lands; ſpecifying the Quantity deviſed away under that Head, in the ſeveral Purgunnahs of the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſillee Year 1180.

			Cunwas.		Cuttchs.
In Cheyl - - - - - - -	Villages	72	8 - - -	and Begas	37,926	2
Arreyll - - - - - - -	D°	4	- - -	and D°	5,273	16
Suram - - - - - - -	D°	13	- - - - -		—	—
Secoundrah - - - - - -	D°	33	15 - - - - -		—	—
Singrore, or Nuab Gunge - - -	D°	3	5 - - -	and D°	700	—
Jouſſey - - - - - - -	D°	3	- - -	and D°	2,769	—
Mah - - - - - - -	D°	31	12 - - - - -		—	—
	Villages -	163		and Begas	46,668	18

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

APPENDIX
No. 18.

ABSTRACT ACCOUNT of Charity Lands in the Province of Corah, including Nancar, or Lands originally granted to the Canoongoes in lieu of Wages, taken in the Fuſſillee Year 1181.

Names of the Pergunnahs.	Ayma held in virtue of the King's Sunnuds.		Ayma deviſed away by the Zem^{s} and ſucceeding Aumils.		Ayma granted to Perpetuity.		Nancar held by the Canoongoes.		Total Villages.	
	Villages.	Berwas.	Villages.	Berwas.	Villages.	Berwas.	Villages.	Berwas.	Villages.	Berwas.
In Khas Corah	8	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	10	—
Gabtimpore	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	5	—
Kooteah Goonere	3	10	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	10
Huſſua, &c.	12	10	-	-	-	-	4	-	16	10
Futtehpore	37	10	9	10	-	-	8	-	55	—
Hautgang	34	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	38	—
Kerrary	30	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	31	—
Atterbund	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	10	4	10
Kirrah	84	10	13	10	-	-	2	-	100	—
Bretore	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	—
Aingee	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	—
Rarry	4	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	9	—
Bendkee	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	—
Jadgemow	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	7	—
Mohuſſinpore	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	—
Madjaween	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	—
	218	-	31	-	3	-	36	-	288	10

Not included in the above,

In Khas Corah	1	Chuck
Futtehpore	1	D°
Rarry	1	D°
	3	Chucks.

ACCOUNT Lands in Corah, which though not held under any particular Denomination, are alienate from the Government, and of which the Rights of Tenure have not yet been aſcertained.

In Beetore, held by Rajah Gongo Sing, &c.	115	Villages.
Ditto	2	D°.
Jadgemow	9	D°.
Mohuſſinpore	1	D°.
Airyer	2	D°.
Majawun	2	D°.
Futtehpore	3	D°.
Hautgong	1	D°.
Villages	135	

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

ACCOUNT

APPENDIX. No. 18.

ACCOUNT ACHRAJAUT, being an Abſtract of eſtabliſhed as well as extra Charges incurred on Account the Province of Allahabad, for the Fuſſillee Year 1179.

Allowances to Horſemen for the Protection of the Provinces, and for enforcing the Collections	5,65,445	12	6
Allowances to Sepoys for - - D° - - D° - - - - - - - - - -	1,46,710	1	—
Pool Bundey - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	800	—	—
Khelauts or Dreſſes given to the Karry, &c. on the End Feſtival - - - - - -	10,000	—	—
Repairs of the King's Palace - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	10,650	—	—
Rupees - -	7,33,650	13	6

ACCOUNT ACHRAJAUT, being an Abſtract of eſtabliſhed as well as extra Charges incurred on Account the Province of Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1179.

Allowances to Horſemen for the Protection of the Province, and for enforcing the Collections	99,592	12	6
Allowances to Sepoys for - - D° - - D° - - - - - - - - - -	63,012	10	9
Moſuſſil Charges - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	52,962	6	6
Wages to Aumils and Naibs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	7,963	2	—
D° - to Mohurrurs and Peiſkkars on the Part of Government - - - - - -	5,560	6	—
D° - to Mohurrurs on the Part of the Aumils - - - - - - - - - -	10,090	—	—
D° - to Mohurrurs belonging to the different Zelas - - - - - - - -	2,643	2	—
Allowances to the Nabob's Naib at Korah - - - - - - - - - -	33,000	—	—
A per centage of 2 per Cent. allowed to D° on the Collections, but of which a Part was only admitted - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	7,000	—	—
Ruſſoom to Government's Servants - - - - - - - - - - - -	33,888	11	6
D° to the Kanoongoes - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	6,782	7	9
Khelauts and Entertainments - - - - - - - - - - - -	6,247	9	—
Intereſt and Batta paid the Merchants for Money borrowed - - - -	5,289	5	—
Khyraut to the Bramins and Fuckeers - - - - - - - - - - -	196	1	3
Ruſſoom to the Kazey - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	3,113	12	—
Paid for a State Horſe and Camel, with Furniture - - - - - - - - -	1,031	9	—
Repairs of Forts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,995	2	9
Powder, &c. for the Uſe of the Fort of Gurreah - - - - - - - - -	353	11	6
Charges of Sezwals or Collectors employed to collect the Balances in the Diſtricts - -	3,205	9	—
Charges incurred in ſupplying Engliſh Gentlemen with Neceſſaries in travelling through the Diſtricts - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	347	5	9
Charges of reducing ſome Forts belonging to the refractory Zemindars - - - -	149	9	—
Robberies committed in the Diſtricts - - - - - - - - - - -	675	14	—
Remitted for ſundry Ahema Lands, which had been improperly reſumed to Government -	450	—	—
Ruſſoom allowed to the Muſter-Maſter of Horſe and Sepoys - - - - - - -	137	6	6
Sayer Curtch, or City Expences - - - - - - - - - - - - -	7,039	2	6
Rupees - -	3,53,878	13	3

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

ESTIMATE of the Groſs Collections of the Provinces of Allahabad and Corah; ſhewing the Amount collected by Government, and the Amount collected by the Jagheerdars and Aymadars, and finally exhibiting the Groſs Produce.

	Amount Land Rents.	Mehal Sayer or Duties, including alſo the Mints.	Total Collections of Government.	Amount Rents of Jagheers, granted to Perpetuity, per Statement N° 12,	Amount Rents of Jagheers, granted for Life, as per Statements N° 12 and 13.	Amount Rents of Gardens held as Jaghires, per Statement N° 12.	Amount Rents of Ayma and Charity Lands eſtimated.	Total Collections of Jagheers and Ayma.	Grand Total, the Groſs Produce of the Provinces.
Allahabad	8,85,541 8 9	1,05,000 — —	9,90,541 8 9	1,96,500 — —	1,14,550 — —	8,900 — —	57,897 5 —	3,77,847 5 —	13,68,388 13 9
Corah - -	17,80,201 2 —	85,009 — —	18,65,204 2 —	— —	1,79,187 — —	— —	82,497 14 —	2,61,684 14 —	21,26,886 — —
Rupees	26,65,742 10 9	1,90,000 — —	28,55,742 10 9	1,96,500 — —	2,93,737 — —	8,900 — —	1,40,395 3 —	6,39,532 3 —	34,95,274 13 9

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

AN ESTIMATE of Charges which will be neceſſary for making the Collections of the Provinces of Allahabad and Korah, for the Fuſſillee Year 1181.

In Allahabad.

200 Horſemen for the Protection of the Province, and enforcing the Collections, at 20 R^s per Month each, making per Annum -	48,000	
1,500 Armed Peons for D° Expence, eſtimated - - - - -	63,000	
Charges General - - - - - - - - -	10,000	
Allowances to Cutcherry Servants, including petty Charges -	36,000	
		1,57,000

In Korah.

400 Horſemen for the Protection of the Province, &c. at the above Rate, making per Annum - - - - - - -	96,000	
2,000 Armed Peons for D° Expence, eſtimated - - - -	1,26,000	
Artillery and other Military Charges - - - - -	75,000	
Allowance to a Phouzdar - - - - - - -	24,000	
Charges General - - - - - - - -	20,000	
Allowances to Cutcherry Servants, including petty Charges -	36,000	
		3,17,000
Rupees -		4,74,000

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

(E. E.) *James Lawrell.*

An

AN ESTIMATE of the Nett Revenue of the Provinces of Allahabad and Corah. APPENDIX. No. 18.

Allahabad, as per Statement of the Valuation of the Lands taken from the Canoongoes.			
Duties - - - - - - - - - - -	8,88,541 8 9		
Add Mehal Sayer or Duties not included in the above, together with the Mint, eſtimated at - - - - -	1,05,000 — —		
		99,054 8 9	
Deduct for Balances, Nancar, and Abatements, on a Medium of Four Years, being from the beginning of the Fuſſeilee Year 1176 to 1179 inclusive - - -	96,264 4 —		
For Moſuſſell Charges on the Valuation of the Lands, eſtimated at 10 per Cent. - - - - - - -	88,554 2 6		
		1,84,818 6 6	
			8,05,723 2 3
Add Jagheers reſumed, the Rents of which towards the End of laſt Year, were collected by Government:			
In Perg. Cheyl, formerly enjoyed by Huſhall Sing - -	3,000 — —		
In D°, by Mirza Akbar Shaw - - - - -	5,500 — —		
In D°, Suliman Sheeko - - - - - -	1,250 — —		
In D°, Nabob Mobareek - - - - - -	8,300 — —		
In D°, Sadge Mehall - - - - - -	1,500 — —		
In D°, Rajah Ramnaut - - - - - -	1,500 — —		
In D°, Khiſſam ul Dowlah - - - - -	30,000 — —		
In D°, Huſh Chuſhm Ally Cawn - - - - -	400 — —		
In D°, Wajy ul Dowlah - - - - - -	2,000 — —		
In D°, Rapul Aſzam - - - - - - -	4,000 — —		
In D°, Futty Ally Cawn, - - - - - -	2,000 — —		
In D°, Gulam Ally Cawn - - - - - -	400 — —		
In D°, Delleram - - - - - - -	1,500 — —		
In Suram, by Bowanny Sing - - - - -	1,100 — —		
In Arſeyl, by Allum Eſram - - - - - -	2,000 — —		
			64,400 — —
		Total Allahabad	8,70,123 2 3
Corah; Jumma or Amount Settlement of the Fuſſellee Year 1180 - - - - - - - - -	1,865,201 2 —		
Deduct for Balances, Nankar, and Abatements, on a Medium of the laſt Five Years - - - - -	161,094 6 5		
		1,704,106 9 7	
Add, Jagheers reſumed, the Rents of which were, towards the End of laſt Year, collected by Government:			
In Perg. Mohuſſinpore, formerly enjoyed by Acbar Shaw -	50,000 — —		
In Kurah, by Naſſer Munzoorally Cawn - - - -	4,000 — —		
In Khaſs Corah, D° - - - - - - - -	11,000 — —		
In Kirrah, by Rajah Ramnaut - - - - -	5,000 — —		
In Jadgemow, by Tadje Mehal - - - - -	9,000 — —		
In Gauttimpore, by Boochos Khauſs - - - -	2,450 — —		
In Atterbund, by Bhehadur Ally Cawn - - - -	1,737 — —		
In Kirrah, by Tadge Mehal - - - - -	4,000 — —		
In Khaſs Korah, by Badſhaw Zadah - - - -	22,000 — —		
		1,09,187 — —	
		Total Corah - -	1,813,293 9 7
		Grand Total - -	2,683,416 11 10
		Deduct for Charges, as per Eſtimate - -	474 000 — —
		Remains Nett Revenue - -	2,209,416 11 10

Benares, 22d Auguſt 1773.

(E. E.) *James Lawrell.*

The NABOB MUNNEER UL DOWLA in Account with his Majesty Shaw Allum, for the Provinces of Allahabad, Korah, and Kirrah, from the 1st of Ribbe ul Sany, in the 13th Year of the Reign, until the End of Ribbe ul Awul, in the 14th Year of the Reign.

Dr		Cr	
To Amount Settlement made with his Majesty	16,00,001 — —	By Amount remitted to the King, as per Receipts of the following Dates:	
		One dated the 1st of Ribbe ul Awul 73,000 — —	
		One dated the 1st of Jemmadiel Awul 79,475 — —	
		One dated the 1st of Jemmadiel Sany 1,00,001 — —	
		One dated the 19th of Do - - 13,125 — —	
		One dated the 28th of Do - - 1,20,750 — —	
		One dated the 29th of Do - - 26,334 6 —	
		One dated the 25th of Rigib - - 1,20,014 5 —	
		One dated the 15th of Shaban - 1,21,012 8 —	
		One dated the 6th of Ramzan - 27,910 8 —	
		One dated the 2d of Showal - - 50,000 — —	7,32,221 11 —
		By Amount paid on Account of his Majesty's Debt to the Nabob Shujah ul Dowla, through Md Eritch Cawn Behader, for which Receipts have been granted by his Majesty - - - - - 2,00,000 — —	
		Batta, at 3 per cent. - 6,000 — —	2,06,000 — —
		By Amount Allowances.	
		Allowances to the Nabob Muneer ul Dowla, per his Majesty's Order. - - - 1,25,000 — —	
		Allowance to sundry of his Majesty's Officers and Servants stationed at Allahabad, viz.	
		Madar ul Dowlah 3,000 per M. paid 15,000 — —	
		Mahomed Sujah Cawn, 2,000 per M. Do 20,000 — —	
		Furzund Cawn Behader, 3,500 per M. Do 34,000 — —	
		Mehdy Cooly Cawn Behader, 3,000 per M. Do - - - - 16,000 — —	
		Rajah Souchet Roy, &c. per M. 3,332. 8. Do - - - - - 16,074 12 —	
		Rajah Dyaram - - - - 6,594 — —	
		Mahomed Reza Beg Cawn, &c. Sepoys 40,074 3 —	
		Hadja Mahmood Cawn, a 725 10 per Mo paid 4,277 9 6	
		Nurzer Beg Cawn, &c. 502 8 — 4,360 6 —	
		Ray Muccum Mull 101 4 — 997 7 6	
		Abul Mufaher Cawn 501 — — 3,000 — —	
		Maledge Cawn, &c, 201 — — 5,000 — —	
		Rajah Dyaram - 350 — — 2,100 — —	
		Rajah Anundiram - 301 — — 3,600 — —	
		Mulluch Md Cawn 125 — — 1,095 6 —	
		Mirza Wudjy, &c. 165 — — 1,035 — —	
		Sidy Hetall Md Cawn 200 — — 2,310 14 —	
		Mullah Baker - 40 — — 163 — —	
		Ball Muccum Moonshy 101 — — 1,200 — —	
		Seroop Sing - - 67 8 — 597 6 —	
		Mahomed Azem Cawn 525 — — 3,150 — —	
		Muzzoor Ullah Cawn 67 8 — 477 — —	
		Raw Behader Sing, &c. 390 12 — 2,581 4 —	
		Soberah Beg - - 60 — — 522 8 —	
		Mirza Abdul Reheim 150 — — 553 8 —	
		Abud Ally Cawn, &c, 600 — — 2,060 — —	
		Ghallam Hossein - 59 8 — 385 14 —	
		Ghouss Cawn, &c. Chokeydars of Allahabad 250 — — 1,550 — —	
		Lutchmen Doss - 60 — — 489 5 3	
		Mean Mussroor - 75 — — 225 — —	
		Sedy Helall - - 101 — — 1,060 — —	
		Suliman Beg - - 125 — — 618 10 —	
		Ghollam Reza - 45 — — 340 8 —	
		Fuckere Ullah, &c. Morkomen - - 1,285 — — 14,357 8 6	
		Charges of the English Dawks - 1,274 1 —	
		Rammagee Ner Sing and Dandies of Majesty's Budgeraw - - - 1,357 13 —	
		3,33,482 15 9	
Carried over	16,00,001 — —	Carried over	9,38,221 11 —

Amount Settlement.					
Brought over		16,00,001 — —	Brought over		9,38,221 11 —
			Amount Allowances. Brought over	3,33,482 15 9	
			Sela, &c. His Majeſty's Gardeners	186 6 —	
			John Mahummud Bulbulbaz	652 10 3	
			Muſſahel Ally Cawn, Darogha of the King's Pigeon Houſe	376 9 3	
			Kaſem Beg, Camel Keeper	290 — —	
			Charges of maintaining the King's Bullocks	188 8 6	
			Ruzinadaram, or Perſons receiving Charity	3,000 — —	
					3,38,177 1 9
			Expences incurred on account of the King, per his Orders, Khelauts furniſhed by the King's Order	18,246 — —	
			Serpeches, &c. ſent the Vizier, &c.	5,895 — —	
			Ray Dunnyram, for the Marriage of his Daughter, per King's Order	500 — —	
			Coky Khanem Saheba, remitted her a Bill by his Majeſty's Order	816 — —	
					25,457 — —
			Charges of Troops entertained during the Troubles with the Marattas, by Orders and Letters from the Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah		1,02,500 — —
					14,04,355 12 9
			By Balance due from the Nabob Muneer ul Dowlah		1,95,645 3 3
Rupees		16,00,001 — —	Rupees		16,00,001 — —

Benares, September 1ſt 1773.

Compared with the Nabob's Account.

James Lawreil.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 27th September 1773.

PRESENT:

William Alderſey, eſq; Preſident,
Henry Goodwin, *John Graham*, eſqrs.
Mr. *Dacres* indiſpoſed.

The Governor propoſes Kullyan Sing to ſucceed Satabroy his late father.

Received, the following Letter from the Governor, which he diſpatched expreſs in a ſmall boat from *Patna*.

To *William Alderſey*, eſq; &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

From an entire conviction of the merits and faithful ſervices of the deceaſed *Maha Rajah Shitabroy*, and in conſideration of his late ſufferings, I am induced to recommend that the office of Royroyan of the province of *Bahar*, now vacant by his death, be conferred on his ſon *Raja Kullyan Sing*.

Although the young Rajah has already manifeſted a proper diſpoſition to buſineſs, and was actually entruſted by his father with a ſhare in the public affairs, yet as his experience cannot be ſuppoſed as yet to have procured him that complete knowledge which time will beſtow, I have in the meanwhile directed *Sudderam* and *Ryollaram*, both old dependents on the family, men of abilities and intelligence in the revenue, to act as his Naibs, and aſſiſt him in the managment of the buſineſs; and have given inſtructions to the Council of *Patna* accordingly.

I have diſpatched this as ſpeedily as poſſible, that if this recommendation meets your approbation I may be favoured with your anſwer at the city, in time to enable me to obtain from the Nabob his Sunnud, appointing Rajah *Kullyan Sing* alſo to the office of Naib of the Nizamut, in the ſame manner as his father held it, as I conclude that you will join me in opinion that the two offices ſhould continue united.

Patna, 22d September 1773. I am, &c. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*.

Reply to the Governor.

The Board approving the Governor's nomination;

Agreed, That *Raja Kullyan Sing* be accordingly appointed, and that the following reply be immediately diſpatched to the Governor's Letter:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq; Governor, &c.

Honourable Sir,

We this morning received by an expreſs Pulwar, your Letter of the 22d inſtant from *Patna*; and we now return this anſwer to it by a ſpecial Dawk, to ſignify our entire approbation of the appointment of *Raja Kullyan Sing* to ſucceed his father *Mha Raja Shitabroy* as Roy Royan of the province of *Bahar*, as well as of the ſubſidiary arrangements you have made for aſſiſting him in the execution of that office.

We doubt not the Nabob will with equal readineſs concur in your recommendation, for nominating the young Rajah his Naib for that province, on the part of the Nizamut

Fort William, 27th September 1773. We are, &c.

Ordered, That notice of this appointment be ſent to the Board of Revenue, that they may tranſmit the neceſſary directions to *Patna*.

APPENDIX. No. 19.

APPENDIX, No. 19.

Letter from Governor *Haſtings* to the Court of Directors, 10th September 1773.

To the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the honourable united *Eaſt India* Company.

Benares, 10th September 1773.

Gentlemen,

1. IN conſequence of the powers which I received from the Council of *Fort William*, I have concluded a Treaty with the Vizier, dated the 7th inſtant, by which the diſtricts of *Cora* and *Illahabad* are ceded to him for the ſum of fifty lacks of rupees, of which twenty are to be paid in ready money, fifteen at the expiration of one year, and fifteen at the expiration of two years, from the date above-mentioned; and the payment of the charges of the forces, which may hereafter be employed for his aſſiſtance, is fixed at the rate of two lacks ten thouſand rupees per month, for one brigade.

2. I have alſo obtained from the Vizier a confirmation of the Zemindarry of *Gazypoor*, &c. in the name of Rajah *Cheit Sing* and his poſterity, on the ſame tenure and conditions on which they were held by the late Rajah *Bulram Sing*, his father.

3. Mr. *Lambert*, a Member of your Council, who accompanied me to *Benares*, is gone with the Vizier to *Fyzabad*, to receive the firſt payment of twenty lacks, which the Vizier has ſolemnly promiſed to make immediately on his arrival there.

4. I have ordered the firſt brigade, which was cantoned in the province of *Oude*, to return without delay to *Bengal*.

5. I arrived at this place on the 19th Auguſt. I ſhall make a ſhort ſtay of a week or ten days at *Patna*; and if no buſineſs, which I do not foreſee, ſhall occur to detain me at the city of *Moorſhedabad*, I expect to be in *Calcutta* again by the 5th of October. It is a pleaſure to me to add, that by the diligence and aſſiduous attention of the other Members of your Adminiſtration, your affairs will ſuffer no inconvenience from my ſhort abſence.

6. The particulars of my proceedings in the execution of the preſent commiſſion, and of the motives and probable conſequences of the engagements which have been formed, ſhall be duly tranſmitted to you by the *Mercury*, immediately after my return to the Preſidency. In the meantime I think it expedient to give you, in brief, my opinion of the advantages which are likely to accrue from the Treaty. Theſe are,—a very ſerviceable ſupply of ready money;—an addition to the current ſpecie of your provinces; an increaſe of the Vizier's dependence on the Company's protection, by the acquiſition of the ceded diſtricts;—a relief from the burthen of maintaining ſo remote a territory, which you could not have held in property without a vaſt expence, and numberleſs inconveniences, which you could not have protected for the King without yet greater and inſuperable difficulties, which he was incapable of preſerving by himſelf, and had actually abandoned by a formal ceſſion of them to the Marattas; and which the Vizier laid claim to as his own, and would have poſſeſſed himſelf of had we not prevented him;—finally, a conſiderable ſaving of your military expences, and a greater ſecurity to your own poſſeſſions.

7. The Maratta armies which have ravaged the countries contiguous to the dominions of the Vizier for theſe four years paſt, have actually repaſſed the *Nerbuddah*; and it is not improbable that they will have ſufficient employment nearer home to prevent their attempting the renewal of ſuch diſtant enterprizes the enſuing ſeaſon.

8. Perſuaded of the importance of theſe informations, and of the ſeaſonable relief which every pecuniary acquiſition or ſaving muſt afford to the general exigencies of your affairs, I have thought it my duty to communicate them to you by the moſt expeditious means. I have therefore diſpatched this Letter in duplicate over land to your Preſidency at *Bombay*, with a requeſt that they will forward it from thence by the uſual route to *England*.

9. I have the honour to be, with reſpect,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful humble ſervant,

Warren Haſtings.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 12th October 1773.

2. About a week ago our Preſident returned from the interview with the Vizier at *Benares*, and brought with him the original of a new Treaty concluded between them at that city. This he laid before us immediately after his arrival, with a report in full of all his proceedings, from his departure hence till his return. The matters which were negociated in this interview, and the Treaty which he concluded, appeared to us of ſo great importance in the affairs of the Honourable Company, that we judged it expedient to diſpatch your packet the *Mercury* without delay, to carry you the moſt early advices of this tranſaction; and for your complete information, we tranſmit you herewith copies of our inſtructions to the Preſident, his report on his return, with all the papers referred to in it, together with the Conſultations, Minutes, &c. at large, which have paſſed upon it. Theſe are ſo full, and appear to us to contain ſo clear a ſtate of the tranſactions, with the motives and reaſonings, that to expatiate upon them here would be ſuperfluous, and indeed could only prove a tranſcript of the proceedings themſelves. Nevertheleſs, we think it neceſſary, for the convenience of an immediate reference, to ſtate in brief the heads of what has been concluded upon.

3. The provinces of *Corah* and *Illahabad* are ceded to the Vizier, on condition of his paying fifty lacks of Rupees to the Company, twenty of which in ready money, and the remainder in equal payments at the expiration of one and two years.

4. The equivalent which the Vizier is to pay for the charge of our troops, when ſent to his aſſiſtance at his requiſition, is ſtipulated and fixed at two lacks and ten thouſand rupees per month, inſtead of the payments of thirty thouſand, fixed by General *Smith* in the year 1767, and augmented in the two laſt campaigns to one lack fifteen thouſand.

5. We have obtained from the Vizier a renewal of the Sunnuds in favour of Rajah *Cheit Sing* and his poſterity, on the ſame footing as it was granted to his father *Bulwan Sing*, excepting only the increaſe of 2½ lacks to his annual tribute, which the Rajah had agreed to at his acceſſion in 1770.

Fort William, the 4th October 1773. Received per Mercury, 26 Mar. 1774.

At a Conſultation; PRESENT:

The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. being returned, now reſumes his ſeat at the Board as Preſident. Secret Dep^t. Monday.

William Alderſey,
Philip Milner Dacres,
Henry Goodwin,
John Graham, and,
George Vanſittart, eſquires.

eſq. who is alſo returned with the Governor, and takes his ſeat accordingly.

Read, and approved, the Proceedings of the 27th ultimo.

The

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The inſtructions given to the Governor before his departure from *Benares*, which the Board at that time thought proper to ſeal up and depoſit in the cuſtody of Mr. *Alderſey*, are now opened, and recorded as follows, with the Letters written in conſequence. [*Entered in Appendix*, No. 13.]

The Governor delivers in to the Board the following report of his negociations with the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* at *Benares*, and his other proceedings during his abſence from the Preſidency, with all the papers referred to in the Report.

The Governor's Report, and ſubſidiary Papers.

To *William Alderſey*, eſquire, &c. Council at *Fort William*.

Fort William, 4th October 1773.

Gentlemen,

I have already adviſed you, in my Letter of the 7th September from *Benares*, of the iſſue of my negociations, and the ſum of the Treaty concluded with the Vizier; I now lay before you No. 1, the Treaty itſelf, a counterpart of which remains in his poſſeſſion. The other papers which accompany this I ſhall refer to, numbering them in the order in which they may occur.

In the courſe of my journey to *Benares*, I repeatedly addreſſed the King, adviſing him to ſend ſome perſon of confidence to meet me there with full powers to treat upon his affairs. He did not comply with my advice, but contented himſelf with writing to the Vizier, and to *Munneer o'Dowlah*, to demand the balance of the tribute of *Bengal*, the regular payment of it in future, and the reſtitution of *Corah* and *Allahabad* to *Munneer o'Dowlah* on his behalf; but without empowering them to deviate from thoſe demands. Under ſuch circumſtances, your inſtructions directed me to treat for the ceſſion of theſe countries with the Vizier. I propoſed to him the exchange of the territory of Rajah *Cheyt Sing* for them, but I found him inflexibly averſe to it. He replied, that if I inſiſted upon it he had not the power to diſpute it, and muſt of neceſſity ſubmit, but that he would never willingly conſent to part with a ſpan of his territory; that his principal inducement to wiſh for the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Illahabad* was, that he might have the credit of re-poſſeſſing all the territory which he before enjoyed and had inherited from his father; that an exchange would defeat his purpoſe—that he could have no reaſon to give up a valuable part of his country with a certain revenue, for a diſtrict which even in time of peace would not yield him near ſo large nett revenue as was paid him by Rajah *Cheyt Sing*; and in war, or even the alarm of war, nothing, beſides being continually expoſed to the invaſions of the Marattas. Theſe arguments were certainly juſt; and as my view was to confirm and ſtrengthen the alliance between him and the Company, and this propoſal if inſiſted upon would have been productive of a contrary effect, I thought it adviſable to drop it; indeed I mentioned it but ſlightly, knowing his repugnance to it; and I flatter myſelf, that the ſum of 50 lacks of rupees, and the ſtipulation of 2,10,000 rupees per month, for the payment of an incomplete brigade whenever required for his ſervice, will appear to you, Gentlemen, and to our Honourable Maſters, a very advantageous compenſation for a territory, which perhaps ought in policy to have been given to him, even though no return had been made for it.

To have kept it ourſelves would have been inconſiſtent with the repeated and peremptory commands of the Company. The 7th, 8th, and 10th paragraphs of their General Letter, dated the 11th May 1769, are ſo directly in point, and mark ſo forcibly their ſentiments concerning the impropriety of holding territories beyond the boundary of their own provinces, and ſeparated from them, that this Adminiſtration would have been culpable in the higheſt degree in retaining poſſeſſion of *Corah* and *Illahabad* for any other purpoſe than that of making an advantage by the diſpoſal of them; it would have impoſed upon us the neceſſity of ſending our troops continually out of the provinces of *Bengal*, not at the requiſition of the Vizier and at his charge, but at our own expence, and for the protection of the diſtant acquiſitions; and as the Marattas muſt unavoidably paſs either through theſe diſtricts, or near them, to invade the Vizier, this would furniſh him with a perpetual excuſe for refuſing to bear his proportion of the expence of the forces which ſhould be employed in his protection; nor indeed would it ever be neceſſary for him to call for their aid, ſince the preſence of our army, for the protection of the lands lying on his frontier, would make them a ſecure barrier to him, and thus leave us the whole burthen and immediate hazard of the war, although he would be the greateſt, and in the end would probably appear the only gainer by it. Nor is their contiguity leſs exceptionable on account of the tendency which our poſſeſſion of them would have to deſtroy the harmony and good underſtanding which our Honourable Maſters ſo earneſtly enjoin us to maintain with the Vizier their ally; ſince, as he himſelf obſerved to me upon it, they do not form a compact and detached ſpace, which would admit of an eaſy defence from one central ſtation with its bounds clearly defined, but conſiſt in a narrow line without breadth, extending along the weſtern frontier of his dominion, and ſo intermixed with them (many parts lying on the eaſtern bank of the river) that his Aumils and ours would be for ever engaged in mutual quarrels, which could not fail to weaken the friendſhip between him and the Company, as it would be impoſſible to examine on which ſide the right lay at ſo great a diſtance from our obſervation; nor (to uſe the words of our Honourable Maſters) "could we ſend "a man or a gun for the defence of theſe new acquiſitions, "without paſſing through his country, which would be a "perpetual ſource of diſpute and complaint."

Had we reſtored theſe diſtricts to the King who ſo lately abandoned them, and who is confeſſedly unable, by his own ſtrength, to maintain them, we ſhould ſtill have been burthened with the care of their defence, or we ſhould have given them only nominally to the King, but in reality to the Marattas; the evil conſequences of which it is needleſs to enumerate.

By ceding them to the Vizier, we ſtrengthen our alliance with him; we make him more dependant upon us, as he is more expoſed to the hoſtilities of the Marattas; we render a junction between him and them, which has been ſometimes morally impoſſible, ſince their pretenſions to *Corah* will be a conſtant ſource of animoſity between them; we free ourſelves from the expence, and all the dangers attending either a remote property, or a remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited ſyſtem laid down by the honourable Court of Directors; we are no longer under the neceſſity of exhauſting the wealth of our own provinces in the pay and diſburſements of our brigades employed at a diſtance beyond them, but, by fixing the ſum to be paid by the Vizier for their ſervices at their whole expence, and by removing every poſſible cauſe for their paſſing our own borders but at his requiſition and for his defence, we provide effectually for the protection of our frontier, and reduce the expences of our army even in employing it; and laſtly, we acquire a nett ſum of 50 lacks of rupees, moſt ſeaſonably obtained for the relief of the currency of the provinces.

General Sir *Robert Barker* favoured me, at my requeſt, with the calculation on which the ſum was fixed at 2,10,000 rupees for the pay, batta, and extra charges of a brigade employed without the provinces; and I herewith encloſe it, No. 2.

No. 3, is a Perſian copy of a Cowtnâma or engagement which I obtained from the Vizier, confirming to Rajah *Cheyt Sing* and his poſterity the ſtipulations formerly made in behalf of his father *Bulwunt Sing*. No. 4, is an Engliſh tranſlation of it.—No. 5, a copy of the Vizier's pottah or rent-roll, fixed with Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, for the year 1178, and alluded to in the Cowtnâma.—No. 6, an Engliſh tranſlation of the pottah.—No. 7, the tranſlation of a

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Letter which I wrote to Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, as a further aſſurance of the conditions promiſed in the Cowtnâma

The Cowtnâma was executed in my preſence, and atteſted by me. The Vizier deſired, that the ſtipulations made in favour of the Rajah might be executed in this mode, rather than by an article in the Treaty; and it was equally ſatisfactory to the Rajah. I muſt remark, that he had already given the Rajah a Cowtnâma of this tenor, ſoon after the death of *Bulwunt Sing*, through the ſolicitation of Captain *Harper*, by the orders of the Select Committee. He could therefore have no reaſonable plea to refuſe the confirmation of it. Nevertheleſs, he ſeemed to think his former act of ſo little validity, that he preſſed me in very earneſt terms for my conſent, that he ſhould diſpoſſeſs the Rajah of the forts of *Lutufgur* and *Bidgygur*, and take from him 10 lacks of rupees, over and above the ſtipulated rents; and he ſeemed greatly diſſatisfied at my refuſal. He argued, that the Treaty of *Illahabad* related to *Bulwunt Sing* ſolely, and was never meant to extend to his poſterity; and I confeſs the Letter of the Treaty expreſſes no more; yet I cannot conceive, that either the Rajah or Lord *Clive*, when the Treaty was made, could have intended it in that ſenſe. It has certainly been differently underſtood, both by the Company and by this Adminiſtration; and that Vizier himſelf had before put it out of all diſpute, by the ſolemn act paſſed in the Rajah's favour, on his ſucceſſion to the Zemindarry. I am well convinced, that the Rajah's inheritance, and perhaps his life, are no longer ſafe than while he enjoys the Company's protection, which is his due by the ties of juſtice, and the obligations of public faith, and which policy enjoins us to afford him ever moſt effectually. His country is a ſtrong barrier to ours, without ſubjecting us to any expence; and we may depend upon him as a ſure ally, whenever we may ſtand in need of his ſervice.

The day before my departure from *Benares* a Khowaſs, or attendant on the King's perſon, a man of no conſequence, arrived with a Letter to me from his maſter: of which, and my anſwer, I encloſe tranſlations No. 8 and No. 9. You will obſerve, that the acquiſition of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, the payment of the tribute, and the aſſiſtance of our troops, were the objects of his commiſſion. As I ſee no uſe in falſe profeſſion or concealment, and have ever found plain dealing the beſt policy, I hope you will approve of my reply.

Whatever policy ſuggeſted the firſt idea of the tribute, and whatever title he may be conceived to have had to the payment of it while he remained under our protection and united his fortune with ours, his late conduct has forfeited every claim to it, and made it even dangerous to allow it even if the reſources of *Bengal* and the exigencies of the Company could any longer admit of it. Our conduct towards him has certainly afforded matter of admiration to the whole people of *Indoſtan*, whether they conſtrue it as the effect of a miſtaken principle of duty, the juſt return of benefits received, or attribute it to ſome hidden cauſe: we have perſevered, with a fidelity unknown to them, in an unſhaken allegiance to a pageant of our own creation, and laviſhed on him the wealth of this country, which is its blood, although not one of his own natural ſubjects has ever afforded him the leaſt pledge of voluntary obedience; although our conſtituents have been compelled to withhold the legal claims of our own ſovereign; although we have loaded them with an accumulated debt of a crore and a half of rupees, almoſt the exact amount of the ſums remitted, for the uſe of a man who in return has ungratefully deſerted, and ſince headed armies againſt us. It is unjuſt to agree in ſupport of his pretenſions on the Company, that the tribute is no more than a reaſonable acknowledgment for the favour which they received from him in the grant of the Dewanny: they gave him all! they received nothing from him but a preſumptuous gift of what was not his to give, but what they had already acquired by their own power, the ſame power to which he was indebted for his crown, and even for his exiſtence.

The Vizier was at firſt very deſirous of the aſſiſtance of an Engliſh force to put him in poſſeſſion of the Rohilla country lying north of his dominions and eaſt of the *Ganges*. This has long been a favourite object of his wiſhes; and you will recollect that the firſt occaſion of my laſt viſit was furniſhed by a propoſal of this kind. He had certainly juſt grounds of reſentment againſt the Chiefs of this nation, who had not only failed in their engagements to pay him 40 lacks of rupees for his protection againſt the Marattas, but had actually ſupplied them with money when they appeared in arms againſt him. He offered to make the Company a conſideration for this ſervice of 40 lacks of rupees, beſides the ſtipulated ſum for the expences of our troops; but he afterwards laid aſide this deſign, fearing that it would diſable him from fulfilling his engagements for *Corah* and *Illahabad*. I encloſe for your obſervation No. 10, the original agreement of the Rohilla Chiefs, witneſſed by General *Barker*; No. 11, a tranſlation of the ſame; No. 12, a tranſlation of a Letter which I received from *Hafiz Rahmut Cawn*, in whoſe name the agreement was ratified; and No. 13, a tranſlation of a narrative delivered to me by the Vizier in reply to it: the meaſures to be purſued for his ſecurity on that quarter, muſt therefore be determined by future occurrences. I was pleaſed that he urged the ſcheme of this expedition no further, as it would have led our troops to a diſtance from our own borders, which I would wiſh ever to avoid, although there are powerful arguments to recommend it.

The Vizier having no occaſion for the ſervices of the firſt brigade, I have directed it to return within the provinces, and I have ordered Lieutenant Colonel *Muir*, with a battalion of Sepoys from the 2d brigade, to relieve Lieutenant Colonel *Wilding* in the fort of *Chunar*.

In conſequence of the ceſſion of *Illahabad* and *Corah*, Mr. *Lawrell* will return to the Preſidency. On my arrival at *Benares* he made a report to me of his proceedings, and delivered me accounts and eſtimates of the collections and revenues of thoſe diſtricts; copies of which he has alſo tranſmitted to you. Theſe appear to have been collected with great induſtry, and were very uſeful to me in my negociations.

The Vizier inſiſted very ſtrongly on his right to the balance of the King's Tuncaws on the treaſury of *Moorſhedabad*. He ſaid, that he advanced the money for which they were granted to him on the faith of Lord *Clive*'s agreements at *Illahabad*, before there was the ſmalleſt intimation that the tribute would be diſcontinued, and that Mr. *Cartier* had both promiſed him payment and accepted his aſſignments on them. As theſe arguments appear to be well-grounded, and the amount of the Tuncaws was actually due to the King before he ſeparated himſelf from our protection, I thought our credit required that this demand ſhould be complied with, and I accordingly agreed to it.

His engagements for the extra expence of the firſt brigade during the laſt campaign have been adjuſted, and the account cloſed to the 15th of this month. The balance being 4,52,834. 13. 3. is to be paid by an aſſignment, 3,23,000 on the King's Tuncaw, and the remaining 1,29,834. 13. 3. in ready money, at *Fyzabad*. No. 14 is a copy of the account.

In the courſe of our conferences, he made a demand upon me for the pay of the 19th battalion of Sepoys, from the time it was firſt ſtationed with him, and was very urgent for the payment. I told him I was not then furniſhed with the neceſſary papers to enable me to adjuſt the account at *Benares*, this being the firſt intimation that I had ever received of his having ſuch a claim; but promiſed to ſettle it equitably after my return to *Calcutta*. The vehemence with which he inſiſted on the immediate concluſion of this buſineſs, notwithſtanding the length of

time in which it had remained unnoticed, proved an interruption to the other more important affairs which were depending. The encloſed tranſlation of our correſpondence on the ſubject, No. 15, will explain the circumſtances of this demand. You will obſerve, that the Vizier denies his having agreed to pay 15,000 rupees a month for his half of the extra expences of the brigade at *Illahabad*; but this circumſtance ſeems to be very well atteſted; and he at length acquieſced to refer it to our records, and if theſe ſhould eſtabliſh the claim, to allow it to ſtand againſt his advances for the 19th battalion.

I had much converſation with the Vizier concerning a free intercouſe of commerce with his dominions, and recommended to him an eſtabliſhment of cuſtoms ſimilar to that which we have lately adopted in *Bengal*, of which I gave him a plan and explanation in writing; but I found it impoſſible to convince him of the utility of either. He ſeemed confirmed in the perſuaſion, that the current ſpecie of his country would be drained by a free trade with ours: that if the Engliſh Gomaſtahs were authorized to reſide there, they would exerciſe an authority prejudicial to his revenue, notwithſtanding any regulations or reſtrictions of our Government, and involve him in diſputes which perhaps might end in the ruin of his connections with the Company. I promiſed that no Engliſh Gentleman ſhould reſide in his country, and that I would never interfere in any diſputes between Engliſh Gomaſtahs and his people, which I left to be decided by his officers, who might exerciſe the ſame authority over them as over his own ſubjects. As I found it impoſſible to overcome his objections, and I learnt that *Myrzapoor* was the mart from which not only his dominions, but all the interior parts of *Indoſtan* were ſupplied with goods from *Bengal*, I judged it improper to preſs him any further to agree to innovations ſo much againſt his will, when I could effect the ſame purpoſes by an agreement with Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, to whom the town of *Myrzapoor* belongs, as well as all the intermediate country from the borders of *Babar*. I informed him of my intention; to which he ſaid he had no objection; I accordingly ſettled with Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, that the articles of broad cloth, copper, and lead, bought at the Company's ſales, ſhould paſs duty-free through his territories at *Myrzapoor*, and that on all other goods he ſhould collect an equal rate of duties from all merchants, European or Native, or others, indiſcriminately. No. 16 is the Rajah's agreement, with the rates of duties, and No. 17, a tranſlation of it. Theſe rates are in general a medium between what was before charged to the Engliſh merchants, and that paid by the Natives. The former was only half of the latter. The eſtabliſhment of the duties on an equal footing, will be a benefit to the fair trader, and of courſe a general encouragement to the exportation of goods from *Bengal*. The exemption allowed on the articles above-mentioned, will be particularly ſerviceable in promoting the Company's ſales of the productions of *England*, which is the purpoſe to which, in their Letter to the Select Committee, dated the of 1766, they expreſsly direct, that the 8th article of the Treaty of *Illahabad* ſhould be confined. Rajah *Cheyt Sing* having deſired, that the general reſidence of Europeans in this country might be prohibited, and that any particular perſons to whom an indulgence might be granted, ſhould be reſtricted to *Benares*; and having at the ſame time informed me, that Meſſrs. *Fowke*, *Motte*, and *Scott*, had conducted themſelves ſo entirely to his ſatisfaction, that he had no objection to their remaining; I gave notice to all others to quit his territories by the end of December, and told him, that after that time they would be no longer under the Company's protection; and if they proved refractory, he might ſeize and ſend them away by force. I did not heſitate to comply with his requeſt in this particular, becauſe it is literally conformable to the Company's orders.

During my ſtay at *Benares*, a Vackeel from *Nudjiff Cawn* came to me with a Letter from him, requeſting the continuance of his annual penſion of two lacks of rupees, which Lord *Clive* ſettled upon him at *Illahabad*. Encloſed No. 18, is a tranſlation of his Letter. His repreſentation concerning his attendance on the King to *Delhi*, and his conduct ſince, has been entirely confirmed to me by the General. I ſee no pleaſure therefore for withholding the allowance engaged to him by Treaty, and I think it may be of material conſequence to keep him attached to our intereſt. But as I would not give him an anſwer at *Benares*, I deſired his Vackeel to accompany me to *Calcutta*; and I now refer his claim to your determination.

I applied to the Vizier for the diſmiſſion of Mr. *Gentil*, uſing ſuch arguments as I thought moſt likely to induce him to make it his voluntary act, but not inſiſting on it. He promiſed that he would diſmiſs him, but I confeſs I much doubt whether he will. As the peremptory injunctions of the Company in the 52d and 53d paragraphs of their Letter to the Commiſſioners, dated the 23d March 1770, required my endeavours to obtain this point, ſo I have literally obſerved their orders in the mode in which I ſolicited his compliance with it. At the ſame time I muſt declare my opinion, that the man has acquired his importance only from the notice with which he has been thus repeatedly honoured, having neither abilities nor influence which are likely to affect our intereſt.

The Vizier left *Benares* the 10th of laſt month, on which day I alſo departed; Mr. *Lambert* accompanied him to *Fyzabad*, to receive the 20 lacks promiſed in the firſt payment for the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, and the balance of the extra charges of the brigade being R[s] 1,29,834. 13. 3. both which ſums he has aſſured me ſhall be inſtantly paid on his arrival.

I made a ſhort viſit to *Chunar*, where I fixed the boundary of the lands appertaining to the fort, and made ſome other arrangements of too little moment to ſwell this Letter with the relation of them.

On my return to *Patna*, the Chief and Council of the Factory delivered to me the particulars which I had deſired, of the charges at the ſaltpetre factories, together with the ſtatement of the quantity provided, and the medium price (all charges included) for ſeven years paſt. It appears that the price has not of late been increaſed, and I imagine it will hardly admit of a reduction. I encloſe the accounts No. 19, for your obſervation.

In the courſe of our converſation, the Vizier frequently expreſſed the ſatisfaction which he had received from our meeting, and from the friendly and confidential intercourſe which had taken place between us. Though ſuch profeſſions are not always to be received in their literal ſenſe, I took occaſion from them to aſk him whether it would be agreeable to him that a perſon in whom I confide ſhould be appointed by me to reſide near his perſon, for the ſake of perpetuating and ſtrengthening the good underſtanding ſo happily begun, as well as for the tranſaction of ſuch ordinary affairs as might not ſuit the formality of a correſpondence by Letter, but which in their amount always found to be productive of important effects; that I deſired it myſelf, but unleſs it was equally his wiſh, I would neither propoſe nor conſent to it, as it would not in ſuch a caſe be productive of the good effects which I meant to derive from it. He declared to me that it would be entirely pleaſing to him; I told him that I would again addreſs him after my return to *Calcutta* on the ſame ſubject, when I ſhould have made choice of a perſon duly qualified for ſo important a truſt. It now reſts with you, Gentlemen, to determine on the propriety of this appointment. I will offer it frankly as my opinion, that if you ſhall think it proper to entruſt me with the ſole nomination of ſuch a Reſident, and the power of recalling him whenever I ſhall judge his preſence to be no longer neceſſary, it may be attended with good effects. In any other mode I fear the appointment would exclude

me

APPENDIX. No. 19.

me from being any longer the channel of connection between this Government and the Vizier, and prevent me from availing myself of that influence with him, which I I have taken much pains to eſtabliſh, and I hope not altogether unſucceſsfully.

I have addreſſed the Board of Revenue in a ſeparate Letter, concerning ſuch matters as fell under my obſervation in that department.

Permit me, Gentlemen, to conclude my Letter, with my acknowledgments for your indulgence in permitting Mr. *Vanſittart* to accompany me on this ſervice. It is a juſtice which I owe both to him, and to Meſſrs. *Lawrell* and *Lambert*, the other Gentlemen of the Board, who were with me at *Benares*, to declare, that the cordial aſſiſtance which I received from them was of the moſt effectual ſervice to me in my proceedings.

I have the honour to be,
with an unfeigned eſteem,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Treaty with *Sujah ul Dowlah*, No. 1.

The Vizier of the Empire, *Aſiph Jah Shujah ul Mulk*, the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*, *Aboul Munſoor Cawn Bahador*, *Sifdar Jung Sippah Salah*, on the one part, and *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident of the Council, Governor of *Fort William*, and Commander in Chief of the forces of the Engliſh Company, in the provinces of *Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, for and in the name of the Engliſh Company, on the other part, do agree on the following articles:

1ſt. Whereas in the Treaty concluded at *Allahabad* the 16th Auguſt 1765, between the Vizier and the Company, it is expreſſed, that the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Allahabad* were given to his Majeſty for his expences; and whereas his Majeſty has abandoned the poſſeſſion of the aforeſaid diſtricts, and even given a Sunnud for *Corah* and *Currah* to the Marattas, to the great prejudice of the intereſts both of the Vizier and of the Engliſh Company, and contrary to the meaning of the ſaid Treaty, and hath thereby forfeited his right to the ſaid diſtricts, which has reverted to the Company from whom he received it; it is therefore agreed, that the aforeſaid diſtricts ſhall be put into the poſſeſſion of the Vizier, on the following conditions; and that in the ſame manner as the province of *Owd*, and the other dominions of the Vizier, are poſſeſſed by him, ſo ſhall he poſſeſs *Corah* and *Currah*, and *Allahabad*, for ever: he ſhall by no means, and under no pretence, be liable to any obſtructions in the aforeſaid countries from the Company and Engliſh Chiefs; and excluſive of the money now ſtipulated, no mention or requiſition ſhall by any means be made to him for any thing elſe on this account. This agreement ſhall be obſerved by all the Engliſh Chiefs, Gentlemen of the Council, and by the Company, nor ſhall it ever be broke or deviated from.

Conditions, viz.

He ſhall pay to the Company fifty lacks (50,00,000) of Sicca rupees, according to the currency of the province of *Owd*, as follows:

In ready money - - - - -		20,00,000
In two years after the date hereof, viz.		
The 1ſt year - - -	15,00,000	
The 2d year - - -	15,00,000	
		30,00,000
Sicca R^{s} -		50,00,000

2d. To prevent any diſpute ariſing concerning the payments which ſhall be made by the Vizier for the expences of the Company's troops that may march to his aſſiſtance; it is agreed, that the expence of a brigade ſhall be computed at two lacks ten thouſand (2,10,000) Sicca rupees per month, according to the currency of the province of *Owd*. By a brigade is meant as follows; viz.

2 Battalions of Europeans.
6 Battalions of Sepoys.
1 Company of Artillery.

The expence of the ſaid troops ſhall be defrayed by the Vizier, from the time that they ſhall have paſſed the borders of his dominions till they return within the borders of the province of *Bahar*; and, excluſive of the above-mentioned ſum, no more ſhall on any account be demanded from him. Should the Company and the Englief Chiefs have occaſion to ſend for the troops of the Vizier, the Company and Engliſh Chiefs ſhall alſo pay their expences in the like manner.

Signed, ſealed, and ſolemnly ſworn to by the contracting parties at *Benares*, this ſeventh day of September, in the year of our Lord one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-three, in the preſence of us,

John Steward,
William Redfearn.

ESTIMATE of the Monthly Expences of a Brigade employed without the Province, (No. 2.)

A Company of Artillery - - - - - - - - - - -		5,072
A Regiment (2 Battalions) of Infantry - - - - - - - - - -		48,271
Six Battalions of Sepoys - - - - - - - - -	76,923	
Staff Allowances - - - - - - - - - -	4,500	
		81,423
Laſcars Pay and Batta - - - - - - - - - - -		5,920
Artificers and Coolies, D° - - - - - - - - - - -		12,988
Contractors Charges.		
Victualling - - - - - - - - - - -	12,600	
Carriage and Camp Equipage, &c. - - - - - - - -	15,706	
		28,306

Hoſpital

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Hoſpital Charges.

Coſt of Camp Equipage for a Twelvemonth, including 50 per cent. for the Charges of Tranſportation		72,945	
Deduct, ſuppoſed not to be expended in a Twelvemonth, $\frac{1}{3}$ d.		24,315	
Coſt of Stores for a Twelvemonth, including 50 per cent.	48,630$\frac{1}{12}$	is	4,052
For the Charge of Tranſportation	1,74,314		
Deduct, ſuppoſed not to be expended in a Twelvemonth, $\frac{1}{2}$	87,157		
	87,157$\frac{1}{12}$	is	7,263
Contingencies of Paymaſters, Quarter-maſters, &c. agreeably to the Liſt delivered by the General			8,757
			2,05,052
Sundry Contingencies, which cannot be particularly ſpecified, eſtimated			4,948
Total			2,10,000

Tranſlation of the New Cowlnâma or Agreement given by the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah* to Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, No. 4.

The affairs of the Zemindary and Tahua of the Sircar of *Benares* and Sircar *Chunarah*, and of the Mehals of *Juanpoor*, *Bejeypoor*, *Budohy*, *Sukneſegurrah*, *Mulboos Khans*, Sircar *Gazeypoor*, *Lukinderpoor*, *Khereed Shadeyabad*, and *Jopſoch Serinch*, &c. which were under the charge of Rajah *Bulwund Sing*, deceaſed, I do hereby grant and confirm unto you upon their former footing. It is neceſſary that after deducting the Nankar, and half of the Jaghier of *Buddohy*, you monthly and annually pay into the treaſury of the Sirkar the eſtabliſhed and ſtated payments. By the favour of God, whatever is promotive of your honour ſhall be performed, and excluſive of the Jumma ſpecified in the Cabooleat of the preſent Fuſſelly year 1178, no increaſe ſhall ever hereafter be demanded; and if you remain firm and ſteady in your obedience, and in the payment of your rents, no harm ſhall by any means happen to your Ryots or Country. By the word of God and the holy Coran, and of the bleſſed Imaums, this Agreement is made between me and my heirs, and you and your heirs, and it ſhall never be deviated from. Dated this 18th day of the moon Jemmady ul Sami, in the year 1177 Hegiree, anſwering to the 6th September 1773 Engliſh ſtyle.

A true Tranſlation.

(Signed) *Wm Redfearn*,
Pa Tranſlator.

Tranſlation of the Potta given by the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah* to Rajah *Cheyt Sing*, No. 6.

The Sircar of *Benares* and *Chunarah*, and the Mehals of the Sircar of *Juanpoor*, &c. including Land Rents, and Syer Duties, and *Havely Mahomed-abad Benaras*, *Mulhoos Khans*, Purgunnah *Booder*, &c. Talook of *Sikinra Mow*, in the dependencies of the Pergunnah *Khaundah*, Purgunnah *Buddohy*, *Lukneſegur*, *Bejeypoor*, Sircar *Gazeypoor*, Pergunnah *Sekinderpoor*, *Kheried Shadeyabad*, and *Toppet Serinch*, &c. Land Rents and Soyer Duties included, after deducting the Duſtoor Dewanny, Nankar half of the Jaghier of *Buddohy*, and the other exempted Jaghiers, and whatever has formerly been allowed as deductions; I do now fully grant and make over to you in the terms of your Cabooleat, from the firſt of Khareef 1778, in conſideration of the ſum of Benares Cumſuna Rupees 22,48,449 Aſſil Ezafa, as ſpecified underneath, clear of all expences of Sehbundy. It is neceſſary that you pay the above ſum to the Sircars, according to the ſtated and eſtabliſhed Kiſts, year by year, and by the favour of God, there ſhall never be any deviation from this Agreement.

Particulars, viz.

Paid by Rajah Bulwund Sing as follows:

Benares	12,00,607
Buddoohy	1,30,000
Sukneegur	16,000
Bejeypoor	2,00,000
Gazeypoor	5,00,000
Shadeyabad	40,000
	20,86,607
Deduct Nankar half of the Jaghier of Buddoohy and Altumgha, &c.	88,158
Nett Revenue paid by Rajah Bulwund Sing	19,98,449
Increaſe ſettled with Rajah Chyte Sing	2,50,000
Nett Revenue to be paid by Rajah Chyte Sing	Rs 22,48,449

Dated the 27th of Rejub, in the year of the Higeree 1184.

A true Tranſlation. (Signed) *Wm Redfearn*,
Pers Tranſlator.

From the Governor to *Cheyte Sing*, No. 7.

At this time the Vizier of the Empire having given you an Agreement, under his hand and ſeal, which I have counterſigned and alſo affixed my ſeal to; it is neceſſary, that conformable thereto, and according to the Treaty concluded at *Allahabad* by Lord *Clive* and the Vizier, reſpecting Rajah *Bulwand Sing*, your deceaſed father; you, with the greateſt cheerfulneſs pay to the Vizier the rents thereby eſtabliſhed; in which caſe, the Company will always attend to your welfare, and afford you their care and protection; and in the Agreement aforementioned there ſhall never be any breach or deviation.

A true Tranſlation. (Signed) *Wm Redfearn*,
Pers Tranſlator.

From the King to the Governor, No. 8.

We are informed, by our loyal ſervant *Munneer ul Dowlah*, that you, the ſtrength of our empire, have ſent your own Aumils into the diſtricts of *Allahabad* and *Corah*. My choſen ſervant! It is now two years ſince we have received any money from *Bengal*, *Allahabad*, or *Corah*; and our diſtreſs for money is in the greateſt degree. The Engliſh Chiefs are bound, by a Treaty of allegiance to our ſacred perſon, to pay our tribute from *Bengal*, and what place ſoever we may reſide, to let *Corah* and *Allahabad* remain in the hands of our own ſervants. From this Treaty we are aſſured there will be no deviation. Conſidering the loyalty and rectitude of you, our loyal ſervant, we have full confidence that you will remit

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to our preſence the balance of our tribute from *Bengal*, and continue the monthly payments in future; and that you will deliver up *Corah* and *Allahabad* into the hands of *Mumeer ul Dowlah*, and at the ſame time enforce payment of our revenue from thence regularly, month by month. Do you, our loyal ſervant, in concert with our brother, as dear as life, the Vizier of the Empire, come to our royal preſence. Should it happen, that you cannot yourſelf come, let General *Barker* be ſent; and after their arrival, we ſhall aſſent to whatever they may propoſe. We had intentions of ſending to you our noble kinſman, *Majad ul Dowlah*, to communicate to you our commands, and to reconcile you to our royal perſon, of which we informed you in a former Shukha. Afterwards this counſel occurred to our enlightened mind; that if we were informed that you had intentions of ſettling the affairs of our empire, we would then ſend our noble kinſman to you; that after learning from him our royal commands, you might diſpatch the General, with the Vizier, to our preſence; and we could then be aſſured, that where we had two ſuch ſupports with us, as the Vizier and the General, your emulation would not ſuffer you to permit the uſurpers and diſturbers of the peace of our empire, ſuch as the Jauts and the Rohillas, to hold poſſeſſion ſo near our capital: as for the reſt, know that our royal favour attends you. Remit our tribute from *Bengal*, and give up *Corah* and *Allahabad*, which will give the utmoſt ſatisfaction to our ſacred perſon.

Poſtſcript, in the King's own hand.

Do you, our loyal ſervants, come with cheerfulneſs to our preſence. After ſettling affairs here, we ſhall give our royal aſſent to whatever you may repreſent.

A true Tranſlation. (Signed) *Wm Redfearn*, Perſian Tranſlator.

From the Governor to his Majeſty *Shah Allum*, No. 9; written the 13th September 1773.

I have had the honour to receive your Majeſty's commands, by the hands of *Mahomed Jacoob Cawn*, which I have thoroughly underſtood.

Long before my arrival at *Benares*, I repeatedly addreſſed your Majeſty with a requeſt that ſome perſon of confidence, and empowered to treat upon your Majeſty's affairs, might be appointed to meet me at that place; and I was happy, when you intimated to me your pleaſure, that *Mugid ul Dowlah* was deputed for this buſineſs, becauſe I had no doubt, that with the aſſiſtance of ſo capable a perſon every thing would be adjuſted to your Majeſty's ſatisfaction, as I repreſented in the addreſſes which I ſent on this ſubject: but upon my arrival at *Benares*, I underſtood that the orders for his departure were repealed, and that your Majeſty's attention was engaged in other affairs. In this caſe I was remedileſs. The Vizier heving afforded me a meeting at the abovementioned place, after many conferences, I judged it moſt expedient, for the ſecurity of the peace and tranquillity of theſe parts, and even for the benefit of your Majeſty's affairs, that the Chucklahs of *Corah* and *Allahabad* ſhould be reſtored to his poſſeſſion; and I have accordingly aſſigned them to him. I think it incumbent upon me to explain to your Majeſty fully my motives for this tranſaction: while the union between yourſelf and the Company ſubſiſted, your Majeſty is witneſs, and all the world have ſeen, that poſtponing the conſideration of every other concern, the wealth and forces of the Engliſh Company were continually employed in promoting your proſperity, and in the care of your ſafety. The ſame deſire and attachment ſtill prevail; but the neceſſity of the times requires other meaſures and other councils. When your Majeſty ſeparated yourſelf from the Engliſh and the Vizier, and gave your preference to, and conferred your royal favours on others, whoſe views have ever been hoſtile to your former friends and allies, whatever power your Majeſty poſſeſſed inſtantly became theirs; and, preſuming upon it, they oppoſed their forces to the Vizier, and the forces of the Engliſh Company; and even proceeded to acts of violence againſt both, which we forbore to repel, from reſpect to your perſon, which authorized their proceedings. What return of loyalty and ſervices your Majeſty received for the grace which you thus beſtowed upon them, your Majeſty beſt knows. In addition to your other bounties, you were pleaſed to grant them Sunnuds for the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Currah*, which in effect would have alſo given them the command of *Allahabad*. By whatever means the Sunnuds were obtained, it is evident that your Majeſty either wanted power to retain thoſe diſtricts, or that you abandoned them of your own free will to ſtrangers, whoſe deſigns and intereſts were ever contrary to the deſigns and intereſts of the Company. As theſe diſtricts were originally aſſigned by the Company, for the purpoſe of paying your expences, when they ceaſed to be your property, by the univerſal principles of juſtice they reverted to the Company, from whom you firſt received them; and I accordingly cauſed poſſeſſion to be taken of them in the name of the Company, both for the ſecurity of their rights, and to prevent an enemy from uſurping them. And I have given them to the Vizier for theſe reaſons: firſt, becauſe as his intereſts and the Company were the ſame, and this country lay contiguous to his, the defence of it would be more eaſy, and our mutual alliance become ſtronger by this addition to his dominions: ſecondly, becauſe the Vizier, being your firſt ſervant, and the only repreſentative of your perſon, it would enable him hereafter more effectually to ſerve your Majeſty, and to retrieve your affairs. —It was certainly my intention to have put theſe diſtricts again into your hands; and it was with this view that I ſo repeatedly entreated your Majeſty to ſend a perſon of your confidence, to ſettle with me the means of effecting this, and the other arrangements dependant on the Company. But as no one came, and being informed that nobody would come, and I know that without ſome well-concerted plan of defence to reſtore them to your hands would be in effect to give them up to the Marattas, and prove a certain means of arming their hands againſt us, I was therefore compelled to change my firſt deſign, and act as the neceſſity of the ſeaſon adviſed.

Upon the affairs of *Bengal*: I have before in my Letters repreſented the diſtreſſed condition of the people, and the poverty of the country, which are ſolely owing to the heavy drafts which have been made of its current ſpecie for your Majeſty's remittances. As it is the will of God, and agreeable to the commands of the Engliſh Company my maſters, that I am intruſted with the care and protection of the people of theſe provinces; and as their condition, which is at this time on the edge of miſery, would be ruined paſt remedy, by draining the country of the little wealth which remains in it; I muſt plainly declare, that until the ſafety and welfare of theſe provinces will admit of it, I cannot conſent that a ſingle Rupee be ſent out of them, which it is in my power to detain. This declaration I make from the integrity of my heart, and a real attachment to your Majeſty, which will not ſuffer me to deceive you by doubtful promiſes, while I am certain that they can have but one effect. For the reſt, I pray to the Almighty for a more favourable ſeaſon, to enable me to ſhew my zeal for your Majeſty's ſervice, and ſhall continually communicate with the Vizier on the means of exerting our endeavours in conjunction for this purpoſe, which, God willing, may be ſpeedily and happily accompliſhed.

A true Tranſlation. (Signed) *Wm Redfearn*, Perſn Tranſr.

N° 11. Tranſlation of the Agreement given by *Hafez Rahmut Cawn* to the Vizier.

As the Vizier of the Empire, the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*, will put the Rohilla Sirdars in full poſſeſſion of their country, it is at his own option to effect it, either by peace or war, ſhould the Marattas at this time, without coming to an engagement, or peace being eſtabliſhed,

croſs the river and retreat, owing to the rainy ſeaſon, and after that has elapſed, commit diſturbances in the country of the Rohillas. The quelling of theſe diſturbances ſhall belong to the Vizier. The Rohilla Sirdars, after the aforeſaid buſineſs, do agree to pay the Vizier the ſum of forty lacks of rupees on the following terms; viz. as the Marattas are now committing diſorders in the country of the Rohillas, the Vizier ſhall march from *Shahabad* to ſuch place as may be thought proper to arrive at, in order that the Rohilla dependants may come out of the jungles, and arrive at their own homes. The ſum of ten lacks of rupees ſhall be paid in ready money in part of the ſtipulation, and thirty lacks of rupees ſhall be diſcharged in three years, beginning from the Fuſſully year 1180. This Agreement is ſealed in the preſence of General Sir *Robert Barker*.

No. 12. Tranſlation of a Letter from *Hafez Rahmut Cawn* to the Governor.

After the uſual compliments, and expreſſing his deſire of an interview, he proceeds: "the bonds of friendſhip and affection, and the mutual intercourſe which have long ſubſiſted and taken root between me and the Engliſh Sirdars, may be not unknown to you. Having heard of your fame, I wiſh that a perfect harmony and concord ſhould be eſtabliſhed and confirmed between us, and I hope that you will have the ſame inclination on your part. It is from theſe motives, as well as in conſideration of there being no difference or diſagreement between us, that I repreſent to you the following few circumſtances, that you may have them in your memory at the time of diſcuſſion.

Laſt year, when his Majeſty and the Maratta Sirdars were at variance with the Nabob *Zabitta Cawn*, and when, after confuſion was thrown into that Nabob's affairs, his Majeſty and the Marattas croſſed the *Ganges* to come into theſe parts, the Rohilla Sirdars, for the protection of their women, fled to the ſkirts of the jungles. At this time the Vizier of the Empire and General *Barker* arrived at *Shahabad*, and ſent Captain *Harper* to me, with a meſſage to come and join them, in which they perſiſted with great perſeverance. As our intereſts were equal I therefore went, and had an interview with the Gentlemen; when an agreement was concluded between us, in which I agreed to pay 40 lacks of rupees on account of Peſhcuſh to the King and the Maratta Sirdars; and the Gentlemen on their parts engaged to effect my ſecurity, by eſtabliſhing peace between me and the King and the Maratta Sirdars, declaring, that they would in a day or two after that march from *Shahabad*, fall upon and come to extremities with the Marattas, and to put an end to their operations, Notwithſtanding this, the Gentlemen never came to any negociation with the Marattas, ſo as to put an end to their operations, nor ventured to attack them, but finally returned towards *Fyzabad*, leaving their engagements unfulfilled. When the rainy ſeaſon commenced, the Marattas of themſelves croſſed the *Ganges*, and encamped in the *Duabe*, threatening me ſtill with hoſtilities. During the rains I repeatedly called on the Nabob, the General, and Captain *Harper*, to conclude theſe affairs with his Majeſty and the Marattas; but they came to no determination on the ſubject, nor took any meaſures for effecting my ſecurity. When the rainy ſeaſon was drawing to an end, and the Marattas had approached near the banks of the *Ganges*, they then demanded of me ſums of money, which, after much temporizing, I was at laſt obliged to pay them; afterwards they went to the Preſence, and procured a Sunnud for *Corah* and *Allahabad*, with which they returned to the banks of the *Ganges*, and made preparations of bridges for croſſing it, and at the ſame time ſent a perſon of their confidence to demand payment of the money which had been ſtipulated, ſaying, it belonged to them and the King; and alſo with many inducements requeſted that I would let them paſs through my territories, aſſuring me that they would commit no depredation or ravages on the Ryots, and they would paſs through with expedition towards the Soubah of *Onde*, or whitherſoever they thought proper; they alſo engaged to remit to me a large ſum on account of the ſtipulation, and to do whatever was agreeable, and would give ſatisfaction to the Rohilla Sirdars. At this juncture the Nabob and the General being arrived near, they ſent to me *Syed Shaw Muddun* and *Mahomed Mukrim Cawn*, deſiring that I would enter into no terms with the Marattas, and they would give me back my engagement for 40 lacks of rupees, and do every thing both for my preſent and future ſecurity. Having therefore in view the long friendſhip which had ſubſiſted between the Nabob Vizier, the Engliſh Gentlemen, and myſelf, I declined all offers made me by the Marattas, and came over to them; in revenge for which it is well known that the Marattas recroſſed the *Ganges*, and plundered *Moradabad* and *Sumbril*. The Gentlemen promiſed that they would croſs and canton on the other ſide of the *Ganges* during the rains, and would not return to *Fyzabad* or *Calcutta* until they had entirely driven away the Marattas, and fully ſatisfied themſelves both with reſpect to their own and my ſecurity: but at length they left every thing unfiniſhed, and, after temporizing for a long time with the Marattas, returned to their own homes, leaving me ſtill a prey to the Marattas. You are no doubt acquainted with all theſe proceedings: it is a point which requires juſtice and conſideration. As a friendſhip has long been eſtabliſhed between us, I doubt not but you will at all times and on all occaſions wiſh to preſerve it. Other particulars the Major will inform you of.

The Vizier's Narrative of the Behaviour of the Rohillas. No. 13.

The caſe of the Rohillas is as follows: That from the beginning to this time I have treated them with friendſhip and attention, and on their part I have met with nothing but ill-treatment, treachery, and a breach of faith. Accordingly, when the Marattas marched with a large army againſt *Nijib ul Dowla* and the Rohilla Sirdars, and beſieged *Nijib ul Dowla* in *Sukkertaul*, and *Hafiz Rahmut*, *Doondee Cawn*, and the reſt, at *Illahabad*, where they reduced them to the greateſt ſtraits and difficulties, if I had not aſſiſted them, they would all have been ruined, and deprived of their women, country, and government; but by the favour of God I afforded them at that time ſuch aſſiſtance, that the Marattas were put to flight, and took their route to the *Deccan*, and the territory, property, and women, of the Rohillas, remained in ſecurity. Again; the year before laſt, when the Marattas advanced their troops againſt the Rohillas, *Zabitta Cawn* received a total defeat, and *Hafiz Rahmut* and the others being unable to oppoſe them, took ſhelter with their women at the foot of the hills, where, if I had made ten days delay, they would all have periſhed by the bad water and unſalutary air; by the favour of the Almighty, I went with the Engliſh troops to *Shahabad*, and ſtopt the approach of the Marattas, and ſometimes uſing authority and menaces, and ſometimes friendly mediation, and temporiſing according to circumſtances, I cauſed them to paſs the *Ganges*, and releaſing from confinement, delivered to *Zabitta Cawn*, the daughter of *Ally Mahomed Cawn*, a principal Chief of the Rohillas, and nine of the women and daughters of *Nijib ul Dowlah*, and the wife and ſon of *Zabitta Cawn*, together with 400 women the Marattas had taken priſoners. I alſo called to me *Hafiz Rahamet Cawn*, and the others who had taken protection under the hills, and replaced them on their former footing in the poſſeſſion of their country. My friend, General *Barker* is well acquainted with theſe circumſtances, in whoſe preſence they entered into an engagement for the payment of 40 lacks of rupees, and pledged their faith and religion for its performance. In the ſequel, they did not remain ſteady to this agreement, but in the heighth of the rains, antecedent to every other perſon, *Zabitta Cawn* firſt went and connected himſelf with the Marattas, and

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and *Hafiz Rahmut Cawn* ſent the holy Coran, which contains the religion of the Muſſulmen, to the Marattas, as a token of his friendſhip. He alſo gave them five lacks of rupees, and eſtabliſhed a friendſhip and good underſtanding with them. The whole world are well acquainted, that envoys from *Hafiz Rahmut* were with the Marattas, and treated with them in the above manner. Myſelf continuing firm and ſteady to my engagements, I proceeded in concert with the Engliſh troops, from *Fyzabad* to the aſſiſtance of the Rohillas, and arrived by ſucceſſive marches at *Ramgaut*. I previouſly acquainted *Hafiz Rahmut Cawn* that he ſhould make preparations, and that I ſhould ſhortly arrive and act in conjunction with him, as *Hafiz Rahmut Cawn* had entered into intrigues with the Marattas, notwithſtanding I was near him, and the Marattas at a conſiderable diſtance: he, nevertheleſs, under various pretenſions and evaſions, drew near the Maratta army to ſuch a degree, that the morning when I arrived with the Engliſh forces, and came upon the Marattas, *Hafiz Rahmut* was within 7 or 8 coſs of them; when, from neceſſity only, he came and waited on me. I am certain, that if I had been 4 gurries later with the Engliſh forces, he would have joined the Marattas, and fallen upon me; and that only from my near approach he was compelled to come to me. Afterwards, when the Marattas could not face the Engliſh forces and myſelf, and ſet out for the *Decan*, *Hafiz Rahmut Cawn* did not pay me a ſingle Daam on account of the agreement

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The Nabob Shujah ul Dowla, in Account with the Honourable United

Dr.			
To two Battalions, for Auguſt, September, and October - - -	- - -		30,000 — —
To Preparations, and Colonel Goddard's Detachment, Current Rs - -	31,021 13 10		
Deduct Batta 11 per Cent. - -	3,074 4 1		
			27,947 9 9
To extra Expences, from 1ſt December 1772 to 31ſt Auguſt 1773, 9 Months, at 1,15,000 per Month - - - - - -	- - -		10,35,000 — —
To Ditto, for September, and Half of the Month of October - Sonats	- - -		1,72,500 — —
		Sonats -	12,65,447 9 9

ment executed in preſence of the General as aforementioned; nor did he treat me with that reſpect, or preſent me with the cuſtomary preſents, which are uſed amongſt mankind as marks of friendſhip and hoſpitality. The heavy burden of increaſed expences which I have ſuſtained, both on account of my own troops, and thoſe of the Engliſh, are as evident as the ſun at noon-day. I made no uſe of menaces concerning taking the money by force, otherwiſe, had I been ſo inclined, I would have taken it in the ſpace of a day. I paſſed the matter over, and took no notice of it; and they on their part pleaded excuſes, evaſions, and delays. They even encamped at 3 or 4 coſs diſtance from mine and the Engliſh army, with an intention to come to a battle, ſhould I inſiſt on the payment of the money. Of the truth of this, every Gentleman that was with me can witneſs; my mentioning it is unneceſſary. In ſhort, the Rohillas have been guilty of treachery, baſeneſs, and a breach of faith; and have paid no regard either to their oaths or agreements. I have notwithſtanding hitherto put up with this behaviour, but can do it no longer To oblige them to make reparation is expedient and juſt.

A true Tranſlation.

(Signed) *Wm Redfearn*,
Perſn Tranſr.

Company of Merchants of England, trading to the Eaſt Indies. No. 14.

	Cr			
Feb. 4.	By Caſh paid,			
	Lucknow and Illihabad Siccas	43,250 — —		
	Deduct Batta at 3½ per Cent	1,513 12 —		
			41,736 4 —	
		Benares Sonats.		
	Zecaaly Rupees	13,750 — —		
	Deduct 4½	618 12 —		
			13,131 4 —	
	Benares Sonauts		43,000 — —	
				97,867 8 —
March 18.	By Caſh paid,			
	Oude Rupees	99,000 — —		
	Deduct 3½	3,465 — —		
			95,535 — —	
	Recauby Rubees	1,000 — —		
	Deduct 4½	45 — —		
			955 — —	
				96,490 — —
April 19.	By Caſh paid,			
	Benares Sonauts		12,650 — —	
	Recauby Rupees	39,350 — —		
	Deduct 4½	1,770 12 —		
			37,579 4 —	
	Oude Rupees	48,000 — —		
	Deduct 3½	1,680 — —		
			46,320 — —	
				96,549 4 —
D° 25.	By Caſh paid,			
	Corah Sonauts	34,900 — —		
	Deduct 3½	1,221 8 —		
			33,678 8 —	
	Corah Siccas	58,371 4 —		
	Deduct 5½	3,210 6 —		
			55,160 14 —	
				88,839 6 —
May 24th.	By Caſh paid,			
	Corah Siccas	53,920 8 —		
	Deduct 5½	2,965 10 —		
			50,954 14 —	
	Corah Sonauts	76,079 8 —		
	Deduct 3½	2,662 12 6		
			73,416 12 6	
				1,24,371 10 6
July 1.	By Caſh paid,			
	Oude Rupees	8,000 — —		
	Deduct 3½	280 — —		
			7,720 — —	
	Benares Sonauts		24,000 — —	
	Recauby Rupees	18,000 — —		
	Deduct 4½	810 — —		
			17,190 — —	
				48,910 — —
July 2d.	By Caſh paid,			
	Benares Sonauts		5,000 — —	
	Oude Rupees	60,400 — —		
	Deduct 3½	2,114 — —		
			58,286 — —	
	Ferrachabad Rupees	600 — —		
	Deduct 3½	21 — —		
			579 — —	
	Zecaaby Rupees	34,000 — —		
	Deduct 4½	1,530 — —		
			82,470 — —	
				96,335 — —
D° 8th.	By Caſh paid,			
	Oude Rupees	50,000 — —		
	Deduct 3½	1,750 — —		
				48,250 — —
	By Balance due from the Nabob Shujah ul Dowla			1,15,000 — —
				8,12,612 12 6
	To be paid to Mr. Lambert at Fyzabad		1,29,834 13 3	
	To be paid from the Balance of the King's Tunnaw on Moorſhedabad		3,23,000 — —	
				4,52,834 13 3
			Sonats	12,65, 47 9

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Extract of a Letter from the Governor to the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*. No. 15.

Mahomed Elich Cawn has repeatedly and fully explained to me your Excellency's commands upon the ſubject of the accounts of Captain *Harper*'s battalion. The ſtate of this matter is as follows: I am informed by the General that at your requiſition the brigade, of which the General had then the command, was ſent to *Allahabad*, and there continued, at your own requeſt, about three years; that it was agreed between the King, yourſelf, and General *Smith*, that for the batta of this force 30,000 R' ſhould be paid monthly; viz. 15,000 R' by the King, and 15,000 R' by yourſelf; that your ſhare of this payment never was paid, but was always underſtood to have been balanced by the advances made by you on account of the 19th battalion, of which about 5,000 rupees monthly were due from you for batta and extra expences, and 10,000 rupees were advanced by you on account of their pay, by which means it was always conſidered the account was ſettled.

I alſo find it mentioned in ſome authentic Papers, which have accidentally fallen into my hands, that the brigade aforementioned was called to *Allahabad*, and continued there at your own expreſs requiſition, and the Company have been ſo informed in many Letters from the Adminiſtration of *Bengal*. Of the truth of this I am myſelf entirely unacquainted; I know not the dates of the arrival or return of the brigade which went to *Allahabad*, nor of the appointment or continuance of the 19th battalion with your perſon; nor have I one Paper or Account which can ſhew me what ſums have been received, and what are due, on either of theſe accounts. The perſons who were privy to theſe tranſactions (on which a knowledge of theſe accounts depends) are either in *England* or *Calcutta*. How therefore can I poſſibly attempt to ſettle this account here without a ſingle voucher to aſſiſt me? Reflect alſo, that this is a buſineſs of ſeven years ſtanding, and that ſince the commencement of it Mr. *Cartier*, and other Gentlemen appointed by the Government of *Calcutta*, have had a meeting with your Excellency, for the purpoſe of ſettling all matters between you and the Company. If this account was not ſettled with them, nor with the other Engliſh Chiefs who had the immediate cognizance of it, in what manner and by what means am I to ſettle it, who never heard of ſuch an account, nor expected ſuch a demand to be made upon me, till my arrival here? I therefore ſent you word, that upon my return to *Calcutta* I would carefully examine the Paymaſter's books, and make ſuch inquiries as might be proper from their perſons who had any knowledge of them, and of your agreements with the Engliſh Company concerning them; and if it ſhould appear that any thing was juſtly due to your Excellency, it ſhould be faithfully and moſt certainly paid you.

From the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*. Received 4th September 1773.

I conſider you as my true friend, and ſhall write you the plain truth. With reſpect to the account of Captain *Harper*'s battalion, on which I troubled you, the fact is this: the pleaſure with which I heard of your coming into theſe parts is not to be expreſſed; and ſince I have met you, the knowledge, wiſdom, and underſtanding with which I have obſerved you are endowed; your addreſs, and the regard which you have ſhewn, both for the preſervation of our friendſhip and public faith, have all given me the utmoſt degree of ſatisfaction; I therefore reſolved at home, that ſeveral matters which had been put off for years, ſhould be ſettled now. Of former affairs you already know, that while the Nabob *Jabut Jung* (Lord *Clive*) remained in the Country, our negociations were ſettled in the beſt manner; but from the Gentlemen who came after him I never got an anſwer to my Letters in leſs than four months; then, what could become of other affairs? Ever ſince Lord *Clive*'s time I have had a battalion ſtationed with me, and whatever was the batta ſettled for it, Lord *Clive*, on the conſideration that it was too great a diſtance from *Calcutta* to ſend money for the payment of it, ſettled, that the whole of its pay ſhould be advanced by me; and that whatever ſums I might advance on that account, over and above the batta, ſhould be repaid me. Accordingly, this mode took place. At that time *Purſued Roy* my Vackeel, was in *Calcutta*; and upon his coming away, the ſurplus money which I had advanced on account of the payment of the battalion, was paid to him, with which he purchaſed ſeveral articles, and was bringing them up to me, when they were ſtopped at *Patna*. Afterwards a fire happened at *Patna*, in which the whole of theſe goods were burnt; as a recompence for which, 300 and odd Engliſh firelocks were given me at the time of my going to *Allahabad*. This tranſaction may have come to your knowledge; General *Barker* is well acquainted with it.—With reſpect to the batta of the brigade which was quartered at *Allahabad*, and which you ſay was called there by my deſire, the caſe is this; when *Coſſim Cawn* joined himſelf with the Rohillas, and was going to ſet diſturbances on foot, I ſent for the Engliſh troops; in about ten days after whoſe arrival at *Allahabad*, the diſturbances were concluded, and the enemy, ſeeing that I and the Engliſh Chiefs acted in concert, and that the Engliſh troops were at *Allahabad*, diſperſed; and in about ten days or a month after the arrival of thoſe troops at *Allahabad*, I diſmiſſed them. That friendſhip which ſubſiſted between me and General *Smith*, is known to all the world. You muſt alſo be well acquainted, that at length I carried on a correſpondence to *Calcutta*, and had ſome controverſy with the Gentlemen reſpecting the troops that I kept in my ſervice: although no number of troops was mentioned in the Treaty, nor was it any infringement of the Treaty, yet, purely out of regard to the friendſhip and ſatisfaction of the Engliſh Gentlemen, I made no uſe of this argument, but diſmiſſed my troops. After the concluſion of the diſturbances with *Coſſim Cawn*, I knew nothing of the Engliſh troops being ſent for. If they were ſent for, General *Smith* did it of his own accord. There was never any agreement between General *Smith* and me, regarding the 30,000 Rupees, on account of batta for the brigade at *Allahabad*; nor do I know any thing of it. General *Smith* was at that time gone to *Souragepore*, and had a congreſs with *Hafiz Rhamut Cawn*; and upon hearing of ſome diſturbances of the Marattas in the diſtricts of *Bundlecund*, he required my aſſiſtance: upon which I ſent *Beney Perſaud* with my troops to him. You write, "that of the 30,000 rupees, half was to be "paid by me, and half by the King." If the King ſent for thoſe troops, why ſhould I pay half? or, if I ſent for them, why ſhould the King pay half? Beſides this, the troops were ſtationed at *Allahabad*, which is at the diſtance of ſeven days march; and in ſuch caſe, what uſe could they be of to me? Reſpecting the diſturbance of the *Abdallah*, if there was any diſturbance, it muſt have been at *Lahore*, and I am entirely unacquainted with it; nor could thoſe troops be required upon that occaſion. You are juſt and wiſe: if I had ſent for thoſe troops there muſt be ſome Letter or Voucher for it, or it muſt be mentioned in your Records, and let them be produced. This I have wrote out of pure friendſhip, and from a conſideration that you are juſt.

Tranſlation of Raja *Cheyt Sing*'s Agreement relative to Duties. N° 17.

Whereas the duties of the Syers dependent on me, have been fixed and decreed in the preſence of the Governor at the following rates, which are to be taken from the Engliſh and Indoſtan Merchants without diſtinction; for this cauſe I give in writing, that I will demand no more, nor will conſent to an exemption in favour of any man, excepting broad cloth, and lead, and copper, purchaſed of the Company, which ſhall be accompanied by a Letter from the Governor. On them I will conſider the duties as excuſed and diſcontinued, nor in any reſpect interrupt or impede them.

	At Chouſa. Sunt. R^s.	Zemanee. S. R^s.	Ghuly. S. R^s.	Seipore and Gungapore. S. R^s.	Myrzapoor. S. R^s.	Cudguva. S. R^s.	Durra. S. R^s.	Gazipore S. R^s.	Total. S. R. A. P.
On Kerana, as dry Ginger, Paper, &c. per Tunghy of 6 Myrzapoor M^ds	— 8 —	— 7 3	— 7 3	1 13 9	1 15 9	— 4 9	— 6 6	3 1 3	9 — —
On Cloth, Silk, Cloves, Nutmegs, &c.	1 4 —	— 15 —	1 — —	5 10 —	7 9 3	— 10 3	— 12 6	5 3 —	23 — —
On Tin, Tothnague, &c.	— 8 3	— 7 6	— 7 6	1 14 —	2 13 —	— 7 —	— 6 9	3 — —	10 — —
On Iron	— 4 3	— 3 3	— 3 9	— 11 —	— 15 3	— 2 —	— 2 —	1 14 6	4 8 —
On Copper	— 8 3	— 7 9	— 8 —	3 6 9	3 15 —	— 7 9	— 6 6	3 4 —	13 — —
On Cloth, per Bale, containing 6 Pieces	— 14 3	— 14 3	— 7 6	3 4 6	3 9 —	— 5 —	— 6 —	2 3 6	12 — —
On Cotton	— 6 6	— 6 —	— 6 —	1 8 —	2 4 —	— 5 9	— 4 9	2 15 —	8 8 —
On Chatta, &c. Coarſe Cloth	— 3 6	— 3 6	— 3 6	1 2 —	3 5 —	— 3 3	— 3 —	1 5 3	6 13 —
On Beetle Nut	— 6 —	— 6 —	— 6 —	1 9 —	1 10 —	— 3 9	— 5 3	2 2 —	7 — —

At Benares, 2 per-Cent. on the Purchaſe Price as uſual.

Repreſentation of *Nudjiff Cawn*, as delivered by his Vackeel. No. 18.

When Major *Munro* was encamped at *Benares*, there were great diſturbances in the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, and I was in *Bundlechund*. The Major ſent me a Letter of Invitation through Raja *Kyaularam*, together with a bill for 30,000 rupees, and gave me hopes of *Shujah ul Dowla*'s Country. In the Letter he deſired me to join the Engliſh by the way of *Corah*, and immediately upon my arrival to eſtabliſh my own authority there, and drive out *Shuja ul Dowla*'s people, becauſe, he ſaid, the Chucklah of *Corah* and Subahdarry of *Allahabad* were ſettled upon me. Upon the receipt of this Letter I marched to *Corah* with 7 or 8,000 horſe, and drove away *Shujah ul Dowla*'s people, and I was active in aſſiſting Colonel *Fletcher* and General *Carnac* at the ſiege of the fort of *Allahabad*, and in the war with the Marattas. Theſe circumſtances are well known to many Engliſh Gentlemen. When the Vizier ſurrendered himſelf to the Engliſh, they gave up to him the Soubah of *Oude*, and *Corah* and *Allahabad* were made over to the King. The King told Lord *Clive* that he ſhould not get a ſingle Daum by the acquiſition of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, for that I ſhould expend the whole revenue for the payment of my troops. Lord *Clive* ordered that I ſhould receive two lacks of rupees per annum out of the revenues of *Bengal* for my ſupport, and told me, that for my pay and the pay of my troops I ſhould receive from the King whatever he might appoint; that if my inclination to ſerve the King ſhould not continue, I might live where I pleaſed; and there ſhould be no failure in the payment of theſe two lacks, only I muſt not join with any perſon who was an enemy of the King, the Engliſh, or the Vizier: accordingly this is inſerted in the Treaty. I am now in the King's ſervice, whom I attended agreeable to the permiſſion of General *Barker*, and have been guilty of no infringement of my agreement, and I am now alſo ready to obey your commands. As the Engliſh Gentlemen never act contrary to their engagements, I flatter myſelf you will pay my allowance as uſual, together with the arrears. I am ever ready to act agreeably to your directions.

Ordered, That the *Patna* ſaltpetre accounts be entered after the proceedings of this day, in the Public Department.

The Board embrace this opportunity to expreſs their entire approbation of the meaſures adopted by the Preſident, in his congreſs with the Vizier at *Benares*; in particular of the Treaty concluded between the Vizier and the Company, and the ſtipulations obtained from the former in behalf of Raja *Cheyt Sing*, as they are equally calculated for the immediate intereſts of the Company as for the ſecurity of the provinces, by ſtrengthening our alliance with the Vizier, and by ſupporting Raja *Cheyt Sing*, in ſtrict conformity to the political ſyſtem laid down and repeatedly enforced by our honourable Employers. They approve of the Letter which the Preſident wrote to the King: under the circumſtances of his ſituation and ours it would have been as improper as impolitic to have complied with his extravagant and abſurd requiſitions; and as he neglected to pay any attention to the Preſident's repeated advice to ſend a perſon of confidence to treat on his affairs, the Preſident, in proceeding to negociate the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad* with the Vizier, acted ſtrictly conformable to his inſtructions. The repugnance of the Vizier to part with any of his territory, was a circumſtance of which the Board was previouſly aware; and as to have inſiſted on it might have affected our alliance and good underſtanding with the Vizier, the Board approve of the Preſident's having accepted the ready money compenſation for *Corah* and *Illahabad*, which in its amount greatly exceeds what were their expectations. The ſtipulation for the charge of a brigade, according to the General's calculate, appears to them to be equivalent to the expence; and it is further ſatisfactory, as it aſcertains a point which, whilſt it was left in a ſtate of indeciſion, might have continued to be the ſource of diſagreeable altercation with the Vizier.

Ordered, in conſequence of the Governor's agreement with the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* and Rajah *Chiet Sing*, that a public advertiſement be iſſued, to forbid any European whatever under the Company's protection, from going to or reſiding in any part of the dominions of *Sujah ul Dowlah*, under pain of forfeiting that protection; and to command all thoſe who are already there to quit thoſe territories before the 31ſt of December next under the like penalty: alſo to give notice that all Gomaſtahs, not Europeans, reſiding there on the part of any Engliſh Gentlemen, ſhall be amenable in every reſpect to the laws of thoſe provinces; and that the Company's Government will by no means interfere in caſe of their engaging in any diſputes or difficulties with the ſubjects of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*.

Agreed, That we write the following circular Letter with copies of this advertiſement, to be publiſhed at all the ſubordinate factories.

APPENDIX. No. 19.

To *Samuel Middleton*, eſquire, Reſident at the Durbar.

Sir,

Encloſed you will receive an advertiſement to prevent Europeans from going up into *Sujah Dowlah*'s Country, &c. which we deſire you will cauſe to be iſſued, and made as public as poſſible at the City and Coſſimbuzar factory.

Fort William, 4th October 1773. We are, with eſteem, &c.

The ſame to *Patna*, *Dacca*, and *Chittagong*.

With reſpect to the continuance of Meſſrs. *Motte*, *Fowke*, and *Scott*, at *Benares*, as Raja *Cheit Sing* has expreſſed his approbation of their conduct, and a ſeeming inclination that they ſhould continue their reſidence in his diſtrict;

Agreed, That theſe three Gentlemen be permitted to remain there until further orders; and the Secretary is accordingly directed to make them acquainted with this permiſſion.

In conſequence of the Governor's propoſition to appoint a perſon to reſide at the Court of *Suja ul Dowlah*, for tranſacting ſuch matters of correſpondence and communication with the Vizier as he ſhall think proper to entruſt to his management;

Agreed, That we do delegate to the Governor the power of nominating ſuch an agent whenever he judges it requiſite, acquainting the Board of the perſon he chuſes to nominate, for their approbation; and the further power of recalling him at his pleaſure, informing the Board of his having done ſo.

To enable us to judge of the validity of *Suja Dowlah*'s claim for the expence of the 19th battalion of Sepoys, whilſt ſtationed with him; Ordered, that the military Paymaſter General be directed to ſend in an account of the payments made to the 19th battalion of Sepoys ſince Lord *Clive*'s departure from *Bengal*, ſpecifying from whence thoſe payments were iſſued: Ordered alſo, that the Secretary to the Select Committee be called on to refer to the records of his office, and aſcertain to us, whether it was ever ſtipulated that *Sujah Dowlah* ſhould pay half, or any part of the 30,000 rupees, agreed for in lieu of the monthly extra expences of a brigade ſtationed at *Allahabad*.

Agreed, That we poſtpone the conſideration on *Nudjiff Cawn*'s ſtipend till the arrival of the General.

The Preſident acquaints the Board, that whilſt he was at the city, he obtained Sunnuds from the Nabob, appointing *Killyan Sing* (ſon of the late Rajah *Sitabroy*) Naib of the Nazim in the Bahar province, and conferring on him the title of Maha Rajah.

Warren Haſtings. *H. Goodwin.*
W. Alderſey. *J. Graham.*
P. M. Dacres. *Geo. Vanſittart.*

N. B. The Minutes and Proteſt of General *Barker*, are entered in Appendix, No. 13 and 33, and Governor *Haſtings*' Minute in Appendix, No. 12.

In anſwer to the demand made by the General, regarding the powers granted to the Preſident ſolely to negociate with the Vizier at *Benares*, the Board now declare, that they judged the inveſting him with ſuch excluſive powers ſtrictly proper and abſolutely neceſſary. It was proper, becauſe conformable to the orders of the Company, which poſitively direct the conduct and execution of the country correſpondence to be the particular province of the Preſident; nor do the Board think they could with conſiſtency have beſtowed on the General a participation of that power in the buſineſs of a diſtant negociation, which they would not have reſerved to themſelves, even at the ſeat of the Government; for ſuppoſing that the conferences with the Vizier had been held at the Preſidency, the diſcuſſion and execution of the reſolves of the Board would of courſe have been left to the Preſident. It was neceſſary, becauſe the eſſential requiſites in the buſineſs to be tranſacted, were diſpatch and immediate deciſion: the duties of the Government would not admit of a tedious abſence of our Preſident, and he has in his own Minute, which has now been read, elucidated in ſtrong and juſt colours the indeciſion, controverſy, and delay, in which every point to be treated on might have been involved, if liable to be checked by diſcuſſion and impeded by the different ideas of a plurality of negociators. The Board conſider it further incumbent on them to add in this place, that they alſo eſteemed it neceſſary, in order to impreſs the Vizier with a proper idea and knowledge of the ſtation of their Preſident, which ſeems of late years to have been totally eclipſed in theſe parts by the ſuperior influence of the Commanding Officer, who will always derive ſufficient conſequence from the command of the army, without being admitted to interfere in the peculiar province of the Preſident, by appearing the principal agent in the political Government. —The Board having thus fully explained the motives which induced them to veſt in the Preſident excluſive powers for negociating with the Vizier, it would be ſuperfluous to ſubjoin, that no perſonal reflection was or could be intended towards the General, or towards the other Gentlemen of the Board, who were preſent at *Benares*.

They have already aſſigned their reaſons for ſtopping the payment of the King's tribute, they do not think it neceſſary to repeat them, but ſhall make only a few obſervations on the General's objections. It is true, there was no declared war between us and the Marattas at the time when the King put himſelf under their protection, but they have been regarded as our natural enemies ever ſince the acquiſition of the Dewanny, both by the Adminiſtration here and by the Court of Directors, who have repeatedly inſtructed us to encourage the other tribes in *Hindoſtan* to oppoſe them, and by no one has the neceſſity of treating them even as avowed enemies been more warmly urged than by the General in his Letters.

Allowing that the King's ceſſion of *Korah*, &c. to the Marattas; that his marching with them at a time when their intentions appeared ſo hoſtile that it was found neceſſary for our troops and the Vizier's to advance to oppoſe them; and that his adviſing them to ſow diſſentions between us and the Vizier before they attacked us (which facts ſtand eſtabliſhed on our Records) proceeded all from compulſion, they will ſerve only to prove him under the abſolute bondage of the Marattas; and although the Illiabad Treaty does not expreſsly ſtipulate that he ſhould remain in that neighbourhood, yet it certainly implies that he ſhould continue his connection with us, and could never be intended to oblige us to pay a tribute to our enemies. If the Company have forfeited the Dewanny by ſtopping the payment of the tribute, they would not have prevented the forfeiture by paying a part, as the General propoſes; for their ſecurity was for the regular payment of the whole, and the King has repeatedly demanded it. To have paid a part therefore would be uſeleſs, by adding to the Company's diſtreſs, and as to advancing as much as they would, it appears from the accumulated debts in *Bengal*, and the heavy loan they have been obliged to borrow in *Europe*, that their advances have in fact already exceeded their own means. The acknowledgment of *Shaw Allum* as King in the village of *Dondnagur*, by the troops compoſing the army with which he had invaded the Bahar province, hardly deſerves to be dignified by the expreſſion of raiſing him to the Muſnud. The Board believe he was firſt formally proclaimed at *Patna*, by the authority of this Government, and if by acknowledgment a payment of tribute is implied, he has never been acknowledged by any but the Engliſh, not even by the Vizier his firſt ſervant.

The General having declined being preſent at this Conſultation, as the matter in debate is in ſome reſpects perſonal to himſelf, the above Minutes were communicated

cated to him; and he ſends in the following reply, requeſting that it may be recorded in the ſame Proceedings; which is ordered accordingly as follows:

General *Barker* begs leave to obſerve, in ſupport of the declaration contained in his Minute of diſſent to the late Treaty of *Benares*, that although it is not expreſsly the tenor of the fourth article of the Treaty of *Allahabad* with the Vizier, yet the adminiſtration of that period muſt have viewed it in that light; and he therefore quotes the 20th paragraph of their General Letter on this ſubject, under date the 30th September 1765; viz. "With "reſpect to the other articles of the Treaty, you will "obſerve that a ſufficient proviſion is ſecured for the "ſupport of the King's honour and dignity, without "danger of his becoming a future incumbrance; and "that twenty-ſix lacks yearly are granted to him on the "revenues of *Bengal*; a revenue far more conſiderable "than he ever before enjoyed. In gratitude for this "inſtance of our attention to his intereſt, his Majeſty "has been pleaſed to beſtow on the Company the moſt "important grants ever yet obtained by any European "State from the Mogul's Court: beſides confirming to "the Company all their former poſſeſſions, and ſecuring "to them in perpetuity the reverſion of Lord *Clive*'s "Jaghier, he has conferred on them the Dewannee of "*Bengal*, *Bahar*, and *Oriſſa*, and ratified in the ſtrongeſt "terms an agreement we propoſed concluding with the "Nabob, if the King's conſent could be procured; "ſubjects which it will be neceſſary to explain in a ſepa"rate paragraph." And that the 4th Article of the Treaty with the Vizier was merely a confirmation of this grant to his Majeſty, of which he was in abſolute poſſeſſion.

The General, in his communication of the Vizier's propoſals for the reduction of the Rohilla, by no means wiſhed to poſſeſs him of ſo large a tract of country. He had many other propoſals for the conſideration of the Board, had this means been adopted at the time, which would effectually have ſecured the neceſſary balance of power; and if he miſtakes not, the Preſident is in poſſeſſion of ſome remarks of the General's upon this ſubject.

Relative to the quotation which has been taken up by the Preſident from the General's Letter, of the 23d March 1768, he begs leave to obſerve, that ſince that time the Vizier has made conſiderable improvements, both in the diſcipline of his troops and knowledge of arms; and that an increaſe of wealth muſt indubitably enable him to be a ſtill greater proficient in the military ſcience; although he is by no means of opinion, that his Excellency's preſent force ſhould give the Company the leaſt cauſe for apprehenſion.

(Signed) *R^t Barker.*

APPENDIX, No. 20.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee of *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 11th October 1773.

Par. 2. IN our former advices we acquainted you, that the Marattas having extorted from *Shaw Allem* a grant of the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah*, were advancing to take poſſeſſion; that your Adminiſtration, conſidering the right of the Company to that Country when relinquiſhed by the King, as well as the danger that would ariſe to your territories, and thoſe of *Sujah Dowlah*, were the Marattas to obtain ſo near a footing, determined, in concert with the Vizier, to oppoſe their deſigns, and to cover the frontier from an invaſion.

3. In conſequence of this reſolution, a brigade was ordered to march and join the Vizier's army. They proceeded to *Ramgaut* in the Rohilla Country, where the General, having put himſelf at their head, they encamped on the banks of the *Ganges*, as we confined ourſelves to that defenſive plan which you have been pleaſed to preſcribe. The General was ordered not to commence hoſtilities, but to remain on the Northern ſide of the *Ganges*; and the Marattas not daring to attack your forces, the armies continued nearly in this ſituation for two months, without coming to an engagement. On the rapid approach of our army, a conſiderable party of the Marattas, who were then in the Rohilla Country, fled with precipitation, and re-croſſing the *Ganges* joined the main body; at one time they ventured to cannonade our encampment from the oppoſite bank of the river, but being preſently ſilenced by a diſcharge from our artillery, they afterwards confined their operations to laying waſte the neighbouring Country, and at laſt, either recalled by their own Government, or apprehenſive of remaining ſo near our army during the rains (where, in caſe of an attack, they would have been unable to ſecure a retreat, which was open to them at every other ſeaſon) they retired to the *Decan* towards the beginning of May.

4. The campaign has fully anſwered our intentions; and we entertain hopes that the Marattas, obſerving the concord which ſubſiſts between the Company and the Vizier, and the ſteady ſyſtem on which they act, will deſiſt in future from alarming the frontiers with threatened invaſions. The little ſucceſs that has this year attended their arms, and the internal diſſentions which ſubſiſt among themſelves, give ſome probable grounds for this expectation.

5. The ſcene of the Marattas operations lay principally in the Rohilla Country, which, from its ſituation and the weakneſs and jealouſy of its Chiefs, was part cula'y expoſed to their incurſions. One of the leaders of this nation, *Hafez Rhamet*, whoſe territories lie contiguous to thoſe of *Sujah Dowlah*, and to the province of *Corah*, had formerly entered into a Treaty with the Vizier, in which he agreed to pay him 40 lacks of rupees for his protection and aſſiſtance; the half of which ſum the Vizier promiſed to pay to the Company, in conſideration of the ſuperior part they took in theſe tranſactions. *Hafez Rhamet* having for ſome time acted a very double part, at laſt joined the army, and continued his promiſes of fulfilling the Treaty; but protracted the time until the Marattas had retired, and the troops were in conſequence recalled. Being then relieved from the apprehenſion of preſent danger, he declined paying up the ſtipulated ſum, on pretexts of inability, and that it was neceſſary firſt to conſult the other Rohilla Chiefs. The Vizier, highly exaſperated at this conduct of the Rohilla, propoſed immediately to compel him to a compliance with his engagements, by marching into his Country, or in caſe of his refuſal, to reduce it, and unite it to his own. For this purpoſe, he applied to your Adminiſtration for their aid and concurrence; but before we could come to any reſolution, many points of a delicate nature were previouſly to be examined and ſettled.

6. The alarm of an invaſion of the Marattas had for three ſucceſſive ſeaſons occaſioned the march of one of the brigades, at the requiſition and for the aſſiſtance of the Vizier; but the ſum ſtipulated as an indemnification for this extraordinary expence being not only greatly inadequate to the actual amount, but often irregularly paid, the Company was ſubjected to a heavy charge, their military ſtrength greatly weakened, and the wealth of the Country was expended in the pay of the troops. Under ſuch circumſtances the friendſhip of *Sujah Dowlah* grew to be a burden to the Company, and it was evident that an union ſubſiſting on terms ſo unequal, could neither be cordial nor laſting. It became therefore neceſſary to provide ſome remedy for this defect in our alliance with the Vizier.

7. The actual poſſeſſion of the Corah province was another point that required particular attention, and opened a proſpect of advantage to the Company; but from its remote ſituation, and our ignorance of the real

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ſtate of the Country, we thought proper to recommend to the Council to depute one of the Members to proceed thither, and to prepare ſuch materials as might enable us to determine upon the manner of diſpoſing of it moſt beneficial to the Company.

8. While theſe important matters were under our conſideration, the Vizier frequently expreſſed an earneſt deſire of a perſonal interview with our Preſident: and this meaſure appearing the moſt effectual means of bringing them to a concluſion, and of ſtrengthening that friendſhip in which the Company are united with the Vizier, we recommended it to the Council, and it was carried into execution. But as you will be informed by the Board, of the ſucceſs which has attended the Preſident's negociations, we beg leave to refer you on this ſubject to the Letter from that department.

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Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 3d February 1772.—Preſent, the honourable *John Cartier*, eſq. Preſident. *Samuel Middleton*, and *William Alderſey*, eſquires.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort Saint George*; dated *Fort William*, 3d February 1772.

THE means of thoſe Princes, whoſe extent of territory or conſequence in the empire ſhould lead them to combine their ſtrength to ſtem the torrent and prove a counterbalance to the Maratta Power, are not inadequate, if they could be brought to act on one general plan for the ſecurity of the whole; but as it is, they are divided, irreſolute, and incapable of taking any effectual meaſure to avert the impending danger. It is to no purpoſe that we have ſtimulated the Vizier to undertake, in conjunction with the Rohilla, ſomething of ſufficient importance to convince them that a vigorous oppoſition will follow any further advances they may make to the Eaſtward: he will do nothing without the aid of a body of our troops, which however at this particular juncture we do not deem it prudent to grant him.

Extract of Letter from General *Barker* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; dated at *Faizabad*, 21ſt January 1772.

I did myſelf the pleaſure to addreſs you on the 10th inſtant, with information that at the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla*'s earneſt deſire and requeſt to ſee me at *Fayzabad*, I had determined to proceed to that place in my route to *Allahabad*. The 19th I arrived here, and found his Excellency much indiſpoſed, not having quitted his apartments for fourteen days, nor did he appear to be in a condition to have performed his promiſe of meeting me at *Benares*. At a conference I had with him yeſterday morning, he informed me with much concern and anxiety, his preſent ſituation was become ſo critical, that meaſures were neceſſary to be taken without loſs of time for preventing what inevitably threatened his reputation and poſſeſſions. To obey his Majeſty's directions under the preſent circumſtances he was reſolved not to do, for the ſame reaſon I before mentioned to you; that the Maratta Chiefs had gained too great an aſcendency over his Majeſty for him to ſupport the dignity of his ſtation, by which he might be neceſſitated to concur in meaſures oppoſite to his inclination and intereſt, or otherwiſe leaving the King under worſe pretences, than not joining him at all. To remain inactive, and ſee the Rohillas reduced, was as bad or worſe; for, he very juſtly obſerved, that the Rohillas would, to prevent a total extirpation, undoubtedly give up a part of their Country, and would of conſequence be neceſſitated to join their arms with the Marattas. Such a general confederacy would immediately fall on him, as their next object in view; and he further obſerves, that in this caſe he muſt claim the performance of our Treaty for the defence of his poſſeſſions. Or, on the other hand, ſhould the Marattas not receive any conditions of peace from the Rohillas, and the King determined on their overthrow, ſuch an acquiſition of country and riches would ſtrengthen that Power (already arrived at too great a heighth) to a very dangerous degree, particularly as by eſtabliſhing themſelves ſo immediately adjoining to his dominions, they would be ever ready to fall on him when opportunity offered, by his force being called to the aſſiſtance of his allies. Under this dilemma he has only two plans to adopt, the one will require a ſhew of ſupport and approbation of the Engliſh Government, the other to remain in his preſent ſituation waiting the event of conſequences, and relying on the ſupport of his friends and allies. To prevent however his own reputation from ſuffering, and the trouble and expence which muſt neceſſarily and will moſt certainly attend his friends the Engliſh by their aſſiſtance, he could wiſh they would adopt his firſt plan; and purpoſes the march of his whole force to that frontier of his dominions contiguous to the poſſeſſions of the Rohillas. He has already received Letters from *Hafez Rhamut Kaun*, the ſon of *Dundee Kaun* and *Zebta Khan*, requeſting his aſſiſtance to ſave them from the impending blow. A Coul Nama, or Treaty, has been ſent him from the latter, with blanks for filling up ſuch terms as may be moſt agreeable to him. And he is aſſured, that on his appearance at the frontiers with the approbation of the Engliſh Government, which he obſerves can noway appear or be credited, but by my being with him, he can effect a compromiſe between the Rohillas, the Marattas, and the King, ſo that by giving up a part of their Country for his Majeſty's ſupport, they ſhall remain in poſſeſſion of ſuch parts as will be a barrier to his own dominions; for he obſerves that the King is uneaſy in his preſent ſituation, and would moſt heartily join in any accommodation to render himſelf more independent of that aſpiring Power. The Marattas from ſuch appearances would not refuſe a compromiſe for a ſum of money, ſince by advices from the *Decan* it is not improbable but they may be wanted for the defence of their own poſſeſſions, *Hyder Ally* having given a total defeat to the Maratta force ſtationed in his country, and *Nizam Ally* beſieged a fort they had poſſeſſed themſelves of in his Subah, to the aſſiſtance of which *Jannou Gee* is called from *Nagpoor*, and the certainty of *Tucco Gee*, one of the Chiefs at the capital and the friend of *Zabiter Khan*, joining to effect ſuch ſalutary meaſures. In this caſe his Excellency obſerves, he can with propriety take upon him the office of Vizier, and much greater confidence will be placed in his propoſals, for the knowledge of the concern the Engliſh have in theſe negociations, by the preſence of their chief officers: but without the appearance of ſuch a ſupport he will not undertake it. His Excellency has by this conveyance addreſſed the Preſident, on the urgency of his ſituation; and I ſhall wait the reſult of your determination with impatience. He has requeſted a battalion of Sepoys might be ordered from the garriſon of *Allahabad*, to the lines of *Cawnpoor*, which I have taken upon me to direct. Should the Nabob's propoſal meet with the concurrence of the Board, and his negociations prove ſucceſsful, I ſhall deem it one of the luckieſt events that could have happened for the intereſt of the Company. For the knowledge of ſuch an accommodation, effected by the mediation of the Engliſh, will ſtrengthen their reputation, and will be the only means of preventing the almoſt certainty of an attack on the Vizier's or Company's poſſeſſions, ſooner or later.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, to General *Barker*; dated the 3d February 1772.

Sir,

We have read with attention in your Letter of the 12th ultimo, the Vizier's propoſals to effect a general pacification;

pacification; and we conſider the requiſition he has made, of our aſſiſtance to attain this end, in ſo moderate and unaſſuming a light, that we can have no poſſible objection of authorizing you to act on the part of the Honourable Company in the negociations that may occur on this ſubject

We approve therefore of your having ordered the battalion to *Cawnpoor*, and if upon a thorough conviction it ſhall appear to you that the Marattas will certainly make an attempt on the provinces of our allies, we ſhall in that caſe obtain the concurrence of the Board to a brigade's marching to *Buxar*; though, as the ſeaſon is ſo far advanced, we imagine that nothing important in its conſequences will be undertaken by them before the ſetting in of the rains.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 15th March 1772.—Preſent, the honourable *John Cartier*, eſquire, Preſident. *Warren Haſtings*, and *William Alderſey*, eſquires.

Extract of Letter from General *Barker* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; dated the 28th January 1772.

Encloſed I ſend you a Letter which the Nabob ſent to me yeſterday morning; it was wrote in conſequence of his having received advices from the capital. The Marattas, were made uneaſy from Letters they had received from the *Decan*, and were deſirous of puſhing on matters here with as much expedition as poſſible; in conſequence of which, they were urging his Majeſty to march with all expedition towards *Succurtaul* to attack *Zabiter Cawn*, and that the King had actually moved out of the capital ſome coſs for that purpoſe, but for want of money his people refuſed to go with him. The Vizier alſo obſerves, that *Byſagee* will undoubtedly advance him a ſmall ſum for the ſubſiſtence of his attendants, or otherwiſe oblige him to go, as he ſuſpects their intention is to force *Zabiter Cawn* into a compromiſe, and by getting from him a ſum of money, be at liberty to co-operate in meaſures with their Chiefs in the *Decan*. It is this which the Vizier is deſirous to prevent, but, as I before obſerved to you, without the appearance of the Engliſh approbation he cannot do it, for he has hinted to me in confidence what I was delicate of communicating in public; but the times ſeem to require it. His Excellency obſerved to me, that I was no ſtranger to the terms he was on with the Rohillas, and he openly confeſſed his inclination and wiſh at one time to reduce thoſe Powers. Since the death of *Doondee Cawn*, for whom he had an utter averſion, he has been more reconciled, and he now diſcovers it is highly neceſſary for political reaſons, to protect them in their preſent eſtabliſhment; that this difference between them has occaſioned a diffidence on their ſide, and that he ſhall not be credited unleſs the Engliſh appear to adopt the ſyſtem, and his pride would be hurt was he to attempt it, and be refuſed; that there is no time to be loſt; that if his army moves to the weſtern frontiers, and I am with him, he is aſſured *Zabiter Cawn* will not advance a rupee; that inſtead of a compromiſe it will produce an oppoſition. I have before wrote to you that the Nabob had received Letters from the ſeveral Rohilla Chiefs; but then theſe Letters are wrote to him in a ſtile as if he was one and the ſame as the Engliſh, and he doubts, that without ſuch a concurrence, they mean to do nothing with him alone.

To the honourable *John Cartier*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have had the pleaſure to receive your Letter of the 3d inſtant. It gives me great ſatisfaction, that my tranſactions with his Excellency the Vizier have met with your approbation: we arrived at this place on the 13th, and ſet out for the north weſtern extremes of the Nabob's dominions to-morrow. This ſituation at *Nuuamow*, being on the banks of the *Ganges*, will be exceedingly convenient for me, as I ſhall then be in readineſs to proceed in a Snake in ten or eleven days to the Preſidency, ſhould the ſervice, or you, Gentlemen, require my appearance with expedition.

The Nabob has made ſeveral propoſals to act conjunctively with the Rohillas and Pattaus, in oppoſition to the Marattas; but his propoſals have not been ſo well received as he expected; they have however ſo far agreed to act mutually for a general defence of this quarter of the empire. The Rohillas urged the Nabob to march to the aſſiſtance of *Zabiter Cawn*, and poſt himſelf oppoſite to *Succurtaut*, as in this ſituation he would be in readineſs to defend ſuch of the fords as are paſſable at this ſeaſon of the year, and they themſelves would reinforce *Zabiter Cawn*. This the Nabob declined, nor could I prevail on him on any account to proceed ſo far without the ſecurity of an Engliſh force joined to his army. He propoſed however to march acroſs the *Ganges*, from the frontiers of his dominions, into the Pattau diſtrict, and there recover ſuch of the new acquiſitions which the Marattas poſſeſſed themſelves of when they inveſted *Turruchabad*, and by ſuch a diverſion take off a part of their attention from *Succurtaut*; but then the Vizier required an equal diviſion of the recovered countries to anſwer or defray the charges of ſuch an expedition; this I verily believe the Nabob would have executed, becauſe in ſuch an operation he would have been near his own country; and was the Marattas to detach a principal part of their army againſt him, he had the Engliſh at his back, whom he knew would march to ſupport him, and by this ſituation he covered his own country and the Corah province. Neither the Pattau or the Rohilla reliſhed or would agree to this mode of diviſion of country; it is therefore reſolved, that his Excellency ſhall preſent his whole force on the north weſtern frontier of his dominions, in which ſituation he ſhall be in readineſs to defend either his own or the Corah province. *Hafez Rhamet*, with the combined forces of the Rohillas, from the aſſurance that I have given them, that the Vizier will take no improper advantage of their being abſent from thoſe parts of the Rohilla Country which lay contiguous to his Excellency's dominions, whilſt I am with him, will march to the defence of *Zabiter Cawn*, and fords of the *Ganges*; thus the appearance of ſo reſpectable an oppoſition will check the order of the Marattas intention, and probably put a ſtop to their further progreſs this ſeaſon; and this I am in hopes will anſwer the full intent of the diverſion which the Gentlemen of the Madras Adminiſtration could wiſh to have performed, by amuſing their armies in this quarter, without admitting them to gain any advantage. At the ſame time Letters are wrote from the Vizier, myſelf, and ſeveral of the Rohilla Chiefs, requeſting his Majeſty would withdraw his intention of reducing the Rohillas and Pattaus; and repreſented the conſequences of eſtabliſhing the Marattas in their country, and increaſing the ſtrength of that already too preſumptive Power. The Rohillas are willing to give ſuch proportion of their country, as may be judged neceſſary for the ſupport of the royal houſe, and to aſſiſt his Majeſty in ſuch further operations as may be proper to carry into execution; and I am in great hopes, from the little proſpect there is of the Marattas ſucceeding in the reduction of the Rohillas this ſeaſon, the King will liſten to our advice; on the other hand, ſhould the Maratta arms prevail, and they effect a paſſage acroſs the river to reduce the Rohillas, it appears they muſt winter on this ſide of the *Ganges* to acquire any advantage from ſuch a paſſage, as the river is fordable only three months longer, from the melting of the ſnow in the Northern mountains in the hot months; in which caſe I have a plan of operation to propoſe immediately on the taking off the rains, which I am in hopes will meet with your approbation; but it is too long to appear in this Letter. The grand point at preſent appears to be the prevention of a compromiſe between the Rohillas and Marattas, which I am endeavouring at, by ſpiriting up the Rohillas and Pattaus, and perſuading

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perſuading them that although the Marattas ſhould gain ſome advantage this ſeaſon, the near approach of the rains will ſoon afford them an opportunity of recovering their loſſes. I have aſſurances from *Zabiter Cawn*, that he is determined to maintain his poſt at *Succurtaut*, and it is imagined he can do it; *Hafez Rhamet* and the other Rohillas, are ſatisfied with regard to their Eaſtern poſſeſſions, and are drawing together for the defence of the river. And I propoſe on our arrival at *Munancow*, to throw a few of the Nabob's battalions, and ſome thouſand of his beſt horſe, on the frontiers of *Corah*. Thus, Gentlemen, I am in hopes by theſe meaſures to fruſtrate the intentions of the Marattas, and put a ſtop to their rapid progreſs, at leaſt for this ſeaſon, and anſwer all the purpoſe which the Gentlemen of the Madras Adminiſtration can expect, without commencing actual hoſtilities with them ourſelves.

The lateſt advices from the royal encampment inform me that his Majeſty had, by the aſſiſtance of the Marattas, taken a fort called *Gouſe Gur*, belonging to *Zabita Cawn*, in which there were ſix guns, a large quantity of grain, and ſome treaſure, which was immediately divided between the King and the Marattas in equal ſhares: they are now encamped within ſixteen coſs of *Succurtaut*, and ſome parties have been examining the fords. *Zabita Cawn* has reinforced his advanced guards, and is encamped with a conſiderable body of Rohillas on the oppoſite banks of the *Ganges* for the defence of the river.

I ſhould imagine that if the Marattas ſucceed in their attempts of croſſing the river, and make a rapid progreſs through the Rohilla Country towards the Vizier's territories, as they have already given it out that they intend cantoning at *Lucknow*, you will judge it neceſſary to advance a brigade nearer to his Excellency's dominions; for in this caſe the approach of the Marattas will be very quick.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Lucknow,
25th February 1772.

To the honourable *John Cartier*, eſq. Preſident, &c.
Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

His Excellency the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla* has juſt been with me in conſequence of Papers of Intelligence which arrived from the Weſtward late laſt night: they bring advices, that a body of Marattas, amounting to thirty thouſand men, commanded by the Surdar *Maha Gee Sindea*, had made good their paſſage acroſs the *Ganges* under cover of their cannon, and gave a total defeat to the Rohillas and Affgans poſted there for the defence of the fords, and commanded by *Sadut Cawn*, an Affreidi. This Surdar is ſaid to be killed, and the few of the troops who eſcaped the ſlaughter have taken ſhelter with *Zabiter Cawn* in *Succurtaul*. This blow has greatly diſheartened the ſeveral Rohilla Sardars, and it is reported they are each preparing for their own ſecurity and their families. The Marattas, flushed with their ſucceſs, will undoubtedly loſe no time in attacking *Zabiter Cawn* in his lines, and there is too much reaſon to apprehend they will ſucceed; their progreſs through the Rohilla country and towards the Vizier's dominions will conſequently be very rapid. Conſidering therefore the length of time it will take to receive your approbation for marching the 1ſt brigade, I have determined to direct Colonel *Champion* to begin his march immediately; and the exigency of the ſervice will I hope vindicate my conduct therein: ſhould it however be contrary to your approbation, your orders for countermanding will neceſſarily reach Colonel *Champion* before he can have advanced far beyond the *Carramnaſſa*. In the meantime I ſhall take every meaſure, in concert with his Excellency, for the defence of his dominions, that may be neceſſary on the occaſion. I ſhall do myſelf the pleaſure to addreſs you as any material tranſactions from the Weſtward occur, and in a day or two will tranſmit you a full account of the late action.

I am,
Gentlemen,
with the greateſt reſpect,
your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R^t Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Bangarmow*,
28th February 1772.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 30th April 1772.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Hoſtings*, eſquire, *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

Read, the following Letters from General Sir *Robert Barker*, under dates the 9th, 10th, and 14th inſtant.

To the honourable *John Cartier*, eſq. Preſident, &c.
Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

From Sir R. Barker.

Since my laſt addreſs to your Board, the Maratta Vackeel, *Bahar Gur*, has had an audience with the Vizier, and has received a killaut or dreſs. The Nabob has alſo diſpatched *Ellich Cawn* with propoſals to the Marattas; they have it ſeems, through *Babur Gee*, offered him the mediatorſhip of the affairs between them and *Hafez Rhamet*, and the Nabob appears much inclined to undertake the buſineſs; their inducements I am unacquainted with; but he purpoſes to acquire a large ſum from the diſmayed Rohilla, and by giving a proportion to the Marattas, retain a ſufficient ſum to defray the expences which he has been at for the march of his own troops, and the extra expence of the Engliſh forces, with an overplus to reward him for the undertaking. He is now fully intent on this buſineſs; and although I have repreſented to him the probability of his being drawn into a Treaty that will hereafter bring diſhonour both on himſelf and friends, he is not to be diverted from his ſcheme, but declares he will enter into no meaſures that will be detrimental to his allies, or the attachment and friendſhip he has with the Engliſh; and to convince me of the truth of this, nothing is to be concluded on without my approbation. I have poſitively told his Excellency, that I diſlike this Treaty; that it is inconſiſtent with his intereſt and his connection with the Engliſh; that I had much rather ſee him form an alliance with the Rohillas, who may yet be aſſembled againſt the Marattas, than have any thing to ſay to thoſe aſſuming Powers, as I ſuſpect much they have bad deſigns. He aſked me, if the Engliſh forces will join, or be in readineſs to ſupport him in the undertaking? but he has already experienced, that I can give him little ſatisfactory anſwers to theſe queſtions. He tells me he has no choice; for he muſt either join the Marattas in the total reduction of the Rohillas, or bring on a compromiſe between thoſe Powers; for the alternative is an attack on his dominions after the reduction of the Rohilla. I have therefore ſent Captain *Gabriel Harper* to *Hafez Rhamet*, and I will do my endeavours to procraſtinate this Treaty until I receive your inſtructions.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Robert Barker.

Camp, near
Shawabad,
9th April 1772.

To the honourable *John Cartier*, eſquire, Preſident,
&c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Some advices from the *Decan* have thrown the Maratta Chiefs, *Byſagee* and *Sindeah*, into a conſternation. It is reported, that *Mhadarow* has releaſed from his confinement *Ragonaut Row*, and promiſed him a conſiderable command in the Weſt; in conſequence of which it is imagined

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imagined they will conclude a peace with the Rohillas, and re-croſs the river.

The encloſed Papers of Intelligence corroborates this information. The Vizier gives not much credit to this news, leſt it may be propagated to amuſe; but he appears uneaſy under an apprehenſion of being excluded from this Treaty.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R^t Barker.

Camp, near *Shawabad*,
10th April 1772.

Ordered, That we ſend an anſwer to the General in the following terms:

To Brigadier General Sir *R^t. Barker*, Commander in Chief under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your Letters of the 9th, 10th, and 14th inſtant, with the Papers of Intelligence encloſed in the Letters.

It appears by your Letter of the 9th, that the Vizier has formed a plan for a general pacification, to be effected by his intervention, between the Rohillas and the Marattas; and the objects propoſed by it are, that in lieu of a certain ſum of money to be paid them by the former, the Marattas may evacuate their country; and that he himſelf likewiſe may receive a proportionable conſideration to defray the expence of the expedition he has ſet on foot, and as an acknowledgment for his trouble in the mediation. The plan you have adopted ſeems to be the reverſe of this. You ſuppoſe that any compromiſe that will add to the weakneſs of the Rohillas, and ſtrengthen the hands of the Marattas, and which ſhall leave them at liberty and uninterrupted to proſecute their deſigns in other quarters, will only enable them to return with greater advantages, and poſſeſſed of a more effectual means of completing the reduction of the Rohilla country at another ſeaſon, and conſequently to carry their arms into the dominions of the Vizier, by which the Company muſt be ultimately involved in an offenſive and hazardous war againſt the whole power of that State. This we conclude to be the principal ground of your objections, although not expreſſed in your Letter. And the conduct which you are deſirous the Nabob ſhould purſue on this occaſion is, that he ſhould form an alliance with the Rohillas againſt their common enemy, and commence, with the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh forces, an immediate war with the Marattas.

In conſequence of theſe diſſimilar views, the Vizier has ſent a Vackeel to the Marattas, to treat of peace; and you have, on the other hand, diſpatched Captain *Harper* as a plenipotentiary on the part of the Company to the Rohilla Chiefs, in order to procraſtinate a Treaty that is to counteract his Excellency's views, until you ſhall receive our inſtructions. We have ſtated the caſe thus largely on both ſides, that you may the better underſtand the grounds of our reſolutions upon it.

The Committee are confirmed in the opinion they have for ſome time paſt entertained, that the Marattas will not make any ſtay in the Rohilla country, but that they will be obliged to quit it even before the rains ſet in; and every day's intelligence renders the probability of this event the more apparent. We therefore ſo far concur in opinion with you, that any conceſſions made to the Marattas to promote their departure would be ſuperfluous, and highly improper. If their departure is to be purchaſed, although the Vizier might be an immediate gainer by it, yet we do not think ourſelves authorized to engage in any plan which in its conſequences may lead us into inevitable hoſtilities: for this reaſon, we cannot approve of a promiſe being made to him of the junction of our forces in the proſecution of an offenſive war; the more eſpecially as the Court of Directors, in their Letters by the *Lapwing*, have promiſed to furniſh us with clear and preciſe Inſtructions reſpecting the carrying on hoſtilities againſt the Marattas at a diſtance from our own borders; and theſe may be very ſoon expected.

From all theſe conſiderations, the Committee approve of your endeavours to diſſuade the Vizier from entering into any negociations which may lead to an alliance with the Marattas, ſince we might by this means be precluded from taking ſuch meaſures as the Company's exact orders may render neceſſary; at the ſame time, we do not think any Treaty made with thoſe Powers would be longer obſerved by them than as it ſhould prove conſonant to their own intereſts.

As you have already deputed Captain *Harper* to the Rohillas, of courſe the commiſſion with which you have intruſted him muſt have had its effect long before this reaches you: we have therefore only to deſire that you will recal him as ſoon as you conveniently can, as the character in which Captain *Harper* has been ſent to the enemies of the Marattas, carries with it too much the appearance of our being principals in theſe negociations, which we are ſolicitous of avoiding.

We deſire you will inform us very particularly of all proceedings and events in your quarter, of the nature of your inſtructions to Captain *Harper*, and of the conſequent operations, that we may have the ſubject at large before us, and be better enabled to form our reſolutions upon them, at the time the receipt of the Company's orders may enable us to take a more deciſive part in theſe tranſactions, than we think ourſelves at preſent authorized to do.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour to receive your Letter of the 30th ultimo yeſterday, and have taken the earlieſt opportunity of replying thereto. With concern it is that I obſerve by your Letter, that my opinions and meaſures have not appeared to you in the light I expected. Upon the reperuſal of all my addreſſes to your Board, both preceding and ſucceeding thoſe acknowledged in your before-mentioned Letter, I cannot diſcover any alterations in the plans I had laid down for my conduct, farther than the fluctuating changes in the motions and behaviour of the Powers in this quarter abſolutely required; I even flatter myſelf you will find my conduct totally uniform, and that it has been my greateſt care to prevent the appearance of our having taken too active a part in the negociations expected to be brought about between the Rohilla and the Vizier, and his Excellency and the Marattas.

It has been my wiſh to ſee the Vizier form an alliance with the Rohilla, as will evidently appear by my ſeveral Letters. From my firſt arrival at his Excellency's Court in January laſt, and ſince the entire defeat of *Zabiter Cawn*, and the general conſternation the whole Rohilla Power were thrown into, it became more particularly neceſſary, not only to preſerve them from total extirpation, but alſo to ſecure his Excellency's dominions from the eſtabliſhment of ſuch troubleſome neighbours by ſuch an alliance. I alſo propoſed a grand ſtep towards ſtopping the further progreſs of the Maratta arms, at leaſt this ſeaſon. When the propoſals were therefore made by the Maratta Vackeel to the Nabob, for appointing him mediator between them and the Rohilla, he immediately thought of gaining over the Rohilla, and taking the management of their affairs with the Marattas entirely upon himſelf, in conſideration of his receiving from them a crore of rupees, as will appear by my addreſs of the 22d April; and the Vizier at the ſame time diſpatched *Elick Cawn* to the Marattas with their own Vackeels, to treat with them concerning the evacuating of the Rohilla diſtricts, by the payment of a ſum of money: the Vizier however apprehending little effect from his embaſſy to the Rohilla Sardars without the influence of the Engliſh, requeſted Captain *Harper* might attend his Vackeel upon this occaſion, to give weight to his propoſals. I accordingly

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ingly acquieſced; but from what part of my Letters it appears I had ſent him as plenipotentiary on the part of the Honourable Company, I am at a loſs to conceive; for, believe me, Gentlemen, it was the fartheſt from my intentions that the Honourable Company ſhould be in any reſpect whatſoever mentioned in the agreement between the Rohilla and the Vizier; and for your further ſatisfaction on this head I muſt beg leave to ſend you under cover a copy of the inſtructions I gave to that officer upon the occaſion.

By the deceitful behaviour of the Marattas, in denying the promiſes made by their Vackeels, *Bibur Gee* and *Mulkaur Raid*, when *Elick Cawn* arrived to treat with them on the part of the Vizier, all negociations between them and his Excellency were entirely broke off, ſo you may plaſe to obſerve by my Letter of the 10th May, and he then became more urgent for the junction of the Rohilla, leſt the Marattas might under-rate his propoſals, and both forming a junction, fall upon his dominions, which muſt inevitably have brought on hoſtilities between the Marattas and the Company's troops: I was therefore again ſolicited for Captain *Harper*'s return to the Rohilla Chiefs, finally to conclude the wiſhed-for alliance, they having agreed to the payment of ſixty lacks of rupees. This I have the pleaſure to inform you is at laſt nearly effected, and to-morrow or next day I expect Captain *Harper*'s arrival, with *Hafez Rahmet Cawn* accompanying him. On the other hand, from cauſes yet unknown, and notwithſtanding the Marattas refuſed to permit of the Nabob's having any concern in the mediatorſhip of the Rohilla, *Sindeah*, attended by *Hyſein dit dine Cawn*, has ſet out with *Elick Cawn* to the Vizier's camp, with hopes of prevailing on him to proceed to the royal preſence, as will appear by Letter of the 18th, duplicate of which is incloſed: but the Vizier ſeems inflexible in his determination not to form any alliance with ſuch a ſet of people, who can ſo readily commit a breach of promiſe; and my further concluſion on this matter is ſet forth in the afore-mentioned Letter. —After the knowledge of your ſentiments relative to the operations of the Marattas, it would be extraordinary indeed had I endeavoured to bring about immediate hoſtilities, and it therefore concerns me to find you have drawn ſuch an inference. Be aſſured, whatever my private ſentiments may be on this head, I ſhall never adopt a plan ſo contrary to your wiſhes and thoſe of your honourable Employers—conſcious that his Excellency would enter into no treaty with the Marattas, but muſt hereafter prove an inconvenience to his alliance and friendſhip with the Engliſh, I dreaded its happening; and here indeed my views are diſſimilar with thoſe of the Nabob: I endeavoured to diſſuade him from it. Their deceitful conduct has happily effected my intentions, and finally his determination. Should however the Nabob's junction with the Rohillas, and the refuſal he means to give *Sindeah*, induce the Marattas to undertake any hoſtilities immediately, my endeavours ſhall not be wanting to bring it to a ſpeedy concluſion; but if they croſs the river to winter between the *Ganges* and *Jumna*, and defer any further attempts, I hope to be favoured with your orders, in conſequence of the expected Inſtructions from the Honourable the Directors, for my future guide.

I am, Gentlemen,
with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp, *Shawabad*,
20th May 1772.

Extract of *Fort William* Select Conſultations, 24th June 1772.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, and Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

On the 21ſt inſtant Captain *Harper* returned from the Rohilla Sardars, having at length prevailed on *Hafiz Rhamet Cawn* to proceed with him to *Shawabad* the ſecond day's march. However Captain *Harper* came poſt to join me, leaving the Rohilla to follow by eaſy marches, in order to ſettle the mode for his reception. The jealouſy of Hindoſtaners has been very particularly evinced in this viſit; for notwithſtanding *Hafiz Rham t* has been encamped within three coſs ſince the 23d of the month, until this morning he could not prevail on himſelf to perform the meeting. His Excellency and myſelf proceeded about three miles to meet the Rohilla, and the ſame attention and ceremony was obſerved as at the reception of *Zabiter Cawn*.

I hope in a few days to have the ſatisfaction of communicating to you the final concluſion of this agreement with the Rohilla Sardars in general; and am, with reſpect,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble Servant,
R. Barker.

Camp, *Shawabad*,
May 25th, 1772.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 20th July 1772.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Preſident, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

This morning the Treaty of Alliance between his Excellency and the Rohilla Sardars was finally concluded in my preſence; and encloſed I ſend for your information copies and tranſlations of the Treaty of Alliance reciprocally interchanged, and of the agreement on the part of the Rohilla Sardars with the Vizier.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Camp, *Shawabad*,
June 17th, 1772.

Tranſlation of a Treaty entered into between the Vizier of the Empire *Sujah ul Dowlah*, and the Rohilla Sardars, reciprocally interchanged.

Agreement. Firſt, Friendſhip is eſtabliſhed between us: and we *Hafez Rammet Cawn* and *Zahita Cawn*, and all the other Rohilla Sardars, great and ſmall, have agreed and determined with the Vizier of the Empire *Sujah ul Dowlah*, that we adhere to the ſubſtance of this writing, and never deviate from this agreement; that we eſteem his friends as our friends, and his enemies as our enemies; and that we and our heirs during our lives ſhall adhere firmly to this our oath and agreement; that we ſhall be united and joined together for the protection of the country of the Vizier, of the empire, and of our own country; and if any enemy, which God forbid, ſhould make an attempt againſt us and the Vizier, we the Rohilla Sardars and the Vizier of the Empire ſhall uſe our joint endeavours to oppoſe him; we all the Rohilla Sardars ſhall alſo join and unite in any meaſure that may be determined by the Vizier of the Empire for the benefit of the Nabob *Mahummed Zabita Cawn*. We both parties ſwear by the Almighty, his Prophet, and the ſacred Koran, that we will firmly adhere to this ſolemn Agreement, nor ever deviate from this our Treaty.

This Treaty confirmed by oath, and ſealed in the preſence of General Sir *Robert Barker*, written on the 11th of the month Rubba ul wul 1186 Nigarree.

William Davy,
Perſian Interpreter.

Tranſlation of an Agreement on the part of the Rohilla Sardars with the Vizier.

The Vizier of the Empire *Sujah ul Dowlah* ſhall eſtabliſh the Rohilla Sardars in their different poſſeſſions, obliging the Marattas to retire either by peace or war; this to depend on the pleaſure of the Vizier.

If at this time, without either war or peace, the Marattas, on account of the rains, ſhall croſs and retire, and after

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[illegible] xpiration of the rainy ſeaſon they ſhould again [illegible] e country of the Rohillas, their expulſion is the [illegible]ſiels of the Vizier.

The Rohilla Sardars, in conſequence of the above, agree to pay 40 lack of rupees to the Vizier, in the following manner: as the Marattas are now in the country of the Rohilla Sardars, the Vizier of the Empire ſhall march from *Shawalad*, as far as may be neceſſary, to enable the families of the Rohillas to leave the jungle, and return to their habitations: ten lacks of rupees in ſpecie, in part of the above ſum, ſhall then be paid; and the remaining thirty lacks in three years, from the beginning of the year 1180 Fuſſuli.

This Agreement ſealed in the preſence of General Sir *Robert Barker*.

William Davy,
Perſian Interpreter.

Extract of the Proceedings of the Preſident and Council at *Fort William*, in their Secret Department, 18th February 1773.

Extract of Inſtructions given by the Board to General *Barker*.

N. B. A complete copy of the Inſtructions given by the Board to General Barker is included in the collection of original papers reſpecting Corah and Allahabad.

3. Although, for the firſt object, our intention was to confine our operations altogether within the limits of the Vizier's dominions, yet, for reaſons with which as a Member of the Board you are well acquainted, we have determined to include within the line of defence the Rohilla diſtrict lying on the ſame ſide of the river, known by the name of the country of *Hafez Ramut Khân*; and for that purpoſe you are hereby authorized to enter into a Treaty with *Hafez Ramut Khân*, for the defence and protection of his dominions, on ſuch conditions as ſhall fully indemnify the Company for the additional charge and hazard which may be incurred by ſuch an engagement.

4. But ſhould *Hafez Ramut Khân* either fall into the hands of the Marattas, or from any other ſimilar circumſtance be rendered incapable of entering into ſuch an engagement, you are ſtill to conſider his dominions as an object of your operations; and if the Vizier require you to undertake their defence, and engage to perform the conditions which we have deſired you to claim from *Hafez Ramut Khân*, you will not heſitate to comply, but adopt the meaſure heartily, and purſue it as included in the Inſtructions for the immediate defence of the Vizier's dominions.

5. It is however underſtood, that in all this you rigidly and ſtrictly adhere to the maxim laid down, of confining your operations on that ſide within the *Ganges*, and on no account croſs the river, or carry the war into the Rohilla diſtricts beyond it.

Letter from the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*; received the 14th April 1773.

Upon intelligence being given to General *Barker* and myſelf, that the Marattas were going to croſs the river, and had intentions of commencing hoſtilities in the territories of *Hafez Rahamut Cawn*, we determined to proceed thither by rapid marches, in order to afford that country protection. Accordingly we ſet out, and arrived in time for that purpoſe. *Togojee*, with the part of the army which he commanded, not being able to find a croſſing place, fled off on this ſide the river, and the other part under the command of *Byſagee*, which croſſed, ran off on the other ſide. The ſecond day we learned that *Togogee* was a conſiderable diſtance off on this ſide the river, and that *Byſagee* had halted near us on the oppoſite ſhore. We therefore judged, that if we were at once to croſs part of our army and attack *Byſagee*, it might probably put a ſpeedy end to the preſent diſturbances, and in conformity to this our opinion, the General immediately croſſed with the Engliſh troops in order to begin the attack; but *Byſagee*, who had got previous information of the ſtep we were meditating, haſtened his retreat, and fled to the diſtance of 20 coſs, ſo that the Engliſh troops were obliged to croſs again on this ſide. As we have now got certain information that *Togogee* with his force has intentions of plundering *Biſſoolee* and other places belonging to the Rohillas, we have therefore determined to march after him, in order to afford thoſe places relief; accordingly *Hafez Rahamut* is already gone, and to-morrow we ſhall follow. I have promiſed the General, that whenever we ſhall drive the Marattas out of the Rohilla country, and *Hafez Rahamet Cawn* ſhall fulfil his agreement by the payment of 40 lacks of rupees, I will give half of that ſum to the Engliſh Sirdars. Should the Rohilla Sirdars be guilty of a breach of their agreement, and the Engliſh Gentlemen will thoroughly exterminate them, and ſettle me in their country, I will in that caſe pay them 50 lacks of rupees in ready money, and beſides, exempt them from paying any tribute to the King, out of the Bengal Revenues; the General will alſo write you particularly on this matter himſelf.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 15th April 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I now beg leave to tranſmit a duplicate of my addreſs to you, under date of yeſterday.—This morning the troops repaſſed the *Ganges* at the ſame Gaut, which they forded on the 22d inſtant.

The Marattas made no attempts to interrupt the rear. —*Biſſagee* with his diviſion is marched towards *Cavul* it is reported; and *Tuccogee*, with about 15,000, continues in the Rohilla diſtricts on this ſide of the river; *Sunibar* he has already deſtroyed, and threatens the other principal towns.

Yeſterday I had a viſit from *Hafez Rhamet*, and his Excellency the Vizier, when the ſituation of the affairs of the Rohilla were debated. The coming in of *Hafez* has aſſuaged his Excellency a good deal; and upon conditions of the Rohilla immediately clearing off the laſt year's treaty of forty lacks of rupees, it has been determined to afford their families and country protection from the ravages of the Marattas, of which the Nabob is to pay the Company 20 lacks for the part they will take in this protection, but in default of the fulfilling of this agreement by the Rohilla, his Excellency agrees to pay the ſum of 50 lacks of rupees to the Company for their aid in putting him in poſſeſſion of the Rohilla diſtricts, commonly known by the territories of *Hafez Rhamet*.

In conſequence of the determination to protect the Rohilla, I ſhall to-morrow proceed with all expedition towards *Luſſuly*, about 18 coſs diſtant, whither the intelligence adviſes us *Tuccojee* has marched in expectation of ſecuring the family of *Hafez Rhamut Cawn*.

I am, Gentlemen, with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near Aſſutpoor,
24th March 1773.

Agreed, that the following reply be immediately made to the above Letters:

To Brigadier General Sir *Robt Barker*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your ſeveral Letters, with their Encloſures, under dates the 15th, 20th, 21ſt, 23d, and 24th ultimo.

We remark, with much ſatisfaction, the caution obſerved by you, in not commencing hoſtilities with the Marattas, and in delaying to fire until our army had received repeated ſhots from them. But we cannot approve

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approve your having afterwards exceeded our orders, by croſſing the river *Ganges* to attack the Marattas, nor of the reaſons aſſigned for that meaſure. We muſt deſire you to carry in remembrance the very peremptory orders we have ourſelves received from our honourable Employers, to act only on the defenſive, and to avoid, by every poſſible means, the marching of our forces to ſuch a diſtance from our provinces, as to leave them deſtitute of their aid. It was for this reaſon, and not from any opinion we had of the ſufficiency of the *Ganges* as a barrier againſt the Maratta army, that we made that river the boundary of your operations beyond the province of *Corah*. We are however ſatisfied, from your immediate return to your former ſtation within the preſcribed line, that you meant to conform yourſelf to the ſpirit of our inſtructions. Nevertheleſs, as we have been particular in providing for every probable emergency, by recommending the manner in which we would have you act; and as the obſervance of the defenſive plan which we have been obliged to adopt, can only be enſured by a literal adherence to the line marked out, we muſt inſiſt on your conducting yourſelf for the future by the letter, and not by the ſpirit, of your inſtructions.

It is with ſome reluctance that we exceeded our original plan of defence, in ſuffering our troops to paſs beyond the frontiers of the Vizier's dominions; and we were principally induced to this, by the natural boundary which the *Ganges* and mountains formed to the Rohilla diſtrict, and of courſe to your operations in it; added to the danger to which the Vizier's dominions were expoſed, by the eaſy acceſs the enemy might have through that open country to his territories. But theſe lines once paſſed, it is not in our power to preſcribe any limitation to the progreſs of our troops, which either the retreat of the enemy, or any other favourable emergency, might lead to. The latitude allowed in our laſt letter to you was upon this ſame principle.

We approve of the plan formed for the protection of the Rohilla country, and of the ſtipulation you have made in behalf of the Company, for the moiety of the ſum of 40 lacks, to be paid by the Rohilla chief for this aid; and we authorize you to enter into ſuch engagements with the Vizier and the Rohillas. But we cannot as yet agree to the alternative propoſed, as it might not at this time be diſcreet to create new enemies, until our hands are entirely cleared of the Marattas, and eſpecially for an object of no permanent advantage to the Company. We therefore deſire that you will not engage in any meaſures for reducing the country of the Rohillas, in caſe of default in their engagements with the Vizier, before you have adviſed us of every circumſtance, and have received our further inſtructions upon this ſubject.

That a plan of this kind would yield the moſt eſſential advantage to the Vizier, in extending his territories, completing the defenſive line of his poſſeſſions, and freeing him from the moſt troubleſome neighbourhood, we can well conceive; but as this cannot be atchieved by the Vizier without the aſſiſtance of our forces, we can never conſent to engage in it (although we ſhould even be authorized by the treachery or miſconduct of the Rohillas) without ſuch previous conditions as ſhall ſecure to the Company an equivalent for ſo important a ſervice rendered to our ally. And here we cannot avoid expreſſing our regret, that in the whole courſe of our alliance and operations with the Vizier, this neceſſary and equitable precaution has never yet been ſufficiently attended to; but every meaſure we have adopted in conjunction with him, appears wholly to have been calculated for his particular advantage. While he thus reaps the ſole benefit, to the entire excluſion of the Company, it muſt check us in every ſcheme propoſed for the ſucceſs of the cauſe in which we are jointly engaged, unleſs ſome more equal plan of alliance ſhall be formed with him.

Fort William, 15th April 1773.

We are, Sir,
Your moſt obedient ſervants.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 15th April 1773.

The Vizier having in ſeveral of his Letters expreſſed an earneſt deſire to have an interview with the Preſident, and many points of conſequence requiring an adjuſtment which cannot be effected without a perſonal conference, the Committee are further of opinion, that a meeting between the Vizier and the Preſident would at this ſeaſon be productive of great benefit to the Company's affairs.

Reſolved, that we ſubmit theſe ſubjects to the conſideration of the Council at large.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 19th April 1773.

The Preſident lays before the Board the following extract from the Select Committee Proceedings of the 15th inſtant:

Extract of the Select Committee Proceedings of the 15th April 1773.

It having been reſolved to take preſent poſſeſſion of the province of *Corah* on behalf of the Company, the Committee are of opinion that it will be eſſentially neceſſary, both for ſecuring the Company's rights in that province, and as a preparatory ſtep to any exchange of that diſtrict, or other mode of ceſſion which may be reſolved on, immediately to depute a Member of the Board to *Corah*, to receive charge of it from the General, and to inveſtigate and to form an account of its revenue; and that he be inveſted with full powers to exerciſe ſuch an authority and controul over the Naib *Muneer ul Dowlah* and the other officers of that Government, as may be requiſite for theſe ends.—The ſervice in which the General is immediately engaged, as well as the nature of this truſt, which is totally foreign from the duties of his profeſſion, and requires the ſuperintendance of a perſon experienced in the buſineſs of the revenue, preclude us from receiving the aid of his ſervices on this occaſion; beſides, that ſuch an expreſs deputation will have the effect of marking in the moſt public and authentic manner the determination of this Government to maintain its right to the property or diſpoſal of the province of *Corah*. And this opinion we conceive to be of very great importance towards procuring an equivalent for the ceſſion of it whenever that ſhall be made a ſubject of negociation; the more ſo, as the remote ſituation of that country too apparently ſhews, that it cannot be our intereſt, and therefore not our intention, to retain the poſſeſſion of it.

The Vizier having in ſeveral of his Letters expreſſed an earneſt deſire to have an interview with the Preſident, and many points of conſequence requiring an adjuſtment which cannot be effected without perſonal conference, the Committee are further of opinion, that a meeting between the Vizier and the Preſident would at this ſeaſon be productive of great benefit to the Company's affairs;

Reſolved, that we ſubmit theſe ſubjects to the conſideration of the Council at large.

The Board approve of both propoſitions offered by the Select Committee.

Letter to the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*; written 22d April 1773.

I have received your Excellency's Letter, mentioning the particulars of your operations againſt the Marattas, your promiſe to the General that whenever the Marattas ſhall be driven out of the Rohilla country, and *Hafez Rehmet Cawn* ſhall fulfil his agreements by the payment of the forty lacks of rupees, you will give half that ſum to the Company; and that ſhould the Rohilla Chiefs be guilty of a breach of their agreement, we will thoroughly exterminate them and ſettle your Excellency in the country,

country, you will in that caſe pay them 50 lacks of rupees in ready money, and exempt the Company from the King's tribute. Upon the ſame ſubject the General has alſo written to me very fully. Every circumſtance you have written to me I conſider as a proof of the cordial attachment which ſubſiſts between us, and of the confidence and reliance which you place in the friendſhip of the Engliſh Company; but the points which you have propoſed require much conſideration, and the previous ratification of a formal agreement before I can conſent to them; otherwiſe I may incur the diſpleaſure of my Employers. It is true that I have long thought the junction of the Rohilla country with yours, either by a ſure and permanent obligation of friendſhip, or by reducing them to obedience, if they ſhould render ſuch an attempt juſtifiable by any act of enmity or treachery, and be an adviſable point for you to attain, becauſe by that means the defenſive line of your dominions would be completed by including within it all the land lying on that ſide the river *Ganges*; and you will be in no danger from an attack on that quarter, whenever the Marattas ſhall commit diſturbances in another. But it appears to me that it is an object not to be attained by an occaſional viſit of that country; and its diſtance from the province of *Bengal* will not admit of the continuance of the Engliſh forces longer than the period which remains of the dry weather. You will pleaſe to remember they were ſent for your aſſiſtance, and to defend the province of *Corah* againſt the Marattas; thus far only I am authorized by the commands of my Superiors, to employ them beyond the limits of their own poſſeſſions, and even this is the cauſe of a heavy loſs and riſque to their affairs, eſpecially in the expences of their troops and ſtores, and in the abſence of ſo great a part of their force, which was originally deſtined for the ſole defence of the countries dependant on *Bengal*. You have frequently repeated in your Letters the remarks, that to wait till the enemy was at your door, and then to write for the aſſiſtance of our forces would anſwer no good purpoſe; but that every year the ſame cauſe would require their return to the ſame ſervice, and paſs without effecting any purpoſe to real advantage. My friend, all this is true; but it proceeds from the want of proper meaſures having been taken, and from the imperfect footing on which affairs between us have been eſtabliſhed. The concern which the Company take in your ſafety, and the duties of friendſhip which their commands and our own inclinations equally enjoin us to obſerve inviolably to their allies, and eſpecially to one ſo cloſely united to them by an approved attachment, would not ſuffer us to withhold our aid when your affairs required it; but it has always been with reluctance that we have ſuffered the army to paſs the frontiers of our own country, becauſe the loſs and inconveniencies attending it was certain; and although joined with your forces there is no cauſe to fear the moſt powerful efforts of our enemies, yet the events of war are at the diſpoſal of the Almighty, and the only fruits which the moſt ſplendid ſucceſſes can afford us, are the reputation of having maintained the faith of our alliance in oppoſition to every incentive of ſelf-intereſt and ſelf-defence; thus circumſtanced we are precluded from deriving any benefit from your ſupport, and ours can only afford you a relief from preſent danger, without any proviſion for future ſecurity. For theſe reaſons I have often wiſhed for a perſonal interview with you, for the purpoſe of removing difficulties, and of perpetuating the alliance with your Excellency on terms more ſuitable to our mutual intereſts. Your Excellency hath alſo repeatedly expreſſed the ſame inclination; I therefore write, that if your affairs will at this ſeaſon admit of your giving me a meeting, I will haſten to obtain it as ſoon as I am able after the receipt of your Letter in reply to this; if otherwiſe, I muſt wait for it at ſome more diſtant period, as the affairs of this Government will indiſpenſably require my preſence at this place after three or four months, and it is uncertain when I ſhall again have an interval of leiſure for ſuch a journey.

In the meantime, as your Excellency and the General are at a great diſtance from the province of *Korah*, and the affairs of that province require the preſence of a perſon on behalf of the Company, to regulate and take the charge of it, until it ſhall be determined in what manner it ſhall after be diſpoſed of, I have judged it adviſable to depute Mr. *James Lawrell*, a Gentleman of the Council of *Calcutta*, on this ſervice, and he will ſet out accordingly in a few days; which I hope you will approve. APPENDIX No. 21.

Extract of Letter from the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*; received the 10th March 1773.

By God's bleſſing, what is fixed for the expence of the Engliſh forces will be delivered to Colonel *Champion*, the commanding officer of the troops here, without repeated applications; and there will be no deviation therein. You muſt remain eaſy on this head, and conſidering the exceſſive deſire of my heart to have a meeting with you, keep me conſtantly receiving your friendly Letters; for correſpondence is half an interview.

Extract of Letter from the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*; received the 24th March 1773.

After expreſſing his deſire of an interview with Mr. *Haſtings*, he proceeds: the friendſhip and regard which ſubſiſt between us, require no comment. By God's bleſſing, they will receive daily increaſing ſtrength; and the obſervance thereof, as was neceſſary and proper, has on both ſides been brought to paſs; and I am ſenſible that it will ever continue to be our mutual ſentiments. I am exceſſively thankful and pleaſed with the friendſhip which you have performed, and may the Almighty preſerve you for all this goodneſs. For the reſt, I write you a few circumſtances, which proceed from my penetration and forethought. By God's bleſſing, in theſe days, you, my friend, are likewiſe endowed with wiſdom, and you will reflect on them maturely and conſiderately.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, 9th June 1773.

Read, the following Letters from General *Barker*, under date the 10th, 13th, and 20th May.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour of addreſſing you on the 6th, in anſwer to your Letter of the 15th April, which I muſt confeſs gave me much uneaſineſs, as it conveys an idea of your having ſuppoſed me inclined to exceed your inſtructions, by carrying your forces beyond the bounds of your limitation without orders. Had I ſuppoſed you would have drawn ſuch a ſurmiſe from my bare croſſing the river, an act of neceſſity, notwithſtanding the ſucceeding day muſt have informed you of my return to my former ſtation, you may reſt aſſured I ſhould not have taken ſuch a ſtep, as I ſhould be ſorry to give riſe to a ſuſpicion, on any account, which appears to have been ſo readily adopted by the Adminiſtration againſt one of its Members. It requires no great penetration to diſcover the conſequences of carrying your forces to a diſtance, which you ſeemed to apprehend in your Letter of the 15th; and however my Letters may have inclined to the meaſure of carrying the war, when once begun, between the two rivers, and profiting for the many needleſs marches which your forces have made into this quarter; in juſtice to my ſervices, you could not ſuppoſe me guilty of putting ſuch into execution, without your orders for ſo doing.

In conſequence of the retreat of the Marattas towards the *Jumna*, the Rohillas are but little inclined to perform their agreements, and already begin to heſitate, from motives that they deem the defence afforded their coun-

APPENDIX. No. 22.

try by the Engliſh forces and the Vizier, equally neceſſary for the ſecurity of his Excellency's dominions; and that no terms of accommodation have been ſettled with the Marattas, by which only a permanent peace and ſecurity to their poſſeſſions can be enſured to them; that the Marattas may return to them the next ſeaſon, and with equal propriety demand the performance of their Treaty with them for 35 lacks: will we in that caſe be anſwerable to defend their poſſeſſions, or procure an eſtabliſhed peace between them and the Marattas?

Your Letter of the 15th ultimo, expreſſing that your forces were at a great diſtance from your provinces, and there being no manner of occaſion, ſince the retreat of the enemy, for their longer continuance in this part, at a conference with his Excellency, he purpoſes to return within his own dominions, which I readily concurred in, both in regard to the Company's forces and his own. The brigade will therefore march in two days hence towards the banks of the *Gumpty*, between *Lucknow* and *Sultunpoor*, where they will have a temporary ſhelter againſt the latter part of the dry ſeaſon, and alſo the rainy weather, in expectation of your further orders.

Yeſterday I had a Letter from *Nuzzif Khan*, who received his diſmiſſion from the Marattas when they began their retreat. He expreſſed his concern at the part neceſſity has obliged him to take in the late operations of the Maratta, and profeſſed his attachment to the welfare of the Company with great warmth. In juſtice to this perſon, permit me to aſſure you, that he has ſhewn a very ſteadfaſt attachment; and being preſent at all the tranſactions theſe two years paſt, I may be allowed to form no indifferent judgment of his worth and abilities. From my firſt arrival at *Rumgaut* he has been urgent to join your forces; but I denied him, from the hopes that he could render me more material ſervice from his continuance. He failed not to give me moſt minute and exact informations of the Marattas debates and intentions; and would, I am perſuaded, have rendered your arms moſt eminent ſervice, had the Marattas ever ventured to come to a general engagement. He is now in great diſtreſs, and hopes his attachment to the intereſt of the Company, and the former regard he bore in the opinion of the Engliſh Gentlemen, will recommend his ſituation to your conſideration. I am,

Gentlemen, with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Head Quarters,
Camp near *Currembauſs*,
10th May 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since the date of my laſt, the Papers of Intelligence adviſe us of the Maratta force having croſſed the *Jumna*.

Hafez Rhamet ſtill declines anſwering the payment of the Treaty, until he can conſult the other Rohilla Sirdars, who are to bear a proportion of it; but it appears more to delay time, that he may diſcover how the affairs of this quarter are likely to turn out. His Excellency and myſelf will remain ſome days after the troops, that we may uſe our endeavours to ſettle this buſineſs, if poſſible; and I beg leave to ſend you the copy of the Rohilla Treaty, by which you will perceive how literally it has been executed and performed, notwithſtanding the evaſion of their Chiefs.

I concert with the Vizier. I have alſo been weighing the worth and abilities of the Nabob *Nuzzif Cawn*; and it has been determined he ſhould return to his Majeſty, as a perſon thoroughly capable of adviſing and aſſiſting in the welfare of the royal houſe. He will carry Letters of Recommendation from us both, to the King to this purport; and deſiring his Majeſty to confide in his integrity, preferably to thoſe mercenary Miniſters who at preſent direct his councils.

Nuzzif Cawn has aſſured me, and his veracity and obſervations are to be depended upon, that the Maratta forces at *Ram Gaut* under *Buſa* and *Tuccoo* amount to no leſs than fifty thouſand men, of which 35,000 were regular good cavalry, the remainder Bendarra only; and that *Syndeah* had with him 10,000 good horſe and 5,000 Bendarra. I am,

Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
R. Barker.

Camp near *Currunboſs*,
May 13th 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have received your Letters of the 27th April.

Although it did not occur to me before as at all neceſſary, permit me now to inform you, that the aſſignment granted by the Vizier on the Nabob *Moneer ul Dowla* for 1,10,000 rupees, will not affect the revenues of the Corah province from the time the Board determined to take it under their own immediate management; and as the Nabob was acquainted with their orders for its defence, I cannot conceive he would be guilty of ſuch an attempt. His claim on *Moneer ul Dowla* was a balance of an old account of caſh advanced to his Majeſty by *Elick Cawn*.

His Excellency and myſelf, after ſtaying three days at *Curremboſs* without obtaining any determinate anſwer from the Rohilla Chiefs relative to their fulfilling of their engagements, determine to follow the troops: accordingly the Vizier has proceeded for his capital by very expeditious marches, and I am following with the brigade. I am,

Gentlemen, with reſpect,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant
R. Barker.

Camp at *Oriſſait*,
May, 20th 1773.

Warren Haſtings.
Wm Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

APPENDIX, No. 22.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 19th November 1773.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following intelligence, which he has received from the Weſtward: Intelligence from the Weſtward.

"On the 13th of the month Sawbn, the Nabob *Nudjiff Cawn Behadre*, by the bleſſing of God and the King's auſpices, was victorious, and *Nowal Sing* the Jaut was defeated and fled to the fort of *Dhygee*; thouſands of men were killed and wounded on both ſides, and many of the tents and horſes of *Nowal Sing* the Jaut, with other valuable effects, have fallen into the hands of the royal troops. The Nabob *Nudjiff Cawn Behadre* has obtained a very great victory."

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Letters, received from the Vizier:

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*; received 23d October 1773.

By the Papers of Intelligence I learn, that *Narrain Row*, Serdar of the *Decan*, has been aſſaſſinated by the order of *Ragonaut Row*, who I look upon it for certain will ſucceed him in the Government. Copy of a paper containing this intelligence I enclose for your peruſal.—I have now determined to take poſſeſſion of the country in the *Duabe*, which formerly belonged to the Rohillas, and is Letters from the Vizier.

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now poſſeſſed by the Marattas: for this purpoſe I ſhall ſhortly diſpatch my army thither, and ſhall follow myſelf. Should I therefore have occaſion for the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh forces to carry on my operations in that country, I deſire to know what is your pleaſure, whether you will let me have the forces when I ſhall call for them, or you will not. If it be agreeable to you to ſupply me with them, it will be beſt and moſt proper; and ſignify the ſame to me, that I may immediately begin conſidering upon and forming my plan of operations. Let me have your anſwer fully and particularly to this, that I may take my meaſures accordingly.

A true Tranſlation.

(Signed) *Will. Redfearn*, P. T.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*; received the 18th November 1773.

Letter from the Vizier.

I have before written you ſeveral Letters, which you may have received. I have now learnt that *Hafir Rhamut Cawn*, and other Serdars, have intentions of taking poſſeſſion of *Uttawah*, and the reſt of the country belonging to the Marattas; I therefore write to inform you, that if ſuch is their intention, I will not put up with it, but ſhall undoubtedly undertake an expedition againſt them; for, in the firſt place, they have not made good a ſingle D'aam of the 40 lacks of rupees according to their agreement; and, in the next, they are now going to take poſſeſſion of another country; this I will never ſubmit to, and am therefore determined to puniſh them. During our interview at *Benares* we had ſome converſation on this ſubject, and it was then agreed on, that I ſhould pay to the Company the ſum of 40 lacks of rupees, after the expulſion of the Rohillas; and two lack ten thouſand rupees monthly, on account of the Engliſh brigade, during my operations in the Rohilla country; and that I ſhould, with the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh forces, endeavour to puniſh and exterminate the Rohillas out of their country. If therefore theſe terms are agreeable to you, I deſire to know whether you will aſſiſt me with the Engliſh forces, or you will not. Leſt you ſhould want to diſcuſs and ſettle this matter anew, I now ſend you a ſeparate paper, containing the points we before conferred upon, in order that you may come to a final determination concerning them; for if you ſhould write to me, and want my anſwer, much time will be loſt. Should I have occaſion to call for the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh forces on this expedition, whenever I diſmiſs them I will pay to the Company forty lacks of rupees, ready money, on condition of the entire expulſion of the Rohillas. and during the time of their ſervice, the ſum of 2,10,000 rupees ſhall be paid to them monthly, on account of their expences. But one thing more I muſt mention, which is, whenever you ſhall ſend me thoſe troops, I hope they may be commanded by General *Barker*, who is well acquainted with the affairs of this quarter, and eſpecially with my negociations with the Rohillas; for this reaſon it is abſolutely neceſſary that the General ſhould have the command of thoſe troops, which will afford me the greateſt ſatisfaction.

In the courſe of our interview at *Benares*, I ſpoke to you about 10,000 fire arms, and you were pleaſed to ſay, that you would give me an anſwer on that ſubject on your arrival in *Calcutta*. As there is no diſunion between us, and the alliance between the Company and myſelf has become more firmly cemented than ever, ſince our interview at *Benares*, inſomuch that our armies, ſtores, and every thing elſe belonging to us, are equally the property of both; I therefore applied to you for a place for my family, and you told me, that if it was poſſible you would remove the fort of *Calcutta*, and appropriate it to my uſe. If therefore you will ſupply me with 10,000 fire arms, I ſhall conſider them as equal to the fort of *Calcutta*. In ſhort, your complying with this application will afford me the greateſt ſatisfaction, and be a means of perpetuating the friendſhip between us, from which I have the greateſt hopes. The money for the fire arms ſhall be paid immediately. I have paid the money, according to my agreement, to Mr. *Lambert*, of which I give you this information. I have already acquainted you with my intentions of making a journey to *Corah*, but as I always take medicines at this ſeaſon of the year, I have delayed it longer than I intended on that account; however I ſhall now ſet out immediately, and therefore it is neceſſary that you favour me with an anſwer to theſe matters without delay; they are of the greateſt importance, and I ſhall wiſh to hear from you concerning them with the greateſt impatience. Let your anſwer be ſent with the utmoſt expedition.

On a ſeparate Paper.

On condition of the entire expulſion of the Rohillas, I will pay to the Company the ſum of forty lacks of rupees in ready money, whenever I ſhall diſcharge the Engliſh troops, and until the expulſion of the Rohillas ſhall be effected, I will pay the expences of the Engliſh troops; that is to ſay, I will pay them the ſum of 2,10,000 rupees monthly.

A true Tranſlation.

(Signed) *Wm Redfearn*, P. T.

The Board deliberates upon the foregoing Letters from the Vizier.

From the advices now before the Committee, it appears abſolutely neceſſary that ſome immediate reſolutions ſhould be taken with reſpect to the requiſition made by the Vizier, as well as for guarding againſt thoſe attempts and charges which the abſence of the Marattas may give riſe to in the *Duabe*, or tract of country lying between the rivers *Ganges* and *Jumna*: and the Committee having maturely deliberated on the meaſures proper to be adopted, are unanimouſly agreed in the following opinions and reſolutions:

That ſhould the Vizier perſiſt in his intentions with reſpect to the Rohilla country, and determine to proſecute the enterprize with ſteadineſs to a concluſion, the Government, conſidering the ſtrict alliance and engagements which ſubſiſt between the Company and *Sujah Dowlah*, and particularly what paſſed between the Vizier and the Preſident at the conference at *Benares*, cannot on this occaſion refuſe him ſupport and aſſiſtance; that the terms propoſed by the Vizier appear highly advantageous to the Company, not only on account of the ſum which is ultimately ſtipulated as a conſideration for this ſervice, but by immediately relieving them from the heavy expence of a large part of their army. Provided, therefore, full aſſurance and ſecurity can be obtained of the Vizier's intention and ability to make good the many payments which will in this event be due to the Company;

Reſolutions in conſequence:

Reſolved, that the 2d brigade now quartered at *Dinapoor* be ordered to march on the Vizier's requiſition: and, to prevent delay,

And orders.

Agreed, that orders for this purpoſe be lodged with the Chief at *Patna*, to be iſſued by him on the receipt of the Vizier's requiſition for the march of our troops, on the terms above ſpecified; and in the meantime, that every preparation be made for putting the 2d brigade in readineſs to take the field on the ſhorteſt notice.

Agreed, in conſequence, that the following Letter be written to the Chief at *Patna*:

To *Thomas Lane*, eſquire, Chief at *Patna*.

Letter to the Chief at Patna.

Sir,

The Preſident has deſired the Vizier to addreſs himſelf to you, in caſe he ſhould require the aſſiſtance of the 2d brigade. On receiving from him ſuch a requiſition, you will pleaſe to forward the incloſed Letter to the officer commanding the brigade at *Dinapoor*, which you will retain in your hands till then.

We are, Sir,

Fort William, the 19th November 1773.

Your moſt obedient ſervants.

Agreed, that the following order to the Commanding Officer of the 2d brigade, be incloſed in the Letter to the Chief at *Patna*.

To

APPENDIX. No. 22.

To Lieut. Colonel *Tottingham*, commanding the 2d brigade at *Dinapore*.

Sir,

Letter to the commanding Officer of 2d brigade.

You are hereby directed, as ſoon as you conveniently can after the receipt of this order, to take the field with the 2d brigade, to march with it into the territories of the Nabob *Shujah a Dowlah*, and to join him in whatever part of his territories he may be, or require your preſence.

Fort William, the 19th Novr 1773.

We are, Sir, Your obedient ſervants.

Letters to the Vizier;

Agreed, that the Preſident be alſo requeſted to prepare an anſwer to the Vizier's Letters, in conformity to the above reſolutions.

to the King, and Rohillas; to be prepared.

Agreed, that the Preſident be requeſted alſo to prepare Letters to the King, and to the Rohilla Chiefs, requiring from them an explanation of their intentions with regard to the *Duabe*.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 22d November 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq; Preſident, General Sir *Robert Barker*, *William Alderſey*, and *P. M. Dacres*, eſquires.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, the following draft of a Letter to the Vizier, which he has prepared, agreeable to the reſolution of laſt meeting,

To the Vizier.

Letter to the Vizier.

Some days ago I received your Letter, containing the intelligence of the death of *Narrain Row*, the late Sirdar of the *Decan*, and the ſucceſſion of *Ragonaut Row* to the Government; at the ſame time intimating your reſolution to take poſſeſſion of the country in the *Duabe*, which formerly belonged to the Rohillas, and is now poſſeſſed by the Marattas; and deſiring to know, whether I will ſend the Engliſh forces, in caſe you ſhould have occaſion to call for their aſſiſtance.

I am ſince honoured with another Letter from you, to the following purport; viz.—"That you have learnt, "that *Haſſir Rhamut Cawn* and other Sirdars, have intention of taking poſſeſſion of *Ettawah* and the reſt of the "country of *Duabe* belonging to the Marattas; and that "in ſuch caſe you are reſolved to carry into execution the "plan which was concerted between us at *Benares*, for "their expulſion from the country lying to the North of "yours; and deſiring to know, whether I will aſſiſt in the "execution of this deſign;" repeating the conditions formerly propoſed, with other particulars of importance, which I clearly underſtand.

As the ſubject of both the above Letters are intimately connected, and admit of only one and the ſame determination, I ſhall reply particularly to both in this addreſs.

With reſpect to the *Duabe*, you are the maſter to act in whatever manner you ſhall deem moſt fitting for the advancement and ſecurity of your own affairs. You know, that you may always command the forces of the Company for the defence of your own dominions; if you ſhould engage in a war, beyond their borders, and ſhould ſtand in need of aſſiſtance, I certainly cannot ſit ſtill and ſee your danger, without endeavouring to relieve you; and for that reaſon, I hope you will avoid an enterprize at this diſtance, which you cannot be well aſſured of performing with your own ſtrength, as the commands of my Superiors are, as I have repeatedly informed you, peremptory, that I ſhall not ſuffer their arms to be carried beyond the line of their own boundaries, and thoſe of your Excellency their ally, although in one inſtance I have ventured to go beyond them.

Concerning the country of the Rohillas, whatever was formerly propoſed at *Benares*, that I am now equally ready to agree to; that is, the brigade which is now at *Dinapoor* ſhall march whenever you require it to join you, and proceed with you into the country of the Rohillas, which lies North of your dominions, to aſſiſt you in the entire reduction of it; and your Excellency on your part will ſupply them monthly with the ſtipulated ſum of 2,10,000 R^s for their expences; and whenever the country ſhall be ſo far conquered, that you ſhall remain in poſſeſſion of it, although the enemy may lurk in the hills and jungles, or a few refractory Zemindars, as is uſual, may withhold their allegiance, and your Excellency ſhall diſmiſs the brigade, you will on its departure pay 40 lacks of rupees to the Company, as a conſideration for that ſervice. To prevent future miſunderſtandings, I have been thus explicit. I muſt beg leave further to add, that if the expedition ſhall be once undertaken, it will be abſolutely neceſſary to perſevere in it, until it ſhall be accompliſhed. You will therefore reflect, whether it will be in your power to make the above payments punctually with others which are already due; and whether you can reſolve on going through with the undertaking. If you are not certain of accompliſhing theſe neceſſary points, I muſt requeſt that you will ſuſpend the execution of your undertaking, till a more favourable time, as I cannot hazard or anſwer for the effects of diſpleaſure of the Company, my maſters, if they ſhall find themſelves involved in a fruitleſs war, or in an expence for the proſecution of it. But if you are ſatisfied of your ability to perform theſe conditions, and will engage to perform them, the brigade which is at *Dinapoor* ſhall attend you on your requiſition; and that there may be no delay, if you will ſignify your orders for the march of the brigade to Mr. *Lane*, the Chief at *Patna*; and will ſend a Letter from him to me, containing your acquieſcence in theſe conditions in the forms of the form encloſed, he will cauſe the brigade to proceed to you immediately, being furniſhed with the proper orders from me, to the Commander of the forces for that purpoſe.

On the receipt of your firſt Letter, I ordered all the detachments of the brigade at *Dinapoor* to be aſſembled, and every preparation to be made to enable it to take the field; and I hope it will be in readineſs for that purpoſe whenever you may require.

Although in the encloſed form, I have mentioned nothing of the mode in which the money for the expences of the army is to be defrayed, I think it proper to obſerve, that it would be highly expedient that a ſure and effectual mode be previouſly formed for the regular payment of the army. This will prevent difficulties, and will be the ſubject of much eaſe both to you and myſelf, as the charges of the army muſt be regularly paid, or the moſt fatal conſequences may attend the neglect of it; and I have not money to ſend with it.

A true copy,

Will. Redfearn, P. T.

Form of a Letter to be written by the Vizier.

Form of a Letter to be written by the Vizier and encloſed.

Having ſummoned the brigade at *Dinapoor* to my aſſiſtance, I now ſend you this declaration, that no ſubject of future doubt or diſcuſſion concerning the terms or ſervice on which it is to be employed, may remain between us—That it is my reſolution to employ the ſaid brigade in the reduction of the country of the Rohillas which lies between my borders, the river *Ganges*, and the mountains; and I will not require them to paſs thoſe boundaries: that beſides the ſtipulated ſum of 15 lacks of R^s which will be due on the 19th of Jemadee ul Sanci next, on account of the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*; I will pay month by month, punctually, the ſum of 21,000 R^s for the extra expence of the brigade, during the time of its ſervice, according to the terms of the late Treaty concluded between us; and 40 lacks of R^s in ready money, when this ſervice ſhall be concluded; that

that is to ſay, whenever I ſhall diſmiſs the ſaid brigade, or one half of it, whether the country of the Rohillas ſhall be conquered and eſtabliſhed in my poſſeſſion, or an accommodation ſhall have taken place with them.

Some doubts having ariſen concerning the regularity of the Committee's iſſuing the orders of the 19th inſt. of their ſole authority;

Proceedings laid before the Council.

Agreed, that the Proceedings of that date, together with the above Letter, be ſubmitted to the Council at large.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

APPENDIX, No. 23.

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 26th November 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. General Sir *Robert Barker*, *William Alderſey*, and *P. M. Dacres*, eſquires.

Report of the Council's Reſolutions And

THE Preſident reports to the Committee, that this morning he laid before the Council at large the proceedings of this Board of the 19th and 22d ultimo, on the ſubject of the requiſition made by the Vizier for the aſſiſtance of a brigade; and that the reſolutions and meaſures of the Committee have been approved in Council, agreeable to the following extract of their Conſultations:

Extract of the Conſultation of the Board.

Extract of their Conſultations.

The Preſident thinks it requiſite to accompany this reference with a brief explanation of the nature of the meaſure propoſed, and of the motives which determined his opinion in the reſolution of the Select Committee now before the Board, in the following Minute.

I have long conſidered the power of the Rohillas as dangerous to the Vizier, the only uſeful ally of the Company, and as ſuch have wiſhed to ſee it annihilated. We have till lately had a very imperfect knowledge of the Rohilla ſtates, and conſequently the advices tranſmitted our Honourable Maſters on that ſubject muſt have been too defective for them to form an accurate judgment upon them. It is our duty to correct our information to them as we receive more lights; and I am inclined to believe that ſuch information would induce them to adopt the ſyſtem with reſpect to thoſe Powers which are now propoſed.

I muſt therefore declare, that although the honourable the Court of Directors have been pleaſed to rank the Rohillas among the Powers capable of oppoſing the Marattas, I cannot regard them in that light, their Country is too remote from that of the Marattas, and too much out of the line of the incurſions of theſe people, for them either to be able to oppoſe theſe with effect, or to have much to apprehend from them. The Marattas may occaſionally attack them from the allurements of plunder only, but they can never form a ſufficient ſcheme of conqueſt over a Country ſo diſtant and ſo difficult to hold.

On the other hand, the Subadar of *Oude* muſt always be an object of jealouſy and enmity to the Rohillas: his power is to be dreaded by them; and the ſituation of their Country contiguous to his, and in a manner encloſed within the ſame natural boundaries, muſt make the poſſeſſion of it always a deſirable object with him, both for ſecurity and advantage. Theſe are ſources of enmity between them, which from the nature of things cannot fail of producing ſuitable effects; and it is more probable that we ſhould ſoon ſee the Marattas and Rohillas join in hoſtilities againſt the Vizier, than that they ſhould continue in war with one another.

But let us next view the advantages which would reſult to the Vizier, the ally of the Company, and to the Company itſelf, from the poſſeſſion of that part of the Rohilla Country which is the object of the expedition now propoſed: our ally would obtain by this acquiſition a complete compact eſtate, ſhut in effectually from foreign invaſions by the *Ganges* all the way from the frontiers of *Bahar* to the mountains of *Thibet*, while he would remain equally acceſſible to our forces from the above province, either for hoſtilities or protection; it would give him wealth, of which we ſhould partake, and give him ſecurity without any dangerous increaſe of power; and would undoubtedly, by bringing his frontier nearer the Marattas, to whom ſingly he would be no match, render him more dependent on us, and cement the union more firmly between us. I muſt further declare, that I regard as none of the moſt inconſiderable benefits to the Company from the meaſure, beſides the forty lacks of rupees held out to us, the eaſing them immediately of the burden of one-third of their whole army, while at the ſame time it is employed uſefully for their intereſts, and conveniently for keeping up its own diſcipline and practice in war.

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With theſe reaſons for the proſperity of the expedition, on general principles I muſt confeſs I entertain ſome doubts as to its expediency at this time, ariſing from the circumſtances of the Company at home expoſed to popular clamour, all its meaſures liable to be canvaſſed in Parliament, their charter drawing to a cloſe, and his Majeſty's Miniſters unqueſtionably ready to take advantage of every unfavourable circumſtance in the negociation for its renewal.

In this ſituation here appears an unuſual degree of reſponſibility annexed to ſuch an undertaking; I would therefore recommend it to ſerious conſideration, and at the ſame time I think it my duty to declare, that I find myſelf embarraſſed in a peculiar manner in my deciſion, from the circumſtances of what paſt between the Vizier and myſelf at *Benares*. The Board will recollect, that this very Country was included in the line of defenſive operations which they thought fit to adopt laſt year in ſupport of the Vizier; and it is now neceſſary to acquaint them more fully, that the Vizier at the interview did propoſe this expedition to me, and earneſtly ſolicited my aſſiſtance; that I regarded this requeſt as a lucky circumſtance in the negociation; and availing myſelf of it, as the means of purchaſing the Vizier's compliance in the other meaſure, which was the principal object of my commiſſion, I conſented to it; engaging to aſſiſt him in the enterprize on the conditions with which the Board are already acquainted. Afterwards, from a ſuſpicion of his own ability to make good ſo many pecuniary engagements at once as thoſe he had come under, he himſelf made the propoſal for ſuſpending the Rohilla expedition; but the condition which took its riſe from it, viz. that the future payments of the extra charges of the army ſent at any time to his aſſiſtance ſhould be fixed at 2,10,000 R' per month for a brigade, was ſtill allowed to be made an article of the new Treaty. And it was further agreed, that the ſtipulation for *Corah*, which I had before with difficulty raiſed to 45 lacks of rupees, ſhould now be made 50, in conſideration of his being exempted from the additional burthen of the projected campaign, and better enabled to fulfil his other payments. It is unneceſſary to explain the motives which urged the Vizier to make conceſſions for the liberty of relinquiſhing a point which he had apparently ſo much at heart, and what I was not ſolicitous to purſue; the detail would be tedious. The Gentlemen who were with me, and to whom I made daily communication of the progreſs of the negociations, will remember, that ſuch was the iſſue of this part of them. The expedition remained only ſuſpended; and I gave him every reaſon to expect, that whenever it could again be with prudence reſumed, and he deſired it, it ſhould be undertaken.

This is the predicament in which I now ſtand with the Vizier; and although, from a fear of his not being able to fulfil his part of the agreement, I wiſh to avoid engaging in the project at preſent, yet it appears to me, that a direct refuſal, after what paſſed, would have an

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unfriendly aſpect, and might admit of the conſtruction of artifice and inſincerity in our dealings with him.

Moved by the doubts which I have expoſed to the Board, and thus hampered by my ſituation with the Vizier, no better method occurred to me for freeing us from this dilemma, than the Letter which is now in reference before the Board: I have there expreſſed my conſent to the expedition in terms which, if he agrees to them, are moſt likely to ſecure the advantages hoped from it; but we are more likely to make him relinquiſh the deſign. I truſt the Board will find it ſo guarded, both in the ſubſtance and expreſſion, that the Vizier muſt neceſſarily feel himſelf engaged to perform every condition required of him, with the moſt rigid punctuality, at the hazard of forfeiting the Company's friendſhip, or revolt againſt the terms impoſed upon him, and drop all thoughts of proſecuting the deſign; and that I verily believe will be the iſſue of this correſpondence.

The Board, after due conſideration of the matter in reference from the Select Committee, and of the Preſident's repreſentation, concur heartily in wiſhing to avoid the expedition propoſed, without entering into the diſcuſſion of the propriety of ſuch an enterprize on general principles. The Board ſee in their full force all the circumſtances of doubt, as to its preſent expediency, which the Preſident has ſo clearly ſet forth; and they are alſo ſenſible of the embarraſſment he is under, from what paſſed on the ſubject between him and the Vizier at *Benares*. They are equally ſolicitous to ſave the honour of the Company, and watch over its intereſts; and for that reaſon they approve of the Letter now before them, which ſeems equally calculated to ſave both. The conditions, if accepted, would undoubtedly ſecure the greateſt poſſible advantages from ſuch an enterprize; but they appear to them more calculated to drive the Vizier into a refuſal, which is what they truſt in, as its moſt probable, and almoſt infallible conſequence, and which they wiſh for, as the proper reſult of this propoſition, and the preſent circumſtances of affairs.

Letter forwarded, and orders iſſued in conſequence.

Agreed, That the Preſident be requeſted to forward the Letter, as prepared by him, to the Vizier: and that the order of the 19th ultimo, to the Chief at *Patna*, and to the Commanding Officer at *Dinapoor*, be forthwith iſſued.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th November 1773.

General *Barker*'s Minute.

The General has already given it as his opinion, that the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad* ſhould be reſtored to the King for ſuch acquiſitions to the Company as are premiſed in his Minutes and Letters to the Board on that ſubject; in which caſe the conqueſt of the Rohilla country for the Vizier became an object of our attention, becauſe in this he would have accumulated nothing more than was neceſſary to put him on a par with his neighbours, and to enable him to reſiſt the hoſtilities of any force united with the King againſt him, or, what is the ſame thing, to have enabled him to pay for the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh forces when called to his aid: but now that he is in poſſeſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, I think it would be impolitical, from the ſame parity of reaſoning, to put him in poſſeſſion alſo of the Rohilla country; unleſs the Company can acquire by it, the poſſeſſion of thoſe lands in the Zemindarry of *Cheit Sing*, lying to the South of the *Ganges*.

If the Vizier has the Rohilla country added to thoſe of *Oude*, and the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, he will be in poſſeſſion of a revenue of nearly two crores and an half per annum; a ſum, that in ſome future day might render an enterprizing genius a very troubleſome neighbour, on the North Weſt frontiers of the Company's dominions: and although we have no preſent occaſion to ſuſpect the ſincerity of *Sujah ul Dowlah*'s attachment to our intereſt; yet it muſt not be forgotten that he is an Hindoſtanner, or that a ſucceſſor might enter the Government with very different ideas and diſpoſition.

The General agrees with the Preſident, that the Vizier's dominions would become compact, and not ſubject to invaſions; but the General ſuppoſes it will become too compact, and not ſufficiently open to invaſion; it is from the apprehenſion of invaſion that cements the Vizier's friendſhip with the Engliſh, and makes him that ſtaunch ally we find him.

Had we riſen the King to the poſſeſſion of the *Doab*, including the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, it would then have been neceſſary to ſtrengthen the Vizier, becauſe the intereſts of theſe two Potentates are ſeparate, and it is political to guard againſt the one by the ſufficiency of the other. It was on this account the General wrote down to the Board, the propoſal for adding the Rohilla diſtricts on the North of the *Ganges* to the Vizier's dominions; but the caſe is exceedingly altered; one-half the General's propoſal only is adopted, and we appear to be raiſing a particular Power, at the expence of the empire, and in defiance to royalty, for the tranſitory advantage of a pecuniary object, and by it to raiſe a Power, who, from ambitious views, or imaginary reſentment, may hereafter, at a time when the Company's affairs may be embarraſſed, have ſtrength to form foreign alliances to invade the Company's poſſeſſions.

Indeed, the General is of opinion, that it is the political intereſt of this Government, according to the preſent ſyſtem, to inſtil into the mind of the Vizier the neceſſity, and indeed propriety, of his ſtudying the welfare and defence of his preſent poſſeſſions, without extending his ambition to conqueſts that may endanger his own tranquillity, and that of the Company's his ally. He has already a ſufficiency to ſecure himſelf from any ſudden invaſion, and we can at all times prevent the fatal conſequences of ſuch an event, when it is likely to take place; unleſs the Company are pleaſed to adopt the ſyſtem of ſupporting the two great Powers of *Hindoſtan*, the King and the Vizier, in oppoſition to the reſt of the empire, and in which caſe only, the General thinks it would be neceſſary to ſtrengthen the Vizier, to render the intereſt of either dependent on our deciſion.

(Signed) *R^t Barker.*

APPENDIX, No. 24.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 30th December 1773.

Par. 2. SOON after the departure of that ſhip, we received in reference from the Select Committee, accompanied by an explanatory Minute by the Preſident, a propoſal and requiſition of the Vizier's, for our aſſiſtance in an attack which he meditated on the *Doaub*, or the Country lying between the *Jumna* and the *Ganges*, beyond the province of *Corah*, and alſo on that of the Rohillas to the North of the *Ganges*.

3. We determined, without the ſmalleſt heſitation, againſt his firſt propoſition; but the ſecond, involving many queſtions reſpecting the political intereſts of the Company in thoſe parts, we thought it deſerving a more deliberate diſcuſſion. The Preſident ſtated, very fully and clearly, both his opinions and his doubts on the ſubject; and after a ſerious examination of them, and ample diſcuſſion of every point, we determined, that in the preſent juncture it would be adviſable to ſhun entering with the Vizier into ſuch an undertaking as the conqueſt of the Rohilla provinces

provinces to the North of the *Ganges*, as far as we could conſiſtently with our engagements, and the friendſhip and cloſe connection which we wiſh to preſerve with him. In this view, we agreed on ſuch a reply to the Vizier, as under the appearance of compliance muſt either induce him to relinquiſh the project, or bind him to ſuch conditions in the acceptance of our aſſiſtance, as muſt turn altogether to the Company's benefit; but indeed we deem him too wiſe to his own intereſts not to decline our aid on thoſe terms; which is the effect we confidently expect from the reply. The ſubject appears in full in the Conſultations.

4. The General, who concurred with the reſt of the Board in approving the Letter which the Preſident propoſed to be written to the Vizier, thought it however neceſſary to record his ſeparate reaſons againſt the meaſure of attacking the Rohillas, founded chiefly on his opinion with regard to the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*; to which, as we formerly adviſed, he had entered a Minute of objection.

5. About this time we alſo reſumed the conſideration of the General's Letter from *Benares*, requeſting leave to reſign the ſervice; which had been deferred till the return of the Preſident, on account of the ſeveral facts alluded to, which could only be cleared up by the general orders and military correſpondence in his poſſeſſion.

7. It gave us concern to find the General aſſign reaſons for wiſhing to quit the ſervice, which we thought reflected on our conduct in military meaſures; and particularly on the adminiſtration of our Preſident, in executing the duties of his ſtation as Governor, and at the ſame time aſpire at an authority inconſiſtent with the Conſtitution of your ſervice. The Preſident thought it neceſſary to vindicate himſelf in a formal reply; wherein he ſtated the facts circumſtantially, ſupported by proper documents, and, we think, ſufficiently demonſtrated that there was no juſt cauſe for the General's complaints. In a ſubſequent Minute, we expreſſed our ſentiments on this reply; adding ſuch an expoſition of our own conduct, and our ideas of your orders reſpecting the Commander in Chief's authority, as the General's Minute made it incumbent upon us to record.

8th. We would avoid engroſſing your attention on a ſubject of this ſort by any animadverſions on the diſpute, while the meaſures which gave riſe to it are themſelves in our Proceedings before you, ſubmitted to your judgment and approval. Although we have had frequent occaſion to cenſure the conduct of the General in points wherein we believe he has erred, more from a miſguided apprehenſion of his privileges and of the authority of the Board, than a propenſity in his diſpoſition to altercation; yet we gladly do juſtice to his character in declaring, that we believe him to be poſſeſſed of many virtues, which qualified him in an eſpecial manner for command in a ſervice like this; a courage approved in the courſe of many years trial; a thorough practical knowledge of his profeſſion, and great gentleneſs of manners; and as a man, he is a reſpectable member of the community. In a Letter the General delivered in upon his reſignation, he has acknowledged with reſpect and gratitude the honours with which he has been diſtinguiſhed in your ſervice.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee of *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 9th November 1773.

Par. 2. We have now the pleaſure to tranſmit a copy of a Letter which we received within theſe few days from Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Reſident at *Poona*; giving an account of a remarkable revolution which has happened in the Maratta ſtate, and of the diſſentions which it has occaſioned among their Chiefs. We are happy in reflecting that this event will probably contribute to the continuance of the public tranquillity.

APPENDIX, No. 25.

APPENDIX No. 25.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 17th January 1774.

Par. 2. OUR Letter from the Public Department will explain the cauſe of the delay in the *Egmont*'s diſpatch. This delay has afforded us the opportunity of acquainting you with the reſult of the Vizier's propoſition, and our offer of aſſiſtance in his expedition againſt the Rohillas, on the terms and limitations of which we adviſed you.

3. It was with pleaſure we found the plan we had adopted anſwer ſo completely to our intention. The Vizier, on receipt of the Preſident's Letter written agreeably to the reſolution of the Board, returned an immediate anſwer, declining our aſſiſtance in his diſtant expeditions on the conditions we required; but at the ſame time deſiring the brigade might be held in readineſs to march whenever he ſhall find it neceſſary to call on it for the defence of his own dominions.

4. This affair being happily terminated in the manner we wiſhed, we ſhall now remain ſpectators only of the operations of the different Powers in thoſe diſtant parts, preſerving however a watchful eye over the courſe of events, that we may be prepared to interpoſe whenever the intereſts of the Honourable Company are likely to be affected by them. In this view we ſhall, in compliance with the Vizier's requeſt, hold one brigade in readineſs to march to his aſſiſtance within his own territories, including the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*; and we acknowledge we ſhall not be ſorry to find that he calls for them on this footing, as we ſhall then be eaſed of ſo conſiderable a part of the military expence, and have the diſcipline of our troops preſerved in an actual ſervice, at ſo little diſtance from our frontiers.

5. The Preſident on his return from *Benares*, as will appear from our Conſultations, propoſed to us the appointment of a Reſident at the court of the Vizier, for the more immediate communication with him in ordinary buſineſs, and ſuch other matters as the Preſident ſhould think proper to confide to his management; and this appearing to us a meaſure of great convenience and advantage in the correſpondence of this Government with the Vizier, we approved of the propoſal, and left the nomination to the Preſident. He accordingly made choice of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* for that employment, which met with our entire approbation. In conſideration of the great diſtance of the place of his reſidence from *Calcutta*, whence he muſt draw the chief neceſſaries for his table, we have allotted him one thouſand rupees per month for his extraordinary expences.

6. The Select Committee having juſt received advices from Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Reſident at *Poona*, they have thought proper to lay them before us. By theſe we learn, that there prevails great diſtractions among the Maratta Powers; that *Ragoba*, the murderer of his nephew, has marched with an army of ſixty thouſand men to attack *Nizam Ally*, or, as he gives out, to free him from the bondage of *Ruckna Dowla*, his Dewan; that *Sabajee Bouncello* had joined *Nizam Ally*, and that the army were within a few coſs of each other.

7. In this ſituation of affairs in that quarter, we think we have little to apprehend from the Marattas on the ſide of *Bengal*, and there ſeems at preſent the faireſt proſpect of tranquillity for ſome time to come.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 13th January 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *William Aldersey*, *James Lawrell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *Willm Lambert*, *Geo. Vanſittart*, eſquires—Colonel *Chapman* and Mr. *Dacres* indiſpoſed.

The Preſident lays before the Board the following tranſlation of a Letter, which he has received from the Vizier *Sujah Dowlah*:

APPENDIX. No. 26.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, the 10th January 1774.

Suja Dowla refuſes the brigade on the terms offered.

I have received your friendly Letter, informing me that the Engliſh brigade is at my ſervice, either for the protection of my own dominions, or to aſſiſt me in my operations againſt the Rohillas. It it is known that the firmeſt union ſubſiſts between us, and I am certain that you will ſuffer the Engliſh forces to join me for the protection of my own dominions; but as the diſtance between us is now ſo great, that much time will be taken up in writing to you and receiving your anſwer, for precaution ſake I requeſt you will ſend a poſitive order to the Commander in Chief of the forces at *Patna* to march them to the frontiers of *Oude* or *Corah* (both which Countries now belong to me) whenever I ſhall require them: at preſent I have no occaſion for them; and ſhould I chance to call for them, I will not require their proceeding further than the frontiers of *Corah* and *Currah*. I make this requeſt by way of precaution only, and to guard againſt future events. Whenever I ſhall write to the Commander in Chief at *Patna* for the troops, let them immediately be ſent; and it is becoming our union that you give orders accordingly, which will give me great ſatisfaction. My friend, I requeſt this of you, that I may be at eaſe with reſpect to my own dominions, as well as to prevent future delays; otherwiſe I have at preſent no occaſion for the troops.

Agreed, that advice be given of the above Letter in our preſent advices to the Court of Directors by the *Egmont*.

APPENDIX, No. 26.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 15th March 1774.

Par. 2. SOON after the diſpatch of the ſhip *Egmont*, the Vizier availed himſelf of the diſcretionary orders we left with the Chief at *Patna*, to ſend the ſecond brigade to his aſſiſtance as ſoon as he ſhould make a formal requiſition for that purpoſe.

3. You will obſerve in our laſt, that at the ſame time we adviſed you of the Vizier's having declined our former offer, we informed you that we ſhould keep the brigade in readineſs to march to his aſſiſtance whenever he ſhould require it; and declared, we ſhould not be ſorry to take this ſtep, as it would eaſe us of a conſiderable part of our military expence, and preſerve our troops from inaction and relaxation of diſcipline.

4. We therefore immediately confirmed the order for the marching of the brigade, and directed Colonel *Champion*, Commander in Chief, to join them as ſoon as poſſible, to aſſume the command.

5. The declared intention of the Vizier in this requiſition is ſtill the conqueſt of the Rohilla country, and we afford our preſent aſſiſtance under the ſame conditions of reſtrictions which were formerly tendered to him; our troops are to be employed only in his own Country, or in that of the Rohillas laying between the *Ganges* and the mountains; and he is to pay the forty lacks of rupees in ready money whenever the ſervice againſt the Rohillas, if it is undertaken, ſhall be concluded; as well as the monthly ſubſidy of two lacks ten thouſand rupees for the extra expences of the brigade, as ſtipulated with the Preſident at *Benares*. His Letter, recorded in the Conſultations, expreſs in a very clear and conciſe manner his acceptance of theſe conditions, being a tranſcript, with little variation, of the draft ſent to him by the Preſident, as recorded in our Proceedings. To our former full Advices and Proceedings on this ſubject tranſmitted to you, we have only to add at preſent, that we deem the expreſs object of this expedition, viz. the conqueſt of the Rohilla country above deſcribed, as a point of no great difficulty, were it to be undertaken; neither is it likely to involve us in any troubles with the other Powers; the lateneſs of the ſeaſon, and the other deſigns in which the Vizier ſeems to be deeply engaged, as particularized in our Inſtructions to the Commander in Chief, leave little probability of any attempt being made in the proſecution of this undertaking during the preſent year.

6. The Inſtructions we have given to the Commander in Chief are peremptory as to his keeping within the limits of the Vizier's dominions, except in the caſe of attacking the Rohillas as above defined; and we have charged him to act on the defenſive only with regard to every other Power.

29. The Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* adviſed us in a Letter, dated the 18th January, of their apprehenſions of an invaſion from the Marattas, and of their having in conſequence ordered a conſiderable force into the field to be ready to oppoſe their attacks; but as the Nabob had declared his inability to ſupply them with money for this expence, they earneſtly preſſed us to ſend them as large a remittance in caſh or bills as our circumſtances would admit.

30. We are under the neceſſity of replying to them, that we were unable to comply with their application, without adding to the heavy load of our preſent debt; and that they might not be deceived by falſe expectations from us, we peremptorily declared we could not ſupply them.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 3d February 1774.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, a Letter juſt received from the Vizier; of which the following is the tranſlation.

Letter from the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowlah*.

Having ſummoned the brigade at *Dinapore* to my aſſiſtance, I now ſend you this declaration, that no ſubject of future doubt or diſcuſſion, concerning the terms of ſervice in which it is to be employed, may remain between us: that it is my reſolution to employ the ſaid brigade in the reduction of the country of the Rohillas, which lies between my borders, the river *Ganges*, and the mountains; and I will not require them to paſs theſe boundaries: that beſides the ſtipulated ſum of fifteen lacks, which will be due on the 19th Semade ul Sane next, on account of the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, I will, according to my agreement, pay, month by month, punctually, the ſum of 2,10,000 rupees, for the extra expences of the brigade during the time of its ſervice, and forty lacks of rupees, in ready money, when this ſervice ſhall be concluded; that is to ſay, whenever the whole, or half of the country of the Rohillas ſhall fall into my poſſeſſion, or an accommodation ſhall have taken place with them, and I ſhall diſmiſs the brigade. But I am the maſter in theſe matters, and have the power either to keep or diſmiſs the brigade. Whenever I pleaſe I will diſmiſs it; and until ſuch time as I think proper to diſmiſs it, it ſhall remain with me. Never, never, ſhall it leave me, without my diſmiſſion.

A true tranſlation.

Wm Redfearn,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 3d February 1774.—At a Conſultation—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief, *William Alderſey*, *Philip M. Dacres*, *James Lawrell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *William Lambert*, *George Vanſittart*, eſquires. Secr. Dept. Thurſday.

The Conſultation of the 24th ultimo, read, and approved.

The

Select Committee Proceedings.

The President lays before the Board the following Extract from the Proceedings of the Select Committee of the 3d February; by which they will perceive that the Vizier has made uſe of the licence granted him in conſequence of the Reſolution of the Board of the 26th November; and has actually ſummoned the brigade to his aſſiſtance, in the proſecution of his original deſign againſt the Rohillas.

Extract of the Select Committee Proceedings of the 3d February 1774.

The Vizier calls for the brigade, which is ordered to march.

Read the following Letter from Mr. *Lane*, the Chief of *Patna*, dated the 27th of January, together with the tranſlation of a Letter from the Vizier to him.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq^r. &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Having this day received a Letter from the Vizier (copy of which I have the honour to tranſmit you herewith) requiring the aſſiſtance of the 2d brigade, I immediately ſent your Letter to Lieut. Colonel *Tottingham*, commanding at *Dinapore*, agreeably to your order to me for that purpoſe, dated the 19th of November laſt.

Patna, I am, &c.
27th January 1774. (Signed) *Thomas Lane.*

Tranſlation of a Letter from the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* to Mr. *Lane*.

I underſtand, from a Letter which I have at this time received from Mr. *Haſtings*, that he has given orders to you to aſſemble together the troops of the brigade at *Dinapoor*, and to hold them in readineſs to march into this quarter whenever I write to you to diſpatch them. I therefore have written, and now encloſe you, a Letter to Mr. *Haſtings*, together with a copy of it for your own peruſal; the original I requeſt you will forward to Mr. *Haſtings*, and let the brigade be immediately diſpatched to me. Let your orders be given, that the whole brigade ſhall march together, and not two battalions ſeparately, and three or four days after them again another two battalions, and ſo diſperſed in different bodies. It is more adviſable and proper, that on the arrival of this Letter you immediately, without delay, diſpatch the whole brigade to me at once, ſo that it may arrive with me with the greateſt expedition, and even ſurpaſs celerity itſelf.

A true tranſlation.
(Signed) *Wm Redfearn*,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Agreed, That the above Papers be laid before the Board for their information.

A true extract.
(Signed) *G. Bogle*,
Sec^y Sel. Committee.

Col. Champion to take the command.

Reſolved, That the Commander in Chief be directed to repair as ſoon as poſſible to the brigade now in motion from *Dinapore*, to take the command of this expedition, and that Inſtructions be immediately prepared for him.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.
James Lawrell.
J. Graham.
George Vanſittart.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 14th February 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident. Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief, *William Alderſey*, *James Lawrell*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *Willm Lambert*, eſquires—Meſſrs. *Dacres* and *Vanſittart*, at the Committee of Revenue.

The Secretary lays before the Board, the Draft of Inſtructions for Colonel *Champion*, prepared agreeable to the orders of the 3d inſtant.

Reviſed and completed the above Inſtructions; and,

Agreed upon writing two Letters to the *Chief* and Council at *Patna*; the firſt to be immediately diſpatched to that place, and the other given in charge to Colonel *Champion*, agreeable to the tenor of his Inſtructions.

Ordered, That one copy of theſe Papers be referred for the information of the Select Committee, and that they be alſo recorded in this Department as follows:

APPENDIX No. 26.

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

Col. Champion's Inſtructions.

1. Having thought proper, at the requiſition of the Vizier, to grant him the aſſiſtance of one brigade of the Honourable Company's forces; and the troops being already on their march towards his dominions, you will pleaſe to repair with all convenient ſpeed to take upon you their immediate command; and although you are acquainted, as a Member of the Adminiſtration, with the motives and intentions of this expedition, we judge it neceſſary for your more particular guidance in the general line of your operations, to give you the following Inſtructions, truſting the particular conduct in the field to your military ſkill and capacity.

2. The expreſs purpoſe for which the Vizier at this time demanded our aid, being the reduction of the Rohilla country lying between the *Ganges* and the mountains, you are immediately on your arrival in his Country to acquaint him that you are ready to proceed on that ſervice, and require his further Inſtructions. For the general ſtipulations, in the caſe of his requiring the aſſiſtance of our forces, we refer you to the accompanying copy of a treaty executed between our Preſident and the Vizier at *Benares*, in Auguſt laſt; and for the particular conditions on which we afford him our aſſiſtance in this expedition, to the tranſlation of an addreſs from the latter on his making the requiſition of a brigade.

3. As the Vizier appears completely occupied at preſent in his expedition into the *Doauba*, for the recovery (in the behalf of the King *Shaw Alum*) of the territory ſeized by the Marattas, we imagine he will hardly find time this ſeaſon to attempt any thing towards the conqueſt he meditates of the Rohilla country before deſcribed. We think it however neceſſary to ſuppoſe the poſſibility of ſuch a ſervice taking place in deſcribing the line of your operations, which is to be as follows:

4. You are not to paſs the boundary which divides the province of *Oude* from the Rohilla country, except at the expreſs requiſition of the Vizier, and in that caſe you are to confine all your operations to that Country as above deſcribed, and to the dominions of the Vizier—you are in no caſe, nor on any account whatever, to permit the troops, or any part of them, to paſs the river *Ganges* from the Rohilla country, nor the boundaries of the Vizier's dominions, comprehending his ancient poſſeſſions of *Oude* and the new acquiſitions of *Corah* and *Allahabad*. At any rate, whatever be the particular ſervice which you are required to proceed upon within the line of theſe Inſtructions, you will uſe the neceſſary precaution to receive this requiſition from the Vizier in writing, to obviate future doubts or diſputes which may ariſe upon them.

5. If upon your arrival with the army you ſhould find that the Vizier has not returned from his expedition into the *Doauba*, or concerted his plan for immediately executing his intentions on the Rohilla country, we think it will be neceſſary that you ſhould, as ſoon as poſſible, have an interview with him, as well for the purpoſe of concerting the operations in which our troops are to be employed for his aid, as to give you a proper introduction to him in the ſtation which you now fill of our Commander in Chief; but as ſuch interview taking place within the limits of the poſſeſſions which were formerly conquered by the Marattas, and have been lately regained by the Vizier in behalf of the King, may be liable to

APPENDIX. No. 26.

future misrepresentation, and be construed an act of hostility against that Power on the immediate part of this Government, a consequence which we wish studiously to avoid, we would recommend that you advise him of your approach, appoint a place for meeting him, and proceed thither without any other military force than a retinue suitable to your station, and a guard sufficient for your security; you will publicly declare, that you go only to meet the Vizier, and with no intention of joining in any operations against the territories of which the Marattas had possessed themselves; and as soon as you have settled with the Vizier the necessary plan for your operations, you will immediately return to the army.

6. The military conduct of the expedition is entirely left with you; but as the regular payment of the troops is an essential point, and will depend altogether upon the exactness of the Vizier, you will be particularly attentive to make proper applications to him for this purpose; but should he neglect or evade to furnish the monthly subsidy, you will, in conjunction with the Resident at his Court, set before him, in the strongest terms, the impropriety of his conduct.

7. If such instances should, contrary to our expectations, prove ineffectual, and one month shall have elapsed beyond the period in which the payment should have been made, we authorize and enjoin you to suspend your operations, and to return to *Benares*, there to wait our further orders; declaring to the Vizier, in the name of the Board, that you consider this failure in his engagements as equivalent to a dismission of the troops, and that you shall halt at *Benares* until the balance due both of the subsidy and for such other conditions as shall have been performed conformably to the tenor of his Letter in Consultation 3d February, shall have been fully discharged.

8. You will perceive that the Vizier's payments are not to become due till the brigade shall have passed the borders of his dominions. It will be necessary therefore to advise us of this date, in order to ascertain the demand; in the meantime we have sent Instructions to the Chief and Council at *Patna*, to supply the Paymaster with a sum sufficient for the pay and charges of the brigade to the end of this month, trusting to the punctuality of the Vizier for the future supplies; nevertheless, to guard against every possibility of distress which may attend the troops from the want of money, we herewith deliver to you a letter of credit upon the Chief and Council at *Patna*, for 2,50,000 rupees, to be used in case of your having left the Vizier, and being then reduced to extreme necessity for employing it.

9. Whenever the Vizier shall think it expedient to dismiss the troops, you are to require such dismission in writing, to proceed immediately to the frontiers of our provinces with all convenient expedition, according to the stipulations of the agreement; but if he shall not have discharged the balance due for the charges and other conditions of this expedition, you are to halt at *Benares* until the same shall be fully discharged, as we have above directed, or until you shall be furnished with our orders for your further conduct.

10. We recommend in the strongest manner that you cultivate a good understanding with the Vizier, and that you pay the strictest attention to the behaviour and discipline of the troops, that no subject of complaint may arise on that head, either from himself or from any people of the countries with whom we are not in a state of hostilities.

11. For the more convenient execution of military law and justice, we furnish you with a regular warrant for assembling courts martial according to Act of Parliament.

12. You will correspond regularly with the honourable the President and Select Committee, and receive their orders both as to your political and military operations.

Fort William, We are, with esteem, &c.
the 14th February 1774.

To *Thomas Lane*, esquire, Chief, and Council, at *Patna*.

Gentlemen,

We desire you will advance the Paymaster of the second brigade a sum sufficient for its pay and charges to the end of this month of February, receiving his bills for the amount upon the Military Paymaster General. After having furnished this supply, you are to make no further advances whatever to this brigade without our express orders, until it shall return again within the provinces.

The supply for the monthly expence of the garrison of *Chunar* must be furnished as before.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 14th February 1774.

To *Thomas Lane*, esquire, Chief, and Council, at *Patna*.

Gentlemen,

Notwithstanding our orders of this day's date, respecting the advances to the second brigade, we have, in case of exigency, of which the Commander in Chief will be the judge, authorized him to draw upon you for the sum of two lacks and a half of Sicca rupees; and to his bills for that amount you will accordingly pay due honour.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 14th February 1774.

Bengal Select Consultations, the 27th April 1774.—Present, the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President. *William Aldersey*, *Philip Milner Dacres*, esquires.

Read, the following Letter from the Commander in Chief; dated 13th April.

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

This morning I had some conversation with the Vizier concerning the measures to be pursued in order to effectuate the conquest which he meditates; but it will be necessary that I have another interview or two with him, before I can give such accurate information on that subject as it is my wish to convey to you.

In the meantime however I am to inform you, that he has resolved forthwith to commence war against *Kaffiz Rhamet* and the other Rohilla Chiefs, and intends to canton in their Country during the rains.

As I imagine we shall meet with little or no resistance till we approach their strong holds under the mountains, I should suppose common prudence will teach the inhabitants to drive away their cattle, and destroy or conceal the grain which they cannot carry with them.

I have therefore been very earnest with his Excellency to take every possible precaution to prevent any distress to the troops from the want of provisions. He has assured me he will take such measures as that your army shall be duly and sufficiently supplied with the necessaries of life; and you may depend, Gentlemen, upon my giving due attention to the procurement of these indispensable requisites.

This day the brigade advanced to *Jugdispore*, about three cos from hence; and to-morrow his Excellency and I, with the allied armies, will reach *Surumnagur*, about five cos beyond *Jugdispore*.

As there is now no doubt that hostilities will be commenced against the Rohilla Chiefs, the Vizier's life will not only be liable to the common incidents of open war, but to the secret underhand machinations of his enemies; and therefore, supposing myself advanced into the Rohilla country, and the whole or part of it conquered, I wish to avail me, Gentlemen, of your advice and instructions how to act in case any unforeseen accidents should deprive us of our ally, the Vizier of the empire.

Before

Before we enter into the Rohilla dominions, regard ſhall be had to the laſt part of paragraph 4th of the Board's Inſtructions.

At preſent I have only further to add, this is my ſeventh addreſs to you unacknowledged; and that I have the honour to remain, with great reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Head Quarters, 2 coſs above *Sandy*, 13th April 1774. — Your moſt obedient humble ſervant, *A. Champion.*

Agreed, That the following anſwer be written.

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 13th inſtant.

As we conclude that you will have entered the Rohilla dominions, and commenced hoſtilities againſt them, long before this reply to your Letter can arrive, it will be unneceſſary to give you any further Inſtructions on that ſubject; you will be guided by thoſe you have already received.

We cannot too much recommend to you the continuance of that attention which you have paid to the ſupplying of the army with the neceſſaries of life, the want of which in that Country will probably be the greateſt difficulty they will have to contend with. As ſo little is left of the fair ſeaſon, we deſire likewiſe that you will take immediate meaſures for ſecuring dry and healthy quarters for the troops when the rains ſhall oblige them to retire from the field. On this ſubject we muſt, from paſt experience, earneſtly recommend to you to avoid the neighbourhood of the hills and jungles, in whatever ſpot you may fix upon for this purpoſe.

The ſubject on which you have required our Inſtructions in the latter part of your Letter, is of too delicate and dangerous a nature for us to give our ſentiments upon it thus prematurely: on this, as on former occaſions, we muſt rely on chance, which we hope will preclude the neceſſity of our interpoſition. Should it however happen otherwiſe, you muſt be guided by the urgency of preſent circumſtances; always bearing in mind, that this is a point in which we have no right to interfere beyond the meaſures to which the care of our own ſecurity may compel us.

Fort William, the 27th April 1774. — We are, Sir, Yours, &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations the 9th May 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

The following Letter, addreſſed to the Preſident by Colonel *Alexander Champion*, dated the 23d ultimo, was immediately committed to the Members of the Board, and is now recorded.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

Sir,

I have the pleaſure to ſalute you with the hopeful news of victory over the Rohillas. When the purſuit is over, expect more particular accounts; in the meantime I remain,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant, *A. Champion.*

23d April 1774.

P. S. We are in poſſeſſion of the enemy's encampment, with their tents ſtanding, after a cannonade of almoſt two hours.

Read, the following Letters from Colonel *Alexander Champion* to the Committee; dated the 19th and 24th ultimo, and 2d of May. APPENDIX No. 26.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Since my Letter of the 17th to the Governor, *Hafiz Rhamet* has by Letter expreſſed earneſt inclinations to come to an accommodation with the Vizier, which has been the cauſe of my halting here to-day. The Nabob claims no leſs than two crore of rupees; and unleſs he greatly abates his demands, it is not likely that an amicable deciſion can take place.

Hafiz has given away two coſs to poſſeſs himſelf of a bridge over the Babul Nullee, about ten coſs from hence; if he does not retreat farther, I expect to be with him early on the 21ſt, as the united armies will march from hence to-morrow.

I have the honour to remain, Gentlemen, Your moſt obedient humble ſervant, *A. Champion.*

Camp 3 coſs Weſt of *Shajehanpore*, 19th April 1774.

P. S. I have juſt received intelligence that the enemy have all re-croſſed the bridge, and poſted themſelves on the ſide of the Nullah, with a determined reſolution of ſtanding their ground to the laſt extremity.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In a Letter of the 22d to the Preſident, I gave a full account of the progreſs of the army from the 19th, the ſucceſs of the feint made uſe of to draw the Rohillas out of their poſt behind *Cuttera*, with my reſolution of taking the advantage of their movement; and yeſterday I had the inexpreſſible ſatisfaction of tranſmitting a ſhort note to the Governor, with news of the victory, of which I am now to give the particulars.

About three o'clock in the morning, the brigade, with five battalions of the Vizier's regulars, and the Nigib Pultan, conſiſting of about 4,000 matchlock men, began to croſs to the Weſtward ſide of the Gurra river, and with much perſeverance dragged the artillery over a broad and heavy ſand to the oppoſite plains.

The armies marched in three columns towards the Babul Nullah, with intentions to have on our right flank when we ſhould engage; we had proceeded about five miles when our ſcouting horſemen brought notice that they had deſcried ſome of the enemy's cavalry, nor had we advanced half a coſs more, when I could ſee their colours, and very little further when their tents appeared.

My intelligence proved very good, for I ſoon afterwards clearly obſerved, that we were upon the enemy's left flank, within 1,200 yards of which, on a riſing ground, which had hitherto obſtructed our view, was a village and tope, which I ordered to be immediately occupied by part of the left column of the matchlock men; this was a poſt of great importance, and it was a great overſight of the enemy not to have poſſeſſed themſelves of it, as we might have paid very dear for diſlodging them.

Having led the line about 200 yards beyond this village, we filed off to the right towards the Nulla, by ſubdiviſions, and now, about eight o'clock, the enemy's artillery opened upon us. The compliment was returned by two guns, which I had placed on an eminence to amuſe them whilſt our army was forming in order of battle.

The corps of Cadets and Sepoy Grenadiers, led by Major *Hanway*, and three battalions of the brigade Sepoys, compoſed the right wing, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel *Leſlie*; theſe, and the European regiments, ſoon

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gave a full front to the enemy, and whilſt they gradually inclined to the right, under a ſevere cannonade, returned the ſalute with their guns.

The three remaining battalions of our own Sepoys, under the command of Major *Eyres*, compoſed a ſecond line, and the two diviſions of the Nigib Fultan covered the flanks of our army, whilſt we advanced ſlowly towards the enemy; the cannonade on both ſides became very ſmart, and by degrees as the Nabob's regulars, who had marched in the rear of our column, came up, they dreſſed with the European regiment, and became the left wing in place of the matchlock men, who inclined to the left to give them ground and cover their flank; but this wing was not completely formed till nine o'clock.

Hafiz and his army, conſiſting of about 40,000, ſhewed great bravery and reſolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets; they made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns being ſo much better ſerved than theirs kept ſo conſtant and galling a fire, that they could not advance, and where they were cloſeſt there was the greateſt ſlaughter; they gave proof of a good ſhare of military knowledge, by ſhewing inclinations to force both our flanks at the ſame time, and endeavouring to call off our attention by a briſk fire on our center.

They ſeemed particularly deſirous to diſtreſs our right flank, and with that view brought four guns and a large quantity of rockets from a conſiderable diſtance, to enfilade us; at the ſame time lining the Nullah, which could not for ſome time be obſerved for long graſs, with ſome of their troops, in order to ruſh upon us, ſhould our right be thrown into confuſion.

Perceiving their intention, I directed a few ſhells to be played upon them, whilſt a battalion from our right was ordered to diſlodge the enemy from the Nullah; the battalion ſent on this ſervice ſoon performed it, and advanced ſo briſkly after the enemy, that fearing leſt they ſhould go too far, I ordered the battalion on the right of the ſecond line to ſupport them.

Never was I more fully convinced of the utility of a ſecond line than on this occaſion, for in the courſe of the day I found it neceſſary to ſend all the three battalions which formed it to cover the right flank. It is impoſſible to deſcribe a more obſtinate firmneſs of reſolution than the enemy diſplayed; numerous were their gallant men who advanced, and often pitched their colours between both armies, in order to encourage their men to follow them; and it was not till they ſaw our whole army advancing briſkly to charge them, after a ſevere cannonade of two hours twenty minutes, and a ſmart fire of muſquetry for ſome minutes on both flanks, that they fairly turned their backs.

The battalions then formed into ſeparate columns, and with beat of drum and fifes playing, the army preſſed in glory through the Rohilla camp.

And now came on the after-game of the few horſe the Nabob ſent to the field; no ſooner was the enemy irrecoverably broke than they puſhed after them, and got much plunder in money, elephants, and camels, &c. &c. &c. Their camp equipage, which was all ſtanding, and proves we came on them by ſurprize, with whatever effects they could not carry off, fell a ſacrifice to the ravages of the Nabob's people, whilſt the Company's troops, in regular order in their ranks, moſt juſtly obſerved, "We have the honour of the day, and theſe banditti the "profit."

I wiſh I could pay the Vizier any compliment on this occaſion, or that I were not under the indiſpenſable neceſſity of expreſſing my higheſt indignation at his ſhameful puſillanimity; indiſpenſably, I ſay, becauſe it is neceſſary that Adminiſtration ſhould clearly know how little to be depended on is this their ally.

The night before the battle, I applied to him for ſome particular pieces of cannon, which I thought might prove of great ſervice in action; but he declined giving the uſe of them; and though the honour of the Engliſh arms was called in queſtion by the forward raſhneſs of the enemy in challenging us to battle, and abandoning the poſt; yet did the Vizier urge me to decline the fight, and make another march on the Eaſtern ſide of the *Gurrah* towards *Peilybret*. Thus would he have inſpired the enemy, whoſe numbers would have been reinforced with near twelve thouſand men, haſtening under different leaders to their aid.

However, when he found me determined, he promiſed ſolemnly to ſupport me with all his force; and particularly engaged to be cloſe at hand with a large body of cavalry to be uſed as I ſhould direct; but inſtead of being nigh me, he remained beyond the *Gurrah*, on the ground which I had left in the morning, ſurrounded by his cavalry and a large train of artillery, and did not move thence till the news of the enemy's defeat reached him.

To this breach of his faith was owing the danger which followed from the enemy's enfilading the right flank of your army, which might have been attended with conſequences that I dread to think of; but for the advantage derived from our ſecond line. This however was not all; for if his cavalry had been up, to have preſſed upon the enemy in their flight, they muſt have made prodigious havock, might have totally diſabled them from making head again, and rendered any defence of *Peilybret* abſolutely impracticable, by thinning their numbers, and getting between the remainder and their ſtrong hold.

I have been thus particular with regard to the Vizier's conduct, that it may be better known how to deal with him in future.

Of the enemy above 2,000 fell in the field, and amongſt them many Sirdars; of your army little more than a hundred, and not a ſingle Officer. Standards we have taken without number, and above fifty pieces of cannon; but what renders the victory moſt deciſive, is the death of *Hafiz-Ramet*, who was killed whilſt bravely rallying his people to battle: one of his ſons was alſo killed; one taken priſoner; a third returned from flight to-day, and is in the hands of *Sujah Dowlah*.

I cannot, Gentlemen, better convey to your minds the ſenſe which I have of the conduct of your army on this occaſion, than by encloſing herewith a copy of my return of thanks ſignified in the orders of this day. I have to wiſh, that it was in my power moſt liberally to reward ſuch diſtinguiſhed gallantry; but ſince that is not the caſe, I do moſt earneſtly recommend them to every poſſible mark of the bounty and favour of Government.

I have only to add, that the Gentlemen who ſhewed ſuch alertneſs and preſence of mind in carrying my orders to the different bodies of the army during the courſe of the action, were, Captain *Allen M'Pherſon*, Captain *Edward Shewon*, Lieutenants *William Bruce* and *Robert Raine*, and Enſigns *John* and *Alexander Murray*: and that I am,

With much reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient,
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp on the Field of *St. George*, 24th April 1774.

P. S. I have the honour to encloſe a general return of the killed, wounded, and miſſing of the ſeveral corps engaged at the battle of *St. George*.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

Sir,

In a Letter of the 27th I informed you, that the army would canton at *Birelly* during the enſuing rainy ſeaſon; but that the time of going into cantonments muſt depend on a conference which I ſhould have with his Excellency the Vizier in a few days thereafter.

I am now to acquaint you, Sir, that the Nabob and I, with the combined armies, are within five coſs of *Birelly*; and that having intimated to his Excellency that I was ready to perform what further ſervices he might require before

before the ſetting in of the rains; he anſwered, that he thought nothing more could be undertaken; and requeſted I would canton the troops.

The whole of *Hafiz Rhamet*'s country, with *Aily* and *Biſſouly*, belonging to the ſon of *Dundy Cawn*, who has delivered himſelf up, is already in the Nabob's poſſeſſion; and the only part of the Rohilla dominions unoccupied by his troops, is *Zabita Cawn*'s country, which I hold alſo as conquered, becauſe *Zabita Cawn* himſelf is at the Vizier's court, and cannot get away, even if he were diſpoſed to diſpute, which it is probable the fate of his friend *Hafiz* will at all rates deter him from attempting.

This being the caſe, I have the pleaſure to think, that the ſum ſtipulated to be paid to the Company is now due, and may be demanded when you pleaſe.

In the courſe of the ſervice, I have obſerved the greateſt circumſpection; I have not, in one inſtance, interfered between his Excellency and any of the Natives in the conquered country; ſo that I am confident he cannot have the ſmalleſt plea for prolonging the terms of payment of the Company's money.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient

humble ſervant,

A. Champion.

Camp on the Banks of the *Nartu Nulla*, 2d May 1774.

A GENERAL RETURN of the Killed, Wounded, and Miſſing, of the different Corps engaged in the Battle of St. George, fought near the Bogga Nullah on the 23d of April 1774. Head Quarters, Camp near the Bogga Nullah, April 24th, 1774.

	Captains.		Lieut^{s}.		Enſigns.		Serj^{ts}		Subidars.		Jemidars.		Drummers and Trumpeters.		Rank and File.		Tinders.		Laſcars.		Bildars		Water Men.		Bullock Men.		Grand Total.	
The Honourable the Company's Troops.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Total - -	- -	2	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	1	1	1	- -	2	1	- -	23	67	- -	4	3	2	5	8	-	6	6	- -	39	93
His Excellency the Nabob's Troops.																												
Total -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	-	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	80	174	- -	- -	-	- -	-	- -	-	- -	-	- -	80	174

Captain William Anniſly Baille, of the Artillery, and Captain John Lumſdane, of the Grenadier Corps, wounded, included in the above. None miſſing.

No Return from the Nabob's Troops of Cavalry.

(Signed) *A. Champion.*

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Tranſlation of a Letter from the Vizier.

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah.*

Praiſe to the Creator of the world, that by his favour I have obtained the wiſhes of my heart. To-day, which is the 11th of Saffor, the Engliſh troops and mine were oppoſed to thoſe of *Hafiz Rhamet Cawn*, and there enſued a warm conflict, which laſted for the ſpace of one par. A number, of nearly 50,000 Rohillas, Affghans, attacked us on all ſides, and cloſed upon us; but as the favour of the Almighty was on our ſide, we gained a complete victory. *Hafiz Rhamet* was ſlain, and much plunder fell into our hands of the conquered army. May this victory prove happy to my friend, for in reality the alliance betwixt us renders our mutual victories equally intereſting to both. In the engagement General *Champion* and the Engliſh troops behaved with great ſpirit and activity, and it is owing to the favour of God, to a fortunate opportunity, and to the zealous efforts of the Engliſh troops, that this victory has been acquired. There are other principal Rohilla Chiefs who are maſters of a large army, but by the bleſſing of God they ſhall be reduced to ſubjection.

Agreed, That the above Papers be laid before the Board for their information.

Agreed, That the following anſwer be written to Colonel *Champion.*

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your Letter of the 19th, and alſo of the 24th, which has been laid before the Board; and you will be informed of their ſentiments in a ſeparate Letter.

We have only on this occaſion to expreſs our ſincere ſatisfaction at the deciſive advantage gained over the Rohillas, which we aſcribe entirely to your good conduct, and to the bravery of the troops under your command.

We are, Sir,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervants.

Fort William, the 9th May 1774.

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Agreed, That a Letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors, informing them of this advantage gained over the Rohillas, be prepared to be dispatched over land.

Warren Haſtings.
Wm Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

APPENDIX, No. 27.

Copy of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 14th May 1774.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

THE daily expectation of an approaching criſis in the operations of your army in the Rohilla war, has induced us to delay, from time to time, the diſpatch of our accompanying advices, in the hopes of being able to tranſmit more complete information. This is now in our power. By a Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Preſident, dated the 2d inſtant, we learn, that the Vizier had formerly declared to him, that he had no further occaſion for the ſervices of the troops in the field before the rains; that he was accordingly preparing to canton them at *Brietly*, the capital of the new-acquired dominions; that the whole of the Country lately poſſeſſed by *Hafez Rhamet*, with *Ouly* and *Biſſouly*, belonging to the ſon of *Doondy Cawn*, is already in the poſſeſſion of the Vizier; and the only part of the Rohilla dominions unoccupied by his troops, is the territory of *Zabita Cawn*, who is in the Vizier's camp, in his cuſtody, and unable, were he at liberty, to oppoſe him; ſo that we think we may, without preſumption, congratulate you on the happy accompliſhment of the undertaking begun and decided almoſt in the ſame inſtant of time, and the right which you have unqueſtionably acquired to the ſum ſtipulated for the ſervice.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful and moſt
obedient humble ſervants,

Fort William, the 14th May 1774.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council in *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 24th Auguſt 1774.

Par. 2. You were then informed, that the brigade employed under the command of Colonel *Champion*, in the ſervice againſt the Rohillas, was preparing to canton at *Bareilly* for the rains. Soon after, on the requiſition and urgent ſolicitation of the Vizier, this deſtination was changed, and the brigade marched forwards to the city of *Biſſouly*, which is near the centre of the Rohilla country, on that ſide of the *Ganges*, and immediately entered into quarters, with the intention of paſſing the whole ſeaſon of the rains there. But on the news of an accommodation among the Maratta Chiefs, and on the appearance of ſome hoſtile acts on the part of the King, fearing to be interrupted in the courſe of his operations if they were delayed, the Vizier has ſince importuned the Commander in Chief to take the field again, and to march againſt the remainder of the Rohilla forces, who were aſſembled under the command of *Fyzoolla Cawn*, at *Patter Gur*, in the northernmoſt diviſion of that country, hoping that by their diſperſion, which would at this time be with leſs difficulty effected, any deſigns which may have been formed by the King or the Marattas to be executed after the rains, will be anticipated and rendered abortive. To this requeſt Colonel *Champion*, though with reluctance, and having firſt objected to it on account of the dangers to which the troops (the Europeans eſpecially) would be ſubjected from ſickneſs, by being expoſed to the inclemency of the preſent ſeaſon, aſſented. We own the force of the Colonel's objections, and think they outweigh the arguments urged by the Vizier, to prove the neceſſity of preſent ſervice, as we are perſuaded that our forces in that quarter, joined to thoſe of the Vizier, and aided by our other reſources, are ſuperior to any oppoſition which we can foreſee in any probable event of things: but it may accelerate the iſſue of the war, and diſcourage foreign attempts; and our advices from the Commander in Chief, and from the Reſident, mention, that the ſeaſon was and had been for ſome time uncommonly favourable for ſuch a deſign.

3. By a Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Committee, dated 5th Auguſt, he was then advanced with the army 24 coſs beyond *Biſſouly*. We know not how near this may have carried him to *Patter Gur*.

4. The King has lately taken into his ſervice *Sumroo*, the notorious aſſaſſin of the unfortunate priſoners at *Patna*; it is alſo ſaid that he has invited *Gazeo-dun Cawn* and *Meer Coſſim* to his Court, and that he has written Letters to the Abdallee and to the Maratta Chiefs, ſoliciting their return to that quarter; and to *Fyzoolla Cawn*, encouraging him to perſevere, and flattering him with hopes of ſuccour. Theſe indications of his Majeſty's indiſpoſition towards us, for which many obvious cauſes may be aſſigned, are not likely to affect your intereſt, at leaſt not materially, ſince his ſolicitations will have little weight with the Powers to whom they are made, and who know that he has neither wealth, territory, nor perſonal command, to give them credit. The Abdallee is too remote to become an object of our apprehenſion. The Marattas are not to be deſpiſed, although they muſt have ſuffered extremely from their late inteſtine diſturbances: the faction excited by the Miniſters of that ſtate againſt *Ragonaut Row* has prevailed, the infant ſon of *Narrain Row* acknowledged Peſhwa in his ſtead, and *Ragonaut* himſelf a priſoner in their hands, as we are informed by our laſt advices.

5. It is very probable that they will attempt to recover the *Duawb* from the Vizier the next ſeaſon, if they have leiſure and means to ſend their forces ſo far; but we have reaſon to believe that they will not venture to act openly againſt our army, nor to invade the Vizier's own dominions; and we venture to promiſe, that whilſt the orders under which we now act continue in force, we ſhall not permit the army, or any part of it, to paſs the line to which its preſent operations are reſtricted, either to prevent or repel any attempts of the Marattas, while they leave us unmoleſted within it.'

6. This conduct the Vizier will probably expect from the repeated declarations made to him by the Preſident, when he firſt engaged in that enterprize; and it is not improbable that ſuch an expectation may be the ground of his preſent eagerneſs to bring the war to a concluſion, that his own forces may be wholly at liberty to defend his new acquiſitions in the *Duawb* againſt future attacks of the Marattas.

7. As to *Meer Coſſim* and *Gazio-dun Cawn*, they are mere names, and can be of no weight, into whatever ſcale they are thrown, but as they mark the temper and inclinations of thoſe who befriended them.

8. The payments of the monthly ſubſidy for the extra charge of the brigade have been made with great punctuality, ſo far as our advices mentioned them.

The Vizier has given the Reſident an aſſignment on his treaſury at *Fayzabad*, for the 15 lacks due by the treaty for the ſecond payment on account of the ceſſion

of

of *Corah* and *Allahabad*; and we hope that it is by this time on the way to *Calcutta*.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
obedient humble ſervants,

Fort William, the 24th Auguſt 1774.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 19th October 1774.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. Our laſt diſpatch was dated the 24th of Auguſt, and encloſed a duplicate of the preceding. It was ſent to *Fort Saint George* to be forwarded to you on board his Majeſty's ſhips, which were then to return to *Europe*.

2. In that Letter we informed you, that Colonel *Champion* had complied with the preſſing ſolicitations of the Vizier, to advance with the brigade in conjunction with his army againſt the Rohilla's under *Fyzoolla Cawn*, who were in the neighbourhood of *Patter Gur*; and that on the 5th of Auguſt they had proceeded with this intention twenty-four coſs beyond *Beſſouly*, the place of their cantonments. The next Letter received from the Colonel was addreſſed to the Preſident, and dated the 8th of Auguſt, adviſing him of an offer made by the Vizier, of ſeven lacks of rupees as a preſent to the brigade for their ſervices to him, and encloſing the copy of an obligation which the Vizier had delivered for the payment of this ſum ſix months after its date. As the Vizier had made his intentions public, this tranſaction could not be concealed from the troops; but Colonel *Champion* gave them to underſtand that the aſſent of Government was neceſſary to their accepting it, for which purpoſe he addreſſed the Preſident. The Preſident laid his Letter before us, and we referred it to the Council at large, who found, upon a reference to the late Act of Parliament for the better regulation of India affairs, &c. that the acceptance of preſents was poſitively prohibited; and the Colonel was acquainted of the impoſſibility either for them to aſſent or the army to receive the Vizier's donation.

3. The Colonel continued to advance towards *Patter Gur* leiſurely, and with frequent reſting days, for the eaſe of the troops; the weather was very favourable, and the men continued in good health and ſpirits. On the 10th Auguſt he was within four ſhort marches of *Patter Gur*, and received information that the Rohillas were retiring unto the hills, but had left a body of their troops at that place. However, on his advancing nearer they all retired; and on the 16th the Vizier took poſſeſſion of *Patter Gur* without any reſiſtance, and thereby completed his conqueſts of the Rohilla country wherein we were engaged to aſſiſt him. This opened a plea for demanding the 40 lacks, as due by the tenor of our engagement; and the Preſident did accordingly write to the Vizier on this ſubject, and inſtructed the Reſident to make the demand. *Fyzoolla Cawn* with the Rohilla army, ſaid to amount to 40,000 men, was cooped up within the mountains, and confined between them and the river; and the Colonel's Letters deſcribe them to have ſuffered much from want of proviſions. The Vizier was deſirous of bringing the war to an immediate concluſion, by an accommodation with the Rohillas, and offered *Fyzoolla Cawn* terms which he rejected. The poſt occupied by the Rohillas was at a place called *Loll Dong*, which was ſaid to be without the Rohilla territory, and was therefore conſidered by Colonel *Champion* as beyond the line to which his operations were limited; for which reaſon he would not comply with the Vizier's repeated deſire of attacking them, until he ſhould receive our inſtructions in reply to his Letter of the 29th July, which expreſſed his doubts on this ſubject; and the two armies continued for ſome time inactive, although within ſixteen coſs, or about 22 miles of each other. In the meantime negociations were carried on. *Fyzoolla Cawn* requeſted that Mr. *Murray*, the Colonel's Secretary, might be ſent to him, to whom he wiſhed to explain ſome points that he did not chuſe to commit to writing; and the Colonel conſented to his requeſt, in the hopes that he might be perſuaded by Mr. *Murray* to come to camp, and upon a perſonal interview with the Vizier be brought to accede to the terms offered him; the Vizier likewiſe approved of Mr. *Murray*'s viſit, and furniſhed him with inſtructions. The Vizier, by Mr. *Murray*, repeated an offer to *Fyzoolla Cawn* of a ſettlement in the *Duawb*, with aſſurances of ſupport, on his ſurrendering himſelf and delivering up the half of his treaſure and effects. *Fyzoolla Cawn* conſented to the latter part of the propoſal, provided the ſettlement was made in the Rohilla country, which had been lately conquered, and not in the *Duawb*, which he alledged it was impoſſible for him to defend againſt the incurſions of the Marattas: both propoſals were mutually rejected, and Mr. *Murray* was recalled, without having been able to effect the purpoſe for which he was ſent.

4. The Colonel then, at the urgent ſolicitation of the Vizier, made a movement nearer the enemy, by which he entirely cut off their communication with the river and the Rohilla country, and was now within ten coſs, or about 15 miles of them; but being ſtill under the ſame difficulty with reſpect to his inſtructions, he refuſed to proceed further. The Colonel's Letter, dated the 6th of September, mentions the increaſed diſtreſſes of the Rohilla army; and on the 10th he writes, that they had moved their families farther into the country within the hills. A few days after he would have received our inſtructions, giving him a latitude of action beyond the limits to which he thought himſelf reſtricted, and of courſe would be enabled to bring the war to a ſpeedy iſſue, either by accelerating an agreement or attacking and diſperſing the enemy.—Our proceedings properly cloſe at this period, and we make no doubt but you will be informed of the ſequel by the new Adminiſtration.

5. In reply to the demand which was made on the Vizier for payment of the 40 lacks, he pleaded his inability to avail himſelf of reſources for money; while he was obliged to keep the field, and the Rohilla army remained unſubdued; and while the intentions of the Marattas were unknown, who, by attacking him in another quarter, might oblige him to abandon his conqueſts, which would revert to the Rohillas, and he obliged to ſubdue it a ſecond time. As the Vizier has been hitherto punctual in his pecuniary engagements with us, we are not under any apprehenſion of his not fulfilling this, and we were the leſs ſcrupulous to grant him the benefit of the excuſe he pleaded, ſince we had every reaſon to expect, that an early poſt would bring us the advices of his objection being removed, by the concluſion of a peace, or the defeat of the Rohillas; and to have puſhed him for payment at ſuch a critical conjuncture, might have compelled him to a precipitate and diſadvantageous agreement with his enemy.

6. At the time of our laſt diſpatches, the various accounts we had received of the Marattas, agreed in repreſenting the diſſentions among them to have ceaſed, by the confinement of *Ragonaut Row*, and the proclamation of the young prince, *Madan Row*, as Peſhwah; but we have ſince received more authentic advices from Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poonah*, by which it appears, that *Ragonaut Row*, in place of being impriſoned as was ſuppoſed, is ſupported by *Madhajee Sindeah* and *Tokajee Hoolka*, into whoſe hands he had thrown himſelf, and who, though originally attached to the oppoſite faction, now undertook to ſupport him againſt it, having a large force under their command, conſiſting principally of the ſame troops which they had ſo ſucceſsfully employed in the *Duawb*

and

APPENDIX. No. 27.

and the Rohilla diſtricts in the courſe of the laſt two years; he alſo mentions that freſh diſſentions have ariſen among the Miniſters, ſo that the inteſtine diſtractions of the Maratta ſtate promiſe another year's ſecurity to *Hindoſtan* from their incurſions.

7. *Beneram Pundit*, a Vackeel from *Shabajee Booſlah*, Subah of *Berar*, the brother and ſucceſſor of the late *Janojee*, has been attending upon the Preſident upwards of a twelvemonth; he had been mentioned to us by the Preſident as a very intelligent perſon, who has communicated to him on many occaſions the earlieſt information of tranſactions in the *Decan*, which after-advices have confirmed. He has acquainted the Preſident with the views and claim of his maſter to the government of the Maratta ſtate, in the proſecution of which he may be greatly aſſiſted by the preſent diſſentions among the Miniſters; he has alſo often repeated the earneſt deſire of *Shabajee Booſla* to enter into a defenſive alliance with the Company through this Preſidency. An opinion that ſuch an alliance may be of great advantage to the Company, has induced us to ſhew every mark of attention to the Vackeel, who is now ſent back with letters and preſents to his maſter, and *Dereahboy*, the widow of *Janojee*, who has great ſway in the adminiſtration.

8. The Vizier has lately propoſed an interview with the King, under pretence of regulating the countries lately conquered; and we have agreed that the commanding officer of our army ſhall be preſent, and aſſiſt with his counſel and advice; but we have ſtrictly prohibited him from engaging the Company as guarantee to any of the treaties or agreements that ſhall take place between his Majeſty and the Vizier, or in any other engagements whatever, that ſhall produce any new claims or demands upon them. If the influence of our brigade, employed for the protection of the Vizier's country, ſhould extend itſelf to the ſecurity of any country that may be allotted to the King, we have directed Colonel *Champion* to make a merit of our protection to his Majeſty, and demand, as a return, the renunciation of his claim to the Bengal tribute, upon the footing of thereby removing every cauſe of further diſcontent between his Majeſty and us.

9. Accompanying we have the honour to forward our Proceedings to the 6th of October inclusive, duplicate of our laſt General Letter, and broken ſet of Country Correſpondence, from the 3d of March to the 21ſt of November.

We are,
Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful and obedient
Fort William, the 15th October 1774. humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 2d June 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, *William Alderſey*, abſent, *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquire.

Read, a Letter from Colonel *Alexander Champion*.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with your Letter of the 27th ultimo, and you may reſt aſſured of my attention to the procurement of proviſions for the troops; but in this matter, as in others, I muſt, circumſtanced as I am, Gentlemen, chiefly rely on the faith of his Excellency the Vizier, whoſe influence and hearty concurrence is abſolutely neceſſary to render my endeavours effectual; his promiſes are ſolemn and frequent.

You ſeem to have miſconſtrued the 6th paragraph of my addreſs of the 13th of April. I did not extend my views ſo far as to the ſucceſſion to the Vizier's territories in the event I mentioned. If too delicate and dangerous for you, Gentlemen, ſurely it muſt have been too momentous for me to have interfered; I had no thoughts of it; I only wiſhed to know, whether to withdraw your troops immediately from this country, or maintain the conqueſts which I might happen to make, until I received your further orders.

The event has ſhewn, that there was not the leaſt reaſon to apprehend danger to his Excellency's perſon from open war, and the generoſity of his enemies proved a ſecurity againſt private attempts.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Camp, 14th May, 1774. Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following extract from the Secret Department Conſultations of 23d May 1774.

Received a Letter from the Commander in Chief, in the following terms:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

In a Letter of the 27th ultimo I acquainted the Governor, that the army would canton at this place during the enſuing rains. Under date the 2d inſtant I repeated the ſame information, with this addition, that having requeſted the Nabob to point out wherein the army could further ſerve him before the wet ſeaſon came on, he declared his opinion, that nothing more ſhould be undertaken, and ſignified his deſire that I would canton the troops.

I alſo told the Preſident, that the Vizier is in full poſſeſſion of all *Haſez Rhamet*'s country; this I mentioned from my own knowledge; and upon the Nabob's authority, that he was alſo maſter of *Ouly* and *Biſſuly*, belonging to the ſon of *Dundy Cawn*.

But this morning, after the ground for the cantonments had been pitched upon, his Excellency paid me a viſit, and to my great ſurprize requeſted I would move on with and canton the army near *Biſſouly*, 18 coſs from hence, on the banks of the Yarwaffadar river; alledging, that he has not yet obtained abſolute poſſeſſion of *Biſſouly*, in which he ſays there is treaſure to a very large amount.

I immediately propoſed to detach a part of the troops to put him in poſſeſſion of *Biſſouly*, after which they could in a few days rejoin the army at this place; but I expreſſed diſinclination to canton the troops higher up the Country than we now are.

The reaſons I offered were, that our ammunition and ſtore boats, with the Contractor's arrack boats, &c. had been ordered up the Gambery river in conſequence of his Excellency's expreſs deſire that we ſhould canton near *Birelly*; that their returning again down the *Gambery*, and getting back to the *Ganges*, would take much time, and not only retard the ſupplies of ammunition, of which we are much in want on account of the great expence of the 23d of April, but alſo ſubject the officers and ſoldiers to great diſtreſs for want of neceſſaries and liquors, which are very eſſential for the preſervation of their health in this country, where the quality of the water is often pernicious; that the *Yarwaffadar* is a river hardly known to us but by name; that the place of its junction with the *Ganges*, and how far it is navigable to, is uncertain; nor can it be known how the inhabitants of the countries through which it runs, might be diſpoſed towards us; that ſuppoſing the boats were ordered to continue their way up the Gambery river, or directed to return and proceed up the *Ganges* till they came on a line with *Biſſouly*, they would in either caſe be above ſeventeen coſs from the place propoſed for our cantonments, and it is not certain whether the road to them would be paſſable

in the rains; that we could not afford large detachments for eſcorts, and that even if we could, it would be to little purpoſe, unleſs we were at an abſolute certainty as to the ſtation we ſhould occupy in the rains, with regard to which his Excellency might perhaps change his mind again; that our croſſing and cantoning beyond the Coſſey and Ramgunga rivers, which are very broad and rapid in the rains, would render our communication with the Country we have already conquered, and of courſe with the Nabob's provinces of *Oude*, *Korah*, and *Allahabad*, very difficult; and that our ſupplies of proviſions for the army would conſequently be very precarious, ſince the Nabob confeſſedly depends chiefly on ſuch as will be furniſhed from his own Country.

Beſides theſe reaſons, I had ſeveral others which were not for his ear; viz. that in caſe it ſhould be the pleaſure of Adminiſtration on any account to recal their troops, or in the event that I ſhould find it indiſpenſably neceſſary to return down the Country, from a want of proviſions, or on account of being in too great arrears of pay, the difficulty and danger of recroſſing the ſaid two rivers would be obviated.

All I could ſay had not ſufficient weight with his Excellency; and as the power of controul is entirely in his hands, I can only regret that he makes ſo abſolute and ſo improper an uſe of it. My chief motive, however, for giving ſo implicit acquieſcence to his every requeſt, is to prevent the ſmall pretence or excuſe for not fulfilling the terms of his letter of requiſition of aid; namely, the payment of forty lacks of rupees to the Company, when he ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of the whole or half the Rohilla country, or when an accommodation ſhould take place.

Here I am moſt heartily to hope, that it is clearly underſtood between you, Gentlemen, and his Excellency, what the half of the Rohilla country is: for otherwiſe much altercation may ariſe on this head.

Many circumſtances may perhaps concur to render it inexpedient for you to puſh the conqueſt of the Rohilla country. My Letters to the Select Committee of the 24th April, to which I beg leave to refer you, will pretty clearly ſhew, that there is conſiderable danger in truſting your troops with the Vizier on actual ſervice, ſince you muſt lay your account with ſuſtaining the whole weight of the war: nay, it is worſe, he will feed your Commander with ſolemn promiſes of ſupport, and yet diſappoint him.

But ſuppoſing the Vizier as firm as could be wiſhed, it is not improbable that a foreign enemy may, after the rains, reduce him to the neceſſity of retiring to his own dominions, in order to protect them from invaſion: in this caſe, the Rohilla country will fall a prey to others; for he cannot both keep it and defend his own dominions, unleſs our Government give him another brigade, which perhaps they may not chooſe to do.

Now I do not conceive that we are obliged to maintain him in poſſeſſion of this new acquiſition; and if he ſhall be obliged to evacuate it before the forty lacks are acknowledged due to the Company, he will moſt probably uſe every endeavour to evade payment; for I am ſorry to confeſs, that his Excellency is apt to equivocate.

It is ſaid, that *Ahmet Cawn* has given his Country, which lies between *Dundy Cawn*'s and *Zebedy Cawn*'s, to the King, and indeed the treatment of the family of *Hafez* will perfectly juſtify the other Chiefs in every ſtep they can take to avoid coming under the power of *Sujah Dowlah*.

It concerns me much to have your inſtructions, Gentlemen, how to act, in caſe it proves true that *Ahmet Cawn*'s country is actually ceded to his Majeſty; and I am to requeſt you will favour me with them as ſoon as poſſible.

Whiſperers tell me, there was a previous agreement between *Niziſ Cawn* on the part of the King and the Vizier, for a partition of the Rohilla country; and that *Niziſ Cawn*, who we know is in the field, and was on his way to join the Nabob, till he heard of the defeat of *Hafiz*, is marching to poſſeſs himſelf of *Zabedy Cawn*'s Country, which is the moſt remote of the Rohilla dominions.

On the ſuppoſition of the truth of this news, and that the Nabob ſhould, on account of the advantages he had gained by the force of our arms, diſavow any agreement with *Niziſ Cawn*, I would gladly have your directions.

All that could poſſibly be effected before the rains, is already done, excepting marching to *Biſſouly*; which, notwithſtanding what the Nabob ſaid this morning, I am well aſſured is occupied by part of his troops. When he told me there was immenſe treaſure there, I ſuſpected he had diſguiſed his intentions; and my ſuſpicions have been greatly ſtrengthened ſince he was with me, by an information, that the treaſure which he pretends is at *Biſſouly*, is really in the palace and town of *Birelly*, every avenue of which is ſhut up by his troops, inſomuch that a ſingle inhabitant cannot get out of the place; and that his ſole view in requiring me to move, is no other than leſt it be known what riches he may find in the place, or the means he may uſe to obtain them.

This much I am under the neceſſity of declaring, that I am greatly afraid the Vizier's behaviour to the family of the Nabob *Hafez Ramet*, and to the inhabitants of his country, will render our connection with him reproachful to us, and tend to leſſen that reputation of our juſtice which had heretofore prevailed in theſe countries.

As I received my inſtructions from your Board, I have thought it proper to ſubmit theſe matters to your conſideration, that you may do me the honour of ſignifying your pleaſure concerning them.

I remain, with reſpect,

Camp near *Birelly*, 4th May 1774.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Upon the caſe ſtated by Colonel *Champion* in the above Letter, that *Amed Cawn* may have given up his country to the King, the Board are of opinion that we ought ſtill to ſupport the Vizier's pretenſions to that country, but in diſcuſſing this caſe, a doubt having ariſen concerning the propriety of oppoſing the King, ſhould he appear himſelf in perſon to aſſert his pretenſions to any part of the Rohilla country, within the preſcribed line of our plan, or of our preſent military operations,

The queſtion is now put, how in that caſe we ſhould act?

Reſolved by the majority of the Board, that we ſhould oppoſe him.

Meſſrs. *Lawrell* and *Graham* are of opinion we ſhould not oppoſe him.

The majority of the Board record the following reaſons for the above Reſolution:

1ſt. Becauſe it is well known that the King has no power of his own, but is entirely governed by thoſe who have poſſeſſion of his perſon or authority, being in effect the mere inſtrument to execute and ſanctify their deſigns. This reaſon induced the Board to authorize General Sir *Robert Barker* laſt year to act openly againſt the Marattas, although they profeſſed to execute only the commands of the King, and brought him with them into the field to authorize their tranſactions. He is now in the hands of *Mudged o Dowlah* and *Nedjiff Cawn*, the former of whom derives his influence from the poſſeſſion of the King's perſon, the latter from the command of his forces; but both are univerſally regarded as acting entirely from their own authority. The ſame reaſon therefore, that would compel this Government to oppoſe the King when he came againſt our ally the laſt year in perſon at the head of the Maratta army, equally ſubſiſts for oppoſing him now, ſhould he lend the ſame ſanction to *Nedjiff Cawn*, or any other ſtiling himſelf his ſervant.

2d. Becauſe, if it is juſt and lawful to oppoſe the Miniſters of the King in the execution of his orders, it is

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equally ſo to oppoſe the King himſelf in the execution of the ſame deſigns. This Government owes no allegiance to *Shaw Allum*.

3d. Becauſe, if it is to be eſtabliſhed as a rule, though the King in perſon may command our acquieſcence in ſuch acts as we ſhould oppoſe were he not preſent, it would prove an infallible means of inviting him to an interpoſition of his perſonal authority in every meaſure which we ſhould be engaged in, and to an actual invaſion of the poſſeſſions of our ally; nor could we, conſiſtently with that principle, diſpute even his pretenſions to the countries or places which are the incontrovertible property of the Company, if he choſe to employ the ſame arguments to enforce them.

4th. Becauſe the admiſſion of ſuch a principle, hitherto unknown and unpractiſed in any other part of the world, would at once annihilate the right which the Company have acquired by treaty to the ſum ſtipulated for the conqueſt of the Rohillá country; ſince the Vizier might juſtly refuſe to diſcharge it if our Commander in Chief ſhould refuſe to proceed in his operations, in caſe of the King's joining the enemy in perſon, no proviſion having been made for ſuch an event in our engagement with the Vizier, which on the part of the Company was expreſsly for the conqueſt of the Rohilla country.

Meſſrs. *Lawrell* and *Graham* beg leave to record their objections to this Reſolution as follows:

We are of opinion, that we ſhould not oppoſe the King ſhould he appear in the field in perſon to aſſert his pretenſions to any part of the Rohilla dominions, but leave it to the Vizier to ſatisfy his claim by negociation. To attack the King with our forces is to ſtep farther forth in the cauſe than we have reaſon to believe he would do in his own; for whatever opinion we may entertain of the inſufficiency of the King's title to the empire, or of the emptineſs of his character, the ſame ſacred veneration which is by all nations paid to Majeſty, is obſerved towards him by the ſubjects of *Hindoſtan:* the principles and tenets of their religion influence them in general to this attachment and allegiance; and the Vizier has in particular a powerful motive in policy for his perſonal attachment, for he can never attempt to depreciate the title or character of the King, which nothing can teſtify more ſtrongly than his appearing in arms againſt him, without virtually leſſening his own dignity and reputation as his Vizier; a circumſtance which we apprehend would neither ſuit with his private pride nor his public ambition. We are firmly of opinion therefore, that the Vizier would not himſelf draw his ſword in anger againſt the King, and we know of no ſuch indiſpenſable call upon us as to induce us to do it for him; beſides, we are yet ignorant what degree of attention or regard may have been paid by his Britannic Majeſty's Miniſters to the miſſion of Major *Morriſon*, and we think we ſhould be cautious of taking any ſteps at this critical juncture of the Company's affairs, which may be liable to draw down on them or ourſelves the diſpleaſure or cenſure of his Majeſty's Government.

James Lawrell.
J. Graham.

The Preſident remarks on this occaſion an irregularity in Colonel *Champion's* addreſſing his Letter to the Preſident and Council, when by his inſtructions he is directed to correſpond with the Select Committee; he obſerves, that by dividing his correſpondence between the two Boards, he muſt leave his informations to either very imperfect, beſides ſubjecting himſelf perhaps to receive inſtructions from each Board ſeparately, which may tend to deſtroy the general conſiſtency which ought to be preſerved in his conduct and operations. It is for this purpoſe chiefly that the Select Committee was inſtituted, and particularly charged with the political branch of adminiſtration, having it ſtill in their power to refer to the Board, in caſes of great nicety, or to which they judge their power does not extend. He therefore propoſes that the Commander in Chief be deſired for the future to addreſs his public Letters to the Select Committee, or to the Preſident, according to his original inſtructions.

The Board concur with the Preſident in his opinion and propoſal, and agree that Colonel *Champion* be directed accordingly; and in the intermediate time, until the Commander in Chief ſhall have it in his power to conform to this order;

Agreed, That any future Letters received from him on the operations of the war, addreſſed to the Board, be opened, conſidered, and anſwered, by the Select Committee.

The following reply is now ſent to the Commander in Chief:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, eſquire, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your Letter which you addreſſed us of the 4th inſtant.

Your objections to the new propoſal of the Vizier, for cantoning the troops at *Biſſouly* inſtead of *Birelly*, as it was firſt intended, appear to us ſo well founded, that we cannot but approve of your urging them to him in the manner you did; and although your remonſtrance had not the deſired effect, yet it would ſerve to fix the blame entirely on himſelf, ſhould any prejudice to his affairs ariſe from the meaſure.

As to the reſt, we approve of your compliance after ſo proper a remonſtrance, but forbear ſaying any more on this ſubject, as your later advices to the Preſident inform us of your having actually marched towards *Biſſouly*, in conſequence of the Vizier's requiſition.

In your inſtructions we reſtricted your authority to the military operations, leaving the direction in all other caſes to the choice of the Vizier; however, for the future we think it proper, confiding in your diſcretion, to inveſt you with the option of refuſing compliance with the Vizier's requiſitions, when they may endanger the troops, or leave them at his mercy.

In this light we advert to the objections which you have ſtated againſt the cantoning of the brigade at *Biſſouly*. If that place, or any other which he may preſcribe for that purpoſe, ſhall be liable to expoſe the army to ſickneſs or diſtreſs for want of proviſions, or to have their communication cut off from thoſe countries, from which they can be ſupplied with proviſions, we hereby authorize you, in ſuch caſe, to act on your own judgment, and either to return to the ſtation originally propoſed for cantoning at *Barelly*, or to any other equally eligible in point of health and communication; conſulting however, as far as you ſtill can do it under ſuch circumſtances, the inclination of the Vizier.

We have thus applied the general latitude here given to the particular caſes you have repreſented to us with reſpect to cantoning the troops; in all others we muſt recur to the original conditions agreed on with the Vizier, namely, that in all points but ſuch as immediately reſpect the operations in the field, he is ſolely empowered to preſcribe. Whenever you ſhall deem it neceſſary, on the grounds above deſcribed, to deviate from this rule, and to act by your own authority in contradiction to his, we expect that you be able to furniſh us ſuch reaſons as ſhall vindicate this Government in ſupporting your meaſures in oppoſition to the power which we have hitherto conſented to leave in the hands of the Vizier.

We were fully aware from the firſt, of the difficulties which might ariſe in the execution of the Vizier's project of ſubduing the Rohilla country, as well as from his temper as from circumſtances independent of him, and we flatter ourſelves we have it ſufficiently in our power to provide againſt them. In the caſe of an oppoſition

from the King, or *Nudjiff Cawn* acting for him, we have a clear line to purſue; as we have no knowledge of any treaty of partition between the King and the Vizier, we can take no cognizance of the breach of it. Our engagements with the latter are to aid him in the conqueſt of the Rohilla country; and if he is oppoſed by *Nudjiff Cawn*, or the King himſelf ſhould perſonally interfere, you are to pay no regard to either, but ſteadily and invariably proſecute the tenor of your original inſtructions againſt all opponents, of whatever power or character they may be.

We cannot entertain ſo bad an opinion of the Vizier as to ſuppoſe him capable of acting in avowed breach of a treaty; but if any plea of that kind ſhould be made for conteſting our right to occupy any part of the Rohilla country yet unconquered, it will be proper to put the queſtion to him, whether ſuch treaty does exiſt or not? If he ſhould acknowledge ſuch a treaty, you muſt undoubtedly abſtain from further hoſtilities in abetment of his breach of faith: but we repeat, that though in reply to a queſtion propoſed by you to us for your inſtruction, we have thus given you our opinion, yet we do not apprehend the poſſibility of ſuch a caſe occurring; and if the Vizier ſhould deny having engaged in ſuch a treaty, we can neither authorize you to examine the identity of it, nor do we ſee by what means you could inveſtigate the truth.

This will not be underſtood to preclude you from giving us any information which may come to your knowledge on every point of this nature.

Conſidering our right to the ſum ſtipulated for the preſent ſervice as now fully acquired, we have recommended to the Preſident to make immediate application to the Vizier, for the payment of the forty lacks; and he will inſtruct his Agent at that Court accordingly. As we do not mean to inſiſt on the Vizier's paying the money on demand, we wiſh to leave the time and conditions of payment to a negociation between him and the Agent; in which the latter will be directed to apply to you for your advice, and to conclude nothing without it. He will however be enjoined to demand peremptorily an acknowledgment of our right to the ſum in queſtion; and if the Vizier refuſes this, to adviſe us without loſs of time, that we may directly diſpatch ſuch inſtructions to you, as the exigency of the caſe may require.

In due attention to your authority, we think it proper to commiſſion you to make the firſt demand for payment of the ſtipulation, on which the Reſident, in virtue of his office, will treat, acting as above expreſſed by your advice and direction.

In two paragraphs of your Letter before us, you barely mention the Vizier's treatment of the family of *Haſez Rhamet*; but in the laſt place where you notice it, you draw an inference, that, "it will render our connection "with him (the Vizier) reproachful to us, and tend to "leſſen that reputation of our juſtice which had hereto"fore prevailed in theſe countries." Where ſo ſerious a concluſion was to be deduced, we cannot but lament, that being withheld from a knowledge of the promiſes on which it is grounded, ſhould diſqualify us for paſſing a judgment. It has been an invariable maxim in the policy of the Company's Governments, in the execution of any enterprizes which they have undertaken in behalf of their allies, to interpoſe their protection in favour of the conquered Princes, for the ſecurity of their lives and honour; and it will unqueſtionably be the care and attention of this Adminiſtration to adhere to this maxim, which has greatly contributed to the reputation of the Britiſh name, and to perform what may be incumbent on them on the preſent occaſion. We deſire, therefore, to be immediately adviſed of the particulars of the treatment which you allude to, that we may judge of the meaſures proper to be adopted. In the interim, we recommend to you to urge, in your own behalf, and in the name of the Board, ſuch remonſtrances to the Vizier, againſt any vigorous treatment of the Rohilla Chiefs and their families, as you may think the occaſion to require. From the readineſs which the Vizier teſtified in a former inſtance, to be influenced by your advice and perſuaſion, we flatter ourſelves we may expect the ſame good fruits from your interpoſition now. APPENDIX. No. 27.

We have replied in this inſtance to your Letter, as you addreſſed it to us; but we deſire you may direct your anſwer to the Select Committee; and in future continue your correſpondence with them only, as before, according to the tenor of your original inſtructions.

We are, with eſteem,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervants.

Fort William, the 23d May.

Read, the following Letter from the Commander in Chief, addreſſed to the Preſident and Council.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, and Council of *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

In an addreſs of the 4th inſtant, I intimated to you a ſurmiſe, that an agreement had been ſome time ago made between the King and the Vizier, for a partition of the Rohilla country; and it was ſaid *Nudjiff Cawn*, on the part of his Majeſty, was marching to poſſeſs himſelf of *Labitah Caun*'s country.

On the 5th, the latter part of this intelligence was contradicted; and I adviſed the Governor, that *Nudjiff Cawn* had determined on coming to this place; where he accordingly arrived two days before the Nabob and I did.

In ſeveral conferences with the Vizier, he aſſured me, that he did not know what buſineſs brought *Nudjiff Cawn*. On the other hand, *Nudjiff* told me, that when the Vizier was at *Cowriagunge*, he prevailed with him to go to *Delhi*, in order to influence his Majeſty to take the field, and countenance the conqueſt of the Rohillas, on the expreſs condition that half of the country ſhould go to his Majeſty. That he, *Nezif Cawn*, accordingly induced the King to leave *Delhi*, and diſplay the royal ſtandard; that his Majeſty having however been taken ill, was obliged to relinquiſh his intentions of continuing in the field in perſon, but commiſſioned *Nudjiff Khan* to repreſent him, and act in his name as if he were preſent; that accordingly *Nezif* with his army were in full march to join the Vizier when he received the news of the defeat of the Rohillas; that his buſineſs here was to demand the performance of the condition on which the King's troops took the field; that he had ſent for a copy of the agreement, and would not declare his buſineſs to the Vizier until it came.—It was the expectation of being able to ſend down a duplicate of that writing, that made me avoid mentioning this matter in any of my Letters ſince the 5th; but it has not been produced, *nor* have I had any conference with the Vizier on that head; and I am now to introduce another ſubject.

The Nabob *Fazulla Caun*, who, with ſome of his people, was in battle on the part of *Nezif*, and made his retreat good towards the mountains with all his treaſure, which, according to the moſt moderate accounts, is ſaid to amount to 75 lacks of rupees in ready money, has addreſſed me by Letter, offering to throw himſelf upon my protection; accompanied with a meſſage propoſing to pay the Nabob 20 lacks upon being reinſtated in his country, which yields from ſix to eight lacks per annum.

Determined to deal openly with the Vizier, to prevent the leaſt pretence for a breach of his agreement, I went yeſterday morning, and ſignified *Fazulla Khan*'s deſire to him.

His Excellency ſaid he would not give him back a ſpan of his country for a crore of rupees; that he had no objection to my protecting *Fuzulla Khan*'s perſon, but that the treaſure muſt be conſidered as the property of his Excellency independent of the Engliſh; that he would

conſider

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conſider of ſending a body of his own army, with ſome of the Company's forces, in purſuit of the fugitive and his riches. I offered him the grenadier corps for that ſervice, but he deſired leave to think of the matter till the afternoon.

Indiſpoſition having rendered it inconvenient for his Excellency to come abroad, I waited on him again in the evening, and was told, that he would think of the ſubject of the morning's converſation till this day.

Upon my reminding him that was my ſecond viſit in one day, and deſiring immediately to know his determination, he was put to the neceſſity of confeſſing that he had already entered into an agreement to detach part of his own troops under *Elich Khan* with *Nejiff Caun* and his army to ſeize the Nabob *Fazulla* and his treaſure; that as they were cavalry, and as the ſervice required the utmoſt expedition, our infantry could not keep up with them, and therefore it would be unneceſſary to ſend any.

Since the defeat of the Rohillas the Nabob has plundered the whole country, inſomuch, that in *Peely Beet*, *Birelly*, *Ouly*, and *Biſſouly*; he has found jewels and money above and under ground, elephants, camels, horſes, and other effects, to the value, I am confident, of above fifty lacks of rupees, beſides what the individuals of his army have poſſeſſed themſelves of; and if he can lay hold of *Fuzulla Khan*'s treaſure and effects, his acquiſition in ready money, &c. will exceed a crore of rupees.

Theſe are circumſtances which I believe were not foreſeen, Gentlemen, otherwiſe I perſuade myſelf you would have made further conditions with the Vizier, both on account of the Company and of your army.

The expreſs ſtipulation that your troops ſhould ſerve for a certain fixed ſum, has prevented my interfering, but I cannot help thinking it very unjuſtifiable in the Vizier to call in *Nejiff Khan*'s forces to the excluſion of your brave troops, who reduced the Rohillas to the ſtate of non-reſiſtance, and who therefore ought ſurely to have the preference in any ſervice of advantage; certain it is, that *Nejiff Khan* cannot have been brought into the meaſure but upon condition of ſharing conſiderably of the riches of *Fuzulla Khan*, and hopes of further plunder in the country.

It is a matter of very great concern to me, Gentlemen, that no proviſion was made for your army in the event which has happened; but I hope, that if you have not already in conſequence of my Letter to the Governor of the 28th ultimo, you will now be pleaſed to intereſt yourſelves on their behalf, for it muſt be extremely diſcouraging to your troops, if they are not attended to on this occaſion.

By their gallantry they have reduced this country, and of courſe gained to the Company half a million of money; they have moreover been the enrichers of *Sujah ul Dowlah* to an immenſe amount; before their faces he has ſeized theſe riches, and he has not even thanked them for their ſervices.

Theſe matters, Gentlemen, are in my opinion of the utmoſt importance, and deſerve your moſt ſerious conſideration; the good temper and forbearance of your army under ſuch temptation is matter of the greateſt admiration, and a ſource of much ſatisfaction to me; but I muſt confeſs, that I am afraid that if ſome mark of favour and gratification for their ſervices is not manifeſted, it may be dangerous ever to try an experiment of this kind again,, or to put the temper and patience of any part of your troops ſo much to the proof.

Situated as I am, it falls only to my province to ſubmit theſe matters to your wiſdom and deliberation, and I have only at preſent to add, that upon my honour ſelf-intereſt has not dictated a line of this addreſs, to which I have been prompted by a juſt ſenſe of the Vizier's conduct, and a warm regard for troops who have rendered themſelves very dear to me, and whoſe intereſt I ſhall ever ſeek to promote.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

A. Champion.

Camp *Biſſooly*, 16th May 1774.

The Committee conſidering the ſubject of this Letter as of the greateſt importance, and of the moſt alarming tendency, are unwilling to decide upon it by their own authority, eſpecially as their preſent number conſiſts of two Members only;

Agreed, therefore, That it be referred, with this day's Proceeding, to the Preſident and Council in their Secret Department.

Warren Haſtings.
P. M. Dacres.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 3d June 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *Philip M. Dacres*, *James Lawrell*, *John Graham*, *Nich*^{s} *Grueber*, eſquires.

The Conſultation of the 23d ultimo read and approved.

The Board being aſſembled to conſider the following reference from the Select Committee, an Extract of their Proceedings upon the occaſion is here recorded, with the Letter from Colonel *Champion* referred to.

The Select Committee refer a Letter from Colonel Champion.

Extract of the Select Committee's Proceedings, the 2d June 1774.

The Preſident lays before the Board the Letter written to him by Colonel *Champion*, dated the 28th April, and referred to in the Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Board, now referred to them; an extract of one from the Preſident in reply, dated 21ſt May; an extract of another Letter to Colonel *Champion*, dated the 28th May, written on the occaſion of a repreſentation made by the Vizier upon the ſame ſubject: and he deſires that theſe may be read before the Board enter on the conſideration of the Letter addreſſed to them by the Colonel, as they contain particular matters relative to the claim of prize money, with which it is neceſſary the Board ſhould be acquainted before they can form any general determination upon the ſubject: and as they expreſs in the fulleſt manner the ſenſe entertained of it by the Preſident, as already declared to the Colonel himſelf, he waves for the preſent any further argument upon the demand made by Colonel *Champion*, but hopes their judgment upon it will be deciſive, and their orders peremptory.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Governor of *Fort William*.

Laſt night I ſent you a plan of the battle fought by the combined armies againſt the Rohillas, and am now to inform you, that ſince our arrival here this morning a very unexpected circumſtance has happened.

Soon after our coming to this ground, which has only the river between it and the fort of *Peelybeet*, a report was circulated by ſome of the inhabitants, that there are near four crore of rupees in it. This came to the hearing of the troops, and to me, through Field Officers, with a repreſentation of the propriety of examining into the truth of the report, in duty both to the Company and to the army.

Though I was ſatisfied in my own mind that there could be no ſuch ſum in the place, and was extremely averſe to make any inquiries into the matter; yet, when I reflected, that if it ſhould afterwards prove true that there really was ſo much treaſure in the fort, which fell in conſequence of the victory obtained over the enemy by the force of our arms, I might be ſubject to the cenſure of Government for inattention to their intereſt, as well as to that of their army, I went to the Nabob, and ſignified to him what I had heard, telling him at the ſame time, that if there were lacks of crores in the fort, a rupee ſhould not be taken away by my people; that let the ſum be never ſo great, it ſhould all be delivered to him, under this only condition, of repealing whatever the Adminiſtration and he ſhould determine upon as juſt and equitable.

In conſequence of this converſation, it was agreed to ſend Lieutenant Colonel *Leſlie*, Major *Hannay*, and my Secretary,

Secretary, and three of the Nabob's principal Gentlemen, into the fort, to take an account of the treaſure which might be found. Having accordingly gone, they found *Hafiz Khamet*'s family in the greateſt miſery; his eldeſt ſon aſſured them there was no money in the fort, excepting a trifle in the Zinana. His ſtory having every appearance of truth, the Gentlemen commiſſioned gave belief to it, and as they very properly held the women's apartments ſacred, they did not make any attempt to ſearch there for treaſure, and returned, with the moſt earneſt entreaties of interceſſion for the unfortunate family of *Hafiz*.

In this matter you are not to entertain the moſt diſtant ſuſpicion, that any part of our troops were diſpoſed to wanton enormities. The utmoſt requeſt was, that by aſcertaining the treaſure, it might be put in the power of the Board, in caſe of any conſiderable ſum being found, to determine how much the ſervices of theſe forces entitled them to; ſo that you may reſt ſatisfied of the good temper of the army, which I aſſure you gives me the utmoſt heart-felt pleaſure.

I ſhould be glad, however, to know the ſentiments of the Board, how far they may think their troops entitled to any ſhare or conſideration of treaſure, &c. ſhould any thing conſiderable be found during the further progreſs of their conqueſts, either in the field or garriſon.

Camp, oppoſite *Peelybeet* Fort, 28th April 1774. I am, with reſpect, &c. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

Extract of a Letter from the honourable the Governor to Colonel *Champion*; dated May 21ſt, 1774.

"Hitherto every part of your conduct has met with "my moſt entire approbation; but there is one ſubject, "which in ſome meaſure alarms me; the very idea of "prize-money ſuggeſts to my remembrance the former "diſorders which aroſe in our army from this ſource, and "had almoſt proved fatal to it; of this circumſtance you "muſt be ſufficiently appriſed, and of the neceſſity of "diſcouraging every expectation of this kind among the "troops; it is to be avoided like poiſon. However, in "caſe any conſiderable capture ſhould attend your future "operations, I think you cannot purſue a better conduct "than that which you intended; to determine nothing "yourſelf, but acquaint the Board with the circumſtances, "and wait for their deciſion."

A true Extract.

(Signed) *James Browne*, Aid de Camp.

Extract of a Letter from the honourable the Governor to Colonel *Champion*; dated May 28th, 1774.

"I have received a Letter from the Vizier, complaining "of the claim you made to ſearch for treaſure in *Peelibeet*.

"I have already expreſſed my ſentiments upon the "ſubject of prize-money to the army; the only inſtance "wherein our troops in the preſent ſervice could have "any pretenſions to it, by the cuſtoms of war, would be "in the actual aſſault of a place by ſtorm; in every other "caſe, it is clear that the capture becomes the ſole pro-"perty of the Power carrying on the war. In the inſtance "of *Peelibeet*, which made no ſort of defence whatever, "but fell, with the whole Rohilla country, into the hands "of the Nabob, in conſequence of the victory, we had no "more right to ſearch or interfere at all in the riches it "contained, than we had to ranſack every defenceleſs "village or houſe in the open country for plunder.

"It is true, that our General obtained that victory, and "our troops bore the brunt of the action; but ſuch was "the tenure of our engagement with the Vizier; in con-"ſideration of which he ſtipulated to pay a certain ſum to "the Company, and to bear the whole expence of the "ſervice. His own argument is unanſwerable on this "ſubject. If we deprive him of the fruits of his conqueſt, "we infringe the agreement upon which the expedition "was ſet on foot; and he has a right, on his ſide, to refuſe "the payment ſtipulated to us, becauſe he depended on "the fruits of his conqueſt to enable him to make that "payment. I muſt here remark, that the particulars of "this tranſaction, as mentioned by the Vizier, bear a very "different appearance from your account of it; and that "where I approved of the conduct you intended to have "purſued, it reſpected only your intention of delivering "up whatever might be taken to the Vizier, and waiting "for the Board's determination.

"With reſpect to *Peelibeet*, however, and to every "capture in the preſent ſervice, except perhaps in the "caſe of plunder taken in an actual aſſault, the right is "clearly the Nabob's, and will admit of no diſputation. "This is my poſitive deciſion on the ſubject, which muſt "be regarded by you as an inſtruction for your conduct, "until you receive the ſentiments of the Select Com-"mittee, in caſe you ſhould judge it neceſſary to apply "to them on this ſubject."

A true Extract.

(Signed) *James Browne*, Aid de Camp.

The Preſident alſo ſubmits to the Board the tranſlation of a Letter from the Vizier to him, giving an account of the claim of the army to the treaſure ſuppoſed to have been in *Pellibeet*; which is read for the information of the Board, and returned to the Preſident.

Read, the 9th paragraph of the Company's orders in their General Letter of the 24th December 1765, which are as follow:

Extract of a General Letter from the Court of Directors, dated 24th December 1765.

Par. 9. To prevent this diſhonourable practice of ſtipulating for ſervices that are but the duty of a ſoldier's profeſſion, we poſitively forbid all future ſtipulations, by treaty or otherwiſe, with any of the Country Powers, for any donation or gratification for ſervices to be performed. Company's Orders.

Agreed, That a copy of theſe orders be tranſmitted, with the following Letter, to Colonel *Champion*. Reply to Col. Champion.

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

The Letter which you addreſſed us from *Biſſouly*, of the 16th ultimo, was duly received.

It gives us great concern to find a claim urged by the army, and ſupported by you with no inconſiderable degree of warmth, which we deem equally improper, and at this time ill-founded. We cannot admit of any right in the troops to a ſhare of the treaſures which the Vizier may acquire in the Rohilla country. He is the principal in the war, and to him every acquiſition of right belongs, treaſure and effects, as well as territory. We know, that by the uſage of war, the plunder that falls immediately under the ſoldier's hand, in the ſtorming of any city or camp, is left with them; but we believe, that in no Country or State there is a right acknowledged in the army to any further ſhare of the fruits of conqueſt. There are indeed inſtances where the Sovereign, in particular ſervices, grants a ſhare of the general plunder to the troops, and previouſly ſettles the mode of dividing it; but in this caſe the Vizier made no ſuch grant, nor did we ſtipulate for any ſuch from him.

We obſerve, Sir, that after enumerating the immenſe ſpoils which the Vizier is ſaid to have gathered, you teſtify your belief, that we did not foreſee theſe circumſtances, otherwiſe you are perſuaded we ſhould have made further conditions for the Company and the army in our treaty with him. To this we reply, that we certainly did not foreſee what we cannot even yet give credit to upon the ſtrength of reports, although we find they have been ſuf-

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ficient for procuring the implicit belief of the army. An inſtance, which we think almoſt demonſtrative of the exaggeration of theſe reports, is that reſpecting *Fiezulla Khan:* we cannot conceive that this Nabob, from a Country yielding only a yearly revenue of 6 to 8 lacks, which has beſides been the ſeat of war, or in the cloſe neighbourhood of it, for two years paſt, ſhould be able to amaſs a treaſure of 75 lacks in ready money.

But ſtill, were theſe acquiſitions to prove real, and were we to have foreſeen them, we do not know that we could have exacted better terms for the Company: at any rate, reflections of this kind are of no uſe. Arguments introduced in oppoſition to meaſures already decided, can only be conſidered as accuſations; and we doubt not in this inſtance to juſtify ourſelves fully to our Employers.

It is however certain, that in no event, either would we or could we have made any ſtipulation for the army. The bad effects of a ſimilar meaſure were but too plainly felt in a former period, and our honourable Maſters did not fail on that occaſion to reprobate with their cenſure in the moſt ſevere terms, a practice which they regarded as the ſource of infinite evils, and which, if eſtabliſhed, would in their judgment neceſſarily bring corruption and ruin on their army.

This being their opinion on the general practice, they doubtleſs muſt have ſtronger objections to a partial diſtribution among the troops immediately employed, which could not fail of exciting jealouſy in the others, and carry the appearance of injuſtice to them.

Further, Sir, for your more particular information on a ſubject, concerning which it appears you have ſo widely miſunderſtood both our motives and ſentiments, we think proper to communicate to you, as a Member of the Adminiſtration, an extract of the paragraph of the General Letter of 24th December 1765, in which you will find (what it would ſeem you did not ſuſpect) a poſitive prohibition from the Court of Directors againſt all ſuch ſtipulations for the future.

This plan, independent of argument, muſt appear concluſive on the point. You will therefore take the proper method to convey a poſitive and firm declaration to the troops, that they are not to expect any ſhare of the riches acquired by the Vizier in their conqueſt. Indeed, the conſequences which you ſignify to us are to be apprehended from our refuſing this gratification, are ſufficiently alarming; but at the ſame time, were there no other reaſon, the very appearance of ſo dangerous a ſpirit in the troops, would determine us to oppoſe it in the beginning; and we rely on your conduct and firmneſs, and that ſubordination and ſtrict diſcipline which experience has taught us it has been always your pride to maintain, for enforcing, with the ſupport of your ſecond in command, and the other Field Officers, theſe orders, and procuring a complete acquieſcence in them from all the officers and ſoldiers of the army. Indeed we are perſuaded that the general diſpoſition is to obedience, however a few unruly ſpirits or unthinking men may have expreſſed different ſentiments.

We are ſorry to find you imagine the Vizier does not entertain a proper ſenſe of the ſervice of the army in this campaign; although he may not have teſtified it directly to them, we can aſſure you that he has not been wanting in his Letters to the Preſident, in expreſſions of the warmeſt ſort, both as to their behaviour and the ſervices which they have rendered him. It is not in the manners of the Eaſtern Princes to ſignify directly to the troops their ſatisfaction in them; and very probably the rumours which prevailed of the treaſures which he had acquired, prevented the Vizier from expreſſing his ſenſe of it in private converſation, leſt he ſhould raiſe expectations which it was not in his power to gratify.

We conclude with recommending in the warmeſt manner, that you exert yourſelf in bringing the troops to a proper diſpoſition on the ſubject in queſtion; that you diſcourage in future thoſe occaſional reports of riches and treaſure found by the Vizier, which are generally founded on idle rumour, and the cupidity or ſelf-intereſt of individuals, and which can only tend to miſlead the ſoldier into hopes which can never be realized, and inſtil notions into him very incompatible with his duty and profeſſion.

Fort William, We are, with eſteem, &c.
3d June 1774.

The Board juſtify themſelves of the reflection of Colonel Champion.

The Board, in juſtification of their conduct, which ſeems to be reflected upon in the paragraph of Colonel *Champion*'s Letter, where he ſays, "that they muſt not have foreſeen all the advantages reſulting to the Vizier from the conqueſt of the Rohilla country, otherwiſe they would have made further conditions with him, both on account of the Company and of the army;"—think fit to obſerve, that they believe they had every real advantage in ſpeculation which could ariſe from it; but they neither had not, nor have they even at this time, any idea of thoſe immenſe pecuniary acquiſitions which in the imagination of the army *Suja Dowla* has obtained. The Board are convinced, from a conſideration of the geographical bounds of the Country, the ſmall amount of its revenue, and the circumſtance of its having been the ſeat of war for two years paſt, and of its having been plundered by the Marattas, that no treaſures could exiſt to ſuch extent as Colonel *Champion* repreſents to have been found by the Vizier, or as he is ſaid to be in purſuit of: they therefore could found no ſtipulations upon ſuch notions: at the ſame time, if the Vizier ſhould have drawn more advantage from the conqueſt than they foreſaw, the Board are happy in thinking it will better enable him to fulfil the engagement under which he is already bound, and give them good grounds for inſiſting on immediate payment.

Ordered that a copy of theſe Proceedings be ſent for the information of the Select Committee.

Read, the following Letter from the Commander in Chief:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, and Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Col. Champion deſires leave to come down.

His Excellency the Nabob Vizier having requeſted that your army may canton at this place till after the enſuing rainy ſeaſon, I have, in compliance with the ſpirit of your inſtructions, aſſented to his deſire, and have ordered cantonments to be erected with all poſſible expedition.

There is not a ſingle enemy in arms throughout all theſe Countries, ſo that the ſervice of the campaign is effectully over. After the rivers ſhall have ſwelled, the army will not be able to act in the field till the beginning of December; and as the ſituation of my affairs very preſſingly urges the neceſſity of my preſence at *Calcutta*, I am to requeſt you will favour me with your permiſſion to return to the Preſidency, and to commit the charge of the army to Colonel *Galliez* in my abſence.

Camp at *Biſſouly*, I have the honour to be, &c.
10th May 1774. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

Granted.

Agreed that Colonel *Champion* be permitted to return to the Preſidency. The following Letter of licence is therefore written to him:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

Reply to him.

In compliance with your requeſt of the 10th ultimo, you are permitted to return to the Preſidency whenever you think the circumſtances of the campaign, as well as your own convenience, can allow you.

Fort William, We are, with eſteem, &c.
3d June 1774.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, 15th June 1774.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, extract from the Conſultations in Secret Department of 3d June.

Read, the following Letters from the Commander in Chief, under date the 21ſt and 30th May.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Notwithſtanding what his Excellency the Vizier told me of an actual agreement having taken place between him and *Nizif Khan*, reſpecting the ſeizure of *Feizulla Khan* and his treaſure, as mentioned in my Letter to the Board of the 16th, I have diſcovered that none had been concluded: 1ſt, Becauſe *Nizif Khan* refuſed to undertake that ſervice without my approbation as Commander of the Engliſh army; and 2dly, Becauſe *Feizulla Khan* has got to ſuch a diſtance and into ſuch a ſituation as rendered it unadviſable ſo late in the ſeaſon to attempt any thing effectual againſt him, eſpecially as *Nizif Khan*'s affairs make it neceſſary for him to haſten to *Delhi*.

Alla ulat Khan, an old ſervant, and a creature raiſed by the bounty and patronage of *Nizif* to the office of Prime Miniſter, has inſinuated himſelf into the King's good graces, and turning traitor to his old maſter and benefactor, has been at great pains to impreſs his Majeſty with unfavourable opinions of *Nizif Khan*, inſomuch that the King ſeems to withdraw his confidence from him.

The chief cauſe of the King's diſſatisfaction at *Nizif Khan*, is, his refuſal to put *Agra* and the adjoining Country into his Majeſty's poſſeſſion; for which *Nizif* gives this reaſon, that his Majeſty had promiſed him a third of the conqueſts he ſhould make to defray the expences of his troops, and as a gratification for his own ſervices; that inſtead of adhering to this engagement, his Majeſty had given grants to his Court minions, and flatterers, of the Countries which *Nizif* had conquered by his bravery; that his troops had followed him from affection, and the reliance they had on his aſſurance of ſharing part of his acquiſitions amongſt them; and that his Majeſty, having paid no regard to his royal word, had alſo made him *(Nizif Khan)* too frequently fail in his, till at laſt, in juſtice to his troops and to himſelf, he was under the neceſſity of endeavouring to be his own paymaſter, by retaining poſſeſſion of *Agra* and the Country of the Jotts.

Since our arrival here, *Nizif Khan* received the news of a victory obtained by a body of his troops over the Rajah of *Jenagur*, by which a Country yielding a very large revenue has fallen into his hands.

I know not whether it is that the King is jealous of our intentions in ſupporting the Vizier, in bringing conqueſt ſo near the royal reſidence, or whether it is ſuſpicions of the ſeeming cordiality between *Sujah* and *Nizif*, that has laid hold of *Shah Allum*'s mind; but ſo it is, that *Nizif Khan* intercepted a Letter from his Majeſty, addreſſed for *Sumro*, inviting him to his ſervice; and there are certain accounts of his having actually arrived at *Delhi* with three battalions and 18 pieces of cannon.

The King, it is ſaid, has alſo ſent circular Letters to the Maratta Chiefs, the Seiks, and *Coſſim Ally*, to join his ſtandard, and enter *Hindoſtan*. Thoſe meaſures, if his Majeſty has really adopted them, do not proceed from any favourable diſpoſition towards us, or to our ally the Vizier.

In conſequence of theſe advices, I have addreſſed me to the King, aſſuring him of our faithful attachment to his Majeſty; and ſignifying to him, that his employing *Coſſim Ally Khan* and *Sumro*, whom he knows are extremely odious to his friends, the Engliſh, ſeem to indicate a leſs degree of his royal favour than we hoped his Majeſty entertained for the Company; and that I was confident his diſmiſſing theſe villainous vagabonds from the preſence, would be highly agreeable to the Engliſh, as well as profitable to his Majeſty, ſince they could not fail inſidiouſly to infect his mind with unwholeſome advice.

Nizif Khan apprehending ſome danger to himſelf from the cabals at Court, and being, I really believe, firmly and faithfully attached to the Engliſh, has privately given me his promiſe to uſe every means in his power to overturn theſe intrigues. APPENDIX. No. 27.

I will, ſaid he, for my own ſecurity, endeavour to lay hold of the ungrateful man that has prejudiced my royal maſter againſt me, who am and have been his moſt faithful ſervant, and in fact for ſome time paſt the only ſtaff of his ſupport. As a proof of my gratitude to and friendſhip for the Company, I will alſo uſe every endeavour to ſecure *Sumro*, and ſend him to you dead or alive.—With theſe aſſurances he has decamped from hence a little way this morning, on the route to *Delhi*; and as I have placed people about him, I expect to have regular and authentic advices of his proceedings.

The copy of the agreement between the King and the Vizier, for the diviſion of the Rohilla country, has not been ſent down, owing, I preſume, to his Majeſty's diſtruſt of *Nizif Khan*.

This faithful Chief has not, however, neglected the intereſt of his royal maſter, having managed matters ſo with the Vizier, as that *Zabidy Khan* accompanies him to *Delhi*, in order to be preſented to the King.

His Majeſty is already in poſſeſſion of a very large ſhare of this Chief's country, retaken from the Marattas; the Seiks have the reſt, excepting of about five lacks a year, which ſtill remain to *Zabidy Khan* himſelf. He is at preſent under the King's diſpleaſure; but I am informed it is intended to reſtore him to the royal grace, and confirm him in his dominions, on condition of ſwearing fidelity to the King, and paying a large annual tribute.

Nizif Khan has a numerous army on foot; and as he leads them to battle himſelf, they have confidence in him, which renders them very formidable to the Country Powers. The Marattas are his inveterate enemies, and will no doubt aim at cruſhing him. It is with you, Gentlemen, to conſider how far it may be proper to countenance and ſupport him. In my opinion, his power is very growing; and as I have not the leaſt doubt of the ſincerity of his gratitude and attachment to the Company, I think our connection with him might be improved to the advantage of Government. He is a very proper man to divert the Marattas from approaching too near our frontiers; and if he is ſuffered to remain in quietneſs a year more, he will be fully a match for them.

I have the honour to be,
Camp, *Biſſouly*, Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
21ſt May 1774. Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Since writing the above, I have ſeen the Nabob *Nizif Khan*, who ſhewed me a Letter, that inſtant received, in his Majeſty's own hand, deſiring his immediate attendance. He is at a loſs to conceive the cauſe of ſuch urgency; but ſuppoſes it may proceed from a diſcovery of ſome ſiniſter views of his ill-adviſers.—*Nazif* haſtens to his Majeſty.

A. C.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

I have derived much pleaſure from your favour of the 9th current, and in conſequence of your having communicated my Letter of the 24th ultimo to the Board, the army has been honoured with a compliment from them.

Since the 28th April, I have been frequently conſtrained to addreſs the Board, and you, Gentlemen, as well as the Governor, on ſubjects which I conſider of the higheſt importance. I am extremely deſirous of receiving full and explicit anſwers to my Letters, that I may clearly know how to conduct myſelf.

I am, with reſpect,
Camp, *Biſſouly*, Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
30th May 1774. Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Agreed,

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Agreed, That the following reply be made to him:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Presidency.

Sir,

We have duly received your Letters of the 14th, 21ſt, and 30th May.

To the queſtion repeated and explained in your Letter of the 14th, it is become almoſt unneceſſary at this time to reply, for the purpoſe of inſtructing you on the meaſures which you ſhould purſue in caſe of the event which you ſuppoſe, as the army muſt of courſe remain in its preſent quarters until the ſeaſon of the year ſhall favour its return within our own frontier. Nevertheleſs, to obviate even the poſſibility of ſuch an event happening at a period in which you may be in doubt, from the inſtructions before you, what conduct it may be proper for you to obſerve, we think it expedient to inform you, that it is our intention invariably to perſevere in the proſecution of the deſign on which we originally engaged in the preſent war, to the term of its accompliſhment; it being our wiſh, and conſiſtent with the intereſt of our Employers, that our engagements with the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah* may be continued ſucceſſively without alteration, to the perſons of his lawful ſucceſſors, as we hope their intereſt will ever prompt them to ſeek and to merit the alliance of the Britiſh nation. We therefore direct, that notwithſtanding any changes of circumſtances which may happen, you ſteadily perſevere in the line which we have already laid down for your conduct, until you receive our future orders, or thoſe of the Board to the contrary.

Although we do not think ourſelves qualified to judge of the differences which have ariſen between the two Miniſters of the King, we ſee no ill conſequences likely to befal our affairs from any attempts of *Niziſ Cawn* to leſſen the power or influence of his rival *Abdul Ahed Cawn*.

We are at a loſs to account for the concern which the Vizier ſeems to have taken in theſe quarrels, which may perhaps be better explained by the tenor of his engagements with *Niziff Cawn*, for the participation which you inform us he has made with that Chief, or with the King, of the territory of the Rohillas. We approve of the countenance which you have ſhewn to *Niziff Cawn*, but need not caution you againſt affording him any aid of our forces for the execution of his deſigns.

We are, Sir,

Fort William, the 15th June 1774. Your moſt obedient, humble Servants.

The Preſident alſo lays before the Committee, the following Letters from Colonel *Champion*, and the Reſident of the Vizier's Court, addreſſed to him.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident of the Council, and Governor of *Fort William*.

Sir,

Under date the 21ſt inſtant I acquainted the Select Committee, that the Vizier had not carried any plan for the ſeizure of *Fuzullah Khan* into execution.

Since that time I received general propoſitions from him, to throw himſelf upon the faith and protection of the Engliſh; when I communicated this information to the Nabob, he propoſed that I ſhould ſend off a detachment to lay hold of *Fuzullah Cawn*.

I reminded his Excellency of the tender made to him on the 15th, of the grenadier corps for this ſervice, and obſerved to him that I was ſorry he did reject it, becauſe it is now become too late in the ſeaſon to ſend troops to ſo great a diſtance, eſpecially as there are five rivers, and three of them pretty large, between this place and the poſt which *Fuzullah Khan* has taken up; that even ſuppoſing the troops ſhould come up with him there, it is more than probable the communication with the brigade would be cut off by the ſwelling of the rivers, before the detachment could perform the ſervice; that the preſervation of our troops was my firſt care, and that therefore I could not under theſe circumſtances think of detaching any part of the army into a country ſo totally unknown to us.

In conſequence of this converſation, his Excellency iſſued a Perwannah for *Fuzullah Khan*, with his family and attendants, &c. coming to my camp unmoleſted, and at the ſame time wrote a Letter, offering him the country lately conquered in the *Douab*, on the condition of his paying a Nizeranna of twenty lacks of rupees.

Theſe papers were diſpatched yeſterday morning, and about noon *Abdurryin Khan*, Khanſumma to *Fuzullah Khan*, came very unexpectedly to this place with a few attendants, and a Letter for you, one for me, and one to my Secretary, of which I ſend you a copy.

The Letters opened here deſcend to no particulars, but *Abdurryin Khan*, who was fully authorized on the part of his maſter, has made the following propoſitions:

1ſt. To pay the Company eighty lacks of rupees, if they will put him in poſſeſſion of all the Rohilla country, excluſive of *Zabadee Khan*'s; this ſum to be paid in three years, and *Fuzullah Khan*'s ſon to be given as an hoſtage, till the money is paid, or he will give a ſubſidy of 30 lacks per annum.

2d. If the firſt propoſition is not agreeable to the Engliſh, let them put the Vizier in their place, and engage for his faith; in that caſe *Fuzullah* will pay the eighty lacks to the Vizier in three years, and put his ſon into the hands of the Engliſh till the eighty lacks are paid to the Nabob.

3d. Or he will pay the Nabob ſix annas in the rupee, or, at his Excellency's option, thirty lacks annually, and give the Company twenty-five lacks, if they will influence the Nabob to put him in poſſeſſion of the country and guarantee the Treaty; the twenty-five lacks to be paid, ten lacks in hand, five in two months after the agreement, and the remaining ten in two months more; and in either of theſe caſes he will have fifteen thouſand men ready to join the Engliſh and Vizier on all occaſions.

Theſe propoſitions, excepting the offers made to the Company independant of the Nabob, have been mentioned to him, and he has rejected them all with the greateſt diſdain.

I am ſorry for it, becauſe I cannot help thinking his Excellency much out in his politics, for in my own mind it is perfectly clear that he will not be able to maintain poſſeſſion of this country.

Above a lack of people have deſerted their abodes in conſequence of the defeat of *Hafez*; they will ever ſeek for an opportunity of returning; ſixty or ſeventy thouſand of them, though few of them in arms, are with *Fuzulla Khan*, in a place ſurrounded by a jungle, and almoſt inacceſſible, as our own Intelligencers teſtify; there is not therefore the leaſt doubt of his remaining undiſturbed till the next campaign, nor will the Nabob even then venture to ſend his own army without ours.

It is ſaid the Seiks have offered to join *Fuzulla* with forty thouſand fighting men, to invade the Vizier's country after the rains; and if it ſhould ſo happen that our army is called away either to our own dominions, or for the protection of the Nabob from the Marattas, there cannot be the leaſt doubt that he will loſe this country without a blow.

It is very certain that the Vizier's own ſubjects were ripe for plunder and rapine in his own country, and that nothing but the ſeaſonable accounts of the defeat of *Hafez* prevented their being in arms. This being the caſe, it is unqueſtionable that unleſs the Vizier has at leaſt a brigade of our troops always with him he cannot poſſibly ſtand his ground.

It appears to me, that the Nabob relies too much upon a belief that he may keep the brigade as long as he pleaſes; and I am perſuaded his rejecting all the propoſals which have been made proceeds from a confidence that there is no chance of the troops being recalled.

Fuzulla

Fuzulla Khan ſends notice that he has for the preſent refuſed to have any connection with the Seiks, from a deſire of being reconciled to the Nabob, and ſtill a more earneſt wiſh of being under the wings of our protection.

I have laid his offers before you in the ſame plain language in which they have been delivered to me; and I ſhall be extremely glad if, upon due conſideration of them, any means can be deviſed by which the public good may be promoted. I wiſh for nothing ſo much, as that ſome meaſure may be adopted that will ſtrike all the Powers of the Eaſt with admiration of our juſtice in contraſt to the Vizier's conduct.

And I think, if ſo brave and daring a people as the Afghans and *Neziff Khan* were to be of the ſame intereſt with the Engliſh and the Vizier, the Marattas, and all the other Powers they could call to their aid, could not preſume to cope with them.

As to the *Doaub*, I am aſſured *Fuzulla Khan* will not accept of it; at all rates I ſhall avoid having any concern in the diſpoſal of it to him, for the reaſons laid down in the 5th paragraph of the Board's Inſtructions.

I remain, reſpectfully,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp, *Biſſouly*,
28th May 1774.

Aldurryin Khan has deſired leave to remain here till a reply to this addreſs ſhall arrive.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

Sir,

In conformity to your general commands I took the liberty a few days ago to remind the Vizier of the approach of the period which would bring his Excellency indebted to the Honourable Company a further ſum of 15 lacks of rupees, on account of the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad* by the laſt Treaty of *Benares* He ſuggeſted various expedients for accumulating a fund to enable him to anſwer this claim upon him, but none which appeared ſo plauſible or certain as a journey to *Fyzabad*; which, with your approbation, he is determined to undertake towards the cloſe of the rains, accompanied only by ſuch part of his troops as may be neceſſary to form his body guard, leaving the remainder under the conduct of his ſons, with the brigade in cantonments until his return.

This propoſal appearing to me by far the moſt eligible, and probably the only certain means he has of commanding to conſiderable a ſum independent of the neceſſary proviſion for the monthly diſburſement of his own and our troops, I did not heſitate to concur in ſentiments with his Excellency upon this meaſure, and even to encourage its adoption. The only objection to it which ſtruck me with any degree of force, was the poſſibility that his abſence might endanger the regularity of the monthly ſupplies to our brigade; and this I did not omit to intimate to his Excellency. Having however received from him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that an ample and certain fund, either out of the collections of this country or by impoſts from his own Soubah, ſhould be eſtabliſhed for that purpoſe previous to his departure, I ventured to add to my own acquieſcence the ſanction of your approbation. His Excellency in conſequence now addreſſes you on the ſubject, and is making ſome preparations for his journey; not however with an intention to determine finally upon it, or publicly to make known his deſign, until he is favoured with your reply.

The Nabob ſeeming to apprehend that his unexpected return to his capital may poſſibly give riſe to ſome doubts in the breaſt of the Commander in Chief as to the diſpoſition of the brigade during his abſence, urged the expediency of additional inſtructions to Colonel *Champion*, requiring him to continue the troops in cantonments at *Biſſouly* until his Excellency rejoins the army, which he means to do at leaſt as ſoon as the ſeaſon will admit of its again taking the field. In reply to this requiſition I could only recommend to the Nabob to ſignify his wiſhes to you, and that you would of courſe adopt ſuch meaſures as might ſeem neceſſary to obviate miſunderſtanding or ſubject of doubt during his abſence.

Beſides his Excellency's Letter on the above ſubject, I encloſe one from him relative to ſome important information, at leaſt ſo it is conſidered by him, which he has received from the Court of *Delbi*. On this I ſhall take the liberty to offer a few remarks in a future addreſs.

I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf,
with the utmoſt reſpect,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
Nath. Middleton.

Biſſoulee,
the 19th May 1774.

The Preſident further informs the Committee, that in reply to Mr. *Middleton's* Letter of the 19th May, and the Vizier's Letter which accompanied it, he expreſſed his entire acquieſcence in the propoſal of the Vizier, to return to *Fayzabad*, as he was certainly the maſter of his own actions in a point of this nature, which could no way interfere with his engagements to us; recommending only, in earneſt terms, the neceſſity of his ready return for the purpoſe of taking the field, without loſs of time, on the concluſion of the rains; and that agreeably to the deſire expreſſed by the Vizier, he has written alſo to Colonel *Champion*, to obviate any miſconſtruction of the Vizier's intentions in this meaſure.

The Committee having thoroughly conſidered the propoſitions ſtated in the Letter from the Commander in Chief to the Preſident, dated the 28th ult°. and unanimouſly agreeing in opinion, that they cannot be accepted conſiſtently with our engagements with the Vizier, or the general deſign on which the preſent expedition was undertaken, the Preſident replied to it accordingly in the following Letter, which was previouſly ſubmitted to the Committee for their approbation and concurrence.

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*.

Sir,

I am now to reply to your Letter, dated the 28th of May. The following are my ſentiments on the propoſitions which have been made to you by *Abduran Cawn*, on the part of *Fuzulla Cawn*.

The firſt is not to be liſtened to. It would be a direct violation of our Treaty with the Vizier.

The ſecond muſt depend ſolely upon the Vizier; and if it is not agreeable to him, we could neither compel nor inſiſt upon his acceding to it.

The third is exactly the ſame with the ſecond, with the difference only of offering money to the Company for influencing the Vizier; for which reaſon I would of the two prefer the ſecond to the third, becauſe ſuch an agreement muſt become public, and a conduct of this kind would breed perpetual diſtruſt in the Vizier, againſt every future advice which we ſhould give him.

Theſe are my particular objections to the ſeveral propoſitions. But I have one general objection to the whole of them, which is, that they are diametrically oppoſite to the principle on which the Rohilla expedition was on our part undertaken, which was not merely on account of the pecuniary acquiſition of 40 lacks of rupees to the Company; for although this might have been an acceſſary agreement, it was by no means the chief object of the undertaking. We engaged to aſſiſt the Vizier in reducing the Rohilla country under his dominions, that the boundary of his poſſeſſions might be completed by the *Ganges* forming a barrier to cover them from the attack and inſults to which they were expoſed, by his enemies either poſſeſſing or having acceſs to the Rohilla country. This our alliance with him, and the neceſſity of maintaining this alliance ſo long as he and his ſucceſſors ſhall deſerve our protection, rendered advantageous to the Company's intereſt; becauſe the ſecurity of his poſſeſſions from invaſions in that quarter,

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is in fact the security of ours. But if the Rohillas country is delivered to *Fazulla Khan*, the advantages proposed from this measure will be totally defeated. The same objections from the Vizier will take place against him, as against *Hafez Rhamet*; he will be actuated by the same principles of self-defence, and the same impressions of fear, to seek the protection of other Powers against the Vizier, and of course will create the same jealousies and suspicions in the mind of the Vizier; with the additional and strong incentive to a mutual animosity, of an enormous debt, which probably *Fazulla Khan* will find no other means to get clear of, but by engaging in hostilities against the Vizier.

I cannot subscribe to your opinion, of the Vizier's being unable to maintain possession of the conquered country. It is at least certain, that there is a much greater probability of his maintaining possession of it, supported by the resources of his hereditary dominions, and the credit of the English protection, even without our actual intervention, than that *Fazulla Khan* should maintain the possession of it; a man of no repute, without natural power or interest, and unprovided with every means of self-defence. The Board undertook the Rohilla expedition on a firm conviction both that the Vizier would be able to maintain his conquest of it, and that it would make his other dominions more defensible. For the reasons before assigned, and with respect to myself, I declare, that if I had not been morally certain of the justness of this reasoning, I would not have consented to enter upon the enterprize at all. Upon the whole, my opinion is, that instead of soliciting the Vizier to relinquish his conquest to *Fazulla Khan*, every argument should be used to dissuade him from such an intention; and it is my desire you will discourage it as much as is in your power. I make no doubt but, from the explanation I have given, you will be convinced, both of the propriety of adhering to the principles laid down, and the necessity of acting with consistency. Excuse me for adding, that if we suffer our attention to be drawn off from our grand and principal design, by every adventitious allurement that may present itself, our conduct must prove desultory; and we can adhere to no regular plan, nor propose any certain end to our pursuits.

You mention the necessity the Vizier will be under, of constantly having a brigade of our troops with him, as an argument against his retaining the Rohilla country, which you have repeated in several of your Letters. But I should be sorry to regard this circumstance in that light. It has always been my wish, it was a principal reason assigned by the Board to the Court of Directors for our joint undertaking with the Vizier, that a third part of our army should constantly be employed in his country, because it would keep them from losing discipline and vigour by inaction, would prove an encouragement to the officers and soldiers, would save the Company a considerable expence, and perpetuate the dependance of the Vizier upon our alliance. This circumstance therefore cannot operate as an objection, since it is a principal advantage proposed by the Administration to result from the measures they have adopted. If it could have had any weight against the extension of the Vizier's territory, it would have prevented the undertaking entirely, and precluded you from the present command, and the honour you have acquired in it. I cannot suppose, that you mean the reasoning which you have at present adopted on this subject, as a reproach to the Board for having formed a design which, by your argument, must defeat itself, even with all the success that could attend it; but it is astonishing that this consideration should have escaped you, since, by the frequent recitation of this argument, you have undoubtedly been casting the severest reflections on the measures of Government, which, right or wrong, we must now maintain, and which I still think founded on the soundest policy; and I trust the event will prove them so.

The Seiks are at present at too great a distance, and too much engaged in their own affairs, to give any material or lasting opposition to the Vizier; nor are the Marattas likely to get freed from their own internal divisions, or the effects of them, soon enough to renew their pretensions in the next season. But even, although the reason for expecting a junction of the Seiks and Marattas with *Fazulla Khan* were well founded, neither this alarm on the one hand, nor the temptation of the eighty lacks on the other, ought to have a moment's influence with us to deviate from the line prescribed for the undertaking.

With respect to *Fazul'a Cawn*, he appears not to merit our consideration. The petty sovereign of a country estimated at 6 or 8 lacks, ought not for a moment to prove an impediment to any of our measures, or to affect the consistency of our conduct. I own it was my original wish, that the King, or *Nidjiff Cawn* on his part, should have been included in the participation which has actually taken place of the Rohilla dominions, as it would quicken the issue of the war, obviate one source of competition, and still keep the connection of interest between us and the King, and between the King and his Vizier, might be induced to accede to a new participation, by an exchange of the *Duab*, to be given to the King in lieu of the territory of *Zabitah Cawn*. If my memory does not deceive me, this plan was recommended by me to the Vizier in person, when the Rohilla expedition was first concerted at *Benares*; and I own I wish it to take place. This, you will observe, is but a consequence of the original principle of completing the boundary of the Vizier's dominions.

This Letter has been communicated to the Members of the Select Committee; and I am authorized by them to declare their concurrence with the sentiments expressed in it.

I am, Sir, &c.

Warren Hastings.
Fort William, *Wm Aldersey.*
the 17th June 1774. *P. M. Dacres.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, the 20th June 1774.

Read, the following Letter from Colonel *Champion.*

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President, and Council, of *Fort William.*

Gentlemen,

I am favoured with your Letter of the 9th instant; and I have strewed the laurels before your troops with the same liberality and munificence you so justly bestowed them.

I deem myself much honoured in so ample a testimony of approbation; and,

Camp, *Bissouly,* I remain, with respect, &c.
30th May 1774. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

Bengal Secret Consultations, 1st July 1774.—Present, the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire. *William Aldersey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, esquires.

Read, the following Letters from Colonel *Champion*, under dates the 9th and 11th June; that of the 11th, enclosing translations of two Letters from the wife of *Hafiz Rhamet*, and a representation from *Mahebullah Khan* and *Futtulah Khan*, son to the late *Doondy Khan.*

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I am honoured with a Letter from the Board, under date the 23d past; and in reply thereto I am now to address myself to you.

With regard, Gentlemen, to the option of refusing compliance with the Vizier's requisitions, when they shall

ſhall be ſuch as may endanger the troops or leave them at his mercy, which ſeems to be the import of the Board's Letter, I cannot, with ſubmiſſion, regard this as any extenſion of power to me, becauſe it is an authority inherent in, and which I have always conſidered as ablolutely inſeparable from my command.

My Letter therefore of the 4th was not an application for authority to prevent the Vizier's expoſing the army to the riſk of deſtruction at his pleaſure, but that he might be diſempowered from even ſubjecting them to any the leaſt unneceſſary hardſhips or diſtreſs; and moreover, that I might be inveſted with full authority effectually to prevent his perpetrating any enormity under the ſhield of our force, that could in any degree redound to the diſcredit of our reputation.

Bereily would have unqueſtionably been a much more eligible ſituation for the troops than this place, and though I ſhould therefore have been extremely glad to have remained there, yet as we are in daily expectations of the rains breaking upon us, and as the cantonments are now ready, I think it unadviſable to move from hence without an indiſpenſable neceſſity, which I hope will be obviated by the precautions which have been taken.

With regard to the conqueſt of *Zabidy Khan*'s country, I am very glad that ſuch explicit inſtructions have been given; for I muſt confeſs that if the Treaty (which I have reaſon to believe does exiſt) had been preſented, I would probably, circumſtanced as I was, have ſtayed operations till I ſhould have received ſuch orders as the Board have now ſent; more eſpecially after information of the circumſtances mentioned in my Letter of the 21ſt paſt, to the Governor, of the King's having been in poſſeſſion of great part of that country a conſiderable time ago; and my reaſon for bringing that part of the Treaty with the Vizier for half the Rohilla country, under review, was, that I thought it not impoſſible that clauſe might be laid hold of rather than commence hoſtilities againſt his Majeſty, ſince the 40 lacks were already indiſputably due, one of the alternatives in which it was ſtipulated being duly fulfilled.

In compliance with the Board's deſire I am now to mention a very unpleaſing ſubject, the Vizier's treatment of the family of *Hafez Ramut*, &c.; the inhumanity and diſhonour with which *Mihebullah Khan* his brother, *Fittiullah Khan*, late proprietors of this city and country, and their families, have been uſed, is known over all theſe parts; a relation of them would ſwell this Letter to an immenſe ſize, and withal prove very diſagreeable reading. I ſend you tranſlation of two Letters and copy of the third, which, affecting as they are, will convey but a faint idea of the treatment theſe unhappy people have met with.

I could not help compaſſionating ſuch unparalleled miſery; and my requeſts to the Vizier to ſhew lenity were frequent, but as fruitleſs as were thoſe advices which I almoſt hourly gave him, regarding the deſtruction of the villages, with reſpect to which I am now conſtrained to declare, that though he always promiſed as fairly as I could wiſh, yet he did not obſerve one of them, nor ceaſe to overſpread the country with flames till three days after the fate of *Hafiz Rhamet* was decided; but, Gentlemen, "as in all points excepting ſuch as "immediately reſpect the operations in the field, he is "ſolely impowered to preſcribe," the reputation of the Britiſh name is in his hands, and the line which has been laid down for me is very clear.

The above families have been diſpatched to *Fyzabad*, that their mal-treatment might not be ſo generally known to us; I have however frequent accounts of them, and it will give me the moſt ſenſible pleaſure, that you ſtretch forth the hand of benevolence effectually to relieve them from ſo undeſcribable a miſery; and that you may the better deviſe the means of ſo doing, without ſubjecting them to greater misfortunes, I am to inform you, that every application of mine in their favour, though profeſſedly taken in good part by the Vizier, yet only ſerved to procure them more rigorous treatment. APPEND X. No. 27.

I ſhall, without loſs of time, make the demand for the 40 lacks, ſtipulated by his Excellency for the ſervices which your troops have performed, and commit the future management of that buſineſs to the Reſident, to whom I ſhall be always ready to lend my advice and ſupport.

Hitherto I have only been able, with *Middleton*'s aſſiſtance, to obtain two months ſubſidy for the troops, ſo that the Nabob is now near two months in arrears; but I am unwilling to countermarch the troops, leſt I might be taxed with too great precipitancy, eſpecially as he has faithfully promiſed to pay off the arrears.

I remain, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
Camp, 12th June 1774. humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Tranſlation of a Letter from a Wife of the late *Hafez Rhamet Khan* to Colonel *Champion*.

The Engliſh Gentlemen, renowned through *Hindoſtan* for juſtice, for equity, and compaſſionating the miſerable. *Hafez Rhamet Khan* for forty years governed this country, and the very beaſts of the foreſts trembled at his bravery. The will of God is reſiſtleſs: he is ſlain, and to his children not an atom remains, but they are caſt from their habitations, naked, expoſed to the winds, the heats, and the burning ſand, and periſhing for want of even rice and water. How ſhall I either write or ſpeak my condition? my ſighs dry my ink and ſcorch my paper. 'Tis evident, as the Sun, the Engliſh are brave, and merciful, and whoſoever they ſuccour, their children they preſerve, who forget their ſorrows by the kind treatment they receive; nor draw they the ſword in an unjuſt cauſe. Yeſterday I was miſtreſs of an hundred thouſand people—To-day I am in want even of a cup of water, and where I commanded I am a priſoner. Fortune is fickle, ſhe raiſes the humble and lowers the exalted; but I am innocent, and if any one is guilty, it is *Hafez*. But why ſhould the children be puniſhed for the errors of their father? I am taken like a beaſt in a ſnare, without reſting place by night or ſhade by day. From you, Sir, I hope juſtice and compaſſion, for I am as a bird confined in a cage; 'tis better to give up life by the dagger than famiſh thus by hunger and thirſt. You, I hope, Sir, will reflect on my ſtate, or my misfortunes will be doubled. I have nothing left. Pardon this paper.

R. E. Roberts,
P. Interpreter.

Tranſlation of a Repreſentation from *Mahubulah Khan* and *Futty Ullah Khan*, ſons of the late *Doonde Khan*, to Colonel *Champion*, Commander in Chief; received the 3d June 1774.

Your Petitioners, in conſequence of Letters from the Nawab Vizier, remained in this country; for he being Lord, regarding his promiſes we ſhould be benefitted, otherwiſe we ſhould have fled, as the other Chiefs did, and have preſerved our characters and honours; theſe he has taken away with our effects, and how he has diſhonoured us is known to all. Now with our wives and families we are confined and ſent away to *Fayzabad*; thoſe who have fled have carried their lives and reputations with them, while we who remained here on the Nawab's promiſes, have loſt both. Therefore we addreſs you, that you who fear God, will for his ſake releaſe our families and ſelves from the confinement, and place us in your own ſervice, and by the favour of God our whole lives ſhall be ſpent in your ſervitude; your name alſo will be renowned, and it will be a ſingular juſtice that you have ſet us free. The Nawab knows not of our writing; perhaps regarding our condition, what you think juſt for us, will from your favour be ordained.

(A true tranſlation) *R. E. Roberts.*

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The Preſident informs the Committee, that on the firſt mention made by Colonel *Champion*, of the cruelties exerciſed by the Vizier upon the family of *Hafez Rhamet*, he ſent Inſtructions to the Reſident, of which he begs leave to record the following copy, which he flatters himſelf the Committee will judge to have been the moſt likely to prove effectual for the relief of their diſtreſs, and the only means which on ſuch occaſion he could have taken to have influenced the Vizier to a more generous conduct.

Extract of a Letter from the Preſident to Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*; dated 27th May 1774.

Colonel *Champion* complains of the conduct of the Vizier, in ſuffering, and even in ordering his troops to ravage the country, and in his cruel treatment of the family of *Hafez Rhamet*. This is a ſubject on which I cannot write to the Vizier; it might widen the breach between him and the Commander in Chief, and poſſibly influence the Nabob to ſome private revenge on the unhappy remains of *Hafez Rhamet*'s family. I deſire therefore that you will take an immediate occaſion to remonſtrate to him againſt every act of cruelty or wanton violence: the country is his, and the people his ſubjects; they claim by that relation his tendereſt regard and unremitted protection.

The family of *Hafez* have never injured him, but have a claim to his protection, in default of that of which he has deprived them; tell him that the Engliſh manners are abhorrent of every ſpecies of inhumanity and oppreſſion, and enjoin the gentleſt treatment of a vanquiſhed enemy; require and entreat his obſervance of this principle towards the family of *Hafez*; tell him my Inſtructions to you generally, but urgently enforce the ſame maxim, and that there is no part of his conduct will operate ſo powerfully in winning the affections of the Engliſh, as inſtances of benevolence and feeling for others. If theſe arguments do not prevail, you may inform him directly that you have my orders to inſiſt on a proper treatment of the family of *Hafez Rhamet*, ſince in our alliance with him the reputation of our national character is involved in every act which ſubjects his own to reproach; that I ſhall publicly exculpate this Government from the imputation of aſſenting to ſuch a procedure, and ſhall reſerve it as an objection to any future engagements with him, when the preſent ſervice ſhall have been accompliſhed.

Agreed, we write him as follows:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your favour of the 9th and 11th ultimo, ſince we wrote you laſt.

With regard to *Meer Fette Ali Cawn*, ſaid to be ſon of the Nabob *Sadoc Ali Cawn*, we deſire that he may be ſuffered to remain in your camp until you may receive further orders concerning him, with an allowance of rupees 200 per month, which you are hereby authorized to pay him, and in the meantime, we recommend that you make the proper inquiries for aſcertaining his identity as being the ſon of *Sadoc Aly*.

We obſerve what you write on the ſubject of the Inſtructions, conveyed to you in a Letter from the Board of the 23d May; and in reply, we will venture to ſay, without ſtopping to examine what are the powers inherent in your command, that it was not ſo much the intention of the Board to alter or extend thoſe they formerly granted to you, as to intruſt you on the points concerning which, in your Letter of the 4th, you requeſted their ſpecial direction; which they have accordingly given in the moſt diſtinct and explicit manner, both in the particular caſes ſpecified by you, and by deſcribing the general circumſtances on which they were willing to allow you a latitude to deviate from the line laid down by your Inſtructions. Had they underſtood your Letter to contain an application for ſuch powers as you have explained in your laſt, they could not have heſitated an inſtant to deny their aſſent. So abſolute a controul over the actions of the Vizier, we conceive, does not reſide in the Adminiſtration itſelf, much leſs can it be delegated to the commander of the army. A full authority effectually to prevent his perpetrating any enormity under the ſhield of our force, would have been in fact to have rendered him ſubject to that force, and to the perſon who directed it, and we ſhould have become his maſters inſtead of his allies. The Commander in Chief, in ſuch a ſituation, would alſo become the arbiter of peace and war with the Vizier; ſince a caſe might occur where force alone could turn the latter aſide from ſome favourite project, of which the other diſapproved, and his power would leave him at liberty to employ it. At preſent we ſtand thus with the Vizier; we have engaged to ſupport and aſſiſt him in a ſpecific ſervice, and ſtipulated for a certain compenſation to the Company; when that ſervice ſhall be performed, the conquered country, its riches, and inhabitants, and all other acquiſitions, muſt be at his diſpoſal, nor have we a right by our agreement to interfere; if indeed it ſhould happen, that elevated by ſucceſs, and ſecure under our protection, he ſhould in the exerciſe of his authority commit ſuch enormities as we ſhould deem unworthy of the character of our ally, we would then not fail in that caſe to remonſtrate againſt them, and take ſuch other ſteps as ſhould appear beſt adapted for bringing him to a more juſt ſenſe of propriety in his conduct; but we ſhould not eſteem ourſelves either obliged or entitled to interfere with authority, or to put power into the hands of our Commander in Chief effectually to prevent any meaſure in the management of his own affairs, which he ſhould think fit to purſue.

After this plain expoſition of our ſentiments reſpecting your ſituation with the Vizier, together with the Inſtructions, both general and particular, which you already poſſeſs, we flatter ourſelves, that few circumſtances will occur hereafter wherein a more immediate reference to us will be wanting for the rule of your conduct. However, when ſuch happens, we ſhall be ready to afford whatever further explanation you may deem neceſſary.

The intemperate and tyrannical conduct of the Vizier after his conqueſts, as you have repreſented, cannot fail to prove highly diſſatisfactory to us; and although we do not regard ourſelves either as anſwerable for his actions, or obliged abſolutely to interfere for reſtraining them; yet we ſhould have been glad to have been furniſhed with ſuch materials as would enable us, upon good grounds, to expoſtulate with him on the injuſtice and impropriety of ſuch a conduct. It was in this view that we requeſted you to acquaint us with the inſtances of his cruelties; but we confeſs ourſelves exceedingly diſappointed in receiving, inſtead of a preciſe account of facts, only three Letters of looſe declamation, which, however pathetically written, contain not one ſingle inſtance of the Vizier's particular cruelty towards the family of *Hafez*, and indeed expreſs only ſuch ſentiments as we can eaſily conceive to exiſt in the breaſts of that unfortunate family, from reflecting on the ſad reverſe of their fortune alone, without ſuppoſing any peculiar hardſhip in their caſe, or uncommon act of oppreſſion in the Vizier; for this reaſon, we repeat our deſire to be furniſhed with a particular account of the treatment which the family of *Hafez Rhamet* has received, and we ſhall then take ſuch ſteps for their relief as the circumſtances ſhall require. In the meantime, we hope that the remonſtrances which the Preſident informs us he has directed the Reſident to make to the Vizier on this ſubject, will be ſufficient to render any more direct interpoſition needleſs.

We conclude with taking notice of an expreſſion in your Letter, which, in our judgment, conveys a reflection equally improper and unjuſt. It is that in which

you

you say "the reputation of the British name is in the "hands of the Vizier." If this were the case, we who put it into his hands, would undoubtedly stand responsible to our Country and Employers for the wanton prostitution of so precious a trust. But we do not agree that we have in any shape left the national honour at his disposal, or that the British name can be affected by any of his actions, independant of us. Our engagements with the Vizier are clearly defined, and such as we can justify on principles of sound policy and attention to the Company's interest. We afford him our assistance; our honour we commit into no hands but yours: where we trust it is perfectly safe; and that by your conduct in the field, and by maintaining order and discipline among the troops, the British name will acquire new lustre, and the campaign be the means of spreading more wide our national reputation, unconnected with that of the Vizier.

We further must observe on this head, that if the British honour is in the present case in any manner committed, it must be from the Treaty itself, and not from the subsequent operations in execution of it. It then would have been more candid, as it would certainly have been more likely to prove effectual, if you, who, as a Member of the Board, had full communication of the purport and extent of our engagement with the Vizier, had started that reflection before you undertook the conduct of a business so likely to bring disgrace on our name; a consequence which, we believe, never entered into the imagination of any Member of the Board at the time; nor can we now see any cause to apprehend it.

We are, Sir,
Yours, &c.
Warren Hastings.
W. Aldersey.
P. M. Dacres.

Fort William,
1st July 1774.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Consultations, 14th July 1774. — Present, the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President. *William Aldersey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, esquires.

Read, the following Letters from Colonel *Champion*, dated the 16th, 17th, 20th, and 24th June, with their several Enclosures.

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esq. President, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have the honour to enclose you translation of a Letter received from his Excellency the Vizier, in consequence of my application to him for the 40 lacks due to the Company for the conquest of this country by your troops.

I am, with respect,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient
humble servant,
A. Champion.

Camp,
16th June 1774.

Extract of a Letter from the Nawal Vizier to Colonel *Champion*, Commander in Chief.

In this business of the Rohillas, previous to the present time, I conferred with Mr. *Hastings*, and agreeably to what was agreed on between us, and what was written on the subject I will act. For payment of the aforesaid money promised, I am ready and prepared, and the said sum due is now in my charge, whenever the English troops shall completely and entirely have perfected my affairs, and I shall think proper to dismiss them; then when I dismiss them, the sum of forty lacks of rupees, agreeably to my former engagement, shall be paid.

R. E. Roberts,
Persian Interpreter.

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, President, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Herewith I transmit you copy of *Shah Allum*'s answer to the address preferred by me to his Majesty, as mentioned in my Letter to you of the 21st May: with it be pleased also to receive copy of the engagement entered into with his Majesty relative to the conquest of this country, which Treaty is said to be written on a leaf of the Koran, and likewise duplicate of a Letter from *Nizif Khan* to *Sumro*.

The Postscript to the Royal Letter is written by his Majesty himself.

I have to observe to you, that in my address to the King I made no mention of any transactions between him and the Vizier, directly or indirectly.

At present I construe *Nizif Khan*'s Letter as a snare for *Sumro*, from the extreme anxiety which runs through it; or perhaps it owes its origin altogether to the machinations of *Abdulaid Cawn*; for this very day I had some proof of *Nizif Khan*'s fidelity, in sending to camp one of the men who deserted from us.

I am, with respect,
Gentlemen,
Your most obedient
humble servant,
A. Champion.

Camp, *Bessouly*,
17th June 1774.

Extract of a Letter from the King to Colonel *Champion*.

As we imagined that the correspondence so long carried on by *Zoolfucca ul Dowlah* with *Sumro*, was by your approbation and consent; and it happening that our brother, dearer than life, the Vizier, was employed in bringing *Hafiz Ramet Cawn* to punishment, and that we have also given permission to our well-beloved *Zoolfucca Dowlah* to join him in this expedition, and the disturbances amongst the Sheiks was come to such a height that they ravaged the environs of the city, and had for seven or eight months placed Tannahs of their own in the Purgunnahs belonging to our Khalsa, and plundered and burnt *Shahuddura*, with a view to the expediency of the times, which rendered the punishment of the Seiks necessary, and also the separation of *Sumro* from *Noie Sing*, and that he might not join with the enemies of the empire, such as the Marattas, Seiks, and other rebels, we determined for the present to grant *Sumro* a pardon, and send him to punish the Seiks, and release *Kurnaul*, *Panneput*, and *Surhind*, which they had usurped: accordingly, three days after he was admitted to an audience, we ordered him on this expedition.

Do you, our faithful subject, in concert with Colonel *Galliez*, deliberate on the means of promoting our interest, and cause a brigade to be sent to the presence. Our brother, dearer than life, the Vizier, has not performed any part of the Treaty he entered into and sent to us written on a leaf of the Holy Khoran, although by the blessing of God he has been victorious, and acquired immense wealth and territories. Perhaps he has forgot his oath: do you remind him of it, and send to the presence from yourself the proportion stipulated to us. Be assured that you have a place in our remembrance.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Consultations, the 14th July 1774. — Present, the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President. *William Aldersey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, esquires.

Extract of Letter from the King to Colonel *Champion*.

We send you a copy of a sealed Treaty entered into by the Vizier, written on a leaf of the Holy Koran, and sent to the presence for your information. Notwithstanding which he has not delivered us any part of the

APPENDIX. No. 27.

wealth, country, artillery, elephants, &c. which by the bleſſing of God he has acquired.

Copy of a Treaty made by the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*, written on a Leaf of the Holy Koran.

God hath ſaid, " Keep your Treaties, and I will abide " by my promiſes."

Conſidering my ſubjection and obedience to his Majeſty *Shaw Allum* as a bleſſing and happineſs, I engage to God that I ſhall ever have at heart the zealous diſcharge of my duty to my gracious maſter in all his affairs, but more particularly in eſtabliſhing and ſupporting his empire, in defending his life, honour, and dignity, and in keeping the ſecrets of his Government. His Majeſty may reſide at *Shawjehanabad* or *Ackberabad*, it is entirely at his own option. I ſhall repreſent nothing contrary to his inclinations of ſuch new territories, as I may wreſt from the poſſeſſions of uſurpers, excluſive of the Jaghiers attached to the Vizier's, and thoſe held without any conditions. One half I ſhall deliver up to his Majeſty, and the other I ſhall take to defray the expence of my troops. I ſhall afford due aid and aſſiſtance to the officers employed by his Majeſty. The attached property and the Peſhcuſhes of the Rajah's, &c. ſhall be a part of the royal revenue.

The friends of his Majeſty ſhall be my friends, and his enemies my enemies. Thoſe who are in his Majeſty's ſervice I ſhall not entertain in mine; I ſhall tranſact no buſineſs contrary to his Majeſty's inclination; and on condition that *Abdulaid Cawn* ſhall prove ſteady in his loyalty to his Majeſty, and in his friendſhip and attachment towards myſelf, I ſhall certainly be the guardian of his honour, reputation, and life; ſuch faults as *Muged ul Dowlah* may have heretofore committed I forgive, and I ſhall not give ear to the inſinuations of inſidious men regarding him, without fully aſcertaining them. Calling to witneſs God and his Prophet, the five Holy Perſonages, the twelve Imaums, and the fourteen Maſſaums, with whom may the bleſſing of God reſt.

I have written theſe articles on a leaf of the Holy Koran, and will not hereafter deviate or depart from what I have written.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Candour towards the Vizier having induced me to ſhew him the copy of his engagement ſent down by his Majeſty, his Excellency ſhewed me this morning the original counterpart, of which I encloſe you a tranſlation.

The Vizier ſays, that by not coming in perſon, the King has forfeited any benefits which he could claim under theſe engagements; and that he received fifty thouſand rupees in part for travelling expences. The writings are now before you, and will ſpeak for themſelves; and as that ſent down by his Majeſty ſeems acknowledged by the Vizier, I beg leave to refer you to the 7th paragraph of the Board's Letter to me of the 23d May, and to deſire you will honour me with explicit Inſtructions reſpecting the import thereof; that is, whether or how far, that Treaty is to be at all regarded by you.

I ſend you a Perſian duplicate of the Nabob's Letter concerning the 40 lacks; and am, with reſpect,

Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,

Camp, 20th June 1774. Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,

A. Champion.

Tranſlation of an Agreement under the Seal of *Shah Alum*, written on the back of a Leaf of the Koran, delivered by the Nawal Vizier to Colonel *Champion*, Commander in Chief, 20th June 1774.

In the name of God, merciful and compaſſionate.

Whoever is friend of the Nawal Vizier is my friend; his enemy alſo is mine. From the Viziares the bathing-houſe, that is, the ſuperintendary of the private audience chamber and train of artillery as heretofore; while the empire endures, will I never diſmiſs him of whatever new dominions may come into his poſſeſſion, the fixed appendages of the Vizire's excepted. I will confer one half on him for the maintenance of his forces. His dependants and ſervants I will not entertain; but will regard and defend his life, his character, and his honour. I have given the province of *Oude* as an eſtate to him and his children; and half of what new countries may be conquered I will beſtow. And to no perſons whatever will I give eſtates in this half of the conquered countries, or in the province aforeſaid. God and his Prophet, the five Holy Perſons, the twelve Prieſts, and the fourteen Children, are called to witneſs for the ſatisfaction of the Vizier. I have given this writing on a leaf of the ſacred Koran, that henceforward I may not depart from it. Written on the 19th of Mohurrum, in the year of the Higera 1177, the 15th year of our reign.

R. E. Roberts,
Perſian Tranſlator.

Copy of a Letter from the Vizier to the Colonel.

I have received your Letter, and am acquainted with what you write concerning the 40 lacks of rupees, on account of the conqueſt of the Rohillas. My friend, this matter was ſettled between Mr. *Haſtings* and me in a former conference; and I am ready to pay the aforementioned ſum in the manner ſpecified in the Treaty between us. God willing, when the Engliſh troops have concluded my buſineſs, and I think proper to diſmiſs them, I will at the time of diſmiſſing them give them the ſum of forty lacks, according to my agreement.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following extract from Mr. *Middleton*, in reply to the Inſtructions ſent by him to that Gentleman, and recorded in the laſt Proceeding.

Extracts from Mr. *Nath*l *Middleton*'s Letter to the Preſident; dated *Biſſouly*, 17th June 1774.

Although I cannot by any means acquit the Nabob of the charge which the Commander in Chief alledges againſt him, on the ſcore of his treatment of *Hafez Rhamet*'s family, and his wanton ravages of the country, I can almoſt venture to affirm, that his conduct in theſe particulars would appear on a ſcrutiny to have been leſs culpable than Colonel *Champion* has been taught to believe. To you, honourable Sir, who are not unacquainted with the pride and haughtineſs of the Nabob's demeanor, it will not appear extraordinary that he ſhould have more enemies than moſt other men; even his own ſervants are very frequently the firſt to aſperſe his character, and to accuſe him of actions which, with all his vices and imperfections, he is incapable of committing. The univerſal prejudice and diſſatisfaction which his denying the army a gratuity they had built with certainty upon, has raiſed againſt him in our camp, has laid open another ſource of unjuſt calumny. Hence, Sir, I am induced to hope, that Colonel *Champion*, relying too implicitly upon the aſſertions of every one who has thought it neceſſary to add to the popular prejudice, may have viewed his Excellency's conduct through a partial medium. Although I might mention many circumſtances, to prove that my aſſertions are not merely ideal, but drawn from real facts, I think it unneceſſary to take up your time with more than one. Soon after our arrival at *Beſſouly*, a report was propagated, and obtained almoſt univerſal credit, that the Vizier had, in breach of the ſacred laws of the Haram, forcibly entered the Zenanna of *Mahubella Cawn*, and wantonly violated the chaſtity of his daughter; and, to make the crime appear ſtill in a more heinous light, it was confidently aſſerted that the unhappy victim, unwilling to ſurvive the diſgrace, had ſacrificed her life to teſtify her own innocence, and redeem

the honour of her family. The ſtory carrying with it the colour of probability, and artfully related, with ſuch aggravating circumſtances as could not fail to excite pity in every humane breaſt, a general clamour was ſoon raiſed againſt the Nabob; and as people who were indifferent to the effects of his diſpleaſure did not ſcruple to reproach him with the infamous action to his own dependants, the report was not long in reaching his ears. The uneaſineſs he manifeſted on the occaſion, and the anxious deſire he ſhewed to acquit himſelf of ſo diſhonourable a charge, by his unremitted endeavours to diſcover the author, would have furniſhed ſtrong preſumptive proof of his innocence; but when it was notorious that his Excellency at that time had never been in *Mohibilla Cawn*'s houſe, that his effects were left untouched, and that the daughter who was ſuppoſed to have fallen a ſacrifice to his pleaſures, was yet in being, I could be at no loſs what degree of credit to beſtow upon the information. The other proofs, if required, might have been drawn from the peculiar circumſtances which at that time marked the Nabob's ſituation.

The ſeverity with which the Nabob latterly treated *Doondey Cawn*'s family, may be accounted for, and in my humble opinion in ſome meaſure juſtified. He always conſidered them as priſoners; but until an appearance of treachery and deceit on their part had given him cauſe of diſpleaſure, he did not betray any reſentment: on the contrary, although guards were placed upon their houſes, to prevent any things from being carried away, every liberty of acceſs and egreſs was allowed them, although denied to the family of *Hafez Rhamet*; and I am perſuaded they would have retained poſſeſſion, at leaſt of all their preſent effects, had they not abuſed the confidence he had repoſed in them, and attempted to ſecrete their property. This procedure effectually cloſed every avenue to an accommodation with *Mohibulla Cawn*; and thoſe who are acquainted with the impetuoſity and violence of the Nabob's temper, ſeem leſs ſurpriſed that his Excellency ſhould deprive this family of every thing they poſſeſſed, than that *Mohibulla Cawn*'s infidelity ſhould not have coſt him his head.

The family of *Hafez* have not merited ſuch treatment; though I think it probable they may have ſuffered for the miſconduct of others. They certainly have been improperly neglected, and have ſuffered much diſtreſs and inconveniencies for want of proper accommodations in camp; but my own knowledge does not furniſh me with any inſtances of cruelty or violence wantonly exerciſed upon them.

I have the ſatisfaction to find, that I have in general anticipated your Inſtructions on theſe ſubjects in favour of *Hafez Rahmet*'s family. I moſt earneſtly ſolicited the Nabob, at the time I acquainted you with the ſon's having delivered himſelf up; and he aſſured me a Jaghier, which would afford a handſome proviſion for their maintenance, ſhould be allotted them; but as he thought it probable, that the ſuffering Rohillas of former rank and conſequence, to whom the natural inhabitants might be attached, to remain in the country, might prove a bar to the eſtabliſhment of his own authority, and lay the foundation of future troubles, ſuch perſons as had any claim to his conſideration ſhould be provided for in his own three provinces, or in his newly-acquired poſſeſſions in the *Dooaub*, when he could be a ſpy and check upon their actions.

The family of *Hafez Rahmet* and *Doondy Cawn*, together with a numerous train of dependents, were removed a few days ago, under the eſcort of Nabob *Salar Jung*, to *Fayzabad*, there to remain until his Excellency's arrival. From what I have been able to learn, I have reaſon to believe that proper injunctions were laid upon *Salar Jung*, reſpecting the treatment of theſe unhappy people; and as I ſhall be with the Vizier when he determines their reſpective deſtinies, reſt aſſured, honourable Sir, I will not be inattentive to your commands.

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On reference to the original Letter to the Vizier, containing the conditions which he agreed to, and required for the ſervice of the brigade on the Rohilla expedition, copy of which is entered on our proceedings the 3d February, we find theſe conditions expreſſed literally in the following manner: "After the concluſion of this war, "whenſoever the country of the Rohillas ſhall come "wholly and entirely into my poſſeſſion, or I ſhall be "poſſeſſed of half of the country of the Rohillas, or I "ſhall negociate and make a peace and friendſhip with "the Rohillas, and given the Engliſh brigade their diſ-"miſſion, at that time I will give the ſum of 40 lacks "in ready money. But I am the maſter in theſe affairs, "and the power of retaining or diſmiſſing the Engliſh "army is mine; whenever I pleaſe I will diſmiſs it, and "until I ſhall diſmiſs the Engliſh army, it ſhall remain "preſent with me, and without my diſmiſſion the Engliſh "army never, never ſhall go." By the letter and tenor of the above extract, the Committee conceive the Company are fully entitled to the payment of the 40 lacks, the firſt condition of the agreement being inconteſtably accompliſhed, every part of the country being either actually poſſeſſed by the Vizier, or acknowledging his authority; *Fizulla Cawn*, the only enemy remaining, having deſerted the country and fled for ſhelter to the hills. It is true, the draft which was ſent to the Vizier is not ſo explicit as the terms which are above quoted from his own Letter, but it was meant to imply the ſame agreement, according to the ideas and expectations which we at that time entertained of the probable iſſue of the war; and that the Vizier ſo underſtood it, is plain from the manner in which he has altered the draft to the form in which this ſubject now appears in his own Letter, which is the only authority to which either party can appeal.

On theſe grounds, the Committee reſolve that the demand of the payment of the ſtipulated ſum of 40 lacks of rupees be repeated, with a poſitive declaration of our immediate right to it, and the Preſident is deſired to expreſs this reſolution to his Excellency.

Agreed, we reply to Colonel *Champion*'s Letter above recited, as follows:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your Letters dated the 16th, 17th, 20th, and 24th of June, with the ſeveral Encloſures mentioned in them.

The Nabob has not properly ſtated the condition of the payment of the forty lacks; the Preſident has written to him and given freſh Inſtructions to Mr. *Middleton* to explain the nature of his agreement, and to inſiſt on the right of payment; this we hope will prove effectual. We deſire you will alſo urge it if neceſſary.

With reſpect to the Treaties mutually interchanged between the King and the Vizier, as the latter inſiſts on ſecret conditions which invalidate the King's apparent right; as the Treaties were formed without the knowledge or participation of this Government, which could have no right or plea to interfere, but that of being guarantee to them; and as our interpoſition would be productive of much inconvenience and embarraſſment, without the poſſibility of deriving either credit or advantage from it; we again recur to the anſwer which you received from the Board on this very ſubject, in their Letter of the 3d of May, declaring, we will have no concern in theſe engagements, the execution of which we leave entirely to the parties themſelves. It is our intention to perſevere in purſuit of the object which originally engaged us in the preſent enterprize, and to adhere ſtrictly to our engagements with the Vizier, without

ſuffering

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ſuffering our attention to be diverted by foreign incidents or occurrences.

We are, Sir, &c.

Fort William, the 14th July 1774.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 18th Auguſt 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident. *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

Read, the three following Letters from Colonel *Champion*, dated the 3d, 19th, and 24th July.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I have received a Letter from the honourable the Council, dated the 3d ultimo, in anſwer to one of mine of the 16th May; and as that Letter was ſent off before I received their favour of the 23d of the ſame month, directing me to correſpond thereafter only with the Select Committee or the Preſident, I addreſſed myſelf to you, Gentlemen, in reply.

I have to teſtify real concern that any part of my Letter appeared to carry too great a degree of warmth; and it gives me ſtill more pain, that it ſhould be conſtrued to convey a reflection, and even to impart an impeachment of Adminiſtration.

When Gentlemen practiſed in thinking are aſſembled to deliberate, the order, the unreſerve of one or more, if ſuch there ſhould happen to be amongſt them, will be tempered by the equanimity, the circumſpection, and political knowledge and experience of their colleagues.

An individual cannot have theſe advantages; therefore I muſt think for myſelf, muſt write for myſelf; this I can ſay, however, that if there has been warmth it has not been of argument; excuſe me then, Gentlemen, to the Board, if I, who am myſelf a ſoldier, in endeavouring to expreſs my ideas of the merits and eminent ſervices of my followers, have not been able to diveſt my language of the glow natural to the perception of the mind on ſuch occaſions.

I have repeatedly peruſed and conſidered my Letter of the 16th, without being able to obſerve the trace of an accuſation, even in implication; I do in all ſincerity declare, that I had not a thought of the kind; and when it is conſidered that I have not been engaged in any altercation, I think it is, with great ſubmiſſion, impoſſible to receive the paragraph alluded to in the manner it has been conſtrued.

With regard to *Faizulla Khan*'s treaſure, and the riches acquired by the Vizier in this country; though the information which I have been able to obtain, has carried conviction to my own mind, I do not pretend to preſcribe a meaſure for the belief of others; but allowing, Gentlemen, that I had been as credulous as is inſinuated, I muſt be pardoned to ſay, and I ſay it feelingly, that I think the diſbelief of an information, conveyed by the Commander in Chief, might have been expreſſed in terms more delicate.

As to the extract of the General Letter of the 4th December 1765, referred to in the Board's addreſs, if I might do it without offence, which is in no caſe my intention to give, I would ſignify my wiſh that I had received earlier communication of a circumſtance which ſo very nearly and ſo materially related to the department I have the honour to direct.

But, Gentlemen, this order of our Honourable Maſters only regards ſtipulations for ſervices to be performed; and the diſturbance which produced the order would never have happened, but for a breach of very ſolemn and repeated promiſes; at all rates our honourable Employers prohibiting ſuch ſtipulations only amounts to this, that inſtead of a certain fixed ſum, the uſual rights of war, whatever theſe are, remain to their army.

Do not let me be miſunderſtood, Gentlemen, with regard to conſequences alluded to in the concluſion of my Letter of the 16th; let it not be imagined that I have ſo bad an opinion of the diſcipline of your troops, as to ſuppoſe they would deliberately commit unpardonable enormity; the conſequences to which I referred, and which I ſhould ever wiſh to avoid, are the irregularities and dangers that might enſue from the diſperſion of the troops in ſearch of that plunder to which the Board themſelves agree the ſoldier has a right. Believe me, Gentlemen, that if the Rohillas had only made a feigned retreat, and had returned to the charge, the Nabob's troops, when they got into the enemy's camp on the 23d April, his Excellency would have had but a bad account of the flower of his army, which could only have been ſaved from total deſtruction by the aſſiſtance of our troops, who kept due order; but if they were alſo to diſperſe, they would in ſuch caſe be in the ſame predicament.

Whatever may be the practice of Eaſtern Princes in general, I am to inform you, that his Excellency's troops not only received his public thanks after the victory; but that his battalions have been handſomely rewarded by an increaſe of three rupees a month to each ſepoy.

In due obſervance to the Board's injunctions, I aſſembled the Second in command, and all the other Field Officers yeſterday morning, and communicated to them the orders of Adminiſtration regarding the claim of this diviſion of the army to a ſhare of the riches acquired by the Vizier, in conſequence of the battle of *St. George*. The Gentlemen unanimouſly requeſted of me to aſſure Government, that they will ever prove obedient ſoldiers; and of courſe, continue to impreſs the officers and ſoldiers under their command, with a due ſenſe of good order and ſubordination; but they alſo deſired it might be reſpectfully intimated, that they hope to be excuſed if they cannot acquieſce in the opinion which has been delivered regarding the rights and cuſtoms of war.

I remain, with due reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Camp *Biſſouly*, 3d July 1774

I ſhould have been unintentionally guilty of injuſtice to the officers and ſoldiers of the army, if it had eſcaped me to teſtify here, that I have not diſcovered any indication of turbulence or avidity amongſt them.

A. C.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In a converſation which I had with the Vizier two days ago, in conſequence of a meſſage received through Mr. *Middleton*, he expreſſed wiſhes that I would march the army towards *Feizullah Khan*, ſaying, that it had been hinted to him to effectually ſettle this country as ſoon as he poſſible can; that in caſe another enemy ſhould appear after the rains (and perhaps, obſerved he, both the Marattas and *Timeer Shaw* may) he might be able to withdraw his troops from this country, without any riſk of its being attacked.

I replied, that the country being all under water, and my troops without camp equipage, I wiſhed to remain in cantonments at leaſt till the taking off of the rains, as any movement, eſpecially towards the mountains, muſt at this ſeaſon be attended with the loſs of a conſiderable number of men, without any apparent advantage, ſince *Feizullah Khan* has only to retire a little further into the hills to baffle all our attempts. I adviſed his Excellency to ſatisfy himſelf at preſent with covering his conqueſts

ſomewhat

ſomewhat better, by advancing more troops to *Moraadabad*, informing him at the ſame time, I would order two battalions of Sepoys to be in readineſs to march at his pleaſure, and that if the enemy threatened any general movement towards us, which I did not at all think probable, I would lead the army to oppoſe them. His Excellency ſeemed perfectly ſatisfied with this advice; but I find that he has ſince given orders to put almoſt his whole army in motion; and I am apprehenſive therefore, dangerous as it may be to the health of your troops, I ſhall alſo be under the neceſſity of moving; for however much I diſapprove of this meaſure, yet the Vizier muſt, in caſe of emergency, be ſupported, leſt the enemy ſhould lay hold of the advantages that might be derived from our leaving him too much to himſelf.

I am making every preparation, and taking every precaution in my power, to prevent ill conſequences from our taking the field at this unfavourable ſeaſon; but I own, that if we do march, it will for many reaſons be with the greateſt reluctance on my part.

I am really in an embarraſſed ſituation. The Vizier adopts meaſures without conſulting me; and however undigeſted his plans, I am under the neceſſity of ſubſcribing to them; that is, I muſt act in conſequence of them; and I will do ſo, Gentlemen, according to the beſt in my diſcernment and underſtanding, truſting to your lenity for approbation, and deſiring, that only you may judge from motives, not from effects.

The news-papers inform us, that the King has ſent dreſſes to *Coſſim Ally* and *Ghazyudeen Khan*, and invited them to the preſence. This ſeems to alarm the Vizier. I confeſs that I moſt heartily wiſh ſome means were uſed to conciliate his Majeſty both to us and to the Vizier; and I am anxious to receive an anſwer to the Letters which I had the honour of addreſſing to you on the 17th and 20th paſt, that I may clearly know whether any regard is to be paid to his Majeſty's claim to the half of this country.

I am, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Cant[t] at *Biſſouly*,
19th July 1774.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I had the honour of addreſſing under date the 19th, and am now to adviſe you of the march of the greateſt part of the Vizier's army. All his infantry left this on the 22d and 23d, and his cavalry are preparing to follow without delay.

In this buſineſs the Nabob did not conſult me from the 17th (when he ſeemed to have laid aſide all thoughts of the kind) till yeſterday, when he ſent me a Letter, importing, that it is neceſſary to puniſh *Feizullah Khan* ere the rains are over, leſt other enemies ſhould then appear; that it had been recommended "to him to finiſh "whatever is to be done with the utmoſt expedition;" and therefore requeſting me to march with the brigade; adding, that as he cannot accompany me himſelf, he will commit the command of his army to his ſon.

Laſt night I ſent the Perſian Interpreter to his Excellency, with my reaſons in writing againſt a movement of the troops at this ſeaſon, but he would not liſten to them; and though I went in perſon this morning, I could not perſuade him to deſiſt from the enterprize.

According to his accounts of the general diſpoſition of other Powers, appearances are alarming enough. He avows expectations of being attacked after the rains by the Marattas on one hand and *Timur Sha* on the other. He is under conſiderable apprehenſions from the King, whoſe diſtreſſes ſeem to render him deſperate, and to have determined him, as he thinks he is deſerted by us and the Vizier, to try every poſſible effort to extricate himſelf. *Feizullah Khan*, having large ſums of money, and no alternative being left to himſelf or his followers, they appear reſolved to give all the trouble they can; and their numbers are ſaid to be greatly increaſed by reinforcements of Affghans from different parts.

Theſe are matters which I think worthy of your conſideration. In the meantime I am to inform you, that as his Excellency is ſo very deſirous of my taking the field, as he has the ſole authority of preſcribing the ſervice to be undertaken, and has quoted the Preſident's advice for uſing the utmoſt expedition, I am conſtrained to break ground with all the Sepoys of the brigade, and the European grenadiers.

The regiment will be left here at leaſt till the Nabob himſelf is in condition to move after us, by which time they will be better ſupplied with camp equipages. I mean alſo to leave the hoſpital at this place.

I muſt beg, Gentlemen, that I may be favoured with regular anſwers to my Letters. I wiſh not to be left to myſelf in any matter of moment, becauſe, though I will moſt certainly act for the beſt, yet I may not foreſee meaſures that might be moſt conſonant with the wiſhes of Adminiſtration.

I have the honour to be,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Cant[t] at *Biſſouly*,
24th July 1774.

The Preſident informs the Committee, that he did give the Vizier literally the advice which is alluded to in the Colonel's Letter of the 24th July, although at a diſtant time, and under very different circumſtances; the Letter which contained it being written in anſwer to the Vizier's firſt information of the victory gained over *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, which makes the advice leſs applicable to the preſent meaſure, which he is of opinion might have with ſafety been delayed to the cloſe of the rainy ſeaſon, although he hopes and believes, that if it does not injure the health of the troops, it may prove in every other reſpect of beneficial conſequences, and the means of haſtening the concluſion of the war.

The following is a copy of a Letter written by the Preſident to the Vizier, containing his ſentiments above referred to.

To the Vizier.

After acknowledging the receipt of his Letter, and complimenting him on the ſucceſs of his arms, it proceeds—the diſtance between us prevents me from offering my ſentiments on the meaſures it may be neceſſary to purſue, for the ſucceſs of the cauſe in which we are mutually engaged; your wiſdom alſo renders this ſuperfluous, and the preſence of Colonel *Champion*, in whoſe bravery and military ſkill, and on whoſe attachment you may entirely rely, leave me at reſt for the iſſue of the campaign, which I hope will as ſpeedily, as I truſt it will be fortunately accompliſhed. The abſence of thoſe who may interrupt the progreſs of your victories, and the diſturbed ſtate of the affairs of the *Decan*, afford the faireſt ſeaſon to complete what you have ſo ſplendidly begun; but as it appears probable that thoſe troubles are upon the eve of being decided in favour of one or the other party, it is the part of prudence to prevent the revival of their deſigns in the quarter where you now are, by a ſpeedy and complete accompliſhment of your own. From a perſonal knowledge of Colonel *Champion*, I can inform your Excellency that you poſſeſs in his activity, in which he is equalled by few, the ſureſt means of ſeconding the dictates of your enlightened underſtanding, and the ardour of your own courage; and I hope you will continue as you have hitherto done, to conſult with him on all occaſions.

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Reſolved, That we reply to Colonel *Champion*, as follows:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have duly received your Letters of the 3d, 19th, and 24th July.

Notwithſtanding our wiſh to have deferred the renewal of our operations till the concluſion of the rains, had circumſtances permitted it, yet as the Vizier had reſolved in taking the field with his own forces, we much approve and commend your reſolution to accompany him, ſince it might have been productive of fatal conſequences if his army acting without our ſupport were to meet with a defeat, and the appearance of his acting by his own ſtrength, might give riſe to public conſtructions prejudicial to the common cauſe.

We think it very probable that the Marattas may endeavour to interrupt your operations the next ſeaſon, as we are informed their domeſtic troubles are appeaſed by the impriſonment of *Ragonaut Row*; we therefore recommend to you to co-operate with the Vizier in adopting ſuch meaſures as may cruſh the remains of the Rohilla Power before the arrival of a new enemy; and we hope that this premature movement of the Vizier may at laſt prove to effect that good purpoſe.

The conduct of the King appears more calculated to manifeſt his indiſpoſition towards this Government and the intereſt of his Vizier, than to affect either materially. You have better opportunity of foreſeeing the conſequences of it, and we truſt to your judgment and vigilance to obviate or remove them. We cannot alter the line of our conduct towards him; the intereſt of the Honourable Company, and their preſent engagements ſubſiſting between the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla*, bind them to a cloſe attachment to him during the courſe of the war in which we have embarked with him, and to proſecute it with vigour, ſteadineſs, and conſiſtency, againſt all opponents, whoſoever they may be. The King has forfeited every claim to our aſſiſtance, which compaſſion, or the habit of attachment might have given him, independent of more weighty conſiderations. From the lateſt advices of the Vizier, corroborated by many circumſtances of your Letters, we are inclined to attribute the late inſtance of ill-judged policy in the King to the Councils of his Miniſter *Abdul Abed Cawn*, given perhaps in oppoſition to his rival *Nedjiff Cawn*, whom he has ſeen ſupported by the Vizier and his Government.

In this light *Nedjiff Cawn* appears to us the fitteſt inſtrument to counteract ſuch meaſures of the King as may be calculated to embarraſs your operations. If you ſee the neceſſity of ſuch a precaution, which we only ſuppoſe on the grounds which have been afforded us, we recommend to you to engage the ſervices of *Nedjiff Cawn* for this purpoſe, and to adviſe with the Vizier concerning ſuch other meaſures as may be adviſable on the ſame ſubject. We believe it unneceſſary to caution you not to engage perſonally in any deſign which may bear the appearance of an adverſe diſpoſition towards the King, unleſs he ſhould openly declare or act againſt us.

We have already replied in duplicate, by a Letter dated the 14th July, to your Letters of the 17th and 20th of June, and conclude that you have received it.

Fort William, the 10th Auguſt 1774. We are, Sir, &c.

The Preſident delivers in the following tranſlation of a Letter from the Vizier:

From the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*.

I have delivered to Mr. *Middleton* a Paper, containing the news which I have lately received concerning *Coſſim Ally Cawn* and *Jemmad ul Moulk*: from thence you will learn that his Majeſty has ſent Kellaats for the abovementioned perſons, and that they dreſſed themſelves in them, and that he has alſo ſent for them to the preſence. I before wrote you all the particulars of his taking *Sumro* into his ſervice. It appears that his Majeſty has ſent for *Coſſim Ally Cawn* and *Sumro*, and taken them into his ſervice, on account of their enmity to the Engliſh, and that he ſent for *Jemmad ul Moulk* to terrify me.

You who, by the bleſſing of God, are poſſeſſed of an enlightened underſtanding, will perceive the event. When I reflect upon the friendſhip ſubſiſting between us, I have no apprehenſion from the enmity of any one; but I do not think it adviſable to uſe any delay. It is very eaſy to prevent theſe meaſures, and to ſettle the affairs of the empire: it is not an underſtanding of ſo difficult a nature as to require any extraordinary effort to drive all the enemies of the Engliſh, and all my enemies, from the preſence of the King, and to regulate the affairs of the empire in whatever manner may appear moſt adviſable; but as I take no ſtep without the advice and approbation of the Engliſh Chiefs, I have determined to act in this buſineſs agreeably to your advice. My friend, you muſt not conſider this as a trifling concern; although there is not as yet any room for apprehenſion, and it is as eaſy to put a ſtop to ſuch proceedings, yet it is evident that a ſmall ſtream may be ſtopped by a ſpadeful of clay, but when the ſame ſtream is augmented an elephant cannot even paſs: an affair of this kind always increaſes. My friend, I have written all theſe particulars for your information. If you are deſirous of putting a ſtop to theſe proceedings, write me a Letter to the following purport: to drive all the enemies of the Engliſh, and my own enemies, from the preſence of the King, and to regulate the affairs of the empire in the moſt expedient manner.

If you write me ſuch a Letter, by the bleſſing of God I ſhall be able, in a ſhort ſpace of time, and with the greateſt eaſe, to execute this buſineſs. There is ſo ſtrict an alliance between me and the Engliſh Chiefs, that we are like two bodies animated with the ſame ſoul. Whatever you adviſe I will execute. I have written you all theſe particulars, that you may not ſay in future, that I neglected to adviſe you of them: I am entirely free from the poſſibility of ſuch an accuſation.

N. B. A news-paper was received with the above Letter to the ſame purport.

To the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowlah*.

I have received your Excellency's Letter, concerning your having before informed me that his Majeſty has taken into his ſervice, and that he has lately ſent Kellaats to *Coſſim Aly Cawn* and *Jemmad ul Moulk*, and invited them into his ſervice; which muſt proceed ſolely from his enmity to the Engliſh, and a deſire of terrifying me; and requeſting, that I would quickly put a ſtop to ſuch proceedings.

I do not think it either adviſable or becoming for me to interfere in the affairs of the King. If ſuch meaſures are purſued as are intended to prejudice your intereſt, or that of the Engliſh Government, which are mutual, I rely on your wiſdom and care to prevent their taking effect: this conduct is conſiſtent with the ſtation you hold in the empire, and with your allegiance to the King, whoſe affairs muſt be ruined by a perſeverance in the ſyſtem which his ill-adviſers have lately perſuaded him to adopt. But I am of opinion, that as you have now on your hands an important buſineſs, which will, I hope, by the bleſſing of God, be ſpeedily brought to a concluſion, it will be better not to interfere at preſent. It is neceſſary that you take no ſteps in which our intereſts are mutually concerned, without conſulting Colonel *Champion*.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Letter from the Reſident at the Vizier's Court; adviſing him of his having deputed Mr. *Grady to Fyzabad*, to receive the 15 lacks of rupees, due at this time for the ſecond payment, on account of the Treaty at *Benares*.

APPENDIX No. 27.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

Sir,

The hurry of preparing for the march has prevented the Vizier's addreſſing you, as he intended, on the ſubject of his preſent undertaking, and has alſo deprived me of the opportunity of requiring from his Excellency any further explanation of his views, than what I have already tranſmitted you. I ſhall, however, embrace the earlieſt occaſion, after the hurry and confuſion in which he is at preſent involved has a little ſubſided, to confer with him perſonally on this ſubject, and ſhall not fail to acquaint you with the reſult.

As there ſeems little probability that any concluſive ſtroke can be ſtruck againſt *Fuzula Cawn*, before the expiration of the time limited for the payment of 15 lacks of rupees, on account of the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, and as I am convinced the Nabob would be unable to raiſe ſo conſiderable a ſum here within that period, unleſs ſome ſudden acquiſition of wealth ſhould yield him new reſources, I deemed it expedient to remind his Excellency of the demand, and require him to fall on ſome certain means of obviating any diſappointment or delay in the payment. In reply to which, he aſſured me he had taken the neceſſary meaſures to guard againſt any failure; and that he had every reaſon to expect the money would be ready at *Fyzabad* by the time it became due. I have therefore, on the faith of theſe aſſurances, and with the Nabob's concurrence, deputed Mr. *Grady*, whoſe integrity and diſcretion I can entirely rely upon, to proceed immediately to *Fyzabad*, to receive the treaſure, and to accompany it to the Preſidency, or to whatever place you may be pleaſed to order it. I ſhould have been pleaſed to receive your approbation of this meaſure previous to its adoption, but was unwilling to ſubject the buſineſs to any delays, which it is in my power to prevent.

I beg leave to lay before you the inſtructions with which I have furniſhed Mr. *Grady*, for the direction of his conduct in the management of this truſt; and I perſuade myſelf, that a prudent and moſt punctual diſcharge of it will ſufficiently juſtify my choice.

Being, until now, ignorant of the Nabob's final determination, I have omitted to addreſs you on the ſubject of an eſcort for the treaſure. To obviate therefore the delay which would be occaſioned by my waiting your commands, I ſhall take the liberty to requeſt an order from the Commander in Chief to Colonel *Muer*, for ſuch a guard as may be deemed adequate to the importance of the ſervice.

The brigade marched this morning to *Chundoreſy*, about eight coſs to the Northward of *Beſſouly*; and the Vizier has moved out of cantonments, intending himſelf to proceed to-morrow.

I am, very reſpectfully, Sir,
Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
*Nathan*ˡ *Middleton.*
Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Beſſouly, the 31ſt July 1774.

Bengal Select Conſultation, the 22d Auguſt 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

Read, a Letter from Colonel *Champion*, dated the 29th July.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

My Letters of the 19th and 24th have adviſed you that I had, in conſequence of the Vizier's repeated requiſitions, agreed to take the field with the Sepoy Corps, the Europeans, Grenadiers, &c.

When my intention of leaving the regiment cantonments were ſignified to the Nabob, he moſt earneſtly deſired that I would march the whole brigade. The precaution of having given early orders for making up private tents, and the induſtry which has been uſed, together with the little aſſiſtance given by his Excellency, has enabled me to comply with his deſire; conſequently no part of the troops will be left behind, excepting the ſick, who are to remain in the hoſpital in the Fort of *Beſſouly* under cover of a body of troops, to be left as a guard for his Excellency's family.

The weather has been remarkably favourable for ſeveral days, and having got the neceſſary ammunition and ſtores from the boats, I will march to-morrow morning.

The deſign of the enterprize, as formerly mentioned, is to reduce *Fuzullah Khan*, or oblige his forces to diſperſe; which it is hoped, will be effected by our endeavours to cut off their ſupplies of proviſions. For that purpoſe I have recommended to his Excellency to make the neceſſary detachments, and alſo to endeavour to induce the neighbouring Rajahs to haraſs the enemy.

Now that I have got equipage for the Europeans, and have taken every precaution to ſecure our ammunition, ſeveral of the objections which I had to this expedition are removed, and I am leſs fearful of bad conſequences to the troops; but I thought it, notwithſtanding, more adviſable to endeavour to diſſuade his Excellency from proſecuting the meaſure ſo early in this ſeaſon; and I accordingly wrote him a Letter, of which I ſend you a copy, wherein I made uſe of reaſons that appeared the moſt probable to influence him.

The Rohillas are encamped about 18 coſs beyond *Negilgur*, in the country of the Rajah of *Synnagur*, who, and the Rajah of *Comaw* and others, can bring a very reſpectable force to the field. Their dominions, I am informed, extend conſiderably into the plains which run along this; the ſouth ſide of the range of mountains mentioned in the inſtructions under which I act, and the Country to the Weſtward of *Negibgur* on this ſide of the *Ganges*, is alſo in poſſeſſion of Gentoos. I have indeed been told, that the Rajahpoots have at times been overpowered by the Rohillas, and obliged to make them pecuniary acknowledgment.

From his Excellency's anſwer, you will perceive, that he conſiders the Company bound to put him in poſſeſſion of all the Country between the *Ganges* and the mountains, as well as that belonging to the Rajahpoots, as the remainder of what was poſſeſſed by the Rohillas, whom he ſeems to expect I am to chaſe from the diſtricts of the Rajahs, ſome of whom have already ſhewn inclinations of favouring the Rohillas, by ſupplying them with light artillery, grain, and other neceſſaries.

I ſhall ſuppoſe, however, that they are impelled to this by the awe in which it is poſſible they ſtand of the Rohillas; and that upon our approach, they may perhaps through the management of the Vizier, at leaſt withhold future aſſiſtance, if not even diſtreſs the enemy in the rear.

In anſwer to this propoſition, it is ſufficient for me to ſay, that I cannot take upon me at haphazard to exceed the Board's inſtructions in a point of ſuch importance as that of entering into hoſtilities with, or over-running any part of the Country of a people againſt whom I have no authority to war, unleſs in ſelf-defence.

For theſe and other powerful reaſons which might be urged, I am determined not to enter the diſtricts of the Rajahs without your injunctions. I cannot help thinking the ſtyle of the Vizier's addreſs ſomewhat extraordinary, as well regarding his engagements with the Company as in other reſpects. I have thought it moſt prudent to leave it to you, Gentlemen, to make ſuch reply to his Excellency through the Preſident, as may be judged expedient, and I hope to be favoured with a copy of it.

I am very deſirous of receiving reply to my Letters of the 17th and 20th, relative to the agreement between his Majeſty and the Vizier concerning this conqueſt. I deliberately

APPENDIX. No. 27.

liberately weighed in my mind, whether I ſhould acquieſce in the Nabob's requeſt of moving higher up; I diſcovered that my heſitation gave him much diſſatisfaction, and it was very perceptible that if I had perſiſted in remaining here, he would have been impreſſed with doubts and jealouſies of the ſincerity of our attachment towards him, which I was apprehenſive would be never effectually effected; but indeed his conduct in advancing his army above thirty coſs in front of our troops without my concurrence, rendered a movement on my part abſolutely neceſſary, for the reaſon mentioned in my addreſs of the 19th. Moreover, I am not acquainted that his Majeſty has made any formal declaration to the Adminiſtration, nor has he hitherto attempted to ſupport his claim by force of arms, although the Vizier has been in poſſeſſion of ſeven-eighths of the Rohilla country about three months, and I hope therefore that the motives which prevail with me to comply with his Excellency's requiſition, will ſecure to me the honour of your approbation.

Should I find that the Europeans are likely to ſuffer much from this movement, I mean to leave them at *Moradabad* or *Sembol*, where, according ro the report of Officers whom I ſent to examine theſe towns, there is good accommodation.

If from the intelligence which you receive of the tranſactions of the Powers by whom the Vizier ſo confidently declares his expectations of being attacked after the rains, you think there is a probability of its ſo happening, and if you are determined to ſupport him at this diſtance from the Company's provinces, I conſider it incumbent on me to recommend that another brigade be ordered to proceed in due time to the frontiers.

I wrote to the Preſident ſome time ago for a partial ſupply of camp equipage; but in conſequence of our taking the field I muſt requeſt that all poſſible diſpatch may be made in ſending up a complete ſet of tents (or canvas and twine to make them) for the brigade, as it is probable the troops will not otherwiſe have tents to cover them in the cold ſeaſon.

I remain, with reſpect,
29th July 1774, Honourable Sir, and Gentlemen,
Beſſouly. Your moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
A. Champion.

Agreed, we anſwer the Colonel's Letter as follows:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have received your favour of the 29th ultimo, with its encloſures.

We can only approve the ſteps which you have taken in conſequence of the requiſition of the Vizier; the diſtance precludes us from giving any inſtructions for preventing the ill effects which may be occaſioned by the march of our forces at ſo unſeaſonable a time. We implicitly rely on your care to the health of the men, the Europeans eſpecially, which we regard as the object moſt requiring your attention in the preſent campaign.

We are very happy to learn that the weather has been ſo favourable to this movement; ſhould it however prove otherwiſe after you have received this Letter, and the Europeans become ſickly, we would rather approve of your hazarding ſomething more in the field without them, than expoſe them to the fatal effects of ſo dangerous a ſeaſon; and adviſe their being again cantoned in the moſt elevated and healthy ſpot you can make choice of.

When the Board, in the inſtructions given to you, deſcribed the line of your operations, and of the territory which they intended to reduce for the Vizier, they had no idea of any Government ſubſiſting within the line of that deſcription but that of the Rohillas. If however, as appears to be the caſe from your Letter, there are doubts upon this ſubject, we know not on what grounds we can decide upon them. As the ſhorteſt expedient, we muſt recur to our original intentions, and declare, that we regard the whole plain country between the *Ganges* and the hills to be the object of the preſent war, both ſuch diſtricts as form an inconteſted part of the Rohilla territory, ſuch as have occaſionally been held in a ſtate of independence.

It would not anſwer our purpoſe to leave a mixed dominion within that ſpace, and it would afford an inſuperable obſtacle to the proſecution of the war, were we to admit of the privilege of any place whatever within it to afford an aſylum to the enemy. If, therefore, the Vizier ſhall require your aid in reducing the frontier Zemindars, it is our deſire that you do afford him your aſſiſtance. If it ſhould be found neceſſary even to purſue the enemy within the ſkirts of the hills, in order to prevent their collecting freſh ſtrength, we would adviſe the meaſure, although we muſt leave you the judge of that neceſſity. The Letter of our agreement with the Vizier, requiring us to proceed no further than to the ſkirts of the mountains, at the ſame time that we aſſent to the Vizier's requiſition of our aſſiſtance thus far; yet we ſhould be better pleaſed that he choſe the mode of accommodation with the Zemindars, rather than to engage in hoſtilities againſt them, when they may be by ſuch means avoided.

We have read over the Vizier's Letter, but do not remark any paſſage in it liable to exception, excepting only the alluſion repeatedly made to his own conſtruction of his engagement for the payment of the forty lacks ſtipulated for the preſent ſervice. This we think requires no comment or animadverſion, as the Letter addreſſed to him by the Preſident on ultimo, will, we hope, remove all his doubts and objections on this ſubject.

Concerning the movement of another brigade to the frontier of *Babar*, we ſhall wait the concluſion of the rains before we take this point into conſideration, as there is no probability of your being diſturbed by any other enemy than that we have now on our hands, till long after the ſetting in of the fair weather.

The Preſident informs us, that he has already given orders for the camp equipage of the 3d brigade to be forwarded to you; and a further ſupply to complete the number which may be required for your brigade, ſhall alſo follow with all poſſible diſpatch.

We are, Sir,
Fort William, Your moſt obedient
the 22d Auguſt 1774. humble ſervants.

The Preſident likewiſe informs the Committee, That he has received advices that *Ragonaut Row*, having been abandoned by his followers, has thrown himſelf into the hands of *Tuccooge Holcar* and *Mathegee Syndeah*, who were conducting him to *Poona* a priſoner; and that the inteſtine diviſions which have for ſome time prevailed among the Marattas, are by this event to all appearance entirely accommodated.

Warren Haſtings.
Wm. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 29th Auguſt, 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident. *William Alderſey*, *John Graham*, *Nicholas Grueber*, eſquires—Meſſrs. *Dacres* and *Lawrell* at the Committee of Revenue.

Select Committee Proceedings on 7 lacks being offered to the army in the 6 11.

The Preſident lays before the Committee, a Letter which he has juſt received from the Commander in Chief, encloſing one from the Vizier, dated the 8th Auguſt.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

Sir,

Encloſed I have the pleaſure of ſending you copy of a Letter from his Excellency the Vizier, intimating his intentions

intentions of making a preſent of ſeven lacks of rupees to the army in the field, in proof of the grateful ſenſe he has of their ſervices.

I cannot help expreſſing much ſatisfaction at this inſtance of his Exceſſency's bounty, which is much the more princely, that it has proceeded entirely from his own free-will and liberality, and that too at a time when there was no hope or expectation of the kind.

His Excellency having himſelf made his intentions public, I ſignified them to the Field Officers agreeably to his wiſhes, for the encouragement of the troops; but I at the ſame time gave him to underſtand, that your aſſent is neceſſary; and I flatter me it will be given with much cheerfulneſs, as it will be very agreeable to his Excellency, a proper mark of favour towards the brigade, and at the ſame time a laſting obligation conferred on,

Camp at *Sual*, Sir,
20 coſs from *Petturgur*, Your faithful Friend, &c.
8th Auguſt 1774. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

(The Europeans in good health and ſpirits.)

Copy of a Letter from the Vizier to Colonel *Champion*, dated the laſt of Jummadee ul Awul, and encloſed in that Gentleman's Letter to the Governor of the 2d of Auguſt.

As the Engliſh brigade came from *Calcutta* to this place on my buſineſs, and the Gentlemen as well as the brigade have ſubmitted to the greateſt fatigues of hardſhips in the courſe of it, and have not yet received any recompence or gratuity from me, nor have the Gentlemen expreſſed any wiſh or importunity on this account, I have therefore determined to give ſeven lacks of rupees as a gratuity to the brigade and for the Gentlemen's expences. I give this Letter as my bond, that ſix months from this date (the laſt of Jummadee ul Awul) the ſum of ſeven lacks of rupees ſhall be paid to them.

I write this, my friend, for your information.

You may, if you pleaſe, inform Mr. *Haſtings* of this; but I will undoubtedly pay this ſum.

The Committee are of opinion, that as the promiſe made by the Vizier, and expreſſed in the foregoing Papers, has an intimate relation to the commands of the Court of Directors in the 9th paragraph of the Letter of the 24th December 1765, and to a ſubject on which the Board at large have given their expreſs opinion, the Committee cannot with propriety decide upon it by their own authority.

Reſolved, therefore, That it be ſubmitted to the Board, with a copy of this Minute.

The Board avoid entering into any diſcuſſion on this ſubject, as they find themſelves precluded from deciding upon it by the clear and expreſs prohibition contained in the late Act of Parliament, tranſmitted by the Court of Directors, with their commands of the 29th October 1773. The words of the Act are as follows:

Copy of a Clauſe of an Act of Parliament, An. 13° *George* 3d, intituled, An Act for eſtabliſhing certain Regulations for the better Management of the Affairs of the *Eaſt India* Company, &c.

Extract of the Act of Parliament.

And be it further enacted by the authority aforeſaid, That from and after the firſt day of Auguſt, one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-four, no perſon holding or exerciſing any civil or military office under the Crown or the ſaid United Company, in the *Eaſt Indies*, ſhall accept, receive or take, directly or indirectly, by himſelf or any other perſon or perſons on his behalf, or for his uſe or benefit, of and from any of the Indian Princes or Powers, or their Miniſters or Agents (or any of the Natives of *Aſia*) any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity or reward, pecuniary or otherwiſe, upon any account or on any pretence whatſoever, or any promiſe or engagement for any preſent, gift, donation, gratuity or reward: and if any perſon, holding or exerciſing any ſuch civil or military office, ſhall be guilty of any ſuch offence, and ſhall be thereof legally convicted in ſuch Supreme Court at *Calcutta*, or in the Mayor's Court in any other of the ſaid United Company's ſettlements where ſuch offence ſhall have been committed, every ſuch perſon ſo convicted ſhall forfeit double the value of ſuch preſent, gift, donation, gratuity or reward ſo taken and received, one moiety of which forfeiture ſhall be to the ſaid United Company, and the other moiety to him or them who ſhall inform or proſecute for the ſame, and alſo ſhall or may be ſent to *England* by the order of the Governor and Council of the Preſidency or Settlement where the offender ſhall be convicted, unleſs ſuch perſon ſo convicted ſhall give ſufficient ſecurity to remove him or themſelves within twelve months after ſuch conviction.

(A true copy, printed from the Act by authority.)
(Signed) *J. P. Auriol*,
Aſſiſtant Secretary.

Agreed, therefore, that the following Letter be written to the Commander in Chief:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

Anſwer to the Commander in Chief.

The honourable the Preſident and Select Committee having thought proper to refer to our conſideration your Letter to the Preſident of the 8th inſtant, with copy of the Vizier's encloſed, informing him of a donation of ſeven lacks of rupees, granted by the Vizier to the army in actual ſervice under your command, by his obligation, payable in ſix months; we have choſen to avoid any diſcuſſion on the propriety of this meaſure, as we find ourſelves precluded from a deciſion upon it by an expreſs clauſe in the late Act of Parliament, tranſmitted us by the honourable the Court of Directors, which prohibits the ſervants of the Company, civil or military, from receiving any preſents upon any pretence whatſoever. For your better information, we ſend you encloſed a copy of the ſaid clauſe, which will doubtleſs appear to you a ſufficient reaſon for us to refuſe our aſſent to the acceptance of this gift.

We are, with eſteem, &c.
Fort William, *Warren Haſtings.*
the 29th Auguſt 1774. *W. Alderſey.*
J. Graham.
N. Grueber.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultation, 8th September 1774. — Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire. *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; dated at *Poona*, 2d July 1774.

I did myſelf the pleaſure of addreſſing your honour, &c. laſt the 20th May, duplicate of which is encloſed; ſince which your commands of the 9th May have been duly received; and beg leave to congratulate you on the ſucceſs of our Honourable Maſter's arms, as mentioned therein.

Extract of Letter from the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*, to Mr. *Moſtyn* at *Poona*; dated 8th September 1774.

We have the pleaſure to inform you, that the Vizier, in conjunction with our forces, took poſſeſſion of the fort of *Putter Gur* on the 17th inſtant, without oppoſition, the enemy having fled to the hills; their ſucceſs we conſider as having completed the reduction of the Rohilla country lying between the *Ganges* and the Northern mountains; and as we are adviſed alſo that a negociation was on foot for an accommodation with *Fizulla Cawn*, the remaining Chief of that people, we expect that this new acquiſition will ſoon be peaceably ſecured to our ally the Vizier.

We are, &c.

APPEND'X. No. 27.

Read, the following Letter from Colonel *Champion:*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Yeſterday the allied armies arrived at this place, and the Vizier is now in poſſeſſion of the fort of *Putter Gur*. This morning I ſaluted his Excellency on the completion of the Rohilla conqueſt, and he was pleaſed to acknowledge it, by repeated diſcharges of his whole artillery.

Give me leave now, Gentlemen, through you, to offer my gratulations to the Honourable Board on the occaſion; the ſatisfaction which I derive from the ſucceſs of the expedition, is greatly heightened by the healthful ſtate of the troops.

The main body of the Rohillas are ſaid ſtill to conſiſt of about 40,000, are pent up at *Lolldang*, being within 16 coſ of us, where they are already in great diſtreſs for proviſions, having only three ſeer of grain for a rupee; they muſt of neceſſity, without delay, either ſubmit to ſuch terms as the Vizier ſhall grant them, or puſh into the hills, and endeavour to purchaſe or wreſt a ſettlement from the Rajahs, till a more convenient ſeaſon offers for making incurſions into the Country; but as his Excellency ſeems deſirous of an accommodation with *Fizulla Cawn*, it is probable an agreement may take place.

Camp, near *Putter Gur*, 17th Auguſt 1774. I am, &c. *A. Champion.*

Agreed, on the following anſwer:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have had the pleaſure to receive yours, dated the 17th ultimo; and we congratulate you upon the entire reduction of the Rohilla country to the Vizier's Government, which we conſider as effected by the ſurrender of *Putter Gur*, and the inextricable diſtreſs to which the Rohilla army is reduced. Our ſatisfaction is increaſed on this occaſion by the Vizier's intentions of terminating the war in the manner you mention, by an accommodation with the Rohillas, which muſt be eaſily ſettled in their diſtreſsful ſituation; and we hope his Excellency will be diſpoſed to conciliate their affections to his Government, by acceding to lenient terms.

The ſervice being completed, wherein the brigade under your command was engaged, a repetition of our thanks is due to you and the troops who effected it; which we requeſt you to accept, and to make known to them. When we are informed of the final adjuſtment of the Vizier's conqueſts, and the Preſident ſhall have received information from himſelf on that ſubject, we will be able to ſend you orders reſpecting the troops in the field.

We are, &c.

Fort William, 8th September 1774. *Warren Haſtings. W. Alderſey. P. M. Dacres.*

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 17th September 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire. *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following Letter, addreſſed to him by Colonel *Champion*, with his reply immediately made.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire.

Sir,

Incloſed I ſend you the correſpondence between the Vizier and *Fezula Khan*, and myſelf, with the ſubſtance of the converſations which paſſed between *Fezulah Khan* and Mr. *Murray*; from which laſt you will clearly obſerve that *Fezulah* is not his own maſter.

I am juſt now, my good ſir, in a ſituation truly perplexing;—the Rohilla country is completely and entirely conquered—the fugitives are poſted in a very ſtrong ſituation, within the diſtricts of the Rajahs—they have all to combat for. Perhaps the ſucceſs of the event might make Government overlook my going to *Lalldang*, but ſuch approbation depends on a chance. The matter is very weighty; and there is more riſk than I ſhould chuſe to run, without a neceſſity; yet it is grating to have an enemy ſo near; and it will be dangerous, ſhould they not be reduced, or no accommodation take place; becauſe, ſo ſoon as another enemy is in motion to attack the Vizier lower down, we muſt have troubleſome doings. The Nabob, I ſurmiſe, is privately diſpoſed even to give *Fezulla* a part of the conquered country; nay, to have a connection, by accepting of *Fezulla*'s daughter as a wife for one of his ſons; yet he will not give ſufficient authority to bring matters to the amicable deciſion he wiſhes for. I ſhould have leſs difficulty in this matter, but for your deſire that I ſhould diſſuade the Vizier from giving any of the Rohilla country to *Fezula*. I am perfectly firm in the opinion I before ſignified to you on that ſubject; but I muſt not put it in competition with yours. The Vizier ſays, he cannot pay the 40 lacks till he quits the field. He tells us, in a ſhort time the Marattas will be in motion; they will call our attention from hence. The Rohillas, if matters are not decided with them one way or the other, will take the advantage of our abſence; and if we are obliged to go far down, may perhaps recover their Country. Thus the 40 lacks will become precarious; the Vizier will either deny the payment, on pretence that the Rohilla war is not finiſhed, or he will at leaſt delay it, alledging he cannot leave the field.

If the Committee's anſwer to my Letter of the 29th July was arrived, I ſhould know how to proceed with certainty I am hourly importuned by the Vizier, and I wiſh to give way to his inclinations as far as I can; it is therefore reſolved to move five coſ further, near the banks of the *Ganges*, in order more effectually to diſtreſs the enemy; but I will, if poſſible, delay an attack till I receive the Committee's anſwer to my ſaid Letter: if I am forbid to proceed, the Vizier muſt come to terms, and the ready money which he may get, will pay a conſiderable part of our forty lacks. If I am deſired to go on, I will not heſitate; but whatever happens, be aſſured all is well intended by,

Camp near *Puttergur*, 26th Auguſt 1774. Sir, &c. *A. Champion.*

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

I have received your favours of the 21ſt and 26th ultimo, which both arrived this morning: the latter incloſing copies of your correſpondence on the ſubject of the late negociations, and of the converſation which paſſed between *Fyzula Cawn* and Mr. *Murray*. To this I now reply.

I hope, notwithſtanding the heſitation expreſſed in the concluſion, that you have reſolved on proſecuting the war to a final iſſue, without waiting for the reply of the Select Committee to your Letter of the 29th July; becauſe I think it appears very plainly, that *Fizula Cawn* and his adherents lay at your mercy; becauſe I apprehend much inconveniences from delays, and becauſe I am morally certain that no good will be gained by negociating. If however, contrary to this expectation, you ſhall have ſuſpended your operations, or from any other cauſe the war ſhall not be concluded on the receipt of this, it is my expreſs deſire that you do on no account depute any perſon under your command to treat with the enemy; but leave it wholly to the Vizier to conduct every meaſure of this kind by his own agents, and in ſuch a manner as he ſhall think proper, ſince he is the principal and we only acceſſaries in the war. Beſides, by allowing *Fizula Cawn* to treat with both, to

make appeals from you to the Vizier, and from the Vizier to you, you can hardly fail both of you to become the inſtruments of his intrigues, and he will acquire a confidence from ſuch an indulgence, which he cannot place on his own ſtrength or conſequence.

Indeed, I could not read without indignation, the converſation of *Fizulla Cawn* with Mr. *Murray*. The language of the former was highly preſuming, inſolent, and evaſive; and I think Mr. *Murray* ought to have left him after the firſt interview. A circumſtance ſtruck me very forcibly in Mr. *Murray*'s narrative. "I came (ſays *Fezula Cawn*) to this place, which is the diſtrict of the Rajah *Gurual*." This intimation, which was as wide as eaſt and weſt from the buſineſs before him, too manifeſtly ſhews the foundation on which he built his hopes of ſucceeding, by a refuſal to accede to the propoſitions made him, and that he has availed himſelf of your ſuppoſed inability to purſue him beyond the acknowledged limits of the Rohilla juriſdiction.

Although I have referred you to the Vizier for conducting all negociations, I by no means wiſh that he ſhould loſe time by ſeeking for an accommodation. It will be more effectual, more deciſive, and more conſiſtent with his dignity, indeed with his honour, which he has already pledged, to abide by his firſt offers to dictate the conditions of peace, and to admit only an acceptance without reſervation, or a clear refuſal from his adverſary.

I intend to communicate the ſubſtance of your advices to the Select Committee, for their fuller ſentiments on the meaſures to be hereafter taken. In the meantime, to prevent the danger of delay, I deſire that you will be pleaſed to receive theſe inſtructions for your guide.

I am, Sir, &c.

Fort William, the 16th September 1774. (Signed) *Warren Haſtings*.

A true copy.
Robert Patton,
Milit^y Secr^y.

The Committee approve the Preſident's anſwer to the Letter written by Colonel *Champion*; and as it appears that the remainder of the Rohilla forces under *Fizula Cawn*, at the time in which the laſt advices from camp were tranſmitted, were reduced to a ſtate which muſt have rendered it improbable that they could either hope to regain their poſſeſſions from the Vizier, or maintain their preſent poſt, if our army ſhould proſecute their operations againſt them; it is evident that their refuſal to accede to the Vizier's propoſals, and their demand of terms ſo diſproportioned to their ſituation and circumſtances, were founded on the idea that we would not act beyond certain limits; and that by continuing out of the reach of our operations, they might protract the war, and oblige the Vizier to comply with their terms, or perhaps wait for eventual circumſtances which might conduce to retrieve their affairs.

Reſolved, That orders ſhall be immediately ſent to Colonel *Champion*, if the war ſhould not be terminated when they arrive, to proſecute the war with the utmoſt vigour againſt the Rohillas, and to uſe his utmoſt endeavours with the army under his command, either to oblige them to yield to the terms which the Vizier may be pleaſed to grant, or entirely ſubdue or diſperſe them, without regarding the limitation of the Rohilla poſſeſſions; provided he can act effectually and expeditiouſly againſt them. And that the following Letter on the ſubject be written him:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

The Preſident has laid before us your Letter to him, under date the 26th ult^o, with the reply which he immediately diſpatched to it, and which agrees with our ſentiments. We now proceed to give you more at large our inſtructions to your conduct in proſecuting the war againſt *Fizula Cawn* and his adherents.

If upon the receipt of this Letter the war ſhould not have been brought to a concluſion, either by the reduction of the Rohilla army, or an accommodation having taken place between the Vizier and *Fezula Cawn*, you are authorized and directed by us to purſue the moſt vigorous meaſures, in conjunction with the Vizier, effectually to reduce the Rohilla army, without confining your operations to the Rohilla dominions; and even if they ſhould have croſſed the *Ganges*, and you have reaſon to ſuppoſe that by croſſing either part or the whole of your army, you may be able ſpeedily to terminate the war, by acting deciſively againſt them, and obliging them to diſperſe, you have alſo our authority for purſuing this meaſure; but as ſoon as this ſervice ſhall have been performed, you will immediately re-croſs with the army, and retire within the limits originally preſcribed to your operations, making *Fizula Cawn* and his adherents the only objects of your hoſtilities, and undertaking this enterprize only if the occaſion ſhould promiſe immediate ſucceſs.

But if his Excellency the Vizier ſhould be diſpoſed rather to accommodate matters with the Rohillas by negociation, than to proſecute hoſtilities to the utmoſt againſt them, you are to permit him in this reſpect entirely to purſue his own meaſures, and employ his own agents; nor are you at all to interfere unleſs he ſhould ſolicit you to join your ſanction to the terms propoſed, or the accommodations agreed upon, to add to their validity; and in that caſe it will be proper for you to receive from him a formal application in writing; but on no account are you to ſuffer any perſon under your command or authority to be employed as a negociator on the part of the Vizier.

Fort William, the 17th September 1774. We are, &c.

As the orders now intended to be tranſmitted to Colonel *Champion*, and which cannot be delayed without a great riſque of fruſtrating the deſign, are contrary to the Letter of Inſtructions given by the Board; the Committee are of opinion, that a reference of this day's Proceedings ought to be ſubmitted to the Council at large, for their approbation, or for their appeal, if they judge the latitude allowed to the Colonel liable to dangerous conſequences.

Reſolved, That a copy of this day's Proceedings be laid before the Council next Council day.

Warren Haſtings.
Wm Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.

Bengal Select Conſultations, the 19th September 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire. *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

The Preſident lays before the Committee the following extract of a reſolution of the Board; in conſequence of which the following Letter was written to the Commander in Chief from this Department.

Extract of Secret Department Conſultation, the 19th September 1774.

The Board approve of the motives which have induced the Select Committee to give the latitude which they have allowed to Colonel *Champion*, but think it expedient to explain their intentions more fully, and to draw the line of his operations in more direct terms, but conformable to the orders above given him.

Agreed, That the following Letter be written and diſpatched to him from the Select Committee.

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

The latitude allowed in our laſt Letter of the 17th inſtant, being a deviation from the expreſs Letter of the original

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original Inſtructions which you received from the Board, we have thought it neceſſary to communicate to them thoſe orders; which we have accordingly done, and have received their confirmation of them; but leſt the terms of our Letter ſhould not have been ſufficiently explanatory of our intentions, we think it neceſſary to give you this further illuſtration both of our wiſh, and that of the Board, in the latitude above referred to. If *Fizula Cawn*, or the forces under his command, ſhall have croſſed the *Ganges*, and preſuming on the limitation of the ſcene of your operations, ſhall venture to encamp ſo near as to put it into your power, by ſuddenly croſſing the river, either with the whole or a part of the brigade under your command, to attack them by ſurprize, and to diſperſe them, in that caſe, and in that caſe only, we think it adviſable, and we direct, that you do exceed the preſcribed line of your operations to attack them, but that you do not perſiſt in any continued operations againſt them on that ſide of the river, or follow them beyond one day's march if they ſhould betake themſelves to flight; and that if you ſhall either have defeated or diſperſed the enemy, or they ſhall have prevented an attack by flight, in either caſe you are immediately to re croſs the river, and confine yourſelf within the original preſcribed line of your operations.

We thought it neceſſary to be thus explicit, not from any doubt which we entertain in your diſcretion, but to enable you with confidence and ſatisfaction to yourſelf, to carry theſe orders into execution.

We are, &c.

Fort William, the 19th Sept. 1774.

Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey,
P. M. Dacres.

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Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 6th October 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire. *William Alderſey*, and *Philip Milner Dacres*, eſquires.

READ, the following Letters from Colonel *Champion*, dated the 28th Auguſt, 3d, 6th, and 10th September.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

On the 17th inſtant I had the pleaſure of informing you of the Vizier's being in poſſeſſion of the fort of *Putter Gur*, and of all the Rohilla country; and that it was probable an accommodation would take place between him and the enemy.

His Excellency offered *Fizula* a Saydad for 15,000 men in that part of the *Doab* lately taken from the Marattas, on condition of receiving from *Fizula* the half of his treaſure and effects. The Rohilla Chief dreading the power of the Marattas, declined accepting of a ſettlement in the *Doab*, but offered half his treaſure and effects, if the Vizier would give him a ſettlement in the conquered country. The Vizier diſſented to this propoſition, but aſſured *Fizula Cawn* that he would at all times ſupport him in the *Doab* againſt the Marattas; *Fizula* then addreſſed me, ſaying, he had ſome things to communicate, which he did not think proper to commit to writing, and requeſted I would ſend my Secretary to hear what he had to ſay; being extremely deſirous to take away all pretence of further delaying the payment of the ſum ſtipulated for the conqueſt of this country, which his Excellency alledges he cannot diſcharge till he is at liberty to quit the field; I directed Mr. *Murray*, with the written approbation of the Vizier, to proceed to the Rohilla camp, and I took the opportunity of ſending the Field Engineer in company with him, that in caſe no agreement ſhould take place, and we ſhould be obliged to attack the enemy, we might benefit by the Engineer's obſervations.

When Mr. *Murray* had heard what *Fizula* had to ſay, he found it was little elſe but declamation on paſt hardſhips, with expreſſions of great diſtruſt in the Vizier, and earneſt wiſhes that I would intercede with his Excellency and the Adminiſtration, to obtain a ſettlement for him and his followers in ſome part of the Rohilla country.

Mr. *Murray* was commiſſioned to endeavour to bring *Fizulah Khan* to camp with him, in order that he might perſonally pay his reſpects to the Vizier, and endeavour to ſettle all diſputes. Mr. *Murray* was ſo far ſucceſsful as to obtain *Fizulah's* entire conſent to accompany him; but their Councils (in which every petty Serdar muſt be heard) being diſtracted, a majority of the Chiefs denied *Fizulah* the power of putting his intention into execution. They however propoſed that *Aly Mahummud Khan*, *Fizullah's* eldeſt ſon, aged about twenty-five, ſhould be ſent to treat with the Vizier. This propoſition being communicated to his Excellency, was rejected, and Mr. *Murray* recalled.

The Nabob did me the favour of a viſit yeſterday morning, and importuned me to advance upon the enemy, in conſequence of which I moved to this ground, but ſignified to his Excellency that I could not proceed beyond the acknowledged bounds of the Rohilla dominions; the Vizier ſtrongly urged that *Lalldang* is within the Rohilla country, and affirmed that the inhabitants of the villages cloſe to it had always paid rent to *Zabitah Khan* and his father. The truth with regard to the villages, as far as I have been able to learn, is, that they belonged to the Rajahs, but that the Rohillas have often collected the rents; be this however as it may, the enemy being actually encamped on the hills, they are beyond the limits of the country which I was entruſted to conquer; and although I moſt heartily wiſh to comply with the Vizier's requeſt of reducing *Fizulah Khan*, yet I am extremely ſcrupulous of running any riſk of diſapprobation. If in anſwer to the Letter which I had the honour of addreſſing you on the 29th ultimo, I ſhould be directed to proceed no farther, the Vizier muſt accept of *Fizulah Khan's* offer, by which if his Excellency's information is juſt he will receive above 30 lacks of Rupees, and if on the contrary, I ſhould be authorized to attack the enemy at *Lalldang*, I will do it, but I have thought it neceſſary to deſire his Excellency to conſider, that if the enemy's camp is ſtormed their treaſure will fall to the captors, and adviſed him to continue the blockade ſome time longer.

We are now within ten coſs of the enemy, whoſe communication with the *Ganges* and the Rohilla country is completely cut off, ſo that they can neither retreat to, or receive ſupplies from, any place, excepting the country between the hills.

In caſe peace ſhould be concluded between the Vizier and the Rohillas, I requeſt you will do me the favour of informing me, whether, and how far, I may concern myſelf on the part of Adminiſtration in ſuch treaty as may be agreed upon, either regarding the *Doab* or the Rohilla country.

His Excellency informed me, that he has received advices of the Marattas having moved to the Southward, but that he doubts not they will pay him a viſit in the courſe of the ſeaſon.

Camp near *Mohanpore*, Auguſt 28th 1774.

I am reſpectfully, &c.
A. Champion.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I was duly favoured with your Letters of the 1ſt and 14th July; to the firſt I would have replied earlier, but that I wiſhed to comply with your deſire of obtaining information concerning the identity of *Meer Fettee Aly*;

and

and I now encloſe the declarations of ſeveral perſons, particularly that of the nurſe who ſuckled him, in teſtimony of his being the real ſon of *Saddoe Aly*

The ſum which you have been pleaſed to allot for his expences, is by no means adequate to his moſt neceſſary diſburſements. Beſides furniſhing him with tents and other neceſſaries, I had given him 500 R monthly, before the receipt of your Letter. This being a very moderate allowance, eſpecially whilſt he is moving about with the army, I have taken upon me to continue it; and I flatter myſelf it will meet with approbation. I wiſh to receive further inſtructions concerning him.

Regarding my Letter of the 11th June, I am to obſerve, with all due ſubmiſſion, Gentlemen, that you muſt greatly have miſapprehended it; I never wiſhed, nor expreſſed a wiſh, to be the arbiter of peace and war with the Vizier, neither to have the power of correcting his exceſſes by force. "A full authority, effectually to prevent his perpetrating any enormity under the ſhield of our ſtrength, &c" is no more or leſs of denying to ſecond or countenance ſuch proceedings.—And has the Adminiſtration no full authority over the Company's troops? If not, Gentlemen, I am afraid the expreſſion which has been excepted againſt, "that the Britiſh name is in the hands of the Vizier," is but too much juſtified.

It is true, that if the Britiſh name is in any manner committed, it muſt be from the Treaty itſelf; and I am charged with want of candour, for not having ſtated the reflection earlier. After my acknowledgments for this compliment, I anſwer, that had I ſeen the Treaty, which I do not recollect to have done, it would be vanity in me to imagine that I could diſcover faults in it, which has eſcaped the notice of ſo many Gentlemen of nicer diſcernment. If I did not foreſee the evil, it is enough on my part that I complained ſo ſoon as I was ſenſible of its effects; the power of adminiſtering a remedy lay elſewhere.

It is true, Gentlemen, that declamation is uſual in repreſenting miſchiefs; and therefore I ſhould not have been ſurprized that the Letters which I tranſmitted to you had but little effect on your perceptions, if I had not at the ſame time atteſted the truth of the complaints, which I will venture to ſay bear more than one or two inſtances of cruelty; I might add others, ſuch as theſe unhappy captives being driven to the neceſſity of ſupplicating and receiving alms from myſelf and Gentlemen of my family, to purchaſe ſuſtenance; their even begging for water to drink, their ſtruggling who ſhould firſt be ſerved with it, &c. In ſhort, the proofs of the groſs maltreatment of theſe families amounts to an axiom in the minds of the Engliſh army, and even in the Vizier's own troops.

Mr. *Middleton*, I preſume, has informed the Preſident of the reſult of his application to the Vizier, concerning the 40 lacks.

The troops continue to enjoy good health. No remarkable occurrence ſince my laſt. I remain with reſpect, &c.

Camp near *Mohanpore*, 3d September 1774. *A. Champion.*

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; dated Camp near *Mohanpore*, the 6th September 1774.

Since my laſt, nothing remarkable has happened. We have, however, accounts of the increaſing diſtreſs of the enemy.

I have received ſeveral Letters from the Nabob *Zabita Khan*, repreſenting that the Vizier is under the moſt ſolemn engagements not to deprive him of the diſtricts or fort of *Putter Gur*; and although it may not be thought adviſable to interfere, I deem it incumbent in me to make you acquainted with the circumſtance.

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Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; dated Camp near *Mohanpore*, the 10th September 1774

The Vizier has actually addreſſed his Majeſty, propoſing an interview on the banks of the *Ganges*, and on the ſuppoſition that a meeting will take place I am to requeſt I may be honoured with your inſtructions whether to interfere on the part of the Company, in tranſactions or agreements between his Majeſty and the Vizier, regarding the Doab and Rohilla country, and whether it is your deſire that I ſhould make any mention of what his Excellency calls the Bengal treaſure.

As I have permiſſion from the Board to return to the Preſidency, I meet to avail myſelf of it as ſoon as I can with propriety leave the army. It is therefore probable, that I may be on my way down before the anſwer to this addreſs can arrive; and would recommend, that a ſealed duplicate of your reply ſhould be ſent, under cover, to Colonel *Gaſtez*, with inſtructions to deliver it to me, if with the army; if not, to open and act in obedience to it.

I truſt you have given ſuch orders regarding the ſupply of camp equipage as that it will be up as ſoon as poſſible.

I am very anxious to receive anſwers from the ſeveral Letters which I have had the honour of addreſſing to you; replies to all thoſe of July are due.

Fuzullah Khan and the Rohilla Chiefs have removed their families further into the country, between the hills. No other occurrence ſince my laſt.

Agreed we anſwer the Colonel's Letter in the following terms:

To, Colonel *Alexander Champion*, Commander in Chief of the Forces under the Preſidency.

Sir,

We have duly received your Letters of the 28th Auguſt, 3d, 6th, and 10th September.

We muſt conclude, that long before you can receive this, your operations againſt *Fizula Cawn* will have finally ceaſed, either by his defeat, or by peace concluded with him; leſt we ſhould be diſappointed in this expectation, and a treaty of peace ſhould be propoſed between the Vizier and *Fizula Cawn*, if both parties ſhould unite in deſiring your interpoſition, we approve of your either atteſting the treaty, or acting as guarantee on the part of the Company for the performance of it; but in every other reſpect we deſire you to conform to our inſtructions in our Letter of the 17th.

We approve of the allowance you have given *Fittee Aly Cawn* and deſire you will continue it to him.

In reply to the other ſubjects contained in your Letter of 3d ultimo, we have only to refer you to the orders which we have repeatedly and explicitly given regarding the line of your conduct, which do not admit a further diſcuſſion.

Whatever engagements may have been contracted between the Vizier and *Z. bita Cawn*, we will have no concern in them, or in any other engagements formed without our participation. On this ſubject we have already given you general but full inſtructions.

As we are determined to avoid interfering in any affair which may draw our army beyond the line of its preſent operations, we would not have you interfere in any negociations that will take place at the propoſed interview between the King and the Vizier, in any manner which ſhall pledge the faith of our Government for the performance of any ſtipulations agreed on betwixt them. The preſence of the brigade will be a ſure defence to the Vizier's dominions during the abſence of his forces, and its neighbourhood to the *Doab* will have a conſiderable influence on the operations in that country, to which we conclude they will be principally confined, if any hoſtilities ſhould take place againſt the Marattas in conſequence of the plan which may be concerted between the King

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and the Vizier; and in this reſpect we conceive that the ſervice eventually, though not immediately afforded to the King, may merit ſome return on his part. We deſire no other than a formal renunciation of his pretenſions to the tribute of *Bengal*, which is an object with us, merely from the conſideration that it may prove the ſource of future diſcontent between the King and the Company, ſince we can by no means admit, and are perſuaded that our Superiors will juſtify us in this opinion, that his Majeſty has any right to the exaction of that tribute, or ever received it but as a voluntary act flowing from the bounty and attachment of the Company towards him; and viewing it in this light, we conceive that it is at leaſt as much the intereſt of the King to comply with our wiſhes. We think it neceſſary to add, to obviate any miſconception of our intentions, that we will not agree to any compenſation whatever for this renunciation, nor wiſh to accept it, unleſs it ſhall comprehend all claim of arrears, as well as future payments, on account of the tribute. We think alſo, that it will be ſufficient ſimply to propoſe, or to requeſt it as a matter of courſe, but neither to ſolicit his Majeſty's compliance nor repeat the requeſt, it being, as we have already ſaid, a point of little moment to the Company whether he grants it or not. All other points, of whatever nature, you may leave to be adjuſted between the King and the Vizier, unleſs any ſhould ariſe which we do not foreſee, and which ſhall not be contradictory to the line of your inſtructions; in which we truſt to your diſcretion to act as you ſhall judge moſt fitting for the intereſt of the Company.

In caſe you ſhall have quitted the army before this arrives, and it ſhould reach your hands, we deſire you will forward it to Colonel *Galliez*, and that he will conform to the contents of it.

Fort William, the 6th October 1774. We are, &c.

Tranſlation of a Letter framed by the Nawab Vizier, to be written from Colonel *Champion* to *Muged o Dowlah*, in reply to his Letter, received the 29th Auguſt.

I have received your Letter, and comprehend the particulars: it is evident that the Engliſh Chiefs, the Nawab Vizier, and Nawab *Nijuff Chan;* are well-wiſhers to his Majeſty, and all three are ready with their lives for his benefit: formerly, when the Marattas cauſed diſturbances at *Delhi*, the Nawab Vizier marched from *Fyzabad* to join his Majeſty, but they got thither before him, and the Marattas being enemies to the kingdom, the Nawab Vizier twice afforded the Rohillas aſſiſtance, ſhewed them much friendſhip, and was at infinite expence on their account; and now conformably to his Majeſty's order, has ſubdued the Rohillas accordingly. When this matter was formerly in agitation, and *Mahummed Elich Cawn* at *Delhi*, his Majeſty marched thence, but by reaſon of illneſs returned. Now the Nawab Vizier, in conjunction with the Engliſh, has ſubdued the Rohillas, as was befitting; and now the Nawab Vizier and Engliſh Chiefs are ready and prepared to pay the dues of ſervice and obedience to his Majeſty, and if he will ſet out from *Delhi* and proceed to the banks of the *Ganges*, here the Nawab Vizier, the Engliſh Chiefs, and Nawab *Nujiff Chan*, will attend him and pay their reſpects: and it is neceſſary to obſerve, that if his Majeſty will come to the banks of the *Ganges*, that one matter will alſo be ſettled, which will conduce to the benefit of the empire, and of all parties mutually, and every means will be uſed for the advantage of the King and the Nawab Vizier, and the Engliſh Chiefs will in all ways be ready with their beſt ſervices for his Majeſty, and in no reſpect be inattentive to his pleaſure.

On Colonel *Champion* deſiring the Vizier, by a Letter, to explain that matter mentioned in the above, which was to be ſettled if his Majeſty came to the banks of the *Ganges*, his Excellency tranſmitted the following Letter on September 5, 1774.

You deſire me to explain myſelf on the article which was to be ſettled with the King:—It is this, the engagements that ſubſiſt between his Majeſty and me, on the ſubjects of country, I ſent ſome time ago for your peruſal: I am now firm to my agreement to the King, and wiſh to ſee the empire in a proper ſtate, and whatever country of his Majeſty is in the poſſeſſion of enemies, to take it, and reſign it to him; and whenever his Majeſty will come to the banks of the *Ganges*, you and I meeting him there will debate on his foregoing payment of the treaſure paid into the royal treaſury by the Company for *Bengal*, and repreſenting it in a proper manner, induce him to excuſe it, and if his Majeſty will quit *Delhi*, I will attend him, and adjuſt the condition of the empire; after that no enemy will attempt to excite commotions in *Hindoſtan*, and the kingdom will flouriſh: but if he remains in this manner at *Deloi*, the Marattas will ſoon endeavour to cauſe diſturbances, and, God not preventing, he again falls into their hands; from this there can be no good, it will be the ruin of the empire.

R. E. Roberts,
Perſian Interpreter.

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Champion*, Commander in Chief, to the Nabob *Mujed o Dowlah*.

The Nawab Vizier has ſignified his wiſhes to me, that if his Majeſty will come to the banks of the *Ganges*, the engagements which ſubſiſt between the King and him would certainly be performed; and I myſelf am of opinion that his Majeſty's coming would be attended with much advantage, and that all affairs would be ſettled to his ſatisfaction. I hope alſo that his Majeſty will ſeriouſly reflect, that if he calls the Marattas to his aſſiſtance, whether their preſence will not be productive of conſequences contrary to his hopes, the whole empire be thereby deſolated, and no regulation of the affairs of the country take place? For my own part, I think it beſt that if the Nawab Vizier requeſts his Majeſty to come, by all means he do come to the banks of the *Ganges*, and the agreements between him and the Nawab Vizier be fulfilled. This will cauſe the empire and the royal affairs to flouriſh, and I beg you will entreat his Majeſty to wait for the replies to theſe Letters from *Culcutta*.

Letter from *Bengal* to the Court of Directors, 17th October 1774.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

1. The ſame reaſons which induce us to addreſs you from the other Department, on the cloſe of our Adminiſtration, make it alſo expedient that we ſhould write you from this; with an account of our Proceedings ſince our laſt advices. The whole will be left under the care of the new Government, to be forwarded to you by the firſt ſhip.

2. Encloſed are duplicates of our Letters by the *Reſolution* and *Swallow*, and triplicate of that over-land of the 25th April laſt.

3. By the firſt of theſe you were informed of the march of the brigade under Colonel *Champion* to the aſſiſtance of the Vizier in his expedition againſt the Rohilla country, lying betwixt the *Ganges* and the mountains, on the terms and conditions which we ſo amply ſpecified in that and our preceding advices. In our Letters over-land, we briefly noted that we had received accounts of a complete victory gained over theſe people at the fields of *St George*, in which their Chief, *Haſiz Rhamut Cawn*, was killed; the particulars ſtand in the Conſultation referred to in the margin.

4. For a regular connected account of the operations of the army during the campaign, we muſt beg leave to refer you to the Select Committee, with whom Colonel *Champion*

Champion carried on his chief correſpondence, according to the directions of the Board; and ſhall in this Department confine ourſelves to ſuch points as came to us in reference from them, or ſuch as we thought proper to interfere in directing ourſelves.

5. Soon after, and in conſequence of the above-mentioned victory, our troops took and put the Vizier in poſſeſſion of *Pittybut*, *Bireily*, *Owla*, and *Biſſouly*, the places of chief note in the Country; by which we thought that we had completely acquired a right to the forty lacks ſtipulated for our aid in this enterprize, and therefore directed the Commander in Chief to apply to the Vizier, in conjunction with the Reſident at his Court, for payment; but as we foreſaw that it might be impoſſible for the Vizier, in the middle of the campaign and at a diſtance from his capital, to pay down the whole immediately, we inſtructed theſe Gentlemen to relax ſo far in their demands, as not to inſiſt abſolutely on the whole in ready money, but to accept of ſuch as he could give in part, and leave the reſt to be ſettled by a negociation between him and the Reſident; in which however the primary and eſſential article was to be an acknowledgment of our right to the whole.

6 What has occurred ſince in conſequence of theſe inſtructions, has not come under our notice in this Department, as Colonel *Champion*, in obedience to our directions at that time, correſponded afterwards ſolely with the Select Committee upon the ſubject, and they will doubtleſs adviſe you fully relating to it.

7. That Committee thought proper, in the courſe of their correſpondence with the Commander in Chief, to make a reference to us on a point in which they thought they ſtood in need of our advice and concurrence. This was on information from him, that he had received intelligence of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s being on his march with a conſiderable body of troops to claim, in behalf of the King, one-half of the Country lately conquered from the Rohillas, in virtue, as he alledged, of a treaty formerly concluded between the King and the Vizier; but by which agreement the Commander in Chief ſuſpected he was not now willing to abide; and therefore he craved the ſpecial directions of the Board, as to the manner in which he ſhould act, ſhould they, the Vizier and *Nudjiff Cawn*, come to an open rupture about it.

8. We did not heſitate in reply to this, to direct him, that as we had no knowledge of ſuch a Treaty of Participation, if the Vizier denied it, he the Commander in Chief was not to ſuppoſe its exiſtence, but continue to ſupport and aſſiſt the Vizier in the conqueſt of that Country againſt *Nudjiff Cawn* and all other opponents.

9. They alſo referred to us the caſe of the Vizier's having made an offer of ſeven lacks of rupees as a preſent to the army, and actually conſigned into the hands of Colonel *Champion* an obligation, payable in ſeven months, to that amount. Whatever might have been our ſentiments with regard to the pretenſions of the troops, for their merits and ſervices, to ſuch a favour from the Vizier, we ſhould not have thought ourſelves warranted to conſent to ſuch a preſent without your ſpecial commands being firſt had on the ſubject; but what precluded us from any conſideration on the matter was, that the receipt of this preſent muſt have fallen within the penalty of the Act of Parliament which took place from the 1ſt Auguſt laſt. We therefore thought it ſufficient to tranſmit to the Commander in Chief, to be made known to the principal officers of the army, the Clauſe in the ſaid Act which prohibited it.

APPENDIX, No. 29.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Select Committee of *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 17th March 1774.

Par. 4th. IN the meantime *Nijuff Cawn*, the King's General, who ſupported by his perſonal abilities the remains of the royal authority, having defeated the Jauts in a pitched battle, and being recovered from the wounds which he then received, had marched to inveſt *Agra*, the capital city belonging to that tribe. The Vizier, who though little attached to the intereſt of the King, carried on his operations under that ſanction, could not upon this occaſion decline to contribute his aid, and either forward to make a ſhew of his ſervices or jealous of the undivided reputation which his perſonal rival was likely to gain by the capture of *Agra*, he diſpatched a part of his army, with ſome guns, to aſſiſt in carrying on the ſiege. *Nujuff Cawn*'s army alone conſiſted of above 40,000 men, yet being mutinous, ill appointed, and in want of the artillery proper for ſuch an undertaking, the ſiege was protracted longer than could have been expected from the indifferent ſtate of the fortifications, and the little defence made by the beſieged. The garriſon at laſt capitulated on the 15th of February, having obtained more honourable terms than their behaviour or ſituation ſeemed to entitle them to; and *Nujuff Cawn* took poſſeſſion of the fortreſs in the King's name.

Par. 5th. This event, added to their former ill fortune, threatened to complete the ruin of the Jauts, who are now ſtripped of all their extenſive dominions, and reduced to a few inconſiderable forts, with petty territories which ſurround them, while the minority of their preſent Chief, and the diſcord and treachery which reigns among the leading men, cuts off every proſpect of their being able to retrieve their affairs.

Par. 6th. During theſe tranſactions the Maratta Chiefs were ſo fully occupied with their internal diſputes as to be unable to take any part in the affairs of *Indoſtan*. *Ragonaut Row*, who had ſucceeded to the government of *Poona* on the murder of his nephew, was not got well eſtabliſhed in authority. The exceptionable means by which he obtained the command, the mutual diſtruſt which prevailed between him and the different leaders, and the low ſtate of his treaſury, unequal to the ſupport of his numerous forces, conſpired to render his ſituation very precarious. The Berar Chiefs, *Moodajee Boonſela* and *Shabajee Boonſela*, being at variance with one another, took different ſides on this occaſion; the firſt being courted by *Ragonaut Row*, joined with his forces; the latter ſeemed to attach himſelf to the intereſts of *Nizam Ally*, between whom and *Ragonaut* there were many cauſes of diſſention.

Par. 7th. The two Maratta Chiefs, at the head of 60,000 men, proceeded to invade the dominions of *Nizam Ally*, who met them at *Beder*, on the borders of his Country, with an army inferior in number; and ſeveral ſkirmiſhes enſued, but without coming to a general engagement. At laſt an interview being agreed on, ſome points of diſputes were waved by the Marattas, on *Nizam Ally* engaging to aſſiſt him with a ſtipulated number of troops in caſe of an emergency, and an accommodation for the preſent took place.

Par. 8th. *Ragonaut Row* being now diſtreſſed for money to pay his troops, and ſurrounded with a numerous and diſcontented army, whom it was dangerous to keep in a ſtate of inactivity, inſtead of returning to *Poona*, took the reſolution of marching Southward, and proceeded a conſiderable way beyond the river *Khiſta*, but with what deſign we are not well informed. His abſence from *Poona* gave room for the Chiefs diſaffected to his intereſt to carry on their intrigues; and a ſtrong party, headed by *Shabajee Boonſela*, and ſome of the principal officers, and ſecretly favoured by *Nizam Ally*, have at laſt thrown off the maſk, and declared their intention of depriving him of the Government. The widow of *Narrain Row*, the predeceſſor of *Ragonaut*, being far advanced in her pregnancy, has afforded them a pretext for their conduct; and having conveyed her to a place of ſafety, they have aſſumed the Government in her name, and that of her iſſue; have impriſoned the friends of *Ragonaut* and are employed in levying a very large army. As ſoon as news of this reached the Maratta camp, *Ragonaut* abandoned his

APPENDIX. No 30.

his deſigns of invaſion, and move l back towards his own Country. The iſſue of this affair is yet uncertain; but from the formidable appearance of the combination, the diſaffection of *Raghuut*'s forces, and the few reſources of which he is maſter there is the greateſt reaſon to conclude it will prove fatal to his Government.

Par. 9th In conſequence of the Vizier's requiſition, the ſecond brigade has lately marched into his dominions, on the terms mentioned in our former addreſs. They will probably be employed only in protecting his Country, while he is carrying on his operations againſt the Maratta diſtricts, as he is likely, in the preſent poſture of affairs, to meet with little interruption; and we ſhall ſtudiouſly avoid taking an active part againſt the Marattas, until we are favoured with your commands.

APPENDIX, No. 30.

Articles of Agreement between the King *Shah Alum* and the Company.

THE Nabob *Nudjm ul Dowla* agrees to pay his Majeſty, out of the revenues of *Bengal, Behar*, and *Oriſſa*, the ſum of twenty ſix lacks of rupees a year, without any deduction for batta on bills of exchange, by regular monthly payments, amounting to rupees 2,16 66 10. 9. per month; the firſt payment to commence from the firſt of September of the preſent year: and the Engliſh Company, in conſideration of his Majeſty's having been graciouſly pleaſed to grant them the Dewannee of *Bengal*, &c. do engage themſelves to be ſecurity for the regular payment of the ſame: it ſhall be paid month by month, from the factory at *Patna*, to Rajah *Shitabroy*, or whomſoever his Majeſty may think proper to nominate, that it may be forwarded by him to the Court But in caſe the territories of the aforeſaid Nabob ſhould be invaded by any foreign enemy, a deduction is then to be made out of the ſtipulated revenues, proportionable to the damage that may be ſuſtained.

In conſideration of *Nudjuff Khan*'s having joined the Engliſh forces, and acted in his Majeſty's ſervice in the late war, his Majeſty will be graciouſly pleaſed to allow him the ſum of two lacks of rupees a year, to be paid by equal monthly payments; the firſt payment to commence from the firſt of September of the preſent year: and in default thereof, the Engliſh Company, who are guarantees for the ſame, will make it good out of the revenues aſſigned to his Majeſty from the territories of *Bengal*. If the territories of *Bengal* ſhould at any time be invaded, and on that account a deduction be made out of the royal revenue, in ſuch caſe a proportionable deduction ſhall alſo be made out of *Nudjuff Khan*'s allowance.

Dated the 19th of Auguſt 1765.

Fort William, September 30th, 1765.

A true Copy.

Alex. Campbell, S. S. C.

Fort William, 17th March 1772.

Secret Department Conſultations.

By advices received from Sir *Robert Barker*, it appears, that *Nudjiff Khan* has joined the Marattas, intentionally to co-operate with them in their deſigns againſt *Sujah ul Dowlah*.

The Board are of opinion, that all payments on account of his ſtipend ſhould be ſuſpended for the preſent.

Agreed, therefore, directions be ſent to the Council at *Moorſhedabad* for that purpoſe, in the following Letter:

To *Samuel Middleton*, eſquire, Chief, &c. Council of Revenue at *Moorſhedabad*.

Gentlemen,

We deſire you will make no further payments on account of *Nudjiff Khan*'s ſtipend, until you receive particular directions from us.

Fort William, the 17th March 1772. We are, &c.

Extract, *Fort William*, the 7th October 1773.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. General Sir *Robert Barker*, being arrived at the Preſidency, takes his Seat at the Board. *William Alderſey*, *P. M. Ducrez*, *Henry Goodwin*, *John Graham*, *George Vanſittart*.

The General being arrived, the Board, agreeably to their reſolution in laſt Council, take into conſideration that part of the Governor's Report which relates to *Nudjiff Cawn*.

The General begs leave to record the following Minute on the ſubject:

General *Barker* takes this opportunity to enter a Minute in favour of *Nudjiff Cawn*. He can, however, but recapitulate the notice he has already taken of him in his addreſſes to the Board and Select Committee. The laſt campaign has convinced the General more decidedly that this perſon's integrity and zeal for the intereſt of the Company are to be depended on. It was more particularly evinced in a very critical ſituation, where he heſitated not to maintain a correſpondence with the General, and communicated to him the deſigns and councils of the Maratta Sirdars of the greateſt moment from the very midſt of his enemies, who were not ignorant of his attachment to our cauſe, and had ſpies conſtantly about his perſon. The General flatters himſelf the Board's public approbation of this deſerving man may hereafter prove beneficial to the Company's intereſt, and ſecure a powerful friend in caſes of neceſſity, ſince he is aſſured *Nudjiff Cawn* will ever conduct himſelf with the greateſt probity and gratitude.

(Signed) *R. Barker.*

The Preſident thinks it neceſſary to add, in explanation of the opinion he has given at large for the continuance of *Nudjuff Cawn*'s penſion, that he does not conſider *Nudjuff Cawn*'s claim as founded wholly on the treaty or ſtipulations made in favour of the King; but on thoſe engagements connected with his ſubſequent conduct, and particularly at that period in which the behaviour of the King furniſhed us with the firſt occaſion for withholding the pay of his tribute. It appearing that it was with reluctance, and even by perſuaſion on our part, that he left us to accompany the King; and that in all his behaviour, both before and ſince, he has ever manifeſted the firmeſt attachment to the Company. On theſe arguments he founds his opinion of *Nudjiff Cawn*'s claim to the Company's bounty, which it is his further opinion ſhould be continued to him alſo from political motives, as his actual preſence with the King may enable him to divert his Majeſty from engaging in any deſigns to our prejudice; and from the general benefit which the Company's affairs may derive from this proof of their generoſity to thoſe who have ſhewn attachment and fidelity towards them, he ſhould therefore be better pleaſed to put it on the footing of a retribution for paſt ſervices, than an acknowledgment of a fixed right. If the Board are of this opinion, it reſts with them to determine on the ſum to be allowed for his future penſion.

The Board agree with the Preſident: and,

Reſolve that the ſum of two lacks of rupees per annum, the former allowance to *Nudjuff Cawn*, be continued to him from this date until the pleaſure of the Company be known, but that the payment of his arrears be referred to the Company for their determination.

Mr. *Vanſittart* deſires his ſentiments may be recorded in the following words:

I am not only of opinion that *Nudjiff Cawn* ſhould receive an allowance from the Company on account of his paſt ſervices, and for political reaſons as pointed out by the Preſident, but I look upon him to be entitled to it in conſequence of Lord *Clive*'s engagement: two lacks were guaranteed to him by the Company, and he has done nothing to forfeit them; he did not (like the King) join

join the Marattas, in oppoſition to our Government, but acted ſtrictly by the General's advice; my own opinion muſt neceſſarily be, that he is entitled to the whole of his arrears; however, conſidering the preſent low circumſtances of the Company, I think that only two lacks ſhould be immediately paid to him, and the ſame ſum be continued annually, and that what further arrears may be due to him, ſhould remain ſuſpended till we receive the orders of the Court of Directors.

Extract of Secret Letter from *Bengal*; dated the 10th November 1773.

Par. 13. You would obſerve in the Preſident's Report, that an application was made to him at *Benares* from *Nudjiff Cawn*, for a continuance of his penſion of two lacks of rupees per annum, ſettled upon him by Lord *Clive*, and that he had referred it to the determination of the Board.

Conſ. 7th Oct. 14. When his penſion was ſtopt by order of Council, 17th March 1772, it was then the received opinion that he had voluntarily accompanied the King in his expedition to *Delhi*, without the conſent or approbation of our Government; but it now appearing that it was with reluctance, and at the perſuaſion of the General, that he took that ſtep, and alſo that he has continued ever ſince to manifeſt a ſincere attachment to the Company, and a deſire of being uſeful to them in his preſent ſituation, we thought it juſt as well as political to continue his penſion to him, as a reward for his paſt ſervices, and to impreſs an idea in the minds of the people of the generoſity of the Company towards thoſe who are faithful in their attachment to them. We have accordingly ordered two lacks of rupees per annum to be paid to him as a yearly penſion, from the 7th October, till your pleaſure be known, referring the payment of his arrears to your particular determination.

APPENDIX, No. 31.

No. 21.—Copy of the fifth Article of the Treaty between the Nabob *Shujah ul Dowla*, the Nabob *Nudjum ul Dowla*, and the Engliſh Company; executed at *Illiabad* the 16th of Auguſt 1765.

HIS Highneſs *Shujah ul Dowla* engages, in the moſt ſolemn manner, to continue *Bukwant Sing* in the Zemindaries of *Benares*, *Gauzepoor*, and all thoſe diſtricts he poſſeſſed at the time he came over to the late Nabob *Jaffier Ally Khan* and the Engliſh, on condition of his paying the ſame revenue as heretofore.

APPENDIX, No. 32.

The Company's Seal.

(Signed) *E. Baber*, Secretary.

Articles of a Treaty and Agreement between the Governor and Council of *Fort William*, on the Part of the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and the Nabob *Mebarek ul Dowla*.

On the Part of the Company.

WE, the Governor and Council, do engage to ſecure to the Nabob *Mebarek ul Dowla*, the Soubahdarry of the provinces of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, and to ſupport him therein with the Company's forces againſt all his enemies.

On the Part of the Nabob.

Article 1.—The Treaty which my father formerly concluded with the Company, upon his firſt acceſſion to the Nizamut, engaging to regard the honour and reputation of the Company, and of the Governor and Council, as his own, and that entered into with my brothers, the Nabobs *Nazim ul Dowla* and *Syef ul Dowla*, the ſame Treaties, as far as is conſiſtent with the true ſpirit, intent, and meaning thereof, I do hereby ratify and confirm. APPENDIX No. 32.

Article 2.—The King has been graciouſly pleaſed to grant unto the Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company the Dewannee-ſhip of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, as a free gift, for ever; and I, having an entire confidence in them, and in their ſervants ſettled in this Country, that nothing whatever be propoſed or carried into execution by them, derogating from my honour, intereſt, and the good of my Country, do therefore, for the better conducting the affairs of the Soubahdarry, and promoting my honour and intereſt, and that of the Company, in the beſt manner, agree, that the protecting the provinces of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, and the force ſufficient for that purpoſe, be entirely left to their direction and good management, in conſideration of their paying the King *Shah Allum*, by monthly payments, as by Treaty agreed on, the ſum of rupees two lacks ſixteen thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty-ſix, ten annas, and nine pice (rupees 2,16,666. 10. 9.); and to me, *Mebarek ul Dowla*, the annual ſtipend of rupees thirty-one lacks eighty one thouſand nine hundred and ninety-one, nine annas)—(31,81,991.9.) *viz.* the ſum of rupees fifteen lacks eighty-one thouſand nine hundred and ninety-one, nine annas (15.81.991.9.) for my houſe, ſervants, and other expences indiſpenſably neceſſary; and the remaining ſum of rupees ſixteen lacks (rupees 16,00,000) for the ſupport of ſuch ſepoys, peons, and bercundaſſes, as may be thought proper for my Aſſwarry only, but on no account ever to exceed that amount.

Article 3.—The Nabob *Minaub Dowla*, who was, at the inſtance of the Governor and Gentlemen of the Council, appointed Naib of the Provinces, and inveſted with the management of affairs, in conjunction with *Mah Rajah Doolubram* and *Juggat Seat*, ſhall continue in the ſame poſt, and with the ſame authority; and having a perfect confidence in him, I moreover agree to let him have the diſburſing of the above ſum of Rupees ſixteen lacks, for the purpoſes above-mentioned.

This Agreement (by the bleſſing of God) ſhall be inviolably obſerved for ever.

Dated this 21ſt day of March, in the year of our Lord 1770.

(Signed) *John Cartier*,
Richard Becher,
William Alderſey,
Claud Ruſſel,
Charles Floyer,
John Reed,
Francis Hare,
Joſeph Jekyl,
Thomas Lane,
Richard Barwell.

A true Copy.

(Signed.) *W. Wynne*, Secretary.

Extract of the Company's General Letter to *Bengal*; dated the 10th April 1771.

Par. 36. When we advert to the encomiums you have paſſed on your own abilities and prudence, and on your attention to the Company's intereſt (in the expoſtulations you have thought proper to make on our appointment of Commiſſioners to ſuperintend our general affairs in *India*) we cannot but obſerve with aſtoniſhment, that an event of ſo much importance as the death of the Nabob *Syef ul Dowlah*, and the eſtabliſhment of a ſucceſſor in ſo great a degree of nonage, ſhould not have been attended with thoſe advantages for the Company which ſuch a circumſtance offered to your view.

37. We mean not here to diſapprove the preſerving the ſucceſſion in the family of *Mir Jaffier*; on the contrary, both juſtice and policy recommend a meaſure which

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which at once corresponds with the cuſtoms and inclinations of the people of *Bengal*; but when we conſider the ſtate of minority of the now Soubah, we know not on what grounds it could have been thought neceſſary to continue to him the ſtipend allotted to his adult predeceſſors.

38. Convinced as we are, that an allowance of ſixteen lacks per annum will be ſufficient for the ſupport of the Nabob's ſtate and rank while a minor, we muſt conſider every addition thereto as ſo much to be waſted on a herd of paraſites and ſycophants, who will continually ſurround him; or at leaſt to be hoarded up, a conſequence ſtill more pernicious to the Company. You are therefore, during the nonage of the Nabob, to reduce his annual ſtipend to ſixteen lacks of rupees; and this we have the greater reaſon to require, as we find ourſelves ſubjected to the payment of large ſums, due from the revenues of the Dewannee, before the Company became poſſeſſed thereof, on account of the navy donation, and the arrears of that to the army, the balance due for reſtitution to Europeans, Colonel *Munro*'s demand of two lacks, the debt due to *Bolackidaſs*, and the annual ſum of one lack, for ten years, which we have agreed to pay to *Juggat Seat*; all which preſs on us with ſuch united force, that our treaſury will be unable to ſatisfy theſe ſeveral demands, without wounding our commercial intereſts, and endangering our poſſeſſions in *Bengal*. Being once relieved from this load of incumbrances, the ſavings we may expect from this reduction, will properly become a fund for military exigences, which fund being ſolely applicable to the defence of the Provinces, will contribute no leſs to the Nabob's future benefit than to that of the Company.

39. At a time when every juſtifiable meaſure ſhould be adopted for availing the Public and the Company of all the advantage we had in proſpect from our poſſeſſion of the Dewanny, we cannot but reflect on the diſſipation of a conſiderable part thereof, by the allowances to the Nabob's miniſters.

40. And here we muſt obſerve, that how great ſoever the application of *Mahomet Reza Cawn*, and his adherence to the Company's intereſt, may have been, his rewards have been more than adequate thereto; and as the buſineſs of the collections of our revenues, when they ſhall have been thoroughly inveſtigated by the ſupervifors appointed for that purpoſe, will require little or no aſſiſtance from that Miniſter, we muſt deem the continuance of his preſent ſalary as a waſte of thoſe reſources which are become ſo eſſentially neceſſary both for the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions and the extenſion of your inveſtments; it is therefore our pleaſure, that the annual allowance of nine lacks, which he has hitherto enjoyed, be no longer continued to him; but as the minority of the Nabob will make it requiſite for you to appoint, as his Guardian, a perſon of experience in the affairs of Government, and of approved attachment to the Company's intereſts, your choice muſt reſt on *Mahomet Reza Cawn*, and you are to allow him, whilſt in that ſtation, a ſalary of five lacks of rupees per annum, which we conſider not only as ſuitable to ſuch a ſtation, but as a munificent reward for the ſervices he may render the Company in the execution of his office.

41. The annual allowance to *Juggat Seat*, as aſſiſtant to *Mahomet Reza Cawn*, has been a drain on our revenues without the leaſt benefit from his adminiſtration, for we are well aſſured that he has never afforded us a ſingle inſtance of ſervice; his allowance therefore muſt be immediately ſtruck off. But with regard to *Roydoolub*, though we cannot expect from him any ſervices equal to his preſent appointment, have yet, in conſideration of the part he has long held in the affairs of Government, and his advanced age, we are diſpoſed to continue the ſalary he now enjoys; but on his death this allowance is not to be given to any perſon whatever.

42. As the reduction of the Nabob's ſtipend is adventitious and temporary, we by no means intend that the commiſſion of 2½ per cent. granted to our ſervants on our nett territorial revenues, ſhould be increaſed by this alteration, and therefore the former ſtipend of thirty-ſix lacks muſt ſtill be deducted from the groſs amount of theſe revenues. In like manner, no commiſſion muſt be drawn on the ſums which may be retrenched from the appointments to the Nabob's miniſters.

43. Having already apprized you of the purpoſes to which we mean to appropriate the ſavings above-mentioned, we have only to direct, that when the navy and army donations, the debt due to *Bolackidaſs*, and the ſtipulated payment to *Juggat Seat*, ſhall have been wholly ſatisfied and reimburſed to us out of the aggregate reductions before-mentioned, ſuch further ſums as ſhall ariſe therefrom are to be applied from time to time to clear the balance unpaid to the claimants of the reſtitution fund, and the donation of two lacks to Colonel *Munro*, in ſuch proportions as the reſpective claims may bear to each other, until the whole ſhall be diſcharged; but you are to take notice, that the principal only of the ſums due from the Circar are to be conſidered and allowed in the payments here ordered.

Extract of the Secret Letter from *Bengal* to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 10th November 1772.

9. A chain of concurring circumſtances induced the Vizier inſtantly to cloſe with ſo flattering propoſals; the principal links of which ſeemed to be the acceſſion of ſo large a tract of country to his own, and his ſolicitude to extirpate a family with whom he had long held an hereditary enmity; and it is ſaid, he was even inclinable to take advantage of the preſent diſtreſs of the Rohillas, and poſſeſs himſelf of their dominions the moment the Marrattas ſhould be obliged to leave it—we believe the General was a principal means of diverting him from a ſcheme ſo little conſiſtent with prudence or equity.

11. Convinced at length of the impropriety of making the Marattas parties in any cauſe with himſelf, he concluded a Treaty with the Rohillas; in which it was ſtipulated, that in conſideration of their paying him 40 lacks, he was to aſſiſt them in future againſt their common enemy, and reeſtabliſh them in the poſſeſſions which had been wreſted from them.

12. *Zebita Cawn*, with the ſmall remains of his army, together with *Hafez Rhamet*, who had thus thrown themſelves into the Nabob's protection, and had paid him a viſit in his encampment on the frontier, the better to convince him of their ſincerity, and the reliance they repoſed in his honour, were now diſmiſſed with the greateſt profeſſions of cordiality, although it had been particularly required of the Vizier by the Marattas, that he ſhould deliver them into their hands.

13. During theſe tranſactions, his Majeſty was not in a ſituation much to be envied.—We have already ſhewn the little deference which the Marattas paid him after their victory; neither has he ſince experienced the leaſt alteration. His anxiety, which probably gratitude might have prompted, to prevent their commencing hoſtilities with the Vizier and the Company, could not be very pleaſing to them, and if we may form a judgment from his Letters at this juncture, he was very deſirous of reuniting himſelf with his former allies.—There is however, little dependance to be placed in the aſſertions of a man, who at the time he is making the moſt avowed profeſſions of the ſincerity of his attachment to the Nabob and the Engliſh, and who, when an invaſion of their poſſeſſions was propoſed in the Maratta Councils, publicly and ſtrongly remonſtrated againſt it, was ſecretly giving it as his opinion, that diſſenſions, by ſome means or other, ought previouſly to be ſown between them, in order to enſure any certainty of ſucceſs, and that when this could be effected, the royal approbation ſhould not be wanting.

14. The Marattas have not failed of availing themſelves of every advantage which the weakneſs and diſtreſſed circumſtances of this Prince too unavoidably gives

gives them.—They have obliged him, very reluctantly, to give them Sunnuds for *Myrutt* (a tract of country which preſerves the communication with their own); and no doubt they will continue, as in the preſent inſtance, to exact his compliance with every meaſure, no matter how diſgraceful to him, that carries a tendency to raiſe them to that ſummit of power which they have for ſo many years, and ſo effectually, been exerting themſelves to acquire.

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APPENDIX No. 33.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 7 October 1773.—Preſent, The honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident. *Wm Alderſey, P. M. Dacres, Henry Goodwin, Jno Graham, George Vanſittart*, eſquires.

The General's diſſent.

THE General further begs leave to enter his diſſent to the Preſident's meaſures at *Benares*, as follows:

General *Barker* not being preſent at the Conſultation of the 4th October, when the Preſident laid before them the reſult of his negociations with the Vizier at *Benares*, and the Board having recorded their entire approbation of the meaſures adopted by him in his congreſs, and particularly of the Treaty concluded on between the Vizier and the Company, the General, having had reaſon to differ in opinion with the reſt of the Board, as a Member of the Adminiſtration thinks it his duty to diſſent to the meaſures adopted by the Preſident, as well as the aforementioned Treaty; and to lay before the Board his reaſons for ſo doing.

The arguments made uſe of by the Preſident, for poſſeſſing ourſelves of the provinces of *Allahabad* and *Corah*, and afterwards ceding them to the Vizier for fifty lacks of rupees, do not appear to the General to be ſufficient; and conſequently he deems this meaſure repugnant to the articles of the Treaty of *Allahabad*, between the Right honourable Lord *Clive* and his Majeſty *Shaw Allum*, in the year 1765; by which treaty the provinces of *Allahabad* and *Corah* were abſolutely and poſitively ceded to the King, without any reſervation; and in conſequence and by virtue of this ceſſion, the Company were to hold the Dewannee of the provinces of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, in perpetuity. The General forms this opinion from the right which he conceives the King undoubtedly had, of doing what he judged proper with thoſe provinces, without any reference to the Engliſh. Nor does there appear in the Treaty of 1765, any expreſſion from which an idea can be formed to indicate that thoſe provinces were to revert to the Engliſh under any circumſtances whatſoever. Nor can he agree, that his Majeſty having repaired to his capital, after the repeated invitations and ſolicitations he has made to the Engliſh Company to attend him there, can be given as a ſufficient motive for our taking from him theſe provinces, and ceding them to another; ſince it does not appear that any ſuch reſtrictions were laid upon the King by the Treaty of 1765; but on the contrary, that it was a free and voluntary gift, in conſequence of the aforeſaid grant of the Dewannee to the Company.

The General agrees with the Preſident, that to have kept theſe provinces, allowing them to have reverted to the Company upon his Majeſty's removing his place of reſidence, would not only have been inconſiſtent with the repeated commands of the Court of Directors, but would alſo have been impolitical for the reaſons he aſſigned; nevertheleſs, the General judges a more advantageous agreement might have been made for the Company, than the ſale of them for fifty lacks of rupees only. It is certain that theſe two provinces can produce twenty-five lacks of rupees per annum. If this is the caſe, which is too generally known to admit of a doubt, the Vizier has purchaſed them for two years revenue; a purchaſe by much too cheap in the General's opinion for two ſuch provinces, conſidering the heavy expences which has accrued to the Company, over and above the extra allowance made by the Vizier for the charge of the troops, to put us in poſſeſſion, and to afford us a plea for the ſale of them.

The General is of opinion that more ſolid advantages might have ariſen to the Company, by an exchange of country, in putting the Company in poſſeſſion of all thoſe lands lying ſouth of the *Ganges*, in the Zemindarry of *Gauzipore*, including that important fortreſs of *Chunar Gur*; and however averſe the Vizier might have appeared to ſuch a propoſal, the importance of the two provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, the poſſeſſion of which, it is well known, he has been aiming at with indefatigable perſeverance for more than ſeven years, would, it is probable, prevail over every other objection, had the Preſident perſevered in this demand, which, he informs the Board, he only ſlightly propoſed. The Vizier was certainly in the right when he acknowledged that ſuch an exchange would have defeated his purpoſe; which undoubtedly is to accumulate as much power, wealth, and country, as he poſſibly can, and render himſelf a ſtill more formidable and dangerous neighbour than he has hitherto been. At any rate the General is of opinion, that beſides the immediate advance of a ſum of money, a continuation of half the revenues ariſing from thoſe provinces ſhould have been obtained for the Company for a limited number of years, to anſwer for the heavy expences attending the garriſon of *Chunar Gur*, with its magazine of ſtores, ſo ready at all times for the ſecurity of thoſe provinces, inſtead of the agreement for the extra expences, which are only to be paid when our troops are abſolutely in the field; and we are equally bound by the Treaty of 1765, to defend theſe provinces, with the reſt of his dominions, ſince they are included by their becoming a part of them.

But the General has already declared, he deems the ceſſion of *Allahabad* and *Corah* to the Vizier, a meaſure repugnant to the Treaty of 1765, with the King *Shah Allum*. And he further conceives, that equal advantages might have ariſen to the Company without any infringement of that Treaty, ſince his Majeſty would readily have agreed to give up his ſtipend of 26 lacks per annum from the Company (already withheld from him) for the reinſtatement of thoſe provinces, and have conferred the actual Sunnuds or Grants for the Soubah of *Bengal*, *Babar, and Oriſſa*, to the Company for ever; which Sunnuds it is now more than probable we ſhall ſoon ſee in the hands of other nations.

As it may appear extraordinary to the Board, that the General, after having been deſired by them to meet the Preſident at *Benares*, in order to aſſiſt at the negociations, he ſhould diſſent ſo very materially to the preſent Treaty, the General thinks it incumbent upon him to declare to the Board, that he did, in conſequence of their Letter, repair to *Benares*, and met the Preſident; but that ſo far from aſſiſting, or being required to aſſiſt, he never was preſent at any of the conferences held between the Preſident and the Vizier on the ſubject of the commiſſion, excepting the laſt day, when every thing had been concluded on, he was deſired to attend to ſee the Treaty executed between the Preſident and the Vizier. The General cannot help regretting, that he was called from the army for ſuch a purpoſe only, ſince the Natives of *Hindoſtan*, who judge of things from their appearance, without reflecting on cauſes, muſt view his conſequence in a leſſer degree than any of his predeceſſors, whom they have been taught to look on with reverence and reſpect.

The General did expect, conſidering his ſituation in the ſervice, at the head of the army, and a Member of the Board, together with the ſhare he has had in the political tranſaction of affairs, to have been included in the commiſſion for negociating with the Vizier on theſe matters; but he never ſuſpected his attendance at *Benares* ſhould be required for no other viſible purpoſe than to leſſen him in the eyes of the Natives.

When Lord *Clive* was deputed to treat with the King and the Vizier, General *Carnac* attended, and aſſiſted at all conferences, between his Lordſhip and thoſe Powers; and

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and ſo much did his Lordſhip think it compatible with the good of the ſervice, to raiſe a reſpect in the Natives for the character of the General, with whom the military tranſactions were to be intruſted, that he not only conſulted with him in the preſence of them, but joined alſo the General's ſignature as a principal to the then Treaties concluded on. When they have ſeen General *Smith* included in a deputation with two other Members of the Board, it cannot be wondered at that they ſhould (which the Vizier did in the preſence of the General) expreſs his aſtoniſhment at his being entirely excluded from every concern in the preſent negociations.

The General will not preſume to account for the motives which induced the Board to place ſo remarkable a ſhare of confidence and truſt in the Preſident, as to appoint him their ſole agent for negociating ſuch important matters, when the Commander in Chief of their forces, and three other Members of the Board, were preſent. But conſidering however that all the preceding Commanders of the army have been included in tranſactions of this ſort, the General hopes the Board will not eſteem it a preſumption in him to requeſt, that, if there has been any part of his conduct which has given occaſion for ſo pointed an excluſion, that they will be candid enough to inform him, in order that he may have an opportunity of vindicating his conduct, he flatters himſelf, to the ſatisfaction of the Board. At the ſame time, he cannot help declaring, that he has already had an opportunity of ſeeing the effects of the ſlight which has been ſhewn to his ſtation in the ſervice, inſomuch, that he is convinced the influence and importance which it is neceſſary every Britiſh Commander ſhould be poſſeſſed of, who may be entruſted with military operations in this country, connected with the Company's allies, is deſtroyed in him by this act; and however he might aſſume a dignity in him to ſupport a character apparently in no eſteem with the Government, it can only tend to create apprehenſion from the perſon detrimental to the intereſt of the ſervice, without raiſing any reſpect for the character.

The General will dwell no longer on the ſubject in this place, or fill the Conſultation with remarks which cannot now contribute to remove what is paſt; but he has judged it highly neceſſary that his ſentiments on the treatment he has received ſhould appear on the Records of your Conſultation.

(Signed) *R^t Barker.*

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Extract of Bengal Secret Conſultations, the 9th October 1775.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident. Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, *Philip Francis*, eſquires.

MR. *Tayler* having been requeſted to attend the Board this day, agreeable to the Reſolutions of the laſt Council, attends accordingly.

Read again the Letter from the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, dated 23d Auguſt, and recorded in the laſt Conſultation.

Mr. *Tayler* acquaints the Board, that having drawn up in his paſſage from *Bombay*, ſuch repreſentations as he thought neceſſary to make to this Government, on the ſubjects which he has been deputed to treat on by the Preſident and Council of *Bombay*, he begs leave to deliver them in; and they are read as follows:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The honourable the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* having deputed me to repreſent to your Honour, &c. the motives of their proceedings, in their engagements with the Paiſhwah *Ragonaut Ballajee Row*; the ſituation of affairs there; the danger and diſcredit that muſt attend their Treaty with him being utterly cancelled; the general intereſts of the Company at that Preſidency, with other matters as mentioned in their Addreſs of the 22d ultimo, I ſhall now proceed to enter as fully and clearly as I am able on thoſe ſeveral ſubjects.

The better to explain them, it will be neceſſary to advert to a period antecedent to that in which theſe engagements commenced; for this reaſon, though it may at firſt appear foreign to my preſent purpoſe, yet I truſt your Honour, &c. will not deem this recapitulation an unneceſſary one.

In the ancient conſtitution of the Maratta empire, the affairs of it were conducted under the ſupreme authority of the Rajah, by a Council conſiſting of eight perſons, being the eight principal officers of the ſtate; by the laſt account I have ſeen of this Council, it conſiſted of Brachmins, who were generally employed in all civil departments of the ſtate—the command of armies and other military matters were confided to the Maratta or Rajpute caſt.

The principal of theſe Miniſters in power, was the Paiſhwah, which literally means he who precedes the reſt; the nature of his office reſembles that of the Mahometan Vizier.

Piſwanath Ballajee, a Brachmin, born in the diſtrict of *Rahapore*, from an inferior ſtate in the Rugh of *Sahoo* Rajah, roſe by his abilities to the high office of Paiſhwah. By degrees he ſo far gained on the confidence of the Rajah, as to perſuade him to diveſt himſelf of all cares of Government, and reſign them entirely to him. *Sahoo* accordingly inveſted him with all the enſigns of authority and powers incident to the Rajahſhip—all orders, and every detail of government, iſſued immediately from the Paiſhwah; who was further ſtyled by the Rajah, Pundit Pradan, or Chief and Elect of the Pundits; this form of Government ſubſiſts to this day. On the death of a Paiſhwah, his ſucceſſor goes to *Sattarah*, in order to be formally inveſted with the Sirpaw of office by the Rajah. —There is in the Poonah Durbar, a perſon nominally eſteemed in ſome degree ſuperior even to the Paiſhwah; it is the Pretinnery, who is the delegate and immediate repreſentative of the Rajah; and formerly his fiat was neceſſary to give a proper validity to all acts of Government.—Beſides the ſupreme authority, the Sahoo Rajah had alſo reſerved to himſelf a conſiderable degree of actual force; the revenues of a large diſtrict were collected by him, with which he maintained a conſiderable body of troops under his own immediate command.

The Paiſhwah, *Kiſſwanath Ballajee*, had well availed himſelf of the indulgence of the Rajah, by creating a number of adherents; for we find his ſon and ſucceſſor *Bajerow Ballajee*, poſſeſſed in fact of the ſupreme power in the Maratta empire, as he paid little or no regard to his prince. The Rajah indeed poſſeſſed at firſt entire liberty of perſon; but whether it was that the Paiſhwah did it more effectually to ſecure his power, or that the intrigues carried on againſt him rendered it neceſſary for his own ſafety, the Rajah was ſoon confined to *Sattarah*; at his death he was ſucceeded by the preſent Rajah *Ram*, his adopted ſon, who continuing under the ſame reſtrictions as his father, the Rajah has ever ſince been a mere name, an image of authority in the Maratta empire.

The conqueſts of *Chinnajee Oppa*, brother to *Baajinn*, firſt engaged the attention of the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* towards the Marattas. By the acquiſition of *Salſette* and *Baſſein*, they became our neighbours, and as the Paiſhwah's family alſo early turned their thoughts towards the eſtabliſhment of a marine, it was foreſeen, that ſooner or later ſome points of diſcuſſion muſt ariſe, which might lead to diſputes; it was therefore thought prudent to prevent them by ſtating our rights in a Treaty. As the Rajah had formerly ceded to *Bajirow* in his own right, all the countries conquered from the Europeans, it was feared the attempts of his brother *Chinnajee Oppa* might not ſtop at the Portugueze ſettlements; the Preſident and Council ſeemed to think they might effectually

tually ſecure themſelves by an application to the Rajah, and a Gentleman was ſent therefore to him; but judging from the true ſtate of matters of that Court, it was juſtly to be feared an offer to treat immediately with the Rajah, might bring down on us the reſentment of the Paiſhwah, ſundry articles of agreement were concluded with *Chinnajee Oppa*, in behalf of his brother *Bajerow*. Since that time, the Rajah has never been thought of; but finding the Paiſhwah in abſolute poſſeſſion of all power, we have conſtantly, in all tranſactions with the Marattas, applied to and treated with them, as though they were the lawful princes of the Empire.

The wiſdom and policy of *Bajerow* firmly eſtabliſhed in his family the power they had uſurped; and accordingly on his demiſe he was peaceably ſucceeded in the Peſhwaſhip by his eldeſt ſon *Ballajee Bajerow*, more generally known by the appellation of *Nanah*; who, in the year 1761, was alſo regularly ſucceeded by his ſon *Mhadarow Bullajee*, then a minor of 14 years.

On the death of *Nanah* his brother *Ragonath Ballajee Row* conducted the affairs of the Maratta Government as Regent during the minority of his nephew, the young Paiſhwah. There is a Treaty ſubſiſting between the Engliſh and *Mhadarow*, formed under the adminiſtration of *Ragoba*; he conducted matters during the critical ſituation in which the invaſion of the Nizam had plunged the Marattas; and there is no act to prove that ever he ſought to embrace the opportunity of the poſſeſſion of power to ſecure it to himſelf for ever, in prejudice to the rights of his nephew.

In all the civil departments of Government, the Paiſhwahs continued to employ the caſt of Brachmins; by the influence this gave them, they raiſed immenſe fortunes. In order to give that ſecurity to their perſons which a large fortune in this country always endangers, their next ſteps were to create to themſelves a conſequence; this they ſought to effect by dividing the family of the Paiſhwah, and occaſionally ſiding with either party as policy directed. Hence early began thoſe ſcenes of intrigues from whence ſprung the different factions and diviſions which firſt diſcloſed themſelves in the minority of *Mhadarow*, and have nearly brought the power of the Paiſhwah to a total decline; on the ruins of which has aroſe the high influence of thoſe perſons now known in the Poonah Government by the appellation of the Miniſters.

The wiſe and juſt adminiſtration of *Ragoba* would have totally defeated the views thoſe men had formed, of benefitting themſelves by the minority of *Mhadoorow*: they therefore exerted every artifice and intrigue to deprive *Ragoba* of power. *Gopicaboy*, the widow of *Nannah*, was a woman deeply given to intrigues of every kind; and her ſcandalous licentiouſneſs juſtly attracted the reproach of one ſo nearly concerned in the honour of the family, as her huſband's brother. Hence firſt aroſe the bitter inveteracy of *Gopicaboy* to *Ragoba*. The Miniſters availed themſelves of theſe circumſtances, and of her influence with her young ſon, to breed a coolneſs between the uncle and nephew; and which ended in a declared breach in the total deprivation of power, and at length, in ſome degree, in the confinement of *Ragoba*.

Their ends thus compaſſed in this point, they induſtriouſly adverted to the primary object to which this was only intended to lead. All favours of Government now flowed from the Miniſters, and as none are granted in this country without a valuable conſideration, by means of preſents and peculations, theſe men increaſed their fortunes and influence to an immenſe degree, whilſt from the withholding of the tribute by the northern Jaghierdars, and by ſuch other of the Pundits, on various pretences, as could purchaſe friends to protect them, the treaſury of the Paiſhwah became almoſt exhauſted; and as money alone commands troops, his conſequence would have declined with it, but *Mhadoorow*, as he advanced in years, ſhewed a firmneſs and abilities which made him dreaded and reſpected by everyone. In the ſhort time he governed, his wiſe conduct and great parts procured him the reſpect of every Power around him; and as he well knew the deſigns of the Miniſters, there is no doubt, had his life been longer, he would have effectually reſtored the influence of the Paiſhwah; but unfortunately for it, he died in November 1772, at the age of 25, leaving no children.

The gradual progreſs of his diſorder giving him time to reflect on the conſequence of his death, *Mahdoo Row*, on perceiving his end approach, revolved ſeriouſly in his mind the fate and ſituation of his family: his brother, *Narrow Row*, who was to ſucceed him, he knew to be a weak, haſty young man, eaſily ſwayed by any Councils, and particularly under the influence of his mother *Gopicaboy*, whoſe deadly hatred to *Ragoba* he was alſo well apprized of: he was ſenſible of the ambitious and independent views of ſeveral leading miniſters, which, if not well counteracted, muſt in time wreſt from his family the power, and perhaps the office, of Paiſhwah. In this dilemma, nothing better preſented itſelf, than to repoſe a confidence in *Ragoba*. It was true, that *Ragoba* had lately made ſome ſecret ſteps towards liberty, and an acceſſion of power; but, reflecting on the appearance of his own approaching end, and knowing the influence that would guide his brother's actions, *Ragoba*'s attempt appeared to *Mahdoo Row* only a prudent act of ſelf-preſervation: he therefore called them to him, explained his views, remembered them of their anceſtors, and, joining their hands, conjured *Ragoba* to protect the young man, adviſed *Narrow Row* to confide in their uncle, and never to liſten to the inſinuations of their mother *Gopicaboy*, whoſe deadly hatred and revenge he himſelf had experienced would ſtop at nothing to be gratified.

For a ſhort time after the deceaſe of his brother, *Narrow Row* carried it fair to his uncle; it was ſettled that all buſineſs ſhould be conducted by *Rageba*, as Naib, ſubject to the controul of *Narrow Row*; and accordingly, when the Rajah inveſted the latter with the Sirpaw of Paiſhwah, he conferred on the former that of Naib. This harmony was however ſoon interrupted by the intrigues of the Miniſters, but eſpecially by the aſcendancy of *Gopicaboy* over her ſon.

Mahdoo Row had adviſed his brother chiefly to regard the Councils of *Saccaram Bappoo*, the Duan; but it ſeems his inclinations rather led him to attach himſelf to *Nana Furneze*, whoſe age and diſpoſition were better ſuited to his own; hence aroſe two parties in the miniſtry. His confidants in the intereſt of *Gopicaboy* had inſtilled into him jealouſies of his uncle; the hatred of this ſingular and enterprizing woman had received an additional force from his adoption of *Imrut Row*, a young lad, in ſome meaſure connected with *Moodagee Bonſalo*. This adoption ſhe repreſented as contrary to the cuſtoms of their caſt, while he had nephews of his own; as ſingularly unjuſt, by depriving his own family of the riches he might die poſſeſſed of; and impolitic, as it might in time tend to deprive their race of the Peſhwahſhip; his connections alſo with ſo powerful a chief as *Moodajee Bonſello* was likewiſe hinted as a circumſtance to prove his own ambitious deſigns. By theſe arts and inſinuations, the good councils of his late brother were entirely effaced from the mind of the young Paiſhwah; he deprived his uncle of all power; then made him a ſort of priſoner at large; and, on pretence of *Ragoba*'s concerting a plan with the Vackeel of *Hyder* for his eſcape, he, on the 11th April 1773, cloſely confined him to a chamber in the Durbar, debarring him, as well as he could, of all acceſs.

Had *Narrow Row* poſſeſſed the leaſt degree of prudence, he might have remained ſecure in the Paiſhwahſhip; for though, by the inſtigation of the mother, and the choice he had made of confidants, he had created to himſelf a deadly enemy in the old Duan, *Saccaram Bappoo*, yet the influence and abilities of the *Furnezes*, *Nannah* and *Morabah*; and their adherents, were more than a counterpoize to him; but without the leaſt ſhare of judgment,

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judgment, and wholly devoted to low vices and pleaſures, *Narrow Row* paid not the leaſt regard to any one; on the contrary, he behaved in ſo ſenſeleſsly imperious, and diſregardful a manner, even to the Miniſters in his own party, that they became lukewarm in his intereſts, and in time ſuffered him to fall a ſacrifice to the machinations of his enemies.

It is ſaid that by means of *Modajee Bonſello*, the Duan *Saccaram* received advice of an intention to aſſaſſinate him and *Ragoba* at the inſtigation of *Gopicaboy*. Certain it is, that this woman was well known to have been conſtantly adviſing her ſon to deprive him of the Duanſhip, which was the firſt ſtep to the loſs of riches, and perhaps of life. From this inſtant *Saccaram* and his party ſet about concerting the means of depoſing *Narrow Row*, releaſing *Ragoba*, and placing him in the Paiſhwahſhip.

Chiefly by the means of the intervention of the Duan, *Mahommed Eſorf* and *Summerſing*, two Subadars, were won over to execute the deed. On the 18th Auguſt 1773, at two in the afternoon, they led their party of 500 men to the Durbar, under pretence of being muſtered; they forced the gates, and put the guard to the ſword. *Narrow Row*, apprehenſive of their deſign, ran to his uncle *Ragoba*, where the aſſaſſins found him, begging him to take the Government, but ſpare his life.

Ragoba, it ſeems, wiſhed to ſave him, as nothing more than his impriſonment was ever meant; but owing to the reſentment of a ſlave of the family, whom *Narrow Row* had cauſed to be publicly whipped, his death was determined on. The aſſaſſins threatened *Ragoba* to deſtroy both, if he did not inſtantly looſe his nephew; he then thruſt him from his arms, and the young man ſoon expired at his feet. On the death of his nephew, *Ragoba* was inſtantly complimented by the Duan, and other miniſters in *Poonah*, as Paiſhwah; he proceeded to the diſcharge of the office. *Nannah* and *Morabath Furneezes*, with ſome in their party, on learning the late event, had inſtantly quitted *Poonah*, fearing they might become a ſacrifice to their enemies; but *Ragoba*, equally ſenſible of the deſign of all the Miniſters, had no particular attachment or averſion to any of them; and therefore found means to calm the apprehenſions of the *Furneezes*; who returned, and reſuming their former offices, every thing for a time ſeemed to wear the appearance of peace. *Ragoba* ſent his ſon *Jumrut Row* to *Sattarah*, to obtain from the Rajah, in his name, the inveſtiture of the Peſhwahſhip; which was accordingly granted, with every requiſite form and ſolemnity. Every officer in the Maratta ſtate then at *Poonah*, paid *Ragoba* the uſual compliments on the occaſion; and he was publicly and ſolemnly acknowledged by us as Paiſhwah, in a viſit eſpecially paid him by Mr. *Moſtyn*, a Member of the Bombay Board, appointed by the Honourable Company to be their Reſident at *Poonah*, accompanied by the uſual preſents, and the ſame proffers of our friendſhip made him, and engagements to maintain the articles of peace and alliance entered into with his anceſtor *Bajerow*, as had ever been uſual on the acceſſion of a new Paiſhwah.

The appearance of tranquillity between *Ragoba* and the Miniſters was of no great duration. Senſible of all their deſigns, he would place no confidence in any of them; he had appointed no Duan, but tranſacted moſt affairs himſelf. It ſeems that in imitation of his brother the Nanah's policy, he wiſhed to form a body of troops ſolely dependant on himſelf; to effect this, money was principally neceſſary, and as *Mahdoo Row* juſt before his death, had diſburſed 80 lacks of rupees in diſcharge of the Sircar's debts, and the troubles during the ſhort reign of *Narrow Row*, had prevented the regular receipt of the revenues, the treaſury of the Paiſhwah was found very bare; to repleniſh it, *Ragoba* ſeems early to have turned his thoughts towards the Nizam, *Hyder*, and the *Carnatic*; but being diffident of the troops with him, wrote to *Moodajee Bonſalo* to come down and aſſiſt him, and having joined his army, proceeded againſt the combined forces of the Nizam, commanded by *Ruckna ul Dowlah* and *Shabajee Bonſalo*.

Even thoſe Miniſters who had been moſt forward in eſtabliſhing him in the Paiſhwahſhip, never meant he ſhould acquire the leaſt degree of independant influence, well knowing that the firſt effect of it would be an invaſion of their treaſures. Seeing him therefore at the head of an army leagued with *Modajee Bonſalo*, in a way to acquire money, and of courſe troops of his own, their apprehenſions led them to confederate againſt him. On different pretences, ſome left the camp, and thoſe who remained betrayed *Ragoba* to the Moguls in an action with the Nizam's army in November 1773, wherein he was not only defeated, but narrowly eſcaped being cut off, as a part of the enemy had been ſuffered to advance to his tent without oppoſition, and dangerouſly wounded him before he could retreat.

Notwithſtanding the late advantage over the Maratta army, the Nizam thought proper to treat with *Ragoba*, and a peace was concluded between them; *Ruckna ul Dowlah* promiſing on the behalf of the Nizam to comply with *Ragoba*'s demands of twenty lacks of jaghire, and the ceſſion of two or three forts; but the Nizam, at an interview he afterwards had with *Ragoba*, pleading poverty and inability to comply with what his Vizier had promiſed, *Ragoba* agreed to wave the whole demand on his engaging to aſſiſt him with a body of forces on any particular emergency. From whence *Ragoba* directed his ſteps towards *Hyder*, from whom he demanded the arrears of Chout, and as a pretence to the ſame demand, meditated on him, *Ragoba* wrote to *Mahommed Alj*, Nabob of *Arcot*, for aſſiſtance, knowing he ſhould meet with a refuſal. *Hyder* compromiſed matters by paying down 25 lacks, for which he obtained the ceſſion of three provinces of *Mudgewarry*, *Hanſcootah*, and *Chunderdroong*.

Having thus ſettled with *Hyder*, *Ragoba* then declared his intention of marching into the *Carnatic*, in hopes to force from *Mahomed Ali* a ſum of money as arrears of Chout. The proſpect of plunder attracting every deſperado who could muſter a horſe and ſword, his army was ſoon increaſed to a very conſiderable number, and he was in full march towards the *Carnatic*, when his attention was diverted to another quarter.

Juſtly apprehenſive of *Ragoba*'s acquiring ſufficient force to be wholly independent of them, the Miniſters, while they yet had it in their power, were determined to prevent him. Accordingly the two parties united, and a confederacy was formed under the name of the Paunch Bhi, or Five Friends, five principal perſons being the leaders of it. Their intention was to have ſeized *Ragoba*, and confined him; to have carried on the Government in the name of *Gungaboy*, *Narrow Row*'s widow, till the birth of the child ſhe was then induſtriouſly reported to be pregnant of, which, if a boy, was to be proclaimed Paiſhwah. On the firſt of January 1774, a party of them ſeized *Gungaboy* and *Penſettyboy*, the wife of *Sudabah*, and carried them to the fort of *Pronder*, the better to ſecure, it is ſuppoſed, a male child. Somehow five Brachmin women, in the ſame ſtate as the widow of *Narron Raw*, was ſaid to have accompanied her. Every perſon ſuſpected to be in the intereſt of *Ragoba* was guarded, and the confederates immediately ſet about collecting troops to ſupport this declared rebellion againſt the Paiſhwah.

Fortunately for *Ragoba*, he received the news of this confederacy a few hours before the Miniſterials had adviſed the partizans in his camp of their deſign, which gave him time to diſperſe thoſe he doubted, and he retired to *Gutti*, a fort under the command of *Morarow Gorparah*, a Maratta Chief of high influence. The Miniſters now imagined his ruin certain, as *Morarow Gorparah* had always inclined to their party; but they were miſtaken, by his declaring and openly joining with *Ragoba*. As the impolitic avarice of the Brachmins had clearly evinced their intentions to avail themſelves of their preſent poſſeſſion of power, by calling on the Maratta Chiefs for

their

their arrears, whenever a fortunate event gave them hopes of ſucceſs, many Maratta Chiefs quitted their party, and joined *Ragoba*, which enabled him to face the miniſterial army, and by a ſtratagem, in the month of March gained a complete victory, taking priſoner *Trimbuckrow Mamah* the commander in chief, and one of the moſt reſpectful partizans.

This unlooked-for event threw the Confederates at *Pronder* into the utmoſt conſternation, hourly expecting to be ſurrounded by the victorious army of *Ragoba*; in this dilemma they had once thoughts of releaſing the Rajah *Sutterah*, and reſtoring the ancient Government, in order to gain over the Maratta Chiefs, but juſtly dreading the evils they might bring on themſelves in revenge for the uſurpation of their caſt, they dropped all thoughts of this expedient, and had recourſe to that of publiſhing the birth of a ſon to *Gungaboy*, the widow of *Narron Raw*. This child they immediately acknowledged as lawful Peſhwah; the partizans of *Ragoba* declared it to be a fraud, and indeed the general report at the time, the certain circumſtance of the pregnant woman who accompanied *Gungaboy* to *Pronder*, the utility of it to the miniſterial cauſe, inclined many people then to doubt the reality of this child; and the information ſince obtained by the Reſident at *Poonah*, the caution of the Miniſters to conceal *Gungaboy*, by ſurrounding her houſe with a ſtrong wooden fence, together with the manner in which the Nizam treats this reputed child in his late propoſals for pacification, gives much room to doubt the authenticity of the birth of *Mahdoo Raw Narrain*. The cauſes of the ſubſequent retreat of *Ragoba* to the country of *Holkar*, his junction with *Holkar* and *Scindia*, together with all his tranſactions, and thoſe of the different parties concerned in the confederacy againſt him, till the period of his croſſing the *Tippi* in his march towards *Poonah*, I find are fully explained in the Letters from Mr *Moſtyn*, the Reſident there, to the late Government at *Calcutta*, from April to November 1774, and to them I therefore beg leave to refer your Honour, &c. for every neceſſary information during that time.

From the divided ſtate of the miniſterial party, the doubtful ſtate of thoſe they deem their allies, and the reputable force of *Ragoba*, his ſucceſs ſeemed almoſt infallible: the better to ſecure it, he however, in the month of Auguſt, made overtures through his Vacqueel to the Government of *Bombay* for a body of troops to aſſiſt him; his offers were ſuch as could not be accepted conſiſtently with the plan laid down by the Honourable Company, as the grand and ſole object of every military or political engagement which they were unremittingly to purſue, and conſtantly watch every opening offered by the political ſtate of affairs to obtain, he could not be brought either to cede *Salſette* or *Baſſein*. Excluſive of that the Brachmins have ever ſhewn a ſingular attention to depreſs every growing Power in the Weſt of their dominions, and have always beheld, with particular jealouſy, the leaſt advancement of the Engliſh force there; their point of honour is concerned in the preſervation of thoſe territories; it is the family property of the Paiſhwah, acquired by their famous anceſtors, *Chimmajee Oppah*, and the only forts and countries that were ever conquered by Natives of *Hindoſtan* from the Europeans.

It is not well known whether he had any juſt cauſe to ſuſpect them, or whether it was only an artifice of the Miniſters, very uſual in this country; but it is ſaid *Ragoba* intercepted Letters to *Holkar* and *Scindia*, wherein they ſeemed to be bargaining for his deſtruction. Alarmed at this, he found means to quit their army, gave out that he was flying to *Delhi*, but turned off at *Indoor*, and joined *Govend Row Guicawar*, then before *Brodera*, who agreed to aſſiſt him with all his force. Their combined army was then ſaid to conſiſt of 40,000 men.

Holkar and *Scindia* deeming *Ragoba*'s affairs deſperate by his late deſertion, thought beſt to enter ſeriouſly into terms with the Miniſters. A new confederacy was then formed, conſiſting of 12 perſons, partly Brachmin Miniſters and Maratta Chiefs, under the denomination of the Barrah Bhi, or Twelve Friends: the acknowledgment of *Mahdoorow Narrain*, for whom they had obtained from the Rajah the Sirpaw of Paiſhwah, and the total excluſion of *Ragoba* from all ſhare in the Government, was the baſis of their agreement; their private ſtipulations were not known.

Copy of the 11th Article in the Treaty with *Nizam Ally*; dated the 23d February 1768.

As the Engliſh Company do not intend to deprive the Marattas of their Choute, any more than the Soubah of his Piſhcaſh, which uſed to be paid from the *Carnatic Balagaute*, belonging to the Soubahderry of *Viziapour*, now or lately poſſeſſed by *Hyder Naigue*, it is hereby agreed, and the Company willingly promiſe to pay the Marattas regularly and annually, without trouble, for the whole Choute, as ſettled in former times, from the time the ſaid Countries ſhall be under the Company's protection as Dewan; provided however that the Marattas guarantee to the Company the peaceable poſſeſſion of the ſaid Dewannee; to this end, the Nabob *Auſuph Jau* promiſes to uſe his beſt endeavours, jointly with the Engliſh and the Nabob *Wolau Jau*, to ſettle with the Marattas concerning the Choute of the ſaid Countries, how and where it is to be paid, ſo that there may be no diſturbances hereafter on that account, between any of the contracting parties or the Marattas.

Treaty with the Marattas; dated the 12th October 1756.

Article 1.—That the Maratta Government will never permit the Dutch to ſettle, or come into their dominions; but on the contrary iſſue expreſs orders to prevent their carrying on any trade therein.

Article 2.—As an article regarding Mahim River was included in the Treaty made in the time of the deceaſed *Badjerow*; and it having been repreſented, that the Bundorah Coolies have of late begun to ſet up new fiſhing ſtakes, which they ought not to have done in that river, the Maratta Government do hereby oblige themſelves not to permit thereof in future.

Article 3.—As *Bancote* and *Hematgur* have been delivered to the Honourable Company, the Marattas do by theſe preſents give them the following villages towards defraying the expences thereof, and which are to remain the ſaid Honourable Company's property for ever, and of which they are to be put in poſſeſſion without further delay, viz. *Velas Bag*, *Manly*, *Chepolee*, *Veſwee*, *Coodook*, *Pundarree*, *Panam*, *Daſgom*, and *Comela*.

Article 4.—It having been a cuſtom, during the Governments of *Angria* and the Marattas at *Bancote*, that the Sciddees received a Chotic, or quarter part of the cuſtoms, the Marattas engage to ſatisfy the Sciddee in this particular; and that the Honourable Company do not meet with any embarraſſment concerning it, nor concerning the royalty of this river, which is hereby given and made over to them for ever. In caſe the Sciddee ſhould diſpute complying with the foregoing, the Engliſh declare it ſhall not retard the compliance with what may be mentioned in theſe Articles concerning the delivery of *Ghereah*.

Article 5.—Cuſtoms are to be levied by the Marattas on goods which paſs up the river of *Bancote* only at *Gorgom* and *Marr*, and not any let or impediment in any of the intervening places in the ſaid river of *Bancote*.

Article 6.—As *Daſgom* is a paſs for the Verjarrahs, or country merchants, the Marattas engage that ſuch goods as are carried that way to *Marr*, either by the river or by land, ſhall not pay any duties there, but only the uſual Nickolla.

Article 7.—All ſuch ſubjects and inhabitants of *Bancote*, *Hematgur*, and its dependencies, as, on account of the diſpute with *Angria*, retired to the Maratta territories, ſhall, if they are content ſo to do, be allowed to return

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return to the Engliſh without any impediment from the Maratta Government; and others, that in future may leave the Engliſh, are to be permitted to return again, if agreeable to them, in the manner above-mentioned; and ſuch ſubjects as ſhall leave the Maratta Government, and retire to *Bancote*, ſhall have liberty to return to the Marattas again, on their agreeing with them, and in ſuch caſe the Engliſh will not impede them.

Article 8.—The Marattas may export from the river of *Bancote* annually, for the uſe of their Southern forts, &c. grain of all kinds, to the value of forty thouſand (40,000) rupees, and it ſhall be free from cuſtoms at *Bancote*; they ſhall alſo have liberty to export, cuſtom-free, ſuch ſalt, rafters, ſmall timbers, &c. as they may want for the uſe of their Circar or Government; and in conſideration thereof, the Honourable Company's goods, to the amount of one hundred and fifty thouſand (150,000) rupees ſhalll annually, in like manner, be free from all cuſtoms, as far as *Poona*, upon Dalcaas or Certificates being produced on both ſides.

Article 9.—No additional inland duties whatever to be levied on the Engliſh goods by the Maratta Government, but only the Rhaderage cuſtoms.

Article 10.—*Junardow Buttol Phudneſs Mahazon* with *Ballajee Badjerow Pundit Praden*, has a patrimony in *Velaſs*, of one garden and 15 begas of batty ground, which is to remain with him; in lieu or in conſideration of which *Nandgoa Compra* is granted to the Honourable Company.

Article 11.—The Dutch goods will not be permitted to be landed at *Rajahpore*, nor their trade ſuffered to be carried on there, concerning which the Marattas will give proper orders; and the people under the Maratta Government are not to trade at *Rajahpore*; but if diſputes ariſe with Sciddee, this is to be no obſtacle to the delivery of *Ghereah*, as will be mentioned in a ſubſequent Article.

Article 12.—The Bramins, inhabitants at *Hurry Hurraſecar*, and others that will paſs to and from thence on pilgrimage, are to be free from paying cuſtoms in regard to the neceſſaries that they may have for their own uſe, or to perform their ceremonies; but this does not extend to merchandize.

Article 13.—The Mahar Government to carry grain of all kinds, timber, wood, &c. according to the cuſtom formerly obſerved; but as to the power of the river, it is to be carried on agreeable to the Articles of this Treaty.

Article 14.—The fort of *Eſwant Gur* is to be entirely demoliſhed, and the Engliſh on their parts are not to make any forts or fortifications within the nine villages, nor by the river. In like manner the Maratta Government are not to make any by the river of *Bancote*, or in the villages belonging to them. This Article, however, is not to exempt the Engliſh from building ſuch houſes and warehouſes as they think proper, in the villages belonging to them.

Article 15.—As all the royalty of *Bancote* and *Hematgur*, is with the Engliſh, they are to take care, as much as in their power lies, to prevent the enemy prejudicing the Marattas through that river.

Article 16.—Ghereah fort to be delivered within twenty-four days after the departure of the Engliſh Gentlemen from *Poona*, together with ſuch guns, balls, ſtores, &c. either of the fort or fleet, that the captors left for the ſervice of the garriſon or otherwiſe, or did not themſelves ſell; but the ſtores, ammunition, &c. that properly belong to the Honourable Company, they are to carry away with them. The officers of *Toolajee* are to go where they pleaſe, and if his family (wife and children) ſhould be deſirous of returning to him, the Engliſh will not impede it, but grant them free liberty ſo to do; and the Maratta Government engages, that *Toolajee Angria* ſhall have no place given him, nor any power below the Gaut: *Ballajee Badjerow Pundit Praden* is to ſend an Officer of credit with the Engliſh Gentlemen, who is to proceed with one of the Council from *Bombay* to *Ghereah*; which perſon belonging to the Maratta Government, is to have in his poſſeſſion the proper ſunnuds and orders regarding the delivery of *Bancote* and its villages; and when the Maratta people and colours are got into *Ghereah*, and the Engliſh ready to go out, he is deliver directly the ſaid ſunnuds and orders for *Fort Victoria* (or *Bancote*) and its ſeveral villages, to the Engliſh Counſellor, and then return with that Gentleman to *Bancote* directly, to ſee *Nannah*'s orders are effectually executed in regard to the villages.

Article 17.—Theſe Articles being concluded and agreed upon by both parties, they are to act conformable thereto, in conſequence of which, all diſputes are to ſubſide, and no claims are to be made by the Maratta Government on the Honourable Company, to the date of theſe preſents.

Article 18.—All Treaties hitherto made between the Maratta Government and Engliſh, are to be obſerved and maintained inviolable by both parties agreeable to the tenor of them.

The foregoing Articles being agreed to by us, and accepted of by us, we do in confirmation thereof affix to theſe preſents the ſeal of the Honourable United Engliſh *Eaſt India* Company, and do atteſt the ſame with our own proper names in *Poona*, the day and year above written.

Tho' Byfeld,
John Spencer.

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From *Gopaul Row Gunnaſe*. Received 27th December 1775.

398. I HAVE lately received a Letter from *Seremunt Rogonaut Row Pundit Purdham*, containing a particular account of the ſtate of affairs, and deſiring, that I would write a detail of them to you, and ſend it by a truſty agent. As this account is very long, I have written it on a ſeparate paper, and now encloſe it to you. It will be preſented to you by *Dakut Row Billage*, who proceeds to your preſence, and will verbally acquaint you with every circumſtance. I am hopeful, that having well conſidered them, you will give ſuch directions to the Gentlemen at *Bombay*, as may conduce to the extirpation of the rebels, and the regulation of the Raje of my brother *Seremunt*; and further, that you yourſelf will alſo afford him aid. By theſe means, friendſhip will be firmly eſtabliſhed between you and *Ragonaut Row*, who will preſerve the utmoſt gratitude towards you; and your generoſity on this occaſion will not be unprofitable. The monarchs and princes of former times always afforded their aſſiſtance to each other for the protection of their reſpective dominions.

Encloſed in the above,

Particulars relative to the *Decan*.

399. *Bajee Row* and *Jumnajee Anna* were own brothers; the former had a ſon named *Bhow*, and the latter two ſons named *Nanna* and *Ragonaut Row*. Theſe three jointly conducted the affairs of the Raja. *Bhow* was killed in a battle againſt *Abdallah* at *Pauneput*. *Nanna* having the greateſt affection for *Bhow*, ſhortly after died of grief for his loſs. *Nanna* left two ſons, *Madhoo Row*, who had attained his eighth year, and *Narrain Row*, an infant of a year old. *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Naig*, and other potent Rajahs and Zemindars, regarding *Ragonaut Row* and *Narrain Row* as infants, commenced hoſtilities on every ſide. As *Ragonaut Row* was the eldeſt of the three, he took on himſelf the defence of the Raje, and by his bravery preſerved it entire. He placed his nephew *Madoo Row* on the Muſnud, and ſuperintended his education.

education. When *Madhoo Row* attained the age of 16 or 17 years, certain malicious Miniſters inſtilled into his mind ſuſpicions that his uncle *Ragonaut Row* would ſome time or other diſpoſſeſs him of his Raje, and ſeize on it himſelf, or at leaſt would take a part of it from him; that it was therefore expedient to put him under confinement. *Ragonaut Row* heard of this, and perceived that certain malicious Miniſters were endeavouring to make a breach between him and his nephew (whom he always conſidered as his ſon) by means of lying reports. "Had "I deſigned," ſaid he to himſelf, "to poſſeſs myſelf "of the Raje, I ſhould have ſeated myſelf on the Muſ- "nud at firſt; it will be utterly unprofitable to me to "remain here any longer, for where ſuch a number of "falſe and miſchievous men are gathered together, my "ruin cannot fail of being ſome time or other effected. "Such a baſe meaſure was never taken by any one of our "family, it is therefore adviſable for me to retreat from "hence with a few attendants, and to go to *Benares*, there "to paſs my days in retirement, and in the practice of "religious duties." Having thus determined, he began his journey. The malicious Miniſters would have been much better pleaſed to have had *Ragonaut Row* in confinement, as *Madhoo Row* would have then been in fear of him; and they had determined, if *Madhoo Row* gave them cauſe of diſpleaſure, to join with *Ragonaut Row*, and *vice verſa*; but they conſidered that by the departure of *Ragonaut Row*, *Madhoo Row* would remain poſſeſſed of unlimited authority over them, and being an unexperienced youth, might one day or other ill treat them. Led by theſe conſiderations, they came to the following reſolutions: certain of the Miniſters were ſent to *Ragonaut Row*, who importuned him in the ſtrongeſt terms not to leave the place, and deſired, that if he perſiſted in his reſolution, he would firſt of all ſlay them who were his ſervants with his own hand; for, that if he went and left them, *Madhoo Row* would take ſome opportunity of diſgracing and putting them to death. By ſuch deceitful ſpeeches, *Ragonaut Row* was perſuaded to lay aſide his intention of coming to this part; and a negociation for an accommodation with *Madhoo Row* was ſet on foot, but as the Mutſuddies on both ſides were leagued together, they took effectual means to prevent its being effected, equally abuſing and deceiving both parties. Hoſtilities between *Madhoo Row* and *Ragonaut Row* were in conſequence of theſe intrigues; in which the latter was victorious, and brought *Madhoo Row* priſoner. As *Ragonaut Row* regarded *Madhoo Row* in no other light but in that of a ſon, he went to viſit him, and addreſſing him in theſe words: "You are my "ſon, and the Sovereign of this Country; for the pro- "ſperity of which I have taken ſo much trouble, not "from any view of the poſſeſſion of it." He converſed for ſome time with *Madhoo Row* in this ſtrain of encouragement, and afterwards replaced him on the Muſnud, and brought to condign puniſhment the Mutſuddies who were authors of this breach. He took for himſelf a jaghier of 20 lack of rupees to defray his expences, and retired to *Gulſhunabad*, placing *Siccaram Pundit* (one of his own Mutſuddies, who was at firſt a ſervant at 4 R^s^ per month, till raiſed to an eminent ſtation by *Ragonaut Row*) with *Madhoo Row*, as a ſuperintendant of his affairs, ſo that he was in fact his Guardian, and was to tranſact all the affairs of the Government on mature deliberation and advice, conſulting firſt with *Ragonaut Row* on any meaſure which might be reſolved on, which if approved by him was to be carried into execution, otherwiſe to be dropt. Having ſettled theſe points, he went and fixed his habitation at *Gulſhunabad*.

Toocajee Sinda and *Mahdojee Sinda* were brothers. On the death of *Toocajee* the elder, *Ragonaut Row* eſtabliſhed *Godarjee Sinda*, his ſon, in the Government held by his father, and appointed *Mahdojee Sinda* his Guardian, with the ſuperintendance of his affairs. Two months after the retreat of *Ragonaut Row* to *Gulſhunabad*, *Siccaram Baboo*, in conſequence of a bribe given to him by *Mahdojee Sinda*, eſtabliſhed him in the Government, and diſplaced *Godarjee*; who thereupon came and complained to *Ragonaut Row*. *Ragonaut Row* wrote to *Madhoo Row* and *Siccaram*, as follows: "You engaged that you "would conduct the affairs of the Raje with my advice "and concurrence; the ſtep you have now taken in "diſplacing *Godarjee*; and eſtabliſhing *Mhadojee* in his "room, is highly improper; this act of injuſtice is con- "trary to the maxims invariably purſued by our fa- "mily." They return this anſwer: "You have choſen "a ſtate of retirement, what have you to do with the "affairs of Government? we ſhall act as we think fit."— *Ragonaut Row* was highly diſpleaſed at this anſwer, and determined to go in perſon and bring them to reaſon, leſt by ſuch inconſiderate and unjuſt meaſures, which are diſpleaſing to God, the Raje ſhould be taken out of their hands. He accordingly ſet off for *Poona*. On hearing this, *Siccaram* reflecting that if *Ragonaut Row* came to *Poona*, he and his nephew would act in concert, which muſt be of bad conſequence to him, inſtilled apprehenſions into the mind of *Madhoo Row*, that *Ragonaut Row* was coming with a deſign to ſecure his perſon, to prevent which, it would be proper to be beforehand with him, and ſeize him on the road. In conſequence of this advice, they ſet out at the head of 40,000 cavalry, making forced marches towards *Ragonaut Row*, who was attended by no more than 2,000 horſemen, and had no deſign of entering on hoſtilities. *Madhoo Row*, by the advice of the perfidious and miſchievous *Siccaram*, ſeized on *Ragonaut Row*, and brought him priſoner to *Poona*, where he was kept in confinement ſix years, at which period *Madhoo Row* was ſeized with a violent diſorder which brought him to death's door. Juſt before his deceaſe he ſent for *Ragonaut Row*, and ſaid to him, "I was treated by you "as your ſon, and in return have heaped diſgrace on "you; as a puniſhment for which guilt I am cut off in "the flower of my age; pardon the crimes I have been "guilty of towards you, that I may eſcape eternal ruin; "this is your Raje, eſtabliſh yourſelf therein." *Ragonaut Row* was much affected by this ſpeech, and weeping bitterly, ſaid, "Is it fit that a ſon like you ſhould periſh, "and that I ſhould ſet myſelf on the Muſnud? No; I "will eſtabliſh your younger brother *Narrain Row* (who "is my ſon alſo) in your room; do you leave it in "charge to him, to conduct the affairs of the Government "with my advice, till he attains the age of manhood, "and has gained experience in the art of Government." *Madhoo Row* then ſending for *Narrain Row*, gave him in charge to *Ragonaut Row*, and ſoon after expired. After the ceremonies of the funeral were completed, *Ragonaut Row* placed his nephew *Narrain Row* on the Muſnud, and adopted him as his ſon. *Siccaram Pundit*, *Nanna Purnavees*, and ſome other Mutſuddies, being entirely bent on perfidy, malice, and miſchief, obſerved to *Narrain Row*, that if his uncle *Ragonaut Row* ſhould have a ſon, he would lay claim to a part of the Raje for him; to prevent which, it was expedient to ſecure his perſon without loſs of time. *Narrain Row* forbad them ever to renew ſuch villainous advice, and told them, "by your "council, my elder brother was induced to treat him "injuriouſly, who is in the place of a father to us, and "he has been puniſhed for his guilt, in being cut off in "his youth. You would now adviſe me to follow the "ſame conduct, being deſirous of my death, that as "*Ragonaut Row* has no heir, you might on his deceaſe "ſeize the Government for yourſelves." *Narrain Row* would never lend an ear to their advice; on which, having no hopes from that quarter, *Siccaram*, &c. went to the mother of *Narrain Row*, and repreſented to her, that ſhould *Ragonaut Row* have a ſon, he would immediately ſeize on the Government, or at leaſt a part of it for him; that the only way to prevent this would be to put *Ragonaut Row* in confinement. The conſequence of this was, that *Narrain Row*, by the perſuaſions of his mother, ſeized on *Ragonaut Row*, and confined him with ſtill more ſeverity than had been made uſe of by *Madhoo Row*. Some time afterwards

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afterwards a party was formed amongſt the Mutſuddies, ſome inclining to *Narrain Row*, and the reſt favouring *Ragonaut Row*; ſome of the latter came to him, and offered, if he approved of it, to concert a ſcheme for ſeizing the perſon of *Narrain Row*. *Ragonaut Row* declared he could do nothing to forward it, having neither money nor influence; that no perſon was allowed to come near him, how could he then bring about the ſeizure of *Narrain Row*, or of what advantage would it be to him? The Mutſuddies replied, Execute a written engagement, that on the impriſonment of *Narrain Row* you will give us ſuch a ſum, and we will gain over his body guard, and effect our purpoſe of ſeizing his perſon; if this is not carried into execution, his intolerable cruelty will cauſe the deſtruction of the Raje.—As *Ragonaut Row* laboured under all the horrors of a ſevere impriſonment, from which he had no other way of freeing himſelf, he entered into the propoſed engagement. The Mutſuddies having ſettled the matter with the guards, they began the commotion, and under the pretence of demanding their arrears, entered into the houſe with a deſign to kill *Narrain Row*. *Ragonaut Row*, who was confined in the ſame houſe, ran immediately to the place where the uproar was, and forbad them to execute their purpoſe, which he told them was an unadviſable meaſure, for if they killed *Narrain Row* he ſhould have no ſon left. The guards would not hearken to him; on which *Ragonaut Row* took *Narrain Row* in his arms to protect him. The guards then addreſſing themſelves to *Ragonaut Row*, ſaid, "We have now entered on this buſineſs, but can "place no confidence in you; for regarding *Narrain* "*Row* as your ſon, you will replace him on the Muſnud, "and puniſh us with death; if you do not give him up "to our fury, we will make an end of you both." *Ragonaut Row* replied, "It is well; kill me then "alſo." They made ſeveral cuts with their ſwords, and gave *Ragonaut Row* two wounds, one on his head, and the other on his hand. The Kidmutgars who were preſent forcibly carried *Ragonaut Row* on one ſide; the guards then cut down *Narrain Row*, and proclaimed *Ragonaut Row* in the city. *Ragonaut Row* took the reins of Government into his hand, and, on account of the troubles which were on foot in every quarter, he pardoned the guilty Miniſters, and confirmed them in their poſts. He then began his march towards the *Carnatic*, to take ſatisfaction on *Nizam Ally Cawn*, *Hyder Naig*, and other rebellious Chiefs, leaving all his family and dependants behind him at *Poona*. The Mutſuddies, ever bent on ingratitude and perfidy, caballed together, ſaying, *Ragonaut Row* has once more eſtabliſhed himſelf in the Raje; it is neceſſary that we form ſome plan for expelling him. This point being determined on, they gave out that the wife of *Narrain Row* was three months gone with child; and that if the fruit of her pregnancy proved a ſon, he would be their Sovereign. They kept ten pregnant women with the wife of *Narrain Row*, in the fort of *Prounder*; and all the miniſters and ſervants, both great and ſmall, entered into a league, and by bribes engaged the commanders of the armies in their intereſt. When *Ragonaut Row* perceived that all the miniſters and commanders of the forces were confederated together againſt him, being without reſource, he laid aſide his firſt intention, and marched towards *Goujeraut*, followed by the rebellious army; with which he engaged, and obtained a victory, under the diſadvantage of great inferiority of forces; but of this not being ſenſible, by reaſon of the darkneſs of the night, he fled from thence, and went to *Surat*. Before he quitted *Goujeraut*, he had concluded a Treaty with the Gentlemen of *Surat* and *Bombay*. On his arrival at *Surat*, the Gentlemen of that place, as well as thoſe of *Bombay*, received him with the utmoſt cordiality, and aſſiſted him with ſome battalions of their own forces, with which he returned to the diſtrict of *Goujeraut*, where he was again joined by his forces, who had diſperſed after the laſt battle. The army of the rebels, amounting to near 60,000 cavalry, were defeated three ſeveral times by *Ragonant Row*, with the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh, and fled to *Burhanpore*. Although *Ragonaut Row* wiſhed to have purſued them, yet, on account of the rains, and the neceſſity of regulating the affairs of *Goujeraut*, he delayed it. The rebels then gave it out, that a ſon was born to *Narrain Row*: as there were ten pregnant women with the wife of *Narrain Row* in the fort, it is not known which of them brought forth the ſon. The Gentlemen of *Surat* and *Bombay* are all acquainted with this circumſtance, having a factory at *Poona*. The Bundobuſt of *Goujeraut* being completed, and the rainy ſeaſon at an end, *Ragonaut Row* determined to proceed to *Poona*, when Letters from the Gentlemen of *Culcutta* were received by thoſe of *Bombay*, directing a ceſſation of hoſtilities, and a compliance with the orders which ſhould be afterwards ſent them. The expedition to *Poona* is accordingly ſtopped, and a ceſſation of arms has taken place, which reflects the greateſt diſhonour on the reputation of *Ragonaut Row*, and has cauſed the utmoſt aſtoniſhment to all ranks of people, who ſay, "It was formerly a maxim with the Engliſh, that if any one of their countrymen commenced an undertaking, and was not able to complete it, the Government of the reſpective ſettlements, for their own honour, aſſiſted him; and if that was not ſufficient; the Company engaged in it; and in caſe that was ſtill found inadequate, the King of *England* furniſhed money from his own treaſury for the carrying ſuch undertaking into execution; but now that the Engliſh have entered into alliance with *Ragonaut Row*, when his affairs are on the point of being advantageouſly ſettled, they withdraw themſelves from the alliance. How is ſuch conduct to be accounted for? Poſſibly they have changed their ancient maxims."—With reſpect to the report ſpread by the rebels, of the birth of a ſon to *Narrain Row*, *Ragonaut Row* ſays, "if it is really a fact, "it is well; he is my grandſon, I will take care of his "education. I am the proper Guardian of the infant "and of the Raje; but who are thoſe rebels who ſet on "foot diſturbances, and would expel me?"

Bengal Secret Conſultations, 12th February 1776.

An account of the Riſe and Progreſs of the late Diſſentions and Rebellion in the Maratta Government, as given by the Miniſterial Party at the Requeſt of Colonel *Upton*; 3d January 1766.

When *Maderow Row*, the elder brother of the late *Narrain Row*, was Peſhwa, *Ragonaut Row* returned from a war they had been carrying on in *Indoſtan*, and ſoon after told his brother's ſon the Peſhwa, that he was beginning to grow tired of the public world, and wiſhed to retire, to enjoy the reſt of his days in religious ceremonies. The other replied, that he was his uncle, or rather conſidered as his father, his will ſhould be a law to him. *Ragonaut Row* fixed on the banks of the *Gungha* near *Guderury* for his reſidence; the Peſhwa gave him ten lacks of rupees a year, telling him, if at any time he ſhould not find that ſum ſufficient, he had only to command more. He accordingly retired; but in a little more than one year, he all on a ſudden took up the ſword, and without ſaying a word, aſſembled 15,000 men. *Maderow* hearing of this extraordinary meaſure, which reſembled more the actions of a frantic mind than any thing elſe, went to his uncle attended by his army, and aſked his reaſons for making ſuch preparations? he replied, he wanted to make himſelf Peſhwa by force of arms. The other told him, it was exceedingly unneceſſary to raiſe any commotions, for that he was ready to give up to him all the power, keeping only the name, that his family might not be injured. At laſt, he prevailed upon him to lay down his arms, and retire again to his religion; where he continued for another year, and then aſſembled the ſame troops he had before. The Peſhwa learning theſe ſtrange proceedings, ſent a Vackeel to him. In a few days he received a Letter from his Vackeel, telling him, that nothing would ſatisfy his uncle but war. This being the caſe, the Peſhwa marched

at the head of an army to the banks of the *Gungba*, and did every thing in his power to perſuade him to lay aſide his ſtrange unbecoming tranſactions, which tended to nothing but the ruin of their family; however he would hear of no terms of accommodation, and a battle enſued, in which he was totally defeated, and made his eſcape to a fort belonging to the Peſhwa, where he was ſecured and ſent priſoner to *Poona*, where he was confined in his own houſe, with guards round the outer door, to prevent his coming abroad, or any of the Chiefs going near him without being properly attended. Here he continued till the Peſhwa, who has been long ſickly, found that his diſorder would ſoon carry him off; he therefore ſent for his uncle, told him the ſtate he was in, and ſaid, he hoped he had long laid aſide all his hoſtile views; that after his death, his younger brother would become Peſhwa, and ſtand much in need of aſſiſtance and protection of his uncle till he came of age to rule by himſelf, which he now begged, as his laſt requeſt, *Ragonaut Row* would ſtrictly do; and then ordered him to be releaſed. After which he ſent for his brother, and delivered him over to the care of his uncle, and died in a few days after.

Ragonaut Row continued in the Government of the State for ſome time, and *Narrain Row* no more than the nominal Peſhwa only, yet ſhewed great regard and attachment towards his uncle. *Narrain Row* went to viſit his mother on the banks of the *Gungba*. In his abſence, *Ragonaut Row* wrote to *Hyder Naig*, and ſome other princes, to requeſt they would aſſiſt him to uſurp the Peſhwaſhip; which Letters fell into the hands of *Narrain Row*. He inſtantly returned to *Poona*, and preſented them to his uncle, who could not deny being the author of them. The other ſaw nothing left for him but to confine him in the ſame manner he had been in the other reign, which he accordingly did, and placed a body of Muſſulmen then in their ſervice, called the Gardies, as a guard over him. In this confinement he found means to bribe the Chief of the Gardies, named *Mahomed Euſiph* and *Summer Sing*, to engage in a conſpiracy againſt the life of *Narrain Row*, and they brought all their followers to the ſame horrid purpoſe with themſelves, which they ſoon put in execution as follows; viz.

A party of them entered the palace, killed all the centinels, till they came to the door of the ſleeping apartment, where there were two truſty men of ſome rank, whom they killed alſo. *Narrain Row* hearing the diſturbance, immediately judged their intention, got out at another door, and made his eſcape to his uncle's houſe, where he fell down at his feet, graſped him by the knees, begged and prayed he would ſave his life, and he might take every thing elſe. The aſſaſſins followed the unfortunate Prince, and murdered him, when imploring for mercy at the feet of his barbarous uncle. For this cruel action he gave the Gardies four lacks of rupees, two elephants, and ſome jewels.

Ragonaut Row then took poſſeſſion of the Peſhwaſhip, and he being the only one of the family remaining, the people ſubmitted, or rather continued quiet, for the preſent time.

Without waiting to fix himſelf in his poſſeſſions, he immediately aſſembled an army of fifty or ſixty thouſand men, and marched againſt *Hyder Naig*. *Sicca Ram Baboo* and *Ballajee Pundit* attended him; but the firſt, when about 40 coſs from *Poona*, aſked his permiſſion to return, which he granted.

The latter made the ſame requeſt in two or three days after, under pretence of ſickneſs, which was alſo complied with.

When *Ragonaut Row* was in the *Carnatic*, he received intelligence that *Narrain Row's* widow was big with child. Being determined entirely to extirpate the family of the late Peſhwa, he ſent ſome of the aſſaſſins of the father to take the firſt opportunity of murdering the widow and child, ſhould ſhe be delivered of a boy.

The poor unfortunate woman hearing of their being about her houſe, ſent to *Siccaram Baboo* and *Ballajee*, to aſk whether they were men or women? of the firſt, whether they were not aſhamed to ſee a ſet of murderers ready to cut the throat of their late maſter's widow and child?

They were at a loſs what reply to make; but receiving Letters about the ſame time from ſome of the principal Chiefs then with *Ragonaut Row*, deſiring they would remove her to ſome ſafe place till ſhe was delivered; and that they would quit the uſurper to join them, and ſupport the offſpring of their late Peſhwa. This immediately determined their doubts, and they aſſembled; a few of their friends came unexpectedly upon the people ſent by *Ragonaut Row*, impriſoned them, and removed the widow to *Poona Dhur*, where ſhe was ſoon after delivered of a boy. *Ragonaut Row* was marching towards the *Nurbudda* when this news was made public.

The Miniſters were immediately joined by the principal Chiefs, and their army became ſo formidable in a ſhort time, under the command of *Hurry Pundit Purkia*, that they attacked and gained a complete victory over *Ragonaut Row* and his followers, and diſperſed them in ſuch a manner, that he himſelf with difficulty made his eſcape to *Surat* with about a hundred horſe, and ſought an alliance with the Engliſh.—With the reſt the Colonel is perfectly acquainted.

From *Siccaram Baboo*; dated the 29th of Jummadee ul awul, or July. Received the 18th of September 1775.

The circumſtances, my friend, are theſe. Formerly the ſtricteſt union ſubſiſted between the family of the Peſhwa and the Bombay Sirdars, which was cemented by a great number of Treaties; but by a ſudden change of fortune *Narrain Row* being murdered by *Ragonaut Row*, the circumſtances of which are well known, by the favour of God a ſon was born to the deceaſed *Row*, under whoſe ſhadow we are protected. His birth raiſed the hopes of all men, and he was ſeated on the Muſnud of the Peſhwaſhip.

During the lifetime of the late bleſſed *Row*, I and *Ballajee Pundit* had, under him, the entire management of all the affairs of the Government, and out of gratitude to him we ſtill continue to exert ourſelves with the utmoſt aſſiduity for the ſervice of our maſter, and are aſſiſted therein by all the dependants of the Peſhwa, both great and ſmall; moreover, the Nabob *Nizam ul Mulk*, adhering ſtrictly to the rights of his ancient friendſhip, ſhews favour and kindneſs to us.

Articles of Agreement made with *Seuram Punt Tatiab*, in behalf of *Madrao Balajee*, ſon of *Balajee Baajerow*, *Pandit Punt Pradan*; dated the 14th of September 1761.

Article 1ſt.—That ſuch of the Maratta officers who have preſumed to ſtop any Pattamars, and obſtructed the buſineſs of the Engliſh by any impediments whatever, ſhall be ſeverely puniſhed for ſuch their offences; and to prevent the like happening again in future, ſtrict orders ſhall be iſſued immediately for that purpoſe, which, if not found ſufficient to anſwer that end, the Engliſh are to acquaint *Madarao* thereof; and if redreſs is not obtained in reaſonable time, if the Engliſh then take ſatisfaction of ſuch offenders, in whatever manner may by them be thought proper, it is not to be deemed a breach of friendſhip between the two Governments.

Article 2d.—That ample ſatisfaction ſhall be made, within two months from the date hereof, to all merchants trading under the Honourable Company's protection, who have ſuffered in their property, by any unjuſt or illegal actions of the Maratta officers or ſubjects, in any place, ſhape, or manner whatever; and rigid orders iſſued, that all aſſiſtance be afforded in future, to any veſſel or veſſels in diſtreſs, having Engliſh colours or paſſes; without ſubjecting the owners or proprietors thereof to any impediments, under the pretence of their being

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being wrecks, from the ſplitting of a ſail, the breaking of their maſts or yards, and ſuch trifling misfortunes; whereas no veſſels are to be deemed wrecks but ſuch as are drove aſhore, and there break to pieces by ſtreſs of weather; when the Maratta officer, and the people of the veſſels, are to join in ſaving all that is poſſible, which muſt be lodged in ſecure warehouſes, and then one-half of what is ſo ſaved ſhall belong to *Madarao*, and the other half to the owners.

Article 3d.—That all Europeans and Natives, either ſoldiers, ſeamen, or others, in his Britannic Majeſty's or the Honourable Company's pay, who may hereafter deſert from *Bombay*, ſhall be immediately ſecured, and returned to the neareſt Engliſh ſettlement to ſuch place where they may be apprehended, upon landing in any part of the Maratta country; the Governor having promiſed all ſuch a free pardon, and to pay any reaſonable charges that may be incurred on the occaſion. In like manner ſhall be delivered up all deſerters in the Engliſh pay from *Surat*, on their being known, or immediately on receiving notice of them, within the Maratta limits, it not being in their power to ſpeak more poſitively with reſpect to thoſe of *Surat*, as the country thereabouts is open, and numbers go through it without being known. It is alſo agreed, that whatever people, Europeans of all nations excepted, who are in the ſervice of *Madarao*, and may deſert therefrom to the Engliſh, ſhall be delivered up on the ſame terms and conditions.

Article 4th.—That proper people ſhall be forthwith diſpatched, for reſtoring the whole juriſdiction and territories of *Rajahpore* to the Sciddees of *Gingerah*, in the ſame condition and manner as they remained before invaded and attacked by *Ramajee Punt*, which country is not to be moleſted in future by any of the Maratta officers or ſubjects.

Article 5th.—That all priſoners taken by the Marattas or Sciddees, ſubjects of either Government, and now in their poſſeſſion, ſhall be ſent to *Bombay*, within one month from the ſigning of theſe Articles, and mutually reſtored by the Governor to their freedom; and all hoſtilities between the Marattas and Sciddees ſhall ceaſe from this time.

Laſtly, That proper orders ſhall be inſtantly diſpatched to all the Maratta officers, requiring them to ſhew a due obedience to theſe Articles, which are to be confirmed under *Madarao's* ſeal, and tranſmitted to *Bombay* with all poſſible expedition, after the ſigning and ſealing thereof; when a counterpart of the ſame is to be executed by the Governor, and tranſmitted to *Poona*.

In confirmation of all which, I, *Govind Seuram Punt Tatiah*, have to this inſtrument interchangeably ſet my hand and ſeal (in behalf of *Madarao Balajee Pandit* aforeſaid) at *Bombay*, the 14th of September 1761.

An additional Article.—As to what relates to the reſtoration of Undery fort, and the country appertaining thereto, is ſubmitted to *Madarao's* generoſity, in full expectation that he will deliver them likewiſe, or aſſign over in lieu thereof ſuch lands belonging to him as will prove an equivalent thereto. The ſame day and year above-written.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn Bahader*; dated the 18th October, and received the 6th November 1771.

Tranſlate of a Letter from Hyder Ally.

After Compliments.

Trimbuck Row, an officer of the Maratta army, who is encamped at the diſtance of ten coſs from this place, ſends a meſſage to me from time to time, that he wants to go to the Gaut of *Arcot*, to recover his Choute for 20 years, and that he will abate me one-half of what I owe them, and make everlaſting friendſhip with me, on condition that I order my army, with ſome principal officer, to accompany him thither. To which I ſent him for anſwer, that as a peace has been concluded between me and the Engliſh King, under his ſeal as well as mine, and ſigned by the Governor and Council of *Bombay* and *Madras*, I could not act in contempt thereto, and that we both are, thank God, going on agreeable to our abovementioned agreements, and will do the ſame in future. He the ſaid *Trimbuck Row* ſent me word again, that if I have a friendſhip with the Engliſh, why I have not received any aſſiſtance from the Company this time? To which I gave him an anſwer, that if my occaſions will require this aſſiſtance, they will grant me it upon my application to the Governor agreeable to their agreements; and that, if he, *Trimbuck Row*, be diſguſted at my refuſing to grant his requeſt, and may perhaps march againſt me, I will in that caſe ſtand to fight with him till two years, but will not give him my forces, nor will break my word with the Engliſh. On my ſending him this plain anſwer, he is giving me more trouble. Conſidering my firm friendſhip and agreements with the Honourable Company and their Governors, I have already given and will hereafter give him the ſame anſwers, all which your Honour will hear from others. Your Honour being my true friend, I have therefore given you this notice in a friendly way, and will in future act agreeable to your advice. My army lately fell upon the Marattas in the woods on their departure from thence, killed four or five principal officers, and many Sepoys, took of them ſeveral pallankeens, affiaguers, and 3 or 400 horſes; my troops had been as far as their artillery, but their guns being heavy they could not bring them away, but killed the oxen and elephants and the bearers thereof: my people are daily bringing 100 or 200 horſes and camels from them. Your Honours will always pleaſe me with your friendly Letters.

Tranſlate of a Letter from *Hyder Ally Cawn Bebadar*; dated the 31ſt October, and received the 19th November 1771.

After Compliments.

Tranſlate of a Letter from Hyder Ally.

I did continue a war with the Marattas for theſe three years, in hopes that I ſhall receive aſſiſtance from the Company, and did many times write to the Governor of *Madras* about it, but he has not hitherto ſent me any ſuccour. Had the Company's forces joined to my army, the Marattas would have gone away from this country without fighting, and would never thought to have come again either into the Company's dominions or into my countries, and both yours as well as my country would have been very eaſy. They have an intention now to make peace with me any how, and march to *Arcot*; for which purpoſe, they are encamped near *Syringapatam*, at the diſtance of 3 or 4 coſs. They ſent me their Vackeels from time to time, promiſing to abate me one-half from what I juſtly owe them, and to make with me everlaſting peace agreeable to my wiſhes, on condition that I aſſiſt them with my forces againſt *Arcot*; but I conſidering my agreements with the Company, gave them a plain anſwer. We are diſputing about this matter for theſe two months more, eſpecially on the ſubject of ſuccour, which they deſire of me, ſo that I have been fighting with them every day almoſt, and my people are, thank God, bringing from their army in the woods from 50 to 100 horſes, camels, &c. daily. Your Honour very well knows that my country is ruining for theſe three years, and although the Company have not yet granted me their aſſiſtance conformable to their agreements, yet I, for their ſake, and conformable to my agreements with them, am ſending my forces after the Marattas, to hinder them from making an entrance into the country of *Arcot*; of which I give you this friendly notice. Your Honour will always pleaſe me with your friendly Letters.

Extract of the General Letter to *Fort Saint George*; dated 24th November 1772.

Par. 8. The Earl of *Rochford*, one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, having lately intimated his

his deſire to us, to be informed what inſtructions we propoſed to give to our ſervants in *India*, relative to the alliance with the Marattas and *Hyder Ally*, and which of thoſe Powers we meant to prefer in our alliance; we accordingly took the ſame into our moſt mature conſideration, and on referring to your ſeveral proceedings and negociations, as well as our own orders, the Treaty made with *Hyder* in 1769, and a Letter we have lately received from Sir *Robert Harland*, on this moſt important ſubject, whereby we are told, that the Marattas had acceded to his propoſal for a ceſſation of hoſtilities between their Nation, the Engliſh, and the Nabob of the *Carnatic*, until ſuch time as his Majeſty's pleaſure ſhould be known; we at length, after weighing all circumſtances with the utmoſt attention, offered our opinion as follows to Lord *Rochford:*

" That it will not be equitable or advantageous to " depart, if it can poſſibly be avoided, from the neutra- " lity which has been hitherto maintained, and which " the Company are moſt anxious to preſerve throughout " all *Hindoſtan*, ſo long as *Hyder Ally* ſhall continue to " obſerve the conditions of the Treaty of Peace conclud- " ed between him and the Company the 3d April 1769, " by the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, ſtipulating, " that in caſe either of the contracting parties ſhall be " attacked, they ſhall, from their reſpective countries, " mutually aſſiſt each other to drive the enemy out; " and alſo the Treaty made between the ſaid parties, on " the 8th of Auguſt 1770, by the Preſidency of *Bombay*, " ſtipulating, that the Nabob *Hyder Ally* ſhall not aſſiſt " the enemies of the Engliſh, nor on the other hand " ſhall the Engliſh aſſiſt the enemies of the Nabob *Hyder* " *Ally*. And the Court of Directors are further of " opinion, that no poſitive orders can at this time be " given to the Governor and Council of *Fort Saint* " *George* on this moſt important ſubject on the part of the " Company; further than to recommend a perſeverance " in forbearing to join either *Hyder Ally* or the Marattas, " unleſs it ſhall appear to the Governor and Council of " *Fort Saint George*, abſolutely neceſſary for the Com- " pany's intereſt to take part with either of them."

9. It is therefore our pleaſure and we hereby direct, that you pay the ſtricteſt regard to our ſaid opinion, and ſo far as lies in your power act agreeably thereto.

10. Yet notwithſtanding this our opinion, if it ſhould hereafter appear to you upon full and well-grounded information that the Marattas or *Hyder* ſhould have entered into ſuch connections as might endanger the welfare of the Company, we then cannot heſitate to direct, that you no longer obſerve the neutrality ſo heartily wiſhed for by us, but purſue ſuch a line of conduct as may defeat the ill conſequences of an alliance with our competitors.

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Extract of Poona Diary, the 9th September 1773.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

THIS is principally to acquaint you of an extraordinary revolution that took place here the 30th ultimo. That day two Subedars, *Mahomed Eſoof* and *Sumerſing*, having been brought over to *Ragoba*'s intereſt (who has been cloſely confined for ſome time paſt by his nephew) marched to the palace, with about 500 men, on pretence of being muſtered; and after having cut off the guard at the gates, ruſhed in, and killed *Narrain Row*; about an hour after, *Ragoba* was proclaimed in town; and the whole was over in a very little time, without noiſe, or much bloodſhed. There has been frequent reports of ſchemes being formed for *Ragoba*'s releaſe, but they have generally been detected before they came to maturity; however, this was carried on with ſuch addreſs, that it was put into execution before the neceſſary precautions could be taken to prevent its effects.

By what I can learn, moſt of the Miniſters were concerned in this affair; notwithſtanding which, *Ragoba* now ſeems jealous of them all, and places his ſole confidence in his army, which he is recruiting with the utmoſt haſte; but whether it will be ſtaunch to him is yet uncertain, and cannot be determined till Deſſorah, when he means to go to *Setterah*, to receive the Sirpah of Peſhwa from the Rajah, and afterwards take the field. I ſhould have informed your Honour, &c. of the above immediately on its happening, had I not wiſhed to have acquainted you with what turn things would take; and though I have waited till now, it is impoſſible to ſay with certainty (people are ſo divided in their opinions) what may attend this change; but it is generally believed this great empire, which now reſts upon *Ragoba*'s ſingle life, cannot long ſtand. Should he continue to diſtruſt the old Miniſters, who are only able to ſupport him, they will be drove to the diſagreeable neceſſity of forming parties for their own ſafety; and it is moſt probable the bordering Powers will not fail to avail themſelves of ſo favourable an oportunity of ſeizing what they can. *Moodajee Bonſello* in particular, who has a large army on foot, is, it is ſaid, alſo a good ſoldier and politician, and may, from being a relation of the Raja's, form pretenſions to the Government, and not unlikely take this opportunity of attempting at ſecuring it. In ſhort, in this confuſion of affairs, nothing can be depended upon; but after *Ragoba* has been to *Setterah*, I ſhall be better able to judge; when, ſhould any material alterations happen, I will inſtantly acquaint you therewith.

Poona, 9th September 1773. I am, with reſpect, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

From *Ragonaut Row*; received the 27th October 1775.

Though the Miniſters of the Sirkar had been the authors of diſturbances and commotions, and had acted in the moſt ungrateful manner, I nevertheleſs, in conſideration of their ancient ſervices, pardoned their offences, and confirmed them in the adminiſtration of affairs on the ſame footing as formerly, and proceeded myſelf towards the *Carnatic*. In the meantime theſe perfidious men entered into alliance with the *Nabob Nizam Ally Khan*, who had long acted treacherouſly and deceitfully towards me, and by means of the aid which he afforded them commenced hoſtilities.—By the favour of the Almighty the firſt battle was well fought; but as all the fortified places were in their poſſeſſion, I thought proper to go to *Goujeraut*, where I applied to the General of *Bombay*, who was my old friend, and well verſed in affairs, for his alliance; and all matters being ſettled between us, a Treaty was ratified for our jointly acting againſt the enemy, and bringing them to puniſhment, and for my eſtabliſhment in the Government. Accordingly an army from *Bombay* was ſent to aſſiſt me, and by the bleſſing of God the rebels were entirely defeated in five or ſix ſeveral battles, and fled half dead towards the *Decan:* we ſhould have immediately purſued them, but conſidering the difficulty of tranſporting the Engliſh artillery and ammunition to ſo great a diſtance during the rainy ſeaſon, I cantoned near the fort of *Burrooda*, to regulate the affairs of *Goujeraut*. The rainy ſeaſon being at an end, I was deſirous of proceeding to the *Decan*, when Letters from you were received by the General of *Bombay* for a ceſſation of arms. This filled me with the utmoſt aſtoniſhment, as it is notorious that it is the cuſtom with the Engliſh, for all the Company's Sirdars to ratify and carry into execution whatever any one of them has engaged; and this is alſo incumbent on the Company themſelves. What then can be the reaſon of the ſtep you have taken? Poſſibly the rebels have miſrepreſented the affair to you;

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but ſuch conduct is inconſiſtent with the friendſhip between me and the Company; and till the preſent time the Engliſh have never been guilty of a breach of their promiſe, or engagements, nor will they ever. Their name is famous throughout *Hindoſtan* and *Decan* for having brought to puniſhment the diſturbers of the public peace; nor can I ever believe that they will purſue a different conduct. The good faith of the Company is univerſally known; with a view to which, and for the ſake of their honour, it is neceſſary that you act agreeably to the Treaty entered into by the General of *Bombay*, which will be laudable in the ſight of God and man. Friendſhip requires that you immediately write to the General of *Bombay* to carry the Treaty into execution. Preſerve inviolably your engagements, and let not any thing prevail on you to deviate therefrom. Mr. *Tayler*, a Counſellor of *Bombay*, is on his way to you; he will communicate very fully to you all the particulars of the Treaty, and the enmity of thoſe perfidious men. Four months after they had ſet on foot theſe diſturbances, they ſpread a report that a ſon was born to *Narrain Row*. Mr. *Maſtine* was at that time at *Poona*, and is well acquainted with every circumſtance of the affair, which he will repreſent to you to your ſatisfaction. You are alſo an Engliſhman, act in ſuch a manner as to leave no room for any reflection on your nation. Let me frequently have the pleaſure to hear from you.

Extract of *Poona* Diary, the 28th December 1773.

Judging it neceſſary the Gentlemen at *Fort William* ſhould be adviſed of the ſituation of affairs, addreſſed them the following Letter:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee, at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I laſt wrote your Honour, &c. the 29th ult° duplicate of which is encloſed. Agreeable thereto, the Maratta and Mogul armies continued near each other ſeveral days, during which ſome ſkirmiſhes enſued, in which the former were generally worſted; notwithſtanding this, matters were accommodated between *Ragoba* and the Nizam the 9th inſtant, when the latter met the former under a tent pitched between the two camps, and afterwards accompanied him to his own tent. It ſeems *Ragoba* had firſt demanded of the Moguls twenty lacks of jaghire, and two or three forts, which they conſented to give, but afterwards this demand was given up, in conſideration of their long friendſhip, and the Nizam's agreeing to aſſiſt him on any emergency with a ſtipulated number of troops. Thus the diſpute is for the preſent ſettled; but whether the peace is ſincere on both ſides is a doubt, for *Ragoba* has evaded to return the Nizam's viſit, and ſome points ſeem ſtill not to be adjuſted to mutual ſatisfaction, as a Vackeel is yet negociating for the Marattas at the Mogul camp. *Ragoba* was by the lateſt advices at *Culberga*, thirty coſs to the Weſtward of *Buder*, where he is treating with *Hyder*'s Vackeel, and talks of ſending an army of about 20,000 horſe towards the *Carnatic*, but whether to intimidate *Hyder*, or endeavour to induce *Mahomed Ally Cawn* to pay the arrears of Chout, is uncertain. It is ſaid he means to diſpatch *Ragajee Bouncello* (*Moodajee*'s ſon) with the title of Sine Siab Soubah, and *Jonajee*'s widow, to *Berar*, and afterwards return to *Poona*; which ſhould he do, it is not improbable but he may ſend ſome troops into *Hindoſtan*. I ſhall make it my ſtudy to diſcover if theſe are his intentions, and when I can gain any information regarding it, will inſtantly acquaint you therewith; though the preſent face of affairs appear favourable for *Ragoba*, yet the ſame diſtruſt and miſunderſtanding continues between him and the old Miniſters, as I before adviſed your Honour, &c. nor has he appointed a Dewan, but carries on every thing himſelf, which makes many continue ſtill to think his Government is far from being firmly eſtabliſhed.

I am, with great reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Poona, 28th December 1773. Your moſt obedient humble ſervant.

APPENDIX, No. 37.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 9th March 1774.

READ the following Letter from the Reſident at *Poona*, dated 31ſt January.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Your laſt favour, though dated the 19th of November, did not come to hand till the 11th inſtant. Long before your Honour, &c. commands reached me, I, in my different addreſſes (duplicate of the laſt of which is encloſed) adviſed you of the ſituation of affairs here, and alſo with the diſſatisfaction of the Miniſters to *Ragoba*'s Government; they did not however openly appear to act againſt him till yeſterday morning, when three of them, *Nanna Furneſe*, *Hurry Punt Furkiah*, and *Anunt Row Jevagee*, carried off *Gungaboy*, *Narrain Row*'s widow (who is ſeven months gone with child) and *Pervitty Boy*, *Sudabah*'s wife, to Pronder fort. All the old Miniſters and Bramin officers to a man, with *Subajee Bouncello*, are concerned; and I am informed *Madajee Scindia*, *Tookajee Holkar*, and even the Nizam, notwithſtanding the late peace, are in the league againſt *Ragoba*.

The Miniſters have got together a very large force, under *Trimbuck Row Mamma* and *Sabagee Bouncello*, ſaid to be ſixty thouſand men; but they yet do not ſeem to be fixed on the mode of carrying on the Government. Some ſay they mean to take out *Sudabah*, ſo long confined in Dolatabad fort; but it appears to me from their preſent conduct, as if they meant to ſeize on the Peſhwaſhip themſelves, or carry it on under the name of *Gungaboy* and her iſſue; for orders have already been ſent to the different forts, &c. in her name and *Narrain Row*'s. Suca and Chokeys are placed on every perſon ſuſpected to be in *Ragoba*'s intereſt; indeed many of his friends have been impriſoned.

Ragoba, as I informed your Honour, &c. in my laſt, had ſome thoughts of returning to *Poona*, but I have reaſon to believe he is diſſuaded from it by the intrigues of his enemies, who wiſhed him as far as poſſible from the center of his dominions, that they might have the better opportunity of carrying their ſchemes into execution; for by Letters I received yeſterday from his camp, he was advanced ſo far beyond the *Criſtnah* as *Dalari*. But as ſoon as this news reaches him, I ſhould ſuppoſe he will give over all thoughts of foreign affairs, and be under the neceſſity of attending to his ſafety only, though there is very little reaſon to think he will be able to ſtand before this formidable combination, particularly ſo as the greateſt part of his own army are againſt him.

From the foregoing troubles your Honour, &c. will perceive the utmoſt impoſſibility of this Government being able to make any attempts this ſeaſon, or for a longer period, to regain their poſſeſſions in *Hindoſtan*, for ſo far from having any idea at preſent of ſending the troops thither, even *Madajee Scindia*, and *Tookagee Holkar*, as before obſerved, are expected to perform a part in the ſcenes that are now acting in the *Decan*.

I am, with reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Poona, 31ſt January 1774. Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
T. Moſtyn.

P. S. Since

P. S. Since cloſing the above, I am credibly informed there is not the leaſt thoughts of taking out *Sudabah*, but that the Miniſters abſolutely mean to carry on things in *Gungaboy*'s name till ſhe is brought to bed: had they releaſed *Sudaboy*, from his known abilities this Government might in ſome meaſure have been re-eſtabliſhed; but from their omitting to do it, there is great room to apprehend the whole will go to deſtruction.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 9th May 1774.

Read the following Letter from the Reſident at *Poona*, dated 30th March.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I laſt had the honour to addreſs you the 31ſt January, duplicate of which is encloſed; and your favour of the 7th ultimo reached me the 25th inſtant.

The Miniſters having, as I adviſed your Honour, &c. in my laſt, ſeized on the Government in *Gungaboy*'s name, they directed their General, *Trimbuck Row Mamma*, and *Sabajee Bouncello*, to march againſt *Ragoba*, at the head of a conſiderable army; who on their way were joined by the Nizam. On this intelligence reaching *Ragoba*, he ſoon diſperſed the miniſterial party in his camp, and recroſſed the *Criſtnah* on his return hither; and having got as far as *Meritz*, within a few coſs of the enemy, halted ſome time, and by Letters received yeſterday, he ſix days ago, after having placed a number of his foot, &c. in ambuſh, decamped in the night, leaving all his tents and heavy cannon ſtanding, the better to have the appearance of a flight, and deceive the enemy, which had juſt the effect he expected from it; for *Trimbuck Row Mamma* being a-head, and having intelligence of *Ragoba*'s ſuppoſed flight, purſued him immediately, without waiting for the Nizam or *Bouncello*, which he was ſuffered to do without oppoſition, till he had paſſed the people concealed, when they unexpectedly fell on his rear, and *Ragoba* at the ſame time faced about, and attacked him in front; in this manner that part of the army under *Trimbuck Row Mamma* was totally defeated, and himſelf after receiving many wounds made priſoner.

The loſs of *Mamma* and his army has terrified the Miniſters beyond expreſſion, as they have now in a manner no force of their own, and muſt depend ſolely for ſucceſs on the Nizam and *Bouncello*, both of whom this Government, in their proſperity, have uſed extremely ill; and whether they will not take this opportunity to retaliate is uncertain; they however at preſent profeſs themſelves publicly to be friends to the miniſterial party; but whatever their promiſes may be, their actions muſt ſoon declare if they have any views of their own, or on which ſide they are, for *Ragoba* and them are now only a few coſs diſtant from each other.

Madajee Scindia and *Tookajee Holkar*, though frequently entreated by the Miniſters to come or ſend ſome troops to their aſſiſtance, have both hitherto evaded to comply with their requeſt, and ſeem by their behaviour inclined to ſtand neuter, till they ſee how affairs are likely to terminate.

All thoughts of the *Carnatic* and *Hindoſtan*, and indeed of all foreign affairs, are for the preſent loſt to both *Ragoba* and the Miniſters, in their inteſtine diviſions and cares for their own preſervation. When, and in what manner, this diſpute will be decided, is impoſſible to ſay, as it chiefly reſts, as I obſerved before, on the Nizam and *Bouncello*; but until it is brought to a termination, and the Government in ſome meaſure re-eſtabliſhed, it will be morally impracticable for theſe people to form any deſigns to the prejudice of their neighbours.

I am, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
T. Moſtyn.

Poona, 30th March 1774.

Read the following Letter from the Reſident at *Poona*:

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

My laſt addreſs to your Honour, &c. was under the 30th ultimo, and I now trouble you again to encloſe its duplicate.

No material alteration has happened in affairs here ſince my laſt. *Ragoba*, after having got the better of *Trimbuck Row Mamma*, came within a few coſs of *Poona*, and it was imagined by moſt he would go himſelf, or ſend ſome troops, to ſurround the Miniſters in *Prondar*; but contrary to expectation, he a few days ago retreated towards the *Gungah*, and by the lateſt advices was at *Toncha* on the banks of that river. This movement can be accounted for in no other manner than the want of money, and being apprehenſive of the fidelity of ſome of his officers, whoſe families are in the hands of the miniſtry, which makes it dangerous for him to riſk a general battle, at leaſt till the former of theſe evils can be remedied.

The remains of *Mamma*'s army have again aſſembled under *Hurry Punt Furkiah*, who has joined the Nizam and *Bounſello*, and they are now all in purſuit of *Ragoba*; but from the behaviour of the two latter, there is reaſon to think the diſpute will not very ſoon be decided, as their plan is to haraſs *Ragoba*, and drain the Miniſters of their money, both which they completely effect by avoiding an engagement.

As the miniſtry begin to be fearful that the Nizam and *Ragoba* have really ſome views of their own, from having ſo long delayed to fight *Ragoba*, they have come to a reſolution of taking out the Rajah, in hopes by this means to induce the Maratta officers that have hitherto ſtood neuter or ſided againſt them, to embrace their cauſe; but as this is the laſt reſource, it is poſſible if their affairs ſhould change for the better before they put it into execution, they may totally lay it aſide.

I am, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
T. Moſtyn.

Poona, 13th April 1774.

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APPENDIX, No. 38.

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 15th June 1774.

READ a Letter from the Reſident at *Poona*, under date the 28th April.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Preſident and Governor, &c. Members of the Select Committee at *Fort William*.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

The 13th inſtant I had the honour to addreſs you, duplicate of which goes encloſed; and this is principally to adviſe your Honours, &c. that *Gungaboy*, *Narrain Row*'s widow, was a few days ago delivered of a ſon, which it is thought will turn out much in favour of the miniſtry, as many may be now induced to leave *Ragoba* who have hitherto been ſtaunch to his cauſe.

Ragoba was, by the lateſt advices from the camp near *Brampore*, raiſing money, where he purpoſes making ſome ſtay, in hopes of being joined or receiving ſome aſſiſtance from *Madajee Scindia* and *Tookajee Holkar*; from whence it is ſaid he intends going into that part of the *Berar* in the poſſeſſion of *Moodajee Bounſello*, there to remain till the rains make the Nizam quit the field, and then to come this way.

The Nizam, *Sabajee Bounſello*, and *Hurry Punt*, ſtill continue together, and are about forty coſs to the Northward

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ward of *Arungabad*; but the dilatory and equivocal behaviour of the two former, renders their conduct ſuſpected, particularly the Nizam, whoſe frequent halts and demands of the forts and diſtricts promiſed him for his aſſiſtance, it appears as if he acted for himſelf only, and not for the good of the cauſe to which he profeſſes himſelf a friend.

When *Ragoba* was on the other ſide the *Criſtnah*, he, in conſideration of a few lacks of Rupees, and of a promiſe of more, gave *Hyder Ally* an order for moſt of the forts and country taken from him in the war with *Madow Row*; but as the Killidars have refuſed to obey this order, *Hyder* is now backing it with a large army, with which he has reduced *Sany*, and is at this time laying ſiege to *Gurrumcondah*, two of the ſtrongeſt forts in that part.

Poona, I am, &c.
28th April 1774. *T. Moſtyn.*

Extract of *Bengal* Select Conſultations, the 8th September 1774.

Read the following Letters from Mr. *Moſtyn*; dated 20th May and 2d July.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

My laſt reſpects waited on your Honour, &c. the 28th ultimo, duplicate of which is encloſed.

Conformable to what I hinted to you in my laſt, ſoon after *Gungaboy*'s being delivered of a ſon, the greateſt part of *Ragoba*'s forces left him, ſome of whom joined the miniſterial army, and the reſt are coming this way. Being thus forſaken, he made the beſt of his way acroſs the *Norbudah*, to endeavour to induce *Tuccogee Houlker* and *Madhajee Scindia* to give him ſome aſſiſtance; and by Letters lately received from *Indoor*, he had arrived ſafe at that place, where the former of theſe officers had given him a very generous and polite reception. It is uncertain whether they will ſupport him ſtrenuouſly againſt the Miniſters; but it is generally believed they will never give him up to his enemies.

Some part of the miniſterial army are gone after *Ragoba*, and the remainder, with Nizam and *Bouncello*, are near *Brampore*.

The young prince has been named *Madab Row Narrain*, and the Miniſters a few days ago received a Sitterah the Sirpaw of Peſhwa in his name; they at the ſame time, as the preſent Raja is old, and has no ſon of his own, endeavoured to perſuade him to adopt a Maratta boy they carried with them for that purpoſe, but which he has poſitively refuſed to do. His motives for his denial I cannot diſcover.

Notwithſtanding *Ragoba* has in a manner run away, and *Madab Row* is inveſted with the title of Peſhwa, yet the troubles in the *Decan* do not by any means ſeem to be near a concluſion; for, independent of what this Government has to apprehend from the Nizam, *Bouncello*, and *Hyder*, the Miniſters, from appearances, are diſunited among themſelves, each aſpiring to a ſuperiority, which in the end it is thought will create much confuſion.

Poona, I am, &c.
20th May 1774. *T. Moſtyn.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I did myſelf the pleaſure of addreſſing your Honours, &c. laſt the 20th May, duplicate of which is encloſed; ſince which your commands of the 9th May have duly been received; and beg leave to congratulate you on the ſucceſs of our Honourable Maſters arms, as mentioned therein.

In my laſt I acquainted your Honour, &c of the diſunion of the miniſtry, and the probability of a rupture between them; but nothing appeared publicly till the 27th ultimo, when *Sanaram Bappoo*, *Nanna Furneſe*, *Gungaboy*, &c. fled at midnight from *Shapoor* (a village to which they had come to remain for the rains) to *Prondar*, in the utmoſt haſte and terror. It appeared by their conduct ſome time ſince, they ſuſpected ſome kind of treachery, but they were never able to diſcover what it was till then, when they gained intelligence *Morabah Furneſe*, with *Batcheabar Bolliſpe Naigue*, whoſe ſon many months ago was married to *Ragoba*'s daughter, and ſome other Bramins, had come to an agreement to ſeize them that night. *Butchelah*, with whom the execution of the ſcheme was left, on finding it diſcovered, retired a few coſs towards *Tezzey*; the other two remained in defiance in their houſes, one in *Poona* and the other at *Barramaly*. But as the whole plan is now in a manner public, and of courſe no after-game left for either ſide to play, each will undoubtedly exert themſelves, and ſoon end the conteſt, which will, I ſhould ſuppoſe, terminate in the ſurrounding *Gungaboy*, &c. in *Prondar*, and again proclaiming *Ragoba*, or in the impriſonment of *Morabah* and his followers.

Ragoba, by the lateſt advices that can be depended on, continues ſtill near *Indoor*, and in conjunction with *Madhajee Scindia* and *Tuccogee Houlkar*, who have determined to ſupport him, has raiſed a numerous force, and many think that he will immediately come this way; but notwithſtanding which, I imagine his coming ſooner or later will greatly depend on the ſucceſs of his party here. However, there is nothing now ſcarce to obſtruct his paſſage, as *Hurry Punt* having learned ſomething of the above conſpiracy, left a few of his troops behind him, and is with the reſt returned within a few coſs of *Arungabad*. *Sabajee Bouncello* alſo having obtained the releaſe of *Deraboy*, who was made a priſoner, and her people diſperſed, on ſuſpicion of an intention of joining *Moodajee*, is retired towards *Berar*; and the Nizam ſome time ago withdrew himſelf and army in diſguſt; but on *Gungaboy*'s, &c. ſending a Vackeel to him, and promiſing the immediate delivery of the forts and diſtricts agreed on to be given for his aſſiſtance, he is, in compliance with their requeſt, coming to ſtay for the rains at *Dolatabad*, which is one of the places to be ſurrendered to him; though whether the Kelladar will obey any orders that may be given him in this confuſion of affairs is a doubt.

By the laſt advices from the *Carnatic*, *Hyder Ally Burgatta Jung*, and *Morab Row Gorporah*, have each of them taken advantage of the diſſenſions of this Durbar, to reduce to their command, and raiſe contributions on all they can, not only of this Government's country on the other ſide of the *Carnatic*, but on all the Pottagars in their intereſt; indeed the former has lately reduced *Mudguiry*, and is laying ſiege to many of the other ſtrong holds of the Marattas.

Should *Ragoba*'s party ſucceed here, it will moſt likely be the means of ſoon putting an end to the diſputes between the Bramins themſelves; though even ſhould this happen, as moſt if not all the Sircar's money and credit is exhauſted, it muſt take a very conſiderable time, if ever they will be able to effect it, to re-eſtabliſh their internal Government, and adjuſt matters with the neighbouring Powers.

Poona, I am, &c.
2nd July 1774. *T. Moſtyn.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 28th, December 1774.

Received the following Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn* Reſident at *Poona*:

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

I was on the 27th ultimo favoured with your Letter of the 8th September; and I now return your Pattamars, with

with duplicate of my laſt addreſs to your Honour, &c. of the 22d Auguſt.

I ſome time ago thought I ſhould be able to have informed you of ſomething deciſive regarding the Marattas; but every thing ſtill continues almoſt in the ſame uncertainty and unſettled ſtate as when I had laſt the honour to write you. Two Vackeels have been ſent to the Miniſters at *Pronder*, by *Scindy* and *Holkar* in *Ragoba*'s behalf; but as they have yet done nothing, though ſome weeks have elapſed ſince they arrived, I imagine they came more with a view to procraſtinate and ſow diſſention, than with any real intention of putting an end to the diſpute. They made two propoſals in order to an accommodation; that *Ragoba* ſhould govern during the child *Mahdarow Narrain*'s minority, though the Sicca to continue in the young Prince's name, and the Miniſters to act in their reſpective departments; or that the country ſhould be divided, *Ragoba* to have 20 lacks a year, and a proportionable number of forts; both which the Miniſters rejected, and with ſome ſeeming difficulty offered 50 lacks a year, and a penſion for the ſupport of *Ragoba* and his ſon. In this manner the affair at preſent reſts; and as no anſwer has been given to the Miniſters Letters containing this propoſition, and *Ragoba*, with *Scindy* and *Holkar*, ſince the receipt of it, have croſſed the *Tappey*, moſt people apprehend all amicable ideas are at an end.

Ragoba's whole army, by all accounts, at preſent conſiſts of about 40,000 men, with whom it is ſaid he means to advance to *Chandour* (a principal fort belonging to *Holkar*) and there halt till reinforced with ſome troops. *Govind Row Grequar* has promiſed him from *Guzerat*, and is joined by *Moodajee Bouncello*, with ſome part of *Iſmael Cawn*'s Pattams. *Sobajee Bouncello* not being able to accommodate matters with his brother, is coming to the aſſiſtance of the miniſterial forces under *Hurry Punt*, who remains nearly in the ſame ſituation as I before adviſed your Honour, &c.; and though a reinforcement has long been promiſed, none has been ſent. Indeed, the Miniſters have only as yet been able to raiſe four or five thouſand men, notwithſtanding their utmoſt efforts have been exerted for theſe three months paſt, which is principally owing to their treaſury being exhauſted, and the ill uſage they have given to the Jaghire officers in their intereſt, who, at the ſetting in of the rains retired to their reſpective places; and being now ſummoned, moſt of them evade coming, on pretence that their preſence is neceſſary to the preſervation of their own country.

The Miniſtry, who have again found means to appeaſe the Nizam, ſeem ſolely to depend on him; they ſome time ago, on his diſgracing his Vizier (which I now have reaſon to believe was only a fineſſe) ſent him a conſiderable ſum of money, Sunnuds for the country to the amount of twelve lacks and a half a year, and a promiſe of more, with ſundry forts, when affairs are ſettled; on which he reſtored *Rucknah Dowlah* to his former credit, and once more engaged to aſſiſt them. But even if he is ſincere in theſe promiſes, as he is now quiet at *Aurungabad*, and it is ſaid will not take the field till after Ramazan, I ſhould conclude his ſuccours will be of little utility; for if *Ragoba* advances at all, he moſt likely will be here before that period.

Ragoba's party here have done nothing ſince my laſt. Many attempts have been made by thoſe at *Pronder*, to bring them over to their intereſt; nay, the principal of them has been offered the Dewanſhip, which he refuſed; and from the inability of *Gungaboy*'s friends to ſecure their oppoſers, though they remain in *Poona*, the little harmony that ſubſiſts among themſelves, and the general face of their affairs, moſt people are of opinion, without ſome ſudden event occurs in their favour, *Ragoba* will ſucceed againſt them; however, ſhould this happen, the Bramin Government is too much impoveriſhed and divided to be able, for ſome time at leaſt, to make head with ſucceſs againſt thoſe who have taken the advantage of theſe troubles to encroach.

Hyder Ally Cawn's forces ſome time ago reduced the fort of *Gurrumcoonder* which was the laſt place of any conſequence remaining to the Marattas, to the ſouth of the *Tunghabadder*; and ſince this acquiſition, he has been employed in conquering ſome, and levying contributions on others, of the moſt troubleſome Pollygurs in his neighbourhood.

Poona, November 9th, 1774. I am, &c. (Signed) *T. Moſtyn.*

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APPENDIX, No. 39.

Extract *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 6th March 1776.

THE different bands of Marattas, which iſſued forth after the invaſion of *Naider Shaw*, to eſtabliſh themſelves by conqueſt on the ruins of the Mogul empire, were moſtly Rajeputs, and conducted by Chiefs of their own caſt, whether chance directed it, or whether the Bramins thought theſe Chiefs the fitteſt defenders of their new acquired empire, I cannot pretend to determine, but be that as it may, they were fixed on the frontiers in the different countries they had ſubdued.

The firſt of theſe is the Bonſalo, who has pretenſions to the ſucceſſion to the Rajahſhip, and poſſeſſes the province of *Berar*, and part of *Oriſſa*; although he has generally acted in concert with the Poona Durbar, yet he has found means to hold his dominions totally independant of it.

Next in power to the Bonſalo, are the Guicawars, who poſſeſs the province of *Guzerat*. After the Guicawars, the Holkars are eſteemed the moſt powerful; this family have the province of *Mahao*. The Scindias hold as their Jaghire the province of *Ugeir*.

The Guicawar, Holkar, and Scindia hold their countries by hereditary right, and maintain a certain quota of troops, always ready to join with thoſe maintained by the Durbar of *Poona*, when the occaſions of the ſtate require.

The Maratta empire may then I think be ſaid to conſiſt of five different States; the Poona Durbar, the Bonſalo, the Guicawars, Holkar, and Scindia; of which, as repreſenting the Rajah, the Poonah Durbar may be deemed the chief.

The miniſterial confederacy is an aſſociation of certain individuals, ſervants in the Poona State, who, for reaſons beſt known to themſelves, have attempted to wreſt the Government from its lawful and acknowledged ruler.

Extract of a Letter from *Maha Rajah Modajee Bhoſila*, 19th July; received 6th October 1779.

Although the Marattas are in poſſeſſion of near 300 forts built of ſtone, furniſhed with all kinds of warlike ſtores, and can in caſe of war collect into one body near 200,000 cavalry, beſides the Nabob *Nizam ul-Dowlah*, and others alſo, who are all alarmed at the encroachments of the Engliſh into the *Decan*, and are waiting a favourable opportunity to repel them; and although their mode of making war and activity is ſuch, that they will in one night gain a diſtance of 50 coſs; both eating and ſleeping upon their horſes, haraſſing an oppoſing army on all quarters, and cutting off all its convoys and ſupplies; making the moſt furious attacks on it wherever they find an opportunity, retreating, and returning to the charge; laying ſtratagems by pretended flight, to draw parties of the enemy to purſue them off, by which policy they have defeated all the Chiefs and Rajahs of *Hindoſtan*, to wit, *Seſoo Dhaycah*, *Hadah*, *Cotchowana*, and *Ranna*, &c. as alſo the powerful Ameers, in a multitude of battles, and

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reduced all thoſe Countries to their ſubjection, and have at all times afforded their aſſiſtance to the King: yet, notwithſtanding all this, the Engliſh propoſe, without having made preparations, or collected the neceſſaries of war, to overcome them by a trifling effort, and to reduce them to obedience—This is really aſtoniſhing.

Copy of Intelligence from *Hyderabad*, 11 March; received 19 March 1779.

At *Safood*, *Halcur* and *Sindeah* got the Paha Sirdars, that is to ſay, the Chief of the Sirkars * private cavalry, in which conſiſts the real ſtrength of *Nanna Purnaveeſe*, and the other Miniſters.

APPENDIX, No. 40.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, 9th October 1775.

TO form the better judgment of the force and expectations of the two parties, it may not be amiſs to take a ſlight view of the ſtate of affairs in the Maratta empire at this period, and of the States around, ſo far as they may have any relation to them.

The Bonſelo is by far the moſt formidable of the Maratta Chiefs, both by the extent of his dominions and the goodneſs and number of his troops. The late *Jannajee Bonſelo* having no children, had adopted his nephew *Ragojee*, the ſon of his younger brother *Moodajee Bonſello*. This occaſioned a warm diſpute between the ſurviving brothers *Shabajee* and *Moodajee*, the former claimed the right of Government as the elder brother, and the latter as father and guardian to the adopted child; the Miniſters had embraced the party of *Shabajee*, and *Ragoba*, while in power that of *Moodajee*, who partly for this reaſon, and on account of *Ragoba*'s adoption of *Imrut Row*, was ſtrongly in his intereſt. They at firſt afforded each aſſiſtance to the different cauſes they eſpouſed, but at this period their own affairs it was thought would fully engage their attention, and compel them to remain neuter.

The Guicawars, a Maratta family, poſſeſſed the whole of the Guzarat country down to *Damaun*; it was reduced from the Moguls by *Pillajee*, grandfather of the preſent Guicawars, and was held for ſome time independent of the Poona Durbar; but in the Government of *Nanah* they compelled *Dumuljee*, the ſon of *Pillajee*, to yield them ſeveral places in it, part of the revenues, and to furniſh a certain quota of troops when wanted; the whole of the revenues is eſtimated at 80 lacks of rupees, and the Guicawars generally maintain a force of between 20 and 30,000 horſe. During the late diſturbances at *Poona*, this family had been prevented from taking any active part by their own inteſtine diviſions; on the one hand *Futty Sing* was in poſſeſſion of the Government, by orders from *Poona* in the time of *Mahdoo Row*, having obtained it by very high bribes to the Miniſters. On his acceſſion, *Ragoba* had granted this Government to *Govind Row*, the brother of *Futty Sing*, who, after various ſucceſſes in the field, was then beſieging his brother in his capital city of *Broderab*..

The two Northern Jaghierdars, *Tookaje Holkar* and *Madoojee Sindia*, had indeed entered into the confederacy, and were the great hopes and ſupport of it; but as they had till now ſtudiouſly avoided interfering with either party, from the political motive of profiting by the diviſion among the Brachmins, the longer to withhold their tribute, it was imagined they would never heartily endeavour at the total depreſſion of *Ragoba*.

Morab Row Gorparab, an old and experienced Maratta, who poſſeſſed the fort of *Gutti*, and a conſiderable diſtrict bordering on the Nizam's country, ſeemed only attentive to ſecure himſelf in his Jaghire, without ſiding with either party.

The Nizam, whoſe intereſt it eſpecially is to keep the Poona Government divided and depreſſed; had very eſſentially profited by the preſent feuds; he had obtained ceſſions of forts and country from both parties, with conſiderable ſums of money from the Miniſters, without ſhewing the leaſt intention effectually to aſſiſt either.

Hyder, whoſe intereſts are, in reſpect to the Poona Government, the ſame as thoſe of the Nizam, was alſo pleaſed to ſee the diviſion among the Brachmins: he was employed in reducing the forts, for which he had obtained the Sunnuds from *Ragoba*; to whom, if we may judge from his behaviour, he ſeemed rather to incline.

The reduction of the Rohilla had left the Company fully at peace in every part, nor was there the leaſt appearance of any occaſion for the employment of their troops in the Eaſt of *Hindoſtan*.

Such was the ſtate of affairs when the Paiſhwah, *Ragonath Ballijee Row*, applied to the Preſident and Council of *Bombay* for the aſſiſtance of a body of troops to join his army, then generally allowed to conſiſt of 40,000 horſe, in order to reduce to obedience certain of his ſubjects leagued in a rebellious confederacy, not only to deprive him of the Peſhwaſhip, which was his acknowledged right, but of every ſhare in the Government of the Maratta empire.

* The cavalry, of which the horſes are the property of the Sirka houſhold troops.

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Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 10th November 1773.

4. YOU will perceive that our conduct with regard to the French, through the courſe of laſt ſeaſon, has been perfectly conſonant to the line you have been pleaſed to mark out to us in your laſt Letters. We have ever oppoſed their ill-grounded pretenſions, and wherever it was neceſſary, held out the authority of the country government to reſtrain them, without appearing the acting Power ourſelves. They however ſtill continue to deny the juriſdiction of the country courts over them or their concerns, and have even inſiſted on their right of ſending European agents, and eſtabliſhing ſubordinate factories wherever they think fit. We have in return requeſted of them to produce the Firmaunds by which they hold this right; and they have promiſed to furniſh us with atteſted copies of them. In the meantime the matter reſts without any deciſive ſteps on either ſide.

5. While we thus oppoſe their unjuſt encroachments, we are not wanting in affording them that protection in their fair dealings which our ſituation enables us to beſtow. An inſtance of this will be ſeen in our conduct towards friar *Antonio da Luz*, a Portugueſe father, reſiding in the diſtricts of *Dacca*, who of his own authority ſeized the effects of a Frenchman deceaſed, and ſold them without rendering any account. On application from the Director and Council of *Chandernagore*, we ordered the friar down to *Calcutta*, where he would have been regularly proceeded againſt, had they not agreed to refer it to his own ſuperior, and requeſted us to let him repair to his convent for that purpoſe.

6. We have continued with the Dutch on the ſame amicable footing as before. They, as well as the other Foreign Companies, concurred heartily with us in the meaſures we took for preventing the introduction of the plague into *Bengal*; and they have alſo teſtified their

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d ſire to ſecond us in thoſe we have purſued with regard to the embargo on grain.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the Eaſt India Company; dated 17th October 1774.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

10. The Vizier having repreſented to the Preſident, through the Reſident at his Court, a ſtrong deſire to obtain an Engliſh officer in his ſervice for the command of a regular battalion, which he propoſed to raiſe, diſcipline, and pay after the European manner, and to employ chiefly in the protection of his perſon, and to be a check upon the mutinous diſpoſition of his own troops, which he had too often experienced ſince the recal of Captain *Harper*'s battalion; and we, taking this requeſt into conſideration, conſented to it, and permitted Mr. *Lane*, a Lieutenant in your ſervice, on the recommendation of the Preſident, to be employed in that ſtation; and further left with the Governor the nomination of ſuch other officers as might be neceſſary for completing the battalion in the manner the Vizier propoſed.

11. There has no alteration occurred in the ſituation of the Nabob of theſe provinces, *Moborek ul Dowla*, ſince our laſt advices; his domeſtic affairs ſtill continue under the controul and management of *Munny Begum*, upon the plan which was eſtabliſhed for them by the Governor in 1772, of which you were fully informed. *Munny Begum* however, has lately applied to us through the Reſident at the Durbar, to get the Nabob's allowances paid by lunar inſtead of ſolar months, as ſettled at that time; alledging, that by the cuſtom of the country ſhe is obliged to pay the ſervants, and others of the eſtabliſhment, by the firſt mentioned terms. In reply to this, we informed her that it was not material by what terms the payments were made to the Nabob, for the whole ſtipend could not exceed by your orders 16 lacks of rupees per annum, and that ſum by the preſent mode was completely allowed to him.

12. *Mahmud Reza Cawn* made application to us in June laſt, for payment of the arrears of ſalary due to him at the time of his being removed from his employment, amounting to about five lacks; but the enquiry into the whole of his conduct being now in reference before you, we declined complying with his preſent requeſt, until ſuch time as we ſhould obtain your judgment upon it.

13. We adviſed you, in our Letter by the *Reſolution*, of the concluſion of the Cooch Bahar buſineſs, by the Treaty of Peace agreed to between us and the Deb Rajah. This Treaty has been ſince ratified on both ſides, and we are left in the quiet poſſeſſion of that part of the country to which they agreed to cede their pretenſions.

14. Soon after this the Preſident received a Letter from the Taiſhoo Lama, who is the Guardian and Miniſter of the Delai Lama, or the Sovereign and High Prieſt of all *Thibet*. The Letter itſelf is a curioſity of no common ſort, and is replete with ſentiments that do credit to both his eccleſiaſtical and political character. The Preſident, on receipt of this, thought it a fit opportunity of attempting to open an intercourſe between theſe Countries and *Bengal*, which you have often recommended to our attention, and which we think may be of conſiderable advantage in a national view.

15. In purſuance of theſe indeas the Preſident laid before us ſuch lights as he had been able to acquire into the ſtate of that Country, from the report of the perſons who brought this Letter from Teſhoo Lama, and others who had penetrated in the way of trade into that Country; and propoſed that a Company's ſervant ſhould be ſent with a Letter in anſwer to the Lama, and with particular inſtructions to inform himſelf of the nature and ſtate of the Country, and of the advantages which a communication and a free trade with theſe people offer to the Company, or to the Nation; and alſo to make overtures for eſtabliſhing ſuch a communication with them.

16. He further recommended for this arduous and important charge Mr. *George Bogle*, one of your ſervants, whoſe merits and abilities we have already had occaſion to notice to you, and who, by his patience, exactitude, and intelligence, ſeemed peculiarly fitted for it. We aſſented entirely to the Preſident's propoſitions; and Mr. *Bogle* was accordingly diſpatched in June laſt to the Lama, with a letter and ſuitable preſents for him, and was alſo provided with various ſamples of goods, to aſcertain what are moſt probable to become the objects of that commerce; and we allowed Mr. *Hamilton*, Aſſiſtant Surgeon, to accompany him in the expedition. The great length of the journey, and the natural difficulties which Mr. *Bogle* has to encounter, from the ſeverity of the climate, and the rudeneſs of the Country through which he has to paſs, will neceſſarily make it a conſiderable time before we can receive any accounts of the ſucceſs of his miſſion; but we have the greateſt reaſon to believe that he will meet no obſtruction from the people, nor incur any perſonal danger from them. The Preſident tells us that he has received accounts of him from ſome of the ſtages of his journey, but nothing which he deems conſequential or concluſive enough as yet to lay before the Board.

17. Soon after the departure of the *Reſolution* in March laſt, agreeable to what we then adviſed you, we ſent our Secretary and Perſian Tranſlator to *Chandernagore*, with a commiſſion to examine the Firmauns and Sunnuds of the French Company, which they had agreed to ſubmit to our ſcrutiny. Theſe Gentlemen were well received by Mr. *Chevalier*, who appointed on his part *M. Mabé de Cormoré* and Mr. *Auſſang* to ſit conjointly with them and examine the papers. The Report of Meſſrs. *Stewart* and *Redfearn* on their return, will be found in the Conſultation referred to in the margin. It appears by this, that although there are grounds for ſeveral trivial objections, yet in the main the Firmauns, &c. bear the uſual marks of authenticity. How far in fact they are ſo, would be exceeding difficult for us to aſcertain, although by their tenor we are led to ſuſpect, that the extenſive privileges which they convey could not have been really granted by the Mogul Government. Conſ. 3d June.

18. However, the diſcuſſion of this point leading to ſerious conſequences, as well with reſpect to the Nation as to the Company, we choſe, in a period ſo near the expiration of our Adminiſtration, to wave any deciſion upon it, in hopes that the new Government would come provided with preciſe inſtructions on a matter of ſo great delicacy and national import, which has been already in many ſhapes referred to your conſideration.

19. That did not prevent us from adhering ſtrictly to the line of conduct reſpecting the French, which we knew we could maintain from our own rights, or the indiſputed Law of Nations, particularly in the inſtance of a complaint from Mr. *Chevalier*, of a French ſhip being fired at from *Budge Budge*, for coming to anchor before the fort; in reply to which we deſired the Governor, to whom his Letter was addreſſed, to inform him, that we could not depart from that rule; and that whenever French ſhips attempted to anchor under our guns, they muſt expect to meet with the ſame uſage.

20. We adviſed you fully of our diſputes laſt ſeaſon with Mr. *Chevalier*, on the affairs of *Dacca*, and of their having withdrawn their factory on the occaſion; we however learn, that they have ſince continued their Reſident, and all the other ſervants, at a place a ſmall diſtance from *Dacca*, where they ſent to whiten their cloth, and where they can carry on their buſineſs to as great extent and as much advantage as if they had remained in the ancient factory.

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factory. In the month of July laſt, Mr. *Chevalier* complained of ſome muchulkas, or obligations, which our Chief had taken from the Weavers employed for the Company, which he ſaid excluded the French entirely from all ſhare in their labour. Although we found that theſe muchulkas were nothing more than a written obligation of the Weavers, to comply with the engagements which they had voluntarily entered into with us, without precluding them from forming new ones with the French; yet, to remove every ſubject of cavil, we directed our Chief to cancel theſe obligations, and recommended it to him to take more care that the Weavers fulfil their engagements without them.

21. The Dutch have alſo preferred to us ſome complaints reſpecting their Gomaſtahs in the Country, and the obſtructions which they pretend they meet with in the purchaſe of cloths in the Country. We found in general theſe complaints to be ill founded, or at leaſt greatly exaggerated, particularly in the inſtance of one againſt the Reſident at *Malda*, and the Gomaſtahs under him, for taking by violence the cloths which they had purchaſed with ready money. But as we wiſh as much as poſſible to avoid every ſubject of diſpute with them, we directed the Reſident to interfere as little as poſſible with their purchaſes, but to allow the Weavers full liberty to work for whom they pleaſed, provided they fulfilled their prior engagements to us. In the ſame ſpirit, we ordered a Gomaſtah at *Buddaul* to be diſmiſſed the ſervice, on a complaint from the Dutch, merely becauſe he appeared a troubleſome man, although not abſolutely guilty of the fact with which they charged him.

22. The Daniſh Government of *Fredrickſnagore* laſt ſummer informed us of their intention to eſtabliſh a factory at *Patna*, and applied to us for our intereſt and friendſhip to procure them a Sunnud from the Nabob for that purpoſe. As we have ever experienced the moſt friendly diſpoſition towards us in the Daniſh Nation, and have always found them quiet and unambitious traders, we agreed to employ our good offices with the Nabob for them, giving them to underſtand at the ſame time, that they were to hold themſelves bound to comply with the general regulations which had been adopted for better carrying on the internal commerce of the Country. We do not find that their Sunnuds are yet expedited, they requiring ſome explanation of their privileges, which are not yet preciſely aſcertained; but we believe the matter will be ſoon ſettled, without much trouble to either party.

23. Having thus ſtated minutely, for your information, the whole occurrences in this Department ſince our laſt advices; and, as in the cloſe of this Letter, we have undoubted, although not regular intelligence of the Rohilla war being actually ended by a Treaty between the Vizier and *Fizoola Cawn*, of which, no doubt, you will be more accurately informed by the ſubſequent diſpatches by the *Britiſh King*, we think it proper to recapitulate the cauſes on which this war was founded, and the advantages which have reſulted from it.

24. You was informed by our advices of 1772 and 3, of the neceſſity which induced us to carry our arms beyond the preſcribed line of your inſtructions, into the Rohilla country, for its defence againſt the Marattas, whoſe rapid progreſs and unbounded ambition at that time threatened all *Hindoſtan*, and who had actually reduced the greater part of that Country; through which the acceſs was opened to the Vizier by the only quarter of his dominions wanting a defencible barrier.

25. Our records at the time when this ſubject was debated, will ſufficiently manifeſt the extreme diffidence and reluctance with which we at laſt reſolved to paſs the line of the Vizier's dominions with our forces. The actual orders of the Company confined us within the limits of our own and his poſſeſſions; yet they had promiſed to furniſh us with inſtructions, wherein a greater latitude of action on particular occaſions would be allowed and recommended. Theſe very promiſes certainly implied the poſſibility of caſes happening, wherein more extenſive meaſures were thought adviſable and neceſſary, but the unſettled ſtate of the Company's affairs at home has, we ſuppoſe, prevented us from receiving the promiſed directions for our conduct, and left us without a guide at a very critical conjuncture, which ſeemed to call for extraordinary meaſures, and for immediate exertion of our ſtrength, to give a timely check to the accumulating progreſs of the Maratta Power. Such were the circumſtances and the occaſion which firſt dictated to us the meaſure of paſſing the preſcribed bounds.

26. On this occaſion, as declaredly on all others, we acted as if ignorant of the reports and advices received from *Europe*, which informed us that the Company was precluded from reſolving on any clear line of action; that Supervifors were appointed to ſuperſede the actual Government of *Bengal*; that a new Adminiſtration was to be formed; and that the right of the Company and the Nation to the territorial poſſeſſion was ſtill in debate. We conſidered ourſelves as acting for the national benefit, and aſſumed an extraordinary but a dangerous degree of reſponſibility, for the ſake of promoting the attainment of that object: it was therefore reſolved to expel the Marattas from the Rohilla country.

27. The Vizier, whoſe aid had been ſolicited by the Rohillas, undertook their defence againſt the Marattas. An agreement was entered into for this purpoſe, and a ſolemn Treaty ratified between the Vizier and *Hafiz Rahmet Cawn*, in behalf and with the expreſs authority of all the other Rohilla Chiefs, in the preſence of General Sir *Robert Barker*, the Commander in Chief of our forces, by whom it was atteſted: wherein, upon this ſervice being effected, the Rohilla Chiefs bound themſelves to pay to the Vizier the ſum of forty lacks of rupees. The Vizier accordingly took the field, joined by one of our brigades, and fulfilled his engagement, by expelling the Marattas from the Rohilla poſſeſſions. Notwithſtanding which, *Hafiz Rahmet*, and the reſt of the Rohillas, peremptorily refuſed to acquit themſelves of their part of the agreement; and they not only thus infringed the Treaty, by withholding the ſtipulation agreed upon, but treacherouſly aſſiſted the Marattas againſt the Vizier with ſupplies of money, while he was actually engaged, by virtue of the Treaty, in repelling them from the Rohilla country. This laid the foundation of the preſent war againſt the Rohillas, and was the firſt motive which induced us to join our aid to the Vizier, in chaſtiſing them for their perfidy and breach of faith.

28. The agreement for entering with the Vizier upon this new meaſure, appeared to us a fit occaſion for eſtabliſhing the Company's alliance with him upon a footing of more adequate advantage to them. Hitherto they had held the labouring oar. The heavy burden of an enormous military expence, under which they were ready to ſink, they had conſtantly ſupported, while the Vizier, by the tenor of the Treaty then exiſting, without contributing to eaſe the Company of this weight, experienced the principal and the only immediate advantages reſulting from it; thoſe acquired by the Company being remote, and conſiſting merely in the ſafety of his Country, which was a barrier to theirs. Although we ſtill continued without the lights which had been promiſed by the Court of Directors for the guidance of our conduct, yet in their Letter of the 28th Auguſt 1771, they expreſſed, in ſtronger terms than ever they had done before, their intention, in certain caſes, of authorizing our departure from the defenſive principles hitherto recommended and enjoined. Theſe conſiderations determined us to avail ourſelves of the preſent opportunity of aiding the Vizier againſt the Rohillas, as the means of obtaining the propoſed advantages to the Company.

29. With this view the Preſident was deputed to give the Vizier a meeting at *Benares*, and to conclude a new form of alliance; in which he was authorized to comprehend the Rohilla enterprize on ſuch adequate and

permanent terms as ſhould indemnify the Company for the expences at all times incurred in the Vizier's aſſiſtance, and on ſuch other more immediate conditions as were ſuitable to their extraordinary ſervice. A Treaty was accordingly concluded, which in the original draft included both theſe objects, namely, the agreement for the fixed monthly ſubſidy of two lacks ten thouſand rupees for the expences of our troops when employed in his ſervice, and the payment of forty lacks of rupees for the projected reduction of the Rohillas. But the Rohilla expedition was at that time ſet aſide, from the irreſolution of the Vizier, while the ſubſidy which had been conceded in conſideration of our aſſent to this propoſal ſtill remained an article of the new Treaty. The Vizier afterwards renewed his propoſition to attack the Rohillas, and it was again debated in ſeveral ſucceſſive meetings of the Board, as recorded in our Proceedings of the 26th November 1773, with the reaſons at large, which determined us ultimately to reſolve on a compliance with the Vizier's requiſition. A brigade was accordingly ordered into his Country for that purpoſe.

30. Every circumſtance that could poſſibly favour this enterprize, by an uncommon combination of political conſiderations and fortuitous events, operated in ſupport of the meaſure.

1ſt. Juſtice to the Vizier for the aggravated breach of Treaty in the Rohilla Chiefs.

2d. The Honour of the Company pledged implicitly by General *Barker*'s atteſtation for the accompliſhment of this Treaty, and which added to their alliance with the Vizier, engaged us to ſee redreſs obtained for the perfidy of the Rohillas.

3d. The completion of the line of defence of the Vizier's dominions, by extending his boundary to the natural barrier formed by the northern chain of hills, and the *Ganges* and their junction.

4th. The acquiſition of forty lacks of rupees to the Company, and of ſo much ſpecie added to the exhauſted currency of theſe provinces.

5th. The ſubſidy of two lacks ten thouſand rupees per month, for defraying the charges of one-third of our army employed with the Vizier.

6th. The urgent and recent orders of the Company for reſcinding charges, and procuring the means to diſcharge the heavy debt at intereſt, heightened by the advices of their great diſtreſſes at home.

7th. The abſence of the Marattas from *Hindoſtan*, which left an open field for carrying the propoſed plan into execution.

8th, and laſtly. The inteſtine diviſions and diſſenſions in their ſtate, which by engaging them fully at home, would prevent interruptions from their incurſions, and leave a moral certainty of ſucceſs to the enterprize.

31. Theſe were the inducements which determined us to adopt this new plan of conduct, in oppoſition to which one powerful objection, and only one, occurred; namely, the perſonal hazard we ran in undertaking ſo uncommon a meaſure, without poſitive inſtructions, at our own riſk, with the eyes of the whole Nation on the affairs of the Company, and the paſſions and prejudices of almoſt every man in *England*, inflamed againſt the conduct of the Company, and the characters of their ſervants; notwithſtanding which, we yielded to the ſtrong neceſſity impreſſed upon us by the inducements above-mentioned, in ſpite of the ſuggeſtions and the checks of ſelf-intereſts, which ſet continually before our eyes the dread of forfeiting the favour of our Employers, and becoming the objects of popular invective, and made us involuntarily rejoice at every change in the Vizier's advices, which protracted the execution of the meaſures. At length, however, his reſolution coinciding with our opinions, the enterprize was undertaken; and if our intelligence be confirmed, it is now finally cloſed with that ſucceſs which we had foreſeen from the beginning. We ſhall then again return to the ſtate of peace from which we emerged when we firſt engaged in the Rohilla expedition, with the actual poſſeſſion, or acknowledged right (which the power of this Government can amply and effectually aſſert) of near ſeventy lacks of rupees, acquired by the monthly ſubſidy and the ſtipulation; and it reſts with you to paſs the ultimate judgment on our conduct.

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We are,

Honourable Sirs,

Fort William, the 17th Oct. 1774.

Your faithful and moſt obedient humble Servants,

Warren Haſtings,
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres,
James Lawrell,
J. Graham,
Cha. Bentley.

APPENDIX, No. 42.

Treaty between the Company and the Vizier *Shujah-ul-Dowlah.*

WHEREAS unbecoming rumours have been propagated abroad, which tend to the interruption of firm friendſhip, union, and confidence, formerly eſtabliſhed between his Highneſs the Nabob *Shujah-ul-Dowlah*, Vizier of the empire, on the one part, and the Right honourable *Robert* Lord *Clive*, and General *John Carnac*, in behalf of the deceaſed Nabob *Nudjum-ul-Dowla*, late Soubahdar of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, and the Engliſh Company, on the other part; *Harry Verelſt*, eſquire, Preſident and Governor of *Fort William*, and the Council thereof, with a view to the removal of all cauſes of jealouſy and diſagreement, and the confirmation of a good diſpoſition on both ſides, have deputed *John Cartier*, Colonel *Richard Smith*, and *Claud Ruſſell*, three Members of the Council from *Calcutta*, perſonally to confer with his Highneſs aforeſaid: And whereas the aforeſaid *John Cartier*, Colonel *Richard Smith*, and *Claud Ruſſell*, after effecting an interview with his Highneſs aforeſaid, have reaſon to be ſatisfied with his ſteady attachment to the Engliſh; they therefore, in behalf of his Excellency the Nabob *Syef-ul-Dowla*, Soubahdar of *Bengal*, *Babar*, and *Oriſſa*, and the Engliſh Company, renew and confirm the former Treaty, letter by letter, and article by article, and his Highneſs the Nabob *Shujah ul-Dowla* aforeſaid doth likewiſe renew and confirm the ſaid Treaty. And moreover, out of a pure deſire effectually to eradicate all doubts, and jealouſies, to eſtabliſh the preſent harmony on the moſt durable baſis, and to confirm the former Treaty, doth conſent and agree, that the following words ſhall be inſerted as an explanatory clauſe in the ſaid Treaty: It is, by the advice and conſent of the Preſident and Council aforeſaid agreed, That his Highneſs ſhall not entertain a number of forces exceeding thirty-five thouſand men, whether ſepoys, cavalry, peons, artillery men, rocket men, or troops of any denomination whatever; of this number ten thouſand are to be cavalry; ten battalions of ſepoys, including ſoubadars, jemidars, havildars, and all ranks of officers, not to exceed ten thouſand men; the Nujib regiment conſiſting of five thouſand men, with matchlocks, to remain always in its preſent eſtabliſhment; five hundred men for the artillery, and that number never to be exceeded; the remaining nine thouſand five hundred men are to be irregulars, neither to be clothed, armed, or diſciplined, after the manner of the Engliſh ſepoys or Nujib regiment: and his Highneſs alſo engages to arm none of his forces beſides the ten thouſand men mentioned in this Treaty, after the Engliſh manner, nor to train them in the diſcipline of the Engliſh troops. In conſideration thereof the ſaid *John Cartier*, Colonel *Richard Smith*, and *Claud Ruſſell*, engage, in behalf of his Excellency the Nabob *Syef-ul-Dowla*, and the Engliſh Company aforeſaid; that whilſt his Highneſs *Shujah-ul-Dowla* aforeſaid, and his ſucceſſors, ſhall abide by the articles of this Treaty, neither

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the preſent Council of *Fort William*, nor any future Council, ſhall hereafter introduce any new matter relative hereto, beſides what has been formerly agreed to, and is now concluded upon, and both parties ſhall conſider this agreement as firm and binding. His Highneſs aforeſaid ſhall ſwear upon the Koran, *John Cartier*, Colonel *Richard Smith*, and *Claud Ruſſell*, upon the Goſpel, never to infringe the minuteſt part or meaning hereof, and to maintain it themſelves, and to tranſmit it inviolable to their poſterity.

(Signed) *John Cartier*,
Richard Smith,
Claud Ruſſell.

Signed, ſealed, and ſolemnly ſworn to, according to their reſpective faiths, by the contracting parties, at *Benares*, the 29th of November, in the year of our Lord 1768, in the preſence of us,

(Signed) *Gabriel Harper*,
C. W. Boughton,
W. M. Coxe.

I promiſe to diſband all the troops which I now entertain exceeding the number of thirty-five thouſand horſe and foot, and to comply with all the articles ſtipulated in the Treaty within the ſpace of three months.

Written the 19th of the month Rejib, the year of the Hegira 1182, which anſwers to the 29th November 1768.

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Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council in *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 22d Auguſt 1774.

Par. 4. IN our advices of laſt ſeaſon we informed you of the ſteps we had taken towards the diſcharging of our temporary loan of 1773, and reducing the notes of 1769 and 1770, to a debt bearing an intereſt of five per cent. Theſe points were accordingly long ſince effected, and the whole of thoſe bonds diſcharged at the treaſury, excepting to the amount of current rupees five lacks eighty-ſix thouſand three hundred and forty-three, one anna, and three piſe, uncalled for, which lies as a depoſit without intereſt in your treaſury. We have now the pleaſure to inform you, that lately, on a ſummary review of our funds, and an eſtimate of our probable receipts and iſſues under certain heads, we came to a reſolution of diſcharging entirely by the 1ſt January next the whole notes of 1771, to the amount of twenty-five lacks ſeventy thouſand nine hundred and fifty-ſix rupees one anna, and nine piſe, beſides intereſt, and have given public notice accordingly.

5. There will then remain of the old debt, a principal ſum of C^t. R^s. ſeventy-nine lacks eighty-nine thouſand three hundred and twelve, and four piſe, beſides the new loan at five per cent. which we are in no doubt of paying off in the courſe of a few years, provided our expences are confined within the bounds to which we lately reduced them; that a great part of our army continues employed and paid by the Vizier, and that he is punctual in the other payments for which he is engaged to the Company. The courſe of events is not in our hands, but we have ventured to pledge our endeavours for accompliſhing this deſirable end.

6. We have alſo the pleaſure to inform you, that theſe operations on the bonded debt have ſo far raiſed the credit of the Company here, that we have had further conſiderable ſums of money offered us on loans at five per cent. per annum. We have accepted to the amount of rupees fifteen lacks fifteen thouſand one hundred and fifty-three, eight annas and ſix piſe, which we applied, as already noticed, towards diſcharging the bonds of 1769 and 1770, but have been obliged to refuſe the reſt, as we had already found reſources for diſcharging thoſe of 1771, and the ſum offered was not ſufficient for paying off thoſe of 1772, and before next year we hope to be able, from our own funds, and what loan we may then find neceſſary, to extinguiſh them at one payment.

7. We are the better pleaſed with this introduction to a reducing of your current rate of intereſt, as it is the pure and uninfluenced effect of the proſperous ſtate of our finances, and leaves us at liberty to promote it without making it our own act.

8. The Preſidency of *Bombay* have again applied to us for a large ſupply of money, ſetting forth their diſtreſſes in the ſtrongeſt terms, and requeſting immediate relief. We have anſwered them, that the ſtate of our finances and demands here did not enable us to furniſh them to the extent they required, but that we would cheerfully lend our aſſiſtance in the moſt ſpeedy manner. As far as fifteen lacks we had engaged to ſupply them within the courſe of the year, could we find out the means of remittance, but that it was not in our power to obtain draſts here to the amount of above five lacks, and that from doubtful hands, and at the exorbitant exchange of one hundred and twelve ſiccas per one hundred *Bombay* rupees; terms which we ſhould not think ourſelves juſtifiable in accepting, not only as it would have proved an immediate and heavy loſs of near nineteen per cent. on the remittance, but as it ſerved to introduce and encourage the exportation of our own ſpecie, which we eſteem it our duty to guard againſt by every poſſible means, as fatal to the commerce and revenue of thoſe provinces. There has however lately occurred an unexpected event, which will afford them means of taking up money on their bills on us; the ſhips returning from the Gulphs with the produce of the trade for three years paſt, detained by the late troubles in thoſe Countries, great part of which they muſt either bring round to *Bengal* in ſpecie, or leave at *Bombay* for draſts on this place; and we have taken care to ſecure the refuſal for that Preſidency from the owners of ſeveral of theſe veſſels which belong to this port.

The balance in your general treaſury this day, is C^t. R^s. 7,72,377. 1. 9.—In the Dewanny treaſury, S^a R^s 3,89,143. 1. 17. 2. and in the caſh, C^t R^s. 18,476. 8. 5.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sir, and Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble Servants,
Warren Haſtings,
P. M. Dacres,
James Lawrell,
J. Graham,
N. Grueber.

Fort William, 22d Auguſt, 1774.

Ex^d. *J. P. A.* Aſſiſtant Sec^ry.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council of *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated 17th October 1774.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs.

This Letter, probably the laſt which we ſhall have the honour to addreſs you, is intended to be ſent by the *Britiſh King* (Captain *Hoare*) which we have appointed the firſt ſhip for *Europe*; but as in all appearance her final diſpatch will fall under the direction of your new Government, we muſt refer you to them for the advices reſpecting her cargo, the regiſter of treaſure, and the liſt of certificates and drafts, and other paragraphs, which uſually cloſe our reſpective advices.

The certain accounts of the arrival at *Madras* of the tranſports which bring out the Gentlemen appointed by Act of Parliament to the Supreme Council, and conſequently

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quently the probability of our Adminiſtration ceaſing in a very few days, have induced us to addreſs you fully at this time from all our Departments, deeming it moſt expedient for us, and that it would be more ſatisfactory to you, that the report of laſt year's occurrences ſhould come immediately from ourſelves, and that we ſhould have an opportunity of accompanying it with our own obſervations, ſubmitting all to your judgment, in hopes of obtaining from you that approbation, which to deſerve has been the conſtant end of all our endeavours in the execution of the important truſts which you have hitherto been pleaſed to repoſe in our hands.

Our preſent advices will therefore contain every tranſaction of this ſeaſon, ſince the diſpatches of the laſt, ranged under proper heads, not yet mentioned by us; and will be accompanied with a broken ſet of the Conſultations during that period, as well as a reply to the ſeveral Letters received from you by the ſhipping of this ſeaſon. You have alſo herewith copies of ours of the 22d of Auguſt laſt, to which we refer.

Since the date of that Letter, the *Dutton*, Captain *Rice*; the *Bute*, Captain *Bendy*; and the *Pacific*, under the command of Mr. *Williamſon*, Chief Mate, arrived in the river; Captain *Barclay* of the laſt, died at ſea off *Ceylon*, in the way to *Madras*. We have alſo advice of the *Calcutta* being arrived ſafe at *Madras*; a packet by her, addreſſed to the Governor General and Council, lies for them in our hands.

The *Britiſh King*, which laſt year after a proper ſurvey we diſcharged the ſervice, has been lately brought round to this port from *Bombay*, whither ſhe had been carried by Captain *Hoare*, for the purpoſe of receiving a thorough repair. Captain *Hoare* immediately on his arrival in the river, made a tender of his ſhip to us for the Company's ſervice, producing the certificates of the ſhip-builders at *Bombay*, of her having undergone ſuch a repair; on this we accepted of his tender, and on the uſual report from the Maſter Attendant of her being fit to receive a cargo, immediately appointed her, as we have before mentioned, the firſt ſhip for *Europe* directly.

The ſhips, according to the preſent deſtination, ſtand for diſpatch as follows:

For *Europe* directly
- *Britiſh King*,
- *Aſia*,
- *Bute*,
- *Pacific*,
- Ship from *Bombay*.

For *Madras*
- *Speke*,
- *Dutton*,
- *Sea Horſe*.

We had propoſed to have diſpatched the *Speke*, Captain *Jackſon*, to *Madras*, in the month of Auguſt, as an early ſhip for that Preſidency; but were obliged to depart from that reſolution, in conſequence of a repreſentation from Captain *Jackſon*, of the impoſſibility of getting his ſhip out of the river, by reaſon of the weakneſs of his crew, and other impediments, before the laſt of the month, which would throw him too late to arrive at *Madras*, and take in his cargo before the change of the monſoons. The *Sea Horſe*, the only other ſhip in the river, being but juſt arrived, and not being prepared for departure, we were obliged to deſiſt from our intention; but to prevent if poſſible any diſappointment from this to the Preſidency of *Madras*, we acquainted them of it immediately, and deſired them to ſtop any of the ſhips of the ſeaſon, at their pleaſure, which they ſhould find at their port after the receipt of our advices; unluckily however the ſhips were all departed before our advices arrived, ſo that the only remedy we have now left, is to ſend an additional ſhip to them in the latter ſeaſon.

On applications from Captain *Gammage* and Captain *Bendy*, we ordered their reſpective ſhips, the *Aſia* and *Bute*, up to *Calcutta* to be repaired. Every thing that is wanting to the laſt, we believe will be completed in proper time; but we are given to underſtand in a regular report delivered to us by the Maſter Attendant, the Company's Carpenter, and their Officers, of a ſurvey held on the *Aſia*, that ſhe is in a condition totally incapable of receiving any effectual repair, and that ſhe muſt be broken up; we have therefore thought proper to turn her out of the ſervice. Our more late advices by this ſame opportunity will moſt probably give you an account of the meaſures which may be taken to ſupply the place of this ſhip.

On an information received from *Madras*, of a quantity of illicit trade having been received on board the *Speke* at *Madeira*, we took every ſtep in our power for detecting it, deputing two of the Company's ſervants to attend the unloading of the ſhip, to examine the hold, and to keep an exact account of all the goods delivered over the ſide; at the ſame time that we enjoined the ſtricteſt attention in receiving the goods at the Cuſtom-houſe here: we were not however able to make any diſcovery, whether it was that the information was groundleſs, or, what is more probable, that the perſons concerned had found means of conveying away their contraband goods by an early opportunity. The report of Meſſrs. *Young* and *Lloyd* will be found in our Conſultations; we are confident that it was made without the ſmalleſt degree of favour, and we hope it will ſatisfy you that every thing was done on our part that could be deviſed for the detection of the fraud alledged.

We had alſo ſimilar information, with a ſimilar effect, reſpecting the *Bute*, Captain *Bendy*; and we further received and paid due attention to your general information concerning the *Madeira* ſhips; this laſt however arrived ſo late, the ſhips being then unloaded, that it was in vain for us to attempt the detection. We can only obſerve on this head in general, that the means of carrying on theſe illicit practices in this river are ſo eaſy, that it becomes exceedingly difficult to make any diſcovery here, and that we apprehend the moſt probable means of fixing the fact upon the delinquents, would be to obtain proof at home of the receiving of the goods on board, which we imagine will be more eaſy to be had when the ſeamen are diſcharged, and no longer under the influence of their officers.

Secondly, of the Trade of *Europe*, or from one Part of *India* to another.

Agreeable to our expectations and advices of the 22d Auguſt, we find the Preſidency of *Bombay* have had the opportunity of taking up caſh from one of the Buſſorah ſhips for bills on us.—They have already drawn for S. R^s 2,32,960, and as more ſhips are expected there from the ſame port, we are in hopes, that by the ſteps we took here with the owners, they will be able to ſupply themſelves in the ſame manner to the extent for which we had permitted them to draw.

In conſequence of an application from the Governor and Council at *Bombay*, we have ordered 16,000 maunds of ſaltpetre to be ſent round this ſeaſon, for the occaſions of that Preſidency.

Since our Letters of the laſt ſeaſon, we have had no further demands upon us on account of the ſettlement at *Balambangan*, excepting for the demurrage of the Snow *Phœnix*, which was detained 32 days at *Balambangan* before the arrival of any gentleman of the factory to take charge of the ophium on the Company's account.

The rice which, agreeable to what we wrote per *Reſolution*, had been contracted for on account of the Fort Marlborough Preſidency, was ſafely delivered at their port; but a difference ariſing between the contractor and them about the charges of landing, it was referred to us; and we clearly recollecting our intention in the bargain to have been, that the cargo was to be received there on board the ſhip, and landed at the Company's expence, as would have been the caſe with any other veſſel which we might have freighted for them, we ordered the demand

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mand of the contractor, amounting to rupees 750, to be paid.

The President and Council at *Fort Saint George*, in the month of June last, advised us, that apprehending a scarcity of grain on the Coast, they had thought proper to suspend the collection of duties on all importations of that article from *Bengal*, or elsewhere, before the 1st October; and also to contract for the delivery of 41,000 maunds of rice from this river, which we have reason to believe has been duly delivered to their order.

In compliance with their request, we made public this suspension of duties at *Madras*, but some time after having cause, from the unusual dryness of the weather, to apprehend a similar scarcity here, we deliberated on the means for alleviating it, as will appear on the Consultations referred to; happily however, a reasonable fall of rain put an end to our apprehensions, and rendered it unnecessary to carry into execution the precautions we had intended of an embargo.

We have the pleasure to acquaint you, that the sales of your imports from *Europe* have this season turned out nearly upon a par with those of the last year; but the article of copper, which was then thought extremely well sold, has brought a price something higher, as will appear from the account of sales, and a comparative view of the medium prices since the year 1770, entered on our Consultation the 20th of last June. The brocades then remaining were also disposed of at public sale, but many of them being old, damaged, and much tarnished, were sold at a loss.

It having been represented to us by the Board of Customs, that the established usage of suffering all goods having a certificate of their being purchased at the Company's sales at the other Presidencies in *India*, to be imported duty-free, had been greatly abused, and was subject to much inconvenience and fraud; we determined, as the best means of preventing impositions in future, to charge the duties indiscriminately on all goods imported, though bought at the Company's sales in other settlements, after the same rate with such as by a certificate of the Custom Masters at these Presidencies appeared to have already paid a duty to the Company; and this regulation we ordered should take place from the 1st May next, that the merchants in those parts might have time to be informed of it, and regulate their offers at the public sales; accordingly we took the earliest opportunity of transmitting circular Letters of Advice of this resolution to the respective Presidents and Councils.

The Company's Auctioneer at this settlement applied for some allowance from us on the sales of the Company's goods, to defray the charges he is necessarily put to for clerks and other officers, to take the accounts of them, &c. as well as a consideration for his own trouble and attention; but as we did not think ourselves authorized to incur any expence on this head, especially after the first agreement with him upon admitting him to the office, we could only refer the matter to your determination, and in the interim resolved to permit him to draw from the purchasers 1¼ per mille upon the amount sales of ophium and salt; this we thought would be about sufficient to defray these charges, at the same time that the charge appeared too trifling to claim any consideration from the bidders, which could affect the offers at the sales.

In reply to the question in your Letter of the 7th January last, respecting the indent for iron furnaces for melting metal; we are to acquaint you, that they were intended as blast furnaces for the use of the foundery, which being now abolished, there is no further occasion for them.

Thirdly, of Investment.

Having, in compliance with your instructions, used every endeavour to make the provision of your investment by contract, and advertised in due time for receiving proposals for the investment of the present year, several were delivered in before the departure of the *Resolution*, but those from *Patna* were on terms of advantage which we were induced to accept, as mentioned in our Letter by that ship, dated the 15th March; we at the same time observed, that although proposals had been received from *Cossimbazar* for the silk investment, they were in terms too vague to be accepted without further explanations. These have been since received, together with musters both of the raw silk and silk piece goods, and being in general of a superior quality to the goods sent home of late years, though not altogether equal to the old musters, the Chief was invested with discretional powers to accept them; the lateness of the season when these materials were laid before us, leaving it doubtful whether it might be eligible to receive them, or to continue the provision of this season by Gomastahs. The determination has been given in favour of the contract, which, with the provision expected to be made also with the filature assortments, will amount, according to a calculate transmitted to us by the Chief of *Cossimbazar*, to twenty-one lacks of rupees; and from the dispatches hitherto made to us, we flatter ourselves, you will find this valuable article of your investment much improved, and that it soon will be recovered from the declining state to which it has been reduced since the year of the famine, we mean with respect to the quality of the goods. The price still continues very high, nor can we devise any means of reducing it consistently with the encouragement that has been given for a free and open trade, the necessary consequence of which is, an enhancement on the price of goods in those places where any restrictions might have before prevailed. In such predicament particularly is the raw silk Radanagore in the Burdwan province, which for many years had been taken at an arbitrary price, that is, at such rates as were judged sufficient for the maintenance of the Ryotts or original Providers; it then came to less than six rupees per seer, and accounts for the great and partial profit gained on that assortment at the sales in *Europe*; but since those restrictions have been removed in consequence of the system universally adopted for a general freedom of trade, the price of this article has risen from six to nine rupees, at which rate a contract has been entered into for the provision of Radanagore silk this season, and it is still under the market price of that assortment at *Calcutta*.

Prior to the acceptance of the proposals for the Cossimbazar investments, offers were made to us by *Kenkir Mundel*, a native, for the provision of seven hundred maunds of Comercolly raw silk, consisting of three letters, B C D, at the rate of ten rupees nine annas sicca per seer. As this tender appeared to be advantageous to the Company, from the report of the Export Warehouse Keeper and Examiner, they were accepted. This offer was supposed to be independent of the proposals at that time under consideration for the Cossimbazar investment; but it afterwards appeared, that to enable *Kinker Mundit* to fulfil the terms of his engagement, he required a part of the winders usually employed by the Company at *Comercolly*, to be now engaged in his service. This was assented to, as the deed of contract had been executed, and an advance made to him in consequence; but it was a diminution of so much from the Cossimbazar proposals, as the merchants there could on this account engage for 300 maunds only, instead of one thousand maunds. The contract however with *Kinker*, was judged to be the most beneficial by the exclusion of the letter E, and is accordingly in force.

We did entertain the most sanguine hopes, that after the first difficulties necessarily attendant on the introduction of the new mode of winding at the filatures were surmounted, it would have been attended with the advantages there appeared so much reason to expect from it; and although it has not yet answered those expectations, we are still willing to hope that its success will in the end make ample amends for past disappointments.

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As a token that the new or Italian method is likely to ſpread itſelf through the Country, we mentioned in our laſt, that it had found its way into the hands of private adventurers. Propoſals were ſoon after tendered to us, through the Chief of *Coſſimbazar*, for the proviſion of ſeventy maunds of filature ſilk upon muſter, at the rate of ſicca rupees, 14. 8. for the firſt, and 14 for the ſecond aſſortment; which, upon the report of the Export Warehouſe Keeper and Examiner, were accepted.

Mr. *Wiſs*, one of the Superintendants of the filatures, having repreſented that the new mode of winding might be proſecuted with ſucceſs at *Jungeypore*, we gave permiſſion for a temporary building to be erected there; and the ſame was in hand when propoſals were made to us through the Chief of *Coſſimbazar*, for the proviſion of one thouſand maunds of filature ſilk, to be manufactured at *Jungeypore*, and delivered by March 1777, at the rate of 14 ſicca rupees per ſeir of 72 ſicca weight, ſtipulating alſo that the temporary building ſhould be carried on at the expence of the contractor, and delivered up gratis for the future uſe of the Company at the expiration of the contract. He at the ſame time offered to provide eight hundred maunds of the Bengal aſſortment, at the rate of ten ſicca rupees per ſeir. Theſe propoſals, though made by a Servant of the Company, and the Export Warehouſe Keeper of the factory, appeared to be calculated for the advantage of the Company ſo far beyond any other which we were likely to obtain, and the ſecurity for their performance ſo good, that we gladly and without heſitation accepted them. Our reaſons are fully aſſigned in the Proceedings of the Comptroller, noted in the margin.

On receipt of your commands, dated the 23d October 1773, reſpecting the tonnage for the returning cargoes of the ſhips taken up for the preſent ſeaſon, we cauſed a calculate to be laid before us of the inveſtment expected to be provided at this Preſidency, together with the remains of laſt year; from this it appeared, that we ſhould be able to furniſh cargoes for five ſhips, according to the new increaſed rates of tonnage and your orders for loading them, with ſurplus; and the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George* having applied to us for three ſhips to return with full cargoes from the Coaſt, we wrote to *Bombay*, requeſting they would aſſiſt us with one of the ſhips conſigned to their ſide of *India* this ſeaſon, beſides the *Britiſh King* of laſt year; with this they have complied, as appears by the deſtination of your ſhipping already mentioned in the paragraph.

Fourthly, of the Trade of *India*, Country, Government, and Tranſactions with the European Powers.

The Director and Council for the Dutch Company, have this year applied for, and been allowed, the ſame quantity of ſaltpetre they received laſt year.

The French Commander at *Chandernagore* having likewiſe requeſted that a quantity of ſaltpetre, to the amount of 20,000 maunds, ſhould be granted for the ſhips of their nation, we poſtponed for ſome time our compliance with this requeſt, in hopes that your orders might direct our conduct in this particular; but the ſubject not being mentioned in any of your advices hitherto received, we agreed to grant them the quantity deſired.

We have alſo received an application from the Danes for 12,000 maunds, which has been granted them.

The fund ariſing from the ſaving of the Nabob's ſtipend, &c. has accumulated ſo as to enable us, at different times, to pay off, *viz.* 15 annas of the reſtitution to the European ſufferers in the troubles of 1763; and Sicca rupees 1,50,000, three-fourths of the donation to Colonel *Munro*, after liquidating the amount of the Company's demands upon the ſaid Fund, as adviſed in our Letter of the 15th March laſt.

The agents for the navy donation having applied to us for payment of current rupees 95,156, in virtue of the 11th paragraph of your orders of the 7th January 1774, directing the payment of three-eighths of a penny per rupee on the whole donation of the ſum of current rupees 72,500, for the amount of the indemnity of intereſt refunded by them on the ſecond moiety; and finding this claim exactly calculated on the letter of theſe orders, we ordered the amount to be paid accordingly.

In our Letter of the 15th March, we acquainted you of a propoſition to the Preſidency at *Fort Marlborough*, of ſending them the felons who are condemned here to ſlavery for life, to be employed on their fortifications, or other public works; but they have declined our offer, on the apprehenſion of receiving more detriment than ſervice from it, unleſs we could reſolve on tranſporting ſuch felons as were ſkilled in particular branches of handicraft buſineſs.

In our lateſt advices of laſt ſeaſon, we adviſed you of a plan we had adopted, and were then preparing to carry into execution, for eſtabliſhing a regular poſt in theſe provinces; we have now the ſatisfaction to inform you, that it has completely taken place. Although by this we cannot flatter ourſelves with eaſing the Company altogether of the expence of their inland correſpondence, yet we have, on the very grounds of the plan, effected a very conſiderable ſaving, beſides what ariſes from the receipt of poſtage. This laſt hitherto has not been conſiderable, amounting in the whole, ſince the firſt eſtabliſhment, to 2,500 rupees per month on a medium; but we are in hopes it will increaſe, as the Natives become more habituated to that mode of conveyance, and are thoroughly convinced of its ſecurity for their commercial and other correſpondence. The monthly accounts which are entered in the Conſultations, will enable you to form a complete idea of the preſent ſtate of this eſtabliſhment; we beg leave therefore to refer them to your view.

In conſequence of our reſolution to permit no Europeans, or others, ſubject to this Government, to reſide in the territories of the Vizier, without ſpecial licence, the Preſident iſſued orders to the Commanding Officer at *Chunargur*, to ſtop all ſuch whom he ſhould find proceeding thither; and in virtue of this order, Colonel *Muir*, the actual Commandant there, ſtopped in Auguſt laſt two black Portugueze paſſing his poſt with a fleet of boats, and furniſhed only with the uſual Rowannahs from the Cuſtom-houſe, which they attempted to paſs as a paſſport. The two men he ſent down to *Patna*, and allowed the boats to proceed onwards, under the charge of a Sircar.

It ſeems theſe boats were loaded on account of *Lewis da Coſta*, a merchant reſiding in this place, and that the men were his agents for conducting them. *Da Coſta*, apprehending he might be a great ſufferer by the removal of his agents, entered a formal proteſt here againſt Colonel *Muir*, for all damages which might accrue from it, with a view to an after-proſecution, if neceſſary. Colonel *Muir* naturally applied to the Preſident for an indemnification againſt ſuch a proſecution, which, on the Preſident's repreſentation of the facts, we did not heſitate to grant, it appearing Colonel *Muir* had acted ſtrictly in conformity to his orders; nor do we apprehend any conſequences from this proſecution, as, to the beſt of our judgment, the orders iſſued are ſtrictly conſiſtent with the rights of the Company, and of your inſtructions; and we conceive the native Portugueze reſiding under our protection, to be comprehended under every regulation which binds the other Chriſtian ſubjects of this Government.

We have been addreſſed by ſeveral Greek inhabitants of this town, for permiſſion to build a public place of worſhip, after their own rites, in *Calcutta*; and as we ſaw no reaſon for objecting to their requeſt, the Armenians poſſeſſing already the like privilege, it was accordingly granted.

In the month of April laſt we received a complaint from the Portugueze Governor at *Mocoa*, againſt a Captain *Mercer*, of this port, accuſing him of having decoyed away the ſlaves of ſeveral people belonging to that iſland;

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but as Captain *Mercer* had then juſt ſet out on a voyage to *China*, we informed the Governor of *Mocha* of this circumſtance, leaving it to him to ſeek reparation of Captain *Mercer* himſelf, on his arrival at that place.

As Captain *Mercer* is a man of eſtabliſhed credit and reputation in this place, we are inclined to believe the complaint to be without foundation; nor indeed, in ſuch caſes, do we know of any power reſiding in us to afford redreſs, which we believe can only be obtained by a regular ſuit at law for the recovery of the property alledged to be carried off. We have thought proper to make this remark for your conſideration, becauſe we are liable to receive repreſentations of this ſort from the foreign ſettlements, without knowing preciſely how far we ought to interfere in procuring ſatisfaction for them.

Fifthly, of Fortifications and Buildings.

Soon after the diſpatch of our Letter per *Reſolution*, we received Mr. *Phipp*'s anſwer to the call we made on him for an explanation of the cauſe of the bad ſtate of the filature built by him at *Rungpore*, of which we then adviſed you. He not only pleads in his juſtification the looſeneſs of the ſoil on which it ſtands, but alſo repreſents, that from the ſame cauſe it was not in his power to obtain good materials for making the bricks, ſo that they were originally defective—that, further, the workmen (there having formerly been no brick buildings in that province) were ſo aukward and ſo ſlow in their buſineſs, that they were two years in carrying it on, by which it became unuſually expoſed to the rains before it was finiſhed—that, ſenſible of theſe diſadvantages at the time, he repreſented them to his Superiors at *Coſſimbuzar*, and alſo endeavoured to guard againſt them, by giving an uncommon degree of thickneſs to the walls, as well as depth to the foundation; but that after all, ſo far from the building being totally unſerviceable, it is ſtill complete for 56 furnaces, and by means of a temporary building which he immediately run up on the failure of the reſt, he can be able to increaſe the ſilk of the new manufacture to the utmoſt extent of our wiſhes.

Mr. *Wiſs* has petitioned us on the ſubject of the filature he erected at *Comercolly*, in which he had acted contrary to the reſtrictory orders of the Committee of Commerce, by augmenting it to double the number of furnaces to which they had limited him. We are perſuaded, that a zeal for the ſervice, and a confidence of ſucceſs in the ſcheme in which he had engaged himſelf, ſolely induced him to undertake this extenſion of the original plan; and as the extraordinary furnaces have continued ever ſince to be uſed on the Company's account, and found to be no more than can with eaſe be kept in conſtant employment, we agreed to have the additional work determined by arbitration, intending to pay him according to the award; but as Mr. *Wiſs* was averſe to this mode, having no perſons to nominate on his part, he choſe to let the matter reſt entirely with the Board, and we in conſequence ordered an eſtimate of their value to be made by the Engineer at *Coſſimbuzar*, with a view to decide on the purchaſe, when his report ſhould come before us, but it has not yet been tranſmitted to us from the Chief of *Coſſimbuzar*.

Sixthly and Seventhly, of Covenanted Servants and Accounts.

We have to adviſe you of the death of Mr. *Lambert*, a Member of your Council, and of the following of your covenanted ſervants at this Preſidency, ſince our diſpatch by the *Reſolution*; viz.

Meſſrs. *Henry M'Leane*, *Thomas Hilt Pettit*, *William Wynne*, *James Bonwicke*, *Frederick Farrer*.

Immediately after the diſpatch of that ſhip Mr. *Grueber* was admitted to a ſeat at our Board in the room of Mr. *Reed*, who went by her to *England*.

Mr. *Hurſt* has been alſo called upon to take his ſeat in the room of Mr. *Lambert*, and Mr. *Bentley* is admitted in the room of Mr. *Rumbold*, who we found by the inſtructions tranſmitted to us, was no longer eſteemed to be in your ſervice here, his name being left out in the nomination of the eleven ſenior ſervants who are to compoſe the Board of Trade.

The Commiſſary General on his return in June laſt from *Madras*, whither his ill ſtate of health had obliged him to repair, entered upon the charge of his office, and we furniſhed him with further Inſtructions for the execution of it, in which we endeavoured to preſcribe a general line, conſiſtent with the ſeveral Orders and Inſtructions which you had given us on this head. We alſo delivered him copies of the Report of the Committee of Directors, appointed to inveſtigate the army accounts of *Bengal*, as well as of the ſeveral regulations which we had recently formed for the reduction of the military expences.

In juſtice to the propriety of your intention in the appointment of a Commiſſary General, and to the merits of Colonel *Mac Leane*, we muſt declare that we have reaped the greateſt benefit from his ſervice, and have received much aſſiſtance from him in carrying into execution the plan for reducing the contingent and other military expences, which had ſwelled to ſo enormous a height. His labours have been aſſiduous in his office, and his emoluments we are afraid no way equivalent to them. He is actually with the brigade in the field, or in his way thither, to inſpect the ſupplies there in the duty of his department.

Having in our late regulations reduced the allowances of the officers of the Sepoy corps to a par with thoſe of the ſubaltern European infantry, the former addreſſed a memorial to us, repreſenting the hardſhips they ſuffered from this regulation, as they are liable to many expences to which the others are not expoſed, being generally cantoned at a greater diſtance from the public markets, which obliges them to employ an additional number of ſervants, and alſo being obliged to hold themſelves in continual readineſs for detached ſervices; but as thoſe points were in conſideration with us when we formed the regulations, and as we judged theſe diſadvantages of the Sepoy corps amply counterbalanced by the advantages of batta, &c. which they often draw, by being employed on detached and occaſional ſervices, we determined not to alter the regulation.

We mentioned at the ſame time our not being able to diſcover from our books the ſmalleſt foundation for the claim of Captain *Spelman*'s heirs; however, in obedience to your orders, we have attempted to ſettle it, by offering to ſubmit the demand to an arbitration; and if it ſhould be there eſtabliſhed from the proofs which the parties may bring, we will immediately diſcharge it to the amount of the award: we have not yet received an anſwer to this offer from their Attorney.

We have duly attended to the paragraphs of your General Letter of 10th December, reſpecting *Richard Sim* and others, diſcharged ſoldiers: and in reply we can only aſſure you, that we took every method to make public your orders reſpecting the penſion to which officers and ſoldiers have a claim; and if any have gone home without the proper teſtimonials for obtaining it, it muſt have proceeded from their own neglect in not applying to us, or intimating their deſire to the proper officer, as in ſuch caſe they certainly would have been furniſhed with every neceſſary certificate. We can only further ſay, that no pains ſhall be wanting in us to prevent any miſtakes of that kind in future, and in the meantime tranſmitted a copy of theſe paragraphs to the Town Major, for the information of the troops, and gave him directions to conform to your orders exactly, as far as related to him.

On a repreſentation of the caſe of Mr. *Kenderdine*, formerly a Surgeon upon this eſtabliſhment, but then without employment and in great diſtreſs, having been diſmiſſed the ſervice in the year 1767, on a complaint of inattention to his duty; and it appearing from the teſtimonials

monials of the officers which he produced, that he was an able Surgeon, and had, ſince his diſmiſſion, rendered eſſential ſervice to a battalion of Sepoys at *Rangur*, to whom he had voluntarily given his attendance in that capacity, we thought he had already undergone a ſufficient puniſhment for his former inattention, and therefore reſtored him to the ſervice as youngeſt Surgeon, not to riſe.

Captain *William Thomſon*, who lately commanded the ſelect piquet, has applied to us for the reimburſement of the extra expences he unavoidably incurred on that ſtation; and as it appears that he had reaſon, from the general orders of Sir *Robert Barker*, to expect an extra allowance of twenty rupees batta per diem, when he undertook that troubleſome and ungrateful employment, and that he was actually expoſed to extra expences in it, we have preſumed (though we did not think ourſelves authorized to grant it) to recommend it to your conſideration, and hope you will order him the allowance he requeſts.

We are happy that our recommendation of Captain *Rennell*, and the ſurveys which were tranſmitted to you at the ſame time, have had the effect to draw from you ſo honourable an expreſſion of your approbation, and wiſh to recompence his long and faithful ſervices, as is contained in the 13th paragraph of your Letter, dated 10th December. We beg leave to ſpeak again in his favour, and on occaſion of his addreſs to us, referred to in the margin, to point out the means by which your benevolent intentions towards him may be effected. His health deſtroyed by wounds, inceſſant fatigue, and the unwholſome changes of climate, to which his duty as Surveyor General has expoſed him, renders it neceſſary for him to think of returning to his native country; but he has reſolved not to quit *India* before he ſhall have completed the work which he has ſtill in hand. His wiſhes afterwards are centered in retiring with a competency, and ſome ſolid teſtimony of your approbation; on which we take the liberty to remark to you, that no precedent can be drawn from it, as Captain *Rennell* himſelf began this buſineſs, has carried it on in a manner hardly to be equalled we believe by any in *Europe*, and will leave little unfiniſhed in it. No promotion or penſion granted to him can injure the rights of others, becauſe his rank being fixed to the engineer corps, he can riſe in that only, notwithſtanding that his ſeniority in ſervice to many officers bearing higher commiſſions might be conſidered to give him claim to the ſame indulgence they would enjoy, if admitted to reap the benefits of the penſions. We therefore venture to recommend Captain *Rennell* for the penſion he ſolicits, or ſome equivalent mark of your bounty; and flatter ourſelves that the aſſiduity, attention, and obedience to the orders of his Superiors, which he has ever manifeſted, beſides his juſt and inoffenſive conduct to the people of the country, in the courſe of his ſurveys, and total abſtinence from any obnoxious purſuits of wealth, added to the perſeverance and courage manifeſted in the dangers to which he has been frequently expoſed, render him an object really deſerving of your favour. Were it becoming in your Adminiſtration to importune you with their requeſts, we ſhould think this a proper occaſion, and would entreat your benevolence towards a man who has merited our higheſt eſteem by his continual good conduct, and whoſe private character has gained him the love of all who know him.

Lieutenant *Leland*, whoſe trial alſo goes in this packet, was diſmiſſed the ſervice for diſobedience of orders, in conſequence of a ſentence of a court-martial; but ſome time afterwards, at the recommendation of the commanding officer of his brigade, and other aſſurances of his ſenſe of his former miſbehaviour and reſolution of amendment, we thought fit to reſtore him.

Mr. *Harding*, formerly a Captain in your ſervice, whoſe quarrelſome and violent temper had been the occaſion of bringing him ſeveral times before a court martial, and who has been diſmiſſed the ſervice ever ſince the 20th March 1771, as we formerly adviſed, petitioned us in July laſt for a reviſal of ſome of the proceedings againſt him, which it was not in our power legally to grant; neither did any thing in his repreſentation induce us to alter in his favour our former reſolution of diſmiſſing him the ſervice. APPENDIX. No. 43.

Lieutenant *Gardiner*, reſpecting whoſe claim of rank a reference was made to you from the proceedings of the Board of Field Officers, again petitioned us on the diſcovery, as he alleged, of an erazure in the Town Major's books of the date of his rank, to his prejudice, which he thinks ought to decide the competition between him and Captain *Penman* in his favour. Our proceedings upon it will be found in the Conſultations referred to on the margin; and the matter being already in reference before you, is now left to your final deciſion.

Enſign *Bruce* having objected to Enſign *Skinner* taking rank above him, on the ſcore of being his ſenior in the King's ſervice, we called on them both to produce their commiſſions, and found that Mr. *Skinner*'s was of a prior date, but granted in *America* by the commanding officer, in virtue of the authority delegated to him by his Majeſty for the like purpoſes. Enſign *Bruce* does not object to thoſe commiſſions, but ſtill inſiſts that the rank in the army was not ſettled by them, and refers to the war office for a proof. As this is a point which can be only aſcertained at home, we refer Mr. *Bruce*'s memorial to you, before whom it will be his buſineſs to bring proper proofs in ſupport of it.

Colonel *Hugh Grant* laſt month requeſted leave to reſign the ſervice, with an intention to go home in one of the ſhips of this ſeaſon. We granted him the permiſſion to reſign, and appointed Colonel *Ironſide* to the command of his brigade, with a proviſional commiſſion of Colonel, till your pleaſure ſhould be known.

We have ordered Major *Stainforth* to refund the four months allowance which we formerly granted him, agreeable to your commands, and it will be deducted from his current pay accordingly.

In obedience to your commands by the *Pacific*, concerning widows being entitled to the Company's penſion, we have cauſed the paragraph to be made public, that theſe directions may be exactly conformed to in time to come. The names of ſuch widows as may hereafter be admitted on the liſt, and paid here in conſequence of theſe orders, will be regularly tranſmitted to you.

Your orders for refunding the commiſſion on the revenue granted by Sir *Eyre Coote*, were properly attended to; but as the preſent Board were not concerned in leaving out his name at firſt from the commiſſion account, we could not look upon them as chargeable for the whole refund; we therefore ordered in general, that repayment ſhould be made by each individual, of the ſurplus they had received on that account: the greateſt part will be in that manner repaid here, and the only arrears we apprehend will ariſe from ſuch Gentlemen as have quitted the ſervice and gone to *England*, or ſuch as are dead. If their Attornies ſhould decline paying off theſe, you will be duly adviſed when the matter is properly aſcertained.

In purſuance of your orders recommending Mr. *Baillie* to be employed in proſecuting enquiries into the trade and country of *Aſſam*, we have directed him to proceed on this buſineſs, with aſſurances of our ſupport and encouragement in the undertaking, and requiring him to ſend us advice of his ſucceſs, that we may be enabled to furniſh you with the information you deſire on that head.

We adviſed you in our Letter by the *Swallow* ſloop of war, of our having reſolved to pay off entirely your bond debt of 1771, amounting to current rupees 25,70,956. 1. 9. and of our having given notice accordingly.

The balance this day in our treaſury, as particularized in the laſt paragraph of this Letter, added to what will be

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received in a day or two from *Patna*, will ſuffice for their diſcharge; and as the ſeaſon for the heavy collections is now approaching, there is no doubt but there will be again a conſiderable amount in your treaſury by the end of December next. The ſums therefore which may be expected in the interim from the Vizier, *viz.* fifteen lacks of rupees on account of the ceſſion of *Corah*, &c. as ſtipulated by the Benares Treaty, and 20 lacks out of the 40 engaged for the Rohilla expedition, added to about 15 lacks for the bills you have authorized us to draw upon you, will be a further fund for the diſcharge of your bond debt, and reduce it to 35 lacks inſtead of 125 lacks, which was the amount of it in Auguſt laſt. The further ſum of 35 lacks, which will remain due from the Vizier, the payment of which we deem perfectly ſecure, and will therefore be ſufficient to cancel the whole of your bond debt in the courſe of another ſeaſon, inclusive of the ſavings ariſing both from the reduction of expences, the particulars of which were tranſmitted you by the *Reſolution*, and from one of the brigades being employed out of the provinces, and in conſequence paid by the Vizier. But as your treaſury is the only ſafe fund in *Bengal* for lodging the money of widows and orphans reſiding in the country, without this indulgence may be diſtreſſed for a ſubſiſtence, we beg leave to recommend that your Adminiſtration ſhould be allowed to receive to the amount of ten lacks, at the uſual intereſt of eight-per-cent. on this charitable motive, although the ſtate of your treaſury ſhould be ſuch, that the money may not be required for your uſe.

The proceedings of the Board of Inſpection appertain properly to this and the foregoing head; but as the detail of them is ſent in to our Secretary from that Department, we ſhall beg leave, for the ſake of greater perſpicuity, to enter it under a diſtinct head.

Board of Inſpection.

The continuation of the Proceedings of the Board of Inſpection ſince the diſpatch of the *Reſolution*, is forwarded to you by this conveyance.

Our chief employment in this Department has been to watch over and enforce the obſervance of the regulations we had adopted in conformity to your orders, and our own reſolutions, for retrenching the expences of your ſubordinate factories; your civil and military buildings; your civil officers at the Preſidency, and your military eſtabliſhments. Theſe objects we have laboured to effect in regular weekly meetings, by the concurrent aids of the Auditor of the Week, the Comptroller of the Offices, and the Commiſſary General: and we are perſuaded, that upon a minute review of our proceedings, you will find they have not been neglected.

The charges of the Factories do not require of us any more particular mention than what is comprehended in this general ſummary, as we do not know of any material inſtance in which they have been ſuffered to exceed the limits of the fixed eſtabliſhments; and even where trivial exceſſes may appear, the evident neceſſity and reaſons to juſtify them, will at the ſame time preſent themſelves to you on the face of our Records, and the remarks of our Weekly Auditor.

On finding, from a concurrence of cauſes, which were briefly enumerated to you in the Letter from this Department per *Hector*, that the expence of the public buildings had in the firſt year, after the receipt of your orders per *Grafton*, inevitably exceeded the ſum which you preſcribed to be laid out under this head, we came to an early reſolution of reſtricting the expence of the new fort and other buildings as much as poſſible, that we might be enabled to bring the whole in future within the limits of your orders, the ſum of which, we are convinced, when this has been effectually done, will prove amply ſufficient for the purpoſes of this head of expence.

The New Fort, although far from being brought to a ſtate of completion, yet requiring the addition of no conſiderable works, which were abſolutely or immediately neceſſary for its defence, except the uncompleted ravelins, we determined, until we could continue theſe conſiſtently with the letter of your orders, to put the whole upon an eſtabliſhment of expence, anſwering the purpoſes of keeping the fort clean, and the works in proper repair. The different branches which compoſe this eſtabliſhment, are recorded in the Conſultations noted in the margin, and have been ſtrictly adhered to, as have alſo the ſums we informed you we had limited for keeping in repair the Company's houſes in and about *Calcutta*.

In the exception above-mentioned of uncompleted works, we ſhould alſo have ſpecified the facings of the Redans to the ſide of the river, which you were adviſed had fallen down in the month of September 1773. It will doubtleſs be proper to repair this work; but we are under no uneaſineſs on account of the delay which has occurred in ſo doing, as thoſe facings appear to us to be only neceſſary, and indeed it is evident they are only intended, from the nature of their conſtruction, for the preſervation of the interior earthen works from the effects of the ſeaſons peculiar to this climate, and not in any degree for the purpoſes of defence.

We acquainted you of our having publiſhed an advertiſement for propoſals for contracting, for a term of years, for the repairs of the cantonments of *Barrampore* and *Dinahpore*. Many propoſals were in conſequence tendered us for this undertaking; but, upon mature conſideration of the ſubject, although we were ſtill of opinion, that to enter into ſuch a contract would be the moſt eligible meaſure for the intereſt of the Company, as well in order to inſure the effectual execution of the repairs, as to aſcertain and limit the expence in a branch which we had ſo often experienced to exceed all calculations and eſtimates; yet we agreed to poſtpone accepting, for the preſent, any propoſals for that purpoſe: had we accepted them, we ſhould have retained a ſtrict eye to the limits of your orders. Our motives for reſolving to poſtpone the meaſure, are recorded upon the Proceedings of the Board of Inſpection of the 9th June; to which we beg leave to refer, as well as for the eſtabliſhment we then judged it neceſſary to fix for their preſent indiſpenſable repair; and we flatter ourſelves that our conduct on this point will be honoured with your approbation.

For information of the controul which has been exerciſed in checking and regulating the expences of the civil offices at the Preſidency, we beg leave to ſubmit to you the diary of the Proceedings of the Comptroller, which has been monthly laid before us, and been rendered an Appendix to the Proceedings of your Board of Inſpection. The utility and ſalutary effects already experienced, and ſtill to be expected, from this inſtitution, as well as that of our weekly auditor, we are perſuaded, will not eſcape your judicious obſervation.

The ſet of military regulations we had the honour to tranſmit you with our laſt advices, have, by ſeveral ſubſequent additions and orders, being rendered ſtill more complete. Theſe additions and orders have iſſued from your Board of Inſpection, to which Department we allotted the cognizance of the military expences, under the regulations we had formed; and in which, with the concurrence and hearty aſſiſtance of Colonel *Mac Leane*, the Commiſſary General, who has always had a ſeat at our deliberations on military expences, the moſt minute attention has been paid, and every endeavour exerted to enforce the obſervance of the regulations, and preclude every ſuperfluous and unauthorized expence.

It is a ſatisfaction to us to have anticipated the orders contained in the printed inſtructions to the new Adminiſtration, which you were pleaſed to tranſmit to us, for regulating the mode of applying for advances of caſh; namely, that the application ſhould be accompanied with an abſtract account of diſburſements from the laſt advance, an account of the balance in hand, and an eſti-

mate

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mate of the diſburſements for which the advance applied for is required and intended. This regulation we adopted ſo long ago as November 1773, from which time it has been ſtrictly adhered to; and the abſtracts have been alſo regularly entered on record, with the applications; they were entered for ſome time on the Proceedings of the Public Department, of late they have appeared on thoſe of the Board of Inſpection.

The Preſident having laid before us an account of loſſes ſuſtained by Captain *Martin*, in the attack made upon *Chichicotta* by the Boteas, when on his duty there, of Surveyor, and without any military charge, with a requeſt that it might remain on record, and ſtand referred to your pleaſure, we now beg leave to point out this circumſtance to your obſervation, and to add our own recommendation, that you will be pleaſed to allow Captain *Martin* ſome compenſation for his loſſes, amounting to Sonaut rupees 6,625, which he obviouſly ſuſtained by a ſpirited and laudable exertion for the public ſervice, foreign from the line of his duty.

We adviſed you of a plan preparing by our Maſter Attendant, for the reduction of the heavy expences of the Marine Department; and that as ſoon as we ſhould be furniſhed with it, we hope to be enabled to regulate this office to your entire ſatisfaction.

The plan (which propoſed the conducting the buſineſs by contract) was ſoon after ſubmitted to us by the Maſter Attendant; and the expence, on the terms and conditions therein ſtated, appearing reaſonable and moderate, we reſolved to conclude a contract accordingly; at the ſame time we thought it proper to give him the preference, as it was a ſervice which could only be conducted by a perſon verſed and experienced in marine affairs, and as a contract with any other perſon would have been productive of inconveniencies by too much diminiſhing the authority of his office. The Maſter Attendant undertaking to conduct the buſineſs upon the propoſed plan, the agreement accordingly took place for the term of three years, commencing from the 1ſt of May, under the reſerve of retaining to ourſelves the power of annulling it, ſhould it not receive your approbation, or prove upon experience ineligible.

A petition was ſhortly after preſented to us by the Contractors for ſupplying the ſtores to the offices at the Preſidency, repreſenting the great loſs they were likely to ſuſtain by the ſtores which were required for the Marine Department being ſupplied by the Maſter Attendant. This petition was referred to him, and his objections required to receiving the ſtores he would want for executing the new agreement from theſe Contractors, before the ratification of it. His anſwer lay ſome time for conſideration, and whilſt the matter remained in this ſtate of indeciſion, your orders arrived for putting the offices of Naval Storekeeper and Maſter Attendant under ſome new regulations. It was before a matter of heſitation, whether the agreement with the Maſter Attendant ſhould be carried into execution on account of the difficulties ariſing to the former Contractors; but it could now by your orders no longer continue a point of doubt or diſcuſſion, as ſuch a meaſure would have directly counteracted your new arrangement. It was therefore reſolved, that the agreement propoſed by the Maſter Attendant ſhould not be entered into, but that the department ſhould be arranged according to your orders; and we were obliged to exerciſe the reſerve contained in our reſolution of annulling his agreement; and it accordingly ſtood annulled from the end of the month of September.'

Having taken under our conſideration the new regulating and arranging the neceſſary eſtabliſhments of the offices of Naval Storekeeper, Marine Paymaſter, and Maſter Attendant, in conſequence of your orders; and obſerving, that you had recommended the practice of the Preſidency of *Bombay* as our guide; we have applied to the Gentlemen there for a complete detail of the mode of conducting the buſineſs of the Marine at that place, and as ſoon as we receive it we ſhall not fail to adopt the ſame plan here.'

In the interim it has been reſolved, that the office of the Naval Storekeeper do remain on its preſent footing and under its preſent eſtabliſhments, unleſs the reply from the Preſidency at *Bombay* ſhall point out the propriety of any alterations.

With reſpect to the nature of the Marine Paymaſter's office, being unacquainted with the practice of *Bombay*, we ſeparately directed Mr. *Keeble* and Captain *Wedderburn* to lay before us ſuch a plan as might appear to them the moſt proper for regulating the line of the two offices, and managing them in their detail, together with an eſtabliſhment of the neceſſary ſervants and charges. The plan ſubmitted to us in conſequence by Mr. *Keeble*, was unanimouſly reſolved upon to be adopted, under certain additions and alterations; and the ſame having been rectified accordingly, they were directed to conform thereto for the preſent in the management and execution of their reſpective offices. And we think there is every reaſon to expect a reduction of charges, and the introduction of a ſyſtem of method and regularity in your Marine, from the proſecution of the arrangement you have thus preſcribed.

For your more particular information on all the above tranſactions, as well as for a detail of others not mentioned in this abridgement, we muſt beg leave to refer you to the Proceedings of the Board of Inſpection at large; but this being the head of your advices under which it properly falls, we cannot quit the ſubject without expreſſing to you the ineffable regret which we feel in being denied the ſatisfaction which would have flowed to us from obſerving the reſult of our labours. The general adjuſtment of your revenue, the regulating the adminiſtration of juſtice in both its branches, the new modelling the Nabob's houſehold, and the political negociations with the Vizier, being objects of the firſt and moſt immediate moment to the future proſperity of your affairs, of courſe claimed the firſt place in the attention and proceedings of your preſent Adminiſtration; and for this conſideration, the further objects of regulating and retrenching the expences of your ſubordinate factories, your offices at the Preſidency, and your military eſtabliſhments, neceſſarily experienced a temporarary ſuſpenſion, and the ſeveral arrangements made in them, cannot be ſaid to have taken effect ſooner than April 1774. To participate therefore the ſatisfaction accruing from the reſult of theſe our meaſures, we are induced to ſay is denied us; but ſtill we are happy in the reflection, that the grand object of them, the intereſt of our Employers, will be equally promoted, and that however diſtant the appearance of the effects, they can only be conſidered as the fruits of our labours exerted with alacrity and unwearied application, ſince the important truſt has been confided to us of the ſuperintendance of your affairs. That theſe fruits muſt in a very ſhort courſe of time produce reſources to enable your Adminiſtration, after diſcharging your heavy bond debt, to increaſe, if judged eligible, the amount of your Inveſtments, and to reſtore in general the credit of the Company by ſuch farther application of them as you may think proper to direct, are conſequences too obvious to eſcape the attention of the moſt ſuperficial obſerver. If this ſuccinct elucidation carries with it an air of ſelf-applauſe, let it find its juſtification in your candid advertence to the predicament in which we ſtand on the eve of a change in your Government, which will deprive us of all further opportunity of communicating with you on the truſt we have had to manage, and which we are conſcious of having managed with fidelity and attention.

We obſerve what you have been pleaſed to write concerning the Company's bonds to *Vancolſter*. You will however perceive by our advices of laſt ſeaſon, that theſe bonds are no longer in our Secretary's hands, having been attached and afterwards carried off by a writ from the Mayor's court in behalf of his creditors.

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We have obſerved your eſpecial directions about the drafts on you of this ſeaſon; and agreeable to them, gave public notice of the remittance that was intended to be furniſhed, that every perſon entitled to it might put in their claim for a ſhare. The claims were ordered to be ſent in before the firſt of this month, and ſoon after that date we ſettled a diſtribution, and advertiſed, that the money would be received into the treaſury immediately, and bills granted for the amount. A liſt of the drafts will be regularly ſent as they are made, by each ſhip.

About ten days ago, we had notice from Sir *Edward Hughes*, of his arrival in this river with the ſhips of his Majeſty's ſquadron under his command. As we were equally deſirous of paying obedience to your commands, reſpecting the reception of the commanders and officers of his Majeſty's ſhips, and of ſhewing our own ſentiments of reſpect and attention to them, we deputed Mr. *Graham*, a Member of our Board, to wait on Sir *Edward*, with congratulations on his arrival, and aſſurance of every aſſiſtance and accommodation which it was in our power to give; at the ſame time we ſettled the ſalutes which were to be given him on his arrival at the Preſidency, and the allowances to him and his officers, agreeable to your orders.

We this year advertiſed as uſual for ſealed propoſals for the army contract, and five were given in accordingly by the time limited; but as we then had received certain accounts of the arrival of the tranſports at *Madras*, with the Gentlemen from *England*, nominated Members of the new Council by Act of Parliament, which rendered it probable the new Government would ſoon take place, we agreed to leave the ſettlement of the contract to them; but to provide at the ſame time againſt any inconveniency that might ariſe from a delay in receiving it, we directed the preſent Contractor, on his offer to provide ſupplies for three months beyond the expiration of his contract, viz. for the months of January, February, and March next, on the ſame conditions, and for the ſame articles as ſpecified in it.

The balance in our general treaſury this day is current rupees 4,02,837. 11; in the Dewannee treaſury, Sicca rupees 8,90,165. 2. 3.; and in the caſh, current rupees 15,170. 11. 6.

We are, with reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful
humble ſervants,
Warren Haſtings.
W. Alderſey.
P. M. Dacres.
James Lawrell.
J. Graham.
Cha. Bentley.

Fort William, 17th October, 1774.

APPENDIX, No. 44.

Fort William; at a Council the 20th October 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Governor General, Preſident. Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the honourable *George Monſon*, *Philip Francis*, eſquire.

READ, the Act of Parliament of the 13th year of his preſent Majeſty George III. intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in *Europe*."

Ordered, that the following proclamation be made at 7 o'clock to-morrow morning, at the Court-houſe, by the Sheriff, attended by his officers, agreeable to a requiſition in the Act.

Agreed, That the Governor be requeſted to order a guard from the fort to attend alſo upon the Sheriff during this ceremony.

Whereas, by an Act of Parliament, paſſed in the 13th year of the reign of his preſent Majeſty, intituled, "An Act for eſtabliſhing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the *Eaſt India* Company, as well in *India* as in *Europe*," it is amongſt other things enacted, That the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, be conſtituted Governor General, and Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, and *Philip Francis*, eſquires, Counſellors, of the Preſidency of *Fort William* in *Bengal*, and its dependencies:

And whereas it is declared by the Act aforeſaid, that the powers of the ſaid Governor General and Council are to commence and take place from and immediately after the time that public proclamation ſhall be made of their arrival, or the arrival of any three of them, at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; which proclamation the ſaid Governor General and Council are required to make:

It is therefore hereby proclaimed, that the ſaid Governor General and three of the ſaid Counſellors are arrived at *Fort William* aforeſaid, and that the powers veſted by the ſaid Act in the Governor General and Council do commence and take place from the date of this proclamation.

By order of the honourable Governor General and Council.

Dated in *Fort William*, this 20th day of October 1774. *J. Stewart*, Secretary.

Extract of a Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors of the *Eaſt India* Company; dated the 21ſt November 1774.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. This will accompany our Proceedings in the Secret Department, which, by the abolition of the Select Committee, will from this time comprehend the complete Minutes of the Political Tranſactions of your Adminiſtration here. Secret Department.

2. The ſhortneſs of the period which has elapſed ſince we took upon us the government of your affairs, has not left room for any external occurrences; you will however find that our Conſultations have not been unfrequent, and that the Reſolutions in them, we are ſorry to ſay it, have not been formed in that harmony, which was equally the object of your inſtructions and our wiſhes, could it have been maintained conſiſtent with the duty we owe to you and our own characters, in aſſerting the opinions which our judgment dictated.

3. The Proceedings are very full on the ſubject, which have been in debate before us, and contain the Minutes, Aſſents, and Diſſents, at length, on every Queſtion; and as the difference of opinion throughout bore always a relation to one point, namely, the propriety of the Rohilla expedition, you will find we were almoſt without exception divided in the ſame proportion; and as in this caſe it would have been impoſſible to have concurred in a General Letter of arguments and opinions, we determined to have this ſtrictly and ſimply a Letter of advice, comprehending reſolutions and facts, and to refer to the Proceedings for the reaſoning on both ſides.

4. In our firſt Conſultation in this Department, we took into conſideration a Minute of the Governor General's, reſpecting the political ſtate of affairs in *India*, which he had delivered in at the preceding meeting in the other Department, with reſpect to the war then carrying on againſt the Rohillas in aid of the Vizier; we ſoon found that our opinions on its neceſſity and propriety were likely to differ very widely. A majority of the Board, conſiſting of the Commander in Chief, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, thought it neceſſary for the

better

Conſultation, 25th October. better elucidating the grounds and conduct of the war, to ſee the whole of the original Correſpondence between the Governor General, Mr. *Middleton*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel *Champion*, commanding the troops acting in conjunction with him; and it was reſolved to requeſt the Governor General to lay before the Board accordingly.

25th October. 26th Ditto. 5. The Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* diſſented from this Reſolution, and the former, at a ſubſequent meeting, delivered in a Minute, declaring that he meant to lay before the Board ſuch parts of Mr. *Middleton*'s and Colonel *Champion*'s Correſpondence as related to the conduct of public affairs; but as ſome of the Letters might contain things in the courſe of a free and perſonal communication, which might not be proper for a public record, he begged leave to decline laying the whole of them before us.

6. On this refuſal a formal proteſt was entered againſt it by General *Clavering*, Mr. *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; Mr. *Monſon* thereupon moved for the recal of Mr. *Middleton*; and it was determined by the ſame majority, that he ſhould accordingly be recalled, and ordered to repair forthwith to the Preſidency, bringing with him the whole of his Correſpondence during his reſidence at the Court of

Ditto. the Vizier. At the ſame time it was reſolved to appoint Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer of the brigade, to treat with the Vizier in his room. Againſt both theſe Reſolutions the Governor General proteſted, and Mr. *Barwell* alſo diſſented from them.

7. In conſequence of theſe Reſolutions, the Commander in Chief produced, at next meeting, ſome propoſitions which he offered as the groundwork of the inſtructions which it would be neceſſary to ſend to Colonel *Champion*. Theſe were fully debated in a ſubſequent Conſultation, and they were in general agreed to with ſmall variation; the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*

31ſt October. objecting to many parts of them, and entering Minutes accordingly, while on the other hand the Commander in Chief, Mr. *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, either jointly or ſeparately recorded their ſentiments in the ſame manner.

8. The inſtructions agreed on, and which were actually ſent to Colonel *Champion*, or the officer commanding the 2d brigade, were in ſubſtance, after acquainting him with the recal of Mr. *Middleton*, and with his own appointment to treat with the Vizier, to direct him, immediately on receipt of the Letter, to wait on the Vizier, and to demand payment of the 40 lacks due to the Company for the aid they furniſhed him in the Rohilla war, and of ſuch other ſums as would be then due in virtue of his other engagements; and we empowered him to liquidate and ſettle all accounts between the Company and the Vizier, which might be unſettled at that time.

9. At the ſame time that we enjoined him to make this immediate demand for the whole, we left it in his diſcretion, ſhould he find it impoſſible for the Vizier to comply, to relax in his demand ſo far as to accept of any part, not leſs than 20 lacks, in ready money, and to ſettle a kiſtbundy or agreement for payment by inſtalments for the remainder, at any terms not exceeding 12 months for the laſt.

10. In caſe the Vizier ſhould refuſe to comply with the above demands, the Commanding Officer was directed to enter a proteſt againſt him; and within 14 days from the receipt of theſe inſtructions, to retire with the army under his command, and withdraw into the Company's territories.

11. But if the Vizier ſhould comply, as far as his circumſtances would admit, conformable to the terms propoſed, in that caſe the Colonel was only to withdraw the army within the province of *Oud*, and to continue it there for the defence of the Vizier's ancient dominions, ſhould he require it; if otherwiſe, he was to retire into the Company's territories, as in the other caſe.

12. Theſe orders were given with ſuitable directions of caution and reſpectful moderation, as to the manner in which he was to communicate them to the Vizier, and as to his own retreat, ſhould he apprehend that any danger or difficulty might attend it.

13. Before theſe inſtructions were reſolved upon, advices arrived of an end being put to the war, by a Definitive Treaty between the Vizier and *Fyzulla Cawn*, who agreed to lay down his arms, and ſurrender to the former one-half of the treaſure which he had with him in his camp, and on condition of the Vizier putting him in poſſeſſion of a ſmall diſtrict, the capital of which is known by the name of *Rampore*; he conſented to hold it dependant on him, and to renounce all pretenſions to any other part of the country. We were further ſoon after adviſed, that on the ratification of this Treaty the Vizier propoſed 3d November. to aſſign over 15 lacks of rupees, which he was to receive from *Fyzulla Cawn* in lieu of one-half of his treaſure, into the hands of Colonel *Champion*, in part payment of what he owed to the Company, and to ſet out immediately for *Fyzabad*, to take meaſures for diſcharging the reſt: and we learnt at the ſame time that Colonel *Champion* determined to march back with the brigade to *Ramgaut*, nearer to the frontiers of *Oud*, and there to quit the army, and to leave it under the command of Colonel *Galliez*, the next ſenior officer; we alſo received Letters from Mr. *Grady*, whom Mr. *Middleton* had ſent to *Fyzabad* to receive the money on account of the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, which the Vizier had ordered to be paid there before he left the army, adviſing, that he had actually received ten lacks of rupees, and was arrived with it at *Patna*, where he ſtopped to receive 5 lacks more, which was to be paid him on the ſame account by the Raja of *Benares*.

14. On receipt of theſe advices, finding the Vizier was in all probability at *Fyzabad*, we thought fit to alter our former inſtructions, ſo far as to direct Colonel *Champion* or the Commanding Officer to leave the army, and repair to that capital to wait on the Vizier, in execution of his former inſtructions, but to reckon the 14 days preſcribed for the retreat of the army from the day of his meeting with the Vizier.

15. At this time the Governor General propoſed alſo 8th November. for the conſideration of the Board, whether, ſeeing that the Vizier had actually put himſelf in the way of diſcharging his engagements to the Company, and that the army had come ſo much nearer to his frontiers, it might not be proper to ſuſpend the former peremptory orders reſpecting the demands upon him, and the withdrawing of the troops? but it appearing to the majority that there were no circumſtances in theſe events that rendered the former orders improper, the Governor's propoſal was not aſſented to.

16. Since that time we have received no further advices of any conſequence from theſe parts.

17. Some time ago, at the requiſition of the Vizier, the Governor permitted Captain *Brooke* to accept the command of a partizan corps in his ſervice, which he propoſed to raiſe and employ as occaſion ſhould require.

18. Although this did not coincide exactly with the ideas of the majority reſpecting the part which we ought to take in the Vizier's military enterprizes, yet the Board, out of reſpect to the Governor General, whoſe word was pledged to the Vizier for the permiſſion to Captain *Brooke*, thought fit to confirm it; and the former inſtructions given to Captain *Brooke*, which are in the Con- 3d November. ſultation here referred to, appearing to us clear and proper, we alſo gave our approbation to them.

25. Sir *Edward Hughes*, ſoon after his arrival, commu- 25th October. nicated to us a paper of intelligence which was conveyed to him by the Earl of *Rochford*, one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State, containing a project of Mr. *Chevalier*'s for attacking *Bengal* with a body of 1,500 regular troops from *Europe*, ſupported by the army and authority of the King *Shaw Allum*. The particulars of this intelligence appear on the Conſultation referred to in the margin. Sir *Edward* having lately requeſted our opinion of it, we acquainted him, that though we did not doubt the reality of Mr. *Chevalier*'s propoſal, yet we regarded

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garded it as the wild project of a visionary and ambitious man, that did not carry for the present any probability of success; nor could we persuade ourselves that the Court of *France* at this time meant to adopt it, especially as we had no intelligence of the arrival in *India* of Mr. *Monteuil*, or of the *Zephyr* frigate, as announced in the paper, nor could we perceive any preparations here, which seemed to indicate that they are expected.

26. The Dutch Director and Council have applied to us for an augmentation to the share of saltpetre which is annually allowed them; but we have refused, acquainting them that we could spare no more from the Investment required by you for the Company.

We are,

Fort William, the 21st November 1774.

Honourable Sirs,
Your most faithful and obedient humble servants,
Warren Hastings.
J. Clavering.
Geo. Monson.
P. Francis.

Postscript. We have not as yet received authentic advice of the payment of 15 lacks promised to Colonel *Champion* by the Vizier, or of any part of the 40 lacks due to the Company for their aid in the Rohilla war.

The Governor General has this day delivered in a separate address to you, which goes a number in the packet, as does one jointly addressed from General *Clavering*, Mr. *Monson*, and Mr. *Francis*; a Minute of Mr. *Barwell*'s upon the subject also makes a number in the packet. These will all be recorded on the Consultations after the close of this packet.

Mahmud Reza Cawn has sent in to the Governor General an Address to your Court, requesting that it might be forwarded by the present opportunity, and we have consented to enclosing it a number in the packet.

Warren Hastings.
J. Clavering.
Geo. Monson.
Richd Barwell.
P. Francis.

Fort William, the 6th Dec. 1774.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Consultations, 25th October.

The following Letters, addressed to the Select Committee, having been received from Colonel *Champion*, are now read and recorded:

To the Honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Colonel Champion's 5 Letters.

I had the honour of addressing you under date the 15th, and by duplicate the 18th. I then informed you, that his Excellency was very solicitous to re-establish friendship with *Fazulla Khan*. His endeavours through his own people failed. *Fizullah* addressed me by Letter, saying, he was willing to come to pay his respects to, and adjust matters with the Vizier; but that he was apprehensive his effects might be laid hands on in his absence. He offered 25 lacks per annum to the Vizier, and to perform other conditions, if his Excellency would give him the Rohilla country (I believe understood to be exclusive of *Zabita Khan*'s). Having sent the Letter to the Vizier, he wrote me to make an offer in his name to *Fizullah*, of a jaghire of ten lacks annually in *Rohilcund*, and to let him hold the remainder of the country as a renter, if they could at meeting agree on the terms; provided that *Feizullah* gave up half his treasure, and only kept two or three thousand Rohillas for his guard, the rest to be received into the Nabob's service, and to be employed elsewhere. I complied with his Excellency's request. *Feizullah*'s answer is not yet arrived; but as you will no doubt be desirous of receiving frequent advices of the state of matters whilst the army is at such a distance, I have troubled you with this information of what has passed since my last. I have the pleasure to add, that the troops do continue healthful; and that,

Camp, *Mohanpore*, 24th September 1774.

I am,
With all due respect, &c.

To the honourable *Warren Hastings*, esquire, President, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In my last I advised you of certain overtures made by the Vizier to *Feizullah Khan*; and am now to acquaint you, that they have not been accepted of. We are informed, that *Feizullah Khan* having signified intentions of coming in, his people became tumultuous, and prevented him; this I am inclinable to believe, both because the offers seemed highly advantageous, and because I had received private notice from himself, that he would come to the English camp to be presented to the Vizier, and bring matters to a conclusion.

According both to the Nabob's intelligence and mine, the minds of *Feizullah*'s followers have been inflamed by *Ahmit Khan* (son of the late *Aly Mahomed Khan*'s Buckshy) who having been under sworn engagements to the Vizier before the battle of the 23d April, and having failed in them, is afraid of falling into the hands of his Excellency, on whose professions of forgiveness he has no reliance.

Thus there is at present no prospect of peace. The Rohillas are posted between two hills, one on each flank; the space from hill to hill is a natural bank, supposed to be from 14 to 16 feet high, and little more than 400 yards long. This is made their front; so that they are encamped as it were in a deep column, on either side of a small river, which runs between the said hills. On the verge of the bank, in front, and on their flanks, they have made entrenchments, though but with little judgment, having thrown up the earth on the outside of the ditches. At the foot of the bank is a small open space of ground, as an esplanade, which has been cleared by the Rohillas since their retreat to *Lall Dong*. At the left it is computed to be between two and three hundred yards wide, but narrow towards the right. Without it, between us and them, is a very extensive, close jungle, consisting of large trees, interspersed with bamboos and long grass. There is but one road fit for artillery; this road they had made before our arrival, and leads to the base of the hill on the left of their entrenchment; on both sides of it is a close jungle, such as I have mentioned. Since we came here, the Nabob has, at my desire, been clearing away some of the jungle, and making a road, which will bring us in upon the centre of the intrenched bank, on which they place so much dependence. His Excellency has not been quite so industrious in this business as I could have wished; however, the road is pretty far advanced.

The Nabob's intelligencers and mine inform, that the Rohillas are very sickly and in great distress for provisions; that they are resolved not to fight, but to retire into the country between the hills. This is what the Vizier and I both apprehend, and what his Excellency wishes very much to prevent; for not only will he fail in that case to get any part of their money, but they will still continue enemies in this quarter, whilst the Marattas may call our force elsewhere; his Excellency knows too, that though I may dislodge them from their present post, yet that I cannot either consistently with your orders or with any degree of prudence, follow them far into the fortresses in the country between the hills.

I have been for some days extremely unwell, but the moment I can sit my horse I will endeavour to bring matters to a decision. I have this day sent the Quarter Master General to look at a clear spot of ground in the jungle, in order to get into closer neighbourhood with the enemy;

enemy; and ſhould an attack be the reſult, depend upon it, Gentlemen, that every precaution in my power ſhall be uſed for the preſervation of the troops, and to overcome the advantages which the ſtrength of their poſt gives the Rohillas.

Camp, 26th September 1774. I have the honour to be, (Signed) *A. Champion.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In my addreſs of the 25th, I informed you, that the Rohillas had rejected the Vizier's overtures of peace; that I was much indiſpoſed, but would endeavour to bring matters to another deciſion as ſoon as poſſible. Accordingly I ventured abroad on the 28th, advanced with a ſtrong diviſion of the armies four coſs towards the enemy, and this day's march has brought me within leſs than four coſs of them; the ſecond diviſion under Colonel *Galliez* gains ground as we advance; the jungle graſs through which we have paſſed is very high, but the ſpaces between the trees are larger, and there are fewer bamboos than I expected: I am informed however that it is leſs acceſſible farther on. From hence I mean to move on with all the circumſpection poſſible. It is ſaid they have thrown up ſome ſort of work on this ſide of their poſt upon the road where they expect the attack, and as it will probably be five or ſix days before we can cut our way through the jungle, every precaution is taken to render our preſent ſituation ſecure.

Though thus buſied in preparing to attack the enemy, it is both the Vizier's wiſh and mine, that friendſhip ſhould be re-eſtabliſhed, as well for reaſons already mentioned, as to prevent that effuſion of blood which muſt be the conſequence of ſuch an attack.

Accordingly, at his Excellency's requeſt, I wrote a Letter to *Feizulla Khan* after our arrival at this ground, repeating the former offers, and aſſuring him, that if he would come to treat with the Vizier, I made no doubt they would become friends.

You ſhall be adviſed what effect our approach and theſe proffers of mercy will have on the Rohillas; in the meantime I have the honour to remain, &c.

Camp, within 4 coſs of *Lall Dang*, 30th September 1774. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

I encloſe duplicate of a Letter which I had the honour to addreſs to you laſt night; and am now to adviſe you, that *Feizullah Khan* has ſent a man to me, who gives ſome reaſon to believe he will really come in to treat with the Vizier; but his Excellency and I have been ſo long amuſed with aſſurances of this kind, that I am reſolved to carry on our operations as if there were no overtures of peace, becauſe, if the Rohilla is ſerious in his profeſſions, our drawing nearer him will haſten him in to ſettle matters.

I have the pleaſure to inform you, that having rode out this morning about three miles from our camp on the road made by the Rohillas, mentioned in my Letter of the 25th, I found it extremely good, and the jungle on either hand ſo open, that I am in hopes of eſtabliſhing a poſt to-morrow within two coſs of the enemy.

The Vackeel ſent in by *Feizullah Khan* is in attendance at his Excellency's, whoſe reſolutions in theſe matters will of courſe regulate my conduct.

Camp, within 4 coſs of *Lall Dang*, 1ſt October 1774. I am, &c. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

In conformity to the reſolution communicated to you in my addreſs of yeſterday, I moved on this morning with a reſpectable force about three miles towards the enemy, attended by the Vackeel ſent in from their Chief; when I arrived at the ground upon which I had determined to eſtabliſh a poſt, I gave the Vackeel his leave, deſiring him to inform his maſter I was ſo far advanced, and would be glad to ſee him. The Vackeel had yeſterday repeatedly ſaid, that *Feizullah* would come in, but I did not much rely on his declaration: however, he was not gone above two hours, when a Chief came to inform that *Feizullah Khan* would certainly meet me; and he accordingly arrived at our works about noon. To-morrow I ſhall accompany him to the Vizier's, and when any ſettlement is agreed upon, I will do myſelf the honour of acquainting you.

Our advanced poſt is already completely eſtabliſhed within a mile of that of the Rohilla's. I hope however matters are now in a way of being amicably ſettled; and it gives me much ſatisfaction that your favour of the 8th September encourages ſo eligible a meaſure.

Permit me, Gentlemen, to aſſure you, that I derive much pleaſure from this new teſtimony of your approbation, and that I am, &c.

Camp, 2d October 1774. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th October 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident. Lieutenant General *John Clavering*, the honourable *George Monſon*, *Richard Barwell*, and *Philip Francis*, eſquires.

Received the following Letter from Colonel *Champion*, with Encloſures therein mentioned.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, and Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

With duplicate of my addreſs of yeſterday, I have the honour to encloſe for your peruſal, the undermentioned Papers.

Letter received from his Majeſty, *Sha Alum*, 16th September.

Letter from *Migid ul Dowla*, his Majeſty's Prime Miniſter.

Copy of the King's Letter to the Vizier of the empire, referred to in *Migid ul Dowla*'s addreſs; alſo received 16th September, the Vizier's obſervations on the ſaid Letters, 17th September.

Copy of a Letter from me to his Excellency, containing remarks on the King's Letter; and copy of the Vizier's reply.

Letter from *Nejif Khan*, with copy of the King's Letter therein referred to, received 19th September.

Letter from *Nejif Khan*, received 23d September, in anſwer to the accuſations contained in *Mejid ul Dowla*'s Letter; and copies of two Letters therein mentioned.

I accompanied *Feizullah Khan* this morning to viſit the Vizier, who received him with much propriety, and preſented him with the uſual compliment of a dreſs, &c.

I remain, &c.

(Signed) *A. Champion.*

Camp, 3d October 1774.

Ordered, That the Encloſures be entered after the Conſultation.

From his Majeſty to Colonel *Champion*, encloſed in his Letter to the Governor.—Received.

The Letter which you our well-beloved ſubject, worthy of favour, wrote to our dear ſon *Mujid ul Dowla*, was

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was perused by us. You will learn what answer we returned to it from *Mujid ul Dowla*'s Letter. In the affair of *Sumroo* and Mr. *Redman*, you represented to us, that to protect them would give displeasure to the English Chiefs. Although we had taken *Sumroo* into our service from necessity, yet out of regard to the English we dismissed him; after which *Nejif Cawn* gave him encouragement, and took him into his employ. He also seduced several Adjutants, Subadars, and Jemautdars, with four or five companies of the English troops, in our service, and by the promise of superior pay, engaged them in his own. He acted in the same manner with respect to *Sean*, an Armenian, a debtor to the Government, whom he seduced from us with four companies, and also *Golaum Mahmood*, Commandant, with the battalions under his command. He likewise gives protection in his own house to all those who are indebted to our Government. Four battering cannon with which we entrusted him, he has taken to himself; and he hath also taken possession of all the Pergunnahs lately brought into our Khalsa, together with several of the old ones, and makes use of the name of our dear brother the Vizier, to justify his proceedings. Our well-beloved subject the Nabob Vizier and you, both know that we conferred the greatest favours on *Nijif Cawn*, and gave him nine lacks of rupees, which was due to us from *Hissaum ud deen Cawn*, and appointed him to the command of the two battalions of English troops, the red battalion, and all the Moguls, and honoured him with the Nabobship of *Ackberabad*. Since he has been victorious over the Jauts, he has changed his conduct, and in opposition to our will retains numberless troops, and has for this year past granted Sunnuds of his own accord, and with his own seal, for Subaships, Fougedarries, Jaghiers, &c. He has now engaged *Sumroo*, Mr. *Maddor*, and Mr. *Redman*, in his service, and has encouraged *Sumroo* and *Nijif Cooly Cawn* to seize the Pergunnahs belonging to our Khalsa for themselves; he has likewise instructed *Sumroo* to commence hostilities against our forces. *Sumroo* has in consequence of his advice established an officer of his own in the fort of *Puneput*, and in conjunction with *Nijif Cooly Cawn* has seized upon Beree, Mandotee, Sumhotock, and Kerkooda, Pergunnahs belonging to our Khalsa: *Nijif Cawn* has also taken possession of *Akerabad*. Though this conduct has given us great displeasure, we have not used any severity towards him, and considering that we have educated and honoured him with our royal favour, we are averse to disgracing him; but it is expedient that our dear brother the Vizier should give him advice. We have no doubt of your loyalty and attention to our royal person; come therefore to our presence; prevail on our dear brother the Vizier to fulfil the Treaty he made with us, and sworn to the observance of on the holy Koran. It is our wish to establish a firm friendship with our dear brother the Vizier, and to regulate the affairs of the country in conjunction with him. Should any one inform you that we design to call in the Marattas, be assured that it is entirely false. We have for this twelvemonth past written repeatedly to our well-beloved subject Mr. *Hastings*, the support of the empire, to send us an army, and have appointed officers to *Merut*, &c.; were it our intention to call in the Marattas, what could have induced us to act in this manner? but if we have neither treasure nor troops, should they come with an army of 100,000 cavalry, what resistance would we make? we have written you for these three or four months past, that if you would yourself come to the presence it would be of great advantage, but if not, to send some trust-worthy person. You have not yet complied with either of these desires; come now with all expedition, that you may be acquainted with all our designs; and communicate them to our brother the Vizier, and inform me of what you think advisable, after which I will march. Be assured of this, or otherwise give assurances to our well-beloved *Mujid ul Dowla*, of the Vizier's favour, and send for him, that he may give you and the Vizier satisfaction in all points relative to our intentions, and that you may make his peace with the Vizier, after which I will march towards the banks of the *Ganges*. The two battalions of Sepoys which are with *Nijif Cawn*, on the part of our dear brother the Vizier, commit great disorders and oppressions on the citizens. Do you our well-beloved subject represent to the Vizier the necessity of recalling them, or giving orders to them, to put themselves under our authority; for the rest be assured that you have a place in our remembrance.

In the King's own hand.

May the blessing of God rest on you, our well-beloved subject, worthy of favour. It is our most earnest desire, in conjunction with our brother and the English Chiefs, who are undoubtedly attached to our royal person, to deliver the country from the hands of the enemies of our Government; we have no other intention in sending for troops. Act agreeably to what we have now written you, and have directed *Mujid ul Dowla* to write you; and we will march to the banks of the *Ganges*. We are in daily expectation of Letters from the Gentlemen of *Calcutta*; do you procure them to be quickly sent; and come yourself to our presence. Your representations, if consistent with your loyalty and fidelity to us, shall be complied with.

From *Migid ul Dowlah*, his Majesty's Prime Minister.

The first part of this Letter is entirely a repetition of his Letter to the Governor of the 10th of October, and of the above Letter from the King to the General. In the latter part of it he informs the General, that he enclosed him copy of a Letter from his Majesty to the Vizier, for his perusal.

Copy of the King's Letter to the Vizier of the Empire, referred to in *Migid ul Dowlah*'s address.

We have received your Letter, and perfectly comprehend the contents. Whatever professions of loyalty and fidelity are contained in your Letter, we trust you will even exceed them. God preserve you, our dear brother, in health. We do not entertain the least doubt of your attachment, and obedience to us. We are perfectly satisfied with regard to you, our brother. The appointment of a Naib Vizier rests with you, and we consent to your appointing any one of your own servants. (his Majesty then repeats word for word what he has said in his Letter to the General, concerning the favour he has shewn to *Nejif Cawn*, in educating him as a son, &c. and the ingratitude he has met with in return, &c. he then proceeds) if you are desirous of establishing a firm friendship between us, send Colonel *Champion* to the presence. When he arrives, and all our doubts are cleared up, we will then march; or else give assurances of your favour to *Mujid ul Dowlah*, and send for him and settle all affairs.

With respect to what you write, enquiring of us what advantage formerly accrued to us from the Marattas, that some people are now thinking of calling them in? My brother, self-interested people have written you this information. It is our wish to regulate the affairs of our Government in conjunction with you our brother and the English Chiefs. We have no intention to call in any one; but as we are without an army or treasure, we cannot prevent their coming. What have you our brother ever proposed for the benefit of the country that we have not agreed to? You must not now delay sending General *Champion* to our presence. Whatever you have to represent, communicate to him, and we will also inform him whatever we have to propose. For the rest, you our brother expend a crore of rupees annually, and we are in the utmost distress for the support

of our charges. We have repeatedly written to you to ſend us a ſupply; if you approve of it, ſend us what you think proper, that being made eaſy on the head of our expences we may march. If you deſign to ſend for *Muged ul Dowlah*, it will be alſo neceſſary to ſend a ſupply for our charges, that we may be enabled to ſend him to you. You confide in the General; and I alſo conſider him as my well-wiſher and faithful ſervant. We have determined, that if you our brother act agreeably to our will, we will alſo agree to your deſire, and will march; you may depend on this. We return thanks to God that he has given us ſuch a powerful friend.

In his own hand.

Our brother, dearer than life, out of regard to us you appointed *Zoolfuuarul ul Dowla*, a ſervant of ours, to the poſt of Naib Vizier, for which we applaud your loyalty; but we do not deſire this inſtance of it; appoint any one of your own ſervants, and we will agree to it. With reſpect to our expences, ſend us whatever ſupply you think proper; act agreeably to what we have written you, and we will march to the banks of the *Ganges*, and will in future regulate the country with the advice of our brother. The great deſire we have for an interview with you, our dear brother, brings to our remembrance ſome verſes and two cubbits, which, from our great regard to you, we encloſe.

The Vizier's obſervations on the ſaid Letters.

To Colonel *Champion*.

I have received your Letter, with thoſe from his Majeſty and *Abdulaid Cawn* to you, and comprehend the contents. I perceive from his Majeſty's Letter, that he has no deſign of regulating the affairs of the empire; ſince he writes in this manner, his artifices are expoſed to view. He orders me to ſend him a ſupply for his expences: do you, my friend, reflect whether I have any thing to do with his Majeſty's expences. I have none of the country belonging to the Khalſa in my poſſeſſion, nor any authority in the Government of the empire, that I ſhould furniſh him with money: I am not even acquainted with his Majeſty's receipts and diſburſements. Formerly *Munnur ul Dowlah*, and afterwards *Kiſſaum ud Dun*, had the management of his affairs. *Abdulaid Cawn* is now at the head of affairs. The appointment of all officers, the collections of the revenues, and the diſburſements, are under the management of another. Why then ſhould I furniſh ſupplies? Formerly, when *Mahomed Elick Cawn* went to the preſence, I, with great difficulty to myſelf, ſupplied his Majeſty with 3,50,000 rupees, who received the money, but nevertheleſs continued at *Shahjehanebad*. It is not at preſent in my power to furniſh him with any ſupply. You are well acquainted with the greateſt of my diſburſements: nevertheleſs, if his Majeſty would have marched from *Shawjehanabad*, I ſhould have convinced him of my loyalty. You may be aſſured that I have no deſign, but the advantage of the empire. With reſpect to the ſending *Abdulaid Cawn* to you, and the affairs concerning which his Majeſty has written, the caſe is, that I do not approve of ſuch tedious negociations. You are well acquainted with the manners and diſpoſitions of the Natives of *Hindoſtan*, that if I ſhould ſend for *Abaulaid Cawn* here, a month at leaſt would elapſe before his arrival, fifteen days would be ſpent in conferences, and two months more in his return, if preparing for the King's march, thus three or four months would be thrown away unprofitably. As the diſtance from the capital to *Succirall* is not more than five or ſix days march, it appears to me that there would be no great hardſhip in his Majeſty's marching there; and I will act conſiſtently with the loyalty I owe to his Majeſty. Whatever Treaty or Agreement ſubſiſts between his Majeſty and me, we will each of us fulfil. You are concerned in this cauſe; on your own account it is neceſſary that you bring it to a concluſion. I am ready to comply with whatever engagements I have entered into with his Majeſty. Let his Majeſty in future apply to the conqueſt of the country, I will attend him; and whatever we may conquer, let it be divided equally between us. This will reſtore the empire to its former dignity, and will reflect honour on you and me. This appears to me to be the moſt adviſable ſcheme; in what his Majeſty propoſes, I can diſcover nothing but artifice and deceit. My friend, with regard to the cenſure which his Majeſty has thrown on *Nejif Cawn*, the caſe is, I am well acquainted, that though he was much diſtreſſed how to defray his charges, and was not aſſiſted by his Majeſty with a ſingle rupee, yet now that by his own bravery and good conduct he has raiſed himſelf to his preſent ſtate, he ſtill continues firm in his loyalty and attachment to his Majeſty. His Majeſty writes, that it was by means of the cannon entruſted to him that he became victorious. Of what conſequence were they? Let his Majeſty, by way of trial, and ſome other Chief, with cannon, to take poſſeſſion of *Lahore*, *Subind*, &c. The affair of *Sumroo* is this, that his Majeſty ſent him againſt the Seeks, from whence he returned, after having ſuffered a defeat, and did not obtain his ſalary from the preſence; being remedileſs, he quitted his Majeſty's ſervice. If his Majeſty has any propoſitions to make for the advantage of the empire, let him do it through your means.

From Colonel *Champion* to the Vizier.

I have received your Exeellency's Letter, and underſtand the contents; that you are deſirous I ſhould write in anſwer to his Majeſty's Letter, that I have engaged in this affair, and that I will take on myſelf to bring it to a concluſion, and that you are ready to fulfil whatever Treaty you have entered into with his Majeſty; and alſo that if his Majeſty has any propoſitions to make for the regulating of affairs, he ſhould do it through me. My friend, whatever I have written to his Majeſty and *Mejid ul Dowlah* in this affair, has been ſolely in compliance with your deſire, and for your advantage; but I cannot take upon me to be anſwerable for the ſettling this affair, becauſe I have nothing to do with it. It is at his Majeſty's option to come or not. I am much ſurpriſed that his Majeſty in his Letter to you, deſires you will ſend me to the preſence. What could induce him to write in this manner? I cannot proceed to the preſence at the deſire of your Excellency, nor am I in this buſineſs under your direction. If your Excellency writes to his Majeſty on this ſubject, I requeſt you will communicate the contents of your Letter to me.

I informed your Excellency, that the army would be ready to march, or for any other buſineſs, in three or four days. It is now ready.

Anſwer from the Vizier.

I have not written any thing to his Majeſty concerning your proceeding to the preſence. I encloſe for your peruſal copy of my addreſs to him.

You inform me, that you cannot take upon yourſelf the ſettling of this buſineſs. The caſe is, that I did not deſire you ſhould be concerned in this affair for any other purpoſe than that by its being ſettled in your preſence, you might have an opportunity of diſcovering who it is that acts contrary to his engagements.

It is my deſire that you ſhould be a witneſs to the integrity of my conduct.

From *Nejif Cawn* to Colonel *Champion*.

The preſent ſtate of affairs is this, that ſince the time of my arrival at the preſence, I have in every inſtance acted with the greateſt loyalty and ſubmiſſion to his Majeſty; and I am alſo deſirous of complying with the King's pleaſure concerning the diviſion of the country of *Ackberabad*, which is under my authority. Although

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Ab[d] Cawn has prejudiced his Majeſty againſt me by falſe aſperſions, I nevertheleſs perſevere in my loyalty and ſubmiſſion to him. As I conſider myſelf as ſupported by the Company, and am therefore under no apprehenſions from the intrigues of deſigning and malicious men, I have no thought but that of acting agreeable to the King's pleaſure. One day *Ab[d] Cawn* directed the guards at the gate of the fort, that when I came to Court, according to cuſtom, with my attendants, they ſhould not ſuffer them to paſs, but attack them; which they put in execution. Out of reſpect for his Majeſty, though I was witneſs to theſe proceedings, I took no notice of them, but diſcontinued my attendance at Court. His Majeſty afterwards honoured me with a viſit, from which time I renewed my attendance at the Durbar. A day or two after I was treated in the ſame manner, which prevented my going again. As I would not bear that any enemy of the Company's ſhould remain in the preſence, and *Ab[d] Cawn* had ſent for *Sumroo*, and procured him his Majeſty's favour, I took great pains, agreeable to the deſire of Colonel *Champion*, to get him diſmiſſed; but *Abdulaid Cawn* would never conſent to this, but ſupported him. To the repreſentations I made to his Majeſty to diſmiſs *Sumroo*, I received this anſwer from him and *Ab[d] Cawn*: "What benefit or advantage "have I ever received from the Engliſh Chiefs, or what "Treaty have they ever obſerved, that I ſhould ſatisfy "them in this point? I will protect *Sumroo* with my "life. They were even deſirous of engaging us in "hoſtilities."—As I perceived, that ſo long as *Sumroo* remained in the preſence, there would be continual diſputes and quarrels, I wrote him ſeveral Letters, ſometimes giving him hopes, and at others exciting his fears, by which means I ſeparated him from the preſence. He is now at the diſtance of 30 or 40 coſs from hence. Whenever I find an opportunity, I will either deſtroy him, or ſeize and ſend him to you. One Mr. *Redman*, who deſerted from the Engliſh army, *Ab[d] Cawn* alſo gave protection to in his own houſe. I made repreſentations to his Majeſty and *Ab[d] Cawn* in this affair, but they paid no attention to them. On the day of Mr. *Redman*'s arrival, two Letters were preſented to his Majeſty from you, concerning him. Whilſt Mr. *Redman* remained in the preſence, no anſwer was written to them. When I was deſirous of ſeizing Mr. *Redman*, *Ab[d] Cawn* ſupplied him with neceſſaries, and ſent him away. After his departure anſwers were written you. Mr. *Redman* viſited Mr. *Maddoc*, who was on his march from *Shahjehanabad*. Upon hearing this, I wrote immediately to Mr. *Maddoc* to apprehend and ſend him to me. It is known that Mr. *Redman* ſtaid for a day or two with Mr. *Maddoc*, and then purſued his route towards *Gohed*. *Ab[d] Cawn*, out of enmity to me, has repreſented the affairs of *Sumroo* and Mr. *Redman* to the Engliſh Chiefs in a very different manner. Beſides this, he holds correſpondence with the Seeks and Marattas. I ſend you copies of ſome of his Letters to them, which fell into my hands, for your information. I write you continually the ſituation of my affairs; and it is evident to the whole world, that I am in the firmeſt manner attached to the Company. How is it poſſible that I ſhould act contrary to the will of the Company, or join in alliance with their enemies? *Abdulaid Cawn*'s enmity towards me proceeds from my connection with the Nabob Vizier. You are well acquainted that, at the time of his Majeſty's march from *Allahabad* to *Shahjehanabad*, he himſelf introduced me to the Vizier; and at *Gauntpore* General *Barker* alſo carried me to viſit him, and eſtabliſhed a firm friendſhip between us. As I was convinced that the Nabob Vizier was a ſincere friend to the Engliſh Company, I viſited him, and entered into a friendſhip with him. Be aſſured, I conſider all the friends of the Company as my friends, and all their enemies as my enemies. It can never be that I ſhould act contrary to the will of the Company. Let my enemies and aſperſers report what they pleaſe concerning me. *Heſſud ud dud Cawn* formerly acted in the ſame hoſtile manner towards me; but the enmity of *M[d] Cawn* is ten times as great. He one day ſet a man to aſſaſſinate me, whom I ſeized: this man confeſſed, without being tortured, that he was ſent by ſuch a one, whoſe ſervant he had been for a long time; that he had employed him to aſſaſſinate me, but that he had failed for want of an opportunity. He has engaged a number of people for this purpoſe, by the promiſe of a large reward; and he has other deſigns which I cannot write you.

From *Niziſ Cawn* to Colonel *Champion*.

(The ſubſtance of this Letter is exactly the ſame as the foregoing, except that in the latter part of it *Niziff Cawn* informs the Colonel, that the perſons ſent by him for the purpoſe of writing news, had been to viſit him, and complained that *Abdulaid Cawn* obliged them to write whatever he pleaſed; he alſo encloſes a copy of the King's Letter to Colonel *Champion*, which is the ſame as to the ſubſtance of it with the original forwarded by the Colonel, but differs in the expreſſions.)

Encloſed in the foregoing;

Copy of a Letter under the Seal of *Ab[d] Cawn* to *Tocojee*.

I have received your kind Letter, and underſtand the contents. My friend! I conſider myſelf as favoured by what you write me concerning *Gurra Mugsullurdapore*, and I am very ready to agree to it, were it in my power, but this affair is not. You will be informed of the ſtate of affairs here by the Letters of *Rowbehadar Sing* and *Gundaſe Pundit*. It is therefore unneceſſary for me to write you on this ſubject. In a word, I, with thouſands of my adherents, am fallen into diſgrace out of regard to you; and our enemies have found an opportunity to commence hoſtilities. It is adviſable that you immediately ſend me an army; and that you alſo come yourſelf, and bring to puniſhment theſe ſhort-ſighted people; I will not be dilatory in promoting this undertaking to the utmoſt of my power. God grant that you may ſoon arrive. His Majeſty has you in continual remembrance, and his regard for you is increaſed.

In his own hand.

I cannot write you the ſtate of affairs here; if you now delay your coming here, it will be very difficult to execute our deſigns.

Copy of a Letter under the Seal of *Abdulaid Cawn* to the Chiefs of the Seeks, a liſt of whom will be found in the accompanying Arzee.

I have received your kind Letter, and underſtand the contents. Your Vackeel, *Sondee Cawn*, has alſo informed me of all the particulars relative to your affairs, I repreſented to his Majeſty the loyalty and obedience you entertain towards him. Set your mind at reſt, and remain faithful to his Majeſty. When you conſider your attachment to your gracious maſter as your happineſs, there is no doubt but he will ſhew you favour. Your Vackeel will inform you what has been done for your ſatisfaction.

Copy of an Arzee from the Sirdars of the Seeks.

We hope that our propoſitions will be agreed to.—

1ſt. Every Sirdar to have 1,000 horſe and 500 foot.

(Signed) *Ab[d] Cawn.*

2d. Each horſeman R[s] 30 per month; each foot ſoldier five.

(Signed) *Ab[d] Cawn.*

3d. Each of the following Sirdars ſhall be honoured with a Kelaat when he comes to the preſence.

Roy

Roy Sing Bebadar, Baug Sing Bebadar, Doolja Sing Bebadar, Dawan Sing Bebadar, Schib Sing Bebadar, Baug Sing Bebadar, Sudder Seek Bebadar.

(Signed) *Abd Cawn.*

Places ſhall be given for their ſupport.

4th. After they come to the preſence, ſome Purgunnahs ſhall be given for that purpoſe.

(Signed) *Abd Cawn.*

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 26th October 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident. Lieutenant General *John Clavering*; the honourable *George Monſon*; *Richard Barwell*, and *Philip Francis*, eſquires.

Extract of Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Preſident and Select Committee at *Fort William*; dated Camp, 3d October 1774.

I accompanied *Feizullah Khan* this morning to viſit the Vizier, who received him with much propriety, and preſented him with the uſual compliment of a dreſs, &c.

Extract of *Bengal* Secret Conſultations, the 31ſt October 1774.—Preſent, the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, Governor General, Preſident. Lieutenant General *John Clavering*; the honourable *George Monſon*; *Richard Barwell*, and *Philip Francis*, eſquires.

Received the two following Letters and Enclоſures from Colonel *Champion*.

Colonel Champion.

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Treaties concluded between the Vizier and FyzulahCawn.

I have the pleaſure to acquaint you, that his Excellency the Vizier and *Feizulla Khan* have this day agreed upon terms of peace. *Feizulla* is to have a jaghеer of fourteen lacks ſeventy-five thouſand rupees per annum in the Rohilla country, with liberty to keep 5,000 men in arms; in conſideration whereof he is to give the Vizier half his treaſure. When the agreement has gone through the uſual formalities, I ſhall do myſelf the honour of tranſmitting a copy of it to you; in the meantime I beg leave to congratulate you on the concluſion of the war, and remain,

Camp, 5th October 1774. With all due reſpect, &c. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Preſident, &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Gentlemen,

Under date of the 5th inſtant I informed you, that the Vizier and *Feizulla Khan* had come to an accommodation; and I have now the honour to tranſmit copies of the mutual engagements entered into between them, as drawn out by his Excellency the Vizier, and ſealed and ſworn to by him and the Rohilla yeſterday in my preſence.

The Vizier has drawn off his own army, and to-morrow I ſhall, agreeably to his requeſt, follow with the Company's troops.

As *Feizulla Khan* is reſtricted to a ſmall body of men, ſuch of the troops diſbanded by him, as the Vizier does not chuſe to entertain, are to croſs the *Ganges* without delay.

I know not well why his Excellency has not inſerted in *Feizullah*'s agreement the obligation to deliver up half his treaſure. I remarked this ſeeming omiſſion to his Excellency before the agreements were ſigned; he only anſwered, that whatever *Feizullah*'s effects might be, he would be chaſtiſed with hell, unleſs the other promiſed to give a faithful account of them.

Camp, 6th October 1774. I remain, &c. (Signed) *A. Champion.*

Within a week of laſt ſiege, &c.

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Copy of a Treaty under the Hands and Seals of the Nabob *Sujah ul Dowla Babadar*, and Colonel *Champion*.

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A friendſhip having been entered into between me and *Feizulla Cawn*, I have agreed to give him the country of *Rampore*, and ſome other diſtricts dependent thereon, producing altogether an annual revenue of 14,75,000 rupees; and I have ſtipulated, that *Feizulla Cawn* ſhall retain in his ſervice 5,000 troops, and not a ſingle man more; I therefore give this written engagement, that I will at all times, and on all occaſions, ſupport the honour and character of *Feizulla Cawn*, and will promote his intereſt and advantage to the utmoſt of my power, upon the following conditions: that *Feizulla Cawn* ſhall enter into no connection with any perſon but myſelf, and that he ſhall hold no correſpondence with any perſon, except the Engliſh Chiefs; that he ſhall conſider my friends as his friends, and my enemies as his enemies; and that with whomſoever I ſhall make war, *Fizuellah Cawn* ſhall ſend two or 3,000 men, according to his ability, to join my forces; and if I march in perſon, *Fuzellah Cawn* ſhall himſelf accompany me with his troops; and if on account of the ſmallneſs of the number of the forces he is to retain in his ſervice, he is not able to accompany me, I will then appoint him three or 4,000 more troops, that he may accompany me with a good army, and I will be at the expence of ſupporting them. Upon the performance of theſe conditions, I have agreed to give the ſaid countries, at the afore-mentioned revenue to *Fizeullah Cawn*, and to promote his intereſt and advantage to the utmoſt of my power.

If *Fizeullah Cawn* fulfil the articles of this Treaty, and adheres ſteadily to it, God willing, I will not neglect whatever may be for his advantage.

He ſhall ſend the remainder of the Rohillas on the other ſide of the river. I have ſworn by the holy Koran, calling God and his Prophets to witneſs to the performance of theſe articles.

Rujj. 1188.

(Col. Champion's Seal.) (The Vizier's Seal.)

Copy of a Treaty under the Hands and Seals of *Fizeullah Cawn* and Colonel *Champion*.

A friendſhip having taken place between the Nabob Vizier and *Ul Mulk Bahadar* and me, and the Nabob Vizier having been graciouſly pleaſed to beſtow on me a country, I have ſworn on the holy Koran, calling God and his Prophets to witneſs to what I engage, that I will always, whilſt I live continue in ſubmiſſion and obedience to the Nabob Vizier; that I will retain in my ſervice 5,000 men, ſtipulated by the Nabob Vizier, and not a ſingle man more; that with whomſoever the Nabob Vizier ſhall engage in hoſtilities, I will aſſiſt him; and that if the Nabob Vizier ſhall ſend an army againſt any enemy, I will alſo ſend two or 3,000 of my troops to join them, and if he goes in perſon againſt any enemy, I will perſonally attend him with my forces; that I will have no connection with any perſon but the Nabob Vizier, and will hold no correſpondence with any one, the Engliſh Chiefs excepted; that whatever the Nabob Vizier directs, I will execute, and that I will at all times, and on all occaſions, both in adverſity and proſperity, continue his firm aſſociate.

I have ſworn on the holy Koran, calling God and his Prophet to witneſs to the performance of theſe articles. May God and his Prophet puniſh me if I act contrary to them.

Rujjub 1188.

(Seal of the Champion.) (Fizeullah Cawn.)

APPENDIX. No. 45.

APPENDIX, No. 45.

Extract of *Fort William* Secret Conſultations, 25th October 1774.

THE following Minute, delivered into Council yeſterday by the Governor General, being referred for conſideration to this Department, is now recorded, having been ſent in circulation to the different Members of the Board.

The Governor's Minute on the Revenues and Politics of the Country.

Gentlemen,

All the Members of this Council being now aſſembled, I could wiſh to point out ſome general plan for carrying into execution the regulations of the new ſyſtem of Government, agreeably to the inſtructions received from the Company; but upon an attentive review of the various ſubjects which occur, I find it neceſſary to ſelect ſuch particular parts of them as ſeem to claim our earlieſt notice; reſerving the reſt for future conſideration, to be taken up in the order in which their reſpective importance, or particular exigencies may point out. I ſhall take the liberty to accompany every propoſition with a brief relation of ſuch circumſtances, and ſuch paſt tranſactions, as have any relation to it, and are neceſſary to be known for the purpoſe of forming your reſolutions upon it. I mean not, Gentlemen, to prelude any other Member of the Council from offering any point for preſent deliberation, which, in his judgment, may claim a preference in point of time, above thoſe which I may wiſh to introduce;—I only propoſe this method, as the moſt likely to facilitate the diſpatch of buſineſs, which may be retarded by undertaking too many ſubjects at the ſame inſtant. It will unavoidably take ſome time to arrange and perfect the new ſyſtem of this Adminiſtration; in the meanwhile, the current affairs will require your daily aſſiſtance to keep them in motion; and in both, I mean, both in forming the new mode of Government, and conducting the daily buſineſs, you will find it neceſſary to conſult the Records of the former Adminiſtration, for the ſake of due connection and conſiſtency. I deſire alſo to ſhorten the time, and leſſen the trouble of ſuch a ſearch among the voluminous books of Conſultations, by the mode I have propoſed, of laying before you a ſuccinct view of each ſubject, with references to the Conſultations for the ſucceſſive orders which have been iſſued, and the advices which have been received concerning them. I think it my duty to add, and I think I may do it without preſuming too much upon the experience which I have acquired in the affairs of this Government, that I ſhall be at all times happy to aſſiſt any Member of the Council with my communications upon any point, upon which he may deſire to be ſo informed.

Profeſſions of zeal and ſolicitude for the public good are too commonly made uſe of to be received with implicit credit; but I feel my own honour, and my own intereſt, ſo intimately blended with the ſucceſsful iſſue of the meaſures of this Government, that I may with truth, and without hazard of having my declaration ſuſpected, affirm, that I have not a wiſh, even for myſelf, which has not the good of the Company for its immediate object, and my own ultimately as derived from it. I believe, I may ſafely conclude the ſame for the other Gentlemen embarked with me in this great undertaking; and I have the moſt thorough confidence in your diſpoſition to unite with me in the proſecution of the Company's intereſts; while I with the ſtricteſt ſincerity and cordiality declare, that nothing on my part ſhall be wanting to render that union effectual.

The points which I ſhall now beg leave to ſubmit to your conſideration are, firſt, the mode of conducting the buſineſs of the revenue; and next, the political ſyſtem of theſe provinces.

The general mode which is at this time eſtabliſhed for the management of the collections, is as follows: The provinces are formed into ſix diviſions; each comprehending ſeveral inferior diſtricts, under the direction of a Chief and Council; theſe receive their orders from the Board at large, and report to them their proceedings in a ſeparate department, called a Council of Revenue; and for the greater facility of diſpatching buſineſs with the inhabitants, and for the preſervation of the ancient forms and rules of office, a Dewan, or Miniſter of the Revenue, is appointed to each diviſion, who is joined to the Provincial Council, and keeps all the accounts and records of the country languages. Native ſuperintendants are alſo appointed to each diſtrict of the provincial diviſions, with the title of Naibs, and correſpond with the Provincial Councils and Dewans. The Dewans alſo tranſmit their accounts and proceedings to an office of ancient inſtitution, lately tranſferred from the city of *Moorſhedabad* to *Calcutta*, named the Khalſa, which is under the charge of an officer, entitled the Roy Royan, who occaſionally ſits at the meetings of the Councils of Revenue, and is the channel of communication between the Board and the Dewans, tranſmitting to the latter the counterparts of the orders of the Board which are ſent to the Provincial Councils, and receive their anſwers. The exceptions to this general ſyſtem are, the province of *Chittagong*, which, from its remote ſituation, and ſmall revenue, has been left under the ſingle charge of the Chief of the factory; and the diſtricts of *Pallamow* and *Rangur*, under Captain *Camac*; and of the Jungleterry of *Curruckpoor*, &c. under Captain *Browne*. Theſe may be properly termed Military Collectorſhips. They are compoſed of the wild and mountainous parts of the country, which have been lately reduced to a ſtate of ſubmiſſion to Government, and require the continual preſence of a military force to keep them in ſubjection. The revenue which they yield is inconſiderable, but the poſſeſſion of them is a ſecurity to the peace of the cultivated and more civilized lands in their neighbourhood, which, till their reduction, were continually expoſed to the ravages of the wild and lawleſs people inhabiting them. With theſe military Collectors the correſpondence was carried on by the Governor only, but according to the Inſtructions now received from the Company, it ſeems requiſite that it ſhould in future be conducted by the Council at large.

The plan of the general eſtabliſhment for conducting the revenue, and the records explaining the [illegible] objects and progreſs of the Military Collectorſhips, will be found in the following Conſultations and Papers:

No. 1. Plan and eſtabliſhment of the ſix Provincial Councils of Revenue, and the collections of *Chittagong*; Conſultation, [illegible]

2. Further regulations to be obſerved by theſe Councils of Revenue; [illegible]

3. Captain *Camac*'s Letter to the Governor, containing a Narrative of the Pallamow and Nagpore countries; dated *Rangur*, 12th Auguſt 1774.

4. Captain *Camac*'s report of the method in which he has ſettled the Revenues of theſe Countries; [illegible]

5. Further report from Captain *Camac*, of a ſettlement of theſe diſtricts, [illegible] three years; [illegible]

6. The Council on *Burdwan* report the death of the Raja of *Rangur*, in conſequence of which his ſon is ordered down for receiving the appointment of his father; [illegible]

7. Orders to *Patna*, *Monghier*, and Captain *Browne*, relative to ſettling the [illegible] Jungulterry diſtricts. [illegible]

8. Captain *Brooke*'s Narrative and Minute relating to these districts; 6th Sept. 1774.
9. The Governor's Letter, recommending the separation of the districts from under the Patna Council, to form the line of the Jungulterry districts; 15 Oct 1773.
10. Adjustment of the boundaries of the Beerbhoom Jungulterry lands, formerly farmed by the Rajah; 30 Aug. 1774.

I must beg leave to conclude this subject with earnestly offering my advice for the continuation of this system in all its parts, with such alterations only as the late change in the Government has rendered indispensibly necessary. Innovations are always attended with difficulties and inconveniences; innovations in the Revenue, with a suspension of the collections; and a change at this season of the year would be particularly dangerous, as the time of the heaviest payments is now approaching. For the same reason, your speedy determination upon the future mode of managing and collecting the Revenues would prove of essential service.

The Court of Directors have been advised of the formation of this establishment, in consequence of the orders transmitted to us in their Letter of the 7th April 1773; and we may shortly hope to be furnished with their final determination concerning it. I must likewise recommend the continuance of the separation which was originally made, of the Revenue Department from the other offices of the Government, as the only means by which it can be regularly conducted; and as there is no branch of the Company's affairs in which their interests so essentially depend, I propose, that the Council do assemble for the conduct of it, in the same manner as was practised by the late Council of Revenue.

It will be necessary to form other subsidiary regulations for separating the Revenue from the Commercial Department, and preventing competitions between them; and to determine what servants shall be employed in the Revenue branch, that the Board of Trade may be enabled to make choice, from amongst the rest, of such as will be required for conducting the commercial business.

The next point which I have proposed for your consideration, is the political system of these provinces.

The alliance with the Nabob *Sujah Dowla*, the Vizier of the Empire, is the only foreign connection in which the Government can be with propriety said to be engaged. This took place originally by the Treaty formed by Lord *Clive* at *Illahabad* in the year 1765.

By a new Treaty with the Vizier, dated the 8th September 1773, in consequence of an interview I had with him at *Benares*, the monthly subsidy, for the extraordinary expence of our forces employed in his assistance, was fixed at [illegible] 10,000 rupees for one brigade; and [illegible] and *Illahabad* ceded to him [illegible] which [illegible] were [illegible] remaining [illegible] same [illegible] reduce the Rohilla [illegible] of his dominions, between [illegible] of *Tibet*. The [illegible] for the [illegible]

of his former purpose of invading the country of the Rohillas. For this service he engaged to pay the Company, besides the stipulated monthly subsidy, 40 lacks of rupees when it should be concluded.

The Vizier's request was granted; the second brigade was ordered on this service, and Colonel *Champion*, the provisional Commander in Chief, appointed to the command. Having been joined by the Vizier and his troops, he entered the Rohilla borders on the 17th of April, and, on the 23d of the same month, attacked and defeated the army of the Rohillas, commanded by *Hafez Rahmet*, their leader, who was killed in the action. This victory was decisive; no other enemy appeared in the field; and the Vizier having obtained possession of the greatest part of the country, both armies marched on the 7th of May to the city of *Bissooly*, where quarters were prepared for them, and it was intended they should pass the rains there; but the remaining leaders of the Rohillas having assembled forces, under the command of *Fyzoola Cawn*, at *Nejeebgur*, a town on the northern frontier of the country, the Vizier, apprehending their acquiring too great strength, and that the Marattas might return to interrupt the operations before they were brought to a conclusion, prevailed upon Colonel *Champion* to put the brigade again in motion about the latter end of July, and to march with him against the enemy, although the rains were then at their height. The troops enjoyed remarkable good health, and proceeded without opposition to *Pottergur*; the enemy flying before them to the skirts of the hills, whither the combined armies have followed them. They have lain for a considerable time within a short distance of each other; Colonel *Champion* waiting for orders from the Select Committee, to pursue the enemy beyond the line to which he conceived himself limited by his instructions. The necessary orders were sent, and we have been for some time past in daily expectations of hearing that the war was brought to a conclusion, either by the attack and defeat of the enemy, or by negociation. The last Letters from Colonel *Champion*, which you Gentlemen have read, were dated the 2d instant, and advise, that *Fyzoolla Cawn* had delivered himself up, but that the negociation was still continued.

The advantages proposed from this expedition were, 1st, An addition of territory [illegible] to the Vizier [illegible] of our [illegible] expences. [illegible] paid [illegible] of the [illegible]

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advices; but orders had iſſued for effecting it, and an Engliſh Gentlemen had been appointed by the Vizier to receive and take charge of it, at *Fyzabad*, his capital.

The monthly ſubſidy has been paid with ſufficient exactneſs; at leaſt we have had no information to the contrary. The 40 lacks of rupees, ſtipulated for the performance of the preſent ſervice, I conſider as now due, though the Vizier makes ſome objections; but the defeat of *Fyzoola Cawn's* troops, or the concluſion of the negociation with him, has probably, by this time, put the Company's right beyond diſpute. There remains alſo a ſmall balance of former accounts ſtill unadjuſted; theſe will conſtitute the principal part, if not the whole of our concerns with the Vizier; when the buſineſs on which we have been to this time engaged with him is concluded, I apprehend no difficulty in procuring payment.

The bounds which I had preſcribed to myſelf in this Paper, and which I have already exceeded, will not admit of my entering into a diſcuſſion of the benefits depending on the alliance of the Company with the Vizier; theſe will appear at large on various parts of our records, to which I ſhall hereafter diſtinctly refer. They may be reduced to the following abridgment; a ſecure barrier, a conſtant occupation for part of our army, a reduction of our military expences, and an accumulating fund of future wealth. He cannot long ſubſiſt without our protection, and is incapable of himſelf, of becoming an object of our jealouſy or apprehenſion. For the better communication with the Vizier, and for the maintenance of that confidence which is neceſſary to perpetuate the alliance between the Vizier and the Company, it has been judged adviſable to appoint a Reſident at the Durbar, as the immediate agent of the Governor, with whom alone he officially correſponds. The Gentleman employed in that ſtation is Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, with whoſe diſcretion, integrity, and abiility for the diſcharge of this truſt, I have every reaſon to be abundantly ſatisfied.

The King remains at *Delhi*, the ancient capital of the empire, a mere cypher in the adminiſtration of it. With him our connection has been a long time ſuſpended, and I wiſh never to ſee it renewed, as it has proved a fatal drain to the wealth of *Bengal*, and the treaſury of the Company, without yielding one advantage, or poſſible ſource even of remote benefits, in return. The tribute which he claims from the provinces hath been withheld from him ſince his deſertion of the Company, and his union with their natural enemies the Marattas; and a reference has been made to the Court of Directors for their orders concerning the future payments of it, with every argument urged that can induce them to forbid it.

The Maratta ſtate, after having threatened the whole empire with ſubjection during the active adminiſtration of their Paiſhwa, or acting Chief, *Maderow*, has been for this twelve months paſt the ſcene of internal diſtractions, which ſtill ſubſiſts. On the death of *Maderow*, his brother *Narrain Row* ſucceeded him. He was treacherouſly ſlain, and his uncle *Ragonaut Row* releaſed from priſon, and declared Paiſhwa in his ſtead. The Miniſters of the Government, to whom he owed his elevation, became the objects of his jealouſy, and acting from that impreſſion, he made them his enemies; they formed a powerful combination againſt him, ſet up the new-born ſon of *Narrain Row* in competition againſt him, and defeated him. He has ſince thrown himſelf on the protection of *Takojee Holkar*, and *Mahdajeedee Sindea*, two Chiefs of conſideration, who were lately in the party of his opponents. The leaders of this oppoſition, *Sookoram Bolboo*, the principal Miniſter; *Goujabay*, the mother of the Paiſhwas *Maderow* and *Narrain Row*; *Shabajee Bonſela*, the Chief of *Berar*, and the Nabob *Nizam Alli*. The two laſt may be rather conſidered as auxiliaries; *Moodajee*, the brother of *Shabajee*, was on the ſide of *Ragonaut Row* till his defeat; both the brothers are now in *Berar*. The laſt Letter from Mr. *Moſtyn*, the Reſident at *Poonah*, dated the 22d Auguſt, explains the ſtate of theſe diſputes to that period; they ſeem yet likely to be of longer duration, and whenever concluded, will probably leave the prevailing party too weak to undertake any plan of remote conqueſt for ſome time at leaſt to come; of courſe we have no cauſe to apprehend any diſturbances from the Marattas during the preſent ſeaſon.

The province of *Berar*, adjoining to our own borders on the South and Weſt ſide of the provinces, merits, from that conſideration, and from the power and independency of its rulers, a diſtinct conſideration. The preſent Chief, *Shabajee Bonſelah*, is the brother of the late *Janojee Boorſla*, who for many years paſt enjoyed the ſovereignty of the country. His brothers are *Moodajee*, who has been already mentioned in this narrative, and *Bimbajee*: the latter poſſeſſes little other conſequence beſides that which he derives from the credit of his family. The two other brothers have been long at variance, but by the mediation and authority of *Derriaboy*, the widow of *Janojee*, and a woman of great ſpirit and reputed ability, prevented from carrying their animoſities to violent extremes. Their being engaged in oppoſite factions of the Maratta ſtate is not a certain proof of their mutual enmity; it being (as I underſtand) a policy not uncommonly practiſed among the Marattas, for the ſame family to take different ſides in civil diſſentions, with a view to its aggrandizement. While I was at *Benares* the laſt year, a Vakeel from *Shawbajee Boaſla* arrived at that place with a Letter addreſſed to me by that Chief, and attended me in *Calcutta* until the month of September laſt, when he received his diſmiſſion to return to his maſter, in conſequence of orders received for that purpoſe. The purport of *Shawbajee's* Letter, and the verbal propoſitions made to me by his Vakeel, was to ſolicit the friendſhip and alliance of this Government; to which I have replied in ſuch terms as were moſt likely to encourage him to nearer advances if he has formed any deſigns which may make it ſtrongly his intereſt to court the friendſhip of the Company. He is deſcended from the ancient Rajahs of *Sittarah*. The preſent Rajah is called *Ram Rajah*; he has no children. It is worthy of remark, and may ſerve to convey ſome idea of the inſtability of the preſent Government of the Marattas, that it is exerciſed through two ſubſtitute gradations. The Rajah, in whoſe name all the orders of the State are iſſued, is deprived of all authority. The Paiſhwa, or Prime Miniſter, an infant of nine months old; and the actual Miniſter or Regent, who exerciſes the legal powers of both, a man deriving his authority ſolely from the combination of a few wealthy individuals. From this divided ſtate of the Maratta empire, and the intereſts and pretenſions of the ſeveral competitors for power amongſt them, great political advantages may perhaps be attained to the Company, to which the preſent united ſyſtem of the Company's eſtabliſhments in *India* is well calculated to contribute.

(Signed.) *Warren Haſtings.*

The Vizier *Sujah Dowla's* application by Letter through General *Barker* for the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh troops againſt the Rohillas, and the Governor's Reply to him, with the Reſolution of the Select Committee. Select Com. Proceed. 24 June 1772.

The Vizier's application for a force to repel the Marattas, and the Governor's anſwer, deſiring him to wait till receipt of the Company's advices of the ſeaſon. Select Com. Proceed. 20 July 1772.

Orders for the march of the brigade to the aſſiſtance of the Vizier. Ditto. 29 Oct. 1772.

See alſo Conſ. 16 Nov. 1772.

Meaſures to be taken for the defence of the provinces of *Corah* and *Currah* againſt the Marattas; General *Barker* to prepare to join the Vizier with the 1ſt brigade, and proceed to the defence of *Corah* and *Illahabad* in concert with him. See alſo Conſ. 1 Feb. 1773.

Queries of the General propoſed in caſes of particular exigencies, and caſes in his expedition. 11 D°.

The Board's anſwer to theſe queries. 15 D°.

Inſtructions to General *Barker* on his departure for the army. 18 D°.

General *Barker* blamed for having paſſed the *Ganges*. 17 March 1773.

General *Barker*'s reaſons for having croſſed the *Ganges*, and the Select Committee's Cenſure for it. Select Com Proceed. 15 April 1773. And Conſ. 16 D°.

General *Barker*'s vindication of his conduct in this particular. Select Com. Proceed. 10 May.

Propoſal for an interview between the Governor and *Sujah Dowla*. Ditto. 15 April 1773. See alſo Conſ. 19 April.

Sujah Dowla's Letter to the Governor, preſſing for the interview, and the Governor's determination to go. 31 May.

Reſolutions to depute Mr. *Lawrell* to take charge of the provinces of *Corah* and *Illahabad*. 19 April.

Inſtructions given him. 26 D°.

Inſtructions for the Governor agreed on and ſigned, but not recorded for the ſake of ſecrecy. 18 May.

D°. recorded in Conſultation. 4 Oct.

The Governor's report of his tranſactions with *Sujah Dowla* at *Banaras*. 4 Oct.

General *Barker*'s diſſent to D°. 7 Oct.

The Governor's reply to General *Barker*'s Minute, the General's rejoinder, and the Board's obſervations. 12 Oct.

The Vizier's Letter, requiring the brigade to conquer the Rohilla country. Select Com. Proceed. 22 Nov. 1773. Alſo Conſ. 26 Nov.

The Governor's anſwer to the Vizier's Letter, with draft of an engagement to be given by him in caſe of his accepting the ſervice of the brigade; the Preſident's Minute, and the Board's determination to grant it on thoſe terms. Conſ. 26 Nov. 1773.

The Vizier's anſwer to ditto; he does not immediately want the brigade, but deſires it may be ready. 13 Jan. 1774.

The Vizier calls for the brigade, and ſends down the obligation executed. Conſ. 3 Feb. 1774.

Colonel *Champion* ordered to prepare to command it. D°.

Inſtructions to Colonel *Champion* for this expedition. 14 Feb.

Colonel *Champion*'s Letter reporting the victory over the Rohillas at *Pillybeet*, &c. 9 May.

Ditto's Letter on the inconvenience of the troops being ordered to canton at *Biſſouly*, and remove from *Berelly*; and a ſuppoſed Treaty between the King and the Vizier, through *Nudjiff Cawn*, and the Board's anſwer. 23 May.

Ditto's Letter relative to the ſituation of *Fyzoola Khan*, with the anſwer of the Board. Alſo his Letter reſpecting the ſearch of *Pyllibeet* for treaſure reported to be there, and the Governor's and Board's reply to him. 3 June.

Colonel *Champion*'s Letter, that *Fyzoolah Khan* is encamped juſt without the boundaries of the limitation of his operations; the Board's permiſſion to extend his circle, if neceſſary, for the deſeat of *Fyzoola*. 19 Sept.

The Preſident's correſpondence with the proviſional Commander in Chief.

Ditto with the Reſident at the Vizier's court.

The Select Committee's Proceedings, in continuation from 13th April 1772 to the preſent period, are recommended to be read; beſides the Proceedings of the Council in the Secret Department, wherein many other detached pieces relating to theſe ſubjects will be found; particularly within the period of the 13th April 1772, and the 14th of Feb. 1774; moſt things being at that time tranſacted by the Board at large, with little if any reference to the Select Committee.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 25th October 1774.

The political part conſidered.

The Board proceed to the conſideration of that part which reſpects the political ſtate of affairs in *India*.

Read the General Letters of laſt year to the Court of Directors, as far as relates to the Treaty of *Banaras* and the Rohilla expedition.

Read the Treaty of *Banaras*, and the Vizier's requiſition for the march of the brigade.

Read the Governor's Report on his return from *Banaras*.

The Governor called on for his correſpondence with the Reſident at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel Champion. He declines delivering the whole.

The Commander in Chief propoſes, that the Governor General be deſired to lay before the Board his original correſpondence with the Reſident at the Vizier's court, and with Colonel *Champion*, commanding the troops acting in conjunction with the army of the Vizier.

The Governor obſerves on this propoſition, that he will lay before the Board all ſuch extracts of the Reſident's and Colonel *Champion*'s Letters as regard the conduct of public affairs; but as they may contain many things, in the courſe of a free and perſonal communication, which might not be proper for a public record, and as he believes that many of them do contain ſuch, he begs leave to decline laying the original Letters, or the whole of the correſpondence, before the Board.

The General, in reply to the Governor, offers the following for the conſideration of the Board:

In order that the Board may judge of the nature and extent of the engagements which have been contracted with *Sujah Dowla*, and how far they have been fulfilled by the taking of *Putturgur*, and by the entire reduction of the Rohilla country, and with a view to our claiming the 40 lacks of rupees ſtipulated by thoſe engagements, and conſequently, whether it will be proper to ſend an order for the immediate recal of the brigade, or to leave it there till *Sujah Dowla* pleaſes to ſend it back, it appears abſolutely neceſſary that the whole of Mr. *N. Middleton*'s and Colonel *Champion*'s correſpondence, which the late Preſident maintained with them, they being both employed on a public ſervice, ſhould be communicated to this Board; and for the reaſons above ſtated, he moves, that the Governor be deſired to lay the whole of the correſpondence with the Reſident and Colonel *Champion*, according to his firſt propoſal, before the Board.

The Preſident deſired to give up the whole original correſpondence.

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The majority of the Board agree in the General's propoſition, and reſolve, that the Governor be deſired to give in the Letters moved for by the General accordingly.

He diſſents.

The Governor enters his diſſent to this reſolution of the Board, for reaſons which he will deliver in writing to-morrow.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 26th October 1774.

The Governor delivers in the Minute in diſſent to the reſolution of the majority of the Board yeſterday, which he then promiſed, as follows:

The Governor's diſſent to the reſolution for his delivering up all his correſpondence with Mr. Middleton and Colonel Champion.

I diſſent from the reſolution of the Board, becauſe I do not think the whole of the correſpondence, which the Commander in Chief deſires to have laid before the Board, is neceſſary for their information; and becauſe, as I have already declared, there are ſeveral parts of Mr. *Middleton*'s which comprehend an unreſerved and confidential communication of his opinion, and of ſuch occurrences as he judged neceſſary for my private information, entered into and carried on by him on my repeated aſſurances that I would not reveal any part of his correſpondence which might ſubject him to ill-will or inconvenience.

That I had a right to give Mr. *Middleton* ſuch aſſurances, at the time I delivered him his inſtructions, cannot be doubted; and it will be found perfectly conſonant to the truſt repoſed in me by the Adminiſtration. It was the condition and expreſs declaration of the Board in his appointment, that he ſhould be my official agent in the maintenance of that intercourſe with the Vizier, which the Honourable Company had committed eſpecially and ſolely to my charge, and for which I alone was reſponſible. Such were the ideas and the practice, with no exceptions which could invalidate the rule, of every Adminiſtration in *Bengal*, from the year 1757 to the diſſolution of the late Government; and I will venture to appeal to the Members of the laſt Council, whether they did not underſtand that I was allowed to employ the ſervices of Mr. *Middleton* with the latitude I have deſcribed?

If the latitude allowed to me in the exerciſe of theſe conſtitutional powers by the former Adminiſtration ſhould be deemed under the new Government too extenſive, it depends on them to retrench it. But I conceive that engagements, of whatever nature, contracted by me during that period, underſtood to be conſiſtent with the rules of the ſervice, and the powers veſted in me, can loſe no part of their obligation by a change of Government. If theſe engagements were legal, no power on earth can authorize me to violate them, much leſs ſhall I ſubmit to an ex poſt facto law of ſo ſudden formation. If they were not legal, I ſhall patiently ſubmit to the cenſure of thoſe to whom only I am accountable.

I muſt be permitted further to obſerve, that to me the whole proceedings in this buſineſs carries the air of an inquiſition into my perſonal conduct in my negociations with the Vizier. After having ſolemnly declared to the Board, that I would lay before them every part of the correſpondence required which could give any information upon public affairs, without waiting for this communication, without knowing whether it would furniſh them with every light that could be deſired, or whether any chaſm would be found in the intelligence for want of the reſt of the correſpondence, they arbitrarily reſolve, that I ſhould expoſe to them all the minutiæ of a confidential correſpondence, and betray into public record the unreſerved opinions of a young man, hazarded only on the moſt ſacred aſſurances of ſecrecy from the only perſon to whom he looked upon himſelf as accountable in that immediate duty. I muſt declare, that I regard this as prejudging a matter not yet completely laid before the Board, merely to convey a cenſure on my former Adminiſtration in the branch of correſpondence with the foreign Powers, and to introduce the change propoſed with every circumſtance of mortification to me.

I will conclude with a few words, which I think neceſſary, reſpecting Mr. *Middleton*, for obviating any conſtruction to his prejudice, which may be drawn from what I have ſaid of the ſecret nature of part of his correſpondence. I therefore now declare, that I never either expected or received from him any information reſpecting individuals which the ſtricteſt honour could not juſtify; nor has he ever conveyed to me an opinion, or a word, reflecting upon the character of any Gentleman in the ſervice, unleſs the Letters which I ſhall lay before the Board ſhall be conſtrued to have ſuch tendency. As to the reſt, I am certain that the whole of Mr. *Middleton*'s management, including even his moſt ſecret and confidential correſpondence, whenever it ſhall be publicly known, will reflect honour both on his principles and abilities, and recommend him to the notice of his Employers in a manner that will be favourable to himſelf, and do credit to me in the choice I made of him.

I have now formally to acquaint the Board, that all the official Letters of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, and ſuch parts even of his private correſpondence as I can with propriety ſhew, ſhall be laid before them. A copy alſo ſhall be delivered of my Letters addreſſed to him, in which I ſhall obſerve the ſame reſervation.

All Colonel *Champion*'s official Letters ſhall be laid before the Board, with copies of mine to him, if required; but ſuch as have paſſed between us of a familiar and friendly communication, I do not think myſelf authorized to produce, becauſe they were written only for our mutual information; and his are expreſsly marked with a diſtinct mode of addreſs for thoſe which are intended for official, and for thoſe which he intended as confidential. I am the more obſervant of this rule towards Colonel *Champion*, becauſe our correſpondence has not been altogether cordial on many points, and we have ſeveral times expoſtulated with each other on theſe topics with the freedom of private friends, and in a ſtyle, which, though decent in every degree, is yet different perhaps from the formal addreſſes of official correſpondence.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The General thinks it proper to proteſt againſt the Governor's refuſal to deliver up the whole of the correſpondence, and will deliver his reaſons in a Minute to-morrow.

The General, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, proteſt.

Colonel *Monſon* the ſame.

And Mr. *Francis* the ſame.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, the 28th October 1774.

The Governor, in conformity to his declaration in the Minute which he entered on the laſt Conſultation, now lays before the Board the ſeveral original Letters from Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Middleton* to him, and copies of his Letters to the latter; and he acquaints the Board, that copies of his Letters to the former of theſe Gentlemen are preparing, and ſhall be alſo laid before them.

The Correſpondence laid before the Board.

Ordered, That all the abovementioned Letters be entered in a book apart, in regular order, to be tranſmitted as cuſtomary to the Court of Directors.

The General, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, now deliver in the following Proteſt againſt the Governor's refuſal to give up the whole of his Correſpondence with Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Middleton*, agreeable to their intimation at the laſt meeting.

Our reaſons for proteſting as we now do, againſt the Governor General's refuſal to communicate to this Board the whole of his original correſpondence with the Company's Reſident at the Vizier's Durbar, and with the Commander in Chief of the Company's forces employed in the expedition againſt the Rohillas, are founded upon

The General, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, proteſt.

thoſe

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thoſe which induced us to concur in the motion made by General *Clavering*, and approved of by a majority of the Board, for obtaining a communication of the above correſpondence. We beg leave to ſtate thoſe reaſons to the Board.

Upon our arrival at *Fort William*, the firſt material intelligence that came before us concerning the ſtate of the Company's affairs, was, that one-third of their military force was actually employed under the command of *Sujah Dowla*, not in defending his territories againſt invaſion, but in aſſiſting him to ſubdue an independent ſtate, and uniting it to his own dominions. Enquiring farther into facts, and examining the Proceedings of the late Preſident and Council, as far as the ſhortneſs of the time, and immediate preſſure of other buſineſs would permit us, we found, that the reduction of the Rohillas was completed, and that our army, about the beginning of this month, was ſtationed upon the ſkirts of the mountains of *Tibet*, at a place ſo diſtant from our frontier, and ſo conſiderably to the north of *Delhi*, that it is not comprehended in any of the ordinary maps of *Indoſtan*. We ſhall not now enter into the political arguments by which ſuch a meaſure may be arraigned or defended; it is ſufficient for the purpoſe of the preſent Proteſt, that the meaſure itſelf carries upon the face of it a manifeſt violation of all thoſe principles of policy, which we know have been eſtabliſhed by the higheſt authority, and, till now, univerſally admitted (even by the late Preſident and Council themſelves) as the baſis of the Company's Councils in the adminiſtration of their affairs in *India*. Involved, therefore, in this contradiction between facts and principles, and foreſeeing the immediate neceſſity to which we might be reduced, of adopting or departing from the political ſyſtem in which the late Preſident and Council have engaged the Company, we thought it our duty to enquire minutely into every tranſaction, record, correſpondence, or other document, which had relation to that ſyſtem. From that enquiry, and from the information laid before us by the Governor General, it appears, that the aſſiſtance now given to *Sujah Dowla* is not founded upon any ſpecific treaty between him and the Company; that it ariſes from a verbal agreement only, which the late Preſident entered into with him at their conference at *Banares*. That with reſpect to the terms of the agreement, the only authority to which either party can appeal, is contained in a Letter from the Vizier to the late Preſident; and that the active meaſures, which have followed from that agreement, were adopted by the late Council with the greateſt reluctance. In this ſituation, other lights into the nature of the negociations and engagements with *Sujah Dowla*, beyond any that we have yet received, are undoubtedly neceſſary to direct our judgment. We think a complete communication of the original correſpondence between the late Preſident and the Company's Reſident at the Durbar, and the Commander in Chief of the Company's troops now in the field, indiſpenſably requiſite for the information of the Board. The Governor General has declined laying before us that complete correſpondence, for reaſons which do not appear to us to be ſatisfactory. The Court of Directors, in their Letter of the 23d March 1770, have laid down a poſitive rule concerning the Governor's ſeparate correſpondence, which evidently applies to the preſent caſe. It is therein ordered, that "The Governor "ſingly ſhall correſpond with the Country Powers; but "all Letters, before they ſhall be by him ſent, muſt be "communicated to the other Members of the Select "Committee, and receive their approbation; and alſo "*all Letters whatever* which may be received by the "Governor, in anſwer to, or in the courſe of his corre-"ſpondence, ſhall likewiſe be laid before the ſaid Select "Committee, for their information and conſideration." Beſides this particular order of the Court of Directors, which we are bound to conſider as a ſtanding inſtruction to the Board, we think it inconſiſtent with the general principles of a free Government, that the Chief of any Council ſhall carry on a ſecret correſpondence with the Miniſters or Officers of the Government independent of the Council; and much more that he ſhould be at liberty to refuſe to the Council a communication of that correſpondence, when requeſted by them. It is a kind of truſt which, in our judgment, cannot with ſafety be veſted in any individual. It tends to convert a public Miniſter and Officer, employed and paid by the State, into a private agent, which in fact the preſent Reſident at the Vizier's Court is deſcribed to be, not only by the Governor General himſelf in the courſe of our debates on this ſubject, but by his Minute delivered in to the Board on the 26th inſtant, and by the Select Committee in their Letter to Colonel *Champion*, dated the 23d May 1774. It tends to leſſen the dignity of the Board, and to render the appointment of the preſent Governor General and Council unneceſſary. For theſe and other weighty reaſons, it appears to us, that we ſhould not acquit ourſelves of the duty which we owe to the Honourable Court of Directors and to the *Eaſt India* Company, if we did not ſolemnly proteſt againſt the Governor General's conduct in refuſing the communication requeſted of him by the Board, as a refuſal not founded upon right; and againſt all the conſequences which may attend our not being furniſhed by him with ſufficient lights to inform and direct us at the outſet of our adminiſtration.

(Signed) *J. Clavering.*
Geo. Monſon.
P. Francis.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 26th October 1774.

Colonel *Monſon* propoſes the following Queſtion to the Board:

"Whether or not Mr. *Middleton* ſhould be con-"tinued Reſident at the Court of the Vizier, "the Governor having refuſed to lay before the "Board the whole of his correſpondence?" Q. If Mr. Middleton ſhall be withdrawn?

This queſtion being accordingly put; Mr. *Francis* thinks that he ſhould not be continued.

Mr. *Barwell* thinks that it would be improper to remove him at this juncture.

Colonel *Monſon* thinks that Mr. *Middleton* ſhould not be continued there.

The Commander in Chief alſo thinks that he ought not to be continued.

The Governor objects to the removal of Mr. *Middleton*.

Reſolved, by the majority of the Board, That Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* be not continued Reſident at the Vizier's Court. Reſolved by the majority.

The Governor enters the following Diſſent to this Reſolution.—I diſſent from the Reſolution of the majority of the Board for the diſmiſſion of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* from his employment; and I hereby enter my ſolemn Proteſt againſt all the conſequences of ſo violent a meaſure, which proclaims to all the Powers of *Hindoſtan*, in almoſt the firſt public act of the new Adminiſtration, the total abolition of the authority which they have hitherto ſeen exerciſed by me; either in perſon, or through my official agent, as the firſt and executive Member of the Government of *Bengal*; an authority which has been confirmed to me by an Act of the Britiſh Legiſlature, and eſpecially aſſigned me by the Inſtructions of the Honourable the Court of Directors, in the Clauſe appointing me the ſole channel of correſpondence with the Princes and Powers of *India*. The Governor's Diſſent.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The Commander in Chief propoſes, that Mr. *Middleton* be immediately ordered to repair to the Preſidency, and directed to bring down with him the whole of his correſpondence during his reſidence at the Court of the Vizier, and to order Mr. *Grady* to come down with the Q. If Mr. Middleton ſhall be ordered down with his correſpondence.

money

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money he has received from *Sujah Dowla*, on account of the second payment ſtipulated in the Treaty of *Banares*; and if he has not already received any, to come away without waiting further.

Mr. *Francis* agrees to both parts of the General's propoſal.

Mr. *Barwell* delivers his opinion as follows:

As the majority of the Board have reſolved to call on the Governor for his original correſpondence, and do not leave him to be the judge of what is only material for the Board's information, the natural reſult is, the call now made upon Mr. *Middleton*. I think, as I before delivered my ſentiments, that this ſhould be declined; for I cannot imagine that a private correſpondence, for ſuch I deem all that has not immediate relation to public affairs, can be of the leaſt utility in judging the ſubject before us.

(Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

Colonel *Monſon* agrees to the General's propoſal in both parts.

The Governor objects to the laſt part of the propoſal, becauſe it ſeems to imply, that Mr. *Middleton* ſhould bring the whole of his correſpondence with him, public and private; the laſt of which he conceives the Board can have no right to demand from him, or any perſon.

Ordered by the majority.

Reſolved, by the majority of the Board, That Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* be ordered down to the Preſidency, and directed to bring the whole of his correſpondence with him.

Ordered therefore, That the Secretary diſpatch to him the following Letter:

Letter to Mr. N. Middleton.

To Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court.

Sir,

The honourable the Governor General and Council having judged it expedient to withdraw you from the Vizier's Court, I am directed to ſignify to you their commands, that you repair immediately to the Preſidency, bringing with you the whole of your correſpondence during your reſidence there; and that you alſo order Mr. *Grady* thither directly with the money which he may have received at *Fyzabad*, in conſequence of the charge you entruſted him with.

You are, on taking leave of the Vizier, to acquaint him, that your departure will not interrupt the courſe of this Government with him; and that Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer of the brigade, will in the meantime be charged with any negociations which you may leave unfiniſhed with him. And you will accordingly leave in writing with Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer, a ſtate of the ſeveral ſums due to the Company by the Vizier in conſequence of his different engagements, the payments he may have made in diſcharge of them, and the balances which remain due, and, in general, all the papers and documents relating to your pecuniary tranſactions with him, that the ſaid Officer may be enabled to liquidate theſe accounts as ſoon as poſſible.

Fort William, We are, &c.
the 26th October 1774.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 26th October 1774.

Q. If the Commander of the Army ſhall treat with the Vizier.

It being reſolved to recal Mr. *Middleton*, the Commander in Chief propoſes that Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer commanding the brigade, be appointed to treat with *Sujah Dowla* in the room of Mr. *Middleton*.

Mr. *Francis* agrees to this propoſal.

Mr. *Barwell* thinks, that in conſequence of the recal of Mr. *Middleton*, the neceſſity of an appointment in his room in the preſent juncture is obvious; but he never obſerved in any general propoſition of this nature that it involved the nomination of a particular perſon; and he has many reaſons for objecting to our political affairs with the Aſiatic Princes being carried on through a military medium. For this reaſon, and in conſequence of the precedent before the Board, Mr. *Barwell* declares he muſt propoſe a Civil Servant of the Company to this charge, though he will not venture to name any particular perſon, leaving that to the Governor, as has been cuſtomary hitherto.

Colonel *Monſon* agrees to the General's propoſal.

The Governor objects againſt appointing the Military Commander.

Reſolved, by the majority, according to the General's propoſal, that the commanding officer of the army in the field be appointed to treat with the Vizier in the room of Mr. *N. Middleton*. Reſolved by the majority.

The Governor judges it proper to enter the following Diſſent and Proteſt againſt this appointment.

The Governor's Diſſent.

I diſſent from this Reſolution, and proteſt againſt the conſequences which may attend it; becauſe it cuts off all communication between Government and the Vizier, but through the channel of the Commander of the Army, which is contrary to the article of the Company's inſtructions; becauſe it gives the Commander of the Army the power of deciding in all caſes of difference between himſelf and the Vizier; and by ſo declared a proof of the prevalence of the military influence, inevitably tends to diſſolve the alliance between the Company and the Vizier, who can hope for no redreſs from an appeal to the Government, and muſt therefore either ſubmiſſively acquieſce in every act of the Military Commander, however violent, or ſeek for a remedy in other alliances.

By the ſyſtem hitherto eſtabliſhed, the controul of the Board has been ſufficient to reſtrain the power of the Military Commander from every dangerous exceſs, had he been diſpoſed to make that ill uſe of it; and the Vizier was freed from every apprehenſion of the kind by his reliance on the interpoſition of the Governor, to whom he had an immediate appeal. To whomſoever this dangerous truſt may be delegated, which is now given to the Officer who may chance to be in the command at the time that the orders of the Council may reach the army, I declare that I cannot, conſiſtently with my duty, admit his advices as authentic; ſince it is his intereſt to conceal from the knowledge of the Council every circumſtance and tranſaction which, if known, might ſubject his conduct to blame, or oppoſe any deſign which his ambition, his intereſt, or prejudices might dictate.

The Board have been pleaſed to compliment me with the nomination of the perſon who ſhould ſucceed Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* in his office, and I have declined it, becauſe I foreſaw in his removal the reſolution to throw all power and truſt into the hands of the Military Commander. The propoſal was actually made to this effect before the intimation of any reference to my choice; and with ſo recent an inſtance of my own Agent recalled, without a ſingle proof or ſuſpicion alledged of his miſconduct, I did not chuſe to expoſe any other perſon whom I ſhould recommend, to the hazard of ſuffering the ſame cauſeleſs diſgrace.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

The Governor requeſted to write to the Vizier.

Reſolved, That the Governor General be deſired to write to the Vizier, acquainting him of the new Government having taken place, of Mr. *Middleton*'s recal from his Court, and of the appointment of the Commanding Officer of the brigade in the interim to treat with him in the room of Mr. *Middleton*.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 28th October 1774.

The General propoſes queſtions.

The General propoſes the following queſtions for the deliberation of the Board:

1. That the demand for the forty lacks from the Vizier be repeated, and that Colonel *Champion*, or the

officer commanding the ſecond brigade, be inſtructed to that effect.

2. That the Colonel, or Commanding Officer, be alſo inſtructed to make a demand for ſuch further payments as may be due from the Vizier on receiving theſe inſtructions, and to liquidate whatever accounts may be unſettled with him at the time.

3. That he be further inſtructed, that although he is to make an immediate demand for the whole 40 laeks, and for ſuch other payments as may be due at that time, yet, if he finds that it is impoſſible for the Vizier to comply with the whole of theſe demands, he is to receive what can be allowed in ready money, and ſettle a Kiſtbundee with him for the remainder. The ſum to be received in ready money not to be leſs than twenty lacks, and the reſt to be payable at different periods within twelve months.

4. That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be further inſtructed, that in caſe the Vizier ſhould refuſe to comply with theſe demands, he is to enter a Proteſt againſt him, declaring that the Company have fulfilled all their engagements with him; and within 14 days after the receipt of theſe inſtructions, to retire with the army under his command, and withdraw it into the Company's territories.

5. That further orders be ſent to Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer commanding the brigade, that after having finiſhed the negociations for the money now due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of the forces under his command within the limits of the province of *Oude*; and that unleſs the Vizier ſhould require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions, with the provinces of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, he return with them to the cantonments at *Dinapore*.

6. That Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer, on quitting the Vizier, ſhall acquaint him, that the Governor General and Council propoſe to appoint a perſon to reſide at his Court; and to declare, that they mean to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaties of *Illahabad* and *Benares*, till the pleaſure of the Court of Directors regarding the latter be known.

7. That he be further inſtructed, that if he ſhould apprehend any difficulty or danger in his retreat, that then he ſhould ſuſpend his declaration, and take the beſt means in his power for the preſervation of the army, and adviſe the Board immediately of his ſituation.

To be conſidered and determined next Council day.

Ordered, That each individual Member of the Board be furniſhed with a copy of theſe Propoſitions, in order to conſider of them; and,

Agreed, That the Board come to a determination upon them at the next meeting.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 31 October 1774.

The General's Propoſitions conſidered.

Reſumed the conſideration of the General's propoſals of the 28th inſtant.

The Governor and Mr. *Barwell* give in the following Minutes in reply to the whole, which are now read.

Replies to the Queſtions propoſed by the General.

The Governor's Minute on them.

1. The Letters received from Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, ſince the laſt meeting of the Council, have removed every plea of neceſſity for enforcing this demand; becauſe it appears from thoſe advices that the Vizier has already declared his acquieſcence in it. As far therefore as this queſtion goes, the purpoſe of it has already taken effect.

2. This I agree to.

3. To this alſo I agree.

4. I diſapprove of this article. The abrupt removal of the brigade by the firſt act of Adminiſtration, will be publicly regarded, and will actually be a declaration that our engagements with the Vizier no longer exiſt. It may be urged that the money is juſtly due from the Vizier, and that therefore if he delays to pay it, the breach of engagement will be on his ſide, not on ours. But ſuch a rigid diſtatorial ſeverity is very contrary to the delicacy required by the Court of Directors in all our tranſactions with the Vizier; and, by impreſſing him with an opinion that we are no longer diſpoſed to befriend him, tends to the diſſolution of our alliance, the maintenance of which they enjoin in all their Letters on the ſubject in the moſt expliicit and peremptory terms.

I therefore propoſe this amendment to the queſtion; That inſtead of retiring with the army within ſo ſhort a ſpace as 14 days, the Commanding Officer be inſtructed, that if the Vizier ſhall propoſe other terms of payment, ſtill allowing the Company's right to an immediate acquittal of his engagements, the Commanding Officer do tranſmit his reply to the Board, and wait their reſolution, either for accepting theſe terms, or for offering ultimate conditions, or for withdrawing the army without further delay.—The difference of time between the effect of this order and that propoſed by the General, will not probably be more than thirty days; and there can be no cauſe ſo urgent as to require the removal of the brigade preciſely within the ſhort time allowed by the queſtion, which precludes every interpoſition of the Council; whereas, by extending it to the period which I have recommended, that interpoſition is reſerved to the Board, and may prevent the moſt fatal conſequences.

5. This I totally diſapprove, as a breach of faith, which would inflict an indelible diſhonour on the Engliſh name. It is true, that the cuſtomary forms of a Treaty have not been executed for the engagements on which the late expedition againſt the Rohillas was undertaken; but they have received every form that can be morally binding both on the Vizier and on the Company. The undertaking was propoſed by him; the mutual conditions, on which the Company were to aſſiſt in it, were propoſed by the late Adminiſtration in the draft of a Letter which was to be written by him. It was accordingly tranſcribed in a Letter from the Vizier, without any material variation, and his Letter was accepted. What more can be required to give ſuch an engagement the ſanction of the moſt ſolemn Treaty? if more is wanting, the acceptance of the advantages ſtipulated for the Company muſt undeniably complete it; yet it is now propoſed to demand every rupee which ſhall be due from the Vizier in virtue of his engagements to the Company, and the next inſtant to abandon him, although the entire loſs of the conqueſt ſo lately acquired, even the completion of which remained doubtful when the queſtion was propoſed, may be the immediate conſequence of our deſertion. The only reaſon which I have heard alledged, or can conjecture for ſuch a meaſure, is, the danger attending the continuance of the brigade in ſo remote a ſtation. To this the reply is obvious. The moſt diſtant part of the Rohilla country is not above 14 days march from the frontier of the Vizier's dominions; and can the advantage gained by ſo ſmall a diſtance be conſidered of ſuch vaſt importance, that the national faith ſhould be violated to acquire it? but the conſequences do not ſtop here; the Vizier will moſt aſſuredly conſider his own engagements as cancelled by ſuch an example, and will be juſtified in demanding the reſtitution of the money which he has paid in the diſcharge of them, and in withholding that which will ſtill remain unpaid. Thus the moſt ſolemn acts of public faith will be annihilated; the alliance of the Vizier either wholly loſt, or left on the dangerous foundation of occaſional conveniency; the whole amount of the Vizier's debt, which was not inſtantly diſcharged, either wholly ſacrificed, or to be redeemed by open violence, for no other purpoſe, than to bring the brigade, which is not wanted for the defence of our own provinces, to the diſtance of 150 miles, or poſſibly but a hundred, from the ſtation in which its ſervices may be requiſite for confirming to the Vizier the poſſeſſion which it has already acquired for him. I oppoſe the queſtion therefore, becauſe no poſſible advantage can be derived from it; becauſe it is injurious to the national honour; and becauſe it is hazardous of the preſent intereſt and future ſafety of the Company. It will add to the liſt of

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the acts of the new Government, which are calculated to throw an odium on the measures of the last Administration, and to proclaim the new influence which governs the present; and, with whatever intention the order may be promulgated, I am firmly persuaded that it will be construed by the Vizier, and by all the Country Powers, who will all be spectators of its effects, as proceeding solely from these motives.

6. I agree to this question, except the last clause, which I am of opinion ought to be omitted; because it is both unnecessary and dangerous to furnish the Vizier with a suspicion, that the Treaty ratified with him is not valid, and may be cancelled. It is the duty of this Government to conform to the Treaty. If the Company should disapprove of it, and, in consequence of that disapproval, order it to be cancelled, which I will not allow myself to suppose, it will be time enough then to inform him of it.

7. I see no reason for forming cases of danger which are by no means likely to happen. The plea of necessity will justify the commander of the army in taking the best means in his power for its preservation, if it should be in real danger; but to declare an opinion in this Board, that such danger is apprehended from the perfidy or violence of the Vizier, is to sow the seeds of jealousy and apprehension in his breast, and, by the natural effects of such an impression, to bring on the event which it is intended by this order to obviate.

(Signed) *Warren Hastings.*

Mr. *Barwell* replies to the General's Propositions.

Mr. Barwell's Minute on the Propositions.

1. The first question appears to imply, that the demand had been remitted for a time, and that such remission rendered it necessary to instruct Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer of the brigade, to repeat the demand for the forty lacks due from the Vizier. The formal requisition already made in the name of the Government evinces nothing has been left undone, either in point of making the demand, or of obtaining attention to it. The Letters from the Vizier and our Resident at his Court, plainly inform us *it is in a proper train of liquidation*; but as it has been determined to remove the public Agent of the former Government, and to appoint the Military Commander to execute the trust that was reposed in that Agent, I think it but proper he should be directed to the effect mentioned in the first and second Proposition.

I approve of the latitude given by this Proposition to the public Agent, because the pressing the Nabob Vizier beyond his ability could not be attended with any good consequences, and might be productive of the worst. What can be obtained under the Vizier's present circumstances may, by the latitude given, be secured; to insist on more would only compel him to refuse what he has to offer, and, with the best intentions of answering his engagements, oblige him to reply to our demands in a manner that may be dictated from a full persuasion of his utter inability to comply with the requisitions of the English Government.

It is not possible the Vizier should refuse compliance with a claim to which he has already acquiesced in the most express terms. The Letters are before the Board that intimate this acquiescence; I must therefore express my concern to find a suspicion entertained of the rectitude of the intention of our Ally. Where no equivocal conduct gives a ground for imputation, diffidence produces diffidence; and should once an idea strike the Vizier, that he is suspected by our Government of falling off from his engagements, he will naturally be led to form opinions not the most advantageous to that cordial amity, which it has been the aim of the late Administration to establish. And should he know that our forces are to be withdrawn, and on no consideration to be employed in giving permanency to the acquisitions he has made (acquisitions unstable in their very nature, whilst the least repugnance may remain to his Government) he will naturally conceive the means he is possessed of to answer his engagements insecure, and he will of course be backward in answering those engagements; nor will it give him any high idea of the views of the British Government, which he has been taught confidently to believe, in this particular, coincide with his, to perceive that they are directed solely to his treasury, instead of the reputation and pre-eminence he with just reason expected to derive from our alliance, and the concessions made by him to obtain it. And as I cannot but look on the domain lately acquired by the Vizier as a part of his own territory, being obtained through the immediate countenance and assistance of the late Administration, I think the preserving to him the possession of it as much an obligation upon the present Government, as the securing to him any other part of his dominions, and to be equally within the spirit of the Defensive Treaty as if it had been specifically named therein. For these reasons, I cannot give my assent to the Proposition for the withdrawing the troops into the Company's territories, whilst there exists not the most remote pretence of their being wanted for our own defence, and he shall require their presence or influence in settling his late conquests. I confine this opinion merely to the acquisition of such territory as is obtained by him through our direct mediation, not to be extended to projects of ambition he shall form and carry into execution without the participation of the English Government; but to the present acquisition, to which we have granted our aid, we undoubtedly stand as guarantees.

5th. By this Proposition the troops may be kept in the Vizier's paternal territories; I cannot therefore see a reason why they should be debarred acting, if necessary, in securing to him his late acquisition. A bar to this will naturally convey to his mind a reprobation of the measures the late Government adopted in his favour, and that the present is averse to the advantages which have flowed to him from such a spring. But this is a favourable and tender construction of the light in which the Vizier may view this measure. When I place before me the following conditions extracted from the Vizier's Letter, the basis of our present engagements with him, "To employ the brigade in the reduction of the Country "of the Rohillas, which lies between my borders and "the river *Ganges* and the mountains, and I will not "require it to pass these boundaries. I will, according "to my agreement, pay month by month 210,000 ru-"pees for the extra expences of the brigade during the "time of its service, and forty lacks in ready money "when this service shall be concluded;" that is to say;

1st, "Whenever the whole or half of the Rohilla "country shall fall into my possession; or,

2d, "An accommodation shall have taken place with "them, and I shall dismiss the brigade.

3d, "I have the power to keep or dismiss the bri-"gade; and until such time as I think proper to dismiss "it, it shall remain with me; it shall not leave me "without my dismission."

I cannot help considering the absolute recal of the brigade from the Rohilla country as an actual breach of Treaty on our part, and, after the completion of the offensive operations of the war, defeating the consequences to be derived from it, because it may incapacitate the Vizier from fulfilling his engagements, and doubtless affords him a plea to withhold the forty lacks he has acknowledged to be due to the Company; I cannot therefore give my consent for the recal of the troops, should the Vizier think proper to detain them; and I am the more confirmed in my opinion that the troops should not be remanded, if he judges their presence necessary, as such a measure may be productive of the very evils it would seem to guard against. A country newly subjugated must for a time be uneasy under its yoke. The influence of the ancient families cannot in an instant be eradicated;

eradicated; they will naturally ſeize a favourable conjuncture ſo immediately offered to re-eſtabliſh themſelves; and thus, inſtead of the Vizier being benefitted by our aid, he will have to pay our Government forty lacks of rupees, with a war entailed upon him, and we ourſelves defenſively engaged in his ſupport. Good policy therefore, even if this Government ſhould condemn the meaſures of the laſt reſpecting the Rohilla war, dictate to us to purſue a conduct calculated to obviate any poſſibility of a revolution in the ſtate the Vizier has annexed to his dominions; a revolution which, by a ſudden recal of our troops at this critical juncture, is more likely to be encouraged and precipitated than prevented.

6th. I receive this in the light of an alteration propoſed in the reſolution, that has already paſſed, to conſider the Commanding Officer as your Reſident at the Vizier's Court; and I think a new appointment will be proper; and that in obedience to the ſpirit of the ſecond Article of the Company's Inſtructions, it ſhould be veſted in the perſon of a Civil Servant, to ſhew not only oſtenſibly but effectually to the Vizier, that the correſpondence with him and the other Powers of the Country, is ſtill to be carried on by our Governor General, and that the Company's Conſtitution has in this reſpect undergone no change or innovation. The chief part of what I have ſaid in anſwer to the fourth queſtion occurs in the nature of remark upon the latter part of this Propoſition, and ſtrongly implies it cannot fail to ſhake the Vizier's confidence in the faith and powers of the Engliſh Adminiſtration. It is publiſhing by implication to the whole world, that the pleaſure of the Court may be adverſe to him, and profeſſing ourſelves to be total ſtrangers to the ſentiments of our conſtituents. This is a light in which the Company would not chuſe themſelves or their repreſentatives to be made appear to their Ally. All who we are connected with, as well as ourſelves, are ſenſible of the Conſtitution of this Government, and of its dependency; no public declaration ſhould therefore at any time be riſked, that may prove repugnant to the ſucceſs of any political views, which the ſituation or exigency of public affairs may lead the Government to embark in. For theſe reaſons I am for omitting the intimation, "until the pleaſure of the Court of Directors ſhall be known." The occaſion does not demand ſuch an intimation; and its being made on the inſtant of ſo material a change in the Government, muſt inculcate belief, that the Treaty is propoſed to be departed from.

7th. This Propoſition I think big with ill-grounded ſuſpicion, and to be of extreme bad tendency; for ſhould it, any period of time, reach the Vizier's knowledge, what muſt he think of ſuch exceſſive diſtruſt? he cannot regard it as proceeding from our cordial amity, or attribute it to the ſincerity of the profeſſions we make, of ſtrictly adhering to our alliances. The Company have uniformly pointed out the Vizier as the beſt and ſtrongeſt barrier to the ſecurity of their poſſeſſions, and poſitively directed their Government to treat him with every mark of attention, addreſs, and delicacy, to cement their alliance with him. I deem the Propoſition therefore improper, viewed in the medium I have here briefly deſcribed.—In a light of military caution, to provide for the ſafety of the brigade, it is totally unneceſſary; equally ſo from the acknowledged ſtrength of the brigade compared with that of the Vizier's force, as from the precaution which I muſt allow to every officer who ſhall be honoured with ſo important a truſt.

The Propoſitions being read, and the Queſtion being put upon each Article, they are recorded as follows, with the opinions of the Members of the Board upon them reſpectively.

The General propoſes the following queſtions:

The Board's Opinions and Reſolutions on the General's Propoſitions.

1ſt. That the demand for the 40 lacks from the Vizier be repeated, and that Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer commanding the ſecond brigade, be inſtructed to that effect.

Mr. *Francis* thinks no inconvenience can ariſe from repeating the demand for the forty lacks. If, when our orders are received, the money, or any conſiderable part of it, ſhould be already paid, and ſecurity given for the remainder, the commanding officer will of courſe inform us that the object of this part of our inſtructions is obtained. He cannot repeat a demand which he will know, though we do not, is already ſatisfied.

Mr. *Barwell* refers to his opinion above recorded.

Colonel *Monſon* ſees no inconvenience that can ariſe from giving this inſtruction.

The General thinks that this inſtruction ſhould be ſent, as it appears by the late Preſident's Letter to Mr. *Middleton*, of the 17th September, that he had approved of ſuſpending the demand of payment from the Vizier (he having acknowledged the right) till the conqueſt of the Rohilla country was completed; and as *Fyzoolla Cawn* has now ſettled a Treaty, it appears the proper time for repeating the demand.

The Governor refers to the ſentiments delivered in his Minute above entered.

Reſolved, That the firſt propoſal be agreed to.

2d. That the Colonel, or Commanding Officer, be alſo inſtructed to make a demand for ſuch further payments as may be due from the Vizier on receiving theſe inſtructions, and to liquidate whatever accounts may be unſettled with him at that time.

Reſolved, That this propoſal be alſo agreed to.

3d. That he be further inſtructed, that although he is to make an immediate demand for the whole forty lacks, and for ſuch other payments as may be due at that time, yet if he finds that it is impoſſible for the Vizier to comply with the whole of theſe demands, he is to receive what can be obtained in ready money, and ſettle a kiſtbundee with him for the remainder; the ſum to be received in ready money not to be leſs than twenty lacks, and the reſt to be payable at different periods within twelve months.

Reſolved, That this propoſal be agreed to.

4th. That the Colonel, or Commanding Officer be further inſtructed, that in caſe the Vizier ſhall refuſe to comply with theſe demands, he is to enter a Proteſt againſt him, declaring that the Company have fulfilled all their engagements with him, and, within fourteen days after the receipt of theſe inſtructions,

Mr. *Francis* is not for extending the period beyond the term of the fourteen days propoſed by the General; and informs the Board that he means to give in ſome obſervations in writing on what has been urged by the Governor and Mr. *Barwell*.

Mr. *Barwell*'s opinion is above. See his Minute.

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ſtructions, to retire with the army under his command, and withdraw it into the Company's territories.

Colonel *Monſon*.—" I am of opinion that the Colonel or " Commanding Officer ſhould withdraw the army within the " time limited in the Propoſition; and I am further induced " to be of this opinion, from the poſitive and repeated orders " of the Court of Directors to their ſervants in *India*, not to " enter into offenſive wars, and alſo from their laſt inſtruction, " whereby they are directed to fix their attention to the pre- " ſervation of peace throughout *India*.—The Directors in- " ſtructions ſhall be the invariable rule of my conduct."

General *Clavering*.—" I am of opinion that the Propoſi- " tion ſhould be agreed to, as well to ſecure the army as the " payment of the forty lacks, on account of the faithleſs " character of the Vizier, who is thus deſcribed in Mr. " *Middleton*'s Letter to the Preſident of the 20th of September " laſt: " I have experienced much duplicity, evaſion, and " deceit, in moſt of my tranſactions with his Excellency."

The Governor's opinion is above ſtated in his Minute.

Reſolved, by the majority of the Board, That the Inſtructions ſtand according to this Propoſition.

5th. That further orders be ſent to Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer commanding the brigade, that after having finiſhed the negociations for the money now due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of the forces under his command within the limits of the province of *Oude*; and that, unleſs the Vizier ſhould require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions, with the provinces of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, he return with them to the cantonments of *Dinapore*.

Mr. *Francis* ſees no objection to the inſtruction propoſed; he therefore aſſents to it; but means to give in ſome animadverſions on what has been urged by the Governor and Mr. *Barwell*.

Mr. *Barwell*. (See his Minute above entered.)

Colonel *Monſon* is for the Propoſition as it now ſtands, it being conſiſtent with the late Treaty of *Benares*, as well as that of *Illahabad*, and not in the leaſt derogatory to national faith.

The General agrees to this Propoſition; but intimates his intention to enter ſome obſervations on the Governor General's and Mr. *Barwell*'s opinions.

The Governor's opinion is ſtated in Minute above.

Reſolved, by the majority of the Board, That the Inſtruction be made out conformable to this Propoſition.

6th. That Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer, on quitting the Vizier, ſhall acquaint him, that the Governor General and Council propoſe to appoint a perſon to reſide at his Court; and to declare, that they mean to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaties of *Illahabad* and *Benares*, till the pleaſure of the Court of Directors, regarding the latter, be known.

Mr. *Francis*.—I underſtand the appointment of the Commanding Officer to treat with the Vizier to be temporary, and to have relation to the ſingle object of liquidating the accounts between him and the Company. Whenever it ſhall be thought proper to appoint a permanent Reſident at the Court of the Vizier, I think a Civil Servant ſhould be appointed. With regard to the latter part of the Propoſition, I yield to the reaſons given by the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell*; and think that the intimation conveyed in the words, *till the pleaſure of the Court of Directors regarding the latter be known*, ſhould not be made to the Vizier.

Mr. *Barwell*. (See his Minute above.)

Colonel *Monſon*.—" I am of opinion to agree in the firſt part of this Propoſition; but would have it underſtood, that the appointment of the Commanding Officer is only temporary, and for the purpoſes of making the demand of the 40 lacks, and liquidating the other ſums due from the Vizier; and that a Civil Servant ſhould be appointed to reſide at the Vizier's Court when ſuch an appointment ſhall be thought neceſſary. With regard to the latter part of the inſtruction in the Propoſition, I think it would be better to poſtpone it till we hear from the Court of Directors."

General *Clavering*.—" As I made the Propoſition, I can affirm, that my intention in propoſing that Colonel *Champion*, or the actual Commanding Officer of the army, ſhould be appointed, was only to liquidate the accounts during the fourteen days which he was limited to remain with the Vizier, and that I never thought of ſending any other perſon to reſide with him but a Civil Servant; and my reaſon for mentioning the Treaties of *Illahabad* and *Benares* was, that I wiſhed to diſtinguiſh ſolemn Treaties, ratified in form, from a mere verbal engagement, the tenor of which is only known by the Vizier's Letter; and the terms, both as to the object and the time, entirely indefinite; and therefore I deſire the propoſition may ſtand as it is."

The Governor. (See his Minute above entered.)

Reſolved, by the majority, That the propoſition ſtand as it is, only leaving out theſe words at the end, " till " the pleaſure of the Court of Directors regarding the latter be known."

7th. That he be further inſtructed, that if he ſhould apprehend any difficulty or danger in his retreat,

Mr. *Francis* delivers his opinion as follows: The idea of the danger and difficulty of a retreat, which are ſuppoſed poſſible

treat, that then he ſhould ſuſpend his declaration, and take the beſt means in his power for the preſervation of the army, and adviſe the Board immediately of his ſituation.

poſſible in this Article, is not expreſsly directed againſt the Vizier; ſuch difficulty and danger may ariſe from other cauſes. So far as the Vizier may be underſtood to be concerned, I think the order proper. If the Commanding Officer ſhould apprehend that his retreat may be interrupted, he is to ſuſpend the declaration of his intention to withdraw.—As for the reſt, I do not think that any opinions which may ariſe in the Vizier's mind from his conſtruction of an order which ought not, and probably will never come to his knowledge, are to be put in competition with the ſafety of one-third of our army. That the Vizier ſhould be even ſuppoſed to know the ſecrets of our conſultations or orders, argues a breach of truſt and fidelity in ſome of our miniſterial officers, which, without particular charge and proof, I cannot admit as an argument in our deliberations.

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Mr. *Barwell.* (See his Minute above.)

Colonel *Monſon.*—I am for this Propoſition as it ſtands, not ſuppoſing that the Vizier will ever become acquainted with the deliberations or operations of this Board; and I think the caution to the Commanding Officer of the army to be abſolutely neceſſary.

General *Clavering.*—I am likewiſe for the Propoſition as it now ſtands; becauſe this inſtruction is to convey a diſcretionary ſecret order to the Commander of the army, for the preſervation of the troops employed at ſuch a diſtance from this Country, that it is acknowledged that the Sepoys, who are not tranſported by water carriage, will be two months before they can reach the frontiers of *Bahar*; and I think, that Government would not be juſtified, either to their King, their Country, or the India Company, if they did not take every precaution againſt the perfidy of a man, who has dared to preſcribe ſuch inſulting conditions to the late Preſident, as to ſay, "I am the maſter in theſe affairs, "and the power of retaining or diſmiſſing the Engliſh army "is mine; it ſhall remain preſent with me; and without my "diſmiſſion, the Engliſh army never, never ſhall go."

The Governor. (For his opinion, ſee his Minute above entered.)

Reſolved, by the majority, That this Propoſition ſtand as it is.

Mr. *Francis* moves, That in addition to the Articles already agreed on, the Commanding Officer be directed to execute the inſtructions contained in this Letter, with as much reſpect to the Vizier in his addreſſes to him, and in as amicable terms as poſſible, conſiſtenly with an exact and firm execution of our preſent orders.

Mr. *Barwell* obſerves, that he would rather wiſh to take the terms from the heads of a Letter which the General offered to the Board when he firſt introduced this ſubject.

The General acquaints the Board, that if he had with him the heads of the Letter alluded to, he would undoubtedly deliver them in; but as Mr. *Francis*, in his motion, as near as he can recollect, has included what he offered in the heads of the Letter, he agrees to Mr. *Francis*'s motion.

Agreed to the above motion of Mr. *Francis*.

Reſolved, That the following Letter be written and diſpatched to Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer of the ſecond brigade:

To Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer commanding the ſecond Brigade.

Sir,

This accompanies a duplicate of our laſt. We are now to acquaint you, that we have thought proper to recal to the Preſidency Mr. *Middleton*, the Reſident at the Vizier's Court, and have directed him to deliver over to you whatever documents, accounts, or papers, he may have in his hands relating to the Vizier's pecuniary engagements with the Company. As we have further determined to charge you with the negociations reſpecting theſe engagements, and the conſequent payments due to the Company from the Vizier, we proceed to give you ſuch inſtructions for your guidance, as we judge expedient on the occaſion.

You will, then, immediately on the receipt of this Letter, wait on the Vizier, and in the moſt decent and reſpectful terms repeat the demand which has been already made to him of the 40 lacks of rupees due to the Company, on account of their aſſiſtance in the reduction of the Rohilla country, agreeable to his ſtipulations.

You are at the ſame time to demand of him the payment of ſuch other ſums as may then have become due in virtue of his other engagements; and you are hereby empowered to liquidate all accounts which may then remain unſettled between the Company and him.

Although you are thus inſtructed to make an immediate demand on the Vizier for the whole of the 40 lacks, and for ſuch other payments as may be due at that time; yet, if you find that it is impoſſible for him to comply with the whole of theſe demands, you are hereby directed to receive from him what he may offer in ready money, provided it is not leſs than 20 lacks, and to ſettle a kiſtbundee with him for the remainder, payable at different periods within twelve months, as the longeſt term.

In caſe he ſhall refuſe to comply with the above demands, you are then to enter a formal Proteſt againſt him for the failure of his engagements, containing a declaration that the Company have fulfilled theirs with him; and, within 14 days from the receipt of theſe inſtructions, you are to retire with the army under your command, and withdraw it into the Company's territories.

But in caſe you ſhould be able to finiſh theſe negociations with the Vizier in the manner preſcribed, you are then only to withdraw the army within the limits of the province of *Oude*, and continue with them there, if he ſhould require it, for the defence of his original dominions, with the provinces of *Corah* and *Illahabad*; but,

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but, if he ſhould *not* make ſuch a requiſition, you are then to return with the whole of the forces under your command to the cantonment of *Dinapore*.

At any rate, in quitting the Vizier, you are to acquaint him that the Governor General and Council propoſe to appoint a perſon to reſide at his Court; and to declare, that they mean ſtrictly to adhere to the Treaties of *Illahabad* and *Benares*.

If you ſhould apprehend any difficulty or danger to the troops in their retreat, in caſe of your departure, on the firſt ſuppoſition of the Vizier's refuſing to fulfil his engagements, in that caſe you are to ſuſpend the Proteſt and Declaration before enjoined, and take the beſt means in your power for the preſervation of the army, adviſing us immediately of your ſituation.

In all this buſineſs we recommend the greateſt temper and moderation, and enjoin, that your remonſtrances be made, although with firmneſs, yet with reſpect and tokens of friendſhip; ſo as to convey to him the idea that the Company in inſiſting on their juſt rights, have no intention to depart from their alliance and connection with him.

Fort William, the 31ſt October 1774. We are, &c.

Secret Conſultations, Extract of *Fort William*, 3d November 1774.

The General now delivers in his Minute on the ſubject of the Propoſitions debated at the laſt meeting, agreeably to what he then promiſed, as follows:

The General's Minute on the Propoſitions at laſt Council.

On the 5th Propoſition.—When I ſubmitted this Propoſition to the Board, I did not expect an oppoſition would be made to it on the part of the Governor General, and ſtill leſs could I imagine he would have deemed that meaſure a violation of public faith, which in effect is the reſult of his own opinion. I was glad to have his authority for a meaſure which ſo perfectly coincides with my wiſhes; and that however we may differ in opinion with reſpect to the validity of the engagement itſelf with the Vizier, yet it pleaſed me much to find that I had ſtill ſufficient lights before me in the correſpondence which we have been only permitted to ſee, to form my judgment on the performance of the ſtipulations of the engagement on the part of the Company, and conſequently to determine the right of withdrawing the troops. The late Preſident, in his Letter of the 16th July, has been ſo very explicit on the doubtful point of the engagement, whether or not the claim to the 40 lacks was then due, and whether the continuance of the troops in the Vizier's ſervice afterwards was independent or not of the right to the 40 lacks; he ſays, "I cannot admit of the conſtruction the Vizier puts on "the agreement, namely, 'that every condition ſpecified "in the Letter muſt be accompliſhed before the pay"ment became due." He adds, "that the whole "Country of the Rohillas, lying within the boundary "which originally formed the compaſs of our opera"tions, is, according to my conception, wholly and "entirely his, the Vizier's." He thereupon orders Mr. *Middleton* to inſiſt on the right to the 40 lacks in ready money, and acquaints him that the continuance of the brigade afterwards with the Vizier muſt be conſidered as an indulgence.

This is the late Preſident's own expreſſion, and as I cannot conceive that an act of indulgence of the late Adminiſtration can be deemed a right by the enjoyment of it ſince the 16th of July, I flatter myſelf that the Governor General, upon reconſidering his ſentiments at that period, will think himſelf not juſtified in the imputation he has laid on the Members of the Board, who have concurred in the Propoſition for withdrawing the troops out of the Country of the Rohillas.

However, it has been objected, that the Vizier may be offended at the exerciſe of this right. At preſent I ſhould think that not poſſible, if Mr. *Middleton* has done his duty in communicating to him the late Preſident's ſentiments, and making him underſtand how long he has enjoyed an indulgence he was not entitled to. If he has any gratitude he will be ſenſible of the favour he has received, and will, at the aſſurances Colonel *Champion* is ordered to give him, of the reſolution of this new Government to maintain inviolably the Treaties which the Company has with him, for the mutual protection of their reſpective ancient poſſeſſions.

Mr. *Francis* alſo delivers in the following Minute on the ſame ſubject, which he promiſed at the laſt Council.

On the General's 4th Propoſition.

Mr. Francis's Minute on the Propoſitions.

With reſpect to the fourth Article of the Inſtructions now propoſed to be given to Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer of the ſecond brigade, and in anſwer to the objections made to it by Mr. *Barwell* and the Governor General, I muſt declare, that I am at a loſs to comprehend how a demand for money, long ſince acknowledged to be due, but of which no part has yet been paid, can be conſidered as offenſive to the Vizier, if his intentions be as ſincere and upright as they are repreſented. The mere claim of a debt does not of itſelf imply any doubt or ſuſpicion of the honeſty of the debtor; and ſince we have on our ſide fulfilled the conditions which entitle us to make the demand, I think we ſhould be guilty of a breach of duty to the Company if we did not repeat and inſiſt upon it until it ſhould be complied with. I do not expect that the Vizier will act ſo injudicious a part as to give a plain direct negative to ſo regular and juſt a requiſition; if he ſhould, I conſider the bare retreat of our army into our own territories, in conſequence of ſuch refuſal, as the mildeſt and leaſt vindictive meaſure that can be adopted by this Government. In return to ſo groſs a breach of faith, I do not ſee how it is poſſible for us to act with greater moderation. This, however, is a caſe which I think may rather be ſuppoſed than expected. From the character given of the Vizier, not only by Colonel *Champion*, but by Mr. *Middleton*, (whom Mr. *Barwell* is pleaſed to call *the public Agent of the former Government*, notwithſtanding he has been repeatedly deſcribed and acknowledged as the private Agent of the late Preſident) it ſeems more probable that he will endeavour to elude or protract the execution of his engagements, than that he will plainly and abſolutely refuſe to comply with them.—The conditions which the late Government have unfortunately ſuffered him to preſcribe to them, conſidered merely as the terms of a contract (for I do not mean to inſiſt in a political view upon the danger and diſhonour of ſubmitting to ſuch conditions) are ſo looſe and unguarded, that they will always furniſh him with a pretence for deferring the payment of the 40 lacks to a future day. In his Letter to the Preſident, which we are told has a ſanction equal to the moſt ſolemn Treaty, and which in fact is the only authentic document we have to appeal to, he declares, "that he is the maſter in theſe affairs, and that the "troops ſhall never quit his ſervice until he ſhall volun"tarily diſmiſs them." If we recal the brigade without his conſent, or if we confine its operations within any limits diſagreeable to him, or inconſiſtent with his projects, he will of courſe appeal to his Letter, and tell us, that ſince we do not adhere to the engagements preſcribed to us in one part of the Letter, he is not bound to fulfil the conditions ſtipulated in the other. If we leave the brigade with him, and ſuffer it to be employed as he thinks proper, (which I preſume could never be intended without *any* limitation of time or ſervice) he may ſtill expreſs an apprehenſion, that when he has paid the money the troops will be withdrawn, and therefore that he cannot ſafely part with ſo conſiderable a ſum until he himſelf ſhall have granted them their diſmiſſion. By this way of reaſoning, which in my opinion may well be ſupported by the terms of his Letter, the payment of the 40 lacks is made to depend upon an act, which depends upon his own pleaſure, and conſequently may

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be deferred *ſine die*. By the late Preſident's Letter to him of the 18th July laſt, it appears, that this is the conſtruction which the Vizier himſelf then put upon the agreement. In his anſwer to Colonel *Champion*'s firſt demand of the forty lacks, he ſays, "that when the "Engliſh troops have concluded his buſineſs, and he "thinks proper to diſmiſs them, he will, at the time of "diſmiſſing them, give them the ſum of forty lacks of "rupees, according to his agreement." But even at this moment, both Mr. *Barwell* and the Governor General evidently conſider the ſucceſs of the demand as united with the continuance of the troops in their preſent ſituation, when they alledge that the recal of the brigade may furniſh the Vizier with a plea for refuſing to pay the forty lacks; notwithſtanding they acknowledge the money to be due, independently of the brigade quitting or continuing in his ſervice; but they have not yet aſſerted, in writing at leaſt, that it ought to be continued in his ſervice for ever.

With reſpect to the Company's being bound to guarantee this newly-conquered Country to the Vizier, and to ſupport him in the poſſeſſion of it, I differ widely, though with all the reſpect and deference which I owe Mr. *Barwell*, from the formal opinion delivered by him, "that the preſerving to the Vizier the poſſeſſion of the "domain lately acquired by him, is as much an obliga"tion upon the preſent Government, as the ſecuring to "him any other part of his dominions; and that it is "equally within the ſpirit of the Defenſive Treaty, as if "it had been ſpecifically named therein." I am happy to find that ſo dangerous an obligation is not among the burdens impoſed upon the Company by their ſervants. It is not ſtipulated, nor in any manner intimated, in the Vizier's Letter. If ſuch a guarantee had been expected by him, he would not have failed to have made his claim to it clear and ſecure, by a ſpecific Article, or at leaſt by a reference to thoſe formal Treaties, by which the Company is bound to aſſiſt him in the defence of his other poſſeſſions. It appears to me, that, in the late expedition, we have aſſiſted him in a rank not ſo high as even that of alliance. He pays us a ſubſidy for the hire of our troops: and if the projected conqueſt takes place, he promiſes us a ſhare in the plunder. We do not enquire into, or think ourſelves concerned in the juſtice of the cauſe in which the troops are to act. They march at his requiſition, and are ſolely under his command. When the object of the expedition is obtained, the ſum which he engages to pay in return for their ſervice, becomes due. Beyond the completion of that ſervice, I do not find that the late Government have ventured to involve the Company, at leaſt by any engagements that have yet come to our knowledge. All our advices agree in ſaying, that the Chiefs of the Rohillas have capitulated with the Vizier, and that the reduction of the Rohilla country is completed. I do not therefore ſee the leaſt pretence for continuing the brigade in its preſent ſtation, unleſs it be to aſſiſt him in making further conqueſts.

On the fifth Propoſition.

My firſt general argument for agreeing to the fifth Propoſition is, that it is ſtrictly conformable to the ſentiments and injunctions of the Court of Directors, deliberately and repeatedly, though very ineffectually, communicated to their ſervants. They have approved of the engagement to aſſiſt the Vizier in the defence of the poſſeſſions guaranteed to him by the Treaty of *Illiabad*, in caſe they ſhould be attacked; and at preſent I have no right to ſuppoſe that they will be averſe from extending that engagement to the poſſeſſions which he has lately acquired by the pacific title, of a purchaſe. On the other hand, they have moſt expreſsly and uniformly, and on the ſoundeſt principles of policy, reprobated the idea of engaging with him in ſchemes of conqueſt, or of ſuffering their troops to be employed in diſtant expeditions. I am not ſurprized that this conſideration ſhould have leſs weight with the Governor General, who in his Letter to *Shujah Dowla*, of the 26th of November 1773, confeſſes, "that the orders of his Superiors are peremptory, not to "ſuffer their arms to be carried beyond the line of their "own boundaries, or thoſe of his Excellency their Ally." But I muſt confeſs my aſtoniſhment at the declaration made by Mr. *Barwell*, "that he ſees no reaſon why the "troops ſhould be debarred acting, if neceſſary, in ſecur"ing to the Vizier his late acquiſition." I preſume, it was not conſidered by Mr. *Barwell* (to whoſe opinion I pay a ſincere and unaffected deference) that the Vizier is to be the ſole judge of the neceſſity, and of the mode, of employing the troops in his defence; and that if he ſhould declare, that his late conqueſt can no otherwiſe be ſecured, than by their continuing to be ſtationed upon the ſkirts of the mountains of *Tibit*, we muſt yield to his judgment, and aſſiſt him in that mode which he ſhall think moſt adviſable, and moſt for the benefit of his own affairs. This appears to me to be the amount and reſult of all the arguments urged againſt our agreeing to the fifth article. In my opinion, they lead inevitably to this concluſion: if at this time the recal of our troops, is to be conſidered as a breach of faith with the Vizier, I wait with anxiety to be informed at *what* time, and in *what* circumſtances the recal of our troops, without his conſent, will *not* be a breach of faith with him. He has told us, in plain terms, that, "without his diſmiſſion, the "Engliſh army ſhall never go." And we it ſeems, by the acceptance of his Letter, have given it the ſanction of the moſt ſolemn Treaty. For my own part, I do not ſcruple to declare, that if this extravagant engagement had been ratified in all the forms by which public Treaties are uſually authenticated, but none of which have been obſerved upon the preſent occaſion, I ſhould reject it with diſdain. The reaſons I have ſtated, are alone very ſufficient to induce me to agree to the fifth article of General *Clavering*'s Propoſitions. I ſhall add, however, as the moſt urgent and inſtant motive of my aſſent, that as long as we ſuffer one-third of the Company's forces to be ſtationed in the Rohilla country, at the diſpoſal of the Vizier, whoſe own troops, by the returns, amount to above a hundred thouſand men, we leave that conſiderable portion of our ſtrength in a great meaſure at his mercy, and hazard the ſafety of the ſtate.

4th November, 1774. (Signed) *P. Francis.*

As no meaſure follows as the immediate conſequence of theſe Minutes, the Governor General deſires that they may be recorded; that he declines at preſent offering any reply to them, but that he means to take ſome other occaſion to make his obſervations on them, and to lay them before the Board.

The Governor means to reply to them.

Fort William, the 8th of November, 1774.

The late advices from Colonel *Champion* and the Reſident with the Vizier, as well as the Vizier himſelf, leaving it without a doubt that the latter left his camp on the 15th ultimo, on his return to *Fyzabad*, it becomes neceſſary to determine in what manner the orders, lately tranſmitted to the Commander of the army, ſhould be carried into execution; thoſe orders having been given on the ſuppoſition that the Vizier would have continued in the Rohilla country, and in the neighbourhood of the Commander of our army.

Agreed, therefore, that Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer, be directed as follows:

To Colonel *Alexander Champion*, or the Officer commanding the ſecond brigade.

Sir,

Since our Letter of Inſtructions of the 31ſt of October, we have recived advices from Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Middleton*, which leave it without a doubt that the Vizier left his camp on the 15th ultimo, on his return to *Fyzabad*. As this makes a ſmall alteration neceſſary in your former Inſtructions, you are accordingly directed, that

Freſh Inſtructions to Col. Champion.

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that if, on receipt of this, the Vizier ſhould be actually departed for *Fyzabad*, you immediately leave the army under the command of the next ſenior Officer, and proceed for that capital to negociate with the Vizier in the terms of your former Inſtructions; and that in caſe the Vizier refuſe to ſettle with you in thoſe terms, you are to reckon the fourteen days preſcribed in thoſe Inſtructions, for ordering the army to retire, to commence from the time of your meeting with the Vizier; and at their expiration, and not before, you are to ſend orders to the army to withdraw, according to the former Inſtructions. But if, when you receive theſe orders, the money ſhould be already paid, or ſuch part of it as, together with ſuch ſecurity for the remainder, may be equivalent to the terms which you are inſtructed to demand of the Vizier, you will then purſue your former orders with reſpect to the retreat of the army into the country of *Oude*.

Fort William, We are, &c.
8th November, 1774.

The Governor's Propoſition.

The Preſident gives in the following Propoſition for the conſideration of the Board.

The Governor recommends, that the clauſe in the late Inſtructions given to the Commander of the army, requiring him to withdraw the brigade into the province of *Oude*, after payment or ſecurity obtained for the ſums due from the Vizier, be repealed; and that a diſcretionary power be left with the Officer who may be in the command of the brigade, to continue it in its ſtation at *Ramgaut*, until the Vizier's Government ſhall be effectually eſtabliſhed in his new-acquired poſſeſſions, or other circumſtances ſhall induce the Officers in command to believe that the Engliſh forces may evacuate that Country without expoſing it to the danger of freſh hoſtilities.

He begs leave to obſerve, that at the time when the reſolution was taken for withdrawing the brigade, it was ſuppoſed to be, from the laſt advices, in the moſt diſtant extremity of the Rohilla province; but we are ſince aſſured by authority, that it was on the point of returning to *Ramgaut*, which lies within ſixty miles from the borders of the province of *Oude*, in which ſtation it will be equally able to perform any ſervice for which it may be required, as if it was quartered within the limits of the province of *Oude*, and means may be eaſily found to induce the Vizier to give his voluntary aſſent to its entire retreat, without much loſs of time from the Rohilla country.

That Country, though conquered, is not in a ſtate of confirmed ſubjection. *Fyzoola Cawn* has ſubmitted to the conditions impoſed on him, and to acknowledge himſelf the vaſſal of the Vizier; but he is at liberty, and may again aſſert his pretenſions to the territory which has been wreſted from him, if he ſees no danger in the attempt. His forces were ordered to be tranſported beyond the *Ganges*; but they ſtill exiſt, though diſbanded, and may with eaſe be re-aſſembled, if it ſhould ſuit their former Chief to recal them, before time were allowed them to diſperſe, or to ſeek other maſters. To enſure the permanent poſſeſſion of the new-acquired Country, proper Officers muſt be ſtationed in it by the Vizier, to eſtabliſh his Government, and regulate the collections. Theſe ends may be effected with eaſe, and the danger of a revolt effectually obviated by the temporary preſence of that force by which the Country was reduced; whereas the precipitate recal of the Engliſh army, in oppoſition to the Vizier, and before the ſettlement of the Country was completed, would be inevitably conſtrued as a ſure indication, that the preſent Adminiſtration of the Company diſapproved of the late engagements with the Vizier for the conqueſt of the Rohilla country, and was reſolved to withdraw its interpoſition from all future concerns in that quarter. Such a belief at this time might be the cauſe of a general revolt, and of the loſs of all the advantages obtained by our arms; which, whatever diverſity of opinion may prevail concerning the propriety of the paſt tranſactions, the Governor is perſuaded is very foreign from the intention of every Member of the Council. He does not form theſe as certain, but probable concluſions; and as they may be prevented by a temporary continuance of the brigade at *Ramgaut*, or in any other ſtation equally convenient for the preſent protection of the Rohilla country, as there is no poſſible ſervice for it in any other part of the Vizier's dominions, and as the Propoſition now ſubmitted to the Board is entirely conſiſtent with the Inſtructions already given by the Council to the Commander of the army, the Governor hopes it will obtain their concurrence. He wiſhes to take the opinion of Mr. *Monſon* on this occaſion, and is willing to allow it an effect in the deciſion which may be paſſed upon the queſtion, as that Gentleman is prevented by ſickneſs from attending at the Board, and joined with the majority in the reſolutions for withdrawing the brigade.

(Signed) *Warren Haſtings.*

Agreed, that this Propoſition lie for conſideration until the next Council day. To be conſidered.

Fort William, the 14th of November, 1774.

Mr. *Francis*, in conformity to the intention he expreſſed at the laſt Council, now delivers in his ſentiments upon the Governor General's propoſal to alter the Inſtructions ſent to the Commander of the army in the Rohilla country:

Mr. Francis's opinion on the Governor General's propoſal of the 8th inſtant.

In the conſideration of the Governor General's Minute of the 8th inſtant, it gives me pleaſure to obſerve, that in one reſpect his ſentiments and mine are not ſo diſtant as I apprehended they might be. He does not affirm, or even intimate, "that the preſerving to the Vizier the "poſſeſſion of the Rohilla country, is as much an obli- "gation upon the preſent Government, as the ſecuring "to him any other part of his dominions, and equally "within the ſpirit of the Defenſive Treaty, as if it had "been ſpecifically named therein."

The Governor General urges his propoſal on particular motives of policy and temporary convenience, independent of any poſitive obligation that might bind us to act againſt our intereſts or opinion. This is the only ground on which I can conſider the queſtion; for after having had the honour of laying my ſentiments with reſpect to the whole buſineſs of the Rohilla war, repeatedly and deliberately before the Board, I think it cannot be expected of me, that I ſhould ſo ſuddenly renounce the general principles on which thoſe ſentiments were founded. Meeting the Governor General therefore on his own principles, I beg leave to ſay, that I do not think his arguments concluſive. Our laſt advices inform us, that the brigade was to leave the extremities of the Rohilla country on the 15th of October, before which time the remains of the Rohilla army would be ſent acroſs the *Ganges*. This meaſure, I preſume, was reſolved on with the conſent of the Vizier. He himſelf muſt therefore have conſidered the Country as completely reduced to his obedience, and the new Government ſecure from any attempt in that quarter. The retreat of the army to *Ramgaut* is a meaſure of his own. If the diſtance of ſixty miles be all the difference between the ſtation recommended by the Governor General, and that to which a majority of the Board have determined at all events to bring back the brigade, I cannot diſcover any motive, even of convenience, for our heſitating to adopt a meaſure which conforms to the ſentiments of our Superiors, replaces the Company's troops within the defenſive line preſcribed to us by their ſtrict and repeated injunctions, and removes them but ſixty miles from that ſtation, to which the Vizier has himſelf approved of their returning.

I do not underſtand from what premiſes it can be concluded that we mean to deſert the intereſts of the Vizier, while

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while our army continues with him, and when the Commanding Officer is directed to remain in the country of *Oude*, if the Vizier ſhould require it, for the defence of any part of his ancient dominions. The abſolute return of the brigade to *Dinapore* is not to take place, but upon his plain direct refuſal to fulfil his engagements to the Company. Even with reſpect to the ſecurity of the new conqueſt, whatever the ſecret determination of the Board on that ſubject may be, the mere retreat of the brigade within the frontiers of *Oude* cannot, in my opinion, warrant a concluſion, that the preſent Adminiſtration is reſolved to withdraw its interpoſition from all future concerns with the Rohilla country. The utmoſt that the late Government undertook to execute for the Vizier, has been long ſince completed. The return of the brigade to their former ſituation, is no more than the natural conſequence of their having performed the ſervice on which they were employed. Neither can their retreat, with any degree of juſtice, be called *precipitate*. Our firſt Inſtructions to Colonel *Champion* were not diſpatched until the 4th inſtant; in twenty days they would probably each him; fifteen days more are allowed for finiſhing the particular negociation, entruſted to him, with the Vizier; and we have ſince extended the term preſcribed, in order to make an allowance for the Commanding Officer's journey to *Fyzabad*, and for his return to *Ramgaut*, which cannot upon the whole make leſs than an addition of ten days. The ſervice for which the troops were engaged by *Suja Dowla*, was finally determined on the 15th of October, ſince on that day they retire from *Loll Dang*. From that to the earlieſt day on which it is poſſible for the army to begin its march, in obedience to our orders, there is a ſpace of ſixty-two days; during which he enjoys all the countenance and ſupport that can be derived from the appearance of our arms, in ſettling and eſtabliſhing the Government of his new conqueſt. In this computation I ſtate the time ſtrictly, and allow all poſſible advantages againſt my own argument. The truth is, that the Vizier has been in peaceable poſſeſſion of the whole country ſince Auguſt laſt, and of the greateſt part of it ſince April. He has conſequently had all that time to regulate his affairs.

What I have had the honour of ſubmitting to the Board, is meant as a reply to the Governor General's arguments, and not as the foundation of my declining to aſſent to his propoſal. My determination to vote for the recal of the brigade from the Rohilla country, is founded on motives which I have already ſtated to the Board, and hitherto I find no reaſon to alter it. On the contrary, as I really think it probable that we may be ſhortly engaged in a * war with the Marattas, in behalf of *Sujah Dowla*, as the country of the † Rohillas is very remote from that of the Marattas, as it lies out of the line of their incurſions, as their attack will therefore probably be made upon thoſe parts of the Vizier's dominions which lie neareſt to us (and which we are obliged by Treaty to protect) if not immediately upon our own provinces, I think there ought not to be the delay of a ſingle day beyond the term already allowed for our evacuating a country which we are not bound by any ſtipulation to defend, and which we cannot defend without neglecting objects more important to the Vizier himſelf, and in which our own ſafety is immediately concerned.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Mr. Barwell's opinion.

Mr. *Barwell* agrees to the Governor's propoſal for altering the Inſtructions ſent to the Commanding Officer.

Colonel *Monſon*, to whom the Governor's Minute of the 8th inſtant has been ſent for his opinion, ſends in the following:

Colonel Monſon's opinion.

I am extremely ſenſible of the indulgence ſhewn by the honourable the Governor General, in allowing my opinion to have its conſequence in the deciſion of a queſtion before the Board, notwithſtanding I am prevented by ſickneſs attending there. I have already given my ſentiments on the ſubject, and am the more ſtrongly confirmed in them, as the lateſt advices from Colonel *Champion* mention, that he ſhould ſee the Rohillas paſs the river before he would march to *Ramgaut*; the Vizier therefore will be in poſſeſſion of the country, and our part of the ſtipulation accompliſhed.

The brigade is to remain in the province of *Oude* at the requiſition of the Vizier for defenſive meaſures.

The Rohilla country, a conqueſt made by the Vizier ſince the Treaties of *Illahabad* and *Benares*, cannot be conſidered within thoſe Treaties. If the Company are to defend that country, it is a cogent reaſon againſt aiding the Vizier in the conqueſt of it.

* Colonel *Champion* is of opinion, that is is neceſſary to prepare for the reception of the Marattas, by poſting the brigade centrically, and putting their ſtores, &c. in proper order. The moſt effectual mode to prevent the inroads of the Marattas is to have our force within our provinces; I therefore would adviſe, that the brigade ſhould return to *Dinapore*, unleſs demanded by the Vizier for the protection of his ancient dominions.

* Letter, 17th September, 1774.

(Signed) *George Monſon.*

The General gives his ſentiments upon the ſame ſubject in the following Minute:

The General's opinion.

The reſult of the Governor General's Minute now delivered in to the Board, being, that the order which has been ſent to Colonel *Champion* to withdraw the brigade within a certain time out of the Rohilla country, in conſequence of the reſolution of the Council on the 4th and 5th Propoſitions which I ſubmitted to the Board on the 28th ult. may be annulled; and that Colonel *Champion*, or the Commander of the army, be directed to remain at *Ramgaut*, where the laſt intelligence mentioned he was retiring, till the new Government in the Rohilla country be quite eſtabliſhed.

The arguments employed by the Governor General to recommend this alteration in our reſolutions are, firſt, that the Rohillas might take up arms again, and recover their country, if our army left it; ſecondly, that ſo precipitate a ſtep would perſuade the Vizier, that the Governor General and Council were not well-diſpoſed towards him; thirdly, that the brigade not being now wanted within our own provinces, it might on any exigency be ſoon brought into the country of *Oude*, as the diſtance from *Ramgaut* to the neareſt part of the Vizier's dominions is not more than 60 miles.

In reply to theſe arguments I will beg leave to ſtate, that we are not any more obliged to defend the Rohilla country for the Vizier than we were to conquer it for him: that I conſider the verbal promiſe, by virtue of which the late Preſident engaged to march the brigade to attack the Rohillas, as no Treaty; it had none of the requiſites of a contract; there was neither witneſs nor ſignature to it. But I will go further, and declare, that if this engagement had been provided with all the formalities of a ſolemn Treaty, I would not have heſitated to have given my vote to have broken it; becauſe, firſtly, it was an unjuſt war; ſecondly, it is exactly the caſe which the Legiſlature has pointed out to us for our interference, when it inveſted the Governor General and Council with a power of controlling the other Preſidencies; thirdly, the Directors have repeatedly prohibited the Governor and Council of this Preſidency undertaking any ſchemes of foreign conqueſt, or departing from the abſolute line of the defence of the poſſeſſions of the Company, together with thoſe which they are engaged to defend by the Treaty of *Illahabad*; fourthly, becauſe

* Vide Colonel Champion's Letter of 24th of July 1774; Letter from Select Committee to the Court of Directors, of 24th of Auguſt; and Colonel Champion's laſt inſtructions to Colonel Galliez.

† Vide Preſident's Minute of 20th November, 1773.

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the late Preſident and Council have pledged every thing that can be dear to them as men, never to depart from the ſolemn promiſe they made, when they ſigned their names to the 30th paragraph of the Letter to the Court of Directors from the Select Committee, of the 10th of November, 1772, in the following words; " in one point " you may reſt aſſured of our unanimous concurrence; " that no object or conſideration, ſhall either tempt or " compel us to paſs the political line which we have laid " down for our operations with the Vizier. We have " told him, and repeated, that we will aſſiſt him with your " force in the defence of his dominions againſt all in- " vaders; but that we will not engage in any offenſive " war, nor ſuffer your army to be carried beyond the " borders of his territory; and to this reſolution we will " ſteadily adhere."

I might add to theſe four conſiderations, which it is to be hoped will have ſome weight with the Govenor General, conſidering the authority with which ſome of them at leaſt are ſtamped, that it is reaſonably to be apprehended, that if the powers of *Indoſtan* ſhall perceive that the Governor General and Council, in imitation of their predeceſſors in office, do continue to afford protection to the Vizier in maintaining his unjuſt acquiſition of the Rohilla country, they will confederate with the remains of thoſe unhappy people to extirpate the Vizier, and then attack the Company's poſſeſſions, perhaps at the different Preſidencies at the ſame time.

In regard to the interpretation which the Governor General ſuggeſts the Vizier will put on ſo abrupt a departure of the brigade from the Rohilla country, before he has fully eſtabliſhed his own authority in it, if the Governor General will be pleaſed to refer to dates, he will find, there muſt be near two months from the day when *Fyzoolla Cawn* capitulated to the time allowed to the Commander of the army to withdraw the brigade into the cougtry of *Oude*; which time will be judged more than ſufficient to eſtabliſh his Government in a ruined country, deſerted by its inhabitants and protectors, without other purpoſes are intended, the drift of which have appeared by the opinion delivered by Mr. *Barwell* at this Board, namely, that we are equally bound to defend his acquiſition of the Rohilla country againſt all invaders, as we are his ancient domain. If ſuch opinions have been tranſmitted to the Vizier, it is high time he ſhould be undeceived, for his own ſake, and for our reputation. This new Adminiſtration will not exceed, I truſt, the powers which have been confided to them by the Legiſlature and the Honourable Court of Directors, whoſe ſanction as yet only authoriſes us to comply with the ſtipulations of the Treaty of *Illahabad*.

With regard to the laſt argument, that the brigade is not now wanted within the Company's poſſeſſions, and that the diſtance between *Ramgaut* and the neareſt part of the country of *Oude* being ſo ſhort, that in caſe of an exigency it might eaſily be tranſported into that country; I will remark, that the new Adminiſtration can only judge of the neceſſity of the troops being nearer the Company's frontiers by the correſpondence that has been laid before the Council; by which correſpondence, curtailed as it has been, it ſtill appears, that both the Governor General and the Commander of the army thought that the Marattas would return upon the *Ganges* in the autumn. If their conjectures were juſt, it certainly would be very proper to be prepared for the danger, by approaching the army nearer to the frontiers of *Babar*; which frontiers are at preſent only protected by one battalion of Sepoys and fifty-two European Invalids at *Chunagur*, by ſeven companies of brigade Sepoys at *Dinapore*, and one company of the latter at *Buxar*; the reſt of the army being ſtationed as low down as *Berhampore*, and conſequently not able to protect the frontiers of *Babar* in caſe it ſhould be ſuddenly attacked by the Marattas, the King, or any other Power whom we may have provoked.

It is for this reaſon, as well as my deſire to pay obedience to the commands of the Court of Directors, who have enjoined that their arms ſhould never be carried beyond the line they have ſo exactly delineated, that I hope the orders ſent to the Commander of the army may not be revoked.

Reſolved not to repeal the paragraph.

Reſolved, by the majority of the Board, that the paragraph in the Inſtructions to the Commanding Officer of the ſecond brigade, requiring him to withdraw the army into the province of *Cude*, after receipt of the money or ſecurity for it from the Vizier, remain in force.

Extracts referred to in the Minute of Mr. *Francis*.

Select Conſultations, *Fort William*, 18th Auguſt 1774.

Extract of Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Select Committee; dated the 24th July 1774.

Laſt night I ſent the Perſian Interpreter to his Excellency, with my reaſons in writing againſt a movement of the troops at this ſeaſon, but he would not liſten to them; and though I went in perſon this morning, I could not perſuade him to deſiſt from the enterprize.

According to his accounts of the general diſpoſition of other Powers, appearances are alarming enough. He avows expectations of being attacked after the rains by the Marattas on one hand, and *Temur Sha* on the other. He is under conſiderable apprehenſions from the King, whoſe diſtreſſes ſeem to render him deſperate, and to have determined him, as he thinks he is deſerted by us and the Vizier, to try every poſſible effort to extricate himſelf. *Fyzoolla Khan* having large ſums of money, and no alternative being left to himſelf or his followers, they appear reſolved to give all the trouble they can; and their numbers are ſaid to be greatly increaſed by reinforcements of Afghans from different parts.

Theſe are matters which I think worthy of your conſideration; in the meantime I am to inform you, that as his Excellency is ſo very deſirous of my taking the field, as he has the ſole authority of preſcribing the ſervice to be undertaken, and has quoted the Preſident's advice for uſing the utmoſt expedition, I am conſtrained to break ground with all the Sepoys of the brigade and the European grenadiers.

Extract of Letter from the Select Committee at *Fort William* to the Court of Directors; dated 24th Auguſt 1774.

Extracts referred to by Mr. Francis continued.

Our laſt addreſs, of which a duplicate goes encloſed, was written in cypher, and was diſpatched to the Preſident and Council at *Bombay*, to be forwarded over land.

You were therein informed, that the brigade employed under the command of Colonel *Champion*, in the ſervice againſt the Rohillas, was preparing to canton at *Barelly* for the rains. Soon after, on the requiſition and urgent ſolicitation of the Vizier, this deſtination was changed, and the brigade marched forwards to the city of *Biſſouly*, which is near the centre of the Rohilla country on that ſide of the *Ganges*, and immediately entered into quarters, with the intention of paſſing the whole ſeaſon of the rains there. But on the news of an accommodation among the Maratta Chiefs, and on the appearance of ſome hoſtile acts on the part of the King, fearing to be interrupted in the courſe of his operations if they were delayed, the Vizier has ſince importuned the Commander in Chief to take the field again, and to march againſt the remainder of the Rohilla forces, who were aſſembled under the command of *Fyzoolla Cawn* at *Patter-Gur*, in the northernmoſt diviſion of that country; hoping, that by their diſperſion, which would at this time be with leſs difficulty effected, any deſigns which may have been formed by the King, or the Marattas, to be executed after the rains, will be anticipated, and rendered abortive. To this requeſt Colonel *Champion*, though with reluctance, and having

having firſt objected to it on account of the dangers to which the troops (the Europeans eſpecially) would be ſubjected from ſickneſs, by being expoſed to the inclemency of the preſent ſeaſon, aſſented. We own the force of the Colonel's objections, and think they outweigh the arguments urged by the Vizier to prove the neceſſity of preſent ſervice; as we are perſuaded that our forces in that quarter, joined to thoſe of the Vizier, and aided by our other reſources, are ſuperior to any oppoſition which we can foreſee in any probable event of things; but it may accelerate the iſſue of the war, and diſcourage foreign attempts; and our advices from the Commander in Chief and from the Reſident mention, that the ſeaſon was, and had been for ſome time uncommonly favourable for ſuch a deſign.

Select Conſultations, *Fort William*, 26th Nov. 1774.

Extract of the Preſident's Minute.

I muſt therefore declare, that although the Honourable the Court of Directors have been pleaſed to rank the Rohillas among the Powers capable of oppoſing the Marattas, I cannot regard them in that light. Their country is too remote from that of the Marattas, and too much out of the line of the incurſions of theſe people, for them either to be able to oppoſe theſe with effect, or to have much to apprehend from them. The Marattas may occaſionally attack them from the allurements of plunder only, but they can never form a ſufficient ſcheme of conqueſt over a country ſo diſtant, and ſo difficult to hold.

On the other hand, the Subadar of *Oude* muſt always be an object of jealouſy and enmity to the Rohillas; his power is to be dreaded by them; and the ſituation of their country contiguous to his, and in a manner encloſed within the ſame natural boundaries, muſt make the poſſeſſion of it always a deſirable object with him, both for ſecurity and advantage. Theſe are ſources of enmity between them, which from the nature of things cannot fail of producing ſuitable effects; and it is more probable that we ſhould ſoon ſee the Marattas and Rohillas join in hoſtilities againſt the Vizier, than that they ſhould continue in war with one another.

Secret Conſultations, 14th November 1774.

Extract of Colonel *Champion*'s Inſtructions to Colonel *Galliez*; dated 24th October 1774.

Extracts referred to by Mr. Francis continued.

The inteſtine diſſenſions among the Marattas being ſettled, it is to be expected they will direct their attention to foreign affairs, and in particular that they will turn their arms againſt the Vizier. Should they, or any other Power invade, or attempt to invade, any part of his dominions above-mentioned, you will ſupport his Excellency in repelling them with all your force. But as it is moſt probable the firſt endeavour of the Marattas will be to reconquer the country which the Vizier lately took from them in the *Doab*; and as it is not the intention of Adminiſtration to engage openly in maintaining the Vizier in theſe Countries, you will confine your operations to the limits above deſcribed.

It being however the wiſh of Government to aſſiſt his Excellency in the *Doab*, without taking any open meaſures, or employing our troops, it has been agreed by the Preſident to permit Captain *Brooke* to accept of the command of a partizan corps of the Nabob's troops, if his Excellency ſhould think proper to employ him to act ſeparately, on a plan of which Captain *Brooke* is directed to furniſh you with a copy; you will therefore be pleaſed to afford your advice to the Vizier, how beſt to oppoſe and diſconcert the plans of his enemies, according to the intelligence which you may receive of their intentions; and you will regard *Mirza Nijif Khan* as a proper inſtrument for defeating any plans that may be concerted by the King or Marattas, to the diſadvantage of the Company's intereſt, or the diſturbance of our Ally the Vizier.

Fort William, 21ſt November 1774.

Mr. *Barwell* begs leave to record the following Minute:

Mr. Barwell's Minute.

The reply made by Mr. *Francis* to the Governor General's, and my objections to the Propoſitions of the Commander in Chief, in its ſtyle and ſubſtance is of ſuch a nature, that I reſerved to myſelf at the time the right of animadverting upon it, when I might be at leiſure, without delaying the public buſineſs which was before the Board, and more immediately the object of its deliberations.

The whole proceedings in the buſineſs of the peremptory demand on the Vizier, and the poſitive unconditional recal of the troops from his aſſiſtance, I muſt frankly confeſs, appear to me rather in the light of a reprobation of the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, than leading to any real benefit to be derived to the Company; and I think myſelf juſtified in this ſentiment from the language of the Minute before me, which treats the agreement with the Vizier for aid in the Rohilla war as a *looſe unguarded* contract, which that Adminiſtration "*unfortunately* ſuffered the Vizier to *preſcribe* to them," and then "ſubmitted to with *all* the *danger* and *diſhonour* "which attended it. A contract ſo *extravagant*, that "had it even been ratified in all the forms of a public "Treaty," and conſequently public faith ſolemnly pledged for its performance, Mr. *Francis* would have *rejected it with diſdain*. I can hardly conceive words capable of conveying a more ſtrong, and poſſibly the Court of Directors may judge more unjuſt cenſure of the late Adminiſtration, than theſe: or a more free declaration of the ſmall obligation which Mr. *Francis* thinks he lies under, to treat their engagements either with perſonal reſpect or public good faith.

In this place I may likewiſe notice his obſervation on the Governor General, "of not being ſurprized at the "Company's orders having *leſs weight* with him," becauſe it appears from his Letter to the Vizier he was fully apprized of them. But why orders ſhould have leſs weight becauſe they are fully known, with deference to Mr. *Francis*, I cannot underſtand; and I hope he will therefore pardon me for calling upon him for an explanation of his meaning, for, in my humble apprehenſion, every order receives its weight and conſideration from the knowledge it intimately communicates, and is not diſregarded in proportion as it becomes known. I have therefore only to remark, that all concluſions as to the Governor General's undiſguiſed opinions of things, drawn from his correſpondence with the Vizier, are partial, and may be often miſtaken. He muſt be a ſhallow politician indeed, who, in negociating with a foreign Power, does not know how to conceal his real ſentiments at times, and often to urge motives, which, though different from the true ones, are better calculated in their operation to produce the effects that may be propoſed. The Governor General's ſentiments of the Vizier, and our connections with him, ought only to be taken from his unreſerved confidential communications with the Board.

Mr. *Francis* is pleaſed to ſay, that whatever he may think of the Governor General's opinion, he is aſtoniſhed that I ſhould declare for acting, if neceſſary, in defence of the Vizier's late acquiſitions, which he thinks is contradictory to ſound policy, and to the Company's orders. I have already given reaſons for my opinion, and I do not flatter myſelf with being able to add any thing of greater force to effect an alteration in his; however, I will endeavour to remove his ſurprize at my ſentiments, by ſhewing they are grounded on principles ſimilar to his own, and that I think the meaſure I ſupport perfectly conſonant to ſound policy, and the ſpirit of the Company's inſtructions. It often happens with States, that their ſituations are ſuch, that by extending their frontier they bring their

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line of defence to more preſcribed, of courſe to more defined, narrow, and compact limits; and it is an uncontroverted maxim in politics, that natural boundaries are always the moſt ſecure. The territories of the Vizier, before his late acquiſition, undoubtedly ſtood in this predicament. Towards that part of the Rohilla country he had no barrier of any kind; he was not only expoſed to the incurſions of thoſe people, but alſo to thoſe of the Marattas, who either by force or agreement were ſure to obtain from the Rohillas a paſſage through their country to attack him; and we conſequently were ſubject from the ſame cauſe to be annually called out in his defence. This is not mere ſpeculation; for two ſucceſſive years, previous to the Treaty of *Benares*, were we in the field to protect him from that quarter, and that upon the old ſtipulation of 1,15,000 rupees per month for our whole expences. The Vizier endeavoured to form an alliance with theſe people, to obviate if poſſible the danger from their hoſtile enterprizes; they entered into a Treaty with him, broke it afterwards, and called in his enemies to protect them. In this ſituation, who can deny that it was the ſoundeſt policy in the Vizier to attempt their reduction? How far it was ſimilar policy in us to aſſiſt him, is another queſtion; but it appears to me, that if the tranquillity and ſecurity of the Vizier's dominions be the object of our alliance with him, we cannot more effectually ſecure that object, than by aiding to remove a conſtant cauſe of uneaſineſs and diſturbance to him, and procure for him natural barriers to his dominions on the quarter where they were moſt expoſed. That the country in queſtion affords this barrier, is certain. It ſhelters him abſolutely to the North by the Thibet mountains, and to the South and Weſt by the *Ganges*, a river hazardous at all times for an enemy to croſs. That it was on theſe ideas the Rohilla expedition was undertaken, appears manifeſtly from the Records of the Council and Select Committee, where that country is always mentioned ſtanding in the predicaments here defined; and in effect, its defence againſt the Marattas was taken up on theſe very grounds two years paſt, without any particular ſtipulation for the ſervice, or contract for forty lacks on its ſucceſs.

I truſt I have ſufficiently explained to the Board, and particularly to Mr. *Francis*, who is ſurprized at my declaring for the defence of the Rohilla country, the motives upon which I ground my opinion: I think I have clearly ſhewn it was found policy in the late Board to undertake the expedition; that the defence and ſecurity of the Vizier's dominions rendered it eligible; that it had received mature conſideration before it came recommended from the chair; and that if what I have already pointed out are the objects of our alliance with the Vizier, often approved of by the Company, the late Adminiſtration could not have acted more conformably to their intereſts and intentions.

Much notice has been taken in the courſe of our debates on theſe ſubjects, of the expreſſion in the Vizier's Letter, of his right to retain and diſmiſs the brigade: "I am the maſter in theſe points, and without my leave never, never ſhall it depart." And it has been held forth as dictating in the moſt imperious manner his commands to the Council: but theſe Aſiatic expreſſions will not alter the nature of the tranſaction with thoſe who know the fact, that the terms were dictated by the Board, and meant to convey to his mind, that if he acquieſced to the propoſitions made, the aid to be granted ſhould be effectual; and yet ſuch were the advantages aſked for the Company, that even with this aſſurance of ſolid and effectual ſupport, the Board did not flatter themſelves he would have conſented; but doubted, ſo hard were the conditions, his acceptance of the terms proffered. Further, I conceive the expreſſion alluded to as referring only to the condition of retaining at all times a brigade of our troops for the defence of his dominions when he ſhall require it, and continue to pay the ſubſidy ſtipulated by the Treaty of *Benares*; the very nature of all ſuch compacts are, that the party requiring and paying for ſuch defenſive aid, ſhall be the ſole judge of the neceſſity of demanding it, and ſhall retain it while he thinks the neceſſity laſts, without however precluding the other party from recalling it to its own defence, or on other exigencies. The contract is mutual, and the conditions ſo intimately tied together, that they neceſſarily and conſequently ſtand or fall to the ground at the ſame time. While you retain, you pay; when you recal, the pay ceaſes. On ſuch terms I confeſs I wiſh the Vizier may always retain a brigade of our troops; it would eaſe the Company of the heavy burthen of one-third of their whole army, and at the ſame time, preſerve it equally ready for their ſervice, whenever the urgency of their own affairs ſhould oblige them to recal it. On the whole, I have objected to the late meaſures, not only on the general grounds, but as to the mode of proceeding. At the time the General laid his Propoſition before the Board, we had accounts of a propoſal depending, for finiſhing the war entirely; we were informed, that the negociations with the Vizier for the payment of the ſums due from him were in good train; and we were in hourly expectations of hearing ſomething more definitive on theſe heads: yet, in this ſituation, without taking time to enquire fully into the origin and nature of our engagements with the Vizier, without even reading the correſpondence with Mr. *Middleton*, which had been called for, and were then laying on the table unopened, we enter into reſolutions, which either precipitate or counteract all the former meaſures; we call away the Reſident from the Vizier's Court, a meaſure always bearing an hoſtile aſpect; and we order Colonel *Champion*, or whoever ſhould by chance have the chief command, without regard either to his talents or his temper, to demand, with the brigade at his back, immediate payment of the Vizier, or to withdraw from him, leaving him with his new conqueſts and old dominions to defend themſelves. The natural tendency of theſe ſteps is a public diſapprobation of paſt meaſures, and a publication to the world of the cenſure they fix on the late Adminiſtration, may give riſe to jealouſy in the mind of the Vizier, and create fears of hoſtile intentions towards him, and conſequently, induce him to attempt evading or protracting the fulfilling his engagements, until he ſhall be convinced how we mean to act with regard to ours; to endanger the loſs of the new conqueſt, and to encourage the invaſion of his ancient territories, from the notion that we had withdrawn our protection from him; and conſequently, to involve us in new difficulties, whether we abide by our Treaties to defend him, or remain ſpectators while he may be cruſhed. Happily, I think part of the miſchiefs will be prevented, by the reduction of the country being entirely completed, and the payments in a great meaſure made, before theſe orders could arrive; but ſtill I apprehend enough of bad effects, and once more declare my total diſſent to the opinions of the majority of the Board.

(Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

Fort William, the 21ſt November, 1774.

Mr. *Francis* alſo begs leave to enter the following explanation in reply to Mr. *Barwell*:

Mr. Francis's Minute.

Mr. *Francis*, in order to remove every poſſible doubt from Mr. *Barwell*'s mind, concerning the force and intention of his obſervations on the political meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, deſires leave to obſerve, that he did undoubtedly mean to aſſert a ſtrong diſapprobation of thoſe meaſures; and that the terms in which he has expreſſed himſelf are mild and moderate, in compariſon of what he really thinks of their conduct. At all events he conſiders it as his ſtrict right to give his opinion freely in Council, declaring at the ſame time, that he meant no perſonal offence to any man.

If this were a conteſt about *words*, and if *things* of the greateſt moment were not at ſtake, Mr. *Francis* would wiſh to recal Mr. *Barwell*'s attention to the ſtudied courteſy

courteſy and reſpect, with which Mr. *Francis* ventured to expreſs a difference from him in matters of opinion.

With regard to that point on which Mr *Barwell* is pleaſed to call on Mr. *Francis* for an explanation, he willingly gives it to him in the following terms:

" It was to his purpoſe to ſhew, that the late Council " had acted in diametrical oppoſition to the orders and " ſentiments of the Court of Directors; it did not how- " ever neceſſarily follow, that they were *all* aware that " they were doing ſo; he therefore hoped, that the con- " ſideration of thoſe orders might ſtill have great weight " with Mr. *Barwell*, though he could not expect that " they ſhould have ſo much weight with the Governor " General, who had confeſſed to *Suja Dowla*, that he " was acting againſt the peremptory orders of his " Superiors."

For what reaſons the Governor ſhould make ſuch a declaration to the Vizier would, form a ſeparate queſtion. Having once made it, and having really acted up to his declaration, he is precluded from the poſſibility of reconciling his conduct with the letter or ſpirit of his Inſtructions from home. In ſtrict conſiſtency of reaſoning, the Governor General is bound to avow, that he acted upon ſuch principles of policy or evident neceſſity, as in his judgment ſuperſeded the conſideration of any orders from the Court of Directors.

(Signed) *P. Francis.*

Extract of Letter from the Governor General and Council in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors, dated 21ſt November 1774, from Paragraph one to nineteen inclusive, and Poſtſcript of the 6th of December 1774, relative to differences of opinion in the Supreme Council on political affairs. Received in *London* 24th June 1775.

To the honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Honourable Sirs,

This will accompany our Proceedings in the Secret Department, which, by the abolition of the Select Committee, will from this time comprehend the complete Minutes of the political tranſactions of your Adminiſtration here.

2. The ſhortneſs of the period which has elapſed ſince we took upon us the government of your affairs, has not left room for many external occurrences; you will however find, that our Conſultations have not been unfrequent, and that the Reſolutions in them, we are ſorry to ſay it, have not been formed in that harmony, which was equally the object of your inſtructions and our wiſhes, could it have been maintained conſiſtent with the duty we owe to you and our own characters, in aſſerting the opinions which our judgment dictated.

3. The Proceedings are very full on the ſubjects which have been in debate before us, and contain the Minutes, Aſſents, and Diſſents at length on every queſtion; and as the difference of opinion throughout bore always a relation to one point, namely, the propriety of the Rohilla expedition, you will find we were almoſt without exception divided in the ſame proportion. And as, in this caſe, it would have been impoſſible to have concurred in a General Letter of arguments and opinions, we determined to leave this purely and ſimply a Letter of Advice, comprehending reſolutions and facts, and to refer to the Proceedings for the reaſoning on both ſides.

4. In our firſt Conſultation in this Department, we took into conſideration a Minute of the Governor General's reſpecting the political ſtate of affairs in *India*, which he had delivered in at the preceding meeting, in the other Department, with reſpect to the war, then carrying on againſt the Rohillas in aid of the Vizier. We ſoon found that our opinions on its neceſſity and propriety were likely to differ very widely. A majority of the Board, conſiſting of the Commander in Chief, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, thought it neceſſary, for better elucidating the grounds and conduct of the war, to ſee the whole of the original correſpondence between the Governor General, Mr. *Middleton*, Reſident at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel *Champion*, commanding the troops acting in conjunction with him and it was reſolved to requeſt the Governor General to lay it before the Board accordingly.

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5. The Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* diſſented from this Reſolution, and the former, at ſubſequent meeting, delivered in a Minute, declaring that he meant to lay before the Board ſuch parts of Mr *Middleton's* and Colonel *Champion's* correſpondence, as related to the conduct of public affairs; but as ſome of the Letters might contain things, in the courſe of a free and perſonal communication, which might not be proper for a public Record, he begged leave to decline laying the whole of them before us.

6. On this refuſal, a formal Proteſt was entered againſt it by General *Clavering*, Mr. *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*. Mr. *Monſon* thereupon moved for the recal of Mr. *Middleton*; and it was determined by the ſame majority, that he ſhould accordingly be recalled, and ordered to repair forthwith to the Preſidency, bringing with him the whole of his correſpondence during his reſidence at the Court of the Vizier. At the ſame time it was reſolved to appoint Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer of the brigade, to treat with the Vizier in his room. Againſt both theſe Reſolutions the Governor General proteſted, and Mr. *Barwell* alſo diſſented from them.

7. In conſequence of theſe Reſolutions, the Commander in Chief produced at next meeting ſome Propoſitions, which he offered as the groundwork of the Inſtructions which it would be neceſſary to ſend to Colonel *Champion*. Theſe were fully debated in a ſubſequent Conſultation, and they were in general agreed to with ſmall variation; the Governor General and Mr. *Barwell* objecting to many parts of them, and entering Minutes accordingly; while, on the other hand, the Commander in Chief, Mr. *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, either jointly or ſeparately, recorded their ſentiments in the ſame manner.

8. The Inſtructions agreed on, and which were actually ſent to Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer commanding the ſecond brigade, were in ſubſtance, after acquainting him with the recal of Mr. *Middleton*, and with his own appointment to treat with the Vizier, to direct him immediately on the receipt of the Letter, to wait on the Vizier, and to demand payment of the 40 lacks due to the Company for the aid they furniſhed him in the Rohilla war, and of ſuch other ſums as would be then due in virtue of his other engagements; and we empowered him to liquidate and ſettle all accounts between the Company and the Vizier which might be unſettled at that time.

9. At the ſame time that we enjoined him to make this immediate demand for the whole, we left it in his diſcretion, ſhould he find it impoſſible for the Vizier to comply, to relax in his demand ſo far as to accept of any part, not leſs than 20 lacks in ready money, and to ſettle a kiſtbundie, or agreement, for payment by inſtalments, for the remainder, at any terms not exceeding twelve months for the laſt.

10. In caſe the Vizier ſhould refuſe to comply with the above demands, the Commanding Officer was directed to enter a Proteſt againſt him, and, within fourteen days from the receipt of theſe Inſtructions, to retire with the army under his command, and withdraw into the Company's territories.

11. But if the Vizier ſhould comply, as far as his circumſtances would admit, conformable to the terms propoſed, in that caſe the Colonel was only to withdraw the army within the province of *Oude*, and to continue it there for the defence of the Vizier's ancient dominions,

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ſhould he require it; if otherwiſe, he was to retire into the Company's territories, as in the other caſe.

12. Theſe orders were given with ſuitable directions of caution and reſpectful moderation, as to the manner in which he was to communicate them to the Vizier, and as to his own retreat, ſhould he apprehend that any danger or difficulty might attend it.

13. Before theſe Inſtructions were reſolved upon, advices arrived of an end being put to the war by a Definitive Treaty between the Vizier and *Fyzulla Cawn*, who agreed to lay down his arms, and ſurrender to the former one-half of the treaſure which he had with him in his camp; and on condition of the Vizier putting him in poſſeſſion of a ſmall diſtrict, the capital of which is known by the name of *Rampore*, he conſented to hold it dependent on him, and to renounce all pretenſions to any other part of the country. We were further ſoon after adviſed, that on the ratification of this Treaty, the Vizier propoſed to aſſign over 15 lacks of Rupees, which he was to receive from *Fyzulla Cawn* in lieu of one-half of his treaſure, into the hands of Colonel *Champion*, in part payment of what he owed to the Company, and to ſet out immediately for *Fyzabad* to take meaſures for diſcharging the reſt; and we learnt at the ſame time, that Colonel *Champion* determined to march back with the brigade to *Ramgaut*, nearer to the frontiers of *Oude*, and there to quit the army, and to leave it under the command of Colonel *Galliez*, the next ſenior officer. We alſo received Letters from Mr. *Grady*, whom Mr. *Middleton* had ſent to *Fyzabad* to receive the money on account of the ceſſion of *Cora* and *Illahabad*, which the Vizier had ordered to be paid there before he left the army, adviſing, that he had actually received 10 lacks of rupees, and was arrived with it at *Patna*, where he ſtopped to receive five lacks more, which was to be paid him on the ſame account by the Rajah of *Benares*.

14. On receipt of theſe advices, finding the Vizier was in all probability at *Fyzabad*, we thought fit to alter our former Inſtructions ſo far, as to direct Colonel *Champion*, or the Commanding Officer, to leave the army, and repair to that capital, to wait on the Vizier in the execution of his former Inſtructions; but to reckon the fourteen days preſcribed for the retreat of the army, from the day of his meeting with the Vizier.

15. At this time the Governor General propoſed alſo, for the conſideration of the Board, whether, ſeeing that the Vizier had actually put himſelf in the way of diſcharging his engagements to the Company, and that the army had come ſo much nearer to his frontiers, it might not be proper to ſuſpend the former peremptory orders reſpecting the demands upon him, and the withdrawing of the troops; but it appearing to the majority, that there were no circumſtances in theſe events that rendered the former orders improper, the Governor's propoſal was not aſſented to.

16. Since that time we have received no further advices of any conſequence from theſe parts.

17. Some time ago, at the requiſition of the Vizier, the Governor permitted Captain *Brooke* to accept the command of a partizan corps in his ſervice, which he propoſed to raiſe and employ as occaſion ſhould require.

18. Although this did not coincide exactly with the ideas of the majority, reſpecting the part which we ought to take in the Vizier's military enterprizes, yet the Board, out of reſpect to the Governor General, whoſe word was pledged to the Vizier for the permiſſion to Captain *Brooke*, thought fit to confirm it; and the former Inſtructions given to Captain *Brooke*, which are in the Conſultations here referred to, appearing to us clear and proper, we alſo gave our approbation to them.

19. Thus having informed you of the material tranſactions at our Board in relation to the Rohilla expedition, which alone has hitherto divided our Councils, we once more beg leave to refer you to the Proceedings and Minutes for the reaſonings at length, by which the different opinions were ſupported; ſubmitting the whole to your impartial judgment and deciſion.

Poſtſcript; dated 6th December 1774.

The Governor General has this day delivered in a ſeparate addreſs to you, which goes a number in the packet, as does one jointly addreſſed from General *Clavering*, Mr. *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; a Minute of Mr. *Barwell's* upon the ſubject alſo makes a number in the packet. Theſe will all be recorded on the Conſultations after the cloſe of this packet.

Letter from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*.

Fort William, 30th November 1774.

General *Clavering*, Mr. *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, lay before the Council the following Addreſs to the Court of Directors, which they had drawn up in the ſhape of a Letter, and which they deſire may be upon Record as a Minute from them.

It touches them with the higheſt concern to ſee that things are reduced to ſo unfortunate a ſituation, that a juſtification of their conduct muſt of neceſſity carry with it, and can only be ſupported by a ſtrong and deliberate cenſure of the preceding Adminiſtration. They would not have ſacrificed, as they have done, their own happineſs and peace of mind to ſo painful and laborious a diſcuſſion, if they had not been thoroughly convinced, that the queſtions agitated in the following Addreſs to the Court of Directors affect the very vitals of this State, and that, ſooner or later, they muſt be the ſubject of a ſevere parliamentary inquiſition.

The whole of theſe Papers, as they apprehend, muſt, in obedience to the Act of Parliament, be tranſmitted by the Court of Directors to one of his Majeſty's principal Secretaries of State.

J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

To the honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the honourable United *Eaſt India* Company.

Fort William, 30th November 1774.

Gentlemen,

1. It will be the duty of the late Preſident and Council to tranſmit to you a complete ſtate of your affairs, in every branch of their Adminiſtration, up to the period at which they reſigned the Government. From that time you will be regularly informed, by the official Letters of the Governor General and Council, of every material occurrence and tranſaction which may have taken place ſince our arrival.

2. We are now to lay before you the reaſons which we think oblige us to addreſs you in a ſeparate Letter; and we make it our earneſt requeſt, that you will not only receive thoſe reaſons with candour and indulgence, but that you will conſider the ſubſtance of this Letter with your moſt ſerious attention. The queſtions which will neceſſarily ariſe out of it, and which muſt become the ſubject of your immediate deliberations, are, in our judgment, ſo important, that not only the preſervation of your territorial acquiſitions in this country, but perhaps the fate of the Britiſh empire in *India*, may depend upon the deciſion of them.

3. The ſhort time which has elapſed ſince our arrival here, has been ſo totally engroſſed by the firſt forms and multiplicity of inſtant buſineſs, that it has not been poſſible for us to poſſeſs ourſelves of any other particular knowledge of the internal ſtate of theſe provinces, than that which your Governor General has been pleaſed to communicate to us. We do not therefore pretend to give you any information from ourſelves on this head, or to anſwer perſonally for that which you will receive, either from the preſent or the late Adminiſtration. Be-

fore we have time to compare repreſentations with facts, we cannot pretend to enter minutely into any queſtion concerning the accuracy of the information tranſmitted to you by the late Preſident and Council, or laid before us by the Governor General. At the ſame time, in withholding our aſſent in many caſes, it has not been our meaning to diſpute or diſtruſt the ſtate of facts as they have been repreſented to us; on the contrary, though we thought it prudent to ſuſpend our final judgment until we ſhould be poſſeſſed of lights ſufficient to authorize us to ſpeak with ſome degree of certainty, we were inclined to receive thoſe which were given us with a preſumption in favour of their truth and exactneſs.

4. You will obſerve, that what we have ſaid relates to the internal ſtate of the country, and to the meaſures purſued by the late Preſident and Council in the management of your revenues, the produce of the collections, the conduct of your trade, and the government of the people. In theſe articles we would gladly encourage a hope, though we do not venture to ſuggeſt it to you, that your expectations may not be diſappointed. Our preſent addreſs will be confined to the conſideration of the new ſyſtem of external policy, in which we found the late Adminiſtration had engaged the Company, and of which neither you nor we had any knowledge or ſuſpicion when we left *England*. On this ſubject we ſhall deliver our thoughts to you with that clearneſs and preciſion which ariſes from knowledge in point of facts, and from abſolute conviction in point of opinion.

5. Let us begin with aſſuring you, that we came into this country impreſſed with the higheſt idea of the character of our Colleagues, and of the wiſdom and ability with which your affairs had been conducted under Mr. *Haſtings*. We came determined, as far as that idea could found a determination of future conduct, to unite heartily with him in the ſupport of his Adminiſtration. The truſt repoſed in us by the Legiſlature, our duty to you, and the conſideration of our own perſonal eaſe and happineſs, did all equally concur in leading us to cultivate the friendſhip and confidence of our Colleagues, and to promote, as much as poſſible, a general harmony in our Councils. Yet you will ſee, upon the face of our firſt Conſultations, that the majority of the Board have already reſolved on ſome meaſures of the greateſt importance, in direct contradiction to the opinion of your Governor General; and that this difference of opinion has been attended with diſpute and altercation between us.

6. It is in order to avoid a continuance of altercations, highly painful to ourſelves, and by which the moderation and gravity of our debates is liable to be interrupted, our minds heated, and the progreſs of public buſineſs retarded, that we have thought it expedient to addreſs you in this ſeparate Letter. You cannot but be ſenſible of the impoſſibility of forming a general Letter for the ſignature of a Council divided into two opinions, diametrically oppoſite to each other, upon the ſubject and materials of it. From the knowledge we have of the ſentiments of the Governor General, we are convinced that every paragraph would be the ſubject of a debate, in which one part of your Council would affirm, and the other would deny; and that ſuch debates could not fail of being attended with diſtreſs to every Member of the Council, and with the greateſt inconvenience to your affairs. At the ſame time we underſtand, and are determined to adhere to the eſtabliſhed forms of communicating the Proceedings of the Council to our Superiors. We hope indeed, that ſo extraordinary an occaſion of departing from them, as we fear we do in the form of this addreſs, will not preſent itſelf hereafter.

7. The ſituation of the Company's political affairs, with the actual ſtate of the provinces in point of defence againſt invaſion or inſult, muſt at all events have formed one of the firſt and principal objects of our enquiries. We ſhould have been happy in finding theſe important objects ſo honourably and ſecurely provided for, as to have permitted us to turn our thoughts immediately to the internal circumſtances and condition of this Government. We flattered ourſelves that we ſhould find peace in *India*; or at leaſt that, if hoſtile meaſures had been adopted by your ſervants againſt any of the Powers of this country, they would appear to be founded on the neceſſity of defending your own poſſeſſions, or thoſe of your Allies, and on the general principles of policy and juſtice.

8. Long before this Letter can reach *England*, you will have been informed of the engagements entered into by the late Adminiſtration with *Sujah Dowla*, and the aſſiſtance given him to invade and ſubdue the Rohillas. The firſt accounts we heard of theſe tranſactions filled us with anxiety and ſurprize. We thought it our duty to enquire minutely into them, not only for your information, but for our own direction; and we ſhall now lay before you the reſult of our enquiries. We propoſe that this Letter, with the Papers annexed to it, ſhall contain a complete a repreſentation of the ſtate of the engagements with the Vizier, as far as they appear, and of the conduct of the late Preſident and Council on this occaſion, as far as it hath fallen within our knowledge. We lament the neceſſity to which we are reduced, of looking back with diſapprobation to any former meaſures; and heartily wiſh it were poſſible for us to vindicate our own conduct, without condemning that of the preceding Adminiſtration.

9. You will obſerve by the Governor General's Minute of the 4th of October 1773, that the enterprize againſt the Rohillas furniſhed the firſt occaſion of his interview with the Vizier; yet in the Treaty concluded between them at *Benares* on the 8th of September 1773, no mention or intimation whatſoever is made of this intended expedition. The Treaty is confined to the ſale of *Korab* and *Illiabad*, and to the pecuniary terms on which the Company ſhould yield him the aſſiſtance of their arms, conformably to the *defenſive* ſyſtem eſtabliſhed by the Treaty of 1765, and now extended to the territories which he had acquired by purchaſe. The conqueſt, and, as it has ſince appeared, the ruin and extirpation of a brave and independent, though, from the nature of their conſtitution, a weak and divided nation, who, ſo far from having ever been conſidered as the natural enemies of the Company or of the Vizier, were included but the year before in the line of defence againſt the Marattas, was reſolved upon in a private converſation between your Preſident and *Sujah Dowla*, from which the Commander in Chief was expreſsly excluded, and to which no other Member of your Adminiſtration was privy, though Mr. *Lawrell*, Mr. *Vanſittart*, and Mr. Secretary *Stewart*, were upon the ſpot. When you are thoroughly informed of all the circumſtances and conſequences of this tranſaction, you may perhaps agree with us in thinking, that it was not of a nature to be ſupported by any oſtenſible motives, or to bear the appearance of a formal Treaty.

10. When Mr. *Haſtings* returned to the Preſidency, he made a Report to the Board of his negociations with the Vizier. As this Paper is very long, and as it has already been tranſmitted to you in the Conſultations of the 4th of October 1773, we ſhall only beg to encloſe a copy of one paragraph, there being no other part of the Report that has relation to the preſent ſubject; we mean, however, to annex complete copies of every other document to which we refer. The whole of the Papers entered on your Records will be highly worthy of your peruſal. Thoſe which we have ſelected for the immediate illuſtration of this Letter are entire. On matters of ſuch delicacy and moment, we will not truſt ourſelves with the partial power of extracting.

11. Mr. *Haſtings*'s Report above-mentioned is dated the 4th of October 1773. He therein ſtates to the Council, that the Vizier was at firſt very deſirous of the aſſiſtance of an Engliſh force to put him in poſſeſſion of the Rohilla country, but that he afterwards laid aſide the deſign; and that the meaſures to be purſued for *his ſecurity* on that quarter muſt be determined by future occurrences.

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rences. The Preſident thereupon obſerves, " that he " was pleaſed that the Vizier had urged the ſcheme of " this expedition no farther, as it would have led our " troops to a diſtance from our own borders, which he " would wiſh ever to avoid, though there were powerful " arguments to recommend it."

12. When you refer to the ſhort paragraph from which theſe paſſages are taken, you will be led to conclude, that the Preſident had communicated to the Council the whole of what had paſſed between himſelf and the Vizier on the ſubject of the Rohilla expedition; that the project of the expedition was laid aſide; that he had entered into no poſitive engagements on this ſubject; and that the queſtion, whether the Vizier ſhould, or ſhould not, be aſſiſted in attacking the Rohillas, whenever it ſhould recur, would be open and entire for the deciſion of the Board. You will ſoon find, however, that much more had paſſed on this ſubject than Mr. *Haſtings* at firſt thought fit to impart to his Council; and that his communications to them were very gradual and reſerved. The ſecret of the important buſineſs tranſacted between the Vizier and Mr. *Haſtings* appears to us to have been equally withheld from the Court of Directors. In the Letter of the 12th October 1773, in which the Treaty of *Benares* is communicated to you, there is not one word, nor the moſt diſtant intimation, expreſſive of the private engagements contracted at the ſame inſtant by Mr *Haſtings* for invading the Rohillas. You could not poſſibly underſtand from that Letter, or from any of the Papers annexed to it, " that the ex- " pedition againſt the Rohillas remained only ſuſpended; " or that he had given the Vizier every reaſon to expect, " that whenever it could again be with prudence re- " ſumed, and he deſired it, it ſhould be undertaken;" yet a packet was diſpatched to *England* on purpoſe to inform you of the reſult of the Preſident's negociations at *Benares*. Subſequent events, however, ſoon obliged Mr. *Haſtings* to give farther explanations of his conduct.

12. The Vizier, who was ſuppoſed to have laid aſide all thoughts of the expedition againſt the Rohillas, appears to have reſumed them ſuddenly. About the middle of November he ſent up his requiſition for aſſiſtance in that project. The Preſident laid it, with an explanatory Minute of his own, before the Select Committee, by whom the buſineſs was referred to the Council at large. Their reſolution to comply with that part of the Vizier's requiſition which related to the invaſion of the Rohillas, is annexed to the encloſed copy of the Preſident's Minute of the 26th of November 1773. He therein ſtates, for the firſt time, the verbal engagements which he had entered into with the Vizier, the embarraſſing ſituation to which he was perſonally reduced, and how much he was hampered by them. He then recommends an expedient which he thinks calculated to remove all difficulties. That we may not interrupt the narrative part of this Letter, we ſhall reſerve another place for our obſervations upon the arguments and opinions advanced by the Preſident. The expedient propoſed was, to conſent to the expedition on ſuch beneficial terms to the Company as might be likely to make the Vizier relinquiſh the deſign rather than agree to them. This idea was adopted by the Council, who profeſſed themſelves ſenſible of the embarraſſment which the Preſident lay under, from what had paſſed on the ſubject between him and the Vizier at *Benares*. They accordingly agreed to the propoſed Letter, (encloſed N° 3,) the conditions of which, as they obſerved, " if " accepted, would undoubtedly ſecure the greateſt poſ- " ſible advantages from ſuch an enterprize; but they ap- " pear to them more calculated to drive the Vizier into " a refuſal, which is what they truſt in, as its moſt pro- " bable and almoſt infallible conſequence, and which " they wiſh for, as the proper reſult of this propoſition, " in the preſent circumſtances of affairs."

13. This, Gentlemen, is all the approbation which the Preſident's conduct receives from his own Council, and all the ſanction which they give to his engagements. *They concur heartily in wiſhing to avoid the expedition propoſed*, and declare it to be their wiſh and expectation, that the Vizier may be driven to a refuſal of the conditions, *notwithſtanding thoſe conditions would ſecure the greateſt poſſible advantages to the Company*. Such an aſſent to a meaſure of ſuch critical importance, eſpecially from a Council which had not lately been accuſtomed to differ from their Preſident, is, in our opinion, equivalent to the moſt ſolemn condemnation.

14. At the ſame time that the Letter, as agreed on, was ſent to *Sujah Dowla*, to be tranſcribed and ſigned by him, a proviſional order for the march of the brigade at *Dinapore* was diſpatched to the Chief at *Patna*, to remain in his hands, in caſe the Vizier ſhould accept the terms, and require the brigade to join him. When you conſider the reluctance with which the meaſure is adopted, you will rather expect that the execution of it ſhould be retarded by farther conſultations, than that it ſhould be forwarded by this extraordinary precaution.

15. At this ſtage of the tranſaction, the firſt advices, dated 17th of January 1774, from the Secret Department, inform you, that " it was with pleaſure they " found the plan they had adopted anſwer ſo completely " to their intentions. The Vizier, on receipt of the " Preſident's Letter, written agreeably to the Reſolution " of the Board, returned an immediate anſwer, declining " their aſſiſtance in his diſtant expeditions on the condi- " tions they required; but at the ſame time deſiring the " brigade might be held in readineſs to march, whenever " he ſhould find it neceſſary to call on them for the de- " fence *of his own dominions*." They add, that " this " affair being happily terminated in the manner they " wiſhed, they ſhall now remain ſpectators only of the " operations of the different Powers in thoſe diſtant " parts; preſerving however a watchful eye over the " courſe of events, that they may be prepared to inter- " poſe, whenever the intereſts of the Honourable Com- " pany are likely to be affected by them." That, " with this view, they ſhall, in compliance with the " Vizier's requeſt, hold one brigade in readineſs to " march to his aſſiſtance *within his own territories*, in- " cluding the provinces of *Corah* and *Allahabad*:" and they " acknowledge they ſhall not be ſorry to find that " he calls for them *on this footing*, as they ſhall then be " eaſed of ſo conſiderable a part of the military expence, " and have the diſcipline of the troops preſerved, in " an actual ſervice, at ſo little diſtance from our own " territories."

16. The hopes which you probably formed upon the receipt of the preceding Letter, muſt have been ſoon diſappointed by that which followed it from the Select Committee, dated the 17th of March. About the latter end of January, the Vizier, who appears to us hitherto not ſo much to have varied, as to have artfully concealed his real intentions about the Rohilla war, ſent his Letter to the Preſident, containing the terms on which he accepted our aſſiſtance, to the Chief at *Patna*, with a requiſition for the march of the ſecond brigade; which was immediately complied with. We had rather attribute the apparent changes in the Vizier's reſolutions to the duplicity of his character, than ſuppoſe it poſſible that the Preſident was from the firſt acquainted with his real intentions, and that he made uſe of artifice to draw or extort from your Council an involuntary concurrence in his meaſures. Your aſſiſtance is propoſed to be yielded to the Vizier on terms, profeſſedly ſo diſadvantageous to him, that he cannot be expected to accept of it. That conditional engagement being once extorted from your Council, they can no longer recede from it, when the Vizier almoſt immediately accepts the conditions.

17. Obſerving that the Vizier's Letter is not an exact tranſcript of the draft ſent him by the Preſident, as it ought

ought to have been, we ſubmit it to your judgment how far the alterations are material. But the difference between the accounts given you of the object of the requiſition by the Board at large, and by the Select Committee, ſeems to us very remarkable. The former, in the 5th paragraph of their Letter from the Secret Department, dated the 15th of March 1774, tell you, "that the declared intention of the Vizier on this requiſition, is ſtill the conqueſt of the Rohilla country." The Select Committee, in the 9th paragraph of their Letter of the ſame date, inform you, "that the brigade "will probably be employed only in protecting his "Country, while he is carrying on his operations againſt "the Maratta diſtrict." Conſidering that the Vizier himſelf expreſsly ſays, that *it is his reſolution to employ the brigade in the reduction of the Rohillas*, this laſt intimation from the Select Committee appears to us wholly unaccountable.

18. We find that the brigade entered the Rohilla country on the 17th of April laſt, and that the united armies obtained a complete victory over the Rohilla Chiefs on the 23d following. From that time we muſt refer you to the Letters recorded in your Conſultations for the farther operations of the Vizier, his barbarous and unneceſſary devaſtation of the Country, the cruelty with which he treated his unhappy priſoners, and particularly the brutal outrages offered to their wives and daughters, though of the firſt rank. In the Letters of Colonel *Champion* you will find a detail of theſe proceedings, which he calls *wanton enormities* (uncontradicted, though palliated by the Governor's private Agent) which we doubt not will fill you with horror. We encloſe copies of three of them, in order to excite and fix your attention to the reſt. One paragraph in that of the 15th of June is ſo ſtriking, that we cannot forbear inſerting it here. "I am moſt heartily diſpoſed to believe, that the "Board did not ſuſpect their orders could have ſuch "conſequences as have fallen out; they could not have "foreſeen ſo ſudden and ſo total an expulſion and down-"fall of a whole race of people; they could not have "ſuppoſed that a man, exalted and ſupported by Britiſh "arms, could pay ſo very little deference to the ad-"vices and counſel of a Britiſh Commander; nor was "it poſſible to conceive that a man, who had himſelf "taſted the gall of misfortune, ſhould be ſo totally "unmindful of the unbounded and unparalleled grace "ſhewn to him, as to delight in denying a ſingle ray of "benevolence to others; ſuch, however, has been the "caſe; and, in due intimation of it, I have diſcharged "that which was incumbent upon me. I too can ſay "that the Nabob, as the agent of oppreſſion, is alone "culpable; but whilſt all *Aſia* knows that the Engliſh "gave him the rod, and whilſt they in vain look up to "them as thoſe who ought, if not to direct the applica-"tion, at leaſt to prevent an ill uſe being made of that "rod, will they not reaſonably conclude, that the "ſcourges which the Agent gives are connived at? "Will they not ſay, that every Engliſh Chief is another "*Sujah?*"

19. Theſe details, Gentlemen, would probably never have reached your knowledge, if we had not called for Mr. *Haſtings*'s private Correſpondence with Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*. Even now, that Correſpondence is laid before us in ſo broken and imperfect a ſtate, and ſo many Letters belonging to it conſeſſedly withheld, that we do not for ourſelves heſitate to conclude, that facts and circumſtances, ſtill more atrocious than any that appear, are ſuppreſſed.

20. The moſt important chaſm in Mr. *Middleton*'s Correſpondence is from the 1ſt of March to the 29th, and from that time to the 23d of April. The firſt of thoſe Letters is dated at *Illahabad*; the ſecond from *Coreah Kunge*, though written only to acknowledge Mr. *Haſtings*'s Letter of the 10th, ſhews that Mr. *Middleton* was then with the Vizier; but it does not appear how long he had been with him. The Letter of the 1ſt of March is docketed N° 3, that of the 29th N° 7; ſo that there are three Letters miſſing, excluſive of that of the 15th of February, of which mention is made below. The next Letter is of ſo late a date as the 23d of April, giving account of the battle; but as neither that or any of t ſubſequent Letters are numbered, we cannot diſco how many are withheld. It appears plainly, howev that Mr. *Middleton* had not been ſilent in the interv for Mr. *Haſtings*, in his Letter to him of the 19th April, acknowledges the receipt of his ſeveral Lett from the 15th of February to the 3d of April, thereſ if no other are withheld, thoſe two abovementioned certainly ſo. The Letter of the 15th of February m have been the firſt Letter in the Correſpondence, as t next date (viz. February the 18th) is docketed N° what the ſubject of it was can only be matter of conj ture; but it ſeems to us probable, that it related to t ſecret inſtructions which Mr. *Middleton* had receiv independent of his public ones. It is needleſs to tra the other Letters which have been withheld, as it ſufficient for the preſent purpoſe to ſhew, that if t above four Letters of the 15th of February, N° 1, w the numbers 4, 5, and 6, had been produced, we mig have been enabled to have formed a competent jud ment of the real nature of the engagements with t Vizier.

21. We ſhall offer but one obſervation more on t broken ſtate of this Correſpondence. Mr. *Haſtings* ha ing alledged, that his chief reaſon for withholding t above Letters was, that they related to a difference b tween the Vizier and Colonel *Champion*, it may neceſſary to ſhew, that none of the above four Lett could relate to that ſubject. Mr. *Haſtings*, in his Let of the 22d of May, acknowledges Mr. *Middleton*'s 23d, 24th, and 29th of April. The date of the firſt thoſe Letters cloſes the chaſm. The ſuppoſed differen could not have been mentioned in any Letters writt within the period of the chaſm, becauſe Mr. *Haſtings*, the above Letters of the 22d of May, after informi Mr. *Middleton* of the complaints he had received fro Colonel *Champion* againſt the Vizier, adds, "yo "ſilence on theſe ſubjects, with which I cannot ſuppo "you unacquainted, &c. &c." This proves the i poſſibility that any of Mr. *Middleton*'s Letters compr hended in the chaſm could relate to Colonel *Champio* difference with the Vizier.

22. When you examine the orders ſucceſſively ſent Colonel *Champion*, you will find that the Select Co mittee had conſented to extend the operations of yo troops beyond even the line of the Rohilla dominio We refer to their Proceedings of the 22d of Augu the 17th of September laſt. By the firſt, Colonel *Cha pion* is directed to aſſiſt the Vizier in reducing the front Zemindars, with whom the fugitive Rohillas may ta refuge; by the ſecond he is permitted to croſs t *Ganges*, if the Vizier ſhould require it, in purſuit of t remains of his enemies. This laſt Reſolution of t Select Committee appears to have alarmed the Boar in conſequence of which the brigade is limited to o day's march on the other ſide of the *Ganges*.

23. On the 23d of May the firſt orders were ſent Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Middleton* to make a dema of the 40 lacks then due to the Company, according the expreſs terms of the Vizier's Letters; but that c mand, as you will ſee in Mr. *Middleton*'s Letter of t 18th of June, having been evaded by the Vizier, t buſineſs was immediately taken up with a greater a pearance of firmneſs by the Government here, thou with as little effect.

24. On the 14th of July the Select Committee, co ſidering the forty lacks ſtipulated for the Company inconteſtably due, deſire the Preſident to cauſe the c mand to be repeated, with a poſitive declaration of c immediate right to the money. We encloſe you a co of their Reſolution, and of Mr. *Haſtings*'s Letter Mr. *Middleton* on this ſubject; in conſequence of whi

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the demand was again made by Colonel *Champion* with as little ſucceſs as before. In theſe Papers you will ſee the arguments in ſupport of the demand fully ſtated, and the Company's right clearly eſtabliſhed; on the other hand, you will ſee and judge of the validity of the Vizier's reaſons for not making good this engagement to the Company in the anſwers of Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Middleton*, to which we refer you. The plain matter of fact is, that on the 10th of this inſtant (November) no part of the forty lacks had yet been paid.

25. When you compare this delay with the means that the Vizier apparently had in his power to liquidate a much larger account, as well from the plunder of the Country as from the diviſion of *Fyzulla Cawn*'s treaſures ſettled by the late capitulation, you will not perhaps entertain very ſanguine hopes of ſoon receiving the price of your aſſiſtance. At all events we think it muſt be admitted, that in order to bind the Vizier to a punctual performance of his engagements, it is neceſſary to expreſs firmneſs as well as amity in our negociations with him. Colonel *Champion*, in his Letter of the 14th of June, plainly calls him the moſt *faithleſs of men*, and in a ſubſequent Letter adheres to and defends the deſcription. Even Mr. *Haſtings*'s private Agent, whoſe inclinations, or inſtructions, evidently lead him to ſoften and palliate every repreſentation of the Vizier's miſconduct, does not ſcruple to ſay, in his Letter of the 20th of September laſt, that "he has experienced much duplicity, "evaſion, and deceit, in moſt of his tranſactions with "his Excellency."

26. Such is the man, who, as it appears to us, has had the Britiſh arms and honour abſolutely at his diſpoſal, and dared to tell your Preſidency that he is the maſter of your army. As Colonel *Champion* expreſſes himſelf, *The Britiſh name is in the hand of the Vizier*. Confounded by appearances which we are unable to account for, we look in vain for oſtenſible cauſes adequate to ſuch effects, and confeſs, that every enquiry we make fills us with equal diffidence and ſurprize. We ſhall not, however, anticipate any conjectures which may ariſe in your mind, when you review the whole conduct of this dark myſterious buſineſs from firſt to laſt, and reflect upon the abſolute ſurrender which has been made, with ſo little apparent compenſation, of your honour and intereſt to the vindictive or capricious projects of *Suja Dowla*.

27. When you have united the conſideration of the faithleſs character univerſally attributed to the Vizier, with the moderation ſo long, but ſo ineffectually obſerved by the late Government in their applications to him, we apprehend that the meaſures we have ſince reſolved on, to obtain from him ſomething more ſubſtantial than promiſes, will ſtand juſtified in your opinion. If thoſe promiſes were ſincere, they ought to be complied with long before Colonel *Champion* can receive our orders on the ſubject.

28. We arrived and landed at *Fort William* on Wedneſday the 19th of October. The next day was ſpent in ſettling the Proclamation of the new Government, which ought not to have been a matter of much debate. At the Governor's deſire we then adjourned to the Monday following; but it was not till the next day (Tueſday the 25th) that he gave us any light into the political ſtate of the Country.

29. During this interval we were left in the moſt anxious, not to ſay diſgraceful ſituation. Public report ſoon informed us of the nature of the enterprizes in which your troops were engaged. Not receiving the leaſt communication from the Governor General, either public or private, on this ſubject, we employed the days of adjournment in examining and collecting, as carefully as we could, every information relative to it, with which the Records in the Secretary's office could furniſh us. From this inſpection we found the ſtate of facts, up to the time of our arrival, to be exactly what we have repreſented. We found a third part of your army engaged in an offenſive war, which had carried them to a diſtance from your own provinces far greater than that of *Delhi*; and that they were actually ſtationed at a place ſo remote, that it is not comprehended within any of the ordinary maps of *Indoſtan*. Our alarm and anxiety at ſight of this authentic intelligence, can only be equalled by that, which we believe you will yourſelves have felt when you firſt received it. We ſaw your provinces ſtripped of one-third of their defence; the lines repeatedly and moſt peremptorily drawn by you, for the conduct of your ſervants towards the princes of *Indoſtan*, manifeſtly tranſgreſſed; in ſhort, the whole defenſive ſyſtem of your wiſe and pacific policy completely overturned.

30. Theſe were the facts which we were to expect would be explained and accounted for, and which, united with the explanations we might receive of them, were to determine our future meaſures. In ſuch circumſtances, Gentlemen, we appeal not to your candour but to your judgment, and deſire that it may be applied to our conduct with rigour and ſeverity.

31. Poſſeſſed of the above facts, we ſtill ſuſpended our final opinion of them, until we ſhould hear the arguments by which the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration might be defended, and receive an explanation of the motives on which they had acted.

32. On Tueſday the 25th the Governor General laid before us the encloſed Minute which he had prepared for our inſtruction. It appeared to us far from ſatisfactory, a majority of the Board reſolved upon a motion made by the Commander in Chief, that the Governor General ſhould be requeſted to lay before us his complete original correſpondence with Colonel *Champion* from the time the brigade marched, and with Mr. *Middleton*, whom, till then, we underſtood to be the Company's Reſident at the Vizier's Court. The communication we requeſted being refuſed by the Governor General, for reaſons which, in our opinion, ſo far from explaining, added myſtery to the whole tranſaction; we thought it neceſſary for our own juſtification to proteſt againſt his refuſal. Copies of the Governor General's Minute, and of our Proteſt, are encloſed. Mr. *Monſon* then moved, that Mr. *Middleton*, who, though a Company's ſervant, and paid by the Company, was ſtiled the private Agent of the late Preſident, and whoſe Correſpondence was withheld from us, ſhould be immediately recalled to the Preſidency. This motion being agreed to, produced another Minute from the Governor General, the ſubſtance of which ſhall be conſidered in its proper place.

33. We ſhould have thought it our duty to have proceeded immediately to the recal of the brigade within the Company's territories, or at leaſt within the original dominions of the Vizier, but for the vehement oppoſition made to that propoſal by the Governor General. He urged that there were a number of Records and Letters ſtill to be conſulted, particularly ſuch parts of his Correſpondence with Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Middleton* as he could properly lay before us; and that the peruſal of them would probably alter our preſent opinions. We were ſenſible that the caſe required diſpatch, yet we yielded to his authority, and deferred the farther conſideration of the recal of the brigade for three days.

34. On Friday the 28th the heads of inſtructions propoſed to be given to the Commanding Officer of the ſecond brigade, were laid before the Board by General *Clavering*, and the conſideration of them deferred till the Monday following. On that day it was reſolved by the majority, that a Letter ſhould be drawn up in conformity to the above heads. This Letter, of which we encloſe you a copy, was diſpatched on the 4th of November. The arguments by which the Reſolutions of the majority were oppoſed or defended, appear fully in the Minutes of the ſeveral Members entered on your Conſultations. After the diſpatch of our firſt inſtructions to Colonel *Champion*, you will ſee that the Board have agreed to prolong the term limited for the departure of the brigade out of the Rohilla country, in order to give the Commanding Officer time to go and return from *Ramgaut* to *Fizabad*.

Fizabad. As the Vizier had quitted the army before our firſt Letter could be received, this alteration became abſolutely neceſſary. On the 14th of November the Governor propoſed that the brigade ſhould be continued at *Ramgaut*, until the Vizier's Government ſhould be effectually eſtabliſhed in his new-acquired poſſeſſions. You will ſee in our reſpective Minutes the reaſons for and againſt this Propoſition. It was rejected by the majority.

35. It will give us the higheſt pleaſure to be able to tell you, that the Vizier has made good his pecuniary engagements to the Company before he received our laſt requiſition. The Governor General's expectations on this head are very ſanguine; and conſidering every thing but the character of the Vizier, are undoubtedly well founded. But whether they may be diſappointed or accompliſhed, the propriety of the meaſures we have reſolved on, forms a queſtion totally independent of that event, and muſt be determined by itſelf.

36. The general principle on which we have acted, and which we mean to make the rule of our future policy and conduct, is no other than that, which your authority and that of the Legiſlature have equally preſcribed to us; —*to maintain* PEACE *in* INDIA. The preſervation of peace neceſſarily includes the vigorous defence of your own poſſeſſions, with ſuch parts of the dominions of your Allies as are guaranteed by Treaty. On the other hand it excludes every idea of conqueſt, either for yourſelves or others. Adhering to this ſyſtem, we never can engage your arms in any offenſive operations for the aggrandizement of one Indian State at the expence of another; much leſs could we have ſuffered the little States, which at the ſame time formed your barrier, and looked up to you for protection, to be ſwallowed up by the great ones. Had we arrived in this Country ten months ſooner, we ſhould have ſaved a nation. Theſe are our principles, Gentlemen; let our actions be tried by them.

37. You are now in poſſeſſion of all the material facts reſpecting the Rohilla war which have fallen within our knowledge. The Country is reduced; your troops have conquered it for the Vizier; to finiſh the tranſaction, it only remains that you ſhould receive the price of your ſervices.

38. We ſhall now lay before you our obſervations on the conduct and avowed doctrines of the late Preſident, in the ſame order in which we have ſtated the facts. Let us firſt, however, obſerve to you, that if the future peace and ſecurity of theſe provinces were not likely, as we think they are, to be affected by the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, we ſhould not have undertaken the painful office of examining into and cenſuring any thing concluded before our arrival. We know not what fatal conſequences may follow from a falſe ſyſtem of policy, already carried into execution in ſo capital an inſtance, or how far they may extend. Whatever they may be, or whenever they may take place, it is fit that you ſhould know with exactneſs from what origin they ſpring. But, beſides the conſideration of particular meaſures and their effects, you will find that here are opinions as well as facts before you; that there are general principles of policy laid down, and general motives of action ſtated, which for our future guidance you muſt either approve of or condemn.

39. The Preſident's Minute of the 26th of November 1773, begins with ſaying, "that he has long conſidered the power of the Rohillas as dangerous to the Vizier, and that as ſuch he wiſhed to ſee it annihilated." The obvious meaning of this Propoſition is very different from that which the Preſident himſelf annexes to it. You will find that, in his apprehenſion, it was the weakneſs, not the ſtrength of the Rohillas, which rendered them formidable to the Vizier. "The Soubadar of *Oude* muſt always be an object of jealouſy and enmity to the Rohillas; his power is to be dreaded by them." As Mr. *Haſtings* has explained himſelf to us, the conſequence of their jealouſy and dread of the Vizier was, that they were at all times ready to unite with his enemies, and to diſturb the peace of his dominions. Admitting this repreſentation to be true, we do not think it follows, that the power of a people, becauſe they are weak, divided, and defenceleſs, becauſe they live in dread of a ſuperior neighbour, ſhould therefore be annihilated.

40. We ſtate the reaſoning fairly as we receive it, and ſhall leave it unanſwered.—The ſuppoſed facts on which it is founded, are contradicted by unqueſtionable authorities.—Every thing that has been ſaid of the weakneſs of the Rohillas is indeed ſtrictly true. Your Select Committee, in their Letter of the 30th of December 1773, tell you, that, "of the neighbouring powers, "the Marattas only are formidable to your poſſeſſions; "the reſt are weak, and, the Vizier alone excepted, every "way inconſiderable." With reſpect to the Rohillas, we have ſeen their fate decided in one ſlight conteſt, and their Country reduced as faſt as our army could march over it. But we deny that they were formidable to the Vizier, even in that ſenſe in which the Governor General underſtands that a little State may be dangerous to a great one. Though we could ſupport our opinion by a multiplicity of evidence, not to be reſiſted, we think it ſufficient to deſire your attention to the following paragraph of Colonel *Champion*'s Letter, of the 12th of July laſt, to Mr. *Haſtings*.—"If ſtrangers, my good Sir, to what "has paſſed in theſe countries, were to read your Letter, "they would be led to imagine, that the Vizier had "been conſtantly haraſſed by the Rohillas; that they "had been in uſe of making continual inroads into his "Country, and of calling foreign aid to diſtreſs him; "in ſhort, that without reducing them there could be "no ſafety, no reſt for *Suja Dowla*: but I have never "heard it alledged, even by the Vizier himſelf, that "theſe people had ever betrayed any indication of a "diſpoſition to encroach on him, or give him the "ſmalleſt cauſe of diſtreſs." You have a copy of this Letter encloſed, and we beg leave to recommend the whole of it to your conſideration.

41. We return to the Preſident's Minute, which ſoon explains the true motives and object of the war. "*The "ſituation of the Rohilla country muſt make the poſſeſſion of it "always a deſirable object to the Vizier.*" As the truth of this aſſertion is not to be diſputed, we ſhall only obſerve upon it, that the moſt barefaced ambition is ſeldom ſo explicit. *He would obtain, by this acquiſition, a compleat compact State, ſhut in effectually from foreign inveſions; it would give him wealth, of which we ſhould partake; and ſecurity, without any dangerous increaſe of power; and would undoubtedly, by bringing his frontier nearer to the Marattas, for whom ſingly he could be no match, render him more dependent on us.*—In theſe lines it appears to us, that there is but one intelligible propoſition, viz *that by the conqueſt of the Rohillas the Vizier would acquire wealth of which we ſhould partake.* The expectation of ſharing in the ſpoils of a people, who have given us no cauſe of quarrel whatſoever, is plainly avowed to be a motive for invading them. We believe there may have been inſtances of wars undertaken on principles as unwiſe and as unjuſt as theſe, but we doubt whether there ever was an example of the Chief of a great State profeſſing to reckon the probable acquiſition of wealth among his reaſons for taking up arms againſt his neighbours.

42. The remainder of the preceding quotation is involved in contradiction and obſcurity. The Vizier, it is ſaid, *obtains a complete compact State, ſhut in effectually from foreign invaſion*; yet the ſame acquiſition of territory, which is to give him ſecurity, without any dangerous increaſe of power, undoubtedly brings his frontier nearer the Marattas, for whom he is ſingly no match, and renders him the more dependent on us. The amount of this argument, as far as we can underſtand ſuch nice refinements, ſeems to be, that the Vizier, by extending his frontier, becomes ſo much the more open and vulnerable

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nerable to the Marattas; and that by giving him poſſeſſions, which he cannot defend without our aſſiſtance, his dependence on us is effectually enſured. We fear indeed that there is too much truth in theſe ſuppoſitions, and that the ſucceſs of the late expedition will ſerve only to furniſh the Marattas with better means and pretences for attacking our Ally; conſequently that it entails upon us a war with that people. But where is that *ſecurity, that compact State, ſo effectually ſhut in from foreign invaſions*, which the acquiſition of the Rohilla country was to give to *Suja Dowla*?

43. In many parts of the Minute before you, the Preſident acknowledges the doubts and embarraſſment of his mind. In our opinion, every line of it proclaims the diſtreſs to which he was reduced; we ſhall not therefore be very earneſt in preſſing our objections upon him. Let us only obſerve, that we are very ſorry to ſee any mixture of ſophiſtry in the diſcuſſion of queſtions, on which the fate of millions may depend.

44. *Beſides the forty lacks held out to us*, the Preſident inſiſts upon the *benefit of your being immediately eaſed of the burthen of one-third of your army, while at the ſame time it is employed uſefully for your intereſts, and conveniently for keeping up its own diſcipline and practice in war*. With reſpect to all the payments made, or to be made, by *Suja Dowla* to the Company, you may perhaps over-rate your expected wealth, if you do not obſerve, that the ſums ſtipulated in the ſeveral agreements with him are to be paid in rupees of the currency of *Oude*, which either have no fixed ſtandard or whoſe ſtandard is unknown here. The payments hitherto have been made partly in old and new Benares rupees, and partly in Vizery rupees of different years, the intrinſic value of which cannot be computed, either from their number in tale, or from their ſtamp. As a foundation, however, to enable you to judge of the whole value of the ſeveral ſums received, or to be received, from *Suja Dowla*, whether on account of the fifty lacks ſtipulated by the Treaty of *Benares*, or of the forty lacks for the Rohilla war, or of the monthly ſubſidy to the brigade; we beg leave to ſtate to you, that twenty-one lacks of the above rupees, upon being recoined at your mints, have produced only a ſum equivalent to ſicca rupees 1,829,184. 7. 6.

45. With reſpect to the relief which the monthly ſubſidy promiſes to the Company, we deſire that you will ſuſpend your judgment, until we can obtain for you an exact account of the extraordinary expences of the brigade ſince they marched from *Dinapore*, and which muſt be defrayed by the Company. This account cannot be made up at preſent. We are, however, inclined to think, from what we have already heard and ſeen, that when the extraordinary expences incurred by the brigade's being employed on ſo diſtant a ſervice ſhall be taken into calculation, the ſaving to the Company, in conſequence of *Suja Dowla*'s ſubſidy, will not, upon the whole, be very conſiderable. If a computation be made of the hire of boats, the price and conveyance of ſtores and field equipage, Mr. *Middleton*'s ordinary and extraordinary allowances, the pay of a troop of cavalry, raiſed expreſsly for this expedition, but not included in the eſtimate on which the ſubſidy was ſettled, the charge of recruiting, with all the train of contingencies which in this Country particularly attend any diſtant operations in the field, we ſhall be juſtified perhaps in foretelling, that the Company will gain as little in point of profit, as they do in point of honour, from the mercenary ſervices to which their arms have been degraded.

46. You have now, Gentlemen, materials ſufficient to determine, whether this part of your army have in truth *been uſefully employed in your intereſts*, and how far *the keeping up of their diſcipline and practice in war*, without reference to any juſt cauſe of quarrel, is a motive fit to be mentioned for drawing the ſword againſt a nation which never gave you offence, and from which you never could have had any thing to fear.

47. We ſhall diſmiſs the Preſident's Minute with one general obſervation. It ſtates no grounds of quarrel whatſoever with the Rohillas, nor does it contain a ſingle word to juſtify the cauſe in which your troops were to fight. The Preſident's argument, ſuch as it is, turns ſolely upon topics of intereſt or convenience, and the mutual benefits which the contracting parties were likely to derive from the expedition.

48. You have ſeen with what reluctance the meaſures in which the Preſident alone ventured to engage the Company, were adopted by his own Council. Acting in direct oppoſition to your orders, and to every authority which they ought to have reſpected, they could not but be alarmed *at the unuſual degree of reſponſibility annexed to ſuch an undertaking*.—Yet even ſuppoſing this difficulty to be removed, there ſtill remained another obſtacle, which you will probably have thought could never have been ſurmounted. We mean, the repeated and ſolemn declarations made by Mr. *Haſtings* and his Council, from the commencement of his Government up to April 1773, of their reſolution to adhere invariably to the defenſive ſyſtem preſcribed to them by your inſtructions, of their own hearty approbation of that ſyſtem, and of their abhorrence of every meaſure that might tend to implicate the Company in the ambitious views of *Suja Dowla*, or involve you in offenſive wars againſt your neighbours.

49. We have ſelected ſome of the moſt ſtriking of theſe Declarations, and encloſe them a number in this packet; begging leave at the ſame time to refer you to the original Letters in your poſſeſſion from whence they are taken. Compare the language held, and the meaſures purſued by your late Preſident and Council up to the Treaty of *Benares*, with every thing that has been ſaid and done by them ſince Mr. *Haſtings*'s return from his ſecret conference with *Suja Dowla*, and you will find that one ſyſtem forms a complete and preciſe counterpart to the other; that the tranſition they make from one ſet of political opinions to another is ſudden and unprepared; and that they have not even obſerved the common gradations, by which men, who wiſh to preſerve an appearance of conſiſtency, uſually endeavour to introduce and qualify a palpable change of ſyſtem. It is true, indeed, that the Select Committee, in their Letter of the 30th of December 1773, deſire your explicit commands for their conduct, "with reſpect to the "Countries ſituated beyond the limits of theſe Pro"vinces, and thoſe of your Ally; whether their future "operations were to be circumſcribed invariably by thoſe "bounds, or in what caſe you would approve and au"thorize their proceeding beyond them;" but you cannot fail to remark, that they do not aſk for inſtructions on this queſtion, until after they have taken their reſolution, and actually ſent the brigade to aſſiſt the Vizier in an expedition which tranſgreſſes all former limits, and which has evidently no plea but convenience, nor any profeſſed object but conqueſt. In fact, your ſervants wanted no new inſtructions from their Superiors; your orders were clear and preciſe; they knew your ſentiments when they acted in direct contradiction to them.

50. The proofs of theſe ſeveral aſſertions are taken from Letters and other Papers ſigned by themſelves. Among the reſt we beg leave particularly to lead you to a compariſon of thoſe Articles in the inſtructions given in 1773 to Sir *Robert Barker*, and in 1774 to Colonel *Champion*, relative to the defence of the Rohilla country in one year, and to the invaſion of it in the next; copies of which are encloſed.

51. It is not the ſpirit of cenſure that has drawn us into this painful and irkſome diſcuſſion. We have no pleaſure in condemning when we are unable to correct. But it is material to us to ſhew, that when we depart from the meaſures in which we find our predeceſſors in office immediately engaged, we in effect only revert to that ſyſtem, for the ſupport of which they had but a few months before moſt ſolemnly pledged their faith; and

that we are entitled to appeal to their own authority againſt themſelves.

52. When you have maturely conſidered the nature and circumſtances of this extraordinary tranſaction, as it ſtood in our view on the 25th of laſt month, we think you will not be ſurprized at our wiſhing to ſee the late Preſident's Secret Correſpondence with Colonel *Champion*, and with Mr. *Middleton*, whom we then underſtood to be the *Company*'s Reſident at the Durbar. In addition to the reaſons given in our Proteſt for deſiring a communication of this Correſpondence, we beg leave to obſerve, that, as it appears to us, your Council acted contrary to your Orders, and to every principle of your Government, when they permitted the Preſident to appoint a perſon to act as his private Agent at a foreign Court, with power to carry on a ſecret Correſpondence with him, even to the excluſion of your Select Committee. The poſſible conſequences of repoſing ſo dangerous a truſt in any individual, are too obvious to be miſtaken. We think they might with equal right have ſurrendered every other branch of their Adminiſtration into the Preſident's hands, and in effect diſſolved the Council. The ſame opinion applies to his ſecret Correſpondence with the Commanding Officer of the brigade, which has not even the pretence of his being a private Agent to ſupport it. The apparent chaſms in this Correſpondence, as it ſtands, will perhaps ſuggeſt farther motives to you for regretting that the whole of it is not recorded.

53. The Governor General, in his Minutes on this ſubject, complains of our not being ſatisfied with his ſolemn Declaration to the Board, that he would lay before us every part of the Correſpondence required, which could give us any information on public affairs; and of our arbitrarily invading the ſacred rights of a confidential Correſpondence. You will judge for us whether we deſerve this cenſure. Until we receive other lights from your authority, we muſt conſider ourſelves as bound to the ſtrict execution of a public truſt, and not at liberty to repoſe ſuch a perſonal confidence in any Member of our Board, as would exclude us from a perfect knowledge of his official proceedings. If we are to be ſatisfied with ſuch ſhare of the Governor's Correſpondence with your Miniſters or Officers as he ſhall think proper to impart to us, or as he ſhall declare to be ſufficient for our information, we may indeed in the preſent inſtance be under the guidance of the beſt of men, but it is equally poſſible that a Council ſo partially informed may hereafter be at the mercy of the worſt.

54. With reſpect to the Governor's confidential Correſpondence with his Agent at the Vizier's Court, we are unable to conjecture on what topics it could turn. He has repeatedly aſſured us, that previous to the appointment, Mr. *Middleton* was no otherwiſe known to him than by his general good character; and that for his choice of this Gentleman, he had no other motive but his acknowledged fitneſs for the office. Relying on this aſſurance, we are at a loſs to comprehend how any part of a Correſpondence on public affairs, between Gentlemen totally unconnected in private life, can with propriety be withheld from a Council, who, beſides the obligation impoſed upon them by their own ſenſe of honour, are bound by a ſpecific oath of ſecrecy to each other.

55. The recal of Mr. *Middleton* was the inevitable conſequence of the Governor's refuſing to communicate all his Letters to us, and was not intended to throw the leaſt imputation on Mr. *Middleton*'s character. The Governor General, in his diſſent from this reſolution, very truly obſerves, that he is the ſole channel of Correſpondence with the Princes and Powers of *India*. He ſhould have added, however, that by your Inſtructions, "all Letters to be ſent by him are firſt to be approved "in Council; and that he is to lay before the Council "at their next meeting all Letters received by him in "the courſe of ſuch Correſpondence for their information." We venture to affirm, that this Inſtruction was not newly introduced by you on the appointment of the preſent Governor and Council, but that it is conformable to the ancient Conſtitution of your Government here; and that in this reſpect the Legiſlature has made no alteration or addition whatſoever to the powers veſted in the Chief of this Preſidency.

56. Mr. *Middleton* being recalled, it became neceſſary to appoint ſome other perſon to make the demand of the ſums due from the Vizier to the Company, and to liquidate that account. The Governor General declining the nomination, a majority of the Board reſolved, that this buſineſs ſhould be committed to the Officer commanding the brigade. The appointment was temporary, and meant by us to be confined to a ſingle object. We have repeatedly declared, that whenever it ſhall be thought proper to appoint a permanent Reſident at the Vizier's Court, one of your Civil Servants ſhould be employed.

57. In the Minutes given in by Mr. *Barwell* and the Governor General, you will ſee that the oppoſition given to the above Reſolution is founded on the ſuppoſed impropriety of truſting ſuch a commiſſion to a Military Officer, and that many general inſinuations have been thrown out to the diſadvantage of that branch of your ſervice. You are told, "that there is a Reſolution to "throw all power and truſt into the hands of a Military "Commander; that it is a declared proof of the preva-"lence of the military influence; that the advices of "the Commander of your army are not to be admitted "as authentic, ſince it is his intereſt to conceal from "the knowledge of the Council every circumſtance and "tranſaction, which if known might ſubject his con-"duct to blame, or oppoſe any deſign which his ambi-"tion, his intereſt, or prejudices, might dictate."

58. We content ourſelves with oppoſing facts to theſe general unſupported declarations. Without looking back ſo far as General *Carnac* and General *Smith*, we obſerve that Sir *Robert Barker* was frequently employed by the late Preſident and Council, in their political negociations with the Vizier. Colonel *Champion* has been repeatedly ordered and inſtructed by themſelves, in the courſe of the preſent year, to make a demand of the forty lacks due from the Vizier; which forms the principal object of the commiſſion now intruſted to Colonel *Champion*. Thoſe Officers had no ſhare in the offenſive engagements entered into by this Government with *Suja Dowlah*, nor were they ever truſted with the ſecret until the moment of execution. The whole tendency of Colonel *Champion*'s Correſpondence is to condemn the late offenſive hoſtilities in which he unwillingly bears a part. In the laſt inſtance, it is your Military Commander in Chief who propoſes the recal of your army, who urges your Council to revert to the defenſive ſyſtem which you have laid down as the baſis of our Adminiſtration, and who wiſhes to ſheath the ſword drawn by your *civil* ſervants, and by them employed in a cauſe which he thinks a diſhonour to your arms.

59. Mr. *Monſon*, who from his profeſſion, and your appointment of him to the eventual command of your army, muſt feel himſelf affected by the reflexions thrown upon the military, adopts with warmth the pacific meaſures propoſed by General *Clavering*, and pledges his honour to you for the conſtant ſupport of them. If even theſe Gentlemen ſhould depart from the principles they now profeſs, they know the ſentiments and determination of the youngeſt of your Council, that, without your expreſs and explicit orders, he will never concur in any hoſtile project beyond the ſtrict line of defence; that he will never join his name with theirs, in the ſupport of any ſyſtem tending to leſſen the dependence of the Military upon the Civil Power; but that if ſuch a ſyſtem ſhould be adopted by them hereafter (which it is almoſt indecent to ſuppoſe) he will reſiſt their Councils with the ſame firmneſs and ſincerity with which he now applauds their conduct.

60. We hold it beneath us to enter into a refutation

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of loose invectives or general insinuations. Look to facts, Gentlemen, and we are convinced you will find, that it is your Civil Servants who have involved the Company in offensive wars, and in schemes of conquest by which no public interest could be promoted.

61. The whole argument for and against the recal of the brigade from the Rohilla country, is so fully stated in the Minutes of the several Members, upon the questions proposed in Council by General *Clavering* on the 28th of last month, that to enter into it here would only be loading you with superfluous repetition. We trust, that when you have maturely weighed the motives and principles on which we have acted, you will not concur with the Governor General, in charging us with "a "breach of faith, which inflicts an indelible dishonour "on the English name." It is our hope, founded on a thorough conviction of having done right, that your precise and peremptory approbation will vindicate our characters from this reproach. We have no idea of national honour independent of justice. But even upon the Governor General's own principles, we affirm that no part of his agreement with the Vizier has been violated by us, unless it be admitted, that his acceptance of the condition imposed by the Vizier, *that the brigade should* NEVER, NEVER *be recalled without his consent*, constitutes a valid obligation upon the present Government, and that it binds us for ever. To determine our judgment hereafter, we make it our request to you, that you will give us your clear and positive opinion, whether the late President had within himself a power to transfer one-third of your army (without any limitation of time, or reserving any right of recal) to the service of a foreign Prince; or whether the late Council could of right convey to him such a power? Deciding in the affirmative, you will establish a new principle in the Constitution of this Government: deciding in the negative, you will only affirm, that the Representative of a State, let his powers be ever so full, cannot be supposed to have a right to annihilate those of the State he represents.

62. We have but one word more to say upon the justice of that quarrel, which has been adopted here with as much zeal as if it had been your own. We have already observed, that in the President's first Minute of the 26th of November 1773, recommending the expedition, no cause of quarrel whatsoever is stated to justify the measure. In that of the 25th of last month, he tells us, that "the immediate plea for these hostilities was "the breach of faith with which the Rohilla Chiefs were "charged, in the supplies of money afforded by them "to the Marattas, against whom they had solicited and "obtained the Vizier's assistance, under a solemn en"gagement to pay him forty lacks of Rupees on the "departure of the Marattas, and for refusing afterwards "to fulfil that engagement."

63. Supposing this representation to be exact, we do not understand upon what just principle the arms of the Company can be employed in enforcing the execution of a contract to which they are not parties, and which they have not undertaken to guaranty. The fact however differs from the representation. The agreement between the Vizier and the Rohilla Chiefs was not concluded till the 17th of June 1772, some time after their army had been defeated by the Marattas, and the Rohilla country totally plundered and laid waste. On referring to the Select Committee's Letter of the 10th of November 1772, you will find that on the approach of the rains the Marattas re-crossed the *Ganges*, and have not since renewed their invasion of the Rohillas; who, as far as we can learn, did never receive any direct assistance from the Vizier. He never once had the spirit to face the Marattas in the field; and supposing these people to have been deterred from a second invasion of the Rohillas, it must have been entirely owing to the appearance of your army under Sir *Robert Barker*.

64. With respect to the Rohilla Chiefs having entered into engagements with the Marattas, inconsistent with those which they had contracted with *Sujah Dowla*, we assent to the opinion of the late Select Committee, delivered in the 8th paragraph of their Letter of the 15th of January 1773, "that the Rohillas had sought their "safety in an alliance with the Marattas, to which they "were of necessity compelled." A weak defenceless people, placed between two formidable armed Powers, are not to be charged with perfidy, much less are they just objects of a vindictive war and conquest, because their situation involves them in ambiguous measures assumed or relinquished upon the instant, to save themselves from destruction.

65. But while we invalidate the force of this pretended plea, we in reality allow it more weight than it deserves. The truth, Gentlemen, as you well know, is, that the Vizier has many years had it at heart to annex the Rohilla country to his dominions; that this has been a favourite object with him, which he was determined to accomplish *per fas et nefas*, whenever an opportunity should offer. Your Letters from hence are filled with proofs of this assertion. Amongst the rest, it is particularly observable, that the Select Committee tell you, in the 8th paragraph of their Letter of the 10th of November 1772, "that he was even inclinable to take advantage of the "actual distress of the Rohillas, and possess himself of "their dominions the moment the Marattas should be "obliged to leave it; and that General *Barker* was the "principal means of diverting him from a scheme *so* "*little consistent with prudence or equity*."

66. Independent of every particular consideration relative to the Rohilla war, you will find that some general principles, equally new and important, have from choice or necessity been introduced into the policy of your Government here. Mr. *Barwell* has left his deliberate opinion upon record, "that the preserving to the "Vizier the possession of the Rohilla country is as much "an obligation upon the present Government, as the "securing to him any other part of his dominions; and "equally within the spirit of the Defensive Treaty, as if "it had been specifically named therein." We confess that we were as much surprized at the novelty of this doctrine, as we were alarmed at the extent and consequences of it. The engagement with the Vizier expresses no more than that this Government, in return for a subsidy, should lend him a body of their troops to be employed on a particular service. We have assisted him in attaining a particular object; but it does not follow from that circumstance alone, that we are bound as guarantees to maintain him in the perpetual possession of it. We neither understand such reasoning in a general view, nor do we in the present instance find it supported by any particular stipulation. Even Mr. *Hastings*, though he recommends the continuance of the brigade in the country of the Rohillas, supports his opinion by other arguments, and does not proceed so far as to avow the extensive doctrine which Mr. *Barwell* endeavours to establish.

67. It is proposed to us as a fundamental maxim, that every accession of strength to the Vizier is of course beneficial to the Company. On this principle, his acquisition of *Korah* and *Illahabad* by purchase, his conquest of the *Duab* with his own forces, and of the Rohilla country with our assistance, are represented in the light of measures full of utility to the Company. To what length the principle was meant to be extended, or whether any limits whatsoever were meant to be prescribed to the Vizier's ambition, is more than we are able to determine. Let us only observe to you, that the first of the above measures necessarily makes the King your enemy; since the provinces, which (as the late President and Council observe in their Letter to you of the 11th March 1773) *we have so particularly guaranteed to him, which his own Viceroy*, Munnee o' Dowla, *at this time puts under our protection*, and which we might have kept in deposit for him, are now irrecoverably alienated; that the second, in all probability, will involve your Ally in a war with the Marattas, in which we fear it will be very difficult,

difficult, if not impoſſible, for us to ſtand neuter; and that by the laſt, as Colonel *Champion* very accurately expreſſes himſelf on this ſubject, "the line of the Vizier's "frontiers is very far extended; a brave race of men, "who live in friendſhip with him, are added to the "number of his enemies; his force is but the ſame as "formerly; and whilſt the *Ganges* is fordable in a great "number of places, it will ſerve better as a mark of "boundary, than as a cover or defence to his do-"minions."

68. Theſe, we apprehend, are points neceſſary to be taken into your conſideration, before you determine whether the above additions to the Vizier's dominions be in fact advantageous to your intereſts, and how far this aggrandizement is to be promoted by us, at the riſk of making all *Hindoſtan* your enemies.

69. Another general maxim propoſed to us is, that it is highly uſeful to the Company to hire out their troops to *Sujah Dowla*, in order to ſave the expence of their pay, and to preſerve their diſcipline, by keeping them *in the continued practice of war*. The whole of the argument in favour of this maxim is not yet regularly before you; but we fear the time is approaching very faſt, when the India Company and the Nation will know the extent, and feel the force of it. Whatever concealments have hitherto been obſerved on this ſubject, we hold it to be our duty to ſpeak plainly to you, that you may be apprized of the danger with which you are threatened, and endeavour to prepare yourſelves againſt it.

70. It has been repeatedly admitted in Council, that the plan for letting the lands has in a great degree miſcarried, and that this country is unable to bear the expence of your Inveſtments, together with that of the Civil and Military Eſtabliſhments. We, on our part, beſides the urgent diſtreſs implied in the violent nature of the remedy, have other general reaſons to believe that your Revenues are in a ſtate of decline, and that the miſchief is not at its period; in the preſent ſtate of men and things, we doubt whether it be poſſible to ſtop it.

71. The ſaving of a part of the pay of your army by receiving ſubſidies from *Sujah Dowla*, is not a natural reſource to ſuch a country as *Bengal*; at the utmoſt it can be but temporary; while the miſchief which it profeſſes to remedy is permanent and increaſing. It ſuppoſes your troops to be employed in the deſtruction of nations, from whoſe proſperity this commercial country once derived a conſtant ſource of wealth, and whoſe ruin (though it may furniſh an immediate ſupply of money to your treaſury) is infallibly a ſtep to your own.

72. The late Council tell you, in their Letter of the 17th of March laſt, that the ruin of the Jauts was completed by the loſs of *Agra*; that they were ſtripped of their dominions, and reduced to a few inconſiderable forts. We hope and preſume that *Nudjiff Cawn*'s conqueſt of the Jauts has not received any direct aſſiſtance or countenance from this Government; but we could have wiſhed that ſome efforts had been made in the way of negociation at leaſt, to ſave that nation.

73. On the whole, we are convinced, that ſchemes of conqueſt are eventually as ruinous to the conquerors, if they ſucceed, as they are immediately ruinous, if they miſcarry. As a meaſure of finance, they can only be the reſource of a nation that has neither honour nor property to loſe. When ſuch a country as *Bengal* ſhall be unable to ſupport itſelf from the internal reſources of its own produce or induſtry, we ſhall look upon it as a ſymptom of ſuch diſtreſs, as threatens the exiſtence of the Britiſh Empire in *India*. And as for the occaſional relief that may ariſe from the ſucceſs of projects to invade and ſubdue the neighbouring States, we conſider it as a remedy unnatural to the Conſtitution of *Bengal*, and more likely to precipitate than prevent the deſtruction of this Country.

In ſhort, Gentlemen, if the true condition of your Government here has hitherto been concealed from you and from the Nation, it is high time you ſhould be undeceived. *The Summa Rerum is at ſtake.*

74. *In reviewing this long Letter, we fear that you will perceive upon the face of it many marks of an haſty inaccurate compoſition*; and we wiſh that the time would permit us to make it more methodical and correct. As for the authenticity of facts, and the ſubſtance of the inferences deduced from them, we deſire it may be underſtood, that we willingly pledge our honour, and every thing that can be dear to honeſt men, for the truth and exactneſs of this repreſentation, as far as it reaches, of the ſtate of your affairs.

We have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your moſt obedient and moſt
humble ſervants,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

Separate Letter from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honourable United *Eaſt India* Company.

Fort William, 30th November 1774.

Gentlemen,

We have reſerved for a ſeparate Letter the mention of a few points, which, though of a public nature, yet having a more immediate relation to our perſonal conduct, we thought were not of ſufficient moment to be mixed with the important buſineſs to which our other Letter is confined.

1. In obedience to the prohibition in the Act of Parliament, we have refuſed all nazirs or preſents whatſoever. The Governor General has given his reaſons for accepting ſuch nazirs, and paying them into the Company's treaſury. Mr. *Barwell* has alſo given his reaſons for accepting nazirs, and *not* paying them over to the Company. They all appear in the encloſed extract of the Conſultation of the 7th of November 1774.

We have conſtantly accompanied our refuſal of preſents with an explanation of our motives, and with ſuch aſſurances of regard, and other marks of reſpect, according to the rank of the perſons, as we are convinced have cleared us from any ſuſpicion of intending to give them offence. We ſtrongly agree with you in opinion, that the receipt of trifling preſents, though practiſed by men of unqueſtionable honour and upright intentions, forms a precedent very liable to be extended and abuſed. With reſpect to the people of the country, we have reaſon to believe, that they are as well ſatisfied with our behaviour to them as men can be, who, from the hopes of favour, are reduced to the certainty of juſtice. Making every allowance for the force of prejudice and cuſtom, they are not ſo dull as to be incapable of underſtanding that it is poſſible to be their friends without taking their money.

2. We have not yet received a viſit which *Mahomed Reza Cawn* was deſirous to pay us. He has been acquitted of the charges brought againſt him, and is now at large; but as that acquittal is not yet confirmed by your approbation; as we know nothing of the reaſons on which it was founded; and as our receiving and returning his viſit might imply, that we are ſatisfied of his innocence (againſt which, however, we do not mean to give any opinion) we thought it ſafer to decline his viſit, until your pleaſure concerning him ſhould be known, than to commit ourſelves by demonſtrations of favour to him, which we might afterwards be obliged to retract.

3. In the eſtabliſhment of our expences, and regulation of our families, we apprehend that we have conformed ſtrictly to your intentions, in conſulting œconomy and

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and moderation more than vain appearances. We have long ago determined to follow this plan, as well for our own intereſt, as for the ſake of propoſing a uſeful example to others; but we had, before our arrival, no conception of the degree in which ſuch an example is wanted in this country Beſides the conſideration of private diſtreſs to individuals, we are ſatisfied that the conſequences of it affect the public ſervice. Ruinous expences have a natural tendency to accommodate the minds of men to ſuch meaſures of recovery, as the ſame men would probably reject, if they had only a fortune to make, inſtead of a fortune to repair.

4. You will ſee upon the Conſultations, that we have agreed to the appointment of Captain *Brooke* to command an independent corps of the Vizier's troops, to be employed in conjunction with the army under *Nudjiff Cawn*, in defenſive meaſures only, as the conqueſt of the Jauts has long ſince been completed. In this inſtance we have yielded, againſt our ſtrict judgment, to conſiderations of perſonal reſpect to Mr. *Haſtings*. Captain *Brooke* was ſome time ago appointed by him to this employment, and is now, we believe, at the Vizier's Court. To have recalled him from thence could not fail to have been attended with perſonal pain and offence to Mr. *Haſtings*, which we are determined as much as poſſible to avoid. We have reſted our aſſent on this ſingle conſideration, and left it with him to juſtify the meaſure to you. The only reſtraint we have deſired to lay on Captain *Brooke* (excluſive of what his duty to you of courſe implies) is, that he ſhall in no caſe enter the country of the Rohillas.

5. Since the drawing up of this and the preceding Letter, we are now informed, for the firſt time, that Major *Polier*, who, as we were given to underſtand by Mr. *Haſtings*, was employed in the Vizier's country on the ſurveying ſervice only, joined the army under *Nudjiff Cawn*, and had a conſiderable, if not a principal ſhare in the direction of the ſiege of *Agra*. The fact not being diſputed, we ſhall think it our duty to enquire, as ſoon as poſſible after the departure of this ſhip, whether Major *Polier* has acted in this inſtance with or without permiſſion from hence. The next queſtion will be, under what particular authority and inſtructions he has acted; and you ſhall be exactly informed of the reſult of our enquiries.

6. It only remains for us to apprize you, that the laſt Minute from Mr. *Barwell* was not communicated to us until the night of the 23d inſtant, though it profeſſes to be an anſwer to Mr. *Francis*'s Minutes of the 31ſt of October. Beſides the inconvenience and irregularity of reſuming a queſtion at ſuch diſtant intervals (eſpecially when the meaſure referred to is not only reſolved upon, but executed) we really have not time to continue the debate. We have peruſed Mr. *Barwell*'s Minute, and are content to leave him in poſſeſſion of the argument. Mr. *Francis*, in a ſeparate Minute, has given him the explanation he deſired.

7. Touching matters of fact, we could have wiſhed that Mr. *Barwell* had been more guarded in his aſſertions. He is pleaſed to affirm, that we took our reſolutions "without taking time to enquire fully into the deſign "and nature of our engagements with the Vizier, and "without even reading the correſpondence with Mr. "*Middleton*, which had been called for, and were then "laying on the table unopened." As this is only a bare unſupported affirmation, we anſwer it with a ſimple denial, ſupported however by the internal evidence of our ſeveral Minutes, and of this diſpatch. It is poſſible we may have erred in judgment; but we think there is no colour for accuſing us of having taken our reſolution, without conſulting all the Records by which it could any way be affected. We think it will require no aſſeverations on our part to convince you, that the ſeries of facts and opinions which we have had the honour to lay before you, could never have been traced and collected in the manner it has been, if we had not examined the Papers which were open to our inſpection with more than common aſſiduity and attention.

The late Preſident and Council refer to a Letter from the Court of Directors of 28th of Auguſt 1771, for an implied authority to countenance the late offenſive meaſures. They ſay, that in that Letter, the Court of Directors "have expreſſed, in ſtronger terms than ever "they had done before, their intention, in certain caſes, "of authoriſing their departure from the defenſive prin-"ciples hitherto recommended and enjoined."

We have looked into the Letter above-mentioned, and find, that the offenſive meaſures therein mentioned had no object in the mind of the Directors, but to repel the invaſions of the Marattas; that even theſe meaſures were ſimply in contemplation; and the execution of them, or any ſtep leading to it, poſitively forbidden till further orders. The prohibition then concludes with the following words; "in the meantime, we truſt that "your ſole objects will be the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions, "and thoſe of the Powers with whom we are connected, "both by Treaty and Intereſt; and as this appears to "have been the guide of your conduct, upon the Mar-"rattas invading the province of *Korab*, we with plea-"ſure approve the meaſures you have taken for defend-"ing the dominions of the King and Vizier from their "inroads and depredations; more eſpecially, as thoſe "meaſures are not only juſtified by neceſſity, but are "within the line which we have preſcribed for your con-"duct in ſuch a conjuncture."

The laſt argument urged by the late Preſident and Council in their defence, and purpoſely reſerved for the concluſion of their Letter, in order to leave a flattering impreſſion on the minds of the Directors, is "*that they* "*return to a ſtate of peace, with the actual poſſeſſion, or* "*acknowledged right, of near ſeventy lacks of rupees.*"

We hope indeed that we are returning to a ſtate of peace, though in fact our hopes on this head are more than balanced by our apprehenſions. On the remaining part of the aſſertion, we obſerve, that of the forty lacks ſtipulated for the Rohilla expedition, and which they mention in another place, *as ſo much ſpecie added to the exhauſted currency of theſe provinces*, not one rupee has yet been paid; nor do we think, as things were managed by the late Preſident and Council, it ever would have been recovered. By the remaining thirty lacks muſt be meant, the ſaving to the Company on the pay of the brigade. We have made ſome general obſervations on this ſubject in our Letter to the Court of Directors; in this place we ſhall only take notice, that the ſaving on the head of pay, even ſuppoſing no extraordinary expence to be incurred by the Company beyond the amount of *Suja Dowlah*'s ſubſidy, is manifeſtly over-rated.

The ordinary expence of a brigade in quarters at *Dinapore* is computed at 108,059 ſicca rupees per month. The ſecond brigade did not enter into *Sujah Dowla*'s pay till the 24th of February laſt; and ſuppoſing them to continue in it to the end of the preſent year, the whole ſaving would in that caſe be only 1,080,590 ſicca rupees. Even the ſubſidy received from *Sujah Dowlah*, being ſpent in his or the Rohilla country, is of no benefit to theſe provinces.

We deſire you will be ſo good as to preſent our beſt reſpects to the Deputy Chairman, and to all the Gentlemen in the direction.

We have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your moſt obedient and
moſt humble ſervants,
J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

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Extract of a Letter from *Warren Haſtings*, eſquire, Governor General of *Bengal*, to the Court of Directors; dated 3d of December 1774.

To the honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of *England* trading to the *Eaſt Indies*.

Fort William, 3d December 1774.

I do not expect that the ſervices on which your military forces have been employed (except in the ſingle inſtance of the Rohilla war) will be made an article againſt me; yet I will not leave this ſubject unnoticed.

Every military expedition undertaken during the period in which I lately preſided in the Adminiſtration, has been concerted for ſervices of ſolid utility, and calculated for preciſe terminations.

The campaign of 1773 had the recovery of the diſtricts of *Cora* for its immediate object, and the application of it to the relief of the Company's wants for its termination; and it was begun and concluded long within the ſpace of a year.

The laſt campaign has been ended with the moſt complete ſucceſs in eight months, and, excluſive of its political effects, has added many lacks to your pecuniary reſources.

Even in the leſs conſiderable ſervices in which detachments of your forces have been employed, ſome beneficial end has been carefully attended to; regular plans have been concerted, and ſteadily purſued. By Captain *Camac*'s operations at *Ramgur*, that country has been brought into ſubjection, and a conſiderable addition of revenue acquired. By the battalion employed in the Jungleterry, a tract of country which was conſidered as inacceſſible and unknown, and only ſerved as a receptacle to robbers, has been reduced to Government, the inhabitants civilized, and not only the reduction of the revenues, which was occaſioned by their ravages, prevented, but ſome revenue yielded from this country itſelf, which a proſecution of the ſame meaſures will improve.

The *Cooch Beyhar* expedition produced its full effects in the ſettlement of that country; and even the detachments employed againſt the Seneaſſes completely anſwered the intentions for which they were ordered.

Whatever errors may have fallen to the ſhare of the late Adminiſtration, I truſt that they will not be found in points of real magnitude. As to thoſe which may appear in meaſures of little moment, ſuch are unavoidable; they are neceſſary to a Government ſo conſtituted, and crowded with objects ſo various as this has been, the firſt principle of which is diſpatch; and our Records are the beſt evidences of the regard we have paid to this principle. On theſe too I ſhall reſt for proof, that it will not be my fault if our future Records ſhall preſent you with Minutes of controverſy, proteſts, charges, and recriminations, inſtead of that rapid progreſſion of buſineſs, and cordial attention to your intereſts, even in the anticipation of your commands, which it was my happineſs to experience in the labours of the Gentlemen who were formerly united with me in the charge of your affairs.

Painful as my ſituation is likely to prove, and unſuitable to my diſpoſition, it is my determined reſolution to retain the place which your favour originally aſſigned me, and the Legiſlature has ſince ſo honourably confirmed, till your juſtice ſhall decide between me and my opponents. My only reſources are in the knowledge, however imperfect, which a long and local practice in the affairs of this Preſidency may have furniſhed me, and of which the Gentlemen of the majority, even for their own ſakes, will not deny me the application, and in the experience and abilities of Mr. *Barwell*, whoſe ſupport I thankfully acknowledge with the more pleaſure, as I eſteem it to proceed more from a juſt conviction of the propriety of my conduct than perſonal attachment.

I beg leave in all ſubmiſſion to obſerve, that this is not a caſe to which palliatives can be applied. The Legiſlature has enacted, that a Council, conſiſting of five Members, ſhould form a general Adminiſtration for your affairs in *Bengal*, and for your political intereſts in all *India*. By the manner in which the Parliament thought proper to expreſs the office of Governor General, as diſtinct from the Council, as well as by univerſal uſage, ſome peculiar power and reſponſibility ſeemed tacitly reſerved for him above the other Members of the Council; but if it ſhall appear to you, that his authority, as the executive and oſtenſible inſtrument of your Government, has been overpowered, and that a majority, conſiſting of three Members of the Council, has been formed, not by an accidental variation in opinion, but by a decided and permanent combination againſt the other two, it will neceſſarily follow, that the intentions of the Parliament have been fruſtrated, and the Council in effect made to conſiſt of three Members inſtead of five; and that therefore nothing but a deciſive remedy can reſtore that harmony to the Government, which is irrecoverably loſt to the parts of which the preſent is compoſed, and ſave your property, and the national intereſts in theſe provinces from anarchy and ruin.

I will not quit the ground which I ſtand on in this addreſs, to appeal to the large portion of my life ſpent in your ſervice, nor to the important truſts in which it was my lot to be employed from the earlieſt period of it. I reſt my cauſe ſolely on the meaſures which have drawn me into my preſent vindication. I adopted them for your benefit, and for the national honour, and I know they have been productive of both to the utmoſt reach of my wiſhes. Relying on your juſtice, and on the conſciouſneſs of my own integrity, I ſhall wait with patience for your determination on the ſubjects of this addreſs; nor ſhall my care be wanting to prevent your affairs from ſuffering in the long interval which muſt be unavoidably left to diſorder.

If you ſhould judge me fit to be continued in the chief direction of your affairs, I have already ſaid, and yet repeat, that I am willing and deſirous to devote what remains of the active ſeaſon of my life to your ſervice. But allow me, Honourable Sirs, to hope that I may be furniſhed with means equal to the reſponſibility which ought and muſt be annexed to the firſt ſtation, whoſoever ſhall fill it.

If, on the contrary, it ſhall be decreed, either by your Honourable Court, or by yet higher authority, that I ſhall yield my place to any other, I ſhall ſubmit without a murmur to the ſentence; nor ſhall the ſeverity of it make me loſe the ſenſe of gratitude which I feel and owe to the obligations already laid upon me; although it will be impoſſible for me to forego the conſcious pride of having, even in the moſt obnoxious inſtances of my public conduct, manifeſted that principle by an undeviating attachment to the intereſts of the Company, which I have ever regarded as the intereſts of my Country.

I have the honour to be,
with the greateſt reſpect,
Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt faithful and moſt obedient
humble ſervant,
Warren Haſtings.

Governor General's Appeal to the Court of Directors; dated 3d December 1774.

I have purpoſely deferred the reply, which I have recorded my intention to make to the Minutes entered by the General and Mr. *Francis* in Conſultation of the 3d inſtant, becauſe I foreſaw, that in the juſtification of my own conduct from the ſevere cenſures which were caſt upon it in thoſe Minutes, and in the opinion which it was incumbent upon me to expreſs of the conduct of the majority of the Board, which was the immediate object of them, I ſhould be led into ſo long a train of arguments and facts, as would require more time to ſelect and arrange them than I could beſtow in the daily preſſure of current buſineſs. I had yet a ſtronger impulſe

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pulſe for ſuſpending ſo diſagreeable a taſk, in the hope with which I was willing to flatter myſelf, that ſome way of accommodation might ſtill be found before the cloſe of the packet, to remove the neceſſity of entering on a ſubject, which, in whatever form it might appear, muſt ſet my conduct, and that of the other Members of the Council, before the Honourable Court of Directors in a point of view ſo alarming, as to require their moſt peremptory deciſion between us, and muſt of courſe ſhut up every avenue to a future cordiality.

Faint as this hope was, I continued to indulge it while a poſſibility remained of its being accompliſhed. I now proceed, with whatever reluctance, to the laſt reſource which is left me, an appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors; on whoſe juſtice I throw myſelf, for the vindication of my own conduct, and the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, againſt the reproaches which have been caſt upon them; and for the reparation of the violence which has been offered to the authority committed to me by the Parliament of *Great Britain*, in the late acts of the majority of the Council.

Mr. *Barwell*'s obſervations on Mr. *Francis*'s Minute being a ſufficient refutation of the arguments contained both in that and the General's, I ſhall decline replying in form to either; but as the Rohilla war has been the declared ſource of the moſt violent meaſures adopted by the majority of the Council, I ſhall briefly recapitulate the grounds and objects of that enterprize, and then proceed to anſwer the various arguments which have been urged in condemnation of it.

In the beginning of the year 1772 the Marattas invaded the country of the Rohillas, which, after a ſhort but ineffectual oppoſition at *Sukkertoll*, was left at large expoſed to their ravages. The Vizier, alarmed at their approach to the only part of his dominions which was eaſily acceſſible by ſuch an enemy, applied with ſuch earneſtneſs to Sir *Robert Barker*, who was at that time with him, for the aſſiſtance of an Engliſh force, and the General thought the neceſſity ſo urgent, that, of his own authority, he ſent orders to the firſt brigade, which was ſtationed at *Dinapore*, to march inſtantly into the province of *Oude*. The Board diſapproving this irregular proceeding refuſed their confirmation of it; and the brigade having reached the length of *Benares*, remained there till the beginning of June, and then returned to its former ſtation. The Vizier availing himſelf of this movement, offered his protection to the Rohillas, and entered into a general Treaty of Alliance with the Chiefs of that nation, and a ſeparate one with *Hafez Rahmet Cawn*, their principal, who, in their name, and with their authority, engaged to pay him 40 lacks of rupees for that ſupport, whenever the Marattas evacuated the country. Tranſlations of both Treaties are recorded at length in the Conſultation of the 23d July 1772; and the original of the Letter is in the actual poſſeſſion of the Secretary, atteſted by General *Barker*, who was preſent at the ratification of both.

On the approach of the rainy ſeaſon the Marattas evacuated the country, and the Vizier demanded the ſtipulated recompence from the Rohillas; but they evaded the payment.

In the latter end of 1772, the Marattas having extorted from the King a grant of the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Kurrah*, which had been ceded to him by the Company for the expreſs purpoſe of maintaining his dignity, were preparing to take poſſeſſion; and as this acquiſition would have made them maſters of the whole tract of Country lying between the river *Ganges* and *Jumna*, and bordering upon the province of *Oude*, the Vizier again applied for aſſiſtance to repel ſuch dangerous neighbours.

The proceedings of the late Council in their Secret Department, of the 1ſt February 1773, treat this ſubject very largely, and ſhew how much they conſidered not only the ſafety of the Vizier, but even of the Company's poſſeſſions, to be endangered by this formidable encroachment of the Maratta State. It was ultimately concluded to comply with the requiſition of the Vizier, by ſending the firſt brigade for the protection of his dominions againſt any attempt which the Marattas might make on them; and alſo determined to prevent their deſign on *Corah*, by taking prior poſſeſſion for the Company, who had certainly the beſt title to it, when the King could no longer keep it. It was not to be ſuppoſed that the Marattas would quietly ſubmit to the loſs of a territory which they had uſed the moſt perfidious means to obtain; and every precaution was therefore neceſſary to guard againſt their efforts to recover it. The Company's orders of the 28th Auguſt 1771, expreſsly allowed the neceſſity of departing, on ſome occaſions, from the limited plan which they had for a long time paſt enjoined; and in conſequence the Rohilla country, North of the *Ganges*, was included within the line of action preſcribed to the General in his Inſtructions; becauſe if the Marattas, either by the defeat, or, which was as likely to happen, by the deſertion of the Rohillas to their cauſe, ſhould gain a footing in that country, nothing could oppoſe their entering into the province of *Oude*, and laying it waſte, in ſpite of any attempt of our forces united with the Vizier's to prevent them. The Map which accompanies this will demonſtrate this truth more powerfully than any verbal argument.

It was not to be ſuppoſed that the Marattas, whoſe ambition for ſome years paſt had aſpired to univerſal conqueſt, and who had extended their arms from the centre of the *Balaghaut*; to the northern extremity of *Indoſtan*, ſhould ſit down contented when they had added the *Douab*, *Corah*, and *Allahabad* to their dominions; on the contrary, there was every reaſon to apprehend, and it was publicly reported in their own camp, that they would next carry their operations into the country of the Vizier, and even into the Company's own poſſeſſions.

On the grounds which I have deſcribed, it was agreed to maintain the province of *Corah* againſt the Marattas, and afterwards to extend our arms beyond the preſcribed line of the dominions of our Ally into the Rohilla country, by a diſcretional latitude allowed the General as above-mentioned; which he accordingly made uſe of, by marching the brigade as far as *Ramgaut*; and we have the ſtrongeſt reaſons to believe, that it was attended with every immediate advantage which we had projected from ſuch a meaſure, as the Marattas lay during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army, but without daring either to croſs the river, or to approach the borders of *Corah*; and before the ſetting in of the rains of that year, their domeſtic troubles obliged them to return to their own proper dominions.

Of the reſolution to enter the Rohilla country for its defence againſt the Marattas, the Court of Directors were firſt adviſed in the General Letter by the ‡ of the 31ſt of March 1773, which arrived in *England* long before the departure of the tranſports.

The effectual protection then afforded the Rohillas, and the departure of the Marattas, having eſtabliſhed beyond all conteſt the right of the Vizier to the 40 lacks which had been ſtipulated for this important ſervice, and which, by the terms of the engagement, were really due the preceding year, on the retreat of the Marattas from their country, he demanded payment of *Hafez Rhamet Cawn*, who refuſed it. The Vizier alſo accuſed him of having ſecretly encouraged the Marattas, and ſent them a ſupply of money; and, if I miſtake not, General Sir *Robert Barker* in ſome of his Letters mentions the ſame circumſtance. The plea of juſtice thus coinciding with the principles of ſound policy, which dictated to the

‡ N. B. This is a blank in the original; but the Letters brought by the ſhip Hector, dated 31ſt March 1773, were received at London the 15th of October 1773.

Vizier

Vizier the neceſſity of ſecuring himſelf againſt the intrigues and perfidy of the Rohillas; who, from their ſituation, were moſt capable of hurting him in his conteſts with more powerful enemies, and from their natural weakneſs, and the jealouſy inſeparable from it, would ever ſeek for their ſafety in fomenting or joining in attempts againſt him, he formed the deſign of invading and reducing their Country. As his own ſtrength was unequal to ſuch an undertaking, he ſolicited the aid of this Government for effecting it, and made an offer of 50 lacks of rupees to be paid on its accompliſhment. As this propoſal was urged in the warmeſt terms, both in perſon to Sir *Robert Barker*, and in his Letter to me, and this had long been a favourite project of the Vizier, the Board judged with me, that it might afford a fair occaſion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his aſſent to a more equitable compenſation for the expence attending the aid which he occaſionally received from our forces, and to free the Company from the embarraſſment to which they might be ſubjected, by retaining the property and poſſeſſion of the remote diſtricts of *Corah* and *Illahabad*. For this purpoſe, it was agreed that I ſhould write the following Letter to the Vizier, which I beg leave to quote at large, becauſe it fixes the ſource of thoſe engagements, which took place by a progreſſive train of meaſures, and terminated in the Rohilla war; and will mark at leaſt, that this was not the effect either of a precipitate and unweighed reſolution, or a tame acquieſcence in the Vizier's ſchemes of ambition, but the reſult of long deliberation, originally deviſed, and conſiſtently employed as an inſtrument of promoting the intereſts of the Company, of perpetuating the dependence of their Ally, and converting it to a channel of utility.

Fort William, 21ſt of April 1773.

"I have received your Excellency's Letter, mentioning "the particulars of your operations againſt the Marattas. "You promiſe to the General, that whenever the Ma"rattas ſhould be driven out of the Rohilla country, and "*Hafez Rhamet Cawn* ſhall fulfil his agreement of 40 "lacks of rupees, you will give half that ſum to the "Company; and that ſhould the Rohilla Chiefs be guilty "of a breach of their agreement, and we will thoroughly "exterminate them, and ſettle your Excellency in the "country, you will in that caſe pay the Company 50 "lacks of rupees in ready money, and exempt them from "the King's tribute. Upon the ſame ſubject the General "has alſo written to me fully. Every circumſtance which "you have written to me, I conſider as a proof of the "cordial attachment which ſubſiſts between us, and of "the confidence and reliance which you place in the "friendſhip of the Engliſh Company; but the points "which you have propoſed require much conſideration, "and the previous ratification of a formal agreement, "before I can aſſent to them, otherwiſe I might incur the "diſpleaſure of my Employers. It is true, that I have "long thought that the union of the Rohilla country "with yours, either by ſure and permanent obligation of "friendſhip, or by reducing it to obedience, if they ſhould "render ſuch an attempt juſtifiable by any act of enmity "or treachery, would be an adviſable point for you to "attain; becauſe, by that means, the defenſive line of "your dominions would be completed, by including "within it all the land lying on that ſide of the river "*Ganges*; and you would be in no danger from an attack "on that quarter, whenever the Marattas ſhould commit "diſturbances in another. But it appears to me, that "this is an object not to be attained by an occaſional view "of that country; and its diſtance from the provinces "of *Bengal* will not admit of the continuance of the "Engliſh forces longer than the period which remains of "dry weather. You will pleaſe to remember they were "ſent for your aſſiſtance, and to defend the province of "*Corah* againſt the Marattas; thus far only I am autho"rized, by the commands of my Superiors, to employ "them beyond the limits of their own poſſeſſions; and "even this is the cauſe of an heavy loſs and riſk to their "affairs; eſpecially in the expences of their troops and "ſtores, and in the abſence of ſo great a part of their "force, which was originally deſtined for the ſole defence "of the Countries dependant on *Bengal*. You have "frequently repeated in your Letters the remarks, that "to wait till the enemy was at your door, and then to "write for the aſſiſtance of our forces, would anſwer no "good purpoſe; but that every year the ſame cauſe "would require their return to the ſame ſervice, and paſs "without effecting any purpoſe of real advantage. My "friend, all this is true; but it proceeds from the want "of proper meaſures having been previouſly taken, and "from the imperfect footing on which affairs between us "have been eſtabliſhed. The concern which the Com"pany take in your ſafety, and the duties of friendſhip "which their commands, and our own inclinations equally "enjoin us to obſerve inviolably to their Allies, and eſpe"cially to one ſo cloſely united by an approved attach"ment to them, would not ſuffer us to withhold our aid "when your affairs require it; but it has always been "with reluctance that we have ſuffered the army to paſs "the frontiers of our own Country, becauſe the loſs and "inconvenience attending it was certain; and although "joined with your forces, there is no cauſe to fear the "moſt powerful efforts of our enemies, yet the events of "war are at the diſpoſal of the Almighty; and the only "fruits which the moſt ſplendid ſucceſſes can afford us "are the reputation of having maintained the faith of our "alliance, in oppoſition to every incentive of ſelf-intereſt "and ſelf-defence. Thus circumſtanced, we are pre"cluded from deriving any benefit from your ſupport; "and ours can only afford you a relief from preſent "danger, without any proviſion of future ſecurity. For "theſe reaſons, I have often wiſhed for a perſonal inter"view with you, for the purpoſe of removing difficulties, "and perpetuating the alliance with your Excellency, on "terms more ſuitable to our mutual intereſts. Your "Excellency alſo hath repeatedly expreſſed the ſame "inclination. I therefore write, that if your affairs will "at this ſeaſon admit of your giving me a meeting, I "will haſten to obtain it as ſoon as I am able after the "receipt of your Letter in reply to this; if otherwiſe, I "muſt wait for it at ſome more diſtant period, as the "affairs of this Government will indiſpenſably require "my preſence at this place after three or four months, "and it is uncertain when I ſhall again have an interval "of leiſure for ſuch a journey. In the meantime your "Excellency and the General are at a great diſtance "from the province of *Corah*, and the affairs of that pro"vince require the preſence of a perſon on the behalf "of the Company, to regulate and take charge of it, "until it ſhall be hereafter determined in what manner "it ſhall be finally diſpoſed of. I have judged it ad"viſable to depute Mr. *James Lawrell*, a Gentleman of "the Council of *Calcutta*, on this ſervice, and he will ſet "out accordingly in a few days, which I hope you will "approve."

The allurement thus held out to the Vizier ſucceeded. He propoſed in reply a meeting with me at *Benares*, which took place accordingly. I found him ſtill equally bent on the deſign of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had before done, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its ſucceſs, but objecting with great force the orders of the Company, reſtricting us from ſuch remote ſchemes of conqueſt; to which I therefore could not aſſent, without ſuch conditions obtained in return for it, as might obviate their diſpleaſure, and win their ſanction to ſo hazardous and unauthorized a meaſure. I fear not to quote theſe expreſſions, addreſſing myſelf to fair and unbiaſſed judges, who will not infer my real ſentiments from the ſtyle and arguments of a political negociation.

I told him that the Company had drawn themſelves into great diſtreſs by the enormous load of their military expences, one entire brigade being kept up for the ſole purpoſe

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purpoſe of maintaining a connection with him, ſince it was uſeleſs and unneceſſary to the protection of our own provinces. That if he wiſhed therefore to avail himſelf of our aid, either in preventing, or even in repelling the deſigns of his enemies, he muſt firſt agree to bear a more equal ſhare of the burthen of this expence, by paying the whole charge of the forces lent him for this ſervice while they were ſo employed. To this, after much contention, he aſſented; and the ſum of 210,000 rupees, which the General computed to be the amount of the expence, was fixed as the monthly ſubſidy to be paid for the brigade, whenever it ſhould paſs the borders of the province of *Babar* on his requiſition. Having obtained this point, which I conſidered in the light of a perpetual military fund, I eaſily yielded my aſſent to the Rohilla plan, on the ſtipulation of 40 lacks for its accompliſhment, 10 lacks being deducted from his firſt offer, on account of the difference which had taken place in the ſubſidy.

This agreement was no ſooner made, than he ſuddenly repented, deſired to decline the war with the Rohillas till a more favourable conjuncture, when he ſhould be leſs embarraſſed by other engagements, agreeing however to the monthly ſubſidy, whenever his future occaſions ſhould oblige him to require the aid of our forces. Thus the Rohilla plan remained rather ſuſpended than wholly abandoned, although it was left optional in our Government to reject or aſſent to it on a future occaſion. Meſſrs. *Lawrell* and *Vanſittart*, who were with me at the time, and to whom I made a daily communication in writing of the ſubſtance of every converſation which paſſed between the Vizier and myſelf, will vouch for the literal truth of this narrative, as correſponding with what I then repeated to them; and I believe it will appear from it, that although I had not engaged the Government by any expreſs obligation to comply with any future application of the Vizier to ſupport his pretenſions on the Rohillas, yet as the moſt eſſential article of the Treaty had originated from this deſign, and had been yielded to in conſideration of my agreement to engage in it, it would have been diſhonourable to decline the undertaking, when propoſed under circumſtances as favourable to its ſucceſs, and the general intereſts of the Company, as they were when I firſt offered to engage in it.

Soon after my return to *Calcutta*, the Vizier renewed the propoſal for invading the Rohillas, and repeated his deſire of engaging in it, on the conditions before agreed upon. A variety of arguments concurred to favour it at this particular time, none to oppoſe it. The Marattas were ſo much occupied by their own diſſenſions, that they could not even defend their poſſeſſions in the *Doaub*, much leſs were they likely to interrupt our operations againſt the Rohillas. The King had no means of interference but by his General, *Nudjeff Cawn*, for whoſe attachment we had ſtronger ſecurity in his intereſt, and in his fear of his rival *Abdul Abed Cawn*, than his Maſter had in his allegiance. The Rohillas were too weak to reſiſt ſo powerful an attack; and as their country was open and undefended, either by defiles, woods, or fortreſſes, and in its greateſt extent did not exceed 200 miles, its entire ſubjection did not require any length of time.

To theſe inducements, which apply only to the ſucceſs of the undertaking, other motives, equally powerful, engaged our attention to it, as a meaſure neceſſary to the intereſts and ſafety of the Company.

All our advices, both public and private, repreſented the diſtreſſes of the Company at home as extreme. The Letters from the Court of Directors called upon us moſt loudly for ample remittances, and a reduction of our military expences. At the ſame time, ſuch was the ſtate of affairs in this Government, that for many years paſt the income of the year was found inadequate to its expence; to defray which, a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to an hundred and twenty-five lacks of rupees, had accumulated. The Board had beſtowed much labour and time in the retrenchment of their expences, but much remained yet to be done; and the regulations which they had already formed, required time to produce any viſible effect. By allowing the Vizier the military aid which he required, a ſaving of near one-third of our military expences would be effected during the period of ſuch a ſervice; the ſtipulation of 40 lacks would afford an ample ſupply to our treaſury, and to the currency of the country; the Vizier would be freed from a troubleſome neighbourhood, and his dominions would be made more defenſible, while his alliance with the Company ſubſiſted, by being completely ſhut in between the river *Ganges* and the Mountains; and his dependence on the Company would be increaſed by that extenſion of his poſſeſſions, as he himſelf was incapable of defending even his ancient poſſeſſions without our ſupport.

For a more ample diſcuſſion of theſe arguments, I beg leave to refer to the Conſultation in the Secret Department of the 26th of November 1773, in which it was concluded, after a long debate, to conſent to the Vizier's requiſition. As a precaution againſt any effects which were to be apprehended from the Vizier's irreſolution, the conditions originally accepted for this engagement were dictated to him in the form of a Letter to be written by him, in which a clauſe was inſerted, that whether the country was conquered, or a peace concluded between him and the enemy, the ſtipulation for the payment of 40 lacks ſhould become equally due. Of this engagement I ſhall ſpeak more hereafter.

On the 24th of February 1774, the ſecond brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizier. On the 17th of April the united forces entered the borders of the Rohilla dominions; and on the 23d of the ſame month engaged and defeated the Rohillas, with the death of their leader *Hafez Rahmet Cawn*. From that period the conqueſt of that country may be dated, no material oppoſition having been ſince made.

On the 6th of October the war was finally concluded by the Treaty with *Fyzoolla Cawn*. Fifteen lacks of rupees, which he engaged to pay to the Vizier in ready money, were to be immediately appropriated to the payment of part of the ſtipulation of 40 lacks due from the Vizier to the Company; and we are informed that the Vizier has returned with expedition to *Fyzabad*, for the expreſs purpoſe of diſcharging the remainder. The ſubſidy had been punctually paid to the end of September, by the laſt advices received on that ſubject from Colonel *Champion*, dated the 24th of October.

I now proceed to anſwer the objections which have been urged againſt the propriety of this undertaking. Theſe may be reduced to the following heads:

1ſt. That it was contrary to the expreſs, peremptory, and repeated orders of the Company.

2d. That it was contrary to the repeated declarations and promiſes of the Board.

3d. That it was unjuſt.

4th. That it expoſed the Company to the hazard of an indefinite or an endleſs war.

5th. That it might have involved the Company in a war with the Marattas, and may ſtill draw on us their future reſentment.

6th. That by the removal of a third part of the whole military eſtabliſhment to ſo great a diſtance, our own provinces were expoſed to danger.

7th. That by aggrandizing the Vizier it might render him a dangerous neighbour, and deprive the Company of the benefits of his alliance.

8th. That it was reſolved on precipitately without a formal Treaty, the conditions of it appearing only in a Letter from the Vizier, where they are looſely expreſſed, and liable to evaſion.

9th. That the condition which the Vizier expreſſes, that the brigade ſhould never depart without his permiſſion, was an inſtance of arrogance in him, and of an unbecoming ſubmiſſion in the late Adminiſtration, and might prove the cauſe of their being detained for ever.

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Vide Mr. Francis's Minutes, entered in Conſultation of the 3d November.

In the above articles I have not confined myſelf to the public Records, but have endeavoured to collect the ſubſtance of all I have ſeen or heard upon this ſide of the argument, and have choſen to clothe it in my own language; that which I have found prepared for me not being in every inſtance ſuch as I allow myſelf to uſe, even in retaliation of perſonal injury, much leſs in application to meaſures which immediately regard myſelf.—I ſhall reply ſeparately to each.

1. I have read over with great attention all the Letters which have been received from the Honourable Court of Directors ſince the year 1769, and long ago abſtracted all the paragraphs written within that period upon the ſubject of the Company's political concerns, thoſe having been given me for my ſpecial guidance in my negociations with the Vizier the laſt year at *Benares*. I find nothing contained in any of theſe which expreſsly applies to the caſe in queſtion. I meet with injunctions to avoid new connections. "To endeavour to keep peace in *Bengal* "and with the neighbouring Powers; and to confine our "views to the ſecurity and tranquillity of *Bengal*; not to "acquire further poſſeſſions; but to advert to the good "management of thoſe which we have. To incline to "thoſe few Chiefs of *Indoſtan* who are in a condition to "ſtruggle with the Marattas. To defend the King's "perſon, and the diſtricts of *Corah* and *Allahabad*; which "is mentioned as an exception to their limited plan. "To make known to the Powers of *India*, that it is by no "means the intention of the Company to encroach upon "their neighbours, or to acquire an extenſion of domi"nion by conqueſt. That they regard with a jealous eye "the increaſing power of the Marattas; and that it "would be bad policy to take part in any operations, "which might weaken the few remaining Chiefs who are "in a condition to oppoſe their encroachments." But the following extracts are ſo pointedly appoſite to the ſubject, that I ſhall take the liberty to quote them at large.

General Letter 11th May 1769, paragraphs 3 and 16.—30th June 1769, paragraphs 1 and 3.—Inſtructions to the Commiſſioners, par. 2.—General Letter, 15th September 1769, par. 28.

"It is with the moſt ſerious concern we learn from "your late advices, that the incurſions of the Marattas "had ſpread ſuch a terror and deſpondence into the minds "of thoſe Powers which were the remoter barrier of our "poſſeſſions; that the irreſolution and timidity of the "moſt potent of them have given riſe to ſuch ſucceſſes, "as have encouraged the Marattas to invade the domi"nions of the King, and lay claim to part of the territory "of *Sujah Dowlah*. But the conduct of the Rohillas and "Jauts is rather a matter of concern than ſurprize to us; "as the King and *Sujah Dowlah* neglected that occaſion "to unite with thoſe Powers, effectually to repel the "common diſturbers of the empire, and confine them "within the limits of their former poſſeſſions. To what"ever cauſes this general timidity or ſupineneſs may have "been owing, we find ourſelves equally affected, and "the tranquillity of the provinces endangered thereby; "but as the projects of the King, or the conduct of the "Vizier, are at preſent too myſterious for us to decide "on the motives of their inactivity, and as we know not "what alliances may be formed to juſtify us in carrying "our arms beyond the bounds of their dominions, we are "prevented from propoſing any preciſe plan for your "guidance in this reſpect; but ſhould your ſubſequent "advices enable us to form a more certain judgment of "the expediency of departing from the plan we have laid "down, we ſhall communicate to you by ſome early "conveyance, how far we may be diſpoſed to carry our "arms beyond the bounds of the provinces, or the ter"ritories of our allies, and become the parties in an "offenſive war. In the meantime, we truſt your ſole "object will be the ſecurity of our poſſeſſions, and thoſe "of the Powers with whom we are connected both by "Treaty and Intereſt; and as this appears to have been "the guide of your conduct upon the Marattas invading "the province of *Corah*, we with pleaſure approve the "meaſures you have taken for defending the dominions "of the King and Vizier from their inroads and depre"dations; more eſpecially, as thoſe meaſures are not "only juſtified by neceſſity, but are within the line "which we have preſcribed for your conduct in ſuch a "conjuncture."

General Letter 11th May 1769, paragraphs 3 and 16.—30th June 1769, paragraphs 1 and 3.—Inſtructions to the Commiſſioners, par. 2.—General Letter, 28th Auguſt 1771, par. 45.

"The line of neutrality is ſtill recommended; but the "Board are authoriſed to depart from it whenever the "intereſts of the Company ſhall be endangered, or ſhall "materially require it."

General Letter to Fort St. George, of 4th November 1772, par. 10.

The directions promiſed us in the Letter of the 28th of Auguſt 1771, have never yet been ſent us, nor have we ſince received any further lights to guide us on this important ſubject; which I preſume to place to the account of the troubles which have embarraſſed the Company at home.

From the above quotations, and the conſiſtency which ſtrongly marks all the orders on this ſubject, I apprehend it will clearly appear, that the principle primarily inſiſted upon by the Honourable Court of Directors, reſpecting their political and military operations, was to avoid the extenſion of territory; and this we have never attempted.

The prohibition of military expeditions, undertaken beyond the preſcribed bounds of their own provinces and thoſe of their allies, on prudential and cautionary motives, or other cauſes, independent of territorial acquiſitions, is only to be inferred from the tenor and tendency of their reaſonings on the former ſubject. It is evident, that it was not from inattention that their orders never expreſſed a prohibition of this kind, but that they rather avoided it from a conviction that it might be ſometimes neceſſary, and becauſe it would have been difficult to mark the limitations of it. This concluſion I draw, not only from the two laſt paragraphs of their orders, which I have quoted at length, and which were dictated by the experience of paſt advices, and a more intimate conſideration of the ſubject, but even from their orders, ſo far back as the 30th of June 1769; in which, having declared againſt an extenſion of poſſeſſions in the firſt paragraph, they had in the third their "opinion, that the moſt "prudent ſyſtem they could purſue, and the moſt likely "to be attended with a permanent ſecurity to the pro"vinces, would be, to *incline* to thoſe Chiefs of *Indoſtan* "who yet preſerve an independence of the Maratta "Power, and are in a condition to ſtruggle with them."

But in the two laſt of the above quotations there is no occaſion of logical ſurmiſes to diſcover the intentions of the Honourable Court of Directors. They tell us plainly, that it is their wiſh "to confine their views to "the ſecurity of their own poſſeſſions and thoſe of their "allies; but that they foreſee the neceſſity in certain "caſes, of carrying their arms beyond thoſe bounds, and "of becoming parties in an offenſive war;" and they promiſe us an early communication of their inſtructions, with regard to the lengths to which they will allow this doctrine to be extended. In their Letter to the Preſidency of *Fort Saint George*, they authoriſe them, in expreſs terms, "to obſerve no longer the neutrality ſo "heartily wiſhed for by them, in caſe they ſhould judge "it neceſſary for their intereſts to depart from it." And it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Court of Directors would recommend one line of conduct for their Government of *Fort Saint George*, and an oppoſite one for *Bengal*; much leſs that they would admit of ſuch a deviation from their former pacific plan, on merely political motives attended with an heavy expence, and yet prohibit it under circumſtances, which, in addition to the ſame motives, have every conſideration of œconomy to recommend it, with the proſpect of an increaſe to their finances, at a time when their diſtreſſes both at home and abroad ſo urgently required ſuch an increaſe, and their moſt peremptory commands (as I have already obſerved) rendered it the firſt object of our attention.

I preſume to affirm, both for myſelf and the other Members of the late Council, that no period in the Company's annals has been more evidently characteriſed by an exact ſubmiſſion to their commands, than that in

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which I have had the honour to preſide in the Adminiſtration; and for the truth of this I dare appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors. But in caſes to which their commands do not ſpecially apply, to adopt ſuch meaſures as, at the ſame time, approach neareſt to the ſpirit of their general inſtructions, and tend moſt to the advancement of their intereſts, is the faireſt teſt both of our obedience and fidelity. We might have ſuffered the Marattas, under cover of the King's grant, to take poſſeſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*, to have allied themſelves to the Rohillas, or eſtabliſhed themſelves in that territory, and lain with their armies unmoleſted on the borders of the open country of our ally the Vizier till they had completed every preparation for invading it. Such a forbearance might perhaps have been vindicated by the plea, that the Company had promiſed, at the diſtance of two years preceding it, to furniſh us with their Inſtructions for a different conduct; and that wanting thoſe Inſtructions, we took for our rule their lateſt orders on the ſubject; which enjoined us to confine our views to the bare ſecurity of our own poſſeſſions and thoſe of our allies. This might have been a ſure way to guard our characters againſt legal imputation, although in fact it would have been inconſiſtent with the ſecurity required. But it is not by ſuch cold and prudential cautions that the Britiſh name has acquired ſuch a luſtre in *India*, nor that the Britiſh empire in *Bengal* is likely to be perpetuated; neither is this the conduct which the Company demands of us; their orders are informed by a more liberal ſpirit, and allow, in ſuch caſes as are not reducible to fixed and invariable poſitions, a diſcretional latitude for the zeal of their ſervants to exert itſelf for their ſecurity. I cannot better illuſtrate this, than by the following extract of their General Letter, dated the 30th of June 1769, paragraph 5. "We eſteem ourſelves bound "by Treaty to protect the King's perſon, and to ſecure "him the poſſeſſion of the Corah and Allahabad diſtricts. "When we wrote the 11th of November 1768, we "apprehended the conſequences of keeping the brigade at "*Allahabad* would be creating in *Sujah Dowlah* a jealouſy "that would involve us in freſh troubles, having at that "time no cauſe to eſteem him an enemy; but impreſſed "as you were with an opinion of his hoſtile intentions "and growing ſtrength at the time of the diſpatch of the "*Valentine*, we ſhall not blame your caution for deferring "the execution of our orders for its removal, nor ſhall "we at this time attempt to give poſitive directions for "your conduct, which in ſuch critical caſes ought ſeldom "to be done, and in which the ſituation of affairs may be "varied by unforeſeen events at the very moment we are "writing; but having given you, with as much preciſion "as poſſible, a general view of the ſyſtem by which we "wiſh to have our affairs regulated, we muſt leave it to "you to improve, to the utmoſt of your power, every "opportunity of drawing towards that point; and when-"ever you think yourſelves obliged for our ſecurity, "upon emergent occaſions, to adopt meaſures of a con-"trary tendency, you are to give us very full reaſons "for ſuch a deviation, and endeavour to return to the "path we have marked out as ſoon as circumſtances will "admit."

2. The ſecond objection is partly true. The Board have repeatedly declared in their general Letters to the Court of Directors their intentions to adhere to the defenſive plan recommended to them, and to confine their military operations within the limits of the Vizier's territories, and ſuch were their determinations when thoſe Letters were written; but at thoſe times they had not fully experienced the inconveniencies which attended our engagements with the Vizier in the proſecution of that ſyſtem, nor had the remedy occurred which ſince preſented itſelf, in the conditions offered for proſecuting the Rohilla enterprize, and which has been ſucceſsfully applied. Our Treaty of Alliance obliged us to ſupport the Vizier, when his poſſeſſions were threatened with invaſion at an heavy increaſed military expence, and the exportation of our currency with our troops. For three ſucceſſive years theſe inconveniencies had recurred, and it was impoſſible to ſay how often they might recur. At laſt an occaſion took place, when, by a ſlight deviation from the defenſive plan, our alliance with the Vizier might be converted into ſolid advantages. The employment of our troops made to ſave near a third part of our military expences, and the ſucceſs of their operations to bring a large flow of currency, not only into the Company's territories, but into their treaſury; in effect, the very ſame reaſons which before urged us to ſhun every military expedition, namely, the expence attending it, and the exportation of our currency, now operated in the contrary direction, and recommended the employment of our army for the purpoſes of reducing our expences, and adding to our currency."

The preceding argument reſpects only the general ſubject of foreign expeditions. It has been urged alſo as an argument againſt the particular caſe in queſtion, that the Board, when they adopted the meaſure of the Rohilla war, were themſelves convinced of the impropriety of it, from the declaration made by them repeatedly in their Letters to the Court of Directors, of their wiſh and hope that it might not take place. Upon this I beg leave to offer the following reflections.

A conſiſtency of meaſures is difficult to be preſerved among a body of men, becauſe an accidental majority may occaſionally decide for contrary Reſolutions; yet ſuch a caſe has never happened at our Board. A conſiſtency of opinions is not to be expected. The Propoſition for the Rohilla war, after having paſſed the Select Committee, was debated for three ſucceſſive days in Council, in which the Board met, as I recollect, both morning and evening to diſcuſs it. No two Members agreed exactly in opinion, and it was difficult to reconcile them; at laſt they came to a final agreement to leave it to me to accommodate my own, as nearly as I could, to the collective ſenſe of the whole; which was done with much management, and the Propoſition was agreed to in the manner in which it ſtands in Conſultation 26th November 1773.

My ſentiments were the ſame invariably from the beginning, as will be ſeen from my report to the Board of my proceedings at *Benares*, and my Minute entered in the Conſultation above referred to. Private Letters are not commonly admiſſible as authorities; but on this occaſion I cannot produce a ſtronger, both of my own fixed opinion from the firſt movement of this Propoſition, and of the apprehenſion which influenced the Board, and I confeſs myſelf alſo againſt it, than in the following extract of a Letter which I wrote to a Gentleman in the Direction by the firſt diſpatch after my return from *Benares*. "I was glad to be freed from "the Rohilla expedition, becauſe I was doubtful of "the judgment which would have been paſſed upon it at "home, where I ſee too much ſtreſs laid upon general "maxims, and too little attention given to the circum-"ſtances which require an exception to be made from "them. Beſides this, an opinion ſtill prevails of the "Vizier's great power, and his treacherous deſigns againſt "us; and I cannot expect that my word ſhould be taken "as a proof of their non-exiſtence. On the other hand, "the abſence of the Marattas, and the weak ſtate of the "Rohillas, promiſed an eaſy conqueſt of them; and I "own, that ſuch was my idea of the Company's diſtreſs "at home, added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, "that I ſhould have been glad of any occaſion to employ "their forces, which ſaves ſo much of their pay and "expences."

When the meaſure was determined upon, and we had come to a general agreement, I was averſe to introduce any new ſubject of debate, and therefore eaſily acquieſced in the expreſſion of a wiſh entertained by the Board, which might be conſtrued as inconſiſtent with the Reſolution we had taken. My ſentiments of the propriety of the expedition had undergone no change; but I will not

deny that I felt myſelf influenced by the ſame fears which operated in the other Members of the Council, that the propriety of the meaſure might not be ſeen in the ſame light by our Conſtituents; which we knew, from the temper of the times, might not only draw upon us their ſevere reſentment, but aggravate the load of popular odium which has of late fallen on their ſervants; and if I miſtake not, theſe reaſons are aſſigned in expreſs terms upon our proceedings.

3. The engagements between the Vizier and the Rohillas, which have been already quoted, ſufficiently evince the juſtice of the attack upon them. They agreed to make him an acknowledgment of forty lacks of rupees upon certain conditions; he performed thoſe conditions; and they refuſed payment of the money they had promiſed.

4. No political tranſaction can be mathematically demonſtrated to be totally free from danger. The probable advantages muſt be weighed againſt the probable diſadvantages. When the preſent meaſure was undertaken, there was every reaſon to expect that it would be ſpeedily brought to an happy concluſion; and the event has proved that our expectations were well grounded.

5. The Marattas did not poſſeſs, nor had any claim upon any part of the Rohilla country on the North of the *Ganges*, when we undertook to aſſiſt the Vizier in the conqueſt of it. They might, with much more reaſon, have attacked us for oppoſing them in their deſigns on the Corah diſtricts, of which they had obtained a grant from the King; but in fact a timid conduct would have been more likely to involve us in a war with them than either of theſe meaſures. Had they been allowed to ſubdue the Corah diſtrict and the Country of the Rohillas, the Vizier's territory would have been open to their incurſions; their numerous horſe might have plundered it in ſpite of the efforts of our infantry, and their continued ravages might have obliged him to come to an accommodation with them, as was once apprehended, on terms which would have afforded them an eaſy entrance into our own provinces. In ſhort, we are much better ſecured againſt their attacks than we otherwiſe would have been; and the better we are ſecured, the leſs will they be diſpoſed to attack us.

6. In reply to this objection, I will in the firſt place affirm, that, merely for the defence of our own provinces, two brigades upon the preſent eſtabliſhment are ſufficient; a third is neceſſary to add to our influence amongſt the Powers of *Indoſtan*, to ſupport our alliance with the Vizier, and to anſwer other exigencies which may happen at a more remote period of time. Upon the late occaſion, when the Rohilla expedition was undertaken, our apprehenſions of an invaſion from the French had entirely ceaſed; the diſſenſions among the Marattas fully employed them at home, and are mentioned among the ſecondary inducements in favour of the undertaking; there was no other enemy from whom we could have the leaſt apprehenſion of danger. Such was the occaſion to be embraced for effecting our purpoſe, by a temporary employment of a third part of our forces; and under ſuch circumſtances, even without reckoning upon the acquiſition which was the immediate object of the enterprize, to reduce the Company's military expences, by employing that proportion of their troops which was ſuperfluous for the purpoſe of their own defence, was a great and manifeſt advantage; but when the ſtipulated acquiſition of 40 lacks, and the political advantages reſulting from the meaſure are ſuperadded, the viſionary idea of danger, which did not exiſt even in imagination at the time the expedition was undertaken, can have no weight as an objection; eſpecially as from our own knowledge of the open and defenceleſs ſtate of the Rohilla country, we were morally certain that the undertaking would ſoon be brought to an iſſue. By our ancient Treaty with the Vizier, we are bound to aſſiſt him with our forces within his paternal dominions; and the diſtance between their borders and the remoteſt part to which our troops have marched is only 200 miles. I will only add, that ſo long as no immediate danger threatens our own provinces, it is my earneſt wiſh that one of our three brigades might conſtantly be employed with the Vizier; as well to ſave ſo large a proportion of expence to the Company, as to prevent the ill conſequences of total inactivity to our army.

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7. The addition of territory acquired by the Vizier, inſtead of raiſing him to be a dangerous neighbour, ſerves to render him more dependent upon us than before, as he has more occaſion for our aſſiſtance to enable him to maintain it, and to ſupport him againſt the claims of other Powers. If his increaſe of wealth be an object of jealouſy, let it be conſidered how largely the Company ſhare in it. From September 1773 to September 1775, the ſums we have to receive from him, by our late engagements, amount to 130 lacks of rupees.

8. I have already remarked, that the firſt Propoſition for the Rohilla war was made by the Vizier, in a Letter which I received from him in June 1773; that it was employed afterwards in the negociations at *Benares*, as an inſtrument for winning his conſent to the payment of the full expences of our troops employed in his ſervice; and that it was not finally reſolved on till the 26th November, after the moſt ample diſcuſſion in the Select Committee and in the Council; it was not therefore precipitately reſolved on. It is true, that no formal Treaty was executed for the conditions on which we were to aſſiſt the Vizier; nor did the occaſion, which was only temporary, require it. The multiplication of Treaties weakens their efficacy, and therefore they ſhould be reſerved only for very important and permanent obligations. The form which was dictated to the Vizier for the Letter which was to deſcribe the conditions of this engagement, it is true, is not of itſelf ſufficiently clear; but it is explained by my Letter which accompanied it, and the reference therein made to the conditions which had been formerly propoſed at *Benares*, as they ſtood in the three firſt articles of the draft which had been prepared for the Treaty before the Rohilla expedition was ſuſpended. For the fuller elucidation of the ſubject, theſe articles are here ſubjoined. The two firſt had been agreed to by the Vizier; to the third he objected, wiſhing rather to engage for the payment of the whole ſum at once when the conqueſt was completed. It is fortunate that the latter mode was adopted; the completion of the conqueſt having been actually effected, and the ſtipulation, although objected to by the Vizier when firſt demanded, after the defeat of the Rohillas, having ſince been acknowledged by him to be due.

The three firſt Articles of the firſt Draft of the Treaty.

1. "Whereas the Rohilla Chiefs, in the month of June "1772, entered into a Treaty with the Vizier, in the pre- "ſence, and with the concurrence of General Sir *Robert* "*Barker*, by which they engaged to pay him 40 lacks of "rupees for his aſſiſtance againſt the Marattas, and which "Treaty they have treacherouſly broken; it is therefore "agreed, that a brigade of the Company's forces ſhall "join the Vizier, and aſſiſt to puniſh them, and that he "ſhall pay the whole of its expence. By a brigade is "meant, two battalions of Europeans, one company of "artillery, and ſix battalions of Sepoys; and the expence "is ſettled at Sonaut rupees 210,000 per month. The "Company's troops ſhall not croſs the *Ganges*, nor march "beyond the foot of the hills. The Vizier ſhall retain "as his own that part of the Rohilla country, which lies "on the North-eaſt ſide of the *Ganges*; but in conſider- "ation of the Company's relinquiſhing all claim to ſhare "in the ſaid Country, although it is to be conquered by "their joint forces, the Vizier engages to make them an "acknowledgment of forty lacks of rupees, and in future "to defray the whole expence of the Company's troops, "agreeable to the date above-mentioned, whenever he "has

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" has occaſion for their aſſiſtance, notwithſtanding it is " ſtipulated in the ſecond article of the Treaty of *Allahabad*, concluded by the Vizier and the Company on " the 16th Auguſt 1775, that he ſhall pay only their " extraordinary charges.

2. " The Vizier may retain the brigade aforeſaid, on " the above-mentioned terms, as long as he ſhall require " it, unleſs it ſhall be neceſſary to recal it for the defence " of the Company's own territories; and he may employ " them for the protection of any part of his country; " but they ſhall be kept together in one body, and not " diſperſed on different commands, except ſuch detach- " ments as the Commanding Officer ſhall judge neceſſary " in the time of actual ſervice. He may return the " whole or part of the ſaid brigade whenever he has no " further occaſion for their ſervices, and he ſhall ceaſe to " defray their expences as ſoon as they ſhall enter the " province of *Babar*. But as the Company cannot riſk " the credit of their arms, by allowing a ſmaller force to " remain with the Vizier than half a brigade, it is pro- " vided, that he ſhall either retain one-half of the bri- " gade, or return the whole. Upon their diſmiſſion, " they ſhall depart with all convenient expedition; and " to prevent any future diſputes from ariſing on this " ſubject, the time of their march to the borders of his " province ſhall be computed at the rate of five coſs per " day, from the place where they commenced their " march."

3. " The Vizier engages to pay the 40 lacks of ru- " pees, ſtipulated in the 1ſt article, by monthly payments " of four lacks, to commence from the end of the month " Rabbee Ulluwull, or 10th June 1774; but ſhould any " accident (which God forbid) oblige our forces to retire " from the Rohilla country, and prevent the Vizier " from obtaining poſſeſſion of it, the ſaid 40 lacks ſhall " not be demanded."

9. It was neither arrogant nor unreaſonable in the Vizier to require, that ſince his entire dependence for the ſucceſs of the enterprize which he had projected was on the brigade of the Company's forces, the brigade ſhould not abandon him while he was engaged in it, nor while the iſſue of it remained incomplete; nor can I deviſe any other condition which would have removed his apprehenſions. If the Board judged the propoſition reaſonable, it certainly was not unbecoming in them to aſſent to it. It remains therefore to examine whether it was reaſonable, and whether this power granted to the Vizier was liable to danger or inconvenience.

I have already ſhewn, that the removal of the brigade to ſuch a diſtance would not prove of danger to our own provinces, becauſe it was not wanted for their defence; that it would be productive of no inconvenience, becauſe it occaſioned an entire ſuſpenſion of the Company's payments during its employment. It is not to be denied, that there are poſſible caſes in which it may be wanted for the protection of *Bengal*, but theſe are out of the reach of all probability, and too remote to be quoted as an objection to the preſent engagement.

I am not apprehenſive that the Vizier will inſiſt on keeping the brigade continually with him, my fears are that he may diſmiſs it; as there is every reaſon to wiſh its continuance with him, and none, no not one, for its recal. When the brigade was formerly employed with the Vizier, and the ſhare of its monthly expences defrayed by him was only 30,000 and afterwards 115,000 rupees per month, he never ſhewed any earneſtneſs for its continuance with him beyond the duration of the particular ſervice for which it had been wanted, but was ever ready to propoſe its return; it is not likely therefore that he ſhould be more ſolicitous now for its perpetual reſidence in his country, at an expence to him of 25 lacks a year, which he muſt pay, and which his income, even with the late additions to it, can barely afford. He knows that whenever he ſhall require the preſence of the brigade, it will be for our intereſt to grant it; and he will therefore part with it when his own occaſions, which in this inſtance muſt be confined to the defence of his own dominions, no longer require it, that the charge of its maintenance may be ſhifted from his account to the Company's, and that he may be ſubject to that burden only when he is an immediate gainer by it. This may ſuffice to ſhew the little riſk we ran, had we abſolutely engaged the brigade to him as long as he might chuſe to retain it; but, in the preſent caſe (as I have already explained in the preceding article) it was underſtood by both parties, and indeed is inſeparable from the nature of the engagement, and the original conditions of our mutual alliance, that we might recal it if required for our own protection, not only without any imputation of breach of faith, but (unleſs it was done in ſo precipitate a manner as to defeat the purpoſe of the expedition) even without affording him a pretext for refuſing the payment of the 40 lacks.

I have been thus explicit in vindicating my conduct in relation to the Rohilla war, for the ſake of obviating any impreſſion, which a partial repreſentation of this meaſure may make upon the minds of my Employers, as I know that the majority of the Council, which has condemned it, will labour to paint it in the blackeſt colours which they can lay upon it, as an excuſe for the precipitation with which they have proclaimed their reprobation of it, and violated the engagements, on which the right of the Company to participate in the fruits of its ſucceſs eſſentially depended. But it is not on the propriety of my conduct, that I ſhall reſt for proof of the impropriety of theirs, which is equally incompatible with the intereſts of the Company, whether the tranſactions of the late Adminiſtration ſhall be approved or condemned by our Superiors, whoſe judgment only can decide upon it. A recapitulation of the principal acts of the new Council will amply ſuffice for this purpoſe.

The three Members who came paſſengers in the *Aſhburnham* from *England*, arrived on the noon of the 19th of October. The next day I met them in Council, which was adjourned to the 24th; both to afford time to Mr. *Barwell* to join us, and to myſelf to prepare the buſineſs which might be proper for the immediate cognizance of the new Board. To this effect I drew up a Minute, deſcribing the nature and ſtate of two ſubjects, which were undoubtedly the firſt in point of importance; the eſtabliſhment of the revenue, and the tranſactions in our political ſyſtem. If I could have conceived a more regular, or more candid way of leading the Board into the knowledge of paſt affairs, without the influence of my own particular judgment or prepoſſeſſions, I would have adopted it. This Minute I laid before the Council held on the 24th of October. On the 25th the General moved, and the Board (Mr *Barwell* only diſſenting) reſolved to require, that I ſhould produce the whole correſpondence between me and Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, my Agent at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel *Champion*, the late proviſional Commander in Chief, both official and private, for their inſpection. I offered the firſt, and refuſed the ſecond, for reaſons which appear in my Minutes. To what I have already recorded on this ſubject I will further add, that there are few perſons in the ſervice, of any conſiderable truſt or rank in it, with whom I have not maintained that diſtinct mode of intercourſe. My predeceſſors have ever followed the ſame rule, and I am perſuaded would have thought it a diſhonourable breach of confidence, had they inſerted on the Records of the Company any Letters which had been addreſſed to them as extra-official and private, without the conſent of the writers of them. Lord *Clive*, Mr. *Verelſt*, Mr. *Cartier*, General *Smith*, and General Sir *Robert Barker*, are able to contradict me if I have miſquoted their practice; and I ſhall be glad to appeal to them for the truth of it, if there can be a doubt upon the ſubject. A circumſtance, exactly in point to the preſent matter of diſpute, happened in the courſe of Colonel *Smith's* correſpondence with the Select Committee in 1766, when by ſome miſtake the ſubject of a private Letter from the Colonel to the Preſi-

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dent was only alluded to in a Letter from the Select Committee; upon which occaſion the Colonel aſſerts his ſentiments of the ſacred rights of private correſpondence in the following words; "I have been made accountable to "a public Board for an unprejudiced diſcuſſion of facts, "which ought never to have tranſpired beyond the breaſt "of the right honourable perſon to whom, and whom "only, they were addreſſed:" and the Select Committee, by their ſilence, acquieſced in thoſe ſentiments.

The ſame ſubject was reſumed the next day, the 26th. On my refuſal to deliver the correſpondence in the manner in which it was required of me, Colonel *Monſon* moved, and the General and Mr. *Francis* agreed, that Mr *Nathaniel Middleton* ſhould be recalled from his ſtation; and it was reſolved, by a ſubſequent Reſolution of the ſame majority, that the negociations of this Government with the Vizier ſhould be thenceforth committed to Colonel *Champion* (who ought, by a parity of reaſoning, to have been recalled too) or to the Officer who, on the receipt of the orders, ſhould chance to be the firſt in command of the brigade in the field. To theſe acts Mr. *Barwell* and myſelf diſſented; and I entered my Proteſts againſt all the conſequences to which they were liable.

The ſentiments and intentions of the majority with reſpect to the Rohilla war, and the future deſtination of the army, were ſufficiently manifeſted in this meeting, and left me leſs room for ſurprize at the Propoſitions which were made on the next, which was held on the 28th. Theſe Propoſitions, which had been previouſly drawn up by the General, having undergone ſome alterations in ſubſtance and form, ſtand recorded as follow:

The General propoſes the following Queſtions, viz.

1. "That the demand of the 40 lacks from the Vizier "be repeated, and that Colonel *Champion*, or the Officer "commanding the ſecond brigade, be inſtructed to that "effect."

2. "That the Colonel, or Commanding Officer, be "alſo inſtructed to make a demand for ſuch further pay- "ments as may be due from the Vizier, on receiving "theſe inſtructions, and to liquidate what accounts may "be unſettled with him at the time."

3. "That he be further inſtructed, that although he "is to make an immediate demand for the whole 40 "lacks, and for ſuch other payments as may be due at "that time; yet if he finds that it is impoſſible for the "Vizier to comply with the whole of theſe demands, he "is to receive what can be obtained in ready money, "not to be leſs than 20 lacks, and the reſt to be payable "in different periods within 12 months."

4. "That the Colonel, or Commanding Officer, be "further inſtructed, that in caſe the Vizier ſhall refuſe to "comply with theſe demands, he is to enter a Proteſt "againſt him, declaring that the Company have fulfilled "all their engagements with him, and, within 14 days "after the receipt of theſe inſtructions, to retire with the "army under his command, and withdraw it into the "Company's territories."

5. "That further orders be ſent to Colonel *Champion*, "or the Officer commanding the brigade, that after "having finiſhed the negociations for the money now "due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of his "forces under his command within the limits of the pro- "vince of *Oude*; and that unleſs the Vizier ſhould require "the continuance of the troops for the defence of his "original dominions, with the provinces of *Corah* and "*Allahabad*, he return with them to the cantonments at "*Dinapore*."

6. "That on quitting the Vizier he ſhall acquaint "him, that the Governor General and Council propoſe "to appoint a perſon to reſide at his court; and to de- "clare that they mean to adhere ſtrictly to the Treaties "of *Illahabad* and *Benares* till the pleaſure of the Court "of Directors regarding the latter be known."

7. "That he be further inſtructed, that if he ſhould "apprehend any difficulty or danger from the Vizier in "his retreat, that then he ſhould ſuſpend his declaration, "and take the beſt means in his power for the preſerva- "tion of the army, and adviſe the Board immediately "of his ſituation."

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I prevailed upon the majority to defer coming to any concluſion upon theſe Propoſitions till the next Monday's Conſultation, this being Friday; both to allow time for each to come prepared with his opinion upon them, and for the Gentlemen of the majority to read all the proceedings which had any relation to the ſubject, and of which I had furniſhed them with a complete liſt of references, in my Minute recorded on the Conſultation of the 25th.

On Monday the 31ſt, the Council being aſſembled, I delivered in a Minute, containing my opinion on each Propoſition; Mr. *Barwell* did the ſame; both expreſſed an aſſent to the three firſt, but objected wholly to the 4th, 5th, and 7th, and to the laſt clauſe of the 6th.

The ſum of our objections, to which I crave leave to refer, as the force of them muſt be loſt by an abridgment, was, that the 4th was too peremptory, and left no room for the Vizier to propoſe any alternative, in caſe his preſent means, or future reſources, ſhould not enable him to comply literally with the demands which were made upon him; that the fifth was a direct violation of the engagements which had been formed with him by the laſt Government, and would afford him a juſt pretext to declare his alſo void, and to refuſe payment of the 40 lacks, beſides the danger of loſing the new conquered country, by ſo precipitate a retreat from it; that the laſt clauſe of the 6th was an alarming ſuggeſtion of the invalidity of a public Treaty, which ought not even to be ſuppoſed, till it were pronounced by the Company; and that the 7th left it at the option of the Commander of the army to declare war with the Vizier.

The other Gentlemen brought no opinions in writing, but reſolved on all the Propoſitions, except the laſt clauſe of the 6th, which was omitted.

It is proper to remark, that our army, joined by the Vizier's, had purſued the remains of the Rohilla forces, which had re-aſſembled under the command of *Fyzulla Cawn*, to the extremity of the country, and continued encamped more than a month within a very few miles of them, which interval had been employed in negociations till the 2d of October, when *Fyzoolla Cawn* repaired in perſon to the Engliſh camp, and, as it appears from Colonel *Champion*'s Letters, on the faith of ſome aſſurances given for his ſafety. Since the negociations continued, the enemy remained in arms, and our army ſtill advanced nearer to them, making preparations for an aſſault, in caſe terms of peace could not be agreed on. Thus far our advices had reached us, when the General introduced the Propoſitions above-mentioned; yet, at this criſis of affairs, without waiting for the event, which a very few days muſt have determined, the majority came with their Reſolutions decided for withdrawing the brigade from the ſervice in which it was engaged, whether it were completed or not; and to compel the Vizier to the inſtant adjuſtment of all his accounts depending with the Company, or to abandon him altogether.

One reaſon alledged by the majority for the demand which had with ſo much perſeverance been made for Colonel *Champion*'s and Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*'s Letters, was, that without them, and eſpecially without thoſe which I withheld from them, their knowledge of the ſtate and circumſtances of the Rohilla war, which was to enable them to judge of the propriety of continuing the army in that quarter, or to determine on its removal, would be incomplete; yet they had neither taken time to read the ſeries of the former political Records which I had

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I had recommended to their perusal, nor the Letters of Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, with which I had promised to furnish them; although these were surely as necessary for their information as the private Letters addressed to me, the contents of which they could not know, and, I had declared to them, contained no information on the points on which they wanted it.

Soon after we heard that the Vizier had consigned over the 15 lacks, which *Fyzoolla Cawn* had engaged to pay him in ready money, to Colonel *Champion* in part payment of the 40 lacks due from him, and had hastily set out on his return for his capital with Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, for the declared purpose of acquitting himself of the remainder; and that the brigade was in orders to march back to *Ramgaut*. Fearing the consequences of the orders which had been lately issued, I thought this a fit opportunity to induce the majority to moderate that for the immediate recal of the brigade, and proposed, that as our payments were in so fair a channel of acquittance, and *Ramgaut* lay at little more than 60 miles from the border of the province of *Oude*, to which they had destined its future station, a discretionary power might now be entrusted to the Commander of the Army to continue it at *Ramgaut* for a short period, until the Vizier's consent could be obtained for its entire removal, or until he himself should judge that it might leave the Rohilla country, without hazard of losing it by a fresh invasion, or insurrections.

I think it incumbent upon me to remark a small geographical error, which I have committed in my report of the situation of *Ramgaut*, which I found laid down in my own hand-writing upon an old map in my possession at the distance which I have described; but having since received a more correct map of that quarter from Captain *Rennel*, the Surveyor General, which accompanies these papers, I find that it lies near 40 miles more remote from the territories of the Vizier; an error of little consequence, I apprehend, to my argument; but I mention it, that it may not be imputed to me as a deception.

My proposal was rejected. For the reasons, both for and against it, I beg leave to refer to my Minute in Consultation the 8th of November, and to the replies of the majority in Consultation of the 14th.

As a doubt is expressed respecting the nature of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*'s appointment as Resident or Agent for the Governor at the Court of the Vizier, it is necessary I should say a few words, to reconcile the propriety of styling him my particular Agent, and at the same time considering his appointment in the nature of a public one. By the Company's orders of long standing, and now repeated, all correspondence with the Country Powers is directed to be carried on by the President; and the intention of appointing a Resident with the Vizier was for the purpose of facilitating and perfecting this correspondence, which being the particular province of the Governor, he was my especial Agent, and his appointment was at the same time a public one, as it related to the public service, and was conferred upon him by the Board, though at my recommendation.

That the objects of my remonstrance may not be lost or mistaken in the long narrative and arguments with which I have introduced them, I beg leave to repeat, I ground my charge against the Members who form the majority of the Board; on their recal of my public Agent from the court of the Vizier; on their precipitate resolution of abandoning the Vizier, and of withdrawing entirely from his alliance, unless he complied in the given time of fourteen days with their demands, in the exact form and mode in which they were prescribed to him; on their resolution to withdraw the brigade from the Rohilla country, even if he did comply with those demands, whether the conquest of it was secured, or it was in danger of being wrested out of his hands; and lastly, on the extraordinary licence which they had given to the Commander of the brigade, of forcing the Company into a war with their Ally, under covert of taking measures to preserve the army from danger.

Actions so violent in their nature, and bearing such strong appearances of determined hostility, though proceeding from the most just causes of provocation, seldom fail of producing suspicions of worse intended; and in the means which fear suggests for self-defence, too often prove the cause of working up a slight complaint into the most fatal excess of a declared rupture. But under the circumstances of the present Government, nothing could have so evident a tendency to precipitate this conclusion.

The jealousy with which a new Administration is naturally viewed by those who are connected with it, is of itself sufficient to render even their indifferent transactions liable to misconstruction; but what sentiments must have struck the Vizier, when with the first notification of the constitution of the present Council, he received advice of the recal of the public Minister of this Government from his presence, and of the Resolutions respecting his payments and the removal of the brigade? he will have concluded that a majority of the new Council had combined to overthrow my authority, and to raise their own on its ruins; and had determined to force him to a rupture, in order to depreciate the measures I had taken. It will avail little that these proceedings are tempered with solemn professions of an inviolable attachment to former engagements; such assurances accompanying the actual breach of engagements, are more likely to destroy confidence than to inspire it, as they too manifestly infer the conviction of an irregularity of conduct, which requires such declarations to explain or palliate it.

I have been too long versed in public affairs to look for a concurrence of all men's opinions in any one Proposition however expedient; nor am I so much addicted to my own, as to take offence at an opposition to it, where that opposition proceeds from a judgment unbiassed by personal animosity. I appeal to the Minutes of the majority for proofs of the temper which swayed their Resolutions. Had a mere sense of duty impelled them to declare their disavowal of the expedition, in which they found a part of the army engaged against the Rohillas; or if they had judged the continuance of that force beyond the line of the Vizier's possessions inconsistent with the orders of the Company, the path which they should have pursued lay very plain before them, by which they might have amply manifested their own fidelity, and guarded the Company's orders against the like violation hereafter. In many cases I understand it to be a position of law, that *Quod fieri non debet, factum valet*, and I believe it was never more applicable than to the present occasion. The measure was an act of the past Administration; it was on the point of being concluded; all the dangers and inconveniencies to which it could ever have been liable were past; of the conditions which had been agreed to on the part of the Company in this engagement, nothing remained but to bring the war to a period, to place their Ally in the secure possession of the new conquest, and to retire within their former bounds. The payments which formed the conditions of the Vizier's part of the engagement were just due; nor had any reason yet appeared to justify the suspicion that he would have failed in the performance of them.

Under such circumstances, I presume that the Members of the new Council, who disapproved of the enterprize, ought to have recorded their disapprobation of it; to have declared their determination, not to give their consent to the employment of any part of the Company's forces, beyond the line which they judged to be prescribed by the orders of the Court of Directors, after the service in which they were then engaged should be accomplished; but to have permitted the brigade to remain in the Rohilla country so long as that service, and the engagements subsisting between this Government and the Vizier required it; leaving the responsibility of the measure to the

the Members of the laſt Adminiſtration who formed it, and under whoſe authority it was brought to the criſis in which the new Government found it.

The ſame temperate conduct might have been obſerved with reſpect to Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*; his appointment as Reſident on the part of Government at the Court of the Vizier might have been confirmed, but the relation of it transferred from me to the Board at large.

Such a conduct, without the ſmalleſt ſacrifice either of their integrity or duty, would have accommodated their ſentiments to the faith of Government and the conſiſtency of its meaſures; the alarms unavoidably attendant on a change of Government ſo totally new would have ſubſided; the Vizier could have had no pretext to refuſe or withhold the ſums which were due from him; and the Rohilla war would have ended with honour, with unſullied faith, with the reſtoration of that luſtre to our arms, which an inaction of many years had almoſt obſcured in the minds of the people of *Hindoſtan*, with a great addition of wealth to ſupply our impoveriſhed reſources, and without a ſingle inconvenience or cauſe afforded to regret it.

Let the reverſe of this conduct be examined in the firſt acts of the new Council.

By their violent recal of my Agent from the Vizier's Court, they have proclaimed the annihilation of my authority in that branch of the Government in which the Company, for obvious political reaſons, have ever thought it neceſſary to inveſt their Governor with the oſtenſible power, and which in their very firſt orders to the new Adminiſtration, they have directed ſhould continue to be conducted through him.

They have diſregarded the faith of our engagements, which even in the moſt violent Reſolutions have ever been tranſmitted as ſacred from one Government to that which has ſucceeded it. They have expoſed the conqueſt which the Britiſh arms have acquired for the Vizier to be wreſted from him with the loſs of our military reputation; they have riſked the loſs of the pecuniary reſources which were ſtipulated for the Company as the fruits of their ſucceſſes; and they have precipitately withdrawn the brigade from the ſtation where its whole expence is borne by the Vizier, to become again an heavy and uſeleſs burthen upon ourſelves.

I now once more make my ſolemn appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors from the meaſures already decided by the majority of the Council, and proteſt againſt every future act of the ſame unvaried majority; declaring, that I hold myſelf no longer reſponſible for the conſequences which the intereſts of my Employers are liable to ſuffer; while I am deprived of the means which their commands, which the Parliament of *Great Britain*, which (if I preſume not too raſhly on the informations communicated to me) even the gracious intention of my Sovereign, have committed in an eſpecial manner to my charge, for the ſecurity of thoſe intereſts, and the ſupport of the national honour and dominion in this great and valuable branch of the Britiſh empire.

Warren Haſtings.

Mr. *Barwell*'s Minute on the Appeals of the Members of Council.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 8th December 1774.

Mr. *Barwell* delivers in the following Minute upon this occaſion, and deſires that it may be recorded.

When ſuch formal appeals are made to our Superiors, I cannot help lamenting the occaſion from which they proceed, nor repreſs the deep concern it fixes on my mind to view the proſpect before me. When I met Gentlemen ſelected by the public voice to diſcharge a truſt of ſuch national importance, as the ſuperintendance of the intereſt of the crown of *Great Britain*, and of the *Eaſt India* Company, I met them in the ſanguine hope, that one ſpirit would have animated the collective body, and united us ſo firmly in purſuit of the great objects of our appointment, that diſſenſions could not have found a place in our Councils. How great then is my unhappineſs and diſappointment to ſee in an inſtant this agreeable, this honourable ſcene, my imagination formed, prove a chimera, a mere chimera; for on the moment of our entering on the Adminiſtration, a ſcene of contention commenced, and, to my mortification, I found my attention immediately called to meaſures of the late Government, that could not be retracted, having already operated and produced the beneficial conſequences they were planned to effect. We might, indeed, riſk theſe advantages to the ſtate by an ill-timed impatience to contract its political connections; a riſk I deemed incumbent on myſelf, if poſſible, to avert; and on mature thought I have no reaſon to doubt the juſtneſs of my ſentiments, or the propriety of that ſupport I judged due to the Governor General in our late debates. My ultimate object was obviouſly the benefit of the ſtate, not contracted by nice examination of the literal confined meaning of any one particular order, but directed to the general good within our graſp, and offered to us in the ſtate and poſture of our political connections at the time we entered on the Government. Further I conſidered, and I foreſaw no poſſible advantage to the Nation, or to the Company, in debating the propriety of paſt meaſures, ſubmitted long ſince to our Superiors, and for which neither myſelf, nor any of the Gentlemen of the preſent Adminiſtration (the Governor excepted) were reſponſible. The benefits of the meaſures alone were left to us, unburthened with reſponſibility; why then not ſecure them? What neceſſity for rendering them precarious by a precipitation that appears, in degree, to loſe the object, while it inflicts the ſevereſt cenſure on the late Government? A principle of action, that I flatter myſelf will fully acquit me in the public opinion, whatever deciſion it may paſs on the ſentiments I have delivered.

It is with diffidence, and with the utmoſt deference to the judgment my Superiors may give on a policy that terminates proſperouſly for their affairs, I adventure to confirm opinions already pronounced. I am conſcious it is not my province to take upon me to approve or condemn meaſures which have come before their tribunal; but this has been rendered unavoidable in the preſent inſtance, from their being made the ſubject of debate. Thus ſituated, I have carefully conſidered and weighed every circumſtance. I have marked with attention the riſe, progreſs, execution, and happy conſequences reſulting to this Government from its connections with the Vizier; and pronounce, from conviction, the late Adminiſtration fully juſtified, and its meaſures entirely conſonant to the firſt principles of ſound policy. As this is my opinion, I muſt coincide in the Governor General's Letter of Appeal. It is, from all the information I have obtained, a candid expoſition of facts; it is unexceptionable in mode and form, and authorized by the Court of Directors. This, I apprehend, is not the caſe with the Appeal of the Members in oppoſition; not having ſeen it, I cannot ſpeak to the matter; but it is at leaſt exceptionable in form, and the firſt inſtance, within my knowledge, of a part of the Adminiſtration formally ſeparating itſelf. Oppoſing ſentiments I have often ſeen recorded on the proceedings of the Council, but I never before ſaw them addreſſed to the Direction in Letters from the ſeveral Members. I will not therefore attempt to extend known privileges, or to aſſume new ones to my ſtation. I approve, and would affix my name to the Governor General's Appeal; but as the requeſt is improper, and its irregularity would determine him to decline it, I take this method of expreſſing my entire approbation, and joining thus far the Governor General's Addreſs to the Court of Directors.

(Signed) *Richard Barwell.*

A true copy.

J. P. Auriol.

Aſſiſtant Secretary.

Sentiments

APPENDIX. No. 45.

Sentiments of the Court of Directors on the Defeat of the Rohillas.

Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council of *Bengal*; dated 3d March 1775.

49. By Letters received over land from our Select Committee at *Fort William*, dated the 14th and 19th May 1774, we are informed of the defeat and death of *Hafez Rhamut Cawn*, Chief of the Rohillas, and of the probability of that country being ſpeedily ſubdued by *Sujah ul Dowla*; and notwithſtanding the pecuniary advantages which the Company have gained by the event, we are exceedingly concerned to find, that our arms have been employed in the conqueſt of the Rohillas, though we muſt conſeſs the conduct of their Chiefs, in refuſing to fulfil their ſolemn ſtipulations with the Vizier, ſeems to have drawn upon them the calamities they have ſuffered.

50. After noticing the cautionary terms ſettled with *Sujah ul Dowla*, previous to the march of our troops, we can have no doubt of his having fulfilled the conditions of the agreement by which he became entitled to our aſſiſtance; and had the object in view been extended no further, than to compel payment of the forty lacks of rupees due to the Vizier and the Company for the protection afforded the Rohillas, we ſhould have had leſs objection to the meaſure; though we muſt confeſs it would have been much more agreeable to us, if the Rohillas had faithfully complied with their engagements, which were entered into for the immediate and mutual defence of the contracting parties, and in which alſo the intereſt of the Company was concerned.

51. In a political view, we fear the late engagements with *Sujah ul Dowla* are not altogether unexceptionable; however, as they have been carried into execution, we can only enjoin you to take eſpecial care, that the additional power acquired by the Vizier be prevented from operating to the detriment of the Company. We truſt he is now enabled to repel the Marattas in that quarter, ſhould they repeat their incurſions, which petty ſtates have not been able to do. His Country muſt therefore be conſidered as a barrier to our own poſſeſſions, and the ideas of our having rendered him reſpectable, and of our friendſhip being abſolutely neceſſary to his future ſecurity, can never be too much inculcated.

52. The Treaty of *Allahabad* compels us to aſſiſt the Vizier in defending his dominions in caſe they ſhall at any time hereafter be attacked; but in regard to new conqueſts, or to any warlike enterprizes beyond his own territories, we abſolutely prohibit you from employing our troops on ſuch expeditions on any pretence whatever.

53. We much approve the alteration made in the ſecond Article of the Treaty of *Allahabad*, reſpecting the terms upon which our aſſiſtance is in caſe of neceſſity to be granted to *Sujah ul Dowla*, as thoſe terms were very inadequate to the ſervice to be performed, and conſequently very improper.

Orders of the Court of Directors for recalling the troops.

From the Court of Directors to the Governor General and Council at *Fort William* in *Bengal*; dated 7th March 1775.

1. Since we wrote to you under date of the 3d inſtant, we have received two Letters from our Preſident and Council of *Fort William*, dated the 22d of Auguſt 1774, and alſo a Letter from our Select Committee, dated the 24th of the ſame month.

2. The above advices were ſent by the *Hawke* ſloop, by way of *Fort Saint George*, which veſſel arrived at the *Cape of Good Hope* the 30th December, and they were brought from thence by his Majeſty's ſhip *Intrepid*.

3. By the above-mentioned Letter from our Select Committee, we are informed that a brigade of our troops, which by former advices was expected to have been returned within our provinces, had nevertheleſs, at the ſolicitation of *Sujah ul Dowla*, penetrated into the center of the Rohilla country on the oppoſite ſide of the *Ganges*. The above advices cannot but alarm us exceedingly; more eſpecially when we attend to the ſituation and circumſtances of the neighbouring Powers, and are informed, in the Letter above-mentioned, of the ſteps taken by the King, and the probability there is of the Marattas being ſufficiently diſengaged from their inteſtine broils to turn their arms againſt our poſſeſſions, if they ſhall deem it for their intereſt to commit depredations therein.

4. Under the above circumſtances, we could not omit the preſent opportunity of teſtifying our concern; on finding ſo conſiderable a part of our army at ſuch a diſtance from our territories, and ſo employed as to render it difficult for them to repair within the provinces in time to prevent the ravages of an enemy, in caſe the tranquillity of *Bengal* ſhould be ſuddenly interrupted.

5. We therefore direct, that you on no account permit our troops to remain beyond the line of defence originally ſettled with *Sujah ul Dowla*; but that you forthwith take meaſures for their recal, in caſe they ſhall not be returned before the arrival of theſe our orders.

6. And as the hazard to which our poſſeſſions are expoſed by undertaking ſuch diſtant expeditions appears to us very great, and the meaſure ſo very repugnant to every idea of ſound policy, we hereby abſolutely reſtrict you from all attempts of this nature in future; and we poſitively direct, that you never conſent to employ our troops beyond the limits of our own provinces, or thoſe of our ally *Sujah ul Dowla*, including therein ſuch territories only as we are by Treaty obliged to defend, in caſe his dominions ſhall at any time be actually invaded.

We are your affectionate friends,

Edward Wheler.	*William James.*
John Garrſon.	*John Woodhouſe.*
T. B. Rous.	*George Cuming.*
Nathaniel Smith.	*George Latem.*
Peter Laſcelles.	*Joſeph Sparkes.*
Charles Boddam.	*Samuel Peach.*
W. G. Freeman.	*John Smith.*
John Michie.	*Richard Hall.*

London, the 7th March 1775.

Extract of Letter from the Governor General and Council of *Fort William*, in their Secret Department; dated 4th January 1775;—received in *London*, 18th July 1775.

1. We now addreſs you by the *Dutton*, and propoſe to continue our advices from this Department on the plan we adopted for thoſe by the *Britiſh King*, narrating only the reſolutions and orders of the Board, and leaving the opinions and arguments of the different Members to your judgment, as they will be found on the Proceedings ſent by this diſpatch. We have only to requeſt that you will be pleaſed to notice, that by the term "Board," when we ſpeak of their deciſions, we mean only to avoid the invidious expreſſion Majority; which we however only mean to include by the firſt term; when the Board are unanimous we ſhall take care to expreſs it particularly.

2. Since our laſt, Colonel *Champion* arrived at the Preſidency. Colonel *Gallitz*, who ſucceeded him in the command of the brigade, duly received our inſtructions for his negociations with the Vizier, and, by the lateſt advices from him, was preparing to carry them into execution. The brigade was then at *Ramgaut*, but he propoſed to move it immediately down within the limits of the province of *Oude*, to remain there till he ſhould have finiſhed his negociations with the Vizier.

3. We do not find that any part of the treaſure received by the Vizier from *Fuzullah Cawn* was paid in to the Commanding Officer of the troops, as we were given to underſtand there would. By a Letter from Mr. *Middleton* to the Governor General we learn, that he (Mr. *Middleton*) had received from the Vizier fifteen lacks of rupees, and that he was to ſet out with it for the Preſidency as ſoon as he could procure boats.

4. Mr. *Grady* is lately arrived ſafe from *Fyzabad* with the money entruſted to his charge of the former payment, being ten lacks of rupees from the Vizier; he left five lacks at *Coſſimbuzar* by our order, and delivered the remaining five into the treaſury here. The Tuncaw for five lacks of rupees on Raja *Cheyt Sing*, which was alſo delivered to him, was not accepted.

5. It having been reſolved that a fixed Reſident at the Court of the Vizier ſhould be appointed from the Company's civil ſervants, the Governor General lately thought fit to propoſe the honourable *Frederick Stuart* for that truſt, but the Governor General's propoſition was not agreed to, Mr. *Briſtow* being afterwards propoſed by the General, and this propoſal obtaining the concurrence of the Board, he was appointed accordingly with a ſalary and allowances ſimilar to what Mr. *Middleton* enjoyed in the employment which he held at that Court.

6. You were advied by the late Adminiſtration of the donation of ſeven lacks of rupees which the Vizier intended for the army, and of his having actually tranſmitted to Colonel *Champion* an obligation under his hand for that ſum payable in ſix months; you were further informed of the refuſal of the Preſident and Council to give any countenance to the acceptance of this donation, it falling in their apprehenſion within the prohibitions of the late Act of Parliament. Since Colonel *Champion's* arrival here he has delivered over to us the obligation above-mentioned, and has added to it a ſeparate note of hand from the Vizier, for 50,000 rupees, intended by him as a preſent to the Field Officers of the brigade, and a Tunkah for three lacks, intended for himſelf.

7. At this time the Governor General laid before us an addreſs to him, ſigned by all the Field Officers of the brigade ſerving under Colonel *Champion*, accompanied with a caſe, repreſenting the hardſhips which they conceived they ſuſtained, in being deprived of the common right of ſoldiers to the plunder of places taken without capitulation, or to an equivalent for it when they are ſpared; that in the late campaign they had, by a victory in the field, obtained the immediate poſſeſſion of ſeveral conſiderable places which ſurrendered at diſcretion on their approach; particularly *Peelabete*, *Barelli*, *Oubla*, and *Biſſouli*, where treaſures were accumulated to a great amount; all which were ſeized upon by the Vizier without allowing any ſhare to the victorious troops. That afterwards, when the enemy were driven to their laſt retreat, and obliged finally to ſubmit to him on the terms which he was pleaſed to preſcribe, he acquired great riches by the capitulation, without any conſideration had of the troops or their ſervices. That when he offered them the donation of ſeven lacks of rupees, they regarded it merely as a compoſition for the plunder to which they were entitled by the uſage of war, and of which they had been deprived in the courſe of the campaign; and therefore did not conceive that it could come within the intention of the Act, but ſubmitted their caſe to the favour and conſideration of the Board.

8. Incined as we were to liſten to their repreſentation, we ſtill did not think it was in our power to give any countenance to what appeared to us a direct breach of the letter of the Act. The moſt in this caſe which we could do, was to agree to receive the whole of the money as a depoſit into the Company's treaſury, as well the ſeven lacks to the brigade as the three and an half given in by Colonel *Champion*, and to recommend to your Honourable Court to uſe ſuch means as to you ſhall ſeem moſt proper, for obtaining by Act of Parliament or otherwiſe, a permiſſion for the army to receive and divide it among them.

9. In this recommendation we are actuated as well by motives of ſound policy as juſtice; for although it may be expedient to reſtrain your army from extorting grants, under colour of preſents or free gifts, yet we ſubmit to you, whether to preclude them in all caſes from the hopes of a recompence for their ſervices, would not be to put them on a worſe footing than any other ſoldiers, and might not ſerve to depreſs that ardour in enterprize which the hopes of advantage never fail to excite. We therefore truſt you will be able to deviſe ſome means of relief for them under theſe circumſtances, and till your orders arrive (if we receive the money offered them by the Vizier) we ſhall retain it in our hands; and to convince them, particularly the ſubaltern officers and ſoldiers, that ſomething real is intended for them, we propoſe to make a diſtribution of the ſhares which every man will be entitled to receive when permiſſion ſhall be obtained, and to publiſh it immediately in general orders for their ſatisfaction.

10. Colonel *Champion*, Lieutenant Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay*, being all arrived at the Preſidency from the army in the Rohilla country, the Governor General expreſſed his wiſh to have them called before the Board, to anſwer ſome queſtions which he deemed neceſſary for elucidating the grounds and conduct of that war. The queſtions were unanimouſly approved of by the Board, and theſe Gentlemen were ordered to attend for the purpoſes above-mentioned; their examinations appear at length on the Conſultations.

11. We alſo, on Colonel *Champion's* arrival, thought it neceſſary to call upon him for the communication of all the original Letters, or authenticated copies of the whole Correſpondence, which had paſſed between him and the Governor, from his departure in the laſt ſpring to take the command of the army in the Rohilla war, until his return to the Preſidency. He at firſt declined, without the Governor General's aſſent, to lay them before us; but on the latter ſignifying his conſent, he has promiſed to ſend them in, according to our requiſition. Soon after this, on his own requeſt, we permitted him to reſign the Company's ſervice.

Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, dated 11th January 1775, and received in *London* the 18th of July 1775; containing Obſervations and Remarks on the Governor General's Appeal to the Court of Directors, of the 3d of December 1774.

1. We had no opportunity of making any remarks on the Governor General's appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors by the laſt ſhip, dated the 3d of December; nor have we now ſufficient leiſure from public buſineſs to enter into and maintain a voluminous argument with the Governor General, concerning meaſures on which we have already delivered our opinion, and on which it appears to us that no new lights have been produced.—Something however ſeems neceſſary to be ſaid, in reply to the charges brought againſt us by the Governor General, leſt by our ſilence we ſhould appear to abandon any of our declared opinions, or to admit the exactneſs of the Governor's repreſentation by not diſputing it.

2. What we have now to ſubmit to the conſideration of the Court of Directors ſhall be collected cloſely, and brought, if poſſible, into that clear point of view in which it may be ſeen diſtinctly; and judged of with preciſion. It is not *our* intereſt or inclination to perplex the cauſe depending before the Court of Directors, either with the nicety of logical refinements, or with the introduction of matter totally foreign from the ſubject. Their attention may be diſtracted by a multiplicity of *words*, when it is *our* higheſt intereſt that it ſhould be ſteadily fixed and confined to *things*.

APPENDIX. No. 45.

3. The argument againſt the Rohilla war was fully ſtated in our laſt addreſs. We meant to make uſe of all the materials then in our poſſeſſion. One important obſervation however on the conduct of the late Adminiſtration was omitted. The Governor General, in his Minute of the 26th November 1773, in order to relieve his Council from the embarraſſment they were in upon the receipt of *Sujah Dowla*'s demand of the brigade, and in order to elude that demand without violating the Governor's private engagement with *Sujah Dowla*, fortunately falls upon an expedient, which he conceives will remove all difficulties. It is in ſubſtance to yield to the Vizier's demand, but upon ſuch rigid terms as he will probably revolt at, and as may induce him to drop all thoughts of proſecuting the deſign.

4. From theſe premiſes it would naturally follow, that the hard terms which the Governor propoſes to inſiſt on in favour of the Company, ſhould at leaſt be new and unexpected by *Sujah Dowla*; yet by the Governor General's report of the negociations at *Benares*, it appears beyond contradiction, that the above terms were no other than what the Vizer himſelf had previouſly offered, upon the condition of our yielding him our aſſiſtance in the intended war againſt the Rohillas. The ſum of two lacks ten thouſand rupees is ſettled by the Treaty of *Benares* for the monthly pay of the brigade, whenever they might be employed in his ſervice, and he offers to make the Company a conſideration for their ſervice in the Rohilla war of forty lacks of rupees.

5. This being indiſputably the fact, we are at a loſs to comprehend in what new articles the ſuppoſed harſhneſs of the conditions, which were to induce *Sujah Dowla* to relinquiſh his deſign, could be underſtood to have conſiſted. We have no other difficulty in attributing this management to a pre-concerted colluſion, but that it ſeems too groſs to anſwer the purpoſe of deceiving.

6. The real ſecret of the meaſure betrays itſelf to us from day to day. It is not of a nature to be long concealed. The Vizier's correſpondence with Mr. *Haſtings* is well worth the attention of the Court of Directors—They will ſee at once that many of his expreſſions convey more than could have been meant for their information. "*When we concerted this expe-*" *dition together*,"—"*As I was determined to extirpate*" *the Rohillas, I would not liſten to any propoſals of peace.*"—"*Conſider, my friend, that it was my abſolute determination*" *to extirpate the Rohillas, and that I requeſted an Engliſh*" *force for that purpoſe.*" In our opinion it is needleſs to look for farther evidences of the nature of his deſign, or of the approbation it received from Mr. *Haſtings*. It cannot now be a queſtion, whether from the firſt he meant to extirpate the Rohillas or not; or whether Mr. *Haſtings* was originally apprized of that deſign in its full extent.

7. It is not our intention to enter into a refutation of the laborious train of arguments by which the Governor endeavours to ſupport the general expediency and juſtice of the Rohilla war—we willingly ſubmit the whole to better judgments than our own. The only new document introduced by the Governor General on this ſubject, is an extract of a private Letter which he wrote to Mr. *Sulivan* by the firſt diſpatch after his return from *Benares*. Our cauſe is too powerful to make it neceſſary for us to diſpute with him, upon the weakneſs and impropriety of referring to ſuch a record in the diſcuſſion of a great public meaſure,—Let us ſee what the extract, ſuch as it is, and ſo produced, contains.

8. In ſubſtance it amounts to this.—"That although "there were arguments which diſſuaded him from the "Rohilla expedition, yet there were others which "would have made him very glad of *any* occaſion to "employ the Company's forces, that ſaved ſo much of "their pay and of their expences.—On one ſide he fears "the judgment which might be paſſed upon the mea"ſure at home, where he ſees too much ſtreſs laid upon "general maxims, and that his word will not be taken "againſt the prevailing opinion of the Vizier's great "power and treacherous deſigns againſt us."—On the "other ſide he ſtates, "the favourableneſs of the oppor"tunity offered by the abſence of the Marattas;—the "weak ſtate of the Rohillas, which promiſed an eaſy con"queſt of them; and his idea of the Company's diſtreſs at "home, added to his knowledge of their wants abroad."

9. On this ſtate of the communication of the Governor's private ſentiments to his friend, we obſerve, that if it contains more intelligence than he tranſmitted to the Court of Directors, he muſt defend himſelf to them, for communicating to Mr. *Sulivan* what he withheld from his Superiors. If the communication was the ſame to both parties, we know not to what purpoſe the above extract is now produced.—The public declarations of his conſtant approbation of the Rohilla expedition from September 1773, to this time, are as well authenticated as thoſe, which before that period he had uniformly made againſt every meaſure of that nature. We date the change of ſyſtem from April or May 1773.

10. We ſhall avail ourſelves however of this part of the Governor's private correſpondence to prove, under his own authority, that from his knowledge of the Company's diſtreſſes both at home and abroad, he would have been glad of *any* occaſion to have employed their forces. *The Company are in diſtreſs; their troops muſt be employed.* No man we think can miſtake the meaning of ſuch declarations; yet when other immediate purpoſes are to be ſerved, Mr. *Haſtings* is not reſerved in his deſcription of the flouriſhing ſtate of the Company's affairs here, and of the ſalutary effects which his Adminiſtration has produced.

11. In November 1773 they certainly had not yet produced thoſe effects. Since that time there have been ſupplies of money received from *Sujah Dowla*'s treaſury, which undoubtedly muſt have given a temporary relief to this diſtreſſed Government. Admitting that theſe ſupplies have been ſubſtituted from motives of irreſiſtible neceſſity, in the place of thoſe ſolid and permanent reſources, by which the Government of a rich commercial country ought naturally to be ſupported; we deſire, that in an argument ſuch as the preſent, care may be taken to apply effects to their true cauſes, and not to confound objects which have not even an artificial relation to each other. An inſtance will illuſtrate our meaning. We have lately reſolved to ſend ten lacks of rupees in ſpecie to *Bombay*; the immediate power of ſupplying ſuch a ſum is a ſymptom of a flowing treaſury; the neceſſity of ſending it in ſpecie is too clear a proof that our trade to the Weſtward is ruined. A man who underſtands the ſubject, and has no intereſt in making it obſcure, will find nothing contradictory in theſe facts, or in the reaſoning deduced from them. To ſay that a commercial country flouriſhes, when making war is the only reſource it has left, appears to us an abſurdity in terms; but inconſiſtent principles of action muſt of neceſſity be defended by inconſiſtent arguments, and by a different language held at different times, which no ſophiſtry can reconcile.

12. In the preſent inſtance we are candid enough to give the Governor notice of the dilemma to which his own declarations reduce him. From all that we have hitherto obſerved of his way of acting and reaſoning, we are thoroughly convinced, that every thing he ſays and does, in ſupport of what he has already ſaid and done, will only involve him in a labyrinth of contradictions from which he never can extricate himſelf.

13. On this footing we are content to leave for the preſent the arrangement of the Governor General's conduct reſpecting the Rohilla war, and the defence of our own. Much undoubtedly has been done, *quod fieri non debuit*. Whether that be a reaſon for confirming what has been done, or whether this or many other acts of Mr. *Haſtings*'s Adminiſtration can be confirmed on any other principle, are points which we willingly ſubmit to the deciſion of our Superiors.

14. If

14. If the charge appears to be now perſonally levelled againſt the Governor, diſtinguiſhed from his Council, let it be obſerved, that he has voluntarily taken the whole burthen upon himſelf. He ſays, "that after a "debate of three ſucceſſive days, both morning and "evening, the late Council at laſt came to a final agree-"ment to leave the propoſition of the Rohilla war to "him. No two Members agreed exactly in opinion, "and it was difficult to reconcile them;—whereas the "ſentiments of the Preſident were the ſame invariably "from the beginning."

15. In ſtrict right this candour of the Governor General will be no juſtification, though in equity it may be conſidered as ſome excuſe for the late Council, in aſſenting to meaſures which their conſciences condemned. But with reſpect to the Governor General, the exemption he allows to his Council is fatal to himſelf.—If a doubt can poſſibly remain in the mind of any unprejudiced perſon concerning the real motives on which he has acted;—if ſuch premiſes as thoſe, which we think we have eſtabliſhed by a conſtant reference to undiſputed facts, can be preſented to the mind of the Court of Directors, without an unavoidable concluſion that more has been done than yet appears;—in ſhort, if the proofs already extant do not amount to demonſtration, we, for ourſelves, have no doubt that a little time will neceſſarily produce other explanations, by which all thoſe meaſures which at preſent cannot be ſupported by oſtenſible motives, will be completely accounted for, and all opinions on the ſubject reconciled.

16. The few remaining points of the Governor General's Minute and Addreſs to the Court of Directors, which we think proper to take notice of, ſhall be briefly conſidered and diſmiſſed. He is pleaſed to point out to the Court of Directors in what manner it was our duty to have acted, upon our own principle, of adhering to a defenſive ſyſtem for the future. To this we ſay, that the meaſures we reſolved on were the reſult of deliberation, and that our idea of the rectitude and neceſſity of thoſe meaſures is confirmed by reflection. We might indeed have concerted with the Governor, in what manner the ſame meaſures might be carried into execution with the leaſt diminution of his perſonal credit with the Country Powers, and we ſhould probably have done ſo, if it had been poſſible for us to attribute his conduct to error of judgment.

17. The Governor thankfully acknowledges the ſupport which he receives from Mr. *Barwell*, "and with "the more pleaſure, as he eſteems it to proceed rather "from a juſt conviction of the propriety of his conduct "than from perſonal attachment." The happy reconciliation alluded to, took place ſome months before our arrival.

18. Nothing, we confeſs, can be more meritorious than a ſacrifice of private animoſities to the public ſervice; apparently no man poſſeſſes this merit in a higher degree than Mr. *Barwell*.—There have been times in which he did not judge ſo favourably of the propriety of the Governor's conduct as he does at preſent; we do not wiſh to revive the memory of thoſe times, much leſs to interrupt a union, which we are bound to think can have no foundation but the public good. As for ourſelves, we are ready to confeſs, that we have no merit of this ſort to plead to the Court of Directors. We had no enmities to ſacrifice. We had no mutual compliances or conceſſions to make to each other. We ſet out upon one principle. We have but one object in view; and cannot in any important inſtance differ about the means. On this ſubject we ſhall only add, that we are far from deſiring to deprive the Governor of the aſſiſtance he receives from Mr. *Barwell*.

19. We are charged with a reſolution, ſuppoſed to have been formed long before our arrival, of forcing Mr. *Haſtings* to reſign the Government. With ſome men, we truſt, that an acquaintance with our perſonal characters will be ſufficient to acquit us of ſo baſe and abſurd a deſign; with others, we are ſure of being ſufficiently vindicated by their certain knowledge of our firſt ſentiment in regard to Mr. *Haſtings*, repeatedly and uniformly declared in *England*, and ſupported by the ſteps we took on many occaſions, to remove or ſoften every objection which we apprehended might ariſe in his mind, from the new ſituation in which he was placed by the Act of Parliament, or by the Company's inſtructions, and which might have inclined him not to continue in the Government.

20. To Mr. *Haſtings* himſelf our defence is of a different nature, but equally complete. No man, we believe, is better acquainted with the great leading motive which is ſuppoſed to influence and direct the conduct of mankind. Whenever he ſhall inform the Court of Directors in what ſenſe it was our real intereſt to drive him from the Government, we pledge ourſelves to prove to the world, beyond the poſſibility of a doubt, that no event whatever could be perſonally more diſtreſſing to us, nor leſs for our intereſt, underſtanding intereſt as he does, than that which we are accuſed of endeavouring to promote.

21. Some inattention to ceremonies on the part of the Governor in the mode of our reception, is ſuppoſed to have had a ſhare in creating or confirming in us thoſe hoſtile reſolutions which we are accuſed of having formed againſt him. The firſt objection we make to all that the Governor has ſaid on this article is, that it is a defence without a charge. We leave it to our Superiors to judge what ſort of conſciouſneſs is implied in ſo haſty an anticipation of charges not advanced againſt him.

22. Our ſecond objection would be to his ſtate of the facts, if we thought it worthy of ourſelves, or conſiſtent with the proſecution of buſineſs of a far heavier nature, to deſcend to ſuch a detail. As for the reſt, we hope it will be thought too much to be believed, on no better evidence than Mr. *Haſtings*'s bare affirmation, that we are capable of engaging in meaſures, which, if they are ſuch as he deſcribes them, may ſubvert an empire, merely to revenge an omiſſion of ceremony, for which the ſlighteſt conceſſion from Mr. *Haſtings* ought to have been ſo ſufficient an excuſe, that we could not have declined accepting it without betraying an injudicious appearance of hoſtility to him, and diſgracing ourſelves.

23. If the charges of a perſonal failure in the reſpect due to Mr. *Haſtings* had had any foundation whatſoever, we think it ought not to have been deſcribed by ſo groſs a term as that of a *warfare of ſcurrility*. The expreſſions to which he himſelf applies and confines that deſcription are on record, and referred to by himſelf. Our Superiors will judge, whether they have a reference to the public meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, or perſonally to Mr. *Haſtings*; and whether, ſuppoſing them to be directed againſt meaſures only, they were or could be too ſtrong for the occaſion.

24. We ſhall reſerve our obſervations on Mr. *Haſtings*'s ſtate of the revenues for a ſeparate Minute. In this branch of information the Governor has many ſignal advantages over us. The ſubject itſelf requires the ſtricteſt care and attention; and as every official light is either directly withheld from us, or extorted by us with pain to ourſelves, and communicated with a ſtudied perplexity and reluctance, all our enquiries on this head are attended with uncommon labour. Truth however will, we doubt not, ere long find its way to the public view; and if we have any apprehenſion for the conſequence of our enquiries, it is not of being unable to prove even more than we have advanced or ſuggeſted, but leſt the general ſtate of this Country ſhould appear to be ſuch, as may alarm the Company and the Nation for the approaching and inſtant ruin of *Bengal*.

25. We now proceed to the obſervations which we think neceſſary for the information of the Court of Directors, upon ſome events and proceedings which have taken place here ſince the diſpatch of the *Britiſh King*; and we are the leſs ſolicitous about taking up ſo much of their time, as whatever we ſay in theſe Minutes tends to ſhorten the General Letter.

26. With

APPENDIX. No. 45.

26. With regard to the conduct of public buſineſs, let us take notice once for all, that on the principles which we attribute to Mr. *Haſtings*, it is highly his intereſt to make uſe of all thoſe ſuperior means which his ſituation affords him, to retard and perplex the diſpatch and progreſs of that buſineſs; he then has a pretence for complaining that urgent affairs are delayed or neglected, and for attributing that neglect or delay to the affected embarraſſments and diſtreſs with which his new colleagues endeavour to perplex and afflict him.

Colonel Champion.

60. The examination of Colonel *Champion*, furniſhes for the preſent but one ſubject of remark. The Company's right to the forty lacks, in conſideration of their aſſiſtance in the Rohilla war, was acknowledged by the Vizier before Colonel *Champion* left the army, and long before the inſtructions of the Board could reach the Commanding Officer. It appears alſo that Colonel *Champion* has not received any part of the above ſum.

61. We know not on what intelligence the Governor could found the following aſſertion, contained in his Minute of the 3d of December, viz. That ſoon after our inſtructions to Colonel *Champion* were diſpatched, "the Vizier had conſigned over the fifteen lacks, "which *Fizulla Cawn* had engaged to pay him in ready "money, to Colonel *Champion*, in part payment of the "forty lacks due from him." We know with certainty, that there could be no foundation for ſuch intelligence; and we hope that the Court of Directors will obſerve, that on the 6th of December Mr. *Haſtings* ſigned his name to a Poſtſcript to the General Letter, in which it is affirmed with unqueſtionable truth, that no part of the forty lacks had then been received.

62. We muſt further obſerve, that Colonel *Champion*, in his Letter of the 13th of December laſt, expreſsly affirms, that before he left the army, the three lacks, for which the Vizier had given him a Tuncaw, had been repeatedly offered to him, and in particular his Excellency's Miniſter informed him, that he had inſtructions to pay them out of the fifteen lacks, which he (the Vizier) received from *Fyzulla Cawn*. The whole buſineſs of the Vizier's pecuniary engagements and payments to the Company ſeems to us to be involved in an affected confuſion, which we are taking pains to clear up, and do not doubt of ſucceeding, provided the neceſſary documents are not withheld from us. In this place we ſhall only take notice, that the fifteen lacks of rupees which Mr. *Grady* was to have received from the Vizier, was on account of the Treaty of *Benares*, and has no connection with the other fifteen lacks which the Vizier received from *Fyzulla Cawn*, and which he promiſed to pay over to the Company immediately, in part of the forty lacks due for the Rohilla war. This obſervation will be found more material perhaps than the Court of Directors, at firſt ſight, may be aware of.

63. Since writing the above, we have ſeen a private Letter from Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, of the 21ſt of December 1774, in which he ſays, that he has *the* fifteen lacks in his poſſeſſion, but finds a difficulty in procuring boats to convey the money to the Preſidency. He alſo mentions the declining and precarious ſtate of the Vizier's health. We have not yet ſeen any Letters from Colonel *Galliez*, to inform us of what ſteps he has taken in conſequence of the inſtructions of the Board to negociate with the Vizier.

64. On the arrival of Colonel *Champion* at the Preſidency, the Board required a ſight of his whole Correſpondence, of which we have obtained a promiſe, after ſome complimentary apologies had paſſed between the Governor and him, on the reciprocal delicacy of either of them diſcovering what might affect the honour of the other. This Correſpondence ought regularly to have been communicated to us by the Governor General in the firſt inſtance, while the recal of the brigade was under debate. At preſent we are not very anxious to ſee it, eſpecially as it is ſaid by Colonel *Champion* to contain matters *not fit for the public eye.*

Vizier's Donation to the Brigade.

65. The above Letter of Colonel *Champion* informs the Board of his having received an obligation from the Vizier of ſeven lacks of rupees for the troops who were employed for the conqueſt of the Rohilla dominions, of half a lack for the uſe of the Field Officers, and of three lacks for himſelf. At his examination it appeared that he had informed the late Adminiſtration of the firſt preſent, but had not mentioned the two latter till he arrived at the Preſidency, when he acquainted the Governor with it. As all theſe preſents were received after the period limited by that clauſe of the Act of Parliament which reſtrains all Officers from taking preſents, we have agreed to acquieſce in the Governor's propoſal of referring the ſeven lacks to the Court of Directors, for the reaſons mentioned in our Minute of the 31ſt of laſt month, to which we refer.

66. The fatal conſequences of indulging troops with the hopes of plunder have been too often exemplified in this Country. The Rohilla war, with reſpect to the ſhare we took in it, had no other object; and to judge from the Correſpondence which has been laid before us, it ſhould ſeem that plunder had engroſſed the attention, not only of this Government, but of the Army, from the commencement of the campaign to the end of it. We do not mean to intimate the moſt diſtant reflection on the conduct of the brigade, far otherwiſe; we admire and commend the exact diſcipline they obſerved under the diſappointment of hopes, which it was natural enough they ſhould form, from the nature of the ſervice. We mean to fix our cenſure upon the Government, which unneceſſarily employs their military force in ſervices, which of courſe ſuggeſt hopes and expectations utterly unfit to be propoſed or entertained by a regular army.

His Compliant againſt Colonel Champion.

67. We could wiſh to avoid mentioning the Vizier's Letter of complaint againſt Colonel *Champion*, as well as that delivered by the Field Officers in the name of the Army; but it is fair to ſay, that the accuſations which they both contain ought not to make any impreſſion, as Colonel *Champion* has not yet had time to deliver in his anſwer to either. He has given a direct contradiction to the Vizier's aſſertions, which the Colonel calls infamous untruths.

Nudjiff Cawn's Penſion.

68. We find by the Vizier's Letter, that 2,000 ſtand of arms and two eighteen pounders were ſent to the Vizier, with ſtores, by Mr. *Haſtings*; and that Major *Hannay* was appointed Agent to receive *Nudjiff Cawn*'s penſion of two lacks.

69. We have each of us received Letters from the King and his Miniſters, complaining of the detention of his tribute, and demanding the whole arrears due to him. As individuals, we might confine our anſwers to the uſual aſſurances of reſpect and attachment, referring the ſubject of his Majeſty's Letters to the Council. As Members of the Government, we find ourſelves laid under an extraordinary embarraſſment, by the Reſolution of the late Government to reſtore to *Nudjiff Cawn* his penſion, which by the Treaty of 1765 was to be paid out of the twenty-ſix lacks granted to the King, in conſideration of the grant of the Dewannee to the Company.

Military Expeditions.

70. The Letters received by General *Clavering* from ſeveral of the Company's military officers entruſted with ſeparate commands, will be found very deſerving of notice. They contain accounts of military expeditions and hoſtilities carried on againſt a number of different Rajahs and Zemindars, without any authority from the preſent Government, or any direct communication to us of the plan or execution of them. Moſt of theſe meaſures appear to have been directed by the Provincial Chiefs of *Patna* and *Burdwan* ſome time after our arrival here. In ſome places the Rajahs are reduced to obedience, and give hoſtages. In many others, the villages are burnt and the corn cut down and deſtroyed. Enſign *Scott*, having received orders from the Chief at *Patna* to ſeize or expel Rajah *Tuttah Shaw*, purſues him into *Sujah Dowla*'s dominions, and makes three of the Vizier's

Enſign Scott.

Captain Crawford.

ſubjects priſoners of war.—Captain *Crawford*, by order of the Chief of *Burdwan*, entered *Patcoom* on the 5th of laſt month, with ſix companies of Sepoys, took the capital, levelled the town, and cleared the Country, in order to make the poſt tenable. On the 9th he attacks and drives the Natives before him, after which *the whole Country fled into the mountains:* he ſays, he is endeavouring *to ſow diſſenſion among their Chiefs, ſo as to induce them to ſubmit, or enable him with eaſe to rout them out.*

71. We do not pretend to determine at preſent, whether meaſures of this nature be neceſſary or not; but we think it very extraordinary that military expeditions of ſuch importance, and leading to ſuch conſequences, ſhould be undertaken, not only without the orders, but without the knowledge of this Board. We are ſorry to be obliged to conclude this Article with declaring, that, as far as we are able to judge, the general principle which ſeems to have animated this Government, as well with reſpect to the Natives of the provinces as to the neighbouring States, has had too near a relation to the expreſſive words ſo often made uſe of, *extirpate, exterminate, root out, and annihilate.*

72. The remainder of the obſervations which we are at preſent enabled to make on Mr. *Haſtings*'s repreſentations of the ſtate of this Country, is reſerved for a ſeparate Minute. Our enquiries hitherto have been directed, and, as much as poſſible, confined to great and intereſting objects. Our application to them has been equally laborious and inceſſant. To obtain that complete information which we wiſh to give to the Court of Directors on all theſe difficult and complicated queſtions, requires not only uncommon activity on our part, but ſome allowance of time, in which it may be exerted with effect.

73. If we had leiſure or inclination to enter into details of an inferior importance, we are very ſure, that there is hardly a line of the Governor General's Addreſſes to the Court of Directors, in which we might not eaſily detect and prove ſome inaccuracy in matter of fact, or contradiction in argument. We decline the weary taſk, not only becauſe we think it unworthy of us, but as it is really in itſelf unneceſſary. Facts of a tranſcendent magnitude ought to engroſs our attention. When once they are eſtabliſhed beyond contradiction, they include the probability of inferior abuſes, and at the ſame time make it ſuperfluous to puſh that probability into proof.

74. Neither ſhall we endeavour to leſſen the effects of thoſe appeals which Mr. *Haſtings* indirectly makes to the generous paſſions of the Court of Directors.—"His "long ſervices,—the important truſts in which his life "has been employed,—his gratitude for the obligations "already laid on him—and his profound ſubmiſſion to "their future ſentence."——If our judgment of every ſingle branch of his Adminiſtration, ſince the power of doing ſignal miſchief or ſignal ſervice to the Company was entruſted to him, ſhould appear to be well-founded, we ſhould be ſorry to preclude him from the uſe of the only reſources which his cauſe will have left him. If pleas of this nature can be properly introduced and admitted in the refutation of poſitive charges, we are content to allow him all the benefit he can derive from them. —It is not for *us* to ſay, that a mode of defence, which ſeems rather addreſſed to the mercy than to the juſtice of the judge, is irregular in Mr. *Haſtings*'s ſituation. We indeed have yet no ſervices to plead. On the other hand, we do not appeal to the candour of our Superiors; nor can we attempt to engage their future favour by a pathetic acknowledgment of former obligations.

Condition of the Country.

75. The true condition of this Country cannot long be concealed. Effects will be felt before they are accounted for. When that happens, we foreſee no difficulty in determining by what means, and by whoſe miſconduct, a rich and flouriſhing State is reduced to the hazard at leaſt, of beggary and ruin. The great and alarming queſtion will be, by whoſe future ſervices, and by what future exertion of virtue and ability, ſuch a State can be recovered? Common men are not equal to the occaſion.

J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

Minute (N° 2.) from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; dated at *Fort William*, the 11th January 1775;—received in *London* the 18th July 1775.

1. In conſidering the preſent political ſtate of this Country, we beg leave to draw the attention of the Court of Directors to ſome particulars which we think of moment, yet which, we fear, may paſs unobſerved amidſt the voluminous records ſent home by this ſhip.

Sumro. Maddock. Redman. Nudjiff Cawn.

2. By the King's Letters to Mr. *Haſtings*, entered on the Country Correſpondence, it appears, that *Sumro*, *Maddock*, and *Redman*, are taken into the ſervice of *Nudjiff Cawn*, and are high in his favour; that he has encouraged them to ſeize the Pergunnahs belonging to the Royal Khalſa; and in ſhort that *Nudjiff Cawn* has thrown off his allegiance, and is eſtabliſhing a kingdom for himſelf. To this man, let it be obſerved, the late Adminiſtration has reſtored a penſion of two lacks per annum, granted to him formerly in very different circumſtances.

His Penſion reſtored.

King's Tribute.

3. There is an apparent inconſiſtency in the conduct of the late Adminiſtration in regard to the King's tribute, which we believe will be very difficult to account for.—The whole tribute allotted to the King by Treaty is withheld from him ſince he quitted *Illiabad*, on pretence of his having changed the place of his reſidence; yet an order, or tuncaw, from his Majeſty, in favour of the Vizier, to the amount of ſix lacks of rupees, was paid in April laſt, and charged to the account of that tribute, to which, as the late Adminiſtration muſt ſay, he has forfeited his right. The penſion reſtored to *Nudjiff Cawn* comes out of the ſame fund. We ſubmit it to the conſideration of our Superiors, whether theſe operations do not amount to an indirect acknowledgment of the King's right to the arrears of his tribute, and on this head we hope to receive their preciſe inſtructions.

Tuncaw.

4. Let it be farther obſerved, that the Vizier acquits part of his engagements to the Company, on the head of pay due to the troops ſent to his aſſiſtance in 1772 and 1773, with the very money paid him out of our treaſury; ſuch was the care taken by Mr. *Haſtings* of the Company's intereſt. The natural concluſion at firſt ſight of theſe facts muſt be, that *Sujah Dowla* has been very improperly favoured by the late Adminiſtration at the expence of their conſtituents; yet even that concluſion perhaps would not go entirely home to the truth. We doubt whether *Sujah Dowla*'s profit from this tranſaction was intended to have been ſo conſiderable as it appears.

Sale of his Country.

5. Another inconſiſtency in the conduct of the late Government towards the King ſeems to deſerve ſome notice. They firſt reſume the poſſeſſion of his Country, under pretence of keeping it in depoſit for him; next they affirm, that by changing his reſidence (from which however he was not reſtrained by Treaty) and by granting Sunnuds to the Marattas for *Corah* and *Kurrah* (which it is well known were extorted from him by force) he has forfeited his right to the diſtrict in queſtion; they then ſell the King's Country to the Vizier at a little more than two years purchaſe, and give the King no credit for any part of the purchaſe money.

6. A defence of ſuch meaſures, founded on urgent neceſſity, will not juſtify the inconſiſtency of the meaſures, though it may account for the unavoidable cruelty and injuſtice of them. Admitting however the plea of neceſſity in its utmoſt extent, we deſire it may be conſidered, to what ruin this State muſt have been reduced, when ſo ſtrong a neceſſity is pleaded and aſſerted as can be ſufficient to juſtify ſuch meaſures. This being confeſſedly

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feſſedly the unhappy ſtate of things in the latter part of the year 1773, it will be incumbent on Mr. *Haſtings* to prove, that ſome extraordinary change in the Company's affairs has taken place ſince that time, which has reſtored them to their preſent *flouriſhing and proſperous condition.* He muſt then ſhew in what articles this ſudden alteration conſiſts, or by what means it has been effected.

7. The Vizier's Letter to Colonel *Champion* contains an abſolute denial of all dependence on or connection with the King, and a declaration equally plain of his ſtrict union with *Nudjiff Cawn.* From all that we have heard or obſerved on this ſubject, we are much inclined to think, that they muſt have entered into ſome ſecret engagements for their mutual aggrandizement, perhaps to depoſe the King, and to divide the empire between them.

8. It farther appears to us, that *Cheyt Sing*, the Rajah of *Benares*, has not received any real protection or favour from this Government. The Court of Directors are already informed, that ſoon after the death of his father, Rajah *Bulwant Sing*, he was confirmed in the ſucceſſion to the Zemindarry by a ſolemn act of the Vizier, for which he was obliged to pay a very ſufficient conſideration; yet when Mr. *Haſtings* went up to *Benares*, it was thought neceſſary that *Cheyt Sing* ſhould ſubmit to new terms, in order to obtain a confirmation of that firſt ſolemn act, and to ſecure him in his Government. The remainder of our negociations in his favour, as well as many other parts of the politics of *India*, is involved in a cloud of obſcurity, which yet we doubt not a little time will diſpel.

9. By a Letter from *Nudjiff Cawn*, received the 17th of November laſt, we learn, that an army of Sieks has made its appearance in the neighbourhood of *Shaw Jehanabad*, and that a Maratta army is preparing likewiſe to march to that quarter. *Nudjiff Cawn* adds, "I "perceive by this, that great troubles are likely to ariſe, "as was formerly the caſe."

J. Clavering,
Geo. Monſon,
P. Francis.

Minute (N° 3.) from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; dated at *Fort William*, 11th January 1775;—received in *London* the 18th July 1775.

9. We have already made ſome general obſervations on the nature of the ſervices on which the Company's military forces have been employed. Our information on this ſubject is not complete, as we have not yet ſeen the Correſpondence between this Government and the Officers employed in military operations in *Ramgur*, the Jungleterry country, and *Coch Bahar*. All that we know is, that military operations have been, and are actually carrying on in many parts of the frontier country, without the authority of this Board.

10. The true and juſt object of all expeditions of this ſort, ſhould have been merely to check and keep in awe, by the occaſional preſence of a military force, ſuch of the mountaineers, and other inhabitants of thoſe frontier diſtricts, as had been accuſtomed, or were likely to make inroads into, and diſturb the peace of our provinces. The people we ſpeak of were not however in ſo wild and barbarous a ſtate as they have been repreſented. The accounts we have heard of them imply in general a condition of induſtry and ſimplicity of manners, united with a natural deſire of independence. To ſubvert their ſtate, and much more to extirpate them on account of the licentiouſneſs of a few diſorderly people, is neither neceſſary nor expedient.

11. As for the trifling revenue which may have been brought to the Company's account in conſequence of the ſubjection of theſe countries, we only deſire that the Company's Accountant may compare it with the ordinary and extraordinary expence of the troops employed in theſe expeditions, and make his report of the ultimate profit to the Company. At the ſame time, we do not mean to affirm, that theſe countries have not yielded much more conſiderable ſums than what has been brought to public account; or that the various expeditions into them have not been profitable in any ſenſe whatever; or that, under a regular form of Civil Government, the acquiſition of theſe diſtricts, if it could be gained without violence or injuſtice, might not become highly beneficial to the Company. The firſt thing, however, is to conſult the population and improvement of thoſe immenſe tracts of rich land, which at preſent we underſtand lie uncultivated and deſerted in the midſt of theſe provinces.

12. From what has already been written on the ſubject of the Vizier's debts to the Company, the Court of Directors will be able to form a judgment of the probability of their being acquitted. Our moſt ſtrenuous endeavours ſhall not be wanting to realize the amount of our juſt demands on the Vizier; but we muſt deſire that the Company will not reckon ſuch debts among their actual wealth until they are actually paid.

13. We alſo deſire that the following facts may be attended to.

1ſt. Colonel *Champion* declares, that he has received no part of the forty lacks for the Rohilla war.

2d. Mr. *Grady* was to have received fifteen lacks of the Vizier on account of the Treaty of *Benares*; he has brought down with him but ten lacks of Viziery rupees; the remaining five lacks were to have been paid by the Rajah of *Benares*. Why they have not been paid might perhaps appear from Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*'s correſpondence with the Governor, but no explanation whatever has been given to the Board. To ſhew the Court of Directors that we have done every thing in our power to obtain a ſatisfactory information on this ſubject, we beg leave to refer them to our Letter to Mr. Secretary *Stewart*, entered on the laſt Conſultation, and to Mr. *Grady*'s Report thereupon.

3d. Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* ſays, in his Letter to the Governor of the 21ſt December 1774, that he has got *the* fifteen lacks into his poſſeſſion, but does not ſpecify upon what account. We preſume it muſt be on account of the Rohilla war.

4th. Conſiderable drafts have been made on this Preſidency on account of the pay of the ſecond brigade, which was to have been completely provided for by the Vizier's monthly ſubſidy. We have ſeen drafts on this account to the amount of above a lack and a half. We have already apprized the Court of Directors of the nature of the extraordinary charges (beyond the amount of the ſubſidy) which we apprehend muſt be borne by the Company, and conſequently ſet againſt the promiſed profits of the Rohilla war.

Minute of the Governor General, dated 10th January 1775, containing Remarks on the Letter written by General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, to the Honourable Court of Directors; dated the 30th November 1774. Received in *London* 18th July 1775.

4. The Court of Directors were adviſed by all the diſpatches of the year 1773, that our forces had been employed in the Rohilla country in repelling the invaſion of the Marattas, which threatened the ſafety of the Vizier's dominions; and they were adviſed by the diſpatches of the 12th October 1773, by the *Mercury* packet, that a propoſal had been made by the Vizier, and actually encouraged by the late Council, to put him in poſſeſſion of that country; but that it had been laid aſide by the Vizier himſelf, and reſerved to be "deter-"mined by future occurrences." The Court of Directors therefore had certainly ſufficient grounds for the *knowledge* of the new ſyſtem of external policy which the late Adminiſtration had adopted, if by the new ſyſtem is meant, the extenſion of the Company's arms beyond the

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line of the Vizier's territory for its ſecurity; and ſufficient grounds to *ſuſpect* the deſign of reducing the Rohilla country for the Vizier, if that be the ſyſtem alluded to.

5. If theſe were the ſentiments of the majority, if ſuch was their idea of "the characters of their Colleagues," and ſuch their determination to "unite in the ſupport "of my Adminiſtration," to "cultivate the friendſhip "and confidence of their Colleagues, and to promote a "general harmony in our Councils," what could have happened in ſo ſhort a ſpace as five days, which had been, as they expreſs it, totally engroſſed by the firſt forms and multiplicity of inſtant buſineſs, to eradicate their too partial opinions? to determine them in a ſubverſion of all my paſt meaſures and my future authority? to preclude every avenue of perſonal confidence, and to ſow the ſeeds of irreconcileable diſcord and diſunion in our Councils? they found this Government engaged in an enterprize which they diſapproved, and, without informing themſelves fully of the objects and circumſtances of it, without making any allowance for errors in the judgment of others, or ſuſpecting them in their own, they at once condemned the entire meaſure, and ſet down the authors of it for marks of unceaſing perſecution.

9. No expedition was intended, and therefore it was not neceſſary to include it in the Treaty. "The *ſale* "of *Corah* and *Illiabad*, the *pecuniary* terms on which "the Company ſhall yield him the aſſiſtance of their "arms." Is this the language of candour? and is it in theſe expreſſions, which nothing but the moſt mercenary proſtitution of the Company's arms and influence can juſtify, that I am to read the unbounded confidence which the Members of the majority repoſed in the integrity, wiſdom, and ability which had guided the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration? they knew of the *ſale* of *Corah*, and of the *pecuniary* terms on which the Company were to yield the Vizier the aſſiſtance of their arms before they left *England*, and they certainly approved of both, or it is not probable that they ſhould have retained the ſtrong impreſſions which they had received of the characters of their Colleagues, and of the wiſdom and ability with which the Company's affairs were conducted under the late Government.

Brave and *independent* are the epithets of declamation, and require no reply; but they are not very conſiſtent with the deſcription given of the Rohillas in the 39th paragraph.

I muſt beg leave to except to the word *nation*, applied to the Rohilas. They are a tribe of Afgans or Patans; freebooters, who conquered the country about ſixty years ago, and have ever ſince lived upon the fruits of it, without contributing either to its cultivation or manufactures, or even mixing with the native inhabitants. The Rohillas are Mahometans; the Natives Hindoos; and have only changed maſters. The Company never included the Rohillas in the line of defence againſt the Marattas, but mentioned them, it is true, among the Powers capable of oppoſing the Marattas, and therefore expreſſed an inclination to ſupport them. I have given reaſons in my Minute of the 26th November 1773. why I think the Company were miſinformed in this opinion of the Rohillas; and it is no diſreſpect to them to ſuppoſe the late Adminiſtration capable of correcting the information obtained from their predeceſſors, with the acquirements of more recent and authentic diſcoveries.

The converſation between the Vizier and myſelf was generally private; but Mr. *Lawrell* was preſent during one conference and Mr. *Vanſittart* at two others; and both will recollect that the deſign of reducing the Rohillas formed a part of the firſt draft of the Treaty. I have aſſigned good and (I preſume) uncontrovertible reaſons for conducting the buſineſs of my negociations with the Vizier in perſon, and ſingly with him; but I never failed to communicate immediately what had paſſed between us to Meſſrs. *Lawrell*, *Lambert*, and *Vanſittart*, who were daily and almoſt continually with me, either verbally, or generally in writing; as I made it a rule to note down all the particulars of our converſation, as ſoon as I was able after we parted, and this the Gentlemen ſeverally read. The General alſo was conſtantly informed, in every meeting which I had with him, of what had paſſed between the Vizier and me.

11. The 10th paragraph concludes with a maxim equally prudent and candid. "On matters of ſuch "delicacy and moment, we will not truſt ourſelves with "the partial power of extracting." But this precaution ſeems to have been forgotten in what immediately follows, where the majority, in mentioning the deficiency of my Report on the ſubject of the Rohilla expedition, ſuppreſs the particulars related by me, and barely mention the Vizier's laying aſide the deſign, but take no notice of the reaſon aſſigned for it. My words to the Council on this ſubject are, "he offered to make the "Company a conſideration for this ſervice of 40 lacks "of rupees, beſides the ſtipulated ſum for the expences "of the troops; but he afterwards laid aſide this deſign, "*fearing that it would diſable him from fulfilling his engage-*"*ments for* Corah *and* Illahabad." After which are enumerated the Encloſures, No. 10, 11, 12, and 3, which all relate to this ſubject, and which rendered it neceſſary for me to be more particular, eſpecially as the deſign had now been laid aſide by the Vizier.

12. "When you refer to the ſhort paragraph from "which theſe paſſages are taken, you will be led to con-"clude, that the Preſident had communicated to the "Council the whole of what paſſed between himſelf "and the Vizier on the ſubject of the Rohilla expedi-"tion." So he did. I have already obſerved, that I informed Meſſrs. *Lawrell*, *Lambert*, and *Vanſittart*, who were deputed with me by the Board, of every circumſtance that had paſſed during the whole courſe of the negociation; but it was unneceſſary that theſe circumſtances ſhould be recorded when they had become entirely foreign to the terms of the Treaty. The Rohilla expedition *was laid aſide*, or, more properly, it had not been adopted at *Benares*; for the Vizier's propoſal on this ſubject had never been ratified when he deſired it might be ſuſpended. It is true, an option remained with the Vizier to renew this ſubject, but an option alſo remained with the Adminiſtration either to reject or to aſſent to it. It ſo happened that he did renew the ſubject, but at the time of concluding the Benares Treaty, it appeared probable to me that he would not renew it; and where was the occaſion for loading our Records with the particulars of tranſactions which had been voluntarily laid aſide by the Vizier, who was the intereſted perſon in them? eſpecially as they had been unreſervedly communicated by myſelf, and the Members who had been with me, to the other Members of the Adminiſtration in private intercourſe. If he did renew the propoſal, it was then time enough to enter upon a public diſcuſſion of this matter, when it became a meaſure of Adminiſtration, and was to be decided upon by them. This is preciſely the caſe with the meaſure in queſtion; advantages were drawn from the Vizier's eagerneſs to purſue it, which were happily retained by the Company, when the object of them had been ſtruck out of the Treaty. If he had never renewed it, theſe advantages would have remained with the Company. When he did renew it, I thought it but common juſtice to point out to the Board the conceſſions which this conſideration had induced him to grant. There were no *poſitive engagements* entered into relative to this matter; it remained with the Board to determine what influence theſe circumſtances ſhould have in their deciſions; and "the queſtion, "whether the Vizier ſhould or ſhould not be aſſiſted in "attacking the Rohillas, remained *open and entire* for "the deciſion of the Board." If theſe circumſtances had ſome weight in the judgment of the Board, it does not follow that they were *poſitive engagements*. The word *ſecret* is next uſed, ſurely not for candid purpoſes and is applied to my having withheld from the Court o

Director.

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Directors information reſpecting the Rohilla expedition, when I had no information to communicate to them but that the expedition was laid aſide.

In the ſtrictures which the Gentlemen of the majority make upon paſt tranſactions, having a complete view of every thing that has happened, they reaſon upon events with reſpect to my conduct before they had taken place, and ſeem to condemn me for not having ſeen into futurity. When the Vizier, after being ſo eager to adopt the Rohilla expedition, all at once gave it up, although he had conceded part of the terms upon which it was to have been undertaken, it did not appear to me probable that he would have renewed the propoſal, or that future circumſtances, not lying within the reach of human foreſight, would happen to recommend it. But the Gentlemen of the majority, knowing that the Rohilla expedition was afterwards adopted, accuſe me for not having entered into a full diſcuſſion and explanation of that ſubject, at a time when I had little reaſon to expect that it would ever take place. I certainly thought it poſſible; and this is the plain meaning of the words uſed in my Report upon the ſubject, viz. "that the meaſures to "be purſued for his ſecurity in that quarter muſt be "determined by future occurrences;" that is, if the Rohillas would pay the forty lacks due from them, and join in a ſcheme of defenſive alliance with the Vizier, the meaſure to be purſued for his ſecurity in that quarter would be, to afford the Rohillas protection. If, on the contrary, they gave encouragement to the enemy, or refuſed to pay the forty lacks, the meaſures to be purſued for his ſecurity in that quarter would be, to drive out the Rohillas, and reduce the country occupied by them within the line of his dominion.

13. In my Minute of the 26th of November 1773, I had explained my embarraſſment with reſpect to the expectations which I had given the Vizier, that the project of the Rohilla expedition ſhould meet with the ſame favourable diſpoſition in the late Government to encourage it, whenever it could again be with prudence reſumed, and he deſired it. I had expreſſed alſo my doubts of the expediency of engaging in ſuch an undertaking, while the current of the times rendered the ſlighteſt deviation from the beaten tract of affairs perſonally hazardous to our reputations. The Board adopted theſe ſentiments in the following Reſolution.

"The Board, after due conſideration of the matters "in reference from the Select Committee, and of the "Preſident's repreſentation, concur heartily in wiſhing "to avoid the expedition propoſed. Without entering "into a diſcuſſion of the propriety of ſuch an enterprize "on general principles, the Board ſee in their full force "all the circumſtances of doubt, as to its preſent expe"diency, which the Preſident has ſo clearly ſet forth, "and they are alſo ſenſible of the embarraſſment which "he lies under, from what paſſed on the ſubject between "him and the Vizier at *Benares*. They are equally "ſolicitous to ſave the honour of the Company, and "watch over its intereſts, and for that reaſon they ap"prove of the Letter now before them, which ſeems "equally calculated to ſave both. The conditions, if "accepted, would undoubtedly ſecure the greateſt poſſi"ble advantages from ſuch an enterprize; but they "appear to them more calculated to drive the Vizier "into a refuſal, which is what they truſt in, as its moſt "probable and almoſt infallible conſequence, and which "they wiſh for, as the proper reſult of this propoſition "in the preſent circumſtances of affairs."

Let this Minute be compared with the ſhort and mutilated extract of it as it ſtands in the Letter of the majority, and they will be found to convey the moſt oppoſite ſenſes.

An uninformed reader, who ſhould take his knowledge of this tranſaction from the latter, would conclude, that I had urged the meaſure ſolely on the ground of the promiſe which I had made to the Vizier, and on the hope that the conditions which I had propoſed were ſo hard as to induce him to reject them; and that the Board had aſſented to it on no other conſiderations, even while they declared their diſapprobation of the meaſure.

The fact is, that the Board reſted their wiſh to avoid the expedition ſolely upon their doubts of the conſequences which might perſonally affect us, at the ſame time that they were ſenſible of the advantages it would ſecure to the Company.

That I had cauſe for my belief that the Vizier would reject the conditions, is plain, ſince the Vizier did actually reject them, although the encouragement offered him by the ſucceſs of his operations in the *Doaub*, and the total inability of the Marattas to interrupt him in his further purſuits, induced him afterwards to declare his acceptance of them.

14. No. The Board wiſhed to decline the undertaking for the reaſon which has been before repeated; but it ſurely was not neceſſary that they ſhould fruſtrate the ſucceſs of it, if it did take place. This precaution was taken to enſure its ſucceſs, and to prevent any interruption which it might receive from the rains, if it was delayed till their approach, which would have happened had the Board required a repetition of the application to be made to them for the march of the brigade, when they had already expreſſed their aſſent to it.

16. "We had rather attribute the apparent changes "in the Vizier's reſolutions to the ſimplicity of his "character, than ſuppoſe it poſſible that the Preſident "was from the firſt acquainted with his real intentions, "and that he made uſe of artifice to draw or extort from "your Council an involuntary concurrence in his mea"ſures. Your aſſiſtance is propoſed to be yielded to "the Vizier on terms ſo diſadvantageous to him that he "cannot be expected to accept of it; that conditional "engagement being once extorted from your Council, "they can no longer recede from it, when the Vizier "almoſt immediately accepts the conditions."

I am ſorry to ſee the names of *Clavering* and *Monſon* ſubſcribed to ſuch unworthy inſinuations, becauſe I do not believe that even the heat of party contention can have ſo far warped their minds from the conſideration of that juſtice, which every man of honour will yield to the honour of others, as to make them really believe me capable of ſo baſe an artifice as they have imputed to me, without the ſlighteſt grounds to ſupport it. I will not anſwer it.

17. "Conſidering that the Vizier himſelf expreſsly "ſays, *that it is his reſolution to employ the brigade in the "reduction of the Rohillas*, this laſt intimation from the "Select Committee appears to us wholly unaccount"able." Why does this intimation appear unaccountable?

The Select Committee were of opinion, that although the Vizier had declared his intention of making a conqueſt of the Rohilla country, yet he would not actually undertake it, but would employ all the remainder of the fair ſeaſon in his operations in the *Doaub*.

18. An appeal to the paſſions is an inſult to the underſtanding. Such are the allegations of "the barba"rous and unneceſſary devaſtation of the country;" the cruelty with which the Vizier treated his unhappy priſoners; the brutal outrages offered to their wives and daughters, though of "the higheſt rank; his wanton "enormities;" and the declamatory quotation from one of Colonel *Champion*'s Letters on the ſame ſubject.—I believe it will appear, from the evidence of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*'s Letters, and from the examinations of Colonel *Leſlie* and Major *Hannay*, ſtrongly corroborated even by the Letters and Depoſitions of Colonel *Champion*, the Vizier's principal accuſer, that he has been unjuſtly traduced in the reports which prevailed of the enormities committed by him in the courſe of the war. I believe it to be a truth, that he begun it by ſending detachments to plunder. This I pronounce to have been both barbarous and impolitic, but too much juſtified by the practice of war eſtabliſhed among all the nations of the Eaſt,

and,

and, I am ſorry to add, by our own, in an inſtance which the Vizier has a right to quote in vindication of the charge againſt him, of a detachment employed in the war, in which we were engaged with him in the year 1764, to burn and ravage his country. It fell to the lot of Colonel (then Major) *Champion* to execute this commiſſion; and how well he diſcharged it, and how little his feelings were at that time affected by the ſame ſcene of barbarities, and *wanton enormities*, againſt which he has lately ſo pathetically exclaimed, will appear from the following copy of a Letter from him on the ſubject to the late Preſident, Mr. *Vanſittart*; which I quote not meaning to reproach him with having done the duty aſſigned him, but to prove, that the principal which dictated to Colonel *Champion* the ſevere charges with which he has laboured to load the Vizier in the late campaign, was either perſonal animoſity, or the deſire of perſuading the Board to grant him the power which he repeatedly ſolicited, to controul, and in effect to command the Vizier. I pretend not to look into the hearts of others; but I exerciſe the right allowed to all mankind of judging of intentions by facts; and I appeal to Colonel *Champion*'s correſpondence with the Select Committee and the Board for the grounds on which I form my judgment, and on which every man who reads them may judge for himſelf. The Letter above alluded to is as follows:

Extract of a Letter from Major *Champion* to *Henry Vanſittart*, eſquire; dated 20th June 1764.

"Two ſeparate parties have been ſent into the ene-
"my's country, the one of which was as high up as
"*Buxar*, and, according to the directions given me,
"there are deſtroyed upwards of a thouſand villages.
"Had not the rain, &c. prevented us, which occaſioned
"our return, we ſhould have done very conſiderable
"more damage. I am now marching on the borders
"of the *Diva* to the boundary of the Sircar country, to
"endeavour to bring in the Zemindars, as not one of
"them of any conſiderable note is yet come in, nor has
"a rupee been collected from this country."

The cruelty with which the Vizier treated his unhappy priſoners forms the ſecond charge againſt him. It is not even aſſerted (except in the inſtance which I ſhall proceed to in the third charge) that they ſuffered by actual violence, but that they were ill-ſubſiſted; and I believe this to be true. Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, whoſe Letters contain the ſtrongeſt character both of candour and truth, ſays, that the Vizier did allow them too moderate a ſubſiſtence, and that ill ſerved; his commands, though frequently repeated, being in this, as in every other inſtance, ill obeyed.

The third charge is indeed of the blackeſt die; of "brutal outrages offered to the wives and daughters of "the Rohillas, though of the higheſt rank." The only authority which the Gentlemen of the majority had for this horrid accuſation, at leaſt I recollect no other, was a Letter from Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, who mentioned it only as an inſtance of the falſehoods which had been propagated to injure the Vizier; adding, that the unhappy victims of his brutal luſt, who could not ſurvive their ſhame, but had put a violent end to their own lives, were ſtill living; and that the Vizier had never ſeen them. Colonel *Champion*'s anſwer to the queſtion propoſed to him by the Board on this ſubject, namely, "whether he had heard the report, and if he believed "there were grounds for it?" is a ſtriking inſtance of the little inclination he had to ſhew favour to the Vizier, but amounts to the ſtrongeſt *conviction* of the falſehood of this abominable hiſtory. He ſaid, "he did hear ſuch a "report, but as to the grounds, he had none ſufficient "to prove the accuſation; but the report was made to "him."—The charge of oppreſſing his new ſubjects has alſo been laid againſt the Vizier, and totally refuted by the depoſitions of Colonel *Champion*, Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay*, who all declare that the country enjoyed, even in the height of the war, a ſtate of perfect tranquillity.

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19. This contains a charge againſt me for ſuppreſſion. In anſwer, I ſay, that theſe details, if declamations are details, have appeared long ago in Colonel *Champion*'s Letters to the Select Committee, complaining of the cruelties exerciſed by the Vizier; and in the repeated calls which they made upon him to produce the inſtances of them, which he replied to by repeating the ſame declamations, but producing no inſtances, at leaſt none which in my judgment can warrant the ſmalleſt part of his invectives againſt him. The following is his reply:

Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the Select Committee; dated 12th June 1774.*

* Select Committee's Proceedings of the 1ſt July 1774.

"In compliance with the Board's deſire, I am now to "mention a very unpleaſing ſubject. The Vizier's "treatment of the family of *Hafez Rhamut*, &c. the "inhumanity and diſhonour with which they, *Mahibullah* "*Cawn*, his brother *Fizullah Cawn*, late proprietors of "this city and country, and their families, have been "uſed, is known all over theſe parts. A relation of "them would ſwell this Letter to an immoderate ſize, "and withal prove very diſagreeable reading. I ſend "you tranſlations of two Letters, and copy of a third, "which, affecting as they are, will convey but a faint "idea of the treatment theſe unhappy people have met "with.*

"I could not help compaſſionating ſuch unparalleled "miſery; and my requeſts to the Vizier to ſhew lenity "were frequent, but as fruitleſs as were thoſe advices "which I almoſt hourly gave him, regarding the deſtruc-"tion of the villages; with reſpect to which, I am now "conſtrained to declare, that though he always promiſed "as fairly as I could wiſh, yet he did not obſerve one of "them, nor ceaſe to overſpread the country with flames "till three days after the fate of *Hafez* was decided. "But, Gentlemen, *as in all points, excepting ſuch as imme-"diately reſpect the operations in the field, he is ſolely em-"powered to preſcribe*, the reputation of the Britiſh name "is in his hands, and the line which has been laid down "for me is very clear.

"The above families have been diſpatched to *Fyzabad*, "that their mal-treatment might not be ſo generally "known to us; I have however frequent accounts of "them, and it will give me the moſt ſenſible pleaſure, "that you ſtretch forth the hand of benevolence effec-"tually to relieve them from ſo indeſcribable a miſery. "And that you may the better deviſe the means of ſo "doing, without ſubjecting them to greater misfortunes, "I am to inform you, that every application of mine in "their favour, though profeſſedly taken in good part by "the Vizier, yet only ſerved to procure them more "rigorous treatment."

The two Letters which he encloſed are too long to extract; they are inſerted in the Conſultations referred to in the margin, † and will be found to contain no proofs.

† Ibid

21. Although it is not material to prove what part of the private correſpondence of Colonel *Champion* and Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton* were withheld from the Board, when I have publicly refuſed to communicate it, yet it is of conſequence to me to refute miſrepreſentations. I never aſſerted, that my chief reaſon for withholding the correſpondence was, "that they related to a difference between "the Vizier and Colonel *Champion*."

My declared reaſon for withholding this correſpondence was, that I could not in honour reveal it; and in relation to Colonel *Champion*'s Letters, I added, that "I thought "a greater degree of delicacy due to him, becauſe our "correſpondence had not been always cordial on many "points, and we had ſeveral times expoſtulated with each "other on theſe topics with the freedom of private "friends, and in a ſtyle, which, though decent in every

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" degree, is yet different perhaps from the formal addreſſes " of official correſpondence."

26. To blacken my conduct, and to excite indignation againſt me, facts have been perverted, miſrepreſentations employed, inſinuations thrown out of the blackeſt perfidy committed by me, in acts neither known nor even alluded to, and opprobrious epithets and invectives applied to the meaſures of which I had lately the chief direction. Inſtances of all theſe kinds of arguments occur in this ſhort paragraph.

It is a perverſion of facts to ſay, " that the Britiſh " arms and honour were abſolutely at the Vizier's diſ- " poſal; that an abſolute ſurrender has been made of the " honour and intereſts of the Company." We agreed to aſſiſt him in ſubduing the Rohillas. It was neceſſary to draw the line between the authority of the Vizier and our Commanding Officer. The ſervice to be performed was entirely the Vizier's; it was therefore conſiſtent and unavoidable that he ſhould direct the objects of it; but the execution of military operations was expreſsly veſted in our Commanding Officer; of courſe the ſafety of our army, and the honour of the Britiſh name and arms, were entirely confined to his conduct and direction.

It is a miſrepreſentation to ſay, " That the Vizier " dared to tell the Preſidency that he is the *Maſter* of the " Company's army." His words, in a literal tranſlation, which was made by myſelf, and is alluded to in this expreſſion, are theſe; " but I am the *Maſter* in theſe " affairs, and the power of retaining or diſmiſſing the " Engliſh army is mine;" an idiomatical expreſſion, perpetually occurring in the Company's Records, and meaning ſimply, that the brigade was not to ſtay or depart without his conſent, What follows is pure inſinuation and inapplicable abuſe. I quote the paſſage to prove it. " Confounded by appearances which we are " unable to account for, we look in vain for oſtenſible " cauſes adequate to ſuch effects, and confeſs, that every " enquiry that we make fills us with equal diffidence and " ſurprize. We ſhall not however anticipate any con- " jectures which may ariſe in your minds, when you " review the whole conduct of this dark and myſterious " buſineſs from firſt to laſt, and reflect upon the abſolute " ſurrender which has been made, with ſo little apparent " compenſation, of your honour and intereſt to the vin- " dictive or capricious projects of *Sujah Dowla*."

What are the effects which fill them with equal diffidence and ſurpriſe? What buſineſs is it which they call dark and myſterious? Who made an abſolute ſurrender of the honour and intereſts of the Company? No one. I look in vain for the neceſſity which impelled the majority to deviate into ſuch reflections for the juſtification of their conduct, in recalling the brigade at the criſis of the war, and in diſſolving the appointment of my Agent at the Court of the Vizier; but if " the juſtification of " their conduct can only be ſupported by a ſtrong and " deliberate cenſure of the preceding Adminiſtration," this mode of exciting the paſſions and ſurpriſing the attention, which is calculated to ſway with uninformed and inattentive readers, I truſt will not influence the judgment of thoſe, who are to decide both upon their conduct and that of the preceding Adminiſtration.

28 and 29. Theſe paragraphs ſeem to contain ſome criminal charge, but I profeſs I ſcarce know how to apply them. They *did* arrive on the 19th, but too late for buſineſs, and without the packet. We did meet on the 20th, and ſpent the whole morning, as they ſay, in ſettling the proclamation of the new Government, which I ſay too, ought not to have been a matter of much debate. At my deſire we adjourned to the Monday following, Mr. *Barwell* not being arrived; but it was not till the next day, Tueſday the 25th, that I gave them any light into the political ſtate of the Country. Why their ſituation, during this interval, was anxious or diſgraceful I cannot conceive. There was only a vacuity of two days, Friday and Saturday, and theſe not unemployed by me or them. I was wholly occupied in all that time in preparing the firſt points of buſineſs neceſſary for their information, namely, the ſtate of the Revenue, and ſituation of our political affairs. The firſt required ſome inſtant determination, and was brought on the firſt on Monday, and the debates on it took up the whole time of that meeting.

The laſt, which required no immediate reſolution, was brought on Tueſday, but might with equal effect have been totally withheld, as the Members of themajority came prepared with a decided reſolution to reprobate the whole ſyſtem, and to take the ſpeedieſt meaſures to overturn it in the very criſis of its accompliſhment.

39. This is not a fair ſtate of my argument, which I deſire may be taken in my words, in the Minute of the 26th November 1773, not in this mutilation of it. I never conceived the Rohillas to be *weak*, *divided*, and *defenceleſs*; the words ſo connected convey the idea of utter diſability. I ſaid, they were too weak to be a match ſingly oppoſed to the Vizier; that their jealouſy of him would therefore ever make them ready to arm themſelves againſt him; and that they would ſeek their ſafety in involving the Vizier in wars with Powers more formidable than themſelves.

40. To this opinion of Colonel *Champion*'s, I ſhall ſubjoin the following of General Sir *Robert Barker*, which I conſider as at leaſt equal authority.

" The General agrees with the Preſident, that the " Vizier's dominions would become compact, and not " ſufficiently open to invaſion. It is from the appre- " henſion of invaſion that cements the Vizier's friendſhip " with the Engliſh, and makes him that ſtaunch Ally we " find him."

My own opinion upon this ſubject is very fully explained in my remarks on the 42d paragraph.

41. This method of ſeparating the parts of a propoſition, and refuting them ſingly, without adverting to their relation with each other, is new and embarraſſing. I own that the conveniency of poſſeſſing the Rohilla country was not a ſufficient reaſon for invading it. I never ſaid it was; but if they had afforded a juſt provocation for invading their Country, and we ſaw advantages in invading it, though neither cauſe was alone ſufficient to produce that effect, yet both united would certainly juſtify it, and the moſt rigid ſpeculator would approve ſo fair a concluſion.

I hope I ſhall ſtand acquitted in the breaſts of all reaſonable men, for maintaining the opinions quoted againſt me in the concluſion of this paragraph; but I adopt it even in the words of my opponents; and if I am " *The Chief of a great State*," alluded to by them, I ſhall be always ready to " profeſs that I do reckon the pro- " bable acquiſition of wealth among my reaſons for taking " up arms againſt my neighbours." I never in any period of my life, though long engaged in public affairs, gave my conſent for taking up arms in an *unjuſt* cauſe; and I never ſhall, but in caſes of very notorious enormity, give my conſent to take up arms in an *unprofitable* one.

42. The anſwers which have been given by Colonel *Champion*, Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay*, to the queſtions put to them by the Board, at once clear up the obſcurity, and reconcile what appears to the Gentlemen of the majority contradictions in that part of my Minute, reſpecting the acquiſition of the Rohilla territory to the Vizier. It has been aſked them, if they thought the Marattas would venture to croſs the *Ganges*, and enter the Rohilla country, when an Engliſh army was ready to oppoſe them; to which they have all anſwered, they did not think they would; and if they did, that they could not retreat without the loſs of their baggage; therefore I ſay, that the Vizier's poſſeſſions by this acquiſition *make a complete State, ſhut in effectually from foreign invaſions*, if he has an Engliſh army to aſſiſt him. It has alſo been aſked theſe Officers, if they think, that without our aſſiſtance the Vizier's army would prevent the Marattas from croſſing the *Ganges* and entering the Rohilla coun-

Col. Champion, Col. Leſlie, Major Hannay.

try; to which they have anſwered, that they did not think it would; and therefore I ſay, that this acquiſition, *by bringing his frontier nearer to the Marattas, for whom ſingly he would be no match, renders him more dependent on us.* With our aid the Vizier's State, joined to the lately acquired Country, which are both bounded by the *Ganges*, and the northern range of mountains, *form a complete compact State, ſhut in effectually from foreign invaſions.* But without our aid he cannot bring a force into the field capable of defending it; and therefore this very acquiſition renders him more dependent upon us. A fort may be impregnable with a proper garriſon, which might be eaſily aſſaulted and taken, if there were not ſuitable troops to defend it.

Rupees of Oude.

44. The rupees of the currency of *Oude* have a fixed ſtandard. The rupees received by Mr. *Lambert*, in payment of the firſt ſum of the Treaty money, were not all of the currency of *Oude*. The difference is certainly due from the Vizier, and ought to be demanded. It will appear, I believe, upon examination of the Paymaſter's accounts, that the rupees received from the Vizier, on account of the monthly ſubſidy for the troops, have yielded 111 current rupees per-cent.

45. I am informed by the Paymaſter General, that the diſburſements of the troops which marched to the ſervice of the Vizier, during the three firſt months of the campaign, the ſubſequent accounts not having been yet received, amount as follows:

For February 1774 - - -	206,069	9	0
March ditto - - - -	260,752	14	6
April ditto - - - -	246,376	1	7
Current Rupees	713,198	9	1

Value in current rupees.

That is, upon a medium, current rupees 2,37,733, which is leſs than the amount due by my eſtimation for the monthly ſubſidy. The hire of boats, and the price and conveyance of ſtores and field equipages, are as much a part of the military diſburſements as the ſoldier's pay, and are included both in General *Barker*'s eſtimate, on which the amount of the ſubſidy was fixed, and in the above diſburſements. Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*'s allowances had nothing to do with them; he had no military charge, and his appointment even preceded the order for the march of the brigade. The troop of cavalry was not raiſed expreſsly for this ſervice, but propoſed and raiſed long before this ſervice took place, for the purpoſes of a guard to the Governor, for occaſional ſervice againſt the Seneaſſies, and for attendance on the Commander in Chief when the army took the field. I am aſtoniſhed to find the charge of recruiting added to the increaſe of diſburſements occaſioned by the brigade being employed in the Northern Countries; it is from theſe Countries that all our recruits are raiſed, and the expence in bringing them into our own provinces has always been conſiderable.—This expence is ſaved when the brigade can recruit upon the ſpot.

46. My Minute was not written for the information of the Gentlemen of the preſent Adminiſtration, but to inform the late Council of every circumſtance and advantage attending the Rohilla war, with which they were not before fully acquainted. The ground of quarrel had long ſince been conſidered by them, and was notoriouſly known to be juſt; it had furniſhed the occaſion of my journey to *Benares*. To have entered on a matter in which we were all agreed, would have been multiplying words to no purpoſe.

48, 49, 50. In anſwering the ſecond objection to the Rohilla expedition, as ſtated in my Minute of Appeal, I have endeavoured to defend the conduct of the late Adminiſtration from the charge of inconſiſtency. I will only further add, that I think even the extracts which the majority themſelves have made from their Letters, will ſuffice to vindicate them from the accuſation. They at firſt ſteadily refuſe to co-operate with the Vizier in any operations beyond the limits of his own dominions. In the meantime the Marattas reduce the Jauts, invade the Rohillas, and threaten *Corah*. Their power becomes daily more alarming, till at length the Council reſolve to prevent them from gaining a footing, either in the Corah country or the Rohilla. They ſay they are impelled by indiſpenſable reaſons to become parties in theſe political conteſts; but at the ſame time lament that it is a drain of the wealth of this Country, and cannot be productive of any advantage to the Company. Afterwards ſuch engagements are made with the Vizier, as procure advantages to the Company, and prevent the drain of the wealth of *Bengal*; and then the objections which they before lamented no longer ſubſiſt. With reſpect to attacking in 1774 the very people whom we had defended in 1773, both theſe meaſures tended to one uniform object, the prevention of the Marattas from eſtabliſhing themſelves in that Country.

52. The chaſm in my correſpondence with Colonel *Champion* will now be ſupplied, as he has engaged to furniſh the Board with all my Letters to him; and I ſhall with equal fidelity lay all his before them. The ſuggeſtions excited by the chaſm in this part of my correſpondence will vaniſh with the peruſal of them.

53, 54, 55, 56. I preſume I have ſufficiently obviated all the reaſonings of theſe paragraphs in my Minute of Appeal.

57. This is a partial quotation, and the inference drawn from it invidious and uncandid. I deteſt and deſpiſe all profeſſional reflections as illiberal, and the effects of a malevolent heart, or a narrow underſtanding. My ſocial connections have lain as much, if not more, in the military than in any other line; and I know many of that profeſſion whom I love and honour for qualities which would have equally entitled them to my eſteem in whatever ſtate of life I had found them. Let my Minute be read (it is too long to be inſerted) and it will appear, that my objections had no relation to the military character of the Officer who might be in the command of the brigade, but to the power which that command conveyed with it, and which of courſe gave him an abſolute controul and ſovereignty over the Vizier, if every other avenue of communication was cut off between the Vizier and this Government. My objection would have been the ſame whatever might have been the profeſſion of the perſon intended for ſo unconſtitutional a truſt; and I preſume that ſuch were the reaſons which impreſſed the majority of the Board with the like conviction of the propriety of employing an intermediate Agent, in a line independent of the Military Commander, for the miniſterial agency with the Vizier.

60. "We hold it beneath us to enter into refutation "of looſe invectives, or general inſinuations. Look to "facts, Gentlemen, and we are convinced you will find, "that it is your Civil Servants who have involved the "Company in offenſive wars, and in ſchemes of conqueſt "by which no public intereſt could be promoted."

This and the concluding ſentence of the laſt paragraph have much the air of "inſinuations, thrown out to the "diſadvantage of the *civil* branch of the ſervice," and with great injuſtice. The fact is (ſince facts are appealed to) that the propoſition of the Rohilla war came from the Vizier and General *Barker*; a circumſtance of little importance, but as it ſtands properly oppoſed to an aſſertion too peremptorily made, ſince it was intended to brand the objects of it with infamy, unleſs it had been grounded on certain knowledge.

63. "The fact however differs from the repreſen-"tation." I believe not. The date of this Treaty is no proof of miſrepreſentation; nor can I underſtand what this charge alludes to, ſince the facts aſſerted in this paragraph are undoubtedly true, except one, and prove the truth of my repreſentation. The exception which I mean is to the aſſertion, "that the Marattas have not "ſince renewed their invaſion of the Rohillas." They

invaded

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invaded them the next year, and were driven off by General Sir *Robert Barker*, who was accompanied by the Vizier and his army.

64. The paſſage of the Letter of the Select Committee, from which this quotation is taken, was expreſſed alluſively, not in the terms of an affirmation, and upon a ſubject totally different from the preſent. The words are theſe: "yet we judge that the Rohillas, *who* have "ſought their ſafety in an alliance with the Marattas, to "which they were of neceſſity compelled, would, when "left to themſelves, attempt at leaſt to re-eſtabliſh their "own independence."

This quotation will be better underſtood by the words of the original Minute of the Select Committee, in their Proceedings of the 7th January 1773, of which it is an abſtract, intended to convey the ſame ſentiments in their Letter to the Court of Directors. "It is however ſtill "more probable, that the Rohilla Chiefs, who have "ſought their preſent ſafety in a treacherous alliance to "which neceſſity compelled them, with the Marattas, "will from the ſame principles abandon their cauſe, &c."

The Select Committee in theſe reflections aimed only to prove, that the fears of the Vizier were ill-grounded, when he ſuſpected that the Rohillas would abandon themſelves wholly to the Marattas. The idea of juſtifying the treacherous conduct of the Rohillas never had a place in our thoughts. We conſidered the Rohillas as acting merely on the principle of occaſional conveniency, or temporary neceſſity; uniting at one time with the enemies of the Vizier, either to avoid a preſent danger apprehended from them, or to diſtreſs and divert him from forming deſigns againſt their ſecurity; and at another time uniting with the Vizier to oppoſe the ſame enemies, when their ſucceſſes became an object of greater danger to them than the ſuſpected intentions of the Vizier, and he could repel them.

This is conſiſtent with the opinion which I have always declared of the Rohilla policy; and when that policy is manifeſted in acts of open perfidy, they certainly become "*the juſt* objects of war and conqueſt," though not on "vindictive" principles.

65. It would have been little conſiſtent with prudence in the Vizier to poſſeſs himſelf of the dominions of the Rohillas, at a time when the Marattas were capable and at hand to diſpute it with him, and his protection of the Rohillas was neceſſary to defend that avenue to his own dominions; and as little conſiſtent with equity to take that advantage of their diſtreſs, becauſe they had not at that time afforded him provocation for it.

66. We are not bound to aſſiſt the Vizier with our troops for the defence of any part of his dominions, ſhould it be incompatable with our own ſecurity; and on this principle I apprehend the Board would decide, in any requiſitions which might be made to us by the Vizier for our aſſiſtance, as far as may be conſiſtent with our own ſecurity. I am clearly of opinion with Mr. *Barwell*, that it will be politically neceſſary to protect the Vizier's new dominions, if he ſhall be at any time unable to defend them by his own force; which is not very likely to happen, unleſs the aſſurance of the neceſſity of a neutrality on our part ſhould encourage the Marattas, or any other Power who may become equally formidable, to direct their whole ſtrength againſt that quarter, preſuming on their ſuperiority to the Vizier's forces alone, and unſupported by ours. But I am clearly of opinion that ſuch an event is not likely to happen, if it is believed that our forces will march to oppoſe them. In this opinion I am ſupported by thoſe delivered by Colonel *Champion*, Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay*, in their examinations before the Board on the and ult. If the Company's intereſt requires it, and no cauſe forbids it, I ſhall not look for the obligation of a Treaty to compel my aſſent to it.

67. "The firſt of the above meaſures (*i. e.* the pur-"chaſe of *Corah* and *Illahabad*) neceſſarily makes the "King your enemy." It probably has produced that effect, which we have not felt, nor ever ſhall. He owed his exiſtence, and all the power and wealth he ever poſſeſſed, to the Britiſh generoſity, and he repaid it with acts of hoſtility. But why are objections at this time raiſed againſt the *purchaſe* of *Corah* and *Illahabad*? Right or wrong it is paſt, it is irrevocable, and has not even the ſlighteſt connection with the meaſures of the majority, unleſs on the principle fundamentally laid down by them, that "the juſtification of their conduct can "only be ſupported by a ſtrong and deliberate cenſure "of the preceding Adminiſtration." To the opinion of Colonel *Champion*, quoted in this paragraph, I beg leave to oppoſe thoſe delivered by himſelf, Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay*, in the late examination to which I refer.

68. "At the riſk of making all *Hindoſtan* your ene-"mies." This is a new conſequence, drawn from the ſupport afforded the Vizier, and too portentous to be affirmed or admitted, without a reaſon produced in ſupport of it. I cannot gueſs at any, and cannot therefore anſwer it.

69. I have already ſaid, that the ceſſion of *Corah* and *Illahabad*, which is ſtyled by the majority a *ſale*, a *purchaſe*; and the ſubſidy fixed for the maintenance of our troops while employed in the defence of our Ally, which they have branded with the appellations of *pecuniary* terms, and *hiring* out the troops, &c. were known to the Gentlemen of the majority before they left *England*, and at the time in which they profeſs themſelves to have been "impreſſed with the higheſt idea of the wiſdom "and ability with which the Company's affairs had been "conducted under Mr. *Haſtings*." While it united their preſent purpoſe or paſſion to favour the meaſures of which I had the conduct, the moſt exaggerated applauſe was not thought to over-rate them; but the ſame meaſures are now become the ſubjects of their ridicule, and the ruin of the Britiſh intereſts in *Bengal* is inferred from their effects, "becauſe the juſtification of their own "conduct can only be ſupported by a ſtrong and deli-"berate cenſure of the meaſures of the late Admi-"niſtration."

The reaſons which have been alledged for the ſale of *Corah* and *Illahabad* have not been controverted; I believe they never will, and I ſhall therefore paſs over this ſubject as decided; but it may be neceſſary to ſay ſomething in vindication of the ſtipulation for the monthly ſubſidy, againſt the new conſtruction which has been forced upon it, and the inferences deduced from it. By the orignal Treaty formed with the Vizier in 1765, we are under obligation to aſſiſt him with our forces whenever he required it (with the reſerve already mentioned) and he is obliged to pay the extra expence. This engagement has proved a ſource of vaſt expence to the Company, and made the Vizier's alliance a burthen to them. It compelled them to keep up a larger force, at an expence exceeding the proportion of the reſt, than the defence of their own poſſeſſions required, and they derived no other advantages from it, than in the ſecurity which their own provinces eventually received from the ſecurity of their Ally. To remove this heavy load, it was propoſed to raiſe the ſubſidy to the full amount of the expence of a brigade, eſtimated at what it ought to be. This was effected by the Treaty of *Benares*, and at once removed all objections, placing the alliance between the Company and the Vizier on a ground of reciprocal advantages, and at the ſame time rendering the employing of the Company's arms an object of intereſt inſtead of diſadvantage. The ſubſidy is not new, nor an act of the laſt Adminiſtration. It has its foundation in the original alliance with the Vizier, but the modification of it has been improved; the ſum paid in 1765 for it was 30,000 rupees per month, and it is now fixed at 210,000, which is juſt ſeven times the firſt amount.

Here I cannot omit making one general reflection, which occurs in reading the addreſs of the majority, which is, that their grand and principal objection to the

meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, ſeems to be, that we allowed the Company to acquire any pecuniary advantages from our political arrangements. The ceding of *Corah* and *Illahabad* to the Vizier is objected to as a *ſale*, becauſe fifty lacks of rupees were ſtipulated to the Company on that account. If we had given up theſe without any conſideration in return, this objection could not have been made. The ſubſidy for defraying the whole expence of our forces employed with the Vizier, is reproachfully ſtiled *hiring* them. If the Vizier had only paid the extra expences, it would *then* have been leſs reproachful; but if we had made the Company pay the whole expences, in the language of the majority it muſt *then* have been entirely irreproachable, and we ſhould have acted for the glory of the Britiſh Nation. Our agreement with the Vizier concerning the Rohilla war is diſhonourable, becauſe the conditions were *mercenary* and *pecuniary*; that is, the Company were to acquire forty lacks of rupees from it. Had there been no ſuch acquiſition to the Company, the majority would have withheld theſe diſhonourable epithets. Upon theſe points I leave the Company to decide between the ſentiments of the majority and the motives which influenced our conduct.

If I have expreſſed the opinion aſcribed to me in theſe words, "it is highly uſeful to the Company to hire out "their troops to *Sujah Dowla*, in order to ſave the "expence of their pay, and to preſerve their diſcipline, "by keeping them in the *continued practice of war*;" which words, by the line drawn under them, I ſuppoſe to be mine, I hereby retract and diſavow it. I am of opinion that the beſt military eſtabliſhment will loſe its ſpirit and diſcipline by long inaction; that it is neceſſary to both that the troops ſhould frequently take the field, and not enjoy too long an interval from active ſervice. This maxim I have often avowed, and I believe upon Record; but a *continued* practice of war is ſuitable only to a piratical ſtate, or an herd of ſavages. The refutation of this maxim is extraordinary. "We fear the time is approach-"ing very faſt when the *India* Company and the Nation "will know the extent and feel the force of it;" and this is called, *ſpeaking plainly, and apprizing the Company of their danger*.

70. The particulars of this paragraph, which appear improperly introduced on this occaſion, have either been miſunderſtood or miſrepreſented. If it has been admitted in Council, "that the plan for letting the lands has in a "great degree miſcarried, and that this Country is "unable to bear the expence of the Inveſtments, toge-"ther with that of the civil and military eſtabliſhments," the admiſſion is not founded in truth. The plan for letting the lands has not miſcarried, and is ſtill in our opinion the beſt which could have been adopted. What deficiencies have happened in it have proceeded from eventual cauſes, which have been fully explained, and which no general plan could prevent. It has been ſaid, that this country was unable to bear the current expences of the civil and military eſtabliſhments, to furniſh the Company's inveſtments, and ſupplies of treaſure for *China* and *Bombay*, and to pay off a bond debt of near a crore and thirty lacks, accumulated in the courſe of former years, without a reduction of its expences and an addition to its reſources.

It was for this reaſon that ſo much pains were effectually taken by the late Adminiſtration to retrench the current expences, and that their political meaſures were ſucceſsfully calculated to furniſh additional reſources.

71. The employing of our troops with the Vizier does not ſuppoſe the *deſtruction of nations*, but, on the contrary, the preſervation of them, at leaſt of his Country. The expreſs purpoſe for which the Vizier can by Treaty apply for our troops, is for the defence of his dominions, and that moſt probably againſt the Marattas, for there is no other enemy likely to attack them. Colonel *Champion*, Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay*, have given it as their opinion, that ſince his acquiſition of the Rohilla country, this would be effected by our army only appearing in his ſupport, as the Marattas would not dare to croſs the *Ganges* if they were oppoſed by an Engliſh army. The conſequence is, that as often as the Vizier was under apprehenſions of invaſion, he would call for our troops, and we would have it in our power to eaſe the Company of a part of their military expences. It is true that this reſource is temporary; but I hope the difficulties of the Company will alſo prove only temporary. It is to remove them that we have propoſed theſe expedients, and every expedient which leſſens their diſburſements, and adds to their reſources, muſt contribute to produce this effect. APPENDIX No. 45.

72. This paragraph I ſhall reply to in the ſenſe to which I underſtand it to allude obliquely. The conqueſt of *Agra* was effected by *Nudjiff Cawn*, aſſiſted by ſome Sepoys of the Vizier. Major *Polier*, who had been employed by the Vizier, with my permiſſion, in conducting the works of *Fyzabad*, had charge of theſe Sepoys, or ſome other occaſional command (I forget what) given to him by the Vizier, and he was preſent at the ſiege. This Government neither aſſiſted nor countenanced the conqueſt of *Nudjiff Cawn*, ſince the reduction of *Agra* was attempted and accompliſhed before our interference could have availed on either ſide. Conqueſt of Agra. Major Polier.

My wiſhes, however, I own to be favourable to *Nudjiff Cawn*, becauſe I believe him to be ſtrongly attached both by inclination and intereſt to the Company, and a natural enemy to the Marattas. Had I the ſmalleſt idea of its being poſſible that the Vizier ſhould become an enemy to us, this would be an additional motive with me for wiſhing to maintain a conſtant connection with *Nudjiff Cawn*. Nudjiff Cawn.

73. If I underſtand the ſcope of this argument, and I declare that I mean not to miſconſtrue it, it aims to prove, that if the natural reſources of *Bengal* have failed, the exiſtence of the Britiſh empire in *India* is at its criſis, and the attempt to ſave it by external remedies, which are unnatural, will but precipitate its diſſolution. Surely this is not a juſt way of reaſoning. If the internal reſources of a ſtate fail it, or are not equal to its occaſional wants, whence can it obtain immediate relief but from external means? which, in the preſent caſe, will certainly afford that relief, and prove the ſureſt aid to thoſe lenient remedies which the wiſdom of Government may apply for the reſtoration of its conſtitutional vigour. No concealment has been ever made by me, or by the late Adminiſtration, of the true ſtate of this Country. Our advices have been honeſt, full, and explicit. We have told our Employers that we had encountered great difficulties, and that we hoped to ſurmount them; and I truſt that they will already have ſeen theſe hopes in part realized, and ample grounds afforded to look for the eſtabliſhment of a confirmed ſyſtem of Government, and of commercial and territorial reſources in *Bengal*, which it hath hitherto wanted. Such a ſtate it is yet capable of receiving, although it may ſuffer, as I fear it will do, an interval of almoſt two years loſt in anarchy and diſtraction.

The ſolemn aſſeveration at the cloſe of this Addreſs, as it contains no argument, requires no anſwer, and ſhould paſs unnoticed by me, if it were not that ſuch a poſitive pledge of their honour, and every thing that can be dear "to honeſt men," may ſway with many in oppoſition to all reaſoning; and I muſt confeſs it appears to me to be introduced with a view to this effect. I muſt therefore expreſs the ſurpriſe I feel, that the Gentlemen ſhould hazard ſo ſacred a pledge upon the truth of facts, ſo various and unaſcertained, that it is impoſſible for human reaſon to decide on many of them; much leſs for theſe Gentlemen, to whom the ſubjects were entirely new, to receive, in ſo ſhort a time, ſuch information as they could affirm, upon a pledge of honour, to be truth; and in effect it will appear from the above remarks, that they actually have been miſtaken in many of the *facts* and *inferences which relate to the ſtate of the Company's affairs*. For myſelf I will declare, that, with certainly a fuller

APPENDIX. No. 45.

knowledge of the circumstances than they can possibly have attained, and with as earnest a solicitude to abide by truth, I will not venture to pledge my honour, that error and mistake may not have a place in what I have written; but I will make this sacred pledge of my "honour, and "every thing that is dear to me as an honest man," that my endeavours, both in my Minute of Appeal and in these Remarks, have been to free my conduct, and that of the late Administration, from the misrepresentations which have been cast upon them; and, by a fair statement of the motives and effects of our measures, to lay the truth before our Employers, and enable them to decide with justice between us and our accusers.

Having finished my observations on the several arguments made use of by the Gentlemen of the majority in their Letter of Appeal, I think it necessary to conclude with one striking remark, which is apposite to the whole substance of it; namely, that although it is professedly drawn up for the defence of their measures, and the condemnation of the late Administration only, as involved in that defence, there is not a single word in their Address, which, in my understanding, defends, or even aims to defend their measures.

The recal of the brigade at a time when we were in hourly expectation of hearing that the war was concluded, and before the conquest was secured; the dismission of Mr. *Nathaniel Middleton*, the public Minister of this Government at the Court of the Vizier; and the dictatorial licence granted to the Commanding Officer in the field, to provide against any attempts which might be made on the safety of the army, are the measures against which I have protested; and which I affirm to be equally injurious to the faith of Government, and the interest of the Company, whether the measures which they have laboured to depreciate be right or wrong.

Warren Hastings.

Governor General's Remarks on the separate Letters of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monson*, and Mr. *Francis*, to the Honourable Court of Directors.

Mr. Barwell.

7. I must take upon me to justify Mr. *Barwell*, by affirming, that the majority had taken their resolution before they had consulted all the Records by which it could any way be affected. "That much assiduity and attention have been since employed to trace and collect the facts and opinions, which they have offered in justification of their resolution, is undoubted; but I appeal to their own words, and to the Records, for proof, that they could not have obtained that complete information at the time in which they had taken their resolution.

On the 25th of October I read to them the concluding part of my Minute entered on the Consultation of that day, respecting the political state of this Government; and this contained a connected list of all the Proceedings which were necessary for their perusal, to enable them to form a complete understanding of the subject. The only parts of these references which were called for and read at the Board, were the passages of the General Letters of the last year to the Court of Directors which related to the Treaty of *Benares*, and the Rohilla expedition, the Treaty of *Benares*, the Vizier's requisition for the march of the brigade, and my report of my transactions at *Benares*. Yet, on this scanty information, if they waited even for this, they at once formed their decision; and as they themselves affirm, in the 23d paragraph of their Appeal, "they should have thought it their duty to have pro- "ceeded immediately to the recal of the brigade within "the Company's territories, or at least within the original "dominions of the Vizier, but for the vehement oppo- "sition made to that proposal by the Governor Gene- "ral. He urged, that there were a number of Records "and Letters still to be consulted," &c. &c. &c.

Of the Letter addressed to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, one part only requires annotation, the rest having, as I presume, been fully answered in my Minute of Appeal, and in the preceding Remarks.

Much stress is laid on the contents of the last General Letter from the late Council, as containing facts and opinions not according with the date of it; and arguments are accumulated to prove, that the Letter was written later than the date of it. This charge is in part true. That part of the Letter to which this objection particularly applies, was most certainly written after the assembly of the new Council; and written, as I can vouch, with the design of obviating the objections which might be, or had been made to the propriety of the Rohilla expedition. The date was a mere form, necessary to authenticate the Letter, which was to be signed by the Gentlemen of whom the late Council had consisted, and were no longer a public body after the Proclamation of the new Council. This is not the only instance of facts, in their own nature perfectly indifferent, which have been produced against me, and against the late Administration, with all the solemnity of the most criminal accusations.

Warren Hastings.

Remarks on the first Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monson*, and Mr. *Francis*; dated 11th January 1775.

References to paragraphs of the majority's Minute.

Par. 3, 4, 5. These paragraphs labour to prove, that the conditions exacted from the Vizier, by the resolution of the Board passed on the 20th of November 1773, were the same that the Vizier himself had previously offered for our assistance in the intended war against the Rohillas, and that of course, the rigid terms which I had said it was probable the Vizier would revolt at, and drop all thoughts of prosecuting the design, had no existence.

In reply, I desire that the three articles of the original draft of the Treaty which was formed when I was with the Vizier at *Benares*, containing the first conditions on which it was proposed to assist him in the reduction of the Rohillas, may be compared with the draft of the Letter dictated to be written by the Vizier, and containing the conditions on which it was resolved in November 1773 to assist him in that enterprize. The former will be found in my Minute of Appeal, in page 39 of the triplicate accompanying this, and the latter in the Proceedings of the late Select Committee, dated the 22d of November 1773, and in the Proceedings of the Board, in their Secret Department, on the 26th of November 1773. These will shew the difference of the conditions proposed, which consist in this essential point; that the conquest of the Rohilla country was the criterion which established the Company's right to the stipulation of forty lacks in the first instance; and in the second it is agreed, that the forty lacks should become due, and be paid in ready money, whenever the Vizier should dismiss the brigade, or one-half of the brigade, whether the country of the Rohillas should be conquered or not.

6. I am here charged with a concealed design, formed in concert with the Vizier, to "*extirpate*" the Rohillas; and much use is made of this discovery both by the majority, in the Letter before me, and by Colonel *Champion* in his vindication. The word, in the original language of the Letter, which is here translated to "*extirpate*," means to expel or remove. In another passage of the Letter it is joined with a word which does literally express to *extirpate*, or root out; and both passages mean no more, than that it was the intention of the Vizier to expel or remove the Rohillas from the country which they occupied, without suffering the smallest vestige of their power to remain in it. In this sense I most certainly did agree to assist the Vizier, and so did the late President and Council, nor can I conceive how the war could have been undertaken with any other object. The majority know, as well as myself, that the Rohillas are not the people of the country, but a military tribe who conquered it, and quartered themselves upon the people without following any profession but that of

Rohillas. Their origin.

arms, or mixing in any relation with the native inhabitants. I have already deſcribed the nature of this tribe in the 9th paragraph of my obſervations on the firſt Letter of the majority, and the ſame account of them has been given by Colonel *Leſlie* and Major *Hannay*, and, if I miſtake not, by Colonel *Champion* himſelf, in their examination taken before the Board on the 19th and 28th of December. Major *Hannay*'s words are remarkable; I beg leave to quote them. "I have "learned from many people, that it is only within 50 "years that the Rohillas are become maſters of the "country to the North of the *Ganges*. That they were "originally Afgans, came into *Hindoſtan* under a Serdar "named *Doud Cawn*, and that they conquered that coun- "try from the Hindoos, and that ſince that time they have "followed no other profeſſion than that of arms, and "the ancient Hindoos have cultivated the country. "The Rohillas are Muſſelmen, of the ſect of *Omar*, "and the cultivators of the country are Hindoos. I "ſuppoſe the proportion to be about nine Hindoos to "one Muſſelman."

64. The peruſal of the Letters now laid before the Board by Colonel *Champion* will, I doubt not, ſatisfy you of the propriety of my withholding them when firſt demanded by the majority, and of the truth of my aſſertion, that they contained no material public information.

65, 66. I have already fully explained my ſentiments as to the propriety of the Rohilla war. It will appear by the Proceedings, and by my Letter to Colonel *Champion* on the ſubject, that the late Adminiſtration uniformly diſcouraged the hope of plunder. The following extract of my Letter to Colonel *Champion* will probably appear to many too ſtrongly expreſſed on this ſide of the queſtion.

Extract of my Letter to Colonel *Champion*; dated the 21ſt May 1774.

"Hitherto every part of your conduct has met with "my moſt entire approbation; but there is one ſubject "which in ſome meaſure alarms me; *the very idea of "prize money ſuggeſts to my remembrance the former diſ- "orders which aroſe in our army from this ſource, and had "almoſt proved fatal to it.* Of this circumſtance you "muſt be ſufficiently apprized, and of the neceſſity for "diſcouraging every expectation of this kind among "the troops; it is to be avoided like poiſon. However, "in caſe any conſiderable capture ſhould attend your "future operations, I think you cannot purſue a better "conduct than that which you intended, to determine "nothing yourſelf, but acquaint the Board with the cir- "cumſtances, and wait for their deciſion."

Remarks on the ſecond Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; dated 11th January 1775.

King's Tuncaw. The reaſons for continuing the payment of his allowance are explained in my report of my tranſactions at *Bendres*, entered in Conſultation of the 4th October 1773, and the reaſons for diſcharging that part of the King's tribute for which a tuncaw, or aſſignment, had been granted by the King to the Vizier, are explained in the Conſultation of 13th May 1773, and in my report. The principal reaſon was, that the aſſignment had been accepted by the late Government in the time of Mr. *Cartier*. It was a debt due to the Vizier, and paid to the Vizier, not to the King, to whom the portion of the tribute for which the aſſignment was granted had been paid when that aſſignment was granted.

The firſt part of the fourth paragraph I do not underſtand. The latter part indirectly charges me with having ſhared with the Vizier in the amount of this aſſignment;—to this I ſhall not reply.

5. 6. Theſe meaſures have been long ago referred to the Court of Directors, and need no explanation here, as their determination upon them muſt have been formed before this.

The Gentlemen in different parts of their writings ſeem to blame me for ſtopping the payment of the King's tribute; on the other hand, had I paid it, I ſuppoſe, from the preceding paragraph, that I ſhould have been charged with ſharing in it.

It is an undoubted truth, that the ſtate of the Company, at the time in which theſe meaſures were adopted, was diſtreſſed both at home and abroad; it ſhall be inconteſtably ſhewn, that "their preſent condition is "proſperous and flouriſhing." The means by which this ſudden alteration has been effected have been repeatedly and fully ſhewn. It may ſuffice here to ſay, that it has been principally occaſioned by the acquiſition of money from the Nabob *Sujah Dowla*, and the reductions made in the Company's expences in *Bengal*.

7. Requires no reply.

8. The increaſe levied on *Cheyt Sing* was on his ſucceſſion to the Zemindarry immediately on his father's death; no further increaſe was levied upon him on his confirmation in it during my interview with the Vizier at *Benares*.

9. 10. 11. No part of theſe paragraphs requires any comment, except the inſinuation contained in the concluſion of the laſt. The firſt Letter written to me by the Vizier, which notices the late change of Government, was received the 20th of December, in anſwer to mine which adviſed him of that change. It is certain that many Letters were written by the King and others to General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*. It is plain that thoſe Gentlemen are either offended at the Vizier for not having paid them the ſame compliment, or impute the neglect of it to me. Your orders are peremptory, that the correſpondence between this Government and the Country Powers ſhall be carried on by the Governor alone. They have arrogated to themſelves every other power of the Government, and this alſo they now too manifeſtly lay claim to, in defiance of your moſt poſitive injunctions.

Remarks on the third Minute of General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; dated 11th January 1775.

2. This paragraph ſeems to imply, that the late Adminiſtration had always flattered the Company with falſe hopes, and concealed from them the true ſituation of their affairs: a peruſal of the General Letters written in 1773 and 1774 would be ſufficient to evince the contrary.

General *Clavering* delivers in the following copy of the Addreſs of himſelf, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*, to the Court of Directors, ſent by the *Bute*, together with the Papers therein mentioned to be enclоſed.

Minute, N° 1, from General *Clavering*, Colonel *Monſon*, and Mr. *Francis*; dated *Fort William*, the 25th of February 1775;—received in *London* 18th September 1775.

1. The ſeparate Minutes which we have thought it neceſſary to draw up for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors, have never yet retarded or interfered with the proſecution and diſpatch of public buſineſs. The hours which might have been dedicated to eaſe and relaxation, have been employed in the ſevere and toilſome duty of explaining the nature of thoſe meaſures, which we not only had the ſtrongeſt reaſons to condemn, but to which we were obliged to act in immediate oppoſition.

This labour, however, is too heavy to be continued; nor have we any thing at preſent to add to the arguments with which we have endeavoured to ſupport and defend our conduct.

2. If the Rohilla war ſhould be approved of by our Superiors, or if they ſhould condemn us for withdrawing the brigade out of the Rohilla country, and bringing it nearer

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nearer to our own frontier, we ſhall ſubmit to authority, but we do not conceive it poſſible for us to alter our opinion. Without purſuing that or any other endleſs argument with the Governor General, we now think it ſufficient for the complete vindication of our conduct, to eſtabliſh the credit of ſuch of our aſſertions as the Governor General has been pleaſed to diſpute, by referring more particularly to the evidence on which they were founded, and which we preſume will be deemed ſatisfactory.

3. We mean alſo to convince the Governor, that in ſome material inſtances he has concluded haſtily on groundleſs ſuppoſitions. In ſhort, ſince we have not had the good fortune to ſucceed in our attempts to ſatisfy him of the impropriety of his conduct and opinions, by the mode of argument which we have hitherto made uſe of, we ſhall endeavour to obviate all farther difficulties on this head, by appealing to authorities which he cannot diſpute, or by ſetting ſome of his own declared opinions or poſitive aſſertions in a clear and direct oppoſition to each other.

4. The Governor makes frequent reference to that paſſage in our introductory Minute of the 30th November 1774, in which we expreſs our concern, "that the "juſtification of our conduct muſt of neceſſity carry with "it, and can only be ſupported by a ſtrong and deliberate "cenſure of the preceding Adminiſtration."

We, for ourſelves, do not ſee in what particular the ſuppoſed weakneſs or impropriety of this declaration can be underſtood to conſiſt. The adoption of a new ſyſtem, in oppoſition to one already eſtabliſhed, neceſſarily implies a cenſure of that from which we reſolve to depart.—To prove that the new ſyſtem is good, it ſeems indiſpenſably neceſſary to ſhew, that the one to which it is oppoſed was falſe or defective. The cenſure in that caſe muſt be ſtrong and deliberate. The accidental inſertion of the word *only*, ſeems to lead to a preſumption very injurious to our argument.—We believe, that the rectitude of our conduct has been ſupported by a train of poſitive arguments ſufficient to eſtabliſh it, independent of that ſtrong and deliberate cenſure which they neceſſarily fix on the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration. But we are not the judges in our own cauſe, and willingly ſubmit every part of the queſtion between the Governor General and ourſelves to an higher authority.

5. Before we proceed to thoſe obſervations, which we hope will eſtabliſh a poſitive defence of any former opinion delivered by us with reſpect to the Rohilla war, let us clear the ground.

6. The Governor General, without enquiring into facts, or without aſking us an obvious queſtion, which we ſhould immediately have anſwered, takes it for granted, that the contents of the diſpatches ſent to *England* by the *Mercury* packet had been communicated to us by the Court of Directors, and that we were thoroughly informed (as far as his Report of the 4th of October 1773, could inform us) of the nature and extent of his negociation with the Vizier at *Benares*. On this gratuitous ſuppoſition, he founds many a ſerious argument againſt the ſincerity of our profeſſed prejudices in his favour, and very juſtly concludes, that we could not be in earneſt, in declaring, that we came into this country impreſſed with the higheſt idea of the wiſdom and ability with which he had conducted the Company's affairs.—We admit the concluſion to be juſt and regular, but we deny the premiſes. The diſpatches by the *Mercury* were received but a few days before we left *London*, and were never communicated to us by the Court of Directors.

The following extract of a Letter we wrote to their Secretary, Mr. *Michell*, from *Spithead*, dated the 9th of April 1774, will, we hope, convince the Governor General, that we had at that time no reaſon to alter the too partial opinion which we had formed of his character and conduct; as we ſailed in three days after, it was impoſſible for us to receive an anſwer to that Letter.

"We think it very neceſſary to inform you, that "among the ſeveral Letters contained in the Company's "packet directed to us, and intended for our particular "uſe, we do not find copies of the laſt General Letters, "either from *Fort William* or *Madras*, or any Extracts "from them, except one Letter from the Revenue De"partment at *Fort William*, which relates ſolely to the "Bank. We are therefore entirely unacquainted with "the actual ſtate of the Company's affairs at *Bengal*, and "upon the Coaſt, where, nevertheleſs, as we underſtand "from private intelligence, ſome very important events "have lately taken place. Copies of the above Letters were "particularly deſired by us, and we were informed, that "we ſhould be favoured with them*. We now requeſt "that they may be forwarded immediately to the Com"pany's Agent at *Portſmouth*, who will either ſend them "off to us, or return them to you, in caſe we ſhould "have ſailed before he receives your packet."

7. Thus far, we preſume, the Governor's implied charge of inſincerity in our firſt declarations is completely anſwered. The Court of Directors are already ſufficiently informed at what time, and from what cauſes, we found ourſelves obliged to relinquiſh our earlieſt opinions in Mr. *Haſtings*'s favour, and to adopt others diametrically oppoſite to them. We now beg leave to go a little farther than we have yet done in the explanation of our ſentiments on this ſubject.

8. If it had been poſſible for us to have ſeen the diſpatches by the *Mercury*, or if the ſubſequent proceedings of the late Adminiſtration, in regard to the Rohilla war, could have been known to us before we left *England*, we are very much inclined to think, that it would not only have ſhaken our opinion of Mr. *Haſtings*'s character, but have deterred us from engaging with him in any ſhape in the Government of *Bengal*.

9. As for the Treaty of *Benares*, it is true we had heard that *Corah* and *Allahabad* were ceded to the Vizier, but we neither knew on what ſpecific conditions, nor any of the circumſtances that attended and might have juſtified ſuch a meaſure.

The word *ſale*, we apprehend, is the only one that can be properly applied to the terms agreed on with the Vizier, for putting him into poſſeſſion of the King's demeſne. Of itſelf it implies nothing diſhonourable to either party, unleſs we annex to it the idea of ſelling what is not our own, without the owner's conſent; in that caſe, the diſhonour, if any, is excluſively fixed upon the repreſentatives of the Company; the purchaſer has no ſhare in it.

10. Our remarks on ſome particular paſſages in the Governor General's laſt volume ſhall be as ſhort and diſtinct as poſſible, leſt they ſhould ſwell into the ſame alarming ſize.

Many of his objections are already anſwered in our preceding Minutes, which he had not an opportunity of ſeeing or conſidering when he wrote that of the 10th of January. We will not weary the Court of Directors with uſeleſs repetitions; if our unfavourable repreſentation of the preſent ſtate of *Bengal* has been exaggerated, the evidence of facts will ſoon come forward and convict us; in the meantime, we refer the Court of Directors to the anſwers given in by Meſſrs. *Middleton*, *Dacres*, and *Vanſittart*, to the queries propoſed by Colonel *Monſon*, concerning the internal ſtate of this Country. We preſume it could not be the object of theſe Gentlemen to condemn the meaſures of the late Adminiſtration, ſince they themſelves made part of it. Let their own repreſentation of facts be conſidered.

* Copies and Extracts were ſent by expreſs to Portſmouth the 11th of April 1774, but the *Aſhburnham* had ſailed a few hours before their arrival.—The 14th of April 1774, they were diſpatched after the *Aſhburnham* to *Madeira*, but being too late, were returned from thence unopened.

Mr.

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Mr. *Haſtings*'s Minute of the 10th January 1775.

Par. 10. *Brave and independent* are epithets, not very conſiſtent with the deſcription given of the Rohillas in the 39th Paragraph.

Par. 10. The Rohillas are not a nation, but a tribe of freebooters, who conquered the country about ſixty years ago, and have ever ſince lived upon the fruits of it, &c. The Rohillas are Mahometans, the Natives are Hindoos.

Par. 11. The majority, in mentioning the deficiency in my Report on the Rohilla expedition, ſuppreſſed the particulars related by me, &c.

Par. 13. Let this Minute be compared with the ſhort and mutilated Extract, &c.

Par. 16. I am ſorry to ſee the names of *Clavering* and *Monſon* ſubſcribed to ſuch unworthy inſinuations, becauſe I do not believe, that even the heat of party contention can ſo far have warped their minds from the conſideration of that juſtice, which every man of honour will yield to the honour of others, as to make them *really believe* me capable of ſo baſe an artifice as they have imputed to me, without the ſlighteſt ground to ſupport it. I will not anſwer it.

Par. 16. I do not believe that even the heat of party contention, &c.

Par. 18. An appeal to the paſſions is an inſult to the underſtanding.

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11. The deſcription referred to is, that they are *weak, divided, and defenceleſs, and that they live in dread of a ſuperior neighbour*.

Their independence was eſtabliſhed by their having treated for a courſe of years with the neighbouring Powers, particularly with the Vizier, and even with the Repreſentatives of the Company, as an independent State; as ſuch they have been hitherto acknowledged.

12. Admitting the facts, we ſay, that the Rohillas were lords of the country by right of conqueſt and long poſſeſſion; we add, that they governed it with lenity and moderation, as clearly appears by the flouriſhing condition in which our army found it. If a defect in their title, or a difference of religion, be of itſelf a ſufficient ground for invading ſuch a State, we deſire to know on what principles Mr. *Haſtings* will defend the right of the Britiſh empire to the actual ſovereignty of theſe provinces? As this queſtion evidently leads to others, which may not only affect his duty as a ſervant to the Company, but his allegiance as a ſubject, we deſire him to be very cautious what anſwer he makes to it.

13. The particulars referred to are contained in a ſhort Paragraph of Mr. *Haſtings*'s Report of the 4th of October 1773 (copy of which was annexed to our firſt Minute, N° 1, of the 30th November 1774) and the Report itſelf was already before the Court of Directors. We apprehend that any paper annexed to a diſpatch makes part of that diſpatch, otherwiſe every document muſt be inſerted in the body of the Letter.

14. The ſame obſervation applies to the Reſolution of the late Select Committee of the 26th November 1773, of which we encloſed a complete copy.

15. It is with the utmoſt degree of aſtoniſhment we perceive, in the Governor General's obſervations on our Letter to the Court of Directors, intimations and ſuggeſtions injurious to our reputation and honour. We call upon him to manifeſt, in what inſtances we have deviated from the ſentiments therein delineated, and what ſhadow of right there is to ſuppoſe, that the names of *Clavering* and *Monſon* would be affixed to declarations inconſiſtent with their ſentiments and opinions. Such inſinuations may ſometimes have the effect intended on the preſent occaſion, but with men of honour will ever be treated with the diſregard they deſerve.

J. Clavering.
Geo. Monſon.

As I am not charged with having ſet my name to any thing which I did not really believe, I ſhall make no other objection to this paragraph, but that it ſeems to have a tendency to divide me from thoſe men whoſe public principles I adopt, whoſe public meaſures I avow, whoſe private characters I reſpect, and to whom I have the honour to be united, not only in the ſupport of public meaſures, but by the ſtrongeſt ties of perſonal regard and eſteem.

I will not accept of a compliment from the Governor General, or any man, that appears to be excluſive of General *Clavering* and Colonel *Monſon*.

P. Francis.

16. "We pretend not to look into the hearts of others, but we exerciſe the right allowed to all mankind, of judging of intentions by facts."—Vide Mr. *Haſtings*'s Paragraph 18.

17. We cannot aſſent to the truth of this aſſertion, if it be meant as a general propoſition. In many caſes we are convinced, that the appeals which deſerve the moſt favourable attention of the underſtanding, are thoſe which find acceſs to the head through the medium of the heart. True policy, true wiſdom, does not indiſcriminately reject ſuch appeals. But ſuppoſing the propoſition to be true to its utmoſt extent, we at leaſt have a right to expect, that it ſhall be impartially applied.

Mr. *Haſtings*, in his Addreſs of the 3d of December, which regularly ſhould have contained nothing but a defence againſt a charge, takes care to remind the Court of Directors "of "his former ſervices, of his reliance on their juſtice, of the "conſciouſneſs of his own integrity, of his willingneſs to "devote

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" devote the remainder of his life to their ſervice, of his de-
" termination to ſubmit without a murmur to their ſentence,
" nor ſhould the ſeverity of it make him loſe the ſenſe of
" gratitude which he feels, and owes to the obligations already
" laid upon him, &c." Is this an appeal to the juſtice of his judges, or is it an inſult to their underſtanding?

18. The accounts we gave of the enormities practiſed by *Sujah Dowla*, during the conduct, and after the deciſion of the war, were founded on the authority of the Commanding Officer of the Britiſh forces, on which we ſtill implicitly rely; at that time certainly we had not the leaſt ſhadow of reaſon to diſtruſt it. The following private Letter from Colonel *Champion* to Mr. *Haſtings*, dated the 10th of May 1774, will, we apprehend, completely vindicate the truth of this part of our repreſentation. As it is now upon Record, we have an unqueſtionable right to appeal to it.

" *Biſſoulee*, 10th May 1774.

" Dear Sir,

" I have the pleaſure to ſend you a ſhort Addreſs for " the Board, requeſting permiſſion to repair to the Pre-" ſidency; and I beg you will not fail to preſent it, as " ſoon as credible accounts ſhall arrive of any Officers " being on the way to *Bengal* to take the command of " the army.

" Not only do I wiſh to get down as ſoon as poſſible, " to put my little affairs in the beſt order for my return " to *Europe*; but I muſt be candid enough to unboſom " myſelf to you freely, and confeſs, that the nature of the " ſervice, and the terms on which I have been employed " this campaign, have been inexpreſſibly diſagreeable.

" The authority given to the Vizier over your army " has totally abſorbed that degree of conſequence due " to my ſtation. My hands have been tied up from " giving protection or aſylum to the miſerable. I have " been obliged to give a deaf ear to the lamentable cries " of the widow and fatherleſs, and to ſhut my eyes " againſt a wanton diſplay of violence and oppreſſion, of " inhumanity and cruelty.

" The Company's intereſt conſtrained me in public " to ſtifle the workings of my feelings, but I muſt give " them vent in private.

" Though we had no active part in his baſe pro-" ceedings, yet it is well known that the ſucceſs of our " arms gave him the power of perpetrating theſe enor-" mities; and I much fear, that our being even ſilent " ſpectators of ſuch deeds will redound to the diſhonour " of our nation, and impreſs all *Hindoſtan* with the moſt " unfavourable opinion of our Government.

" As matters now are, I know of no remedy that " would ſo effectually re-eſtabliſh our character for " juſtice and clemency, as your taking the family of " *Hafez* under the wings of your mercy and protection, " and influencing the Nabob to make proviſion for them " in ſome degree ſuitable to their birth.

" It would affect your ſenſibility too much were I to " deſcend to particulars; let it ſuffice, that the Nabob " *Mahubbit Cawn*, the eldeſt ſon, and the reſt of the " family of *Hafez*, who are under cloſe confinement " (the Begums and other women included) have been " driven to the neceſſity of making private ſupplications " for a little rice and water.

" I wiſh, my friend, to leave ſcenes which none but " the mercileſs *Sujah* can bear without heart-bleeding " pain. Relieve me therefore as ſoon as poſſible, and " oblige,

" Dear Sir, &c.

(Signed) " *A. Champion.*"

19. The evidence contained in this Letter is more, in our opinion, than ſufficient to juſtify every thing we have ſaid or ſuggeſted, relative to the conduct of the war under the arbitrary command of the late Vizier. The Records to which we now appeal, carry the proofs of *Sujah Dowla*'s inhuman treatment of his priſoners farther than the moſt prejudiced imagination could have conceived poſſible, or the moſt malignant ſpirit of calumny would have ventured to ſuggeſt.

20. The Letter from *Sujah Dowla* ſent home by the laſt ſhip, and which Colonel *Champion* has given the Board ſome reaſon to think was fabricated or adviſed by Colonel *Macleane*, has produced a reply from Colonel *Champion*, which we think deſerves the higheſt attention, not only of the Court of Directors, but of Parliament and the Nation. Such a detail of enormities has never yet, we believe, made part of the hiſtory of any nation. We ſubmit it to the Court of Directors, whether it be not abſolutely neceſſary, for the vindication of the Company, for clearing the honour of the Britiſh name, and for fixing the opprobrium of theſe tranſactions upon the perſons who alone ſhall appear to be guilty, that every Letter and other Document ſent from hence relative to the Rohilla war ſhould be immediately printed and publiſhed.

For the preſent, however, we beg leave to ſupport our firſt ideas of the perſonal baſeneſs and brutality of the late Vizier, by the encloſed copies of Seven Papers, annexed to Colonel *Champion*'s reply.

They come before us, ſupported by every ſpecies of concurring evidence of which the ſubject is capable.

If they ſhould require any further explanation, Colonel *Champion* will be in *England*, and may be called upon to give it.

21. Let us not be underſtood to mean that Mr. *Haſtings* ought to be implicated in the perſonal charges fixed upon *Sujah Dowla*.

In ſtrict juſtice, perhaps, the author or promoter of an unjuſt meaſure may be deemed anſwerable for all the fatal conſequences that attend it. We are willing to believe, that many of theſe conſequences were not foreſeen or intended by Mr. *Haſtings*.

Mr. *Haſtings*'s Minute,

Par. 18. In the year 1764, a detachment of our troops was employed to burn and ravage *Sujah Dowla*'s country. It fell to the lot of Major *Champion* to execute this commiſſion, and how well he diſcharged it, and how little his feelings were at that time affected, &c.

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22. To prove an inconſiſtency between Colonel *Champion*'s preſent ſentiments and his own practice above ten years ago, Mr. *Haſtings* produces an Extract of a Letter from Colonel *Champion* to the late Mr. *Vanſittart*, dated 20th June 1764.

Mr. *Haſtings*'s Minute.

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We leave it to our Superiors to determine upon the validity of this evidence, with reſpect to the concluſion propoſed to be drawn from it, and upon the fairneſs and equity of introducing it at this period.

What we ſay for ourſelves is, that the Governor manifeſtly contradicts himſelf in the very paragraph in which he charges Colonel *Champion* with inconſiſtency.

Speaking of the Vizier ſending out detachments to plunder, he ſays, "this I pronounce to be both barbarous and im-"politic;" yet when he mentions the ſame ſcene of barbarity and wanton enormities, ſuppoſed to have been exerciſed by Major *Champion* in the year 1764, he ſays, "I do not mean "to reproach him with having done the duty aſſigned him."

Our queſtion is, could it be Colonel *Champion*'s *duty* to do what was both barbarous and impolitic? and if it was, by whom was it aſſigned to him?

Par. 20. The Governor diſputes the truth of the reports of brutal outrages offered to the wives and daughters of the Rohillas, though of the higheſt rank.

23. We continue to believe the truth of the charge upon the beſt evidence that the nature of it will admit of.

1ſt. Public notoriety and opinion.

2d. The reports made to Colonel *Champion*, on which the Colonel candidly obſerves, that he had no grounds ſufficient to *prove* "the accuſation."

3d. The perſonal character of the Vizier; and laſtly, the undiſputed evidence of Colonel *Leſlie*, that he had repeatedly entered the women's apartments, which no Muſſulman would do without a baſe and brutal intention, nor could do without leaving ſhame and diſhonour behind him.

As for the reſt, it appears, by Colonel *Leſlie*'s evidence, that he even deſcended to rob the women of their trinkets. But as on this general head we have already referred to evidence of a more direct and comprehenſive nature, it only remains for us to obſerve, that ſuppoſing the Vizier to have conducted the war upon the moſt moderate and honourable principles, or ſuppoſing his quarrel with the Rohillas to have been ever ſo well founded, it would have been no motive or juſtification of our engaging in it with him.

Par. 19. The Governor quotes a Letter from Colonel *Champion* of the 12th of June 1774.

24. As every word of this quotation tends to confirm, in the ſtrongeſt manner, our repreſentation of the Vizier's inhuman treatment of his priſoners, we deſire that it may be particularly conſidered.

Colonel *Champion*, ſays, that "the inhumanity and diſ-"honour with which the late proprietors of the Country and "their families had been treated was known over all thoſe "parts. That their Letters to him would convey but a faint "idea of the treatment thoſe unhappy people had met "with. That he could not help compaſſionating ſuch un-"paralleled miſery."

"That his requeſts to the Vizier to ſhew lenity, were fre-"quent, but fruitleſs; and though profeſſedly taken in good "part by the Vizier, yet only ſerved to procure them more "rigorous treatment."

On the repreſentations in this Letter, we content ourſelves with remarking, that excluſive of the probability of their being true, and of the groſs improbability of their being invented by Colonel *Champion*, we have a right to appeal to his authority, as a competent witneſs of the facts he vouches for, until his credit ſhall be completely invalidated; by ſome ſatisfactory and poſitive proof of his having deliberately intended to traduce the Vizier, and deceive his Superiors, and that he adopted this diſhonourable deſign ſo long ago as May laſt.

Par. 21. "I never aſſerted that my chief reaſon "for withholding the Correſpondence was, that "they related to a difference between the Vizier "and Colonel *Champion*."

25. We well recollect that this was one of the reaſons aſſigned by the Governor, though it might not have been the chief one.

It now appears that ſuch a difference did exiſt, and that it aroſe from circumſtances which he might naturally wiſh ſhould continue to be concealed from us.

As the truth of our aſſertion however turns upon perſonal teſtimony, we ſhall not inſiſt on it.

Par. 26. It is a miſrepreſentation to ſay, "that "the Vizier dared to tell the Preſidency, that he is "the *Maſter* of the Company's army." He ſays, "*but I am the Maſter in theſe affairs, and the power* "*of retaining or diſmiſſing the Engliſh army is mine.*"

26. We do not pretend to underſtand the Perſian idiom. The words we quoted are plain Engliſh.

That *Suja Dowla* conſidered himſelf as, in effect, the Maſter of the Company's army, appears plainly from the ſtyle he aſſumed in his diſcourſes with Colonel *Champion*; for

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Mr. *Haſtings*'s Minute.

Par. 26. "I look in vain for the juſtification of their conduct in recalling the brigade at the *criſis of the war*."

Par. 41. I do reckon the "probable acquiſition "of wealth among my reaſons for taking up arms "againſt my neighbours."

Par. 44. "The rupees of the currency of *Oude* "have a fixed ſtandard."

Par. 44. "I believe, upon examination of the "Paymaſter's accounts, that the rupees received "from the Vizier, on account of the monthly ſub- "ſidy, have yielded one hundred and eleven current "rupees per cent."

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which we beg leave to refer to the Colonel's Narrative, and to the Documents annexed to it.

27. The facts relative to the negociation at *Benares*, as far as they appear, are laid before the Court of Directors. It is for them to judge and conclude from the facts to the motives. We ſay that Mr. *Haſtings* conferred conſtantly with the Vizier, without the preſence of a third perſon, though the Commander in Chief and two of the Council were upon the ſpot. We ſay, that the Treaty contained nothing but a defenſive alliance; but that, in two months, it appeared, that Mr. *Haſtings* had entered into offenſive engagements with the Vizier. Theſe are the tranſactions which we (at firſt) called dark and myſterious. We are now ready to retract thoſe epithets, and to declare our opinion, that they are not ſo dark and myſterious as we thought them.

28. The orders for recalling the brigade were not diſpatched till the 4th of November. The Treaty with the laſt of the Rohilla Chiefs was concluded on the 6th * of October, but the fate of the war had been decided many months before.

On other occaſions we are charged with a wanton or malignant cenſure of a meaſure already paſt and determined, in the ſole view of throwing a uſeleſs reflection on the laſt Adminiſtration.

29. The charge being thus deliberately admitted, and the doctrine thus triumphantly avowed, we ſhould go beyond the limits of our office, if we took upon us to pronounce any ſentence or farther opinion upon it.

30. If they have, it muſt be known. We have called upon the proper Officers of the Mint to inform us what is the ſtandard and intrinſic value of the ſicca rupee of the currency of *Oude*; for this is the coin in which, by the Treaty of *Benares*, the payments were to be made.

By their Report, contained in the annexed Paper, it appears, that the Governor is miſtaken in aſſerting that the "above rupees have a fixed ſtandard. Mr. *Paxton*, the "Aſſay Maſter, ſays, that on examining the aſſay book for "ſeveral years back, he does not find that any rupees, under "the deſcription of Oude ſiccas, have been brought to the "Mint." That,

"The Viziery rupees ſeem to have no fixed ſtandard, but "are found to vary in reſpect to fineneſs from dwts. 8,511. to "37,022 per cent. worſe than Calcutta ſiccas."

Mr. *Lloyd*, the Mint Maſter ſays, that "the ſicca rupees "of the province of *Oude* have no fixed ſtandard, all vary- "ing from each other in their intrinſic value."

Mr. *Touchet*, the late Mint Maſter, ſays, "that there is "ſuch a variety of Viziery rupees, that no kind of ſtandard "can be aſcertained. Thoſe laſt received from *Sujah Dowla* "turned out in the Mint in nett produce from 18 to 40 per "cent. below the Calcutta ſiccas; and that the Benares rupee "produces upon a medium 7 per cent. leſs than the Calcutta "ſicca."

If, however, it ſhould be found that the ſums received from *Sujah Dowla* are equal upon the whole, or ſuperior in value to the ſame number of current rupees (which, notwithſtanding the firſt payments were made in a better ſpecie, we very much doubt) ſtill it does not follow that the Company will have received the full value of what they were entitled to by Treaty.

31. Suppoſing 100 rupees of *Oude* to be worth 111 current rupees, it follows, that twenty-one lacks of thoſe rupees ſhould be worth 23,31,000 current. The account we gave of their produce in ſiccas was received from the Mint Maſter, viz. 18,29,184, or current rupees 21,21,853. 7. If current rupees were meant by the Treaty, the Vizier has then paid 21,853. 7. current rupees too much. If ſonauts, or a coin equal in value to them, were meant by the Treaty, he has then paid 2,09,146. 9. current rupees too little. If ſiccas were meant, the deficiency, on this payment of twenty-one lacks (which we believe will be found to be the beſt he has ever made) will then increaſe to 3,14,146. 9. current rupees.

32. It is not at preſent neceſſary to go farther into this part of the ſubject of our reſpective Minutes.

* "On the 6th of October the War was finally concluded by the Treaty with Fyzoolla Cawn." *Vide Mr. Haſtings's Minute of the 30th November 1774.*

When

Mr. *Haſtings*'s Minute.

Par. 45. "I am informed that the diſburſe-
" ment of the troops, which marched to the ſervice
" of the Vizier, during the three firſt months,
" amounted at a medium to current rupees 2,37,773
" per month."

Par. 45. "The troop of cavalry was not ex-
" preſsly raiſed for this ſervice."

Par. 45. I am aſtoniſhed to find the charge of recruiting added, &c.

Par. 52. The chaſm in my "Correſpondence
" with Colonel *Champion* will now be ſupplied," &c.

Par. 60. "This and the concluding ſentence of
" the laſt Paragraph have much the air of inſinua-
" tion thrown out to the diſadvantage of the *civil*
" branch of the ſervice."

Par. 42. I ſay that the Vizier's poſſeſſions, "by
" theſe acquiſitions, make a compact State, ſhut in
" effectually from foreign invaſions."

Par. 66. "I am ſupported by the opinions de-
" livered by Colonel *Champion*, Colonel *Leſlie*, and
" Major *Hannay*."

Par. 69. "The ceſſion of *Corah* and *Allahabad*
" is ſtiled by the majority *a ſale, a purchaſe*; and
" the ſubſidy is branded with the appellations of
" *pecuniary terms*, and *hiring out* the troops," &c.

Par. 69. "To remove this heavy load, it was
" propoſed to raiſe the ſubſidy," &c.

Par. 69. "I retract and diſavow the words, *by*
" *keeping them in the continued practice of war*."

Remarks.

When once it is determined in what ſpecific coin the payments from the Vizier are to be completed, and when the ſeveral payments made on that account are appreciated at the Mint, we preſume there can be but one opinion at the Board, viz. "that the deficiency, whatever it is, ſhall be made good
" by the State of *Oude*, and juſtice done to the Company."
We ſhall only add, that as far as our preſent information goes, the monthly ſubſidy to the brigade has not been paid up beyond September laſt.

33. It is well known that the Paymaſter of the ſecond brigade has not adjuſted his accounts, nor ſent up any diſtribution for ſeveral months paſt to the Paymaſter General here. Till this be done, and till all the extraordinary expences attending the above ſervice are liquidated, no certain judgment can poſſibly be formed, whether the Company are upon the whole loſers, or gainers, by the ſubſidy ſtipulated for the foreign ſervice of their troops.

34. For whatever purpoſe it was raiſed, it ſtill ſerved in the field at the Company's expence, ſince no proviſion was made for it in the eſtimate of the monthly ſubſidy.

35. We meant the recruiting of the European battalion, not the Sepoys.

36. The chaſm taken notice of by us was in the Correſpondence of Mr. *Middleton*, not of Colonel *Champion*.

37. The Civil Servants of the Company, who, in our opinion, have involved the Company in offenſive wars, are the few who ſat in Council. The planning and execution of ſuch meaſures muſt be confined to thoſe perſons only who were honoured with the confidence of the Company, and veſted with their authority.

38. If the Governor's object was to give the Vizier the whole country of the Rohillas as far as the mountains, why did he propoſe that *Nudjiff Khân*, or the King, ſhould have a ſhare of the conqueſt?

39. We very earneſtly deſire that the Court of Directors may think it adviſable to publiſh the examinations of theſe Officers referred to by the Governor.

40. We have already proved that theſe meaſures were unknown to us when we left *England*. We ſtill adhere to the terms in which we have deſcribed them. The King's demeſne was ſold for a ſpecific ſum, and our troops, by the very plan of the agreement, acted as mercenaries in *Sujah Dowla*'s ſervice. We refer to Colonel *Champion*'s Narrative for the manner in which the Britiſh Commander in Chief, and the troops who acted under him, were treated by the Prince from whom they received their ſtipend.

41. Waving at preſent our objections to the ſubſidy's not being equal to the actual expence, we inſiſt upon another, which we have already taken notice of. The circulation created by the preſence of a brigade, with that of the numerous followers who attend it, gives life to induſtry wherever the brigade is ſtationed, furniſhes a multitude of perſons with means of ſubſiſtence, and of courſe is beneficial to the revenue. It is in the nature of things, that the removal of a brigade out of the Company's territories muſt, in every inſtance, produce the oppoſite effect. It has already been pleaded by the farmers as a reaſon for their inability to pay their rents.

42. We deſire that no advantage may be taken of a haſty inconſiderate expreſſion, eſpecially after ſo ſolemn a retraction. Without regarding words, or wiſhing to bind the Governor to the ſtrict meaning of the terms he makes uſe of, we affirm, that whether the principle be avowed or not, the practice correſponds with it; and that the whole tendency of Mr. *Haſtings*'s argument in defence of this part of his conduct, is to prove that it is highly uſeful to the Company *to keep their troops in the continued practice of war*.

Letter from the Vizier *Sujah ul Dowla* to Governor *Haſtings*;—received the 28th November 1774.

I have already written you, that on the day of my arrival at *Peelebut*, one of my Hircarrahs brought me intelligence, that the Engliſh troops had entered the city, and were committing outrages and violence; I therefore ſent word by *Sheek Shuffi Ullah* to check them; in anſwer to which Colonel *Champion* returned me a meſſage, that he would ſtation the Engliſh ſoldiers at the gate of the city. I again ſent him word, that his doing ſo would be improper, and deſired he would put a ſtop to it. The Colonel afterwards came to me himſelf, and told me that the

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the Engliſh Gentlemen ſaid there were four crore of rupees in the city, of which the troops would come in for a part; that they were very earneſt upon this point, and that he would ſend three Gentlemen of confidence and truſt to take an account of the effects which were in the city. I obſerved to him that this was a new affair, and quite different from the agreement mutually concluded between us. The Colonel then replied, that if he did not take this ſtep, there would be a mutiny among the troops. Seeing therefore that he was averſe to it, and not at liberty to follow his own inclinations, I told him that I would conſider the matter farther the next day, and do what was proper. After this the Colonel wrote me, that it was neceſſary people ſhould be immediately ſent into the city. As I perceived that he was greatly diſturbed, I went to him at twelve o'clock, in the extreme heat of the day, and aſked him what Gentlemen he propoſed ſending into *Peelebut?* Upon which he called Mr. *Murray*, Colonel *Leſlie*, and Major *Hannay* before me, and pointing to them, ſaid, "theſe three "Gentlemen ſhall go to take the account." I told him that I had made no ſuch agreement with Mr. *Haſtings*, nor could there be more than 4 or 5000 rupees in *Peelebut*; that provided there were, the Gentlemen had no buſineſs with it, and that nothing of the like had happened heretofore: Mr. *Murray* then anſwered, and told me, that at the time of diſturbances with the Marattas there was no country in the caſe, which was the reaſon no ſuch point had been inſiſted upon; and that if the Engliſh were not now allowed to go into *Peelebut*, the Sepoys would plunder and lay waſte the whole country. Colonel *Champion* then interrupted him, and told him, that it was improper his ſaying any thing on that ſubject. I afterwards obſerved, that although I had made no agreement on this ſubject with Mr. *Haſtings*, it did not ſignify, and that they might take all the money which they ſaid was in *Peelebut* in lieu of the amount I had ſtipulated to pay Mr. *Haſtings* on account of the Company, giving me an acquittance for the latter. They made no reply to this propoſal, but inſiſted upon what they before urged; upon this I obſerved, that if the Engliſh were this time allowed to go into *Peelebut*, it would be a precedent for their inſiſting to the ſame when they came to other cities and places: to this it was anſwered, that they only meant the preſent city, and that they would make no ſuch demands when they came to other places. I then told Major *Hannay*, that it did not ſignify, that in the preſent inſtance I ſhould be ſilent, but that in future if they made the ſame requiſitions, I would quit the country, and retreat into my own Subah. Major *Hannay* then explained what I ſaid to Colonel *Leſlie*, who gave me no anſwer himſelf, but turned to Colonel *Champion*, and calling him by his rank ſaid, "well, well." I underſtand nothing of the Engliſh language myſelf, but theſe words which I have mentioned are very common, and I underſtand the meaning of them very well. I told the Gentlemen, that by their ſending people into the city, nothing would be got but a bad name; however, to ſatisfy them, I conſented to their deſire: they experienced the truth of what I told them, for having at laſt ſent them, they returned diſappointed. My friend, the caſe is this; there was not ſo much as 4 or 5000 rupees in *Peelebut*; ſuppoſing there had been more, what buſineſs had the Gentlemen with it? When we concerted this expedition together, no ſuch condition was provided for: the ſum which I ſtipulated with you I will pay without evaſion; but what can be the meaning of theſe ſteps taken by the Gentlemen? They aſtoniſh me! Conferences between me and the Engliſh Gentlemen were never before conducted in ſuch a manner, that other Gentlemen were allowed to anſwer the queſtions which I aſked, whilſt the principal withdrew himſelf on one ſide. I have long been acquainted with the principal Engliſh Gentlemen, ſuch as Lord *Clive*, and others, as well as yourſelf, but I never ſaw it cuſtomary that the principal Chief and Commander of the whole ſhould ſit ſtill, and let every one elſe talk as each thought fit. It is now a ſpace of three years that I have been in alliance with the Engliſh, and hitherto it has gained daily ſtrength. It is always my wiſh, that there may be never room for a ſingle expreſſion which (God forbid!) can poſſibly create the difference of a hair's breadth in our friendſhip: as to my part, I pay the moſt implicit regard and attention to it; you, Gentlemen, too, have hitherto contributed every duty towards ſtrengthening and perpetuating it; but I confeſs the preſent conferences have alarmed me. You well know what a burthen of expences I have for theſe three years been obliged to ſuſtain; I am notwithſtanding night and day employed in deviſing means for the payment of the money I ſtipulated with you: but if the Gentlemen are to talk to me in this manner, they no doubt will make the ſame requiſitions of me at every other place, and it will be impoſſible for me to comply therewith. I ſubmit to your own impartiality whether what I have written be right or wrong. In all my negociations and conferences with the Engliſh, it was never before uſual to introduce pretenſions, and inſiſt upon matters which were neither ſtipulated in the Treaty, nor before we had any idea of; nor was it ever uſual for the Commander in Chief to withdraw himſelf apart, and let others impoſe ſuch conditions, and make what requeſts they pleaſed. Conſider well upon this matter, and reprimand the Gentlemen, that they may not commit ſuch practices again. It is the cuſtom in no country for the principal himſelf to remain ſilent, and let others make themſelves principals; amongſt the Engliſh eſpecially this never happened.

Afterwards, when I arrived at *Biſſoulee*, and *Fyzoolla Khan* and the other Rohilla Chiefs fled towards *Nejeebabad*, and eſtabliſhed themſelves in that part, ambaſſadors came on the part of *Fyzoolla Khan* to Colonel *Champion*, to confer with him concerning an accommodation, which the Colonel propoſed to me. As I was determined to extirpate the Rohillas, I would not liſten to any propoſals of peace, and frankly told Colonel *Champion* that he muſt put an end to theſe conferences, and ſend away the ambaſſadors of *Fyzoolla*: notwithſtanding which they remained a long time afterwards with the Colonel; at laſt he diſmiſſed them, but ſtill maintained a correſpondence with *Fyzoolla Khan*, and received many Letters from him. Conſider, my friend, that it was my abſolute determination to extirpate the Rohillas, and that I requeſted the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh troops for that purpoſe; was it not therefore highly improper in the Colonel to enter into ſuch a correſpondence without my permiſſion? If he had ever conſulted me on the occaſion, it would not have ſignified; but when I gave him a clear anſwer, and abſolutely refuſed my conſent to the propoſals for an accommodation, was it proper for him to continue the negociations? At laſt, perceiving that *Fyzoolla Khan*, encouraged by his correſpondence with the Engliſh, aſſembled his forces and daily became more formidable, I determined, though it was in the height of the rains, immediately to bring him to puniſhment. I informed Colonel *Champion* of my intentions, and ſent a meſſage to him to march towards *Fyzoolla Khan* for the execution of them: Colonel *Champion* excuſed himſelf by ſaying, that he had no orders from the Gentlemen of *Calcutta* to proceed to the place of *Fyzoolla Khan's* encampment, which was beyond the boundaries of *Rohilcund*, and that therefore he would not march; I anſwered, you certainly have not a map of this country, for it is mentioned in the Treaty between us, that the Engliſh forces ſhall march into every part of the Rohilla country, from my borders to the foot of the mountains, and to the river *Ganges*; the place where *Fyzoolla Khan* is now encamped is within theſe limits; the Gentlemen of *Calcutta* will not therefore be diſpleaſed at the march of the army; they are even deſirous that the war ſhould be at any rate brought to a concluſion, and the money ſtipulated to the Company quickly diſcharged: though I am in a bad ſtate of health, I will undergo the fatigue of marching. The Colonel marched with the greateſt unwillingneſs: in

the meantime conferences for an accommodation were ſet on foot with the Colonel, and *Fyzoolla Khan* was encouraged by this circumſtance to make a ſtand. When we afterwards arrived at *Pattergur*, and *Fyzoolla Khan* was at the diſtance of fifteen coſs from us at the foot of the mountains, I determined to march forward and attack him; the Colonel again delayed, and pretended that he had no orders to proceed further: in anſwer to which I explained clearly to him, that he had orders to march to any part of the Rohilla country, from my borders to the ſkirts of the mountains and to the river *Ganges*; that it was neceſſary to conclude this buſineſs immediately, for which purpoſe it was expedient to march forwards. At laſt, after many conferences, he marched from thence alſo, and encamped within five or ſix coſs of the hills, and continued his conferences for an accommodation with *Fyzoolla Khan*, and propoſed it alſo to me. Although I was averſe from the firſt to making a peace, and had deſired the aſſiſtance of the Engliſh troops to extirpate the Rohillas; yet when I perceived that the Colonel interpoſed, and had for ſeveral months maintained a correſpondence with *Fyzoolla Khan*, and that he was deſirous of peace, being remedileſs, I told him it did not ſignify, that I would give *Fyzoolla Khan* a country yielding a revenue of nine or ten lacks of rupees, and that I would take from him half his wealth. The Colonel replied, *Fyzoolla Khan* has deſired that an Engliſh Gentleman may be ſent to confer about the terms of an accommodation. I anſwered, it is well; we will ſend a Gentleman under this pretence to the camp of *Fyzoolla Khan*, that he may obſerve the ſituation of their encampment and their retreat, and give us information; for this purpoſe let us ſend Mr. *Brooke* and Mr.*———. *Collicherrun* came to me, and repreſented, that it ſhould be left to the pleaſure of the Colonel whom to ſend on this expedition. At laſt the Colonel ſent Mr. *Murray* and Mr. *Brooke*, who departed without waiting on me to take their leave. After two or three days theſe Gentlemen returned unprofitably, without having ſettled any thing. For four or five days after this the conferences were broke off; after which *Omar Cawn*, and two other Sirdars, came from *Fyzoolla Khan* to me with propoſals of peace: I aſked them, why they had taken ſuch meaſures as to oblige me to march againſt them in the rainy ſeaſon? they replied, we remained peaceably at the extremity of the country without any force, but when a correſpondence was ſet on foot by means of the Engliſh Chiefs, they wrote to *Fyzoolla Khan* to take ſome ſtep, that might make it appear that he was in a ſituation to oppoſe the army of the Vizier, by which means his affairs would be ſettled. Encouraged by the advice of the Engliſh Chiefs, *Fyzoolla Khan* aſſembled this number of troops, and ſent them to *Nejeebabad*; otherwiſe how could he have taken ſuch a ſtep? My friend, *Omar Cawn* did not particularize any Gentleman to me, but informed me of the above particulars: be pleaſed to reflect on this. In ſhort I returned this anſwer to *Omar Cawn*, &c. that I was at firſt averſe to an accommodation, but ſince they had entered into conferences by means of the Engliſh Chiefs, whatever I had mentioned to the Colonel I would perform. The Vackeels took their leave, and returned; after which our joint forces marched near the encampment of *Fyzoolla Khan*, and prepared to attack it; but there was ſtill a private intelligence between the Colonel and *Fyzoolla Khan*, encouraged by which *Fyzoolla Khan* rode out of his own encampment and came to the Colonel. The day that *Fyzoolla Khan* came to the Colonel, the Engliſh troops were ready to engage in a quarrel with mine, and took ſeveral improper ſteps; but it paſſed over happily. Afterwards *Collicherrun* came and informed me, that *Fyzoolla Khan* was arrived, and would not agree to accept of nine or ten lacks of country; that he was now with the Engliſh Chiefs, and that it was neceſſary to pay regard to this circumſtance. I conſidered the reſpect to the Engliſh name as ſuperior to all other conſiderations, and replied, that although I was averſe to an accommodation, nevertheleſs, as *Fyzoolla Khan* had ſurrendered himſelf to the General, it did not ſignify; I would give him a country yielding a revenue of twelve lacks of rupees. After which *Collicherrun* having reported theſe particulars to the Colonel, returned with an anſwer, that *Fyzoolla Khan* would not agree to theſe conditions; and if I was not deſirous of an accommodation, to write ſo to the Colonel, that he might diſmiſs *Fyzoolla Khan*, and put a ſtop to the conferences. I wrote to the Colonel, that if *Fyzoolla Khan* would not agree to theſe offers to ſend him away; I alſo ſent *Mahomed Elich Cawn* to explain theſe particulars more fully to the Colonel; who went and executed my orders. The Colonel, in anſwer to this, made uſe of ſome diſagreeable expreſſions, and ſaid, the Nabob Vizier has broke his word in the anſwer he has ſent me, has he no reſpect for the Engliſh name? *Fyzoolla Khan* is come under the Engliſh protection, will he not ſettle his affairs? briefly, he made uſe of a number of ſuch kind of expreſſions. At laſt, as I ſaw that I ſhould diſpleaſe the Colonel by inſiſting on the former conditions, I was compelled to give 14,75,000 rupees of country, and ſaid, let *Fyzoolla Khan* take this much country, and give me 20 lacks of rupees in ſpecie in lieu of half his wealth; becauſe, if I am to take half of his property, how am I to diſcover what he is poſſeſſed of, and where it is kept? it can therefore never be ſettled in this manner. Theſe conferences were at firſt maintained, and afterwards new propoſitions were introduced, that this affair had been already ſettled by the Engliſh Chiefs in this manner; that *Fyzoolla Khan* ſhall give up half his property; that he had one lack and ſome thouſand gold mohurs, and one lack of rupees, of which I ſhould take the half: I replied, when I agreed to take one-half of *Fyzoolla Khan*'s property, it was on condition that I was to give him a country yielding a revenue of nine or ten lacks of rupees, and that he ſhould not retain more than five or 600 men in his ſervice; now, that I am to give him a revenue of 14,75,000 rupees, and conſent to his entertaining 5,000 men in his ſervice, I will have twenty lacks. Briefly, after a great deal of trouble and argument, this affair was thus ſettled, that *Fyzoolla Khan* ſhould give me fifteen lacks of rupees, and take a country amounting to 14,75,000 rupees. My friend, conſider well that I firſt propoſed to give *Fyzoolla Khan* a country amounting to nine or ten lacks of rupees, and on theſe offers *Fyzoolla Khan* came to the General; if he did not conſent to theſe terms why did he come? After that *Fyzoolla Khan* came to the General, he increaſed his demands, and they obliged me to give him, 14,75,000 rupees: beſides which, you will conſider, that when theſe conferences were firſt ſet on foot, the Colonel obſerved to me, that *Fyzoolla Khan* had one lack and ſome thouſand gold mohurs and one lack of rupees, amounting to fifteen or ſixteen lacks, of which I ſhould take the half; but afterwards, when the affair was ſettled, *Fyzoolla Khan* gave me fifteen lacks of rupees: conſider then, if *Fyzoolla Khan* was only poſſeſſed of thus much, would he have given me all his property? from this circumſtance you will clearly perceive how the caſe is. My friend, whilſt I refuſed to conſent to conferences for an accommodation, it was propoſed that I ſhould give a country of eight or nine lacks of rupees to *Fyzoolla Khan*, and take all his money; after that I was obliged out of reſpect to the Engliſh to conſent to a peace. Then the following propoſitions were made to me; that I ſhould take twenty lacks of rupees from *Fyzoolla Khan*, and give him the whole of the Rohilla country. I anſwered, I am much indebted to the Company, and I have expended many lacks for the ſupport of my army; if I give up all the Rohilla country for the ſum of twenty lacks, what advantage ſhall I gain, and how ſhall I fulfil my engagements? Before I marched from *Biſſoulee*, Mr. *Roberts* came to me from the Colonel, and informed me that conferences for an accommodation with *Fyzoolla Khan* were on foot, and that it was adviſable I ſhould agree to them.

* The name is omitted in the original.

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them. My friend, this is called giving advice in *Indoſtan*, when a perſon ſays, I think this is for the beſt, and you muſt do ſo. When the Engliſh Chiefs were continually ſending to me theſe meſſages, how could I refuſe to ſatisfy them? briefly, I was at firſt averſe to an accommodation, and ſhould never have conſented to it but for the ſatisfaction of the General. In like manner the ſeveral Letters which the General cauſed me to write at the concluſion of this affair, I gave out of reſpect to him. After the concluſion of this buſineſs, when I marched towards my Subah, and determined to ſend the Engliſh brigade to *Ramgaut*, I told the General to ſend two battalions with me; he replied, that the battalions could not be ſeparated from the brigade. What can I write on this ſubject? the caſe is, that I pay the moſt implicit regard and attention to the friendſhip of the Engliſh, and I am always apprehenſive leſt ſuch meaſures ſhould be purſued as might be the cauſe of any difference in our friendſhip; for which reaſon I overlook every ſtep that is taken, whether it is proper or otherwiſe, and on all occaſions endeavour to give ſatisfaction to the Engliſh Chiefs. Conſider well, my friend, the conferences at *Peelebut*, and the method of ſettling the affair of *Fyzoolla Khan*. How ſhall I inform you of all the other inſtances of this kind.

During the war with *Fyzoolla Khan*, an Engliſh Gentleman plundered a Chief in my army of a pallankeen, four looking-glaſſes, and other goods: when I ſent word of this, it was anſwered, that no one in the Engliſh army had taken them. Some days afterwards it happened that the bamboo of the ſaid pallankeen was brought before all the Gentlemen to ſell, which my Sirdar ſeeing, took it forcibly away, and having learnt the name of the Gentleman who had taken the pallankeen, informed me of it: I ſent the bamboo to the General with this meſſage, that it was now proved that it had been taken by ſome one in his army, and that it was neceſſary that the reſt of the things which had been plundered ſhould be returned, the perſon puniſhed, and care taken to prevent any thing of the kind happening in future. But the goods were not returned, nor any puniſhment inflicted on the offender. Beſides which, wherever the Engliſh army encamped, they committed ſuch violences and outrages on all the villages around them, as to render them quite deſolate; they went under the pretence of getting wood, cots, and Cudjeree pots, and when they got into the villages, plundered whatever they could lay their hands on. My friend, theſe things were the wealth of theſe poor people, which they not only took, but alſo all the grain, cloth, and every thing elſe they found in their houſes, by which means the whole country was deſolated. The Engliſh army encamped near a large and populous town named *Cuſtab*, into which they went, and deſtroyed the ſhops of the traders, and plundered and laid waſte the city; how then could the villagers remain in ſafety? they paid no regard to my repeated remonſtrances on this head. It is known that they had permiſſion to take wood, cots, and Cudjeree pots. Whilſt this is the caſe, and the troops are ſatisfied that they ſhall not be puniſhed for any outrages they are guilty of, they will undoubtedly laſt waſte all the villages they come near. Briefly, the particulars of this kind are ſo numerous that I cannot write them to you; I will inform you of ſome few particulars out of thoſe which have happened. The Engliſh troops are continually quarrelling and diſputing with my people, ſometimes on the moſt trifling occaſions, and frequently without any at all, and putting them under a guard; ſometimes, after a confinement of one or two pars, and at others immediately, they ſend them before me. My friend, the caſe is, that all the infantry in my ſervice know the cuſtom of the army, that if any one commits a fault he will be impriſoned for it, and think nothing of being put under a guard; but there are other Hindoſtannies, and the Nejeeb battalions, and others in my ſervice, who conſider it as the higheſt diſgrace to be put under a guard; and if any one attempts it, they will defend themſelves againſt it, and rather loſe their lives than ſubmit to ſuch a diſhonour. I was apprehenſive leſt the Engliſh Gentlemen ſhould attempt to ſeize and impriſon ſome Sirdar who had five or 10,000 men in his ſervice; in this caſe there is no doubt but the Sirdar and all his people would repulſe with all their force thoſe who attempted it; I alſo know, that was this the caſe I ſhould puniſh ſuch Sirdar with death; but he would be in no fear of me when he expoſed his life in a quarrel with the Engliſh: in this caſe it would be neceſſary for me to aſſiſt the Engliſh army; by this means a civil war would ariſe in our joint army, and a great number of people loſe their lives: it would be equally bad for me which ever ſide had the advantage. I was continually ſubject to theſe apprehenſions, and made it my ſtudy to prevent any difference ariſing between the two armies. Although I am convinced that you are, by the bleſſing of God, endowed with wiſdom and underſtanding, and will pay no attention to the falſe repreſentations of any one, yet I cannot help being uneaſy on this account. Some people formerly wrote you many circumſtances to my diſcredit; I did not return this by accuſing them to you. Some time ago you received Letters from ſome Gentlemen concerning the affair of the family of *Hafiz Rhamut Cawn* and *Eunait Cawn*. The Engliſh Gentlemen firſt begun this method; I therefore have written all the above particulars for your information. The affair of *Hafiz Rhamut Cawn*'s family is as follows: the Colonel ſent a meſſage to me, that the family of *Hafiz Rhamut* were dying with hunger; that a ſtorm had one day thrown down the purdas of the tent of *Hafiz Rhamut Cawn*'s family, and left the men and women expoſed: I went to viſit the Colonel, and returned an anſwer to his meſſage, that I ſent proviſions from my own Sircar daily for their ſupport; and that with reſpect to the purdas which were thrown down by the violence of the wind, I could not help it, that I had no authority over the winds to ſtill them; and that if I had not ſupplied them with proviſions, what means had they taken to preſerve their exiſtence? My friend, the family of *Hafiz Rhamut Cawn* is well ſupplied with proviſions, and 3,000 rupees per month is appointed for this purpoſe. I have not power with God to prevent the violence of the wind. Conſider well theſe particulars. Let priſoners be ever ſo well treated and ſupplied with neceſſaries, ſtill confinement is uncomfortable. Whoever has loſt a father and brother in war, has fallen from the dignity of a throne and become a priſoner, will undoubtedly ſuffer much miſery. I have written this long account that you may be informed of every affair; I have related them all more particularly to Colonel *Macleane*, who will inform you of them; Mr. *Middleton* will alſo write you on theſe ſubjects. I am very much pleaſed with Mr. *Middleton*'s good conduct; he is a ſenſible and intelligent man, and a ſincere well-wiſher of mine; I therefore conſult him on all affairs, and have been ſpoken to on this ſubject by the Colonel, who ſays that Mr. *Middleton* was appointed to collect the money due to the Company, and that he has no buſineſs to interfere in any other matter: I returned him no anſwer to this. I conſulted Mr. *Middleton* on ſeveral affairs, particularly at *Peelebut*, when the Engliſh Gentlemen introduced ſo many new propoſitions and arguments. The Colonel then made uſe of the expreſſion I have mentioned above, that Mr. *Middleton* had no other concern but to collect the money due to the Company. I have now given you an account of all that has happened here for ſome time paſt.

Extract of Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 14th February 1775.

Read the following Letter from Colonel *Champion*, with the Papers to which it refers, all which accompanied his Addreſs of the 3d February, recorded in Conſultations of that day.

To

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To the honourable *Warren Haſtings*, eſq. Governor General, &c. Council of *Fort William*.

Gentlemen,

Colonel Champion in refutation of the Vizier's charges againſt him.

On the evening of the 27th paſt I was furniſhed with the tranſlation of a Letter received by the Governor General from the Vizier, as far back as the 28th of November.

I acknowledged the receipt of it next day, and expreſſed my concern that it had not been convenient to favour me with an earlier peruſal. It contains charges highly injurious to my honour, and it would therefore have been ſatisfactory that an opportunity had been given me of uſhering theſe aſperſions into your preſence with their refutation.

I know the Vizier's character intimately; too well I know his littleneſs of ſoul to be ſurprized at his ſtooping to any meanneſs; but I cannot help expreſſing my aſtoniſhment at the appearances of a certain management with which this Letter is ſtrongly marked.

It muſt have been written about the middle of November. The Vizier and I parted on the moſt friendly terms on the 14th October. Not only had he often perſonally thanked me for the ſervices I had rendered him, but he did ſo by a Letter after he had left camp. When I told him of my intentions to return to *Europe*, he ſaid he ſhould lament my abſence as that of his beſt of friends; and I have already informed you, in another Addreſs, that I was urged to accept of a more convincing proof of his approbation and ſatisfaction after the concluſion of the ſettlement with the Rohilla Chief.

How then ſhall I account for the appearance of the preſent extraordinary Letter?—Obſerve, if you pleaſe, Gentlemen, the firſt part of it, till you arrive at *Biſſoulee*, then caſt your eyes on a Letter which his Excellency wrote to Mr. *Haſtings* from *Peelebut*; according to the tranſlations one is an exact tranſcript of the other. Now the Vizier had duly received an anſwer from Mr. *Haſtings* to the Letter ſent from *Peelebut*. The war was over early in October; there remained no more towns to plunder, no new-diſcovered hoards of treaſure to dig up, no unhappy man to rob of his wealth, no miſerable woman of her raiment: why then does his Excellency ſet down in November to copy a Letter to which he had received a ſatisfactory anſwer ſix or ſeven months before? there is ſomething myſterious in this buſineſs; perhaps in the ſequel we may ſee more clearly.

28th April. Two Letters to the Governor. 14th June.

It is unneceſſary to recapitulate what paſſed at *Peelebut*; I communicated the circumſtance to Mr. *Haſtings* the very day it happened, and I afterwards gave him my ſentiments on his own Letter, as well as on the Vizier's complaint.

It would now therefore perhaps ſuffice to refer to what has already paſſed on that ſubject; but it may not be out of place to remark, that the compliment which the Vizier pays me, of having ſuffered myſelf to be lorded over by the Gentlemen he mentions, will, I am confident, upon enquiry, meet with the polite retort from each of them as it does from me.

After all, what did the complaint amount to? only to this; 1ſt. That a demand was made on the part of the Engliſh troops to take an account of the riches which might be found in *Peelebut*, and that this demand was not agreeable to his Excellency. 2dly. That he was diſpleaſed with the deportment of Colonel *Leſlie* and the other Gentlemen.

With regard to the firſt, we may in politeneſs be ſorry that the demand was diſagreeable to his Excellency; we are not ſurprized at it, becauſe he is leſs a friend to us than to himſelf; but it does not therefore follow that any apology is due; on the contrary, I wiſh it may not be thought that other Commanding Officers would have cauſed the ſearch to have been more particular.

Two Letters to the Governor. 14th June.

With reſpect to the behaviour of the Gentlemen, I have already acquitted them of impropriety ſo far as fell under my obſervation; and I dare ſay, if they are called upon, they will anſwer for themſelves in confutation of his Excellency. But why, as I have already ſaid, why is this complaint reiterated at this time of day?

I cannot help admiring the confidence with which his Excellency has advanced, that there was not ſo much as 4 or 5,000 rupees in *Peelebut*. The report of four crore being concealed there I always thought extravagant, but his Excellency has gone ſo far in the other extreme, that it is impoſſible he can ever expect to be credited. According to the accounts of truſty and intelligent ſpies, the fact proved to be, that the Company would have been conſiderable gainers by the offer which he ſays he made, of giving up all the riches in the fort for the forty lacks.

As we are now on the ſubject of plunder, permit me to offer my attachment to the army in apology for begging of you to attend to it a little farther.

According to the Letter and to the meaning of my Inſtructions, I had authority to proceed to the conqueſt of the Rohilla country, if the Vizier required it, with the Company's troops only.

Suppoſing then, Gentlemen, that the Nabob had found himſelf ſufficiently engaged in the *Doab*, and that I had effected the Rohilla conqueſt, can it be alledged that the Company's troops would have taken charge of the riches found in the forts and cities merely on account of the Vizier, and that they muſt afterwards have delivered them over to his Excellency? Impoſſible! And it follows of courſe, that his being preſent could only entitle him to a proportion. I ſubmit, therefore, whether the giving up the rights of the army was not in effect ſacrificing the intereſt of our Nation, inaſmuch as the riches of the individuals contribute to the ſupport of the State.

But paſſing over this remarkable complaiſance to the Vizier as inexplicable, we ſhall march from *Peelebut*, and accompany his Excellency towards *Biſſoulee*, dragging in triumph the diſconſolate Begum and children of the brave but unfortunate *Hafiz*, the widow of his eldeſt ſon, *Emnait Khan*, the wife of his eldeſt ſurviving ſon, *Mahubbet Khan*; and ſome hundreds of miſerable captive women, on carts.

Leaving *Berelly* and *Oulab* behind us, and truſty ſlaves of his Excellency's to ſee the inhabitants indiſcriminately plundered for the behoof of their maſter, we arrived at *Biſſoulee*, where the whole army were witneſſes of ſcenes that cannot be deſcribed.

But not to dwell on the enormities or exceſſes of his Excellency, I ſhall proceed to anſwer the charges brought againſt me.

In doing this, Gentlemen, I muſt trouble you with a narrative of all the tranſactions relative to *Fyzoolla Khan*; and in proceeding I ſhall deduce from the facts ſuch arguments, as naturally ariſe in ſupport of the propriety of my conduct during the campaign. The Vizier ſays, that after our arrival at *Biſſoulee* I carried on an underhand correſpondence with *Fyzoolla Khan*. I received and anſwered ſeveral Letters from the Rohilla Chief, but his Excellency is an œconomiſt of truth when he ſays I did ſo clandeſtinely.

The firſt Letter I received from *Fyzoolla Khan* was in theſe words:

14th May.

"After the death of my father theſe Gentlemen, the "Rohilla Chiefs, took poſſeſſion of my ancient eſtate, "and gave me a trifle for my ſubſiſtence: this is as "evident as the Sun; ſurely it is known to you; I "therefore from neceſſity ſupported myſelf with diffi- "culty. The perſon who deſigned the war is no more. "Regarding your ſacred friendſhip and ſincerity, I re- "queſt, without other intervention, that the degree of "friendſhip with you may be confirmed. Your good- "neſs and celebrity is every where known, and that you, "the Engliſh, diſpoſſeſs no one. This trouble therefore "is given, that in caſe I am reinſtated in my ancient "poſſeſſions, whatever is conferred upon me, I will "pay you as much, without damage or deficiency, as "any other perſon will agree to do; and in all matters "I will regard you as my maſter and benefactor till

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" death, but no other perſon. My agreements will I on " no account depart from; and, God willing, I will " perform them with my heart and ſoul.

" Whenever you require it I ſhall attend you, and " perform my duty and my firm alliance. I hope in " God, that by your means I ſhall receive juſtice, which " goodneſs I ſhall hold in remembrance while I have " life. I would have ſent a faithful perſon to you to " have explained all particulars, but the roads not being " free prevented me; if you will ſend a man to me, " mine accompanying him ſhall attend you."

I received at the ſame time a Letter from *Ahmed Khan Khanſuman*.

14th May. " Long before this *Titte Khan Khanſuman*, deceaſed, " performed his duty to the Engliſh Chiefs.

" At his death I was left ſingly, and *Hafiz Rhamut* " *Cawn* took that opportunity to ſeize half my country, " and conferred it on my brother *Azeem Khan*, by which " I attained not my hereditary eſtate; I therefore with- " drew my connection with him, but he carried me with " him forcibly. When the Nabob Vizier's Letter to " conſole me was received, I wiſhed to join him and " you: I declared my deſires; but what could I do, for " *Hafiz* would not let me go? this will have reached " you from others throughout *Hindoſtan*: there the " Engliſh beneficence is founded, and it is manifeſt to " all that they diſpoſſeſs no one of his right; it is there- " fore requeſted that on our, the Rohillas, particular " compaſſion may be ſhewn, and whatever be thought " juſt, beſtowed. By God's aſſiſtance, from the dues " of fidelity and duty I will never deviate the breadth of " an hair.

" As *Fyzoolla Khan* has true eſteem for me, I quitted " him not, but accompanied him to this fort. From " your honour and clemency a reply to this Addreſs is " intreated; it was neceſſary it ſhould be made. May " you ever proſper!"

Theſe Letters commenced the correſpondence; and if his Excellency had not, by the cruelty and inhumanity of his conduct in general, and by a piece of treachery towards other Chiefs, which I ſhall hereafter have occaſion to mention, and to prove under his own ſeal; I ſay, if he had not, by ſuch means as theſe, impreſſed the Natives with a juſt and deep-rooted diſtruſt of his honour, it is probable I ſhould not have been troubled with their addreſſes. But to continue:

15th May. Next morning I waited upon the Vizier, and ſhewed him the above Letters; at the ſame time I offered him the corps of grenadiers of the army to accompany a body of his troops to reduce the fugitives, and in the evening repeated the offer in perſon: how he received it may be ſeen in my Letter to the Governor and Council, 16th May; of which date, by advice of the Vizier, I ſent the following anſwer to the Rohilla Chiefs:

To *Fyzoolla Khan*.

15th May. " Your Letter is received, and gives me pleaſure. " The particulars are clear. My reply is this: This " country is not taken into the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh; " but in conſequence of engagements the Engliſh army " is come to the aid and aſſiſtance of the Nabob Vizier, " who is now maſter of this country. Agreeably to " your deſire, I communicated the particulars of your " Letter to the Vizier, and this is his reply, that he did " not chuſe any Patan Chief ſhould have ſettlement in " this country; I therefore ſaid no more: but if you, " or *Ahmed Khan*, ſhould at any time wiſh to come to " me, for ye and your family, and to *Ahmed Khan* and " his family, I will give protection, that no perſon ſhall " give you the ſmalleſt moleſtation; but of your country " and effects the Nabob Vizier is now maſter. Your " deſires are made known to him; and if ye can ſettle " your affairs agreeably to his pleaſure, it will be very " adviſable; and in this agreement I alſo ſhall be very " glad."

To *Ahmed Khan*.

16th May. " Your repreſentation is received, and the particulars " known. All that ye have written in excuſe for your " conduct, I have communicated to the Nabob Vizier; " and his determination is this, that no perſon of the " Rohilla tribe ſhall have reſidence in this country. I " write to adviſe you explicitly of the Vizier's pleaſure, " that ye may act according to it. Should ye at any " time wiſh to come to me, for yourſelf and family I " will afford full protection; but your country and " effects are now the property of the Nabob Vizier."

From theſe replies, Gentlemen, it is evident how implicitly I obeyed the orders I had received, to conſider the Vizier as the maſter.

On the 24th, a Letter arrived from *Fyzoolla Khan*, in theſe words:

24th May. " Previous to this, I addreſſed you with a repreſen- " tation of my condition, which from it will be evident to " you. Juſt now I have received a Letter from the Na- " bob Vizier; I have returned in reply to it, that through " your mediation I will come in to him. This trouble " therefore is given, to beg you will write me of what- " ever you have determined in my favour, that acting " agreeably to it, and arriving by your means, I may " obtain an interview. From whatever promiſes and " agreements I make I will not deviate the breadth of " an hair."

This Letter ſpeaks more plainly than the former the diſtruſt which the Vizier had cauſed in the minds of the fugitives, by his conduct to their kindred.

In conſequence of a communication of it to the Nabob, his miniſter, *Elich Khan*, waited on me, and, purſuant to the pleaſure of his Excellency, the following reply was written to the Rohilla Chief:

" I now adviſe you, that the two following propoſals " are offered to ye: 1ſt. The Vizier will not confer on " ye, or any other (Rohilla) perſon, one foot of land in " this country; but he will give you an equal quantity " with what you poſſeſſed here in the country of *Doab*, " provided ye will now pay him twenty lacks of rupees: " on this condition come ſatisfied. The ſecond propoſal, " ſhould ye not accept of the firſt, is this: That you, " with your family, domeſtics, treaſure, and effects, but " without troops, come in and meet me; after which ye " will proceed directly into the Engliſh diſtricts, where- " ever may be beſt, and remain there till the pleaſure of " the Board in this particular is written to me. The " reaſon of this is, that the Vizier does not chuſe ye " ſhould remain here. I now give you promiſe of pro- " tection, and ſend you a paſs under the Vizier's ſeal, " and one under my own: whicheve: of theſe you chuſe " to accept, act agreeably; but ſhould neither of them " be agreeable to you, you are your own maſter, there- " fore ſend the paſſes back to me."

This Letter was diſpatched in the morning, and in the afternoon I received one in reply to mine of the 16th:

25th May. " Your gracious Letter is received, and the particulars " comprehended. You write, that this country is not " come into the poſſeſſion of the Engliſh; but in con- " ſequence of engagements between the Engliſh and " the Vizier to give him aſſiſtance, their troops came " into this country, of which the Vizier is now " Lord: that agreeably to the Letter, having told " all the particulars to the Nabob, his pleaſure is " this, that no Chief of the Rohilla tribe ſhall have " ſettlement in this country; therefore that in this " matter I ſhould attempt no farther. The caſe is this: " I have never acted in ſuch manner that the Vizier " ſhould have taken hatred to his heart againſt me, but " it was the diſturbances of other Chiefs which afflicted " his noble heart; in that I am guiltleſs: therefore I " trouble you, that if this country is not in your poſſeſ-

" ſion,

" ſion, the management of it finally will be put into the " hands of others; it is better therefore to accept it from " me. If it is in the Nabob's dominion, foregoing every " other connection, I will take it through your means. " I am in hopes that the Nabob's favour being regained, " that this country will be put under my charge; and " whatever any others may offer for it, I will bind my- " ſelf to perform. In reply to Letters received from " the Vizier, calling me in to him, I have replied, that " whatever may be his pleaſure regarding me, he ſhall " adviſe you of it, that by your means I may come to his " preſence. Your bravery and generoſity is as evident " as the Sun; and whoever loſes his country by war, is " again replaced in it I wiſh to take it (the country) " purely through you; then by your favour let us not " loſe our country. In the dues of friendſhip and fide- " lity I will never fail, and while I live I ſhall be obe- " dient to your commands. *Abdulrhum Khan* and *Huk-* " *abmet Oulla* I have ſent to you. In the matter of my " offer for receiving the country of my father, whatever " is my ability to give, they will repreſent to you; " agreeably to that, ſhewing the dues of lordlineſs and " compaſſion, your fame will reſound through the " world."

The offers which the Vackeel made in the name of his maſter are mentioned in my Letter to the Governor of the 28th May.

From the reinſtatement of *Sujah ul Dowla* in his own dominions, the Powers of *Hindoſtan* had conceived the Engliſh to be a people of unparalleled magnanimity, as celebrated for their juſtice and humanity as for their bravery and generoſity: this is evident from the ſtyle of their Letters which were addreſſed to me.

I thought nothing could be more honourable to our nation than the ſupport of ſo exalted a character; and whilſt it could be done on terms ſo advantageous as an annual increaſe of near £. 400,000 to the revenues of our Ally, and an immediate acquiſition of above £. 300,000 to the Company, for their influence in effecting an accommodation perfectly conſiſtent with their engagements to the Vizier, who would have thus derived more than a reaſonable advantage from that manner of terminating the war; I ſuppoſed it very unlikely that the Vackeel's propoſition ſhould be received with indifference.

They were not, it is true, agreeable to the Vizier; they were not favourable to his ambitious deſigns, nor to his inhuman plan of *extirpation*.

I informed the Governor of *Sujah*'s having received them with diſdain; and when I candidly told his Excellency that I ſhould act in the matter agreeably to the orders of Government, he anticipated the anſwer which I received, by ſaying, " *Mr. Haſtings will tell you* " *as I do.*"

But though his Excellency gave himſelf the liberty of divining this, how was it poſſible that I ſhould believe that we were to conſult the Vizier's intereſt and aggrandizement only? I could not as a Company's ſervant give place to ſuch an idea.

I knew that *Sujah*'s acquiſitions in plunder had exceeded the expences of the campaign, even including the forty lacks which he had promiſed to pay to the Company; I had with regret obſerved, that the part which the Engliſh took in the war brought their national character into the higheſt diſrepute; I had remarked, and all the officers in the army had remarked, that his Excellency's haughtineſs increaſed with the power which we put into his hands.

Independent therefore of the immenſe pecuniary conſiderations which I have mentioned, nothing could be more conſiſtent with what I conceived to be the intereſt of the Company, than embracing the opportunity which preſented itſelf of having a ſtanding army of 15 or 20,000, and in caſe of emergency, 50 or 60,000 Aſghans ready to aſſiſt in repelling any of the Powers to the weſtward of the *Ganges*, or to cruſh the growing inſolence of the Vizier himſelf.

Knowing that we owe eſtabliſhment in this country to the want of unanimity amongſt the natives, I had always underſtood it to have been an axiom in our ſyſtem of politics, that it was our part to endeavour at keeping the power of the Country Princes as much upon an equipoiſe as poſſible; leſt by lengthening the ſword of one, he ſhould deſtroy his neighbour and become formidable to ourſelves.

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It was upon this principle that a deputation was a few years ago ſent at a great expence to the Company, to limit the forces of *Sujah Dowla*, when they were far leſs numerous than at preſent.

Thus, Gentlemen, as has been already obſerved, I was induced to think it very probable that the overtures of the Rohilla Chief would have been totally diſregarded, nor could I ever be poſſibly reconciled to myſelf, had I preſumed to have withheld them from the knowledge of Government.

I therefore referred the propoſals to the Adminiſtration through the honourable the Governor, and I reflect with real ſatisfaction on having done ſo.

" I ſhall be extremely glad if, upon due conſideration " of them, any means can be deviſed by which the public " good may be promoted. I wiſh for nothing ſo much " as that ſome meaſure may be adopted that will ſtrike " all the Powers of the Eaſt with admiration of our " juſtice in contraſt to the Vizier's conduct."

Concluſion of a Letter to the Governor 28th May.

In the meantime, however, I wrote the following anſwer to *Fyzoolla*:

" I acquaint you, that your agreeable Letter by your " Vackeel is received, and gives me pleaſure. The " contents are clearly underſtood. In your buſineſs I " have had a good deal of converſation with the Nabob " Vizier, but he will not conſent that either you or any " other perſon (Rohilla) ſhall have one foot of land in " this country; but the Vizier offers you the ſame quan- " tity of country you have poſſeſſed here in the province " of *Doab*. If you chuſe to accept of this it is well; if not, " there is no other choice. Had the Vizier accepted of " your propoſal, it would have given me much pleaſure, " but in regard to the country, the Vizier is lord. Further " correſpondence on this matter will be fruitleſs, on " which account I write you explicitly."

With this Letter I deſired the Vackeel to return to his maſter, telling him I could do nothing in his affairs of my own authority, but that I would make his offers known to the Gentlemen at *Calcutta*, and afterwards adviſe *Fyzoolla* of their pleaſure.

The Vackeel however ſent the Letter by another perſon, and intreated permiſſion to remain in camp till I ſhould hear from the Preſidency; which I granted, as intimated to the Governor. 28th May.

I had no further intercourſe with *Fyzoolla* until the 7th June, when, in conſequence of a report that Lieutenant *Redman* and two other European deſerters were with him, I deſired he would ſend them forthwith to my camp.

On the 8th of the ſame month being adviſed, as well through his Excellency as by other intelligence, that the King had invited over the Rohillas, and the Vizier and myſelf being of opinion that the conſequences of their joining his Majeſty would prove prejudicial to his Excellency's future peace, eſpecially in caſe of a Maratta war, of which he ſeemed very apprehenſive, I addreſſed *Fyzoolla* as follows:

" Hearing at this time that Letters are arrived with you " from his Majeſty, wherein he ſtrongly enjoins you to " come to him without any apprehenſions, I write ye, " that having clearly repreſented your condition to the " Board at *Calcutta*, and in a friendly manner having " recommended the ſettlement of them to the Governor, " I wait impatiently for replies. In this caſe I think it " neceſſary and adviſable that ye do not comply with the " King's deſires until anſwers come from *Calcutta*; when- " ever

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" ever they do come they ſhall be immediately tranſ-
" mitted to you; in this matter there ſhall be no neglect
" on my part."

To this Letter, Gentlemen, is probably owing the preſent peace of the empire; to it is certainly owing that the Nabob is undiſturbed, and that *Fyzoolla Khan* is the mere dependant of his Excellency; for if that Chief had not, as he afterwards complained, been lulled into inactivity by the hopes which he entertained from the interpoſition of our Government, he would have croſſed the *Ganges* at Baize Gaut and Chandy Gaut whilſt the river was fordable.

He had, according to our advices, made very early application to *Timur Shah* for aſſiſtance, which the Vizier was apprehenſive would be granted. His Majeſty *Shah Allum*, it was ſaid, had invited the Marattas; he ſtood chiefly in need of money to proſecute his deſigns; *Fyzoolla* was maſter of a large ſum; the inferior Chiefs were alſo poſſeſſed of riches; the Seiks were ready to join them; in ſhort, they muſt at leaſt have eaſily eſtabliſhed themſelves in the *Doab*, and have been able to have kept the Vizier in a ſtate of diſquietude during the remainder of his life. This Letter had the deſired effect, and the liſtening to it proved the cauſe of much ſelf-diſapprobation to the Rohilla.

Nothing further paſſed between *Fyzoolla Khan* and me till the 25th June, when, on receipt of new advice regarding *Redman*, a copy of which was ſent to the Governor, I again demanded the deſerter.

No other circumſtance occurred regarding the Rohillas till the 7th July; on the morning of that day I received a meſſage from the Nabob, deſiring me to ſend away the Vackeel, for which his reaſons may be collected from what follows:

After the fall of *Hafiz*, the Vizier,* as has been elſewhere obſerved, became extremely arrogant; it was well known that even his people carried themſelves haughtily to the Engliſh officers, and we ſhall hereafter have occaſion to mention a very remarkable and daring inſtance of it. Great pains were taken to impreſs the Natives of *Indoſtan* in general, and the Vizier's own ſubjects in particular, with the higheſt ideas of his late and great acquiſition of power and magnificence.

I have been told, that in a Fitte-Nama, publiſhed in many parts of his country on account of the victory, the Engliſh troops were not ſo much as mentioned; and it is an undoubted truth, that ſeveral officers when on their way to the army (one of them now in town) were aſked if the Engliſh had been at the defeat of *Hafiz*.

The circumſtances of the Engliſh being in his pay, and under his abſolute direction, were circulated with great induſtry; nay, ſo indiſcreet was his Excellency, in the uſe of the command which it had been thought proper to confer on him over the Company's troops, that our own Sepoys could not *help* obſerving the difference between theſe and former times; "Now the Saheb Loque (Gen-
" tlemen) muſt run at his nod, and muſt halt at his nod."

As the Vackeel's remaining in camp was therefore not favourable to the views with which theſe reports were ſpread abroad, and tended to render the Vizier's unlimited authority over the Engliſh army doubtful to the Country Powers, his Excellency requeſted his diſmiſſion.

I had been directed to conſider our Government in a ſecondary point of view only; and having myſelf no particular deſire for the Vackeel's preſence, I indulged the Vizier in his wiſhes, and immediately directed him to return, promiſing to acquaint his maſter of the anſwer which ſhould be received from *Calcutta*.

It happened to arrive that very day, and I gave the Vackeel the following Letter to carry to *Fyzoolla* as a final anſwer:

" I laid the ſtate of your affairs before the Board, and
" impatiently awaited their anſwer; accordingly this day
" it arrived, and they write, that the Rohilla country
" being in the poſſeſſion of the Nabob Vizier, and he
" the ruler thereof, whatever he may chuſe to do in the
" ſettlement of it, it would not be proper for them to
" interfere therein. I in conſequence adviſe you, that as
" they have written that they cannot interfere, that with-
" out their concurrence I alone am not able to do it. I
" have exerted the effects of friendſhip and ability in
" your concerns, as *Abdulrhum Khan*, who is here, is
" well convinced of. Having now diſmiſſed him, he
" will return to you, and telling you all particulars, will
" aſſure you that I have done every thing I was able;
" but now I can do no more."

Early in the morning of the 8th July the Vackeel took his departure, lamenting his want of ſucceſs, and preſaging the diſgrace into which he actually fell with his maſter and his tribe*, and not having immediately returned in conſequence of my Letter to *Fyzoolla* of the 28th May, and being thereby in ſome meaſure the cauſe of their not croſſing the *Ganges*, and decoying them into imaginary ſecurity.

On the 9th advices being received that ſupplies of grain were ſent to *Fyzoolla*'s retreat from the diſtricts of *Zabita Khan*, the firſt Omrah of the empire, I wrote to him, deſiring he would peremptorily forbid his people to furniſh the enemy with proviſions.

I had very early ſignified to the Governor how exceedingly diſagreeable I found my ſituation. The unhandſome manner in which, I muſt be pardoned to ſay, I thought myſelf treated, on account of the notice I took of the impropriety that had appeared to me in repoſing a greater truſt in the Vizier than in the Company's Commander in Chief, had determined me to return to the Preſidency as ſoon as the rivers ſhould have ſwelled, either to have matters put upon a more becoming footing, or to have taken my leave for *England*; which, in caſe of failure in this particular, I had reſolved to do, even if *no* ſucceſſor ſhould arrive.

Accordingly I had made preparations for my journey downwards, and had declared my intention of quitting camp on the 25th. 16th July.

In the meantime, however, Mr. *Middleton*, the Reſident at the Vizier's Court, brought me a meſſage expreſſive of his Excellency's wiſhes, that the army ſhould take the field. Next day I waited upon him, and the following is the* ſubſtance of the converſation which paſſed: 17th July.

" My reaſon for ſending Mr. *Middleton* was this; Mr.
" *Haſtings* has hinted to me to effectually ſettle this
" country as ſoon as I poſſibly can, that in caſe another
" enemy ſhould appear after the rains, and perhaps *both*
" *the Marattas and* Timur Shah *may*, I may be able to
" withdraw my troops from this country without any
" riſk of its being attacked; and on this account, if the
" Colonel approves, we will move towards *Fyzoolla Khan*,
" who cannot eſcape, and may be got at without much
" difficulty."

I replied, " that as the ſeaſon was ſo far advanced,
" and the camp equipage extremely bad, I wiſhed to
" avoid moving now, as it would be attended with the
" loſs of a number of men, but adviſed the Vizier to ſend
" more troops to *Moradabad*; that I would now advance
" ſome battalions, and if the enemy came down from
" their preſent ſituation, would march with the brigade
" to oppoſe them; adding, that *if I remained here*, I
" would move with the army towards them at the latter
" end of the rains, and before they could get away:" *All this was approved of.*

On the 19th I adviſed the Select Committee of theſe circumſtances, and informed them that I believed I ſhould be under the neceſſity of marching, although I was apprehenſive the conſequences would prove fatal to the troops.

* The Vackeel continued a conſiderable time in diſgrace, and his Excellency was ſo much ſatisfied of the ſervices of this man, that he conferred a jaghire of 5,000 rupees per annum upon him after the peace.

In

In the interim I took every poſſible meaſure towards a ſudden movement; but I heard nothing more from the
24th July. Nabob himſelf on the ſubject till the 23d, when he acquainted me he had ſent forward part of his troops, and deſired the brigade might alſo march. In the evening I ſent my interpreter, and the next morning waited upon him myſelf, as well to repreſent how neceſſary it was to march at that ſeaſon, as the diſadvantages with which I thought our movement would be attended; but finding him bent on the expedition, I gave into his meaſure, and took the precaution enjoined by Adminiſtration, of requiring a Letter from his Excellency, expreſſing the neceſſity of taking the field, which he accordingly ſent me.

24th July. The ſame day I addreſſed the Select Committee, acquainting them of theſe circumſtances, and alſo iſſued orders for the troops to hold themſelves in readineſs to march.

25th July. I paid his Excellency a viſit, and informed him, that in conſequence of his requiſition, the brigade ſhould be got in readineſs to march as ſoon as poſſible.

The ſame day another Vackeel arrived from *Fyzoolla* in my camp, but he was inſtantly diſmiſſed.

26th July. I was taken ill; Colonel *Galliez*, the ſecond in command, was alſo extremely indiſpoſed. I reminded his Excellency of his being near three months in arrears of ſubſidy to the troops, and obſerved that it was neceſſary to ſupply them with money before the march.

27th July. Continued ill; ordered the troops to march the 29th in the morning.

28th July. Directed the camp equipage to be ſent forward to *Chandouſy*. Colonel *Galliez* and myſelf very unwell. Supply of ammunition not yet arrived from the boats; at night therefore countermanded the march of the army.

29th July. My illneſs conſiderably abated. Addreſſed the Select Committee. Ordered the army to march on the 30th at three o'clock in the morning. I was informed that our carriage cattle had been obliged to make two trips for the camp equipage.

30th July. The army accordingly broke ground, and marched to the encampment at *Chandouſy*.

And if you conſider, Gentlemen, that we were unprovided with the neceſſaries requiſite for the ſecurity of our ammunition and ſtores; that great part of them being in the boats diſtant about forty miles, the carriage to *Biſſoulee* at that unfavourable ſeaſon was attended with much trouble and delay, as well as riſk of damage; that many of the younger Gentlemen of the army, whoſe allowances in the field, however handſome they may be thought, are barely ſufficient to indemnify their expences where the neceſſaries of life bear ſo exorbitant prices, had, from motives of œconomy, diſmiſſed their Coolies, in confidence of our continuing in cantonments during the rains; that ſeveral hundreds of the contractor's drivers, and in particular thoſe attached to the magazine and artillery, had either deſerted or been diſcharged by his agent, that it was with great difficulty even the Nabob's influence, in the courſe of ſeveral days, procured ſo many of theſe neceſſary people as enabled us to proceed; I ſay, Gentlemen, theſe circumſtances conſidered, it appears that the army was in motion with uncommon alacrity.

I confeſs I was, however, extremely embarraſſed in mind, leſt my deſire of pleaſing the Nabob ſhould ſubject me to reprehenſion.

Accordingly you find, that in my Letter to the Select Committee, 29th July, I ſtudiouſly endeavoured to apologize for venturing to take ſo much upon me.

"I deliberately weighed in my mind, whether I ſhould "acquieſce in the Nabob's requeſt of moving higher; I "diſcovered that my heſitation gave him much diſſatis- "faction; and it was very perceptible, that if I had "perſiſted in remaining here, he would have been im- "preſſed with doubts and jealouſies of the ſincerity of "our attachment towards him, which I was apprehenſive "would never be effectually effaced: but indeed his "conduct in advancing his army above thirty coſs in "front of our troops, without my concurrence, rendered "a movement on my part abſolutely neceſſary, for the "reaſons mentioned in my Addreſs of the 19th, &c. &c. "and I hope, therefore, that the motives which have "prevailed with me to comply with his Excellency's "requiſition will ſecure to me the honour of your "approbation."

Nor will you be ſurprized, Gentlemen, that I was anxious for ſuch approbation, when you ſhall have conſidered the cauſes which I had to be doubtful of obtaining it, and the inward diſquiet which theſe doubts occaſioned.

Firſt, I remained in a ſtate of diſagreeable ſuſpenſe, as to the effect which the Treaty of Partition of the conquered country between his Majeſty and the Vizier might have.

The Board had ſaid, "We cannot entertain ſo bad an "opinion of the Vizier, as to ſuppoſe him capable of "acting in avowed breach of Treaty; but if any plea of "that kind ſhould be made for conteſting *our right** to "occupy any part of the Rohilla country *yet unconquered*, "it would be proper to put the queſtion to him, whe- "ther ſuch Treaty does exiſt or not? If he ſhould "acknowledge ſuch a Treaty, you muſt undoubtedly "ceaſe from farther hoſtilities in abetment of his breach "of faith."

The King had ſent me a copy of the Treaty which had been ſworn to on the Koran; "Perhaps," ſaid his Majeſty, "the Nabob has forgot his oath, it is fit you "ſhould remind him of it."

When I ſhewed his Excellency the Treaty, he acknowledged its authenticity; he had not forgot his oath, but he braved it: he alledged, that the counterpart in his poſſeſſion expreſſed a condition that his Majeſty ſhould take the field in perſon, and that his failure in that particular annulled the Treaty.

But when the original counterpart which he put into the hands of my Interpreter came to be examined, it appeared there was no ſuch ſtipulation; nor indeed did it ever exiſt even verbally, as may be underſtood from *Nudjif Khan*'s declaration on that ſubject, where he ſaid, "he had no doubts of the Vizier's abiding by his "engagements."

I ſent copies of both to the Committee, having been repeatedly deſired to correſpond with them only; and as the above ſentiments of the Adminiſtration ſeemed very favourable towards his Majeſty, it was not clear to me, that ſo frivolous an excuſe would have been ſanctified in breach of ſo ſolemn a Treaty; I therefore made a reference to the paragraph above quoted, and deſired the Committee would give me explicit inſtructions regarding the import thereof; nor was I a little anxious for a reply.

Secondly, After I had agreed to take the field, and before we marched, but when it was too late to retract, I diſcovered that the Vizier had groſsly impoſed upon me, regarding the Letter which he had pretended to have *juſt* received from the Governor; for although I had not been favoured with any addreſs from Mr *Haſtings* on that ſubject, yet believing that his Excellency had really got
19th and 24th July. ſuch a Letter, it was the moſt prevailing argument with me, and I urged it accordingly in my Letters to the Select Committee in juſtification of my conduct.

But upon finding that the Letter which the Vizier pretended to have *juſt* received was no other than one he had got in May, congratulating him on the victory, and "the *ardour* of his *courage*," and caſually recommending the ſettlement of his affairs in the Rohilla country, I was much concerned, becauſe the Governor's advice could apply to the preſent time; and if the expedition ſhould be diſapproved, it would not be in my power to quote Mr. *Haſtings*'s authority in favour of the undertaking.

* As if they had had a right! This is not the language of Auxiliaries, but of Principals in the war.

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Thirdly, The Board had already declared the forty lacks due to the Company.

" Conſidering our right to the ſum ſtipulated for the " preſent ſervice *as now fully acquired*, we have recom- " mended to the Preſident to make *immediate* application " for the payment of the forty lacks: " a formal demand had accordingly been made for the money *; this was in effect avowing that they had already performed all that was incumbent on them, conſequently that no further ſervice was due from their troops without new ſtipulations for the advantage of the Company; and I intimated ſome time before pretty plainly, that this was my own opinion.

Had I not therefore great reaſon to be apprehenſive leſt I ſhould be told by the Adminiſtration, that my acquieſcence with the Vizier's deſires had rendered it impoſſible for them to make ſuch ſtipulations with his Excellency?

And I would aſk, Gentlemen, whether the treatment which I received in the courſe of correſpondence left me the ſmalleſt room to doubt, that if any unfortunate accident had happened during the ſecond campaign, " of my own undertaking," for ſuch it would be termed, every argument would be laid hold of to ſcreen others from, and ſaddle me with the indignation of the Company.

From what I have already ſaid, I think it muſt appear that I had very forcible reaſons for the diſinclination which I informed the Select Committee I ſhould have at marching; and that in overcoming all theſe powerful cauſes of my embarraſſment, I manifeſted even a ſuperlative degree of attention to his Excellency's wiſhes.

But fourthly, this will be ſtill more evident, from the circumſtance of my having marched while the troops were near three months in arrears of pay; for though I had made application to his Excellency on the 26th to pay up at leaſt a part of the arrears, I had no ſucceſs; he contented himſelf with ſignifying pleaſantly to ſome of thoſe about his perſon, " that he had no ſilver then " except in bars, and that although he had bars, he had " no implements of coinage." The only obſervation that occurred to me on this head was, that if he carried the bars from his own provinces, I was ſorry he had not brought the neceſſary utenſils; and that if he found the bars in the Rohilla country, to have been conſiſtent in his plan, he ſhould have forgot that he had them.

But to enforce the argument ariſing from my having marched whilſt the troops were ſo much in arrears;

Board's Inſtructions, Par. 7.

Be pleaſed to recollect, that, according to my inſtructions, I had full authority not only to diſcontinue the operations, but to countermarch with the army, in the event of his Excellency's ſuffering himſelf to be in arrears of ſubſidy for the ſpace of one month after the day on which it ſhould have been paid.

Now whilſt it is evident, that, by adhering to the orders of the Board, my conduct could not be liable to challenge, it is equally obvious, that, by acting thus in direct contradiction to them, I ſhewed a condeſcenſion to his Excellency, which, independent of every other conſideration, is fully ſufficient to deſtroy the calumnies with which this inſidious man would ſtab my reputation; for if I had been diſpoſed to thwart his inclinations, I might have embraced this opportunity of doing it in ſecurity.

Having therefore clearly eſtabliſhed the falſity of the malicious inſinuations which have been directed againſt me, on account of the objections made to the movement from *Biſſoulee*, I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, that thoſe which regard my ſubſequent conduct are no leſs ſlanderous and void of truth.

Under every poſſible diſadvantage we took the field, in ſubmiſſion to the caprice of this ungrateful Ally; every difficulty was ſtruggled againſt with uncommon perſeverance, as you, Gentlemen, will be well convinced even from peruſing very ſummary Minutes of occurrences taken down by one of my Aid de Camps †, from which you will perceive that I perſiſted in keeping the field, and dragging the Europeans along, contrary to the written opinion of the ſurgeons.

Our march was as expeditious as the ſeaſon and the ſcarcity of proviſions would permit. His Excellency did me the favour of a viſit almoſt every morning; he told me of his expectations that the Marattas would make war on him as ſoon as poſſible; a report alſo prevailed that *Timur Shah* had determined to take the field againſt him; his Majeſty *Shah Allum* was likewiſe exceedingly diſſatisfied, and ready to adopt any meaſure to humiliate the Vizier; in ſhort, according to all advices, there were great appearances of a general flame.

The Nabob ſeemed therefore exceedingly uneaſy, leſt the Rohillas ſhould retire into the country between the mountains, and gain time until his attention ſhould be called off by the Marattas to the defence of his own dominions, in which caſe he would have enemies in front and rear, and all his ambitious ſchemes would fall to the ground; his Excellency therefore, on the 12th of Auguſt, propoſed to me to make overtures of accommodation to the Rohillas.

The propoſitions were, that *Fyzoolla* ſhould deliver up half his effects to the Vizier, who would give him a diſtrict ſufficient for the maintenance of 15,000 men in the country which his Excellency had lately taken from the Marattas.

Correſpondence between me and *Fyzoolla* had ceaſed from the 7th July, when the Vackeel was diſmiſſed, till this day, 13th Auguſt. that I addreſſed him, agreeable to the Vizier's deſire, encloſing a copy of his Excellency's Letter making the above propoſitions.

On the 14th I adviſed the Committee of the Vizier's wiſhes and propoſal of ſettling matters amicably with the Rohillas.

On the 15th I received a reply from *Fyzoolla*, declining to accept the country taken from the Marattas in the *Doab*; obſerving, that in caſe of their approach, he muſt either break his engagements with the Vizier, and join them, or they would take the country from him; he therefore tendered half his effects to the Vizier, for a ſettlement in the Rohilla country equal to that which his Excellency offered in the *Doab*.

Having communicated *Fyzoolla*'s Letter to the Nabob, his Excellency on the 17th Auguſt addreſſed me thus:

" I have peruſed the copy of *Fyzoolla Khan*'s Letter " that ye ſent me, and underſtand the particulars: do ye " write him a reply to this purport; that of whatever " effects he has he will give me half, and that I will give " him country in the *Doab*, which I took from the Ma- " rattas, for the maintenance of 15,000 men; and that " him and me will enter into mutual agreements, to " which the Engliſh Gentlemen ſhall accede; that in " future, if the Marattas attempt to take the aforeſaid " country, I will join and aſſiſt *Fyzoolla Khan* to oppoſe " them. This matter firmly agreed on and determined, " I enter into by means of the Engliſh Gentlemen. Do " you write to this purport to *Fyzoolla Khan*, that he " may be ſatisfied. I am ready to give the aforeſaid " quantity of country, and to aid and aſſiſt him againſt " the Marattas; never, never will I be neglectful in this " matter."

Accordingly I wrote to *Fyzoolla Khan*, encloſing a copy of his Excellency's Letter, recommending to him to accept the conditions, or at leaſt to come and diſcourſe on the ſubject.

In reply he obſerved, that he was unable to write ſo much as he had to ſay; and requeſted I would ſend my Secretary to hear from him, and relate to me all particulars. His deſire being communicated to the Vizier,

* Remark of the Vizier, " the Board always ready to lay hold of any thing that would bear a diſpute."

† See alſo a Paper marked L.

his

his Excellency wrote to me on the 26th, recommending a compliance with it, and containing the neceſſary inſtructions; in conſequence of which, I directed my Secretary to proceed immediately to the Rohilla camp; and in order to obtain as much information as poſſible regarding the enemy's poſt, I availed myſelf of this opportunity of ſending Lieutenant *Bruce*, the field engineer, to make his obſervations, that we might profit thereby, in caſe the enemy ſhould oblige us to attack them.

On the 21ſt of Auguſt the Engineer ſent me an account of the road to *Lall Dang*.

" After croſſing the Nullah at the village *Bhjouree*, " diſtant from your camp about 4½ coſs, we entered a " low jungle, in which are two deſerted villages, the wells " of which afford plenty of good water. Continuing our " courſe northward three coſs further, we arrived at the " large village of *Ramnagur*; to the north-weſtward of " which is an open ſpace (I think) ſufficiently large " to encamp the brigade on; *this muſt be the laſt ſtage.* " Altering our route to N. N. Weſt along the foot of " the hills, *an almoſt impenetrable jungle lines each ſide of* " *the road.* Another difficulty the troops will have to " ſtruggle with is *the want of water*: except at a river two " coſs to the weſtward of *Ramnagur*, *we did not meet* " *with a drop of that element during a diſtance of eight coſs*, " when we arrived at the Rohilla encampment. The " opening here is of very little extent, and muſt have " been cleared by the Rohillas after their flight to *Lall* " *Dang*."

At the ſame time that theſe two Gentlemen were in the enemy's camp, *Elich Khan*, the Vizier's Miniſter, had agents there, offering all his influence to effect a ſettlement: this tended to give the Rohillas confidence; at the ſame time that Lieutenant *Bruce*, being recognized by people who had ſeen him ſurveying, created ſuſpicions of our intentions.

Fyzoolla Khan however declared his willingneſs to come to an interview with the Vizier; but his Chiefs would not conſent to his leaving their ſtrong hold: they propoſed to ſend his eldeſt ſon, accompanied with ſome of their own number; but his Excellency having refuſed to receive them, and the Gentlemen being recalled on the 24th, correſpondence dropped, and I reſolved to move nearer the enemy, in order if poſſible more effectually to diſtreſs them.

On the 26th, attended by the Quartermaſter General, &c. I went twelve miles to reconnoitre the country between the *Ganges* and the jungles, leaving the road which the Engineer had travelled to *Lall Dang* ſeveral coſs to the right.

On the 27th a body of the Nabob's troops were ordered by my direction to proceed along the banks of the river towards Chandy-Gaut. The 28th I advanced with the grenadier corps five coſs; and the brigade under the command of Colonel *Gallies* marched three coſs. I ſtrengthened the advanced diviſion of the army, and gave the command of it to Lieutenant Colonel *Leſlie*.

In conſequence of an advice which I had early given to the Vizier, a party of *Nudjiff Khan*'s troops had come acroſs the *Doab*, and poſted themſelves on the oppoſite banks of the river, at Chandy-Gaut, to prevent all ſupplies to the enemy from the weſtern ſide of the *Ganges*.

On the 29th I rode out fourteen miles, to reconnoitre the Ramnagur road. On the 30th, ordered the Quartermaſter General to pitch upon a ſpot of ground for the brigade to encamp upon, between Lieutenant Colonel *Leſlie*'s camp and the hills, and the brigade accordingly took up that ground the next morning.

1ſt September, accompanied by the Gentlemen of my family, I ſpent the day with his Excellency upon the banks of the *Ganges*.

All this time his Excellency was buſied in intriguing with the Rohillas; *Elich Khan*, and the Abyſſinian *Mahomed Buſhier Khan*, by the Nabob's deſire, had ſet their emiſſaries at work; and in this manner the Nabob kept up a conſtant intercourſe with the enemy.

In conſequence of which, on the 2d of September, his Excellency tranſmitted me a Letter which he had received from *Fyzoolla Khan*, profeſſing obedience; and his Excellency alſo informed me, that the Rohilla Chief had ſent a truſty perſon to him to explain all matters. APPENDIX. No. 45.

This day I ordered two battalions of grenadier Sepoys to hold themſelves in readineſs to attend me early on the 3d, on a party of obſervation; but on account of a ſevere fall of rain that morning, I was obliged to countermand the order. On the 4th however I went, eſcorted by the ſaid two battalions of grenadier Sepoys, five coſs, and with a body of the Nabob's beſt horſe advanced two coſs further, when I arrived at an *almoſt impenetrable jungle*, *where only one horſeman could paſs*; I deſired the Nabob's Bildars and Tavildars might be employed to cut a road through it. 2d September.

Very ſevere rain on the 5th. The 6th I again rode out to examine the Ramnagur road. On the 7th his Excellency tranſmitted me a copy of the anſwer which he ſent to the Letter he had received from *Fyzoolla Khan* on the 2d, importing, that if he did not accept of the former terms, further diſcourſe was needleſs.

Notwithſtanding all which, his Excellency's agents were ſtill employed. Severe rains on the 8th and 9th. On the 10th, having viſited his Excellency, he acquainted me, that the ſituation of the Rohillas was very hard; that after the rains ceaſed, the water from the hills would kill them: " Perhaps," added his Excellency, " *with* " *theſe new Gentlemen new meaſures may take place.*"

This was not the only time he had expreſſed himſelf in that manner; the advices which he had early received from the Preſidency created him no ſmall uneaſineſs; he became more anxious than ever to ſettle with *Fyzoolla*, and in order to effect it he doubled his agents and his induſtry.

On the 11th I received a reply from the Select Committee to my Letters of the 19th and 24th July; and upon the ſtrength of the approbation of my conduct in moving from *Biſſoulé*, without waiting for an anſwer to my addreſs of the 29th July, I ſent immediate notice to his Excellency, that I would preſs upon the enemy as ſoon as poſſible.

His Excellency viſited me on the 12th, and without taking any notice of my meſſage of the preceding day, told me, that the Rohillas were in the moſt diſtreſſed ſituation; that the Chiefs threatened to deſert *Fyzoolla*. Upon my adviſing him to offer them ſervice, he replied, that he had done ſo, and alſo ſecurity to all who would quit the enemy's camp.

But nothing can more clearly demonſtrate how wiſhful the Vizier was to avoid an attack, and bring the Rohillas to an agreement; nothing can more inconteſtably prove, that the delays which he would impute to me were really his own, than the following circumſtance:

On the 13th I reſolved to ride out as next morning, to obſerve what progreſs the Nabob's Bildars and Tavildars had made in cutting the road, and to penetrate as much further as I could into the jungle, for the ſake of obſervation; expecting alſo to have an opportunity of ſurprizing ſome of the enemy's advanced poſts.

Purſuant to this deſign I applied to his Excellency for a ſtrong body of his troops to attend me; his Excellency returned for anſwer, " that he had put himſelf under a " courſe of phyſic, *which would continue ſix days*, for " which time he begged I would defer the attack, as " then he would be *able* to accompany me."

Although I thought this a very unmilitary preparative, I was willing to leave his Excellency to his own mode of whetting his courage; but thinking it neceſſary for me in the meantime to obtain as perfect a knowledge as poſſible of the ground we ſhould have occaſion to act upon, I replied, that I only meant to go in front to examine the road, and therefore deſired his Excellency would ſend me the eſcort demanded.

Before my note had reached his Excellency, he ſent a meſſage importing that he was treating; and on receipt

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of my note he returned another, desiring I would be governed by his pleasure, and defer the expedition.

14th September.

This day two Ambassadors came from *Fyzoolla* to the Vizier on the invitation of his Excellency; *Fyzoolla's* Vackeel brought me also a Letter, and informed me, that the Vizier had made proposals of accommodation to his master, but that he would trust the English only; I observed, that it was probable his master would not have many days to consider; and sent himself and the Letter to his Excellency.

On the 15th I acknowledged the Select Committee's Letter of the 18th August, and advised them of the Vizier's mode of proceeding.

" His Excellency has several persons employed in " endeavouring to settle with *Fyzoolla*, or to detach the " Rohilla Sirdars from the common cause; but I am " afraid he discovers too much anxiety, and renders the " enemy more backward in coming to terms than they " otherwise would be."

September the 16th, after some conferences with the Vackeels, his Excellency acquainted me that he would make *Fyzoolla* Collector of the revenues of *Robilcund*, allowing six lacks for his expences, and desired I would therefore address the Rohilla to that purpose; which I did accordingly.

His Excellency had so many schemes, and so many agents to conduct them, that it was impossible to know his real intentions; but it was evident that he was departing from his former resolutions. He had some time before refused to receive *Fyzoolla's* eldest son, accompanied by some of the principal Chiefs, and he had now not only admitted two Chiefs without the son, but even sent several Sirdars to invite and conduct them to his camp.

On the 17th I acquainted the Governor of these circumstances, and on the 18th took occasion to repeat the offer of the service of the troops, and to inform his Excellency that they were in readiness.

The two Vackeels remained in his camp, and were entertained several days by *Bushier Khan*, &c. by order of his Excellency.

On the 19th I received a Letter from *Fyzoolla*, in answer to that which I had addressed to him on the 16th by desire of the Vizier; and having transmitted it to his Excellency, he sent me the following reply:

" The Letter of *Fyzoolla Khan* which you sent me to " peruse I have received, and clearly understand. I " desire the death of no Mussulman, and therefore have " fixed on this plan which I now write. Do you ac- " quaint *Fyzoolla Khan* from yourself, that the Nabob " Vizier will settle a jaghire of ten lacks of rupees per " year on him of the Rohilcund country, and he shall " keep two or three thousand men as household servants " along with him; the troops of the Nabob Vizier shall " be stationed in the country; that the troops and Chiefs " of *Khuteer Rohilcund* shall be taken into service, but " shall not remain with him.

" If this is agreeable to *Fyzoolla Khan*, do ye write him " to come in to you; when he comes I will have an " interview with him; and if he desires it, shall rent or " superviſe the whole Rohilla country, which shall be " settled face to face; but of whatever effects he may " have, half shall be given to me; and the troops of " *Khuteer*, or Rohillas, that are with him shall not re- " main."

Thus, Gentlemen, you find, that in emerging from his Hebdomadal purgation, the Vizier became a most devout and excellent Mussulman. The near approach of " these " new Gentlemen" seemed also to operate powerfully on his Excellency.

Agreeably to his wishes I sent a copy of his Letter to the Rohilla Chief, and recommended to him to accept of the Vizier's proposals; at all events to return a speedy reply.

From this time we had very heavy rains for several days successively; and no answer being arrived from *Fyzoolla*, I wrote him a note on the 25th, demanding an immediate reply.

Afterwards, on the same day, an answer was received from *Fyzoolla*, importing, that if the Vizier would not grant either of his former requests, fate must determine between them.

I saw no longer any prospects of peace, which I accordingly signified to the Select Committee the same day that the above answer came to hand.

On the 26th the Vizier favoured me with a visit, when it was resolved to move the army nearer to *Lall-Dang*, as the most probable means of " *bringing the Rohillas to* " *terms.*"

I ordered the troops to hold themselves in readiness 27th Sept. to march the 29th in the morning, and the division under Colonel *Galliez* to take the ground occupied by the Grenadier corps.

Well assured of the great advantages the enemy had 28th Sept. in the strength of their situation, sensible that nothing but the strictest observance of good order could ensure our success, and having reason to be suspicious lest the troops, mindful of past neglects, should suffer their discontent to get the better of their moderation, and impel them to disperse in search of plunder, I assembled the Field Officers at head quarters.

Some proposed to stipulate with his Excellency for twenty, some for fifteen, and the most moderate for ten lacks, in lieu of plunder, and that the troops should be acquainted of it before the attack.

I told the Gentlemen, that if his Excellency should offer five lacks, I thought it would be advisable to accept of them, both on account of the imminent danger which would ensue from any disorder of the troops, and the small probability of discovering the riches of a people accustomed to bury their treasure; declaring, however, my wishes that the Vizier might offer a larger sum: the Gentlemen, satisfied of my good inclinations, said no more on the subject.

In conformity to the injunctions of Administration, I Board's Instructions, Paragraph 4th. desired his Excellency to signify in writing, that it was now his pleasure the army should proceed to attack *Fyzoolla* in his intrenchments; his Excellency accordingly did so.

And though I was unable to mount my horse without assistance, having been confined to my tent by a severe illness from the 19th, I advanced with the front division of the army four cos towards the enemy.

Mention being made to his Excellency of the plunder, he observed, that he had certain intelligence where the riches of the enemy lay buried; that he knew the English could never discover the treasure, and therefore he would not give them one cowrie; a circumstance which I thought it prudent to conceal carefully from the knowledge of the troops.

On the 30th I proceeded four cos further, the brigade under Colonel *Galliez* taking up our last ground.

" This day I received a Letter from the Select Com- 30th Sept. " mittee of the 8th September, expressing their satisfaction " at the Vizier's intention of terminating the war by an " accommodation, and their hopes that his Excellency " would be disposed to *conciliate their affections to his* " *Government by acceding to lenient terms.*"

Being now arrived near the Rohillas, who were very strongly posted, and had thrown up works in their front, it became necessary to advance by regular approaches, and before evening a work was established sufficient to cover 1,200 men; but it was agreed to give the enemy the option of accepting the terms offered by his Excellency, or stand the consequences; which was accordingly done in the following Letter:

" This day I am arrived with my army near the foot " of the hills; but as friendship has been formed between " us, I perform my part, and tell you, that ye still have " opportunity of coinciding to the Nabob Vizier's offers

" which

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" which were before ſent ye, and of coming hither; this " is the beſt advice ye can follow. There has been diſ- " courſe between the Nabob Vizier and me, when the " Nabob ſaid, and confirmed, that whenever you would " accede to his propoſals, that ſomething ſhould be ſet- " tled for every Chief with ye. Now the Nabob Vizier " has ſaid, and has written this conformably to your " requeſt. My advice is this; do you now come here " and agree to this, for I do not deſire that the blood of " the people be ſpilt. Motives of friendſhip induce me " again to write ye on this ſubject. If ye will not accept of " this, and will not come, the fault is not mine, as I have " done every thing in my power. Now for what may " enſue ye and your Chiefs are anſwerable. In caſe ye " conſent, and come in, write me, and I will ſend a pro- " per perſon to conduct ye; in this there is neither pre- " judice or danger. If ye will not agree, let me certainly " have your reply this day."

In the meantime, however, our works were carried on with all poſſible diligence. Buſh-fighting all this day between ſmall ſcouting parties of both armies. A few men of the Nabob's and of the enemy's ſaid to be killed. Adviſed the Committee of the poſture of affairs, and of the laſt offer made to *Fyzoolla*.

Next morning, 1ſt October, the Rohilla Chief ſent an unſatisfactory reply. I reconnoitred the road ſeveral miles in front. Many ſhot fired by the enemy. Pitched upon a ſpot for eſtabliſhing our ſecond works.

About noon a man came from *Fyzoolla* to inform me that he would certainly come in next day. I could not give myſelf leave to rely implicitly on his aſſurances; having informed the Vizier of the circumſtance, he expreſſed a ſatisfaction at the news.

Very early on the following morning I advanced, with a ſtrong body of the combined armies, to the ground which had been pitched upon for our ſecond approach; from thence I diſpatched *Fyzoolla*'s meſſenger to inform his maſter, that I was ſo far advanced with the army to pay him a viſit at *Lall-Dang*. All induſtry uſed to eſtabliſh our poſt. Many ſhot fired in the jungles on our flanks.

About two hours after the Meſſenger's departure a Chief came to inform me, that if our advanced parties were recalled *Fyzoolla* would come out. At noon notice being brought that he was approaching, I ſent a Field Officer and the Perſian Interpreter to eſcort him through our advanced parties; and on his arrival immediate advice being ſent to his Excellency, he appointed the next morning for receiving him.

Accordingly *Fyzoolla* was preſented to the Vizier on the third; at that meeting nothing paſſed but compliment; however his Excellency afterwards addreſſed me thus:

" I before wrote ye, that if *Fyzoolla Khan* would come " in and meet us, a Jaghire for ten lacks of rupees of the " Rohilcund country ſhould be conferred on him; that " he ſhould keep 2 or 3,000 people with him as attend- " ants, and that of his effects half ſhould be taken: now " that he is come in, in conſideration of his coming, I " will preſent him with two lacks more; and twelve " lacks of the Rohilcund country, including his former " diſtricts, ſhall be given as a Jaghire; and of his effects " half ſhall be taken. In this eſtate of twelve lacks *Fy-* " *zoolla Khan* is at liberty to keep five perſons or 5,000, " but he muſt not keep one more than 5,000; and to " content him and the people with him I will entertain in " my own ſervice from 10 to 15,000, and they ſhall be " ſtationed where he chuſes, and ſhall receive their pay " from me."

I communicated the Vizier's pleaſure to the Rohilla in the evening; he acknowledged the generoſity of the offer, but remarked, that twelve lacks would be inſufficient for the maintainance of all his relations and dependants, and entreated I would requeſt of the Vizier to increaſe the Jaghire.

I ſaid I would endeavour, but gave him no hopes of ſucceſs; and the following is the Letter which I addreſſed to the Vizier on the ſubject.

" I converſed with *Fyzoolla Khan* laſt night on the " ſubject of the Jaghire, and told him ye had agreed to " ſettle twelve lacks of rupees on him, which it was " adviſable he accepted; he replied, that he did not " deſire a ſettlement for the troops with him, but that he " had a great number of relations and dependants, who " had been with him from their birth, and from whom he " could not part, and that the twelve lacks of rupees ye " had conferred would be ſmall for the ſupport of the " whole; he therefore entreated ye would graciouſly " beſtow what would be ſufficient for their maintenance. " He hopes ye will be pleaſed to make ſome addition; " and I alſo give ye this trouble, that if ye think it proper " and adviſable to comply, that ye will do ſo; favour " me, however, with your pleaſure in reply."

His Excellency replied, that he could not do more for *Fyzoolla Khan*: afterwards he ſent his Miniſter, *Elich Khan*, requeſting to make enquiry concerning *Fyzoolla Khan*'s circumſtances and deſires.

This being done, *Fyzoolla* gave in a ſtatement, ſpecifying, that he had in ſilver one lack fourteen thouſand rupees, and one lack ſeventeen thouſand three hundred and eighty-eight gold mohurs, which he valued at 20 Berelly rupees each, beſides his jewels and other effects, of which he could not give an eſtimate without returning to his entrenchment. He ſolicited *Elich Khan* to intercede for him with his Excellency for an increaſe of the Jaghire; and upon *Elich Khan*'s report of theſe matters, the Nabob addreſſed me thus:

" Previous to this ye wrote me, that *Fyzoolla Khan* " would not accept of a Jaghire of twelve lacks of " rupees; in reply it was written, that if he would not " accept of that ſum ye would return him to the entrench- " ment, as I would not give any thing more. After that " I ſent *Elich Khan* to ye, to learn the condition, &c. of " *Fyzoolla Khan*, and from his report I find *Fyzoolla* " *Khan* deſires a Jaghire of 14 lacks and 75,000 rupees; " I therefore give you this trouble to acquaint you, that " that ſum is not very great, and in conſideration of *Fy-* " *zoolla Khan*'s coming in, a Jaghire for 14 lacks and " 75,000 rupees ſhall be given him. Do ye bring " *Fyzoolla Khan* along with you hither to me to-morrow " morning, and I will give a Jaghire for 14 lacks and " 75,000 rupees, and I will take half his effects. When " ye come I will have farther converſation with ye."

According to his Excellency's requeſt, I waited upon him in the morning of the 6th accompanied by *Fyzoolla Khan*, when they ſettled the terms of accommodation.

On the 7th his Excellency viſited me; *Fyzoolla Khan* being ſent for, the mutual writings were framed by his Excellency, and the only amendment made, at the deſire of *Fyzoolla*, was, that he ſhould be at liberty to correſpond with the Engliſh.

I remarked, that there was no mention made of the diviſion of the effects, upon which his Excellency ſaid, he would be contented with the half, whatever it might be.

It was afterwards found however that the omiſſion was intentional, and with a view to ſqueeze *Fyzoolla Khan* as much as poſſible: accordingly, from this time till the 14th, the Nabob's Miniſter and *Fyzoolla Khan* had daily conferences on that ſubject. The Rohilla advanced the equity of the Vizier's accepting half his effects of every kind, conformably to his Excellency's original and repeated ſtipulation; *Elich Khan* inſiſted on receiving money only: and I alſo, being willing to promote the Nabob's intereſt: *Fyzoolla* was importuned ſo much that he was conſtrained to give fifteen lacks of rupees in order to ſatisfy the Vizier.

A diſpute then aroſe concerning the ſpecies of rupees; *Elich Khan* was deſired to go and ſettle that point, and he returned immediately, ſaying, that his Excellency agreed to receive Berelly rupees, and had alſo ſignified his wiſhes to ſee *Fyzoolla Khan* and me, as he intended

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to proceed next day towards *Fyzabad*; I waited on him accordingly, and after ſome converſation we took leave.

His Excellency marched very early next morning; an altercation then enſued between *Fyzoolla Khan* and *Elich Khan*, regarding the value of the gold mohurs, which was alſo compromiſed by me, and my deciſion referred to his Excellency, who in the evening tranſmitted to me the following Letter:

" The pains and trouble you have taken in ſettling " this buſineſs of *Fyzoolla Khan* is beyond the power of " writing to expreſs. In all reſpects you have acted to " my ſatisfaction, and in no reſpect contrary to it: I " eſteem this as pure friendſhip in you."

Thus, Gentlemen, I have given you a particular detail of the tranſactions of the campaign. All the correſpondence which paſſed between *Fyzoolla Khan* and me is before you. It appears that that carried on at *Biſſoulee* was duly communicated to the Vizier and to the Governor; that the propoſition for renewing it came from the Nabob himſelf on the 12th October; that the continuation of it was at his expreſs deſire; that I did not take a ſingle ſtep, from the beginning to the end of this buſineſs, but by his direction and approbation, with which you find the whole is cloſed.

In the courſe of what has been premiſed I have therefore already fully confuted the Vizier's calumnies; but I ſhall nevertheleſs glance over his Excellency's Letter once more, and take notice of ſuch parts as may hitherto have eſcaped me.

" Conſider, my friend," ſays his Excellency repeatedly to Mr. *Haſtings*, " that it was my abſolute determination " to *extirpate the Rohillas, and that I requeſted the aſſiſtance " of the Engliſh for that purpoſe*."

However well it is known that his Excellency is equal to the barbarous deſign for which he thus publicly and daringly avows he ſolicited the aid of the Engliſh, is it poſſible we can believe that the reſpectable Gentleman here traduced could have been privy to ſo horrid a purpoſe? Could he have ſo entirely overcome the feelings of humanity? Could he have been ſo loſt to every ſenſe of honour, as to proſtitute the Engliſh troops, and to ſtain the glory of the Britiſh name, by ſubſcribing to a preconcerted maſſacre? What is not his Excellency capable of advancing?

" If the Colonel had *ever* conſulted me on the occa- " ſion, *it would not have ſignified*; but when I gave him a " clear anſwer, and abſolutely refuſed my conſent to the " propoſals for an accommodation, was it proper for him " to continue the negociations?"

If I had not conſulted him, Gentlemen, how could he have refuſed his conſent? I have already ſhewn, that the moment I was told it could not be for the intereſt of the Company to receive three hundred thouſand pounds for their influence as mediators in an honourable peace, which would have brought four hundred thouſand pounds annually into the coffers of the Vizier, I ſubmitted to the authority with implicit obedience, though I could not chime with the propriety or wiſdom of the doctrine.

I ſhould have thought myſelf excuſable even if I had not conſulted the Vizier on this occaſion; the fact however is, that I did communicate all country correſpondence to him; but his Excellency ſeems to have an inſuperable antipathy to truth.

" At laſt, perceiving that *Fyzoolla Khan*, encouraged " by his correſpondence with the Engliſh, aſſembled his " forces, and daily became more formidable, I deter- " mined, though it was in the height of the rains, to " bring him to puniſhment."

One part of this ſentence, like the former, deſtroys and belies the other: after the ſetting in of the rains it was impoſſible *Fyzoolla Khan* could get a reinforcement of men; it was impoſſible he could wiſh for them, becauſe he could not give them grain to feed upon.

But it is demonſtrable that the Vizier himſelf did not believe what is written in that paragraph; he ſays the enemy were encouraged by the Engliſh, and yet he would make the very ſame Engliſh bring thoſe whom he alledges they favoured to puniſhment.

This would indeed be an extraordinary proof of his abſolute power over us, but it would be to carry the idea too far. The Vizier is wiſer than to have undertaken an expedition depending on the ſupport of troops ſuppoſed to be attached to his enemies.

His Excellency knew perfectly well that I was anxious to return to *Calcutta*, and that I had determined to ſet off in a very few days; if he had entertained any ſuſpicion of my fidelity, would he not have gladly concealed his intentions of moving till after my departure?

" You certainly have not a map of the country, &c."

I remember informing both the Vizier and the Committee that I would march to *Nigeebgur*; but that I did not think myſelf authorized to go farther; his Excellency obſerved, with an unbecoming air of ridicule, " if *Nigeebgur* is on the other ſide of the *Ganges*, or of the " hills, no matter; the Engliſh troops ſhall not go " thither."

Now, Gentlemen, I had told him that I would go to *Nigeebgur*; wherefore then ſuch a wanton diſplay of petulance? the impropriety of it neither eſcaped the notice of " his ſincere well-wiſher," Mr. *Middleton*, or of my Interpreter. I pointed at it in my Letter to the Committee, but they ſuffered themſelves to overlook the diſreſpect ſhewn to their Commander in Chief, forgetting, or chuſing to forget, that an indignity to him was in effect an inſult to the Government.

" When we arrived afterwards at *Pattergur*, and *Fy-* " *zoolla Khan* was at the diſtance of 15 coſs from us at " the foot of the mountains, I determined to march for- " ward and attack him; the Colonel again delayed, &c."

I have clearly eſtabliſhed by his Excellency's own Letters, &c. in a regular chain, that the overtures of accommodation made on the 13th Auguſt, and the ſubſequent intercourſe on that ſubject, was at his expreſs deſire: the truth is, that he never had an idea of attacking the enemy; he had declared originally and invariably, that his reſolution was " *to ſtarve them.*"

It was agreed on the 24th to approach nearer them; on the 26th I went twelve miles to look for ground; 27th, a body of his troops were ſent forward by my deſire; on the 28th the whole army advanced; 29th, I rode twenty-eight miles, examining the country; 30th, the Quarter-maſter General pitched on ground for the brigade to advance to, which they did on the 31ſt, in order completely to environ the enemy.

2d September, I found that his Excellency was treating with the enemy, that he had received a Vackeel; and you ſee him buſied in the ſame manner during the remainder of the campaign. After I had offered him the ſervice of the troops to ſtorm the enemy's intrenchments, you find he denied me even the liberty of reconnoitring.

" For four or five days after this, the 24th Auguſt, " the conferences were broke off; after which *Omar* " *Khan* and two other Sirdars came from *Fyzoolla* to me " with propoſals of peace. I aſked them, why they had " taken ſuch meaſures as to oblige me to march againſt " them in the rainy ſeaſon? they replied, we remained " peaceably at the extremity of the Country without any " force; but when a correſpondence was ſet on foot by " means of the Engliſh Chiefs, they wrote to *Fyzoolla* " *Khan* to take ſome ſtep that might make it appear that " he was in a ſituation to oppoſe the army of the Vizier, " by which means his affairs would be ſettled. Encou- " raged by the advice of the Engliſh Chiefs, *Fyzoolla* " *Khan* aſſembled this number of troops, and ſent them " to *Nejeebabad*; otherwiſe how would he have taken ſuch " a ſtep?"

From the 23d of Auguſt I had not the leaſt intercourſe with the Rohillas till the 16th September, that I wrote *Fyzoolla* a Letter, by deſire of the Vizier, offering him the Collectorſhip of *Rohilcund*. It was about the 14th that *Omar Khan* and *Bahadar Khan* had come to his Excellency, in conſequence of *Mutiſhim Khan*, *Abdurihman* *Khan*,

Khan, and *Meir Moghul*, and others, having been repeatedly ſent to the enemy's camp, to prevail with *Fyzoolla* to ſend out ſome Sirdar to temporize with his Excellency.

The ſtory which he would put into their mouths is truly a knaviſh one; but forgeries of this kind generally detect themſelves.

Omar Khan is a ſoldier, who it is well known has ever held the Vizier's character in deteſtation, *Bahadar Khan* is the brother-in-law of *Fyzoolla*; can we ſuppoſe then that theſe two Gentlemen, who had come intruſted with a negociation for their friend, and for their kindred, ſhould have talked to his Excellency in a manner ſo deſtitute of truth, ſo wide of their purpoſe, and had the report been true, ſo ruinous to their intereſt with the Engliſh? moſt certainly we cannot believe it.

His Excellency makes theſe two Chiefs tell him, "that they had no force," which was an abſurdity too groſs for them to have ſaid; he makes them charge *Fyzoolla Khan* with the folly of increaſing his numbers, at a time when he could not ſubſiſt the troops he already had. His Excellency concludes with making the Chiefs aſk the queſtion, "how could *Fyzoolla* have taken ſuch a ſtep "as ſending his troops to *Nejeebabad*, if he had not been "encouraged to do it?"

It would not be more prepoſterous in his Excellency to repreſent them ridiculous enough to have aſked, how it was poſſible that a people in want of food ſhould be ſuſceptible of hunger? the dreadful proſpects of which had made them endeavour to collect all the grain they could before our near approach.

"Our joint forces marched near the encampment of "*Fyzoolla*, and prepared to attack it; but there was "ſtill a private intelligence between the Colonel and "*Fyzoolla*, encouraged by which *Fyzoolla* rode out of "his own encampment, and came to the Colonel."

It is aſtoniſhing with what effrontery his Excellency advances theſe untruths. I have already, Gentlemen, informed you of all the intercourſe I ever had with the Rohillas: I did not write a Letter to any native during the campaign but ſuch as went through my Interpreter; that Gentleman had my Perſian ſeals in his cuſtody from the time I left *Benares* in March till after my return to *Calcutta*; and I deſire that he and my Secretary, and every perſon who may be ſuppoſed to have had any ſhare of my confidence, be called before you and interrogated, whether they know or believe that I at any time carried on any ſiniſter correſpondence with the enemy.

"The day *Fyzoolla* came out, the Engliſh troops were ready to quarrel with mine, &c."

It is the firſt time I have ever heard of it.

Colonel *Leſlie* and Major *Hannay*, who commanded the advanced diviſion of the army, are in town, and will, I am perſuaded, if called upon, ſatisfy you that this allegation is totally void of foundation.

"I wrote to the Colonel, that if *Fyzoolla* would not "agree to theſe offers, to ſend him away; I alſo ſent "*Mahomed Elich Khan* to *explain theſe particulars* more "fully to the Colonel."

What explanation did ſo expreſs a deſire require?

The Vizier's own Letter of the 5th October beſt tells why he ſent his Miniſter; "I ſent him to enquire into "*Fyzoolla*'s condition, &c."

"At laſt I ſaw that I ſhould diſpleaſe the Colonel by "inſiſting on the former conditions; I was compelled "to give fourteen lacks and ſeventy-five thouſand rupees "of Country."

The concluſion of my Letter of the 4th October ſpeaks for itſelf how far I went in this matter: "he "*(Fyzoolla Khan)* hopes he will be pleaſed to make "ſome addition; and I alſo give ye this trouble, that "if ye think it proper and adviſable to comply, that ye "will do ſo; favour me, however, with your pleaſure in "reply."

It was after *Elich Khan*'s interceſſion and report, that his Excellency reſolved to make a *ſeeming increaſe* of two lacks ſeventy-five thouſand rupees to the twelve lacks formerly offered.

You will admire his Excellency's addreſs and management in this buſineſs.

Inſtead of making *a real addition* to the Jaghire, he gave diſtricts, which had till then only paid twelve lacks forty-five thouſand rupees, and obliged the Rohilla Chief to receive them at an increaſed valuation of fourteen lacks ſeventy-five thouſand rupees; ſo that in fact his Excellency only made an addition of forty-five thouſand rupees to the twelve lacks offered in his Letter of the 3d October; and in place of a ſettlement of fourteen lacks ſeventy-five thouſand, *Fyzoolla* only got a Jaghire of twelve lacks forty-five thouſand rupees.

"Briefly, after a great deal of trouble and argument, "this affair was thus ſettled; that *Fyzoolla Khan* ſhould "give me fifteen lacks of rupees, and take a country "amounting to fourteen lacks ſeventy-five thouſand "rupees. You will conſider that when theſe conferences "were ſet on foot, the Colonel obſerved to me, that "*Fyzoolla* had one lack and ſome thouſand gold mohurs, "and one lack of rupees, amounting to fifteen or ſix-"teen lacks, of which I ſhould take half; but after-"wards, when the affair was ſettled, *Fyzoolla Khan* gave "me fifteen lacks of rupees: conſider then, if *Fyzoolla* "was only poſſeſſed of this much, would he have given "me all his property?"

The firſt and only enquiry regarding the Rohilla Chief's riches was in conſequence of the Nabob's own deſire of the 5th October, and, according to the account given in by *Fyzoolla Khan*, he had near twenty-five lacks in money, beſides his jewels and effects.

The agreement to give the Jaghire for the fourteen lacks ſeventy-five thouſand rupees was ſigned on the 7th October; but the ſtipulation for the fifteen lacks in lieu of half the effects did not take place till the 15th.

The Vizier purpoſely omitted mention of the effects, to leave room for the after-game which he put in practice; inſomuch, that although the Rohilla repeatedly offered to deliver over half his effects of every kind on oath, the Nabob declined to receive them; hence *Fyzoolla* was neceſſitated to agree to give a ſum of money nearly equal to two-thirds of all his fortune; for his Excellency not only took fifteen lacks, but the helpleſs Chief was obliged to pay away his gold mohurs at a great diſcount, the Vizier allowing only ſixteen one-half Berelly rupees for each, although I have been aſſured that they uſually paſs in that country for about twenty Berelly rupees: the Nabob therefore owes his getting ſo large a ſhare of the unhappy *Fyzoolla*'s fortune to his Excellency's chicane, not to his juſtice.

After the concluſion of the peace, his Excellency ſays, "then the following propoſition was made to me, that "I ſhould take twenty lacks from *Fyzoolla*, and give "him the whole Rohilla country."

I never heard of ſuch a propoſition.

"Before I marched from *Biſſoulee* Mr. *Roberts* came "to me from the Colonel, and informed me, that con-"ferences for an accommodation with *Fyzoolla* were on "foot, and that it was adviſable I ſhould agree to them. "My friend, this is called giving advice in *Indoſtan*; I "think this is for the beſt, and you muſt do ſo. When "the Engliſh Chiefs were continually ſending me theſe "meſſages, how could I refuſe to ſatisfy them?"

Why does his Excellency lead us back to *Biſſoulee*? we have ſeen the whole that paſſed there; we have ſeen that he rejected the overtures; nay, in the very Letter under conſideration, he ſays, "*but when I gave him a* "*clear anſwer, and abſolutely refuſed my conſent*," &c. and yet in another place he has the modeſty to aſk, "how "could I refuſe to ſatisfy the Engliſh Chiefs?"—Strange incongruity! endeavouring by a ſtudied confuſion of

times

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times and circumſtances, to make the efforts of low art and cunning ſupply the want of truth and reaſon.

" In the like manner the ſeveral Letters which the " Colonel cauſed me to write at the concluſion of this " affair, I gave out of reſpect for him."

I am greatly indebted to his Excellency for profeſſions, but I cannot ſay that I have ever had occaſion to thank him for any real mark of reſpect. His Excellency in particular owed me no reſpect of the nature he mentions here; for although he applied to me at *Biſſoulee*, when his ſhameful conduct rendered him odious over all the country, when he was ſpoken of with irreverence even by his own ſlaves, for a Letter or Teſtimony under my hand in his vindication, I declined giving it.

7th July.

Therefore it is improbable that his Excellency's politeneſs, in repugnance to his conviction, would carry him ſo far as to pay me a compliment, which my regard to truth had made me deny to him.

It was matter of no moment whether I had received the Letter of the 15th October or not, thoſe which his Excellency addreſſed to me ſo frequently during the courſe of the negociation being very ſufficient to ſhew that I was guided by his pleaſure.

I therefore owe nothing to his Excellency's reſpect for me; but I owe much to that part of the Board's inſtructions, which directed me to do nothing material without requiring his Excellency's deſire in writing; for if I had not got that " neceſſary precaution," as it was emphatically called by thoſe who knew his Excellency better than I did, it is probable I ſhould have truſted too much to his word, and not have had theſe written authorities to produce in ſupport of my conduct.

There cannot be a more ſtriking inſtance of his meanneſs than the preſent: in order, as he apprehends, the better to gloſs over the innumerable liberties he has taken with truth, he has laid aſide all the dignity of a man, and condeſcended to ſubject himſelf to the opinion of being thought a dupe.

On the ſame ſyſtem he might ſay, that the Letter which he addreſſed to Mr. *Haſtings*, promiſing the forty lacks to the Company, was mere matter of courteſy; indeed we have detected him in endeavouring to falſify that Letter.

17th April. Letter to the Governor.

I foretold as early as April 1774, about the time we entered the Rohilla country, how his Excellency would act regarding that money.

With reſpect to the refuſal of two battalions to accompany him to *Subah*, he aſked for none; he deſired the brigade, or at leaſt two battalions, might be left at *Sukertal*, which I refuſed, but not without aſſigning reaſons that appeared ſufficient to his Excellency.

" An Engliſh Gentleman plundered a Chief in my " army of a pallankeen and four looking-glaſſes, &c."

The eaſy temper of this Chief, in ſuffering himſelf to be robbed with impunity, is not perfectly conſiſtent with the character of heroiſm and independent ſpirit, which his Excellency would elſewhere attribute to his Sirdars.

The Vizier would bring our troops even under a level with his own banditti; and truly his Excellency has exemplified the depredations of the Engliſh by an inſtance worthy of himſelf. It is painful to follow him through his jumble of untruths and inconſiſtencies; but as this accuſation is derogatory to the character of Engliſh officers, it becomes neceſſary to enquire into the ſtory of the Chief of the Mirrors.

The pallankeen alluded to was ſaid to have been loſt on the 23d April, on the field of battle.

Whilſt his Excellency was exulting over the pale head of *Hafiz*, whilſt we ſhould ſuppoſe that joy at his ſucceſs had entirely occupied his mind, we find it ſuſceptible of meanneſſes; for the very next day after the action he complained of the loſs his Sirdar had met with, and alledged that the articles taken from him were in the poſſeſſion of ſome perſon belonging to the 10th battalion of Sepoys.

In conſequence of this repreſentation, I directed one of my Aid-de-Camps to write a note to Captain *Bevan*, deſiring the pallankeen might be delivered up if it could be found.

Captain *Bevan* addreſſed himſelf in anſwer:

" To Captain *Allan Macpherſon*, Aid-de-Camp.

" Sir,

" My Commandant yeſterday took the ſhell of a pal- " lankeen cut in two in three places, from which cir- " cumſtance I ſhould imagine it is not the one meant; " however, I have ordered him to deliver it to the " bearer, agreeable to the Commander in Chief's orders, " which you will pleaſe to acquaint him of."

The Nabob's people kept the ſaid ſhell; notwithſtanding which his Excellency ſent me another meſſage concerning the pallankeen, and my Aid-de-Camp wrote a ſecond time to Captain *Bevan*.

" The Nabob has again ſpoke to the Colonel upon " the ſubject of the pallankeen I before wrote you about, " and perſiſts that it is in the poſſeſſion of ſome one of " your battalion.

" The Commander in Chief therefore directs, that " you will be pleaſed to order it to be delivered up to the " bearer, who is to have permiſſion to go into the lines " of your battalion to ſhew you where it is."

Captain *Bevan* replied,

" Sir,

" You will pleaſe to acquaint the Commander in Chief " that I have given the Nabob's man permiſſion to go " through my lines, and if there is any pallankeen there " that he can lay proper claim to, I will order it to be " delivered to him; but at the ſame time muſt requeſt, " that as the pallankeen I formerly ſent was not the one " required, it may be returned to my Commandant, " whoſe property it is."

I heard nothing more concerning any pallankeen, excepting that, a conſiderable time afterwards, ſome of the Nabob's people impudently forced from a ſervant of Enſign *Ramſay* a pallankeen bamboo, which it was found belonged to that Officer.

This is another circumſtance that may well ſerve to illuſtrate the degree of inſolence at which even the Nabob's menial ſervants had arrived.

" Wherever the Engliſh army encamped they com- " mitted ſuch violences on all the villages around them, as " to render them quite deſolate, &c. My Friend, theſe, " theſe things were the wealth of theſe poor people!"

Poor people, indeed, who were unfortunate enough to fall into the iron gripe of *Sujah!*

Though ſuch a liberty with the diſcipline of the troops is one of thoſe extravagancies which carries its own diſcredit along with it, yet it is ſuch a reflection on the Engliſh army, and on me as Commander in Chief, that I muſt requeſt of you, Gentlemen, to call upon Colonel *Galliez*, Major *M'Kenzie*, and other Field Officers of the ſecond brigade, to give you a Report upon honour of the behaviour of the troops during the Rohilla war.

It may not in the meantime be improper to obſerve, that on our way from *Shabad* to *Peelebut* it was uſual to ſend ſafeguards to the villages contiguous to head quarters, to preſerve them from deſtruction; but the moment the Sepoys were withdrawn to proceed on their march, the villages were ſet on flames by way of bonfire for his Excellency.

Afterwards, when we were cantoned at *Biſſoulee*, many Jemidars, who reſided at the diſtance of ten, twenty, and thirty miles, very frequently ſent to entreat for even one Sepoy to protect them; and though they could not always be ſupplied, it is ſufficient to ſhew the opinion which the natives entertained of our troops.

Beſides my Aid-de-Camps, who had the charge of detaching theſe Sepoys, ſeveral other Officers in town are perfectly acquainted with theſe circumſtances.

The apprehenſions with which his Excellency ſays his mind was agitated, and the dreadful ſuppoſitions he has made, in order to give an *ideal* proof of his fidelity to the Engliſh, by an imaginary ſlaughter of thouſands of his own troops, is too chimerical to deſerve any notice.

But we cannot forget that his people, after his own example, by an unpardonable arrogance of deportment, often put the temper and patience of the Engliſh to trial; a daring inſtance of which happened to Lieutenant *Charles Forbes*, who, in the preſence of another Gentleman and ſeveral of our Sepoys, was told by an Officer of the Nabob, that he would be the means of his Excellency's not only having his (Mr. *Forbes*) coat ſtript from his back, but his ears cut off.

Such inſolence was well calculated to ferment the minds of our troops, and an Officer of leſs diſcretion than Mr. *Forbes* would have cut down the miſcreant; yet the Vizier never gave the leaſt ſatisfaction for the indignity; and it is well known that my ſervants have been beat, and my baggage thrown on the ground, by the Nabob's people.

His Excellency is very unſeaſonable in his raillery regarding the unfortunate family of *Hafiz*, and there is a palpable impertinence towards me in his manner of expreſſion. Although he could not command the winds, he had it in his power to have treated the captives with tenderneſs; he could have ordered it ſo, that theſe illuſtrious priſoners ſhould not have been diſtreſſed for food or raiment; yet the truth is, that they were covered with vermin, were reduced to the ſevere neceſſity of making ſupplications for private charity, and actually received alms from ſeveral Gentlemen.

But the Minutes which my Aid-de-Camp took down from Reports of truſty Hircarrahs ſtationed for the purpoſe of bringing faithful intelligence regarding the priſoners, will ſpeak more plainly their miſerable ſituation, and at the ſame time prove how moderate I was when under examination on theſe ſubjects, and how reluctant I have hitherto been to enlarge on the exceſſes of the Nabob.

His behaviour to the families of *Mahubullah Khan*, and his brother *Fitte Ullub Khan*, who poſſeſſed a country of about twenty lacks of rupees per annum, was yet more criminal.

Before the commencement of the war he correſponded with them, and upon his aſſurances of protection and friendſhip they remained at peace at *Biſſoulee*, the capital of their diſtrict.

He wrote to them on the 23d of March in theſe words:

" I have received your Addreſs, the particulars of " which are clearly underſtood. *Ye are very dear to me*, " and have been long impreſſed on my heart: I there- " fore write, that ye may remain in your own poſſeſſions " in *Biſſoulee* in perfect ſecurity, and raiſe no commotions. " To what I write hereafter you will act conformably, " and you will ſooth and ſatisfy all Rohillas who are diſ- " poſed to obey me. By the favour of God no one " ſhall receive injury. *The families of Robillas I regard* " *as my own**. Let all remain in their habitations."

On the 4th of April his Excellency addreſſed them as follows:

" Previous to this *Meir Golawn Mahomed Khan* will " have arrived with you, and made you acquainted " with whatever was neceſſary. *By the bleſſing of God* " *there is not the ſmalleſt difference between us; nay, there* " *is the firmeſt friendſhip*, and all will be well.

" Regarding the deva[illegible]ation of your country, I " have avoided marching through it. Remain per- " fectly at eaſe where you are; whatever is befitting " will be performed on my part, and all will be well. It " is neceſſary you regard me as a friend in this affair. " Whatever *Meir Golawn Mahomed Khan* has engaged " for, I will not depart from." APPENDIX No. 45.

Subſequent to the above Letter, his Excellency ſent a Letter to the ſaid Chiefs, and to their mother the Begum, in theſe terms:

" Your Addreſs is received. What you write, that " *Meir Golawn Khan* is arrived, and has related all par- " ticulars, and that ye will act agreeably thereto, *relying* " *firmly on my friendſhip*, is clearly underſtood. It is " manifeſt that I have long had *true regard for your fami-* " *lies*; and now that ye renew our former union, all will " moſt certainly be well. Nothing ſhall be wanting on " my part for your benefit, for I wiſh for your good and " proſperity. I am now marching by your boundaries " by way of *Cundſeroon*, &c. It behoves that ye remain at " home in perfect ſecurity, and firm to your agreements."

Upon the faith of theſe Letters the deluded Chiefs remained in their habitations, in full confidence of being treated as friends by the Nabob, and of being left undiſturbed in their poſſeſſions.

The moment he arrived at *Biſſoulee*, however, they were put into rigorous confinement, denied acceſs to their families, robbed of their property, and themſelves and their women treated not only with diſhonour and indignity, but even with cruelty.

The unhappy Chiefs preferred frequent complaints to me in the moſt moving terms, and ſent the Nabob's original Letters, to prove how much he had deceived them.

" He has deprived us of our country, of our riches, 27th May. " *and even of our honour*; and not ſatisfied with that, he is " going to ſend us priſoners to *Fyzabad*. We deſire no " country, no riches, no houſes; but at *Biſſoulee* are the " tombs of our noble anceſtors; near them, under ſome " ſhade, we beg permiſſion to ſpend the remainder of " our days as Faquiers. Relying on the Vizier's pro- " miſes, we remained in this country, otherwiſe we " ſhould have fled as the other Chiefs did, and have pre- " ſerved our characters and honours; theſe he has taken " away with our effects; *and how he has diſhonoured us is* 3d June. " *known to all.*"

It was this deceitful conduct, this inhuman treatment, that filled the minds of all the fugitive Chiefs with ſuch a diſtruſt and deteſtation of the Nabob.

And although my repreſentations of the diſtreſſes of the family of *Hafiz* were ungraciouſly received, and I am ſorry to ſay, gave me but little encouragement to plead the cauſe of the unhappy, yet I regret exceedingly that I have ſo long ſuppreſſed my inclinations of endeavouring to alleviate the miſfortunes of the much-injured Chiefs to whom theſe Letters were addreſſed, and who, as well as the family of *Hafiz*, I have good reaſon to believe, are even now ſtinted of the neceſſaries of life; and when I was on the way down, I received the affecting accounts of the death of twenty-five of theſe ill-fated priſoners, ſince their arrival at *Allahabad*, for want of ſuſtenance.

" Whoever has loſt a father and brother in war, has " fallen from the dignity of a throne and become a pri- " ſoner, will undoubtedly ſuffer much miſery."

The analogy between the ſtyle of this paragraph, and of a Letter which I received ſome time ago from another quarter on the ſame ſubject, is worthy of obſervation.

We grant that the fall of a father and of a brother, and the loſs of a throne, were ſufficient cauſes for impreſſing the ſouls of the family of *Hafiz* with ſorrow: but what ſhall we think of that unfeeling man who added cruelty to the burthen of their afflictions? What ſhall we ſay of him who, in violation of all faith, in breach of every ſacred tie, under the artful maſk of diſſembled friendſhip, not only robbed the family of *Deondy Khan* of their

* Such was the Vizier's regard for the Rohillas, and ſuch his regard for humanity, that he refuſed to give any aſſiſtance, either in tranſporting their Wounded to our hoſpitals, or in burying their Dead.

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throne, but even deſpoiled them of their honour; and, not contented with depriving them of their liberty, has imbittered the draught of their misfortunes by unexampled ſeverity in their bondage?

You find theſe unhappy people in the utmoſt dread leſt the Nabob ſhould hear of their complaints; let me therefore hope and entreat, Gentlemen, that whatever it may be your pleaſure to do in their favour, may be ſo ordered and concerted, as that they may not be expoſed to the implacable reſentment of *Sujah*.

Towards the concluſion of the Nabob's Letter we find mention made of Colonel *Macleane*. I have hitherto been much at a loſs to account for that Gentleman's expedition to the army, and more ſo to divine the cauſes of his ſpeedy return.

He quitted his Budgerow at *Buxar*, and in fifteen days, including thoſe he halted, arrived at our encampment, in the extremity of the Rohilla country, having travelled above ſix hundred miles in nine days. He had hardly got to camp when he talked of leaving it. If he had not been ſo much on wing, I ſhould have ſuppoſed that he came up in the way of his duty; but deferring the comptrolling of accounts till ſome future opportunity, he ſet off again in a very few days. In thirty-two hours he reached *Biſſoulee*, diſtant above one hundred and forty miles from our camp; but having overtaken the Nabob and Mr. *Middleton* there, he found it convenient to abate of his haſte, made eaſy journies, and accompanied his Excellency to *Lucknow*.

It is not obvious what buſineſs Colonel *Macleane*, either in the character of Commiſſary General of Stores, or Comptroller General of Accounts, could have with the Vizier; yet if his Excellency had ſaid that he had been conſulting Mr. *Macleane* on eſtabliſhments of that nature, or on ſubjects connected with his office, I ſhould have been willing to have thought ſo.

But when he declares that he has been converſing with Colonel *Macleane*, who was an entire ſtranger to him, on matters totally foreign to that Gentlemen's department; when I conſider that I received no intimation from the Preſident regarding Colonel *Macleane*'s expedition; that he did not trouble himſelf with the duties of his office, which was the only pretence he had for his journey; when I conſider that the Governor had been ſolicitous to prevent the Gentlemen of the army from having acceſs to the Vizier; and that, notwithſtanding a poſitive prohibition againſt any Officer's viſiting the Nabob without my permiſſion, Colonel *Macleane* had a particular and private introduction to him: in ſhort, when his hurry to join the army, his abrupt departure, his rapid journey to *Biſſoulee*, his ſudden and extraordinary intimacy with the Vizier, his private conferences with his Excellency as a boſom friend, his courteous jaunt to *Lucknow*, his poſting from thence in ten days, and arriving at *Calcutta* nearly about the ſame time with the Vizier's Letter; I ſay, when theſe and other circumſtances are conſidered collectively, I cannot help thinking it impoſſible that all could be accident.

It is not eaſy to develope tranſactions of this nature; but his Excellency was ill-adviſed when he wrote, "I "have related all more particularly to Colonel *Macleane*, "who will inform you of them." This unguarded ſentence reflects a great deal of light, and the veil is no longer more than a cobweb.

I am concerned that his Excellency took the liberty of treating Colonel *Macleane* ſo ungracefully, as to make him the vehicle of ſuch malevolence and calumny; and I am exceedingly ſurprized that the Gentleman could condeſcend to become an agent in ſuch a buſineſs: at all events, it would have been no more than candid in Colonel *Macleane*, when he did me the favour of deſiring to audit my bills before the reſignation of his office, to have informed me of theſe manœuvrings.

"Mr. *Middleton* will alſo write you on theſe ſubjects; "I conſult him on all affairs."

Here his Excellency has removed the curtain entirely, and although he has not perhaps brought forth all the characters who were buried behind it, yet ſuch hints have eſcaped him, as leave us very little at a loſs for the complete dramatis perſonæ.

"I am very much pleaſed with Mr. *Middleton*'s good "conduct; he is a very ſenſible, intelligent man, and a "very ſincere well-wiſher of mine."

If I did not think favourably of Mr. *Middleton*, I ſhould be induced, from his Excellency's mode of expreſſion, to believe that the one had agreed to ſound the eulogium of the other.

"I have been ſpoken to on this ſubject by the Colonel, "who ſays, that Mr. *Middleton* was appointed to collect "the money due to the Company, and that he has no "buſineſs to interfere in any other matter."

This paragraph bears ſo little connection with the preceding parts of the Letter, that it ſeems rather introduced as a complaint of Mr. *Middleton*'s than of his Excellency.

It is true I thought Mr. *Middleton* rather officious, and I repeatedly delared that he had no buſineſs with military affairs; but as I afterwards had it under a reſpectable ſignature, that the young Gentleman did not concern himſelf in ſuch matters, I was willing, till now, to have perſuaded myſelf that I had been miſtaken.

I would gladly ſuppoſe Mr. *Middleton* did not intend any diſreſpect to me by his interferences with the province of the Commander in Chief; and although I am ignorant of what he has written on the ſubject which his Excellency mentions, I truſt it is perfectly conſiſtent with his ſentiments of the Vizier, of whom, I muſt do Mr. *Middleton* the juſtice to ſay, he entertains a very proper opinion.

"I have had ſo many proofs of his Excellency's de-"viating from truth, as well as violating his promiſe, "that I know not how to believe his aſſurances."

With theſe ſentiments of Mr. *Middleton*'s I ſhould cloſe this Addreſs, Gentlemen, but that I find it neceſſary to trouble you yet a little further.

Since my arrival in town, I have been told that it was unfortunate the Rohilla war was not concluded "*a month earlier*."

Whether this was intended as a ſupplement to the Vizier's Letter I know not, but I conſider the connection very ſtrong.

When I left *Calcutta* to go on the late expedition, the Members of Adminiſtration declared they would think it fortunate if the war could be finiſhed "*in two years*:" obſerve what happened; ſeven-eighths of the Rohilla country was conquered, and in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the Vizier, and the Company's engagements to his Excellency fully performed, in leſs than *three weeks* from the commencement of the war.

He was in the collection of three-eighths of the country more than it was neceſſary to put into his hands, in order to have entitled us to the forty lacks.

The ſecond campaign, in which, upon the authority of the late Adminiſtration themſelves, I deny the Company were under any obligation of being a party, was finiſhed in two months.

In fine, the Articles of Peace were ſigned in little more than five months from the beginning of the war, including a receſs of three months which we had at *Biſſoulee*; yet the very ſame Gentlemen who had allotted two years for this buſineſs, and theſe Gentlemen only, are now diſſatisfied that it was not concluded *a month earlier*.

And why? becauſe in that caſe theſe tranſactions might poſſibly have been leſs attended to.

But wherefore ſlur over meaſures in this manner? or how could it be expected they ſhould eſcape unnoticed?

The public have for ſome time been very obſervant of, and very minute in their enquiries regarding the tranſactions in this country.

Whenever the Adminiſtration of a commercial body take upon themſelves a military character, they become reſponſible for their conduct, not only to their immediate conſtituents, but to the ſtate.

The Guardians of the glory of *Britain* are ever on the watch, leſt any ſtain ſhould be brought on the honour of the empire.

The principles upon which the Rohilla war was undertaken, the mode on which the Vizier choſe to conduct it, could not paſs unobſerved.

We may well ſay of the Britiſh, that they are the modern Romans; their Senate could never overlook the proſtitution of the national honour, in ſubjecting a Britiſh General to the command of an infidel Prince.

If theſe meaſures were improper, the concluſion of the war, or ſooner or later, could not juſtify them.

I have, in the preceding part of this Addreſs, clearly ſhewn that there was no unneceſſary delay on my part; and I muſt here beg leave to tranſcribe a Letter which I wrote to the Governor, under date the 11th October.

" Had there appeared any urgent neceſſity of preſſing " upon the Rohillas immediately after our arrival at " *Pattergur*, it is probable that, notwithſtanding the ſcru- " ples which I entertained with regard to the extent " of my authority, I ſhould not have been able to have " overcome my inclinations of attacking; but as the " Marattas, even ſuppoſing a certainty of their intentions " to diſturb the Vizier, could not reach the *Doab* earlier " than December; as the Rohillas were ſhut up, and " could only receive ſcanty ſupplies from the country " between the hills; as a delay in the attack of courſe " ſubjected them to greater diſtreſs, and tended to " weaken and render them leſs capable of taking ad- " vantage of the ſtrength of their ſituation; as it would " have been highly imprudent to enter the jungle which " ſurrounds them till after the heavy fall of rain " uſual at the equinox; as the attack, ſuppoſing it moſt " ſucceſsful, could have only made the enemy retire " further into the country between the hills; as this " would have entirely defeated the Vizier's intentions of " cruſhing or making the Rohillas his friends before " any other Power could make head againſt him; as the " natural ſtrength of the enemy's poſt would put the " credit of the Company's arms to the teſt; as the ſmall " ſhare of reputation which I have had the good fortune " of acquiring in the courſe of long ſervice was at ſtake; " as I could not have aſſured myſelf of approbation, in " caſe I riſked the attack and had failed; as the Vizier " very earneſtly, and from the moſt prudential motives, " wiſhed to re-eſtabliſh friendſhip with *Fyzoolla Khan*; " and as I was for ſome time ill of a ſevere indiſpoſition: " in ſhort, Sir, as there did not appear a ſingle reaſon in " favour of an earlier advance than was made; and as, " on the contrary, every conſideration that could weigh " with me, either as a General, or in a political view, " argued very ſtrongly againſt any attack at all, I am " perfectly ſatisfied with the iſſue which matters have " had; and it is my firm hope and wiſh, that the " honourable and ſpeedy concluſion to which the Rohilla " war has been brought may give you ſincere pleaſure, " and add to that reputation which you have ſo juſtly " acquired in your Adminiſtration."

And I repeat it, Gentlemen, that no occurrence brought more credit to that Adminiſtration than the honourable period put to the Rohilla war, which has in ſome meaſure done away the reproach that was ſo wantonly brought upon the Engliſh name.

I am confident that even a few of the reaſons urged in the above Letter, would carry to any unprejudiced mind a conviction of the propriety of my conduct; but many others might be added.

The Engineer had informed me, in his deſcription of the road to *Lall Dang*, that there was no ground for encampment within leſs than ſixteen miles, and that there was not a drop of water nearer the enemy's poſt than twelve miles. APPENDIX. No. 45.

In a ſubſequent Letter he obſerved, " the people we " have been among are ſtrong and robuſt; they ſeem " not to be affected by their preſent ſituation; are of a " haughty and independent temper, and conſider their " Sirdars more as kinſmen than commanders."

The Gentlemen of the late Adminiſtration may have been more able politicians; they muſt have known better than I could how to make up the Company's Inveſtment; but it can be no compliment to myſelf to ſay, that I was the beſt judge how to conduct military operations.

Very long experience had taught me to know, that a cloſe attack with Sepoys ought if poſſible to be avoided; becauſe it has hitherto been impracticable to make them keep their order and preſerve their fire.

I have very often been an eye-witneſs of their miſconduct in that particular, and had a recent and remarkable proof of it on the 23d of April, when one of the battalions ſent from the ſecond line to drive off a body of the enemy who galled our right flank, fell into immediate diſorder, and fired in the air twenty deep, although they had an European Officer to every diviſion, and were in an open plain: what then was to be expected in the jungles?

One ſhould imagine too, that a ſcarcity of ammunition might be admitted as a good reaſon why an Officer ſhould be cautious of engaging an enemy.

I carried a much larger quantity to the field than the regulations allowed carriage for, and yet we had no more than forty-five rounds per man when we left *Biſſoulee* in the height of the rains.

I had made indents to the ſeveral magazines for ſupplies to arrive with the army in due time for opening the campaign at the uſual ſeaſon; and on the 24th July, in conſequence of the reſolution of taking the field in the rains, I directed Lieutenant Colonel *Muir* to forward one hundred thouſand rounds of muſket ammunition from *Chunar* to *Ramgaut*; and although that attentive Officer took every poſſible meaſure to expedite its arrival, yet the ammunition did not reach the place of deſtination till the campaign was over, owing to the rapidity and force of the current.

I had applied to the Vizier very frequently, as Mr. *Middleton* well knows, for the loan of as much lead as would make one hundred thouſand muſket balls, yet I never could get an ounce from his Excellency; ſo that we really had not ammunition enough for the attack, much leſs a proviſion for the event of a retreat.

The troops had been neglected by the Vizier, and were greatly diſcontented; the conſequence of diſorder amongſt them threatened deſtruction to us all. The Vizier's uniform plan was to have *ſtarved* the enemy into terms; my inclinations to mercy were proportioned to that degree of odium which our concern in the Rohilla perſecution had brought upon us. The idea I had formed, upon the faith of good intelligence, of the ſtrength of the enemy's poſt, made me believe our ſucceſs would be very precarious; and the opinions of the Engineers, which I afterwards took, will ſatisfy you, Gentlemen, that it was fortunate we were not obliged to riſk the reputation of our arms, and all the advantages we had gained, ſo unneceſſarily. Lieutenant *Bruce*, whoſe opinion of the ſpirit and diſpoſition of the Rohillas you have ſeen, talking of their poſt, ſays, " from " this the road leads directly under the hills to a ſecond " paſſage over the *Sewaſſa*, where from the heights *a* " *handful of reſolute men are capable of oppoſing a conſider-* " *able army*.

" To the Southward of the river lies the ſpot where " the families of the Rohillas reſided; but before we " could reach that, it would have been abſolutely neceſ- " ſary

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" ſary to have gained the ſummit of the ſurrounding " hills; the ſlaughter that would have been the conſe- " quence of ſuch an attempt, if we conſider that the " Rohillas were fighting for their families, muſt un- " doubtedly have *been dreadful.*"

Captain *Penman* expreſſes himſelf thus:

" In order to gain this poſt, it is neceſſary to ford the " river ſeveral times; and as the banks are very high " and ſteep, and covered with trees and jungles, the " paſſages might be diſputed with great advantages to " the Rohillas. The natural ſtrength of this poſt is " greater than can well be deſcribed, and I am confident " that a handful of reſolute men might baffle the attempts " of the moſt daring aſſailants: nor could any thing, in " my humble opinion, be more dangerous than to lead " a body of native troops to ſuch an attack, as I have " always underſtood that it is almoſt impoſſible to pre- " vent Sepoys from throwing away their fire, by which " means they would of courſe fall a ſacrifice."

For a further illuſtration of this ſubject, I produce copies of the plans taken by theſe two Engineers, and of their opinions at large.

Even the fulleſt inſtructions from the Select Committee, which, by the way, let me obſerve I did not receive till after the peace, did not authorize me to proceed into the hill country at all; and yet the enemy were actually entrenched between the hills.

The deſire of ſatisfying the Vizier, however, and my wiſhes of obliging thoſe whom I knew ſupported his Excellency, had prevailed on me to go much greater lengths than perhaps I ought to have done.

I had acquainted the Committee on the 17th Auguſt of the Vizier's being in poſſeſſion of *Pattergur*, &c. " the main body of the Rohillas, ſaid ſtill to conſiſt of " about forty thouſand, are penned up at *Lall Dang*, " within ſixteen coſs of us, &c."

In anſwer the Committee were pleaſed to expreſs themſelves thus:

" The ſervice being completed wherein the brigade " was engaged under your command, a repetition of " our thanks is due to you, and to the troops who " effected it."

Thus, Gentlemen, although they were adviſed of the enemy's being within ſo ſhort a diſtance of us, they again pronounced the ſervice completed.

I beg your attention to the ſituation in which the receipt of this Letter placed me.

When it came to hand I was within ſix coſs of the enemy; and let the event have been what it would, I muſt have puſhed forward if the Rohillas had perſiſted in declining the Vizier's offer.

What would have been the conſequence if the army had been repulſed or greatly thinned, which muſt have been the caſe even upon the moſt favourable ſuppoſition. Would not the above paragraph have been laid hold of to throw the whole upon my ſhoulders?

The Company would have had great reaſon to ſay, our Adminiſtration made a ſtrange bargain with the Vizier, and our Commander in Chief has been obſtinate in ſervility. Our Preſident ſtipulated, that we ſhould receive forty lacks if an agreement took place between *Sujah* and the Rohillas; we were to receive forty lacks if half the Rohilla country was conquered, and we are to receive no more for ſubduing the whole.

Our Adminiſtration declared the forty lacks to be due in May; payment was demanded early in June; and yet a ſecond expedition was undertaken, and approved of, without any regard to our intereſt, or making any new ſtipulation for our advantage.

Not content with reducing the whole country, our Commander in Chief took upon himſelf, even after the Adminiſtration had a ſecond time declared the ſervice completed, to embark in a dangerous undertaking, and, without the ſhadow of advantage to us, has precipitated our army to deſtruction, and endangered even our exiſtence in *Indoſtan*.

Such would very naturally be the language of the Gentlemen in the Direction, had their army been repelled, or had they even been victorious at the expence of a great number of lives unneceſſarily thrown away; and I muſt confeſs that I think their higheſt indignation would be moſt juſtly excited.

Suppoſing however our ſucceſs out of the queſtion, and that the Rohillas had all been cut off, what benefit would have derived—what profit to the Company?

The Adminiſtration had declared the forty lacks due in May, and they were not to reap any farther advantage; but admitting, for a moment, that the Gentlemen in *Leadenhall-ſtreet* were of ſo forgiving a diſpoſition as to overlook the neglect of the Company's intereſt, would they not be incenſed at the wanton ſacrifice of above one hundred thouſand lives?

The language of the Britiſh Senate on ſuch an occaſion would be very ſerious.

We condeſcend to admit of your keeping a military force for the preſervation of your factories and the protection of your trade; you have abuſed our indulgences, have entered into an unprovoked war, have hired out his Majeſty's ſubjects for your private emolument, and to crown all, have brought an indelible ſtain on your country by the maſſacre of an innocent people.

The Company would throw the blame upon their Adminiſtration, and theſe Gentlemen would endeavour to transfer it to the Commander in Chief.

I thank God it is out of their power: I have often ſucceſsfully fought the battles of the Company, and have acquired them riches, and to myſelf renown; I have been the aſſerter of their neglected rights; I have been mercifully diſpoſed towards a perſecuted people, and have endeavoured to alleviate the affliction of the miſerable and unhappy; I have ſtood forth for the honour of Humanity, and for the glory of my King and of my Country.

If theſe are crimes, Gentemen, permit me to ſtand condemned, and, worſe than death, let the ſentence be diſhonour: but if theſe are not crimes, let thoſe beware who have wantonly accuſed me of their being ſo.

I ſhould now, Gentlemen, offer an apology for the prolixity of this addreſs, but that would be to ſpin it out longer: I have an apology to make, but it is of a very different nature; it is for that implicit ſubmiſſion, bordering I am afraid on extreme humility, which I manifeſted towards the Vizier, and towards thoſe who ſupported him.

Military men have in this country ſtood always in a diſagreeable predicament; lorded over by every young man who could ſcrawl a waſte-book, or poſt a ledger, the ſoldier's fire was ſmothered; or, if from any Officer a ſpark of liberty broke forth, thoſe Gentlemen, grown up to Counſellors, pronounced his fate—DISMISSION.

And although ſuch a fate could not prevail on me to act in any manner inconſiſtent with honour, yet it muſt be allowed that ſuch a conſideration would weigh much with every man of prudence, who had dedicated his life to the ſervice, and had been habituated to the obedience of many orders repugnant to his own feelings.

I will not treſpaſs longer on your patience, Gentlemen: to conclude therefore,

It is an eaſy matter to accuſe, but allegations unſupported, as the Vizier's, fall of themſelves.

Conſcious that no man was ever more injuriouſly aſperſed than I have been, and ſenſible of the diſrepute into which his Excellency has irrecoverably plunged himſelf, it might perhaps be enough for me to have ſaid, I defy the ſlanderer; and it is not incumbent upon me to prove a negative.

It too frequently happens that the moſt irreproachable are thus maliciouſly accuſed; and though they

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cannot be formally condemned, yet I am afraid the generality of mankind are ſo prone to think ungenerouſly of their fellows, that innocent men often lay under the moſt unjuſt imputations: happy he, who in ſuch a ſituation can put his hand on his breaſt, and ſay, All is quiet, all is ſerenity within.

Fortunately for me, however, Gentlemen, on this occaſion, I have been able to ſtand forth; I have bearded the calumniator, and have brought ſuch a load of truth upon his back as ſhall make the burthen irkſome.

Fort William, (Signed)
30th January 1775. *A. Champion.*

Secret Conſultations, *Fort William*, 26th April 1775.

Extract of Letter from Mr. *Briſtow* to the Governor General and Council; dated 11th April 1775.

In conſequence of your commands, I have made enquiry concerning the ſurviving parts of the families of *Hafiz Rhamut* and the other Rohilla Chiefs; the encloſed account of their names and ſituation will explain every thing relative to their preſent circumſtances.

At ſeveral interviews with his Excellency I urged him to grant thoſe at *Allahabad* their freedom, and ſome certain and honourable proviſion; but as he is exceedingly jealous of them, he refuſed to do either; and ſaid, in regard to a proviſion for them, that he allowed them as much as he was able. On the Nabob's deputing *Murtehzeb Khan* to *Fyzabad*, he directed him to ſeize all the effects of the widow of *Saad ulla Khan*; I had no intelligence of it till after his departure, and then only as a report, which I did not credit, and aſked his Excellency whether it was true; he poſitively denied it. Two or three days after I was told for certain that ſuch an order had been iſſued; it then became my duty to enter into a particular explanation of the meaning of the Honourable Board in interceding for the families of the Rohilla Chiefs, which I accordingly did in a written repreſentation in the Perſian language, a copy of which I herewith encloſe. I reſpectfully deſired to be favoured with an anſwer in writing, agreeable to which I would inform the Honourable Board. I had always before this met with the politeſt treatment from his Excellency; but after he had read my repreſentation, he of a ſudden adopted a different mode of behaviour, ſaid the Engliſh wanted to releaſe his enemies, but he on his part would never conſent to it: I deſired him to conſider the matter deliberately, and then reply, for I was perſuaded the Honourable Board would liſten to his reaſons with great willingneſs, and be happy on all occaſions of ſhewing their regard for him. In the courſe of the converſation his Excellency obſerved, that unleſs he ſhould conceive it for his intereſt, he would never comply with any propoſal, or inſert any condition in the new Treaty not ſpecified in the former ones ſubſiſting with his late father, in which no mention was made of granting freedom to the families of the Rohilla Chiefs, and conſequently no obligation on him to do it.

In regard to the new Treaty, *Murtehzeb Khan* has ſo much influence with his maſter, that I had determined to wait until his return before I made any propoſals; indeed the Nabob had himſelf requeſted it of me; and, excepting when he ſtarted the ſubject, I have never mentioned it; and then only to communicate ſuch matters as were neceſſary, and the Honourable Board directed.

Though his Excellency both denied his having ordered the effects of the widow of *Saad ulla Khan* to be ſeized, and promiſed me it ſhould not be done, yet he had directed it, and there was really at one time guards placed upon her houſe: as a proof I encloſe the Extract of a Letter from *Fyzabad*, aſſerting the fact, and can aſſure the Honourable Board that it has been confirmed by intelligence through other channels. Finding from this circumſtance that his Excellency had only trifled with me, I took the method of a written repreſentation, hoping that he would be more cautious in a reply under his hand, which could not be afterwards contradicted. Notwithſtanding his Excellency was ſo diſſatisfied at my requeſt, yet I hope my conduct will meet with the approbation of the Honourable Board.

On my receiving certain intelligence of the effects of the widow of *Saad ulla Khan* being ſeized, I repreſented it to the Nabob, but did not preſume to reproach him with a breach of promiſe; I only requeſted his performance of it, and I got him to countermand the order.

When I have come to treat of matters of real conſequence with his Excellency, he has not latterly ſhewn that readineſs which I had reaſon to expect; however, as *Murtehzeb Khan* will be back in the courſe of ſeven or eight days, I ſhall not delay in writing the Honourable Board with certainty of the event of my negociations on the ſubject of the new Treaty. Regarding the Nabob's ſituation, I have only to repeat what I have before obſerved, that the ſame diſcontents ſtill prevail, and if ever he will be induced to comply with the Company's propoſals, it muſt be at the preſent juncture. The Nabob appears doubtful of the extent of the truſt repoſed in me; and, by what I can learn from intelligent men about the Court, it is the general opinion, that until he ſhall receive an explanation of it, he will not pay that attention to my repreſentations which he otherwiſe would: for inſtance, he has in my converſations with him repeatedly quoted the words of my credentials, mentioning "the intercourſe that had ſubſiſted between "his late father and the Company," which he interprets into a ſimple confirmation of the old Treaties, and wants to extend it to the guarantee of all his dominions: in order to obviate a poſſibility of miſtake, I ſhall particularly explain this point in writing.

When I reminded his Excellency about anſwering my repreſentation relative to the families of the Rohilla Chiefs, he ſaid he had done it in a Letter to the Honourable the Governor General.

I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) *J. Briſtow*,
Reſident at the Court of the Nabob of *Oude*.

Account of the names and ſituation of the ſurviving parts of the families of *Hafiz Rhamut* and the other Rohilla Chiefs.

Hafiz Rhamut left twelve ſons and nine daughters. Three of the ſons, named *Irradut Khan*, *Mohubbut Khan*, and *Zolefekkar Khan*, are in camp. The firſt, being the eldeſt, had three hundred rupees a month ſettled on him by the late Vizier, which has been regularly paid him: he was countenanced by *Sellar Jung*, and in hopes of obtaining by his influence a Roſſala and ſome lands; but as affairs are at preſent ſituated, there is little chance of his ſucceeding. The ſecond had one thouſand rupees a month ſettled on him, but it has never been paid; and the third had an allowance of ten or fifteen rupees a day, which is now diſcontinued. The remaining nine ſons, his daughters, ſeventeen of his women, ſeven of the wives of his ſons, and one of the late *Emrayut Khan*, who was his eldeſt ſon, together with ſome of his diſtant relations, and the dependants of the family, to the number of four hundred perſons, are all in confinement at *Allahabad*.

Doondy Khan left three ſons, named *Mahub ulla Khan*, *Fitte ulla Khan*, and *Azim ulla Khan*. They, their wives, together with the widows of *Doondy Khan*, and many of the relations of the family, to the number of two hundred perſons, are all confined at *Allahabad*.

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Serdar Khan left ſeven ſons, named *Aſ ud Khan, Mahomed Khan, Saadut Khan, Mahaabut Khan, Rehmaan Khan, Hubbiib Khan*, and *Azim Khan*, all of whom, excepting *Saadut Khan*, who is at liberty in this camp, are with *Zabita Khan*.

Fitte Khan left ſix ſons, all of whom are with *Fyzoolla Khan*; but they, like the reſt who were releaſed, have had no allowances made them by the Nabob.

A wife of *Fitte Khan*, and two wives of his ſons, with their dependants and ſervants, to the number of forty-four perſons, are in confinement at *Allahabad*.

Beſides thoſe above-mentioned, there is the ſon of *Abdut Jebnar Khan*, who married a daughter of *Doondy Khan*, and many Roſſalladars and other Rohillas, of whom the late Vizier was jealous, in confinement at *Allahabad:* the whole number may amount to one thouſand, for the ſupport of whom the Nabob told me he had allowed two hundred rupees a day; but it is not regularly paid them, for I underſtand they hardly get two-thirds of it.

The widow and family of *Saad ulla Khan* are at *Fyzabad*, to the number of two hundred perſons.

(Signed) *John Briſtow.*

The End of The SEVENTH VOLUME.

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